A.C. No.11156 [Formerly CBD Case No.

12-3680], March 19, 2018

MICHELLE YAP, Complainant, v. ATTY. GRACE C. BURI, Respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

The instant case stemmed from the complaint of Michelle Yap against respondent Atty. Grace C. Buri for
refusing to pay her monetary obligation and for filing a criminal case of Estafa against her based on false
accusations.

The factual backdrop of the case is as follows:

Complainant Michelle Yap was the vendor in a contract of sale of a condominium unit, while Atty. Grace C.
Buri, Yap's close friend and her daughter's godmother, was the vendee. Buri made an offer to purchase the
property but asked for the reduction of the price from P1,500,000.00 to P1,200,000.00. After consulting
with her husband, Yap agreed. Of the total amount of purchase price of P1,200,000.00, P200,000.00
remains unpaid; Buri insisted that she would just pay the balance on installment starting in but without
specifying the amount to be paid on each installment. Because she trusted the respondent, Yap gave Buri
the full and immediate possession of the condominium unit upon completion of the P1,000,000.00 despite
the outstanding balance and even without the necessary Deed of Absolute Sale. However, when Yap finally
asked for the balance in January 2011, Buri said she would pay it on a monthly installment of P5,000.00
until fully paid. When Yap disagreed, Buri said she would just cancel the sale. Thereafter, Buri also started
threatening her through text messages, and then later on filed a case for estafa against her.

Buri alleged in the criminal case that when she found out that the sale of the condominium unit was made
without the consent of Yap's husband, Yap cancelled the sale and promised to return the amount of
P1,000,000.00 initially paid. Despite several demands, however, she failed and refused to return the money.
Thus, Buri was constrained to file a case for estafa against Yap. Said case was later dismissed.

Yap then filed an administrative complaint against Buri for the alleged false accusations against her.

When ordered to submit her answer, Buri failed to comply. She did not even appear during the mandatory
conference. Thus, the mandatory conference was terminated and the parties were simply required to submit
their respective position papers. However, only Yap complied with said order.

On July 2, 2014, the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
recommended Buri's suspension to wit:1

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, undersigned Commissioner recommends to impose the penalty of
suspension from the practice of law for a period of three (3) months upon the respondent, Atty. Grace C.
Buri, and for her to pay the complainant the amount of PhP200,000.00 upon execution by complainant and
spouse of the Deed of Absolute Sale of the condominium unit subject of the sale between the parties.
On January 31, 2015, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XXI-2015-062,2 which adopted the
foregoing recommendation but with modification, thus:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification, the
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made
part of this Resolution as Annex "A," finding Respondent's violation of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Hence, Atty. Grace C. Buri is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1)
year. The order to pay P200,000.00 is deleted without prejudice to the filing of proper action by
Complainant in Court.
The Court's Ruling

The Court finds no sufficient reason to overturn the findings and recommendation of the IBP that Buri must
be disciplined accordingly.

Here, instead of paying Yap the remaining balance of the purchase price of the condominium unit, Buri
opted to simply threaten her and file a criminal case against her. Obviously, this strategy was to intimidate
Yap and prevent her from collecting the remaining P200,000.00. When given a chance to defend herself,
Buri chose to stay silent and even refused to file an answer, attend the hearing, or to submit her position
paper, despite due notice. Hence, Yap's version of the facts stands and remains uncontroverted.

Buri's unwarranted tenacity simply shows, not only her lack of responsibility, but also her lack of interest in
clearing her name, which, as pronounced in case law, is indicative of an implied admission of the charges
levelled against her.3

Buri's persistent refusal to pay her obligation despite frequent demands clearly reflects her lack of integrity
and moral soundness; she took advantage of her knowledge of the law and clearly resorted to threats and
intimidation in order to get away with what she wanted, constituting a gross violation of professional ethics
and a betrayal of public confidence in the legal profession.4

Buri indubitably swept aside the Lawyer's Oath that enjoins her to support the Constitution and obey the
laws. She forgot that she must not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful
suit nor give aid nor consent to the same. She also took for granted the express commands of the Code of
Professional Responsibility (CPR), specifically Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 and Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of the CPR.

Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of the CPR provide:

CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND
PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.

Rule 1.01 -A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

xxxx
While Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the CPR state:
CANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.

Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor
shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession.
The foregoing canons require of Buri, as a lawyer, an enduring high sense of responsibility and good fidelity
in all her dealings and emphasize the high standard of honesty and fairness expected of her, not only in the
practice of the legal profession, but in her personal dealings as well. A lawyer must conduct himself with
great propriety, and his behavior should be beyond reproach anywhere and at all times. For, as officers of
the courts and keepers of the public's faith, they are burdened with the highest degree of social
responsibility and are thus mandated to behave at all times in a manner consistent with truth and honor.
Likewise, the oath that lawyers swear to impresses upon them the duty of exhibiting the highest degree of
good faith, fairness and candor in their relationships with others. Thus, lawyers may be disciplined for any
conduct, whether in their professional or in their private capacity, if such conduct renders them unfit to
continue to be officers of the court.5

That Buri's act involved a private dealing with Yap is immaterial. Her being a lawyer calls for - whether she
was acting as such or in a non professional capacity - the obligation to exhibit good faith, fairness and
candor in her relationship with others. There is no question that a lawyer could be disciplined not only for a
malpractice in his profession, but also for any misconduct committed outside of his professional capacity.
Buri's being a lawyer demands that she conduct herself as a person of the highest moral and professional
integrity and probity in her dealings with others.6

The Court has repeatedly emphasized that the practice of law is imbued with public interest and that a
lawyer owes substantial duties, not only to his client, but also to his brethren in the profession, to the
courts, and to the public, and takes part in the administration of justice, one of the most important functions
of the State, as an officer of the court. Accordingly, lawyers are bound to maintain, not only a high standard
of legal proficiency, but also of morality, honesty, integrity, and fair dealing.7

Time and again, the Court has stressed the settled principle that the practice of law is not a right but a
privilege bestowed by the State on those who show that they possess, and continue to possess, the
qualifications required by law for the conferment of such privilege. Membership in the bar is a privilege
burdened with conditions. A high sense of morality, honesty, and fair dealing is expected and required of a
member of the bar. The nature of the office of a lawyer requires that he shall be of good moral character.
This qualification is not only a condition precedent to the admission to the legal profession, but its continued
possession is essential to maintain one's good standing in the profession. Consequently, a lawyer can be
deprived of his license for misconduct ascertained and declared by judgment of the Court after giving him
the opportunity to be heard.8

Verily, Buri has fallen short of the high standard of morality, honesty, integrity, and fair dealing expected of
her. On the contrary, she employed her knowledge and skill of the law in order to avoid fulfillment of her
obligation, thereby unjustly enriching herself and inflicting serious damage on Yap. Her repeated failure to
file her answer and position paper and to appear at the mandatory conference aggravate her misconduct.
These demonstrate high degree of irresponsibility and lack of respect for the IBP and its proceedings. Her
attitude severely stains the nobility of the legal profession.9

The Court sustains the modified recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors. The Court has held that the
deliberate failure to pay just debts constitutes gross misconduct, for which a lawyer may be sanctioned with
one (1) year-suspension from the practice of law.10 The Court likewise upholds the deletion of the payment
of the P200,000.00 since the same is not intrinsically linked to Buri's professional engagement. Disciplinary
proceedings should only revolve around the determination of the respondent lawyer's administrative and not
his civil liability. Thus, when the claimed liabilities are purely civil in nature, as when the claim involves
money owed by the lawyer to his client in view of a separate and distinct transaction and not by virtue of a
lawyer-client relationship, the same should be threshed out in a separate civil action.11

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court SUSPENDS Atty. Grace C. Buri from the practice
of law for a period of one (1) year and WARNS her that a repetition of the same or similar offense shall be
dealt with more severely.

Let copies of this decision be included in the personal records of Atty. Grace C. Buri and entered in her file in
the Office of the Bar Confidant.

Let copies of this decision be disseminated to all lower courts by the Office of the Court Administrator, as
well as to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.
 A.C. No. 11246, June 14, 2016

ARNOLD PACAO, Complainant, v. ATTY. SINAMAR LIMOS, Respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

Before this Court is a verified complaint1 filed on November 4, 2011 by Arnold Pacao (complainant), seeking
the disbarment of Atty. Sinamar Limos (Atty. Limos) for conduct unbecoming of a member of the Bar.

The Facts

Sometime in March 2008, complainant's wife Mariadel Pacao, former vault custodian of BHF Pawnshop (BHF)
branch in Mandaluyong City, was charged with qualified theft by BHF. At the preliminary investigation, Atty.
Limos appeared as counsel for BHF. Thereafter, the case was filed before the Regional Trial Court of
Mandaluyong City.2 ChanRoblesVi rt ualawlib ra ry

To buy peace, the complainant initiated negotiation with BHF, through Atty. Limos, for a possible settlement.
A meeting was then arranged between the complainant and Atty. Limos, where the latter represented that
she was duly authorized by BHF. After a series of negotiations, Atty. Limos relayed that BHF is demanding
the sum of P530,000.00 to be paid in full or by installments. Further negotiation led to an agreement
whereby the complainant would pay an initial amount of P200,000.00 to be entrusted to Atty. Limos, who
will then deliver to the complainant a signed affidavit of desistance, a compromise agreement, and a joint
motion to approve compromise agreement for filing with the court.3 ChanRoblesVirt ualawli bra ry

On October 29, 2009, the complainant gave the initial amount of P200,000.00 to Atty. Limos, who in turn,
signed an Acknowledgment Receipt4 recognizing her undertakings as counsel of BHF. However, Atty. Limos
failed to meet the terms of their agreement. Notwithstanding such failure, Atty. Limos still sought to get
from the complainant the next installment amount of their purported agreement, but the latter refused.5 ChanRobles Vi rtua lawlib rary

Thereafter, in June 2010, the complainant met BHF's representative, Camille Bonifacio, who informed him
that Atty. Limos was no longer BHF's counsel and was not authorized to negotiate any settlement nor
receive any money in behalf of BHF. The complainant also learned that BHF did not receive the P200,000.00
initial payment that he gave to Atty. Limos.6 ChanRoblesVi rtua lawlib rary

This prompted the complainant to send a demand letter7 to Atty. Limos to return the P200,000.00 initial
settlement payment, but the latter failed and refused to do so.8 ChanRoblesVirtualawl ibra ry

The complainant then filed a disbarment case against Atty. Limos before the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) - Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD). The IBP-CBD required Atty. Limos to file an answer
but she did not file any responsive pleading.9 A mandatory conference was then set on March 1 and 29,
2012, and April 19, 2012, but Atty. Limos failed to attend. Thereafter, the IBP-CBD ordered the parties to
submit their position paper, but once again, Atty. Limos did not bother to submit her position paper.

On May 5, 2014, the Investigating Commissioner recommended the disbarment of Atty. Limos.10 The
Investigating Commissioner found enough evidence on record to prove that Atty. Limos committed fraud
and practiced deceit on the complainant to the latter's prejudice by concealing or omitting to disclose the
material fact that she no longer had the authority to negotiate and conclude a settlement for and on behalf
of BHF, nor was authorized to receive the P200,000.00 from the complainant. Atty. Limos was likewise
ordered to return to the complainant the full amount of P200,000.00 with interest thereon at the rate of
12% per annum from the date of her receipt of the said amount to the date of her return of the full
amount.11 ChanRoblesVi rtualaw lib rary

In a Resolution12 dated April 19, 2015, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the Investigating
Commissioner's report and recommendation.

On March 8, 2016, the IBP transmitted the notice of the resolution and the case records to the Court for
final action pursuant to Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court.13 As per verification of the Court, neither party has
filed a motion for reconsideration or a petition for review thereafter.
 The Issue

Whether or not the instant disbarment complaint constitutes a sufficient basis to disbar Atty. Limos from the
practice of law?14ChanRobles Virtualawl ibra ry

Ruling of the Court

To begin with, the Court notes that this is not the first time that Atty. Limos is facing an administrative case,
for she had already been twice suspended from the practice of law, by this Court, for three months each
in Villaflores v. Atty. Limos15 and Wilkie v. Atty. Limos.16 In Villaflores, Atty. Limos received attorney's fees
of P20,000.00 plus miscellaneous expenses of P2,000.00, but she failed to perform her undertaking with her
client; thus she was found guilty of gross negligence and dereliction of duty. Likewise, in Wilkie, Atty. Limos
was held administratively liable for her deceitful and dishonest conduct when she obtained a loan of
P250,000.00 from her client and issued two postdated checks in the latter's favor to pay the said loan
despite knowledge of insufficiency of funds to cover the same. In both cases, the Court, gave Atty. Limos a
warning that repetition of the same or similar acts by her will merit a more severe penalty.

Once again, for the third time, Atty. Limos is facing an administrative case before this Court for receiving the
amount of P200,000.00 from the complainant purportedly for a possible amicable settlement with her client
BHF. However, Atty. Limos was no longer BHF's counsel and was not authorize to negotiate and conclude a
settlement for and on behalf of BHF nor was she authorized to receive any money in behalf of BHF. Her
blunder is compounded by the fact that she did not turn over the money to BHF, nor did she return the
same to the complainant, despite due demand. Furthermore, she even tried to get the next installment
knowing fully well that she was not authorized to enter into settlement negotiations with the complainant as
her engagement as counsel of BHF had already ceased.

The fact that this is Atty. Limos' third transgression exacerbates her offense. The foregoing factual
antecedents demonstrate her propensity to employ deceit and misrepresentation. It is not too farfetched for
this Court to conclude that from the very beginning, Atty. Limos had planned to employ deceit on the
complainant to get hold of a sum of money. Such a conduct is unbecoming and does not speak well of a
member of the Bar.

Atty. Limos' case is further highlighted by her lack of regard for the charges brought against her. Similar
with Wilkie, despite due notice, Atty. Limos did not bother to answer the complaint against her. She also
failed to file her mandatory conference brief and her verified position paper. Worse, Atty. Limos did not even
enter appearance either personally or by counsel, and she failed to appear at the scheduled date of the
mandatory conferences which she was duly notified.17 ChanRobles Vi rtualaw lib rary

By her failure to present convincing evidence, or any evidence for that matter, to justify her actions, Atty.
Limos failed to demonstrate that she still possessed the integrity and morality demanded of a member of the
Bar. Her seeming indifference to the complaint brought against her was made obvious by her unreasonable
absence from the proceedings before the IBP. Her disobedience to the IBP is, in fact, a gross and blatant
disrespect for the authority of the Court.

Despite her two prior suspensions, still, Atty. Limos is once again demonstrating to this Court that not only
is she unfit to stay in the legal profession for her deceitful conduct but is also remiss in following the dictates
of the Court, which has supervision over her. Atty. Limos' unwarranted obstinacy is a great insolence to the
Court which cannot be tolerated.

The present case comes clearly under the grounds given in Section 27,18 Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of
Court. The Court, however, does not hesitate to impose the penalty of disbarment when the guilty party has
become a repeat offender. Considering the serious nature of the instant offense and in light of Atty. Limos'
prior misconduct which grossly degrades the legal profession, the imposition of the ultimate penalty of
disbarment is warranted.

In imposing the penalty of disbarment upon Atty. Limos, the Court is aware that the power to disbar is one
to be exercised with great caution and only in clear cases of misconduct that seriously affect the standing
and character of the lawyer as a legal professional and as an officer of the Court.19 However, Atty. Limos'
recalcitrant attitude and unwillingness to heed with the Court's warning, which is deemed to be an affront to
the Court's authority over members of the Bar, warrant an utmost disciplinary sanction from this Court. Her
repeated desecration of her ethical commitments proved herself to be unfit to remain in the legal profession.
Worse, she remains apathetic to the need to reform herself.
"[T]he practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the State upon those who show that they
possess, and continue to possess, the qualifications required by law for the conferment of such privilege.
Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions."20 "Of all classes and professions, the lawyer
is most sacredly bound to uphold the laws. He is their sworn servant; and for him, of all men in the world, to
repudiate and override the laws, to trample them underfoot and to ignore the very bonds of society, argues
recreancy to his position and office, and sets a pernicious example to the insubordinate and dangerous
elements of the body politic."21
ChanRobles Virtualawl ibra ry

Indeed, Atty. Limos has disgraced the legal profession. The facts and evidence obtaining in this case
definitely establish her failure to live up to her duties as a lawyer in accordance with the strictures of the
lawyer's oath, the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Canons of Professional Ethics, thereby making
her unworthy to continue as a member of the bar.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Sinamar Limos, having violated the Code of Professional Responsibility by
committing grave misconduct and willful insubordination, is DISBARRED and her name ordered STRICKEN
OFF the Roll of Attorneys effective immediately.

Let a copy of this Decision be entered in the records of Atty. Sinamar Limos. Further, let other copies be
served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and on the Office of the Court Administrator, which is
directed to circulate them to all the courts in the country for their information and guidance.

This Decision is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 10164 March 10, 2014

STEPHAN BRUNET and VIRGINIA ROMANILLOS BRUNET, Complainants,

vs.
ATTY. RONALD L. GUAREN, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

MENDOZA, J.:

On August 9, 2002, complainant spouses Stephan and Virginia Brunet (complainants) filed a
complaint against respondent Atty. Ronald L. Guaren (Atty. Guaren) before the Commission on Bar
Discipline (CED), Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).

Complainants alleged that in February 1997, they engaged the services of Atty. Guaren for the titling
of a residential lot they acquired in Bonbon, Nueva Caseres; that Atty. Guaren asked for a fee of Ten
Thousand Pesos (₱10,000.00) including expenses relative to its proceeding; that it was agreed that
full payment of the fee shall be made after the delivery of the title; that Atty. Guaren asked for an
advance fee of One Thousand Pesos (Pl,000.00) which they gave; that Atty. Guaren took all the
pertinent documents relative to the titling of their lot-certified true copy of the tax declaration, original
copy of the deed of exchange, sketch plan, deed of donation, survey plan, and original copy of the
waiver; that on March 10, 1997, Atty. Guaren asked for additional payment of Six Thousand Pesos
(₱6,000.00) which they dutifully gave; that from 1997 to 2001, they always reminded Atty. Guaren
about the case and each time he would say that the titling was in progress; that they became
bothered by the slow progress of the case so they demanded the return of the money they paid; and
that respondent agreed to return the same provided that the amount of Five Thousand Pesos
(₱5,000.00) be deducted to answer for his professional fees.
Complainants further alleged that despite the existence of an attorney-client relationship between
them, Atty. Guaren made a special appearance against them in a case pending before the
Metropolitan Circuit Trial Court, Oslob, Cebu (MCTC).

Atty. Guaren admitted that he indeed charged complainants an acceptance fee of ₱10,000.00, but
denied that the amount was inclusive of expenses for the titling of the lot. He claimed, however, that
he received the payment of ₱1,000.00 and ₱6,000.00; that their agreement was that the case would
be filed in court after the complainants fully paid his acceptance fee; that he did not take the
documents relative to the titling of the lot except for the photocopy of the tax declaration; and that he
did not commit betrayal of trust and confidence when he participated in a case filed against the
complainants in MCTC explaining that his appearance was for and in behalf of Atty. Ervin
Estandante, the counsel on record, who failed to appear in the said hearing.

In the Report and Recommendation,1 dated August 24, 2012, the Investigating Commissioner found
Atty. Guaren to have violated the Canon of Professional Responsibility when he accepted the titling
of complainants’ lot and despite the acceptance of ₱7,000.00, he failed to perform his obligation and
allowed 5 long years to elapse without any progress in the titling of the lot. Atty. Guaren should also
be disciplined for appearing in a case against complainants without a written consent from the latter.
The CBD recommended that he be suspended for six (6) months.

In its May 20, 2013 Resolution,2 the IBP Board of Governors, adopted and approved with
modification the Report and Recommendation of the CBD, suspending Atty. Guaren from the
practice of law for three (3) months only.

The Court adopts the findings of the IBP Board of Governors on the unethical conduct of Atty.
Guaren, except as to the penalty.

The practice of law is not a business. It is a profession in which duty to public service, not money, is
the primary consideration. Lawyering is not primarily meant to be a money-making venture, and law
advocacy is not a capital that necessarily yields profits. The gaining of a livelihood should be a
secondary consideration. The duty to public service and to the administration of justice should be the
primary consideration of lawyers, who must subordinate their personal interests or what they owe to
themselves.3

Canons 17 and 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that:

CANON 17 - A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and
confidence reposed in him.

CANON 18 - A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.

In the present case, Atty. Guaren admitted that he accepted the amount of ₱7,000.00 as partial
payment of his acceptance fee. He, however, failed to perform his obligation to file the case for the
titling of complainants' lot despite the lapse of 5 years. Atty. Guaren breached his duty to serve his
client with competence and diligence when he neglected a legal matter entrusted to him. 1âwphi1

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Ronald L. Guaren is found GUILTY of having violated Canons 17
and 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of
law for a period of SIX (6) MONTHS effective from receipt of this Resolution, with a warning that a
similar infraction in the future shall be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this resolution be furnished the Bar Confidant to be included in the records of the
respondent; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for distribution to all its chapters; and the Office of
the Court Administrator for dissemination to all courts throughout the country.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 100113 September 3, 1991

RENATO CAYETANO, petitioner,

vs.
CHRISTIAN MONSOD, HON. JOVITO R. SALONGA, COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENT, and
HON. GUILLERMO CARAGUE, in his capacity as Secretary of Budget and
Management, respondents.

Renato L. Cayetano for and in his own behalf.

Sabina E. Acut, Jr. and Mylene Garcia-Albano co-counsel for petitioner.

PARAS, J.:

We are faced here with a controversy of far-reaching proportions. While ostensibly only legal issues
are involved, the Court's decision in this case would indubitably have a profound effect on the
political aspect of our national existence.

The 1987 Constitution provides in Section 1 (1), Article IX-C:

There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners

who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at
least thirty-five years of age, holders of a college degree, and must not have been
candidates for any elective position in the immediately preceding -elections. However, a
majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have
been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. (Emphasis supplied)

The aforequoted provision is patterned after Section l(l), Article XII-C of the 1973 Constitution which
similarly provides:

There shall be an independent Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and eight

Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their
appointment, at least thirty-five years of age and holders of a college degree. However, a majority
thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in
the practice of law for at least ten years.' (Emphasis supplied)

Regrettably, however, there seems to be no jurisprudence as to what constitutes practice of law as a

legal qualification to an appointive office.

Black defines "practice of law" as:

 The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal principles and
technique to serve the interest of another with his consent. It is not limited to appearing in
court, or advising and assisting in the conduct of litigation, but embraces the preparation of
pleadings, and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, conveyancing, the
preparation of legal instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all legal advice to clients. It
embraces all advice to clients and all actions taken for them in matters connected with the
law. An attorney engages in the practice of law by maintaining an office where he is held out
to be-an attorney, using a letterhead describing himself as an attorney, counseling clients in
legal matters, negotiating with opposing counsel about pending litigation, and fixing and
collecting fees for services rendered by his associate. (Black's Law Dictionary, 3rd ed.)

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. (Land Title Abstract and Trust Co.
v. Dworken, 129 Ohio St. 23, 193 N.E. 650) A person is also considered to be in the practice of law
when he:

... for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person, firms, associations
or corporations as to their rights under the law, or appears in a representative capacity as an
advocate in proceedings pending or prospective, before any court, commissioner, referee,
board, body, committee, or commission constituted by law or authorized to settle
controversies and there, in such representative capacity performs any act or acts for the
purpose of obtaining or defending the rights of their clients under the law. Otherwise stated,
one who, in a representative capacity, engages in the business of advising clients as to their
rights under the law, or while so engaged performs any act or acts either in court or outside
of court for that purpose, is engaged in the practice of law. (State ex. rel. Mckittrick v..C.S.
Dudley and Co., 102 S.W. 2d 895, 340 Mo. 852)

This Court in the case of Philippine Lawyers Association v.Agrava, (105 Phil. 173,176-177) stated:

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the
preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the
management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts,
and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in
matters connected with the law incorporation services, assessment and condemnation
services contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage,
enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting
proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to
constitute law practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the
work done involves the determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and
conditions. (5 Am. Jr. p. 262, 263). (Emphasis supplied)

Practice of law under modem conditions consists in no small part of work performed outside
of any court and having no immediate relation to proceedings in court. It embraces
conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on a large variety of subjects, and the preparation
and execution of legal instruments covering an extensive field of business and trust relations
and other affairs. Although these transactions may have no direct connection with court
proceedings, they are always subject to become involved in litigation. They require in many
aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide experience with men and affairs, and great
capacity for adaptation to difficult and complex situations. These customary functions of an
attorney or counselor at law bear an intimate relation to the administration of justice by the
courts. No valid distinction, so far as concerns the question set forth in the order, can be
drawn between that part of the work of the lawyer which involves appearance in court and
that part which involves advice and drafting of instruments in his office. It is of importance to
 the welfare of the public that these manifold customary functions be performed by persons
possessed of adequate learning and skill, of sound moral character, and acting at all times
under the heavy trust obligations to clients which rests upon all attorneys.
(Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 3 [1953 ed.] , p. 665-666, citing In re Opinion
of the Justices [Mass.], 194 N.E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. v. Automobile Service
Assoc. [R.I.] 179 A. 139,144). (Emphasis ours)

The University of the Philippines Law Center in conducting orientation briefing for new lawyers
(1974-1975) listed the dimensions of the practice of law in even broader terms as advocacy,
counselling and public service.

One may be a practicing attorney in following any line of employment in the profession. If
what he does exacts knowledge of the law and is of a kind usual for attorneys engaging in
the active practice of their profession, and he follows some one or more lines of employment
such as this he is a practicing attorney at law within the meaning of the statute. (Barr v.
Cardell, 155 NW 312)

Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal
procedure, knowledge, training and experience. "To engage in the practice of law is to perform those
acts which are characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice or render
any kind of service, which device or service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or
skill." (111 ALR 23)

The following records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission show that it has adopted a liberal
interpretation of the term "practice of law."

MR. FOZ. Before we suspend the session, may I make a manifestation which I forgot to do
during our review of the provisions on the Commission on Audit. May I be allowed to make a
very brief statement?

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir).

The Commissioner will please proceed.

MR. FOZ. This has to do with the qualifications of the members of the Commission on Audit.
Among others, the qualifications provided for by Section I is that "They must be Members of
the Philippine Bar" — I am quoting from the provision — "who have been engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten years".

To avoid any misunderstanding which would result in excluding members of the Bar who are now
employed in the COA or Commission on Audit, we would like to make the clarification that this
provision on qualifications regarding members of the Bar does not necessarily refer or involve actual
practice of law outside the COA We have to interpret this to mean that as long as the lawyers who
are employed in the COA are using their legal knowledge or legal talent in their respective work
within COA, then they are qualified to be considered for appointment as members or commissioners,
even chairman, of the Commission on Audit.

This has been discussed by the Committee on Constitutional Commissions and Agencies and we
deem it important to take it up on the floor so that this interpretation may be made available
whenever this provision on the qualifications as regards members of the Philippine Bar engaging in
the practice of law for at least ten years is taken up.
 MR. OPLE. Will Commissioner Foz yield to just one question.

MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.

MR. OPLE. Is he, in effect, saying that service in the COA by a lawyer is equivalent to the
requirement of a law practice that is set forth in the Article on the Commission on Audit?

MR. FOZ. We must consider the fact that the work of COA, although it is auditing, will
necessarily involve legal work; it will involve legal work. And, therefore, lawyers who are
employed in COA now would have the necessary qualifications in accordance with the
Provision on qualifications under our provisions on the Commission on Audit. And, therefore,
the answer is yes.

MR. OPLE. Yes. So that the construction given to this is that this is equivalent to the practice
of law.

MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.

MR. OPLE. Thank you.

... ( Emphasis supplied)

Section 1(1), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution, provides, among others, that the Chairman and
two Commissioners of the Commission on Audit (COA) should either be certified public accountants
with not less than ten years of auditing practice, or members of the Philippine Bar who have been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. (emphasis supplied)

Corollary to this is the term "private practitioner" and which is in many ways synonymous with the
word "lawyer." Today, although many lawyers do not engage in private practice, it is still a fact that
the majority of lawyers are private practitioners. (Gary Munneke, Opportunities in Law Careers [VGM
Career Horizons: Illinois], [1986], p. 15).

At this point, it might be helpful to define private practice. The term, as commonly understood,
means "an individual or organization engaged in the business of delivering legal services." (Ibid.).
Lawyers who practice alone are often called "sole practitioners." Groups of lawyers are called
"firms." The firm is usually a partnership and members of the firm are the partners. Some firms may
be organized as professional corporations and the members called shareholders. In either case, the
members of the firm are the experienced attorneys. In most firms, there are younger or more
inexperienced salaried attorneyscalled "associates." (Ibid.).

The test that defines law practice by looking to traditional areas of law practice is essentially
tautologous, unhelpful defining the practice of law as that which lawyers do. (Charles W.
Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics [West Publishing Co.: Minnesota, 1986], p. 593). The practice of law
is defined as the performance of any acts . . . in or out of court, commonly understood to be the
practice of law. (State Bar Ass'n v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 145 Conn. 222, 140 A.2d 863, 870
[1958] [quoting Grievance Comm. v. Payne, 128 Conn. 325, 22 A.2d 623, 626 [1941]). Because
lawyers perform almost every function known in the commercial and governmental realm, such a
definition would obviously be too global to be workable.(Wolfram, op. cit.).

The appearance of a lawyer in litigation in behalf of a client is at once the most publicly familiar role
for lawyers as well as an uncommon role for the average lawyer. Most lawyers spend little time in
courtrooms, and a large percentage spend their entire practice without litigating a case. (Ibid., p.
593). Nonetheless, many lawyers do continue to litigate and the litigating lawyer's role colors much
of both the public image and the self perception of the legal profession. (Ibid.).

In this regard thus, the dominance of litigation in the public mind reflects history, not reality. (Ibid.).
Why is this so? Recall that the late Alexander SyCip, a corporate lawyer, once articulated on the
importance of a lawyer as a business counselor in this wise: "Even today, there are still uninformed
laymen whose concept of an attorney is one who principally tries cases before the courts. The
members of the bench and bar and the informed laymen such as businessmen, know that in most
developed societies today, substantially more legal work is transacted in law offices than in the
courtrooms. General practitioners of law who do both litigation and non-litigation work also know that
in most cases they find themselves spending more time doing what [is] loosely desccribe[d] as
business counseling than in trying cases. The business lawyer has been described as the planner,
the diagnostician and the trial lawyer, the surgeon. I[t] need not [be] stress[ed] that in law, as in
medicine, surgery should be avoided where internal medicine can be effective." (Business Star,
"Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).

In the course of a working day the average general practitioner wig engage in a number of legal
tasks, each involving different legal doctrines, legal skills, legal processes, legal institutions, clients,
and other interested parties. Even the increasing numbers of lawyers in specialized practice wig
usually perform at least some legal services outside their specialty. And even within a narrow
specialty such as tax practice, a lawyer will shift from one legal task or role such as advice-giving to
an importantly different one such as representing a client before an administrative agency.
(Wolfram, supra, p. 687).

By no means will most of this work involve litigation, unless the lawyer is one of the relatively rare
types — a litigator who specializes in this work to the exclusion of much else. Instead, the work will
require the lawyer to have mastered the full range of traditional lawyer skills of client counselling,
advice-giving, document drafting, and negotiation. And increasingly lawyers find that the new skills of
evaluation and mediation are both effective for many clients and a source of employment. (Ibid.).

Most lawyers will engage in non-litigation legal work or in litigation work that is constrained in very
important ways, at least theoretically, so as to remove from it some of the salient features of
adversarial litigation. Of these special roles, the most prominent is that of prosecutor. In some
lawyers' work the constraints are imposed both by the nature of the client and by the way in which
the lawyer is organized into a social unit to perform that work. The most common of these roles are
those of corporate practice and government legal service. (Ibid.).

In several issues of the Business Star, a business daily, herein below quoted are emerging trends in
corporate law practice, a departure from the traditional concept of practice of law.

We are experiencing today what truly may be called a revolutionary transformation in

corporate law practice. Lawyers and other professional groups, in particular those members
participating in various legal-policy decisional contexts, are finding that understanding the
major emerging trends in corporation law is indispensable to intelligent decision-making.

Constructive adjustment to major corporate problems of today requires an accurate

understanding of the nature and implications of the corporate law research function
accompanied by an accelerating rate of information accumulation. The recognition of the
need for such improved corporate legal policy formulation, particularly "model-making" and
"contingency planning," has impressed upon us the inadequacy of traditional procedures in
many decisional contexts.
In a complex legal problem the mass of information to be processed, the sorting and
weighing of significant conditional factors, the appraisal of major trends, the necessity of
estimating the consequences of given courses of action, and the need for fast decision and
response in situations of acute danger have prompted the use of sophisticated concepts of
information flow theory, operational analysis, automatic data processing, and electronic
computing equipment. Understandably, an improved decisional structure must stress the
predictive component of the policy-making process, wherein a "model", of the decisional
context or a segment thereof is developed to test projected alternative courses of action in
terms of futuristic effects flowing therefrom.

Although members of the legal profession are regularly engaged in predicting and projecting
the trends of the law, the subject of corporate finance law has received relatively little
organized and formalized attention in the philosophy of advancing corporate legal education.
Nonetheless, a cross-disciplinary approach to legal research has become a vital necessity.

Certainly, the general orientation for productive contributions by those trained primarily in the
law can be improved through an early introduction to multi-variable decisional context and
the various approaches for handling such problems. Lawyers, particularly with either a
master's or doctorate degree in business administration or management, functioning at the
legal policy level of decision-making now have some appreciation for the concepts and
analytical techniques of other professions which are currently engaged in similar types of
complex decision-making.

Truth to tell, many situations involving corporate finance problems would require the services
of an astute attorney because of the complex legal implications that arise from each and
every necessary step in securing and maintaining the business issue raised. (Business Star,
"Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).

In our litigation-prone country, a corporate lawyer is assiduously referred to as the "abogado

de campanilla." He is the "big-time" lawyer, earning big money and with a clientele
composed of the tycoons and magnates of business and industry.

Despite the growing number of corporate lawyers, many people could not explain what it is
that a corporate lawyer does. For one, the number of attorneys employed by a single
corporation will vary with the size and type of the corporation. Many smaller and some large
corporations farm out all their legal problems to private law firms. Many others have in-house
counsel only for certain matters. Other corporation have a staff large enough to handle most
legal problems in-house.

A corporate lawyer, for all intents and purposes, is a lawyer who handles the legal affairs of a
corporation. His areas of concern or jurisdiction may include, inter alia: corporate legal
research, tax laws research, acting out as corporate secretary (in board meetings),
appearances in both courts and other adjudicatory agencies (including the Securities and
Exchange Commission), and in other capacities which require an ability to deal with the law.

At any rate, a corporate lawyer may assume responsibilities other than the legal affairs of the
business of the corporation he is representing. These include such matters as determining
policy and becoming involved in management. ( Emphasis supplied.)

In a big company, for example, one may have a feeling of being isolated from the action, or
not understanding how one's work actually fits into the work of the orgarnization. This can be
frustrating to someone who needs to see the results of his work first hand. In short, a
corporate lawyer is sometimes offered this fortune to be more closely involved in the running
of the business.

Moreover, a corporate lawyer's services may sometimes be engaged by a multinational

corporation (MNC). Some large MNCs provide one of the few opportunities available to
corporate lawyers to enter the international law field. After all, international law is practiced in
a relatively small number of companies and law firms. Because working in a foreign country
is perceived by many as glamorous, tills is an area coveted by corporate lawyers. In most
cases, however, the overseas jobs go to experienced attorneys while the younger attorneys
do their "international practice" in law libraries. (Business Star, "Corporate Law Practice,"
May 25,1990, p. 4).

This brings us to the inevitable, i.e., the role of the lawyer in the realm of finance. To borrow
the lines of Harvard-educated lawyer Bruce Wassertein, to wit: "A bad lawyer is one who
fails to spot problems, a good lawyer is one who perceives the difficulties, and the excellent
lawyer is one who surmounts them." (Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11,
1989, p. 4).

Today, the study of corporate law practice direly needs a "shot in the arm," so to speak. No
longer are we talking of the traditional law teaching method of confining the subject study to
the Corporation Code and the Securities Code but an incursion as well into the intertwining
modern management issues.

Such corporate legal management issues deal primarily with three (3) types of learning: (1)
acquisition of insights into current advances which are of particular significance to the
corporate counsel; (2) an introduction to usable disciplinary skins applicable to a corporate
counsel's management responsibilities; and (3) a devotion to the organization and
management of the legal function itself.

These three subject areas may be thought of as intersecting circles, with a shared area
linking them. Otherwise known as "intersecting managerial jurisprudence," it forms a unifying
theme for the corporate counsel's total learning.

Some current advances in behavior and policy sciences affect the counsel's role. For that
matter, the corporate lawyer reviews the globalization process, including the resulting
strategic repositioning that the firms he provides counsel for are required to make, and the
need to think about a corporation's; strategy at multiple levels. The salience of the nation-
state is being reduced as firms deal both with global multinational entities and simultaneously
with sub-national governmental units. Firms increasingly collaborate not only with public
entities but with each other — often with those who are competitors in other arenas.

Also, the nature of the lawyer's participation in decision-making within the corporation is
rapidly changing. The modem corporate lawyer has gained a new role as a stakeholder — in
some cases participating in the organization and operations of governance through
participation on boards and other decision-making roles. Often these new patterns develop
alongside existing legal institutions and laws are perceived as barriers. These trends are
complicated as corporations organize for global operations. ( Emphasis supplied)

The practising lawyer of today is familiar as well with governmental policies toward the
promotion and management of technology. New collaborative arrangements for promoting
specific technologies or competitiveness more generally require approaches from industry
that differ from older, more adversarial relationships and traditional forms of seeking to
influence governmental policies. And there are lessons to be learned from other countries. In
Europe, Esprit, Eureka and Race are examples of collaborative efforts between
governmental and business Japan's MITI is world famous. (Emphasis supplied)

Following the concept of boundary spanning, the office of the Corporate Counsel comprises
a distinct group within the managerial structure of all kinds of organizations. Effectiveness of
both long-term and temporary groups within organizations has been found to be related to
indentifiable factors in the group-context interaction such as the groups actively revising their
knowledge of the environment coordinating work with outsiders, promoting team
achievements within the organization. In general, such external activities are better
predictors of team performance than internal group processes.

In a crisis situation, the legal managerial capabilities of the corporate lawyer vis-a-vis the
managerial mettle of corporations are challenged. Current research is seeking ways both to
anticipate effective managerial procedures and to understand relationships of financial
liability and insurance considerations. (Emphasis supplied)

Regarding the skills to apply by the corporate counsel, three factors are apropos:

First System Dynamics. The field of systems dynamics has been found an effective tool for
new managerial thinking regarding both planning and pressing immediate problems. An
understanding of the role of feedback loops, inventory levels, and rates of flow, enable users
to simulate all sorts of systematic problems — physical, economic, managerial, social, and
psychological. New programming techniques now make the system dynamics principles
more accessible to managers — including corporate counsels. (Emphasis supplied)

Second Decision Analysis. This enables users to make better decisions involving complexity
and uncertainty. In the context of a law department, it can be used to appraise the settlement
value of litigation, aid in negotiation settlement, and minimize the cost and risk involved in
managing a portfolio of cases. (Emphasis supplied)

Third Modeling for Negotiation Management. Computer-based models can be used directly
by parties and mediators in all lands of negotiations. All integrated set of such tools provide
coherent and effective negotiation support, including hands-on on instruction in these
techniques. A simulation case of an international joint venture may be used to illustrate the
point.

[Be this as it may,] the organization and management of the legal function, concern three
pointed areas of consideration, thus:

Preventive Lawyering. Planning by lawyers requires special skills that comprise a major part
of the general counsel's responsibilities. They differ from those of remedial law. Preventive
lawyering is concerned with minimizing the risks of legal trouble and maximizing legal rights
for such legal entities at that time when transactional or similar facts are being considered
and made.

Managerial Jurisprudence. This is the framework within which are undertaken those activities
of the firm to which legal consequences attach. It needs to be directly supportive of this
nation's evolving economic and organizational fabric as firms change to stay competitive in a
global, interdependent environment. The practice and theory of "law" is not adequate today
to facilitate the relationships needed in trying to make a global economy work.
 Organization and Functioning of the Corporate Counsel's Office. The general counsel has
emerged in the last decade as one of the most vibrant subsets of the legal profession. The
corporate counsel hear responsibility for key aspects of the firm's strategic issues, including
structuring its global operations, managing improved relationships with an increasingly
diversified body of employees, managing expanded liability exposure, creating new and
varied interactions with public decision-makers, coping internally with more complex make or
by decisions.

This whole exercise drives home the thesis that knowing corporate law is not enough to
make one a good general corporate counsel nor to give him a full sense of how the legal
system shapes corporate activities. And even if the corporate lawyer's aim is not the
understand all of the law's effects on corporate activities, he must, at the very least, also gain
a working knowledge of the management issues if only to be able to grasp not only the basic
legal "constitution' or makeup of the modem corporation. "Business Star", "The Corporate
Counsel," April 10, 1991, p. 4).

The challenge for lawyers (both of the bar and the bench) is to have more than a passing
knowledge of financial law affecting each aspect of their work. Yet, many would admit to
ignorance of vast tracts of the financial law territory. What transpires next is a dilemma of
professional security: Will the lawyer admit ignorance and risk opprobrium?; or will he feign
understanding and risk exposure? (Business Star, "Corporate Finance law," Jan. 11, 1989,
p. 4).

Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the position of
Chairman of the COMELEC in a letter received by the Secretariat of the Commission on
Appointments on April 25, 1991. Petitioner opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does
not possess the required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten
years.

On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the nomination of Monsod as

Chairman of the COMELEC. On June 18, 1991, he took his oath of office. On the same day, he
assumed office as Chairman of the COMELEC.

Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of Monsod's

nomination, petitioner as a citizen and taxpayer, filed the instant petition for certiorari and Prohibition
praying that said confirmation and the consequent appointment of Monsod as Chairman of the
Commission on Elections be declared null and void.

Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed the bar examinations of
1960 with a grade of 86-55%. He has been a dues paying member of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines since its inception in 1972-73. He has also been paying his professional license fees as
lawyer for more than ten years. (p. 124, Rollo)

After graduating from the College of Law (U.P.) and having hurdled the bar, Atty. Monsod worked in
the law office of his father. During his stint in the World Bank Group (1963-1970), Monsod worked as
an operations officer for about two years in Costa Rica and Panama, which involved getting
acquainted with the laws of member-countries negotiating loans and coordinating legal, economic,
and project work of the Bank. Upon returning to the Philippines in 1970, he worked with the Meralco
Group, served as chief executive officer of an investment bank and subsequently of a business
conglomerate, and since 1986, has rendered services to various companies as a legal and
economic consultant or chief executive officer. As former Secretary-General (1986) and National
Chairman (1987) of NAMFREL. Monsod's work involved being knowledgeable in election law. He
appeared for NAMFREL in its accreditation hearings before the Comelec. In the field of advocacy,
Monsod, in his personal capacity and as former Co-Chairman of the Bishops Businessmen's
Conference for Human Development, has worked with the under privileged sectors, such as the
farmer and urban poor groups, in initiating, lobbying for and engaging in affirmative action for the
agrarian reform law and lately the urban land reform bill. Monsod also made use of his legal
knowledge as a member of the Davide Commission, a quast judicial body, which conducted
numerous hearings (1990) and as a member of the Constitutional Commission (1986-1987), and
Chairman of its Committee on Accountability of Public Officers, for which he was cited by the
President of the Commission, Justice Cecilia Muñoz-Palma for "innumerable amendments to
reconcile government functions with individual freedoms and public accountability and the party-list
system for the House of Representative. (pp. 128-129 Rollo) ( Emphasis supplied)

Just a word about the work of a negotiating team of which Atty. Monsod used to be a member.

In a loan agreement, for instance, a negotiating panel acts as a team, and which is
adequately constituted to meet the various contingencies that arise during a negotiation.
Besides top officials of the Borrower concerned, there are the legal officer (such as the legal
counsel), the finance manager, and an operations officer (such as an official involved in
negotiating the contracts) who comprise the members of the team. (Guillermo V. Soliven,
"Loan Negotiating Strategies for Developing Country Borrowers," Staff Paper No. 2, Central
Bank of the Philippines, Manila, 1982, p. 11). (Emphasis supplied)

After a fashion, the loan agreement is like a country's Constitution; it lays down the law as far
as the loan transaction is concerned. Thus, the meat of any Loan Agreement can be
compartmentalized into five (5) fundamental parts: (1) business terms; (2) borrower's
representation; (3) conditions of closing; (4) covenants; and (5) events of default. (Ibid., p.
13).

In the same vein, lawyers play an important role in any debt restructuring program. For aside
from performing the tasks of legislative drafting and legal advising, they score national
development policies as key factors in maintaining their countries' sovereignty. (Condensed
from the work paper, entitled "Wanted: Development Lawyers for Developing Nations,"
submitted by L. Michael Hager, regional legal adviser of the United States Agency for
International Development, during the Session on Law for the Development of Nations at the
Abidjan World Conference in Ivory Coast, sponsored by the World Peace Through Law
Center on August 26-31, 1973). ( Emphasis supplied)

Loan concessions and compromises, perhaps even more so than purely renegotiation
policies, demand expertise in the law of contracts, in legislation and agreement drafting and
in renegotiation. Necessarily, a sovereign lawyer may work with an international business
specialist or an economist in the formulation of a model loan agreement. Debt restructuring
contract agreements contain such a mixture of technical language that they should be
carefully drafted and signed only with the advise of competent counsel in conjunction with
the guidance of adequate technical support personnel. (See International Law Aspects of the
Philippine External Debts, an unpublished dissertation, U.S.T. Graduate School of Law,
1987, p. 321). ( Emphasis supplied)

A critical aspect of sovereign debt restructuring/contract construction is the set of terms and
conditions which determines the contractual remedies for a failure to perform one or more
elements of the contract. A good agreement must not only define the responsibilities of both
parties, but must also state the recourse open to either party when the other fails to
discharge an obligation. For a compleat debt restructuring represents a devotion to that
 principle which in the ultimate analysis is sine qua non for foreign loan agreements-an
adherence to the rule of law in domestic and international affairs of whose kind U.S.
Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. once said: "They carry no banners, they
beat no drums; but where they are, men learn that bustle and bush are not the equal of quiet
genius and serene mastery." (See Ricardo J. Romulo, "The Role of Lawyers in Foreign
Investments," Integrated Bar of the Philippine Journal, Vol. 15, Nos. 3 and 4, Third and
Fourth Quarters, 1977, p. 265).

Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term Practice of law". particularly the modern
concept of law practice, and taking into consideration the liberal construction intended by the framers
of the Constitution, Atty. Monsod's past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager,
a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both
the rich and the poor — verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement — that he has been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.

Besides in the leading case of Luego v. Civil Service Commission, 143 SCRA 327, the Court said:

Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be performed by the officer in

which it is vested according to his best lights, the only condition being that the appointee
should possess the qualifications required by law. If he does, then the appointment cannot
be faulted on the ground that there are others better qualified who should have been
preferred. This is a political question involving considerations of wisdom which only the
appointing authority can decide. (emphasis supplied)

No less emphatic was the Court in the case of (Central Bank v. Civil Service Commission, 171
SCRA 744) where it stated:

It is well-settled that when the appointee is qualified, as in this case, and all the other legal
requirements are satisfied, the Commission has no alternative but to attest to the
appointment in accordance with the Civil Service Law. The Commission has no authority to
revoke an appointment on the ground that another person is more qualified for a particular
position. It also has no authority to direct the appointment of a substitute of its choice. To do
so would be an encroachment on the discretion vested upon the appointing authority. An
appointment is essentially within the discretionary power of whomsoever it is vested, subject
to the only condition that the appointee should possess the qualifications required by law. (
Emphasis supplied)

The appointing process in a regular appointment as in the case at bar, consists of four (4) stages: (1)
nomination; (2) confirmation by the Commission on Appointments; (3) issuance of a commission (in
the Philippines, upon submission by the Commission on Appointments of its certificate of
confirmation, the President issues the permanent appointment; and (4) acceptance e.g., oath-taking,
posting of bond, etc. . . . (Lacson v. Romero, No. L-3081, October 14, 1949; Gonzales, Law on
Public Officers, p. 200)

The power of the Commission on Appointments to give its consent to the nomination of Monsod as
Chairman of the Commission on Elections is mandated by Section 1(2) Sub-Article C, Article IX of
the Constitution which provides:

The Chairman and the Commisioners shall be appointed by the President with the consent of
the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years without reappointment. Of those
first appointed, three Members shall hold office for seven years, two Members for five years,
and the last Members for three years, without reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy
 shall be only for the unexpired term of the predecessor. In no case shall any Member be
appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity.

Anent Justice Teodoro Padilla's separate opinion, suffice it to say that his definition of the
practice of law is the traditional or stereotyped notion of law practice, as distinguished
from the modern concept of the practice of law, which modern connotation is exactly what
was intended by the eminent framers of the 1987 Constitution. Moreover, Justice Padilla's
definition would require generally a habitual law practice, perhaps practised two or three
times a week and would outlaw say, law practice once or twice a year for ten consecutive
years. Clearly, this is far from the constitutional intent.

Upon the other hand, the separate opinion of Justice Isagani Cruz states that in my written opinion, I
made use of a definition of law practice which really means nothing because the definition says that
law practice " . . . is what people ordinarily mean by the practice of law." True I cited the definition but
only by way of sarcasm as evident from my statement that the definition of law practice by
"traditional areas of law practice is essentially tautologous" or defining a phrase by means of the
phrase itself that is being defined.

Justice Cruz goes on to say in substance that since the law covers almost all situations, most
individuals, in making use of the law, or in advising others on what the law means, are actually
practicing law. In that sense, perhaps, but we should not lose sight of the fact that Mr. Monsod is a
lawyer, a member of the Philippine Bar, who has been practising law for over ten years. This is
different from the acts of persons practising law, without first becoming lawyers.

Justice Cruz also says that the Supreme Court can even disqualify an elected President of the
Philippines, say, on the ground that he lacks one or more qualifications. This matter, I greatly doubt.
For one thing, how can an action or petition be brought against the President? And even assuming
that he is indeed disqualified, how can the action be entertained since he is the incumbent
President?

We now proceed:

The Commission on the basis of evidence submitted doling the public hearings on Monsod's
confirmation, implicitly determined that he possessed the necessary qualifications as required by
law. The judgment rendered by the Commission in the exercise of such an acknowledged power is
beyond judicial interference except only upon a clear showing of a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. (Art. VIII, Sec. 1 Constitution). Thus, only where such
grave abuse of discretion is clearly shown shall the Court interfere with the Commission's judgment.
In the instant case, there is no occasion for the exercise of the Court's corrective power, since no
abuse, much less a grave abuse of discretion, that would amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction
and would warrant the issuance of the writs prayed, for has been clearly shown.

Additionally, consider the following:

(1) If the Commission on Appointments rejects a nominee by the President, may the
Supreme Court reverse the Commission, and thus in effect confirm the appointment?
Clearly, the answer is in the negative.

(2) In the same vein, may the Court reject the nominee, whom the Commission
has confirmed? The answer is likewise clear.
 (3) If the United States Senate (which is the confirming body in the U.S. Congress) decides
to confirm a Presidential nominee, it would be incredible that the U.S. Supreme Court would
still reverse the U.S. Senate.

Finally, one significant legal maxim is:

We must interpret not by the letter that killeth, but by the spirit that giveth life.

Take this hypothetical case of Samson and Delilah. Once, the procurator of Judea asked Delilah
(who was Samson's beloved) for help in capturing Samson. Delilah agreed on condition that —

No blade shall touch his skin;

No blood shall flow from his veins.

When Samson (his long hair cut by Delilah) was captured, the procurator placed an iron rod burning
white-hot two or three inches away from in front of Samson's eyes. This blinded the man. Upon
hearing of what had happened to her beloved, Delilah was beside herself with anger, and fuming
with righteous fury, accused the procurator of reneging on his word. The procurator calmly replied:
"Did any blade touch his skin? Did any blood flow from his veins?" The procurator was clearly relying
on the letter, not the spirit of the agreement.

In view of the foregoing, this petition is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

July 24, 2017

A.C. No. 11494

HEIRS OF JUAN DE DIOS E. CARLOS, namely, JENNIFER N. CARLOS, JOCELYN N. CARLOS,

JACQUELINE CARLOS-DOMINGUEZ, JO-ANN CARLOS-TABUTON, JIMMY N. CARLOS,
LORNA A. CARLOS, JERUSHA ANN A. CARLOS and JAN JOSHUA A. CARLOS, Complainants
vs.
ATTY. JAIME S. LINSANGAN, Respondent

DECISION

TIJAM, J.:

Complainants are children of the late Juan De Dios E. Carlos (Juan) who presently seek to disbar
respondent Atty. Jaime S. Linsangan (Atty. Linsangan). Atty. Linsangan acted as counsel for their
late father in several cases, one of which involving the recovery of a parcel of land located in
Alabang, Muntinlupa City. Complainants alleged that Atty. Linsangan forced them to sign pleadings
and documents, sold the parcel of land in Alabang, Muntinlupa City in cahoots with complainants'
estranged mother, and evaded payment of income taxes when he divided his share in the subject
property as his supposed attorney's fees to his wife and children, all in violation of his oath as
lawyer.

The Facts and Antecedent Proceedings

The parcel of land located in Alabang, Muntilupa City and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. 139061 with an area of 12,331 square meters was previously owned by the Spouses Felix
and Felipa Carlos. Their son, Teofilo Carlos (Teofilo), convinced them to transfer said title to his
name with a promise to distribute the same to his brothers and sisters. Teofilo delivered the owner's
duplicate copy of the title to his brother, Juan. However, Teofilo sold the entire property to Pedro
Balbanero (Pedro). Pedro, however, failed to pay the agreed installment payments.

For purposes of recovering the subject property from Teofilo (and Teofilo's supposed wife,
Felicidad), and from Pedro, Juan engaged the services of Atty. Linsangan. It appears that Atty.
Linsangan, for Juan, filed the following cases: (a) a case1 against Felicidad which was settled with
the latter acknowledging Juan's one-half interest and ownership over the property; (b) a case against
Pedro which was concluded on September 12, 1997; and (c) another case2 against Felicidad, albeit
filed by another lawyer who acted under the direct control and supervision of Atty. Linsangan. In this
case against Felicidad, it appears that the other half of the property was adjudicated to Juan, as
Teofilo's sole heir. Said adjudication was appealed to the CA.3

It further appears that Atty. Linsangan represented Juan in the following cases, likewise all involving
the subject property: (a) an action for partition4 filed by Bernard Rillo against Pedro; (b) an ejectment
case5 filed by Juan against Pedro; and (c) Juan's intervention in the case6 between Pedro and
Teofilo.

It finally appears that Atty. Linsangan also represented Juan in the certiorari cases and petitions for
review filed before the CA7 and this Court,8 likewise involving the same property.

During the pendency of the above cases, or on September 22, 1997, Atty. Linsangan and Juan
executed a Contract for Professional Services9 enumerating the above cases being handled by Atty.
Linsangan for Juan. In said Contract, Atty. Linsangan and Juan agreed, as follows:

xxxx

WHEREAS, the Parties have decided to consolidate their agreements in connection with
ATTORNEY's engagement as CLIENT's attorney to recover the subject property;

NOW, THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the foregoing premises, the parties hereto have
mutually agreed and bound themselves as follows:

1. That ATTORNEY shall continue to take all legal steps to recover the 10,000 square meters
covered by TCT No. 139061, or any portion thereof acceptable to CLIENT, through any or all of the
Court cases mentioned above, or such other Court cases as may be necessary;

2. That ATTORNEY shall not enter into any compromise agreement without the written consent of
CLIENT. CLIENT may enter into any compromise agreement only upon consultation with
ATTORNEY;

3. That ATTORNEY shall avail of all legal remedies in order to recover the property and shall
continue the prosecution of such remedies to the best of his knowledge, ability, and experience, all
within legal and ethical bounds;

4. That CLIENT shall shoulder all necessary and incidental expenses in connection with the said
cases;
5. That considering, among others, the extent of services rendered by ATTORNEY; the value of the
property sought to be recovered; the importance of the case to CLIENT; the difficulty of recovery
(considering that the Balbanero spouses have a favorable Court of Appeals['] Decision in C.V. No.
29379, while Felicidad Sandoval's name appears in the TCT No.139061 as wife of the registered
owner, Teofila Carlos), the professional ability and experience of ATTORNEY; as well as other
considerations, CLIENT hereby confirms and ratifies that he has agreed and bound himself to pay
ATTORNEY a contingent fee in an amount equivalent to FIFTY PERCENT (50%) of the market
value of the property, or portion thereof, which may be recovered, or the zonal value thereof,
whichever is higher.

The said attorney's fees shall become due and payable upon recovery of the property, or any portion
thereof, (a) upon finality of a favorable Court decision, or (b) compromise settlement, whether
judicially or extrajudicially, through the execution of any document acknowledging or transferring
CLIENT's rights over the property, or any portion thereof, whether or not through A TTORNEY's,
CLIENT's, or other person's efforts or mediation, or (c) or by any other mode by which CLIENT's
interest on the subject property, or a portion thereof, is recognized, or registered, or transferred to
him; or (d) should CLIENT violate this contract; or (e) should CLIENT terminate A TTORNEY's
services without legal or just cause.

6. That CLIENT undertakes and binds himself to pay the said attorney's fees to the following:

(a) To ATTORNEY himself;

(b) In case of ATTORNEY'S death or disability, to LORNA OBSUNA LINSANGAN;

(c) In case of death or disability of ATTORNEY and LORNA OBSUNA LINSANGAN, jointly and
severally, to LAUREN KYRA LINSANGAN, LORRAINE FREYJA LINSANGAN, and JAMES
LORENZ LINSANGAN;

(d) In default of all the [foregoing], to the estate of ATTORNEY.

7. That this Contract shall be binding and enforceable upon CLIENT's heirs, successors-in-interest,
administrators, and assigns, if any.

8. That finally, CLIENT hereby authorizes, at ATTORNEY's option, the annotation of this contract on
TCT No. 139061 or any subsequent title which may be issued. (Emphasis supplied)

xxxx10

However, it was not only Juan who went after the property, but also Bernard Rillo and Alicia Carlos,
a sister-in-law. The latter also filed an action11 for recovery of their share and by Compromise
Agreement, an area of 2,331 square meters was awarded in their favor, leaving a 10,000 square
meter portion of the property.12

This remaining 10,000 square meter portion was eventually divided in the case filed by Juan against
Felicidad (which Atty. Linsangan admits13 to have filed albeit through another lawyer who acted under
his control and supervision), through a Compromise Agreement wherein 7,500 square meters of the
subject property was given to the heirs of Juan while the remaining 2,500 square meters thereof was
given to Felicidad.14 In said Compromise Agreement, the parties likewise agreed to waive as against
each other any and all other claims which each may have against the other, including those pending
in the CA15 and this Court. This Compromise Agreement was approved by the trial court on
December 11, 2009.16

Subsequently, a Supplemental Compromise Agreement17 dated December 16, 2009 was submitted
by the heirs of Juan and Atty. Linsangan, dividing among them the 7,500 square meter-portion of the
property as follows: 3,750 square meters to the heirs of Juan and 3,750 square meters to Atty.
Linsangan pursuant to the Contract for Professional Services. In said Supplemental Compromise
1âwphi 1

Agreement, Atty. Linsangan waived in favor of his wife and children his 3,750 square meter share,
except as to the 250 square meters thereof, as follows:

(a) To Mrs. Lorna O. Linsangan - 2,000 square meters;

(b) To Lauren Kyra O. Linsangan - 500 square meters;

(c) To Lorraine Freyja O. Linsangan - 500 square meters;

(d) To James Lorenz O. Linsangan - 500 square meters;

(e) To Atty. Jaime S. Linsangan - 250 square meters.18

Said Supplemental Compromise Agreement was likewise approved by the trial court in its
Decision19 dated December 18, 2009. There was no mention in the record, however, that the
Compromise Agreement and the Supplemental Compromise Agreement were likewise presented for
approval before the several courts where the other cases were pending.

On December 10, 2015, Atty. Linsangan executed a Deed of Absolute Sale20 with a certain Helen S.
Perez (Helen) covering the entire 12,331 square meters of the subject property for a purchase price
of One Hundred Fifty Million Pesos (PhP150,000,000). Atty. Linsangan sold the entire property using
the following:

1. a Special Power of Attorney21 dated August 26, 2010, executed by his wife Lorna Linsangan, and
children, Lauren Kyra O. Linsangan, Lorraine Freyja O. Linsangan and James Lorenz O. Linsangan
to sell their shares in the subject property;

2. a Special Power of Attorney22 dated September 2009, executed by Juan's wife, Bella N. Vda. de
Carlos, and their children, Jo-Ann Carlos-Tabuton, Jacqueline Carlos-Dominguez and Jimmy N.
Carlos to represent them in all cases involving their interests and shares in the properties of Juan;

3. a Special Power of Attorney23 dated September 30, 2009 executed by Lorna A. Carlos, Jerusha
Ann A. Carlos and Jan Joshua A. Carlos to represent them in all cases involving their interests and
shares in the properties of Juan;

4. a Special Power of Attorney24 dated May 2013 executed by Porfirio C. Rillo and Jose Rillo to sell
their shares consisting of 200 square meter portion and 199 square meter portion, respectively, of
the subject property;

5. a Special Power of Attorney25 dated October 15, 2009 executed by Jocelyn N. Carlos and Jennifer
N. Carlos to represent them in all cases involving their interests and shares in the properties of Juan;

6. a Special Power of Attorney26 dated May 28, 2010 executed by Bernard Rillo in favor of Alicia D.
Carlos to sell his share in the subject property by virtue of a Compromise Agreement dated
September 3, 1987 in the case of Bernard Rillo, et al. vs. Teofilo Carlos, et al., Civil Case No. 11975,
Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch CXLIV.

On November 28, 2015, Helen issued several checks27 in varying amounts either made payable to
Cash or to Jaime S. Linsangan or Loma O. Linsangan and simultaneous thereto, Atty. Linsangan
released the owner's duplicate original of TCT No. 139061 to Helen.28 It further appears that in lieu of
one check in the amount of PhP2,500,000, Atty. Linsangan received, in cash, the amounts of
PhP2,000,000 on December 4, 2015,29 and PhP500,000 on December 10, 2015,30 from Helen.

Upon learning of the sale, complainants allegedly requested from Atty. Linsangan for their shares in
the proceeds and for the copies of the Special Power of Attorney as well as the case records, but
that Atty. Linsangan refused.31 Complainants also requested from Atty. Linsangan, this time through
another lawyer, Atty. Victor D. Aguinaldo, that their shares in the subject property be at least
segregated from the portion sold.32

On August 20, 2016, complainants wrote a letter33 to Atty. Linsangan revoking the Special Power of
Attorney which they executed in the latter's favor. In said letter, complainants accused Atty.
Linsangan of conniving with their mother, Bella N. Vda. De Carlos, in submitting the Compromise
Agreement and in selling the subject property. Complainants, however, recognized Atty. Lisangan's
services for which they proposed that the latter be paid on the basis of quantum meruit instead of
fifty percent (50%) of the subject property.34

Subsequently, or in September 2016, complainants filed the instant administrative

complaint35 against Atty. Linsangan accusing the latter of forcing them to sign pleadings filed in court,
copies of which were not furnished them; of selling the subject property in cahoots with their mother;
of evading the payment of income taxes when he apportioned his share in the subject property to his
wife and children.36

By way of Comment,37 Atty. Linsangan avers that the Supplemental Compromise Agreement was
never questioned by the complainants until now38 and that they had never requested for a copy
thereof from him. Atty. Linsangan admits that the subject of the sale with Helen is the property in
Alabang, Muntinlupa City and that complainants were not given a share from the payments because
such were specifically made applicable to his and his family's share in the subject property
only.39 Atty. Linsangan also contends that the proposal that he be paid on the basis of quantum
meruit is only for the purpose of reducing his 50% share as stated in the Contract for Professional
Services he executed with Juan, so that the balance thereof may accrue to complainants.40

The Issue

The threshold issue to be resolved is whether respondent is guilty of violating his lawyer's oath.

The Ruling of this Court

After a careful review of the record of the case, the Court finds that respondent committed acts in
violation of his oath as an attorney thereby warranting the Court's exercise of its disciplinary power.

We begin by emphasizing that the practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the State
upon those who show that they possess, and continue to possess, the qualifications required by law
for the conferment of such privilege.41 Whether or not a lawyer is still entitled to practice law may be
resolved by a proceeding to suspend or disbar him, based on conduct rendering him unfit to hold a
license or to exercise the duties and responsibilities of an attorney. The avowed purpose of
suspending or disbarring an attorney is not to punish the lawyer, but to remove from the profession a
person whose misconduct has proved him unfit to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities
belonging to an office of an attorney, and thus to protect the public and those charged with the
administration of justice.42 The lawyer's oath is a source of obligations and its violation is a ground for
suspension, disbarment or other disciplinary action.43

The record shows and Atty. Linsangan does not deny, that while the cases involving the subject
property were still pending resolution and final determination, Atty. Linsangan entered into a
Contract for Professional Services with Juan wherein his attorney's fees shall be that equivalent to
50% of the value of the property, or a portion thereof, that may be recovered. It is likewise not denied
by Atty. Linsangan that he apportioned upon himself, and to his wife and children, half of the
property awarded to complainants as heirs of Juan, through a Supplemental Compromise
Agreement. Similarly, such Supplemental Compromise Agreement was entered into by Atty.
Linsangan and the heirs of Juan concurrently with the pendency of several cases before the CA and
this Court44 involving the very same property. What is more, Atty. Linsangan, probably anticipating
that he may be charged of having undue interest over his client's property in litigation, caused
another lawyer to appear but all the while making it absolutely clear to Juan that the latter's
appearance was nevertheless under Atty. Linsangan's "direct control and supervision."

Plainly, these acts are in direct contravention of Article 1491(5)45 of the Civil Code which forbids
lawyers from acquiring, by purchase or assignment, the property that has been the subject of
litigation in which they have taken part by virtue of their profession. While Canon 10 of the old
Canons of Professional Ethics, which states that "[t]he lawyer should not purchase any interests in
the subject matter of the litigation which he is conducting," is no longer reproduced in the new Code
of Professional Responsibility (CPR), such proscription still applies considering that Canon 1 of the
CPR is clear in requiring that "a lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and
promote respect for law and legal process " and Rule 13 8, Sec. 3 which requires every lawyer to
take an oath to "obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities
therein."46 Here, the law transgressed by Atty. Linsangan is Article 1491(5) of the Civil Code, in
violation of his lawyer's oath.

While jurisprudence provides an exception to the above proscription, i.e., if the payment of
contingent fee is not made during the pendency of the litigation involving the client's property but
only after the judgment has been rendered in the case handled by the lawyer,47 such is not applicable
to the instant case. To reiterate, the transfer to Atty. Linsangan was made while the subject property
was still under litigation, or at least concurrently with the pendency of the certiorari proceedings in
the CA and the petitions for review in this Court.48 As mentioned, there was nothing in the record
which would show that these cases were likewise dismissed with finality either before the execution
of, or by virtue of, the Compromise Agreement and the Supplemental Compromise Agreement
between complainants and Atty. Linsangan.

What is more, Atty. Linsangan, at the guise of merely waiving portions of the subject property in
favor of his wife and children, actually divided his attorney's fee with persons who are not licensed to
practice law in contravention of Rule 9.02,49 Canon 950 of the CPR.

Another misconduct committed by Atty. Linsangan was his act of selling the entire 12,331 square
meters property and making it appear that he was specifically authorized to do so by complainants
as well as by the other persons51 to whom portions of the property had been previously adjudicated.
However, a perusal of the supposed Special Power of Attorney attached to the Deed of Absolute
Sale, save for that executed by his wife and children, only authorizes Atty. Linsangan to represent
complainants in the litigation of cases involving Juan's properties. Nothing in said Special Power of
Attorney authorizes Atty. Linsangan to sell the entire property including complainants' undivided
share therein.
Atty. Linsangan's reasoning that he only took it upon himself to sell the property because
complainants were unfamiliar with real estate transactions does not exculpate him from liability. If
indeed that were the case, then it is incumbent upon Atty. Linsangan to make it clear to the
complainants that he was acting in such capacity and not as their lawyer.52 But even this, Atty.
Linsangan failed to do.

Worse, Atty. Linsangan does not deny having received the downpayment for the property from
Helen. Atty. Linsangan does not also deny failing to give complainants' share for the reason that he
applied said payment as his share in the property. In so doing, Atty. Linsangan determined all by
himself that the downpayment accrues to him and immediately appropriated the same, without the
knowledge and consent of the complainants. Such act constitutes a breach of his client's trust and a
violation of Canon 1653 of the CPR. Indeed, a lawyer is not entitled to unilaterally appropriate his
client's money for himself by the mere fact that the client owes him attorneys fees.54 The failure of an
attorney to return the client's money upon demand gives rise to the presumption that he has
misappropriated it for his own use to the prejudice and violation of the general morality, as well as of
professional ethics; it also impairs public confidence in the legal profession and deserves
punishment. In short, a lawyer's unjustified withholding of money belonging to his client, as in this
case, warrants the imposition of disciplinary action.55

Pointedly, the relationship of attorney and client has consistently been treated as one of special trust
and confidence. An attorney must therefore exercise utmost good faith and fairness in all his
1âwphi 1

relationship with his client. Measured against this standard, respondent's act clearly fell short and
had, in fact, placed his personal interest above that of his clients. Considering the foregoing
violations of his lawyer's oath, Article 1491 (5) of the Civil Code, Rule 9.02, Canon 9, and Canon 16
of the CPR, the Court deems it appropriate to impose upon respondent the penalty of six (6) months
suspension from the practice of law.56

WHEREFORE, We find Atty. Jaime S. Linsangan LIABLE for violations of his lawyer's oath, Article
1491(5) of the Civil Code, Rule 9.02, Canon 9, and Canon 16 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and he is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for SIX (6) months effective
from the date of his receipt of this Decision. Let copies of this Decision be circulated to all courts of
the country for their information and guidance, and spread in the personal record of Atty. Linsangan.

SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 9608 November 27, 2012

MARIA VICTORIA B. VENTURA, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. DANILO S. SAMSON, Respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

The Court has often reminded members of the bar to live up to the standards and norms of the legal
profession by upholding the ideals and principles embodied in the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Lawyers are bound to maintain not only a high standard of legal proficiency, but also
of morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing. Lawyers are at all times subject to the watchful public
eye and community approbation. Needless to state, those whose conduct – both public and private –
fail this scrutiny have to be disciplined and, after appropriate proceedings, accordingly penalized.1
Complainant Maria Victoria B. Ventura filed on July 29, 2004 a Complaint2 for Disbarment or
Suspension before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Commission on Bar Discipline against
respondent Atty. Danilo S. Samson for "grossly immoral conduct."

In her complaint, complainant alleged that

2. The herein Complainant MARIA VICTORIA B. VENTURA executed a Sworn Statement

dated 19 April 2002 and a Supplemental-Complaint dated 10 May 2002 stating therein that
the crime of RAPE was committed against her person sometime in December, 2001 and on
19 March 2002 when she was merely thirteen (13) years of age by herein Respondent
ATTY. DANILO S. SAMSON, then thirty eight (38) years old, married to Teresita B. Samson,
Filipino and resident of Barangay 5, San Francisco, Agusan Del Sur, Philippines….

3. In his Counter-Affidavit, herein Respondent ATTY. DANILO S. SAMSON admitted that

sexual intercourse indeed transpired between the herein Complainant MARIA VICTORIA B.
VENTURA and himself….

4. After the conduct of preliminary investigation, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of
Agusan Del Sur, Philippines issued a RESOLUTION dated 10 June 2002 dismissing the
charge of RAPE and finding the existence of probable cause for the crime of QUALIFIED
SEDUCTION and issued the corresponding INFORMATION for QUALIFIED SEDUCTION on
04 July 2002….

5. Thereafter, the herein Complainant filed a MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION dated 26

August 2002 which was denied in the RESOLUTION dated 02 October 2002 of the Office of
the Provincial Prosecutor of Agusan Del Sur….

6. The aforesaid RESOLUTION dated 02 October 2002 was elevated to the Department of
Justice, by way of a PETITION FOR REVIEW, and is pending resolution by the Department
of Justice.

xxxx

8. The act/s committed by the herein Respondent Atty. Danilo S. Samson against the herein
Complainant MARIA VICTORIA B. VENTURA as hereinbefore stated clearly constitute …
"grossly immoral conduct" under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court of the
Philippines which provides for a penalty of "DISBARMENT or SUSPENSION of an Attorney
by the SUPREME COURT."

Complainant narrated in her Sworn Statement3 that sometime in December 2001, at around midnight,
she was sleeping in the maid’s room at respondent’s house when respondent entered and went on
top of her. Respondent kissed her lips, sucked her breast, and succeeded in having sexual
intercourse with her. She felt pain and found blood stain in her panty. She stated that another
incident happened on March 19, 2002 at respondent’s poultry farm in Alegria, San Francisco,
Agusan del Sur. Respondent asked her to go with him to the farm. He brought her to an old shanty
where he sexually abused her. Thereafter, respondent gave her five hundred pesos and warned her
not to tell anyone what had happened or he would kill her and her mother.

In her Supplemental-Complaint,4 complainant averred that respondent allowed her to sleep in his
house after her mother agreed to let her stay there while she studied at the Agusan National High
School. She further stated that on the night she was sexually abused, she was awakened when
respondent went on top of her. She struggled to free herself and shouted, but respondent covered
her mouth and nobody could hear as nobody was in the house. Complainant also claimed that on
March 19, 2002, between 5:00 p.m. to 6:00 pm, respondent forced her to ride a multi-cab. When
they arrived at his poultry farm in Alegria, respondent dragged her to a dilapidated shack. She
resisted his advances but her efforts proved futile.

Respondent alleged in his Answer5 that

2. Respondent admits the allegations in paragraph 2 of the complaint to the effect that Maria
Victoria Ventura filed a complaint against him for Rape at the Provincial Prosecutor’s Office
with qualification that the said complaint for Rape was dismissed. Respondent, however, has
no knowledge or information as to the truth of the allegation that she was 13 years….

xxxx

5. Respondent vehemently denies the truth of the allegations in paragraph 8 of the complaint
to the effect that the acts of respondent in having sex with complainant constitute … grossly
immoral conduct. The truth is that the act of respondent in having sex with complainant was
done with mutual agreement after respondent gave money to complainant. Respondent
respectfully submits that his act of having sex with complainant once does not constitute…
grossly immoral conduct.

There is no human law that punishes a person who has sex with a woman with mutual
agreement and complainant accepts compensation therefore. Having sex with complainant
once with just compensation does not amount to immoral conduct….

xxxx

6. The complaint is instigated by Corazon Ventura who was an employee at the Law Office
of respondent herein. The said Corazon Ventura entertained hatred and had a grudge
against the herein respondent who terminated her services due to misunderstanding….

7. The filing of the Criminal Case against respondent as well as this Administrative Case is a
well orchestrated and planned act of Corazon Ventura as vengeance against respondent as
a result of her separation from the employment in the Law Office of the respondent. This
claim is supported by the Affidavit of Natividad Ruluna, the former Office Clerk at the Law
Office of respondent….

8. To show that Corazon Ventura desires to get back at respondent, she demanded from
respondent to settle with her and demanded the payment of the amount of P2,000,000.00;
otherwise she will file a case against him in Court for Rape and for disbarment. Respondent
did not come across with Corazon Ventura, the latter made good her threats and filed the
criminal case for Rape. [sic] When the case for rape did not prosper because the Prosecutor
dropped the Rape Case, Corazon Ventura sent word to respondent that she is amenable for
the amount of P400,000.00. In effect, Corazon Ventura wanted to extort from respondent so
that she can get even with him and his wife for separating her from the employment;

9. Complainant is a woman of loose moral character. This is supported by the Affidavit of

Patronio Punayan, Jr. which is hereto attached as Annex "3". And Corazon Ventura can
afford to utilize Maria Victoria Ventura as her instrument in putting down the respondent
herein because Maria Victoria Ventura is not her biological daughter and she knows before
hand that her ward has a questionable reputation. The fact that Corazon Ventura is not the
 biological mother of Maria Victoria Ventura is shown by the pre-trial order in Criminal Case
No. 5414….

xxxx

Respondent has not violated any grounds mentioned in this rule. Respondent respectfully submits
that his having sex with complainant with just compensation once does not amount to immoral
conduct. For who among men will not yield to temptation when a woman shall invite him for sex?

Attached to respondent’s Answer is his Counter-Affidavit6 which he submitted to the Provincial

Prosecutor. He alleged therein that complainant usually stayed late at night with her male friends
when her mother was out of the house. He claimed that he heard rumors that complainant had
sexual affairs with different boys. Respondent narrated that on March 19, 2002, he saw complainant
with some of her classmates near their rented house. Complainant told him that they wanted to go
out to swim but they did not have money. When she asked if he could spare some amount, he gave
her money. He told her in jest that he wanted to see her that afternoon and go to a place where they
could be alone, and he was surprised when she agreed. He just thought that for complainant, sex is
a common thing despite her age. At around 5:00 p.m., he fetched complainant at her house. She
casually walked towards the car and boarded it. He told her that they will not check in a lodging
house because people might recognize him. Upon reaching his poultry farm, respondent met his
farm worker and asked him if he could use the latter’s hut. The farm worker agreed and they went
straight to the hut.

Inside the farm worker’s hut, complainant did not hesitate in entering the room. Respondent did not
notice any involuntariness on her part as she undressed herself. He asserted that they had sexual
intercourse based on their mutual understanding. Thereafter, the complainant dressed up and
walked back to the multi-cab where she waited for him. He told her not to tell anyone about what had
happened, to which she replied "natural buang kay motug-an" meaning, she’s not crazy as to tell
anyone. He alleged that she accepted the money he gave because she needed to buy some things
but her mother did not give her any allowance. Respondent insisted that what happened between
them was the first and the last incident. He claimed that he was able to confirm that complainant is
no longer a virgin.

It likewise appears that the Investigating Prosecutors found that probable cause exists for
respondent to stand trial for qualified seduction.7 The charge of rape, however, was dismissed for
insufficiency of evidence. An Information was filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Agusan del
Sur, Branch 6, but complainant who was not satisfied with the dismissal of the rape charge, filed a
motion for reconsideration. When said motion was denied, complainant filed a petition for review with
the Department of Justice (DOJ). However, the DOJ sustained the findings of the prosecutor.

Then, on December 14, 2006, complainant and her mother appeared before the public prosecutor
and executed their respective Affidavits of Desistance.8 Complainant stated that what happened
between respondent and her in March 2002 was based on mutual understanding. Thus, she was
withdrawing the complaint she filed against respondent before the RTC as well as the one she filed
before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline. Accordingly, the criminal case against respondent
was dismissed.9

In its Report and Recommendation10 dated October 10, 2007, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline
recommended that respondent be suspended for a period of one year from the practice of law for
immorality with the warning that repetition of the same or similar act will merit a more severe penalty.
On November 10, 2007, the Board of Governors of the IBP issued Resolution No. XVIII-2007-237, to
wit:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED

with modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-
entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation
fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering that
respondent is found guilty of immorality, the victim is a minor, respondent and his wife was victim’s
guardians and for being a married man, Atty. Danilo S. Samson is hereby SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for five (5) years with Stern Warning that repetition of the same or similar act in the
future will be dealt with more severely.11

Complainant now moves to reconsider the IBP Resolution. She argues that the penalty imposed by
the IBP is not commensurate to the gravity and depravity of the offense. She contends that
respondent committed grossly immoral conduct by forcing himself to have sexual intercourse with a
young and innocent lass of 13 years of age. He also took advantage of his moral ascendancy over
complainant considering that she was then staying at respondent’s residence. Moreover, there was
a betrayal of the marital vow of fidelity considering that respondent was a married man. She insists
that this detestable behavior renders respondent unfit and undeserving of the honor and privilege
which his license confers upon him.Thus, complainant prays that the penalty of disbarment be
imposed.12

Meanwhile, respondent also filed a Motion for Reconsideration13 of the IBP Resolution. He asserts
that complainant has not presented any proof of her minority. Likewise, during the sexual encounter,
complainant was not under their custody. He contends that complainant’s mother even testified that
her daughter stayed at respondent’s house only until February 2002. He further stresses that
because of his admission and remorse, and since this is the first time he has been found
administratively liable, he is entitled to a reduction of the penalty to one year suspension from the
practice of law.

The pertinent provisions in the Code of Professional Responsibility provide:

CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND
AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.

Rule 1.01. - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

xxxx

CANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE
LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.

xxxx

Rule 7.03. - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice
law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of
the legal profession.

As we explained in Zaguirre v. Castillo,14 the possession of good moral character is both a condition
precedent and a continuing requirement to warrant admission to the bar and to retain membership in
the legal profession. It is the bounden duty of members of the bar to observe the highest degree of
morality in order to safeguard the integrity of the Bar.15 Consequently, any errant behavior on the part
of a lawyer, be it in the lawyer’s public or private activities, which tends to show said lawyer deficient
in moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor, is sufficient to warrant suspension or
disbarment.

Immoral conduct involves acts that are willful, flagrant, or shameless, and that show a moral
indifference to the opinion of the upright and respectable members of the community.16 Immoral
conduct is gross when it is so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act, or so unprincipled as to be
reprehensible to a high degree, or when committed under such scandalous or revolting
circumstances as to shock the community’s sense of decency.17

From the undisputed facts gathered from the evidence and the admissions of respondent himself,
we find that respondent’s act of engaging in sex with a young lass, the daughter of his former
employee, constitutes gross immoral conduct that warrants sanction. Respondent not only admitted
he had sexual intercourse with complainant but also showed no remorse whatsoever when he
asserted that he did nothing wrong because she allegedly agreed and he even gave her money.
Indeed, his act of having carnal knowledge of a woman other than his wife manifests his disrespect
for the laws on the sanctity of marriage and his own marital vow of fidelity. Moreover, the fact that he
procured the act by enticing a very young woman with money showed his utmost moral depravity
and low regard for the dignity of the human person and the ethics of his profession.

In Cordova v. Cordova,18 we held that the moral delinquency that affects the fitness of a member of
the bar to continue as such includes conduct that outrages the generally accepted moral standards
of the community, conduct for instance, which makes a mockery of the inviolable social institution of
marriage.

Respondent has violated the trust and confidence reposed on him by complainant, then a 13-year-
old minor,19 who for a time was under respondent’s care. Whether the sexual encounter between the
respondent and complainant was or was not with the latter’s consent is of no moment. Respondent
clearly committed a disgraceful, grossly immoral and highly reprehensible act. Such conduct is a
transgression of the standards of morality required of the legal profession and should be disciplined
accordingly.

Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court expressly states that a member of the bar may be
disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for, among others, any
deceit, grossly immoral conduct, or violation of the oath that he is required to take before admission
to the practice of law. It bears to stress that membership in the Bar is a privilege burdened with
conditions. As a privilege bestowed by law through the Supreme Court, membership in the Bar can
be withdrawn where circumstances concretely show the lawyer’s lack of the essential qualifications
required of lawyers.20

Likewise, it was held in Maligsa v. Cabanting21 that a lawyer may be disbarred for any misconduct,
whether in his professional or private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral character, in
honesty, probity and good demeanor or unworthy to continue as an officer of the court. Similarly, in
Dumadag v. Lumaya,22 the Court pronounced:

The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions. Adherence to the rigid standards of
mental fitness, maintenance of the highest degree of morality and faithful compliance with the rules
of the legal profession are the conditions required for remaining a member of good standing of the
bar and for enjoying the privilege to practice law.
The fact that complainant filed an Affidavit of Desistance during the pendency of this case is of no
moment. Complainant’s Affidavit of Desistance cannot have the effect of abating the instant
proceedings in view of the public service character of the practice of law and the nature of
disbarment proceedings as a public interest concern. A case of suspension or disbarment is sui
generis and not meant to grant relief to a complainant as in a civil case, but is intended to cleanse
the ranks of the legal profession of its undesirable members in order to protect the public and the
courts. A disbarment case is not an investigation into the acts of respondent but on his conduct as
1âw phi 1

an officer of the court and his fitness to continue as a member of the Bar.23

Illicit sexual relations have been previously punished with disbarment, indefinite or definite
suspension, depending on the circumstances.24 In this case, respondent’s gross misbehavior and
unrepentant demeanor clearly shows a serious flaw in his character, his moral indifference to sexual
exploitation of a minor, and his outright defiance of established norms. All these could not but put the
legal profession in disrepute and place the integrity of the administration of justice in peril, hence the
need for strict but appropriate disciplinary action.25

The Court is mindful of the dictum that the power to disbar must be exercised with great caution, and
only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and character of the lawyer as
an officer of the Court and as a member of the bar. Thus, where a lesser penalty, such as temporary
suspension, could accomplish the end desired, disbarment should never be decreed.26 However, in
the present case, the seriousness of the offense compels the Court to wield its power to disbar as it
appears to be the most appropriate penalty.27

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Danilo S. Samson is hereby DISBARRED for Gross Immoral
Conduct, Violation of his oath of office, and Violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7, Rule 7.03
of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Let a copy of this Decision, which is immediately executory, be made part of the records of
respondent in the Office of the. Bar Confidant, Supreme Court of the Philippines. And let copies of
the Decision be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and circulated to all courts.

This Decision takes effect immediately.

SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 5095 November 28, 2007

FATHER RANHILIO C. AQUINO, LINA M. GARAN, ESTRELLA C. LOZADA, POLICARPIO L.

MABBORANG, DEXTER R. MUNAR, MONICO U. TENEDRO, ANDY R. QUEBRAL, NESTOR T.
RIVERA, EDUARDO C. RICAMORA, ARTHUR G. IBAÑEZ, AURELIO C. CALDEZ and DENU A.
AGATEP, complainants,
vs.
ATTY. EDWIN PASCUA, respondent.

DECISION

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

For our resolution is the letter-complaint dated August 3, 1999 of Father Ranhilio C. Aquino, then
Academic Head of the Philippine Judicial Academy, joined by Lina M. Garan and the other above-
named complainants, against Atty. Edwin Pascua, a Notary Public in Cagayan.
In his letter-complaint, Father Aquino alleged that Atty. Pascua falsified two documents committed
as follows:

(1) He made it appear that he had notarized the "Affidavit-Complaint" of one Joseph B.
Acorda entering the same as "Doc. No. 1213, Page No. 243, Book III, Series of 1998, dated
December 10, 1998".

(2) He also made it appear that he had notarized the "Affidavit-Complaint" of one Remigio B.
Domingo entering the same as "Doc. No. 1214, Page 243, Book III, Series of 1998, dated
December 10, 1998.

Father Aquino further alleged that on June 23 and July 26, 1999, Atty. Angel Beltran, Clerk of Court,
Regional Trial Court, Tuguegarao, certified that none of the above entries appear in the Notarial
Register of Atty. Pascua; that the last entry therein was Document No. 1200 executed on December
28, 1998; and that, therefore, he could not have notarized Documents Nos. 1213 and 1214 on
December 10, 1998.

In his comment on the letter-complaint dated September 4, 1999, Atty. Pascua admitted having
notarized the two documents on December 10, 1998, but they were not entered in his Notarial
Register due to the oversight of his legal secretary, Lyn Elsie C. Patli, whose affidavit was attached
to his comment.

The affidavit-complaints referred to in the notarized documents were filed by Atty. Pascua with the
Civil Service Commission. Impleaded as respondents therein were Lina M. Garan and the other
above-named complainants. They filed with this Court a "Motion to Join the Complaint and Reply to
Respondent's Comment." They maintain that Atty. Pascua's omission was not due to inadvertence
but a clear case of falsification.1 On November 16, 1999, we granted their motion.2

Thereafter, we referred the case to the Office of the Bar Confidant for investigation, report and
recommendation.

On April 21, 2003, the Office of the Bar Confidant issued its Report and Recommendation partly
reproduced as follows:

A notarial document is by law entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. For this reason,
notaries public must observe the utmost care to comply with the formalities and the basic
requirement in the performance of their duties (Realino v. Villamor, 87 SCRA 318).

Under the notarial law, "the notary public shall enter in such register, in chronological order,
the nature of each instrument executed, sworn to, or acknowledged before him, the person
executing, swearing to, or acknowledging the instrument, xxx xxx. The notary shall give to
each instrument executed, sworn to, or acknowledged before him a number corresponding to
the one in his register, and shall also state on the instrument the page or pages of his
register on which the same is recorded. No blank line shall be left between entries" (Sec.
246, Article V, Title IV, Chapter II of the Revised Administrative Code).

Failure of the notary to make the proper entry or entries in his notarial register touching his
notarial acts in the manner required by law is a ground for revocation of his
commission (Sec. 249, Article VI).
In the instant case, there is no question that the subject documents allegedly notarized by
Atty. Pascua were not recorded in his notarial register.

Atty. Pascua claims that the omission was not intentional but due to oversight of his staff.
Whichever is the case, Atty. Pascua cannot escape liability. His failure to enter into his
notarial register the documents that he admittedly notarized is a dereliction of duty on his
part as a notary public and he is bound by the acts of his staff.

The claim of Atty. Pascua that it was simple inadvertence is far from true.

The photocopy of his notarial register shows that the last entry which he notarized on
December 28, 1998 is Document No. 1200 on Page 240. On the other hand, the two
affidavit-complaints allegedly notarized on December 10, 1998 are Document Nos. 1213 and
1214, respectively, under Page No. 243, Book III. Thus, Fr. Ranhilio and the other
complainants are, therefore, correct in maintaining that Atty. Pascua falsely assigned
fictitious numbers to the questioned affidavit-complaints, a clear dishonesty on his part not
only as a Notary Public, but also as a member of the Bar.

This is not to mention that the only supporting evidence of the claim of inadvertence by Atty.
Pascua is the affidavit of his own secretary which is hardly credible since the latter cannot be
considered a disinterested witness or party.

Noteworthy also is the fact that the questioned affidavit of Acorda (Doc. No. 1213) was
submitted only when Domingo's affidavit (Doc. No. 1214) was withdrawn in the
administrative case filed by Atty. Pascua against Lina Garan, et al. with the CSC. This
circumstance lends credence to the submission of herein complainants that Atty. Pascua
ante-dated another affidavit-complaint making it appear as notarized on December 10, 1998
and entered as Document No. 1213. It may not be sheer coincidence then that both
documents are dated December 10, 1998 and numbered as 1213 and 1214.

A member of the legal fraternity should refrain from doing any act which might lessen in any
degree the confidence and trust reposed by the public in the fidelity, honesty and integrity of
the legal profession (Maligsa v. Cabanting, 272 SCRA 409).

As a lawyer commissioned to be a notary public, Atty. Pascua is mandated to subscribe to

the sacred duties appertaining to his office, such duties being dictated by public policy and
impressed with public interest.

A member of the Bar may be disciplined or disbarred for any misconduct in his
professional or private capacity. The Court has invariably imposed a penalty for notaries
public who were found guilty of dishonesty or misconduct in the performance of their
duties.

In Villarin v. Sabate, Jr. (325 SCRA 123), respondent lawyer was suspended from his
Commission as Notary Public for a period of one year for notarizing a document without
affiants appearing before him, and for notarizing the same instrument of which he was one of
the signatories. The Court held that respondent lawyer failed to exercise due diligence in
upholding his duties as a notary public.

In Arrieta v. Llosa (282 SCRA 248), respondent lawyer who certified under oath a Deed of
Absolute Sale knowing that some of the vendors were dead was suspended from the
practice of law for a period of six (6) months, with a warning that another infraction would be
 dealt with more severely. In said case, the Court did not impose the supreme penalty of
disbarment, it being the respondent's first offense.

In Maligsa v. Cabanting (272 SCRA 409), respondent lawyer was disbarred from the practice
of law, after being found guilty of notarizing a fictitious or spurious document. The Court
considered the seriousness of the offense and his previous misconduct for which he was
suspended for six months from the practice of law.

It appearing that this is the first offense of Atty. Pascua, a suspension from the practice of
law for a period of six (6) months may be considered enough penalty for him as a lawyer.
Considering that his offense is also a ground for revocation of notarial commission, the same
should also be imposed upon him.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, it is most respectfully recommended that the notarial

commission of Atty. EDWIN V. PASCUA, if still existing, be REVOKED and that he be
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months."3

After a close review of the records of this case, we resolve to adopt the findings of facts and
conclusion of law by the Office of the Bar Confidant. We find Atty. Pascua guilty of misconduct in the
performance of his duties for failing to register in his Notarial Register the affidavit-complaints of
Joseph B. Acorda and Remigio B. Domingo.

"Misconduct" generally means wrongful, improper or unlawful conduct motivated by a premeditated,

obstinate or intentional purpose.4 The term, however, does not necessarily imply corruption or
criminal intent.5

The penalty to be imposed for such act of misconduct committed by a lawyer is addressed to the
sound discretion of the Court. In Arrieta v. Llosa,6 wherein Atty. Joel A. Llosa notarized a Deed of
Absolute Sale knowing that some of the vendors were already dead, this Court held that such
wrongful act "constitutes misconduct" and thus imposed upon him the penalty of suspension from
the practice of law for six months, this being his first administrative offense. Also, in Vda. de Rosales
v. Ramos,7 we revoked the notarial commission of Atty. Mario G. Ramos and suspended him from
the practice of law for six months for violating the Notarial Law in not registering in his notarial book
the Deed of Absolute Sale he notarized. In Mondejar v. Rubia,8 however, a lesser penalty of one
month suspension from the practice of law was imposed on Atty. Vivian G. Rubia for making a false
declaration in the document she notarized.

In the present case, considering that this is Atty. Pascua's first offense, we believe that the
imposition of a three-month suspension from the practice of law upon him is in order. Likewise, since
his offense is a ground for revocation of notarial commission, the same should also be imposed
upon him.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Edwin Pascua is declared GUILTY of misconduct and is SUSPENDED from
the practice of law for three (3) months with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or
similar act will be dealt with more severely. His notarial commission, if still existing, is
ordered REVOKED.

SO ORDERED.

March 4, 2014
A.C. No. 10179
(Formerly CBD 11-2985)

BENJAMIN Q. ONG, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. WILLIAM F. DELOS SANTOS, Respondent.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

A lawyer's issuance of a worthless check renders him in breach of his oath to obey the laws. To
accord with the canon of professional responsibility that requires him to uphold the Constitution,
obey the laws of the land, and promote respect for the law and legal processes, he thereby becomes
administratively liable for gross misconduct.

Antecedents

In January 2008, complainant Benjamin Ong was introduced to respondent Atty. William F. Delos
Santos by Sheriff Fernando Mercado of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila. After several calls
and personal interactions between them, Ong and Atty. Delos Santos became friends.1 In time,
according to Ong, Atty. Delos Santos asked him to encash his postdated check inasmuch as he was
in dire need of cash. To reassure Ong that the check would be funded upon maturity, Atty. Delos
Santos bragged about his lucrative practice and his good paying clients. Convinced of Atty. Delos
Santos’ financial stability, Ong handed to Atty. Delos Santos on January 29, 2008 the amount of
P100,000.00 in exchange for the latter’s Metrobank Check No. 0110268 postdated February 29,
2008.2 However, the check was dishonored upon presentment for the reason that the account was
closed.3 Ong relayed the matter of the dishonor to Atty. Delos Santos, and demanded immediate
payment, but the latter just ignored him.4 When efforts to collect remained futile, Ong brought a
criminal complaint for estafa and for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 against Atty. Delos
Santos.5 Ong also brought this disbarment complaint against Atty. Delos Santos in the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (IBP), which docketed the complaint as CBD Case No. 11-2985.

Findings and Recommendation

of the IBP Bar Commissioner

In his Commissioner’s Report,6 IBP Bar Commissioner Jose I. Dela Rama, Jr. stated that Ong had
sufficiently established the existence of the dishonored check; and that Atty. Delos Santos did not
file his answer despite notice, and did not also present contrary evidence.7 He recommended that
Atty. Delos Santos be held liable for violating Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility; and that the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for
two years, plus the return of the amount of P100,000.00 to the complainant,8 be meted on Atty.
Delos Santos in view of an earlier disbarment case brought against him (Lucman v. Atty. Delos
Santos, CBD Case No. 09-253).

Resolution No. XX-2013-253

On March 20, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XX-2013-253 adopting and
approving the findings of IBP Commissioner Dela Rama, Jr.,9 to wit:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED the
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein
made part of this Resolution as Annex "A," and finding the recommendation fully supported by the
evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules and considering that Respondent violated
Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, Atty. William
F. Delos Santos is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3) years and ORDERED
to RETURN the amount of One Hundred Thousand (P100,000.00) Pesos to complainant with legal
interest within thirty days from receipt of notice.

Issue

By issuing the worthless check, did Atty. Delos Santos violate Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7,
Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility?

Ruling

We agree with the findings of the IBP but modify the recommended penalty.

Every lawyer is an officer of the Court. He has the duty and responsibility to maintain his good moral
character. In this regard, good moral character is not only a condition precedent relating to his
admission into the practice of law, but is a continuing imposition in order for him to maintain his
membership in the Philippine Bar.10 The Court unwaveringly demands of him to remain a competent,
honorable, and reliable individual in whom the public may repose confidence.11 Any gross
misconduct that puts his moral character in serious doubt renders him unfit to continue in the
practice of law.12

Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 has been enacted in order to safeguard the interest of the banking system
and the legitimate public checking account users.13 The gravamen of the offense defined and
punished by Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, according to Lozano v. Martinez,14 is the act of making and
issuing a worthless check, or any check that is dishonored upon its presentment for payment and
putting it in circulation; the law is designed to prohibit and altogether eliminate the deleterious and
pernicious practice of issuing checks with insufficient funds, or with no credit, because the practice is
deemed a public nuisance, a crime against public order to be abated. The Court has observed in
Lozano v. Martinez:

The effects of the issuance of a worthless check transcends the private interests of the parties
directly involved in the transaction and touches the interests of the community at large. The mischief
it creates is not only a wrong to the payee or holder, but also an injury to the public. The harmful
practice of putting valueless commercial papers in circulation, multiplied a thousandfold, can very
well pollute the channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking system and eventually hurt the
welfare of society and the public interest.15 xxx

Being a lawyer, Atty. Delos Santos was well aware of the objectives and coverage of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22. If he did not, he was nonetheless presumed to know them, for the law was penal
in character and application. His issuance of the unfunded check involved herein knowingly violated
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, and exhibited his indifference towards the pernicious effect of his illegal
act to public interest and public order.16 He thereby swept aside his Lawyer’s Oath that enjoined him
to support the Constitution and obey the laws. He also took for granted the express commands of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, specifically Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7, Rule 7.03,
viz:
CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND
AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR THE LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.

Rule 1.01 - A Lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

CANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE
LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.

Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law,
nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the
legal profession.

These canons, the Court has said in Agno v. Cagatan,17 required of him as a lawyer an enduring high
sense of responsibility and good fidelity in all his dealings, thus:

The afore-cited canons emphasize the high standard of honesty and fairness expected of a lawyer
not only in the practice of the legal profession but in his personal dealings as well. A lawyer must
conduct himself with great propriety, and his behavior should be beyond reproach anywhere and at
all times. For, as officers of the courts and keepers of the public's faith, they are burdened with the
highest degree of social responsibility and are thus mandated to behave at all times in a manner
consistent with truth and honor. Likewise, the oath that lawyers swear to impresses upon them the
duty of exhibiting the highest degree of good faith, fairness and candor in their relationships with
others. Thus, lawyers may be disciplined for any conduct, whether in their professional or in their
private capacity, if such conduct renders them unfit to continue to be officers of the court.18

That his act involved a private dealing with Ong did not matter. His being a lawyer invested him –
whether he was acting as such or in a non- professional capacity – with the obligation to exhibit good
faith, fairness and candor in his relationship with others. There is no question that a lawyer could be
disciplined not only for a malpractice in his profession, but also for any misconduct committed
outside of his professional capacity.19 His being a lawyer demanded that he conduct himself as a
person of the highest moral and professional integrity and probity in his dealings with others.20

Moreover, in issuing the dishonored check, Atty. Delos Santos put into serious question not only his
personal integrity but also the integrity of the entire Integrated Bar. It cannot be denied that Ong
acceded to Atty. Delos Santos’ request for encashment of the check because of his complete
reliance on the nobility of the Legal Profession. The following excerpts from Ong’s testimony bear
this out, to wit:

COMM. DELA RAMA: What did you feel when you were issued a bounced check by the
respondent?

MR. ONG: Actually, the reason I even loaned him money because actually he was not even my
friend. He was just referred to me. The reason why I felt at ease to loan him money was because the
sheriff told me that abogado eto. It is his license that would be at stake that’s why I lent him the
money.21

xxxx

COMM. DELA RAMA: In other words, what you are saying is that you felt betrayed when the lawyer
issued a bounced check in your favor.
MR. ONG

Yes, Commissioner.

COMM. DELA RAMA:

Why, what is your expectation of a lawyer?

MR. ONG

They uphold the law, they know the law. He

should not have issued the check if you know it cannot be funded because actually I have many
lawyer friend[s] and I have always high regard for lawyers.22

Atty. Delos Santos should always be mindful of his duty to uphold the law and to be circumspect in
all his dealings with the public. Any transgression of this duty on his part would not only diminish his
reputation as a lawyer but would also erode the public’s faith in the Legal Profession as a whole. His
assuring Ong that he was in good financial standing because of his lucrative law practice when the
contrary was true manifested his intent to mislead the latter into giving a substantial amount in
exchange for his worthless post-dated check. Such actuation did not speak well of him as a member
of the Bar.

Accordingly, Atty. Delos Santos was guilty of serious misconduct, warranting appropriate
administrative sanction. Noting that the criminal complaint charging him with the violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 was already dismissed, and that he already repaid to Ong the full amount of
P100,000.00,23 both of which are treated as mitigating circumstances in his favor, we find the
recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors to suspend him from the practice of law for a period
of three years harsh. Thus, we reduce the penalty to suspension from the practice of law to six
months in order to accord with the ruling in Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation v.
Carandang.24

ACCORDINGLY, the Court PRONOUNCES respondent ATTY. WILLIAM F. DELOS SANTOS

GUILTY of violating the Lawyer’s Oath, and Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code
of

Professional Responsibility, and, accordingly, SUSPENDS HIM FROM THE PRACTICE OF LAW
FOR A PERIOD OF SIX MONTHS EFFECTIVE FROM NOTICE, with a stern warning that any
similar infraction in the future will be dealt with more severely.

Let copies of this decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to Atty.
Delos Santos' personal record as an attorney; to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and to all
courts in the country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

July 19, 2016

A.C. No. 11078

VERLITA V. MERCULLO and RAYMOND VEDANO, Complainants,

vs.
ATTY. MARIE FRANCESE RAMON, Respondent.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

This case concerns the complaint for the disbarment of Atty. Marie Frances E. Ramon for violating
Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Lawyer's Oath for deceiving
the complainants in order to obtain the substantial amount of P350,000.00 on the pretext of having
the foreclosed asset of the latter's mother redeemed.

Antecedents

In the period from 2002 to 2011, the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC) sent
several demand letters to Carmelita T. Vedaño1 regarding her unpaid obligations secured by the
mortgage covering her residential property in Novaliches, Caloocan City.2 To avoid the foreclosure of
the mortgage, Carmelita authorized her children, Verlita Mercullo and Raymond Vedaño
(complainants herein), to inquire from the NHMFC about the status of the obligations. Verlita and
Raymond learned that their mother's arrears had amounted to P350,000.00, and that the matter of
the mortgage was under the charge of respondent Atty. Ramon, but who was not around at that
time.

On June 20, 2012, Carmelita received a letter from the sheriff of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in
Caloocan City, stating that her property would be put up for auction in July 2013. Verlita and
Raymond thus went to the NHMFC to see the respondent, who advised them about their right to
redeem the property within one year from the foreclosure.3

In August 2013, Verlita and Raymond called up the respondent, and expressed their intention to
redeem the property by paying the redemption price. The latter agreed and scheduled an
appointment with them on August 30,2013.

On August 30, 2013, the respondent arrived at the designated meeting place at around 1:30 p.m.,
carrying the folder that Verlita and Raymond had seen at the NHFMC when they inquired on the
status of their mother's property. After the respondent had oriented them on the procedure for
redemption, the complainants handed P350,000.00 to the respondent, who signed an
acknowledgment receipt.4 The respondent issued two acknowledgment receipts for the redemption
price and for litigation expenses,5 presenting to the complainants her NHMFC identification card.
Before leaving them, she promised to inform them as soon as the documents for redemption were
ready for their mother's signature.6

On September 4, 2013, the respondent met with Verlita and handed a letter7 that she had signed,
along with the special power of attorney (SPA) for Carmelita's signature.8 The letter reads:

Office of the Clerk of Court and Ex Officio Sheriff

Regional Trial Court
Caloocan City
Re: Redemption of the property covered by EJF No. 7484-2013

Dear Atty. Dabalos,

Please assist Ms. Carmelita Vedano, through her Attorney-in-Fact in redeeming the property
covered by EJF No. 7484-2013. Please provide the necessary computation as to the full redemption
amount in order for Ms. Vedano to redeem the same.

Thank you.

Truly yours,

(Sgd.) rances E. Ramon

Verlita and Raymond went to the NHMFC on September 9, 2013 to follow up on the redemption, but
discovered that the respondent had already ceased to be connected with the NHMFC. On
September 20, 2013, they met with her at Branch 145 of the Regional Trial Court in Makati City
where she was attending a hearing. She informed them that the redemption was under process, and
that the certificate of redemption would be issued in two to three weeks time.9

After communicating through text messages with the respondent, Verlita and Raymond finally went
to see the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court in Caloocan City On November 27, 2013 to
inquire on the status of the redemption. There, they discovered that the respondent had not
deposited the redemption price and had not filed the letter of intent for redeeming the property.10

On December 5, 2013, Verlita and Raymond again went to Branch 145 of the Regional Trial Court in
Makati City where the respondent had a hearing, and handed to her their demand letter requiring her
to return the amount she had received for the redemption.11 She acknowledged the letter and
promised to return the money on December 16, 2013 by depositing the amount in Verlita's bank
account. However, she did not fulfill her promise and did not show up for her subsequent scheduled
hearings in Branch 145.12

With their attempts to reach the respondent being in vain, V erlita and Raymond brought their
disbarment complaint in the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).
1âw phi 1

Findings and Recommendation of the IBP

The respondent did not submit her answer when required to do so. She also did not attend the
mandatory conference set by the IBP despite notice. Hence, the investigation proceeded ex parte.13

IBP Commissioner Arsenio P. Adriano submitted his Report and Recommendation,14 whereby he
found the respondent to have violated Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for
engaging in deceitful conduct, and recommended her suspension from the practice of law for two
years, and her return to the complainants of P350,000.00. with legal interest from December 2,
2013.

The IBP Board of Governors adopted Commissioner Adriano's recommendation as stated in its
Resolution No. XXI-2014-929,15 viz.:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED AND APPROVED, the Report
and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made
part of this Resolution as Annex "A", and finding the recommendation to be fully supported by the
evidence on record and applicable laws, and for violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, Atty. Marie Frances E. Ramon is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for
two (2) years and Ordered to Return the amount of Three Hundred Fifty Thousand
(P350,000.00) Pesos to Complainant.

Ruling of the Court

The Court declares the respondent guilty of dishonesty and deceit.

The Lawyer's Oath is a source of the obligations and duties of every lawyer. Any violation of the oath
may be punished with either disbarment, or suspension from the practice of law, or other
commensurate disciplinary action.16 Every lawyer must at no time be wanting in probity and moral
fiber which are not only conditions precedent to his admission to the Bar, but are also essential for
his continued membership in the Law Profession.17 Any conduct unbecoming of a lawyer constitutes
a violation of his oath.

The respondent certainly transgressed the Lawyer's Oath by receiving money from the complainants
after having made them believe that she could assist them in ensuring the redemption in their
mother's behalf. She was convincing about her ability to work on the redemption because she had
worked in the NHFMC. She did not inform them soon enough, however, that she had meanwhile
ceased to be connected with the agency. It was her duty to have so informed them. She further
misled them about her ability to realize the redemption by falsely informing them about having
started the redemption process. She concealed from them the real story that she had not even
initiated the redemption proceedings that she had assured them she would do. Everything she did
was dishonest and deceitful in order to have them part with the substantial sum of P350,000.00. She
took advantage of the complainants who had reposed their full trust and confidence in her ability to
perform the task by virtue of her being a lawyer. Surely, the totality of her actuations inevitably
eroded public trust in the Legal Profession.

As a lawyer, the respondent was proscribed from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct in her dealings with others, especially clients whom she should serve with
competence and diligence.18 Her duty required her to maintain fealty to them, binding her not to
neglect the legal matter entrusted to her. Thus, her neglect in connection therewith rendered her
liable.19 Moreover, the unfulfilled promise of returning the money and her refusal to communicate with
the complainants on the matter of her engagement aggravated the neglect and dishonesty attending
her dealings with the complainants.

The respondent's conduct patently breached Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which provides:

CANON 1 - A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for
law and for legal processes.1âw phi1

Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or deceitful conduct.

Evil intent was not essential in order to bring the unlawful act or omission of the respondent within
the coverage of Rule 1. 01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.20The Code exacted from her
not only a firm respect for the law and legal processes but also the utmost degree of fidelity and
good faith in dealing with clients and the moneys entrusted by them pursuant to their fiduciary
relationship.21
Yet another dereliction of the respondent was her wanton disregard of the several notices sent to her
by the IBP in this case. Such disregard could only be wrong because it reflected her undisguised
contempt of the proceedings of the IBP, a body that the Court has invested with the authority to
investigate the disbarment complaint against her. She thus exhibited her irresponsibility as well as
her utter disrespect for the Court and the rest of the Judiciary. It cannot be understated that a lawyer
in her shoes should comply with the orders of the Court and of the Court's duly constituted
authorities, like the IBP, the office that the Court has particularly tasked to carry out the specific
function of investigating attorney misconduct.22

The respondent deserves severe chastisement and appropriate sanctions. In this regard, the IBP
Board of Governors recommended her suspension for two years from the practice of law, and her
return of the amount of P350,000.00 to the complainants. The recommended penalty is not
commensurate to the gravity of the misconduct committed. She merited a heavier sanction of
suspension from the practice of law for five years. Her professional misconduct warranted a longer
suspension from the practice of law because she had caused material prejudice to the clients'
interest.23 She should somehow be taught to be more ethical and professional in dealing with trusting
clients like the complainants and their mother, who were innocently too willing to repose their utmost
trust in her abilities as a lawyer and in her trustworthiness as a legal professional. In this connection,
we state that the usual mitigation of the recommended penalty by virtue of the misconduct being her
first offense cannot be carried out in her favor considering that she had disregarded the several
notices sent to her by the IBP in this case. As to the return of the P350,000.00 to the complainant,
requiring her to restitute with legal interest is only fair and just because she did not comply in the
least with her ethical undertaking to work on the redemption of the property of the mother of the
complainants. In addition, she is sternly warned against a similar infraction in the future; otherwise,
the Court will have her suffer a more severe penalty.

WHEREFORE, the Court FINDS and HOLDS ATTY. MARIE FRANCES E. RAMON guilty of
violating Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Lawyer's
Oath; SUSPENDS HER FROM THE PRACTICE OF LAW FOR A PERIOD OF FIVE YEARS
EFFECTIVE FROM NOTICE, with the STERN WARNING that any similar infraction in the future will
be dealt with more severely; ORDERS her to return to the complainants the sum of P350,000.00
within 30 days from notice, plus legal interest of 6% per annum reckoned from the finality of this
decision until full payment; and DIRECTS her to promptly submit to this Court written proof of her
compliance within the same period of 30 days from notice of this decision.

Let copies of this decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to Atty.
Marie Frances E. Ramon's personal record as an attorney; to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines;
and to the Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination to all courts throughout the country for
their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 11064, September 27, 2016

BIENVENIDA FLOR SUAREZ, Complainant, v. ATTY. ELEONORA. MARAVILLA-ONA, Respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

This administrative case arose from a verified letter-complaint1 dated July 19, 2012 filed by complainant
Bienvenida Flor Suarez before the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) seeking for the refund of the professional and legal fees which she paid to respondent Atty.
EleonorA. Maravilla-Ona.

The Facts

On February 22, 2011, Bienvenida went to the office of Atty. Maravilla-Ona to seek the latter's legal
assistance in transferring title to a land, under her name. Atty. Maravilla-Ona agreed to render her services
for a consideration of forty-eight thousand pesos (P48,000) by way of professional and legal fees. Accepting
the engagement, Bienvenida turned over the necessary documents to Atty. Maravilla-Ona and gave the
latter the amount of one thousand pesos (P1,000) as down payment, as evidenced by Official Receipt No.
515532 dated February 22, 2011.

On March 4, 2011, Bienvenida returned to Atty. Maravilla-Ona's office to make another payment in the
amount of thirty-five thousand pesos (P35,000), as evidenced by Official Receipt No. 49376. Thereafter, on
March 28, 2011, Bienvenida made her final payment to Atty. Maravilla-Ona in the amount of twelve
thousand pesos (P12,000), as evidenced by Official Receipt No. 52163.3 chan roble slaw

Despite the lapse of a considerable period, Bienvenida did not receive any update on the status of the
transfer of land title under her name. Apparently, Atty. Maravilla-Ona failed to do anything to facilitate the
said transfer of title. Thus, Bienveriida opted not to push through with the transaction and, instead, claimed
reimbursement for the amounts she paid to Atty. Maravilla-Ona, to which the latter agreed.

After a year of waiting, Atty. Maravilla-Ona issued to Bienvenida a Bank of Commerce check dated May 9,
2012 in the amount of fifty-eight thousand pesos (P58,000).4 However, to Bienvenida's dismay, when she
presented the check to the bank, it was dishonored due to insufficiency of funds. Atty. Maravilla-Ona
thereafter made several promises to return Bienvenida's money, which, up to this moment, remain
unfulfilled.

Aggrieved, Bienvenida filed the instant administrative case before the CBD praying for the recovery of
P58,000, representing the amount of the dishonored check issued by Atty. Maravilla-Ona.

Acting on the complaint, the CBD, through Director for Bar Discipline Pura Angelica Y. Santiago, issued an
Order5 dated August 1, 2012 requiring Atty. Maravilla-Ona to submit her Answer to the complaint, with a
warning that failing to do so would render her in default. However, notwithstanding the said warning, Atty.
Maravilla-Ona did not submit any Answer.

On January 31, 2013, IBP Commissioner Loreto C. Ata (Commissioner Ata) notified the parties to appear for
a mandatory conference scheduled on March 7, 2013. The notice stated that "nonappearance by any of the
parties shall be deemed a waiver of their right to participate in further proceedings."6 chanrob leslaw

At the mandatory conference, only Bienvenida appeared. Thus, Commissioner Ata issued an Order7 noting
Atty. Maravilla-Ona's absence during the mandatory conference and her failure to file an Answer.
Accordingly, Atty. Maravilla-Ona was declared in default.

Considering the condition and age of Bienvenida, who was already 84 years old at that time, Commissioner
Ata found it imperative to proceed with the investigation ex parte. Hence, after clarificatory questions were
propounded on Bienvenida, the mandatory conference was terminated and the case was submitted for
report and recommendation.8 chanro bleslaw

Findings and Recommendation of the IBP

In its Report and Recommendation9 dated July 22, 2014, the CBD found that Atty. Maravilla-Ona was guilty
of gross misconduct and violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility for: (1) issuing a worthless
check; (2) refusing to settle due obligations despite demand; (3) failing to serve the complainant with
competence and diligence; and (4) failing to apprise her client of the status of the transactions.10 Thus, the
CBD recommended that Atty. Maravilla-Ona be suspended from the practice of law for a period of one (1)
year and ordered to pay Bienvenida the amount of P58,000.

On December 13, 2014, the IBP Board of Governors passed a Resolution11 adopting the Report and
Recommendation of the CBD with the modification increasing Atty. Maravilla-Ona's penalty to disbarment, to
wit:
chanRoble svirtual Lawlib ra ry
RESOLUTION NO. XXI-2014-917
CBD Case No. 12-3534
Bienvenid[a] Flor Suarez vs.
Atty. EleonorA. Maravilla-Ona

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification, the
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made
part of this Resolution as Annex "A", and finding Respondent guilty of gross misconduct and violation of the
Code of Canon 18 and Rule 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for issuing a worthless check, for
her refusal to settle due obligations despite demand, for her failure to serve the Complainant with
competence and diligence, and for her failure to apprise her client of the status of transactions in relation to
a plethora of cases, Atty. Eleanor A. Maravilla-Ona is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law and
[her] name ORDERED stricken off from the Roll of Attorneys.12 chanroblesv irt uallawl ibra ry

On January 11, 2016, the CBD transmitted to this Court the Notice of Resolution along with the records of
this case. 13 chanroble slaw

The Court's Ruling

We concur with the IBP Board of Governors' finding of administrative liability.

Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code provides that "[lawyers] shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct." By taking the lawyer's oath, lawyers become guardians of the law and indispensable
instruments for the orderly administration of justice.14 As such, they can be disciplined for any conduct, in
their professional or private capacity, which renders them unfit to continue to be officers of the court.15 chan robles law

In the instant case, it is clear that Atty. Maravilla-Ona violated her sworn duties under the Lawyer's Oath
and the Code. The records plainly show that Atty. Maravilla-Ona was completely remiss and negligent in
fulfilling her obligations as a lawyer to Bienvenida. After collecting the full amount of her professional and
legal fees, Atty. Maravilla-Ona did not take a single step to process the registration of land title in
Bienvenida's name. Worse, when asked to return the money she received from Bienvenida, Atty. Maravilla-
Ona issued a worthless check which consequently bounced when presented for payment.

In Belleza v. Atty. Macasa, the Court ruled that a lawyer's failure to return the client's money upon demand
gives rise to the presumption that the lawyer has misappropriated it for his or her own use to the prejudice
of and in violation of the trust reposed in him or her by the client. It is a gross violation of general morality
as well as of professional ethics; it impairs public confidence in the legal profession and deserves
punishment.16 Atty. Maravilla-Ona's failure to return Bienvenida's money is a breach of Rule 16.01 of the
Code, which provides:
chanRoble svirtual Lawlib ra ry

Rule 16.01 -A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client.

Atty. Maravilla-Ona's agreement to render her legal services to Bienvenida, sealed by her receipt of her legal
fees, is an assurance and representation that she would be diligent and competent in fulfilling her
responsibilities as Bienvenida's lawyer. However, Atty. Maravilla-Ona acted to the contrary. Thus, the IBP
correctly found that she violated Canon 18 and Rule 18.03 thereof, which state:
chanRoble svirtual Lawlib ra ry

Canon 18 A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence;

xxxx

Rule 18.03 A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in connection
therewith shall render him liable.

Atty. Maravilla-Ona's negligence, her failure to return her client's money, and her act of issuing a worthless
check constitute dishonesty, abuse of trust and confidence, and betrayal of her client's interests. These acts
undoubtedly speak of deceit Deceitful conduct involves moral turpitude and includes anything done contrary
to justice, modesty or good morals. It is an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social
duties which a person owes to his or her fellowmen or to society in general, contrary to justice, honesty,
modesty, or good morals.17 Such malfeasance is not only unacceptable, disgraceful, and dishonorable to the
legal profession; it also reveals a basic moral flaw that makes her unfit to practice law.18 chanrob leslaw
In this regard, Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court mandates that a lawyer may be disbarred
or suspended by this Court for any of the following acts: (1) deceit; (2) malpractice; (3) gross misconduct in
office; (4) grossly immoral conduct; (5) conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude; (6) violation of the
lawyer's oath; (7) willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court; and (8) willfully appearing as
an attorney for a party without authority to do so.19 Thus, a lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for any
violation of his oath, a patent disregard of his duties, or an odious deportment unbecoming an attorney.
However, the question as to what disciplinary sanction should be meted out against a lawyer found guilty of
misconduct requires consideration of a number of factors.

In the instant case, the misconduct of Atty. Maravilla-Ona is aggravated by her unjustified refusal to obey
the orders of the IBP directing her to file an answer to the complaint of Bienvenida and to appear at the
scheduled mandatory conference. This .constitutes blatant disrespect for the IBP which amounts to conduct
unbecoming lawyer. In Almendarez, Jr. v. Langit, We held that a lawyer must maintain respect not only to
the courts, but also to judicial officers and other duly constituted authorities, including the IBP:
chanRoble svirtual Lawlib ra ry

The misconduct of respondent is aggravated by his unjustified refusal to heed the orders of the IBP requiring
him to file an answer to the complaint-affidavit and, afterwards, to appear at the mandatory conference.
Although respondent did not appear at the conference, the IBP gave him another chance to defend himself
through a position paper. Still, respondent ignored this directive, exhibiting a blatant disrespect for
authority. Indeed, he is justly charged with conduct unbecoming a lawyer, for a lawyer is expected to uphold
the law and promote respect for legal processes. Further, a lawyer must observe and maintain respect not
only to the courts, but also to judicial officers and other duly constituted authorities, including the IBP.
Under Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, the Court has empowered the IBP to conduct proceedings for the
disbarment, suspension, or discipline of attorneys.20

We also take note of the past disbarment complaints that had been filed against Atty. Maravilla-Ona. In A.C.
No. 10107 entitled Beatrice C. Yatco, represented by her Attorney-In-Fact, Marivic Yatco v. Atty. Eleanor Ma
illa-Ona, the complainant filed a disbarment case against Atty. Maravilla-Ona for issuing several worthless
checks as rental payments for the complainant's property and for refusing to vacate the said property, thus
forcing the latter to file an ejectment case against Atty. MaraviJla-Ona. The IBP required Atty. Maravilla-Ona
to file her Answer, but she failed to do so. Neither did she make an appearance during the scheduled
mandatory conference. In its Resolution21 dated February 13, 2013, IBP found Atty. Maravilla-Ona guilty of
serious misconduct and for violating Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code. The Court latter adopted and approved
the IBP's findings in its Resolution dated September 15, 2014 and suspended Atty. Maravilla Ona from the
practice of law for a period of one (1) year.

In yet another disbarment case against Atty. Maravilla-Ona, docketed as A.C. No. 10944 and entitled Norma
M. Gutierrez v. Atty. Eleanor Maravilla-Ona, the complainant therein alleged that she engaged the services
of Atty. Maravilla-Ona and gave her the amount of P80,000 for the filing of a case in court. However, Atty.
Maravilla-Ona failed to file the case, prompting the complainant to withdraw from the engagement and to
demand the refund of the amount she paid. Atty. Maravilla-Onreturned P15,000 and executed a promissory
note to pay the remaining P65,000. However, despite several demands, Atty. Maravilla-Ona failed to refund
the complainant's money. Thus, a complaint for disbarment was filed against Atty. Maravilla-Ona for grave
misconduct, gross negligence and incompetence. But again, Atty. Maravilla-Ona failed to file her Answer and
appear in the mandatory conference before the IBP. The IBP found that Atty. Maravilla-Ona violated Canon
16, Rule 16.03 of the Code22 and recommended her suspension for a period of five ( )years, considering her
pr ious infractions. The Court, however, reduced Atty. Maravilla-Ona's penalty to suspension from the
practice of law for a period of three (3) years, with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar offense
will be dealt with more severely. She was also ordered to return the complainant's money.

Clearly, Atty. Maravilla-Ona exhibits the habit of.violating her oath as a lawyer and the Code, as well as
defying the processes of the IBP. The Court cannot allow her blatant disregard of the Code and her sworn
duty as a member of the Bar to continue. She had been warned that a similar violation will merit a more
severe penalty, and yet, her reprehensible conduct has, again, brought embarrassment and dishonor to the
legal profession.

In her previous disbarment case, We showed leniency by reducing her penalty to suspension for a period of
three (3) years. We cannot similarly treat Atty. Maravilla-Ona this time. It is clear that she did not learn any
lesson from her past experiences and since then has continued to exhibit traits of incorrigibility. It is time to
write finis to Atty. Maravilla-Ona's professional legal career for the sake of the public, the profession and the
interest of justice.23 c hanro bles law
In Overgaard v. Valdez,24 the respondent was disbarred for deserting his client after collecting the full
amount of his legal fees without attending to any of the cases for which he was engaged. This Court ruled
that respondent committed manifestly deceitful and dishonest acts, which violated Rule 1.01 of Canon 1,
Canon 15; and Rule 16.01 of Canon 16 of the Code.

Similarly in Arellano University, Inc. v. Mijares III,25 the Court disbarred the· lawyer therein for
cralawred

misappropriating the client's money intended for securing a certificate of title on the latter's behalf. Finally,
in CF Sharp Crew Management Incorporated v. Atty. Torres,26 the Court disbarred the respondent for failing
to account for, and misappropriating, the various amounts he received from his client.

Considering all of the foregoing, We deem it fit to affirm the imposition of the ultimate penalty of disbarment
from the practice of law upon Atty. Maravilla-Ona. Membership in the legal profession is a privilege, and
whenever it is made to appear that an attorney is no longer worthy of the trust and confidence of her clients
and the public, it becomes not only the right but also the duty of the Court to withdraw the same.27 chanrobles law

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Eleonor A. Maravilla-Ona is found GUILTY of gross misconduct and
violation of Canons 1, 16, and 18; and Rules 1.01, 16.01, 18.03, and 18.04 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Accordingly, she is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law and her name is ordered
stricken off from the Roll of Attorneys, effective immediately. The Court orders respondent
to RESTITUTE complainant Bienvenida Flor Suarez the amount of fifty-eight thousand pesos (P58,000)
within thirty (30) days from receipt of this Decision. Otherwise, respondent may be held liable for contempt.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished all courts of the land, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, as well as
the Office of the Bar Confidant for their information and guidance, and let it be entered in Atty. Eleonor A.
Maravilla-Ona's record in this Court.

SO ORDERED. c

A.C. No. 12156, June 20, 2018

PAULINO LIM, Complainant, v. ATTY. SOCRATES R. RIVERA, Respondent.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Before the Court is an administrative complaint1 dated March 9, 2015 filed by Paulino Lim (complainant)
against respondent Atty. Socrates R. Rivera (respondent), praying that the latter be meted disciplinary
sanctions for defrauding the former by issuing a worthless check as guarantee for the payment of
respondent's loan.

The Facts

Complainant alleged that he met respondent sometime in June 2014 in the hallway of the Regional Trial
Court of Makati City while accompanying his cousin who was then inquiring about the status of a case. The
two (2) became acquainted after striking a conversation with each other. The following month, or in July
2014, respondent borrowed from complainant the amount of P75,000.00, which the former needed
immediately.2 Complainant did not think twice in lending money to respondent and issuing in his favor BDO
Check No. 03565553 dated July 3, 2014 for P75,000.00, especially since the latter issued a guarantee check
(Union Bank Check No. 00034057804 dated July 19, 2014) to ensure payment of the loan. Subsequently,
respondent made several other loans in the amounts of P150,000.00, P10,000.00, and another P10,000.00,
for which he no longer issued any guarantee checks. Complainant claimed to have been taken by
respondent's sweet talk and promises of payment considering the millions he expects to receive as
contingent fee in one (1) of his cases.5

However, when complainant deposited Union Bank Check No. 0003405780, it was dishonored for the reason
"Account Closed." Thereafter, respondent would not take or return complainant's calls nor respond to the
latter's text messages. He completely avoided complainant.6 Consequently, complainant's lawyer wrote a
demand letter7 dated October 15, 2014 for the payment of respondent's indebtedness in the aggregate
amount of P245,000.00, but to no avail. Thus, complainant was constrained to file an administrative case
before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).8

In an Order9 dated April 17, 2015, the IBP directed respondent to submit his answer to the complaint within
a period of fifteen (15) days from receipt of said Order, failing which the case shall be heard ex
parte.10 However, respondent filed no answer.11 Subsequently, a Notice of Mandatory
Conference/Hearing12 scheduled on November 13, 2015 was sent to respondent on October 20, 2015, during
which the latter did not appear.13

The IBP's Report and Recommendation

In a Report and Recommendation14 dated November 14, 2016, the IBP Investigating Commissioner (IC)
found respondent administratively liable, and accordingly, recommended that he be meted the penalty of
suspension from the practice of law for one (1) year and be ordered to return to complainant the amount of
P75,000.00 with legal interest reckoned from July 19, 2014.15 The other loans alleged by complainant were
not duly proven. 16

The IBP IC declared that respondent's act of issuing a worthless check was a violation of Rule 1.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) which requires that "a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct." Citing the case of Foronda v. Alvarez, Jr.,17 the IBP IC held that
the issuance of a check that was later dishonored for having been drawn against a closed account indicates
a lawyer's unfitness for the trust and confidence reposed on him and hence, constitutes a ground for
disciplinary action.18 The penalty of one (1)-year suspension from the practice of law was based on the case
of Lao v. Medel,19 where the Court meted the same penalty for gross misconduct committed by deliberately
failing to pay just debts and issuing worthless checks.20

In a Resolution21 dated June 14, 2017, the IBP Board of Governors adopted the aforesaid report and
recommendation.

The Issue Before the Court

The essential issue in this case is whether or not respondent should be held administratively liable for the
issuance of a worthless check in violation of the CPR.

The Court's Ruling

After a judicious perusal of the records showing the existence of the loan obligation incurred by respondent
as evidenced by complainant's BDO Check No. 0356555 dated July 3, 2014, as well as Union Bank Check
No. 0003405780 dated July 19, 2014 issued by respondent to guarantee the payment of said loan but which
was dishonored upon presentment for the reason "Account Closed," the Court concurs with the findings and
adopts the recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors, except for the return to complainant of the
amount of P75,000.00 with legal interest.

Time and again, the Court has imposed the penalty of suspension or disbarment for any gross misconduct
that a lawyer may have committed, whether it is in his professional or in his private capacity. Good
character is an essential qualification for the admission to and continued practice of law. Thus, any
wrongdoing, whether professional or non-professional, indicating unfitness for the profession justifies
disciplinary action,22 as in this case.

It is undisputed that respondent had obtained a loan from complainant for which he issued a post-dated
check that was eventually dishonored and had failed to settle his obligation despite repeated demands. It
has been consistently held that "[the] deliberate failure to pay just debts and the issuance of
worthless checks constitute gross misconduct, for which a lawyer may be sanctioned with suspension from
the practice of law. Lawyers are instruments for the administration of justice and vanguards of our legal
system. They are expected to maintain not only legal proficiency but also a high standard of morality,
honesty, integrity and fair dealing so that the peoples' faith and confidence in the judicial system is ensured.
They must at all times faithfully perform their duties to society, to the bar, the courts and to their clients,
which include prompt payment of financial obligations. They must conduct themselves in a manner
that reflects the values and norms of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional
Responsibility."23 Thus, the IBP IC correctly ruled that respondent's act of issuing a worthless check was a
violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the CPR, which explicitly states:

CANON 1 - A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and
legal processes.

Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

In Enriquez v. De Vera,24 the Court categorically pronounced that a lawyer's act of issuing a worthless
check, punishable under Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, constitutes serious misconduct penalized by suspension
from the practice of law for one (1) year, for which no conviction of the criminal charge is even necessary.
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 was '"designed to prohibit and altogether eliminate the deleterious and pernicious
practice of issuing checks with insufficient funds, or with no credit, because the practice is deemed a public
nuisance, a crime against public order to be abated."25 Being a lawyer, respondent was well aware of, or was
nonetheless presumed to know, the objectives and coverage of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22. Yet, he knowingly
violated the law and thereby "exhibited his indifference towards the pernicious effect of his illegal act to
public interest and public order."26

In addition, respondent's failure to answer the complaint against him and his failure to appear at the
scheduled mandatory conference/hearing despite notice are evidence of his flouting resistance to lawful
orders of the court and illustrate his despiciency for his oath of office in violation of Section 3, Rule 138,
Rules of Court.27 Respondent should stand foremost in complying with the directives of the IBP Commission
on Bar Discipline not only because as a lawyer, he is called upon to obey the legal orders of duly constituted
authorities, as well as court orders and processes, but also because the case involved the very foundation of
his right to engage in the practice of law. Therefore, his lack of concern or interest in the status or outcome
of his administrative case would show how much less he would regard the interest of his clients.

Indisputably, respondent has fallen short of the exacting standards expected of him as a vanguard of the
legal profession. His transgressions showed him to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges
which his license and the law confer to him, for which he must suffer the consequence.

The appropriate penalty for an errant lawyer depends on the exercise of sound judicial discretion based on
the surrounding facts.28 In the cases of Lao v. Medel,29Rangwani v. Dino,30 and Enriquez v. De Vera,31 the
Court imposed the penalty of one (1)-year suspension from the practice of law for deliberate failure to pay
just debts and for the issuance of worthless checks. In Sanchez v. Torres,32 the Court increased the penalty
to two (2) years in light of the amount of the loan which was P2,200,000.00, and the fact that respondent
therein had repeatedly asked for extensions of time to file an answer and a motion for reconsideration,
which he nonetheless failed to submit, and had likewise failed to attend the disciplinary hearings set by the
IBP. Considering, therefore, that the amount of the loan proven by complainant herein is P75,000.00, the
Court sustains the recommended penalty of one (1)-year suspension from the practice of law. With respect,
however, to the return of the amount of P75,000.00 which respondent received from complainant, the same
cannot be sustained. It is settled that in disciplinary proceedings against lawyers, the only issue is whether
the officer of the court is still fit to be allowed to continue as a member of the Bar.33 In Tria-Samonte v.
Obias,34 the Court held that its "findings during administrative-disciplinary proceedings have no bearing on
the liabilities of the parties involved which are purely civil in nature – meaning, those liabilities which have
no intrinsic link to the lawyer's professional engagement – as the same should be threshed out in a proper
proceeding of such nature."35 Thus, the return of the P75,000.00 clearly lies beyond the ambit of this
administrative case.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Socrates R. Rivera is found GUILTY of violating Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, as well as the Lawyer's Oath, and is hereby SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for one (1) year to commence immediately from the receipt of this Decision, with
a WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar offense will warrant a more severe penalty.

He is DIRECTED to immediately file a Manifestation to the Court that his suspension has started, copy
furnished all courts and quasi-judicial bodies where he has entered his appearance as counsel.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished to: the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to respondent's
personal record as an attorney; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for its information and guidance; and
the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.

SO ORDERED.

August 16, 2017

A.C. No. 10245

ELIBENA A. CABILES, Complainant,

vs.
ATIY. LEANDRO S. CEDO,, Respondent.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

Complainant Elibena Cabiles (Elibena) filed this administrative complaint1 before the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (IBP) seeking the disbarment of Atty. Leandro Cedo (respondent lawyer) for
neglecting the two cases she referred to him to handle.

The Facts

According to Elibena, she engaged the services of respondent lawyer to handle an illegal dismissal
case, i.e., NLRC NCR Case No. 00-11-16153-08 entitled "Danilo Ligbos v. Platinum Autowork and/or
Even Cabiles and Rico Guido," where therein respondents were Elibena’s business partners.
Respondent lawyer was paid Php5, 500.002 for drafting therein respondents' position paper3 and
Php2,000.004 for his every appearance in the NLRC hearings.

During the hearing set on March 26, 2009, only Danilo Ligbos (Danilo), the complainant therein,
showed up and submitted his Reply.5 On the other hand, respondent lawyer did not file a Reply for
his clients,6 despite being paid his appearance fee earlier.7

In a Decision8 dated March 31, 2009, the Labor Arbiter ruled for Danilo, and ordered the clients of
respondent lawyer to pay Danilo backwages, separation pay, and 13th month pay.

Worse still, on October 27, 2009, the NLRC likewise dismissed the appeal of the clients of
respondent lawyer for failure to post the required cash or surety bond, an essential requisite in
perfecting an appeal.9

According to Elibena, respondent lawyer misled them by claiming that it was Danilo who was absent
during the said hearing on March 26, 2009; and that moreover, because of the failure to submit a
Reply, they were prevented from presenting the cash vouchers10 that would refute Danilo' s claim
that he was a regular employee.

With regard to the non-perfection of the appeal before the NLRC, Elibena claimed that respondent
lawyer instructed them (his clients) to pick up the said Memorandum only on the last day to file the
appeal, i.e., on May 28, 2009; that the memorandum was ready for pick up only at around 2:30 p.m.
that day; that left to themselves, with no help or assistance from respondent lawyer, they rushed to
file their appeal with the NLRC in Quezon City an hour later; that the NLRC Receiving Section
informed them that their appeal was incomplete, as it lacked the mandatory cash/surety bond, a
matter that respondent lawyer himself did not care to attend to; and, consequently, their appeal was
dismissed for non-perfection.

Elibena moreover claimed that respondent lawyer failed to indicate his Mandatory Continuing Legal
Education (MCLE) compliance11 in the position paper and in the memorandum of appeal that he
prepared. Elibena pointed to a certification12 issued on June 29, 2010 by the MCLE Office that
respondent lawyer had not at all complied with the first, second, and third compliance periods13 of the
(MCLE) requirement.

Elibena also averred that in May 2009, she hired respondent lawyer to file a criminal case for unjust
vexation against Emelita Claudit; that as evidenced by a May 5, 2009 handwritten receipt,14 she paid
respondent lawyer his acceptance fees, the expenses for the filing of the case, and the appearance
fees totallfil.g Php45,000.00; and that in order to come up with the necessary amount, she sold to
respondent lawyer her 1994 Model Mitsubishi Lancer worth Php85,000.00, this sale being covered
by an unnotarized Deed of Sale15 dated August 1, 2009.

Elibena claimed that, despite payment of his professional fees, respondent lawyer did not exert any
effort to seasonably file her Complaint for unjust vexation before the City Prosecutor's Office; that the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Muntinlupa City dismissed her Complaint for unjust vexation on
September 10, 2009 on the ground of prescription; and that although she moved for reconsideration
of the Order dismissing the case, her motion for reconsideration was denied by the City Prosecutor's
Office in a resolution dated October 19, 2009.16

In his Answer,17 respondent lawyer argued that the March 26, 2009 hearing was set to provide the
parties the opportunity either to explore the possibility of an amicable settlement, or give time for him
(respondent lawyer) to decide whether to file a responsive pleading, after which the case would be
routinely submitted for resolution, with or without the parties' further appearances. As regards the
cash vouchers, respondent lawyer opined that their submission would only contradict their defense
of lack of employer-employee relationship. Respondent lawyer likewise claimed that Elibena was
only feigning ignorance of the cost of the appeal bond, and that in any event, Elibena herself could
have paid the appeal bond. With regard to Elibena's allegation that she was virtually forced to sell
her car to respondent lawyer to complete payment of the latter's professional fee, respondent lawyer
claimed that he had fully paid for the car.18

Respondent lawyer did not refute Ebilena's claim that he failed to indicate his MCLE compliance in
the position paper and in the memorandum of appeal.

The IBP's Report and Recommendation

In a May 18, 2011 Report and Recommendation,19 the Investigating Commissioner found respondent
lawyer guilty of having violated Canons 5, 17, and 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and
recommended his suspension from the practice of law for two years. Aside from respondent lawyer's
failure to comply with the MCLE requirements, the Investigating Commissioner also found him
grossly negligent in representing his clients, particularly (1) in failing to appear on the March 26,
2009 hearing in the NLRC, and file the necessary responsive pleading; (2) in failing to advise and
assist his clients who had no knowledge of, or were not familiar with, the NLRC rules of procedure,
in filing their appeal and; 3) in failing to file seasonably the unjust vexation complaint before the city
prosecutor's office, in consequence of which it was overtaken by prescription.

In its March 20, 2013 Resolution, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the
Investigating Commissioner's Report and Recommendation, but modified the recommended
administrative sanction by reducing the suspension to one year.
 The Court's Ruling

We adopt the IBP's finding that respondent lawyer violated the Code of Professional Responsibility.
We also agree with the recommended penalty.

Violation of Canon5

Firstly, Bar Matter 850 mandates continuing legal education for IBP members as an additional
requirement to enable them to practice law. This is "to ensure that throughout their career, they
1âw phi 1

keep abreast with law and jurisprudence, maintain the ethics of the profession and enhance the
standards of the practice of law."20 Non-compliance with the MCLE requirement subjects the lawyer
to be listed as a delinquent IBP member.21 In Arnado v. Adaza,22 we administratively sanctioned
therein respondent lawyer for his non-compliance with four MCLE Compliance Periods. We stressed
therein that in accordance with Section 12(d) of the MCLE Implementing Regulations,23 even if
therein respondent attended an MCLE Program covered by the Fourth Compliance Period, his
attendance therein would only cover his deficiency for the First Compliance Period, and he was still
considered delinquent and had to make up for the other compliance periods. Consequently, we
declared respondent lawyer therein a delinquent member of the IBP and suspended him from law
practice for six months or until he had fully complied with all the MCLE requirements for all his non-
compliant periods.

In the present case, respondent lawyer failed to indicate in the pleadings filed in the said labor case
the number and date of issue of his MCLE Certificate of Compliance for the Third Compliance
Period, i.e., from April 15, 2007 to April 14, 2010, considering that NLRC NCR Case No. 00-11-
16153-08 had been pending in 2009. In fact, upon checking with the MCLE Office, Elibena
discovered that respondent lawyer had failed to comply with the three MCLE compliance periods.
For this reason, there is no doubt that respondent lawyer violated Canon 5, which reads:

CANON 5 - A LA WYER SHALL KEEP ABREAST OF LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS, PARTICIPATE IN

CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION PROGRAMS, SUPPORT EFFORTS TO ACH1EVE HIGH ST
AND ARDS IN LAW SCHOOLS AS WELL AS IN THE PRACTICAL TRAINING OF LAW STUDENTS
AND ASSIST IN DISSEMINATING INFORMATION REGARDING THE LAW AND
JURISPRUDENCE.

Violation of Canons 17 and 18 and Rule 18.03

The circumstances of this case indicated that respondent lawyer was guilty of gross negligence for
failing to exert his utmost best in prosecuting and in defending the interest of his client. Hence, he is
guilty of the following:

CANON 17 - A LA WYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND HE SHALL BE
MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM.

CANON 18 - A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.

Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable.

Furthermore, respondent lawyer's act of receiving an acceptance fee for legal services, only to
subsequently fail to render such service at the appropriate time, was a clear violation of Canons 17
and 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.24
Respondent lawyer did not diligently and fully attend to the cases that he accepted, although he had
been fully compensated for them. First off, respondent lawyer never successfully refuted Elibena's
claim that he was paid in advance his Php2,000.00 appearance fee on March 21, 2009 for the
scheduled hearing of the labor case on March 26, 2009, during which he was absent. Furthermore,
although respondent lawyer had already received the sum of Php45,000.00 to file an unjust vexation
case, he failed to promptly file the appropriate complaint therefor with the City Prosecutor's Office, in
consequence of which the crime prescribed, resulting in the dismissal of the case.

We have held that:

Case law further illumines that a lawyer's duty of competence and diligence includes not merely
reviewing the cases entrusted to the counsel's care or giving sound legal advice, but also consists of
properly representing the client before any court or tribunal, attending scheduled hearings or
conferences, preparing and filing the required pleadings, prosecuting the handled cases with
reasonable dispatch, and urging their termination without waiting for the client or the court to prod
him or her to do so.

Conversely, a lawyer's negligence in fulfilling his duties subjects him to disciplinary action. While
such negligence or carelessness is incapable of exact formulation, the Court has consistently held
that the lawyer's mere failure to perform the obligations due his client is per se a violation.25

"[A] lawyer 'is expected to exert his best efforts and [utmost] ability to [protect and defend] his client's
cause, for the unwavering loyalty displayed to his client likewise serves the ends of
justice."26 However, in the two cases for which he was duly compensated, respondent lawyer was
grossly remiss in his duties as counsel. He exhibited lack of professionalism, even indifference, in
the defense and protection ofElibena's rights which resulted in her losing the two cases.

With regard to the labor case for which he opted not to file a Reply and refused to present the cash
vouchers which, according to Elibena, ought to have been submitted to the NLRC, we hold that even
granting that he had the discretion being the handling lawyer to present what he believed were
available legal defenses for his client, and conceding, too, that it was within his power to employ an
allowable legal strategy, what was deplorable was his way of handling the appeal before the NLRC.
Aside from handing over or delivering the requisite pleading to his clients almost at the end of the
day, at the last day to file the appeal before the NLRC, he never even bothered to advise Elibena
and the rest of his clients about the requirement of the appeal bond. He should not expect Elibena
and her companions to be conversant with the indispensable procedural requirements to perfect the
appeal before the NLRC. If the averments in his Answer are any indication, respondent lawyer
seemed to have relied heavily on the NLRC's much vaunted 'leniency' in gaining the successful
prosecution of the appeal of his clients in the labor case; no less censurable is his propensity for
passing the blame onto his clients for not doing what he himself ought to have done. And, in the
criminal case, he should have known the basic rules relative to the prescription of crimes that
operate to extinguish criminal liability. All these contretemps could have been avoided had
respondent lawyer displayed the requisite zeal and diligence.

As mentioned earlier, the failure to comply with the MCLE requirements warranted a six-month
suspension in the Adaza case. Respondent lawyer must likewise be called to account for violating
Canons 17, 18, and Rule 18.03. In one case involving violation of Canons 17 and 18 where a lawyer
failed to file a petition for review with the Court of Appeals, the lawyer was penalized with a six.-
month suspension.27 In another case,28 involving transgression of the same Canons, the guilty lawyer
was meted out the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for a period of six months and
admonished and sternly warned that a commission of the same or similar acts would be dealt with
more severely.
"[T]he appropriate penalty for an errant lawyer depends on the exercise of sound judicial discretion
based on the surrounding facts."29 Given herein respondent lawyer's failure to maintain a high
standard of legal proficiency with his refusal to comply with the MCLE as well as his lack of showing
of his fealty to Elibena’s interest in view of his lackadaisical or indifferent approach in handling the
cases entrusted to him, we find it apt and commensurate to the facts of the case to adopt the
recommendation of the IBP to suspend him from the practice of law for one year.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Leandro S. Cedo is hereby found GUILTY of violating Canons 5,
17, 18, and Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is hereby SUSPENDED from
the practice of law for a period of one (1) year effective upon receipt of this Decision, and warned
that a repetition of the same or a similar act will be dealt with more severely.

Let a copy of this Decision be attached to Atty. Cedo’s personal record as attorney-at-law. Further,
let copies of this Decision be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the
Court Administrator, which is directed to circulate said copies to all courts in the country for their
information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 154207 April 27, 2007

FERDINAND A. CRUZ, Petitioner,

vs.
ALBERTO MINA, HON. ELEUTERIO F. GUERRERO and HON. ZENAIDA
LAGUILLES, Respondents.

DECISION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Before the Court is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, grounded on pure
questions of law, with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction assailing the Resolution dated May 3, 2002
promulgated by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 116, Pasay City, in Civil Case No. 02-0137,
which denied the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction against the Metropolitan Trial Court
(MeTC), Branch 45, Pasay City, in Criminal Case No. 00-1705;1 and the RTC’s Order dated June 5,
2002 denying the Motion for Reconsideration. No writ of preliminary injunction was issued by this
Court.

The antecedents:

On September 25, 2000, Ferdinand A. Cruz (petitioner) filed before the MeTC a formal Entry of
Appearance, as private prosecutor, in Criminal Case No. 00-1705 for Grave Threats, where his
father, Mariano Cruz, is the complaining witness.

The petitioner, describing himself as a third year law student, justifies his appearance as private
prosecutor on the bases of Section 34 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court and the ruling of the Court
En Banc in Cantimbuhan v. Judge Cruz, Jr.2 that a non-lawyer may appear before the inferior courts
as an agent or friend of a party litigant. The petitioner furthermore avers that his appearance was
with the prior conformity of the public prosecutor and a written authority of Mariano Cruz appointing
him to be his agent in the prosecution of the said criminal case.
However, in an Order dated February 1, 2002, the MeTC denied permission for petitioner to appear
as private prosecutor on the ground that Circular No. 19 governing limited law student practice in
conjunction with Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court (Law Student Practice Rule) should take
precedence over the ruling of the Court laid down in Cantimbuhan; and set the case for continuation
of trial.3

On February 13, 2002, petitioner filed before the MeTC a Motion for Reconsideration seeking to
reverse the February 1, 2002 Order alleging that Rule 138-A, or the Law Student Practice Rule,
does not have the effect of superseding Section 34 of Rule 138, for the authority to interpret the rule
is the source itself of the rule, which is the Supreme Court alone.

In an Order dated March 4, 2002, the MeTC denied the Motion for Reconsideration.

On April 2, 2002, the petitioner filed before the RTC a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus with
Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order against the private respondent
and the public respondent MeTC.

After hearing the prayer for preliminary injunction to restrain public respondent MeTC Judge from
proceeding with Criminal Case No. 00-1705 pending the Certiorari proceedings, the RTC, in a
Resolution dated May 3, 2002, resolved to deny the issuance of an injunctive writ on the ground that
the crime of Grave Threats, the subject of Criminal Case No. 00-1705, is one that can be prosecuted
de oficio, there being no claim for civil indemnity, and that therefore, the intervention of a private
prosecutor is not legally tenable.

On May 9, 2002, the petitioner filed before the RTC a Motion for Reconsideration. The petitioner
argues that nowhere does the law provide that the crime of Grave Threats has no civil aspect. And
last, petitioner cites Bar Matter No. 730 dated June 10, 1997 which expressly provides for the
appearance of a non-lawyer before the inferior courts, as an agent or friend of a party litigant, even
without the supervision of a member of the bar.

Pending the resolution of the foregoing Motion for Reconsideration before the RTC, the petitioner
filed a Second Motion for Reconsideration dated June 7, 2002 with the MeTC seeking the reversal of
the March 4, 2002 Denial Order of the said court, on the strength of Bar Matter No. 730, and a
Motion to Hold In Abeyance the Trial dated June 10, 2002 of Criminal Case No. 00-1705 pending the
outcome of the certiorari proceedings before the RTC.

On June 5, 2002, the RTC issued its Order denying the petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.

Likewise, in an Order dated June 13, 2002, the MeTC denied the petitioner’s Second Motion for
Reconsideration and his Motion to Hold in Abeyance the Trial on the ground that the RTC had
already denied the Entry of Appearance of petitioner before the MeTC.

On July 30, 2002, the petitioner directly filed with this Court, the instant Petition and assigns the
following errors:

I.

the respondent regional trial court abused its discretion when it resolved to deny the prayer for the
writ of injunction of the herein petitioner despite petitioner having established the necessity of
granting the writ;
 II.

THE RESPONDENT TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION, TANTAMOUNT TO IGNORANCE

OF THE LAW, WHEN IT RESOLVED TO DENY THE PRAYER FOR THE WRIT OF PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTION AND THE SUBSEQUENT MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF THE HEREIN
PETITIONER ON THE BASIS THAT [GRAVE] THREATS HAS NO CIVIL ASPECT, FOR THE SAID
BASIS OF DENIAL IS NOT IN ACCORD WITH THE LAW;

III.

THE RESPONDENT METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT

DENIED THE MOTION TO HOLD IN ABEYANCE TRIAL, WHEN WHAT WAS DENIED BY THE
RESPONDENT REGIONAL TRIAL COURT IS THE ISSUANCE OF THE WRIT OF PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTION and WHEN THE RESPONDENT REGIONAL TRIAL COURT IS YET TO DECIDE ON
THE MERITS OF THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI;

IV.

THE RESPONDENT COURT[s] ARE CLEARLY IGNORING THE LAW WHEN THEY PATENTLY
REFUSED TO HEED TO [sic] THE CLEAR MANDATE OF THE LAPUT, CANTIMBUHAN AND
BULACAN CASES, AS WELL AS BAR MATTER NO. 730, PROVIDING FOR THE APPEARANCE
OF NON-LAWYERS BEFORE THE LOWER COURTS (MTC’S).4

This Court, in exceptional cases, and for compelling reasons, or if warranted by the nature of the
issues reviewed, may take cognizance of petitions filed directly before it.5

Considering that this case involves the interpretation, clarification, and implementation of Section 34,
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, Bar Matter No. 730, Circular No. 19 governing law student practice
and Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court, and the ruling of the Court in Cantimbuhan, the Court takes
cognizance of herein petition.

The basic question is whether the petitioner, a law student, may appear before an inferior court as
an agent or friend of a party litigant.

The courts a quo held that the Law Student Practice Rule as encapsulated in Rule 138-A of the
Rules of Court, prohibits the petitioner, as a law student, from entering his appearance in behalf of
his father, the private complainant in the criminal case without the supervision of an attorney duly
accredited by the law school.

Rule 138-A or the Law Student Practice Rule, provides:

RULE 138-A
LAW STUDENT PRACTICE RULE

Section 1. Conditions for Student Practice. – A law student who has successfully completed his 3rd
year of the regular four-year prescribed law curriculum and is enrolled in a recognized law school's
clinical legal education program approved by the Supreme Court, may appear without compensation
in any civil, criminal or administrative case before any trial court, tribunal, board or officer, to
represent indigent clients accepted by the legal clinic of the law school.
Sec. 2. Appearance. – The appearance of the law student authorized by this rule, shall be under the
direct supervision and control of a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines duly accredited by
the law school. Any and all pleadings, motions, briefs, memoranda or other papers to be filed, must
be signed by the supervising attorney for and in behalf of the legal clinic.

However, in Resolution6 dated June 10, 1997 in Bar Matter No. 730, the Court En Banc clarified:

The rule, however, is different if the law student appears before an inferior court, where the issues
and procedure are relatively simple. In inferior courts, a law student may appear in his personal
capacity without the supervision of a lawyer. Section 34, Rule 138 provides:

Sec. 34. By whom litigation is conducted. - In the court of a justice of the peace, a party may
conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose,
or with the aid of an attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct his litigation personally or by
aid of an attorney, and his appearance must be either personal or by a duly authorized member of
the bar.

Thus, a law student may appear before an inferior court as an agent or friend of a party without the
supervision of a member of the bar.7 (Emphasis supplied)

The phrase "In the court of a justice of the peace" in Bar Matter No. 730 is subsequently changed to
"In the court of a municipality" as it now appears in Section 34 of Rule 138, thus:8

SEC. 34. By whom litigation is conducted. — In the Court of a municipality a party may conduct his
litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with the
aid of an attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an
attorney and his appearance must be either personal or by a duly authorized member of the bar.
(Emphasis supplied)

which is the prevailing rule at the time the petitioner filed his Entry of Appearance with the MeTC on
September 25, 2000. No real distinction exists for under Section 6, Rule 5 of the Rules of Court, the
term "Municipal Trial Courts" as used in these Rules shall include Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts.

There is really no problem as to the application of Section 34 of Rule 138 and Rule 138-A. In the
former, the appearance of a non-lawyer, as an agent or friend of a party litigant, is expressly
allowed, while the latter rule provides for conditions when a law student, not as an agent or a friend
of a party litigant, may appear before the courts.

Petitioner expressly anchored his appearance on Section 34 of Rule 138. The court a quo must have
been confused by the fact that petitioner referred to himself as a law student in his entry of
appearance. Rule 138-A should not have been used by the courts a quo in denying permission to
act as private prosecutor against petitioner for the simple reason that Rule 138-A is not the basis for
the petitioner’s appearance.

Section 34, Rule 138 is clear that appearance before the inferior courts by a non-lawyer is allowed,
irrespective of whether or not he is a law student. As succinctly clarified in Bar Matter No. 730, by
virtue of Section 34, Rule 138, a law student may appear, as an agent or a friend of a party litigant,
without the supervision of a lawyer before inferior courts.
Petitioner further argues that the RTC erroneously held that, by its very nature, no civil liability may
flow from the crime of Grave Threats, and, for this reason, the intervention of a private prosecutor is
not possible.

It is clear from the RTC Decision that no such conclusion had been intended by the RTC. In denying
the issuance of the injunctive court, the RTC stated in its Decision that there was no claim for civil
liability by the private complainant for damages, and that the records of the case do not provide for a
claim for indemnity; and that therefore, petitioner’s appearance as private prosecutor appears to be
legally untenable.

Under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly
liable except in instances when no actual damage results from an offense, such as espionage,
violation of neutrality, flight to an enemy country, and crime against popular representation.9 The
basic rule applies in the instant case, such that when a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for
the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with criminal
action, unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or
institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.10

The petitioner is correct in stating that there being no reservation, waiver, nor prior institution of the
civil aspect in Criminal Case No. 00-1705, it follows that the civil aspect arising from Grave Threats
is deemed instituted with the criminal action, and, hence, the private prosecutor may rightfully
intervene to prosecute the civil aspect.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolution and Order of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 116, Pasay City are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Metropolitan Trial Court,
Branch 45, Pasay City is DIRECTED to ADMIT the Entry of Appearance of petitioner in Criminal
Case No. 00-1705 as a private prosecutor under the direct control and supervision of the public
prosecutor.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

June 27, 2018

A.C. No. 8502

CHRISTOPHER R. SANTOS, Complainant

vs.
ATTY. JOSEPH A. ARROJADO, Respondent

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

Where a lawyer's integrity is questioned through a disbarment complaint, this Court, as the ultimate
arbiter of such disbarment proceedings, is duty-bound to ascertain the veracity of the charges
involved therein. But, when the charges lack merit, the Court will not hesitate to dismiss the case.

In an Affidavit1 dated December 7, 2009, complainant Christopher R. Santos (Complainant Santos)

sought the disbarment of respondent Atty. Joseph A. Arrojado (Atty. Arrojado) for violation of Article
1491 of the Civil Code, by acquiring an interest in the land involved in a litigation in which he had
taken part by reason of the exercise of his profession

Complainant Santos alleged that he was the defendant in the unlawful detainer case filed by Lilia
Rodriguez (Lilia) wherein the respondent lawyer, Atty. Arrojado, was the counsel for Lilia. The case
eventually reached the Supreme Court which resolved2 the same in favor of Atty. Arrojado's client.

Complainant, however, claimed that on August 7, 2009, while the case was pending before the
Supreme Court, Lilia sold one of the properties in litis pendentia to Atty. Arrojado's son, Julius P.
Arrojado (Julius) and that Atty. Arrojado even signed as a witness of that sale. Believing that Atty.
Arrojado committed malpractice when he acquired, through his son Julius, an interest in the property
subject of the unlawful detainer case in violation of Article 1491 of the Civil Code, complainant
instituted the instant complaint.

In his Verified Comment,3 Atty. Arrojado admitted: (1) that Lilia was a client of the law firm wherein
he was a senior partner; (2) that Julius was his son; and (3) that one of the subject properties in the
ejectment suit was purchased by his son from Lilia. Atty. Arrojado maintained that he did not violate
Article 1491 as he had absolutely no interest in the property purchased by his son; and that the
proscription in the said article did not extend to the relatives of the judicial officers mentioned therein.
He postulated that, when the sale took place, Julius was already of legal age and discretion, as well
as a registered nurse and an established businessman; and that while it was through him
(respondent lawyer) that Lilia and Julius met, he did not at all facilitate the transaction. Respondent
lawyer also pointed out that complainant failed to cite a specific provision or canon in the Code of
Professional Responsibility which he had allegedly transgressed or violated.

Report and Recommendation of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines

In his Report and Recommendation,4 Investigating Commissioner Winston A. Abuyuan of the

Integrated Bar of the Philippines - Commission on Bar Discipline, (IBP-CBD), recommended the
exoneration of Atty. Arrojado.

In recommending the dismissal of the administrative case against respondent lawyer, the
Investigating Commissioner opined that:

Undeniably, [Julius] is the son of [Atty. Arrojado], counsel of the owners of the parcel of land which
was leased by [Santos]. The subject property was acquired by (Julius] while the unlawful detainer
case was still pending before the Supreme Court.

In an unlawful detainer case, the issue to be resolved is possession and not ownership of the
property in question. This is very clear. There is no showing that [Santos] is even claiming ownership
of the property in question. In fact, it appears that the issues that remain to be resolved are [Santos']
obligation to pay the rentals due (as lessee) to the owner of the property.

Did [Atty. Arrojado] take advantage of his fiduciary relationship with his clients when his son bought
the property in question? We rule in the negative.

There is no evidence to show that [Atty. Arrojado] had used his son as a conduit to gain the property
in question considering that (Julius] is a personality separate and distinct from his father, herein
respondent. He is quite capable of acquiring property on his own. x x x. Moreover, a scrutiny of
complainant's arguments would reveal that he himself is even unsure if respondent had indeed taken
advantage of his fiduciary relationship with his client, as he safely uses the words 'it looks like' or 'we
believe'. There is no established jurisprudence to the effect that the prohibition applies to immediate
family members. In fact, Article 1491(5) is quite clear and explicit, stating in unequivocal terms that
the prohibition solely applies to lawyers, with respect to the property and rights to the object in
litigation. There is not even the slightest inkling that the prohibition was qualified to extend to any
family member.

xxxx

There is even no proof presented to show that [Atty. Arrojado] had used his fiduciary relationship
with his client in order to obtain the property in question. What merely changed was the ownership of
the property, and the lease of [Santos] was not in any [manner] affected. In fact, records would
reveal that [Julius] was even thinking of allowing [Santos] to continue leasing the property in
question but the same was rejected by the latter. As can be seen, no rights of (Santos] were
prejudiced by this sale.

xxxx

Considering that there is no proof presented by [santos] to substantiate any of his allegations, we
have no other option but to dismiss the charges.5

The Board of Governors (BOG) of the IBP, in Resolution No. XX- 2012-359 dated July 21, 2012,
adopted the findings of the Investigating Commissioner and his recommendation to dismiss the
complaint for lack of merit.6

Similarly, in Resolution7 No. XX-2013-306 dated March 21, 2013, the IBP-BOG denied complainant's
motion for reconsideration.

Hence, the case in now before us for final action pursuant to Section 12(c), Rule 139-B of the Rules
of Court.

Issue

Whether or not the prohibition in Article 1491(5) of the Civil Code against justices, judges,
prosecuting attorneys, clerks of court, and other officers and employees connected with the
administration of justice, as well as lawyers, from purchasing property and rights which may be the
object of any litigation in which they may take part by virtue of their profession, extends to their
respective immediate families or relatives.

Our Ruling

It is complainant's contention that respondent lawyer, as counsel of record in the ejectment case in
question, cannot acquire the property subject of litigation, either personally or through his son,
without violating the Civil Code and his ethical duties.

The Court does not agree.

For reference, Article 1491(5) of the Civil Code is reproduced below:

Article 1491. The following persons cannot acquire by purchase, even at a public or judicial auction,
either in person or through the mediation of another.

xxxx
(5) Justices, judges, prosecuting attorneys, clerks of superior and inferior courts, and other officers
and employees connected with the administration of justice, the property and rights in litigation or
levied upon on execution before the court within whose jurisdiction or territory they exercise their
respective functions; this prohibition includes the act of acquiring by assignment and shall apply to
lawyers, with respect to the property and rights which may be the object of any litigation in which
they may take part by virtue of their profession.

In Pena v. Delos Santos, 8 we held that:

The rationale advanced for the prohibition in Article 1491(5) is that public policy disallows the
transactions in view of the fiduciary relationship involved, i.e., the relation of trust and confidence
and the peculiar control exercised by these persons. It is founded on public policy because, by virtue
of his office, an attorney may easily take advantage of the credulity and ignorance of his client and
unduly enrich himself at the expense of his client. x x x

Undeniably, Article 1491(5) of the Civil Code prohibits the purchase by lawyers of any interest in the
subject matter of the litigation in which they participated by reason of their profession. Here,
however, respondent lawyer was not the purchaser or buyer of the property or rights in litigation. For,
in point of fact, it was his son Julius, and not respondent lawyer, who purchased the subject
property.

Were we to include within the purview of the law the members of the immediate family or relatives of
the lawyer laboring under disqualification, we would in effect be amending the law. We apply to this
case the old and familiar Latin maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, which means that the
express mention of one person, thing, act, or consequence excludes all others. Stated otherwise,
"where the terms are expressly limited to certain matters, it may not, by interpretation or
construction, be stretched or extended to other matters."9

As worded, Article 1491(5) of the Civil Code covers only (1) justices;

(2) judges; (3) prosecuting attorneys; (4) clerks of court; (5) other officers and employees connected
with the administration of justice; and (6) lawyers. The enumeration cannot be stretched or
1âw phi 1

extended to include relatives of the lawyer - in this case, Julius, son of respondent lawyer.

Concededly, Article 1491 provides that "[t]he following persons cannot acquire by purchase, even at
a public or judicial auction, either in person or through the mediation of another xx x." However,
perusal of the records would show that complainant failed to adduce any shred of evidence that
Julius acted or mediated on behalf of respondent lawyer, or that respondent lawyer was the ultimate
beneficiary of the sale transaction. The mere fact that it was Julius, son of respondent lawyer, who
purchased the property, will not support the allegation that respondent lawyer violated Article
1491(5) of the Civil Code. As aptly noted by the Investigating Commissioner, "[t]here is no evidence
to show that respondent had used his son as a conduit to gain the property in question xx x." 10

In addition, it must be stressed that the "prohibition which rests on considerations of public policy
and interests is intended to curtail any undue influence of the lawyer upon his client on account of
his fiduciary and confidential relationship with him." 11 Again, we adopt the findings of the
Investigating Commissioner that "a scrutiny of complainant's arguments would reveal that he himself
[was] even unsure if respondent had indeed taken advantage of his fiduciary relationship with his
client, as he safely uses the words "it looks like" or "we believe". 12 Moreover, the Investigating
Commissioner aptly observed that there was no "slightest proof showing that [Julius] was used by
respondent to acquire the property of his clients. Affidavits executed by the owners, as well as
[Julius] himself showed that respondent did not even actively participate in the negotiations
concerning the property." 13 At most, although respondent lawyer's role or participation in the sale in
question, if any, might ruffle very sensitive scruples, it is not, however, per se prohibited or forbidden
by said Article 1491.

WHEREFORE, the present administrative case is DISMISSED for lack of me

SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 6273 March 15, 2010

ATTY. ILUMINADA M. VAFLOR-FABROA, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. OSCAR PAGUINTO, Respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

An Information for Estafa1 was filed on June 21, 2001 against Atty. Iluminada M. Vaflor-Fabroa
(complainant) along with others based on a joint affidavit-complaint which Atty. Oscar Paguinto
(respondent) prepared and notarized. As the joint affidavit-complaint did not indicate the involvement
of complainant, complainant filed a Motion to Quash the Information which the trial court
granted.2 Respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration of the quashal of the Information was denied3

Respondent also filed six other criminal complaints against complainant for violation of Article 31 of
Republic Act No. 6938 (Cooperative Code of the Philippines) before the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor, but he eventually filed a Motion to Withdraw them.4

On October 10, 2001, complainant, who was Chairperson of the General Mariano Alvarez Service
Cooperative, Inc. (GEMASCO), received a Notice of Special General Assembly of GEMASCO on
October 14, 2001 to consider the removal of four members of the Board of Directors (the Board),
including her and the General Manager.5 The notice was signed by respondent.

At the October 14, 2001 Special General Assembly presided by respondent and PNP Sr. Supt.
Angelito L. Gerangco (Gerangco), who were not members of the then current Board,6 Gerango,
complainant’s predecessor, as Chair of the GEMASCO board, declared himself Chair, appointed
others to replace the removed directors, and appointed respondent as Board Secretary.

On October 15, 2001, respondent and his group took over the GEMASCO office and its premises,
the pumphouses, water facilities, and operations. On even date, respondent sent letter-notices to
complainant and the four removed directors informing them of their removal from the Board and as
members of GEMASCO, and advising them to cease and desist from further discharging the duties
of their positions.7

Complainant thus filed on October 16, 2001 with the Cooperative Development Authority (CDA)-
Calamba a complaint for annulment of the proceedings taken during the October 14, 2001 Special
General Assembly.

The CDA Acting Regional Director (RD), by Resolution of February 21, 2002, declared the
questioned general assembly null and void for having been conducted in violation of GEMASCO’s
By-Laws and the Cooperative Code of the Philippines.8 The RD’s Resolution of February 21, 2002
was later vacated for lack of jurisdiction9 of CDA.

In her present complainant10 against respondent for disbarment, complainant alleged that
respondent:

X X X PROMOTED OR SUED A GROUNDLESS, FALSE OR UNLAWFUL SUIT, AND GAVE AID

AND CONSENT TO THE SAME11

X X X DISOBEYED LAWS OF THE LAND, PROMOTE[D] DISRESPECT FOR LAW AND THE
LEGAL PROFESSION12

X X X DID NOT CONDUCT HIMSELF WITH COURTESY, FAIRNESS AND CANDOR TOWARD
HIS PROFESSIONAL COLLEAGUE AND ENGAGED IN HARASSING TACTICS AGAINST
OPPOSING COUNSEL13

X X X VIOLATED CANON 19 – A LAWYER SHALL REPRESENT HIS CLIENT WITH ZEAL WITHIN
THE BOUNDS OF THE LAW 14

X X X RUINED AND DAMAGED NOT ONLY THE GEN. MARIANO ALVAREZ SERVICES
COOPERATIVE, INC. (GEMASCO, INC.) BUT THE ENTIRE WATER-CONSUMING COMMUNITY
AS WELL15

Despite the Court’s grant,16 on respondent’s motion,17 of extension of time to file Comment,
respondent never filed any comment. The Court thus required him to show cause why he should not
be disciplinarily dealt with,18 but just the same he failed to comply.19

The Court thus referred the complaint to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation,
report, and recommendation.20

It appears that during the mandatory conference before the IBP, complainant proposed the following
issues:

1. Whether or not the acts of respondent constitute violations of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, particularly the following:

1.1 Canon 1 – A lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and
promote respect for law and legal [processes].

1.2 Canon 8 – A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness, and candor
toward his professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against
opposing counsel.

1.3 Canon 10 – A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court.

1.4 Canon 19 – A lawyer shall represent his client with zeal within the bounds of the
law.

1.5 Rule 12.03 – A lawyer shall not, after obtaining extensions of time to file
pleadings, memoranda or briefs, let the period lapse without submitting the same or
offering an explanation for his failure to do so.
 2. Whether or not the above acts of respondent constitute violations of his lawyer’s oath,
particularly the following:

2.1 support the Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly
constituted authorities therein

2.2 will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court

2.3 will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit,
nor give aid nor consent to the same

2.4 will delay no man for money or malice

3. Whether or not the above acts of [respondent] complained of are grounds for disbarment
or suspension of attorneys by the Supreme Court as provided for in Section 27, Rule 138 of
the Revised Rules of Court.21

Respondent’s counsel who represented him during the conference proposed the issue of whether,
on the basis of the allegations of the complaint, misconduct was committed by respondent.22

After the conclusion of the conference, both parties were ordered to submit position
papers.23 Complainant filed hers,24 but respondent, despite grant, on his motion, of extension of time,
did not file any position paper.

In her Report and Recommendation,25 Investigating Commissioner Lolita A. Quisumbing found

respondent guilty of violating the Lawyer’s Oath as well as Canons 1, 8, 10, and Rule 12.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. Noting that respondent had already been previously suspended
for six months, the Commissioner recommended that respondent be suspended for two years.

The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) Board of Governors opted for the dismissal of the
complaint, however, for lack of merit.26
1avv phi 1

On Motion for Reconsideration,27 the IBP-CBD Board of Governors recommended that respondent
be suspended from the practice of law for six months.

The Court finds that by conniving with Gerangco in taking over the Board of Directors and the
GEMASCO facilities, respondent violated the provisions of the Cooperative Code of the Philippines
and the GEMASCO By-Laws. He also violated the Lawyer’s Oath, which provides that a lawyer shall
support the Constitution and obey the laws.

When respondent caused the filing of baseless criminal complaints against complainant, he violated
the Lawyer’s Oath that a lawyer shall "not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false
or unlawful suit, nor give aid or consent to the same."

When, after obtaining an extension of time to file comment on the complaint, respondent failed to file
any and ignored this Court’s subsequent show cause order, he violated Rule 12.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which states that "A lawyer shall not, after obtaining extensions of time
to file pleadings, memoranda or briefs, let the period lapse without submitting the same or offering
an explanation for his failure to do so." Sebastian v. Bajar28 teaches:
x x x Respondent’s cavalier attitude in repeatedly ignoring the orders of the Supreme Court
constitutes utter disrespect to the judicial institution. Respondent’s conduct indicates a high degree
of irresponsibility. A Court’s Resolution is "not to be construed as a mere request, nor should it be
complied with partially, inadequately, or selectively". Respondent’s obstinate refusal to comply with
the Court’s orders "not only betrays a recalcitrant flaw in her character; it also underscores her
disrespect of the Court’s lawful orders which is only too deserving of reproof.

Lawyers are called upon to obey court orders and processes and respondent’s deference is
underscored by the fact that willful disregard thereof will subject the lawyer not only to punishment
for contempt but to disciplinary sanctions as well. In fact, graver responsibility is imposed upon a
lawyer than any other to uphold the integrity of the courts and to show respect to their
processes.29 (Citations omitted).

The Court notes that respondent had previously been suspended from the practice of law for six
months for violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility,30 he having been found to have
received an acceptance fee and misled the client into believing that he had filed a case for her when
he had not.31 It appears, however, that respondent has not reformed his ways. A more severe
penalty this time is thus called for.

WHEREFORE, respondent, Atty. Oscar P. Paguinto, is SUSPENDED for two years from the practice
of law for violation of Canons 1, 8, 10, and Rule 12.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and
the Lawyer’s Oath, effective immediately.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to
respondent’s personal record as an attorney; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and all courts in
the country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 3921, June 11, 2018

DELFINA HERNANDEZ SANTIAGO, Complainant, v. ATTY. ZOSIMO SANTIAGO AND ATTY.

NICOMEDES TOLENTINO, Respondents.

RESOLUTION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,* J.:

We resolve the administrative case for disbarment1 filed by complainant Judge Delfina Hernandez Santiago
against respondents Atty. Zosimo Santiago and Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino, charging them with deceit, gross
misconduct and violating their oaths as members of the Bar.

During the time when the material events transpired in this case, complainant was the City Personnel Officer
of Caloocan City while respondents Santiago and Tolentino respectively held the positions of City Legal
Officer and Legal Officer II in the City Government of Caloocan.

In 1988, complainant applied for, and was granted, a sick leave of absence with commuted pay covering
240 days from January 25 to December 31, 1988.2 Sometime in February 1988, complainant received a
Memorandum3 from then Mayor Macario A. Asistio, Jr., which cancelled all leaves of absence of city officials
and employees. She also received a memorandum,4 detailing her to the Office of the Secretary to the Mayor.
Complainant apparently paid no heed to said memoranda. She was later directed to return to work in a
letter5 dated April 21, 1988 signed by respondent Tolentino, which pertinently state:
On February 5, 1988 you were served with a [Memorandum] from the Office of the Mayor that all [leaves] of
absence of city officials and employees were cancelled in the interest of public service. [In spite] of the
aforesaid memo you did not return to work thereby, ignoring the memo of the Hon. Mayor Macario A.
Asistio, Jr.

In this [regard], we are giving you another five (5) days from receipt hereof to report for work, otherwise,
the undersigned may be constrained to take drastic action against you.

Complainant replied with a handwritten note,6 asking for ten days within which to answer and/or act on the
letter. She, however, did not return to work. At the end of her leave, she tendered her resignation.7 She
subsequently received a memorandum8 dated May 18, 1989 from Mayor Asistio terminating her
employment. Enclosed therewith was a Resolution9dated December 19, 1988 signed by respondents
Santiago and Tolentino, which recommended her dismissal from service.

Complainant then filed the present case, accusing the respondents of making deceitful statements in said
Resolution, committing gross misconduct and violating their Attorney's Oath for recommending her dismissal
without just cause or due process. Quoted hereunder is the aforesaid resolution with emphasis on the
allegedly false statements:

RESOLUTION

This is a case involving Atty. Delfina H. Santiago, Asst. City Administrator, indorsed to this office by the Hon.
Mayor, Macario A. Asistio, Jr. for appropriate action.

The facts of the case are as follows:

1. In 1972, Atty. Delfina H. Santiago was, per court decision, dismissed illegally as Asst. City Administrator
on Personal Matters.

2. In 1976, Atty. Santiago, was appointed Chief, Administrative Office, a position of lower rank.

3.In 1983, Atty. Santiago was charged administratively for UNAUTHORIZED ABSENCES, in
violation of Civil Service laws. Upon recommendation of the Office of the City Legal Office, Atty. Santiago
was validly and lawfully ordered to be dropped from the rolls which was subsequently approved and affirmed
by the Civil Service Commission in the latter's order dated October 1983 x x x.

xxxx

4. In 1985, the Supreme Court, in affirming an RTC decision, ordered the reinstatement of Santiago as Asst.
City Administrator on Personal Matters and declaring the 1972 dismissal as illegal.

5. In 1986, Atty. Santiago was appointed by Mayor Martinez as Asst. City Administrator, her former position,
pursuant to the Supreme Court decision.

6. In January 1988 Atty. Santiago filed a leave of absence (Sick Leave & Vacation Leave) on advice
of her Doctor, a Med. Cert. was attached thereto and the duration of the leave was 240 days starting
January 25 up to December 31, 1988.

The said leave of absence was initially approved but later disapproved by the Hon. Macario A. Asistio, Jr.
when the latter issued a Memorandum dated February 5, 1988 cancelling all leave of absence of which
Memo Atty. Santiago was duly served with. However despite service of the said Memo to Atty. Delfina H.
Santiago she failed and refused to report for work [continuously] up to the present. There was not even a
semblance of showing that she would comply with the memorandum.

At this juncture the office of the City Mayor indorsed this case against Atty. Delfina H. Santiago for
appropriate action. This office conducted an investigation and summoned Atty. Delfina H. Santiago
for several times to appear before the undersigned; present her evidence and explain her side in
consonance with the due process mandated by the constitution. Despite several notice sent to
Delfina Santiago the latter did not heed the said notices, thereby, leaving the undersigned without
any alternative but to decide the case on the basis of the evidence available and the records pertaining to
Atty. Delfina Santiago.

FINDINGS

The records disclosed that the memorandum dated February 5, 1988 issued by the Hon. City Mayor, Macario
A. Asistio, Jr. to all employees of the City Government cancelled all leave of absences in the interest of
service effective 5 February 1988. There is no doubt a so that Atty. Santiago was duly served with the said
memo as appearing on the said memo is her signature, an evidence of receipt thereof. Having received the
said memo Atty. Santiago was fully aware of the cancellation of her leave of absence and therefore as a
prudent employee she should have obeyed the memorandum of the City Mayor by way of reporting for work
as called for. What happened instead was that Atty. Santiago never showed-up, thereby, neglecting her duty
as Asst. City Administrator and committed, in effect, insubordination.

What is nagging and aggravates the predicament of Atty. Santiago is that the instant case is
already her second violation which places her in the category of incorrigible employees. The first
is when she was charged of UNAUTHORIZED ABSENCES, punished for said act and made to suffer
the corresponding penalty thereof.

Under the Civil Service Law, Art. 9, Section 36 Par. 3, "No office or employee in the Civil Service shall be
suspended except for the cause as provided by law and after due process".

The following shall be grounds for disciplinary action:

x x x x 3. Neglect of Duty x x x

27. Insubordination

The actuations of the respondent Atty. Santiago squarely falls on the aforequoted grounds for dismissal as
her failure to report for work amounts to [willful] disobedience to her superior officer. Nothing can be more
important to the upholding and maintenance of the public service in its integrity and good name than the
enforcement of the reasonable discipline of laws. In the discharge of an official duty and obligation Atty.
Santiago as a government employee is expected to obey the order and instruction of the duly constituted
authorities and she should not ignore or disregard a legitimate official order. Her act is inimical to the public
service. To tolerate Santiago to get away with it would be tantamount to allowing her to act as she suits and
satisfies her personal convenience in violation of her superior's order. An act which would be certainly
demoralizing to the public service. As may be gleaned from the foregoing discussions Atty. Santiago
had [willfully] ignored her superior's order without any attempt to comply with it and
therefore insubordination is clearly present aside from neglect of duty.

RECOMMENDATION

WHEREFORE, the instant case being the second [infraction] of the Civil Service law by Atty. Santiago, it is
respectfully. recommended that the latter be dismissed from service.10 (Emphases and underscoring
supplied.)

Complainant contended that she was not administratively charged for any offense in 1983 or in 1988. Thus,
she was not an incorrigible employee. Instead of being sent a notice or summons, she received respondent
Tolentino's letter dated April 21, 1988, but the same neither stated that an administrative case had been
filed against her nor did it require her to appear in any investigation. Since she was on a sick leave of
absence, not a vacation leave, she could not be guilty of neglect of duty as she had no duties to perform.
She was also not in a position to defy any lawful order, which would have amounted to insubordination.
Annexed to the complaint were copies of: (a) the Resolution December 19, 1988; (b) Mayor Asistio's
dismissal order dated May 18, 1989; (c) complainant's resignation letter; (d) her approved sick leave of
absence application; and (e) the commutation voucher showing the payment of her salaries.
In respondent Santiago's comment11 to the complaint, he argued that the allegedly deceitful statements in
the above Resolution were not malicious imputations of falsehoods. If the statements were inaccurate, the
same may have been caused by a misappreciation of facts or evidence. As to whether complainant was
formally charged for unauthorized absences in 1983, the material point considered was that she was
dismissed because of unauthorized absences. It also did not matter that she filed a sick leave of absence,
not a. vacation and sick leave, as the issue of the investigation was whether she was liable for disobeying
Mayor Asistio's directives.

Respondent Santiago further alleged that Mayor Asistio indorsed12 to the City Legal Office the matter of
complainant's noncompliance with the Mayor's return to work order and this referral was equivalent to an
administrative complaint. Complainant was sent a notice regarding her failure to report for work, thereby
informing her that she could be subjected to disciplinary action. Her failure to answer indicated her intent to
disregard Mayor Asistio's order and her option not to participate in the investigation. Respondents'
investigation proceeded ex parte and the assailed Resolution was issued on the basis of the evaluation of the
evidence at hand. Without proof of bad faith or adverse personal motives, respondents cannot be held
administratively liable for issuing the Resolution in the discharge of their official duties even if the same
turned out to be erroneous.

In respondent Tolentino's comment,13 he likewise argued that Mayor Asistio's referral of the case to the City
Legal Office was treated as a complaint. Complainant was apprised of the nature thereof and she even
requested ten days within which to answer the same. After the City Legal Office conducted an investigation
wherein complainant failed to participate, respondents decided the case on the basis of records and evidence
available. Anent the charge that she was not administratively charged in 1983, what was considered was
that she did incur unauthorized absences that led to her dropping from the rolls. That she filed a sick leave
of absence, not sick leave and vacation leave, was immaterial as Mayor Asistio's memorandum did not
qualify the nature of the leaves of absence being cancelled.

Among the documents attached to respondent Tolentino's comment were copies of: (a) Mayor Asistio's
letter 14 to complainant dated August 4, 1982 about her sick leave of absence; (b) Mayor Asistio's letter15 to
complainant dated July 5, 1983 about her unauthorized absences; (c) letter16 dated August 4, 1982 of
Administrative Officer Soriano to Mayor Asistio, seeking advice on the action to be taken on complainant's
situation; (d) Mayor Asistio's indorsement17 dated October 5, 1983 to the City Legal Office of complainant's
case; (e) the indorsement18 from the City Legal Office dated October 6, 1983, recommending that
complainant be dropped from the roll of employees; (f) the order19 of Mayor Asistio dated October 19, 1983
regarding complainant's separation from service; and (g) the Orders20 dated October 27, 1983 and
November 3, 1983 from the office of the Regional Director of the Civil Service Commission (CSC)-National
Capital Region (NCR), approving the complainant's dismissal.

Complainant insisted in her Consolidated Reply21 that the indorsement of Mayor Asistio was not at all signed
by the Mayor and it was merely an indorsement of documents for study and recommendation. She was also
not informed of said document. She asked for a period of ten days within which to answer and/or act on
respondent Tolentino's letter dated April 21, 1988 and she did report to Atty. Enrique Cube, the Mayor's
secretary to explain why she cannot go back to work yet. As no administrative case was filed against her in
1988, there could not have been a valid investigation under Presidential Decree No. 807.22 Yet, respondents
made up fictitious statements of facts and conclusions of law in recommending her dismissal.

The Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report, and
recommendation.23

The IBP Report and Recommendation

IBP Investigating Commissioner Mario V. Andres issued a Report and Recommendation24 dated April 4,
2008, which recommended the dismissal of the complaint for lack of merit. Commissioner Andres found that
complainant failed to present convincing evidence that respondents acted in bad faith in rendering the
Resolution dated December 19, 1988. Thus, they were held to be entitled to the legal presumption of
innocence.

According to Commissioner Andres, respondents concluded that complainant was previously charged for
unauthorized absences by relying on existing records that showed that she was dropped from the rolls in
1983. Complainant's letter asking for a period of ten days to reply to respondents' April 21, 1988 letter also
meant that she understood that an investigation was underway. When she failed to respond, respondents
assumed that she waived her right to present evidence. Respondents may have only been careless in their
choice of words when they wrongly assumed that complainant was administratively charged in 1983 and
they used the term summons in referring to the letter dated April 21, 1988. Still, respondents cannot be
held liable for deceit without proof that they deliberately worded their Resolution to mislead Mayor Asistio
into dismissing complainant.

Respondents were also not found guilty of misconduct as their actions neither indicated moral depravity, nor
did it affect their qualifications as lawyers. Respondents may have erred in failing to follow the procedure
under Section 3825 of Presidential Decree No. 807 and they may be investigated for such lapses as
government officials before some other venue. However, absent evidence showing respondents' moral
depravity in issuing the said Resolution, they cannot be penalized therefor as members of the Bar.

Lastly, Commissioner Andres ruled that respondents did not violate their oath as members of the Bar,
particularly the oath to "do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court."26 The falsehood
contemplated in the Attorney's Oath is one that is intentional or committed with malice. Although the
allegedly deceitful statements in respondents' Resolution may not be wholly accurate, the same were found
to be based on documents and made in the discharge of respondents' official functions as City Legal Officers.

In Resolution No. XVIII-2008-22527 passed on May 22, 2008, the IBP Board of Governors approved
Commissioner Andres's recommendation.

Complainant filed a Motion for Reconsideration with Motion to Vacate Resolution of the IBP,28 which the
Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) of the Supreme Court referred to the IBP for appropriate action.29

In an Order30 dated September 30, 2008, the IBP required the respondents to comment on the above
motion. Only respondent Tolentino commented31 thereon, praying that it be denied for being a mere rehash
of complainant's previous pleadings and issues that had already been passed upon.

Complainant filed before this Court an Ex Parte Motion to Vacate IBP Order dated September 30, 2008/to
Declare this Case Submitted for Decision,32 arguing that the Court's referral of her complaint to the IBP did
not include the latter's authority to decide it. She averred that the IBP was also not in a position to take
cognizance of her motion for reconsideration since the pleading was not addressed to the latter. Moreover,
since respondents failed to present their case before the IBP, they were allegedly precluded from presenting
any evidence in their behalf and any comment to complainant's motion for reconsideration will not serve any
purpose.

In a Resolution33 dated March 11, 2009, the Court referred to the IBP complainant's Motion for
Reconsideration with Motion to Vacate Resolution of the IBP and her Ex Parte Motion to Vacate IBP Order
dated September 30, 2008/to Declare this Case Submitted for Decision.

In Resolution No. XIX-2011-41334 passed on June 26, 2011, the IBP Board of Governors denied
complainant's motion for reconsideration as it found no cogent reason to reverse its previous ruling.

The IBP then transmitted the record of the case to the Court for final action.

Undaunted, complainant filed with this Court a Motion to Disregard IBP Resolution No. XIX-2011-413 dated
June 26, 2011,35 arguing that the IBP had no jurisdiction to dismiss her complaint or to rule on her motion
for reconsideration. She insisted that the Resolution Nos. XVIII-2008-225 and XIX-2011-413 of the IBP
Board of Governors should have only been recommendatory in nature and the IBP should not have
arrogated unto itself the power of the Court to decide on her complaint.

The Ruling of the Court

The Court finds no merit in the complaint.

At the outset, we reject complainant's contention that the IBP infringed on this Court's jurisdiction in
dismissing her complaint and denying her motion for reconsideration thereon.

The case was initiated upon the filing of the complaint for disbarment with this Court and the same was
subsequently referred to the IBP for investigation, report, and recommendation in accordance with Section
1, Rule 139-B36 of the Rules of Court. The Resolution Nos. XVIII-2008-225 and XIX-2011-413 of the IBP
Board of Governors embody their recommendation to this Court. As succinctly stated in Cojuangco, Jr. v.
Palma37 :

Clearly, the resolution of the IBP Board of Governors is merely recommendatory. The "power to recommend"
includes the power to give "advice, exhortation or indorsement, which is essentially persuasive in character,
not binding upon the party to whom it is made." Necessarily, the "final action" on the resolution of the IBP
Board of Governors still lies with this Court. x x x (Citation omitted.)

Verily, there is nothing in the IBP resolutions that would suggest that the same already constituted the final
determination of the case and were beyond the power of the Court to review.

After thoroughly reviewing the record of this case, the Court affirms the recommendation of Commissioner
Andres and the IBP Board of Governors that the instant complaint should be dismissed.

Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides for the grounds for the imposition of the penalty of
disbarment, to wit:

SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. — A member of the
bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit,
malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take
before admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for
corruptly or wilfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. x x x

In this case, complainant accused the respondents of deceit, gross misconduct and of violating their
Attorney's Oath in issuing the Resolution dated December 19, 1988 that allegedly contained false
statements and which was arrived at without her being informed of the charges or given the opportunity to
present evidence.

As Commissioner Andres correctly ruled, deceit covers intentional falsehoods or false statements and
representations that are made with malice or with the intent to do wrong. Gross misconduct, on the other
hand, is "any inexcusable, shameful or flagrant unlawful conduct on the part of a person concerned with the
administration of justice; i.e., conduct prejudicial to the rights of the parties or to the right determination of
the cause. The motive behind this conduct is generally a premeditated, obstinate or intentional
purpose."38 Similarly, on the charge of the alleged violation of the Attorney's Oath, the settled rule is that:

The Code of Professional Responsibility does not cease to apply to a lawyer simply because he has joined the
government service. In fact, by the express provision of Canon 6 thereof, the rules governing the conduct of
lawyers '"shall apply to lawyers in government service in the discharge of their official tasks." Thus, where
a lawyer's misconduct as a government official is of such nature as to affect his qualification as a
lawyer or to show moral delinquency, then he may be disciplined as a member of the bar on such
grounds. Although the general rule is that a lawyer who holds a government office may not be disciplined
as a member of the bar for infractions he committed as a government official, he may, however, be
disciplined as a lawyer if his misconduct constitutes a violation of his oath [as] a member of the legal
profession.39 (Citations omitted; emphasis supplied.)

Before the Court may impose against respondents the severe disciplinary sanction of disbarment,
complainant must be able to establish by substantial evidence the malicious and intentional character of the
misconduct complained of that evince the moral delinquency of respondents. Substantial evidence is the
amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.40
Except for complainant's allegations, however, she failed to present sufficient evidence to substantiate her
complaint. The Court agrees with the findings of Commissioner Andres that complainant has not proffered
any evidence that tended to show that respondents intentionally and deliberately made false statements in
the Resolution dated December 19, 1988 in order to deceive and induce Mayor Asistio to dismiss
complainant from service. She neither offered any documentary evidence to buttress her arguments nor
presented any witness to corroborate her claims.

Quite the contrary, complainant herself revealed her lack of certainty as to the malicious intent or other ill
motives of respondents when she made the following statements on her Motion for Reconsideration with
Motion to Vacate Resolution of the IBP before the Court:

[Respondents] knew that there was never a first nor a second administrative case against her. Yet they
twisted their facts and language to suit their purpose. Whether they misled the Hon. Mayor Asistio to
dismiss her from the service, or they conspired to engineer her removal from the service, or
followed a directive from Mayor Asistio to justify her dismissal, she does not specifically know.
But certainly, their Resolution is not an honest mistake of judgment, as shown by the malicious
warp and woof of the Resolution itself.41 (Emphasis supplied.)

We find such line of argumentation distinctly wanting. Complainant cannot simply rely on speculations and
suspicions, no matter how deep-seated, without evidence to support the same. We held in Osop v.
Fontanilla42 that charges meriting disciplinary action against a lawyer generally involve the motives that
induced him to commit the act charged and that, to justifY disbarment or suspension, the case against the
lawyer must be clear and free from doubt, not only as to the act charged but as to his motive. Furthermore,
in Cabas v. Sususco,43 we ruled that "mere allegation is not evidence and is not equivalent to proof. Charges
based on mere suspicion and speculation likewise cannot be given credence."

As a final point, the Court deliberately dispensed with any discussion regarding the validity of the Resolution
dated December 19, 1988. Commissioner Andres aptly pointed out that complainant may file in the proper
tribunal a separate case against respondents, as City Legal Officers, for possible lapses in the procedure
undertaken by them in the administrative investigation of the charge against her and/or the propriety of her
dismissal. On this matter, complainant admitted in her complaint and consolidated reply that she had indeed
filed administrative cases against respondents before the CSC, as well as a separate administrative case
against Mayor Asistio, in order to impugn the validity of her dismissal from service. However, the specific
details, stages and/or outcome of said cases were not properly manifested before this Court. Complainant
merely stated that she was not satisfied with these other proceedings so she opted to file the instant case
for disbarment.44

The Court cannot allow this to be done.

What is at once clear is that this case for disbarment cannot be resorted to as another remedy in order to
attack the legality of said Resolution or to nullify its consequences. The only issue that should be determined
in this case is whether respondents committed misconduct that put into question their moral character and
moral fitness to continue in the practice of law. As previously discussed, this issue had been answered in the
negative.

Considering that complainant failed to discharge the burden of proof to warrant the imposition of
administrative penalty against respondents Santiago and Tolentino, we dismiss the complaint.

WHEREFORE, the complaint for disbarment against respondents Atty. Zosimo Santiago and Atty.
Nicomedes Tolentino is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 7481 April 24, 2012

LORENZO D. BRENNISEN, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. RAMON U. CONTAWI, Respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

Before the Court is an administrative complaint1 for disbarment filed by complainant Lorenzo D.
Brennisen against respondent Atty. Ramon U. Contawi for deceit and gross misconduct in violation
of his lawyer's oath.

The Facts

Complainant is the registered owner of a parcel of land located in San Dionisio, Parañaque City
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 211762 of the Register of Deeds for the Province of
Rizal. Being a resident of the United States of America (USA), he entrusted the administration of the
subject property to respondent, together with the corresponding owner's duplicate title.

Unbeknownst to complainant, however, respondent, through a spurious Special Power of Attorney

(SPA)3 dated February 22, 1989, mortgaged and subsequently sold the subject property to one
Roberto Ho ("Ho"), as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale4 dated November 15, 2001. As a result,
TCT No. 21176 was cancelled and replaced by TCT No. 1508145 issued in favor of Ho.

Thus, on April 16, 2007, complainant filed the instant administrative complaint against respondent for
having violated his oath as a lawyer, causing him damage and prejudice.

In his counter-affidavit,6 respondent denied any formal lawyer-client relationship between him and the
complainant, claiming to have merely extended his services for free. He also denied receiving
money from the complainant for the purpose of paying the real estate taxes on the property. Further,
he averred that it was his former office assistants, a certain Boy Roque ("Roque") and one Danilo
Diaz ("Diaz"), who offered the subject property to Ho as collateral for a loan. Nevertheless,
respondent admitted to having confirmed the spurious SPA in his favor already annotated at the
back of TCT No. 21176 upon the prodding of Roque and Diaz, and because he was also in need of
money at that time. Hence, he signed the real estate mortgage and received his proportionate share
of ₱130,000.00 from the proceeds of the loan, which he asserted to have fully settled.

Finally, respondent denied signing the Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Ho and insisted that it was a
forgery. Nonetheless, he sought complainant's forgiveness and promised to repay the value of the
subject property.

In the Resolution7 dated July 16, 2008, the Court resolved to refer the case to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.

The Action and Recommendation of the IBP

During the mandatory conference held on October 21, 2008, the parties stipulated on the following
matters:

1. That complainant is the owner of a property covered by TCT No. 21176 (45228) of the
Register of Deeds of Parañaque;
 2. Respondent was in possession of the Owner's Duplicate Certificate of the property of the
complainant;

3. The property of the complainant was mortgaged to a certain Roberto Ho;

4. The title to the property of complainant was cancelled in year 2000 and a new one, TCT
No. 150814 was issued in favor of Mr. Roberto Ho;

5. The Special Power of Attorney dated 24 February 1989 in favor of Atty. Ramon U.
Contawi is spurious and was not signed by complainant Lorenzo D. Brennisen;

6. That respondent received Php100,000.00 of the mortgage loan secured by the mortgagee
on the aforementioned property of complainant;

7. That respondent did not inform the complainant about the unauthorized mortgage and sale
of his property;

8. That respondent has a loan obligation to Mr. Roberto Ho;

9. That respondent has not yet filed any case against the person whom he claims to have
falsified his signature;

10. That respondent did not notify the complainant that the owner's copy of TCT No. 21176
was stolen and was taken out from his office.8

In its Report9 dated July 10, 2009, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD), through
Commissioner Eduardo V. De Mesa, found that respondent had undeniably mortgaged and sold the
property of his client without the latter's knowledge or consent, facilitated by the use of a falsified
SPA. Hence, in addition to his possible criminal liability for falsification, the IBP-CBD deduced that
respondent violated various provisions of the Canons of Professional Responsibility and accordingly
recommended that he be disbarred and his name stricken from the Roll of Attorneys.

On May 14, 2011, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the report of Commissioner
De Mesa through Resolution No. XIX-2011-24810 as follows:

"RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED

the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case,
herein made part of this Resolution as Annex 'A' and finding the recommendation fully supported by
the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and finding Respondent guilty of
falsification; making or using falsified documents; and for benefiting from the proceed[s] of his
dishonest acts, Atty. Ramon U. Contawi is hereby DISBARRED."

The Issue

The sole issue before the Court is whether respondent violated his lawyer's oath when he mortgaged
and sold complainant's property, which was entrusted to him, without the latter's consent.

The Court's Ruling

After a punctilious examination of the records, the Court concurs with the findings and
recommendation of Commissioner De Mesa and the IBP Board of Governors that respondent acted
with deceit when, through the use of a falsified document, he effected the unauthorized mortgage
and sale of his client's property for his personal benefit.

Indisputably, respondent disposed of complainant's property without his knowledge or consent, and
partook of the proceeds of the sale for his own benefit. His contention that he merely accommodated
the request of his then financially-incapacitated office assistants to confirm the spurious SPA is
flimsy and implausible, as he was fully aware that complainant's signature reflected thereon was
forged. As aptly opined by Commissioner De Mesa, the fraudulent transactions involving the subject
property were effected using the owner's duplicate title, which was in respondent's safekeeping and
custody during complainant's absence.

Consequently, Commissioner De Mesa and the IBP Board of Governors correctly recommended his
disbarment for violations of the pertinent provisions of the Canons of Professional Responsibility, to
wit:

Canon 1 – A lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for
law and legal processes.

Canon 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

Canon 16 – A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client which may come into
his possession.

Canon 16.01 – A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from
client.

Canon 16.03 – A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon demand.

Canon 17 – A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and
confidence reposed in him.

In Sabayle v. Tandayag,11 the Court disbarred one of the respondent lawyers and ordered his name
stricken from the Roll of Attorneys on the grounds of serious dishonesty and professional
misconduct. The respondent lawyer knowingly participated in a false and simulated transaction not
only by notarizing a spurious Deed of Sale, but also – and even worse – sharing in the profits of the
specious transaction by acquiring half of the property subject of the Deed of Sale.

In Flores v. Chua,12 the Court disbarred the respondent lawyer for having deliberately made false
representations that the vendor appeared personally before him when he notarized a forged deed of
sale. He was found guilty of grave misconduct.

In this case, respondent's established acts exhibited his unfitness and plain inability to discharge the
bounden duties of a member of the legal profession. He failed to prove himself worthy of the
privilege to practice law and to live up to the exacting standards demanded of the members of the
bar. It bears to stress that "[t]he practice of law is a privilege given to lawyers who meet the high
standards of legal proficiency and morality. Any violation of these standards exposes the lawyer to
administrative liability."13

Moreover, respondent's argument that there was no formal lawyer-client relationship between him
and complainant will not serve to mitigate his liability. There is no distinction as to whether the
transgression is committed in a lawyer's private or professional capacity, for a lawyer may not divide
his personality as an attorney at one time and a mere citizen at another.14 1âwphi 1

With the foregoing disquisitions, the Court thus finds the penalty of disbarment proper in this case,
as recommended by Commissioner De Mesa and the IBP Board of Governors. Section 27, Rule 38
of the Rules of Court provides:

"SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. - A member
of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any
deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, xxx or for any violation of the
oath which he is required to take before admission to practice xxx" (emphasis supplied)

The Court notes that in administrative proceedings, only substantial evidence, i.e., that amount of
relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, is
required.15 Having carefully scrutinized the records of this case, the Court therefore finds that the
standard of substantial evidence has been more than satisfied.

WHEREFORE, respondent ATTY. RAMON U. CONTAWI, having clearly violated his lawyer's oath
and the Canons of Professional Responsibility through his unlawful, dishonest and deceitful conduct,
is DISBARRED and his name ordered STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys.

Let copies of this Decision be served on the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and all courts in the country for their information and guidance. Let a copy of this
Decision be attached to respondent's personal record as attorney.

SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 5581 January 14, 2014

ROSE BUNAGAN-BANSIG, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. ROGELIO JUAN A. CELERA, Respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

Before us is a Petition for Disbarment1 dated January 8, 2002 filed by complainant Rose Bunagan-
Bansig (Bansig) against respondent Atty. Rogelio Juan A. Celera (respondent) for Gross Immoral
Conduct.

In her complaint, Bansig narrated that, on May 8, 1997, respondent and Gracemarie R. Bunagan
(Bunagan), entered into a contract of marriage, as evidenced by a certified xerox copy of the
certificate of marriage issued by the City Civil Registry of Manila.2 Bansig is the sister of Gracemarie
R. Bunagan, legal wife of respondent.

However, notwithstanding respondent's marriage with Bunagan, respondent contracted another

marriage on January 8, 1998 with a certain Ma. Cielo Paz Torres Alba (Alba), as evidenced by a
certified xerox copy of the certificate of marriage issued by the City Registration Officer of San Juan,
Manila.3
Bansig stressed that the marriage between respondent and Bunagan was still valid and in full legal
existence when he contracted his second marriage with Alba, and that the first marriage had never
been annulled or rendered void by any lawful authority.

Bansig alleged that respondent’s act of contracting marriage with Alba, while his marriage is still
subsisting, constitutes grossly immoral and conduct unbecoming of a member of the Bar, which
renders him unfit to continue his membership in the Bar.

In a Resolution4 dated February 18, 2002, the Court resolved to require respondent to file a comment
on the instant complaint.

Respondent failed to submit his comment on the complaint, despite receipt of the copy of the Court's
Resolution, as evidenced by Registry Return Receipt No. 30639. Thus, the Court, in a
Resolution5 dated March 17, 2003, resolved to require respondent to show cause why he should not
be disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt for failing to file his comment on the complaint against
him.6

On December 10, 2002, Bansig filed an Omnibus Ex Parte Motion7 praying that respondent's failure
to file his comment on the complaint be deemed as a waiver to file the same, and that the case be
submitted for disposition.

On May 4, 2003, in a Motion, respondent claimed that while it appeared that an administrative case
was filed against him, he did not know the nature or cause thereof since other than Bansig's
Omnibus Motion, he received no other pleading or any processes of this Court. Respondent,
however, countered that Bansig's Omnibus Motion was merely a ploy to frighten him and his wife
from pursuing the criminal complaints for falsification of public documents they filed against Bansig
and her husband. He also explained that he was able to obtain a copy of the Court's Show Cause
Order only when he visited his brother who is occupying their former residence at 59-B Aguho St.,
Project 3, Quezon City. Respondent further averred that he also received a copy of Bansig's
Omnibus Motion when the same was sent to his law office address.

Respondent pointed out that having been the family's erstwhile counsel and her younger sister's
husband, Bansig knew his law office address, but she failed to send a copy of the complaint to him.
Respondent suspected that Bansig was trying to mislead him in order to prevent him from defending
himself. He added that Bansig has an unpaid obligation amounting to ₱2,000,000.00 to his wife
which triggered a sibling rivalry. He further claimed that he and his wife received death threats from
unknown persons; thus, he transferred to at least two (2) new residences, i.e., in Sampaloc, Manila
and Angeles City. He then prayed that he be furnished a copy of the complaint and be given time to
file his answer to the complaint.

In a Resolution8 dated July 7, 2003, the Court resolved to (a) require Bansig to furnish respondent
with a copy of the administrative complaint and to submit proof of such service; and (b) require
respondent to file a comment on the complaint against him.

In compliance, Bansig submitted an Affidavit of Mailing to show proof that a copy of the
administrative complaint was furnished to respondent at his given address which is No. 238
Mayflower St., Ninoy Aquino Subdivision, Angeles City, as evidenced by Registry Receipt No. 2167.9

On March 17, 2004, considering that respondent failed anew to file his comment despite receipt of
the complaint, the Court resolved to require respondent to show cause why he should not be
disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt for such failure.10
On June 3, 2004, respondent, in his Explanation,11 reiterated that he has yet to receive a copy of the
complaint. He claimed that Bansig probably had not complied with the Court's Order, otherwise, he
would have received the same already. He requested anew that Bansig be directed to furnish him a
copy of the complaint.

Again, on August 25, 2004, the Court granted respondent's prayer that he be furnished a copy of the
complaint, and required Bansig to furnish a copy of the complaint to respondent.12

On October 1, 2004, Bansig, in her Manifestation,13 lamented the dilatory tactics allegedly
undertaken by respondent in what was supposedly a simple matter of receipt of complaint. Bansig
asserted that the Court should sanction respondent for his deliberate and willful act to frustrate the
actions of the Court. She attached a copy of the complaint and submitted an Affidavit of Mailing
stating that again a copy of the complaint was mailed at respondent's residential address in Angeles
City as shown by Registry Receipt No. 3582.

On May 16, 2005, the Court anew issued a Show Cause Order to respondent as to why he should
not be disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt for failure to comply with the Resolution dated July
7, 2003 despite service of copy of the complaint by registered mail.14

On August 1, 2005, the Court noted the returned and unserved copy of the Show Cause Order dated
May 16, 2005 sent to respondent at 238 Mayflower St., Ninoy Aquino Subd. under Registry Receipt
No. 55621, with notation "RTS-Moved." It likewise required Bansig to submit the correct and present
address of respondent.15

On September 12, 2005, Bansig manifested that respondent had consistently indicated in his
correspondence with the Court No. 238 Mayflower St., Ninoy Aquino Subdivision, Angeles City as
his residential address. However, all notices served upon him on said address were returned with a
note "moved" by the mail server. Bansig averred that in Civil Case No. 59353, pending before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 1, Tuguegarao City, respondent entered his appearance as
counsel with mailing address to be at "Unit 8, Halili Complex, 922 Aurora Blvd., Cubao, Quezon
City."16

On February 13, 2006, the Court resolved to resend a copy of the Show Cause Order dated May 16,
2005 to respondent at his new address at Unit 8, Halili Complex, 922 Aurora Blvd., Cubao, Quezon
City.17

On June 30, 2008, due to respondent's failure to comply with the Show Cause Order dated May 16,
2005, for failure to file his comment on this administrative complaint as required in the Resolution
dated July 7, 2003, the Court resolved to: (a) IMPOSE upon Atty. Celera a FINE of ₱1,000.00
payable to the court, or a penalty of imprisonment of five (5) days if said fine is not paid, and (b)
REQUIRE Atty. Celera to COMPLY with the Resolution dated July 7, 2003 by filing the comment
required thereon.18

In a Resolution19 dated January 27, 2010, it appearing that respondent failed to comply with the
Court's Resolutions dated June 30, 2008 and July 7, 2003, the Court resolved to: (1) DISPENSE
with the filing by respondent of his comment on the complaint; (2) ORDER the arrest of Atty. Celera;
and (3) DIRECT the Director of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to (a) ARREST and
DETAIN Atty. Celera for non-compliance with the Resolution dated June 30, 2008; and (b) SUBMIT
a report of compliance with the Resolution. The Court likewise resolved to REFER the complaint to
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation, report and recommendation.20
However, the Return of Warrant21 dated March 24, 2010, submitted by Atty. Frayn M. Banawa,
Investigation Agent II, Anti-Graft Division of the NBI, showed that respondent cannot be located
because neither Halili Complex nor No. 922 Aurora Blvd., at Cubao, Quezon City cannot be located.
During surveillance, it appeared that the given address, i.e., No. 922 Aurora Blvd., Cubao, Quezon
City was a vacant lot with debris of a demolished building. Considering that the given address
cannot be found or located and there were no leads to determine respondent's whereabouts, the
warrant of arrest cannot be enforced.

The Integrated Bar of the Philippines, meanwhile, in compliance with the Court's Resolution,
reported that as per their records, the address of respondent is at No. 41 Hoover St., Valley View
Royale Subd., Taytay, Rizal.

Respondent likewise failed to appear before the mandatory conference and hearings set by the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD), despite several notices.
Thus, in an Order dated August 4, 2010, Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva-Maala, of the IBP-CBD,
declared respondent to be in default and the case was submitted for report and recommendation.
The Order of Default was received by respondent as evidenced by a registry return receipt.
However, respondent failed to take any action on the matter.

On January 3, 2011, the IBP-CBD, in its Report and Recommendation, recommended that
respondent Atty. Celera be suspended for a period of two (2) years from the practice of law.

RULING

A disbarment case is sui generis for it is neither purely civil nor purely criminal, but is rather an
investigation by the court into the conduct of its officers.22 The issue to be determined is whether
respondent is still fit to continue to be an officer of the court in the dispensation of justice. Hence, an
administrative proceeding for disbarment continues despite the desistance of a complainant, or
failure of the complainant to prosecute the same, or in this case, the failure of respondent to answer
the charges against him despite numerous notices.

In administrative proceedings, the complainant has the burden of proving, by substantial evidence,
the allegations in the complaint. Substantial evidence has been defined as such relevant evidence
as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. For the Court to exercise
its disciplinary powers, the case against the respondent must be established by clear, convincing
and satisfactory proof. Considering the serious consequence of the disbarment or suspension of a
member of the Bar, this Court has consistently held that clear preponderant evidence is necessary to
justify the imposition of the administrative penalty.23

In the instant case, there is a preponderance of evidence that respondent contracted a second
marriage despite the existence of his first marriage. The first marriage, as evidenced by the certified
xerox copy of the Certificate of Marriage issued on October 3, 2001 by the City Civil Registry of
Manila, Gloria C. Pagdilao, states that respondent Rogelio Juan A. Celera contracted marriage on
May, 8, 1997 with Gracemarie R. Bunagan at the Church of Saint Augustine, Intramuros, Manila; the
second marriage, however, as evidenced by the certified xerox copy of the Certificate of Marriage
issued on October 4, 2001 by the City Civil Registry of San Juan, Manila, states that respondent
Rogelio Juan A. Celera contracted marriage on January 8, 1998 with Ma. Cielo Paz Torres Alba at
the Mary the Queen Church, Madison St., Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila.

Bansig submitted certified xerox copies of the marriage certificates to prove that respondent entered
into a second marriage while the latter’s first marriage was still subsisting. We note that the second
marriage apparently took place barely a year from his first marriage to Bunagan which is indicative
that indeed the first marriage was still subsisting at the time respondent contracted the second
marriage with Alba.

The certified xerox copies of the marriage contracts, issued by a public officer in custody thereof, are
admissible as the best evidence of their contents, as provided for under Section 7 of Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court, to wit:

Sec. 7. Evidence admissible when original document is a public record. – When the original of a
document is in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office, its contents may be
proved by a certified copy issued by the public officer in custody thereof.

Moreover, the certified xerox copies of the marriage certificates, other than being admissible in
evidence, also clearly indicate that respondent contracted the second marriage while the first
marriage is subsisting. By itself, the certified xerox copies of the marriage certificates would already
have been sufficient to establish the existence of two marriages entered into by respondent. The
certified xerox copies should be accorded the full faith and credence given to public documents. For
purposes of this disbarment proceeding, these Marriage Certificates bearing the name of respondent
are competent and convincing evidence to prove that he committed bigamy, which renders him unfit
to continue as a member of the Bar.24

The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

Rule 1.01- A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

Canon 7- A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, and
support the activities of the Integrated Bar.

Rule 7.03- A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law,
nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the
legal profession.

Respondent exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of morality required of him as a member of
the Bar. He made a mockery of marriage, a sacred institution demanding respect and dignity. His act
of contracting a second marriage while his first marriage is subsisting constituted grossly immoral
conduct and are grounds for disbarment under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court.25

This case cannot be fully resolved, however, without addressing rather respondent’s defiant stance
against the Court as demonstrated by his repetitive disregard of its Resolution requiring him to file
his comment on the complaint. This case has dragged on since 2002. In the span of more than 10
years, the Court has issued numerous directives for respondent's compliance, but respondent
seemed to have preselected only those he will take notice of and the rest he will just ignore. The
Court has issued several resolutions directing respondent to comment on the complaint against him,
yet, to this day, he has not submitted any answer thereto. He claimed to have not received a copy of
the complaint, thus, his failure to comment on the complaint against him. Ironically, however,
whenever it is a show cause order, none of them have escaped respondent's attention. Even
assuming that indeed the copies of the complaint had not reached him, he cannot, however, feign
ignorance that there is a complaint against him that is pending before this Court which he could have
easily obtained a copy had he wanted to.

The Court has been very tolerant in dealing with respondent's nonchalant attitude towards this case;
accommodating respondent's endless requests, manifestations and prayers to be given a copy of
the complaint. The Court, as well as Bansig, as evidenced by numerous affidavits of service, have
relentlessly tried to reach respondent for more than a decade; sending copies of the Court's
Resolutions and complaint to different locations - both office and residential addresses of
respondent. However, despite earnest efforts of the Court to reach respondent, the latter, however
conveniently offers a mere excuse of failure to receive the complaint. When said excuse seemed no
longer feasible, respondent just disappeared. In a manner of speaking, respondent’s acts were
deliberate, maneuvering the liberality of the Court in order to delay the disposition of the case and to
evade the consequences of his actions. Ultimately, what is apparent is respondent’s deplorable
disregard of the judicial process which this Court cannot countenance.

Clearly, respondent's acts constitute willful disobedience of the lawful orders of this Court, which
under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court is in itself alone a sufficient cause for suspension
or disbarment. Respondent’s cavalier attitude in repeatedly ignoring the orders of the Supreme Court
constitutes utter disrespect to the judicial institution. Respondent’s conduct indicates a high degree
of irresponsibility. We have repeatedly held that a Court’s Resolution is "not to be construed as a
mere request, nor should it be complied with partially, inadequately, or selectively." Respondent’s
obstinate refusal to comply with the Court’s orders "not only betrays a recalcitrant flaw in his
character; it also underscores his disrespect of the Court's lawful orders which is only too deserving
of reproof."26

Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides:

Sec. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court grounds therefor. - A member of
the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any
deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason
of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude or for any violation of the oath which he is
required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a
superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without
authority to do so. The practice of soliciting cases for the purpose of gain, either personally or
through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.

Considering respondent's propensity to disregard not only the laws of the land but also the lawful
orders of the Court, it only shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity and good
demeanor. He is, thus, unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, we find respondent ATTY. ROGELIO JUAN A. CELERA, guilty
of grossly immoral conduct and willful disobedience of lawful orders rendering him unworthy of
continuing membership in the legal profession. He is thus ordered DISBARRED from the practice of
law and his name stricken of the Roll of Attorneys, effective immediately. 1âw phi 1

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, which shall forthwith record it
in the personal file of respondent. All the Courts of the Philippines and the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines shall disseminate copies thereof to all its Chapters.

SO ORDERED.

November 7, 2017

A.C. No. 8887

ROMAN DELA ROSA VERANO* , Complainant

vs.
ATTY. LUIS FERNAN DIORES, JR., Respondent
 DECISION

PER CURIAM:

This administrative case stemmed from a letter-complaint1 filed with the Court on February 2, 2011
by complainant Roman Dela Rosa Verano (Verano) against respondent Atty. Luis Fernan Diores, Jr.
(Atty. Diores) for deceit, malpractice, gross ignorance of the law and violation of the Lawyer's Oath
for surreptitiously using Verano's parcel of land to secure bail bonds in connection with at least 61
cases of Estafa and Violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (B.P. Blg. 22) that had been filed against
Atty. Diores.2

The salient facts, as borne by the records, are the following:

On April 11, 2006, Verano executed a Special Power of Attomey3 (SP A) in favor of Atty. Diores
authorizing the latter to use Verano's parcel of land covered by TCT No. T-77901 (subject property)
as guaranty to obtain a bail bond for particular criminal cases4 that had been filed against Atty.
Diores.

Verano was surprised when he subsequently discovered that Atty. Diores executed a Memorandum
of Agreement5 (MOA) dated August 31, 2006 with Visayan Surety and Insurance Corporation
(Visayan Surety) in order to use the subject property as guarantee to obtain bail bonds for at least 61
cases of Estafa and Violation of B.P. Blg. 22 that had been filed against him, which included, among
others, Criminal Case Nos. CBU-48996 and CBU-49706, which were filed with the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 6, Cebu City (RTC). Verano alleged that he did not authorize Atty. Diores to enter into
such MOA, much less to use the subject property as collateral for bail bonds of the more than
61 Estafa cases filed against the latter which were other than those he authorized under the SPA,
causing great loss and damage to Verano.

Thereafter, the aforementioned RTC branch, through Presiding Judge Ester M. Veloso, promulgated
a Joint Judgment6 dated November 16, 2009 in the said Criminal Case Nos. CBU-48996 and CBU-
49706 together with Criminal Case Nos. CBU-50599, CBU-50279, CBU-50335 and CBU-51277,
finding Atty. Diores guilty beyond reasonable doubt of six (6) counts of Estafa through false
pretenses and fraudulent means under Article 315 (2) (a) of the Revised Penal Code by engaging in
a Ponzi scheme,7 as follows:

WHEREFORE, the court hereby finds the accused Luis F. Diores, Jr. guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of six (6) counts of the crime of Estafa and sentences him as follows:

(1) In Criminal Case No. CBU-50599, to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of four (4) years and two
(2) months of prision correccional as minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal as
maximum, and to pay the off ended party Irene Lumapas the sum of [₱]3,050,000.00 plus legal
interest to be computed from June 2, 1999 until such time that the amount is paid in full;

(2) In Criminal Case No. CBU-48996, to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of four (4) years and two
(2) months of prision correccional as minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal as
maximum, and to pay the offended party Calixto Ventic the sum of [₱]500,000.00 plus legal interest
to be computed from December 7, 1998 until such time that the amount is paid in full;

(3) In Criminal Case No. CBU-49706, to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of four (4) years and two
(2) months of prision correccional as minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal as
maximum, and to pay the offended party Lilia Amy Ursal the sum of [₱]416,000.00 plus legal interest
to be computed from March 2, 1999 until such time that the amount is paid in full;
(4) In Criminal Case No. CBU-50279, to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of four (4) years and two
(2) months of prision correccional as minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal as
maximum, and to pay the offended party Rolando Chiu the sum of [₱]660,000.00 plus legal interest
to be computed from May 4, 1999 until such time that the amount is paid in full;

(5) In Criminal [Case] No. CBU-50335, to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of four (4) years and
two (2) months of prision correccional as minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal as
maximum, and to pay the offended party Philholina Villamor the sum of [₱]200,000.00 plus legal
interest to be computed from May 8, 1999 until such time that the amount is paid in full; and

(6) In Criminal Case No. CBU-51277, to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of four (4) years and two
(2) months of prision correccional as minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal as
maximum, and to pay the offended party John Michael Velez the sum of [₱]2,100,000.00 plus legal
interest to be computed from August 2, 1999 until such time that the amount is paid in full.

SO ORDERED.8

Thus, Verano filed this letter-complaint against Atty. Diores. In its Resolutions dated March 9,
20119 and November 28, 2011,10 the Court directed Atty. Diores to file his comment on the letter-
complaint. However, Atty. Diores failed to file any comment despite notice. Consequently, in its
Resolution11 dated July 25, 2012, the Court considered as waived the filing of Atty. Diores' comment,
and referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation.

At the scheduled mandatory conference before the IBP on April 1, 2013,12 only Verano appeared
together with his counsel, Atty. Manuel F. Ong. Atty. Diores, on the other hand, failed to appear
despite notice.13 Thereafter, Verano filed his position paper,14 adding that subsequent to the filing of
the letter-complaint before the Court, Atty. Diores had jumped bail in some of his criminal cases and
had failed to serve his sentence on some of the decided cases against him which had already
become final and executory.15 Atty. Diores, on the other hand, failed to file his position paper.

After due proceedings, Commissioner Eldrid C. Antiquiera (Commissioner Antiquiera) rendered a

Report and Recommendation16 on June 18, 2013, finding Atty. Diores guilty of deceit in violation of
Canon 1, Rule 1.0117 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR), holding that Atty. Diores: (1)
took undue advantage of the trust reposed on him by Verano by secretly entering into the subject
MOA; (2) jumped bail on some of the criminal cases and failed to serve sentence in those where he
was duly convicted by final judgment; and (3) refused to comply with the orders of the Court and the
IBP to submit his comment and position paper, and to attend the mandatory conference. The
dispositive portion reads:

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, it is recommended that respondent be SUSPENDED

from the practice of law for a period of TWO (2) YEARS with a stem warning that a repetition of the
same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.18

In its Resolution19 dated October 10, 2014, the IBP Board of Governors resolved to adopt and
approve the said Report and Recommendation, but recommended that Atty. Diores be disbarred,
thus:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, with

modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-
entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A ", and considering that Respondent is
liable for deceit in violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility aggravated by his
recalcitrance to legal orders in his refusal to comply with the resolution of the Supreme Court for him
to file Comment and his deliberate failure to file his Position Paper with the IBP and attend the
Mandatory Conference before the Investigating Commissioner, Atty. Luis Fernan Diores[, Jr.] is
hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law and his name stricken off the Roll of Attorneys.20

After a judicious examination of the records and submissions of the parties, the Court has no
compelling reason to diverge from the factual findings of Commissioner Antiquiera and the
recommended penalty of the IBP Board of Governors.

In dealing with clients or other people, lawyers are expected to observe the highest degree of good
faith, fairness and candor, both in their private and professional capacities. Thus, any form of
deception or fraudulent act committed by a lawyer in either capacity is not only disgraceful and
dishonorable, but also severely undermines the trust and confidence of people in the legal
profession, violates Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the CPR, and puts the lawyer's moral character into
serious doubt as a member of the Bar, rendering him unfit to continue his practice of law.21 Moreover,
a lawyer has the duty to obey lawful orders of a superior court and the IBP. Willful disobedience to
such orders, especially to those issued by this Court, is a sufficient ground to disbar a lawyer or
suspend him from the practice of law under Section 27,22 Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.23

In this case, Commissioner Antiquiera observed that while there was an SPA executed by Verano in
favor of Atty. Di ores for the latter to use Verano's land as guarantee for the bail bonds, it only
authorized Atty. Diores to use the same for specific criminal cases, and not for the other criminal
cases filed against him. In addition, Atty. Diores failed to file his comment to Verano's letter-
complaint filed against him despite two (2) notices from the Court ordering him to do so, failed to
attend the mandatory conference and file his position paper despite orders from the IBP, and jumped
bail in the criminal cases filed against him.

The Court agrees with Commissioner Antiquiera's observation. While the SPA executed by Verano
empowered Atty. Diores, in his private capacity, to use the subject property as guaranty for his bail
bond in some of his criminal cases, this did not grant him carte blanche to use the said property to
secure bail bonds in his other criminal cases which were not included in the SP A, much less enter
into a MOA with Visayan Surety for the said purpose. Such act not only violates the trust granted to
him by Verano, but also shows doubt as to his moral character.

Moreover, the fact that Atty. Diores jumped bail in the criminal cases filed against him, failed to file a
comment in the instant case despite notice from the Court, and also failed to attend the mandatory
conference and file his position paper when he was directed to do so by the IBP, shows his
propensity to willfully disobey the orders - of the Court, no less - and other judicial authorities,
including the IBP, which is a grave affront to the legal profession, and which should be penalized to
the greatest extent.

As for the recommended penalty, the Court agrees with, and hereby adopts, the IBP's
recommendation that Atty. Diores should be disbarred, in view of the totality of infractions he had
committed, compounded by his conviction for six (6) counts of Estafa by the RTC.

It is also well-settled that Estafa, which is an act of defrauding another person, whether committed
through abuse of confidence, false pretenses or other fraudulent acts,24 is a crime involving moral
turpitude25 which is also a violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the CPR, and a ground to disbar or
suspend a lawyer as gross misconduct under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.

Here, Atty. Diores was convicted of not only one, but six (6) counts of Estafa through false pretenses
and fraudulent means under Article 315(2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code. Such conviction simply
shows his criminal tendency to defraud and deceive other people into remitting to him their hard-
earned money, which the legal profession condemns in the strongest terms. This, together with his
willful disobedience of court orders and his act of using Verano's subject property as guaranty for his
bail bond outside the criminal cases wherein he was authorized, cements his utter unfitness to
continue exercising his duties as a lawyer. Thus, the Court will not hesitate to adopt the penalty of
the IBP and hereby disbar Atty. Diores to protect the trust and confidence of the people in this noble
profession.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Luis Fernan Diores, Jr. is found GUILTY of Deceit in violation of
Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and Willful Disobedience to a Lawful Order of
the Court and Conviction for Estafa, both in violation of Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court. He is hereby DISBARRED, and his name is ordered STRICKEN FROM the Roll of Attorneys
1âwphi1

effective immediately upon the date of his receipt of this Decision.

Atty. Diores is hereby DIRECTED to immediately file a Manifestation to the Court that his disbarment
has commenced, copy furnished to all courts and quasi-judicial bodies where he has entered his
appearance as counsel.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished to: (a) the Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination
to all courts throughout the country for their information and guidance; (b) the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines; and (c) the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to Atty. Di ores' personal record
as a member of the Bar.

SO ORDERED.

January 12, 2016

A.C. No. 10910

[Formerly CBD Case No. 12-3594)

ANTERO M. SISON, JR., Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. MANUEL N. CAMACHO, Respondent.

DECISION

PERCURIAM:

In his verified affidavit-complaint,1 dated September 17, 2012, filed before the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline (JBP-CBD), complainant Atty. Antero M. Sison, Jr. (Atty.
Sison), president of Marsman-Drysdale Agribusiness Holdings Inc. (MDAHI), charged respondent
Atty. Manuel Camacho (Atty. Camacho) with violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR). He accused Atty. Camacho of violating Rule 1.01, for dishonestly entering into
a compromise agreement without authorization, and Rule 16.01, for failure to render an accounting
of funds which were supposed to be paid as additional docket fees.

Complaint's Position

Atty. Sison alleged that Atty. Camacho was the counsel of MDAHI in an insurance claim action
against Paramount Life & General Insurance Corp. (Paramount Insurance), docketed as Civil Case
No. 05-655, before the Regional Trial Court, Makati City, Branch 139 (RTC). The initial insurance
claim of MDAHI against Paramount Insurance was P14,863,777.00.

On March 4, 2011, Atty. Camacho met with Atty. Enrique Dimaano (Atty. Dimaano), corporate
secretary of MDAHI, and proposed to increase their claim to P64,412,534. l 8 by taking into account
the interests imposed. Atty. Camacho, however, clarified that the increase in the claim would require
additional docket fees in the amount of Pl,288,260.00, as shown in his hand-written
computation.2 MDAHI agreed and granted the said amount to Atty. Dimaano which was evidenced
by a Payment Request/Order Form.3 On May 27, 2011, Atty. Dimaano gave the money for docket
fees to Atty. Camacho who promised to issue a receipt for the said amount, but never did.4

Atty. Sison later discovered that on May 26, 2011, the RTC had already rendered a decision5 in favor
of MDAHI granting its insurance claim plus interests in the amount of approximately P65,000,000.00.

On August 11, 2011, Atty. Camacho sent a letter6 to MDAHI recommending a settlement with
Paramount Insurance in Civil Case No. 05-655 in the amount of Pl5,000,000.00 allegedly to prevent
a protracted appeal with the appellate court. MDAHI refused the offer of compromise and did not
indicate its conforme on the letter of Atty. Camacho. Surprisingly, even without the written conformity
of MDAHI, Atty. Camacho filed the Satisfaction of Judgment,7 dated August 15, 2011, before the R
TC stating that the parties had entered into a compromise agreement.

On August 18, 2011, Atty. Sison met with Atty. Camacho to clarify the events that transpired.8 He
asked Atty. Camacho whether he paid the amount of Pl,288,260.00 as additional dockets fees, and
the latter replied that he simply gave it to the clerk of court as the payment period had lapsed.

Disappointed with the actions of Atty. Camacho, Atty. Sison sent a letter,9 dated August 24, 2011,
stating that he was alarmed that the former would accept a disadvantageous compromise; that it
was against company policy to bribe any government official with respect to the Pl,288,260.00 given
to the clerk of court; and that MDAHI would only pay P200,000.00 to Atty. Camacho as attorney's
fees.

Respondent's Position

In his verified answer,10 dated October 30, 2012, Atty. Camacho denied all the allegations against
him. He stressed that he had the authority to enter into the compromise agreement. Moreover, the
alleged docket fees given to him by MDAHI formed part of his attorney's fees.

He further stated in his position paper11 that the judgment debt was paid and accepted by MDAHI
without any objection, as duly evidenced by an acknowledgment receipt.12 Thus, there was no
irregularity in the compromise agreement.

With respect to the amount handed to him, Atty. Camacho averred that he filed a Motion to Compel
Plaintiff to Pay Attorney's Fee on September 13, 2011 before the RTC. The Court granted the said
motion in its April 12, 2012 Order13 stating that the amount of Pl,288,260.00 was considered as part
of his attorney's fees.

On July 6, 2012, the R TC issued an Order14 resolving the motion for reconsideration filed by both
parties in favor of Atty. Camacho. In the said order, the RTC opined that only P300,000.00 was
previously paid to Atty. Camacho15 as attorney's fees. Based on the foregoing, Atty. Camacho
asserted that the amount of Pl,288,260.00 which he received, truly formed part of his unpaid
attorney's fees. He stressed that the said RTC order had attained finality and constituted res
judicata on the present administrative case. He added that MDAHI disregarded the RTC order as it
filed an estafa case against him concerning the amount ofl:ll,288,260.00.

Report and Recommendation

After the mandatory conference on January 24, 2013 and upon a thorough evaluation of the
evidence presented by the parties in their respective position papers, the IBP-CBD submitted its
Report and Recommendation,16 dated April 1, 2013 finding Atty. Camacho to have violated the
provisions of Rule 1.01 and Rule 16.01 of the CPR and recommending the imposition of the penalty
of one (1) year suspension from the practice of law against him. In its Resolution No. XX-2013-
474,17 dated April 16, 2013, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (Board) adopted the said report and recommendation of Investigating Commissioner
Eldrid C. Antiquiera.

Aggrieved, Atty. Camacho filed a motion for reconsideration18 before the Board reiterating that the
compromise agreement was valid because MDAHI did not reject the same and that the amount of
Pl,288,260.00 formed part of his attorney's fees.

In his Comment/Opposition,19 Atty. Sison countered that Atty. Camacho never denied that he filed the
satisfaction of judgment without the written authority of MDAHI and that there was ca pending estafa
case against him before the Regional Trial Court, Makati City, Branch 146, docketed as Criminal
Case No. 13-1688, regarding the Pl,288,260.00 handed to him.

In its Resolution No. XXI-2014-532,20 dated August 10, 2014, the Board adopted the report and
recommendation21 of National Director Dominic C.M. Solis. The Board partially granted the motion for
reconsideration and dismissed, without prejudice, the charge regarding the failure to account for the
money, because it was premature to act on such issue due to the pending criminal case against the
Atty. Camacho. Accordingly, the penalty of one (1) year suspension imposed was lowered to six (6)
months suspension from the practice of law.

Hence, the case was elevated to the Court.

The Court's Ruling

The Court finds that Atty. Camacho violated Rules 1.01 and 16.01 of the CPR.

Entering into a compromise

agreement without written
authority of the client

Those in the legal profession must always conduct themselves with honesty and integrity in all their
dealings. Members of the Bar took their oath to conduct themselves according to the best of their
knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to their clients and to delay no
man for money or malice. These mandates apply especially to dealings of lawyers with their clients
considering the highly fiduciary nature of their relationship.22

In the practice of law, lawyers constantly formulate compromise agreements for the benefit of their
clients. Article 1878 of the Civil Code provides that " [ s ]pecial powers of attorney are necessary in
the following cases: xxx (3) To compromise, to submit questions to arbitration, to renounce the right
to appeal from a judgment, to waive objections to the venue of an action or to abandon a
prescription already acquired xxx."
In line with the fiduciary duty of the Members of the Bar, Section 23, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court
specifies a stringent requirement with respect to compromise agreements, to wit:

Sec. 23. Authority of attorneys to bind clients. - Attorneys have authority to bind their clients in any
case by any agreement in relation thereto made in writing, and in taking appeals, and in all matters
of ordinary judicial procedure. But they cannot, without special authority, compromise their
client's litigation, or receive anything in discharge of a client's claim but the full amount in
cash.

[Emphasis and Underscoring Supplied]

In the case at bench, the R TC decision, dated May 26, 2011, awarded MDAHI approximately
P65,000,000.00. When Paramount Insurance offered a compromise settlement in the amount of
Pl5,000,000.00, it was clear as daylight that MDAHI never consented to the said offer. As can be
gleaned from Atty. Camacho's letter, MDAHI did not sign the conforme regarding the compromise
agreement.23

Glaringly, despite the lack of a written special authority, Atty. Camacho agreed to a lower judgment
award on behalf of his client and filed a satisfaction of judgment before the R TC. The said pleading
also failed to bear the conformity of his client.24 Although MDAHI subsequently received the payment
of P15M from Paramount Insurance, it does not erase Atty. Camacho's transgression in reaching the
compromise agreement without the prior consent of his client.

For entering into a compromise agreement without the written authority of his client, Atty. Camacho
violated Rule 1.01 of the CPR, which states that " [a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct." Members of the Bar must always conduct themselves in a way that
promotes public confidence in the integrity of the legal profession.25

Failing to account for

the money of the client

Atty. Camacho was also charged with violation of Rule 16.01 of the CPR, which provides for a
lawyer's duty to "account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client."

Here, Atty. Sison alleged that MDAHI gave Atty. Camacho the amount of P 1,288,260.00 as
payment of additional docket fees but the latter failed to apply the same for its intended purpose. In
contrast, Atty. Camacho invoked the July 6, 2012 Order of the RTC which declared the MDAHI
allegation as unsubstantiated, and claimed that the said amount formed part of his attorney's fees.
The Board, on the other hand, opined that it was still premature to decide such issue because there
was a pending estafa case, docketed as Criminal Case No. 13-1688, filed by MDAHI against Atty.
Camacho involving the same amount of P 1,288,260.00.

The Court is of the view that it is not premature to rule on the charge against Atty. Camacho for his
failure to account for the money of his client. The pending case against him is criminal in nature. The
issue therein is whether he is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of misappropriating the amount of
Pl,288,260.00 entrusted to him by his client. The present case, however, is administrative in
character, requiring only substantial evidence. It only entails a determination of whether Atty.
Camacho violated his solemn oath by failing to account for the money of his client. Evidently, the
adjudication of such issue in this administrative case shall not, in any way, affect the separate
criminal proceeding.
In disciplinary proceedings against lawyers, the only issue is whether the officer of the court is still fit
to be allowed to continue as a member of the Bar. The only concern of the Court is the
1âw phi 1

determination of the respondent's administrative liability. The findings in this case will have no
material bearing on other judicial action which the parties may choose to file against each other.
While a lawyer's wrongful actuations may give rise at the same time to criminal, civil, and
administrative liabilities, each must be determined in the appropriate case; and every case must be
resolved in accordance with the facts and the law applicable and the quantum of proof required in
each.26

Delving into the substance of the allegation, the Court rules that Atty. Camacho indeed violated Rule
16.01 of the CPR. When Atty. Camacho personally requested MDAHI for additional docket fees, the
latter obediently granted the amount of Pl ,288,260.00 to the former. Certainly, it was understood
that such amount was necessary for the payment of supposed additional docket fees in Civil Case
No. 05-655. Yet, when Atty. Sison confronted Atty. Camacho regarding the said amount, the latter
replied that he simply gave it to the clerk of court as the payment period had lapsed. Whether the
said amount was pocketed by him or improperly given to the clerk of court as a form of bribery, it
was unmistakably clear that Atty. Camacho did not apply the amount given to him by his client for its
intended legal purpose.

Atty. Camacho did not even deny making that request to MDAHI for additional docket fees and
receiving such amount from his client. Rather, he set up a defense that the said amount formed part
of his attorney's fees. Such defense, however, is grossly contradictory to the established purpose
of the Pl,288,260.00. In its Payment Request/Order Form,27 it is plainly indicated therein that MDAHI
released the said amount only to be applied as payment for additional docket fees, and not for any
other purposes. Consequently, the lame excuse of Atty. Camacho is bereft of merit because it
constitutes a mere afterthought and a manifest disrespect to the legal profession. Atty. Camacho is
treading on a perilous path where the payment of his attorney's fees is more important than his
fiduciary and faithful duty of accounting the money of his client. Well-settled is the rule that lawyers
are not entitled to unilaterally appropriate their clients' money for themselves by the mere fact that
the clients owe them attorney's fees.28

Moreover, Atty. Camacho failed to issue a receipt to MDAHI from the moment he received the said
amount. In Tarog v. Ricafort,29 the Court held that ethical and practical considerations made it both
natural and imperative for a lawyer to issue receipts, even if not demanded, and to keep copies of
the receipts for his own records. Pursuant to Rule 16.01 of the CPR, a lawyer must be aware that he
is accountable for the money entrusted to him by the clients, and that his only means of ensuring
accountability is by issuing and keeping receipts.

Worse, on May 26, 2011, the RTC already rendered its decision in Civil Case No. 05-655, adjudging
MDAHI entitled to an insurance claim in the amount of approximately P.65,000,000.00. From that
date on, there was no more need for additional docket fees. Apparently, still unaware of the
judgment, MDAHI subsequently released the money for additional docket fees to Atty. Dimaano,
who handed it to Atty. Camacho on May 27, 2011. Despite a decision having been rendered, Atty.
Camacho did not reject the said amount or return it to his client upon receipt. Instead, he unilaterally
withheld the said amount by capriciously invoking the payment of his attorney's fees.

The fiduciary nature of the relationship between the counsel and his client imposes on the lawyer the
duty to account for the money or property collected or received for or from his client. Money
entrusted to a lawyer for a specific purpose but not used for the purpose should be immediately
returned. A lawyer's failure, to return upon demand, the funds held by him on behalf of his client
gives rise to the presumption that he has appropriated the same for his own use in violation of the
trust reposed in him by his client. Such act is a gross violation of general morality as well as of
professional ethics. It impairs public confidence in the legal profession and deserves punishment.30

Administrative penalty

A member of the Bar may be penalized, even disbarred or suspended from his office as an attorney,
for violation of the lawyer's oath and/or for breach of the ethics of the legal profession as embodied
in the CPR. The practice of law is a profession, a form of public trust, the performance of which is
entrusted to those who are qualified and who possess good moral character. The appropriate
penalty for an errant lawyer depends on the exercise of sound judicial discretion based on the
surrounding facts.31

In Luna v. Galarrita,32 the Court suspended the respondent lawyer for two (2) years because he
accepted a compromise agreement without valid authority and he failed to tum over the payment to
his client. In the case of Melendrez v. Decena,33 the lawyer therein was disbarred because he
entered into a compromise agreement without the special authority of his client and he drafted
deceptive and dishonest contracts. Similarly, in Navarro v. Meneses III,34 another lawyer, who
misappropriated the money entrusted to him by his client which he failed and/or refused to account
for despite repeated demands, was disbarred because his lack of personal honesty and good moral
character rendered him unworthy of public confidence.

In this case, Atty. Camacho entered into a compromise agreement without the conformity of his
client which is evidently against the provisions of the CPR and the law. Moreover, he deliberately
failed to account for the money he received from his client, which was supposed to be paid as
additional docket fees. He even had the gall to impute that the money was illicitly given to an officer
of the court. The palpable indiscretions of Atty. Camacho shall not be countenanced by the Court for
these constitute as a blatant and deliberate desecration of the fiduciary duty that a lawyer owes to
his client.

The Court finds that Atty. Camacho's acts are so reprehensible, and his violations of the CPR are so
flagrant, exhibiting his moral unfitness and inability to discharge his duties as a member of the Bar.
His actions erode rather than enhance the public perception of the legal profession. Therefore, in
view of the totality of his violations, as well as the damage and prejudice they caused to his client,
Atty. Camacho deserves the ultimate penalty of disbarment.

Further, he must be ordered to return the amount of Pl,288,260.00 to MDAHI, which he received in
his professional capacity for payment of the purported additional docket fees. Disciplinary
proceedings revolve around the determination of the respondent-lawyer's administrative liability,
which must include those intrinsically linked to his professional engagement.35

WHEREFORE, Atty. Manuel N. Camacho is found guilty of violating Rule 1.01 and Rule 16.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. For reasons above-stated, he is DISBARRED from the practice
of law and his name stricken off the Roll of Attorneys, effective immediately.

Furthermore, Atty. Manuel N. Camacho is ORDERED to return to Marsman-Drysdale Agribusiness

Holdings Inc. the money intended to pay for additional docket fees which he received from the latter
in the amount of P 1,288,260.00 within ninety (90) days from the finality of this decision.

Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be entered into the records
of respondent Atty. Manuel N. Camacho. Copies shall likewise be furnished the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts concerned.
SO ORDERED.

January 24, 2017

A.C. No. 5582

ARTHUR O. MONARES, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. LEVI P. MUÑOZ, Respondent.

x-----------------------x

A.C. No. 5604

ALBAY ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC., Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. LEVI P. MUNOZ, Respondent.

x-----------------------x

A.C. No. 5652

BENJILIEH M. CONSTANTE, 1 Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. LEVI P. MUNOZ, Respondent.

DECISION

CAGUIOA, J.:

For resolution is the Joint Petition for Review with Prayer for Absolution and/or Clemency2 (Joint
Petition) dated May 14, 2009 filed by respondent Atty. Levi P. Muñoz (Muñoz), in connection with the
complaints for disbarment filed by Arthur O. Monares (Monares), Atty. Oliver O. Olaybal (Olaybal)
purportedly representing Albay Electric Cooperative, Inc. (ALECO), and Benjilieh M. Constante
(Constante), dated January 17, 2002, February 4, 2002 and March 21, 2002, respectively.

Monares is the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 9923 filed against Ludolfo Muñoz (Ludolfo) before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Legazpi City. In his complaint, Monares alleged that Muñoz
represented his brother Ludolfo in the said case during regular government hours while employed as
Provincial Legal Officer of Albay City. 3

Under the chairmanship of Olaybal, ALECO's old board of directors (BOD) engaged Muñoz as
retained counsel sometime in June 1998. Olaybal averred that Muñoz did not inform ALECO's old
BOD that he was employed as Provincial Legal Officer at such time. Olaybal raised that after its
administrator, the National Electrification Administration (NEA), deactivated the old BOD on the
ground of mismanagement, Muñoz served as retained counsel of the NEA-appointed team which
took over the management of ALECO. Moreover, Olaybal alleged that Muñoz illegally collected
payments in the form of notarial and professional fees in excess of what was agreed upon in their
retainer agreement. 4
Constante is the Executive Assistant for Legal Affairs of Sunwest Construction and Development
Corporation (Sunwest). Constante claimed that Muñoz filed ten (10) cases against Sun west on
Ludolfo's behalf before the Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman) while he was serving as
Provincial Legal Officer. 5

All three (3) complaints prayed that Muñoz be disbarred for unlawfully engaging in private practice.
In addition, Olaybal sought Muñoz's disbarment for acts of disloyalty, particularly, for violating the
rule against conflict of interest.6

To support their position, the complainants raised that Muñoz had been previously disciplined by the
Ombudsman for two (2) counts of unauthorized practice of profession in OMB-ADM-1-01-0462, and
was meted the penalty of removal and dismissal from service. The complainants further manifested
that Muñoz had been convicted by the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of Legazpi City in
Criminal Case Nos. 25568 and 25569 for violation of Section 7(b)(2) in relation to Section 11 of
Republic Act No. 6713.7 Munoz's conviction has since become final pursuant to the Court's
Resolution dated June 14, 2004 in G.R. No. 160668.8

In his respective comments to the complaints,9 Muñoz claimed that he had requested Governor Al
Francis C. Bichara (Governor Bichara) for authority to continue his private practice shortly after his
appointment. This request was granted on July 18, 1995.10 Thereafter, Muñoz submitted the same
request to Rafael C. Alunan III, then Secretary of the Department of the Interior and Local
Government (DILG).11 On September 8, 1995, Acting Secretary Alexander P. Aguirre granted
Muñoz's request, under the following conditions:

1. That no government time, personnel, funds or supplies shall be utilized in connection (sic)
and that no conflict of interest with your present position as Provincial Legal Officer shall arise
thereby;

2. That the time so devoted outside of office hours, the place(s) and under what circumstances you
can engage in private employment shall be fixed by the Governor of Albay to the end that it will not
impair in any way your efficiency; and

3. That any violation of the above restrictions will be a ground for the cancellation and/or revocation
of this authority. 12 (Emphasis supplied)

Pursuant to the DILG's authorization, Governor Bichara imposed the following conditions upon
Muñoz:

a. [Y]ou cannot handle cases against the Province of Albay;

b. [Y]ou will be on call and you will have no fix (sic) working hours provided that the efficiency of the
Provincial Legal Office shall not be prejudiced;

c. [Y]ou are exempted in (sic) accomplishing your Daily Time Record considering the limitation
already mentioned above; [and]

d. In addition to the above enumeration[,] you are to perform functions subject to limitations in Sec.
481 of RA 7160. 13
Muñoz emphasized that his authority 'to engage in private practice was renewed by Governor
Bichara on July 3, 1998 for his second term ending in July 2001, and again on July 5, 2001 for his
third term ending in July 2004. 14

The complaints were separately referred by the Court to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
for investigation, report and recommendation. 15 The complaints were then consolidated through the
Order dated January 16, 2003 issued by Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan. 16 Subsequently, the
complaints underwent a series of re-assignments, until finally assigned to Commissioner Doroteo B.
Aguila.17

In his Report dated March 11, 200518 (IBP Report), Commissioner Aguila recommended that Muñoz
be found guilty of gross misconduct and violation of Rules 1.01, 6.02, 15.01 and 15.03 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility (CPR). The penalty of suspension from the practice of law for an
aggregate period of four (4) years19 was recommended. On automatic review, the IBP Board of
Governors (IBP-BOG) approved and adopted Commissioner Aguila's recommendation in a
Resolution dated October 22, 2005.20

On December 22, 2005, Muñoz filed an Ex-Parte Appeal for Mercy, Clemency and Compassion
before the IBP-BOG, praying that the recommended penalty be reduced to one (1) year.21 This
appeal was denied on January 28, 2006.22

Muñoz filed before this Court an Ex-Parte Appeal for Mercy, Clemency, Forgiveness and
Compassion23 (Appeal) dated April 8, 2006 praying for the reduction of the recommended penalty of
suspension for four (4) years to one (1) year or less, and the dismissal of the complaints for
disbarment filed against him. As an alternative prayer, Muñoz requested that he be granted special
limited authority to practice law until all his pending cases are terminated. 24

In his Appeal, Muñoz insisted that when he served as Provincial Legal Officer from June 1995 to
May 2002, he engaged in private practice pursuant to the three (3) written authorities issued by
Governor Bichara, and the written authority of the DILG issued during his first term, which he claims
had never been revoked. Muñoz also argued that no conflict of interest existed between ALECO's
old BOD and the NBA management team, since he was engaged as retained counsel of ALECO as
an institution, not its management teams. 25

On August 28, 2006, the Court resolved to remand Muñoz's Appeal to the IBP for disposition. 26

Acting on Munoz's Appeal, the IBP-BOG issued a Resolution reducing the recommended period of
suspension from four (4) to three (3) years. 27 Unsatisfied, Muñoz filed a Motion for Reconsideration,
which the IBP-BOG denied on December 11, 2008.28

Aggrieved, Muñoz elevated his case anew to this Court through this Joint Petition. In fine, Muñoz
reiterates the allegations in his Appeal, with the additional assertion that the fees he collected from
ALECO were contemplated under their retainer agreement. 29

The Court agrees with the IBP-BOG's findings and recommendations.

Muñoz violated the conditions of his

DILG authorization.

Muñoz's DILG authorization prohibited him from utilizing government time for his private practice. As
correctly observed by Commissioner Aguila, Rule XVII of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V
of Executive Order No. 292 and Other Pertinent Civil Service Laws (Omnibus Rules), requires
government officers and employees of all departments and agencies, except those covered by
special laws, to render not less than eight (8) hours of work a day for five (5) days a week, or a total
of forty (40) hours a week.30 The number of required weekly working hours may not be reduced, even
in cases where the department or agency adopts a flexible work schedule. 31

Notably, Muñoz did not deny Monares' allegation that he made at least eighty-six (86) court
appearances in connection with at least thirty (30) cases from April 11, 1996 to August 1, 2001.32 He
merely alleged that his private practice did not prejudice the functions of his office.

Court appearances are necessarily made within regular government working hours, from 8:00 in the
morning to 12:00 noon, and 1:00 to 5:00 in the afternoon.33 Additional time is likewise required to
study each case, draft pleadings and prepare for trial. The sheer volume of cases handled by Muñoz
clearly indicates that government time was necessarily utilized in pursuit of his private practice, in
clear violation of the DILG authorization and Rule 6.0234 of the CPR.

Muñoz should have requested for

authority to engage in private practice
from the Secretary of DILG for his
second and third terms.

Acting Secretary Aguirre's grant of authority cannot be unreasonably construed to have been
perpetual. Moreover, Muñoz cannot claim that he believed in good faith that the authority granted by
Governor Bichara for his second and third terms sufficed.

Memorandum No. 17 dated September 4, 1986 (Memorandum 17), which Muñoz himself cites in his
Joint Petition, is clear and leaves no room for interpretation. The power to grant authority to engage
in the practice of one's profession to officers and employees in the public service lies with the head
of the department, in accordance with Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules
which provides, in part:

Sec. 12. No officer or employee shall engage directly in any private business, vocation, or profession
or be connected with any commercial, credit, agricultural, or industrial undertaking without a written
permission from the head of Department: Provided, That this prohibition will be absolute in the
case of those officers and employees whose duties and responsibilities require that their entire time
be at the disposal of the Government: Provided, further, That if an employee is granted permission
to engage in outside activities, the time so devoted outside of office hours should be fixed by the
chief of the agency to the end that it will not impair in any way the efficiency of the officer or
employee x x x. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Memorandum 17 was issued more than nine (9) years prior to Munoz's appointment as Provincial
Legal Officer, hence, he cannot feign ignorance thereof. As a local public official, it was incumbent
1âwphi1

upon Muñoz to secure the proper authority from the Secretary of the DILG not only for his first term,
but also his second and third. His failure to do so rendered him liable for unauthorized practice of his
profession and violation of Rule 1.0135 of the CPR.

Muñoz represented conflicting interests.

Muñoz cannot elude Olaybal's allegations of disloyalty. In Mabini Colleges, Inc. v. Pajarillo,36the
Court explained the tests to determine the existence of conflict of interest, thus:
There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two or more opposing
parties. The test is "whether or not in behalf of one client, it is the lawyer's duty to fight for an
issue or claim, but it is his duty to oppose it for the other client. In brief, if he argues for one
client, this argument will be opposed by him when he argues for the other client." This rule
covers not only cases in which confidential communications have been confided, but also those in
which no confidence has been bestowed or will be used. Also, there is conflict of interest if the
acceptance of the new retainer will require the attorney to perform an act which will
injuriously affect his first client in any matter in which he represents him and also whether he
will be called upon in his new relation to use against his first client any knowledge acquired
through their connection. Another test of the inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance
of a new relation will prevent an attorney from the full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and
loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing in the performance thereof.
(Emphasis supplied)

As Muñoz himself detailed in his Joint Petition, he acted as counsel for ALECO under the
management of the old BOD in the following cases:

A. Civil Case No. 10007 -ALECO (Petitioner) vs. Eleuterio Adonay, NEA Project Supervisor and his
team John Catral et. al., a case filed by Oliver O. Olaybal and his group. For: Injunction,
Accounting with Prayer for Writs of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining
Order, seeking to stop the election of the new set of member (sic) of the Board of Directors x x
x.

B. Civil Case [N]o. 10066 entitled ALBAY ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC. as Petitioner, also filed
by Oliver O. Olaybal, a case for Prohibition, Mandamus and Receivership, with Preliminary
Prohibition and Mandatory Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining and Mandatory Orders. Among
others, this Petition was filed to stop the second scheduled election of the ALECO Board of
Directors scheduled for February 23, and 24, 2002.37 (Underscoring omitted; additional emphasis
supplied)

Muñoz thereafter served as retained counsel of ALECO under the direction of the NEA management
team. Muñoz could have easily anticipated that his advice would be sought with respect to the
prosecution of the members of the old BOD, considering that the latter was deactivated due to
alleged mismanagement. The conflict of interest between Olaybal's board on one hand, and NEA
and its management team on the other, is apparent. By representing conflicting interests without the
permission of all parties involved, Muñoz violated Rules 15.01 and 15.03 of the CPR.38

In Catu v. Rellosa,39the Court imposed the penalty of suspension for six (6) months upon a punong
barangay who acted as counsel for respondents in an ejectment case without securing the authority
of the Secretary of DILG. In Aniñon v. Sabitsana, Jr.,40the Court imposed the penalty of one (1) year
suspension upon a lawyer who accepted a new engagement that required him to oppose the
interests of a party whom he previously represented. In view of Muñoz's multiple infractions, the
Court finds the recommended penalty of suspension for an aggregate period of three (3) years
proper.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Levi P. Muñoz is found GUILTY of gross misconduct and violation of Rules
1.01, 6.02, 15.01 and 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of three (3) years effective upon receipt of
this Decision, with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of any violation hereunder shall be dealt
with more severely.

SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 6252 October 5, 2004

JONAR SANTIAGO, complainant,

vs.
Atty. EDISON V. RAFANAN, respondent.

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J.:

Notaries public are expected to exert utmost care in the performance of their duties, which are
impressed with public interest. They are enjoined to comply faithfully with the solemnities and
requirements of the Notarial Law. This Court will not hesitate to mete out appropriate sanctions to
those who violate it or neglect observance thereof.

The Case and the Facts

Before us is a verified Complaint1 filed by Jonar Santiago, an employee of the Bureau of Jail
Management and Penology (BJMP), for the disbarment of Atty. Edison V. Rafanan. The Complaint
was filed with the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
on January 16, 2001. It charged Atty. Rafanan with deceit; malpractice or other gross misconduct in
office under Section 27 of Rule 1382 of the Rules of Court; and violation of Canons 1.01, 1.02 and
1.033, Canon 54, and Canons 12.075 and 12.08 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).

In his Report, IBP Investigating Commissioner Leland R. Villadolid Jr. summarized the allegations of
the complainant in this wise:

"x x x. In his Letter-Complaint, Complainant alleged, among others, that Respondent in

notarizing several documents on different dates failed and/or refused to: a)make the proper
notation regarding the cedula or community tax certificate of the affiants; b) enter the details
of the notarized documents in the notarial register; and c) make and execute the certification
and enter his PTR and IBP numbers in the documents he had notarized, all in violation of the
notarial provisions of the Revised Administrative Code.

"Complainant likewise alleged that Respondent executed an Affidavit in favor of his client
and offered the same as evidence in the case wherein he was actively representing his
client. Finally, Complainant alleges that on a certain date, Respondent accompanied by
several persons waited for Complainant after the hearing and after confronting the latter
disarmed him of his sidearm and thereafter uttered insulting words and veiled threats."6

On March 23, 2001, pursuant to the January 19, 2001 Order of the CBD,7 Atty. Rafanan filed his
verified Answer.8 He admitted having administered the oath to the affiants whose Affidavits were
attached to the verified Complaint. He believed, however, that the non-notation of their Residence
Certificates in the Affidavits and the Counter-affidavits was allowed.

He opined that the notation of residence certificates applied only to documents acknowledged by a
notary public and was not mandatory for affidavits related to cases pending before courts and other
government offices. He pointed out that in the latter, the affidavits, which were sworn to before
government prosecutors, did not have to indicate the residence certificates of the affiants. Neither
did other notaries public in Nueva Ecija -- some of whom were older practitioners -- indicate the
affiants’ residence certificates on the documents they notarized, or have entries in their notarial
register for these documents.

As to his alleged failure to comply with the certification required by Section 3 of Rule 1129 of the
Rules of Criminal Procedure, respondent explained that as counsel of the affiants, he had the option
to comply or not with the certification. To nullify the Affidavits, it was complainant who was duty-
bound to bring the said noncompliance to the attention of the prosecutor conducting the preliminary
investigation.

As to his alleged violation of Rule 12.08 of the CPR, respondent argued that lawyers could testify on
behalf of their clients "on substantial matters, in cases where [their] testimony is essential to the
ends of justice." Complainant charged respondent’s clients with attempted murder. Respondent
averred that since they were in his house when the alleged crime occurred, "his testimony is very
essential to the ends of justice."

Respondent alleged that it was complainant who had threatened and harassed his clients after the
hearing of their case by the provincial prosecutor on January 4, 2001. Respondent requested the
assistance of the Cabanatuan City Police the following day, January 5, 2001, which was the next
scheduled hearing, to avoid a repetition of the incident and to allay the fears of his clients. In support
of his allegations, he submitted Certifications10 from the Cabanatuan City Police and the Joint
Affidavit11 of the two police officers who had assisted them.

Lastly, he contended that the case had been initiated for no other purpose than to harass him,
because he was the counsel of Barangay Captain Ernesto Ramos in the cases filed by the latter
before the ombudsman and the BJMP against complainant.

After receipt of respondent’s Answer, the CBD, through Commissioner Tyrone R. Cimafranca, set
the case for hearing on June 5, 2001, at two o’clock in the afternoon. Notices12 of the hearing were
sent to the parties by registered mail. On the scheduled date and time of the hearing, only
complainant appeared. Respondent was unable to do so, apparently because he had received the
Notice only on June 8, 2001.13 The hearing was reset to July 3, 2001 at two o’clock in the afternoon.

On the same day, June 5, 2001, complainant filed his Reply14 to the verified Answer of respondent.
The latter’s Rejoinder was received by the CBD on July 13, 2001.15 It also received complainant’s
Letter-Request16 to dispense with the hearings. Accordingly, it granted that request in its
Order17 dated July 24, 2001, issued through Commissioner Cimafranca. It thereby directed the
parties to submit their respective memoranda within fifteen days from receipt of the Order, after
which the case was to be deemed submitted for resolution.

The CBD received complainant’s Memorandum18 on September 26, 2001. Respondent did not file
any.

The IBP’s Recommendation

On September 27, 2003, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XVI-2003-
17219 approving and adopting the Investigating Commissioner’s Report that respondent had violated
specific requirements of the Notarial Law on the execution of a certification, the entry of such
certification in the notarial register, and the indication of the affiant’s residence certificate. The IBP
Board of Governors found his excuse for the violations unacceptable. It modified, however, the
recommendation20 of the investigating commissioner by increasing the fine to "₱3,000 with a warning
that any repetition of the violation will be dealt with a heavier penalty."
The other charges -- violation of Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court; and Canons 1.01 to
1.03, 12.07 and 12.08 of the CPR -- were dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.

The Court’s Ruling

We agree with the Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors.

Respondent’s Administrative Liability

Violation of the Notarial Law

The Notarial Law is explicit on the obligations and duties of notaries public. They are required to
certify that the party to every document acknowledged before them has presented the proper
residence certificate (or exemption from the residence tax); and to enter its number, place of issue
and date as part of such certification.21 They are also required to maintain and keep a notarial
register; to enter therein all instruments notarized by them; and to "give to each instrument executed,
sworn to, or acknowledged before [them] a number corresponding to the one in [their] register [and
to state therein] the page or pages of [their] register, on which the same is recorded."22 Failure to
perform these duties would result in the revocation of their commission as notaries public.23

These formalities are mandatory and cannot be simply neglected, considering the degree of
importance and evidentiary weight attached to notarized documents. Notaries public entering into
their commissions are presumed to be aware of these elementary requirements.

In Vda. de Rosales v. Ramos,24 the Court explained the value and meaning of notarization as
follows:

"The importance attached to the act of notarization cannot be overemphasized. Notarization

is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act. It is invested with substantive public interest,
such that only those who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries public. Notarization
converts a private document into a public document thus making that document admissible
in evidence without further proof of its authenticity. A notarial document is by law entitled to
full faith and credit upon its face. Courts, administrative agencies and the public at large must
be able to rely upon the acknowledgment executed by a notary public and appended to a
private instrument."

For this reason, notaries public should not take for granted the solemn duties pertaining to their
office. Slipshod methods in their performance of the notarial act are never to be countenanced. They
are expected to exert utmost care in the performance of their duties,25 which are dictated by public
policy and are impressed with public interest.

It is clear from the pleadings before us -- and respondent has readily admitted -- that he violated the
Notarial Law by failing to enter in the documents notations of the residence certificate, as well as the
entry number and the pages of the notarial registry.

Respondent believes, however, that noncompliance with those requirements is not mandatory for
affidavits relative to cases pending before the courts and government agencies. He points to similar
practices of older notaries in Nueva Ecija.

We cannot give credence to, much less honor, his claim. His belief that the requirements do not
apply to affidavits is patently irrelevant. No law dispenses with these formalities. Au contraire, the
Notarial Law makes no qualification or exception. It is appalling and inexcusable that he did away
with the basics of notarial procedure allegedly because others were doing so. Being swayed by the
bad example of others is not an acceptable justification for breaking the law.

We note further that the documents attached to the verified Complaint are the Joint Counter-Affidavit
of respondent’s clients Ernesto Ramos and Rey Geronimo, as well as their witnesses’ Affidavits
relative to Criminal Case No. 69-2000 for attempted murder, filed by complainant’s brother against
the aforementioned clients. These documents became the basis of the present Complaint.

As correctly pointed out by the investigating commissioner, Section 3 of Rule 112 of the Rules of
Criminal Procedure expressly requires respondent as notary -- in the absence of any fiscal, state
prosecutor or government official authorized to administer the oath -- to "certify that he has
personally examined the affiants and that he is satisfied that they voluntarily executed and
understood their affidavits." Respondent failed to do so with respect to the subject Affidavits and
Counter-Affidavits in the belief that -- as counsel for the affiants -- he was not required to comply with
the certification requirement.

It must be emphasized that the primary duty of lawyers is to obey the laws of the land and promote
respect for the law and legal processes.26 They are expected to be in the forefront in the observance
and maintenance of the rule of law. This duty carries with it the obligation to be well-informed of the
existing laws and to keep abreast with legal developments, recent enactments and jurisprudence.27 It
is imperative that they be conversant with basic legal principles. Unless they faithfully comply with
such duty, they may not be able to discharge competently and diligently their obligations as
members of the bar. Worse, they may become susceptible to committing mistakes.

Where notaries public are lawyers, a graver responsibility is placed upon them by reason of their
solemn oath to obey the laws.28 No custom or age-old practice provides sufficient excuse or
justification for their failure to adhere to the provisions of the law. In this case, the excuse given by
respondent exhibited his clear ignorance of the Notarial Law, the Rules of Criminal Procedure, and
the importance of his office as a notary public.

Nonetheless, we do not agree with complainant’s plea to disbar respondent from the practice of law.
The power to disbar must be exercised with great caution.29 Disbarment will be imposed as a penalty
only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and the character of the lawyer
as an officer of the court and a member of the bar. Where any lesser penalty can accomplish the
end desired, disbarment should not be decreed.30 Considering the nature of the infraction and the
absence of deceit on the part of respondent, we believe that the penalty recommended by the IBP
Board of Governors is a sufficient disciplinary measure in this case.

Lawyer as Witness for Client

Complainant further faults respondent for executing before Prosecutor Leonardo Padolina an
affidavit corroborating the defense of alibi proffered by respondent’s clients, allegedly in violation of
Rule 12.08 of the CPR: "A lawyer shall avoid testifying in behalf of his client."

Rule 12.08 of Canon 12 of the CPR states:

"Rule 12.08 – A lawyer shall avoid testifying in behalf of his client, except:

a) on formal matters, such as the mailing, authentication or custody of an instrument

and the like;
 b) on substantial matters, in cases where his testimony is essential to the ends of
justice, in which event he must, during his testimony, entrust the trial of the case to
another counsel."

Parenthetically, under the law, a lawyer is not disqualified from being a witness,31 except only in
certain cases pertaining to privileged communication arising from an attorney-client relationship.32

The reason behind such rule is the difficulty posed upon lawyers by the task of dissociating their
relation to their clients as witnesses from that as advocates. Witnesses are expected to tell the facts
as they recall them. In contradistinction, advocates are partisans -- those who actively plead and
defend the cause of others. It is difficult to distinguish the fairness and impartiality of a disinterested
witness from the zeal of an advocate. The question is one of propriety rather than of competency of
the lawyers who testify for their clients.

"Acting or appearing to act in the double capacity of lawyer and witness for the client will provoke
unkind criticism and leave many people to suspect the truthfulness of the lawyer because they
cannot believe the lawyer as disinterested. The people will have a plausible reason for thinking, and
if their sympathies are against the lawyer’s client, they will have an opportunity, not likely to be
neglected, for charging, that as a witness he fortified it with his own testimony. The testimony of the
lawyer becomes doubted and is looked upon as partial and untruthful."33

Thus, although the law does not forbid lawyers from being witnesses and at the same time counsels
for a cause, the preference is for them to refrain from testifying as witnesses, unless they absolutely
have to; and should they do so, to withdraw from active management of the case.34

Notwithstanding this guideline and the existence of the Affidavit executed by Atty. Rafanan in favor
of his clients, we cannot hastily make him administratively liable for the following reasons:

First, we consider it the duty of a lawyer to assert every remedy and defense that is
authorized by law for the benefit of the client, especially in a criminal action in which the
latter’s life and liberty are at stake.35 It is the fundamental right of the accused to be afforded
full opportunity to rebut the charges against them. They are entitled to suggest all those
reasonable doubts that may arise from the evidence as to their guilt; and to ensure that if
they are convicted, such conviction is according to law.

Having undertaken the defense of the accused, respondent, as defense counsel, was thus
expected to spare no effort to save his clients from a wrong conviction. He had the duty to
present -- by all fair and honorable means -- every defense and mitigating circumstance that
the law permitted, to the end that his clients would not be deprived of life, liberty or property,
except by due process of law.36

The Affidavit executed by Atty. Rafanan was clearly necessary for the defense of his clients, since it
pointed out the fact that on the alleged date and time of the incident, his clients were at his residence
and could not have possibly committed the crime charged against them. Notably, in his Affidavit,
complainant does not dispute the statements of respondent or suggest the falsity of its contents.

Second, paragraph (b) of Rule 12.08 contemplates a situation in which lawyers give their testimonies
during the trial. In this instance, the Affidavit was submitted during the preliminary investigation
which, as such, was merely inquisitorial.37 Not being a trial of the case on the merits, a preliminary
investigation has the oft-repeated purposes of securing innocent persons against hasty, malicious
and oppressive prosecutions; protecting them from open and public accusations of crime and from
the trouble as well as expense and anxiety of a public trial; and protecting the State from useless
and expensive prosecutions.38 The investigation is advisedly called preliminary, as it is yet to be
followed by the trial proper.

Nonetheless, we deem it important to stress and remind respondent to refrain from accepting
employment in any matter in which he knows or has reason to believe that he may be an essential
witness for the prospective client. Furthermore, in future cases in which his testimony may become
essential to serve the "ends of justice," the canons of the profession require him to withdraw from the
active prosecution of these cases.

No Proof of Harassment

The charge that respondent harassed complainant and uttered insulting words and veiled threats is
not supported by evidence. Allegation is never equivalent to proof, and a bare charge cannot be
equated with liability.39 It is not the self-serving claim of complainant but the version of respondent
that is more credible, considering that the latter’s allegations are corroborated by the Affidavits of the
police officers and the Certifications of the Cabanatuan City Police.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Edison V. Rafanan is found guilty of violating the Notarial Law and Canon 5 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility and is hereby FINED ₱3,000 with a warning that similar
infractions in the future will be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 5299 August 19, 2003

ATTY. ISMAEL G. KHAN, JR., Assistant Court Administrator and Chief, Public Information
Office, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO, Respondent.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 157053 August 19, 2003

ATTY. RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO, Petitioner,

vs.
IBP COMMISSION ON BAR DISCIPLINE and ATTY. ISMAEL G. KHAN, JR., in his capacity as
Assistant Court Administrator and Chief, Public Information Office, Respondents.

RESOLUTION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This administrative complaint arose from a paid advertisement that appeared in the July 5, 2000
issue of the newspaper, Philippine Daily Inquirer, which reads: "ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE
Specialist 532-4333/521-2667."1

Ms. Ma. Theresa B. Espeleta, a staff member of the Public Information Office of the Supreme Court,
called up the published telephone number and pretended to be an interested party. She spoke to
Mrs. Simbillo, who claimed that her husband, Atty. Rizalino Simbillo, was an expert in handling
annulment cases and can guarantee a court decree within four to six months, provided the case will
not involve separation of property or custody of children. Mrs. Simbillo also said that her husband
charges a fee of P48,000.00, half of which is payable at the time of filing of the case and the other
half after a decision thereon has been rendered.

Further research by the Office of the Court Administrator and the Public Information Office revealed
that similar advertisements were published in the August 2 and 6, 2000 issues of the Manila Bulletin
and August 5, 2000 issue of The Philippine Star.2

On September 1, 2000, Atty. Ismael G. Khan, Jr., in his capacity as Assistant Court Administrator
and Chief of the Public Information Office, filed an administrative complaint against Atty. Rizalino T.
Simbillo for improper advertising and solicitation of his legal services, in violation of Rule 2.03 and
Rule 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court.3

In his answer, respondent admitted the acts imputed to him, but argued that advertising and
solicitation per se are not prohibited acts; that the time has come to change our views about the
prohibition on advertising and solicitation; that the interest of the public is not served by the absolute
prohibition on lawyer advertising; that the Court can lift the ban on lawyer advertising; and that the
rationale behind the decades-old prohibition should be abandoned. Thus, he prayed that he be
exonerated from all the charges against him and that the Court promulgate a ruling that
advertisement of legal services offered by a lawyer is not contrary to law, public policy and public
order as long as it is dignified.4

The case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation, report and
recommendation.5 On June 29, 2002, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline passed Resolution No.
XV-2002-306,6 finding respondent guilty of violation of Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court, and suspended him from
the practice of law for one (1) year with the warning that a repetition of similar acts would be dealt
with more severely. The IBP Resolution was noted by this Court on November 11, 2002.7

In the meantime, respondent filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration,8 which was denied by the
IBP in Resolution No. XV-2002-606 dated October 19, 20029

Hence, the instant petition for certiorari, which was docketed as G.R. No. 157053 entitled, "Atty.
Rizalino T. Simbillo, Petitioner versus IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, Atty. Ismael G. Khan, Jr.,
Asst. Court Administrator and Chief, Public Information Office, Respondents." This petition was
consolidated with A.C. No. 5299 per the Court’s Resolution dated March 4, 2003.

In a Resolution dated March 26, 2003, the parties were required to manifest whether or not they
were willing to submit the case for resolution on the basis of the pleadings.10 Complainant filed his
Manifestation on April 25, 2003, stating that he is not submitting any additional pleading or evidence
and is submitting the case for its early resolution on the basis of pleadings and records
thereof. 11 Respondent, on the other hand, filed a Supplemental Memorandum on June 20, 2003.

We agree with the IBP’s Resolutions Nos. XV-2002-306 and XV-2002-606.

Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility read:

Rule 2.03. – A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designed primarily to solicit legal
business.
Rule 3.01. – A lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive,
undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal services.

Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court states:

SEC. 27. Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor. – A member
of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any
deceit, malpractice or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct or by reason of
his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is
required to take before the admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience appearing as attorney
for a party without authority to do so.

It has been repeatedly stressed that the practice of law is not a business.12 It is a profession in which
duty to public service, not money, is the primary consideration. Lawyering is not primarily meant to
be a money-making venture, and law advocacy is not a capital that necessarily yields profits.13 The
gaining of a livelihood should be a secondary consideration.14 The duty to public service and to the
administration of justice should be the primary consideration of lawyers, who must subordinate their
personal interests or what they owe to themselves.15 The following elements distinguish the legal
profession from a business:

1. A duty of public service, of which the emolument is a by-product, and in which one may
attain the highest eminence without making much money;

2. A relation as an "officer of the court" to the administration of justice involving thorough

sincerity, integrity and reliability;

3. A relation to clients in the highest degree of fiduciary;

4. A relation to colleagues at the bar characterized by candor, fairness, and unwillingness to

resort to current business methods of advertising and encroachment on their practice, or
dealing directly with their clients.16

There is no question that respondent committed the acts complained of. He himself admits that he
caused the publication of the advertisements. While he professes repentance and begs for the
Court’s indulgence, his contrition rings hollow considering the fact that he advertised his legal
services again after he pleaded for compassion and after claiming that he had no intention to violate
the rules. Eight months after filing his answer, he again advertised his legal services in the August
14, 2001 issue of the Buy & Sell Free Ads Newspaper.17 Ten months later, he caused the same
advertisement to be published in the October 5, 2001 issue of Buy & Sell.18 Such acts of respondent
are a deliberate and contemptuous affront on the Court’s authority.

What adds to the gravity of respondent’s acts is that in advertising himself as a self-styled
"Annulment of Marriage Specialist," he wittingly or unwittingly erodes and undermines not only the
stability but also the sanctity of an institution still considered sacrosanct despite the contemporary
climate of permissiveness in our society. Indeed, in assuring prospective clients that an annulment
may be obtained in four to six months from the time of the filing of the case,19 he in fact encourages
people, who might have otherwise been disinclined and would have refrained from dissolving their
marriage bonds, to do so.

Nonetheless, the solicitation of legal business is not altogether proscribed. However, for solicitation
to be proper, it must be compatible with the dignity of the legal profession. If it is made in a modest
and decorous manner, it would bring no injury to the lawyer and to the bar.20 Thus, the use of simple
signs stating the name or names of the lawyers, the office and residence address and fields of
practice, as well as advertisement in legal periodicals bearing the same brief data, are permissible.
Even the use of calling cards is now acceptable.21 Publication in reputable law lists, in a manner
consistent with the standards of conduct imposed by the canon, of brief biographical and informative
data is likewise allowable. As explicitly stated in Ulep v. Legal Clinic, Inc.:22

Such data must not be misleading and may include only a statement of the lawyer’s name and the
names of his professional associates; addresses, telephone numbers, cable addresses; branches of
law practiced; date and place of birth and admission to the bar; schools attended with dates of
graduation, degrees and other educational distinctions; public or quasi-public offices; posts of honor;
legal authorships; legal teaching positions; membership and offices in bar associations and
committees thereof, in legal and scientific societies and legal fraternities; the fact of listings in other
reputable law lists; the names and addresses of references; and, with their written consent, the
names of clients regularly represented.

The law list must be a reputable law list published primarily for that purpose; it cannot be a mere
supplemental feature of a paper, magazine, trade journal or periodical which is published principally
for other purposes. For that reason, a lawyer may not properly publish his brief biographical and
informative data in a daily paper, magazine, trade journal or society program. Nor may a lawyer
permit his name to be published in a law list the conduct, management, or contents of which are
calculated or likely to deceive or injure the public or the bar, or to lower dignity or standing of the
profession.

The use of an ordinary simple professional card is also permitted. The card may contain only a
statement of his name, the name of the law firm which he is connected with, address, telephone
number and special branch of law practiced. The publication of a simple announcement of the
opening of a law firm or of changes in the partnership, associates, firm name or office address, being
for the convenience of the profession, is not objectionable. He may likewise have his name listed in
a telephone directory but not under a designation of special branch of law. (emphasis and italics
supplied)

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO is found GUILTY of

violation of Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27
of the Rules of Court. He is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for ONE (1) YEAR effective upon
receipt of this Resolution. He is likewise STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar
offense will be dealt with more severely.

Let copies of this Resolution be entered in his record as attorney and be furnished the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines and all courts in the country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 9387 June 20, 2012

(Formerly CBD Case No. 05-1562)

EMILIA R. HERNANDEZ, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. VENANCIO B. PADILLA, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

SERENO, J.:
This is a disbarment case filed by Emilia Hernandez (complainant) against her lawyer, Atty.
Venancio B. Padilla (respondent) of Padilla Padilla Bautista Law Offices, for his alleged negligence
in the handling of her case.

The records disclose that complainant and her husband were the respondents in an ejectment case
filed against them with the Regional Trial Court of Manila (RTC).

In a Decision1 dated 28 June 2002, penned by Judge Rosmari D. Carandang (Judge Carandang), the
RTC ordered that the Deed of Sale executed in favor of complainant be cancelled; and that the latter
pay the complainant therein, Elisa Duigan (Duigan), attorney’s fees and moral damages.

Complainant and her husband filed their Notice of Appeal with the RTC. Thereafter, the Court of
Appeals (CA) ordered them to file their Appellants’ Brief. They chose respondent to represent them
in the case. On their behalf, he filed a Memorandum on Appeal instead of an Appellants’ Brief. Thus,
Duigan filed a Motion to Dismiss the Appeal. The CA granted the Motion in a Resolution2 dated 16
December 2003.

No Motion for Reconsideration (MR) of the Resolution dismissing the appeal was filed by the couple.
Complainant claims that because respondent ignored the Resolution, he acted with "deceit,
unfaithfulness amounting to malpractice of law."3 Complainant and her husband failed to file an
appeal, because respondent never informed them of the adverse decision. Complainant further
claims that she asked respondent "several times" about the status of the appeal, but "despite
inquiries he deliberately withheld response [sic]," to the damage and prejudice of the spouses.4

The Resolution became final and executory on 8 January 2004. Complainant was informed of the
Resolution sometime in July 2005, when the Sheriff of the RTC came to her house and informed her
of the Resolution.

On 9 September 2005, complainant filed an Affidavit of Complaint5 with the Committee on Bar
Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), seeking the disbarment of respondent on the
following grounds: deceit, malpractice, and grave misconduct. Complainant prays for moral damages
in the amount of ₱ 350,000.

Through an Order6 dated 12 September 2005, Director of Bar Discipline Rogelio A. Vinluan ordered
respondent to submit an answer to the Complaint. In his Counter-Affidavit/Answer,7 respondent
prayed for the outright dismissal of the Complaint.

Respondent explained that he was not the lawyer of complainant. He averred that prior to the
mandatory conference set by the IBP on 13 December 2005, he had never met complainant,
because it was her husband who had personally transacted with him. According to respondent, the
husband "despondently pleaded to me to prepare a Memorandum on Appeal because according to
him the period given by the CA was to lapse within two or three days."8 Thus, respondent claims that
he filed a Memorandum on Appeal because he honestly believed that "it is this pleading which was
required."9

Before filing the Memorandum, respondent advised complainant’s husband to settle the case. The
latter allegedly "gestured approval of the advice."10

After the husband of complainant picked up the Memorandum for filing, respondent never saw or
heard from him again and thus assumed that the husband heeded his advice and settled the case.
When respondent received an Order from the CA requiring him to file a comment on the Motion to
Dismiss filed by Duigan, he "instructed his office staff to contact Mr. Hernandez thru available means
of communication, but to no avail."11 Thus, when complainant’s husband went to the office of
respondent to tell the latter that the Sheriff of the RTC had informed complainant of the CA’s
Resolution dismissing the case, respondent was just as surprised. The lawyer exclaimed, "KALA KO
BA NAKIPAG AREGLO NA KAYO."12

In his 5 January 2009 Report,13 IBP Investigating Commissioner Leland R. Villadolid, Jr. found that
respondent violated Canons 5, 17, and 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (the Code). He
recommended that respondent be suspended from practicing law from 3 to 6 months.

The board of governors of the IBP issued Resolution No. XIX-2010-452 on 28 August 2010. Therein,
they resolved to adopt and approve the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner. Respondent was suspended from the practice of law for six months.

Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration.14 He prayed for the relaxation of the application of the
Canons of the Code. On 14 January 2012, the IBP board of governors passed Resolution No. XX-
2012-1715 partly granting his Motion and reducing the penalty imposed to one-month suspension from
the practice of law.

Pursuant to Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, acting Director for Bar Discipline Dennis A.B. Funa,
through a letter16 addressed to then Chief Justice Renato C. Corona, transmitted the documents
pertaining to the disbarment Complaint against respondent.

We adopt the factual findings of the board of governors of the IBP. This Court, however, disagrees
with its Decision to reduce the penalty to one-month suspension. We thus affirm the six-month
suspension the Board originally imposed in its 28 August 2010 Resolution.

Respondent insists that he had never met complainant prior to the mandatory conference set for the
disbarment Complaint she filed against him. However, a perusal of the Memorandum of Appeal filed
in the appellate court revealed that he had signed as counsel for the defendant-appellants therein,
including complainant and her husband.17 The pleading starts with the following sentence:
"DEFENDANT[S]-APPELLANTS, by counsel, unto this Honorable Court submit the Memorandum
and further allege that: x x x."18 Nowhere does the document say that it was filed only on behalf of
complainant’s husband.

It is further claimed by respondent that the relation created between him and complainant’s husband
cannot be treated as a "client-lawyer" relationship, viz:

It is no more than a client needing a legal document and had it prepared by a lawyer for a fee. Under
the factual milieu and circumstances, it could not be said that a client entrusted to a lawyer handling
and prosecution of his case that calls for the strict application of the Code; x x x19

As proof that none of them ever intended to enter into a lawyer-client relationship, he also alleges
that complainant’s husband never contacted him after the filing of the Memorandum of Appeal.
According to respondent, this behavior was "very unusual if he really believed that he engaged" the
former’s services.20

Complainant pointed out in her Reply21 that respondent was her lawyer, because he accepted her
case and an acceptance fee in the amount of ₱ 7,000.
According to respondent, however, "[C]ontrary to the complainant’s claim that he charged ₱ 7,000 as
acceptance fee," "the fee was only for the preparation of the pleading which is even low for a
Memorandum of Appeal: x x x."22

Acceptance of money from a client establishes an attorney-client relationship and gives rise to the
duty of fidelity to the client’s cause.23 Once a lawyer agrees to handle a case, it is that lawyer’s duty to
serve the client with competence and diligence.24 Respondent has failed to fulfill this duty.

According to respondent, he merely drafted the pleading that complainant’s husband asked from
him. Respondent also claims that he filed a Memorandum of Appeal, because he "honestly believed"
that this was the pleading required, based on what complainant’s husband said.

The IBP Investigating Commissioner’s observation on this matter, in the 5 January 2009 Report, is
correct. Regardless of the particular pleading his client may have believed to be necessary, it was
respondent’s duty to know the proper pleading to be filed in appeals from RTC decisions, viz:

Having seen the Decision dated 18 June 2002 of the trial court, respondent should have known that
the mode of appeal to the Court of Appeals for said Decision is by ordinary appeal under Section
2(a) Rule 41 of the1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. In all such cases, Rule 44 of the said
Rules applies.25

When the RTC ruled against complainant and her husband, they filed a Notice of Appeal.
Consequently, what should apply is the rule on ordinary appealed cases or Rule 44 of the Rules on
Civil Procedure. Rule 44 requires that the appellant’s brief be filed after the records of the case have
been elevated to the CA. Respondent, as a litigator, was expected to know this procedure. Canon 5
of the Code reads:

CANON 5 — A lawyer shall keep abreast of legal developments, participate in continuing legal
education programs, support efforts to achieve high standards in law schools as well as in the
practical training of law students and assist in disseminating information regarding the law and
jurisprudence.

The obligations of lawyers as a consequence of their Canon 5 duty have been expounded in Dulalia,
Jr. v. Cruz,26 to wit:

It must be emphasized that the primary duty of lawyers is to obey the laws of the land and promote
respect for the law and legal processes. They are expected to be in the forefront in the observance
and maintenance of the rule of law. This duty carries with it the obligation to be well-informed of the
existing laws and to keep abreast with legal developments, recent enactments and jurisprudence. It
is imperative that they be conversant with basic legal principles. Unless they faithfully comply with
such duty, they may not be able to discharge competently and diligently their obligations as
members of the bar. Worse, they may become susceptible to committing mistakes.

In his MR, respondent begged for the consideration of the IBP, claiming that the reason for his
failure to file the proper pleading was that he "did not have enough time to acquaint himself
thoroughly with the factual milieu of the case." The IBP reconsidered and thereafter significantly
reduced the penalty originally imposed.

Respondent’s plea for leniency should not have been granted.

The supposed lack of time given to respondent to acquaint himself with the facts of the case does
not excuse his negligence.

Rule 18.02 of the Code provides that a lawyer shall not handle any legal matter without adequate
preparation. While it is true that respondent was not complainant’s lawyer from the trial to the
appellate court stage, this fact did not excuse him from his duty to diligently study a case he had
agreed to handle. If he felt he did not have enough time to study the pertinent matters involved, as
he was approached by complainant’s husband only two days before the expiration of the period for
filing the Appellant’s Brief, respondent should have filed a motion for extension of time to file the
proper pleading instead of whatever pleading he could come up with, just to "beat the deadline set
by the Court of Appeals."27

Moreover, respondent does not deny that he was given notice of the fact that he filed the wrong
pleading. However, instead of explaining his side by filing a comment, as ordered by the appellate
court, he chose to ignore the CA’s Order. He claims that he was under the presumption that
complainant and her husband had already settled the case, because he had not heard from the
husband since the filing of the latter’s Memorandum of Appeal.

This explanation does not excuse respondent’s actions.

First of all, there were several remedies that respondent could have availed himself of, from the
moment he received the Notice from the CA to the moment he received the disbarment Complaint
filed against him. But because of his negligence, he chose to sit on the case and do nothing.

Second, respondent, as counsel, had the duty to inform his clients of the status of their case. His
failure to do so amounted to a violation of Rule 18.04 of the Code, which reads:

18.04 - A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a
reasonable time to the client’s request for information.

If it were true that all attempts to contact his client proved futile, the least respondent could have
done was to inform the CA by filing a Notice of Withdrawal of Appearance as counsel. He could have
thus explained why he was no longer the counsel of complainant and her husband in the case and
informed the court that he could no longer contact them.28 His failure to take this measure proves his
negligence.

Lastly, the failure of respondent to file the proper pleading and a comment on Duigan’s Motion to
Dismiss is negligence on his part. Under 18.03 of the Code, a lawyer is liable for negligence in
1âwphi1

handling the client’s case, viz:

Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable.

Lawyers should not neglect legal matters entrusted to them, otherwise their negligence in fulfilling
their duty would render them liable for disciplinary action.29

Respondent has failed to live up to his duties as a lawyer. When a lawyer violates his duties to his
client, he engages in unethical and unprofessional conduct for which he should be held
accountable.30
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Venancio Padilla is found guilty of violating Rules 18.02, 18.03,
18.04, as well as Canon 5 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Hence, he is SUSPENDED
from the practice of law for SIX (6) MONTHS and STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same
or a similar offense will be dealt with more severely.

Let copies of this Resolution be entered into the personal records of respondent as a member of the
bar and furnished to the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Court
Administrator for circulation to all courts of the country for their information and guidance.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

A.M. No. 10-5-7-SC December 7, 2010

JOVITO S. OLAZO, Complainant,

vs.
JUSTICE DANTE O. TINGA (Ret.), Respondent.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

Before us is the disbarment case against retired Supreme Court Associate Justice Dante O. Tinga
(respondent) filed by Mr. Jovito S. Olazo (complainant). The respondent is charged of violating Rule
6.02,1 Rule 6.032 and Rule 1.013 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for representing
conflicting interests.

Factual Background

In March 1990, the complainant filed a sales application covering a parcel of land situated in
Barangay Lower Bicutan in the Municipality of Taguig. The land (subject land) was previously part of
Fort Andres Bonifacio that was segregated and declared open for disposition pursuant to
Proclamation No. 2476,4 issued on January 7, 1986, and Proclamation No. 172,5 issued on October
16, 1987.

To implement Proclamation No. 172, Memorandum No. 119 was issued by then Executive Secretary
Catalino Macaraig, creating a Committee on Awards whose duty was to study, evaluate, and make a
recommendation on the applications to purchase the lands declared open for disposition. The
Committee on Awards was headed by the Director of Lands and the respondent was one of the
Committee members, in his official capacity as the Congressman of Taguig and Pateros (from 1987
to 1998); the respondent’s district includes the areas covered by the proclamations.

The First Charge: Violation of Rule 6.02

In the complaint,6 the complainant claimed that the respondent abused his position as Congressman
and as a member of the Committee on Awards when he unduly interfered with the complainant’s
sales application because of his personal interest over the subject land. The complainant alleged
that the respondent exerted undue pressure and influence over the complainant’s father, Miguel P.
Olazo, for the latter to contest the complainant’s sales application and claim the subject land for
himself. The complainant also alleged that the respondent prevailed upon Miguel Olazo to accept,
on various dates, sums of money as payment of the latter’s alleged rights over the subject land. The
complainant further claimed that the respondent brokered the transfer of rights of the subject land
between Miguel Olazo and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez, who is the nephew of the respondent’s
deceased wife.

As a result of the respondent’s abuse of his official functions, the complainant’s sales application
was denied. The conveyance of rights to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez and his sales application were
subsequently given due course by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).

The Second Charge: Violation of Rule 6.03

The second charge involves another parcel of land within the proclaimed areas belonging to Manuel
Olazo, the complainant’s brother. The complainant alleged that the respondent persuaded Miguel
Olazo to direct Manuel to convey his rights over the land to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez. As a result of
the respondent’s promptings, the rights to the land were transferred to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez.

In addition, the complainant alleged that in May 1999, the respondent met with Manuel for the
purpose of nullifying the conveyance of rights over the land to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez. The
complainant claimed that the respondent wanted the rights over the land transferred to one Rolando
Olazo, the Barangay Chairman of Hagonoy, Taguig. The respondent in this regard executed an
"Assurance" where he stated that he was the lawyer of Ramon Lee and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez.

The Third Charge: Violation of Rule 1.01

The complainant alleged that the respondent engaged in unlawful conduct considering his
knowledge that Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez was not a qualified beneficiary under Memorandum No.
119. The complainant averred that Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez is not a bona fide resident of the
proclaimed areas and does not qualify for an award. Thus, the approval of his sales application by
the Committee on Awards amounted to a violation of the objectives of Proclamation No. 172 and
Memorandum No. 119.

The complainant also alleged that the respondent violated Section 7(b)(2) of the Code of Conduct
and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees or Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6713 since he
engaged in the practice of law, within the one-year prohibition period, when he appeared as a lawyer
for Ramon Lee and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez before the Committee on Awards.

In his Comment,7 the respondent claimed that the present complaint is the third malicious charge
filed against him by the complainant. The first one was submitted before the Judicial and Bar Council
when he was nominated as an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court; the second complaint is now
pending with the Office of the Ombudsman, for alleged violation of Section 3(e) and (i) of R.A. No.
3019, as amended.

With his own supporting documents, the respondent presented a different version of the antecedent
events.

The respondent asserted that Miguel Olazo owned the rights over the subject land and he later
conveyed these rights to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez. Miguel Olazo’s rights over the subject land and
the transfer of his rights to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez were duly recognized by the Secretary of the
DENR before whom the conflict of rights over the subject land (between Miguel Olazo and Joseph
Jeffrey Rodriguez, on one hand, and the complainant on the other hand) was brought. In its
decision, the DENR found Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez a qualified applicant, and his application over
the subject land was given due course. The respondent emphasized that the DENR decision is now
final and executory. It was affirmed by the Office of the President, by the Court of Appeals and by
the Supreme Court.

The respondent also advanced the following defenses:

(1) He denied the complainant’s allegation that Miguel Olazo told him (complainant) that the
respondent had been orchestrating to get the subject land. The respondent argued that this
allegation was without corroboration and was debunked by the affidavits of Miguel Olazo and
Francisca Olazo, the complainant’s sister.

(2) He denied the complainant’s allegation that he offered the complainant ₱50,000.00 for
the subject land and that he (the respondent) had exerted undue pressure and influence on
Miguel Olazo to claim the rights over the subject land. The respondent also denied that he
had an inordinate interest in the subject land.

(3) He claimed that there was nothing wrong in signing as a witness in Miguel Olazo’s
affidavit where the latter asserted his rights over the subject land. The affidavit merely
attested to the truth.

(4) He asserted that he and Miguel Olazo were cousins and that the latter decided to sell his
rights over the subject land for the medical treatment of his heart condition and the illness of
his daughter, Francisca Olazo. The respondent insisted that the money he extended to them
was a form of loan.

(5) The respondent’s participation in the transaction between Miguel Olazo and Joseph
Jeffrey Rodriguez involved the payment of the loan that the respondent extended to Miguel
Olazo.

(6) Manuel’s belated and secondhand allegation in his Sinumpaang Salaysay, dated January
20, 2000, regarding what his father told him, cannot prevail over his earlier Sinumpaang
Salaysay with Francisca Olazo, dated August 2, 1997. In the said Sinumpaang Salaysay,
Manuel categorically asserted that his father Miguel Olazo, not the complainant, was the
farmer-beneficiary. Manuel also expressed his agreement to the transfer of rights
(Pagpapatibay Sa Paglilipat Ng Karapatan) in favor of Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez, and the
withdrawal of his father’s application to give way to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez’s application.

(7) The complainant’s allegation that the respondent had pressured and influenced Miguel
Olazo to sell the subject land was not sufficient as it was lacking in specificity and
corroboration. The DENR decision was clear that the complainant had no rights over the
subject land.

The respondent additionally denied violating Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
He alleged that during his third term as Congressman from 1995 to 1997, the conflicting applications
of the complainant, Miguel Olazo and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez were not included in the agenda for
deliberation of the Committee on Awards. Rather, their conflicting claims and their respective
supporting documents were before the Office of the Regional Director, NCR of the DENR. This office
ruled over the conflicting claims only on August 2, 2000. This ruling became the basis of the decision
of the Secretary of the DENR.

Similarly, the respondent cannot be held liable under Rule 6.02 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility since the provision applies to lawyers in the government service who are allowed by
law to engage in private law practice and to those who, though prohibited from engaging in the
practice of law, have friends, former associates and relatives who are in the active practice of
law.8 In this regard, the respondent had already completed his third term in Congress and his stint in
the Committee on Awards when he represented Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez on May 24, 1999.

Lastly, the respondent claimed that he cannot be held liable under Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility since he did not intervene in the disposition of the conflicting applications
of the complainant and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez because the applications were not submitted to the
Committee on Awards when he was still a member.

The Court’s Ruling

Generally, a lawyer who holds a government office may not be disciplined as a member of the Bar
for misconduct in the discharge of his duties as a government official.9 He may be disciplined by this
Court as a member of the Bar only when his misconduct also constitutes a violation of his oath as a
lawyer.10

The issue in this case calls for a determination of whether the respondent’s actions constitute a
breach of the standard ethical conduct – first, while the respondent was still an elective public official
and a member of the Committee on Awards; and second, when he was no longer a public official,
but a private lawyer who represented a client before the office he was previously connected with.

After a careful evaluation of the pleadings filed by both parties and their respective pieces of
evidence, we resolve to dismiss the administrative complaint.

Accountability of a government lawyer in public office

Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility highlights the continuing standard of ethical
conduct to be observed by government lawyers in the discharge of their official tasks. In addition to
the standard of conduct laid down under R.A. No. 6713 for government employees, a lawyer in the
government service is obliged to observe the standard of conduct under the Code of Professional
Responsibility.

Since public office is a public trust, the ethical conduct demanded upon lawyers in the government
service is more exacting than the standards for those in private practice. Lawyers in the government
service are subject to constant public scrutiny under norms of public accountability. They also bear
the heavy burden of having to put aside their private interest in favor of the interest of the public;
their private activities should not interfere with the discharge of their official functions.11

The first charge involves a violation of Rule 6.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. It
imposes the following restrictions in the conduct of a government lawyer:

A lawyer in the government service shall not use his public position to promote or advance his
private interests, nor allow the latter to interfere with his public duties.

The above provision prohibits a lawyer from using his or her public position to: (1) promote private
interests; (2) advance private interests; or (3) allow private interest to interfere with his or her public
duties. We previously held that the restriction extends to all government lawyers who use their public
offices to promote their private interests.12

In Huyssen v. Gutierrez,13 we defined promotion of private interest to include soliciting gifts or

anything of monetary value in any transaction requiring the approval of his or her office, or may be
affected by the functions of his or her office. In Ali v. Bubong,14 we recognized that private interest is
not limited to direct interest, but extends to advancing the interest of relatives. We also ruled that
private interest interferes with public duty when the respondent uses the office and his or her
knowledge of the intricacies of the law to benefit relatives.15

In Vitriolo v. Dasig,16 we found the act of the respondent (an official of the Commission on Higher
Education) of extorting money from persons with applications or requests pending before her office
to be a serious breach of Rule 6.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.17 We reached the
same conclusion in Huyssen, where we found the respondent (an employee of the Bureau of
Immigration and Deportation) liable under Rule 6.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
based on the evidence showing that he demanded money from the complainant who had a pending
application for visas before his office.18

Similarly, in Igoy v. Soriano19 we found the respondent (a Court Attorney of this Court) liable for
violating Rule 6.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, after considering the evidence
showing that he demanded and received money from the complainant who had a pending case
before this Court.

Applying these legal precepts to the facts of the case, we find the absence of any concrete proof that
the respondent abused his position as a Congressman and as a member of the Committee on
Awards in the manner defined under Rule 6.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

First, the records do not clearly show if the complainant’s sales application was ever brought before
the Committee on Awards. By the complaint’s own account, the complainant filed a sales application
in March 1990 before the Land Management Bureau. By 1996, the complainant’s sales application
was pending before the Office of the Regional Director, NCR of the DENR due to the conflicting
claims of Miguel Olazo, and, subsequently, of Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez. The records show that it
was only on August 2, 2000 that the Office of the Regional Director, NCR of the DENR rendered its
decision, or after the term of the respondent’s elective public office and membership to the
Committee on Awards, which expired in 1997.

These circumstances do not show that the respondent did in any way promote, advance or use his
private interests in the discharge of his official duties. To repeat, since the sales application was not
brought before the Committee on Awards when the respondent was still a member, no sufficient
basis exists to conclude that he used his position to obtain personal benefits. We note in this regard
that the denial of the complainant’s sales application over the subject land was made by the DENR,
not by the Committee on Awards.

Second, the complainant’s allegation that the respondent "orchestrated" the efforts to get the subject
land does not specify how the orchestration was undertaken. What appears clear in the records is
the uncorroborated Sinumpaang Salaysay of Miguel Olazo, dated May 25, 2003,20 categorically
stating that the respondent had no interest in the subject land, and neither was he a contracting
party in the transfer of his rights over the subject land. In the absence of any specific charge, Olazo’s
disclaimer is the nearest relevant statement on the respondent’s alleged participation, and we find it
to be in the respondent’s favor.

Third, the other documents executed by Miguel Olazo, that the complainant presented to support his
claim that the respondent exerted undue pressure and influence over his father (namely: the letter,
dated June 22, 1996, to the DENR Regional Director-NCR;21 the Sinumpaang Salaysay dated July
12, 1996;22 and the Sinumpaang Salaysay dated July 17, 199623), do not contain any reference to
the alleged pressure or force exerted by the respondent over Miguel Olazo. The documents merely
showed that the respondent helped Miguel Olazo in having his farm lots (covered by the proclaimed
areas) surveyed. They also showed that the respondent merely acted as a witness in the
Sinumpaang Salaysay dated July 17, 1996. To our mind, there are neutral acts that may be
rendered by one relative to another, and do not show how the respondent could have influenced the
decision of Miguel Olazo to contest the complainant’s sales application. At the same time, we cannot
give any credit to the Sinumpaang Salaysay, dated January 20, 2000, of Manuel. They are not only
hearsay but are contrary to what Miguel Olazo states on the record. We note that Manuel had no
personal knowledge, other than what Miguel Olazo told him, of the force allegedly exerted by the
respondent against Miguel Olazo.

In turn, the respondent was able to provide a satisfactory explanation - backed by corroborating
evidence - of the nature of the transaction in which he gave the various sums of money to Miguel
Olazo and Francisca Olazo in the year 1995. In her affidavits dated May 25, 200324 and July 21,
2010,25 Francisca Olazo corroborated the respondent’s claim that the sums of money he extended to
her and Miguel Olazo were loans used for their medical treatment. Miguel Olazo, in his Sinumpaang
Salaysay dated May 25, 2003, asserted that some of the money borrowed from the respondent was
used for his medical treatment and hospitalization expenses.

The affidavit of Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez further corroborated the respondent’s claim that the latter’s
involvement was limited to being paid the loans he gave to Miguel Olazo and Francisca Olazo.
According to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez, he and Miguel Olazo agreed that a portion of the loan would
be directly paid by Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez to the respondent and the amount paid would be
considered as part of the purchase price of the subject land.26

It also bears stressing that a facial comparison of the documentary evidence, specifically the dates
when the sums of money were extended by the respondent – on February 21, 1995, September 2,
1995 and October 17, 1995, and the date when the Deed of Conveyance27 over the subject land was
executed or on October 25, 1995, showed that the sums of money were extended prior to the
transfer of rights over the subject land. These pieces of evidence are consistent with the
respondent’s allegation that Miguel Olazo decided to sell his rights over the subject land to pay the
loans he obtained from the respondent and, also, to finance his continuing medical treatment.

Private practice of law after separation from public office

As proof that the respondent was engaged in an unauthorized practice of law after his separation
from the government service, the complainant presented the Sinumpaang Salaysay, dated January
20, 2000, of Manuel and the document entitled "Assurance" where the respondent legally
represented Ramon Lee and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez. Nevertheless, the foregoing pieces of
evidence fail to persuade us to conclude that there was a violation of Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.

In Cayetano v. Monsod,28 we defined the practice of law as any activity, in and out of court, that
requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. Moreover, we
ruled that to engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are characteristics of the
profession; to practice law is to give notice or render any kind of service, which device or service
requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill.

Under the circumstances, the foregoing definition should be correlated with R.A. No. 6713 and Rule
6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which impose certain restrictions on government
lawyers to engage in private practice after their separation from the service.

Section 7(b)(2) of R.A. No. 6713 reads:

Section 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. — In addition to acts and

omissions of public officials and employees now prescribed in the Constitution and existing laws, the
following shall constitute prohibited acts and transactions of any public official and employee and are
hereby declared to be unlawful:

xxxx

(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto. – Public officials and employees during
their incumbency shall not:

xxxx

(2) Engage in the private practice of their profession unless authorized by the Constitution or law,
provided, that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with their official functions; x x x

These prohibitions shall continue to apply for a period of one (1) year after resignation, retirement, or
separation from public office, except in the case of subparagraph (b) (2) above, but the professional
concerned cannot practice his profession in connection with any matter before the office he used to
be with, in which case the one-year prohibition shall likewise apply.

As a rule, government lawyers are not allowed to engage in the private practice of their profession
during their incumbency.29 By way of exception, a government lawyer can engage in the practice of
his or her profession under the following conditions: first, the private practice is authorized by the
Constitution or by the law; and second, the practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with his or her
official functions.30 The last paragraph of Section 7 provides an exception to the exception. In case of
lawyers separated from the government service who are covered under subparagraph (b) (2) of
Section 7 of R.A. No. 6713, a one-year prohibition is imposed to practice law in connection with any
matter before the office he used to be with.

Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility echoes this restriction and prohibits lawyers,
after leaving the government service, to accept engagement or employment in connection with any
matter in which he had intervened while in the said service. The keyword in Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility is the term "intervene" which we previously interpreted to include an act
of a person who has the power to influence the proceedings.31 Otherwise stated, to fall within the
ambit of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the respondent must have accepted
engagement or employment in a matter which, by virtue of his public office, he had previously
exercised power to influence the outcome of the proceedings. 1avv phi 1

As the records show, no evidence exists showing that the respondent previously interfered with the
sales application covering Manuel’s land when the former was still a member of the Committee on
Awards. The complainant, too, failed to sufficiently establish that the respondent was engaged in the
practice of law. At face value, the legal service rendered by the respondent was limited only in the
preparation of a single document. In Borja, Sr. v. Sulyap, Inc.,32 we specifically described private
practice of law as one that contemplates a succession of acts of the same nature habitually or
customarily holding one’s self to the public as a lawyer.

In any event, even granting that respondent’s act fell within the definition of practice of law, the
available pieces of evidence are insufficient to show that the legal representation was made before
the Committee on Awards, or that the Assurance was intended to be presented before it. These are
matters for the complainant to prove and we cannot consider any uncertainty in this regard against
the respondent’s favor.
Violation of Rule 1.01

Rule 1.01 prohibits a lawyer from engaging in unlawful, immoral or deceitful conduct. From the
above discussion, we already struck down the complainant’s allegation that respondent engaged in
an unauthorized practice of law when he appeared as a lawyer for Ramon Lee and Joseph Jeffrey
Rodriguez before the Committee on Awards.

We find that a similar treatment should be given to the complainant’s claim that the respondent
violated paragraph 4(1)33 of Memorandum No. 119 when he encouraged the sales application of
Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez despite his knowledge that his nephew was not a qualified applicant. The
matter of Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez’s qualifications to apply for a sales application over lots covered
by the proclaimed areas has been resolved in the affirmative by the Secretary of the DENR in the
decision dated April 3, 2004,34 when the DENR gave due course to his sales application over the
subject land. We are, at this point, bound by this finding.

As pointed out by the respondent, the DENR decision was affirmed by the Office of the President,
the Court of Appeals35 and, finally, the Court, per our Minute Resolution, dated October 11, 2006, in
G.R. No. 173453. In our Resolution, we dismissed the petition for review on certiorari filed by the
complainant after finding, among others, that no reversible error was committed by the Court of
Appeals in its decision.36

All told, considering the serious consequences of the penalty of disbarment or suspension of a
member of the Bar, the burden rests on the complainant to present clear, convincing and satisfactory
proof for the Court to exercise its disciplinary powers.37 The respondent generally is under no
obligation to prove his/her defense,38 until the burden shifts to him/her because of what the
complainant has proven. Where no case has in the first place been proven, nothing has to be
rebutted in defense.39

With this in mind, we resolve to dismiss the administrative case against the respondent for the
complainant’s failure to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the former committed unethical
infractions warranting the exercise of the Court’s disciplinary power.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DISMISS the administrative case for violation of Rule 6.02,
Rule 6.03 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, filed against retired Supreme
Court Associate Justice Dante O. Tinga, for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

January 24, 2017

A.C. No. 5582

ARTHUR O. MONARES, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. LEVI P. MUÑOZ, Respondent.

x-----------------------x

A.C. No. 5604

ALBAY ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC., Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. LEVI P. MUNOZ, Respondent.

x-----------------------x

A.C. No. 5652

BENJILIEH M. CONSTANTE, 1 Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. LEVI P. MUNOZ, Respondent.

DECISION

CAGUIOA, J.:

For resolution is the Joint Petition for Review with Prayer for Absolution and/or Clemency2 (Joint
Petition) dated May 14, 2009 filed by respondent Atty. Levi P. Muñoz (Muñoz), in connection with the
complaints for disbarment filed by Arthur O. Monares (Monares), Atty. Oliver O. Olaybal (Olaybal)
purportedly representing Albay Electric Cooperative, Inc. (ALECO), and Benjilieh M. Constante
(Constante), dated January 17, 2002, February 4, 2002 and March 21, 2002, respectively.

Monares is the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 9923 filed against Ludolfo Muñoz (Ludolfo) before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Legazpi City. In his complaint, Monares alleged that Muñoz
represented his brother Ludolfo in the said case during regular government hours while employed as
Provincial Legal Officer of Albay City. 3

Under the chairmanship of Olaybal, ALECO's old board of directors (BOD) engaged Muñoz as
retained counsel sometime in June 1998. Olaybal averred that Muñoz did not inform ALECO's old
BOD that he was employed as Provincial Legal Officer at such time. Olaybal raised that after its
administrator, the National Electrification Administration (NEA), deactivated the old BOD on the
ground of mismanagement, Muñoz served as retained counsel of the NEA-appointed team which
took over the management of ALECO. Moreover, Olaybal alleged that Muñoz illegally collected
payments in the form of notarial and professional fees in excess of what was agreed upon in their
retainer agreement. 4

Constante is the Executive Assistant for Legal Affairs of Sunwest Construction and Development
Corporation (Sunwest). Constante claimed that Muñoz filed ten (10) cases against Sun west on
Ludolfo's behalf before the Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman) while he was serving as
Provincial Legal Officer. 5

All three (3) complaints prayed that Muñoz be disbarred for unlawfully engaging in private practice.
In addition, Olaybal sought Muñoz's disbarment for acts of disloyalty, particularly, for violating the
rule against conflict of interest.6

To support their position, the complainants raised that Muñoz had been previously disciplined by the
Ombudsman for two (2) counts of unauthorized practice of profession in OMB-ADM-1-01-0462, and
was meted the penalty of removal and dismissal from service. The complainants further manifested
that Muñoz had been convicted by the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of Legazpi City in
Criminal Case Nos. 25568 and 25569 for violation of Section 7(b)(2) in relation to Section 11 of
Republic Act No. 6713.7 Munoz's conviction has since become final pursuant to the Court's
Resolution dated June 14, 2004 in G.R. No. 160668.8

In his respective comments to the complaints,9 Muñoz claimed that he had requested Governor Al
Francis C. Bichara (Governor Bichara) for authority to continue his private practice shortly after his
appointment. This request was granted on July 18, 1995.10 Thereafter, Muñoz submitted the same
request to Rafael C. Alunan III, then Secretary of the Department of the Interior and Local
Government (DILG).11 On September 8, 1995, Acting Secretary Alexander P. Aguirre granted
Muñoz's request, under the following conditions:

1. That no government time, personnel, funds or supplies shall be utilized in connection (sic)
and that no conflict of interest with your present position as Provincial Legal Officer shall arise
thereby;

2. That the time so devoted outside of office hours, the place(s) and under what circumstances you
can engage in private employment shall be fixed by the Governor of Albay to the end that it will not
impair in any way your efficiency; and

3. That any violation of the above restrictions will be a ground for the cancellation and/or revocation
of this authority. 12 (Emphasis supplied)

Pursuant to the DILG's authorization, Governor Bichara imposed the following conditions upon
Muñoz:

a. [Y]ou cannot handle cases against the Province of Albay;

b. [Y]ou will be on call and you will have no fix (sic) working hours provided that the efficiency of the
Provincial Legal Office shall not be prejudiced;

c. [Y]ou are exempted in (sic) accomplishing your Daily Time Record considering the limitation
already mentioned above; [and]

d. In addition to the above enumeration[,] you are to perform functions subject to limitations in Sec.
481 of RA 7160. 13

Muñoz emphasized that his authority 'to engage in private practice was renewed by Governor
Bichara on July 3, 1998 for his second term ending in July 2001, and again on July 5, 2001 for his
third term ending in July 2004. 14

The complaints were separately referred by the Court to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
for investigation, report and recommendation. 15 The complaints were then consolidated through the
Order dated January 16, 2003 issued by Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan. 16 Subsequently, the
complaints underwent a series of re-assignments, until finally assigned to Commissioner Doroteo B.
Aguila.17

In his Report dated March 11, 200518 (IBP Report), Commissioner Aguila recommended that Muñoz
be found guilty of gross misconduct and violation of Rules 1.01, 6.02, 15.01 and 15.03 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility (CPR). The penalty of suspension from the practice of law for an
aggregate period of four (4) years19 was recommended. On automatic review, the IBP Board of
Governors (IBP-BOG) approved and adopted Commissioner Aguila's recommendation in a
Resolution dated October 22, 2005.20
On December 22, 2005, Muñoz filed an Ex-Parte Appeal for Mercy, Clemency and Compassion
before the IBP-BOG, praying that the recommended penalty be reduced to one (1) year.21 This
appeal was denied on January 28, 2006.22

Muñoz filed before this Court an Ex-Parte Appeal for Mercy, Clemency, Forgiveness and
Compassion23 (Appeal) dated April 8, 2006 praying for the reduction of the recommended penalty of
suspension for four (4) years to one (1) year or less, and the dismissal of the complaints for
disbarment filed against him. As an alternative prayer, Muñoz requested that he be granted special
limited authority to practice law until all his pending cases are terminated. 24

In his Appeal, Muñoz insisted that when he served as Provincial Legal Officer from June 1995 to
May 2002, he engaged in private practice pursuant to the three (3) written authorities issued by
Governor Bichara, and the written authority of the DILG issued during his first term, which he claims
had never been revoked. Muñoz also argued that no conflict of interest existed between ALECO's
old BOD and the NBA management team, since he was engaged as retained counsel of ALECO as
an institution, not its management teams. 25

On August 28, 2006, the Court resolved to remand Muñoz's Appeal to the IBP for disposition. 26

Acting on Munoz's Appeal, the IBP-BOG issued a Resolution reducing the recommended period of
suspension from four (4) to three (3) years. 27 Unsatisfied, Muñoz filed a Motion for Reconsideration,
which the IBP-BOG denied on December 11, 2008.28

Aggrieved, Muñoz elevated his case anew to this Court through this Joint Petition. In fine, Muñoz
reiterates the allegations in his Appeal, with the additional assertion that the fees he collected from
ALECO were contemplated under their retainer agreement. 29

The Court agrees with the IBP-BOG's findings and recommendations.

Muñoz violated the conditions of his

DILG authorization.

Muñoz's DILG authorization prohibited him from utilizing government time for his private practice. As
correctly observed by Commissioner Aguila, Rule XVII of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V
of Executive Order No. 292 and Other Pertinent Civil Service Laws (Omnibus Rules), requires
government officers and employees of all departments and agencies, except those covered by
special laws, to render not less than eight (8) hours of work a day for five (5) days a week, or a total
of forty (40) hours a week.30 The number of required weekly working hours may not be reduced, even
in cases where the department or agency adopts a flexible work schedule. 31

Notably, Muñoz did not deny Monares' allegation that he made at least eighty-six (86) court
appearances in connection with at least thirty (30) cases from April 11, 1996 to August 1, 2001.32 He
merely alleged that his private practice did not prejudice the functions of his office.

Court appearances are necessarily made within regular government working hours, from 8:00 in the
morning to 12:00 noon, and 1:00 to 5:00 in the afternoon.33 Additional time is likewise required to
study each case, draft pleadings and prepare for trial. The sheer volume of cases handled by Muñoz
clearly indicates that government time was necessarily utilized in pursuit of his private practice, in
clear violation of the DILG authorization and Rule 6.0234 of the CPR.
Muñoz should have requested for
authority to engage in private practice
from the Secretary of DILG for his
second and third terms.

Acting Secretary Aguirre's grant of authority cannot be unreasonably construed to have been
perpetual. Moreover, Muñoz cannot claim that he believed in good faith that the authority granted by
Governor Bichara for his second and third terms sufficed.

Memorandum No. 17 dated September 4, 1986 (Memorandum 17), which Muñoz himself cites in his
Joint Petition, is clear and leaves no room for interpretation. The power to grant authority to engage
in the practice of one's profession to officers and employees in the public service lies with the head
of the department, in accordance with Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules
which provides, in part:

Sec. 12. No officer or employee shall engage directly in any private business, vocation, or profession
or be connected with any commercial, credit, agricultural, or industrial undertaking without a written
permission from the head of Department: Provided, That this prohibition will be absolute in the
case of those officers and employees whose duties and responsibilities require that their entire time
be at the disposal of the Government: Provided, further, That if an employee is granted permission
to engage in outside activities, the time so devoted outside of office hours should be fixed by the
chief of the agency to the end that it will not impair in any way the efficiency of the officer or
employee x x x. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Memorandum 17 was issued more than nine (9) years prior to Munoz's appointment as Provincial
Legal Officer, hence, he cannot feign ignorance thereof. As a local public official, it was incumbent
1âwphi1

upon Muñoz to secure the proper authority from the Secretary of the DILG not only for his first term,
but also his second and third. His failure to do so rendered him liable for unauthorized practice of his
profession and violation of Rule 1.0135 of the CPR.

Muñoz represented conflicting interests.

Muñoz cannot elude Olaybal's allegations of disloyalty. In Mabini Colleges, Inc. v. Pajarillo,36the
Court explained the tests to determine the existence of conflict of interest, thus:

There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two or more opposing
parties. The test is "whether or not in behalf of one client, it is the lawyer's duty to fight for an
issue or claim, but it is his duty to oppose it for the other client. In brief, if he argues for one
client, this argument will be opposed by him when he argues for the other client." This rule
covers not only cases in which confidential communications have been confided, but also those in
which no confidence has been bestowed or will be used. Also, there is conflict of interest if the
acceptance of the new retainer will require the attorney to perform an act which will
injuriously affect his first client in any matter in which he represents him and also whether he
will be called upon in his new relation to use against his first client any knowledge acquired
through their connection. Another test of the inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance
of a new relation will prevent an attorney from the full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and
loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing in the performance thereof.
(Emphasis supplied)

As Muñoz himself detailed in his Joint Petition, he acted as counsel for ALECO under the
management of the old BOD in the following cases:
A. Civil Case No. 10007 -ALECO (Petitioner) vs. Eleuterio Adonay, NEA Project Supervisor and his
team John Catral et. al., a case filed by Oliver O. Olaybal and his group. For: Injunction,
Accounting with Prayer for Writs of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining
Order, seeking to stop the election of the new set of member (sic) of the Board of Directors x x
x.

B. Civil Case [N]o. 10066 entitled ALBAY ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC. as Petitioner, also filed
by Oliver O. Olaybal, a case for Prohibition, Mandamus and Receivership, with Preliminary
Prohibition and Mandatory Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining and Mandatory Orders. Among
others, this Petition was filed to stop the second scheduled election of the ALECO Board of
Directors scheduled for February 23, and 24, 2002.37 (Underscoring omitted; additional emphasis
supplied)

Muñoz thereafter served as retained counsel of ALECO under the direction of the NEA management
team. Muñoz could have easily anticipated that his advice would be sought with respect to the
prosecution of the members of the old BOD, considering that the latter was deactivated due to
alleged mismanagement. The conflict of interest between Olaybal's board on one hand, and NEA
and its management team on the other, is apparent. By representing conflicting interests without the
permission of all parties involved, Muñoz violated Rules 15.01 and 15.03 of the CPR.38

In Catu v. Rellosa,39the Court imposed the penalty of suspension for six (6) months upon a punong
barangay who acted as counsel for respondents in an ejectment case without securing the authority
of the Secretary of DILG. In Aniñon v. Sabitsana, Jr.,40the Court imposed the penalty of one (1) year
suspension upon a lawyer who accepted a new engagement that required him to oppose the
interests of a party whom he previously represented. In view of Muñoz's multiple infractions, the
Court finds the recommended penalty of suspension for an aggregate period of three (3) years
proper.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Levi P. Muñoz is found GUILTY of gross misconduct and violation of Rules
1.01, 6.02, 15.01 and 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of three (3) years effective upon receipt of
this Decision, with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of any violation hereunder shall be dealt
with more severely.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 208290 December 11, 2013

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE JUANITO C. CASTANEDA, JR., HONORABLE CAESAR A. CASANOVA,
HONORABLE CIELITO N. MINDARO-GRULLA, AS ASSOCIATE JUSTICES OF THE SPECIAL
SECOND DIVISION, COURT OF TAX APPEALS; and MYRNA M. GARCIA AND CUSTODIO
MENDOZA VESTIDAS, JR., Respondents.

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:

This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking to review the March 26,
20131 and May 15, 20132 Resolutions of the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) in CTA Crim. Case No. 0-
285, ordering the dismissal of the case against the private respondents for violation of Section
36023 in relation to Sections 2503 and 2530 (f) (i) and 1, (3) (4) and (5) of the Tariff and Customs
Codeof the Philippines, as amended, on the ground of insufficiency of evidence.

The antecedentsas culled from the records:

Private respondents Myrna M. Garcia (Garcia) and Custodio Mendoza Vestidas,

Jr.(VestidasJr.)were charged before the CTA under an Information which reads:

That on or about November 5, 2011, or prior or subsequent thereto, in the City of Manila,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused Myrna M.
Garcia and Custodio Mendoza Vestidas, Jr. as owner/proprietress and broker of Plinth Enterprise
respectively, conspiring and confederating with each other, with intent to defraud the government,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and fraudulently import into the Port of Manila, 858 cartons of
17,160 pieces of Anti-Virus Software Kaspersky Internet Security Premium 2012, subject to customs
duties,by misdeclaration under Import Entry No. C-181011 and Bill of Lading No. PFCMAN1715,
filed with the Bureau of Customs (BOC),covering One Forty Footer (1x40) container van shipment
bearing No. KKFU7195683 which was falsely declared to contain 40 pallets/1,690 cartons of CD kit
cleaner and plastic CD case, said imported items having customs duties amounting to Three Million
Three Hundred Forty One Thousand Two Hundred Forty Five Pesos (Php 3,341,245) of which only
the amount of One Hundred Thousand Three Hundred Sixty Two Pesos (Php100,362) was paid, in
violation of the above-captioned law, and to the prejudice and damage of the Government in the
amount of Three Million Two Hundred Forty Thousand Eight Hundred Eighty Three Pesos
(Php3,240,883).4

In a hearing held on August 1, 2012, Garcia and VestidasJr.pleaded "Not Guilty" to the
aforementioned charge. Thereafter, a preliminary conference was held on September 5, 2012
followed by thepre-trial on September 13, 2012. Both the prosecution and the defense agreed to
adopt the joint stipulations of facts and issues entered in the course of the preliminary conference.

Thereafter, trial ensued.

The prosecution presented a number of witnesses whoessentially observed5 the physical

examination of Container Van No. KKFU 7195638 conducted6 by the Bureau of Customs (BOC) and
explained7 the process of electronic filing under the Electronic to Mobile (E2M) Customs Systems of
the BOC and the alleged misdeclared goods therein.

Subsequent to the presentation of witnesses, the prosecution filed its Formal Offer of Evidence on
December 10, 2012.

On January 15, 2013, Garcia and Vestidas, Jr. filed their Omnibus Motion to File Demurrer to
Evidence with Leave of Court to Cancel Hearing Scheduled on January 21, 2013,whichwas
grantedby the CTA. Thereafter, they filed theDemurrer to Evidence, dated January 13, 2012,
claimingthat the prosecution failed to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt for the following
reasons:

a)The pieces of documentary evidence submitted by the prosecution were inadmissible

incourt;

b)The object evidence consisting of the allegedly misdeclared goods were not presented as
evidence; and
 c)None of the witnesses for the prosecution made a positive identification of the two accused
as the ones responsible for the supposed misdeclaration.

Despite opposition, the CTA dismissed the caseagainst Garcia and Vestidas Jr.in its March 26, 2013
Resolution, for failure of the prosecution to establish theirguilt beyond reasonable doubt.

According to the CTA, "no proof whatsoever was presented by the prosecution showing that the
certified true copies of the public documents offered in evidence against both accused were in fact
issued by thelegal custodians."8 It cited Section 26, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court,
whichprovidesthat"when the original of a document is a public record, it should not generally be
removed from the office or place in which it is kept."9 As stated in Section 7, Rule 130,10 its contents
may be proven using secondary evidence and such evidence may pertain to the certified true copy
of the original document issued by the public officer in custody thereof.Hence, the CTA wrotethat the
certified true copiesof the public documents offered in evidence should have been presented in
court.

Anent its offer of private documents,11 the prosecution likewise failed to comply with Section 27, Rule
132 of the Rules of Court, which reads, "[a]n authorized public record of a private document may be
proved by the original record, or by a copy thereof, attested by the legal custodian of the record, with
an appropriate certificate that such officer has the custody." Considering that the private documents
were submitted and filed with the BOC, the same became part of public records. Again, the records
show that the prosecution failed to present the certified true copies of thedocuments.

The CTA noted that,in its Opposition to the Demurrer,the prosecution even admitted that none of
their witnesses ever positively identified the accused in open court and that the alleged misdeclared
goods were not competently and properly identified in court by any of the prosecution witnesses.

The prosecution filed its motion for reconsideration, but it was deniedby the CTAin its May 15, 2013
Resolution, stressing, among others, that to grant it would place the accused in double jeopardy.12

On July 24, 2013, the Run After the Smugglers (RATS) Group, Revenue Collection Monitoring
Group (RCMG), as counsel for the BOC, received a copy of the July 15, 2013 Resolution of the CTA
ordering the entry of judgment in the case.

Hence,this petition for certiorari, ascribing grave abuse of discretion on the part of theCTA when in
ruled that: 1) the pieces of documentary evidence submitted by the prosecution were inadmissible in
evidence; 2) the object evidence consisting of the alleged misdeclared goods were not presented as
evidence; and 3) the witnesses failed to positively identifythe accused as responsible forthe
misdeclaration of goods.

The Court agrees with the disposition of the CTA.

At the outset, it should be noted that the petition was filed beyond the reglementary periodfor the
filingthereof under Rule 65. The petition itself statedthat a copy of the May 15, 2013 Resolution was
received by the BOC two (2) days after its promulgation, or on May 17, 2013. Nonetheless, the
RATS was only alerted by the developments in the case on July 24, 2013, when Atty. Danilo M.
Campos Jr. (Atty. Campos) received the July 15, 2013 Resolution of the CTA ordering the entry of
judgment in the case, considering that no appeal was taken by any of the parties. According toAtty.
Campos, it was only on that occasion when he discovered the May 15, 2013 Resolution of the
CTA.Thus, it was prayed that the petitionbe given due course despite its late filing.

This belated filing cannot be countenanced by the Court.

Section 4, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedureis explicit in stating thatcertiorarishould be
instituted within a period of 60 days from notice of the judgment, orderor resolution sought to be
assailed. The 60-day period is inextendible to avoid any unreasonable delay that would violate the
constitutional rights of parties to a speedy disposition of their case.13 While there are recognized
exceptions14 to such strict observance, there should be an effort on the part of the party invoking
liberality to advance a reasonable or meritorious explanation for his/her failure to comply with the
rules.15

In the case at bench, no convincing justification for the belated filing of the petition was advanced to
warrant the relaxation of the Rules.Notably, the records show that the petition was filedonly on
August 12, 2013, or almost a month late from the due date which fell on July 16, 2013. To excuse
this grave procedural lapse will not only be unfairto the other party, but it will also sanction a
seeming rudimentary attempt to circumvent standing rules of procedure. Suffice it to say, the
reasons proffered by the petitioner do not carry even a tinge of merit that would deserve leniency.

The late filing of the petition was borne out of the petitioner’s failure to monitor incoming court
processes that neededto be addressed by the office. Clearly, this is an admission of inefficiency, if
not lack of zeal, on the part of an office tasked toeffectively curb smuggling activities which rob the
government of millions of revenue every year.

The display of patent violations of even the elementary rules leads the Court to suspectthat the case
against Garcia and Vestidas Jr. was doomed by designfrom the start. The failure to present the
certified true copies of documentary evidence; the failure to competently and properly identify the
misdeclared goods; the failure to identify the accused in court; and,worse, the failure to file this
petition on time challenging a judgment of acquittal, are tell-tale signs ofa reluctantand
subduedattitude in pursuing the case. This stance taken by the lawyers in government service
rouses the Court’s vigilance against inefficiency in the administration of justice. Verily, the
lawyersrepresenting the offices under the executive branchshould be reminded that theystill remain
as officers of the courtfrom whom a high sense of competence and fervor is expected. The Courtwill
not close its eyes to this sense of apathy in RATS lawyers, lest the government’s goal of revenue
enhancement continues to suffer the blows of smuggling and similar activities.

Even the error committed by the RATS in filing a motion for reconsideration with the CTA displays
gross ignorance as to the effects of an acquittal in a criminal case and the constitutional proscription
on double jeopardy. Had the RATS been eager and keen in prosecuting the respondents, it would
have, in the first place, presented its evidence with the CTA in strict compliance with the Rules.

In any case, even if the Court decides to suspend the rules and permit this recourse, the end result
would remain the same. While a judgment of acquittal in a criminal case may be assailed in a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,it must be shown that there was grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction or a denial of due process.In this
case, a perusal of the challenged resolutions ofthe CTAdoes not disclose any indication of grave
abuse of discretion on its partor denial of due process.The records are replete with indicators that
the petitioner actively participated during the trial and, in fact, presented its offer of evidence and
opposed the demurrer. 1âwphi1

Grave abuse of discretion is defined as capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent

to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion
of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in
contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by
reason of passion and hostility.16 Here, the subject resolutions of the CTA have been issued in
accordance with the rules on evidence and existing jurisprudence.
On a final note, the Court deems it proper to remind the lawyers in the Bureau of Customs that the
canons embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility equally apply to lawyers in government
service in the discharge of their official tasks. 17 Thus, RA TS lawyers should exert every effort and
consider it their duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice.18

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and the assailed March 26, 2013 and May 15, 2013
Resolutions of the Court of Tax Appeals are AFFIRMED.

The Office of the Ombudsman is hereby ordered to conduct an investigation for possible criminal or
administrative offenses committed by the Run After the Smugglers (RA TS) Group, Revenue
Collection Monitoring Group (RCMG), Bureau of Customs, relative to the filing and handling of the
subject complaint for violations of the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines.

Let copies of this resolution be furnished the Office of the President, the Secretary of Finance, the
Collector of Customs, and the Office of the Ombudsman for their guidance and appropriate action.

SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 6683 June 21, 2011

RE: RESOLUTION OF THE COURT DATED 1 JUNE 2004 IN G.R. NO. 72954 AGAINST, ATTY.
VICTOR C. AVECILLA, Respondent.

DECISION

PEREZ, J.:

The present administrative case is based on the following facts:

Prelude

Sometime in 1985, respondent Atty. Victor C. Avecilla (Atty. Avecilla) and a certain Mr. Louis C.
Biraogo (Mr. Biraogo) filed a petition before this Court impugning the constitutionality of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 883, i.e., the law that called for the holding of a presidential snap election on 7
February 1986. The petition was docketed as G.R. No. 72954 and was consolidated with nine (9)
other petitions1 voicing a similar concern.

On 19 December 1985, the Court En banc issued a Resolution dismissing the consolidated petitions,
effectively upholding the validity of Batas Pambansa Blg. 883.2

On 8 January 1986, after the aforesaid resolution became final, the rollo3 of G.R. No. 72954 was
entrusted to the Court’s Judicial Records Office (JRO) for safekeeping.4

The Present Case

On 14 July 2003, the respondent and Mr. Biraogo sent a letter5 to the Honorable Hilario G. Davide,
Jr., then Chief Justice of the Supreme Court (Chief Justice Davide), requesting that they be
furnished several documents6 relative to the expenditure of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF).
In order to show that they have interest in the JDF enough to be informed of how it was being spent,
the respondent and Mr. Biraogo claimed that they made contributions to the said fund by way of the
docket and legal fees they paid as petitioners in G.R No. 72954.7
On 28 July 2003, Chief Justice Davide instructed8 Atty. Teresita Dimaisip (Atty. Dimaisip), then Chief
of the JRO, to forward the rollo of G.R. No. 72954 for the purpose of verifying the claim of the
respondent and Mr. Biraogo.

On 30 July 2003, following a diligent search for the rollo of G.R. No. 72954, Atty. Dimaisip
apprised9 Chief Justice Davide that the subject rollo could not be found in the archives. Resorting to
the tracer card10 of G.R. No. 72954, Atty. Dimaisip discovered that the subject rollo had been
borrowed from the JRO on 13 September 1991 but, unfortunately, was never since returned.11 The
tracer card named the respondent, although acting through a certain Atty. Salvador Banzon (Atty.
Banzon), as the borrower of the subject rollo.12

The next day, or on 31 July 2003, Chief Justice Davide took prompt action by directing13 Atty.
Dimaisip to supply information about how the respondent was able to borrow the rollo of G.R. No.
72954 and also to take necessary measures to secure the return of the said rollo.

Reporting her compliance with the foregoing directives, Atty. Dimaisip sent to Chief Justice Davide a
Memorandum14 on 13 August 2003. In substance, the Memorandum relates that:

1. At the time the rollo of G.R. No. 72954 was borrowed from the JRO, the respondent was
employed with the Supreme Court as a member of the legal staff of retired Justice Emilio A.
Gancayco (Justice Gancayco). Ostensibly, it was by virtue of his confidential employment
that the respondent was able to gain access to the rollo of G.R. No. 72954.15

2. Atty. Dimaisip had already contacted the respondent about the possible return of the
subject rollo.16 Atty. Dimaisip said that the respondent acknowledged having borrowed the
rollo of G.R. No. 72954 through Atty. Banzon, who is a colleague of his in the office of
Justice Gancayco.17

On 18 August 2003, almost twelve (12) years after it was borrowed, the rollo of G.R. No. 72954 was
finally turned over by Atty. Avecilla to the JRO.18

On 22 September 2003, Chief Justice Davide directed19 the Office of the Chief Attorney (OCAT) of
this Court, to make a study, report and recommendation on the incident. On 20 November 2003, the
OCAT submitted a Memorandum20 to the Chief Justice opining that the respondent may be
administratively charged, as a lawyer and member of the bar, for taking out the rollo of G.R. No.
72954. The OCAT made the following significant observations:

1. Justice Gancayco compulsorily retired from the Supreme Court on 20 August

1991.21 However, as is customary, the coterminous employees of Justice Gancayco were
given an extension of until 18 September 1991 to remain as employees of the court for the
limited purpose of winding up their remaining affairs. Hence, the respondent was already
nearing the expiration of his "extended tenure" when he borrowed the rollo of G.R. No.
72954 on 13 September 1991.22

2. The above circumstance indicates that the respondent borrowed the subject rollo not for
any official business related to his duties as a legal researcher for Justice Gancayco, but
merely to fulfill a personal agenda.23 By doing so, the respondent clearly abused his
confidential position for which he may be administratively sanctioned.24

3. It must be clarified, however, that since the respondent is presently no longer in the
employ of the Supreme Court, he can no longer be sanctioned as such
 employee.25 Nevertheless, an administrative action against the respondent as a lawyer and
officer of the court remains feasible.26

Accepting the findings of the OCAT, the Court En banc issued a Resolution27 on 9 December 2003
directing the respondent to show cause why he should not be held administratively liable for
borrowing the rollo of G.R. No. 72954 and for failing to return the same for a period of almost twelve
(12) years.

The respondent conformed to this Court’s directive by submitting his Respectful Explanation
(Explanation)28 on 21 January 2004. In the said explanation, the respondent gave the following
defenses:

1. The respondent maintained that he neither borrowed nor authorized anyone to borrow the
rollo of G.R. No. 72954.29 Instead, the respondent shifts the blame on the person whose
signature actually appears on the tracer card of G.R. No. 72954 and who, without authority,
took the subject rollo in his name.30 Hesitant to pinpoint anyone in particular as the author of
such signature, the respondent, however, intimated that the same might have belonged to
Atty. Banzon.31

2. The respondent asserted that, for some unknown reason, the subject rollo just ended up in
his box of personal papers and effects, which he brought home following the retirement of
Justice Gancayco.32 The respondent can only speculate that the one who actually borrowed
the rollo might have been a colleague in the office of Justice Gancayco and that through
inadvertence, the same was misplaced in his personal box.33

3. The respondent also denounced any ill-motive for failing to return the rollo, professing that
he had never exerted effort to examine his box of personal papers and effects up until that
time when he was contacted by Atty. Dimaisip inquiring about the missing rollo.34 The
respondent claimed that after finding out that the missing rollo was, indeed, in his personal
box, he immediately extended his cooperation to the JRO and wasted no time in arranging
for its return.35

On 24 February 2004, this Court referred the respondent’s Explanation to the OCAT for initial study.
In its Report36 dated 12 April 2004, the OCAT found the respondent’s Explanation to be
unsatisfactory.

On 1 June 2004, this Court tapped37 the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) to conduct a formal
investigation on the matter and to prepare a final report and recommendation. A series of hearings
were thus held by the OBC wherein the testimonies of the respondent,38 Atty. Banzon,39 Atty.
Dimaisip40 and one Atty. Pablo Gancayco41 were taken. On 6 August 2007, the respondent submitted
his Memorandum42 to the OBC reiterating the defenses in his Explanation.

On 13 October 2009, the OBC submitted its Report and Recommendation43 to this Court. Like the
OCAT, the OBC dismissed the defenses of the respondent and found the latter to be fully
accountable for taking out the rollo of G.R. No. 72954 and failing to return it timely.44 The OBC, thus,
recommended that the respondent be suspended from the practice of law for one (1) year.45

Our Ruling

We agree with the findings of the OBC. However, owing to the peculiar circumstances in this case,
we find it fitting to reduce the recommended penalty.
The Respondent Borrowed The Rollo

After reviewing the records of this case, particularly the circumstances surrounding the retrieval of
the rollo of G.R. No. 72954, this Court is convinced that it was the respondent, and no one else, who
is responsible for taking out the subject rollo.

The tracer card of G.R. No. 72954 bears the following information:

1. The name of the respondent, who was identified as borrower of the rollo,46 and

2. The signature of Atty. Banzon who, on behalf of the respondent, actually received the rollo
from the JRO.47

The respondent sought to discredit the foregoing entries by insisting that he never authorized Atty.
Banzon to borrow the subject rollo on his behalf.48 We are, however, not convinced.

First. Despite the denial of the respondent, the undisputed fact remains that it was from his
possession that the missing rollo was retrieved about twelve (12) years after it was borrowed from
the JRO. This fact, in the absence of any plausible explanation to the contrary, is sufficient
affirmation that, true to what the tracer card states, it was the respondent who borrowed the rollo of
G.R. No. 72954.

Second. The respondent offered no convincing explanation how the subject rollo found its way into
his box of personal papers and effects. The respondent can only surmise that the subject rollo may
have been inadvertently placed in his personal box by another member of the staff of Justice
Gancayco.49 However, the respondent’s convenient surmise remained just that—a speculation
incapable of being verified definitively.

Third. If anything, the respondent’s exceptional stature as a lawyer and former confidante of a
Justice of this Court only made his excuse unacceptable, if not totally unbelievable. As adequately
rebuffed by the OCAT in its Report dated 12 April 2004:

x x x However, the excuse that the rollo "inadvertently or accidentally" found its way to his personal
box through his officemates rings hollow in the face of the fact that he was no less than the
confidential legal assistance of a Member of this Court. With this responsible position, Avecilla is
expected to exercise extraordinary diligence with respect to all matters, including seeing to it that
only his personal belongings were in that box for taking home after his term of office in this Court has
expired.50

Verily, the tracer card of G.R. No. 72954 was never adequately controverted. We, therefore, sustain
its entry and hold the respondent responsible for borrowing the rollo of G.R. No. 72954.

Respondent’s Administrative Liability

Having settled that the respondent was the one who borrowed the rollo of G.R. No. 72954, We next
determine his administrative culpability.

We begin by laying the premises:

1. The respondent is presently no longer in the employ of this Court and as such, can no
longer be held administratively sanctioned as an employee.51 However, the respondent, as a
 lawyer and a member of the bar, remains under the supervisory and disciplinary aegis of this
Court.52

2. The respondent was already nearing the expiration of his "extended tenure" when he
borrowed the rollo of G.R. No. 72954 on 13 September 1991.53 We must recall that Justice
Gancayco already retired as of 20 April 1991. Hence, it may be concluded that for whatever
reason the respondent borrowed the subject rollo, it was not for any official reason related to
the adjudication of pending cases.54

3. The respondent’s unjustified retention of the subject rollo for a considerable length of time
all but confirms his illicit motive in borrowing the same. It must be pointed out that the subject
rollo had been in the clandestine possession of the respondent for almost twelve (12) years
until it was finally discovered and recovered by the JRO.

Given the foregoing, We find that there are sufficient grounds to hold respondent administratively
liable.

First. Taking judicial records, such as a rollo, outside court premises, without the court’s consent, is
an administratively punishable act. In Fabiculana, Sr. v. Gadon,55 this Court previously sanctioned a
sheriff for the wrongful act of bringing court records home, thus:

Likewise Ciriaco Y. Forlales, although not a respondent in complainant's letter-complaint, should be

meted the proper penalty, having admitted taking the records of the case home and forgetting about
them. Court employees are, in the first place, not allowed to take any court records, papers or
documents outside the court premises. It is clear that Forlales was not only negligent in his duty of
transmitting promptly the records of an appealed case to the appellate court but he also failed in his
duty not to take the records of the case outside of the court and to subsequently forget about
them.56 (Emphasis supplied)

Second. The act of the respondent in borrowing a rollo for unofficial business entails the employment
of deceit not becoming a member of the bar. It presupposes the use of misrepresentation and, to a
1awphi1

certain extent, even abuse of position on the part of the respondent because the lending of rollos
are, as a matter of policy, only limited to official purposes.

As a lawyer then employed with the government, the respondent clearly violated Rule 6.02, Canon 6
of the Code of Professional Responsibility, to wit:

Rule 6.02 - A lawyer in the government service shall not use his public position to promote or
advance his private interests, nor allow the latter to interfere with his public duties. (Emphasis
supplied).

Third. However, We find the recommended penalty of suspension from the practice of law for one (1)
year as too harsh for the present case. We consider the following circumstances in favor of the
respondent:

1. G.R. No. 72954 was already finally resolved when its rollo was borrowed on 13 September
1991. Thus, the act of respondent in keeping the subject rollo worked no prejudice insofar as
deciding G.R. No. 72954 is concerned.

2. It was never established that the contents of the rollo, which remained confidential despite
the finality of the resolution in G.R. No. 72954, were disclosed by the respondent.
 3. After his possession of the subject rollo was discovered, the respondent cooperated with
the JRO for the return of the rollo.

We, therefore, temper the period of suspension to only six (6) months.

WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing premises, the respondent is hereby SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for six (6) months. The respondent is also STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of a
similar offense in the future will be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 5377 June 30, 2014

VICTOR C. LINGAN, Complainant,

vs.
ATTYS. ROMEO CALUBAQUIB and JIMMY P. BALIGA, Respondents.

RESOLUTION

LEONEN, J.:

This court has the exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the practice of law. When this court orders a
lawyer suspended from the practice of law, the lawyer must desist from performing all functions
requiring the application of legal knowledge within the period of suspension. This includes desisting
from holding a position in government requiring the authority to practice law.

For our resolution is respondent Atty. Jimmy P. Baliga's motion to lift one-year suspension from the
practice of law.1

In the resolution2 dated June 15, 2006, this court found Attys. Romeo I. Calubaquib and Jimmy P.
Baliga guilty of violating Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility3 and of the
Lawyer's Oath.4 Respondents allowed their secretaries to notarize documents in their stead, in
violation of Sections 2455 and 2466 of the Notarial Law. This court suspended respondents from the
practice of law for one year, revoked their notarial commissions, and disqualified them from
reappointment as notaries public for two years.

Complainant Victor C. Lingan filed his motion for reconsideration,7 praying that respondents be
disbarred, not merely suspended from the practice of law. In the resolution8 dated September 6,
2006, this court denied complainant Lingan's motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.

On March 22, 2007, Atty. Baliga, also the Regional Director of the Commission on Human Rights
Regional Office for Region II, filed the undated ex parte clarificatory pleading with leave of court.9

In his ex parte clarificatory pleading, Atty. Baliga alleged that on July 14, 2006, complainant Lingan
wrote the Commission on Human Rights. Lingan requested the Commission to investigate Atty.
Baliga following the latter's suspension from the practice of law.

After this court had suspended Atty. Baliga from the practice of law, the Commission on Human
Rights En Banc issued the resolution10 dated January 16, 2007, suspending him from his position as
Director/Attorney VI of the. Commission on Human Rights Regional Office for Region II. According to
the Commission on Human Rights En Banc, Atty. Baliga's suspension from the practice of law
"prevent[ed] [him] from assuming his post [as Regional Director] for want of eligibility in the
meantime that his authority to practice law is suspended."11

Atty. Baliga · argued that he cannot be suspended for acts not connected with his functions as
Commission on Human Rights Regional Director. According to Atty. Baliga, his suspension from the
practice of law did not include his suspension from public office. He prayed for clarification of this
court's resolution dated June 15, 2006 "to prevent further injury and prejudice to [his] rights."12

This court noted without action Atty. Baliga's ex parte clarificatory pleading as this court does not
render advisory opinions.13

On May 8, 2009, this court received ·a letter from complainant Lingan. In his letter14 dated May 4,
2009, Lingan alleged that Atty. Baliga continued practicing law and discharging his functions as
Commission on Human Rights Regional Director, in violation of this court's order of suspension.

Complainant Lingan allegedly received a copy of the Commission on Human Rights En Banc 's
resolution suspending Atty. Baliga as Regional Director. On Atty. Baliga's motion, the ommission
reconsidered Atty. Baliga's suspension and instead admonished him for "[violating] the conditions of
his commission as a notary public."15 According to complainant Lingan, he was not served a copy of
Atty. Baliga's motion for reconsideration.16

Complainant Lingan claimed that the discharge of the functions of a Commission on Human Rights
Regional Director necessarily required the practice of law. A Commission on Human Rights Regional
Director must be a member of the bar and is designated as Attorney VI. Since this court suspended
Atty. Baliga from the practice of law, Atty. Baliga was in effect "a non-lawyer . . . and [was]
disqualified to hold the position of [Regional Director] [during the effectivity of the order of
suspension]."17 The Commission on Human Rights, according to complainant Lingan, should have
ordered Atty. Baliga to desist from performing his functions as Regional Director. Complainant
Lingan prayed that this court give "favorable attention and action on the matter."18

This court endorsed complainant Lingan's letter to the Office of the Bar Confidant for report and
recommendation.19

In its report and recommendation20 dated June 29, 2009, the Office of the Bar Confidant found that
the period of suspension of Attys. Calubaquib and Baliga had already lapsed. It recommended that
respondents be required to file their respective motions to lift order of suspension with certifications
from the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Executive Judge of the court where they might
appear as counsel and state that they desisted from practicing law during the period of suspension.

On the claim that the Commission on Human Rights allowed Atty. Baliga to perform his functions as
Regional Director during the period of suspension, the Office of the Bar Confidant said that the
Commission "deliberate[ly] disregard[ed]"21 this court's order of suspension. According to the Office
of the Bar Confidant, the Commission on Human Rights had no power to "[alter, modify, or set aside
any of this court's resolutions] which [have] become final and executory. "22

Thus, with respect to Atty. Baliga, the Office of the Bar Confidant recommended that this court
require him to submit a certification from the Commission on Human Rights stating that he desisted
from performing his functions as Regional Director while he was suspended from the practice of
law.23

The Office of the Bar Confidant further recommended that Atty. Baliga and the Commission .on
Human Rights be required to comment on complainant Lingan's allegation that Atty. Baliga
continued to perform his functions as Regional Director while he was suspended from the practice of
law.

On July 17, 2009, Atty. Baliga filed a manifestation,24 arguing that his suspension from the practice of
law did not include his suspension from public office. Atty. Baliga said, "[t]o stretch the coverage of
[his suspension from the practice of law] to [his] public office would be tantamount to [violating] his
constitutional rights [sic] to due process and to the statutory principle in law that what is not included
is deemed excluded."25

In the resolution26 dated September 23, 2009, this court required respondents to file their respective
motions to lift order of suspension considering the lapse of the period of suspension. This court
further ordered Atty. Baliga and the Commission on Human Rights to comment on complainant
Lingari's allegation that Atty. Baliga continued performing his functions as Regional Director while he
was suspended from the practice of law. The resolution dated September 23, 2009 provides:

Considering that the period of suspension from the practice of law and disqualification from being
commissioned as notary public imposed on respondents have [sic] already elapsed, this Court
resolves:

(1) to require both respondents, within ten (10) days from notice, to FILE their respective
motions to lift relative to their suspension and disqualification from being commissioned as
notary public and SUBMIT certifications from the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and
Executive Judge of the Court where they may appear as counsel, stating that respondents
have actually ceased and desisted from the practice of law during the entire period of their
suspension and disqualification, unless already complied with in the meantime;

(2) to require Atty. Jimmy P. Baliga to SUBMIT a certification from the Commission on
Human Rights [CHR] stating that he has been suspended from office and has stopped from
the performance of his functions for the period stated in the order of suspension and
disqualification, within ten (10) days from notice hereof;

(3) to require respondent Atty. Baliga and the CHR to COMMENT on the allegations of
complainant against them, both within ten (10) days from receipt of notice hereof;
...27 (Emphasis in the original)

In compliance with this court's order, Attys. Calubaquib and Baliga filed their respective motions to
lift order of suspension.28 Atty. Baliga also filed his comment on complainant Lingan's allegation that
he continued performing his functions as Regional Director during his suspension from the practice
of law.

In his comment29 dated November 13, 2009, Atty. Baliga alleged that as Regional Director, he
"perform[ed], generally, managerial functions,"30 which did not require the practice of law. These
managerial functions allegedly included ."[supervising] ... the day to day operations of the regional
office and its personnel";31 "monitoring progress of investigations conducted by the [Commission on
Human Rights] Investigation Unit";32 "monitoring the implementation of all other services and
assistance programs of the [Commission on Human Rights] by the different units at the regional
level";33 and "[supervising] . . . the budgetary requirement preparation and disbursement of funds and
expenditure of the [Regional Office]."34 The Commission allegedly has its own "legal services unit
which takes care of the legal services matters of the [Commission]."35
Stating that his functions as Regional Director did not require the practice of law, Atty. Baliga
claimed thaf he "faithful[ly] [complied] with [this court's resolution suspending him from the practice of
law]."36

The Commission on Human Rights filed its comment37 dated November 27, 2009. It argued that "the
penalty imposed upon Atty. Baliga as a member of the bar is separate and distinct from any penalty
that may be imposed upon him as a public official for the same acts."38 According to the Commission,
Atty. Baliga's suspension from the practice of law is a "bar matter"39 while the imposition of penalty
upon a Commission on Human Rights official "is an entirely different thing, falling as it does within
the exclusive authority of the [Commission as] disciplining body."40

Nevertheless, the Commission manifested that it would defer to this court's resolution of the issue
and would "abide by whatever ruling or decision [this court] arrives at on [the] matter. "41 In reply42 to
Atty. Baliga's comment, complainant Lingan argued that Atty. Baliga again disobeyed this. court.
Atty. Baliga failed to submit a certification from the Commission on Human Rights stating that he
was suspended from office and desisted from performing his functions as Regional Director.

As to Atty. Baliga's claim that he did not practice law while he held his position as Regional Director
and only performed generally managerial functions, complainant Lingan countered that Atty. Baliga
admitted to defying the order of suspension. Atty. Baliga admitted to performing the functions of a
"lawyer-manager,"43 which under the landmark case of Cayetano v. Monsod44 constituted practice of
law. Complainant Lingan reiterated that the position of Regional Director/ Attorney VI requires the
officer "to be a lawyer [in] good standing."45 Moreover, as admitted by Atty. Baliga, he had
supervision and control over Attorneys III, IV, and V. Being a "lawyer-manager," Atty. Baliga
practiced law while he held his position as Regional Director.

With respect to Atty. Baliga's claim that he was in good faith in reassuming his position as Regional
Director, complainant Lingan countered that if Atty. Baliga were really in good faith, he should have
followed the initial resolution of the Commission on Human Rights suspending him from office. Atty.
Baliga did not even furnish this court a copy of his motion for reconsideration of the Commission on
Human Right's resolution suspending him from office. By "playing ignorant on what is 'practice of
law', twisting facts and philosophizing,"46 complainant Lingan argued that Atty. Baliga "[no longer has
that] moral vitality imperative to the title of an attorney."47 Compfainant Lingan prayed that Atty.
Baliga be disbarred.

On February 17, 2010, this court lifted the order of suspension of Atty. Calubaquib.48 He was allowed
to resume his practice of law and perform notarial acts subject to compliance with the requirements
for issuance of a notarial commission.

On the other hand, this court referred to the Office of the Bar Confidant for evaluation, report, and
recommendation Atty. Baliga's motion to lift one-year suspension and the respective comments of
Atty. Baliga and the Commission on Human Rights.49

In its report and recommendation50 dated October 18, 2010, the Office of the Bar Confidant stated
that Atty. Baliga "should not [have been] allowed to perform his functions, duties, and responsibilities
[as Regional Director] which [required acts constituting] practice .of law."51 Considering that Atty.
Baliga claimed that he did not perform his functions as Regional Director which required the practice
of law, the Office of the Bar Confidant recommended that the Commission on Human Rights be
required to comment on this claim. The Office of the Bar Confidant also recommended holding in
abeyance the resolution of Atty. Baliga's motion to lift suspension "pending [the Commission on
Human Right's filing of comment]."52
In the resolution53 dated January 12, 2011, this court held in abeyance the resolution of Atty. Baliga's
motion to lift one-year suspension. The Commission on Human Rights was ordered to comment on
Atty. Baliga's claim that he did not practice law while he held his position as Regional Director.

In its comment54 dated April 6, 2011, the Commission on Human Rights reiterated that the penalty
imposed on Atty. Baliga as a member of the bar is separate from the penalty that might be imposed
on him as Regional Director. The Commission added that it is "of honest belief that the position of
[Regional Director] is managerial and does not [require the practice of law]."55 It again manifested
that it will "abide by whatever ruling or decision [this court] arrives on [the] matter."56

The issue for our resolution is whether Atty. Baliga's motion to lift order of suspension should be
granted.

We find that Atty. Baliga violated this court's order of suspension. We, therefore, suspend him further
from the practice of law for six months.

Practice of law is "any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal
procedure, knowledge, training and experience."57 It includes "[performing] acts which are
characteristics of the [legal] profession"58 or "[rendering any kind of] service [which] requires the use
in any degree of legal knowledge or skill."59

Work in government that requires the use of legal knowledge is considered practice. of law. In
Cayetano v. Monsod,60 this court cited the deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission and
agreed that work rendered by lawyers in the Commission on Audit requiring "[the use of] legal
knowledge or legal talent"61 is practice of law.

The Commission on Human Rights is an independent office created under the Constitution with
power to investigate "all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights[.]"62 It is
divided into regional offices with each office having primary responsibility to investigate human rights
violations in its territorial jurisdiction.63 Each regional office is headed by the Regional Director who is
given the position of Attorney VI.

Under the Guidelines and Procedures in the Investigation and Monitoring of Human Rights
Violations and Abuses, and the Provision of CHR Assistance,64 the Regional Director has the
following powers and functions:

a. To administer oaths or affirmations with respect to "[Commission on Human Rights]

matters;"65

b. To issue mission orders in their respective regional offices;66

c. To conduct preliminary evaluation or initial investigation of human rights complaints in the

absence of the legal officer or investigator;67

d. To conduct dialogues or preliminary conferences among parties and discuss "immediate

courses of action and protection remedies and/or possible submission of the matter to an
alternative dispute resolution";68

e. To issue Commission on Human Rights processes, including notices, letter-invitations,

orders, or subpoenas within the territorial jurisdiction of the regional office;69 and
 f. To review and approve draft resolutions of human rights cases prepared by the legal
officer.70

These powers and functions are characteristics of the legal profession. Oaths and affirmations are
usually performed by members of the judiciary and notaries public71 - officers who are necessarily
members of the bar.72 Investigating human rights complaints are performed primarily by the
Commission's legal officer.73 Discussing immediate courses of action and protection remedies and
reviewing and approving draft resolutions of human rights cases prepared by the legal officer require
the use of extensive legal knowledge.

The exercise of the powers and functions of a Commission on Human Rights Regional Director
constitutes practice of law. Thus, the Regional Director must be an attorney - a member of the bar in
good standing and authorized to practice law.74 When the Regional Director loses this authority, such
as when he or she is disbarred or suspended from the practice of law, the Regional Director loses a
necessary qualification to the position he or she is holding. The disbarred or suspended lawyer must
desist from holding the position of Regional Director.

This court suspended Atty. Baliga from the practice of law for one year on June 15, 2006, "effective
immediately."75 From the time Atty. Baliga received the court's order of suspension on July 5,
2006,76 he has been without authority to practice law. He lacked a necessary qualification to his
position as Commission on Human Rights Regional Director/ Attorney VI. As the Commission on
Human Rights correctly resolved in its resolution dated January 16, 2007:

WHEREAS, this suspension under ethical standards, in effect, prevents Atty. Baliga from assuming
his post, for want of eligibility in the meantime that his authority to practice law is suspended. This is
without prejudice to the investigation to be conducted to the practice of law of Atty. Baliga, which in
the case of all Regional Human Rights Directors is not generally allowed by the Commission;

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the Commission on Human Rights of the Philippines
resolved to put into effect and implement the legal implications of the SC decision by decreeing the
suspension of Atty. Jimmy P. Baliga in the discharge of his functions and responsibilities as
Director/Attorney VI of CHRP-Region II in Tuguegarao City for the period for which the Supreme
Court Resolution is in effect.77 (Emphasis in the original)

In ordering Atty. Baliga suspended from office as Regional Director, the Commission on Human
Rights did not violate Atty. Baliga's right to due process. First, he was only suspended after:
investigation by the Commission on Human Rights Legal and Investigation Office.78 Second, the
Commission gave Atty. Baliga an opportunity to be heard when he filed his motion for
reconsideration.

Atty. Baliga's performance of generally managerial functions was not supported by the record. It was
also immaterial. He held the position of Commission on Human Rights Regional Director because of
1âw phi 1

his authority to practice law. Without this authority, Atty. Baliga was disqualified to hold that position.

All told, performing the functions of a Commission on Human Rights Regional Director constituted
practice of law. Atty. Baliga should have desisted from holding his position as Regional Director.

Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, willful disobedience to any lawful order of a
superior court is a ground for disbarment or suspension from the practice of law:

SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. - A member
of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any
deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason
of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is
required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a
superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without
authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or
through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.

In Molina v. Atty. Magat,79 this court suspended further Atty. Ceferino R. Magat from the practice of
law for six months for practicing his profession despite this court's previous order of suspension.

We impose the same penalty on Atty. Baliga for holding his position as Regional Director despite
lack.of authority to practice law.
1âw phi 1

We note that the Commission on Human Rights En Banc issued the resolution dated April 13, 2007,
reconsidering its first resolution suspending Atty. Baliga as Regional Director/ Attorney VI. Instead,
the Commission admonished Atty. Baliga and sternly warned him that repeating the same offense
will cause his dismissal from the service. The resolution with CHR (III) No. A2007-045 dated April
13, 2007 reads:

In his Motion for Reconsideration dated March 15, 2007, respondent Atty. Jimmy P. Baliga prays
before the Honorable Commission to recall and annul his suspension as Regional Director/ Attorney
VI of the Commission on Human Rights - Regional Office No. II, per 16 January 2007 Commission
en Banc Resolution CHR (III) No. A2007-013.

The grounds relied upon the motion are not sufficient to convince the Commission that Atty. Jimmy
P. Baliga is totally blameless and should not suffer the appropriate penalty for breach of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and his Lawyer's oath.

The Commission, in the exercise of its authority to discipline, is concerned with the transgression by
Atty. Baliga of his oath of office as government employee. As records have it, the Commission
granted Atty. Baliga authority to secure a commission as a notary public. With this, he is mandated
to act as a notary public in accordance with the rules and regulations, to include the conditions
expressly set forth by the Commission.

With the findings clearly enunciated in the Supreme Court resolution in SC Administrative Case No.
5277 dated 15 June 2006, the Commission cannot close its eyes to the act of Atty. Baliga that is
clearly repugnant to the conduct of an officer reposed with public trust.

This is enough just cause to have this piece of word, short of being enraged, and censure Atty.
Baliga for having contravened the conditions of his commission as a notary public. What was
granted to Atty. Baliga is merely a privilege, the exercise of which requires such high esteem to be in
equal footing with the constitutional mandate of the Commission. Clearly, Atty. Baliga should keep in
mind that the Commission exacts commensurate solicitude from whatever privilege the Commission
grants of every official and employee.

The Commission notes that by now Atty. Baliga is serving the one year suspension imposed on him
pursuant to the Supreme Court resolution. The Commission believes that the further suspension of
Atty. Baliga from the office may be too harsh in the meantime that the Supreme Court penalty is
being served. This Commission is prevailed upon that the admonition of Atty. Baliga as above
expressed is sufficient to complete the cycle of penalizing an erring public officer.
WHEREFORE, the Commission hereby modifies its ruling in Resolution CHR (III) No. A2007-013
and imposes the penalty of admonition with a stem warning that a repetition of the same will merit a
penalty of dismissal from the service.80 (Emphasis in the original)

The Commission on Human Rights erred in issuing the resolution dated April 13, 2007. This
resolution caused Atty. Baliga to reassume his position as Regional Director/ Attorney VI despite
lack of authority to practice law.

We remind the Commission on Human Rights that we have the exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the
practice of law.81 The Commission cannot, by mere resolutions and .other issuances, modify or defy
this court's orders of suspension from the practice of law. Although the Commission on Human
Rights has the power to appoint its officers and employees,82 it can only retain those with the
necessary qualifications in the positions they are holding.

As for Atty. Baliga, we remind him that the practice of law is a "privilege burdened with
conditions."83 To enjoy the privileges of practicing law, lawyers must "[adhere] to the rigid standards
of mental fitness, [maintain] the highest degree of morality[,] and [faithfully comply] with the rules of
[the] legal profession."84

WHEREFORE, we further SUSPEND Atty. Jimmy P. Baliga from the practice of law for six ( 6)
months. Atty. Baliga shall serve a total of one (1) year and six (6) months of suspension from the
practice of law, effective upon service on Atty. Baliga of a copy of this resolution.

SERVE copies of this resolution to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Office of the Bar
Confidant, and the Commission on Human Rights.

SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 10992, June 19, 2018

RODOLFO M. YUMANG, CYNTHIA V. YUMANG AND ARLENE TABULA, Complainants, v. ATTY. EDWIN
M. ALAESTANTE, Respondent.

A.C. No. 10993, , June 19, 2018

BERLIN V. GABERTAN AND HIGINO GABERTAN, Complainants, v. ATTY. EDWIN M.

ALAESTANTE, Respondent.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

Subject of the present Decision are two administrative cases for disbarment, separately filed against Atty.
Edwin M. Alaestante (respondent lawyer) by complainants Rodolfo M. Yumang (Rodolfo), Cynthia V. Yumang
(Cynthia), and Arlene Tabula (Arlene), in A.C. No. 10992, and Berlin V. Gabertan (Berlin), and Higino
Gabertan (Higino), in A.C. No. 10993, (collectively, complainants). Complainants charged respondent lawyer
with violating the Code of Professional Responsibility; gross ignorance of the law; grave misconduct; grave
abuse of authority; gross dishonesty; malpractice; and infidelity to the client.1

Facts

On January 3, 2012, respondent lawyer wrote then Department of Justice (DOJ) Secretary Leila De Lima
(Secretary De Lima) a letter,2viz.:
Dear Secretary De Lima:
May I respectfully request from your Honorable Office for the conduct of preliminary investigation and/or
Prosecution of respondent Cynthia V. Yumang, et al., for the crimes of syndicated Estafa, Qualified Theft and
Grave Threats.

Though mindful that venue/jurisdiction of the alleged crimes is primarily vested with your Public Prosecutor
at Marikina City, we earnestly seek your good favor, and instead take a direct action on our case since
respondent Cynthia V. Yumang is a savvy businesswoman and possesses material wealth and tremendous
political clout and influence at Marikina City, and Complainants have [a] well[-]grounded belief that they
could not obtain justice in [the] said venue. Complainants have already suffered injustice when they [first]
lodged their complaint before the local police but they were instead given [a] run-around and advised for
the 9th time to go back and forth to the Marikina Police Headquarters.

Compounding complainant[']s predicament, they are Engineers/Contractors based at Balanga City[,] Bataan
and have no means and method[s] to steal-mate [sic] respondents influence and political clout at Marikina
City, except via the direct intervention of your office.3
On even date, respondent lawyer's clients, Ernesto S. Mallari (Ernesto) and Danilo A. Rustia, Jr. (Danilo),
executed a Joint Complaint Affidavit against herein complainants for syndicated estafa, qualified theft and
grave threats cases.4

Claiming that respondent lawyer's January 3, 2012 letter contained scurrilous statements intended to malign
and besmirch Cynthia's reputation and business standing, Cynthia and her husband, the complainant
Rodolfo, filed a libel complaint against respondent lawyer, Ernesto, and Danilo before the Pasig City
Prosecutor's Office (libel case).5

In their counter-affidavit, Ernesto and Danilo denied any knowledge of, or participation in, the writing of the
said letter.6

On the other hand, respondent lawyer admitted that he was the author of the letter.7 He denied, however,
that the letter was libelous or defamatory, and insisted that the same was privileged communication. He
claimed that he wrote the letter to protect and advance the interests of Ernesto and Danilo.8

In a Resolution9 dated October 5, 2015, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Pasig found probable cause to
indict respondent lawyer, as well as Ernesto, and Danilo, for the crime of libel.

In the meantime, in a Resolution10 dated November 28, 2012, the DOJ dismissed for lack of merit, the
complaint for syndicated estafa, qualified theft, and grave threats filed by Ernesto and Danilo against herein
complainants.

Based on the foregoing, herein complainants filed on March 7, 2013, two separate disbarment complaints
against respondent lawyer before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).

In their Joint Affidavit of Complaint/Petition for Disbarment,11 complainants Rodolfo, Cynthia, and Arlene
averred that respondent lawyer violated his Oath of Office and the Code of Professional Responsibility, when
he prepared, wrote, signed, and published the malicious and libelous January 3, 2012 letter.

For their part, complainants Berlin and Higino declared in their Sinumpaang Salaysay12 that they were the
respondents in the alleged syndicated estafa, grave threats and qualified theft cases alongside their
relatives, Cynthia and Arlene. They claimed that they had previously engaged respondent lawyer's legal
services in other cases; that since they knew respondent lawyer, they approached him regarding his letter
dated January 3, 2012, but respondent lawyer told them not to worry about the cases mentioned in the said
letter, and promised to draft the appropriate pleadings for their defense; that indeed respondent lawyer
drafted their Counter-Affidavit and their Rejoinder by way of defense; and that in payment for his
professional legal services, they issued respondent lawyer a Bank of Commerce check in the amount of
P50,000.00.

Higino stressed that respondent lawyer's act of preparing their responsive pleadings in the syndicated
estafa, grave threats and qualified theft cases was violative of the proscription against lawyers representing
conflicting interests since he was the very same lawyer who initiated and/or drafted the complaint in these
cases against them; and that as a consequence thereof, he (Berlin) moved to discharge respondent lawyer
as counsel in another case.13

In his Answer,14 respondent lawyer admitted that he was the author of the January 3, 2012 letter to then
DOJ Secretary De Lima; but he insisted that the letter was privileged because it was written in response to a
moral or legal duty, he being the lawyer for his clients in the cases mentioned in the letter. He denied that
he was the defense counsel for Berlin and Higino in the syndicated estafa, grave threats and qualified theft
cases, and averred that the P50,000.00 check that was issued in his favor by Berlin and Higino was just a
"petty portion" of the P1.1 million that he previously entrusted to Berlin and Higino relative to a case that he
lawyered for them.

Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner:

In a Report and Recommendation15 dated September 10, 2013, the Investigating

Commissioner16 recommended respondent lawyer's suspension from the practice of law for six months, in
connection with the disbarment case filed by Cynthia, Rodolfo, and Arlene; and suspension from the practice
of law for one year, in regard to the disbarment case filed by Berlin and Higino.

The Investigating Commissioner ratiocinated that -

It is admitted that Respondent authored a letter addressed to the Secretary of DOJ on January 03, 2012 and
the matter was investigated by the DOJ but the same was dismissed for lack of merit. x x x

That prior to January 03, 2012 x x x filing of the charges with the DOJ, against herein Complainants, Berlin
and Higino Gabertan engaged the services of Respondent as their counsel in several cases since April 2011
to August 31, 2012.

That Respondent received the amount of P50,000.00 from Berlin and Higino Gabertan thru Bank of
Commerce check No. 0000008 dated June 11, 2012 and personally encashed by the Respondent (Exh. H). x
xx

That because of that letter filed with the DOJ by Respondent and [which] was [later] dismissed,
complainants filed a libel case with the RTC, Pasig City Branch 157 (Exh. D).

That the letter filed by Respondent with the DOJ [was] correctly ruled by the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Pasig City, as not privileged communication as it [was] not made in the course of judicial proceedings. (Exh.
C).

That Respondent acted as defense counsel for Berlin and Higino Gabertan whom he charged together with
the other complainants with the DOJ (Exh. L).

Clearly, Respondent violated the prohibition that [a] lawyer should not represent new clients whose interest
oppose those of a former client in any manner, whether or not they are parties in the same action or totally
unrelated cases. (In Re Dela Rosa, 27 Phil. 258. Lim et al. vs. Villorosa A.C. 5303 June 15, 2006).

It is enough that the counsel of one party had a hand in the preparation of the pleading of the other party,
claiming adverse and conflicting interest with that of his original client. (Artezuela vs. Madferazo, A.C. No.
4354 April 22, 2002).

Respondent violated his Lawyer's Oath when he sent unsealed malicious and libelous letter against herein
Complainants without any effort to ascertain the truth thus constituted gross evident bad faith for which act
he is liable in CBD Case No. 13-3767 while for acting as counsel for the complainant in the case before the
DOJ and [at] the same time preparing the counter affidavit of Berlin and Higino Gabertan who were
Respondents] in the DOJ case he filed against herein complainants, thus he is also liable under CBD Case
No. 13-3767.

It was found out also [that] the Respondent was the defense counsel of Berlin Gabertan whom he charged
before the DOJ in an ongoing civil case at San Mateo, Rizal RTC Branch 76 but claimed that he was just
acting as counsel pro-bono.

Complainants having presented sufficient evidence thus proving their case by clear preponderance of
evidenced it is hereby recommended that Respondent be meted the appropriate penalty for the violation he
committed.17
Report and Recommendation of the IBP-Board of Governors (BOG):

Finding the Report and Recommendation supported by law and the evidence, the IBP-BOG adopted and
accepted the Investigating Commissioner's recommendation, but with modification as regards the
recommended penalty in that respondent lawyer be suspended from the practice of law for one year in the
complaint filed by Cynthia, Rodolfo, and Arlene; and for two years, in the case filed by Berlin and
Higino,18 said penalties to be served successively.

Ruling

These administrative cases bear some factual resemblance to Pacana, Jr. v. Atty. Pascual-
Lopez.19 In Pacana, Jr., the lawyer denied any lawyer-client relationship with the complainant, saying that
no formal agreement had been entered to that effect; also, the therein counsel questioned the admissibility
of an electronic mail he sent to therein complainant. In said case, the lawyer likewise assured the
complainant that there was nothing to worry about when the latter expressed doubts over the propriety of
the lawyer's representing conflicting interests. We therein rejected the erring lawyer's defenses, thus:
Respondent also tries to disprove the existence of such relationship by arguing that no written contract for
the engagement of her services was ever forged between her and complainant. This argument all the more
reveals respondent's patent ignorance of fundamental laws on contracts and of basic ethical standards
expected from an advocate of justice. The IBP was correct when it said:
The absence of a written contract will not preclude the finding that there was a professional relationship
between the parties. Documentary formalism is not an essential element in the employment of an
attorney; the contract may be express or implied. To establish the relation, it is sufficient that the
advice and assistance of an attorney is sought and received in any matter pertinent to his profession.
Given the situation, the most decent and ethical tiling which respondent should have done was either to
advise complainant to engage the services of another lawyer since she was already representing the
opposing parties, or to desist from acting as representative of Multitel investors and stand as counsel for
complainant. She cannot be permitted to do both because that would amount to double-dealing and violate
our ethical rules on conflict of interest.20 (Emphasis in the original)
What is more, administrative cases are sui generis.21 This Court, acting as the legal profession's sole
disciplinary body, is not strictly bound by the technical rules of procedure and evidence.22 Indeed, hewing
strictly to technical rules of procedure and evidence could at times thwart this Court's efforts to rid the legal
profession of unscrupulous individuals who use their very knowledge of the law to perpetrate fraud or
commit transgressions to the detriment of their clients, who purposefully have sought their legal opinion and
assistance in the hopes of attaining justice.

Here, even disregarding the electronic mail sent by respondent lawyer, we are satisfied that other
incontrovertible evidence supports the allegation that a lawyer-client relationship did exist, or had been
established, between respondent lawyer on the one hand, and Berlin and Higino on the other. For one thing,
it was remarkable that respondent lawyer never refuted or denied Berlin's claim that he (Atty. Alaestante)
represented him in a civil case pending before the Regional Trial Court of San Mateo, Rizal (RTC-Rizal). As
against a Motion to Discharge Counsel duly filed with the RTC-Rizal, respondent lawyer's bare denial of the
existence of a lawyer-client relationship is of no avail.23 Caught in a web of lies, Atty. Alaestante even
contradicted himself when he stated that "[a]fter having been convinced of the personalities of Berlin and
Higino Gabeitan in relation to counsel'[s] pro bono handling of the case in RTC San Mateo, as well as the
smell of estafa having been committed by Berlin Gabeitan against the plaintiff thereof, counsel decided not
to pursue defending defendant Gabertan."24 That is the problem with fibs, falsehoods, dissemblances,
prevarications, and half-truths. They not only collide with the truth, they also collide with each other.

More than these, guided by the tenor of a Memorandum of Agreement25 (MOA) constituted between or
amongst, Berlin, respondent lawyer, and two other persons, it can hardly be doubted that Berlin and
respondent lawyer had a close relationship with the parties therein, and that he offered his legal expertise to
the said parties. This is evident from the language of the MOA where Berlin and respondent lawyer were
collectively referred to as the "second parties" who were able to secure "a favorable decision dated August
26, 2011 from the Honorable Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila[,] Branch 26" and were hired "to recover
actual and physical possession over" a parcel of land.26

It is almost a cliche to say that a lawyer is forbidden "from representing conflicting interests except by
written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. Such prohibition is founded on
principles of public policy and good taste as the nature of the lawyer-client relations is one of trust and
confidence of the highest degree. Lawyers are expected not only to keep inviolate the client's confidence,
but also to avoid the appearance of [impropriety] and double-dealing for only then can litigants be
encouraged to entrust their secrets to their lawyers, which is of paramount importance in the administration
of justice.27

The alleged "non-payment of professional [fees, even if true, would] not exculpate respondent [lawyer] from
liability. [The a]bsence of monetary consideration does not exempt lawyers from complying with the
prohibition against pursuing cases with conflicting interests. The prohibition attaches from the moment the
attorney-client relationship is established and extends even beyond the duration of the professional
relationship."28

The sending of the unsealed scurrilous letter by respondent lawyer to DOJ Secretary De Lima, was a
violation of Rule 8.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which stipulates that "[a] lawyer shall not,
in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper." In that letter,
not only did respondent lawyer employ intemperate or unbridled language, he was also guilty of corner-
cutting unprofessionally. His act of directly asking the Secretary of Justice to intervene immediately in the
syndicated estafa, grave threats and qualified theft cases showed his propensity for utterly disregarding the
rules of procedure which had been formulated precisely to regulate and govern legal and judicial processes
properly.

Under the circumstances, we find the penalty of suspension for six (6) months from the practice of law, in
connection with A.C. No. 10992, and suspension for one (1) year from the practice of law, in connection with
A.C. No. 10993, as recommended by the Investigating Commissioner, proper and commensurate.

ACCORDINGLY, this Court resolves to SUSPEND Atty. Edwin M. Alaestante from the practice of law for six
(6) months in A.C. No. 10992 and for one (1) year in A.C. No. 10993, reckoned from his receipt of this
Decision, said penalties to be sewed in succession, with a WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar
offense will warrant a more severe penalty.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished all courts, the Office of the Bar Confidant, and the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines for their information and guidance. The Office of the Bar Confidant is also DIRECTED to
append a copy of this Decision to respondent's record as a member of the Bar.

SO ORDERED.

June 19, 2017

A.C. No. 11600

ROMULO DE MESA FESTIN, Complainant

vs.
ATTY. ROLANDO V. ZUBIRI, Respondent

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

This administrative case stemmed from an affidavit-complaint1 filed by complainant Romulo De Mesa
Festin (complainant) against respondent Atty. Rolando V. Zubiri (respondent) before the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for gross violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).

The Facts

Complainant alleged that he was elected as Mayor of the Municipality of San Jose, Occidental
Mindoro in the May 2013 elections. His opponent, Jose Tapales Villarosa (Villarosa), filed an
election protest against him before the Regional Trial Court of San Jose, Occidental Mindoro,
Branch 46 (RTC). 2 After deciding in favor of Villarosa, the RTC issued an Order3 dated January 15,
2014 (January 15, 2014 Order), granting his motion for execution pending appeal, viz.:

WHEREFORE, the Motion for Execution Pending Appeal is GRANTED.

The OIC-Branch Clerk of Court [(COC)] is hereby directed to issue a Writ of Execution Pending
Appeal after the lapse of twenty (20) working days to be counted from the time [complainant's]
counsel receives a copy of this Special Order, if no restraining order or status quo order is issued
pursuant to Section 11 (b),4 Rule 14 of A.M. No. 07- 4-15-SC. 5 (Emphasis supplied)

Distressed, complainant filed a petition for certiorari 6 before the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC), seeking a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) against the issuance of the writ of
execution pending appeal.7 In an Order 8 dated February 13, 2014, the COMELEC issued a TRO,
directing Hon. Gay Marie F. Lubigan-Rafael (RTC Judge), in her official capacity as Presiding Judge
of the RTC, to cease and desist from enforcing the January 15, 2014 Order, effective
immediately.9 Accordingly, the RTC issued another Order10 dated February 25, 2014 (February 25,
2014 Order), pertinent portion of which reads:

In view thereof, the OIC-Branch [COC] is directed NOT TO ISSUE a Writ of Execution in accordance
with the [January 15, 2014] Order until further notice. 11 Despite the TRO and the RTC's February 25,
2014 Order, respondent, as counsel of Villarosa, filed five (5) manifestations 12 addressed to the
COC insisting on the writ's issuance. Notably, he did not serve copies of these manifestations to the
other party. 13

In these manifestations, respondent claimed that his client received the RTC's January 15, 2014
Order on January 18, 2014, and counting from said date, the twenty-day period ended on February
12, 2014. 14 Since the COMELEC only issued the TRO on February 13, 2014, the TRO no longer had
any effect. Respondent further asserted that the TRO was addressed only to the RTC Judge, and
not to the COC; therefore, the COC is not bound by the TRO. For these reasons, respondent
insisted that the COC could legally issue the writ of execution pending appeal. 15

The COC eventually issued a Writ of Execution Pending Appeal addressed to the sheriff. However,
complainant only found out about respondent's manifestations when the sheriff attempted to serve
the writ on him. 16 Soon thereafter, complainant filed the disbarment complaint.

In his complaint, complainant argued that respondent violated his ethical duties when he misled and
induced the COC to defy lawful orders - particularly, the COMELEC's TRO and the RTC's February
25, 2014 Order. 17 As a result, respondent allegedly violated Canons 1, 10, 15, and 19 of the CPR.18

In his answer, 19 respondent claimed that, first, since the case records had been transmitted to the
COMELEC on January 31, 2014, the RTC was divested of jurisdiction over the case; therefore, it
had no more power to issue the February 25, 2014 Order. 20 Respondent put forward the same
reason for filing the five manifestations with the COC instead of the RTC Judge.21 Second, the
manifestations contained no misleading statements or factual deviations. He merely stated in his
manifestations his honest belief that the twenty-day period had already lapsed when the COMELEC
issued its TRO; hence, it no longer had any binding effect. He explained that the filing of
manifestations to highlight his position did not violate any rule. 22 Third, he allegedly filed those
manifestations pursuant to his duty under Canon 18 of the CPR to represent his client with
competence and diligence. 23

The IBP's Report and Recommendation

In a Report and Recommendation 24 dated September 1, 2014, the Investigating Commissioner

recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months. 25 He
observed that by filing manifestations instead of motions, respondent was able to disregard the rule
that motions shall be served on the other party and shall contain a notice of hearing. In this regard,
the Investigating Commissioner noted that a manifestation merely informs the court about a certain
matter involving the case, and does not require affirmative action by the court. In the present case,
however, the manifestations filed by respondent were actually motions as these contained
arguments to support his prayer for the issuance of a writ of execution pending appeal. Moreover,
the Investigating Commissioner also held that respondent acted in bad faith when he convinced the
COC to disregard the COMELEC's TRO. He pointed out that when the TRO enjoins the court, it
includes the judge and all officers and employees of the court, including the clerk of court. Hence,
respondent was unfair to the other party and employed deceit when he filed the manifestations. As a
result, the other party was not afforded due process by being deprived of an opportunity to oppose
the manifestations 26

In a Resolution 27 dated December 14, 2014, the IBP Board of Governors (IBP Board) adopted and
approved the Report and Recommendation of the Investigation Commissioner.

Respondent moved for reconsideration, 28 which was, however, denied in a Resolution 29 dated May
28, 2016.

On October 10, 2016, respondent filed a petition for review30 before the Court purportedly pursuant to
the procedure laid out in Ramientas v. Reyala (Ramientas ). 31

The Issue Before the Court

The core issue in this case is whether or not respondent should be held administratively liable for the
acts complained of.

The Court's Ruling

I.

At the outset, the Court deems it proper to clarify that respondent's filing of the instant petition for
review does not conform with the standing procedure for the investigation of administrative
complaints against lawyers.

Section 12 (b) and (c) of Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, as amended by Bar Matter No. 1645
dated October 13, 2015,32 states:

Section 12. Review and Recommendation by the Board of Governors. -

xxxx

b) After its review, the Board, by the vote of a majority of its total membership, shall recommend to
the Supreme Court the dismissal of the complaint or the imposition of disciplinary action against the
respondent. The Board shall issue a resolution setting forth its findings and recommendations,
clearly and distinctly stating the facts and the reasons on which it is based. The resolution shall be
issued within a period not exceeding thirty (30) days from the next meeting of the Board following the
submission of the Investigator's report.

c) The Board's resolution, together with the entire records and all evidence presented and submitted,
shall be transmitted to the Supreme Court for final action within ten (10) days from issuance of the
resolution.

x x x x (Emphases supplied)
Under the old rule, the IBP Board had the power to "issue a decision" if the lawyer complained of
was either exonerated or meted a penalty of "less than suspension of disbarment." In this situation,
the case would be deemed terminated unless an interested party files a petition before the
Court.33 The case of Ramientas,34 which was cited as respondent's basis for filing the present petition
for review, was pronounced based on the old rule.35

In contrast, under the amended provisions cited above, the IBP Board's resolution is merely
recommendatory regardless of the penalty imposed on the lawyer. The amendment stresses the
Court's authority to discipline a lawyer who transgresses his ethical duties under the CPR.

Hence, any final action on a lawyer's administrative liability shall be done by the Court based on the
entire records of the case, including the IBP Board's recommendation, without need for the lawyer-
respondent to file any additional pleading.

On this score, respondent's filing of the present petition for review is unnecessary. Pursuant to the
current rule, the IBP Board's resolution and the case records were forwarded to the Court. The latter
is then bound to fully consider all documents contained therein, regardless of any further pleading
filed by any party - including respondent's petition for review, which the Court shall nonetheless
consider if only to completely resolve the merits of this case and determine respondent's actual
administrative liability.

II.

After a judicious review of the case records, the Court agrees with the IBP that respondent should be
held administratively liable for his violations of the CPR. However, the Court finds it proper to impose
a lower penalty.

Canon 1 of the CPR mandates lawyers to uphold the Constitution and promote respect for the legal
processes.36 Additionally, Canon 8 and Rule 10.03, Canon 10 of the CPR require lawyers to conduct
themselves with fairness towards their professional colleagues, to observe procedural rules, and not
to misuse them to defeat the ends of justice. These provisions read thus:

CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAW OF THE LAND
AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.

xxxx

CANON 8 - A LAWYER SHALL CONDUCT HIMSELF WITH COURTESY, FAIRNESS AND

CANDOR TOWARDS HIS PROFESSIONAL COLLEAGUES, AND SHALL A VOID HARASSING
TACTICS AGAINST OPPOSING COUNSEL.

xxxx

CANON 10 -A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT.

xxxx

Rule 10.03 - A lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure and shall not misuse them to defeat the
ends of justice.
Contrary to these edicts, respondent improperly filed the five (5) motions as "manifestations" to
sidestep the requirement of notice of hearing for motions. In effect, he violated his professional
obligations to respect and observe procedural rules, not to misuse the rules to cause injustice, and
to exhibit fairness towards his professional colleagues.

The difference between a manifestation and a motion is essential in determining respondent's

administrative liability.
1âw phi1

A manifestation is usually made merely for the information of the court, unless otherwise indicated.
In a manifestation, the manifesting party makes a statement to inform the court, rather than to
contest or argue.37 In contrast, a motion is an application for relief from the court other than by a
pleading38 and must be accompanied by a notice of hearing and proof of service to the other party,
unless the motion is not prejudicial to the rights of the adverse party. 39 Settled is the rule that a
motion without notice of hearing is proforma or a mere scrap of paper; thus, the court has no reason
to consider it and the clerk has no right to receive it. The reason for the rule is simple: to afford an
opportunity for the other party to agree or object to the motion before the court resolves it. This is in
keeping with the principle of due process. 40

In the present case, respondent filed five (5) manifestations before the COC praying for affirmative
reliefs. The Court agrees with the IBP that these "manifestations" were in fact motions, since reliefs
were prayed for from the court - particularly, the issuance of the writ of execution pending appeal. By
labelling them as manifestations, respondent craftily sidestepped the requirement of a notice of
hearing and deprived the other party of an opportunity to oppose his arguments. Moreover, the fact
that he submitted these manifestations directly to COC, instead of properly filing them before the
RTC, highlights his failure to exhibit fairness towards the other party by keeping the latter completely
unaware of his manifestations. Undoubtedly, respondent violated his professional obligations under
the CPR.

In the present case, respondent filed five (5) manifestations before the COC praying for affirmative
reliefs. The Court agrees with the IBP that these "manifestations" were in fact motions, since reliefs
were prayed for from the court - particularly, the issuance of the writ of execution pending appeal. By
labelling them as manifestations, respondent craftily sidestepped the requirement of a notice of
hearing and deprived the other party of an opportunity to oppose his arguments. Moreover, the fact
that he submitted these manifestations directly to COC, instead of properly filing them before the
RTC, highlights his failure to exhibit fairness towards the other party by keeping the latter completely
unaware of his manifestations. Undoubtedly, respondent violated his professional obligations under
the CPR.

He attempts to justify his acts by arguing that he merely represented his client with competence and
diligence. However, respondent should be reminded that a lawyer is ethically bound not only to
serve his client but also the court, his colleagues, and society. His obligation to represent his client is
not without limits, but must be "within the bounds of the law" pursuant to Canon 19 of the CPR.
Accordingly, he is ethically bound to employ only fair and honest means to attain their clients'
objectives.

Respondent further argues that his filing of the manifestations with the COC is justified considering
that the RTC had already lost jurisdiction over the case and the COC had the ministerial duty to
issue the writ of execution. His argument fails to persuade. The Court has ruled that a COC has a
ministerial duty to issue a writ of execution when the judge directs its issuance.41 In this case,
however, the RTC Judge had issued the second Order (dated February 25, 2014) explicitly directing
the COC "NOT TO ISSUE a Writ of Execution." Therefore, the COC in this case did not have a
ministerial duty to issue the writ of execution. If respondent honestly believed that his client was
entitled to the writ, then he should not have clandestinely submitted ex parte manifestations directly
to the COC to coerce the latter to grant his intended relief. Instead, respondent should have filed the
proper motions before the court, which alone has the inherent power to grant his prayer pursuant to
Section 5 (c), (d), and (g), Rule 135 of the Rules of Court.42

The Court has the plenary power to discipline erring lawyers. In the exercise of its sound judicial
discretion, it may to impose a less severe punishment if such penalty would achieve the desired end
of reforming the errant lawyer. 43 In light of the foregoing discussion, the Court deems that a penalty
of suspension from the practice of law for three (3) months is sufficient and commensurate with
respondent's infractions.44

As a final note, the Court stresses that a lawyer's primary duty is to assist the courts in the
administration of justice. Any conduct that tends to delay, impede, or obstruct the administration of
justice contravenes this obligation. 45 Indeed, a lawyer must champion his client's cause with
competence and diligence, but he cannot invoke this as an excuse for his failure to exhibit courtesy
and fairness to his fellow lawyers and to respect legal processes designed to afford due process to
all stakeholders.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Rolando V. Zubiri (respondent) is found GUILTY of violating Canon
1, Canon 8, and Rule 10.03, Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he
is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3) months effective from the finality of this
Decision, and is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with
more severely.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be attached to
respondent's personal record as a member of the Bar. Furthermore, let copies of the same be
served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator, which is
directed to circulate them to all courts in the country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 5338 February 23, 2009

EUGENIA MENDOZA, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. VICTOR V. DECIEMBRE, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:

Any departure from the path which a lawyer must follow as demanded by the virtues of his
profession shall not be tolerated by this Court as the disciplining authority for there is perhaps no
profession after that of the sacred ministry in which a high-toned morality is more imperative than
that of law.1

Before the Court is the Petition filed by Eugenia Mendoza (complainant) dated September 19, 2000,
seeking the disbarment of Atty. Victor V. Deciembre (respondent) for his acts of fraudulently filling up
blank postdated checks without her authority and using the same for filing unfounded criminal suits
against her.
Complainant, a mail sorter at the Central Post Office Manila, averred that: On October 13, 1998, she
borrowed from Rodela Loans, Inc., through respondent, the amount of ₱20,000.00 payable in six
months at 20% interest, secured by 12 blank checks, with numbers 47253, 47256 to 47266, drawn
against the Postal Bank. Although she was unable to faithfully pay her obligations on their due dates,
she made remittances, however, to respondent's Metrobank account from November 11, 1998 to
March 15, 1999 in the total sum of ₱12,910.00.2 Claiming that the amounts remitted were not
enough to cover the penalties, interests and other charges, respondent warned complainant that he
would deposit Postal Check No. 47253 filled up by him on March 30, 1999 in the amount of
₱16,000.00. Afraid that respondent might sue her in court, complainant made good said check and
respondent was able to encash the same on March 30, 1999. Thereafter, complainant made
subsequent payments to the Metrobank account of respondent from April 13, 1999 to October 15,
1999,3 thereby paying respondent the total sum of ₱35,690.00.4

Complainant further claimed that, later, respondent filled up two of the postal checks she issued in
blank, Check Nos. 47261 and 47262 with the amount of ₱50,000.00 each and with the dates
January 15, 2000 and January 20, 2000 respectively, which respondent claims was in exchange for
the ₱100,000.00 cash that complainant received on November 15, 1999. Complainant insisted
however that she never borrowed ₱100,000.00 from respondent and that it was unlikely that
respondent would lend her, a mail sorter with a basic monthly salary of less than ₱6,000.00, such
amount. Complainant also claimed that respondent victimized other employees of the Postal Office
by filling up, without authorization, blank checks issued to him as condition for loans.5

In his Comment dated January 18, 2000, respondent averred that his dealings with complainant
were done in his private capacity and not as a lawyer, and that when he filed a complaint for
violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. (B.P. Blg.) 22 against complainant, he was only vindicating his
rights as a private citizen. He alleged further that: it was complainant who deliberately deceived him
by not honoring her commitment to their November 15, 1999 transaction involving ₱100,000.00 and
covered by two checks which bounced for the reason "account closed"; the October 13, 1999
transaction was a separate and distinct transaction; complainant filed the disbarment case against
him to get even with him for filing the estafa and B.P. Blg. 22 case against the former; complainant's
claim that respondent filled up the blank checks issued by complainant is a complete lie; the truth
was that the checks referred to were already filled up when complainant affixed her signature
thereto; it was unbelievable that complainant would issue blank checks, and that she was a mere
low-salaried employee, since she was able to maintain several checking accounts; and if he really
intended to defraud complainant, he would have written a higher amount on the checks instead of
only ₱50,000.00.6

The case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines7 (IBP), and the parties were required
to file their position papers.8

In her Position Paper, complainant, apart from reiterating her earlier claims, alleged that respondent,
after the hearing on the disbarment case before the IBP on September 5, 2001, again filled up three
of her blank checks, Check Nos. 47263, 47264 and 47265, totaling ₱100,000.00, to serve as basis
for another criminal complaint, since the earlier estafa and B.P. Blg. 22 case filed by respondent
against her before the Office of the Prosecutor of Pasig City was dismissed on August 14, 2000.9

Respondent insisted in his Position Paper, however, that complainant borrowed ₱100,000.00 in
exchange for two postdated checks, and that since he had known complainant for quite some time,
he accepted said checks on complainant's assurance that they were good as cash.10

Investigating Commissioner Wilfredo E.J.E. Reyes submitted his Report dated September 6, 2002,
finding respondent guilty of dishonesty and recommended respondent's suspension from the
practice of law for one year.11 The Report was adopted and approved by the IBP Board of Governors
in its Resolution dated October 19, 2002.12 Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was
denied, however, by the IBP Board of Governors on January 25, 2003 on the ground that it no longer
had jurisdiction on the matter, as the same was already endorsed to the Supreme Court.13

On June 9, 2003 this Court's Second Division issued a Resolution remanding the case to the IBP for
the conduct of formal investigation, as the Report of Commissioner Reyes was based merely on the
pleadings submitted.14

After hearings were conducted,15 Investigating Commissioner Dennis A. B. Funa submitted his
Report dated December 5, 2006 finding respondent guilty of gross misconduct and violation of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, and recommended respondent's suspension for three years.16

Commissioner Funa held that while it was difficult at first to determine who between complainant and
respondent was telling the truth, in the end, respondent himself, with his own contradicting
allegations, showed that complainant's version should be given more credence.17

Commissioner Funa noted that although complainant's total obligation to respondent was only
₱24,000.00, since the loan obtained by complainant on October 13, 1998 was ₱20,000.00 at 20%
interest payable in six months, by April 13, 1999, however, complainant had actually paid
respondent the total amount of ₱30,240.00. Thus, even though the payment was irregularly given,
respondent actually earned more than the agreed upon 20% interest. Moreover, the amounts of
₱50,000.00 as well as the name of the payee in the subject checks were all typewritten18

Commissioner Funa also gave credence to complainant's claim that it was respondent's modus
operandi to demand a certain amount as "settlement" for the dropping of estafa complaints against
his borrowers. As Commissioner Funa explains:

[A] complaint for estafa/violation of BP 22 was filed against [complainant] before the Prosecutor's
Office in Pasig City on June 21, 2000. On August 14, 2000, the Prosecutor's Office dismissed the
complaint. On October 2, 2000, Complainant filed this disbarment case. About one year later, or on
September 5, 2001, Complainant was surprised to receive a demand letter demanding payment
once again for another ₱100,000.00 corresponding to another three checks, Check Nos. 0047263,
0047264 and 0047265.

Furthermore, Respondent filed another criminal complaint for estafa/violation of BP 22 dated

October 17, 2001, this time before the QC Prosecutor's Office. The prosecutor's office recommended
the filing of the criminal case for one of the checks.

xxxx

Respondent's version, on the other hand, is that Check Nos. 0047261 and 0047262 were given to
him for loans (rediscounting) contacted on November 15, 1999 and not for a loan contracted on
October 13, 1998. x x x He claims that the October 13, 1998 transaction is an earlier and different
transaction. x x x On the very next day, or on November 16, 1999, Complainant again allegedly
contracted another loan for another ₱100,000.00 for which Complainant allegedly issued the
following Postal Bank checks [Check No. 0047263 dated May 16, 2001 for ₱20,000.00; Check No.
0047264 dated May 30, 2001 for ₱30,000.00 and Check No. 0047265 dated June 15, 2001 for
₱50,000.00].

xxxx
Oddly though, Respondent never narrated that Complainant obtained a second loan on November
16, 1999 in his Answer [dated January 18, 2000] and in his Position Paper [dated October 8, 2001].
He did not even discuss it in his Motion for Reconsideration dated December 20, 2002, although he
attached the Resolution of the QC Prosecutor's Office. Clearly, the November 16, 1999
transaction was a mere concoction that did not actually occur. It was a mere afterthought.
Respondent once again filled-up three of the other checks in his possession (checks dated May 16,
2001, May 30, 2001 and June 15, 2001) so that he can again file another estafa/BP 22 case against
Complainant (October 17, 2001) AFTER the earlier complaint he had filed before the Pasig City
Prosecutor's Office had been dismissed (August 14, 2000) and AFTER herein Complainant had filed
this disbarment case (October 2, 2000).

More telling, and this is where Respondent gets caught, are the circumstances attending this second
loan of November 16, 1999. In addition to not mentioning it at all in his Answer, his Position Paper,
and his Motion for Reconsideration, which makes it very strange, is that fact that he alleges that the
loan was contracted on November 16, 1999 for which Complainant supposedly issued checks dated
May 16, 2001, May 30, 2001 and June 15, 2001. Note that May 16, 2001 is eighteen (18 months), or
1 year and 6 months, from November 16, 1999. This is strangely a long period for loans of this
nature. This loan was supposedly not made in writing, only verbally. With no collaterals and no
guarantors. Clearly, this is a non-existent transaction. It was merely concocted by Respondent.

More importantly, and this is where Respondent commits his fatal blunder thus exposing his
illegal machinations, Complainant allegedly received ₱100,000.00 in cash on November 16, 1999 for
which Complainant gave Respondent, in return, checks also amounting to ₱100,000.00. The checks
were supposedly dated May 16, 2001, May 30, 2001 and June 15, 2001 x x x.

Now then, would not Respondent suffer a financial loss if he gave away ₱100,000.00 on November
16, 1999 and then also receive ₱100,000.00 on May 16, 2001 or 1 year and 6 months later? A
person engaged in lending business would want to earn interest. The same also with a person re-
discounting checks. In this instance, in his haste to concoct a story, Respondent forgot to factor in
the interest. At 20% interest, assuming that it is per annum, for 1½ years, Respondent should have
collected from Complainant at least ₱130,000.00. And yet the checks he filled up totaled only
₱100,000.00. The same is true in re-discounting a check. If Complainant gave Respondent
₱100,000.00 in checks, Respondent should be giving Complainant an amount less than
₱100,000.00. This exposes his story as a fabrication.

The same observations can be made of the first loan of ₱100,000.00 secured by Check Nos.
0047261 and 0047262.

More strangely, during the course of the entire investigation, Respondent never touched on what
transpired on the dates of November 15 and 16, 1999. Consider that Complainant's position is that
no such transaction took place on November 15 and 16. And yet, Respondent never made any effort
to establish that Complainant borrowed ₱100,000.00 on November 15 and then another
₱100,000.00 again on November 16. Respondent merely focused on establishing that Complainant's
checks bounced --- a fact already admitted several times by the Complainant --- and the reasons for
which were already explained by Complainant. This only shows the lack of candor of Respondent.19

xxxx

We take note further that Complainant is a mere mail sorter earning less than ₱6,000.00 per
month. Who would lend ₱200,000.00 to an employee earning such a salary, nowadays, and not
even secure such a loan with a written document or a collateral? It defies realities of finance,
economy and business. It even defies common sense.20
Commissioner Funa also took note that the instant case had practically the same set of facts as
in Olbes v. Deciembre21 and Acosta v. Deciembre.22 In Olbes, complainants therein, who were also
postal employees, averred that respondent without authority filled up a total of four checks to
represent a total of ₱200,000.00. In Acosta, the complainant therein, another postal employee,
averred that respondent filled up two blank checks for a total of ₱100,000.00. Acosta, however, was
dismissed by Commissioner Lydia Navarro on the ground that it did not involve any lawyer-client
relationship, which ground, Commissioner Funa believes, is erroneous.23

On May 31, 2007, the IBP Board of Governors issued a resolution adopting and approving
Commissoner Funa's Report, but modifying the penalty, as follows:

RESOLUTION NO. XVII-2007-219

Adm. Case No. 5338
Eugenia Mendoza vs.
Atty. Victor V. Deciembre

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, with

modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-
entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation
fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering
Respondent's gross misconduct and for practically found guilty of committing the same set of facts
alleged in AC 5365, Atty. Victor V. Deciembre is hereby SUSPENDED INDEFINITELY from the
practice of law to be served successively after the lifting of Respondent's Indefinite Suspension.24

Although no motion for reconsideration was filed before the IBP Board of Governors, nor a petition
for review before this Court as reported by IBP and Office of the Bar Confidant, the Court considers
the IBP Resolution merely recommendatory and therefore would not attain finality, pursuant to par.
(b), Section 12, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court. The IBP elevated to this Court the entire records
of the case for appropriate action.

The Court agrees with the findings of the IBP, but finds that disbarment and not just indefinite
suspension is in order.

The practice of law is not a right but merely a privilege bestowed by the State upon those who show
that they possess, and continue to possess, the qualifications required by law for the conferment of
such privilege.25 A high sense of morality, honesty and fair dealing is expected and required of
members of the bar.26 They must conduct themselves with great propriety, and their behavior must
be beyond reproach anywhere and at all times.27

The fact that there is no attorney-client relationship in this case and the transactions entered into by
respondent were done in his private capacity cannot shield respondent, as a lawyer, from liability.

A lawyer may be disciplined for acts committed even in his private capacity for acts which tend to
bring reproach on the legal profession or to injure it in the favorable opinion of the public.28 Indeed,
there is no distinction as to whether the transgression is committed in a lawyer's private life or in his
professional capacity, for a lawyer may not divide his personality as an attorney at one time and a
mere citizen at another.29

In this case, evidence abounds that respondent has failed to live up to the standards required of
members of the legal profession. Specifically, respondent has transgressed provisions of the Code
of Professional Responsibility, to wit:
CANON 1 – A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for
law and legal processes.

Rule 1.01. - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

xxxx

CANON 7 – A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and
support the activities of the integrated bar.

xxxx

Rule 7.03. A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law,
nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the
legal profession.

As correctly observed by IBP Investigating Commissioner Funa, respondent failed to mention in his
Comment dated January 18, 2000, in his Position Paper dated October 8, 2001 and in his Motion for
Reconsideration dated December 20, 2002, the ₱100,000.00 loan which complainant supposedly
contracted on November 16, 1999. It is also questionable why the checks dated May 16, 2001, May
30, 2001 and June 15, 2001 which were supposedly issued to secure a loan contracted about 18
months earlier, i.e. November 16, 1999, were made without any interest. The same is true with the
checks dated January 15 and 20, 2000 in the total sum of ₱100,000.00, which were supposed to
secure a loan contracted on November 15, 1999, for the same amount. Considering these
circumstances and the sequence of dates when respondent filed his criminal cases against
complainant, and complainant her disbarment case against respondent, what truly appears more
believable is complainant's claim that respondent was merely utilizing the blank checks, filling them
up, and using them as bases for criminal cases in order to harass complainant.

The Court also notes that the checks being refuted by complainant, dated January 15 and 20, 2000,
May 16, 2001, May 30, 2001 and June 15, 200130 had its dates, amounts and payee's name all
typewritten, while the blanks on the check for ₱16,000.00 dated March 30, 1999 which complainant
used to pay part of her original loan, were all filled up in her handwriting.31

It is also observed that the present case was not the only instance when respondent committed his
wrongful acts. In Olbes,32 complainants therein contracted a loan from respondent in the amount of
₱10,000.00 on July 1, 1999, for which they issued five blank checks as collateral. Notwithstanding
their full payment of the loan, respondent filled up four of the blank checks with the amount of
₱50,000.00 each with different dates of maturity and used the same in filing estafa and B.P. Blg. 22
cases against complainants. The Court, in imposing the penalty of indefinite suspension on
respondent, found his propensity for employing deceit and misrepresentation as reprehensible and
his misuse of the filled up checks, loathsome.33

In Acosta,34 complainant therein also averred that on August 1, 1998, she borrowed ₱20,000.00 from
respondent with an interest of 20% payable in six months and guaranteed by twelve blank checks.
Although she had already paid the total amount of ₱33,300.00, respondent still demanded payments
from her, and for her failure to comply therewith, respondent filed a case against her before the City
Prosecutor of Marikina City, using two of her blank checks which respondent filled up with the total
amount of ₱100,000.00. Unfortunately, the complaint was dismissed by IBP Investigating
Commissioner Navarro on October 2, 2001 on the ground that the said transaction did not involve
any lawyer-client relationship.35 As correctly observed by Commissioner Funa, such conclusion is
erroneous, for a lawyer may be disciplined even for acts not involving any attorney-client
relationship.

As manifested by these cases, respondent's offenses are manifold. First, he demands excessive
payments from his borrowers; then he fills up his borrowers' blank checks with fictitious amounts,
falsifying commercial documents for his material gain; and then he uses said checks as bases for
filing unfounded criminal suits against his borrowers in order to harass them. Such acts manifest
respondent's perversity of character, meriting his severance from the legal profession.

While the power to disbar is exercised with great caution and is withheld whenever a lesser penalty
could accomplish the end desired,36 the seriousness of respondent's offense compels the Court to
wield its supreme power of disbarment. Indeed, the Court will not hestitate to remove an erring
attorney from the esteemed brotherhood of lawyers where the evidence calls for it.37 This is because
in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to
account for his actuations as an officer of the Court, with the end in view of preserving the purity of
the legal profession and the proper and honest administration of justice by purging the profession of
members who by their misconduct have proved themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with
the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney.38

As respondent's misconduct brings intolerable dishonor to the legal profession, the severance of his
privilege to practice law for life is in order.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Victor V. Deciembre is hereby found GUILTY of GROSS MISCONDUCT and
VIOLATION of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. He is DISBARRED from the practice of law and his name is ordered stricken off the
Roll of Attorneys effective immediately.

Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant which shall forthwith record
it in the personal files of respondent; all the courts of the Philippines; the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, which shall disseminate copies thereof to all its Chapters; and all administrative and
quasi-judicial agencies of the Republic of the Philippines.

SO ORDERED.

B.M. No. 1370 May 9, 2005

LETTER OF ATTY. CECILIO Y. AREVALO, JR., REQUESTING EXEMPTION FROM PAYMENT

OF IBP DUES.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

This is a request for exemption from payment of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) dues filed
by petitioner Atty. Cecilio Y. Arevalo, Jr.

In his letter,1 dated 22 September 2004, petitioner sought exemption from payment of IBP dues in
the amount of P12,035.00 as alleged unpaid accountability for the years 1977-2005. He alleged that
after being admitted to the Philippine Bar in 1961, he became part of the Philippine Civil Service
from July 1962 until 1986, then migrated to, and worked in, the USA in December 1986 until his
retirement in the year 2003. He maintained that he cannot be assessed IBP dues for the years that
he was working in the Philippine Civil Service since the Civil Service law prohibits the practice of
one's profession while in government service, and neither can he be assessed for the years when he
was working in the USA.

On 05 October 2004, the letter was referred to the IBP for comment.2

On 16 November 2004, the IBP submitted its comment3 stating inter alia: that membership in the IBP
is not based on the actual practice of law; that a lawyer continues to be included in the Roll of
Attorneys as long as he continues to be a member of the IBP; that one of the obligations of a
member is the payment of annual dues as determined by the IBP Board of Governors and duly
approved by the Supreme Court as provided for in Sections 9 and 10, Rule 139-A of the Rules of
Court; that the validity of imposing dues on the IBP members has been upheld as necessary to
defray the cost of an Integrated Bar Program; and that the policy of the IBP Board of Governors of
no exemption from payment of dues is but an implementation of the Court's directives for all
members of the IBP to help in defraying the cost of integration of the bar. It maintained that there is
no rule allowing the exemption of payment of annual dues as requested by respondent, that what is
allowed is voluntary termination and reinstatement of membership. It asserted that what petitioner
could have done was to inform the secretary of the IBP of his intention to stay abroad, so that his
membership in the IBP could have been terminated, thus, his obligation to pay dues could have
been stopped. It also alleged that the IBP Board of Governors is in the process of discussing
proposals for the creation of an inactive status for its members, which if approved by the Board of
Governors and by this Court, will exempt inactive IBP members from payment of the annual dues.

In his reply4 dated 22 February 2005, petitioner contends that what he is questioning is the IBP
Board of Governor's Policy of Non-Exemption in the payment of annual membership dues of lawyers
regardless of whether or not they are engaged in active or inactive practice. He asseverates that the
Policy of Non-Exemption in the payment of annual membership dues suffers from constitutional
infirmities, such as equal protection clause and the due process clause. He also posits that
compulsory payment of the IBP annual membership dues would indubitably be oppressive to him
considering that he has been in an inactive status and is without income derived from his law
practice. He adds that his removal from nonpayment of annual membership dues would constitute
deprivation of property right without due process of law. Lastly, he claims that non-practice of law by
a lawyer-member in inactive status is neither injurious to active law practitioners, to fellow lawyers in
inactive status, nor to the community where the inactive lawyers-members reside.

Plainly, the issue here is: whether or nor petitioner is entitled to exemption from payment of his dues
during the time that he was inactive in the practice of law that is, when he was in the Civil Service
from 1962-1986 and he was working abroad from 1986-2003?

We rule in the negative.

An "Integrated Bar" is a State-organized Bar, to which every lawyer must belong, as distinguished
from bar association organized by individual lawyers themselves, membership in which is voluntary.
Integration of the Bar is essentially a process by which every member of the Bar is afforded an
opportunity to do his shares in carrying out the objectives of the Bar as well as obliged to bear his
portion of its responsibilities. Organized by or under the direction of the State, an Integrated Bar is
an official national body of which all lawyers are required to be members. They are, therefore,
subject to all the rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar, including the requirement of
payment of a reasonable annual fee for the effective discharge of the purposes of the Bar, and
adherence to a code of professional ethics or professional responsibility, breach of which constitutes
sufficient reason for investigation by the Bar and, upon proper cause appearing, a recommendation
for discipline or disbarment of the offending member.5
The integration of the Philippine Bar means the official unification of the entire lawyer population.
This requires membership and financial support of every attorney as condition sine qua non to the
practice of law and the retention of his name in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court.6

Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not to
attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he
chooses. The only compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of his annual dues. The
Supreme Court, in order to foster the State's legitimate interest in elevating the quality of
professional legal services, may require that the cost of improving the profession in this fashion be
shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program – the lawyers.7

Moreover, there is nothing in the Constitution that prohibits the Court, under its constitutional power
and duty to promulgate rules concerning the admission to the practice of law and in the integration of
the Philippine Bar8 - which power required members of a privileged class, such as lawyers are, to
pay a reasonable fee toward defraying the expenses of regulation of the profession to which they
belong. It is quite apparent that the fee is, indeed, imposed as a regulatory measure, designed to
raise funds for carrying out the noble objectives and purposes of integration.

The rationale for prescribing dues has been explained in the Integration of the Philippine Bar,9 thus:

For the court to prescribe dues to be paid by the members does not mean that the Court is
attempting to levy a tax.

A membership fee in the Bar association is an exaction for regulation, while tax purpose of a
tax is a revenue. If the judiciary has inherent power to regulate the Bar, it follows that as an
incident to regulation, it may impose a membership fee for that purpose. It would not be
possible to put on an integrated Bar program without means to defray the expenses. The
doctrine of implied powers necessarily carries with it the power to impose such exaction.

The only limitation upon the State's power to regulate the privilege of law is that the
regulation does not impose an unconstitutional burden. The public interest promoted by the
integration of the Bar far outweighs the slight inconvenience to a member resulting from his
required payment of the annual dues.

Thus, payment of dues is a necessary consequence of membership in the IBP, of which no one is
exempt. This means that the compulsory nature of payment of dues subsists for as long as one's
membership in the IBP remains regardless of the lack of practice of, or the type of practice, the
member is engaged in.

There is nothing in the law or rules which allows exemption from payment of membership dues. At
most, as correctly observed by the IBP, he could have informed the Secretary of the Integrated Bar
of his intention to stay abroad before he left. In such case, his membership in the IBP could have
been terminated and his obligation to pay dues could have been discontinued.

As abovementioned, the IBP in its comment stated that the IBP Board of Governors is in the process
of discussing the situation of members under inactive status and the nonpayment of their dues
during such inactivity. In the meantime, petitioner is duty bound to comply with his obligation to pay
membership dues to the IBP.

Petitioner also contends that the enforcement of the penalty of removal would amount to a
deprivation of property without due process and hence infringes on one of his constitutional rights.
This question has been settled in the case of In re Atty. Marcial Edillon,10 in this wise:

. . . Whether the practice of law is a property right, in the sense of its being one that entitles
the holder of a license to practice a profession, we do not here pause to consider at length,
as it [is] clear that under the police power of the State, and under the necessary powers
granted to the Court to perpetuate its existence, the respondent's right to practice law before
the courts of this country should be and is a matter subject to regulation and inquiry. And, if
the power to impose the fee as a regulatory measure is recognize[d], then a penalty
designed to enforce its payment, which penalty may be avoided altogether by payment, is
not void as unreasonable or arbitrary.

But we must here emphasize that the practice of law is not a property right but a mere
privilege, and as such must bow to the inherent regulatory power of the Court to exact
compliance with the lawyer's public responsibilities.

As a final note, it must be borne in mind that membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with
conditions,11 one of which is the payment of membership dues. Failure to abide by any of them
entails the loss of such privilege if the gravity thereof warrants such drastic move.

WHEREFORE, petitioner's request for exemption from payment of IBP dues is DENIED. He is
ordered to pay P12,035.00, the amount assessed by the IBP as membership fees for the years
1977-2005, within a non-extendible period of ten (10) days from receipt of this decision, with a
warning that failure to do so will merit his suspension from the practice of law.

SO ORDERED.

A.C No. 4749. January 20, 2000

SOLIMAN M. SANTOS, JR., complainant, vs. ATTY.

FRANCISCO R. LLAMAS, Respondent.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a complaint for misrepresentation and non-payment of bar

membership dues filed against respondent Atty. Francisco R.
Llamas.

In a letter-complaint to this Court dated February 8, 1997,

complainant Soliman M. Santos, Jr., himself a member of the bar,
alleged that:

On my oath as an attorney, I wish to bring to your attention and

appropriate sanction the matter of Atty. Francisco R. Llamas who,
for a number of years now, has not indicated the proper PTR and
IBP O.R. Nos. and data (date & place of issuance) in his pleadings.
If at all, he only indicates "IBP Rizal 259060" but he has been using
this for at least three years already, as shown by the following
attached sample pleadings in various courts in 1995, 1996 and
1997: (originals available)

Annex A .......- "Ex-Parte Manifestation and Submission"

dated December 1, 1995 in Civil Case No.
Q-95-25253, RTC, Br. 224, QC
Annex B .......- "Urgent Ex-Parte Manifestation Motion"
dated November 13, 1996 in Sp. Proc. No.
95-030, RTC Br. 259 (not 257), Paraaque,
MM
Annex C .......- "An Urgent and Respectful Plea for
extension of Time to File Required Comment
and Opposition" dated January 17, 1997 in
CA-G.R. SP (not Civil Case) No. 42286, CA
6th Div.

This matter is being brought in the context of Rule 138, Section 1

which qualifies that only a duly admitted member of the bar "who is
in good and regular standing, is entitled to practice law". There is
also Rule 139-A, Section 10 which provides that "default in the
payment of annual dues for six months shall warrant suspension of
membership in the Integrated Bar, and default in such payment for
one year shall be a ground for the removal of the name of the
delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys."

Among others, I seek clarification (e.g. a certification) and

appropriate action on the bar standing of Atty. Francisco R. Llamas
both with the Bar Confidant and with the IBP, especially its Rizal
Chapter of which Atty. Llamas purports to be a member.

Please note that while Atty. Llamas indicates "IBP Rizal 259060"
sometimes, he does not indicate any PTR for payment of
professional tax.
Under the Rules, particularly Rule 138, Sections 27 and 28,
suspension of an attorney may be done not only by the Supreme
Court but also by the Court of Appeals or a Regional Trial Court
(thus, we are also copy furnishing some of these courts).

Finally, it is relevant to note the track record of Atty. Francisco R.

Llamas, as shown by:

1........his dismissal as Pasay City Judge per Supreme Court Admin.

Matter No. 1037-CJ En Banc Decision on October 28, 1981 ( in
SCRA )

2........his conviction for estafa per Decision dated June 30, 1994 in
Crim. Case No. 11787, RTC Br. 66, Makati, MM (see attached copy
of the Order dated February 14, 1995 denying the motion for
reconsideration of the conviction which is purportedly on appeal in
the Court of Appeals).

Attached to the letter-complaint were the pleadings dated

December 1, 1995, November 13, 1996, and January 17, 1997
referred to by complainant, bearing, at the end thereof, what
appears to be respondents signature above his name, address and
the receipt number "IBP Rizal 259060."1 Also attached was a copy
of the order,2 dated February 14, 1995, issued by Judge Eriberto U.
Rosario, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 66, Makati, denying
respondents motion for reconsideration of his conviction, in Criminal
Case No. 11787, for violation of Art. 316, par. 2 of the Revised
Penal Code.

On April 18, 1997, complainant filed a certification3 dated March 18,

1997, by the then president of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
Atty. Ida R. Macalinao-Javier, that respondents "last payment of his
IBP dues was in 1991. Since then he has not paid or remitted any
amount to cover his membership fees up to the present."

On July 7, 1997, respondent was required to comment on the

complaint within ten days from receipt of notice, after which the
case was referred to the IBP for investigation, report and
recommendation. In his comment-memorandum,4 dated June 3,
1998, respondent alleged:5 c räläwvi rtua lib räry
3. That with respect to the complainants absurd claim that for using
in 1995, 1996 and 1997 the same O.R. No. 259060 of the Rizal IBP,
respondent is automatically no longer a member in good standing.

Precisely, as cited under the context of Rule 138, only an admitted

member of the bar who is in good standing is entitled to practice
law.

The complainants basis in claiming that the undersigned was no

longer in good standing, were as above cited, the October 28, 1981
Supreme Court decision of dismissal and the February 14, 1995
conviction for Violation of Article 316 RPC, concealment of
encumbrances.

As above pointed out also, the Supreme Court dismissal decision

was set aside and reversed and respondent was even promoted
from City Judge of Pasay City to Regional Trial Court Judge of
Makati, Br. 150.

Also as pointed out, the February 14, 1995 decision in Crim. Case
No. 11787 was appealed to the Court of Appeals and is still pending.

Complainant need not even file this complaint if indeed the decision
of dismissal as a Judge was never set aside and reversed, and also
had the decision of conviction for a light felony, been affirmed by
the Court of Appeals. Undersigned himself would surrender his right
or privilege to practice law.

4. That complainant capitalizes on the fact that respondent had

been delinquent in his dues.

Undersigned since 1992 have publicly made it clear per his Income
Tax Return, up to the present, that he had only a limited practice of
law. In fact, in his Income Tax Return, his principal occupation is a
farmer of which he is. His 30 hectares orchard and pineapple farm is
located at Calauan, Laguna.

Moreover, and more than anything else, respondent being a Senior

Citizen since 1992, is legally exempt under Section 4 of Rep. Act
7432 which took effect in 1992, in the payment of taxes, income
taxes as an example. Being thus exempt, he honestly believe in
view of his detachment from a total practice of law, but only in a
limited practice, the subsequent payment by him of dues with the
Integrated Bar is covered by such exemption. In fact, he never
exercised his rights as an IBP member to vote and be voted upon.

Nonetheless, if despite such honest belief of being covered by the

exemption and if only to show that he never in any manner wilfully
and deliberately failed and refused compliance with such dues, he is
willing at any time to fulfill and pay all past dues even with
interests, charges and surcharges and penalties. He is ready to
tender such fulfillment or payment, not for allegedly saving his skin
as again irrelevantly and frustratingly insinuated for vindictive
purposes by the complainant, but as an honest act of accepting
reality if indeed it is reality for him to pay such dues despite his
candor and honest belief in all food faith, to the contrary.

On December 4, 1998, the IBP Board of Governors passed a

resolution6 adopting and approving the report and recommendation
of the Investigating Commissioner which found respondent guilty,
and recommended his suspension from the practice of law for three
months and until he pays his IBP dues. Respondent moved for a
reconsideration of the decision, but this was denied by the IBP in a
resolution,7 dated April 22, 1999. Hence, pursuant to Rule 139-B,
12(b) of the Rules of Court, this case is here for final action on the
decision of the IBP ordering respondents suspension for three
months.

The findings of IBP Commissioner Alfredo Sanz are as follows:

On the first issue, Complainant has shown "respondents non-

indication of the proper IBP O.R. and PTR numbers in his pleadings
(Annexes "A", "B" and "C" of the letter complaint, more particularly
his use of "IBP Rizal 259060 for at least three years."

The records also show a "Certification dated March 24, 1997 from
IBP Rizal Chapter President Ida R. Makahinud Javier that
respondents last payment of his IBP dues was in 1991."
While these allegations are neither denied nor categorically
admitted by respondent, he has invoked and cited that "being a
Senior Citizen since 1992, he is legally exempt under Section 4 of
Republic Act No. 7432 which took effect in 1992 in the payment of
taxes, income taxes as an example."

....

The above cited provision of law is not applicable in the present

case. In fact, respondent admitted that he is still in the practice of
law when he alleged that the "undersigned since 1992 have publicly
made it clear per his Income tax Return up to the present time that
he had only a limited practice of law." (par. 4 of Respondents
Memorandum).

Therefore respondent is not exempt from paying his yearly dues to

the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.

On the second issue, complainant claims that respondent has misled

the court about his standing in the IBP by using the same IBP O.R.
number in his pleadings of at least six years and therefore liable for
his actions. Respondent in his memorandum did not discuss this
issue.

First. Indeed, respondent admits that since 1992, he has engaged in

law practice without having paid his IBP dues. He likewise admits
that, as appearing in the pleadings submitted by complainant to this
Court, he indicated "IBP-Rizal 259060" in the pleadings he filed in
court, at least for the years 1995, 1996, and 1997, thus
misrepresenting that such was his IBP chapter membership and
receipt number for the years in which those pleadings were filed. He
claims, however, that he is only engaged in a "limited" practice and
that he believes in good faith that he is exempt from the payment
of taxes, such as income tax, under R.A. No. 7432, 4 as a senior
citizen since 1992.

Rule 139-A provides:

Sec. 9. Membership dues. - Every member of the Integrated Bar

shall pay such annual dues as the Board of Governors shall
determine with the approval of the Supreme Court. A fixed sum
equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the collections from each
Chapter shall be set aside as a Welfare Fund for disabled members
of the Chapter and the compulsory heirs of deceased members
thereof.

Sec. 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. - Subject to the provisions

of Section 12 of this Rule, default in the payment of annual dues for
six months shall warrant suspension of membership in the
Integrated Bar, and default in such payment for one year shall be a
ground for the removal of the name of the delinquent member from
the Roll of Attorneys.

In accordance with these provisions, respondent can engage in the

practice of law only by paying his dues, and it does not matter that
his practice is "limited." While it is true that R.A. No. 7432, 4 grants
senior citizens "exemption from the payment of individual income
taxes: provided, that their annual taxable income does not exceed
the poverty level as determined by the National Economic and
Development Authority (NEDA) for that year," the exemption does
not include payment of membership or association dues.

Second. By indicating "IBP-Rizal 259060" in his pleadings and

thereby misrepresenting to the public and the courts that he had
paid his IBP dues to the Rizal Chapter, respondent is guilty of
violating the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides:

Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,

immoral or deceitful conduct.

CANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE

INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION, AND
SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.

CANON 10 - A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD

FAITH TO THE COURT.

Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the
doing of any court; nor shall he mislead or allow the court to be
misled by any artifice.
Respondents failure to pay his IBP dues and his misrepresentation
in the pleadings he filed in court indeed merit the most severe
penalty. However, in view of respondents advanced age, his express
willingness to pay his dues and plea for a more temperate
application of the law,8 we believe the penalty of one year
suspension from the practice of law or until he has paid his IBP
dues, whichever is later, is appropriate.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Francisco R. Llamas is SUSPENDED

from the practice of law for ONE (1) YEAR, or until he has paid his
IBP dues, whichever is later. Let a copy of this decision be attached
to Atty. Llamas personal record in the Office of the Bar Confidant
and copies be furnished to all chapters of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and to all courts in the land.

SO ORDERED.
A.C. No.7054 November 11, 2014

CONRADO N. QUE, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. ANASTACIO E. REVILLA, JR., Respondent.

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:

For the Court's consideration is the Profound Appeal for Judicial Clemency1 filed by Atty. Anastacio
E. Revilla, Jr. (respondent), who seeks to be reinstated as a member of the Philippine Bar.

Factual Background

In a Decision2 dated December 4, 2009, this Court disbarred the respondent from the practice of law
on the following grounds: abuse of court procedures and processes; filing of multiple actions and
forum-shopping; willful, intentional and deliberate resort to falsehood and deception before the
courts; maligning the name of his fellow lawyer; and fraudulent and unauthorized appearances in
court.

The material portions of the subject Decision provide:

Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the respondent committed various acts of professional
misconduct and thereby failed to live up to the exacting ethical standards imposed on members of
the Bar. We cannot, agree, however, that only a penalty of one-year suspension from the practice of
law should be imposed. Neither should we limit ourselves to the originally recommendedpenalty of
suspension for two (2) years.
Given the respondent’s multiple violations, his past record as previously discussed, and the nature of
these violations which shows the readiness to disregard court rules and to gloss over concerns for
the orderly administration of justice,we believe and so hold that the appropriate action of this Court is
to disbar the respondent to keep him away from the law profession and from any significant role in
the administration of justice which he has disgraced. He is a continuing risk, too, to the public that
the legal profession serves. Not even his ardor and overzealousness in defending the interests of his
client can save him. Such traits at the expense of everything else, particularly the integrity of the
profession and the orderly administration of justice, this Court cannot accept nor tolerate.

Additionally, disbarment is merited because this is not the respondent’s first ethical infraction of the
same nature. We penalized him in Plus Builders, Inc. and Edgardo Garcia versus Atty. Anastacio E.
Revilla for his willful and intentional falsehood before the court; for misuse of court procedures and
processes to delay the execution of a judgment; and for collaborating with non-lawyers in the illegal
practice of law. We showed leniency then by reducing his penalty to suspension for six (6) months.
We cannot similarly treat the respondent this time; it is clear that he did not learn any lesson from his
past experience and since then has exhibited traits of incorrigibility. It is time to put a finis to the
respondent’s professional legal career for the sake of the public, the profession and the interest of
justice.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby AFFIRM Resolution No. XVII-2005-164 dated

December 17, 2005 and Resolution No. XVII-2008-657 dated December 11, 2008 of the Board of
Governors of the IBP Committee on Bar Discipline insofar as respondent Atty. Anastacio Revilla, Jr.
is found liable for professional misconduct for violations of the Lawyer’s Oath; Canon 8; Rules 10.01
and 10.03, Canon 10; Rules 12.02 and 12.04, Canon 12; and Rule 19.01, Canon 19 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility;and Sections 20(d), 21 and 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.
However, we modify the penalty the IBP imposed, and hold that the respondent should be
DISBARREDfrom the practice of law.

SO ORDERED.

On July 8, 2010, the respondent filed a Petition for Judicial Clemency and Compassion3 praying that
his license to practice law be restored based on humanitarian considerations, but the Court En
Bancresolved to deny the petition for lack of merit.

The respondent subsequently filed on January 11, 2011, an Appeal for Grace, Succor, and
Mercy4 asking the Court to take a second look at the penalty imposed upon him. He maintained that
Conrado N. Que (complainant) failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that he
committed grossly immoral conduct meriting the severe penalty of disbarment. He also attempted to
pass the blame on another individual (a certain Gerolin Piedad, General Manager of Kalayaan
Development Corporation) to free himself from liability by claiming that one of the charges leading to
his disbarment was not of his own doing.

In a Resolution5 dated February 8, 2011, the Court denied the appeal.

The respondent again wrote the Court on July 13, 2011, reiterating his pleas for the Court’s
compassion and mercy.6 He sought the Court’s forgiveness stating that he has learned his lesson;
but at the same time, questioning the Court’s finding for lackof factual support. He appended to his
appeal proofs of his updated payment of IBP membership dues,7 MCLE compliance,8 and a letter
from the Bishop of Marinduque.9 His appeal, however, was denied by a Resolution10 dated August 2,
2011.
On May 17, 2012, the respondent sent a letter11 addressed to the Members of the Court En Banc
once again reiterating his prayer to lift the order of disbarment. He alleged among others that for
more than three years that he has been disbarred in the practice of law, he has never been involved
in any immoral or illegal activities, has devoted himself in the services of St. Peter Parish and Shrine,
CommonwealthAvenue as Eucharistic Minister leader, has conducted regular monthly lectures on
the subject of marriage at the Diocese of Novaliches, and has participated as monthly financial
contributor to Mr. Carmel Church, Lucena City. He also begged the Court to no longer prolong his
penalty since it had already served its purpose. The plea was also denied on July 3, 2012.12

On August 30, 2012, the respondent once more prayed for his reinstatement professing repentance
and remorse for what he did.13 He pleaded for the Court’s consideration, and vowed that he will no
longer misuse the rules of procedure but instead, devote his time and energy for its proper
observance and implementation. He also stated that for almost three years of being disbarred from
the practice of law, he has never been involved in any unlawful, dishonest, and immoral activities.
He promised to maintain at all times a high degree of legal proficiency, morality, integrity, and fair
dealings to the courts, clients, and the legal profession in accordance with the values and morals
embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility.

In a Resolution14 dated October 9, 2012, the Court denied his petition for lack of merit. Aggrieved, the
respondent filed on March 27, 2013 a letter15 pleading the Court to revisit his previousrequests for
reinstatement.

Treating his letter as a motion for the reconsideration of the resolutions dated August 2, 2011, July3,
2012, and October 9, 2012, the Court, on June 4, 2013 deniedthe motion with finality.16 On July 18,
2014, the respondent filed a Profound Appeal for Judicial Clemency17 reiterating his apologies to the
Court. He stressed that the penalty of disbarment has already taken its toll on his health; he has now
become most frail and weak; and he had been diagnosed with chronic kidney disease at stage five
(5) and undergoing dialysis thrice weekly. He also stressed that in the years that he had been
excluded from the practice of law, he devoted his time to Christian and charity pursuits serving with
all humility as a Lay Minister and a regular lecturer on Legal Aspect of Marriage at St. Peter Church,
Quezon City.

The respondent also pleads for clemency, not because he intends to practice law again, but to be
made whole, to recover from being shattered, and to finally have peace of mind. Heexpressed his
sincere repentance and deep remorse by taking full responsibility for his misdemeanor. He also
prayed that his disbarment be lifted and that he be reinstated as a member of the Philippine bar. As
part of his petition, he submitted a Medical Abstract18 evidencing his diagnosis for chronic kidney
disease, and a certification19 from St. Peter Parish, Commonwealth Avenue, Quezon City, proving
that he and his family are dedicated parishioners.

The Court's Ruling

We deny the present appeal.

Membership in the Bar is a privilege burdened with conditions.20 It is not a natural, absolute or
constitutional right granted to everyone who demands it, but rather, a special privilege granted and
continued only to those who demonstrate special fitness inintellectual attainment and in moral
character.21 The same reasoning applies to reinstatement of a disbarred lawyer. When exercising its
inherent power to grant reinstatement, the Court should see to it that only those who establish their
present moral fitness and knowledge of the law will be readmitted to the Bar. Thus, though the doors
to the practice of law are never permanently closed on a disbarred attorney, the Court owes a duty
to the legal profession as well as to the general public to ensure that if the doors are opened,it is
done so only as a matter of justice.22

The basic inquiry in a petition for reinstatementto the practice of law is whether the lawyer has
sufficiently rehabilitated himself or herself in conduct and character.23 Whether the applicant shall be
reinstated in the Roll of Attorneys rests to a great extent on the sound discretion of the Court.24 The
lawyer has to demonstrate and prove by clear and convincing evidence that he or she is again
worthy of membership in the Bar. The Court will take into consideration his or her character and
standing prior to the disbarment, the nature and character of the charge/s for which he or she was
disbarred, his or her conduct subsequent to the disbarment, and the time that has elapsed in
between the disbarment and the application for reinstatement.25

In the present case, we note that before his admission to the Bar, the respondent had demonstrated
an active involvement and participation in community and church activities by joining Youth For
Christ, Catechism, and Bible Study and Sharing. Likewise, upon admission to the Bar, the
respondent worked as Municipal Attorney in Sta. Cruz, Marinduque rendering free legal assistance
to his townmates who were inneed of legal service. Thereafter, the respondentwas appointed as a
Municipal Administrator and had continued extending assistance to the indigent residents.

The respondent also actively engaged and participated in various community projects, through the
Marinduque Jaycees, where he served as President from 1980 to 1981, and the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines Marinduque Chapter, where he served as a member, Director, and President from
1982 to 1987.

In his present appeal for judicial clemency, the respondent acknowledged his indiscretions and
claimed to have taken full responsibility for his misdemeanor. Unlike in his previous petitions/appeal
for judicial clemency, the respondent no longerquestioned the Court’s decision. According to him, he
has long expressed deep remorse and genuine repentance.

The respondent also claimed that the long period of his disbarment gave him sufficient time to reflect
on his professional conduct, to show remorse and repentance, and to realize the gravity of his
mistakes. After his disbarment, the respondent continued lending assistance, and deviated his time
and effort in pursuing civic and religious work that significantly contributed to his character
reformation.He professed that during his almost five (5) years of disbarment, he has been an active
member of the Couples for Christ, Marriage Encounter, and Knights of Columbus; and through his
affiliations with these groups, he had served in the ecclesial affairs in his parish as an Extraordinary
Minister for Holy Communion and a lecturer on Legal Aspect of Marriage Pre-Cana and Marriage
Preparation Seminar at the Parish Church of St. Peter in Commonwealth Avenue, Quezon City.

Although the Court believes that the respondent is not inherently lacking in moral fiber as shown by
his conduct prior to his disbarment, we are not convinced that he had sufficiently achieved moral
reformation.

In Rodolfo M. Bernardo v. Atty. Ismael F. Mejia,26 the Court, in deciding whether or not to reinstate
Atty. Mejia, considered that 15 years had already elapsed from the time hewas disbarred, which
gave him sufficient time to acknowledge his infractions and to repent. The Court also took into
account the fact that Atty. Mejiais already of advanced years, has long repented, and suffered
enough. The Court also notedthat he had made a significant contribution by putting up the Mejia Law
Journal containing his religious and social writings; and the religious organization named "El Cristo
Movement and Crusade on Miracle of the Heart and Mind." Furthermore, the Court considered that
Atty. Mejia committed no other transgressions since he was disbarred.
Similarly in Adez Realty, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,27 the Court granted the reinstatement of the
disbarred lawyer (found to be guilty of intercalating a material fact in a CA decision) and considered
the period of three (3) years as sufficient time to do soul-searching and to prove that he is worthy to
practice law. In that case, the Court took into consideration the disbarred lawyer’s sincere admission
of guilt and repeated pleas for compassion.

Also in Valencia v. Antiniw,28 the Court reinstated Atty. Antiniw (who was found guilty of malpractice
in falsifying a notarized deed of sale and subsequently introducing the document in court) after
considering the long period of his disbarment (almost 15 years). The Court considered that during
Atty. Antiniw’s disbarment, he has been persistent in reiterating his apologies to the Court, has
engaged inhumanitarian and civic services, and retained an unblemished record as an elected public
servant, as shown by the testimonials of the numerous civic and professional organizations,
government institutions, and members of the judiciary.

In all these cases, the Court considered the conduct of the disbarred attorney before and after his
disbarment, the time that had elapsed from the disbarment and the application for reinstatement,
and more importantly, the disbarred attorneys’ sincere realization and acknowledgement of guilt.

In the present case, we are not fully convinced that the passage of more than four (4) years is
sufficient to enable the respondent to reflect and to realize his professional transgressions.

We emphasize that this is the second timethat the respondent was accused and was found guilty of
gross misconduct. The respondent, in an earlier case of Plus Builders, Inc. v. Atty. Anastacio E.
1âwphi1

Revilla,Jr.,29 was likewise found guilty of gross misconduct for committing willful and intentional
falsehood before the court; misusing court procedure and processes to delay the execution of a
judgment; and collaborating with nonlawyers in the illegal practice of law – mostly the same grounds
on which the Decision dated December 4, 2009 (2nd disbarment) was based. In Plus Builders, we
granted the respondent’s motion for reconsideration and reduced the penalty of suspension from the
practice of law from two (2) years to six (6) months out of compassion to the respondent.

Considering the respondent’s earlier disbarment case(and subsequent reduction of the penalty
imposed as an act of clemency), and another disbarment case against him still pending review by
the Court, we are not fully and convincingly satisfied that the respondent has already reformed. The
period of five (5) years is likewise not considerably long considering the nature and perversityof the
respondent’s misdeeds. We believe that it is still early for the Court to consider the respondent’s
reinstatement.

Furthermore, we are not persuaded by the respondent's sincerity in acknowledging his guilt. While
1âw phi 1

he expressly stated in his appeal that he had taken full responsibility of his misdemeanor, his
previous inclination to pass the blame to other individuals, to invoke self-denial, and to make alibis
for his wrongdoings, contradicted his assertion. The respondent also failed to submit proof
satisfactorily showing his contrition. He failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that he is
again worthy of membership in the legal profession. We thus entertain serious doubts that the
respondent had completely reformed.

As a final word, while the Court sympathizes with the respondent's unfortunate physical condition,
we stress that in considering his application for reinstatement to the practice of law, the duty of the
Court is to determine whether he has established moral reformation and rehabilitation, disregarding
its feeling of sympathy or pity. Surely at this point, this requirement was not met. Until such time
when the respondent can demonstrate to the Court that he has completely rehabilitated himself and
deserves to resume his membership in the Bar, Our decision to disbar him from the practice of law
stands.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Profound Appeal for Judicial Clemency filed by Atty.
Anastacio E. Revilla, Jr. is hereby DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 9604 March 20, 2013

RODRIGO E. TAPAY and ANTHONY J. RUSTIA, Complainants,

vs.
ATTY. CHARLIE L. BANCOLO and ATTY. JANUS T. JARDER, Respondents.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This administrative case arose from a Complaint tiled by Rodrigo E. Tapay (Tapay) and Anthony J.
Rustia (Rustia), both employees of the Sugar Regulatory Administration, against Atty. Charlie L.
Bancolo (Atty. Bancolo) and Atty. Janus T. larder (Atty. Jarder) for violation of the Canons of Ethics
and Professionalism, Falsification of Public Document, Gross Dishonesty, and Harassment.

The Facts

Sometime in October 2004, Tapay and Rustia received an Order dated 14 October 2004 from the
Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas requiring them to file a counter-affidavit to a complaint for
usurpation of authority, falsification of public document, and graft and corrupt practices filed against
them by Nehimias Divinagracia, Jr. (Divinagracia), a co-employee in the Sugar Regulatory
Administration. The Complaint1 dated 31 August 2004 was allegedly signed on behalf of Divinagracia
by one Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo of the Jarder Bancolo Law Office based in Bacolod City, Negros
Occidental.

When Atty. Bancolo and Rustia accidentally chanced upon each other, the latter informed Atty.
Bancolo of the case filed against them before the Office of the Ombudsman. Atty. Bancolo denied
that he represented Divinagracia since he had yet to meet Divinagracia in person. When Rustia
showed him the Complaint, Atty. Bancolo declared that the signature appearing above his name as
counsel for Divinagracia was not his. Thus, Rustia convinced Atty. Bancolo to sign an affidavit to
attest to such fact. On 9 December 2004, Atty. Bancolo signed an affidavit denying his supposed
signature appearing on the Complaint filed with the Office of the Ombudsman and submitted six
specimen signatures for comparison. Using Atty. Bancolo’s affidavit and other documentary
evidence, Tapay and Rustia filed a counter-affidavit accusing Divinagracia of falsifying the signature
of his alleged counsel, Atty. Bancolo.

In a Resolution dated 28 March 2005, the Office of the Ombudsman provisionally dismissed the
Complaint since the falsification of the counsel’s signature posed a prejudicial question to the
Complaint’s validity. Also, the Office of the Ombudsman ordered that separate cases for Falsification
of Public Document2 and Dishonesty3 be filed against Divinagracia, with Rustia and Atty. Bancolo as
complainants.

Thereafter, Divinagracia filed his Counter-Affidavit dated 1 August 2005 denying that he falsified the
signature of his former lawyer, Atty. Bancolo. Divinagracia presented as evidence an affidavit dated
1 August 2005 by Richard A. Cordero, the legal assistant of Atty. Bancolo, that the Jarder Bancolo
Law Office accepted Divinagracia’s case and that the Complaint filed with the Office of the
Ombudsman was signed by the office secretary per Atty. Bancolo’s instructions. Divinagracia asked
that the Office of the Ombudsman dismiss the cases for falsification of public document and
dishonesty filed against him by Rustia and Atty. Bancolo and to revive the original Complaint for
various offenses that he filed against Tapay and Rustia.

In a Resolution dated 19 September 2005, the Office of the Ombudsman dismissed the criminal
case for falsification of public document (OMB-V-C-05-0207-E) for insufficiency of evidence. The
dispositive portion states:

WHEREFORE, the instant case is hereby DISMISSED for insufficiency of evidence, without
prejudice to the re-filing by Divinagracia, Jr. of a proper complaint for violation of RA 3019 and other
offenses against Rustia and Tapay.

SO ORDERED.4

The administrative case for dishonesty (OMB-V-A-05-0219-E) was also dismissed for lack of
substantial evidence in a Decision dated 19 September 2005.

On 29 November 2005, Tapay and Rustia filed with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) a
complaint5 to disbar Atty. Bancolo and Atty. Jarder, Atty. Bancolo’s law partner. The complainants
alleged that they were subjected to a harassment Complaint filed before the Office of the
Ombudsman with the forged signature of Atty. Bancolo. Complainants stated further that the
signature of Atty. Bancolo in the Complaint was not the only one that was forged. Complainants
attached a Report6 dated 1 July 2005 by the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory 6 which
examined three other letter-complaints signed by Atty. Bancolo for other clients, allegedly close
friends of Atty. Jarder. The report concluded that the questioned signatures in the letter-complaints
and the submitted standard signatures of Atty. Bancolo were not written by one and the same
person. Thus, complainants maintained that not only were respondents engaging in unprofessional
and unethical practices, they were also involved in falsification of documents used to harass and
persecute innocent people.

On 9 January 2006, complainants filed a Supplement to the Disbarment Complaint Due to Additional
Information. They alleged that a certain Mary Jane Gentugao, the secretary of the Jarder Bancolo
Law Office, forged the signature of Atty. Bancolo.

In their Answer dated 26 January 2006 to the disbarment complaint, respondents admitted that the
criminal and administrative cases filed by Divinagracia against complainants before the Office of the
Ombudsman were accepted by the Jarder Bancolo Law Office. The cases were assigned to Atty.
Bancolo. Atty. Bancolo alleged that after being informed of the assignment of the cases, he ordered
his staff to prepare and draft all the necessary pleadings and documents. However, due to some
minor lapses, Atty. Bancolo permitted that the pleadings and communications be signed in his name
by the secretary of the law office. Respondents added that complainants filed the disbarment
complaint to retaliate against them since the cases filed before the Office of the Ombudsman were
meritorious and strongly supported by testimonial and documentary evidence. Respondents also
denied that Mary Jane Gentugao was employed as secretary of their law office.

Tapay and Rustia filed a Reply to the Answer dated 2 March 2006. Thereafter, the parties were
directed by the Commission on Bar Discipline to attend a mandatory conference scheduled on 5
May 2006. The conference was reset to 10 August 2006. On the said date, complainants were
present but respondents failed to appear. The conference was reset to 25 September 2006 for the
last time. Again, respondents failed to appear despite receiving notice of the conference.
Complainants manifested that they were submitting their disbarment complaint based on the
documents submitted to the IBP. Respondents were also deemed to have waived their right to
participate in the mandatory conference. Further, both parties were directed to submit their
respective position papers. On 27 October 2006, the IBP received complainants’ position paper
dated 18 October 2006 and respondents’ position paper dated 23 October 2006.

The IBP’s Report and Recommendation

On 11 April 2007, Atty. Lolita A. Quisumbing, the Investigating Commissioner of the Commission on
Bar Discipline of the IBP, submitted her Report. Atty. Quisumbing found that Atty. Bancolo violated
Rule 9.01 of Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility while Atty. Jarder violated Rule 1.01
of Canon 1 of the same Code. The Investigating

Commissioner recommended that Atty. Bancolo be suspended for two years from the practice of law
and Atty. Jarder be admonished for his failure to exercise certain responsibilities in their law firm.

In her Report and Recommendation, the Investigating Commissioner opined:

x x x. In his answer, respondent Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo admitted that his signature appearing in the
complaint filed against complainants’ Rodrigo E. Tapay and Anthony J. Rustia with the Ombudsman
were signed by the secretary. He did not refute the findings that his signatures appearing in the
various documents released from his office were found not to be his. Such pattern of malpratice by
respondent clearly breached his obligation under Rule 9.01 of Canon 9, for a lawyer who allows a
non-member to represent him is guilty of violating the aforementioned Canon. The fact that
respondent was busy cannot serve as an excuse for him from signing personally. After all
respondent is a member of a law firm composed of not just one (1) lawyer. The Supreme Court has
ruled that this practice constitute negligence and undersigned finds the act a sign of indolence and
ineptitude. Moreover, respondents ignored the notices sent by undersigned. That showed patent
lack of respect to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines’ Commission on Bar Discipline and its
proceedings. It betrays lack of courtesy and irresponsibility as lawyers.

On the other hand, Atty. Janus T. Jarder, a senior partner of the law firm Jarder Bancolo and
Associates Law Office, failed to exercise certain responsibilities over matters under the charge of his
law firm. As a senior partner[,] he failed to abide to the principle of "command responsibility". x x x.

xxxx

Respondent Atty. Janus Jarder after all is a seasoned practitioner, having passed the bar in 1995
and practicing law up to the present. He holds himself out to the public as a law firm designated as
Jarder Bancolo and Associates Law Office. It behooves Atty. Janus T. Jarder to exert ordinary
diligence to find out what is going on in his law firm, to ensure that all lawyers in his firm act in
conformity to the Code of Professional Responsibility. As a partner, it is his responsibility to provide
efficacious control of court pleadings and other documents that carry the name of the law firm. Had
he done that, he could have known the unethical practice of his law partner Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo.
Respondent Atty. Janus T. Jarder failed to perform this task and is administratively liable under
Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.7

On 19 September 2007, in Resolution No. XVIII-2007-97, the Board of Governors of the IBP
approved with modification the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner. The
Resolution states:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, with
modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-
entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation
fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering
Respondent Atty. Bancolo’s violation of Rule 9.01, Canon 9 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1)
year.

However, with regard to the charge against Atty. Janus T. Jarder, the Board of Governors
RESOLVED as it is hereby RESOLVED to AMEND, as it is hereby AMENDED the Recommendation
of the Investigating Commissioner, and APPROVE the DISMISSAL of the case for lack of merit.8

Tapay and Rustia filed a Motion for Reconsideration. Likewise, Atty. Bancolo filed his Motion for
Reconsideration dated 22 December 2007. Thereafter, Atty. Jarder filed his separate Consolidated
Comment/Reply to Complainants’ Motion for Reconsideration and Comment Filed by Complainants
dated 29 January 2008.

In Resolution No. XX-2012-175 dated 9 June 2012, the IBP Board of Governors denied both
complainants’ and Atty. Bancolo’s motions for reconsideration. The IBP Board found no cogent
reason to reverse the findings of the Investigating Commissioner and affirmed Resolution No. XVIII-
2007-97 dated 19 September 2007.

The Court’s Ruling

After a careful review of the records of the case, we agree with the findings and recommendation of
the IBP Board and find reasonable grounds to hold respondent Atty. Bancolo administratively liable.

Atty. Bancolo admitted that the Complaint he filed for a former client before the Office of the
Ombudsman was signed in his name by a secretary of his law office. Clearly, this is a violation of
Rule 9.01 of Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides:

CANON 9
A LAWYER SHALL NOT, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ASSIST IN THE UNAUTHORIZED
PRACTICE OF LAW.

Rule 9.01 - A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person the performance of any task which
by law may only be performed by a member of the Bar in good standing.

This rule was clearly explained in the case of Cambaliza v. Cristal-Tenorio,9 where we held:

The lawyer’s duty to prevent, or at the very least not to assist in, the unauthorized practice of law is
founded on public interest and policy. Public policy requires that the practice of law be limited to
those individuals found duly qualified in education and character. The permissive right conferred on
the lawyer is an individual and limited privilege subject to withdrawal if he fails to maintain proper
standards of moral and professional conduct. The purpose is to protect the public, the court, the
client, and the bar from the incompetence or dishonesty of those unlicensed to practice law and not
subject to the disciplinary control of the Court. It devolves upon a lawyer to see that this purpose is
attained. Thus, the canons and ethics of the profession enjoin him not to permit his professional
services or his name to be used in aid of, or to make possible the unauthorized practice of law by,
any agency, personal or corporate. And, the law makes it a misbehavior on his part, subject to
disciplinary action, to aid a layman in the unauthorized practice of law.
In Republic v. Kenrick Development Corporation,10 we held that the preparation and signing of a
pleading constitute legal work involving the practice of law which is reserved exclusively for
members of the legal profession. Atty. Bancolo’s authority and duty to sign a pleading are personal
to him. Although he may delegate the signing of a pleading to another lawyer, he may not delegate it
to a non-lawyer. Further, under the Rules of Court, counsel’s signature serves as a certification that
(1) he has read the pleading; (2) to the best of his knowledge, information and belief there is good
ground to support it; and (3) it is not interposed for delay.11 Thus, by affixing one’s signature to a
pleading, it is counsel alone who has the responsibility to certify to these matters and give legal
effect to the document.1âwphi1

In his Motion for Reconsideration dated 22 December 2007, Atty. Bancolo wants us to believe that
he was a victim of circumstances or of manipulated events because of his unconditional trust and
confidence in his former law partner, Atty. Jarder. However, Atty. Bancolo did not take any steps to
rectify the situation, save for the affidavit he gave to Rustia denying his signature to the Complaint
filed before the Office of the Ombudsman. Atty. Bancolo had an opportunity to maintain his
innocence when he filed with the IBP his Joint Answer (with Atty. Jarder) dated 26 January 2006.
Atty. Bancolo, however, admitted that prior to the preparation of the Joint Answer, Atty. Jarder
threatened to file a disbarment case against him if he did not cooperate. Thus, he was constrained to
allow Atty. Jarder to prepare the Joint Answer. Atty. Bancolo simply signed the verification without
seeing the contents of the Joint Answer.

In the Answer, Atty. Bancolo categorically stated that because of some minor lapses, the
communications and pleadings filed against Tapay and Rustia were signed by his secretary, albeit
with his tolerance. Undoubtedly, Atty. Bancolo violated the Code of Professional Responsibility by
allowing a non-lawyer to affix his signature to a pleading. This violation Is an act of falsehood which
IS a ground for disciplinary action.

The complainants did not present any evidence that Atty. Jarder was directly involved, had
knowledge of, or even participated in the wrongful practice of Atty. Bancolo in allowing or tolerating
his secretary to sign pleadings for him. Thus, we agree with the finding of the IBP Board that Atty.
Jarder is not administratively liable.

In sum, we find that the suspension of Atty. Bancolo from the practice of law for one year is
warranted. We also find proper the dismissal of the case against Atty. larder.

WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the complaint against Atty. Janus T. larder for lack of merit.

We find respondent Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo administratively liable for violating Rule 9.01 of Canon 9
of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for
one year effective upon finality of this Decision. He is warned that a repetition of the same or similar
acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely.

Let a copy of this Decision be attached to respondent Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo's record in this Court
as attorney. Further, let copies of this Decision be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
and the Office of the Court Administrator, which is directed to circulate them to all the courts in the
country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 173188 January 15, 2014

THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF THE SPOUSES VICENTE CADAVEDO AND BENITA
ARCOY-CADAVEDO (both deceased), substituted by their heirs, namely: HERMINA,
PASTORA, Heirs of FRUCTUOSA, Heirs of RAQUEL, EVANGELINE, VICENTE, JR., and
ARMANDO, all surnamed CADAVEDO, Petitioners,
vs.
VICTORINO (VIC) T. LACAYA, married to Rosa Legados, Respondents.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

We solve in this Rule 45 petition for review on certiorari1 the challenge to the October 11, 2005
decision2 and the May 9, 2006 resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) inPetitioners, CA-G.R. CV
No. 56948. The CA reversed and set aside the September 17, 1996 decision4 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 10, of Dipolog City in Civil Case No. 4038, granting in part the complaint for
recovery of possession of property filed by the petitioners, the Conjugal Partnership of the Spouses
Vicente Cadavedo and Benita Arcoy-Cadavedo against Atty. Victorino (Vic) T. Lacaya, married to
Rosa Legados (collectively, the respondents).

The Factual Antecedents

The Spouses Vicente Cadavedo and Benita Arcoy-Cadavedo (collectively, the spouses Cadavedo)
acquired a homestead grant over a 230,765-square meter parcel of land known as Lot 5415 (subject
lot) located in Gumay, Piñan, Zamboanga del Norte. They were issued Homestead Patent No. V-
15414 on March 13, 1953andOriginal Certificate of Title No. P-376 on July 2, 1953.On April30, 1955,
the spouses Cadavedo sold the subject lot to the spouses Vicente Ames and Martha Fernandez (the
spouses Ames) Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-4792 was subsequently issued in the name
of the spouses Ames.

The present controversy arose when the spouses Cadavedo filed an action5 before the RTC(then
Court of First Instance) of Zamboanga City against the spouses Ames for sum of money and/or
voiding of contract of sale of homestead after the latter failed to pay the balance of the purchase
price. The spouses Cadavedo initially engaged the services of Atty. Rosendo Bandal who, for health
reasons, later withdrew from the case; he was substituted by Atty. Lacaya.

On February 24, 1969, Atty. Lacaya amended the complaint to assert the nullity of the sale and the
issuance of TCT No. T-4792 in the names of the spouses Ames as gross violation of the public land
law. The amended complaint stated that the spouses Cadavedo hired Atty. Lacaya on a contingency
fee basis. The contingency fee stipulation specifically reads:

10. That due to the above circumstances, the plaintiffs were forced to hire a lawyer on contingent
basis and if they become the prevailing parties in the case at bar, they will pay the sum of ₱2,000.00
for attorney’s fees.6

In a decision dated February 1, 1972, the RTC upheld the sale of the subject lot to the spouses
Ames. The spouses Cadavedo, thru Atty. Lacaya, appealed the case to the CA.

On September 18, 1975, and while the appeal before the CAin Civil Case No. 1721was pending, the
spouses Ames sold the subject lot to their children. The spouses Ames’ TCT No. T-4792 was
subsequently cancelled and TCT No. T-25984was issued in their children’s names. On October 11,
1976, the spouses Ames mortgaged the subject lot with the Development Bank of the Philippines
(DBP) in the names of their children.
On August 13, 1980, the CA issued itsdecision in Civil Case No. 1721,reversing the decision of the
RTC and declaring the deed of sale, transfer of rights, claims and interest to the spouses Ames null
and void ab initio. It directed the spouses Cadavedo to return the initial payment and ordered the
Register of Deeds to cancel the spouses Ames’ TCT No. T-4792 and to reissue another title in the
name of the spouses Cadavedo. The case eventually reached this Court via the spouses Ames’
petition for review on certiorari which this Court dismissed for lack of merit.

Meanwhile, the spouses Ames defaulted in their obligation with the DBP. Thus, the DBP caused the
publication of a notice of foreclosure sale of the subject lot as covered by TCT No. T-25984(under
the name of the spouses Ames’ children). Atty. Lacaya immediately informed the spouses Cadavedo
of the foreclosure sale and filed an Affidavit of Third Party Claim with the Office of the Provincial
Sheriff on September 14, 1981.

With the finality of the judgment in Civil Case No. 1721,Atty. Lacaya filed on September 21, 1981 a
motion for the issuance of a writ of execution.

On September 23, 1981,and pending the RTC’s resolution of the motion for the issuance of a writ of
execution, the spouses Ames filed a complaint7 before the RTC against the spouses Cadavedo for
Quieting of Title or Enforcement of Civil Rights due Planters in Good Faith with prayer for
Preliminary Injunction. The spouses Cadavedo, thru Atty. Lacaya, filed a motion to dismiss on the
ground of res judicata and to cancel TCT No. T-25984 (under the name of the spouses Ames’
children).

On October 16, 1981, the RTC granted the motion for the issuance of a writ of execution in Civil
Case No. 1721,andthe spouses Cadavedo were placed in possession of the subject lot on October
24, 1981. Atty. Lacaya asked for one-half of the subject lot as attorney’s fees. He caused the
subdivision of the subject lot into two equal portions, based on area, and selected the more valuable
and productive half for himself; and assigned the other half to the spouses Cadavedo.

Unsatisfied with the division, Vicente and his sons-in-law entered the portion assigned to the
respondents and ejected them. The latter responded by filing a counter-suit for forcible entry before
the Municipal Trial Court (MTC); the ejectment case was docketed as Civil Case No. 215. This
incident occurred while Civil Case No. 3352was pending.

On May 13, 1982, Vicente andAtty. Lacaya entered into an amicable settlement (compromise
agreement)8 in Civil Case No. 215 (the ejectment case), re-adjusting the area and portion obtained
by each. Atty. Lacaya acquired 10.5383 hectares pursuant to the agreement. The MTC approved the
compromise agreementin a decision dated June 10, 1982.

Meanwhile, on May 21, 1982, the spouses Cadavedo filed before the RTC an action against the
DBP for Injunction; it was docketed as Civil Case No. 3443 (Cadavedo v. DBP).The RTC
subsequently denied the petition, prompting the spouses Cadavedo to elevate the case to the CAvia
a petition for certiorari. The CA dismissed the petition in its decision of January 31, 1984.

The records do not clearly disclose the proceedings subsequent to the CA decision in Civil Case No.
3443. However, on August 18, 1988, TCT No. 41051was issued in the name of the spouses
Cadavedo concerning the subject lot.

On August 9, 1988, the spouses Cadavedo filed before the RTC an action9 against the respondents,
assailing the MTC-approved compromise agreement. The case was docketed as Civil Case No.
4038 and is the root of the present case. The spouses Cadavedo prayed, among others, that the
respondents be ejected from their one-half portion of the subject lot; that they be ordered to render
an accounting of the produce of this one-half portion from 1981;and that the RTC fix the attorney’s
fees on a quantum meruit basis, with due consideration of the expenses that Atty. Lacaya incurred
while handling the civil cases.

During the pendency of Civil Case No. 4038, the spouses Cadavedo executed a Deed of Partition of
Estate in favor of their eight children. Consequently, TCT No. 41051 was cancelled and TCT No.
41690 was issued in the names of the latter. The records are not clear on the proceedings and
status of Civil Case No. 3352.

The Ruling of the RTC

In the September 17, 1996 decision10 in Civil Case No. 4038, the RTC declared the contingent fee of
10.5383 hectares as excessive and unconscionable. The RTC reduced the land area to 5.2691
hectares and ordered the respondents to vacate and restore the remaining 5.2692hectares to the
spouses Cadavedo.

The RTC noted that, as stated in the amended complaint filed by Atty. Lacaya, the agreed attorney’s
fee on contingent basis was ₱2,000.00. Nevertheless, the RTC also pointed out that the parties
novated this agreement when they executed the compromise agreement in Civil Case No. 215
(ejectment case), thereby giving Atty. Lacaya one-half of the subject lot. The RTC added that
Vicente’s decision to give Atty. Lacaya one-half of the subject lot, sans approval of Benita, was a
valid act of administration and binds the conjugal partnership. The RTC reasoned out that the
disposition redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership as it was done precisely to
remunerate Atty. Lacaya for his services to recover the property itself.

These considerations notwithstanding, the RTC considered the one-half portion of the subject lot, as
Atty. Lacaya’s contingent fee,excessive, unreasonable and unconscionable. The RTC was
convinced that the issues involved in Civil Case No. 1721were not sufficiently difficult and
complicated to command such an excessive award; neither did it require Atty. Lacaya to devote
much of his time or skill, or to perform extensive research.

Finally, the RTC deemed the respondents’ possession, prior to the judgment, of the excess portion
of their share in the subject lot to be in good faith. The respondents were thus entitled to receive its
fruits.

On the spouses Cadavedo’s motion for reconsideration, the RTC modified the decision in its
resolution11 dated December 27, 1996. The RTC ordered the respondents to account for and deliver
the produce and income, valued at ₱7,500.00 per annum, of the 5.2692hectares that the RTC
ordered the spouses Amesto restore to the spouses Cadavedo, from October 10, 1988 until final
restoration of the premises.

The respondents appealed the case before the CA.

The Ruling of the CA

In its decision12 dated October 11, 2005, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC’s September 17,
1996 decision and maintained the partition and distribution of the subject lot under the compromise
agreement. In so ruling, the CA noted the following facts: (1) Atty. Lacaya served as the spouses
Cadavedo’s counsel from 1969 until 1988,when the latter filed the present case against Atty.
Lacaya; (2) during the nineteen (19) years of their attorney-client relationship, Atty. Lacaya
represented the spouses Cadavedo in three civil cases –Civil Case No. 1721, Civil Case No. 3352,
and Civil Case No. 3443; (3) the first civil case lasted for twelve years and even reached this Court,
the second civil case lasted for seven years, while the third civil case lasted for six years and went
all the way to the CA;(4) the spouses Cadavedo and Atty. Lacaya entered into a compromise
agreement concerning the division of the subject lot where Atty. Lacaya ultimately agreed to acquire
a smaller portion; (5) the MTC approved the compromise agreement; (6) Atty. Lacaya defrayed all of
the litigation expenses in Civil Case No. 1721; and (7) the spouses Cadavedo expressly recognized
that Atty. Lacaya served them in several cases.

Considering these established facts and consistent with Canon 20.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (enumerating the factors that should guide the determination of the lawyer’s fees), the
CA ruled that the time spent and the extent of the services Atty. Lacaya rendered for the spouses
Cadavedo in the three cases, the probability of him losing other employment resulting from his
engagement, the benefits resulting to the spouses Cadavedo, and the contingency of his fees
justified the compromise agreement and rendered the agreed fee under the compromise agreement
reasonable.

The Petition

In the present petition, the petitioners essentially argue that the CA erred in: (1) granting the
attorney’s fee consisting of one-half or 10.5383 hectares of the subject lot to Atty. Lacaya, instead of
confirming the agreed contingent attorney’s fees of ₱2,000.00; (2) not holding the respondents
accountable for the produce, harvests and income of the 10.5383-hectare portion (that they obtained
from the spouses Cadavedo) from 1988 up to the present; and (3) upholding the validity of the
purported oral contract between the spouses Cadavedo and Atty. Lacaya when it was champertous
and dealt with property then still subject of Civil Case No. 1721.13

The petitioners argue that stipulations on a lawyer’s compensation for professional services,
especially those contained in the pleadings filed in courts, control the amount of the attorney’s fees
to which the lawyer shall be entitled and should prevail over oral agreements. In this case, the
spouses Cadavedo and Atty. Lacaya agreed that the latter’s contingent attorney’s fee was
₱2,000.00 in cash, not one-half of the subject lot. This agreement was clearly stipulated in the
amended complaint filed in Civil Case No. 1721. Thus, Atty. Lacaya is bound by the expressly
stipulated fee and cannot insist on unilaterally changing its terms without violating their contract.

The petitioners add that the one-half portion of the subject lot as Atty. Lacaya’s contingent attorney’s
fee is excessive and unreasonable. They highlight the RTC’s observations and argue that the issues
involved in Civil Case No. 1721, pursuant to which the alleged contingent fee of one-half of the
subject lot was agreed by the parties, were not novel and did not involve difficult questions of law;
neither did the case require much of Atty. Lacaya’s time, skill and effort in research. They point out
that the two subsequent civil cases should not be considered in determining the reasonable
contingent fee to which Atty. Lacaya should be entitled for his services in Civil Case No. 1721,as
those cases had not yet been instituted at that time. Thus, these cases should not be considered in
fixing the attorney’s fees. The petitioners also claim that the spouses Cadavedo concluded separate
agreements on the expenses and costs for each of these subsequent cases, and that Atty. Lacaya
did not even record any attorney’s lien in the spouses Cadavedo’s TCT covering the subject lot.

The petitioners further direct the Court’s attention to the fact that Atty. Lacaya,in taking over the case
from Atty. Bandal, agreed to defray all of the litigation expenses in exchange for one-half of the
subject lot should they win the case. They insist that this agreement is a champertous contract that
is contrary to public policy, prohibited by law for violation of the fiduciary relationship between a
lawyer and a client.
Finally, the petitioners maintain that the compromise agreement in Civil Case No. 215 (ejectment
case) did not novate their original stipulated agreement on the attorney’s fees. They reason that Civil
Case No. 215 did not decide the issue of attorney’s fees between the spouses Cadavedo and Atty.
Lacaya for the latter’s services in Civil Case No. 1721.

The Case for the Respondents

In their defense,14 the respondents counter that the attorney’s fee stipulated in the amended
complaint was not the agreed fee of Atty. Lacaya for his legal services. They argue that the
questioned stipulation for attorney’s fees was in the nature of a penalty that, if granted, would inure
to the spouses Cadavedo and not to Atty. Lacaya.

The respondents point out that: (1) both Vicente and Atty. Lacaya caused the survey and subdivision
of the subject lot immediately after the spouses Cadavedo reacquired its possession with the RTC’s
approval of their motion for execution of judgment in Civil Case No. 1721; (2) Vicente expressly
ratified and confirmed the agreement on the contingent attorney’s fee consisting of one-half of the
subject lot; (3) the MTC in Civil Case No. 215 (ejectment case) approved the compromise
agreement; (4) Vicente is the legally designated administrator of the conjugal partnership, hence the
compromise agreement ratifying the transfer bound the partnership and could not have been
invalidated by the absence of Benita’s acquiescence; and (5) the compromise agreement merely
inscribed and ratified the earlier oral agreement between the spouses Cadavedo and Atty. Lacaya
which is not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order and public policy.

While the case is pending before this Court, Atty. Lacaya died.15 He was substituted by his wife -
Rosa -and their children –Victoriano D.L. Lacaya, Jr., Rosevic Lacaya-Ocampo, Reymar L. Lacaya,
Marcelito L. Lacaya, Raymundito L. Lacaya, Laila Lacaya-Matabalan, Marivic Lacaya-Barba, Rosalie
L. Lacaya and Ma. Vic-Vic Lacaya-Camaongay.16

The Court’s Ruling

We resolve to GRANT the petition.

The subject lot was the core of four successive and overlapping cases prior to the present
controversy. In three of these cases, Atty. Lacaya stood as the spouses Cadavedo’s counsel. For
ease of discussion, we summarize these cases (including the dates and proceedings pertinent to
each) as follows:

Civil Case No. 1721 – Cadavedo v. Ames (Sum of money and/or voiding of contract of sale of
homestead), filed on January 10, 1967. The writ of execution was granted on October 16, 1981.

Civil Case No. 3352 – Ames v. Cadavedo (Quieting of Title and/or Enforcement of Civil Rights due
Planters in Good Faith with Application for Preliminary injunction), filed on September 23, 1981.

Civil Case No. 3443 – Cadavedo v. DBP (Action for Injunction with Preliminary Injunction), filed on
May 21, 1982.

Civil Case No. 215 –Atty. Lacaya v. Vicente Cadavedo, et. al. (Ejectment Case), filed between the
latter part of 1981 and early part of 1982. The parties executed the compromise agreement on May
13, 1982.

Civil Case No. 4038 –petitioners v. respondents (the present case).

The agreement on attorney’s fee
consisting of one-half of the subject
lot is void; the petitioners are entitled
to recover possession

The core issue for our resolution is whether the attorney’s fee consisting of one-half of the subject lot
is valid and reasonable, and binds the petitioners. We rule in the NEGATIVE for the reasons
discussed below.

A. The written agreement providing for

a contingent fee of ₱2,000.00 should prevail
over the oral agreement providing for one-
half of the subject lot

The spouses Cadavedo and Atty. Lacaya agreed on a contingent fee of ₱2,000.00 and not, as
asserted by the latter, one-half of the subject lot. The stipulation contained in the amended complaint
filed by Atty. Lacaya clearly stated that the spouses Cadavedo hired the former on a contingency
basis; the Spouses Cadavedo undertook to pay their lawyer ₱2,000.00 as attorney’s fees should the
case be decided in their favor.

Contrary to the respondents’ contention, this stipulation is not in the nature of a penalty that the court
would award the winning party, to be paid by the losing party. The stipulation is a representation to
the court concerning the agreement between the spouses Cadavedo and Atty. Lacaya, on the
latter’s compensation for his services in the case; it is not the attorney’s fees in the nature of
damages which the former prays from the court as an incident to the main action.

At this point, we highlight that as observed by both the RTC and the CA and agreed as well by both
parties, the alleged contingent fee agreement consisting of one-half of the subject lot was not
reduced to writing prior to or, at most, at the start of Atty. Lacaya’s engagement as the spouses
Cadavedo’s counsel in Civil Case No. 1721.An agreement between the lawyer and his client,
providing for the former’s compensation, is subject to the ordinary rules governing contracts in
general. As the rules stand, controversies involving written and oral agreements on attorney’s fees
shall be resolved in favor of the former.17 Hence, the contingency fee of ₱2,000.00 stipulated in the
amended complaint prevails over the alleged oral contingency fee agreement of one-half of the
subject lot.

B. The contingent fee agreement between

the spouses Cadavedo and Atty. Lacaya,
awarding the latter one-half of the subject
lot, is champertous

Granting arguendo that the spouses Cadavedo and Atty. Lacaya indeed entered into an oral
contingent fee agreement securing to the latter one-half of the subject lot, the agreement is
nevertheless void.

In their account, the respondents insist that Atty. Lacaya agreed to represent the spouses Cadavedo
in Civil Case No. 1721 and assumed the litigation expenses, without providing for reimbursement, in
exchange for a contingency fee consisting of one-half of the subject lot. This agreement is
champertous and is contrary to public policy.18

Champerty, along with maintenance (of which champerty is an aggravated form), is a common law
doctrine that traces its origin to the medieval period.19 The doctrine of maintenance was directed
"against wanton and in officious intermeddling in the disputes of others in which the intermeddler has
no interest whatever, and where the assistance rendered is without justification or
excuse."20 Champerty, on the other hand, is characterized by "the receipt of a share of the proceeds
of the litigation by the intermeddler."21 Some common law court decisions, however, add a second
factor in determining champertous contracts, namely, that the lawyer must also, "at his own expense
maintain, and take all the risks of, the litigation."22

The doctrines of champerty and maintenance were created in response "to medieval practice of
assigning doubtful or fraudulent claims to persons of wealth and influence in the expectation that
such individuals would enjoy greater success in prosecuting those claims in court, in exchange for
which they would receive an entitlement to the spoils of the litigation."23 "In order to safeguard the
administration of justice, instances of champerty and maintenance were made subject to criminal
and tortuous liability and a common law rule was developed, striking down champertous agreements
and contracts of maintenance as being unenforceable on the grounds of public policy."24

In this jurisdiction, we maintain the rules on champerty, as adopted from American decisions, for
public policy considerations.25 As matters currently stand, any agreement by a lawyer to "conduct the
litigation in his own account, to pay the expenses thereof or to save his client therefrom and to
receive as his fee a portion of the proceeds of the judgment is obnoxious to the law."26 The rule of the
profession that forbids a lawyer from contracting with his client for part of the thing in litigation in
exchange for conducting the case at the lawyer’s expense is designed to prevent the lawyer from
acquiring an interest between him and his client. To permit these arrangements is to enable the
lawyer to "acquire additional stake in the outcome of the action which might lead him to consider his
own recovery rather than that of his client or to accept a settlement which might take care of his
interest in the verdict to the sacrifice of that of his client in violation of his duty of undivided fidelity to
his client’s cause."27

In Bautista v. Atty. Gonzales,28 the Court struck down the contingent fee agreement between therein
respondent Atty. Ramon A. Gonzales and his client for being contrary to public policy. There, the
Court held that an reimbursement of litigation expenses paid by the former is against public policy,
especially if the lawyer has agreed to carry on the action at his expense in consideration of some
bargain to have a part of the thing in dispute. It violates the fiduciary relationship between the lawyer
and his client.29

In addition to its champertous character, the contingent fee arrangement in this case expressly
transgresses the Canons of Professional Ethics and, impliedly, the Code of Professional
Responsibility.30 Under Rule 42 of the Canons of Professional Ethics, a lawyer may not properly
agree with a client that the lawyer shall pay or beat the expense of litigation.31 The same reasons
discussed above underlie this rule.

C. The attorney’s fee consisting of

one-half of the subject lot is excessive
and unconscionable

We likewise strike down the questioned attorney’s fee and declare it void for being excessive and
unconscionable. The contingent fee of one-half of the subject lot was allegedly agreed to secure the
1âwphi 1

services of Atty. Lacaya in Civil Case No. 1721.Plainly, it was intended for only one action as the two
other civil cases had not yet been instituted at that time. While Civil Case No. 1721 took twelve years
to be finally resolved, that period of time, as matters then stood, was not a sufficient reason to justify
a large fee in the absence of any showing that special skills and additional work had been involved.
The issue involved in that case, as observed by the RTC(and with which we agree), was simple and
did not require of Atty. Lacaya extensive skill, effort and research. The issue simply dealt with the
prohibition against the sale of a homestead lot within five years from its acquisition.

That Atty. Lacaya also served as the spouses Cadavedo’s counsel in the two subsequent cases did
not and could not otherwise justify an attorney’s fee of one-half of the subject lot. As assertedby the
petitioners, the spouses Cadavedo and Atty. Lacaya made separate arrangements for the costs and
expenses foreach of these two cases. Thus, the expenses for the two subsequent cases had been
considered and taken cared of Based on these considerations, we therefore find one-half of the
subject lot as attorney’s fee excessive and unreasonable.

D. Atty. Lacaya’s acquisition of

the one-half portion contravenes
Article 1491 (5) of the Civil Code

Article 1491 (5) of the Civil Code forbids lawyers from acquiring, by purchase or assignment, the
property that has been the subject of litigation in which they have taken part by virtue of their
profession.32 The same proscription is provided under Rule 10 of the Canons of Professional Ethics.33

A thing is in litigation if there is a contest or litigation over it in court or when it is subject of the
judicial action.34 Following this definition, we find that the subject lot was still in litigation when Atty.
Lacaya acquired the disputed one-half portion. We note in this regard the following established
facts:(1)on September 21, 1981, Atty. Lacaya filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution in
Civil Case No. 1721; (2) on September 23, 1981, the spouses Ames filed Civil Case No. 3352
against the spouses Cadavedo; (3)on October 16, 1981, the RTC granted the motion filed for the
issuance of a writ of execution in Civil Case No. 1721 and the spouses Cadavedo took possession
of the subject lot on October 24, 1981; (4) soon after, the subject lot was surveyed and subdivided
into two equal portions, and Atty. Lacaya took possession of one of the subdivided portions; and (5)
on May 13, 1982, Vicente and Atty. Lacaya executed the compromise agreement.

From these timelines, whether by virtue of the alleged oral contingent fee agreement or an
agreement subsequently entered into, Atty. Lacaya acquired the disputed one-half portion (which
was after October 24, 1981) while Civil Case No. 3352 and the motion for the issuance of a writ of
execution in Civil Case No. 1721were already pending before the lower courts. Similarly, the
compromise agreement, including the subsequent judicial approval, was effected during the
pendency of Civil Case No. 3352. In all of these, the relationship of a lawyer and a client still existed
between Atty. Lacaya and the spouses Cadavedo.

Thus, whether we consider these transactions –the transfer of the disputed one-half portion and the
compromise agreement –independently of each other or resulting from one another, we find them to
be prohibited and void35 by reason of public policy.36 Under Article 1409 of the Civil Code, contracts
which are contrary to public policy and those expressly prohibited or declared void by law are
considered in existent and void from the beginning.37

What did not escape this Court’s attention is the CA’s failure to note that the transfer violated the
provisions of Article 1491(5) of the Civil Code, although it recognized the concurrence of the transfer
and the execution of the compromise agreement with the pendency of the two civil cases
subsequent to Civil Case No. 1721.38 In reversing the RTC ruling, the CA gave weight to the
compromise agreement and in so doing, found justification in the unproved oral contingent fee
agreement.

While contingent fee agreements are indeed recognized in this jurisdiction as a valid exception to the
prohibitions under Article 1491(5) of the Civil Code,39 contrary to the CA’s position, however, this
recognition does not apply to the present case. A contingent fee contract is an agreement in writing
where the fee, often a fixed percentage of what may be recovered in the action, is made to depend
upon the success of the litigation.40 The payment of the contingent fee is not made during the
pendency of the litigation involving the client’s property but only after the judgment has been
rendered in the case handled by the lawyer.41

In the present case, we reiterate that the transfer or assignment of the disputed one-half portion to
Atty. Lacaya took place while the subject lot was still under litigation and the lawyer-client
relationship still existed between him and the spouses Cadavedo. Thus, the general prohibition
provided under Article 1491 of the Civil Code, rather than the exception provided in jurisprudence,
applies. The CA seriously erred in upholding the compromise agreement on the basis of the
unproved oral contingent fee agreement.

Notably, Atty. Lacaya, in undertaking the spouses Cadavedo’s cause pursuant to the terms of the
alleged oral contingent fee agreement, in effect, became a co-proprietor having an equal, if not
more, stake as the spouses Cadavedo. Again, this is void by reason of public policy; it undermines
the fiduciary relationship between him and his clients.42

E.The compromise agreement could not

validate the void oral contingent fee
agreement; neither did it supersede the
written contingent fee agreement

The compromise agreement entered into between Vicente and Atty. Lacaya in Civil Case No. 215
(ejectment case) was intended to ratify and confirm Atty. Lacaya’s acquisition and possession of the
disputed one-half portion which were made in violation of Article 1491 (5) of the Civil Code. As
earlier discussed, such acquisition is void; the compromise agreement, which had for its object a
void transaction, should be void.

A contract whose cause, object or purpose is contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or
public policy is in existent and void from the beginning.43 It can never be ratified44 nor the action or
defense for the declaration of the in existence of the contract prescribe;45 and any contract directly
resulting from such illegal contract is likewise void and in existent.46

Consequently, the compromise agreement did not supersede the written contingent fee agreement
providing for attorney’s fee of ₱2,000.00; neither did it preclude the petitioners from questioning its
validity even though Vicente might have knowingly and voluntarily acquiesced thereto and although
the MTC approved it in its June 10, 1982 decision in the ejectment case. The MTC could not have
acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter of the void compromise agreement; its judgment in the
ejectment case could not have attained finality and can thus be attacked at any time. Moreover, an
ejectment case concerns itself only with the issue of possession de facto; it will not preclude the
filing of a separate action for recovery of possession founded on ownership. Hence, contrary to the
CA’s position, the petitioners–in filing the present action and praying for, among others, the recovery
of possession of the disputed one-half portion and for judicial determination of the reasonable fees
due Atty. Lacaya for his services –were not barred by the compromise agreement.

Atty. Lacaya is entitled to receive attorney’s fees on a quantum meruit basis

In view of their respective assertions and defenses, the parties, in effect, impliedly set aside any
express stipulation on the attorney’s fees, and the petitioners, by express contention, submit the
reasonableness of such fees to the court’s discretion. We thus have to fix the attorney’s fees on a
quantum meruit basis.
"Quantum meruit—meaning ‘as much as he deserves’—is used as basis for determining a lawyer’s
professional fees in the absence of a contract x x x taking into account certain factors in fixing the
amount of legal fees."47 "Its essential requisite is the acceptance of the benefits by one sought to be
charged for the services rendered under circumstances as reasonably to notify him that the lawyer
performing the task was expecting to be paid compensation"48 for it. The doctrine of quantum meruit
is a device to prevent undue enrichment based on the equitable postulate that it is unjust for a
person to retain benefit without paying for it.49

Under Section 24, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court50 and Canon 20 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility,51 factors such as the importance of the subject matter of the controversy, the time
spent and the extent of the services rendered, the customary charges for similar services, the
amount involved in the controversy and the benefits resulting to the client from the service, to name
a few, are considered in determining the reasonableness of the fees to which a lawyer is entitled.

In the present case, the following considerations guide this Court in considering and setting Atty.
Lacaya’s fees based on quantum meruit: (1) the questions involved in these civil cases were not
novel and did not require of Atty. Lacaya considerable effort in terms of time, skill or the performance
of extensive research; (2) Atty. Lacaya rendered legal services for the Spouses Cadavedo in three
civil cases beginning in 1969 until 1988 when the petitioners filed the instant case; (3) the first of
these civil cases (Cadavedo v. Ames) lasted for twelve years and reaching up to this Court; the
second (Ames v. Cadavedo) lasted for seven years; and the third (Cadavedo and Lacaya v. DBP)
lasted for six years, reaching up to the CA; and (4) the property subject of these civil cases is of a
considerable size of 230,765 square meters or 23.0765 hectares.

All things considered, we hold as fair and equitable the RTC’s considerations in appreciating the
character of the services that Atty. Lacaya rendered in the three cases, subject to modification on
valuation. We believe and so hold that the respondents are entitled to two (2) hectares (or
approximately one-tenth [1/10] of the subject lot), with the fruits previously received from the
disputed one-half portion, as attorney’s fees. They shall return to the petitioners the remainder of the
disputed one-half portion.

The allotted portion of the subject lot properly recognizes that litigation should be for the benefit of
the client, not the lawyer, particularly in a legal situation when the law itself holds clear and express
protection to the rights of the client to the disputed property (a homestead lot). Premium
consideration, in other words, is on the rights of the owner, not on the lawyer who only helped the
owner protect his rights. Matters cannot be the other way around; otherwise, the lawyer does indeed
effectively acquire a property right over the disputed property. If at all, due recognition of parity
between a lawyer and a client should be on the fruits of the disputed property, which in this case, the
Court properly accords.

WHEREFORE, in view of these considerations, we hereby GRANT the petition. We AFFIRM the
decision dated September 17, 1996 and the resolution dated December 27, 1996of the Regional
Trial Court of Dipolog City, Branch 10,in Civil Case No. 4038, with the MODIFICATION that the
respondents, the spouses Victorino (Vic) T. Lacaya and Rosa Legados, are entitled to two (2)
hectares (or approximately one-tenth [1/10] of the subject lot) as attorney’s fees. The fruits that the
respondents previously received from the disputed one-half portion shall also form part of the
attorney’s fees. We hereby ORDER the respondents to return to the petitioners the remainder of the
10.5383-hectare portion of the subject lot that Atty. Vicente Lacaya acquired pursuant to the
compromise agreement.

SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 6622 July 10, 2012

MIGUEL G. VILLATUYA, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. BEDE S. TABALINGCOS, Respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

In this Complaint for disbarment filed on 06 December 2004 with the Office or the Bar Confidant,
complainant Manuel G. Villatuya (complainant) charges Atty. Bcde S. 'L1halingcos (resrondent) with
unlawful solicitation of cases, violation of the ('ode or Professional Responsibility for nonpayment of
fees to complainant, and gross immorality for marrying two other women while respondent’s first
marriage was subsisting.1

In a Resolution2 dated 26 January 2005, the Second Division of this Court required respondent to file
a Comment, which he did on 21 March 2005.3 The Complaint was referred to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation within sixty (60) days from receipt
of the record.4

On 23 June 2005, the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP (Commission) issued a
Notice5 setting the mandatory conference of the administrative case on 05 July 2005. During the
conference, complainant appeared, accompanied by his counsel and respondent. They submitted
for resolution three issues to be resolved by the Commission as follows:

1. Whether respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility by nonpayment of

fees to complainant

2. Whether respondent violated the rule against unlawful solicitation, and

3. Whether respondent is guilty of gross immoral conduct for having married thrice.6

The Commission ordered the parties to submit their respective verified Position Papers. Respondent
filed his verified Position Paper,7 on 15 July 2005 while complainant submitted his on 01 August
2005.8

Complainant’s Accusations

Complainant averred that on February 2002, he was employed by respondent as a financial

consultant to assist the latter on technical and financial matters in the latter’s numerous petitions for
corporate rehabilitation filed with different courts. Complainant claimed that they had a verbal
agreement whereby he would be entitled to ₱ 50,000 for every Stay Order issued by the court in the
cases they would handle, in addition to ten percent (10%) of the fees paid by their clients. He alleged
that, from February to December 2002, respondent was able to rake in millions of pesos from the
corporate rehabilitation cases they were working on together. Complainant also claimed that he was
entitled to the amount of ₱ 900,000 for the 18 Stay Orders issued by the courts as a result of his
work with respondent, and a total of ₱ 4,539,000 from the fees paid by their clients.9 Complainant
appended to his Complaint several annexes supporting the computation of the fees he believes are
due him.
Complainant alleged that respondent engaged in unlawful solicitation of cases in violation of Section
27 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Allegedly respondent set up two financial consultancy
firms, Jesi and Jane Management, Inc. and Christmel Business Link, Inc., and used them as fronts
to advertise his legal services and solicit cases. Complainant supported his allegations by attaching
to his Position Paper the Articles of Incorporation of Jesi and Jane,10 letter-proposals to clients signed
by respondent on various dates11 and proofs of payment made to the latter by their clients.12

On the third charge of gross immorality, complainant accused respondent of committing two counts
of bigamy for having married two other women while his first marriage was subsisting. He submitted
a Certification dated 13 July 2005 issued by the Office of the Civil Registrar General-National
Statistics Office (NSO) certifying that Bede S. Tabalingcos, herein respondent, contracted marriage
thrice: first, on 15 July 1980 with Pilar M. Lozano, which took place in Dasmarinas, Cavite; the
second time on 28 September 1987 with Ma. Rowena Garcia Piñon in the City of Manila; and the
third on 07 September 1989 with Mary Jane Elgincolin Paraiso in Ermita, Manila.13

Respondent’s Defense

In his defense, respondent denied the charges against him. He asserted that complainant was not
an employee of his law firm – Tabalingcos and Associates Law Office14 – but of Jesi and Jane
Management, Inc., where the former is a major stockholder.15 Respondent alleged that complainant
was unprofessional and incompetent in performing his job as a financial consultant, resulting in the
latter’s dismissal of many rehabilitation plans they presented in their court cases.16 Respondent also
alleged that there was no verbal agreement between them regarding the payment of fees and the
sharing of professional fees paid by his clients. He proffered documents showing that the salary of
complainant had been paid.17

As to the charge of unlawful solicitation, respondent denied committing any. He contended that his
law firm had an agreement with Jesi and Jane Management, Inc., whereby the firm would handle the
legal aspect of the corporate rehabilitation case; and that the latter would attend to the financial
aspect of the case’ such as the preparation of the rehabilitation plans to be presented in court. To
support this contention, respondent attached to his Position Paper a Joint Venture Agreement dated
10 December 2005 entered into by Tabalingcos and Associates Law Offices and Jesi and Jane
Management, Inc.;18 and an Affidavit executed by Leoncio Balena, Vice-President for Operations of
the said company.19

On the charge of gross immorality, respondent assailed the Affidavit submitted by William Genesis, a
dismissed messenger of Jesi and Jane Management, Inc., as having no probative value, since it had
been retracted by the affiant himself.20 Respondent did not specifically address the allegations
regarding his alleged bigamous marriages with two other women.

On 09 January 2006, complainant filed a Motion to Admit Copies of 3 Marriage Contracts.21 To the
said Motion, he attached the certified true copies of the Marriage Contracts referred to in the
Certification issued by the NSO.22 The appended Marriage Contracts matched the dates, places and
names of the contracting parties indicated in the earlier submitted NSO Certification of the three
marriages entered into by respondent. The first marriage contract submitted was a marriage that
took place between respondent and Pilar M. Lozano in Dasmarinas, Cavite, on 15 July 1980.23 The
second marriage contract was between respondent and Ma. Rowena G. Piñon, and it took place at
the Metropolitan Trial Court Compound of Manila on 28 September 1987.24 The third Marriage
Contract referred to a marriage between respondent and Mary Jane E. Paraiso, and it took place on
7 September 1989 in Ermita, Manila. In the second and third Marriage Contracts, respondent was
described as single under the entry for civil status.
On 16 January 2006, respondent submitted his Opposition to the Motion to Admit filed by
complainant, claiming that the document was not marked during the mandatory conference or
submitted during the hearing of the case.25 Thus, respondent was supposedly deprived of the
opportunity to controvert those documents.26 He disclosed that criminal cases for bigamy were filed
against him by the complainant before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila. Respondent
further informed the Commission that he had filed a Petition to Declare Null and Void the Marriage
Contract with Rowena Piñon at the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Biñan, Laguna, where it was
docketed as Civil Case No. B-3270.27 He also filed another Petition for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage Contract with Pilar Lozano at the RTC-Calamba, where it was docketed as Civil Case No.
B-3271.28 In both petitions, he claimed that he had recently discovered that there were Marriage
Contracts in the records of the NSO bearing his name and allegedly executed with Rowena Piñon
and Pilar Lozano on different occasions. He prayed for their annulment, because they were
purportedly null and void.

On 17 September 2007, in view of its reorganization, the Commission scheduled a clarificatory

hearing on 20 November 2007.29 While complainant manifested to the Commission that he would not
attend the hearing,30 respondent manifested his willingness to attend and moved for the suspension
of the resolution of the administrative case against the latter. Respondent cited two Petitions he had
filed with the RTC, Laguna, seeking the nullification of the Marriage Contracts he discovered to be
bearing his name.31

On 10 November 2007, complainant submitted to the Commission duplicate original copies of two
(2) Informations filed with the RTC of Manila against respondent, entitled "People of the Philippines
vs. Atty. Bede S. Tabalingcos."32 The first criminal case, docketed as Criminal Case No. 07-257125,
was for bigamy for the marriage contracted by respondent with Ma. Rowena Garcia Piñon while his
marriage with Pilar Lozano was still valid.33 The other one, docketed as Criminal Case No. 07-
257126, charged respondent with having committed bigamy for contracting marriage with Mary Jane
Elgincolin Paraiso while his marriage with Pilar Lozano was still subsisting.34 Each of the Informations
recommended bail in the amount of P24,000 for his provisional liberty as accused in the criminal
cases.35

On 20 November 2007, only respondent attended the clarificatory hearing. In the same proceeding,
the Commission denied his Motion to suspend the proceedings pending the outcome of the petitions
for nullification he had filed with the RTC–Laguna. Thus, the Commission resolved that the
administrative case against him be submitted for resolution.36

IBP’s Report and Recommendation

On 27 February 2008, the Commission promulgated its Report and

Recommendation addressing the specific charges against respondent.37 The first charge, for
dishonesty for the nonpayment of certain shares in the fees, was dismissed for lack of merit. The
Commission ruled that the charge should have been filed with the proper courts since it was only
empowered to determine respondent’s administrative liability. On this matter, complainant failed to
prove dishonesty on the part of respondent.38 On the second charge, the Commission found
respondent to have violated the rule on the solicitation of client for having advertised his legal
services and unlawfully solicited cases. It recommended that he be reprimanded for the violation. It
failed, though, to point out exactly the specific provision he violated.39

As for the third charge, the Commission found respondent to be guilty of gross immorality for
violating Rules 1.01 and 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Section 27 of Rule 138
of the Rules of Court. It found that complainant was able to prove through documentary evidence
that respondent committed bigamy twice by marrying two other women while the latter’s first
marriage was subsisting.40 Due to the gravity of the acts of respondent, the Commission
recommended that he be disbarred, and that his name be stricken off the roll of attorneys.41

On 15 April 2008, the IBP Board of Governors, through its Resolution No. XVIII-2008-154, adopted
and approved the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.42 On 01 August
2008, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration, arguing that the recommendation to disbar him
was premature. He contends that the Commission should have suspended the disbarment
proceedings pending the resolution of the separate cases he had filed for the annulment of the
marriage contracts bearing his name as having entered into those contracts with other women. He
further contends that the evidence proffered by complainant to establish that the latter committed
bigamy was not substantial to merit the punishment of disbarment. Thus, respondent moved for the
reconsideration of the resolution to disbar him and likewise moved to archive the administrative
proceedings pending the outcome of the Petitions he separately filed with the RTC of Laguna for the
annulment of Marriage Contracts.43

On 26 June 2011, the IBP Board of Governors denied the Motions for Reconsideration and affirmed
their Resolution dated 15 April 2008 recommending respondent’s disbarment.44

The Court’s Ruling

The Court affirms the recommendations of the IBP.

First Charge:

Dishonesty for nonpayment of share in the fees

While we affirm the IBP’s dismissal of the first charge against respondent, we do not concur with the
rationale behind it.

The first charge of complainant against respondent for the nonpayment of the former’s share in the
fees, if proven to be true is based on an agreement that is violative of Rule 9.0245 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. A lawyer is proscribed by the Code to divide or agree to divide the fees
for legal services rendered with a person not licensed to practice law. Based on the allegations,
respondent had agreed to share with complainant the legal fees paid by clients that complainant
solicited for the respondent. Complainant, however, failed to proffer convincing evidence to prove
the existence of that agreement.

We ruled in Tan Tek Beng v. David46 that an agreement between a lawyer and a layperson to share
the fees collected from clients secured by the layperson is null and void, and that the lawyer involved
may be disciplined for unethical conduct. Considering that complainant’s allegations in this case had
not been proven, the IBP correctly dismissed the charge against respondent on this matter.

Second Charge:

Unlawful solicitation of clients

Complainant charged respondent with unlawfully soliciting clients and advertising legal services
through various business entities. Complainant submitted documentary evidence to prove that Jesi &
Jane Management Inc. and Christmel Business Link, Inc. were owned and used as fronts by
respondent to advertise the latter’s legal services and to solicit clients. In its Report, the IBP
established the truth of these allegations and ruled that respondent had violated the rule on the
solicitation of clients, but it failed to point out the specific provision that was breached.

A review of the records reveals that respondent indeed used the business entities mentioned in the
report to solicit clients and to advertise his legal services, purporting to be specialized in corporate
rehabilitation cases. Based on the facts of the case, he violated Rule 2.0347 of the Code, which
prohibits lawyers from soliciting cases for the purpose of profit.

A lawyer is not prohibited from engaging in business or other lawful occupation. Impropriety arises,
though, when the business is of such a nature or is conducted in such a manner as to be
inconsistent with the lawyer’s duties as a member of the bar. This inconsistency arises when the
business is one that can readily lend itself to the procurement of professional employment for the
lawyer; or that can be used as a cloak for indirect solicitation on the lawyer’s behalf; or is of a nature
that, if handled by a lawyer, would be regarded as the practice of law.48

It is clear from the documentary evidence submitted by complainant that Jesi & Jane Management,
Inc., which purports to be a financial and legal consultant, was indeed a vehicle used by respondent
as a means to procure professional employment; specifically for corporate rehabilitation cases.
Annex "C"49 of the Complaint is a letterhead of Jesi & Jane

Management, Inc., which proposed an agreement for the engagement of legal services. The letter
clearly states that, should the prospective client agree to the proposed fees, respondent would
render legal services related to the former’s loan obligation with a bank. This circumvention is
considered objectionable and violates the Code, because the letter is signed by respondent as
President of Jesi & Jane Management, Inc., and not as partner or associate of a law firm.

Rule 15.0850 of the Code mandates that the lawyer is mandated to inform the client whether the
former is acting as a lawyer or in another capacity. This duty is a must in those occupations related
to the practice of law. The reason is that certain ethical considerations governing the attorney-client
relationship may be operative in one and not in the other.51 In this case, it is confusing for the client if
it is not clear whether respondent is offering consultancy or legal services.

Considering, however, that complainant has not proven the degree of prevalence of this practice by
respondent, we affirm the recommendation to reprimand the latter for violating Rules 2.03 and 15.08
of the Code.

Third Charge:

Bigamy

The third charge that respondent committed bigamy twice is a serious accusation. To substantiate
this allegation, complainant submitted NSO-certified copies of the Marriage Contracts entered into
by respondent with three (3) different women. The latter objected to the introduction of these
documents, claiming that they were submitted after the administrative case had been submitted for
resolution, thus giving him no opportunity to controvert them.52 We are not persuaded by his
argument.

We have consistently held that a disbarment case is sui generis. Its focus is on the qualification and
fitness of a lawyer to continue membership in the bar and not the procedural technicalities in filing
the case. Thus, we explained in Garrido v. Garrido:53
Laws dealing with double jeopardy or with procedure — such as the verification of pleadings and
prejudicial questions, or in this case, prescription of offenses or the filing of affidavits of desistance
by the complainant — do not apply in the determination of a lawyer's qualifications and fitness for
membership in the Bar. We have so ruled in the past and we see no reason to depart from this
ruling. First, admission to the practice of law is a component of the administration of justice and is a
matter of public interest because it involves service to the public. The admission qualifications are
also qualifications for the continued enjoyment of the privilege to practice law. Second, lack of
qualifications or the violation of the standards for the practice of law, like criminal cases, is a matter
of public concern that the State may inquire into through this Court.

In disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon the complainant. For the court to
1âwphi1

exercise its disciplinary powers, the case against the respondent must be established by convincing
and satisfactory proof.54 In this case, complainant submitted NSO-certified true copies to prove that
respondent entered into two marriages while the latter’s first marriage was still subsisting. While
respondent denied entering into the second and the third marriages, he resorted to vague assertions
tantamount to a negative pregnant. He did not dispute the authenticity of the NSO documents, but
denied that he contracted those two other marriages. He submitted copies of the two Petitions he
had filed separately with the RTC of Laguna – one in Biñan and the other in Calamba – to declare
the second and the third Marriage Contracts null and void.55

We find him guilty of gross immorality under the Code.

We cannot give credence to the defense proffered by respondent. He has not disputed the
authenticity or impugned the genuineness of the NSO-certified copies of the Marriage Contracts
presented by complainant to prove the former’s marriages to two other women aside from his wife.
For purposes of this disbarment proceeding, these Marriage Contracts bearing the name of
respondent are competent and convincing evidence proving that he committed bigamy, which
renders him unfit to continue as a member of the bar. The documents were certified by the NSO,
which is the official repository of civil registry records pertaining to the birth, marriage and death of a
person. Having been issued by a government agency, the NSO certification is accorded much
evidentiary weight and carries with it a presumption of regularity. In this case, respondent has not
presented any competent evidence to rebut those documents.

According to the respondent, after the discovery of the second and the third marriages, he filed civil
actions to annul the Marriage Contracts. We perused the attached Petitions for Annulment and found
that his allegations therein treated the second and the third marriage contracts as ordinary
agreements, rather than as special contracts contemplated under the then Civil Code provisions on
marriage. He did not invoke any grounds in the Civil Code provisions on marriage, prior to its
amendment by the Family Code. Respondent’s regard for marriage contracts as ordinary
agreements indicates either his wanton disregard of the sanctity of marriage or his gross ignorance
of the law on what course of action to take to annul a marriage under the old Civil Code provisions.

What has been clearly established here is the fact that respondent entered into marriage twice while
his first marriage was still subsisting. In Bustamante-Alejandro v. Alejandro,56 we held thus:

We have in a number of cases disciplined members of the Bar whom we found guilty of misconduct
which demonstrated a lack of that good moral character required of them not only as a condition
precedent for their admission to the Bar but, likewise, for their continued membership therein. No
distinction has been made as to whether the misconduct was committed in the lawyer’s professional
capacity or in his private life. This is because a lawyer may not divide his personality so as to be an
attorney at one time and a mere citizen at another. He is expected to be competent, honorable and
reliable at all times since he who cannot apply and abide by the laws in his private affairs, can hardly
be expected to do so in his professional dealings nor lead others in doing so. Professional honesty
and honor are not to be expected as the accompaniment of dishonesty and dishonor in other
relations. The administration of justice, in which the lawyer plays an important role being an officer of
the court, demands a high degree of intellectual and moral competency on his part so that the courts
and clients may rightly repose confidence in him.

Respondent exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of morality required of him as a member of
the bar. He made a mockery of marriage, a sacred institution demanding respect and dignity.57 His
acts of committing bigamy twice constituted grossly immoral conduct and are grounds for disbarment
under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court.58

Thus, we adopt the recommendation of the IBP to disbar respondent and order that his name be
stricken from the Roll of Attorneys.

WHEREFORE, this Court resolves the following charges against Atty. Bede S. Tabalingcos as
follows:

1. The charge of dishonesty is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

2. Respondent is REPRIMANDED for acts of illegal advertisement and solicitation.

3. Atty. Bede S. Tabalingcos is DISBARRED for engaging in bigamy, a grossly immoral

conduct.

Let a copy of this Decision be attached to the personal records of Atty. Bede S. Tabalingcos in the
Office of the Bar Confidant, and another copy furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.

The Clerk of Court is directed to strike out the name of Bede S. Tabalingcos from the Roll of
Attorneys.

SO ORDERED.