BARTOSZ BROŻEK

MEDIEVAL THEORIES OF DOUBLE TRUTH

1. Greek philosophy and Christian faith

One of the most interesting and important clashes of ideas in the history of western
civilization is the encounter between Greek philosophy and Christian faith. The term ‘clash’ may be
a little misleading in this context since is only justified as long as one maintains that both Athens
and Jerusalem represent two great and sometimes incompatible traditions. On the other hand,
however, the encounter between Greek philosophy and Judaeo-Christian faith was far from being a
sudden and unexpected event. It was rather a gradual process of the incorporation of Christian ideas
into the Greek conceptual scheme. Most of the early fathers of the Church, like Origen, were well
educated representatives of Hellenistic culture. It is Greek philosophy which constituted the base for
the development of the theology of early Christendom.
It is well known that the first phase of medieval philosophy was platonic or rather
neoplatonic. This is an important factor that made easier (or even possible) the formulation of the
articles of faith in philosophical terms. Platonic and neoplatonic metaphors (like that of Demiurg or
of emanations) are well-suited for expressing the Transcendent. It is not the case, however, with
Aristotelian philosophy, which is rather based on common-sense experience.

1.1. The Arabic influence: the philosophy of Averroes

The first serious encounter between Aristotelian philosophy and a monotheistic religion is
recorded in the writings of Arabic philosophers. Arabic philosophy flourished from the 9 th to the 12th
century. Its first representatives, al-Kindi, al-Farabi and Avicenna (Ibn Sina), were aware of
Aristotelian conceptions but were to varying degrees influenced by a neoplatonic way of
philosophizing. The doctrines developed by the three philosophers caused a number of theological
problems and prompted a very significant reaction from one of the most prominent theologians of
Arabic world, al-Ghazali. Of particular note is that Ghazali decided to meet philosophers on their
own ground. He wrote:
I was convinced that a man cannot grasp what is defective in any of the sciences unless he
has so complete a grasp of the science in question that he equals its most learned exponents
 in the appreciation of its fundamental principles, and even goes beyond and surpasses them,
probing into some of the tangles and profundities which the very professors of the science
have neglected. Then and only then is it possible that what he has to assert about its defects
is true.1
Ghazali attacked philosophers – in a philosophical manner – in Tahafut al-Falasifah (“Incoherence
of the Philosophers”). From our point of view, one of the most significant aspects of this treatise is
Ghazali’s analysis of the problem of the necessary connection between causes and effects.
Philosophers maintain, Ghazali argues, that when a causal connection is established it has to be a
necessary one. Ghazali disagrees with this view saying that “one has to contest it, for on its negation
depends the possibility of affirming the existence of miracles which interrupt the usual course of
nature like the changing of the rod into a serpent or the resurrection of the dead or the cleavage of
the moon, and those who consider the ordinary course of nature a logical necessity regard all this as
impossible.”2 According to our theologian, the very possibility of miracles is put into doubt once the
Aristotelian account of cause and effect is assumed. Ghazali’s resolution of the problem stated
above, which essentially follows the lines of the much later and more famous Humean attack on
causality, does not interest us here. What needs to be stressed is the discovery of a very important
source of incompatibility between philosophical and theological worldviews. We will come back to
this point on several occasions.
Ghazali’s work was highly influential. A proof of this fact may be found in the writings of
Spanish Arab Averroes (Ibn Rushd), who wrote Tahafut al-Tahafut (“Incoherence of Incoherence”),
a work rebutting, one by one, the theses put forward by Ghazali. The philosophy of Averroes, who
followed Aristotle as closely as no other influential Arabic thinker, is full of arguments that aim at
establishing the connection between theology and philosophy. In one of his major works, Fasl al-
Maquâl (“Decisive Treaty”), Averroes says: “the purpose of this treatise is to examine, from the
standpoint of the study of the [Religious] Law, whether the study of philosophy and logic is allowed
by the [Religious] Law, or prohibited, or commanded – either by way of recommendation or as
obligatory.”3 The Spanish philosopher does not hesitate to conclude that “since reflection is nothing
more than inference and drawing out of the unknown from the known, and since this is reasoning or
at any rate done by reasoning, therefore we are under an obligation to carry on our study of beings
by intellectual reasoning.”4 The problem of this solution becomes visible when, as in the case of
causal connections, the results of natural reasoning contradict the articles of faith. The emphasis put
on rational reflection – the “obligation to carry on our study of beings” – may lead, as sometimes

1
Ghazali 1963, p. 29; quoted after Giacama, Bahlul 2000.
2
Ghazali 1962, p. 192; Averroes 1954, p. 1:313, quoted after Giacama, Bahlul 2000.
3
Averroes 1967, p. 44; quoted after Taylor 2000, p. 3.
4
Averroes 1967, p. 45; quoted after Taylor 2000, p. 3.
indicated5, to the possibility of adopting a kind of double truth theory.
Although Averroes has been from time to time accused of maintaining double truth, his
explicit declarations are to the contrary. In Fasl al-Maquâl one can find the following passage:
“Now since this religion is true and summons to the study which leads to the knowledge of
the Truth, we the Muslim community know definitely that demonstrative study does not lead
to [conclusions] conflicting with what Scripture [or Religious Law] has given us; for truth
does not oppose truth but accords with it and bears witness to it.”6
Averroes assures us, therefore, that there is only one truth and there is no possibility of a conflict
between faith and reason and, consequently, there is no place for a double truth theory. The quoted
fragment, although plain and clear, does not tell us what to do if the conclusions of natural reason
seem to contradict the truth as found in scripture and religious law. In order to formulate Averroes’
answer to this question, a few aspects of his anthropology must be reported.
The commentator observes that “the natures of men are on different levels with respect to
[their paths to] assent. One of them comes to assent through demonstration; another comes to assent
through dialectical arguments, just as firmly as the demonstrative man through demonstration, since
his nature does not contain any greater capacity; while another comes to assent through rhetorical
arguments, again just as firmly as the demonstrative man through demonstrative argument.”7 Here
Averroes, using the Aristotelian concepts of logic (the science of demonstration), dialectics and
rhetoric differentiates between three types of human nature. He comes to the conclusion that every
type has its own way of reaching the certainty as regards the articles of faith. He does not hesitate,
however, to indicate that the three methods are not equal: only the philosopher, i.e. the one who
practices demonstration, assents to the articles of faith by the way of reasoning that necessarily
leads to true conclusions8. For this reason Averroes notes:
“[We] affirm definitely that whenever the conclusion of a demonstration is in conflict with
the apparent meaning of Scripture [or Religious Law], that apparent meaning admits of
allegorical interpretation according to the rules for such interpretation in Arabic. This
proposition is questioned by no Muslim and doubted by no believer. (…) Indeed we may say
that whenever a statement in Scripture [or Religious Law] conflicts in its apparent meaning
with a conclusion of demonstration, if Scripture [or Religious Law] is considered carefully,
and the rest of its contents searched page by page, there will invariably be found among the
expressions of Scripture [or Religious Law] something which in its apparent meaning bears

5
Cf. Swieżawski 2000, p. 551.
6
Averroes 1967, p. 50; quoted after Taylor 2000, p. 6. Taylor translates the last sentence in the following way: “Truth
does not contradict truth but rather is consistent with it and bears witness to it”.
7
Averroes 1967, p. 49; quoted after Taylor 2000, p. 5.
8
Cf. Taylor 2000.
 witness to that allegorical interpretation or comes close to bearing witness.”9
Averroes’ position, as presented in the passage, is perfectly clear: there is no possibility of there
being a contradiction between what has been established by demonstration and the ‘real’ meaning of
scripture. If such an apparent contradiction occurs one has to look for an appropriate allegorical
interpretation of the scripture. Two aspects of the Commentator’s conception are worth noticing.
First, when a contradiction appears it is the reading of the scripture and not the argument of natural
reason that has to be modified. Second, the presented way of resolving the apparent conflicts
between faith and reason is applicable only when the ‘natural’ reasoning involved deserves the
name ‘demonstration’.
This second aspect is of particular interest. In Topics Aristotle distinguishes between three
types of arguments: demonstrative, dialectic and eristic10. Demonstrations are syllogisms that,
besides having a valid form, use true premises, i.e. premises that are self-evident (axioms) or
deduced from axioms. Dialectic syllogisms have valid forms and are composed of premises that are
accepted by all or nearly all people or by specialists in a field. Aristotle describes dialectic premises
using the word œndoxa that could be translated as “founded on the common opinion” or
“probable”. The term ‘probable’ could be further paraphrased as ‘credible’. Therefore, we do not
speak here of probability in its typical, 20th century meaning. This fact should be kept in mind, as
we will encounter a similar problem in the writings of Medieval Latin philosophers. Finally, a
syllogism is eristic if it has an invalid form or uses premises that only pretend to be œndoxa.

It is easy to realize that the most important question in the context of Averroes’ conception
of interpreting scripture and religious law reads as follows: what is the criterion of distinguishing
between first principles (self-evident statements that could serve as demonstrative premises) and
œndoxa (dialectic premises)? Aristotle gives a somewhat vague answer to this question11,
underlining the role of both induction and ‘rational intuition’. This problem becomes clearly visible
when one looks at a practical application of the theory of Averroes described above.
In Tahafut al-Tahafut the Commentator did not use demonstrative arguments since what was
required to rebut Ghazali’s theses was only a certain level of persuasiveness. As Averroes notes
himself, “nothing (…) of what we have said in this book is a technical demonstrative proof; they are
all non-technical statements, some of them having greater persuasion than others, and it is in this
spirit that what we have written here must be understood.”12 Therefore, “it is for [the reader] to
inquire about these questions in the places where they are treated in the books of demonstration.”13

9
Averroes 1967, p. 51; quoted after Taylor 2000, p. 5. Cf. St. Augustine, De gensi ad litteram I, 18, 39; Epistola 143.
10
See Aristotle 1995a, 100a – 101a.
11
Aristotle 1995b, 99b-100b. Cf. Zupko 2003, p. 114.
12
Averroes 1969, p. 257-258; quoted after Taylor 2000, p. 8-9.
13
Ibid.
On the other hand there are writings where Averroes seems to tackle philosophical issues with less
methodological care. As R.C. Taylor indicates, “Averroes seems to have gone further than his
arguments would allow in his denial of the possibility of personal immortality in the Long
Commentary of De Anima, which was based on philosophical argumentation which hardly could be
said to have started from ‘premises of demonstrated knowledge’ (…).”14 The denial resulted from
the use of the Commentator’s own reconstruction of Aristotles’ epistemology that did not deserve
anything more than being called œndoxa. Therefore, “Averroes’ proper conclusion should have
been that, on the principles accepted by him, there was no demonstration of personal immortality.”15
This subtle issue demonstrates the kinds of problems that will be at the centrecentre of our
attention in the remaining part of this chapter. In this context, two observations are vitally
important. First, Aristotelian philosophy gives rise to a conception that identifies a specific kind of
knowledge attained by the use of natural reason that could challenge or exclude some
interpretations of scripture. Second, Averroes indicates different levels (or methods) of approaching
truth (even as regards ‘natural cognition’). All this provides a conducive environment for a theory
of double truth to originate.

1.2. The first condemnation

As already noted, the writings of Aristotle remained unknown to the Latin world for several
centuries (with the exception of a part of Organon translated by Boethius in the 6th century).
Aristotelian philosophy was rediscovered by the West during the 12th century. The works of
Stagiryte were translated into Latin – some from Arabic but some directly from Greek. The writings
of Avicenna and Averroes were also translated. Thanks to the schools of Sicily and Toledo, by the
end of the 12th century Latin scholars were in possession of a vast part of corpus aristotelicum.
As soon as the translations emerged, the problem of the incompatibilities between Aristotle’s
philosophy and Christian faith arose since some of the central theses of the corpus aristotelicum
were contrary to important claims backed by the authority of the Holy Church. The examples are
well known: Stagiryte’s insistence on the eternity of the world as opposed to the Christian creatio
ex nihilo; the impossibility of there being a vacuum which thus questions God’s omnipotence, etc.
Two elements in particular made the situation serious. On the one hand Aristotle’s philosophy was
difficult to be reinterpreted in a way which maintained its consistency with the theses officially
advocated by the Church. On the other, the character of Stagyrite’s teachings was so appealing that
the authority of the Philosopher began to grow very rapidly.
Apart from the substantial (doctrinal) causes there were also some important institutional

14
Taylor 2000, p. 11-12.
15
Ibid., p. 12.
factors that, combined with the confluence of ideas described, resulted in the dramatic events of the
late 13th century. This century may justly be called the century of the establishment of European
universities. Parisian University, the major scene of the events to which we will refer below, was the
centre of the ups and downs of the teaching of Aristotle’s works in these years. As early as 1210 the
local Provincial Council of Paris in Sens prohibited the teaching of Aristotelian natural philosophy
(i.e., mathematics, physics and metaphysics). Only five years later the Papal Legate, Robert de
Courçon, banned Aristotle’s Metaphysics and other books on natural philosophy (the ban was
renewed in 1228). At the same time, Stagyrite’s logic was taught at Paris and his natural philosophy
and metaphysics were not banned in Oxford (and also elsewhere, for example in Toulouse).16 It is
reasonable to assume then, that even in Paris the ban was not fully observed and that the entirety of
Aristotle’s corpus was read and discussed privately.
On 13 April 1231 the ban was revised by Pope Gregory IX who decided that Aristotle’s
Physics could be taught but in a censored version. It seems that the censored version was never
produced but nevertheless the event signaled a potential shift in the official evaluation of
Aristotelian philosophy. But the change did not occur very quickly but was rather a gradual process.
During the 1240’s at the Arts Faculty the Parisian masters studied all areas of Aristotle’s philosophy.
An interesting and extremely important fact is that at the same time the masters of the Theological
faculty did not make use of Stagyrite’s thought, bearing in mind Pope Gregory’s warning of 1228
that the word of God should not be mixed up with ideas fabricated by philosophers.17 This is only
one symptom of an important process that led to the distancing of both faculties from one another.
The process accelerated after the 12th of March 1255 when the teaching of Aristotle’s
doctrines was allowed in Paris. The Arts Faculty, no longer viewed as a place only for a preliminary
education preparing for the study of theology, medicine or law, became interested in guaranteeing
its own autonomy. The autonomy in question had two dimensions; on the institutional level it was
concerned with the danger of subordination to the Theological faculty, while on the methodological
level the autonomy of philosophical method was at stake.
All of these kinds of factors combined to create aserious rivalry between the Arts and
Theology faculties which revealed itself in a serious crisis at the Parisian University during the
1270’s. It is not my aim to describe the complicated situation of those years in detail but it is worth
noticing, however, that the so-called Latin Averroism, represented by Siger of Brabant and Boethius
of Dacia, was not only a product of a particular reading of Aristotle’s writings, but also of the
unquiet 13th century, itself filled with institutional perturbations.
An instructive example of the rivalry between the two faculties is the statute issued on April
1st, 1272 at the Arts Faculty. According to the statute, from their entry into the Faculty every master
16
Cf. Dodd 1998, pp. 9-36 and 68-80.
17
See Dodd 1998, p. 22.
and bachelor had to take an oath that he would not dispute any purely theological questions, as it
would constitute a transgression of the limits of their own science (scil. philosophy).18 The oath was
one of the instruments of securing the primacy of theological research over philosophical studies;
later in this chapter, from the example of John Buridan, we will see how it worked in practice.
Meanwhile it has to be noted that the issuance of the statute of 1272 was not the first of the
important events that should be described here.
Two years earlier, on December 10th, 1270, the Bishop of Paris Stephane Tempier
condemned 13 philosophical theses as erroneous. It is instructive to quote Tempier’s decree in
extenso. The condemned theses were:
“1. That the intellect of all human beings is the same and one numerically.
2. That it is false or improper that man perceives.
3. That human will is determined in willing and choosing.
4. That everything that happens in the inferior world happens with necessity of celestial
bodies.
5. That the world is eternal.
6. That there never was the first man.
7. That the soul, which is the form of a man as a man, perishes with the body.
8. That the soul separated after the death from the body does not suffer from corporeal fire.
9. That the free will is passive and not active; and that it is determined by the object of
desire.
10. That God does not perceive individual things.
11. That God does not perceive anything apart from himself.
12. That the divine Providence does not govern human action.
13. That God cannot make immortal or incorruptible things that are mortal or corruptible.”19

18
Statuimus et ordinamus quod nullus magister vel bachellarius nostrae facultatis aliquam questionem pure
theologicam (...), determinare seu etiam disputare presumat, tanquam sibi determinatos limites transgrediens,
Denilfe and Chatelain 1889, vol. I, p. 499.
19
Isti sunt errores condemnati et excommunicati cum omnibus qui eos docuerint scienter vel asseruerint a domino
Stephano, Parisiensi episcopo, anno domini MoCCoLXXo, die mercurii post festum beati Nicholai hyemalis.
Primus articulus est: Quod intellectus omnium hominum est unus et idem numero.
2. Quod ista est falsa vel impropria: homo intelligit.
3. Quod voluntas hominis ex necessitate vult vel eligit.
4. Quod omniqa quae hic in inferioribus aguntur subsunt necessitate corporum celestium.
5. Quod mundus est eternus.
6. Quod nunquam fuit primus homo.
7. Quod anima quae est forma hominis secundum quod homo corrumpitur corruptio corpore.
8. Quod anima post mortem separate non patitur ab igne corporeo.
9. Quod liberum arbitrium est potentia passive, non active; et quod necessitate movetur ab appetibili.
10. Quod Deus non cognoscit singularia.
11. Quod Deus non cognoscit alia a se.
12. Quod humani actus non reguntur providentia Dei.
13. Quod Deus non potest dare immortalitatem vel incorruptionem rei corruptibili vel mortali.
Quoted after van Steenberghen 1977, p. 74-75.
The condemned propositions could be divided, then, into four groups, concerning: the doctrine of
monopsychism20 and its consequences (1,2,7,8,13), determinism of the will (3,4,9), eternity of the
world (5,6) and the negation of divine Providence (10,11,12)21. It is obvious that all 13 theses were
heretical from the viewpoint of Christian faith and that this is the main reason why they were
condemned. The secondary source of Tempier’s action of 1270, however, was the institutional
background referred to above. Yet another issue is whether anyone at the Parisian University in the
second half of the 13th century seriously maintained any of the condemned propositions. This is an
intriguing issue to which this text will return to when reporting on Siger’s and Boethius’ doctrines.

1.3. Condemnation of 1277

Historical evidence suggests that the condemnation of 1270 failed to achieve its aim. The
masters of the facultas artium still taught Aristotelian philosophy and the situation at the Parisian
University was more and more unstable.22 The troubles reached their climax in 1276 and 1277: on
September 2nd 1276 a decree for the entire university was issued which prohibited the teaching in
private places of anything Aristotelian apart from logic and grammar. A few months later on
November 23rd the Inquisotor General of France, Simon du Val, called Siger of Brabant, Gosvin of
La Chapelle and Bernier of Nivelles to appear before him in January 1277 to answer a charge of
heresy. It is likely that by then all of the aforementioned masters had fled Paris and on January 18th,
1277 Pope John XXI asked Stephan Tempier to investigate the events leading to disorder at the
university.23 Finally, on March 7th, 1277 Tempier condemned 219 propositions; the syllabus must
have been composed in a hurry as it seems slightly chaotic. On March 18th the Archbishop of
Canterbury, Robert Kilwardby, issued a similar syllabus for Oxford University.
The chaotic organization of the condemned theses makes it difficult to describe in a coherent
way the matters included in the syllabus. At the beginning of the 20th century P. Mandonnet
rearranged the syllabus, distinguishing 179 philosophical errors from 40 theological. The
philosophical theses concerned:
- the nature of philosophy (7 theses);
- God, his nature, perception, will etc. (25 theses);
- the angels or separate intelligences (31 theses);
- the world, its eternity etc. (49 theses);
- man, his intellect and will (57 theses);
- ethics (10 theses).

20
Which was not, of course, an Aristotelian, but Averroes’ doctrine.
21
See van Steenberghen 1977, p. 75-76.
22
The situation is described in detail in van Steenberghen 1977, p. 80ff.
23
Cf. van Steenberghen 1977 and Dodd 1998.
Additionally, the 40 theological theses referred to:
- Christian faith (5 theses);
- dogmas (15 theses);
- Christian virtues (13 theses);
- the final end (7 theses).24
Most of the condemned philosophical propositions are Aristotelian or Averroistic in origin. Some of
them could, however, be found not only in the writings of the masters of the Arts faculty, but also in
the works of theologians as, for example, a significant number of the errors are Aquinas’ theses.25 It
is beyond doubt, however, that the main target of Tempier’s actions was some of the teachings at
facultas artium.
In the introduction to the syllabus there is a passage previously quoted in the prologue to this
work:
Thus [some philosophers] state things to be true according to philosophy, but not according
to the Catholic faith, as if there are two contrary truths and as if there is a truth in the sayings
of pagans in hell that is opposed to the truth of Sacred Scripture.
This passage, as van Steenberghen puts it, “is the principal source of the legend of ‘double truth.’”26
Here the idea of double truth was stated for the first time in history and a closer examination reveals
an interesting thing in the passage. The case in point is the ‘as if’ (quasi) clause used by Tempier
since the Bishop of Paris says, in effect, that there are some philosophers whose doctrines may be
taken to imply double truth theory. In this context the question arises as to the reason for the use of
this cautious form of expression. One possible answer is that Tempier acted first and foremost
against certain theses and not against certain philosophers. Another possibility is that the teachings
of the accused philosophers did not contain any evident trace of double truth. This is an issue to
which we will return in the course of this study.
Another obvious question that arises from Tempier’s accusation is the following: who was
condemned in 1277 and, more specifically, who are the philosophers that “state things to be true
according to philosophy, but not according to the Catholic faith, as if there are two contrary truths”?
The Bishop of Paris does not mention any names in his syllabus. However, one of the Parisian
manuscripts of the condemnations bears the title Contra Segerum et Boetium hereticos. Two further
medieval manuscripts (one with the text of condemnations and the other being Raymond Lull’s
commentary to the condemned theses) are registered under headings referring to Siger (in the
former case) or to both Siger and Boethius (in the latter). It is advisable therefore to now begin a
closer examination of Siger’s and Boethius’ philosophical views.

24
See van Steenberghen 1977, p. 152.
25
See for example Świeżawski 2000, p. 726.
28
26
van Steenberghen 1977, p. 151.
 2. Siger of Brabant

2.1. Life and writings

Siger of Brabant was born around 1240.27 From the information we have28, it may be
assumed that Siger became a Master of Arts in Paris in the mid 1260’s, as his name is mentioned in
two documents describing some controversies between the French and Picard nations in 1266. It
seems that over the following years Siger became one of the leaders of the Picard nation, the Arts
Faculty and of the opposition movement to the conservative theologians. There are some
illustrations of this fact such as the 1271 election of Alberic of Reims (of the French nation) to the
rectorship of the Parisian University. A minority group protested against this electionand the
Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis describes this group as pars Sigeri and the French majority
is labeled pars Alberici. Despite the controversy surrounding the role Siger played in these events, 29
one may assume that Siger’s position at the Faculty of Arts in the late 1260’s and early 1270’s was
rather an important and leading one.
The above described events of 1276 led to Siger’s escape from Paris, probably at the end of
1276. It is likely that he went directly to the papal curia which then resided at Viterbo. As to the last
few years of Siger’s life, the lack of explicit information forces us to make conjectures: it is usually
assumed that Siger spent those years at the curia, either as a papal guest or as a prisoner before
probably dying in 1284, but certainly not later.30
I do not intend to reconstruct Sigerian philosophy in its entirety here. 31 As regards the aims
of the present study is suffices to examine some issues closer that might have given rise to the
double truth accusation. Of special interest are the problems of the eternity of the world, and the
teachings concerning the soul.

2.2. Eternity of the world

The ancient idea of the eternity of the world became problematic when the Christian idea of
creation entered the stage. The issue had already been addressed by Patristic thought and was
analyzed scrupulously by Augustine. In the 13th century, however, the problem reoccurred with the
‘rediscovery of Aristotle’. The Aristotelian (and Averroes’) case for the eternity of the world was

27
For controversies surrounding the date and place of Siger’s birth see Dodd 1998, van Steenberghen 1977.
28
Cf. Dodd 1998, van Steenberghen 1977.
29
Cf. Dodd 1998.
30
Cf. ibidem.
31
For more details see two monographs, van Steenberghen 1977 and Dodd 1998.
particularly strong as it consisted of several arguments of a different nature. The arguments
concerned ‘physical’ matters such as motion, ‘psychological’ ones such as the nature of the soul and
the way it conceives, and the ‘theological’ such as the nature of God (the First Cause). These
arguments opposed some explicit teachings of the Church, as put forward for example in the decree
of the Fourth Lateran Council of 1215, which says that God established all kinds of creatures “from
the beginning of time” (ab initio temporis).32
The first quaestiones concerning the eternity of the world were composed by Wilhelm of
Durham and others as early as the 1230’s. It was traditionally believed that scholasticism worked
out three answers to the problem of the eternity of the world. Firstly, philosophers such as
Bonaventure claimed that it is possible to prove creatio ex nihilo philosophically. Secondly, there
were scholars who maintained that one can neither demonstrate the eternity of the world nor its
creation, with Aquinas being the most notable representative of this approach. Finally, it is believed
that some scholars maintained the viability of the thesis that the world is eternal and, in this context,
the names most often mentioned are those of Siger and Boethius of Dacia.
Of the works written before 1270, Siger seems to maintain the Aristotelian thesis that the
world is eternal. A closer examination reveals, however, that in the mentioned writings the aim of
the Master from Brabant is not to present his own views but rather to faithfully reconstruct the ideas
of Aristotle and Averroes. This seems to be the case, especially in Quaestio utrum haec sit vera:
Homo est Animal, Nullo Homine Existente.33 A still more interesting dimension to our portrait of
Siger’s philosophy could be found in his Quaestiones in tertium de anima where the Brabantine
Master compares two sets of arguments, one developed by Aristotle and the other by Augustine.
Aristotle claims that the soul is not generated and hence eternal, while Augustine argues to the
contrary. The comparison leads Siger to accept the thesis that Aristotle’s position is “more
probable” (probabilior) than that of Augustine.
We have to pause here for a moment in order to understand the presented opinion of the
Brabantine Master correctly. The key is Siger’s use of the word ‘probabilis’ since it has been
shown34 that the word ‘probabilis’ in the terminology of scholastic philosophers meant ‘provable’ or
‘with evidence in its favour’.35 Therefore it was a considerably different meaning than that which
we can find in today’s dictionaries. Thus the medieval reading suggests the following image of
Siger’s undertaking in Quaestiones in tertium de anima: our thinker compares the arguments
developed by Aristotle and Augustine, weights the reasons for and against both proposals and
decides that the Philosopher’s solution is probabilior than Augustine’s, i.e. the former is backed by

32
See Dodd 1998, p. 138.
33
See Dodd 1998; van Steenberghen disagrees with this opinion, see van Steenberghen 1977, p. 310.
34
See van Steenberghen 1977, p. 247, ft. 42, referring to the work of G. de Mattos.
35
Ibidem. See also Dodd 1998, p. 152. A.Maier translates ‘probabilitas’ as ‘Beweissbarkeit’, see Maier 1955.
stronger reasons than the latter.36
After 1270 Siger becomes even more cautious (and understandably so) when it comes to
dealing with the problem of the eternity of the world. His most important work in this context is De
aeternitate mundi. At the beginning of the treatise he states explicitly that his aim is to refute all
arguments that claim to demonstrate the necessity of the creation (i.e., conversely, that the world is
not eternal). Siger’s work may therefore be regarded as an attack on some theologians, most notably
on Bonaventure.
At the same time, Siger makes it clear that he does not attempt to prove the eternity of the
world. He says:
We are not trying however to demonstrate the opposite of the conclusion for which they [i.e.,
Bonaventure and others] are arguing, but only the defect in the reasoning.37
Of special interest is the strategy Siger adopts in his work. Several times he stresses that he is
speaking from a philosophical perspective (secundum viam philosophiae). Finally, having
dismantled the arguments of Bonaventure and his colleagues, Siger concludes with an explicit:
Here ends the treatise of Master Siger of Brabant concerning a certain argument of some
people regarding the generation of human beings. From the nature of this generation they
think they have demonstrated that the world came into existence, although neither this nor
its contrary can be so demonstrated but it is by faith that it must be maintained that it had a
beginning.38
Two things are worth underlining in this context. Firstly, Siger here explicitly adheres to the
position that in the outline of the traditional views presented above was attributed to Aquinas. He
speaks very clearly that neither the eternity of the world nor the creation could be demonstrated by
philosophical argumentation. Secondly, Siger indicates that in such a case where, philosophically
speaking, we should remain agnostics as to whether the world is eternal or not, the solution offered
by faith is to be accepted without a doubt: the world was created by God. A caveat should be made
here that there are some scholars, notably van Steenberghen, who cast doubt on the authenticity of
the explicit quoted above.39
The problem of the eternity of the world was also address by the Brabantine Master,
although not directly, in De anima intellectiva. Here he declares to follow natural reason as Aristotle
did, thus leading him to the following conclusion:

36
See Dodd 1998, p. 152-153. van Steenberghen reads Siger here as saying that Aristotle’s opinion is “the most
probable of all possibilities”, van Steenberghen 1977, p. 310.
37
Non conamur autem hic oppositum conclusione ad quam arguunt ostendere, sed solum suae rationis defectum,
Siger of Brabant 1972, p. 120; quoted after Dodd 1998, p. 161.
38
Explicit tractatus Magistri Sigeri de Brabantia super quadam ratione ab aliquibus reputata generationem hominum
tangente, ex cuius generationis natura putant se demonstrasse mundum incepisse, licet neque hoc, neque eius
oppositum sit demonstrabile, sed fide tenendum quod inceperit, ibidem, p. 136; quoted after Dodd 1998, p. 165.
39
See van Steenberghen 1977, p. 90; Dodd 1998 expresses a contrary opinion.
 Everything which is corruptible or mortal is composed of matter and form or is a material
form. The intellective soul is neither composed of matter and form nor is a material form,
but is freed from matter and subsists of its own accord. Therefore it is neither corruptible nor
mortal.40
The immortality of the soul leads in turn to the eternity of the world. There is a controversy over the
question as to whether Siger expresses here his own position, as van Steenberghen maintains 41, or if
he is simply presenting the views of Aristotle and other philosophers.42 We have to note such
controversies as they indicate precisely these places in Siger’s writings from which the double truth
accusation might have originated.
In order to conclude our analysis of Siger’s teachings on the problem of the eternity of the
world, we have to look closer at two very insightful comments from Quaestiones in metaphysicam.
In one place, after a presentation of the Aristotelian argument to the effect that species must be
perpetual and everlasting, Siger concludes:
Hence, despite the fact that the opposite of this may be held through faith although it cannot
be demonstrated conclusively, and although the reasoning of Aristotle can be challenged, it
does not however seem able to satisfy fully the human intellect. That is why Aristotle speaks
of knowledge of the truth as dissolution of doubts. Therefore, it does not seem that someone
could know the truth and not know how to defeat opposing reasons.43
The quoted passage is included only in one version of Questiones in metaphysicam.44 Another
version contains the following words:
And I believe that just as matters of faith cannot be proved through human reasoning, so
there are some human reasons for opposing the above, which cannot be dispelled through
human reasoning. That is not a reason for being wrong about matters of faith. There is a
different way of believing those things known through human reason.45
Both fragments are a perfect illustration of what kind of tension could be observed between faith
and natural reason. The human intellect cannot be “fully satisfied” by a mere declaration that the
40
Omne corruptibile seu mortale est compositum ex materia et forma, vel est forma materialis. Anima intellectiva nec
est composita ex materia et forma, nec est forma materialis, sed liberata a materia, per se subsistens. Ergo non est
corruptibilis seu mortalis, Siger of Brabant 1972, p. 89, quoted after Dodd 1998, p. 171.
41
van Steenberghen 1977, p. 310: Le De anima intellectiva enseigne l’éternité de l’âme intellective, mais comme
doctrine d’Aristote (…) ; pourtant, dans la seconde partie du chapitre, oû l’auteur expose que l’âme est créée tout en
étant éternelle, on a le sentiment qu’il exprime sa conviction personnelle.
42
Cf. Dodd 1998, p. 176.
43
Unde, licet oppositum huius per fidem teneatur, quamquam non possit per demonstrationes probari, et quamquam
rationes Aristotelis possint impediri, non tamen videtur quod possit ad plenum satisfieri intellectui humano; unde
dicit Aristoteles quod cognitio veritatis est solutio dubitatorum: unde, quod aliquis cognoscat veritatem et nesciat
solvere rationes in oppositum, non videtur, Siger of Brabant 1981, p. 136, quoted after Dodd 1998, p. 178.
44
The published versions are: Munich, Vienna, Paris, and Cambridge manuscripts.
45
Et credo quod, sicut ea quae fidei sunt per rationem humanam probari non possunt, ita sunt aliquae rationes
humanae ac oposita eorum, quae per humanam rationem dissolve non possunt. Propter hoc tamen in his quae fidei
sun non est errandum: sed est alia via credendi ad quam per rationem humanam (…), Siger of Brabant 1983, p. 110,
quoted after Dodd 1998, p. 179.
articles of faith are ex definitione true. Fides quaerens intellectum, faith is looking for and requires
understanding. This is a very important psychological or anthropological observation: philosophical
enquiry is necessary; the desire to understand is immutable.
When one examines Siger’s writings concerning the eternity of the world they may find
several propositions which echo some of the theses condemned in 1277.46 They are used by Siger,
however, with various reservations: that they only constitute what the Philosopher has to say, that
they are more acceptable on the level of natural reason than the arguments to the contrary or that
they are sound only according to the way of philosophy (secundum viam philosophiae). Siger did
not maintain that the world is truly eternal from the philosophical perspective and truly created from
the perspective of Christian faith. Therefore, Tempier’s double truth accusation seems unjustified.
This does not mean, however, that the problem at hand could be easily dealt with. Faith makes us
believe in the creation but our rational nature demands rational arguments. Therefore, what Aristotle
offers us is, to say the least, worth examining further. The same may be said about Aristotelian
conceptions of the human soul, to which we will now turn our attention.

2.3. Monopsychism
The problem of monopsychism, or, more generally, Siger’s views concerning the human
soul, is the next object of our inquiry. The Aristotelian account of perception that led Averroes, in
the footsteps of some earlier writers to a certain extent, to the theory of monopsychism is as
follows.47 The things of the physical world affect the senses which are capable of receiving
intentions (forms) from things. The intentions are further processed by the internal senses, forming
an image of the external sensible object. The imaginative power, together with the cogitative power,
internal (common) sense and memory help to perceive only individual things. They are, therefore,
incapable of providing human beings with real knowledge, which by its very definition is universal.
Hence the question arises, how is such understood knowledge possible? The answer to this question
postulates another power, the so-called Agent Intellect that is needed to distill universal forms from
the individual intentions provided by cogitative power. Averroes follows some suggestions of the
Philosopher and ethe xplicit teachings of Alexander of Aphrodisias, Themistius, Avicenna and al-
Farabi in accepting the thesis that Agent Intellect is separate and transcendent, for only as such
could it be capable of providing human beings with universal knowledge.
Agent Intellect is purely immaterial and therefore requires the so-called Material Intellect to
actualize the extracted form as an actual intelligibile within it. The earlier writers, such as
Alexander of Aphrodisias or Avempace, maintained Material Intellect to be a function of the
imagination and therefore perishable. At the end of his career, in the Long Commentary on De
46
See Dodd 1998, p. 193 ff.
47
See Taylor 2003.
Anima, Averroes, in resolving some of the problems posed by his metaphysics, developed a theory
of a separate and eternal Material Intellect. Moreover, according to him both Agent and Material
Intellects are unique: “Individual human beings thus serve the Material Intellect, which is eternally
being actualized by intelligibles in act thanks to the ‘light’ of the Agent Intellect and the provision
of intentions by individual human beings via sensation.”48
It is easy to see how the doctrine of monopsychism could be declared incompatible with
Christian faith. According to Averroes’ theory there is no individual soul; the unique and separate
Agent Intellect as well as the unique and separate Material Intellect are ‘shared’ by all human
beings. Furthermore, while both intellects are eternal (and hence one cannot say that they were
created) all the remaining powers of cognition are perishable. It is therefore difficult to imagine how
one could be responsible for his sins after death, if there is no individual rational soul that survives.
Understandably then, some theses constituting or resulting from the doctrine of
monopsychism were condemned in 1270 and in 1277. The first condemnation referred to
monopsychism in five articles: 1, 2, 7, 8 and 13 (e.g. 1. That the intellect of all human beings is the
same and one numerically; 7. That the soul, which is the form of a man as a man, perishes with the
body). Tempier’s syllabus of 1277 condemned some 37 propositions linked with monopsychism.
Two of Siger’s works are of special interest in the context of monopsychism. In
chronological order they are: Quaestiones in tertium de anima and De anima intellectiva. The first
was probably written in 1269 (and therefore before the condemnation of 1270) and the second
probably in 1274. Of still greater significance is the fact that the first gave rise to Aquinas’ treatise
De Unitate Intelectus contra Averroistas, to which the second was a response.
In Quaestiones in tertium de anima Siger adapts an Averroistic position although with some
modification. He asserts that the intellect is immaterial and hence ungenerated, concluding that “it is
not in its nature that the intellect, being immaterial, is multiplicable in number” 49, and affirms that
“the intellect perfects the body not through its substance but through its potentiality, because if it
were to perfect through its substance it would not be separable.”50 The nature of this perfection is
described by Siger with the term ‘operante’ which indicates the dynamism of the relationship
between human body and the intellect. It should be noted that Siger does not follow all of the ideas
of Averroes since when speaking of the Agent Intellect and the Material Intellect (which he calls the
Possible Intellect), he indicates that they “are not two substances but that they are two powers of the
same substance.”51
48
Taylor 2003, p. 191.
49
…concluditur quod intellectus, (cum) sit materialis, in eius natura non est quod multiplicetur secundum
numerum…, Siger of Brabant 1972, p. 26, quoted after Dodd 1998, p. 220.
50
Intellectus perficit corpus, non per suam substantiam, sed per suam potentiam, quia, si per suam substantiam
perficeret, non esset separabilis..., Siger of Brabant 1972, p. 23, quoted after Dodd 1998, p. 221.
51
Adhuc de intellectu agente et possibili intelligendum quod non sunt duae substantiae, sed sunt duae virtutes eiusdem
substantiae..., Siger of Brabant 1972, p. 58, quoted after Dodd 1998, p. 225.
 An interesting thing is that in saying all of this Siger does not bother to ask whether his
teachings are compatible with the Christian faith – indeed, nowhere in the treatise is such a question
raised. In this context the urgent problem reads: whose conceptions are expressed in the presented
work, Siger’s or Aristotle’s (Averroes’)? The events that followed proved it to be an important issue.
In 1270 Aquinas prepared his Tractatus de Unitate Intellectus contra Averoistas. Some of the
copies of the treatise mentioned Siger by name as the principal object of attack. At the beginning of
his work, Aquinas declares that he “intends to show that [Siger’s] position is not less opposed to the
principles of philosophy than it is contrary to the documents of faith.”52 Thomas is trying, therefore,
to argue on a purely philosophical basis against some of the theses and implications of
monopsychism.
I do not intend to present Aquinas’ argumentation in detail here. It suffices to observe that
the doctor angelicus insists that soul is the form of the body; therefore the union between the two is
not operational, as Siger maintains. Furthermore, Aquinas argues against the unicity of intellect,
indicating various paradoxes implied by Averroes’ doctrine. He ends his treatise with a famous
passage demanding a written reaction from Siger:
…let him not speak in corners nor in the presence of juveniles who do not know how to
make judgments about such difficult matters. On the other hand, let him write back against
this writing, if he should dare…53
It is possible that Siger answered immediately with a treatise that has so far not been discovered.
There are only secondary sources that allow us to hypothesize that such a reply was produced. 54
What is certain is that four years after Aquinas’ attack, Siger composed De anima intellectiva, a
work directly tackling the philosophical problems concerning the soul and its functions. The very
beginning of this treatise indicates the level of caution Siger adopted after the events of 1270:
And hence, at the pleading of friends and wishing to satisfy their desire as best we can, we
propose to declare in this present treatise not our own personal assertions but what is felt
about the foresaid matters according to the writings of approved philosophers.55
Here the clauses of ‘speaking philosophically’ and of ‘not expressing own personal assertions’ are
characteristic. As soon as one looks at the details, however, one realizes that Siger is defending
essentially the same position as presented in Quaestiones in tertium de anima. First and foremost,
he defends the conception of the union between body and soul as a dynamic one brought about by

52
Intendimus autem ostendere positionem praedictam non minus contra philosophiae principia esse quam contra fidei
documenta, Thomas Aquinas 1936, p. 2, quoted after Dodd 1998, p. 238.
53
… non loquatur in angulis nec coram pueris qui nesciunt de tam arduis iudicare; sed contra hoc scriptum rescribat,
si audit…, Thomas Aquinas 1936, p. 80, quoted after Dodd 1998, p. 247.
54
See Dodd 1998, p. 251 ff.
55
Et ideo, exposcentibus amicis, eorum desiderio pro modulo nostrae possibilitatis satisfacere cupientes, quid circa
praedicta sentiendum sit secundum documenta philosophorum probatorum, non aliquid ex nobis asserentes,
praesenti tractatu proponimus declarare, Siger of Brabant 1972, p. 70, quoted after Dodd 1998, p. 257.
joint operation within the individual.56
What is new in this treatise is the reflection on the apparent conflict between what
philosophy leads us to and what faith dictates us to believe. The conflict is resolved in a significant
manner:
We have stated that Aristotle felt this about the union of the intellective soul with the body.
However, just as in any other matters whatsoever, we wish to prefer the opinion of the holy
catholic faith if this should be opposed to the opinion of Aristotle.57
Siger adapts a similar solution – the adherence to the truth as revealed by faith – in the case of the
problem of unicity or multiplicity of intellect:
Indeed it is certain, according to the truth that cannot lie, that intellective souls are
multiplied with the multiplication of human bodies. However, some philosophers have felt
the opposite and the opposite does seem to be the case according to the path of philosophy.58
Once again, Siger affirms his adherence to the teachings of the Church, but at the same time
expresses the fundamental problem that lies behind his activities as a philosopher: even though the
faith dictates something to the contrary, rational arguments are still of some value. The value of
rational argumentation, i.e. of philosophizing, is such that even if some teachings of Aristotle and
other philosophers are – absolutely speaking – false, they are nevertheless worth studying and the
path of philosophy should not be abandoned.
In another place Siger says:
Here, however, we seek only the meaning intended by the philosophers and especially
Aristotle, although the latter may perhaps have felt differently from what actually constitutes
truth and wisdom, which may have been handed down about the soul through revelation and
which cannot be concluded through natural reasoning. Nevertheless, we are not concerned at
present with divine miracles, since we are arguing on natural grounds about things of
nature.59
It is necessary to note one element that could be found in the quoted passage. It will be at the centre
of our attention when the philosophy of John Buridan and his school is examined: the things handed
down about the soul through revelation are said to be unattainable through natural reasoning, being
simply miraculous. This fragment suggests how the proper domain of philosophy should be
56
Cf. Dodd 1998, p. 264.
57
Hoc dicimus sensisse Philosophum de unione animae intellectivae ad corpus; sententiam tamen sanctae fidei
catholicae, si contraria huic sit sententiae Philosophi, praeferre volentes, sicut in aliis quibuscumque, Siger of
Brabant 1972, p. 88, quoted after Dodd 1998, p. 266.
58
Certum est enim secundum veritatem quae mentiri non potest, quod animae intellectivae multiplicantur
multiplicatione corporum humanorum. Tamen aliqui philosophi contrarium senserunt, et per viam philosophiae
contrarium videtur, Siger of Brabant 1972, p. 101, quoted after Dodd 1998, p. 272.
59
Quaerimus enim hic solum intentionem philosophorum et praecipue Aristotelis, etsi forte Philosophus senserit aliter
quam veritas se habeat et sapientia, quae per revelationem de anima sint tradita, quae per rationes naturales concludi
non possunt. Sed nihil ad nos nunc de Dei miraculis, cum de naturalibus naturaliter disseramus, Siger of Brabant
1972, p. 83-84, quoted after Dodd 1998, p. 258.
determined. A philosopher should speak only about the things of nature, leaving miraculous events
for the theologians.
Perhaps one more fragment taken from De anima intellectiva can serve to complete the
complex picture of Siger’s situation as portrayed in this treatise:
And therefore I state that, on account of the difficulty involved in the premises and a number
of other points, I have for a long time been uncertain what should be held by the path of
natural reason and what Aristotle felt about the question. So, in such a matter of doubt, we
should adhere to faith which supercedes all human reason.60
Now we are in a position to summarize Siger’s doctrine concerning the human soul. First and
foremost it has to be stressed that – as in the case of the eternity of the world – nowhere does Siger
explicitly adhere to the double truth theory. It does not mean, however, that his position is easily
reconstructible or doubtless. There are some scholars, notably van Steenberghen, who maintain that
Siger’s views on the soul evolved in time, starting from a purely Averroistic stance of
monopsychism towards more moderate theses.61 Our analyses cast some doubt on this opinion.62
Speaking on a purely philosophical level, almost the same position is defended in both Quaestiones
in tertium de anima and De anima intellectiva. But in the latter the whole undertaking is built into a
broader framework that takes into account revelation. With this, the problem of the relationship
between philosophy and theology arises as does the question as to how it should be resolved. Here
Siger’s position does not seem to be a fixed view, rather a mélange of ideas that could be
summarized as follows. Firstly, Siger claims to be presenting the doctrines of other philosophers,
while on many occasions insisting on his own solutions as in the case of the dynamic union of soul
and body or the nature of the union between Agent and Passive (Material) Intellects. Secondly,
Siger repeatedly affirms that the teachings of the Holy Church constitute true wisdom, while
underlining the intrinsic value of philosophical argumentation. Thirdly, he suggests, although only
in a short passage, an explanation of the role of philosophy in the domain of studying natural
phenomena as opposed to miracles. But, fourthly, he asserts that the problem of the soul is
extremely difficult to deal with. This short characterization uncovers a philosophy that is in statu
nascendi, still in the process of determining its boundaries and setting its aims. It is, however,
already an autonomous discipline and it is the autonomy of philosophy that Siger’s work serves.
We will arrest our presentation of Sigerian doctrines here, although some other topics
addressed by the Brabantine Master are relevant in the context of our investigation; amongst them

60
Et ideo dico propter difficultatem praemissorum et quorumdam aliorum, quod mihi dubium fuit a longo tempore
quid via rationis naturalis in praedicto problemate sit tenendum, et quid senserit Philosophus de dicta quaestione; et
in tali dubio fidei adhaerendum est, quae omnem rationem humanum superat, Siger of Brabant 1972, p. 108, quoted
after Dodd 1998, p. 275.
61
Cf. van Steenberghen 1977, p. 338 ff.
62
The issue is addressed in detail in Dodd, pp. 203-294.
the problems of determinism and divine providence are worth mentioning but they would not,
however, influence our conclusions concerning the merits of Tempier’s accusation.

2.4. Double truth?

Is there then any evidence that Siger was guilty of advocating the double truth theory? From
what we have said, the answer is a plain and clear: no! “Siger never affirms there being one
philosophical truth and the other revealed, nor that these truths could be contrary.”63 Siger even goes
as far as underlining the validity of the principle of non-contradiction that blocks all talk of double
truth: “it must be stated that something cannot be and not be at the same time, nor can
contradictories be true at the same time.”64 But as I have already repeated on a number of occasions,
Siger’s view on the relationship between faith and reason is not as clear and homogenous as we
would like. van Steenberghen summarizes this view in the following two propositions:
“(1) There cannot exist a contradiction between the truth of revelation and the truth
discovered by reason (…).
(2) The truth of revelation is of its nature superior as regards excellence and certitude than
the truth discovered by the human reason. Therefore, in case of a conflict between a revealed
truth and a philosophical opinion, the former should be opted for and the latter should be
recognized as being contrary to the truth (…).”65
In a third thesis, van Steenberghen goes on to say that revealed truth is superior to the findings of
natural reason for tin the former occur miracles that modify the common course of nature.66
The affirmation of the superiority of the revelation is one side of the story. The other
concerns the value of philosophy as a necessary undertaking. Although Siger recognizes that “a
philosopher, however great he may be, can be wrong about many things” 67, he is keen to assure the
autonomy of philosophical enquiry and, one assumes, of whole of the Arts faculty). As Dodd puts it,
“we have seen a continuous thread running through [Siger’s] writings whereby he stresses the
independence of the process of philosophical investigation, regardless of the apparent dictates of
faith.”68 Van Steenberghen even goes as far as to say that Siger has transformed the autonomous
philosophy as found in Albert the Great’s and Thomas Aquinas’ writings into a separate
philosophy.69 Disregarding the epithets, it is clear that for Siger philosophy as a discipline is
63
van Steenberghen 1977, p. 242.
64
dicendum quod non contingit aliquid simul esse et non esse, neque contradictoria simul esse vera…, Bazan 1974, p.
94, quoted after Dodd 1998, p.108.
65
van Steenberghen 1977, p. 248 and 250.
66
Ibidem, p. 251.
67
Philosophus quantumcumque magnus in multis possit errare, Siger of Barbant 1983, p. 412, quoted after Dodd
1998, p. 116.
68
Dodd 1998, p. 190.
69
Mais il le fait a sa manière, car il transforme la philosophie autonome d’Albert et de Thomas en une philosophie
séparée : il ne semble pas admettre, ou apercevoir, que la vérité revelée puisse, par l’intermédiaire du philosophie
chrétien, exercer un contrôle quelconque sur les conclusions du travail philosophique lui-même, van Steenberghen
different from theology and therefore the method of philosophy has to differ from the method of
theology. As the Brabantine Master puts it:
“the method of the reflection in that theology which is a branch of philosophy is to proceed
from principles which are known to us through the senses, memory and experience, by
means of natural vision and reason. The method of reflection in that theology, which is
sacred scripture, is not to proceed from principles known through the senses, memory and
experience by natural reason but from principles known by divine revelation.”70
Thus Siger’s position regarding the autonomous position of philosophy is clear. It is not so clear
however, what kind of knowledge philosophy provides. Siger gives an Aristotelian account of
knowledge acquisition and believes that “while sophists only seek to give the appearance of
knowledge, the philosopher seeks nothing else in life except knowledge”71, the knowledge
consisting of true opinions. The problem emerges when philosophical knowledge contradicts the
revealed truth. In this case the priority is given to the faith, and the contrary propositions are not
labeled true; sometimes they deserve the tag ‘probabiles’, and more often are described as attained
secundum viam philosophiae. Siger seems to be uncomfortable with this solution, though, as when
he says that “it does not seem that someone could know the truth and not know how to defeat
opposing reasons.”
This is closely connected with the third characteristic feature of Siger’s views on philosophy,
well summarized by Dodd: “Siger is searching for truth, not always certain of his position and
indeed willing to amend it at times, when faced with convincing counter-examples. This provisional
approach also implicitly acknowledges the existence of truth on more than one dimension.”72
It is difficult to describe Siger’s conception of the relationship between philosophy and
theology in one word; the best would seem to be ‘autonomy’, but it is far from being adequate. Both
philosophy and theology are autonomous undertakings, with their own methods of inquiry. Does it
not then lead to a kind of double truth? Some sentences from the writings of the Brabantine Master,
if taken out of context, could be the basis for developing a modified version of double truth theory.
But – apart from the explicitly stated rule that in the case of a conflict, priority is given to faith – the
essential problem behind Siger’s search for truth is the disruption caused by the apparent
contradictions between demonstrations of reason and articles of faith. Both the presence of the
disruption which underlies what Siger explicitly states and the ‘out of context’ evaluation of some
1977, p.254.
70
Modus considerari in ista theologia, quae est pars philosophiae, est procedere ex princpiis quae sunt nota nobis via
sensus, memoriae et experimenti, ex lumine et ratione naturali. Modus autem considerandi in theologia quae est
sancta scriptura non est procedere ex principiis quae sint nota via sensus, memoriae et experimenti et lumine
naturali, sed proceditur in ea ex principiis notis per divinam revelationem, Siger of Brabant 1981, p. 359-360, quoted
after Dodd 1998, p. 128.
71
Sophistae non quaerunt in vita nisi apparere scire, philosophus autem non appetit in vita nisi scire, Siger of Brabant
1981, p. 180-181, quoted after Dodd 1998, p. 92.
72
Dodd 1998, p. 126.
sentences he produced could explain why the Brabantine Master might have been accused of
supporting double truth theory. As we have seen, however, these arguments are not sufficient to call
him a proponent of double truth in the full sense of the term.

3. Boethius of Dacia

3.1. Life and writings

Boethius of Dacia was born somewhere in what is now Sweden and was a priest in the
diocese of Linkoping before studying and teaching at the Arts Faculty of the Parisian University.
The events of the 1270’s caused him – as one of the most active representatives of Averroism – to
go to the papal curia in Orvieto before joining the Dominican order. There is no information that
would tell us something of his later life.73
Boethius wrote several important tracts, among which one should mention De summo bono,
De sompniis sive de sompniorum divinatione, Omnis homo de necessitate est animal, and De
aeternitate mundi. It is the last of the aforementioned works that is of the greatest interest to us.

3.2. Eternity of the world

The treatise starts with a presentation of several arguments which support the thesis that the
world was created before presenting a series of counterarguments to the effect that the fact that the
world is eternal is a given. The main part of the treatise is devoted to developing a solution to the
problem. It is symptomatic that Boethius does not claim one of the parties in the controversy to be
victorious but instead goes on to explain what the tasks of a philosopher are and the limits of natural
philosophy.
In due course he states some things that are extremely important for our discussion of double
truth. After conceding that a natural philosopher cannot oppose truths that he cannot demonstrate or
know by the principles of his science, as long as they are not inconsistent with these principles and
do not ruin his science, Boethius adds:
“But he has to deny that truth which he can neither cause nor know on the basis of his
principles, and which is contrary to his principles and destroys his science; for just as one
has to concede that which follows from one's principles, so also one has to deny that which
is incompatible with these principles.”74
73
Boethius of Dacia 1990, p. VIII-IX.
74
Veritatem tamen illam quam ex suis principiis causare non potest nec scire, quae tamen contrariatur suis principiis
Few paragraphs later we find the following passage:
“In this way the Christian states something true when he says that the world and the primary
motion had a beginning, and that there was a first man, and that numerically the same man
will be resurrected, and that a generable thing can come to be without generation; but this is
conceded to be possible [only] for a superior cause, the power of which is greater than the
power of a natural cause; however, the natural scientist will also state something true when
he asserts that this is not possible by natural causes; for a natural scientist denies or concedes
nothing, except on the basis of natural causes, just as a grammarian, as such, denies or
concedes something only on the basis of grammatical principles and causes.”75
Perhaps the most striking fragment of the quoted passages is when Boethius says that a natural
philosopher has “to deny that truth which he can neither cause nor know on the basis of his
principles, and which is contrary to his principles and destroys his science.” In the context of the
controversy over the eternity of the world it implies that a natural philosopher should oppose what
the faith has to say. When we add to this what is stated at the beginning of the second passage,
namely that “the Christian states something true when he says that the world and the primary
motion had a beginning”, it leads to a “full-blooded” theory of double truth. The second part of the
second passage weakens this conclusion, however. Boethius states that “the natural scientist will
also state something true when he asserts that this [i.e., the creation of the world] is not possible by
natural causes”. Here, the theories as developed by a natural philosopher are related to “what is
possible by natural causes”.
This point is further explained by Boethius in the following way:
“For anything denied or conceded by a natural scientist, insofar as he is a natural scientist, is
denied or conceded by him on the basis of natural causes. Hence the conclusion by means of
which the natural scientist states that the world and the primary motion did not have a
beginning, taken absolutely, is false, but if it is referred to the arguments and principles from
which he concluded to it, it does follow from them.”76
The important distinction which is stressed in the passage quoted above concerns conclusions which
are ‘absolutely true’ and which only ‘follow’ from certain ‘arguments and principles’. The latter is

et destruit suam scientiam, negare debet, quia sicut consequens ex principiis est concedendum, sic repugnans est
negandum ..., Boethius of Dacia 1964, quoted after Klima 1998.
75
Sic verum dicit christianus, dicens mundum et motum primum esse novum, et primum hominem fuisse, et hominem
redire vivum et eundem numero, et rem generabilem fieri sine generatione, cum tamen hoc concedatur possibile esse
per causam cuius virtus est maior, quam sit virtus causae naturalis; verum etiam dicit naturalis qui dicit hoc non esse
possibile ex causis et principiis naturalibus: nam naturalis nihil concedit vel negat nisi ex principiis et causis
naturalibus, sicut etiam nihil negat vel concedit grammaticus secundum quod huiusmodi nisi ex principiis et causis
grammaticalibus, Boethius of Dacia 1964, quoted after Klima 1998.
76
Quidquid enim naturalis, secundum quod naturalis, negat vel concedit, ex causis et principiis naturalibus hoc negat
vel concedit. Unde conclusio in qua naturalis dicit mundum et primum motum non esse novum, accepta absolute,
falsa est, sed si referatur in rationes et principia ex quibus ipse eam concludit, ex illis sequitur, Boethius of Dacia
1964, quoted after Klima 1998.
the case of the conclusions of natural reason concerning the eternity of the world. To state that the
world is eternal is not to say something ‘absolutely true’ but to say something that follows from the
principles concerning ‘natural causes’, and to use such principles in explaining the world is the task
of a natural philosopher.
Boethius does not go any further in his treatise. He does not state that there are two ‘equally
important’ truths – that of natural reason and that of faith – that may contradict one another. At the
same time, he does not offer us any elaborate conception of the relationship between the
conclusions of faith and the conclusions of natural reason. He states only that there are situations in
which natural-reason arguments oppose that of the Christian faith; he deems the latter ‘absolutely
true’; and, finally, he explains the structure of natural reason knowledge as describing what can
result from natural causes.
One more thing I would like to stress here is that when Boethius refers in his works to the
conclusions of a natural philosopher being relative to the principles of natural causes, he anticipates
a more developed conception of the relationship between faith and reason that found its best
expression in the writings of the members of John Buridan’s school.77

4. John Buridan

4.1. Life and writings

After the condemnations of 1277, philosophical speculation at the Faculty of Arts of the
Parisian University was not possible. However, arts masters were allowed to take up the study of
Aristotelian philosophy by the beginning of the 14th century and the most important philosophical
school of this century was that of John Buridan.78
There is not much to be said on John Buridan’s life as we have very little information about
it. He was born around (probably just before) 1300 in the dioecese of Arras in Picardy. He obtained
venio legendi at the Parisian University in mid 1320s and twice, in 1327/28 and 1340, he served as
rector of the University before dying around 1360.
During his long career as arts master he attained the status of an esteemed and famous
figure. This special status is reflected in the various legends and anecdotes that have arisen in
connection with his name and one fact in particular, of special significance from the viewpoint of
the aims of the present study, remains a kind of mystery. Buridan never moved to the Theological
Faculty, remaining for his entire academic career at the less prestigious Arts Faculty, a highly
unusual situation for a gifted medieval thinker.79

77
See later in this chapter.
78
Cf. Pine 1974, p. 35ff.
79
See Zupko 2003, p. xi ff.
 We are in possession of a substantial number of Buridan’s writings. Besides commenting on
all of the major works of Aristotle, the most impressive of the writings of the Picard Master
is Summulae de dialectica, a treatise intended as a commentary to Peter Lombard’s Summulae
Logicales, but which proved to be an original and very influential masterpiece of medieval logic.
From our point of view, the most interesting are Buridan’s teachings concerning the eternity
of the world and the nature of human soul. A short story will also be told about the intriguing
problem of transubstantiation.

4.2. Eternity of the world

The problem of the eternity of the world, which we have already encountered in the writings
of Siger of Brabant and Boethius of Dacia, is the subject of numerous Buridian remarks and
arguments. The following two passages summarize the Picard Master’s attitude towards the issue
particularly well:
The first conclusion is that it is possible that something come into existence without a
preexisting subject, from which that something emerged. And this conclusion I believe on
faith and not because of any proof except the authority of the sacred scripture and the
doctors of the catholic faith. For thus God made and created angels and heaven and earth.
And this is the conclusion intended by those saying that something can be created ex nihilo.
(…) The second conclusion is that it is necessary naturally that everything that comes into
being comes from or in a preexisting subject. (…) But I think this second conclusion cannot
be demonstrated but only shown by induction, there being no counter-instances. This is how
Aristotle proves it and such conclusions should be deemed principles in natural science.80
In another place, in answering the question “Whether there always has been or will be generation
and corruption” (utrum semper fuit vel erit generatio et corruptio?) Buridan says:
According to faith a question thus formulated should be answered with a firm ‘no’, for
according to faith the world was created and the motion of heaven had a beginning. But this
is the case not naturally, but supernaturally. And we the natural philosophers and Aristotle
should speak naturally. So the problem should be restated: it is conceded that according to
Aristotle the world is eternal and the motion of heaven is eternal, for there always has been
and will be generation and corruption.81
80
Prima [conclusio] est quod possibile est aliquid fieri sine subiecto praesupposito, ex quo vel in quo fiat. Et hanc
conclusionem credo fide et non aliqua probatione nisi auctoritate Sacrae Scripturae et doctorum fidei catholicae. Sic
enim Deus fecit et creavit angelum et caelum et mundum; et hanc conclusionem intendunt qui dicunt posse aliquid fieri
ex nihilo… Secunda conclusio est, quod necesse est omne, quod fit naturaliter, fieri ex subiecto praesupposito vel in
subiecto praesupposito… Sed tamen non puto, quod haec conclusio sit demonstrabilis, sed est declarabilis per
inductionem, in qua non inventa est instantia. Sic probat enim eam Aristoteles, et tale reputari debet principium in
scientia naturali, Buridan 1509, I, 15, fols. 18vb-19ra, quoted after Sylla 2003, p. 226.
81
Quaestione sic formata statim secundum fidei veritatem respondemus quod non, quia mundus est factus et motus
In these two short fragments Buridan’s view concerning the relationship between natural
philosophy and Christian faith is encapsulated. The essential features of this relationship are the
following. First, some things, like that the world was created, are known only through revelation
and from this point of view it is justifiable to say that something was created ex nihilo. Second, it is
necessar y naturally (necesse est omne quod fit naturaliter) that everything that comes into being
comes from or in a preexisting subject and hence the world has to be eternal. Furthermore, Buridan
says that the last conclusion, although naturally necessary, cannot be demonstrated but only shown
by induction and that such are the principles of natural science. Moreover, in clarifying his position
the Picard Master distinguishes between what is the case naturally and supernaturally, creation ex
nihilo being a supernatural event.

4.3. Human soul

One can find a similar chain of arguments in Buridan’s writings concerning the human soul.
The Picard master provides an in-depth analysis of the problems connected with the Aristotelian
views on the human soul. He recognizes two fundamental ways of interpreting the Philosopher’s
doctrine of the soul: one of them could be called “Alexandrian” and the other “Averroistic”.
Alexander of Aphrodisia’s conception is well summarized by the following six theses: the intellect
is generable and corruptible, extended, derived, inherent, and multiplied. The Averroistic standpoint
consists of six contrary claims: the intellect is everlasting, not generated or corruptible, not derived
from a material potentiality, not inhering in matter, not materially extended and not multiplied
(intellectum esse perpetuum, non esse genitum nec corruptibilem, non esse eductum de potentia
materiae, non inhaerere materiae, non esse extensum extensione materiae, et non esse
multiplicatum).82 As Jack Zupko comments on the subject, “Buridan seems to be saying that from
the standpoint of natural reason, there are two equally possible but diametrically opposed ways of
understanding the human intellect, viz., the materialism of Alexander, or the immaterialism of
Averroes. A third contender, the position of the faith, is repeatedly described as something ‘natural
reason does not dictate (ratio naturalis non dictaret)’”.83
Natural reason leaves then an alternative when it comes to characterizing human soul (the
intellect). But what the faith reveals does not belong to the set of ‘natural options’. Unlike in the
case of the eternity of the world, there is no solution that could be described as ‘necessary
naturally’. But, as expected, the revealed truth could be labeled ‘supernatural’:

coeli incepit sucundum fidem. Sed videtis, quod hoc non est naturaliter, sed supernaturaliter. Nos autem in hac
scientia et Aristoteles debemus loqui naturaliter. Ideo restringetur quaestio: utrum ponendo quod mundus fuerit
aeternus secundum Aristotelem, et motus caeli eternus, esset concedendum, quod semper fuit et semper erit
generatio et corruptio.
82
See Zupko 2001, passim.
83
Ibidem, p. 9.
 It is certainly true that there is a great difficulty if we posit just one soul in a human being,
for it must be intellective and indivisible, not extended in any way by the extension of matter
or subject. And then that unextended soul is [also] a sensitive and vegetative soul. How, then
– since sensation is supposed to be materially extended in organs – could it be inherent in an
indivisible subject and, as it were, derived from its potentiality? This seems to be
miraculous, since the only extension form has its extension in its subject. And how could a
divisible and extended thing inhere in an indivisible and unextended thing? This seems to be
miraculous. And I reply with certainty that it is miraculous, because the human soul inheres
in the human body in a miraculous and supernatural way, neither extended nor derived from
the potentiality of the subject in which it inheres, and yet also inhering in the whole body
and in each part of it. This is truly miraculous and supernatural.84

4.4. Eucharist
Buridan’s way of dealing with the relationship between faith and natural philosophy finds
further confirmation in his solution to the problem of transubstantiation. The idea of
transubstantiation causes some problems for the Aristotelian conception of being since, according to
Aristotle, accidentis esse est inesse, i.e. accidents are beings only as inhering in a substance while
substances are beings that exist per se. In other words, substances are beings simpliciter and
accidents are being in a relative way (secundum quid). As a consequence, Aristotle must maintain
that the term ‘being’ signifies substances and accidents equivocally, by means of two different
concepts.
This theory is put into doubt by the doctrine of transubstantiation. According to faith, the
accidents of the consecrated bread subsist without a subject.85 This is incompatible with Aristotelian
definition of accidents which are said to exist only as inhering in substances. Therefore a question
arises what to do with such an incompatibility.
Buridan’s answer to this challenge is particularly interesting. In order to show that
substances and accidents could be called beings univocally, he amends the received definition of an
accident:
But we have to speak in a different way, i.e. that substance is everything that subsists per se

84
Verum est quod certe magna est dubitatio si ponamus in homine solam animam. Oportet enim istam esse
intellectivam et indivisibilem, non extensam aliquo modo extensione materiae vel subiecti. Et tunc ista anima
inextensa est anima sensitiva et vegetativa. Quomodo igitur, cum sensatio ponitur extensa extensione organi et
materia, poterit ipsa esse in subiecto indivisibili inhaerente et tamquam educta de potentia istius? Hoc videtur
mirabile, cum forma non habeat extensionem nisi extensionem sui subiecti. Et quomodo divisibile et extensum
poterit inhaerere indivisibili et inextenso? Hoc videtur mirabile. Et certe ego respondeo quod hoc est mirabile, quia
mirabili et supernaturali modo anima humana inhaeret corpori humano non extensa nec educta de potentia subiecti
cui inhaeret, et tamen etiam toti corpori inhaereat et cuilibet parti eius. Hoc vere est mirabile et supernaturale,
Buridan 1984, 3, II 9:138, quoted after Zupko 2003, p. 180.
85
Cf. Bakker 2001, p. 250.
 naturally and not inhering in some other being; and therefore substance is everything that is
such part of nature that subsists per se. And accident is everything that does not subsist per
se naturally, nor is a part of nature subsisting per se, disregarding the situation when it
subsists per se miraculously. And thus the whiteness, although subsists per se [in the
consecrated bread] is not called substance, for it does no subsist naturally, but only
miraculously.86
The distinction between what happens naturally and miracoulsly (or supernaturally) is used here to
adapt a metaphysical definition in a way that takes into account the facts dictated by faith. The
distinction then is not a philosophical trick that helps in dealing with some troublesome conclusions
of Aristotle’s works; to put it in modern terms, it is rather an essential element of our picture of
reality.

4.5. Two orders

What has been said so far suffices in an attempt to outline Buridan’s conception of the
relationship between natural philosophy and theology in some detail. Both sciences are contrasted
by the Picard Master in the following way:
Metaphysics differs from theology in the fact that although each considers God and those
things that pertain to divinity, metaphysics only considers them as regards what can be
proved and implied by demonstrative reason or inductively inferred. But theology has for its
principles articles [of faith], which are believed quite apart from their evidentness, and
further, considers whatever can be deduced from articles of this kind.87
The passage confirms a separation of philosophy (metaphysics) and theology and stems from the
fact that both sciences use different methods rather than because their subject matters differ.
Philosophy, as an undertaking of natural reason, is based on premises attainable by human intellect
by way of natural deduction or induction. Theology, on the other hand, uses premises as revealed by
faith and, in addition, both philosophical and theological methods confine themselves to valid
syllogisms, i.e. they use only valid forms of argument.
In the case of an apparent contradiction between what is provable by natural reason and
what is dictated by Christian faith, the problem is clarified with recourse to the distinction between

86
Sed nos possumus aliter dicere, scilicet quod omne illud est substantia quod naturaliter per se subsistit, ita quod non
inheret alteri; et omne illud etiam est substantia quod est pars talis naturae per se subsistens. Et omne illud est accidens
quod sic non subsistit per se naturaliter, nec est pars per se subsistentis, non obstante quod subsistit per se miraculose.
Et sic albedo, quamvis per se subsisteret, non diceretur substantia, quia non sic subsistit naturaliter, sed miraculose,
Buridan 1518, IV.6, quoted after Bakker 2001, p. 255.
87
Unde in hoc differt metaphysica a theologia, quod cum utraque consideret de deo et de divinis nisi ea quae possunt
probari et ratione demonstrativa concludi seu induci. Theologia vero habet pro principiis articulos creditos absque
evidentia et considerat ultra quamcumque ex huiusmodi articulis possunt deduci, Buridan 1518, I.2, 4 ra-rb, quoted
after Zupko 2003, p. 141, 337.
natural and supernatural orders. The propositions obtained by natural reasoning are usually
accompanied by the clause “naturaliter loquendo” (speaking naturally) in Buridan’s writings.88 The
truths of faith, on the other hand, are declared supernaturaliter. It seems that, for Buridan, this use
of the notions of ordo naturalis and ordo supernaturalis removes any danger of a contradiction or
inconsistency between theology and natural philosophy. The status of the orders and the nature of
their relationship are therefore two issues worth analyzing and must be carried out from the
epistemological and the ontological perspectives.
The epistemological problems concern such notions as truth, probability, demonstration etc.
The first question that must be answered can be formulated as follows: should the propositions
describing the laws of natural order be qualified as true or false? According to Anneliese Maier, in
the Buridan School the findings of natural reason were always tagged as probabiles, and therefore
located on a different level than the truth of Christian faith. In such a setting, talking of a possible
collision between philosophical and theological truths was pointless.89 The term ‘probabilis’, as I
have already observed above, does not mean ‘probable’ in the contemporary sense; it should rather
be read as ‘with arguments in its favour’ or ‘justifiable’. But this way of rendering the term
‘probabilitas’ may be a little misleading since sometimes Buridan refers to the proposition of
natural philosophy using the word ‘truth’ (veritas), as in the following passage:
But again, there is firmness of truth assuming the common course of nature (ex suppositione
communis cursus naturae), and in this way it would be a firm truth that the heavens are
moved and the fire is hot, and so on for other propositions and commonalities of natural
science, notwithstanding the fact that God could make a cold fire, and so falsify this
proposition ‘Every fire is hot’.90
The notion of truth as used here, however, is not veritas simpliciter but veritas ex suppositione; we
have to do, therefore, not with simple and absolute truth but with a relative one, that could be
expressed on the assumption that everything goes according to the common course of nature.
More often than the notion of veritas ex suppositione, Buridan uses the term ‘evidentness-
on-assumption’ (evidentia ex suppositione). For example he writes:
relative evidentness or evidentness on the assumption would be observed in entities in the
common course of nature; and in this way, it would be evident to us that every fire is hot and

88
See Maier 1955, Baird 2001.
89
Maier 1955, p. 9: Es sind das für die christlichen Aristoteliker Lehren, denen eine rein philosophische richtigkeit,
eben im Sinn der Probabilität, zukommt, die aber gegenüber der eigentlichen veritas auf einer ganz andern und
tieferen Ebene liegen, sodas eine Kollision von philosophischer und theologischer, von naturalischer und
übernaturalischer Wahrheit gar nicht in Frage kommt.
90
Sed etiam est firmitas veritatis ex suppositione communis cursus naturae, et sic esset forma veritas quod coelum
movetur, quod ignis calidus, et sic de aliis propositionibus et communibus scientiae naturalis, non obstante quod
Deus posset sic facere ignum frigidum, et sic falsificaretur ista ‘omnis ignis est calidus’, Buridan 1518, II.1, fol. 8vb,
quoted after Baird 2001, p. 94.
 that the heavens are moved, even though the contrary is possible through God’s power.91
And he adds:
if God operates simply miraculously, it must be concluded that he can; and so there is only
evidentness on the assumption [of the common course of nature] which, as we have already
said, is sufficient for natural science.92
In this way the natural philosopher can maintain that, on the assumption of the common course of
nature, it is evident that for example nothing could be created ex nihilo. It should be added that
Buridan’s conception of evidentness-on-assumption was developed against the background
provided by the so-called ultricurian skepticism, advocated inter alia by Nicolas of Autrecourt.93
Nicolas maintains that “the certitude of evidentness has no degrees” and therefore one can only
speak of the certitude of faith and of propositions that are reducible to the first principle, i.e. the
principle of non-contradiction. Within this scheme, the undertaking called ‘natural philosophy’ is
put into jeopardy.94
Against this skeptical theory, Buridan remarks:
I say that this is not and inference on the basis of the form, but that the intellect, predisposed
by its natural inclination to the truth, assents to the universal principle by experience. And it
can be conceded that experiences of this kind are not valid for absolute evidentness, but they
are valid for the [kind of] evidentness which suffices for natural science. And along with this
there are also other principles arrived at from the inclusion or opposition of terms or
propositions, which do not require experiences.95
Among the premises that are ‘sufficient for natural science’ (quae sufficit ad scientiam naturalem),
besides the propositions that in post-Kantian terminology may be labeled ‘analytic’, Buridan locates
universal principles which we attain by experience. Buridan is aware of the fact that inductive
arguments based on experience are fallible from the logical point of view. The answer to the
difficulty posed by this observation could be found in the above passage, where the Picard Master
speaks of the ‘natural inclination to the truth’ (naturalis inclinatio ad verum). He posits “a certain
innate power in us, naturally inclined and determined to assent to the truth of principles, if they

91
Evidentia secundum quid sive ex suppositione … observaretur in entibus communis cursus naturae, et sic esset
nobis evidentia quod omnis ignis est calidus et quod caelum movetur, licet contrarium sit possible per potentiam dei,
Buridan 1518, II.1, fol. 8vb-9ra, quoted after Zupko 2003, p. 361.
92
Si vero deus simpliciter miraculose operetur, concludendum est quod potest, ideo non est evidentia sed solum ex
suppositione sicut antedictum fuit quae est sufficiens ad scientiam naturalem, Buridan 1518, II.1, fol. 9 ra, quoted
after Zupko 2003, p. 364.
93
See Zupko 2003, p. 183ff.
94
See ibidem.
95
Dico quod non est illatio gratia formae, sed intellectus per naturalem inclinationem suam ad verum praedispositus
per experientias assentit universali principio. Et potest concedi quod huiusmodi experientiae non valent ad
evidentiam simpliciter, sed valent ad evidentiam quae sufficit ad scientiam naturalem. Et cum hoc etiam alia sunt
principia ex inclusionibus vel repugnantiis terminorum vel propositionum quae non indigent experientiis, Buridan
1518, II.1, fol. 9rb, quoted after Zupko 2003, p. 359.
have been properly presented to it, just as fire is naturally inclined to burning when it has been
placed next to something combustible. And that innate power in us is the human intellect.”96
It is, therefore, understandable why induction is ‘sufficient for natural science’: our intellect
has a natural disposition to state the truth, to detect the truth in propositions that are formed by way
of induction. It has to be stressed that there is no trace of aprioricity in Buridan’s conception. We
have a natural, i.e. innate disposition to assent the truth, but all the principles that are assented in
this way are based on experience and induction.97
There occur, however, events that are contrary to the principles recognized as true by our
intellect on the basis of induction. These events are simply miraculous or supernatural and cannot
be explained in terms of natural reason. Therefore, the principles of natural science cannot be
labeled absolutely true (verae simpliciter) or absolutely evident. They are true- or, better to say,
evident-on-assumption; it follows that they must be justifiable (with arguments in favour,
probabiles).
As soon as the conceptual scheme that includes the notions of natural and supernatural
orders, evidentness- and truth-on-assumption as well as probabilitas is developed, the role of
philosophical thinking and the domain of natural philosophy are fixed. Natural scientists are
interested only in explaining events on the assumption that they follow the common course of
nature.
As I remarked earlier, Aristotle distinguished between three kinds of arguments:
demonstrative, dialectical and rhetoric. The first kind is the most relevant as regards the acquisition
of knowledge since it leads from true premises via valid syllogisms to true conclusions. Dialectic
arguments, on the other hand, have as their premises propositions that are acceptable by most
people (or by specialists) and use valid syllogistic figures. The obvious question in this context is
what kind of argument is characteristic of natural science. Buridan’s answer to this problem is very
interesting:
one may doubt whether such an example or induction should be called a dialectical
argument or a demonstrative argument. And I reply that it is not demonstrative, for it is not a
syllogism, absolutely speaking. But neither should it strictly speaking be called dialectical,
for dialectic does not produce certain and evident knowledge. Rather, it is an argument
producing the knowledge not of the conclusion of a demonstration but of a principle.
Therefore, it exceeds the nature of dialectical argument for it produces not opinion but
evident and certain knowledge; and it falls short of a demonstrative argument, for it does not
96
Dicendum est quod nobis est innata virtus quaedam inclinata naturaliter et determinata ad assentiendum veritati
principiorum si sibi fuerint debite applicata, sicut ignis est naturaliter inclinatus ad comburendum cum sibi fuerit
combustibile appositum, et illa virtus nobis innata est intellectus humanus, Buridan’s Questiones in duos libros
Aristotelis Posteriorum Analyticorum, quoted after Zupko 2003, p. 362.
97
See Zupko 2003, p. 194ff.
 conclude necessarily and on account of its form and thus it is not able of itself to direct the
intellect to this knowledge.98
Buridan refers here directly to the ‘intermediate’ strength of our adherence to natural principles such
as “Every fire is hot”. But such principles serve as the premises of arguments in natural science and
thus the arguments themselves can therefore be placed somewhere in between demonstrative and
dialectic proofs.99
One more illustration of the use Buridan made of the notions of natural and supernatural
orders can be found in his discussions concerning necessity and possibility. We have already
remarked on this issue while commenting that the proposition that “it is necessary naturally that
everything that comes into being comes from or in a preexisting subject.” It indicates that, as in the
case of evidentness, Buridan distinguishes between natural or relative and supernatural or absolute
necessities. The same differentiation one may find as regards the notion of possibility.100
The notions of evidentness or truth may be treated as purely epistemological. Necessity and
possibility, on the other hand, lead us firmly to some profound ontological questions. The most
urgent of those questions concerns the ontological status of natural and supernatural orders. On the
one hand it may be assumed that natural order is only an epistemological device that names our
cognitive constraints, i.e. it refers to what we are able to know about the structure of reality. On the
other hand, however, ordo naturalis can be understood ontologically, as a set of laws according to
which the world was structured at the moment of creation. On the second reading, miracles or
events from the supernatural order are transgressions of the laws governing the world. Which of the
alternative interpretations should prevail?
An interesting fact is that it is difficult to find a direct answer to the question just posed in
Buridan’s writings. It is possible, of course, that the problem has been stated in contemporary terms
that are, to use a ‘trendy’ word, incommensurable with the medieval conceptual scheme. It is
symptomatic that the interpreters of Buridan’s thought seem to give inconsistent conclusions.
Annelise Maier notes, for example, that ‘naturaliter’ does not mean “according to the laws of
nature”, but rather “according to the principles of natural reason.”101 Jack Zupko echoes this
opinion, remarking that “Buridan’s conception of the miraculous is not absolute, but relative to the
epistemic situation of human beings. Thus, when he calls the inherence of the human soul in its
body miraculous, he has nothing in mind like the Humean conception of miracles as violations or
transgressions of the laws of nature, but something more in the spirit of Augustine’s remark that a
miraculous event ‘does not occur contrary to nature, but contrary to what is known of nature.’”102
98
Quoted after Zupko 2003, p. 121.
99
See Zupko 2003, p. 120-121.
100
Cf. Knuuttilla 2001.
101
Maier 1955, p. 9.
102
Zupko 2003, p. 181.
 On the other hand, as Joël Biard observes: “we do not simply have the assumption of a pre-
established harmony between what I am inclined to think is true and what is the case in the real
world. More precisely, we have the assumption or supposition that there is in fact a natural order,
limited and defined by this very limitation, on the one side by the supernatural order, and on the
other side by human freedom (…). And this order legitimates – grounds, if you wish – the leap
which represents the passage from singular to universal proposition in the inductive process.”103
Biard’s remark may be interpreted as follows: Buridan’s epistemology, with its assumptions
concerning the natural assent to the truth of principles based on induction, needs a justification in
the concept of natural order ontologically understood. Some additional arguments for the
‘ontological’ interpretation may be offered from within an analysis of the historical development of
the concept of nature.104
It seems advisable to leave the problem discussed at this point, i.e. with two different
interpretations of the notion of natural order. According to one of them, which I deem
‘epistemological’, natural order is the name for what the human intellect can know of nature. The
other interpretation, the ‘ontological’ one, takes ‘natural order’ to mean ‘the set of laws that actually
govern the world.’
One more thing that must be addressed in connection with Buridan’s philosophy is the
question of whether the Picard Master could be accused of adhering to a kind of double truth theory.
It is evident that Buridan was not an adherent of double truth as defined by Tempier. He never says
that it is possible for a proposition to be true according to philosophy and false according to
theology. However, Buridan’s conception of the relationship between faith and reason allows for a
situation when a principle of natural science that could be deemed ‘probabilis’, ‘relatively evident’
or even ‘true-on-assumption’, whilst opposing a proposition formed upon faith and called
‘absolutely true’.
Another thing worth mentioning in this context is the fact that nowhere does Buridan
consider the possibility of a reinterpretation of the scriptures in order to make the truths of faith fit
the well established findings of natural science. Such a possibility of reinterpreting Bible in case the
current interpretation is inconsistent with clear and evident demonstrations of natural reason was
already advocated by Augustine.105 Buridan didn’t follow the great pater ecclesiae. The reason for
that is obvious: the Picard was an arts master and any of his attempts to interpret Scriptures would
constitute the forbidden trespassing of the borders of his science.
We should notice one more thing. In our exposition of Buridan’s ideas there was no trace of
the fallibility of the principles established by natural reason. The Picard Master was not, of course,

103
Biard 2001, p. 94.
104
See Liana 1996.
105
See Pedersen 1997, p. 100.
an advocate of fallibilism. It does not mean that he didn’t reflect on the possibility of error in our
cognitive activities.106 He believed it possible, however, to achieve error-free knowledge and that
this knowledge is evident or true only on the assumption of the common course of nature.107 So, the
problem of the relationship between faith and reason becomes a delicate matter in a situation where
there are articles of faith and error-free propositions of philosophy that stand in an apparent
contradiction to one another. Some complications are added, as in the case of the problem of human
soul, when a natural scientist is incapable of choosing between two or more equally justifiable
solutions and the faith offers yet another account.
To complete the picture we should dwell a little on a yet more complicated case – the case of
metaphysics. Following Aristotle, Buridan distinguishes between metaphysics, mathematics and
physics. What separate them are different domains but they are similar in that they are all exclusive
undertakings of natural reason, i.e. they have natural principles as their first premises. The problem
with metaphysics is that it concerns ‘being as being’ and in such a general matter the separation of
faith and reason is very difficult. An apt illustration of this fact is Buridan’s conception of
substances and accidents developed against the background of the revealed truths concerning the
Eucharist. There the notion of natural order was introduced into the definition of an accident,
serving as an important metaphysical concept.
Buridan’s notions of natural and supernatural order and his solution to the problems of the
relationship between faith and reason are typical of all medieval philosophers, although Buridan
seems to exemplify this attitude in the highest degree. Some traces of the way of thinking I have
just described can be traced back as early as the works of Robert Grosseteste, Albertus Magnus,
Roger Bacon, and Aegidius Romanus.108 The spirit of the Buridanian solution is present in the
writings of the members of his school, such as Nicholas Oresme or Marsilius of Inghen, as well as
in the works of Averroists such as Richard Fitz-Ralph or, especially, John of Jandun.109 Of special
interest are the Italian Averroists of the 15th and 16th centuries and in particular Pietro Pomponazzi, a
philosopher belonging already to the Renaissance period, who was accused of adhering to the
theory of double truth on several occasions.110 It is advisable, therefore, to look closer at his
teachings.

106
See Zupko 2003, chapter XII.
107
It is significant that Buridan does not label the articles of faith ‘knowledge’, although he maintains they are true.
See Zupko 2003.
108
See Maier 1955, passim.
109
See Pine 1974.
110
See ibidem and Kristeller 1964.