LegEth 2020 Outline

Far Eastern University
Institute of Law
Basic Legal Ethics
2nd Semester, Schoolyear 2019-20
Part I. Legal Ethics

I – Preliminaries
A. Sources of Ethical Standards for Members of the Bench
and Bar:
Gacias v. Balauitan (507 SCRA 8, 2006): There is no distinction

between the personal life of the lawyer and his life as a lawyer.
B. The Attorney’s Oath (Rules of Court, Form 28)
Alawi v. Alauya, A.M. SDC-97-2-P, February 24, 1997: Only

individuals who successful passed the bar examinations and
are considered full-fledged lawyers can use the prefix “Atty.”
The Four-fold duty of a lawyer under the Attorney’s Oath:
C. Different Roles of a Lawyer

1. Attorneys-at Law: vis-a vis Attorney-in-Fact
2. Counsel de officio
3. Attorney Ad Hoc
4. Attorney of Record
5. Of Counsel
6. Lead Counsel
7. House Counsel
8. Amicus Curiae
9. Amicus Curiae par Excellence
10. Counsel de parte
11. Pro bono Counsel
12. Advocate
13. Barrister
14. Solicitor
15. Proctor
II. Practice of Law
A. Concept:
Cayetano v. Monsod (201 SCRA 210): Practice of law under

modem conditions consists in no small part of work performed
outside of any court and having no immediate relation to
proceedings in court. It embraces conveyancing, the giving of
legal advice on a large variety of subjects, and the preparation
and execution of legal instruments covering an extensive field
of business and trust relations and other affairs.
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Lim-Santiago v. Atty. Sagucio, A.C. No. 6705 (31 March 2006):
The act of being a legal consultant is a practice of law. To
engage in the practice of law is to do any of those acts that are
characteristic of the legal profession (In re: David, 93 Phil.
461). It covers any activity, in or out of court, which required
the application of law, legal principles, practice or procedures
and calls for legal knowledge, training and experience.
Paguia v. Office of the President (621 SCRA 600): Petitioner’s

suspension from the practice of law bars him from performing
"any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application
of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience."
Certainly, preparing a petition raising carefully crafted
arguments on equal protection grounds and employing highly
legalistic rules of statutory construction to parse Section 23 of
RA 7157 falls within the proscribed conduct.
Natanauan v. Atty. Tolentino, A.C. No. 4269 (11 October 2016):

The practice of law is neither a natural nor a constitutional
right but a privilege bestowed by the State only upon the
deserving and worthy for conferment of such privilege.
Sps. Eustaquio v. Atty. Navales, A.C. No. 10465 (8 June 2016:

It is settled that the Court has the exclusive jurisdiction to
regulate the practice of law. As such, when the Court orders a
lawyer suspended from the practice of law, he must desist
from performing all functions requiring the application of legal
knowledge within the period of suspension. This includes
desisting from holding a position in government requiring the
authority to practice law
B. The elements of the legal profession

C. Legal Profession is not a business. The practice of law
includes:
Ulep v. The Legal Clinic, Inc., (Bar Matter No. 550, June 17,
1993): The practice of law cannot be pursued through a stock
corporation and a lawyer should not allow non-lawyers to
render legal matters.
III. Requirements for Admission to the Practice of Law
A. Educational Qualifications
Republic Act No. 7662 (1993)
RULES OF COURT, Rule 138, Sec. 6.
In the Matter of the Petition for Disbarment of Telesforo A. Diao,
A.C. No. 244 (29 March 1963): A bar passer who does not
possess any pre-law degree cannot be allowed membership in
the legal profession.
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Patrick A. Caronan v. Richard A. Caronan a.k.a. “Atty. Patrick
A. Caronan,” A.C. No. 11316 (12 July 2016): A bar passer who
assumes the identity of another and based on this identity
also uses the Transcript of Records of that person to obtain
admission to a college of law is not considered a candidate for
admission to the practice of law for gross misrepresentation.
The Court ordered his name stricken off from the Roll of
Attorneys and he was perpetually barred from admission to
the bar.
B. Citizenship and Residency

Article XII, Sec. 14, Constitution
In Re: Vicente Ching, BAR MATTER No. 914 October 1, 1999: A

claim of Philippine citizenship must be done within a
reasonable period of time upon reaching the age of majority.
Dacanay v. Baker & McKenzie, et al., A.C. No. 2131 (10 May
1985): An American law firm cannot be allowed to practice law
in the Philippines.
C. Bar Examinations
RULES OF COURT, Rule 138, Sec. 7-16
Bar Subjects (Sec. 9, Rule 138, Rules of Court): Political
Law, Labor and Social Legislation, Civil Law, Taxation,
Mercantile Law, Criminal Law, Remedial Law and Legal and
Judicial Ethics and Practical Exercises
Academic Credentials
Aguirre v. Rana, B.M. No. 1036 (10 June 2003): A bar passer
who engages in the practice of law before taking his oath was
no longer allowed by the Court to become a full-fledged lawyer.
D. Good Moral Character

Figueroa v. Barranco, SBC Case No. 519 (31 July 1997): After
27 years, a bar passer was allowed to take his oath as a lawyer
upon proof of good moral character.
Re: Petition of Al Argosino to Take the Lawyer’s Oath, B.M. No.

712 (19 March 1997): A person convicted of homicide based on
a plea agreement was eventually allowed to take his oath as a
lawyer upon proof of good moral character.
Good moral character is a continuing requirement.

Purisima Barba v. Hector Pedro (1956 bar passer), A.C. No.
545-SBC. December 26, 1974: A bar passer was not allowed to
take his oath for lack of good moral character.
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Mecaral v. Velasquez (A.C. No 8392 June 29, 2010): A lawyer
who detained his office staff for a substantial period of time
and considered her as his”sex slave” was disbarred.
Cordon v. Balicanta (390 SCRA 299 (2002): A lawyer who used

his knowledge of the law to effectively defraud his client of the
estate of her husband was disbarred.
Arellano University, Inc. v. Mijares III, (605 SCRA 93, 2009): A

lawyer who solicited money from his client which he disclosed
was used as a “facilitation fee” to bribe a public officer was
ordered disbarred by the Court.
Zaguirre v. Atty. Castillo, A.C. No. 4921. March 6, 2003: A bar

passer was suspended indefinitely for misrepresentation of his
civil status.
Patricia Figueroa v. Simeon Barranco, Jr. (1970 bar passer),

SBC Case No. 519 July 31, 1997: A bar passer was allowed to
take his oath after more than 25 years.
E. Oath-Taking
F. Signing of the Roll of Attorneys

In re: Petition to Sign in the Roll of Attorneys, Michael O.

Medado, B.M. No. 2540 (24 September 2013): A lawyer who
asked the Court to sign the Roll of Attorneys 32 years after
passing the bar was fined P32,000.00 and suspended from the
practice of law for a period of one year.
G. Membership in the Integrated Bar of the Philippines

REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6397 (1971)
In the Matter of the Integration of the Bar of the Philippines (9

January 1973): The Court ordered the organization of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines to ensure that lawyers are
reminded of their role of officers of the Court and as such, they
instruments in the administration of justice.
In the Matter of the Inquiry into the 1989 Elections of the

Integrated Bar of the Philippines, A.M. No. 491, October 6, 1989:
The Court decried the use of government resources in the
election of officers in the IBP. The Court nullified the election
of Atty. Violeta C. Drilon and appointed Atty. Eugene Tan in
her stead. The Court assigned a member of the Supreme Court
to closely monitor the activities of the IBP.
In the Matter of the Brewing Controversies in the Elections of

the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, A.M. No. 09-5-2-SC, April
11, 2013: The Court reiterated the rule on rotational
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assumption of leadership in the IBP. The Court cautioned the
officers of the IBP for making the Court the “referee” of its
intramurals.
In Re JOAQUIN T. BORROMEO, Ex Rel. Cebu City Chapter of

the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, A.M. No. 93-7-696-0
February 21, 1995: Unknown to the Court and to IBP,
Borromeo was engaged in the practice of law without being a
member of the IBP. For some sixteen (16) years from 1978 to
1995, he had been instituting and prosecuting legal
proceedings in various courts, dogmatically pontificating on
errors supposedly committed by the courts, including the
Supreme Court. The Court found Borromeo guilty of contempt,
for abuse of and interference with judicial rules and processes,
gross disrespect to courts and judges and improper conduct
directly impeding, obstructing and degrading the
administration of justice.
New Schedule of Membership Fees:

Annual fee had been adjusted to P2000.00.
Effective January 2019, the new IBP lifetime membership of
P25,000.00 may only be availed of after meeting the following
requirements:
a. One must be a member in good standing;
b. One had at least ten (10) years continuous membership in the
IBP;
c. One should have attended at least five (5) conventions of the
IBP, either national or regional, or combination thereof; and
d. One must have rendered at least One Hundred Twenty (120)
hours of free legal aid service with the IBP.
The application for life membership shall be approved by the

National President upon favorable recommendation by the National
Secretary, National Treasurer, and the Director of the National
Center for Legal Aid (NCLA) and a clearance of no pending case from
the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD).
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 181 (1973)

In re: Atty. Edrillon, A.M. No. 1928 (3 August 1978): The
membership in the IBP is a constitutionally-mandated duty.
Payment of IBP dues is mandatory.
Santos v. Atty. Llamas, A.M. No. 4749 (20 January 2000): The
payment of IBP dues is an obligation imposed on all lawyers.
There is no legal basis to grant discount to lawyers who have
reached the age of 60 years old.
IV. Non-lawyers Authorized to Appear in Court
A. A.M. No. 19-03-24-SC Rule 138-A Law Student Practice,

otherwise known as the Revised Law Student Practice Rule
(Revised Rule).
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A salient feature of the Revised Rule is that a law student must
be certified to engage in the limited practice of law.
Limited Practice of Law:

The Rule covers the limited practice of law by students certified
under the Clinical Legal Education Program (CLEP) of the law
school, to include among others, the following:
a. Appearances;
b. Drafting and submission of pleadings and documents before
trial and appellate courts and quasi-judicial and
administrative bodies;
c. Assistance in mediation, legal counseling and advice; and
d. Others mentioned under Section 1.
Graduated Certifications:
The Rule requires that law students, before engaging in practice of

law via the Clinical Legal Education Program (CLEP), must first
apply for and secure the following:
a. Level 1 Certification for those who have completed the 1st
year; and/or
b. Level 2 Certification for those who are currently enrolled in
their third year, second Semester under Section 3.
The basic distinction between the two levels involve the

minimum academic requirement the law student has
successfully completed: for Level 1 Certification – first-year law
courses, while for Level 2 Certification – third-year law
courses.
Section 4 enumerates the areas of law student-practitioners can

engage in accordance with their certification. Under the revised
rules, those in Level 1 may give legal advice to clients, draft legal
documents, and provide legal public orientations, among others.
Those in Level 2 can perform all activities under Level 1, assist in
the taking of sworn evidence and prepare judicial affidavits of
witnesses, appear on behalf of the client at any stage of trial, among
other tasks that are subject to approval of the supervising lawyer.
Level 1 is valid before all courts, quasi-judicial and administrative
bodies within the judicial region where the law school is located
while Level 2 is valid before all courts, quasi-judicial and
administrative bodies.
Section 5 enumerates the requirements for certification application,

which include among others, a duly-accomplished application form
under oath in three copies accompanied by proof of payment of the
necessary legal and filing fees. It also distinguishes where each level
certification is valid. Level 1 is valid before all courts, quasi-judicial
and administrative bodies within the judicial region where the law
school is located, whereas Level 2 is valid before all courts, quasi-
judicial and administrative bodies.
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Section 6 enumerates the duties of a law student-practitioner.
Certified students are bound by the Code of Professional
Responsibility and must take a modified “Lawyer’s Oath.”
Section 7 is the counterpart of the lawyer's signature provision

under the Rules of Court. A law student practitioner may sign
briefs, pleadings, letters and other similar documents under the
direction of the supervising lawyer and indicating his/her
practitioner's certificate number.
Section 9 enumerates the duties of law schools, one of which is to

develop and maintain a legal clinic.
> Under Section 34 of the Rules of Court, a law student may appear
before the first level court as an agent or friend of a party without
the supervision of a member of the bar.
RULES OF COURT, Rule 116, Sec. 7: Appointment of counsel de

oficio. — The court, considering the gravity of the offense and the
difficulty of the questions that may arise, shall appoint as counsel
de oficio only such members of the bar in good standing who, by
reason of their experience and ability, can competently defend the
accused. But in localities where such members of the bar are not
available, the court may appoint any person, resident of the
province and of good repute for probity and ability, to defend the
accused.
LABOR CODE, Art. 222 – Non-lawyers can appear in NLRC cases if

they appear for themselves or they represent their organization or
members thereof.
ACT NO. 2259, Sec. 9: Any person claiming any interest in any part
of the lands, whether named in the notice or not, shall appear
before the Court by himself, or by some person in his behalf and
shall file an answer on or before the return day or within such
further time as may be allowed by the Court.
A.M. No. 08-8-7-SC, Sec. 17 (1 February 2016): Section 17.

Appearance of Attorneys Not Allowed. - No attorney shall appear in
behalf of or represent a party at the hearing, unless the attorney is
the plaintiff or defendant.
If the court determines that a party cannot properly present his/her
claim or defense and needs assistance, the court may, in its
discretion, allow another individual who is not an attorney to assist
that party upon the latter's consent.
B. Proceedings where lawyers are prohibited from appearing:

proceedings before the Lupong Tagapamayapa and court
ordered mediation
C. Sanctions for practice or appearance without authority
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1. Lawyers without authority: Contempt of Court (Sec. 1, Rule
71)
Acts constituting contempt: Misbehavior as an officer of the

court, disobedience or resistance to a lawful order of the court,
abuse or unlawful interference with judicial proceedings,
obstruction in the administration of justice, misleading the
court or making false allegations, criticisms, insults or veiled
threats against the court, aiding in the unauthorized practice
of law, unlawful retention of clients, advising a client to commit
a contemptuous act, publications which tend to impede,
obstruct, embarrass or influence courts.
2. Persons who are not lawyers: Indirect Contempt (Sec. 3

(e), Rule 71)
Ciocon-Reer v. Lubao, 674 SCRA 13: Not all administrative

complaints against judges merit a corresponding penalty. In
the absence of fraud, dishonesty or corruption, the acts of a
judge in his judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary
action. The Court held that the remedy of the complainants in
this case is judicial in nature.
The Court held that Karaan was engaged in unauthorized
practice of law. The OCA was able to establish the pattern in
Karaan’s unauthorized practice of law. He would require the
parties to execute a special power of attorney in his favor to
allow him to join them as one of the plaintiffs as their
attorney-in-fact. Then, he would file the necessary complaint
and other pleadings "acting for and in his own behalf and as
attorney-in-fact, agent or representative" of the parties. The
fact that Karaan did not indicate in the pleadings that he was
a member of the Bar, or any PTR, Attorney’s Roll, or MCLE
Compliance Number does not detract from the fact that, by his
actions, he was actually engaged in the practice of law.
V. Prohibitions and Restrictions on the Private Practice of Law

by Public Officials
A. Prohibitions
● CONSTITUTION, Art. VII, Sec. 13 – Executive Branch
● CONSTITUTION, Art. IX (A), Sec. 2 – Constitutional
Commissions
● CONSTITUTION, Art. XI, Sec. 8 – Office of the Ombudsman
● LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE, Sec. 90, par. (a) – Governors,
Mayors
● RULES OF COURT, Rule 138, Sec. 35: Certain attorneys not to
practice. — No judge or other official or employee of the
superior courts or of the Office of the Solicitor General, shall
engage in private practice as a member of the bar or give
professional advice to clients.
B. Restrictions
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● CONSTITUTION, Art. VI, Sec. 14 – Members of the Senate and
the House of Representatives
● LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE, Sec. 90, par. (b) – Vice-

Governors and members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan,
Vice-Mayors and councilors, barangay elective officials
● REPUBLIC ACT NO. 910 (1953): AN TO PROVIDE FOR THE

RETIREMENT OF JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT
AND OF THE COURT OF APPEALS, FOR THE
ENFORCEMENT OF THE PROVISIONS HEREOF BY THE
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, AND TO
REPEAL COMMONWEALTH ACT NUMBERED FIVE
HUNDRED AND THIRTY-SIX
“Section1: x x x It is a condition of the pension provided for
herein that no retiring Justice during the time that he is
receiving said pension shall appear as counsel before any
court in any civil case wherein the Government or any
subdivision or instrumentality thereof is the adverse party, or
in any criminal case wherein and officer or employee of the
Government is accused of an offense committed in relation to
his office, or collect any fee for his appearance in any
administrative proceedings to maintain an interest adverse to
the Government, insular, provincial or municipal, or to any of
its legally constituted officers.”
VI. THE CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
A. The Lawyer and Society

Canon 1 – A lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws
of the land, and promote respect for law and legal processes.
Rule 1.01. Shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral,
deceitful conduct
Ecraela v. Pangalangan, A.C. No. 10676 (8 September 2015):

The Court found disbarred Atty. Ian Raymond A. Pangalangan
for his illicit relations, chronic womanizing, abuse of authority
as an educator, and "other unscrupulous activities" which
cause "undue embarrassment to the legal profession." Such
actions constituted deceit, malpractice, gross misconduct and
grossly immoral conduct in violation of the Lawyer's Oath.
Reyes v. Atty. Nieva, A.C. No. 8560 (6 September 2016): A

lawyer was suspended for inappropriate conduct with a staff
who undergoing an OJT program at CAAP. The Court
suspended Nieva for two years for sexual harassment which
exhibited his immoral conduct. The Court said that good
moral conduct requirement has four (4) ostensible purposes,
namely: (a) to protect the public; (b) to protect the public
image of lawyers; (c) to protect prospective clients; and (d) to
protect errant lawyers from themselves.
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Sebastian v. Atty. Calis, A.C. No. 5118 (9 September 1999): A
lawyer was disbarred by the Court for allowing a client to
travel on a fraudulent travel document. The Court disbarred
respondent for jeopardizing the life and liberty of complainant
when he made her travel with spurious documents. Not only
are respondent’s acts illegal, they are also detestable from the
moral point of view. His utter lack of moral qualms and
scruples is a real threat to the Bar and the administration of
justice.
Rule 1.02. Shall not counsel defiance of the law
Fernando Chu v. Atty. Guico, Jr., A.C. No. 10573(13 January

2015): Lawyer who made a client believe that with
P580,000.00, he can secure a favorable judgment was ordered
is barred.
Rule 1.03. Shall not encourage corruptly motivated suit, or delay

any man’s cause
Linsangan v. Atty. Tolentino, A.C. No. 6672 (4 September

2009): A lawyer who enticed seafarers to transfer
representation to his law office by extending financial
assistance of P50,000.00 to each of them was suspended by
the Court.
Rule 1.04. Shall encourage client to avoid or end controversy
Canon 2 - A lawyer shall make his legal services available in an

efficient and convenient manner compatible with the
independence, integrity, and effectiveness of the profession.
Rule 2.01 – Shall not reject the cause of the defenseless or

oppressed
Rule 2.02 - Shall not refuse to render legal advice
Rule 2.03 – Shall not solicit legal business
Ulep v. Legal Clinic, Inc., B.M. No. 553 (7 June 1993): The
practice of law cannot be done through a stock corporation.
Rule 2.04 – Shall not charge rates lower than customary
Canon 3 - A lawyer in making known his legal services shall use

only true, honest, fair, dignified, and objective information or
statement of facts.
Rule 3.01 – Shall not use false or unfair claims on his qualifications
Ulep v. Legal Clinic, Inc., supra.
Rule 3.02 – Shall not use false, misleading, or assumed firm name
Petition for Authority to Continue Use of the Firm Name "Sycip,

Salazar, Feliciano, Hernandez & Castillo," et al., (30 July 1979):
There is no prohibition in the continued use of the name of a
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deceased partner provided there is no deception. There must
be an indication that the partner is already deceased.
Rule 3.03Rule 3.03 – Withdrawal of partners accepting public office
Rule 3.04 – Shall not use media to attract legal business
Cruz v Salva, G.R. No. L-12871 (25 July 1959): The Court will
not countenance the resort to media in order to win public
opinion. (See more detailed discussion found in the other
section of the course outline.)
Canon 4 - A lawyer shall participate in the development of the

legal system by initiating or supporting efforts in law reform
and in the improvement of the administration of justice.
Canon 5 - A lawyer shall keep abreast of legal developments,

participate in continuing legal education programs, support
efforts to achieve high standards in law schools as well as in
the practical training of law students, and assist in
disseminating the law and jurisprudence.
Bar Matter No. 850 (Re: Rules on Mandatory Continuing Legal

Education for Active Members of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, see also Resolution of the Court dated 17
February 2015)
Bar Matter No. 1922 (Re: Recommendation of the Mandatory

Continuing Legal Education [MCLE] Board to Indicate in All
Pleadings Filed with the Courts the Counsel's MCLE
Certificate of Compliance or Certificate of Exemption); see also
Resolution of the Court dated 14 January 2014
Arnado v. Atty. Adaza, A.C. No. 9834 (26 August 2015): The
Court held that respondent had been remiss in his
responsibilities by failing to comply with Bar Matter No. 850.
His application for exemption for the First and Second
Compliance Periods was filed after the compliance periods had
ended. He did not follow-up the status of his application for
exemption. The Court issued the following directives:
(1) REMIND the Mandatory Continuing Legal Education Office
to promptly act on matters that require its immediate
attention, such as but not limited to applications for
exemptions, and to communicate its action to the interested
parties within a reasonable period;
(2) DENY the prayer of Atty. Adaza to be exempted from MCLE
compliance as the matter had already been denied with finality
by the MCLE Governing Board on 28 November 2013;
(3) DECLARE Atty. Adaza as a delinquent member of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and SUSPEND him from the
practice of law for SIX MONTHS, or until he has fully
complied with the MCLE requirements for the First, Second,
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Third, and Fourth Compliance Periods, whichever is later, and
he has fully paid the required non-compliance and
reinstatement fees.
People v. Arrojado, G.R. No. 207041 (9 November 2015):

Accused moved for dismissal of the case for failure of the
Prosecutor to indicate her MCLE Compliance Certificate
Number. The Prosecutor contends that: (1) the term
"pleadings" as used in B.M. No. 1922 does not include
criminal Informations filed in court; (2) the failure of the
investigating prosecutor to indicate in the Information the
number and date of issue of her MCLE Certificate of
Compliance is a mere formal defect and is not a valid ground
to dismiss the subject Information which is otherwise complete
in form and substance. The Court dismissed the case against
Arrojado for failure of the Prosecutor to comply with B.M.
Matter 850.
Sanchez v. Atty. Aguilos, A.C. No. 10543 (16 March 2016): The
respondent misrepresented his professional competence and
skill to the complainant. He did not know the distinction
between the grounds for legal separation and for annulment of
marriage. The case unquestionably contemplated by the
parties and for which his services was engaged, was no other
than an action for annulment of the complainant's marriage
with her husband with the intention of marrying her British
fiance. They did not contemplate legal separation at all, for
legal separation would still render her incapacitated to re-
marry.
The respondent shall be fined in the amount of P10,000.00 for

his misrepresentation of his professional competence, and he
is further to be ordered to return the entire amount of
P70,000.00 received from the client, plus legal interest of
6% per annum reckoned from the date of this decision until
full payment.
The respondent's statement in his answer that the demand

from Atty. Martinez should be treated "as a mere scrap of
paper or should have been addressed by her counsel x x x to
the urinal project of the MMDA where it may service its
rightful purpose" constituted simple misconduct that this
Court cannot tolerate. For this, he was reprimanded by the
Court.
Canon 6 - These canons shall apply to lawyers in government

services in the discharge of their tasks.
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7613 (1989), Sec. 4 provides for the Norms of
Conduct of Public Officials and Employees. - (A) Every public official
and employee shall observe the following as standards of personal
conduct in the discharge and execution of official duties:
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a. Commitment to public interest. - Public officials and
employees shall always uphold the public interest over and
above personal interest. All government resources and powers
of their respective offices must be employed and used
efficiently, effectively, honestly and economically, particularly
to avoid wastage in public funds and revenues.
b. Professionalism. - Public officials and employees shall perform
and discharge their duties with the highest degree of
excellence, professionalism, intelligence and skill. They shall
enter public service with utmost devotion and dedication to
duty. They shall endeavor to discourage wrong perceptions of
their roles as dispensers or peddlers of undue patronage.
c. Justness and sincerity. - Public officials and employees shall
remain true to the people at all times. They must act with
justness and sincerity and shall not discriminate against
anyone, especially the poor and the underprivileged. They
shall at all times respect the rights of others, and shall refrain
from doing acts contrary to law, good morals, good customs,
public policy, public order, public safety and public interest.
They shall not dispense or extend undue favors on account of
their office to their relatives whether by consanguinity or
affinity except with respect to appointments of such relatives
to positions considered strictly confidential or as members of
their personal staff whose terms are coterminous with theirs.
d. Political neutrality. - Public officials and employees shall
provide service to everyone without unfair discrimination and
regardless of party affiliation or preference.
e. Responsiveness to the public. - Public officials and employees
shall extend prompt, courteous, and adequate service to the
public. Unless otherwise provided by law or when required by
the public interest, public officials and employees shall provide
information of their policies and procedures in clear and
understandable language, ensure openness of information,
public consultations and hearings whenever appropriate,
encourage suggestions, simplify and systematize policy, rules
and procedures, avoid red tape and develop an understanding
and appreciation of the socio-economic conditions prevailing
in the country, especially in the depressed rural and urban
areas.
f. Nationalism and patriotism. - Public officials and employees
shall at all times be loyal to the Republic and to the Filipino
people, promote the use of locally produced goods, resources
and technology and encourage appreciation and pride of
country and people. They shall endeavor to maintain and
defend Philippine sovereignty against foreign intrusion.
g. Commitment to democracy. - Public officials and employees
shall commit themselves to the democratic way of life and
values, maintain the principle of public accountability, and
manifest by deeds the supremacy of civilian authority over the
military. They shall at all times uphold the Constitution and
put loyalty to country above loyalty to persons or party.
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h. Simple living. - Public officials and employees and their
families shall lead modest lives appropriate to their positions
and income. They shall not indulge in extravagant or
ostentatious display of wealth in any form.
Lorenzana v. Fajardo (462 SCRA 1): For accepting employment

as a member of the PLEB of Quezon City while concurrently
employed as Legal Officer V of the Manila Urban Settlement
Office, in violation of the Constitution and the statutes, which
in turn contravene his Attorneys Oath and Code of
Professional Responsibility; and by engaging in the illegal
practice of law, Atty. Cesar G. Fajardo was SUSPENDED from
the practice of law for a period of six (6) months effective from
notice and is REPRIMANDED and WARNED that any
repetition of similar acts would be dealt with more severely.
Facturan v. Prosecutor Barcelona, Jr., A.C. No. 11069, (8 June

2016): Generally, a lawyer who holds a government office may
not be disciplined as a member of the Bar for misconduct in
the discharge of his duties as a government official. Rule 6.02
of Canon 6 is particularly directed to lawyers in the
government service, enjoining them from using one's public
position to: (1) promote private interests; (2) advance private
interests; or (3) allow private interests to interfere with public
duties.
Respondent Prosecutor Barcelona, Jr. was found GUILTY of
violating Rule 6.02, Canon 6 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. He is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of
law for a period of one (1) year, effective upon his receipt of
this Decision, and is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of
the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
Florencio v. Atty. Mayor, A.C. No. 7314 (25 August 2015): The
Court found as unacceptable the respondent’s gross delay in
performing what is supposedly a purely ministerial act on his
part, his unexplained and unsanctioned resort to "archiving"
which led to the disappearance of the case records, and his
gross ignorance of the law in refusing to issue a writ of
execution against what the SEC has essentially certified to be
a company hiding under a new name. The respondent's
actions were not a product of ignorance, indolence, or
negligence, but rather, were clearly borne out of a willful,
deliberate, and wholly malicious intent to misuse his position
by favoring one of the parties thus causing no small degree of
serious injury to the complainant therein and to the integrity
of the legal process as a whole.
The Court held ATTY. MAYOR, JR. guilty of grave misconduct

and gross ignorance of the law in violation of the Lawyer's
Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility rendering
him unworthy of continuing membership in the legal
profession. He is thus ordered DISBARRED from the practice
14 | P a g e
of law and his name is stricken off the Roll of Attorneys,
effective immediately.
Rule 6.01 – Primary duty of public prosecutor is not to convict to

see that justice is done. A prosecutor violates this duty when he
suppresses evidence and conceals a witness to allow the accused to
establish his innocence.
Cuenca v. CA, G.R. No. 109870 (1 December 1995): The

Solicitor General himself recommends that petitioner be
entitled to a new trial, proceeding from the same impression
that a certain Rodolfo Cuenca’s (petitioner’s brother) sworn
statement is an admission against interest which may
ultimately exonerate petitioner from criminal liability. Citing
Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78 (1935), the Court said
that prosecutors represent a sovereign ‘whose obligation to
govern impartially is compelling as its obligation to govern at
all; and whose interest, therefore in a criminal prosecution is
not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done.
Rule 6.02 – Shall not use public position to advance private

interests
Rule 3.03 – Withdrawal of partners accepting public office
Samonte v. Gatdula, A.M. No. P-99-1292 (26 February 1999):

Respondent did not categorically deny why his name is
included in the Law Firm of Baligod, Gatdula, Tacardon,
Dimailig and Celera. This may be considered as an admission
that it is his name which appears on the calling card, a
permissible form of advertising or solicitation of legal
services. The card clearly gives the impression that he is
connected with the said law firm. The inclusion/retention of
his name in the professional card constitutes an act of
solicitation which violates Section 7 sub-par. (b) (2) of Republic
Act No. 6713, otherwise known as "Code of Conduct and
Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees" which
declares it unlawful for a public official or employee to, among
others, engage in the private practice of their profession unless
authorized by the Constitution or law. Atty. Gatdula was
reprimanded by the Court.
Rule 3.04 – Shall not use media to attract legal business
Cruz v Salva, G.R. No. L-12871 (25 July 1959): According to

the petitioner and not denied by the respondent, the
investigation was conducted not in respondent's office but in
the session hall of the Municipal Court of Pasay City evidently,
to accommodate the big crowd that wanted to witness the
proceeding, including members of the press. Not only this, but
in the course of the investigation, as shown by the transcript
of the stenographic notes taken during said investigation, on
15 | P a g e
two occasions, the first, after Oscar Caymo had concluded his
testimony respondent Salva, addressing the newspapermen
said, "Gentlemen of the press, if you want to ask questions I
am willing to let you do so and the question asked will be
reproduced as my own"; and the second, after Jose Maratella y
de Guzman had finished testifying and respondent Salva,
addressing the newsmen, again said, "Gentlemen of the press
is free to ask questions as ours."
The members of Court were greatly disturbed and annoyed by

such publicity and sensationalism, all of which may properly
be laid at the door of respondent Salva. In this, he committed
what was regard a grievous error and poor judgment for which
we fail to find any excuse or satisfactory explanation. His
actuations in this regard went well beyond the bounds of
prudence, discretion and good taste. It is bad enough to have
such undue publicity when a criminal case is being
investigated by the authorities, even when it being tried in
court; but when said publicity and sensationalism is allowed,
even encouraged, when the case is on appeal and is pending
consideration by this Tribunal, the whole thing becomes
inexcusable, even abhorrent, and this Court, in the interest of
justice, is constrained and called upon to put an end to it and
a deterrent against its repetition by meting an appropriate
disciplinary measure, even a penalty to the one liable.
The Court Francisco publicly reprehended and censured
Salva for the uncalled for and wide publicity and
sensationalism that he had given to and allowed in connection
with his investigation, which it considered and found to be
contempt of court; and, furthermore, he is warned that a
repetition of the same would meet with a more severe
disciplinary action and penalty.
Rule 6.03 – Shall not accept engagement/employment in any

matter he had intervened in while in public service
R.A. NO. 7613 (1989), sec. 7, par. (b).
R. A. NO. 3019 (1960), sec. 3, par. (d).
Cases:
Huyssen v. Atty. Gutierrez, A.C. No. 6707, (24 March 2006):
The Court said that the respondent’s act of asking money from
complainant in consideration of the latter’s pending
application for visas is violative of Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which prohibits members of the
Bar from engaging or participating in any unlawful, dishonest,
or deceitful acts. Moreover, said acts constitute a breach of
Rule 6.02 of the Code which bars lawyers in government
service from promoting their private interest. Promotion of
private interest includes soliciting gifts or anything of
monetary value in any transaction requiring the approval of
16 | P a g e
his office or which may be affected by the functions of his
office. Respondent’s conduct in office betrays the integrity and
good moral character required from all lawyers, especially from
one occupying a high public office.
Atty. Gutierrez was DISBARRED from the practice of law and
ordered to return the amount he received from the
complainant with legal interest from his receipt of the money
until payment. The case was referred to the Office of the
Ombudsman for criminal prosecution for violation of Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Acts and to the Department of
Justice for appropriate administrative action.
PNB v. Atty. Cedo, A.C. No. 3701 (28 March 1995): The IBP
found a deliberate intent on the part of respondent to devise
ways and means to attract as clients former borrowers of
complainant bank since he was in the best position to see the
legal weaknesses of his former employer, a convincing factor
for the said clients to seek his professional service. In sum, the
IBP saw a deliberate sacrifice by respondent of his ethics in
consideration of the money he expected to earn.
Having been an executive of complainant bank, respondent
sought to litigate as counsel for the opposite side, a case
against his former employer involving a transaction which he
formerly handled while still an employee of complainant, in
violation of Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility;
and on adverse influence and conflicting interests under
Canon 15.
The Court affirmed the recommendation of the IBP Board of
Governors and suspended respondent for three years.
Atty. Pasok v. Atty. Zapatos, A.C. No. 7388 (19 October 2016):
The respondent could not accept work or employment from
anyone that would involve or relate to any matter in which he
had intervened as a judge except on behalf of the body or
authority that he served during his public employment. The
restriction as applied to him lasted beyond his tenure in
relation to the matters in which he had intervened as
judge. Accordingly, the fact that he was already retired from
the Bench, or that he was already in the private practice of law
when he was engaged for the case was inconsequential.
Although the respondent removed himself from the cases once
his neutrality and impartiality were challenged, he ultimately
did not stay away from the cases following his retirement from
the Bench, and acted thereon as a lawyer for and in behalf of
the defendant. The retired judge was suspended for one
month.
Lawyers who represent the government:

a. Lawyers tasked to represent government:
OSG, OGCC, lawyers in regular departments, bureaus,
offices, lawyers in the government financial institutions,
lawyers in government owned and controlled corporations,
17 | P a g e
lawyers who serve the government’s interest under special
contracts/or engagements, lawyers under the local
government units;
b. Government lawyers tasked to prosecute: Public
Prosecutors from the DOJ and Office of the Ombudsman;
c. Government lawyers who represent indigent litigants:
Public Attorneys’ Office
B. The Lawyer and the Legal Profession

Canon 7 - A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and
dignity of the legal profession and support the activities of the
Integrated Bar.
Cases:
In the Matter of the Inquiry into the 1989 Elections of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, A.M. No. 491 (6 October
1989): The Supreme Court en banc, exercising its power of
supervision over the Integrated Bar, resolved to suspend the
oath-taking of the IBP officers-elect and to inquire into the
veracity of the reports on intensive electioneering and
overspending by the candidates.
Mr. Jurado mentioned the resentment of Atty. Drilon's rivals
who felt at a disadvantage because Atty. Drilon allegedly used
PNB helicopters to visit far-flung IBP chapters on the pretext
of distributing Bigay Puso donations, and she had the added
advantage of having regional directors and labor arbiters of the
Department of Labor and Employment (who had been granted
leaves of absence by her husband, the Labor Secretary)
campaigning for her. Jurado's informants alleged that there
was rampant vote-buying by some members of the U.P. Sigma
Rho Fraternity, as well as by some lawyers of ACCRA where
Mrs. Drilon is employed, and that government positions were
promised to others by the office of the Labor Secretary.
The Court annulled the results of the IBP elections and
instituted, among others, the following reforms:
1. Section 47 of Article VII is hereby amended to read as
follows:
Section 47. National Officers. — The Integrated Bar of the
Philippines shall have a President and Executive Vice-
President to be chosen by the Board of Governors from
among nine (9) regional governors, as much as practicable,
on a rotation basis. The governors shall be ex oficio Vice-
President for their respective regions. There shall also be a
Secretary and Treasurer of the Board of Governors to be
appointed by the President with the consent of the Board.
2. At the end of the President's two-year term, the Executive
Vice-President shall automatically succeed to the office of
president. The incoming board of governors shall then elect
an Executive Vice-President from among themselves. The
position of Executive Vice-President shall be rotated among
the nine (9) IBP regions. One who has served as president
may not run for election as Executive Vice-President in a
18 | P a g e
succeeding election until after the rotation of the presidency
among the nine (9) regions shall have been completed;
whereupon, the rotation shall begin anew.
3. Section 33(b), Art. V, IBP By-Laws, is hereby amended as
follows:
(b) The President and Executive Vice President of the IBP
shall be the Chairman and Vice-Chairman, respectively, of
the House of Delegates. The Secretary, Treasurer, and
Sergeant-at-Arms shall be appointed by the President with
the consent of the House of Delegates.'
4. Section 37, Article VI is hereby amended to read as follows:
Section 37. Composition of the Board. — The Integrated Bar
of the Philippines shall be governed by a Board of Governors
consisting of nine (9) Governors from the nine (9) regions as
delineated in Section 3 of the Integration Rule, on the
representation basis of one (1) Governor for each region to
be elected by the members of the House of Delegates from
that region only. The position of Governor should be rotated
among the different Chapters in the region.
Santos v. Atty. Llamas, AC No. 4749 - January 20, 2000:

Lawyer was suspended for one year for non-payment of his
IBP dues.
Re: 2003 Bar Examinations, B.M. 1222 – Atty. dela Cruz (4

February 2004): On 22 September 2003, the day following the
bar examination in Mercantile Law, Justice Jose C. Vitug,
Chairman of the 2003 Bar Examinations Committee, was
apprised of a rumored leakage in the examination on the
subject. After making his own inquiries, Justice Vitug reported
the matter to Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., and to the
other members of the Court, recommending that the bar
examination on the subject be nullified and that an
investigation be conducted forthwith.
The Committee finds that the leaked test questions in
Mercantile Law were the questions which the examiner,
Attorney Marcial O. T. Balgos, had prepared and submitted to
Justice Jose C. Vitug, as chairman of the 2003 Bar
Examinations Committee. The questions constituted 82% of
the questions asked in the examination in Mercantile Law in
the morning of September 21, 2003, Sunday, in some cases
with slight changes which were not substantial and in other
cases exactly as proposed by Atty. Balgos. Dela Cruz was
disbarred.
Rule 7.01 – Shall be answerable for false statement in application to

the Bar
Zaguirre v. Atty. Castillo, A.C. No. 4921 (6 March 2003):

Complainant and respondent met sometime in 1996 when the
two became officemates at the NBI. Respondent courted
complainant and promised to marry her while representing
19 | P a g e
himself to be single. During their affair, respondent was
preparing for the bar examinations which he passed. On May
10, 1997, he was admitted as a member of the Philippine
Bar. It was only around the first week of May 1997 that
complainant first learned that respondent was already married
when his wife went to her office and confronted her about her
relationship with respondent.
On September 10, 1997, Castillo executed an affidavit,
admitting his relationship with the complainant and
recognizing the unborn child she was carrying as his. On
December 9, 1997, complainant gave birth to a baby girl,
Aletha Jessa. By this time however, respondent had started to
refuse recognizing the child and giving her any form of
support.
The illicit relationship with Carmelita took place while
respondent was preparing to take the bar examinations. Thus,
it cannot be said that it is unknown to him that an applicant
for admission to membership in the bar must show that he is
possessed of good moral character, a requirement which is not
dispensed with upon admission to membership of the
bar. This qualification is not only a condition precedent to
admission to the legal profession, but its continued possession
is essential to maintain one's good standing in the
profession; it is a continuing requirement to the practice of
law.
The Court found respondent GUILTY of Gross Immoral
Conduct and ordered to suffer INDEFINITE SUSPENSION from
the practice of law.
Rule 7.02 - Shall not support any unqualified Bar applicant

Rule 7.03 - Shall not engage in conduct adversely affecting the
profession
Melvyn G. Garcia v. Atty. Raul h. Sesbreño (A.C. No. 7973 and

A.C. No. 10457, February 03, 2015, per curiam)
Dr. Elmar o. Perez v. Atty. Catindig and Atty. Baydo (A.C. No.
5816, March 10, 2015, per curiam): Respondent Catindig was
disbarred for deceit. He led the complainant to believe that the
divorce decree he obtained from the Domincan Republic was
valid so she agreed to marry him.
Tiong v. Florendo (662 SCR A 1): Respondent Florendo was

suspended from practice for six months for having an affair
with the wife of his client.
Garrido v. Garrido, (611 SCRA 508): Garrido and Atty. Valencia

were both disbarred for gross misconduct. Atty. Garrido
married complainant knowing that he had a subsisting
marriage. He then contracted a third marriage to his co-
respondent, Atty. Valencia.
20 | P a g e
Sison, Jr. v. Atty. Camacho, A.C. No. 10910 (12 January 2016):
Respondent Camacho was disbarred for entering into a
compromise agreement without the consent of his client.
Pacao v. Atty. Limos, A.C. No. 11246, June 14, 2016: Atty.
Limos was disbarred for failure to demonstrate that she still
possessed the integrity and morality demanded of a member of
the Bar. She violated her fiduciary duty.
Canon 8 - A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy,

fairness and candor towards his professional colleagues, and
shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel.
Que v. Atty. Revilla, Jr., A.C. No. 7054 (4 December 2009): On

December 4, 2009, the Court disbarred the respondent from
the practice of law on the following grounds: abuse of court
procedures and processes; filing of multiple actions and
forum-shopping; willful, intentional and deliberate resort to
falsehood and deception before the courts; maligning the name
of his fellow lawyer; and fraudulent and unauthorized
appearances in court. When exercising its inherent power to
grant reinstatement, the Court should see to it that only those
who establish their present moral fitness and knowledge of the
law will be readmitted to the Bar. Thus, though the doors to
the practice of law are never permanently closed on a
disbarred attorney, the Court owes a duty to the legal
profession as well as to the general public to ensure that if the
doors are opened, it is done so only as a matter of justice.
Rule 8.01 – Shall not use abusive or improper language
The Law Firm of Chavez Miranda Aseoche v. Attys. Lazaro and

Merta, A.C. No. 8210 (5 September 2016): The Court said that
it cannot countenance the dismissal of the case against
respondents merely because the public prosecutor has not
been joined as a party. The Court emphasized that in
disbarment proceedings, it merely calls upon members of the
bar to account for their actuations as officers of the Court.
Consequently, only the lawyer who is the subject of the case is
indispensable. No other party, not even a complainant, is
needed.
The Court did not countenance the dismissal of the complaint
as recommended by the IBP Board of Governors.
Spouses Nuezca v. Atty. Villagarcia, A.C. No. 8210 (8 August

2016): The Court suspended the respondent for one month.
The Court said that the respondent could have simply stated
the ultimate facts relative to the alleged indebtedness of
complainants to his client, made the demand for settlement
thereof, and refrained from the imputation of criminal offenses
against them, especially considering that there is a proper
forum therefor and they have yet to be found criminally liable
21 | P a g e
by a court of proper jurisdiction. Respondent's use of
demeaning and immoderate language put complainants in
shame and disgrace. Moreover, it is important to consider that
several other persons had been copy furnished with the
demand letter. As such, respondent could have besmirched
complainants' reputation to its recipients.
Rule 8.02 – Shall not encroach on professional employment of

another
Canon 9 - A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, assist in the

unauthorized practice of law.
Rule 9.01 – Shall not delegate work to non-lawyers

Plus Builders v. Atty. Revilla, Jr., A.C. No. 7056 (13 September
2006): The Court agreed with the finding of IBP Commissioner
Espina that the silence or failure of respondent to challenge
the allegation that he allowed non-lawyers to engage in the
unauthorized practice of law may be deemed an admission of
the truth of the accusation. He was suspended for two years.
Rule 9.02 - Shall not divide fees for legal services with non-lawyers
Lijauco v. Atty. Terrado, A.C. No. 6317 (31 August 2006):

Complainant engaged the services of respondent sometime in
January 2001 for P70,000.00 to assist in recovering her
deposit with Planters Development Bank, Buendia, Makati
branch in the amount of P180,000.00 and the release of her
foreclosed house and lot located in Calamba, Laguna. He failed
to abide by the agreement and he openly admitted he divided
the Php70,000.00 to other individuals as commission/referral
fees respondent violated Rule 9.02, Canon 9 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Rule 9.02 provides - “A lawyer
shall not divide or stipulate to divide a fee for legal services
with persons not licensed to practice law, except:
a) Where there is a pre-existing agreement with a partner or
associate that, upon the latter's death, money shall be paid
over a reasonable period of time to his estate or to the
persons specified in the agreement; or
b) Where a lawyer undertakes to complete unfinished legal
business of a deceased lawyer; or
c) Where a lawyer or law firm includes non-lawyer employees
in a retirement plan, even if the plan is based in whole or in
part, on a profit-sharing arrangement.
Tan Tek Beng v. David, supra.: Tan Tek Beng and David
executed an agreement where David not only agreed to give
one-half of his professional fees to an intermediary or
commission agent but he also bound himself not to deal
directly with the clients. The Court censured David for having
entered and acted upon such void and unethical agreement.
The Court said it could not discountenance his conduct, not
22 | P a g e
because of the complaint of Tan Tek Beng (who did not know
legal ethics) but because David should have known better.
C. The Lawyer and the Courts

Canon 10 – A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the
court.
RULES OF COURT, Rule 138, sec. 20, par. (d).

Rule 10.1 – Shall do no falsehood
Maligaya v. Atty. Doronilla, A.C. No. 6198 (15 September

2006): The Court held that by stating untruthfully in open
court that complainant had agreed to withdraw his lawsuits,
Atty. Doronilla breached these peremptory tenets of ethical
conduct. Not only that, he violated the lawyer's oath to "do no
falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court," of which
Canon 10 and Rule 10.01 are but restatements. His act
infringed on every lawyer's duty to "never seek to mislead the
judge or any judicial officer by an artifice or false statement of
fact or law." He was suspended for two months.
Vasco-Tamaray v. Atty. Daquis, A.C. No. 10868 (26 January

2016): Vasco-Tamaray filed a Complaint-Affidavit before the
IBP, alleging that respondent Atty. Daquis) filed, on her behalf,
a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage without her
consent and forged her signature on the Petition. 1 She also
alleged that Atty. Daquis signed the Petition for Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage as her counsel. By pretending to be counsel
for complainant, respondent violated Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility and failed to uphold
her duty of doing no falsehood nor consent to the doing of any
falsehood in court as stated in the Lawyer's Oath. Respondent
also violated Canon 7, Rule 7.03 and Canon 10, Rule 10.01
when she allowed the use of a forged signature on a petition
she prepared and notarized. She also violated Canon 17 when
she failed to protect the interests of her client when she
represented complainant, who is the opposing party of her
client Leomarte Tamaray, in the same case. She was
disbarred.
Rule 10.2 - Shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the

contents of a paper, the language or the argument of opposing
counsel, or the text of a decision or authority, or knowingly cite as
law a provision already rendered inoperative by repeal or
amendment, or assert as a fact that which has not been proved.
Que v. Atty. Revilla, Jr., supra: Given the respondent's multiple

violations, his past record as previously discussed, and the
nature of these violations which shows the readiness to
disregard court rules and to gloss over concerns for the orderly
administration of justice, the Court held that the appropriate
action of this Court is to disbar the respondent to keep him
23 | P a g e
away from the law profession and from any significant role in
the administration of justice which he has disgraced. He is a
continuing risk, too, to the public that the legal profession
serves. Not even his ardor and overzealousness in defending
the interests of his client can save him. Such traits at the
expense of everything else, particularly the integrity of the
profession and the orderly administration of justice, cannot be
accepted nor tolerated by the Court.
Rule 10.03 – Shall not misuse rules of procedure

Sanidad v. Atty. Aguas, A.C. No. 9838, June 10, 2019: In her
complaint, Sanidad averred that respondent took advantage of
his legal knowledge as a lawyer and employed several tactics
to defraud her. She claimed that respondent, after receiving
the total amount of P1,152,000.00 from her, sent her demand
letters and threatened her with eviction.The Court held that
respondent's conduct in dealing with Sanidad to be wanting in
moral character, honesty, probity, and fairness. While the
Court cannot conclude that respondent indeed entered into a
verbal contract for the sale of a real property despite
knowledge that said verbal contract is unenforceable due to
lack of clear evidence, it said that it was, however, apparent
due to the fact that he eventually agreed to surrender the title
of the subject property to Sanidad, that he has certainly
entered into a contract of sale of the subject property.
Respondent's claim that he decided to turn over the title of the
subject property to Sanidad without receiving a single centavo
is outright outrageous to deserve any credibility. He was
suspended for one year.
Plus Builders v. Atty. Revilla, Jr., A.C. No. 7056 (13 September
2006): At the conclusion of the investigation by the IBP
Commissioner, it was established that respondent had
"maliciously concealed the defeat of his clients in the case
before the PARAD of Cavite and the higher courts," in order to
secure a temporary restraining order from the RTC of Imus,
Cavite. He failed to observe the rules of procedure and
misused them to defeat the ends of justice. The records
showed that his course of legal action was obviously a
stratagem. It was meant to delay unduly the execution of the
provincial adjudicator's Decision. The Code of Professional
Responsibility enjoins lawyers from committing or consenting
to any falsehood in court or from allowing the courts to be
misled by any artifice.
Canon 11 - A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due

to the courts and to judicial officers and should insist on
similar conduct by others.
Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 159486-88 (25

November 2003): Canon 11 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility mandates that the lawyer should observe and
24 | P a g e
maintain the respect due to the courts and judicial officers
and, indeed, should insist on similar conduct by others. In
liberally imputing sinister and devious motives and
questioning the impartiality, integrity, and authority of the
members of the Court, Atty. Paguia has only succeeded in
seeking to impede, obstruct and pervert the dispensation of
justice.
The attention of Atty. Paguia has also been called to the
mandate of Rule 13.02 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility prohibiting a member of the bar from making
such public statements on a case that may tend to arouse
public opinion for or against a party. Regrettably, Atty. Paguia
has persisted in ignoring the Court’s well-meant admonition.
He was suspended indefinitely by the Court.
In Re: Published Alleged Threats by Atty. Leonard de Vera, A.M.

No. 01-12-03- SC (29 July 2002): The Court said that it is
respondent’s duty as an officer of the court, to uphold the
dignity and authority of the courts and to promote confidence
in the fair administration of justice and in the Supreme Court
as the last bulwark of justice and democracy. Respondent’s
utterances as while the case of Estrada v. Sandiganbayan was
pending consideration by the Court, belies his protestation of
good faith but were clearly made to mobilize public opinion
and bring pressure upon the court. Atty. Leonard De Vera was
found GUILTY of indirect contempt of court and was FINED in
the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00).
Re: Letter of the UP Law Faculty entitled “Restoring Integrity: A

Statement by the Faculty of the University of the Philippines
College of Law on the Allegations of Plagiarism and
Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court, ”A.M. No. 10-10-4-
SC, 19 October 2010: Except for Atty. Raul Vasquez, all
professors of the U.P. College of Law were admonished by the
Court.
The 35 respondent law professors were reminded of their
lawyerly duty, under Canons 1, 11 and 13 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, to give due respect to the Court
and to refrain from intemperate and offensive language
tending to influence the Court on pending matters or to
denigrate the Court and the administration of justice and
warned that the same or similar act in the future shall be
dealt with more severely.
The Court found the separate Compliance of Dean Marvic
M.V.F. Leonen regarding the charge of violation of Canon 10
UNSATISFACTORY. He is further ADMONISHED to be more
mindful of his duty, as a member of the Bar, an officer of the
Court, and a Dean and professor of law, to observe full candor
and honesty in his dealings with the Court and warned that
the same or similar act in the future shall be dealt with more
severely.
25 | P a g e
Rule 11.01 - Shall appear properly attired
Falcis v. Civil Registar General, January 6, 2020: The Court

cited Falcis in contempt of Court for not appearing in Court
properly attired.
Rule 11.02 - Shall punctually appear
Rule 11.03 - Shall abstain from offensive language and behavior

before the courts
In the Matter of Proceedings for Disciplinary Action Against Atty.
Almacen in L-27654 (18 February 1970): The Court held that
the misconduct committed by Atty. Almacen is of considerable
gravity cannot be overemphasized. However, heeding the stern
injunction that disbarment should never be decreed where a
lesser sanction would accomplish the end desired, and
believing that it may not perhaps be futile to hope that in the
sober light of some future day, Atty. Almacen will realize that
abrasive language never fails to do disservice to an advocate
and that in every effervescence of candor there is ample room
for the added glow of respect, it is our view that suspension
will suffice under the circumstances. His demonstrated
persistence in his misconduct by neither manifesting
repentance nor offering apology therefor leave us no way of
determining how long that suspension should last and,
accordingly, we are impelled to decree that the same should be
indefinite.
Pobre v. Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago, A.C. No. 7399 (25

August 2009): The claim for parliamentary immunity was
accepted by the Court.
Rule 11.04 – Shall not attribute to a judge unsupported or

immaterial motives
In re: Supreme Court Resolution dated 28 April 2003 in G.R.

Nos. 145817 and 145822, A.C. No. 6332 (17 April 2002): For
violating Canons 8, 10 and 11 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and for failing to give due respect to the Courts
and his fellow lawyers, the Court disbarred Atty. Magdaleno M.
Peña.
Re: Interview with Atty. Lorna Kapunan on Corruption in the

Judiciary, A.M. No. 13-11-09-SC: Lawyers enjoy freedom of
expression.
Roxas v. Zuzuarregui, et. al., G.R. No. 152072 (12 July 2007):
The Court found Atty. Roxas GUILTY of indirect contempt of
court. The Court said that Letters addressed to individual
Justices, in connection with the performance of their judicial
functions, become part of the judicial record and are a matter
of concern for the entire court. As can be gathered from the
26 | P a g e
records, the letter to then Chief Justice Panganiban was
merely noted and no show-cause order was issued in the hope
that Atty. Roxas would stop his assault on the Court.
However, since Atty. Roxas persisted in attacking the
Court via his second letter, it behooved the Court to order him
to explain why he should not be held in contempt of court and
subjected to disciplinary action.
Rule 11.05 – Shall submit grievances to proper authorities

Art. VIII, Sec. 6, CONSTITUTION
Canon 12 - A lawyer shall exert every effort and consider it his

duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of
justice.
Rule 12.01 – Shall be adequately prepared

Rule 12.02 – Shall not file multiple actions arising from the same
cause
Salabao v. Atty. Villaruel, A.C. No. 8084, August 24, 2015:

The Court said that while it is true that lawyers owe "entire
devotion" to the cause of their clients, 10 it cannot be
emphasized enough that their first and primary duty is "not to
the client but to the administration of justice.” Canon 12 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility states that "A lawyer
shall exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist in the
speedy and efficient administration of justice." Thus, in the
use of Court processes, the lawyer's zeal to win must be
tempered by the paramount consideration that justice be done
to all parties involved, and the lawyer for the losing party
should not stand in the way of the execution of a valid
judgment.
Villaruel was found GUILTY of violation of the Lawyer's Oath
and Rules 10.03 and 12.04 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and was suspended from the practice of law for
a period of eighteen (18) months.
Rule 12.03 – Shall not let extensions lapse
Enriquez v. Atty. Lavadia, Jr., A.C. No. 5686 (16 June 2015):
While the Court noted that the complaint was Atty. Lavadia’s
first infraction. However, given his proven propensity for filing
motions for extension of time and not filing the required
pleading, the Court found that it should impose the severe
sanction lest some other unknowing client’s engage his
services only to lose their case due to Atty. Lavadia's
nonchalant attitude. Considering the gravity of Atty. Lavadia's
cavalier actions both to his client and his impertinent attitude
towards the Court, it DISBARRED Lavadia for violating
Canons 11 and 18 and Rules 10.03, 12.03 and 18.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility and ORDERED his name
STRICKEN.OFF from the Roll of Attorneys.
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Chua v. Atty. De Castro, A.C. No. 10671 (25 November 2015):
The Court suspended De Castro for a period of three months.
The Court said that Atty. De Castro failed to live up to the
exacting standards expected of him as a vanguard of law and
justice. Files showed his great propensity to disregard court
orders. His acts of wantonly employing dilatory tactics show
an utter disrespect for the Court and the legal profession.
Rule 12.04 – Shall not delay a case or misuse court processes
Bugaring v. Hon. Español, A.C. No. 133090 (19 January 2001):

The Court of Appeals found that from a thorough reading of
the transcript of stenographic notes of the hearing held on
December 5, 1996, it was obvious that the petitioner was
indeed arrogant, at times impertinent, too argumentative, to
the extent of being disrespectful, annoying and sarcastic
towards the court. 9 It affirmed the order of the respondent
judge, but found that the fine of P3,000.00 exceeded the limit
of P2,000.00 prescribed by the Rules of Court, 10 and ordered
the excess of P1,000.00 returned to petitioner. The Supreme
Court affirmed the findings of the Court of Appeals.
Avida v. Atty. Al C. Argosino, A.C. No. 7437 (17 August 2016)
Rule 12.05 - Shall refrain from talking to witness while he is under

examination
Rule 12.06 – Shall not assist a witness to misrepresent

himself/impersonate another
REVISED PENAL CODE, Art. 184.
Rule 12.07Rule 12.07 - Shall not abuse or harass witness
Rule 12.08 – Shall avoid testifying on behalf of his client,
exceptions
Canon 13 - A lawyer shall rely upon the merits of his cause and
refrain from any impropriety which tends to influence, or gives
the appearance of influencing the court.
D. The Lawyer and the Client

Canon 14 - A lawyer shall not refuse his services to the needy.
Rule 14.01 – Shall not decline to represent on account of race, sex,
creed, status, or opinion as to guilt
RULES OF COURT, Rule 138, Sec. 20, par. (h)(i).
Rule 14.02 - Shall not decline appointment as counsel de officio or

amicus curiae
RULES OFRULES OF COURT, Rule 138, Sec. 20, par. (h)(i).
RULES OF COURT, Rule 116, Sec. 6-8.
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Rule 14.03 – Valid grounds to refuse representation
Rule 14.04 – Shall observe same standard of conduct as with
paying clients
RULES OF COURT, Rule 138, Sec. 21
Canon 15 - A lawyer shall observe candor, fairness and loyalty

in all his dealings and transactions with his clients.
Canon 16 - A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and

properties of his client that may come into his profession.
CIVIL CODE, Art. 1491, par.(5).
Canon 17 – A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and
he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him.
Canon 18 - A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and

diligence.
Canon 19 - A lawyer shall represent his client with zeal within

the bounds of the law.
Canon 20 - A lawyer shall charge only fair and reasonable fees.

RULES OF COURT, Rule 138, Sections 24 and 32.
Canon 21 – A lawyer shall preserve the confidence and secrets

of his client even after the attorney-client relation is
terminated.
RULES OF COURT, Rule 138, Sec. 20, par.(e)
RULES OF COURT, Rule 130, Sec. 24, par.(b)
REVISED PENAL CODE, Art. 209.
Canon 22 - A lawyer shall withdraw his services only for good

cause and upon notice appropriate in the circumstances.
Rule 22.01 – Causes for withdrawal
Rule 22.02 – Duties of withdrawing lawyer
Obando v. Figueras, G.R. No. 134854 (18 January 2000):

Representation continues until the court dispenses with the
services of counsel in accordance with Section 26, Rule 138 of
the Rules of Court. Counsel may be validly substituted only if
the following requisites are complied with: (1) new counsel files
a written application for Substitution; (2) the client's written
consent is obtained; and (3) the written consent of the lawyer
to be substituted is secured, if it can still be; if the written
consent can no longer be obtained, then the application for
substitution must carry proof that notice of the motion has
been served on the attorney to be substituted in the manner
required by the Rules. The Court held that Atty. Yuseco
continued to represent the respondents in the case.
VIII. Disbarment Proceedings
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1. Constitutional Duty of the Supreme Court to Discipline Lawyers
Bernardino v. Atty. Santos, A.C. No. 10583 (18 February 2015)
Spouses Buffe v. Sec. Raul M. Gonzalez, et al., A.C. No. 8168

(12 October 2016): The Court said that in several cases, the
Court has disciplined lawyers without further inquiry or resort
to any formal investigation where the facts on record
sufficiently provided the basis for the determination of their
administrative liability.
Prudential Bank v. Castro, A.M. No. 2756 March 15, 1988: The
Court disbarred a lawyer without need of any further
investigation after considering his actions based on records
showing his unethical misconduct; the misconduct not only
cast dishonor on the image of both the Bench and the Bar, but
was also inimical to public interest and welfare. In this regard,
the Court took judicial notice of several cases handled by the
errant lawyer and his cohorts that revealed their modus
operandi in circumventing the payment of the proper judicial
fees for the astronomical sums they claimed in their cases.
The Court held that those cases sufficiently provided the basis
for the determination of respondents' administrative liability,
without need for further inquiry into the matter under the
principle of res ipsa loquitur.
2. Procedure; Nature of proceedings (read Rule 139-B)

Yumul-Espina v. Atty. Tabaquero, A.C. No. 11238 (21
September 2016): The reiterated that disbarment proceedings
are sui generis. Their main purpose is mainly to determine the
fitness of a lawyer to continue acting as an officer of the court
and as participant in the dispensation of justice. Hence, the
underlying motives of the complainant are unimportant and of
little relevance.ch
The Court has consistently looked with disfavor upon
affidavits of desistance filed in disbarment proceedings.
Administrative proceedings are imbued with public interest.
Hence, these proceedings should not be made to depend on
the whims and caprices of complainants who are, in a real
sense, only witnesses.
Heirs of Atilano v. Atty. Examen, A.C. No. 10132 (24 March

2015): The Court found Atty. Examen liable for breach of the
Notarial Law and introducing false Absolute Deeds of Sale
before court proceedings. By his negligent act of not checking
the work of his secretary and merely perfunctorily notarizing
documents, it cannot be said that he upheld legal processes
thus violating Canon 1 of the CPR. Neither can it be said that
he promoted confidence in the legal system. If anything, his
acts serve to undermine the functions of a diligent lawyer. He
thus ran afoul Rule 1.02 of the CPR. He was suspended for
two years; his notarial commission was revoked; and he was
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disqualified to be commissioned as notary public for the period
of two years. The Court also said a disbarment case is not
subject to a claim of prescription.
Coronel v. Atty. Cunanan, A.C. No. 6738 (12 August 2015): The
complainant initiated this disbarment case against Atty.
Nelson A. Cunanan, alleging that he had advised and
convinced her to engage him for the transfer of Original
Certificate of Title No. 9616 and Transfer Certificate of Title
No. T-72074, which were both registered in the name of their
deceased grandparents, to her name and to the names of her
co-heirs by direct registration with the Office of the Register of
Deeds in violation of the proper legal procedure; that following
the engagement, he had received from her the amount of
P70,000.00 for the payment of the transfer and other fees, and
had misappropriated the same; and that he had not returned
the money and the owner's duplicate copy of Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-72074. The Court said that a lawyer
who proposes to his client a recourse or remedy that is
contrary to law, public policy, public order and public morals,
or that lessens the public confidence in the legal system is
guilty of gross misconduct, and should be suspended from the
practice of law, or even disbarred. Cunanan was suspended
for a period of one year and was ordered to return the amount
of P70,000.00 to the complainant.
Datu Dumanlag v. Atty. Intong, A.C. No. 8638 (10 October

2016): Considering that this is the first infraction of
respondent, the Court reprimanded him for refusing to obey
lawful orders of the Court and the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, with a warning that a repetition of the same or
similar act or offense shall be dealt with more severely.
Datu Duque v. COMELEC Chairman Sixto Brillantes, et al., A.C.

No. 9912 (21 September 2016): The object of a disbarment
proceeding is not so much to punish the individual attorney
himself, as to safeguard the administration of justice by
protecting the court and the public from the misconduct of
officers of the court, and to remove from the profession of law
persons whose disregard for their oath of office have proved
them unfit to continue discharging the trust reposed in them
as members of the bar. Thus, the power to disbar attorneys
ought always to be exercised with great caution, and only in
clear cases of misconduct which seriously affects the standing
and character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and
member of the bar. The Court dismissed the case for lack of
merit.
4. Effects of disciplinary penalty
Sps. Eustaquio v. Atty. Navales, A.C. No. 10465 (8 June 2016):

While undergoing suspension, Navales is precluded from
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seeking a government position which will require his
application of his knowledge of the law.
Feliciano v. Atty. Bautista-Lozada, A.C. No. 7593 (11 March

2015): The Court en banc promulgated a Resolution in A.C.
No. 6656 entitled “Frias vs. Atty. Bautista Lozada” suspending
Atty. Lozada for violation of Rules 15.03 and 16.04 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility. While undergoing suspension,
she appeared as counsel of her husband in a criminal case.
The Court her GUILTY of violating Section 27,19 Rule 138 of
the Rules of Court, and SUSPENDED her for a period of six (6)
months from the practice of law
5. Reinstatement
Maniago v. Atty. De Dios, A.C. No. 7472 (30 March 2010): For
clarification, the Court said that it should adopt a uniform set
of guidelines in lifting the suspension of a lawyer. It
emphasized that the lawyer cannot automatically resume the
practice of law upon the expiration of the period of
suspension. The following guidelines must be observed in the
matter of the lifting of an order suspending a lawyer from the
practice of law:
1. After a finding that respondent lawyer must be
suspended from the practice of law, the Court shall
render a decision imposing the penalty;
2. Unless the Court explicitly states that the decision is
immediately executory upon receipt thereof, respondent
has 15 days within which to file a motion for
reconsideration thereof. The denial of said motion shall
render the decision final and executory;
3. Upon the expiration of the period of suspension,
respondent shall file a Sworn Statement with the Court,
through the Office of the Bar Confidant, stating therein
that he or she has desisted from the practice of law and
has not appeared in any court during the period of his or
her suspension;
4. Copies of the Sworn Statement shall be furnished to the
Local Chapter of the IBP and to the Executive Judge of
the courts where respondent has pending cases handled
by him or her, and/or where he or she has appeared as
counsel;
5. The Sworn Statement shall be considered as proof of
respondent’s compliance with the order of suspension;
6. Any finding or report contrary to the statements made by
the lawyer under oath shall be a ground for the
imposition of a more severe punishment, or disbarment,
as may be warranted.
Macarubbo v. Macarubbo, A. C. No. 6148, January 22, 2013:

Respondent Macarubbo was found guilty of gross immorality
and was DISBARRED from the practice of law. He was likewise
32 | P a g e
ORDERED to show satisfactory evidence to the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline and to this Court that he is
supporting or has made provisions for the regular support of
his two children by complainant. After a lapse of eight years,
Macarrubo filed a PETITION (FOR EXTRAORDINARY
MERCY). Macarubo was reinstated upon considering the
following guidelines in resolving requests for judicial clemency,
to wit:
1. There must be proof of remorse and reformation. These
shall include but should not be limited to certifications
or testimonials of the officer(s) or chapter(s) of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, judges or judges
associations and prominent members of the community
with proven integrity and probity. A subsequent finding
of guilt in an administrative case for the same or similar
misconduct will give rise to a strong presumption of non-
reformation.
2. Sufficient time must have lapsed from the imposition of
the penalty to ensure a period of reform.
3. The age of the person asking for clemency must show
that he still has productive years ahead of him that can
be put to good use by giving him a chance to redeem
himself.
4. There must be a showing of promise (such as intellectual
aptitude, learning or legal acumen or contribution to
legal scholarship and the development of the legal
system or administrative and other relevant skills), as
well as potential for public service.
5. There must be other relevant factors and circumstances
that may justify clemency.
Bernardo v. Atty. Mejia, A.C. No. 2984, August 31, 2007: On

July 29, 1992, Mejia was disbarred for misappropriating and
converting to his personal use, falsification of certain
documents and for issuing a check, knowing that he was
without funds in the bank, in payment of a loan obtained from
Bernardo. The Court, in deciding whether or not to reinstate
Atty. Mejia, considered that 15 years had already elapsed from
the time he was disbarred, which gave him sufficient time to
acknowledge his infractions and to repent. The Court also took
into account the fact that Atty. Mejia is already of advanced
years, has long repented, and suffered enough.
Adez Realty, Inc. v. CA, G.R. No. 100643 August 14, 1992:
Atty. Dacanay, counsel of Petitioner filed the Petition for
Review in behalf of petitioner Adez Realty, Inc., wherein he
quoted that: “After trial on the merits, the lower court
rendered the questioned order dated November 20, 1984,
without notice to the actual occupants of the property, Adez
Realty, granting the applicant’s petition for reconstitution in
the name of the deceased Elias Eugenio.” For this artifice, he
has disbarred by the Court because that portion of the
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pleading was supposed to have been part of the decision on
appeal penned by Associate Justice Manuel C. Herrera for
respondent Court of Appeals. The Court granted the
reinstatement of the disbarred lawyer (found to be guilty of
intercalating a material fact in a CA decision) and considered
the period of three (3) years as sufficient time to do soul-
searching and to prove that he is worthy to practice law. In
that case, the Court took into consideration the disbarred
lawyer’s sincere admission of guilt and repeated pleas for
compassion.
Valencia v. Antiniw, A.C. No. 1302, 1391 and 1543 April 26,
1991: The Court found Atty. Antiniw committed falsification of
a deed of sale, and its subsequent introduction in court
prejudiced his prime duty in the administration of justice as
an officer of the court. The Court reinstated Atty. Antiniw after
considering the long period of his disbarment (almost 15
years). The Court considered that during Atty. Antiniw’s
disbarment, he has been persistent in reiterating his apologies
to the Court, has engaged in humanitarian and civic services,
and retained an unblemished record as an elected public
servant, as shown by the testimonials of the numerous civic
and professional organizations, government institutions, and
members of the judiciary.
Part II: JUDICIAL ETHICS

A. Sources of Judicial Ethics:
B. Membership in the Judiciary

Qualifying to the Bench
1. Members of the Supreme Court and lower appellate courts
(Court of Appeals, Court of Tax Appeals and
Sandiganbayan):
Section 7(1), Article VIII, 1987 Constitution mandates that a
Justice of the Supreme Court and all collegiate appellate
courts must be a natural born Filipino.
Qualifications of SC Justice: natural born Filipino, at least
be 40 years old, must have been for 15 years or more a judge
of a lower court or engaged in the practice of law in the
Philippines.
2. Members of the lower courts (regional trial courts and first

level courts): Section 7(2), article VIII, 1987 Constitution
provides that Congress shall provide for qualifications but one
must be citizen of the Philippines and member of the
Philippine Bar.
Note: The Congress may enact a law which prescribes that a
naturalized Filipino citizen can qualify to become a judge in
the lower trial courts.
3. Common qualification for all members of the judiciary,

Section 7(3), Article VIII, 1987 Constitution provides: “A
34 | P a g e
member of the Judiciary must be a person of proven
competence, integrity, probity and independence.”
4. Term of Office: Section 11, Article VIII, 1987 Constitution

provides that members of the judiciary “shall hold office
during good behavior until they reach 70 years old or they
become incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office.”
Chavez v. JBC, et al., G.R. No. 202242, July 17, 2012:

Congress is entitled only to one seat in the JBC and not one for
each house.
Recent rulings related to the JBC:

Villanueva v. JBC (2015): A first level trial court must await a
5-year period before he can be promoted as RTC judge. The
Court sustained the power of the JBC to prescribe rules in the
screening of qualified candidates to the judiciary to ensure
that only men of proven competence, integrity, probity and
independence will be appointed to the bench.
However, the Court held that JBC must publish all
requirements to apprise applicants of such requirements.
Jardeleza v. CJ Sereno and JBC (2015): Having been denied

due process, Jardeleza should be included in the list of
nominees to be appointed as justice of the Supreme Court. An
issue about his integrity was raised in the selection process
but Jardeleza was never given the opportunity to be heard to
overturn the allegation against him.
Appointments made by the President in the judiciary do

not need any confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments. (Section 9, Article VIII, 1987 Constitution)
Please note that:

Any vacancy in the Supreme Court must be filled within 90
days from the occurrence thereof. (Section 4(1), Article VIII,
1987 Constitution)
De Castro v. JBC, (GR No. 191002 Apr. 20, 2010): The

Court's exclusion of appointments to the Judiciary from the
Constitutional ban on midnight appointments is based on the
plain and unequivocal language of the Constitution. The Court
affirmed the appointment of Chief Justice Corona.
For lower courts, the President shall issue the appointments

within 90 days from the submission of the list. (Section 9,
Article VIII, 1987 Constitution)
Judge Aguinaldo v. President Benigno Simeon C. Aquino

III (G.R. No. 224302, Nov 29, 2016): The Court held that
while it is the function of the JBC to search, screen, and select
nominees recommended for appointment to the Judiciary, it
35 | P a g e
cannot impair the prerogative of the President to appoint
members of the Sandiganbayan. The JBC cannot restrict the
appointing power of the President by resorting to clustering
the nominees to the six vacancies in the Sandiganbayan.
Requirements in the discharge of responsibilities of members

of the judiciary:
1. No decision shall be rendered by any court without
expressing therein clearly and distinctly, the facts and law
on which it is based. (Section 14, Article VIII, 1987
Constitution)
2. Dedicated service to the judiciary
3. Members of the judiciary shall not be designated to any
agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative
functions. (Section12, Article VIII, 1987 Constitution)
4. SALN Requirement
Members of the Supreme Court shall not only report all their
assets, liabilities, and net worth upon assumption to duty
but they must disclose such to the PUBLIC in the manner
provided by law. (Section 17, Article XI, 1987 Constitution)
5. Allegiance to the Philippine Government. Any public officer
owes allegiance to the Philippine government and its
Constitution and a public officer who seeks to change
citizenship or acquire the status of an immigrant of another
country during his tenure shall be dealt with by law.(Section
18, Article VIII, 1987 Constitution)
C. Qualities required of Members of the Judiciary based on the

Code of Judicial Conduct
1. Independence
2. Integrity
3. Impartiality
4. Propriety
5. Equality
6. Competence and diligence
THE CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT

1. Duty to Maintain the Integrity and Independence of the
Court
CANON 1 – A judge should uphold the integrity and
independence of the Judiciary. (Sections 1-8)
Canon 1: Judicial independence is a pre-requisite to the rule of

law and a fundamental guarantee of a fair trial. A judge shall
therefore uphold and exemplify judicial independence in both its
individual and institutional aspects.
Two aspects of independence: institutional independence and

personal independence: What is expected of judges: to discharge
their functions based solely on a fair assessment of the facts and
invoking the appropriate provision of law in resolving issues
36 | P a g e
presented before the court; and shield themselves from any kind
of influence from any party involved in the case.
Cases:
In Re: Verified Complaint of Engr. Oscar L. Ongjoco, 664
SCRA 465 (2012): A complaint against justices of the Court of
Appeals must be dismissed if the same is baseless and the
recourse of the party is to seek judicial relief from an adverse
decision.
In Re: S.C. Resolution dated 28April 2003 in G.R. Nos.

146817 and 145822, (Atty. Pena) 669 SCRA 530(2012): A
motion to inhibit the ponente in a pending case before the S.C.
based on suspicion of bribery in the form of a brand new
Mercedes Benz and collusion with another senior associate
justice of S.C. cannot be given due course. Counsel must show
proof that a connection and direct correlation exists between his
failure to receive a copy of its Motion for Clarification of the other
party. He alleged that the incident did not allow him to refute the
allegations therein. The Court said that such imputation is
“completely untenable and irresponsible.”
Santos v. Judge Arcaya- Chua, A. M. No. MT J-07-20093,

February 17, 2009. A judge was suspended by the Court for ha
ving accepted money to intercede on behalf of her husband’s
relative in a pending case before the Supreme Court where she
was previously employed.
Go v. Court of Appeals, G. R. No. 101837, February 11, 1992,

206 SCRA 165. The Court held that the complainant was not
deprived of due process when the charge against him was
upgraded from grave serious injuries to homicide. It said that
when the death occurred after the filing of the first information
the same can be amended as a matter of course.
2. Duty to Uphold the Integrity of the Judiciary

CANON 2 – Integrity is essential not only to the proper
discharge of the judicial office but also to the personal
demeanor of judges. (Sections 1-3)
Republic v. Sereno, G.R. No. 237428, June 19, 2018: Sereno

was found DISQUALIFIED from and was adjudged GUILTY
of UNLAWFULLY HOLDING and EXERCISING the OFFICE OF
THE CHIEF JUSTICE. Accordingly, Respondent Maria Lourdes
P.A. Sereno was OUSTED and EXCLUDED therefrom.
The Court said that quo warranto and impeachment are two
distinct proceedings, although both may result in the ouster of
a public officer. Strictly speaking, quo warranto grants the
relief of "ouster", while impeachment affords "removal."
A quo warranto proceeding is the proper legal remedy to
determine a person's right or title to a public office and to oust
the holder from its enjoyment. It is the proper action to inquire
37 | P a g e
into a public officer's eligibility or the validity of his
appointment. Under Rule 66 of the Rules of Court, a quo
warranto proceeding involves a judicial determination of the
right to the use or exercise of the office.
Impeachment, on the other hand, is a political process
undertaken by the legislature to determine whether the public
officer committed any of the impeachable offenses, namely,
culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft
and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public
trust. It does not ascertain the officer's eligibility for
appointment or election, or challenge the legality of his
assumption of office. Conviction for any of the impeachable
offenses shall result in the removal of the impeachable official
from office.
Re Letter of Lucena Ofendoreyes (A.M. No. 16-12-03-CA and

IPI No. 17-248-CA-J, June 6, 2017): The complaint charged a
certain Atty. Dorothy Cajayon from Zamboanga City and
Associate Justice Jane Aurora C. Lantion of the Court of
Appeals in Cagayan De Oro City (CA-CDO) of illicitly selling
favorable decisions involving cases filed in the CA-CDO to the
highest bidding clients.
Under the Rules of Court, administrative complaints both
against lawyers and judges of regular and special courts as
well as Justices of the Court of Appeals and the
Sandiganbayan must be verified and supported by affidavits of
persons who have personal knowledge of the facts alleged
therein or by documents which may substantiate said
allegations. For lawyers, these requirements are stated in
Section 1, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court.
Guanzon v. Judge Rufon, 537 SCRA 38. The Court reminded

the family court judge to avoid using vulgar language in the
course of the trial. Use of vulgar language insults a witness and
may also diminish the respect of the litigants towards the court
because court proceedings are held in public.
Talens-Dabon v. Arceo, A.M. 1. No. RTJ-96-1336, July 25,

1996: A judge was dismissed from service for gross misconduct
for sexually harassing his Clerk of Court.
Samson v. Judge Caballero, A. M. No. RT J-08- 213, 595

SCRA 423. The newly appointed judge was not allowed to
assume his post as RTC judge of Cabanatuan City for his
material misrepresentation in his application form. Caballero
did not disclose that a graft and corruption charge was filed
against him before the Office of the Ombudsman when he
served as a prosecutor.
Suarez v. Judge Dilag, A. M. No. RT J-06-2014, March 4,

2009, 580 SCRA 491. A judge was dismissed from service due
to gross misconduct. The judge was found to have officiated
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several marriage rites in a short span of time without having
resolved the numerous cases pending before his court.
Inonog v. Judge Ibay, A. M. No. RT J-09-2175, July 28, 2009,

594 SCRA 168.A judge was fined by the Court for “oppressive”
conduct for citing a driver in contempt of court for having
parked the car of his employer in the parking slot assigned to
the judge. The judge imposed upon the driver a monetary fine.
OCA v. Judge Edwin C. Larida, Jr., RTC, Branch 18,

Tagaytay City, A.M. No. RTJ-08-2151, March 11, 2014. The
Court held that Judge Larida, Jr. committed several lapses,
specifically the non-submission to the Court of the required
inventory of locally-funded employees, and his allowing
Marticio to draft court orders. Such lapses manifested a wrong
attitude towards administrative rules and regulations issued
for the governance and administration of the lower courts, to
the extent of disregarding them, as well as a laxity in the
control of his Branch and in the supervision of its functioning
staff. The omission to submit the inventory should not be
blamed on Atty. Calma as the Branch Clerk of Court. Although
it was very likely that Judge Larida, Jr. had tasked Atty. Calma
to do and submit the inventory in his behalf, Judge Larida, Jr.
as the Presiding Judge himself remained to be the officer
directly burdened with the responsibility for doing so. Further,
for knowingly allowing detailed employees to solicit
commissions from bonding companies, Judge Larida, Jr.
contravened the Code of Judicial Conduct, which imposed on
him the duty to take or initiate appropriate disciplinary
measures against court personnel for unprofessional conduct
of which he would have become aware.
Lorenzana v. Judge Austria, A.M. No. RTJ-09-2200, April 2,

2014. The Court held the conduct of Judge Austria of and
posting a picture with indecent attire for the public’s
consumption in her Frendster account is inappropriate. The
Court held that she was guilty of impropriety. While judges are
not prohibited from becoming members of and from taking
part in social networking activities, they do not shed off their
status as judges. They carry with them in cyberspace the same
ethical responsibilities and duties that every judge is expected
to follow in his/her everyday activities. Judge Austria was
guilty of impropriety when she posted her pictures in a manner
viewable by the public. Joining Friendster per se does not
violate the New Code of Judicial Conduct. The Court said
Judge Austria disregarded the propriety and appearance of
propriety required of her when she posted Friendster photos of
herself wearing an “off-shouldered” suggestive dress and made
this available for public viewing.
3. Duty to Maintain Impartiality
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CANON 3 – A judge should perform official duties honestly, and
with impartiality and diligence. (Sections 1-6)
Impartiality is essential to the proper discharge of the judicial

office. It applies not only to the decision itself but also to the
process by which the decision is made.
Dulang v. Judge Regencia, A.M. No. MTJ-14-1841, June 2,

2014. The Supreme Court held that pursuant to Rule 3.05,
Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, prompt disposition
of cases is attained basically through the efficiency and
dedication to duty of judges. In this case, the civil case was
already submitted for resolution. Being an ejectment case, it is
governed by the Rules of Summary Procedure which clearly
sets a period of 30 days from the submission of the last
affidavit or position paper within which a decision must be
issued. In violation of this rule, Judge Regencia rendered
judgment only more than two years later the judge failed to
proffer any acceptable reason in delaying the disposition of the
ejectment case, thus, making her administratively liable for
undue delay in rendering a decision. .
Concerned Lawyers of Bulacan v. Judge Vilalon-Pornillos,

592 SCRA 36: A judge was dismissed from service for gross
misconduct. Evidence was presented to establish the
propensity to exact money from litigants and lawyers. She also
exhibited manifest bias in her demeanor in court.
Paco v. Quilala, et. Al., A. M. No. RT J-02-1699, 413 SCRA

364. A judge together with the Clerk of Court and the court
stenographer assigned to his court were also sanctioned by the
S.C. The Court said that except for clarificatory questions, the
judge may not be allowed to ask questions that would elicit
answers to favor one of the parties to the case. It is not also
proper for the judge to allow the Clerk of Court to conduct any
proceeding in the absence of the judge and for the
stenographer to transcribe such proceedings.
Complaint against Chief Justice Corona dated Sept. 14,

2011 filed by Inter-Petal Recreational Corp., A.M. No. 12-
6-10 SC, June 13, 2012. The complaint raised the issue on the
capacity of then Chief Justice to decide on a pending case
without any bias. The S.C. dismissed the complaint because
the same has become moot and academic with the
impeachment and eventual removal of Chief Justice Corona
from office.
Villaluz v. Mijares, A. M. No. RT J-98-1402, April 3, 1998, 288

SCRA 594. This case was filed by Justice Villaluz, the former
spouse of Pasay City RTC Judge Mijares, against her. The S.C.
called the attention of Mijares that the Rules of Court prohibit
judges from hearing cases involving relatives up to the sixth
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civil degree of consanguinity or affinity. In the same fashion a
member of the bench may not hear cases where a counsel is a
relative up to the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or
affinity.
Biggel v. Judge Pamintuan, A. M. No. RT J- 08-2101, 559

SCRA 344. The apparent bias exhibited by the judge shown in
the delay in the legal procedure cannot be condoned. S.C. held
reminded judges of their pivotal role in the administration of
justice.
4. Duty to Improve the Law and the Administration of Justice

CANON 4: A judge may, with due regard to official duties, engage
in activities to improve the law, the legal system and the
administration of justice. (Sections 1-15)
Albos v. Alaba, A.M.No. MTJ-91517, March 11, 1994. A judge

who failed to sign the order granting bail to the accused and who
left for an out of town was found to have been remised of his
responsibility as a judge.
5. Duty to Avoid Conflict with Judicial Responsibilities

CANON 5: A judge should regulate extra-judicial activities to
minimize the risk of conflict of judicial duties. (Sections 1 - 5)
Re. Conviction of Judge Angeles, A. M. No. RT J-06-9-5215, 543

SCRA. The Court held that a judge cannot be suspended in the
discharge of her responsibilities until after conviction of a
criminal offense she allegedly committed has become final and
executory.
Sy v. Judge Fineza, A. M. RT J-03-1808, October 15, 2003, 413

SCRA 374. The Court will not condone the acts of judges of
accepting money from a litigant with a pending case before his
court nor should a judge be seen dining with a litigant facing a
criminal case before his court.
6. Duty to Exhibit Competence and Diligence

CANON 6: Competence and Diligence (Sections 1-7)
Lubaton v. Judge Lazaro, A.M. RTJ-12-2320, September 2,

2013. The S.C. held that the 90-day period within which a
sitting trial Judge should decide a case or resolve a pending
matter is mandatory. If the Judge cannot decide or resolve within
the period, she can be allowed additional time to do so, provided
she files a written request for the extension of her time to decide
the case or resolve the pending matter. The rule, albeit
mandatory, is to be implemented with an awareness of the
limitations that may prevent a Judge from being efficient. Under
the circumstances specific to this case, it would be unkind and
inconsiderate on the part of the Court to disregard Judge
Lazaro’s limitations and exact a rigid and literal compliance with
41 | P a g e
the rule. With her undeniably heavy inherited docket and the
large volume of her official workload, she most probably failed to
note the need for her to apply for the extension of the 90-day
period to resolve the Motion to Dismiss.
Re: Cases Submitted for Decision before Hon. Teofilo D.

Baluma, Former Judge, Branch 1, Regional Trial Court,
Tagbilaran City, Bohol, A. M. No. RTJ-13-2355, September 2,
2013: For his failure to sufficiently explain why he failed to act on
the twenty-three (23) cases submitted for decision/resolution,
the S.C. imposed upon him administrative sanctions. The Court
held that it has consistently impressed upon judges the need to
decide cases promptly and expeditiously under the time-honored
precept that justice delayed is justice denied. Every judge should
decide cases with dispatch and should be careful, punctual, and
observant in the performance of his functions for delay in the
disposition of cases erodes the faith and confidence of our people
in the judiciary, lowers its standards and brings it into disrepute.
OCA v. Hon. Soriano, A.M. No. MTJ-07-1683, September 11,

2013.The S.C. held that Judge Soriano has been remiss in the
performance of his judicial duties for his failure to decide thirty-
six (36) cases submitted for decision in MTC and MTCC, which
were all due for decision at the time he compulsorily retired.
Such unreasonable delay in deciding cases and resolving
incidents and motions, and his failure to decide the remaining
cases before his compulsory retirement constitutes gross
inefficiency. The Court that this warrants the imposition of an
administrative sanction on the defaulting judge. Judge Soriano’s
inefficiency in managing his caseload was compounded by gross
negligence as evinced by the loss of the records of at least four (4)
cases which could no longer be located or reconstituted despite
diligent efforts by his successor. Judge Soriano was responsible
for managing his court efficiently to ensure the prompt delivery of
court services, especially the speedy disposition of cases. Thus,
Judge Soriano was found guilty of gross inefficiency and gross
ignorance of the law, and fined P40,000 to be taken from the
amount withheld from his retirement benefits.
Re: Failure of Former Judge Carbonell to Decide Cases

Submitted for Decision and Resolve Pending Motions in the
RTC, Branch 27, San Fernando, La Union, A.M. No. 08-5-305-
RTC, July 9, 2013: The S. C. said that Carbonell’s failure to
decide cases within the reglamentary 90-day period without any
justifiable and credible reasons constitutes gross inefficiency.
The Court reiterated that as a frontline official of the Judiciary, a
trial judge should always act with efficiency and probity. He is
duty-bound not only to be faithful to the law, but also to
maintain professional competence. The pursuit of excellence
ought always to be his guiding principle. Such dedication is the
least that he can do to sustain the trust and confidence that the
public have reposed in him and the institution he represents.
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The Court reduced the recommended penalty of fine from
P50,000 to P20,000 considering that Judge Carbonell has retired
due to disability, his poor health condition may have greatly
contributed to his inability to efficiently perform his duties as a
trial judge.
Tupal v. Judge Rojo, etc., A.M. No. MTJ-14-1842. February 24,

2014.The Court held Judge Rojo guilty of violating the New Code
of Judicial Conduct and Circular No. 1–90, and of gross
ignorance of the law. He was suspended for six months for
having notarized affidavits of cohabitation, which were
documents not connected with the exercise of his official
functions and duties as solemnizing officer. He also notarized
affidavits of cohabitation without certifying that lawyers or
notaries public were lacking in his court’s territorial jurisdiction.
As a solemnizing officer, the judge’s only duty involving the
affidavit of cohabitation is to examine whether the parties have
indeed lived together for at least five years without legal
impediment to marry. The Guidelines do not state that the judge
can notarize the parties’ affidavit of cohabitation. Notarizing
affidavits of cohabitation is inconsistent with the duty to examine
the parties’ requirements for marriage.
Note: Circular No. 1–90 dated February 26, 1990. Circular

No. 1–90 allows municipal trial court judges to act as
notaries public ex officio and notarize documents only if
connected with their official functions and duties.
Any fee collected by the judge in his capacity as notary
public must be turned over to the Municipal Treasurer.
Otherwise, he may be guilty of double compensation.
Dulalia v. Judge Cajigal, A.M. No. OCA IPI No. 10-3492-RTJ,

December 4, 2013. S.C. said that as a matter of public policy, a
judge cannot be subjected to liability for any of his official acts,
no matter how erroneous, as long as he acts in good faith. To
hold otherwise would be to render judicial office untenable, for
no one called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the
process of administering justice can be infallible in his
judgment. The Court reminded parties that resort to judicial
remedies must be exercised to question the decision of the trial
judge. Bad faith on the part of the trial judge should never be
imputed unless the same can be supported by evidence.
Bayaca v. Judge Ramos (RIP), A. M. No. MT J-07-1676, 577

SCRA 93: S.C. held that gross misconduct and serious lapses in
the conduct of the affairs of the court merit dismissal from the
judiciary except for reasons of compassion, the Court awarded
the retirement benefits of the judge who died during the
pendency of this administrative case.
Ma. Liza M. Jorda, City Prosecutor’s Office, Tacloban City v.

Judge Bitas; Prosecutor Leo C. Tabao v. Judge Bitas, A.M.
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No. RTJ-14-2376/A.M. No. RTJ-14-2377. March 5, 2014. The
Court held Judge Bitas judge liable for gross ignorance of the law
when he deviated from the requirement of a hearing where there
is an application for bail and aggravated his offense when he also
granted bail to Miralles without neither conducting a hearing nor
a motion for application for bail. Judge Bitas’ acts are not mere
deficiency in prudence, discretion and judgment on his part, but
a patent disregard of well-known rules. When an error is so
gross and patent, such error produces an inference of bad faith.
Miralles was charged with Qualified Trafficking, which under
Section 10 (C) of R.A. No. 9208 is punishable by life
imprisonment and a fine of not less than P2,000,000 but not
more than P5,000,000. Thus, by reason of the penalty
prescribed by law, the grant of bail is a matter of discretion
which can be exercised only by Judge Bitas after the evidence is
submitted in a hearing. The hearing of the application for bail in
capital offenses is absolutely indispensable before a judge can
properly determine whether the prosecution’s evidence is weak or
strong.
Lorenzana v. Judge Austria, A.M. No. RTJ-09-2200, April 2,

2014. The Court reiterated the rule that in administrative cases
and disbarment proceedings, the complainant bears the onus of
proving the averments of his complaint by substantial evidence.
In this case, the allegations of grave abuse of authority,
irregularity in the performance of duty, grave bias and partiality,
and lack of circumspection are devoid of merit because the
complainant failed to establish Judge Austria’s bad faith, malice
or ill will. The complainant merely pointed to circumstances
based on mere conjectures and suppositions. These, by
themselves, however, are not sufficient to prove the accusations.
Even granting that the judge erred in the exercise of her judicial
functions, these are legal errors correctible not by a disciplinary
action, but by judicial remedies that are readily available to the
complainant. An administrative complaint is not the appropriate
remedy for every irregular or erroneous order or decision issued
by a judge where a judicial remedy is available, such as a motion
for reconsideration or an appeal.
D. Disqualification of Justices and Judges (Rule 137)

Prohibition on practice of profession: No member of the judiciary
may practice their profession during their incumbency.
1. Duty to resolve pending matters within prescriptive period
●All matters pending with the Supreme Court must be
resolved with 24 months;
●Twelve (12) months for all collegiate appellate courts; and
●Three (3) months for all other lower courts. (Section 15(1),
1987 Constitution)
2. Disqualification and Inhibition of Judges: may be

voluntary or involuntary: There are two rules governing the
qualification and voluntary inhibition of judges: Section 1,
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Rule 137 of the Rules of Court; and Rule 3. 12 of the New
Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary.
Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court provides:”
Disqualification of judges. – No judge or judicial officer shall
sit in any case in which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily
interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise , or in which
he is related to either party within the sixth degree of
consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth
degree, computed according to the rules of the civil law,
or in which he has been executor, administrator, guardian,
trustee or counsel, or in which he has presided in any
inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of
review, without the written consent of all parties in interest,
signed by them and entered upon the record.
A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify
himself from sitting in case, for just or valid reasons other
than those mentioned above.” (ex. If judge served as wedding
sponsor to one of the litigants or litigant is his “kasambahay.”)
Canon 3 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the

Philippine Judiciary states:
“Rule 3.12. – A Judge should take no part in proceeding where
the judge’s impartially might reasonably be questioned. These
cases include, among others, proceedings where:
a. The judge has personal knowledge of disputed
evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding;
b. The judge served as executor, administrator, guardian,
trustees or lawyer in the case or matter in controversy, or
a former associate of the judge served as counsel during
their association, or the judge or lawyer was a material
witness therein;
c. The judge’s ruling in a lower court is the subject of
review;
d. The judge is related by consanguinity or affinity to a
party litigant within the sixth degree or to co-counsel
within the fourth degree;
e. The judge knows that his spouse or child has a financial
interest, as heir, legatee, creditor, fiduciary, or otherwise,
in the subject matter in controversy or in a party to the
proceeding, or any other interest that could be
substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding.”
Voluntary Inhibition: When voluntary inhibition be done:

A judge is allowed under the second paragraph of Section 1 of
Rule 137 of the Rules of Court, supra, to voluntary inhibit
from a case for just or valid reasons other than those grounds
of disqualification.
Re: Complaint filed by Lucena B. Rallos against Justices

Gabriel T. Ingles, Pamela Ann Maxino, and Carmelita S.
Manahan, IPI No. 12-203-CA-J/A.M. No. 12-9-08-CA, December
10, 2013. Complainant charged Justice Hernando with
45 | P a g e
manifest bias because he voluntarily inhibited himself in CA-
G.R. CEB SP. No. 06676 only after the promulgation of the
March 28, 2012 and April 13, 2012 resolutions. Complainant
alleged that she should have been informed of the voluntary
inhibition. The Court, however, said that under the internal
rules of the C.A., the same was not necessary. In the spirit of
transparency, the Court held that henceforth all the parties in
any action or proceedings should be immediately notified of
any mandatory disqualification or voluntary inhibition of the
Justice who has participated in any action of the court, stating
the reason for the mandatory disqualification or voluntary
inhibition. The requirement of notice is a measure to ensure
that the disqualification or inhibition has not been resorted to
in order to cause injustice to or to prejudice any party or
cause.
How voluntary inhibition is effected: A judge may motu

proprio or on motion of a party voluntarily recluse from a case
if he has good or valid reasons which render him incapable of
acting objectively on the case.
When a judge should not inhibit himself: Absent any

ground for disqualification, a judge should not inhibit and if a
motion to that effect is filed, he should deny it if, despite the
circumstances cited by the movant, he honestly believes that
he can act on the case objectively.
Remittal of Disqualification: Nature of remittal: Remittal of

disqualification is the process by which a judge who is
disqualified to sit on a case on any of the grounds enumerated
in Section 5, Canon 3, may purge himself of such a
disqualification so that he may act upon the case.
How remittal is effected: This process is allowed under

Section 6 of the same Canon which provides:
“A judge disqualified as stated above may, instead of
withdrawing from the proceeding, disclose on the record the
basis of disqualification. If, based on such disclosure, the
parties and lawyers, independently of the judge’s participation,
all agree in writing that the reason for inhibition is immaterial
or unsubstantial; the judge may then participate in the
proceeding. The Agreement, signed by all the parties and
lawyers, shall be incorporated in the record of the
proceedings.”
E. Removal of Members of the Supreme Court and

Administrative Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court over
Judges and Justices
1. Members of the Supreme Court: Impeachment. (Section 2,

Article XI, 1987 Constitution); Grounds; and Proceedings
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Republic v. Sereno, (G.R. No. 237428, May 18, 2018): The
Court held that quo warranto may be a remedy to oust an
impeachable public official. An infirmity in the qualification of
the appointed public official may subject of a challenge
instituted by the republic. The pending consideration of an
impeachment complaint shall not bar the removal of the
public officer through quo warranto proceedings.
In re: Undated letter of Mr. Louis C. Biraogo (A.M. No. 09-

2-19, S.C.): The Court fined a retired justice of the Supreme
Court with P500, 000.00 and indefinite suspension for
premature release of a decision involving the citizenship
requirement of a member of the House of Representatives. The
Court applied the principle of res ipsa loquitor in this case.
In Re: Letter Complaint of Atty. Pena against Justices

Carpio and Sereno (A.M. No. 12-6-11- SC): The Court
dismissed the complaint for failure of Atty. Pena to
substantiate his allegations and that the same are purely
conjectures which cannot be a subject of judicial review.
2. Discipline of Appellate Justices and Lower Court Judges:

Read Section 11, Article VIII, 1987 Constitution
(1). Jurisdiction over disciplinary cases: The Supreme
Court en banc shall have the power to discipline appellate
justices and lower court judges.
(2). Vote required dismissing a member of the judiciary: A

majority vote of all justices who actually took part in the
deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon.
3. Grounds for disciplinary action over appellate and trial

judges
Arabani Jr . v Arabani (A.M. No. SCC-10-14-P, A.M. No. SCC-
10-15-P, A.M. No. SCC-11-17 February 21, 2017): Presiding
Judge Bensaudi A. Arabani, Jr. charged respondents Rahim A.
Arabani, Junior Process Server, and Abduraji G. Bakil, Utility
Worker I, with conduct unbecoming of a court employee,
dishonesty, insubordination, and misconduct arising out of
Bakil's alleged punching of Rahim's bundy card on three (3)
occasions despite being repeatedly warned by Judge Arabani.
Judge Arabani charged Clerk of Court Rodrigo Ramos, Jr. with
conduct unbecoming a court employee for loafing during office
hours and his unauthorized absences.
Upon the other hand, the court employees charged Judge
Arabani with conduct unbecoming of a Judge, and many abuses
consisting, among others, of his absences without filing the
corresponding leaves of absence, and toleration of the absences
and tardiness of members of his family. Rahim further claimed
that Judge Arabani was courting a court employee, Sheldalyn A.
Maharan, who he asked to accompany him on his motorcycle to
go around town, professing his love and buying her gifts.
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The Court’s ruling:
1. Following judicial precedents, the Court adopted the penalty
recommended by the OCA, and accordingly suspended
Abduraji and Rahim for a period of six (6) months without pay
for dishonesty.
The Court also reprimanded them for their failure to comply
with Judge Arabani's memorandum requiring them to explain
the subject incidents in writing, which constitutes a violation
of reasonable office rules and regulations, a light offense
punishable with reprimand for the first offense.
2. The Court imposed upon Ramos the penalty of six (6) months
and one (1) day suspension for his unauthorized absences.
3. Respondent Judge Arabani was found GUILTY of sexual
harassment classified as a less grave offense under Section 53
(B) (5), Rule X of Civil Service Commission Resolution No. 01-
0940, and is accordingly SUSPENDED for six (6) months
without pay. The charge that Judge Arabani made a drawing of
a vagina and a penis, and thereafter showed it to Sheldalyn
was corroborated by Mirad, a disinterested witness,
who categorically declared that it was Judge Arabani who made
the drawing, and affirmed that it was he (Mirad) who crumpled
it. The act was enough to create an intimidating, hostile, or
offensive environment for Sheldalyn such that all subsequent
interaction with Judge Arabani became unwelcome on her part.
Miano v Aguilar (A.M. No. RTJ-15-2408, March 2, 2016): The

instant administrative case arose from a Verified Complaint filed
by complainant Atty. Florante A. Miano before the Office of the
Court Administrator charging respondent Ma. Ellen M. Aguilar,
Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Burgos,
Pangasinan, Branch 70, with ignorance of the rules on inhibition
and gross inefficiency relative to several pending cases in
her sala.
The Court found respondent Ma. Ellen M. Aguilar GUILTY of
Undue Delay in Issuing Orders in Several Cases and Undue
Delay in Transmitting the Records of a Case. She
was SUSPENDED from office without salary and other benefits
for a period of three (3) months, with a warning that a repetition
of the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely.
Marquez et al. v. Ovejera (A.M. No. P-11-2903, February 5,

2014): The complainants instituted an administrative complaint
against Judge Ovejera and Collado for violations of their
administrative and judicial functions. The Court dismissed the
case against Judge Ovejera but found Lourdes E. Collado
GUILTY of violating Section 8 in relation to Section 11 of
Republic Act No. 6713 for her failure to duly comply with the
legal requirements pertaining to the submission of her Statement
of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth (SALN) and was FINED the
amount of ₱5,000.00 which was deducted from her retirement
benefits in view of her compulsory retirement on June 11, 2011.
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4. Sanctions: fines, suspension, dismissal from office, forfeiture
of benefits and disbarment
OCA v. Former MTC Judge Liangco (A.C. No.5355, December 11,

2011). A trial court judge was dismissed from service for gross
misconduct and gross ignorance of the law. He allowed a local
government unit to take possession and awarded ownership of a
private property without any expropriation proceedings having been
filed by the government. As a defense, the judge said that what he
rendered was not a decision but only an opinion. After his
dismissal, the Court initiated disbarment proceedings against him
before the IBP. The IBP recommended his disbarment which the
Court affirmed.
OCA v. Grageda (A.M. No. RTJ-10-2235, March 11, 2013): The

Court Administrator recommended that respondent Judge Jesus L.
Grageda (ret.) be found GUILTY of Gross Ignorance of the Law for
rendering orders/resolution on his retirement day and Gross
Inefficiency for undue delay in rendering decisions or orders and be
FINED in the amount of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos
(₱200,000.00) to be taken from the ₱200,000.00 withheld from his
retirement benefits. The Supreme Court, however, dismissed the
case against Judge Grageda in view of his compulsory retirement
from service.
The Court said that jurisprudence is replete with rulings that in
order for the Court to acquire jurisdiction over an administrative
proceeding, the complaint must be filed during the incumbency of
the respondent public official or employee. This is because the filing
of an administrative case is predicated on the holding of a position
or office in the government service. However, once jurisdiction has
attached, the same is not lost by the mere fact that the public
official or employee was no longer in office during the pendency of
the case. In fine, cessation from office by reason of resignation,
death or retirement is not a ground to dismiss the case filed against
the said officer or employee at the time that he was still in the
public service or render it moot and academic.
Lagado v. Leonido (A.M. No. P-14-3222, August 12, 2014): Judge

Lagado filed an administrative case against respondent Clerk II
Bryan Antonio C. Leonido of the Municipal Trial Court of Mahaplag,
Leyte, for encashing checks due to other court employees. The
Court found GUILTY of Dishonesty and Grave Misconduct and
would have been DISMISSED from service, had he not been earlier
dropped from the rolls effective January 3, 2011. The Court
forfeited his retirement and other benefits, except accrued leave
credits and PERPETUALLY DISQUALIFIED him from re-employment
in any government agency or instrumentality, including any
government-owned and controlled corporation or government
financial institution.
Re: Complaint of Velasco (A.M. OCA I.P.I. No. 10-25-SB-J

January 15, 2013): An administrative complaint was filed by
49 | P a g e
Leonardo A. Velasco against the respondents, Honorable Associate
Justices Francisco H. Villaruz, Jr., Alex L. Quiroz, and Samuel R.
Martires of the Third Division of the Sandiganbayan for grave
misconduct and violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct.
Mayor Pacifico Velasco was convicted for violation of R.A. 3019 and
his Motion for Reconsideration was denied. However, there was a
considerable delay in the execution of judgement of Mayor Velasco
which complainant Leonardo Velasco questioned.
The Court admonished Honorable Associate Justices Francisco H.
Villaruz, Jr., Alex L. Quiroz, and Samuel R. Martires of the Third
Division of the Sandiganbayan to be ·more circumspect and prudent
in observing the proper rules and procedures for the execution of
judgments of conviction in the absence of restraining orders or
injunctive writs from the Court.
OCA v Amor (A.M. No. RTJ-08-2140, October 7, 2014): The Court

received a report on several acts committed by respondent judge.
Among them were:
a. Respondent impounded the tricycle of a certain Gervin Ojeda
at the Hall of Justice of Daet, Camarines Norte, when the
latter bumped the former’s vehicle and was unable to pay the
amount demanded for the incurred damages. Another judge
discovered that Judge Amor berated the guards of the Hall of
Justice, including Security Guard Morico, for issuing the
certification (of the impounding), and that SG Morico and
Head Guard Quintin Fernandez tried to conceal the alleged
acts of grave abuse of authority by respondent
b. Judge Amor accused Judge Lalwani – an acting presiding
judge, of being lazy and abusive. Respondent instructed Judge
Lalwani to go slow with the trial of a BP 22 case as the
accused therein was his friend
c. Under the pretext of a judicial visit, respondent visited Judge
Contreras at the latter’s chambers and personally intervened
for one Atty. Freddie Venida, who was previously arrested and
charged with indirect contempt. Respondent then told Judge
Contreras that he does not mind Atty. Verida’s abusive
practice as he gives him gold which was abundant in Paracale,
Camarines Norte. Respondent further sneered at Judge
Contreras for “not exploiting the situation” and intimated to
the latter that Atty. Venida would give him gold.
d. Respondent was habitually absent resulting in delays in the
disposition of cases in violation of existing laws and circulars
on speedy trial.
e. Upon assumption as Executive Judge, respondent ordered
Clerk of Court Atty. Perfecto Loria to submit all petitions for
extrajudicial foreclosures to him for scrutiny, especially those
requiring publication upon filing, resulting in the delay in the
proceedings.
The Court held that the totality of respondent’s acts warrant the
imposition of the penalty of dismissal from service but since he
filed his Certificate of Candidacy, he is deemed resigned from
50 | P a g e
the judiciary. Corollary thereto, such penalty carries with it the
following administrative disabilities:
a) cancellation of civil service eligibility;
b) forfeiture of retirement and other benefits, except accrued
leave credits, if any;
c) perpetual disqualification from reemployment in any
government agency or instrumentality, including any
government-owned and controlled corporations or
government financial institution; and
d) bar from taking the civil service examinations
51 | P a g e

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Far Eastern University

Part I. Legal Ethics

Gacias v. Balauitan (507 SCRA 8, 2006): There is no distinction

B. The Attorney’s Oath (Rules of Court, Form 28)

Alawi v. Alauya, A.M. SDC-97-2-P, February 24, 1997: Only

The Four-fold duty of a lawyer under the Attorney’s Oath:

C. Different Roles of a Lawyer

II. Practice of Law

Cayetano v. Monsod (201 SCRA 210): Practice of law under

Paguia v. Office of the President (621 SCRA 600): Petitioner’s

Natanauan v. Atty. Tolentino, A.C. No. 4269 (11 October 2016):

Sps. Eustaquio v. Atty. Navales, A.C. No. 10465 (8 June 2016:

B. The elements of the legal profession

III. Requirements for Admission to the Practice of Law

B. Citizenship and Residency

In Re: Vicente Ching, BAR MATTER No. 914 October 1, 1999: A

D. Good Moral Character

Re: Petition of Al Argosino to Take the Lawyer’s Oath, B.M. No.

Good moral character is a continuing requirement.

Cordon v. Balicanta (390 SCRA 299 (2002): A lawyer who used

Arellano University, Inc. v. Mijares III, (605 SCRA 93, 2009): A

Zaguirre v. Atty. Castillo, A.C. No. 4921. March 6, 2003: A bar

Patricia Figueroa v. Simeon Barranco, Jr. (1970 bar passer),

F. Signing of the Roll of Attorneys

In re: Petition to Sign in the Roll of Attorneys, Michael O.

G. Membership in the Integrated Bar of the Philippines

In the Matter of the Integration of the Bar of the Philippines (9

In the Matter of the Inquiry into the 1989 Elections of the

In the Matter of the Brewing Controversies in the Elections of

In Re JOAQUIN T. BORROMEO, Ex Rel. Cebu City Chapter of

New Schedule of Membership Fees:

The application for life membership shall be approved by the

PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 181 (1973)

IV. Non-lawyers Authorized to Appear in Court

A. A.M. No. 19-03-24-SC Rule 138-A Law Student Practice,

Limited Practice of Law:

The Rule requires that law students, before engaging in practice of

The basic distinction between the two levels involve the

Section 4 enumerates the areas of law student-practitioners can

Section 5 enumerates the requirements for certification application,

Section 7 is the counterpart of the lawyer's signature provision

Section 9 enumerates the duties of law schools, one of which is to

RULES OF COURT, Rule 116, Sec. 7: Appointment of counsel de

LABOR CODE, Art. 222 – Non-lawyers can appear in NLRC cases if

A.M. No. 08-8-7-SC, Sec. 17 (1 February 2016): Section 17.

B. Proceedings where lawyers are prohibited from appearing:

C. Sanctions for practice or appearance without authority

Acts constituting contempt: Misbehavior as an officer of the

2. Persons who are not lawyers: Indirect Contempt (Sec. 3

Ciocon-Reer v. Lubao, 674 SCRA 13: Not all administrative

V. Prohibitions and Restrictions on the Private Practice of Law

● LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE, Sec. 90, par. (b) – Vice-

● REPUBLIC ACT NO. 910 (1953): AN TO PROVIDE FOR THE

VI. THE CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

A. The Lawyer and Society

Ecraela v. Pangalangan, A.C. No. 10676 (8 September 2015):

Reyes v. Atty. Nieva, A.C. No. 8560 (6 September 2016): A

Rule 1.02. Shall not counsel defiance of the law

Fernando Chu v. Atty. Guico, Jr., A.C. No. 10573(13 January

Rule 1.03. Shall not encourage corruptly motivated suit, or delay

Linsangan v. Atty. Tolentino, A.C. No. 6672 (4 September

Rule 1.04. Shall encourage client to avoid or end controversy

Canon 2 - A lawyer shall make his legal services available in an