[G.R. No. 104768.

July 21, 2003]

Republic of the Philippines, petitioner, vs. Sandiganbayan, Major
General Josephus Q. Ramas and Elizabeth Dimaano, respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:

The Case

Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to set

aside the Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan (First Division)[1] dated 18
November 1991 and 25 March 1992 in Civil Case No. 0037. The first
Resolution dismissed petitioners Amended Complaint and ordered the
return of the confiscated items to respondent Elizabeth Dimaano,
while the second Resolution denied petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration.Petitioner prays for the grant of the reliefs sought in
its Amended Complaint, or in the alternative, for the remand of this
case to the Sandiganbayan (First Division) for further proceedings
allowing petitioner to complete the presentation of its evidence.

Antecedent Facts
Immediately upon her assumption to office following the successful
EDSA Revolution, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Executive
Order No. 1 (EO No. 1) creating the Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG). EO No. 1 primarily tasked the PCGG to recover all
ill-gotten wealth of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his
immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close associates. EO No. 1
vested the PCGG with the power (a) to conduct investigation as may
be necessary in order to accomplish and carry out the purposes of this
order and the power (h) to promulgate such rules and regulations as
may be necessary to carry out the purpose of this order. Accordingly,
the PCGG, through its then Chairman Jovito R. Salonga, created an AFP
Anti-Graft Board (AFP Board) tasked to investigate reports of
unexplained wealth and corrupt practices by AFP personnel, whether
in the active service or retired.[2]

Based on its mandate, the AFP Board investigated various reports of

alleged unexplained wealth of respondent Major General Josephus Q.
Ramas (Ramas). On 27 July 1987, the AFP Board issued a Resolution on
its findings and recommendation on the reported unexplained wealth
of Ramas. The relevant part of the Resolution reads:

III. FINDINGS and EVALUATION:

Evidence in the record showed that respondent is the owner of a
house and lot located at 15-Yakan St., La Vista, Quezon City. He is also
the owner of a house and lot located in Cebu City. The lot has an area
of 3,327 square meters.

The value of the property located in Quezon City may be estimated

modestly at P700,000.00.

The equipment/items and communication facilities which were found

in the premises of Elizabeth Dimaano and were confiscated by
elements of the PC Command of Batangas were all covered by invoice
receipt in the name of CAPT. EFREN SALIDO, RSO Command Coy, MSC,
PA. These items could not have been in the possession of Elizabeth
Dimaano if not given for her use by respondent Commanding General
of the Philippine Army.

Aside from the military equipment/items and communications

equipment, the raiding team was also able to confiscate money in the
amount of P2,870,000.00 and $50,000 US Dollars in the house of
Elizabeth Dimaano on 3 March 1986.

Affidavits of members of the Military Security Unit, Military Security

Command, Philippine Army, stationed at Camp Eldridge, Los Baos,
Laguna, disclosed that Elizabeth Dimaano is the mistress of
respondent. That respondent usually goes and stays and sleeps in the
alleged house of Elizabeth Dimaano in Barangay Tengga, Itaas,
Batangas City and when he arrives, Elizabeth Dimaano embraces and
kisses respondent. That on February 25, 1986, a person who rode in a
car went to the residence of Elizabeth Dimaano with four (4) attache
cases filled with money and owned by MGen Ramas.

Sworn statement in the record disclosed also that Elizabeth Dimaano

had no visible means of income and is supported by respondent for she
was formerly a mere secretary.
Taking in toto the evidence, Elizabeth Dimaano could not have used
the military equipment/items seized in her house on March 3, 1986
without the consent of respondent, he being the Commanding General
of the Philippine Army. It is also impossible for Elizabeth Dimaano to
claim that she owns the P2,870,000.00 and $50,000 US Dollars for she
had no visible source of income.

This money was never declared in the Statement of Assets and

Liabilities of respondent. There was an intention to cover the existence
of these money because these are all ill-gotten and unexplained
wealth. Were it not for the affidavits of the members of the Military
Security Unit assigned at Camp Eldridge, Los Baos, Laguna, the
existence and ownership of these money would have never been
known.

The Statement of Assets and Liabilities of respondent were also

submitted for scrutiny and analysis by the Boards consultant. Although
the amount of P2,870,000.00 and $50,000 US Dollars were not
included, still it was disclosed that respondent has an unexplained
wealth of P104,134. 60.

IV. CONCLUSION:
In view of the foregoing, the Board finds that a prima facie case exists
against respondent for ill-gotten and unexplained wealth in the
amount of P2,974,134.00 and $50,000 US Dollars.

V. RECOMMENDATION:
Wherefore it is recommended that Maj. Gen. Josephus Q. Ramas (ret.)
be prosecuted and tried for violation of RA 3019, as amended,
otherwise known as Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and RA 1379,
as amended, otherwise known as The Act for the Forfeiture of
Unlawfully Acquired Property.[3]

Thus, on 1 August 1987, the PCGG filed a petition for forfeiture under
Republic Act No. 1379 (RA No. 1379) [4] against Ramas.

Before Ramas could answer the petition, then Solicitor General

Francisco I. Chavez filed an Amended Complaint naming the Republic
of the Philippines (petitioner), represented by the PCGG, as plaintiff
and Ramas as defendant. The Amended Complaint also impleaded
Elizabeth Dimaano (Dimaano) as co-defendant.

The Amended Complaint alleged that Ramas was the Commanding

General of the Philippine Army until 1986. On the other hand, Dimaano
was a confidential agent of the Military Security Unit, Philippine Army,
assigned as a clerk-typist at the office of Ramas from 1 January 1978 to
February 1979. The Amended Complaint further alleged that Ramas
acquired funds, assets and properties manifestly out of proportion to
his salary as an army officer and his other income from legitimately
acquired property by taking undue advantage of his public office
and/or using his power, authority and influence as such officer of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines and as a subordinate and close
associate of the deposed President Ferdinand Marcos.[5]

The Amended Complaint also alleged that the AFP Board, after a
previous inquiry, found reasonable ground to believe that respondents
have violated RA No. 1379.[6] The Amended Complaint prayed for,
among others, the forfeiture of respondents properties, funds and
equipment in favor of the State.

Ramas filed an Answer with Special and/or Affirmative Defenses and

Compulsory Counterclaim to the Amended Complaint. In his Answer,
Ramas contended that his property consisted only of a residential
house at La Vista Subdivision, Quezon City, valued at P700,000, which
was not out of proportion to his salary and other legitimate income. He
denied ownership of any mansion in Cebu City and the cash,
communications equipment and other items confiscated from the
house of Dimaano.

Dimaano filed her own Answer to the Amended

Complaint. Admitting her employment as a clerk-typist in the office of
Ramas from January-November 1978 only, Dimaano claimed ownership
of the monies, communications equipment, jewelry and land titles
taken from her house by the Philippine Constabulary raiding team.
After termination of the pre-trial,[7] the court set the case for trial on
the merits on 9-11 November 1988.
 On 9 November 1988, petitioner asked for a deferment of the
hearing due to its lack of preparation for trial and the absence of
witnesses and vital documents to support its case. The court reset the
hearing to 17 and 18 April 1989.

On 13 April 1989, petitioner filed a motion for leave to amend the

complaint in order to charge the delinquent properties with being
subject to forfeiture as having been unlawfully acquired by defendant
Dimaano alone x x x.[8]

Nevertheless, in an order dated 17 April 1989, the Sandiganbayan

proceeded with petitioners presentation of evidence on the ground
that the motion for leave to amend complaint did not state when
petitioner would file the amended complaint. The Sandiganbayan
further stated that the subject matter of the amended complaint was
on its face vague and not related to the existing complaint. The
Sandiganbayan also held that due to the time that the case had been
pending in court, petitioner should proceed to present its evidence.

After presenting only three witnesses, petitioner asked for a

postponement of the trial.

On 28 September 1989, during the continuation of the trial,

petitioner manifested its inability to proceed to trial because of the
absence of other witnesses or lack of further evidence to
present. Instead, petitioner reiterated its motion to amend the
complaint to conform to the evidence already presented or to change
the averments to show that Dimaano alone unlawfully acquired the
monies or properties subject of the forfeiture.

The Sandiganbayan noted that petitioner had already delayed the

case for over a year mainly because of its many postponements.
Moreover, petitioner would want the case to revert to its preliminary
stage when in fact the case had long been ready for trial.The
Sandiganbayan ordered petitioner to prepare for presentation of its
additional evidence, if any.

During the trial on 23 March 1990, petitioner again admitted its

inability to present further evidence. Giving petitioner one more
chance to present further evidence or to amend the complaint to
conform to its evidence, the Sandiganbayan reset the trial to 18 May
1990. The Sandiganbayan, however, hinted that the re-setting was
without prejudice to any action that private respondents might take
under the circumstances.

However, on 18 May 1990, petitioner again expressed its inability to

proceed to trial because it had no further evidence to present. Again,
in the interest of justice, the Sandiganbayan granted petitioner 60 days
within which to file an appropriate pleading.The Sandiganbayan,
however, warned petitioner that failure to act would constrain the
court to take drastic action.

Private respondents then filed their motions to dismiss based

on Republic v. Migrino.[9] The Court held in Migrino that the PCGG does
not have jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute military officers by
reason of mere position held without a showing that they are
subordinates of former President Marcos.

On 18 November 1991, the Sandiganbayan rendered a resolution, the

dispositive portion of which states:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the Amended

Complaint, without pronouncement as to costs. The counterclaims are
likewise dismissed for lack of merit, but the confiscated sum of money,
communications equipment, jewelry and land titles are ordered
returned to Elizabeth Dimaano.

The records of this case are hereby remanded and referred to the Hon.
Ombudsman, who has primary jurisdiction over the forfeiture cases
under R.A. No. 1379, for such appropriate action as the evidence
warrants. This case is also referred to the Commissioner of the Bureau
of Internal Revenue for a determination of any tax liability of
respondent Elizabeth Dimaano in connection herewith.

SO ORDERED.

On 4 December 1991, petitioner filed its Motion for Reconsideration.

 In answer to the Motion for Reconsideration, private respondents
filed a Joint Comment/Opposition to which petitioner filed its Reply on
10 January 1992.

On 25 March 1992, the Sandiganbayan rendered a Resolution

denying the Motion for Reconsideration.

Ruling of the Sandiganbayan

The Sandiganbayan dismissed the Amended Complaint on the
following grounds:

(1.) The actions taken by the PCGG are not in accordance with the
rulings of the Supreme Court in Cruz, Jr. v.
Sandiganbayan[10] and Republic v. Migrino[11] which involve the
same issues.
(2.) No previous inquiry similar to preliminary investigations in
criminal cases was conducted against Ramas and Dimaano.
(3.) The evidence adduced against Ramas does not constitute
a prima facie case against him.
(4.) There was an illegal search and seizure of the items confiscated.

The Issues
Petitioner raises the following issues:

A. RESPONDENT COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN

CONCLUDING THAT PETITIONERS EVIDENCE CANNOT
MAKE A CASE FOR FORFEITURE AND THAT THERE
WAS NO SHOWING OF CONSPIRACY, COLLUSION OR
RELATIONSHIP BY CONSANGUINITY OR AFFINITY BY
AND BETWEEN RESPONDENT RAMAS AND
RESPONDENT DIMAANO NOTWITHSTANDING THE
FACT THAT SUCH CONCLUSIONS WERE CLEARLY
UNFOUNDED AND PREMATURE, HAVING BEEN
RENDERED PRIOR TO THE COMPLETION OF THE
PRESENTATION OF THE EVIDENCE OF THE
PETITIONER.

B. RESPONDENT COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING

THAT THE ACTIONS TAKEN BY THE PETITIONER,
 INCLUDING THE FILING OF THE ORIGINAL
COMPLAINT AND THE AMENDED COMPLAINT,
SHOULD BE STRUCK OUT IN LINE WITH THE RULINGS
OF THE SUPREME COURT IN CRUZ, JR. v.
SANDIGANBAYAN, 194 SCRA 474 AND REPUBLIC v.
MIGRINO, 189 SCRA 289, NOTWITHSTANDING THE
FACT THAT:

1. The cases of Cruz, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, supra, and

Republic v. Migrino, supra, are clearly not applicable
to this case;

2. Any procedural defect in the institution of the

complaint in Civil Case No. 0037 was cured and/or
waived by respondents with the filing of their
respective answers with counterclaim; and

3. The separate motions to dismiss were evidently

improper considering that they were filed after
commencement of the presentation of the
evidence of the petitioner and even before the
latter was allowed to formally offer its evidence and
rest its case;

C. RESPONDENT COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING

THAT THE ARTICLES AND THINGS SUCH AS SUMS OF
MONEY, COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT, JEWELRY
AND LAND TITLES CONFISCATED FROM THE HOUSE
OF RESPONDENT DIMAANO WERE ILLEGALLY SEIZED
AND THEREFORE EXCLUDED AS EVIDENCE.[12]

The Courts Ruling

First Issue: PCGGs Jurisdiction to Investigate Private Respondents

This case involves a revisiting of an old issue already decided by this
Court in Cruz, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan[13] and Republic v. Migrino.[14]

The primary issue for resolution is whether the PCGG has the
jurisdiction to investigate and cause the filing of a forfeiture petition
against Ramas and Dimaano for unexplained wealth under RA No.
1379.

We hold that PCGG has no such jurisdiction.

The PCGG created the AFP Board to investigate the unexplained

wealth and corrupt practices of AFP personnel, whether in the active
service or retired.[15] The PCGG tasked the AFP Board to make the
necessary recommendations to appropriate government agencies on
the action to be taken based on its findings.[16] The PCGG gave this task
to the AFP Board pursuant to the PCGGs power under Section 3 of EO
No. 1 to conduct investigation as may be necessary in order to
accomplish and to carry out the purposes of this order. EO No. 1 gave
the PCGG specific responsibilities, to wit:

SEC. 2. The Commission shall be charged with the task of assisting the
President in regard to the following matters:

(a) The recovery of all ill-gotten wealth accumulated by former

President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family,
relatives, subordinates and close associates, whether
located in the Philippines or abroad, including the takeover
and sequestration of all business enterprises and entities
owned or controlled by them, during his administration,
directly or through nominees, by taking undue advantage of
their public office and/ or using their powers, authority,
influence, connections or relationship.

(b) The investigation of such cases of graft and corruption as the

President may assign to the Commission from time to time.
x x x.

The PCGG, through the AFP Board, can only investigate the
unexplained wealth and corrupt practices of AFP personnel who fall
under either of the two categories mentioned in Section 2 of EO No.
1. These are: (1) AFP personnel who have accumulated ill-gotten wealth
during the administration of former President Marcos by being the
latters immediate family, relative, subordinate or close associate,
taking undue advantage of their public office or using their powers,
influence x x x;[17] or (2) AFP personnel involved in other cases of graft
and corruption provided the President assigns their cases to the
PCGG.[18]

Petitioner, however, does not claim that the President assigned

Ramas case to the PCGG. Therefore, Ramas case should fall under the
first category of AFP personnel before the PCGG could exercise its
jurisdiction over him. Petitioner argues that Ramas was undoubtedly a
subordinate of former President Marcos because of his position as the
Commanding General of the Philippine Army. Petitioner claims that
Ramas position enabled him to receive orders directly from his
commander-in-chief, undeniably making him a subordinate of former
President Marcos.

We hold that Ramas was not a subordinate of former President

Marcos in the sense contemplated under EO No. 1 and its amendments.
Mere position held by a military officer does not automatically make
him a subordinate as this term is used in EO Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A
absent a showing that he enjoyed close association with former
President Marcos. Migrino discussed this issue in this wise:

A close reading of EO No. 1 and related executive orders will readily

show what is contemplated within the term subordinate. The Whereas
Clauses of EO No. 1 express the urgent need to recover the ill-gotten
wealth amassed by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his
immediate family, relatives, and close associates both here and abroad.
EO No. 2 freezes all assets and properties in the Philippines in which
former President Marcos and/or his wife, Mrs. Imelda Marcos, their
close relatives, subordinates, business associates, dummies, agents, or
nominees have any interest or participation.

Applying the rule in statutory construction known as ejusdem

generis that is-

[W]here general words follow an enumeration of persons or things by

words of a particular and specific meaning, such general words are not
to be construed in their widest extent, but are to be held as applying
only to persons or things of the same kind or class as those specifically
mentioned [Smith, Bell & Co, Ltd. vs. Register of Deeds of Davao, 96
Phil. 53, 58, citing Black on Interpretation of Laws, 2nd Ed., 203].

[T]he term subordinate as used in EO Nos. 1 & 2 refers to one who

enjoys a close association with former President Marcos and/or his
wife, similar to the immediate family member, relative, and close
associate in EO No. 1 and the close relative, business associate, dummy,
agent, or nominee in EO No. 2.
xxx

It does not suffice, as in this case, that the respondent is or was a

government official or employee during the administration of former
President Marcos. There must be a prima facie showing that the
respondent unlawfully accumulated wealth by virtue of his close
association or relation with former Pres. Marcos and/or his wife.
(Emphasis supplied)

Ramas position alone as Commanding General of the Philippine

Army with the rank of Major General[19] does not suffice to make him a
subordinate of former President Marcos for purposes of EO No. 1 and
its amendments. The PCGG has to provide a prima facie showing that
Ramas was a close associate of former President Marcos, in the same
manner that business associates, dummies, agents or nominees of
former President Marcos were close to him. Such close association is
manifested either by Ramas complicity with former President Marcos
in the accumulation of ill-gotten wealth by the deposed President or by
former President Marcos acquiescence in Ramas own accumulation of
ill-gotten wealth if any.

This, the PCGG failed to do.

Petitioners attempt to differentiate the instant case

from Migrino does not convince us. Petitioner argues that unlike
in Migrino, the AFP Board Resolution in the instant case states that the
AFP Board conducted the investigation pursuant to EO Nos. 1, 2, 14 and
14-A in relation to RA No. 1379. Petitioner asserts that there is a
presumption that the PCGG was acting within its jurisdiction of
investigating crony-related cases of graft and corruption and that
Ramas was truly a subordinate of the former President. However, the
same AFP Board Resolution belies this contention. Although the
Resolution begins with such statement, it ends with the following
recommendation:

V. RECOMMENDATION:
Wherefore it is recommended that Maj. Gen. Josephus Q. Ramas (ret.)
be prosecuted and tried for violation of RA 3019, as amended,
otherwise known as Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and RA 1379,
as amended, otherwise known as The Act for the Forfeiture of
Unlawfully Acquired Property.[20]

Thus, although the PCGG sought to investigate and prosecute private

respondents under EO Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, the result yielded a finding
of violation of Republic Acts Nos. 3019 and 1379 without any relation to
EO Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A. This absence of relation to EO No. 1 and its
amendments proves fatal to petitioners case. EO No. 1 created the
PCGG for a specific and limited purpose, and necessarily its powers
must be construed to address such specific and limited purpose.

Moreover, the resolution of the AFP Board and even the Amended
Complaint do not show that the properties Ramas allegedly owned
were accumulated by him in his capacity as a subordinate of his
commander-in-chief. Petitioner merely enumerated the properties
Ramas allegedly owned and suggested that these properties were
disproportionate to his salary and other legitimate income without
showing that Ramas amassed them because of his close association
with former President Marcos. Petitioner, in fact, admits that the AFP
Board resolution does not contain a finding that Ramas accumulated
his wealth because of his close association with former President
Marcos, thus:

10. While it is true that the resolution of the Anti-Graft Board of the
New Armed Forces of the Philippines did not categorically find
a prima facie evidence showing that respondent Ramas unlawfully
accumulated wealth by virtue of his close association or relation with
former President Marcos and/or his wife, it is submitted that such
omission was not fatal. The resolution of the Anti-Graft Board should
be read in the context of the law creating the same and the objective
of the investigation which was, as stated in the above, pursuant to
Republic Act Nos. 3019 and 1379 in relation to Executive Order Nos. 1, 2,
14 and 14-a;[21] (Emphasis supplied)

Such omission is fatal. Petitioner forgets that it is precisely a prima

facie showing that the ill-gotten wealth was accumulated by a
subordinate of former President Marcos that vests jurisdiction on
PCGG. EO No. 1[22] clearly premises the creation of the PCGG on the
urgent need to recover all ill-gotten wealth amassed by former
President Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, subordinates and
close associates. Therefore, to say that such omission was not fatal is
clearly contrary to the intent behind the creation of the PCGG.

In Cruz, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan,[23] the Court outlined the cases that fall
under the jurisdiction of the PCGG pursuant to EO Nos. 1, 2,[24] 14,[25] 14-
A:[26]

A careful reading of Sections 2(a) and 3 of Executive Order No. 1 in

relation with Sections 1, 2 and 3 of Executive Order No. 14, shows what
the authority of the respondent PCGG to investigate and prosecute
covers:

(a) the investigation and prosecution of the civil action for the
recovery of ill-gotten wealth under Republic Act No.
1379, accumulated by former President Marcos, his
immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close
associates, whether located in the Philippines or abroad,
including the take-over or sequestration of all business
enterprises and entities owned or controlled by them, during
his administration, directly or through his nominees, by
taking undue advantage of their public office and/or using
their powers, authority and influence, connections or
relationships; and

(b) the investigation and prosecution of such offenses

committed in the acquisition of said ill-gotten wealth as
contemplated under Section 2(a) of Executive Order No. 1.

However, other violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act

not otherwise falling under the foregoing categories, require a
previous authority of the President for the respondent PCGG to
investigate and prosecute in accordance with Section 2 (b) of
Executive Order No. 1. Otherwise, jurisdiction over such cases is
vested in the Ombudsman and other duly authorized investigating
agencies such as the provincial and city prosecutors, their assistants,
the Chief State Prosecutor and his assistants and the state
prosecutors. (Emphasis supplied)

The proper government agencies, and not the PCGG, should

investigate and prosecute forfeiture petitions not falling under EO No.
1 and its amendments. The preliminary investigation of unexplained
wealth amassed on or before 25 February 1986 falls under the
jurisdiction of the Ombudsman, while the authority to file the
corresponding forfeiture petition rests with the Solicitor
General.[27] The Ombudsman Act or Republic Act No. 6770 (RA No.
6770) vests in the Ombudsman the power to conduct preliminary
investigation and to file forfeiture proceedings involving unexplained
wealth amassed after 25 February 1986.[28]

After the pronouncements of the Court in Cruz, the PCGG still

pursued this case despite the absence of a prima facie finding that
Ramas was a subordinate of former President Marcos. The petition for
forfeiture filed with the Sandiganbayan should be dismissed for lack of
authority by the PCGG to investigate respondents since there is
no prima facie showing that EO No. 1 and its amendments apply to
respondents. The AFP Board Resolution and even the Amended
Complaint state that there are violations of RA Nos. 3019 and
1379. Thus, the PCGG should have recommended Ramas case to the
Ombudsman who has jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary
investigation of ordinary unexplained wealth and graft cases. As stated
in Migrino:

[But] in view of the patent lack of authority of the PCGG to investigate

and cause the prosecution of private respondent for violation of Rep.
Acts Nos. 3019 and 1379, the PCGG must also be enjoined from
proceeding with the case, without prejudice to any action that may be
taken by the proper prosecutory agency. The rule of law mandates that
an agency of government be allowed to exercise only the powers
granted to it.
 Petitioners argument that private respondents have waived any
defect in the filing of the forfeiture petition by submitting their
respective Answers with counterclaim deserves no merit as well.

Petitioner has no jurisdiction over private respondents. Thus, there

is no jurisdiction to waive in the first place. The PCGG cannot exercise
investigative or prosecutorial powers never granted to it. PCGGs
powers are specific and limited. Unless given additional assignment by
the President, PCGGs sole task is only to recover the ill-gotten wealth
of the Marcoses, their relatives and cronies.[29] Without these
elements, the PCGG cannot claim jurisdiction over a case.

Private respondents questioned the authority and jurisdiction of the

PCGG to investigate and prosecute their cases by filing their Motion to
Dismiss as soon as they learned of the pronouncement of the Court
in Migrino. This case was decided on 30 August 1990, which explains
why private respondents only filed their Motion to Dismiss on 8
October 1990. Nevertheless, we have held that the parties may raise
lack of jurisdiction at any stage of the proceeding.[30] Thus, we hold
that there was no waiver of jurisdiction in this case. Jurisdiction is
vested by law and not by the parties to an action.[31]

Consequently, the petition should be dismissed for lack of

jurisdiction by the PCGG to conduct the preliminary investigation. The
Ombudsman may still conduct the proper preliminary investigation for
violation of RA No. 1379, and if warranted, the Solicitor General may file
the forfeiture petition with the Sandiganbayan.[32] The right of the
State to forfeit unexplained wealth under RA No. 1379 is not subject to
prescription, laches or estoppel.[33]

Second Issue: Propriety of Dismissal of Case

Before Completion of Presentation of Evidence
Petitioner also contends that the Sandiganbayan erred in dismissing
the case before completion of the presentation of petitioners
evidence.

We disagree.
Based on the findings of the Sandiganbayan and the records of this
case, we find that petitioner has only itself to blame for non-
completion of the presentation of its evidence. First, this case has been
pending for four years before the Sandiganbayan dismissed
it. Petitioner filed its Amended Complaint on 11
August 1987, and only beganto present its evidence on 17 April
1989. Petitioner had almost two years to prepare its evidence.
However, despite this sufficient time, petitioner still delayed the
presentation of the rest of its evidence by filing numerous motions for
postponements and extensions. Even before the date set for the
presentation of its evidence, petitioner filed, on 13 April 1989, a Motion
for Leave to Amend the Complaint.[34] The motion sought to charge the
delinquent properties (which comprise most of petitioners evidence)
with being subject to forfeiture as having been unlawfully acquired by
defendant Dimaano alone x x x.

The Sandiganbayan, however, refused to defer the presentation of

petitioners evidence since petitioner did not state when it would file
the amended complaint. On 18 April 1989, the Sandiganbayan set the
continuation of the presentation of evidence on 28-29 September and
9-11 October 1989, giving petitioner ample time to prepare its evidence.
Still, on 28 September 1989, petitioner manifested its inability to
proceed with the presentation of its evidence. The Sandiganbayan
issued an Order expressing its view on the matter, to wit:

The Court has gone through extended inquiry and a narration of the
above events because this case has been ready for trial for over a year
and much of the delay hereon has been due to the inability of the
government to produce on scheduled dates for pre-trial and for trial
documents and witnesses, allegedly upon the failure of the military to
supply them for the preparation of the presentation of evidence
thereon. Of equal interest is the fact that this Court has been held to
task in public about its alleged failure to move cases such as this one
beyond the preliminary stage, when, in view of the developments such
as those of today, this Court is now faced with a situation where a case
already in progress will revert back to the preliminary stage, despite a
five-month pause where appropriate action could have been
undertaken by the plaintiff Republic.[35]

On 9 October 1989, the PCGG manifested in court that it was

conducting a preliminary investigation on the unexplained wealth of
private respondents as mandated by RA No. 1379.[36] The PCGG prayed
for an additional four months to conduct the preliminary investigation.
The Sandiganbayan granted this request and scheduled the
presentation of evidence on 26-29 March 1990. However, on the
scheduled date, petitioner failed to inform the court of the result of
the preliminary investigation the PCGG supposedly conducted. Again,
the Sandiganbayan gave petitioner until 18 May 1990 to continue with
the presentation of its evidence and to inform the court of what lies
ahead insofar as the status of the case is concerned x x x.[37] Still on the
date set, petitioner failed to present its evidence. Finally, on 11 July
1990, petitioner filed its Re-Amended Complaint.[38] The Sandiganbayan
correctly observed that a case already pending for years would revert
to its preliminary stage if the court were to accept the Re-Amended
Complaint.

Based on these circumstances, obviously petitioner has only itself to

blame for failure to complete the presentation of its evidence. The
Sandiganbayan gave petitioner more than sufficient time to finish the
presentation of its evidence. The Sandiganbayan overlooked
petitioners delays and yet petitioner ended the long-string of delays
with the filing of a Re-Amended Complaint, which would only prolong
even more the disposition of the case.

Moreover, the pronouncements of the Court

in Migrino and Cruz prompted the Sandiganbayan to dismiss the case
since the PCGG has no jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute the
case against private respondents. This alone would have been
sufficient legal basis for the Sandiganbayan to dismiss the forfeiture
case against private respondents.

Thus, we hold that the Sandiganbayan did not err in dismissing the
case before completion of the presentation of petitioners evidence.

Third Issue: Legality of the Search and Seizure

Petitioner claims that the Sandiganbayan erred in declaring the
properties confiscated from Dimaanos house as illegally seized and
therefore inadmissible in evidence. This issue bears a significant effect
on petitioners case since these properties comprise most of petitioners
evidence against private respondents. Petitioner will not have much
evidence to support its case against private respondents if these
properties are inadmissible in evidence.

On 3 March 1986, the Constabulary raiding team served at Dimaanos

residence a search warrant captioned Illegal Possession of Firearms
and Ammunition. Dimaano was not present during the raid but
Dimaanos cousins witnessed the raid. The raiding team seized the
items detailed in the seizure receipt together with other
items not included in the search warrant. The raiding team seized these
items: one baby armalite rifle with twomagazines; 40 rounds of 5.56
ammunition; one pistol, caliber .45; communications equipment, cash
consisting of P2,870,000 and US$50,000, jewelry, and land titles.

Petitioner wants the Court to take judicial notice that the raiding
team conducted the search and seizure on March 3, 1986 or five days
after the successful EDSA revolution.[39] Petitioner argues that a
revolutionary government was operative at that time by virtue of
Proclamation No. 1 announcing that President Aquino and Vice
President Laurel were taking power in the name and by the will of the
Filipino people.[40] Petitioner asserts that the revolutionary
government effectively withheld the operation of the 1973
Constitution which guaranteed private respondents exclusionary right.

Moreover, petitioner argues that the exclusionary right arising from

an illegal search applies only beginning 2 February 1987, the date of
ratification of the 1987 Constitution.Petitioner contends that all rights
under the Bill of Rights had already reverted to its embryonic stage at
the time of the search. Therefore, the government may confiscate the
monies and items taken from Dimaano and use the same in evidence
against her since at the time of their seizure, private respondents did
not enjoy any constitutional right.

Petitioner is partly right in its arguments.

The EDSA Revolution took place on 23-25 February 1986. As

succinctly stated in President Aquinos Proclamation No. 3 dated 25
March 1986, the EDSA Revolution was done in defiance of the
provisions of the 1973 Constitution.[41] The resulting government was
indisputably a revolutionary government bound by no constitution or
legal limitations except treaty obligations that the revolutionary
government, as the de jure government in the Philippines, assumed
under international law.

The correct issues are: (1) whether the revolutionary government

was bound by the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution during
the interregnum, that is, after the actual and effective take-over of
power by the revolutionary government following the cessation of
resistance by loyalist forces up to 24 March 1986 (immediately before
the adoption of the Provisional Constitution); and (2) whether the
protection accorded to individuals under the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights (Covenant) and the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights (Declaration) remained in effect during the interregnum.

We hold that the Bill of Rights under the 1973 Constitution was not
operative during the interregnum. However, we rule that the
protection accorded to individuals under the Covenant and the
Declaration remained in effect during the interregnum.

During the interregnum, the directives and orders of the

revolutionary government were the supreme law because no
constitution limited the extent and scope of such directives and
orders. With the abrogation of the 1973 Constitution by the successful
revolution, there was no municipal law higher than the directives and
orders of the revolutionary government. Thus, during the interregnum,
a person could not invoke any exclusionary right under a Bill of Rights
because there was neither a constitution nor a Bill of Rights during the
interregnum. As the Court explained in Letter of Associate Justice
Reynato S. Puno:[42]

A revolution has been defined as the complete overthrow of the

established government in any country or state by those who were
previously subject to it or as a sudden, radical and fundamental change
in the government or political system, usually effected with violence or
at least some acts of violence. In Kelsen's book, General Theory of Law
and State, it is defined as that which occurs whenever the legal order
of a community is nullified and replaced by a new order . . . a way not
prescribed by the first order itself.
It was through the February 1986 revolution, a relatively peaceful one,
and more popularly known as the people power revolution that the
Filipino people tore themselves away from an existing regime. This
revolution also saw the unprecedented rise to power of the Aquino
government.

From the natural law point of view, the right of revolution has been
defined as an inherent right of a people to cast out their rulers, change
their policy or effect radical reforms in their system of government or
institutions by force or a general uprising when the legal and
constitutional methods of making such change have proved
inadequate or are so obstructed as to be unavailable.It has been said
that the locus of positive law-making power lies with the people of the
state and from there is derived the right of the people to abolish, to
reform and to alter any existing form of government without regard to
the existing constitution.
xxx

It is widely known that Mrs. Aquinos rise to the presidency was not due
to constitutional processes; in fact, it was achieved in violation of the
provisions of the 1973 Constitution as a Batasang Pambansa resolution
had earlier declared Mr. Marcos as the winner in the 1986 presidential
election. Thus it can be said that the organization of Mrs. Aquinos
Government which was met by little resistance and her control of the
state evidenced by the appointment of the Cabinet and other key
officers of the administration, the departure of the Marcos Cabinet
officials, revamp of the Judiciary and the Military signaled the
point where the legal system then in effect, had ceased to be obeyed by
the Filipino. (Emphasis supplied)

To hold that the Bill of Rights under the 1973 Constitution remained
operative during the interregnum would render void all sequestration
orders issued by the Philippine Commission on Good Government
(PCGG) before the adoption of the Freedom Constitution. The
sequestration orders, which direct the freezing and even the take-over
of private property by mere executive issuance without judicial action,
would violate the due process and search and seizure clauses of the Bill
of Rights.
 During the interregnum, the government in power was concededly
a revolutionary government bound by no constitution. No one could
validly question the sequestration orders as violative of the Bill of
Rights because there was no Bill of Rights during the
interregnum. However, upon the adoption of the Freedom
Constitution, the sequestered companies assailed the sequestration
orders as contrary to the Bill of Rights of the Freedom Constitution.

In Bataan Shipyard & Engineering Co. Inc. vs. Presidential

Commission on Good Government,[43] petitioner Baseco, while
conceding there was no Bill of Rights during the interregnum,
questioned the continued validity of the sequestration orders upon
adoption of the Freedom Constitution in view of the due process
clause in its Bill of Rights. The Court ruled that the Freedom
Constitution, and later the 1987 Constitution, expressly recognized the
validity of sequestration orders, thus:

If any doubt should still persist in the face of the foregoing

considerations as to the validity and propriety of sequestration, freeze
and takeover orders, it should be dispelled by the fact that these
particular remedies and the authority of the PCGG to issue them have
received constitutional approbation and sanction. As already
mentioned, the Provisional or Freedom Constitution recognizes the
power and duty of the President to enact measures to achieve the
mandate of the people to . . . (r)ecover ill-gotten properties amassed
by the leaders and supporters of the previous regime and protect the
interest of the people through orders of sequestration or freezing of
assets or accounts. And as also already adverted to, Section 26, Article
XVIII of the 1987 Constitution treats of, and ratifies the authority to
issue sequestration or freeze orders under Proclamation No. 3 dated
March 25, 1986.

The framers of both the Freedom Constitution and the 1987

Constitution were fully aware that the sequestration orders would
clash with the Bill of Rights. Thus, the framers of both constitutions
had to include specific language recognizing the validity of the
sequestration orders. The following discourse by Commissioner
Joaquin G. Bernas during the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission is instructive:
FR. BERNAS: Madam President, there is something schizophrenic
about the arguments in defense of the present amendment.

For instance, I have carefully studied Minister Salongas lecture in

the Gregorio Araneta University Foundation, of which all of us
have been given a copy. On the one hand, he argues that
everything the Commission is doing is traditionally legal. This is
repeated by Commissioner Romulo also. Minister Salonga spends
a major portion of his lecture developing that argument. On the
other hand, almost as an afterthought, he says that in the end
what matters are the results and not the legal niceties, thus
suggesting that the PCGG should be allowed to make some legal
shortcuts, another word for niceties or exceptions.

Now, if everything the PCGG is doing is legal, why is it asking the

CONCOM for special protection? The answer is clear. What they
are doing will not stand the test of ordinary due process, hence
they are asking for protection, for exceptions. Grandes malos,
grandes remedios, fine, as the saying stands, but let us not say
grandes malos, grande y malos remedios. That is not an
allowable extrapolation. Hence, we should not give the
exceptions asked for, and let me elaborate and give three
reasons:

First, the whole point of the February Revolution and of the work
of the CONCOM is to hasten constitutional normalization. Very
much at the heart of the constitutional normalization is the full
effectivity of the Bill of Rights. We cannot, in one breath, ask for
constitutional normalization and at the same time ask for a
temporary halt to the full functioning of what is at the heart of
constitutionalism. That would be hypocritical; that would be a
repetition of Marcosian protestation of due process and rule of
law. The New Society word for that is backsliding. It is tragic
when we begin to backslide even before we get there.

Second, this is really a corollary of the first. Habits tend to

become ingrained. The committee report asks for extraordinary
exceptions from the Bill of Rights for six months after the
convening of Congress, and Congress may even extend this
longer.

Good deeds repeated ripen into virtue; bad deeds repeated

become vice. What the committee report is asking for is that we
should allow the new government to acquire the vice of
disregarding the Bill of Rights.

Vices, once they become ingrained, become difficult to shed. The

practitioners of the vice begin to think that they have a vested
right to its practice, and they will fight tooth and nail to keep the
franchise. That would be an unhealthy way of consolidating the
gains of a democratic revolution.

Third, the argument that what matters are the results and not
the legal niceties is an argument that is very disturbing. When it
comes from a staunch Christian like Commissioner Salonga, a
Minister, and repeated verbatim by another staunch Christian like
Commissioner Tingson, it becomes doubly disturbing and even
discombobulating. The argument makes the PCGG an auctioneer,
placing the Bill of Rights on the auction block. If the price is right,
the search and seizure clause will be sold. Open your Swiss bank
account to us and we will award you the search and seizure
clause. You can keep it in your private safe.

Alternatively, the argument looks on the present government as

hostage to the hoarders of hidden wealth. The hoarders will
release the hidden health if the ransom price is paid and the
ransom price is the Bill of Rights, specifically the due process in
the search and seizure clauses. So, there is something positively
revolving about either argument. The Bill of Rights is not for sale
to the highest bidder nor can it be used to ransom captive
dollars. This nation will survive and grow strong, only if it would
become convinced of the values enshrined in the Constitution of
a price that is beyond monetary estimation.

For these reasons, the honorable course for the Constitutional

Commission is to delete all of Section 8 of the committee report
and allow the new Constitution to take effect in full vigor. If
 Section 8 is deleted, the PCGG has two options. First, it can
pursue the Salonga and the Romulo argument that what the
PCGG has been doing has been completely within the pale of the
law. If sustained, the PCGG can go on and should be able to go
on, even without the support of Section 8. If not sustained,
however, the PCGG has only one honorable option, it must bow
to the majesty of the Bill of Rights.

The PCGG extrapolation of the law is defended by staunch

Christians. Let me conclude with what another Christian replied
when asked to toy around with the law. From his prison cell,
Thomas More said, "I'll give the devil benefit of law for my
nations safety sake. I ask the Commission to give the devil benefit
of law for our nations sake. And we should delete Section 8.
Thank you, Madam President. (Emphasis supplied)

Despite the impassioned plea by Commissioner Bernas against the

amendment excepting sequestration orders from the Bill of Rights, the
Constitutional Commission still adopted the amendment as Section
26,[44] Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution. The framers of the
Constitution were fully aware that absent Section 26, sequestration
orders would not stand the test of due process under the Bill of Rights.

Thus, to rule that the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution remained
in force during the interregnum, absent a constitutional provision
excepting sequestration orders from such Bill of Rights, would clearly
render all sequestration orders void during the
interregnum. Nevertheless, even during the interregnum the Filipino
people continued to enjoy, under the Covenant and the Declaration,
almost the same rights found in the Bill of Rights of the 1973
Constitution.

The revolutionary government, after installing itself as the de

jure government, assumed responsibility for the States good faith
compliance with the Covenant to which the Philippines is a
signatory. Article 2(1) of the Covenant requires each signatory State to
respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject
to its jurisdiction the rights[45] recognized in the present
Covenant. Under Article 17(1) of the Covenant, the revolutionary
government had the duty to insure that [n]o one shall be subjected to
arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or
correspondence.

The Declaration, to which the Philippines is also a signatory,

provides in its Article 17(2) that [n]o one shall be arbitrarily deprived of
his property. Although the signatories to the Declaration did not intend
it as a legally binding document, being only a declaration, the Court has
interpreted the Declaration as part of the generally accepted principles
of international law and binding on the State.[46] Thus, the
revolutionary government was also obligated under international law
to observe the rights[47] of individuals under the Declaration.

The revolutionary government did not repudiate the Covenant or

the Declaration during the interregnum. Whether the revolutionary
government could have repudiated all its obligations under the
Covenant or the Declaration is another matter and is not the issue
here. Suffice it to say that the Court considers the Declaration as part
of customary international law, and that Filipinos as human beings are
proper subjects of the rules of international law laid down in the
Covenant. The fact is the revolutionary government did not repudiate
the Covenant or the Declaration in the same way it repudiated the 1973
Constitution. As the de jure government, the revolutionary
government could not escape responsibility for the States good faith
compliance with its treaty obligations under international law.

It was only upon the adoption of the Provisional Constitution on 25

March 1986 that the directives and orders of the revolutionary
government became subject to a higher municipal law that, if
contravened, rendered such directives and orders void. The Provisional
Constitution adopted verbatim the Bill of Rights of the 1973
Constitution.[48]The Provisional Constitution served as a self-limitation
by the revolutionary government to avoid abuses of the absolute
powers entrusted to it by the people.

During the interregnum when no constitution or Bill of Rights

existed, directives and orders issued by government officers were valid
so long as these officers did not exceed the authority granted them by
the revolutionary government. The directives and orders should not
have also violated the Covenant or the Declaration. In this case, the
revolutionary government presumptively sanctioned the warrant since
the revolutionary government did not repudiate it. The warrant, issued
by a judge upon proper application, specified the items to be searched
and seized. The warrant is thus valid with respect to the items
specifically described in the warrant.

However, the Constabulary raiding team seized items not included

in the warrant. As admitted by petitioners witnesses, the raiding team
confiscated items not included in the warrant, thus:
Direct Examination of Capt. Rodolfo Sebastian
AJ AMORES

Q. According to the search warrant, you are supposed to seize

only for weapons. What else, aside from the weapons,
were seized from the house of Miss Elizabeth Dimaano?
A. The communications equipment, money in Philippine
currency and US dollars, some jewelries, land titles, sir.
Q. Now, the search warrant speaks only of weapons to be
seized from the house of Elizabeth Dimaano. Do you know
the reason why your team also seized other properties not
mentioned in said search warrant?
A. During the conversation right after the conduct of said raid,
I was informed that the reason why they also brought the
other items not included in the search warrant was
because the money and other jewelries were contained in
attach cases and cartons with markings Sony Trinitron,
and I think three (3) vaults or steel safes. Believing that the
attach cases and the steel safes were containing firearms,
they forced open these containers only to find out that
they contained money.
xxx
Q. You said you found money instead of weapons, do you
know the reason why your team seized this money instead
of weapons?
A. I think the overall team leader and the other two officers
assisting him decided to bring along also the money
because at that time it was already dark and they felt most
secured if they will bring that because they might be
 suspected also of taking money out of those items, your
Honor.[49]
Cross-examination
Atty. Banaag
Q. Were you present when the search warrant in connection
with this case was applied before the Municipal Trial Court
of Batangas, Branch 1?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And the search warrant applied for by you was for the
search and seizure of five (5) baby armalite rifles M-16 and
five (5) boxes of ammunition?
A. Yes, sir.
xxx
AJ AMORES
Q. Before you applied for a search warrant, did you conduct
surveillance in the house of Miss Elizabeth Dimaano?
A. The Intelligence Operatives conducted surveillance
together with the MSU elements, your Honor.
Q. And this party believed there were weapons deposited in
the house of Miss Elizabeth Dimaano?
A. Yes, your Honor.
Q. And they so swore before the Municipal Trial Judge?
A. Yes, your Honor.
Q. But they did not mention to you, the applicant for the
search warrant, any other properties or contraband which
could be found in the residence of Miss Elizabeth
Dimaano?
A. They just gave us still unconfirmed report about some
hidden items, for instance, the communications
equipment and money. However, I did not include that in
the application for search warrant considering that we
have not established concrete evidence about that. So
when
Q. So that when you applied for search warrant, you had
reason to believe that only weapons were in the house of
Miss Elizabeth Dimaano?
A. Yes, your Honor.[50]
xxx
 Q. You stated that a .45 caliber pistol was seized along with
one armalite rifle M-16 and how many ammunition?
A. Forty, sir.
Q. And this became the subject of your complaint with the
issuing Court, with the fiscals office who charged Elizabeth
Dimaano for Illegal Possession of Firearms and
Ammunition?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Do you know what happened to that case?
A. I think it was dismissed, sir.
Q. In the fiscals office?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Because the armalite rifle you seized, as well as the .45
caliber pistol had a Memorandum Receipt in the name of
Felino Melegrito, is that not correct?
A. I think that was the reason, sir.
Q. There were other articles seized which were not included in
the search warrant, like for instance, jewelries. Why did
you seize the jewelries?
A. I think it was the decision of the overall team leader and his
assistant to bring along also the jewelries and other items,
sir. I do not really know where it was taken but they
brought along also these articles. I do not really know their
reason for bringing the same, but I just learned that these
were taken because they might get lost if they will just
leave this behind.
xxx
Q. How about the money seized by your raiding team, they
were not also included in the search warrant?
A. Yes sir, but I believe they were also taken considering that
the money was discovered to be contained in attach
cases. These attach cases were suspected to be containing
pistols or other high powered firearms, but in the course
of the search the contents turned out to be money. So the
team leader also decided to take this considering that they
believed that if they will just leave the money behind, it
might get lost also.
 Q. That holds true also with respect to the other articles that
were seized by your raiding team, like Transfer Certificates
of Title of lands?
A. Yes, sir. I think they were contained in one of the vaults
that were opened.[51]

It is obvious from the testimony of Captain Sebastian that the

warrant did not include the monies, communications equipment,
jewelry and land titles that the raiding team confiscated. The search
warrant did not particularly describe these items and the raiding team
confiscated them on its own authority. The raiding team had no legal
basis to seize these items without showing that these items could be
the subject of warrantless search and seizure.[52] Clearly, the raiding
team exceeded its authority when it seized these items.

The seizure of these items was therefore void, and unless these
items are contraband per se,[53] and they are not, they must be
returned to the person from whom the raiding seized them. However,
we do not declare that such person is the lawful owner of these items,
merely that the search and seizure warrant could not be used as basis
to seize and withhold these items from the possessor. We thus hold
that these items should be returned immediately to Dimaano.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED. The

questioned Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan dated 18 November 1991
and 25 March 1992 in Civil Case No. 0037, remanding the records of this
case to the Ombudsman for such appropriate action as the evidence
may warrant, and referring this case to the Commissioner of the
Bureau of Internal Revenue for a determination of any tax liability of
respondent Elizabeth Dimaano, are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED
.
Bellosillo, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr. and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr., C.J., in the result. I concur with Mr. Justice Vitug in his concurring opinion.
Puno and Vitug, JJ., see separate opinion
Panganiban, J., in the result.
Quisumbing and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., on official leave.
Ynares-Santiago, J., in the result. I concur in the separate opinion of J. Reynato Puno.
Tinga, J., separate opinion reserved.

[1]
Composed of Justices Regino Hermosisima, Jr., Francis Garchitorena and Cipriano del Rosario.
[2]
Republic v. Migrino, G.R. No. 89483, 30 August 1990, 189 SCRA 289.
[3]
Records of the Sandiganbayan [hereinafter Records], pp. 53-55.
[4]
An Act Declaring Forfeiture in Favor of the State Any Property Found to Have Been Unlawfully Acquired by Any
Public Officer or Employee and Providing for the Proceedings Therefor.
[5]
Records, p. 14.
[6]
Ibid., p.16.
[7]
Ibid., p. 166.
[8]
Ibid., p. 286.
[9]
Supra, note 2.
[10]
G.R. No. 94595, 26 February 1991, 194 SCRA 474.
[11]
Supra, note 2.
[12]
Rollo, p. 21.
[13]
Supra, note 10.
[14]
Supra, note 2.
[15]
Republic v. Migrino, supra, note 2.
[16]
Supra, note 2.
[17]
Republic v. Migrino, supra, note 2.
[18]
Republic v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 115906, 29 September 1994, 237 SCRA 242.
[19]
Presidential Decree No. 1769 Amending PD 360 dated December 30, 1973 adjusting the authorized grades in the
command and staff structure of the AFP dated 12 January 1981. The ranking is as follows:
Chief of Staff, AFP General (0-10)
Vice Chief of Staff, AFP Lt. General (0-9)
Commander of Major Services, AFP Maj. General (0-8)
xxx.
[20]
Records, pp. 54-55.
[21]
Rollo, p. 27.
[22]
WHEREAS, vast resources of the government have been amassed by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his
immediate family, relatives and close associates both here and abroad;
WHEREAS, there is an urgent need to recover all ill-gotten wealth;
xxx
[23]
Supra, note 10.
[24]
Regarding the Funds, Moneys, Assets, and Properties Illegally Acquired or Misappropriated by Former President
Marcos, Mrs. Imelda Marcos, their Close Relatives, Subordinates, Business Associates, Dummies, Agents or
Nominees dated 12 March 1986.
[25]
Defining the Jurisdiction over Cases Involving the Ill-gotten Wealth of Former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, Mrs.
Imelda R. Marcos, Members of their Immediate Family, Close Relatives, Subordinates, and/or Business
Associates, Dummies, Agents and Nominees dated 7 May 1986.
[26]
Amending Executive Order No. 14 dated 18 August 1986.
[27]
Republic v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 90529, 16 August 1991, 200 SCRA 667.
[28]
Section 15 (11), RA No. 6770.
[29]
Republic v. Migrino, supra, note 2.
[30]
Cudia v. CA, 348 Phil. 190 (1998).
[31]
Monsanto v. Zerna, G.R. No. 142501, 7 December 2001, 371 SCRA 664; Republic v. Estipular, G.R. No. 136588, 20
July 2000, 336 SCRA 333.
[32]
Republic v. Migrino, supra, note 2.
[33]
Cojuangco, Jr. v. Presidential Commission on Good Govt., G.R. Nos. 92319-20, 2 October 1990, 190 SCRA 226.
[34]
Records, p. 285.
[35]
Records, p. 347.
[36]
Ibid., p. 346.
[37]
Ibid., p. 395.
[38]
Ibid., p. 422.
[39]
Rollo, p. 34.
[40]
Ibid.
[41]
Proclamation No. 3, Provisional Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, provides:
WHEREAS, the new government under President Corazon C. Aquino was installed through a direct exercise of the
power of the Filipino people assisted by units of the New Armed Forces of the Philippines;
WHEREAS, the heroic action of the people was done in defiance of the provisions of the 1973Constitution, as
amended;
xxx. (Emphasis supplied)
See also Estrada v. Desierto, G.R. No. 146710-15 and G.R. No. 146738, 3 April 2001, 356 SCRA 108; Mun. of San Juan,
Metro Manila v. Court of Appeals, 345 Phil. 220 (1997).
[42]
A.M. No. 90-11-2697-CA, 29 June 1992, 210 SCRA 589.
[43]
No. L-75885, 27 May 1987, 150 SCRA 181.
[44]
Section 26, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Sec. 26. The authority to issue sequestration or freeze orders under Proclamation No. 3 dated March 25, 1986 in
relation to the recovery of ill-gotten wealth shall remain operative for not more than eighteen months after
the ratification of this Constitution. However, in the national interest, as certified by the President, the
Congress may extend said period.
A sequestration or freeze order shall be issued only upon showing of a prima facie case. The order and the list of the
sequestered or frozen properties shall forthwith be registered with the proper court. For orders issued
before the ratification of this Constitution, the corresponding judicial action or proceeding shall be filed
within six months from its ratification. For those issued after such ratification, the judicial action or
proceeding shall be commenced within six months from the issuance thereof.
The sequestration or freeze order is deemed automatically lifted if no judicial action or proceeding is commenced as
herein provided.
[45]
Among the rights of individuals recognized in the Covenant are: (1) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life
[Article 6(1)]; (2) No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment. [Article 7]; (3) Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be
subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention. No one shall be deprived of his liberty except on such grounds and
in accordance with such procedures as are established by law. Anyone arrested or detained on a criminal
charge shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorized by law to exercise judicial power
and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release [Article 9(1 & 3)]; (4) Anyone who is
arrested shall be informed, at the time of the arrest, of the reasons for his arrest and shall be promptly
informed of the charges against him [Article 9(2)]; (5) Everyone lawfully within the territory of a State shall,
within that territory, have the right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his residence. Everyone
shall be free to leave any country, including his own. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter
his own country [Article 12(1, 2 & 3)]; (6) Everyone charged with a criminal offense shall have the right to be
presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law [Article 14(2)]; (7) Everyone shall have the right of
freedom of thought, conscience and religion [Article 18(1)]; (8) Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions
without interference. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression [Article 19(1 & 2)]; (9) The right
of peaceful assembly shall be recognized [Article 21]; (10) Everyone shall have the right of freedom of
association with others [Article 22(1)]; (11) All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any
discrimination to the equal protection of the law [Article 26].
[46]
Andreu v. Commissioner of Immigration, 90 Phil. 347 (1951); Chirskoff v. Commissioner of Immigration, 90 Phil.
256 (1951); Borovsky v. Commissioner of Immigration, 90 Phil. 107 (1951); Mejoff v. Director of Prisons, 90
Phil. 70 (1951).
[47]
Among the rights enshrined in the Declaration are: (1) Everyone has the right to own property alone or in
association with others [Article 17(1)]; (2) Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his
country, directly or through freely chosen representatives [Article 21(1)]; (3) Everyone has the right to work,
to free choice of employment, to just and favorable conditions of work and to protection against
unemployment [Article 23(1)].
[48]
Section 1, Article I of the Provisional Constitution provides: The provisions of xxx ARTICLE IV (Bill of Rights) xxx
of the 1973 Constitution, as amended, remain in force and effect and are hereby adopted in toto as part of
this provisional Constitution. (Emphasis supplied)
[49]
TSN, 18 April 1989, pp. 115-117.
[50]
Ibid., pp. 136-138.
[51]
Ibid., pp. 144-146.
[52]
Five generally accepted exceptions to the rule against warrantless search and seizure have been judicially
formulated as follows: (1) search incidental to a lawful arrest, (2) search of moving vehicles, (3) seizure of
evidence in plain view, (4) customs searches, and (5) waiver by the accused themselves of their right against
unreasonable search and seizure. (People v. Que Ming Kha, G.R. No. 133265, 31 May 2002; Caballes v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 136292, 15 January 2002; People v. Lacerna, G.R. No. 109250, 5 September 1997, 278 SCRA
561).
[53]
People v. Lim, G.R. No. 141699, 7 August 2002; Del Rosario v. People, G.R. No. 142295, 31 May 2001, 358 SCRA 373.
Facts:
Upon her assumption to office following the EDSA Revolution,
then President Aquino issued Executive Order No. 1 creating the
Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG). Pursuant to its
mandate to recover all ill-gotten wealth of former President Marcos,
his immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close associates,
PCGG created an AFP Anti-Graft Board to investigate corrupt practices
by AFP personnel, whether in the active service or retired.

The AFP Board investigated reports of unexplained wealth of

Major General Ramas, the Commanding General of the Philippine Army
until 1986 (with the rank of Major General) and filed a petition for
forfeiture against him and his office clerk and alleged mistress,
Elizabeth Dimaano.

During the trial, respondents filed a motion to dismiss on the

ground that the PCGG does not have jurisdiction to investigate and
prosecute military officers by reason of mere position held without a
showing that they are "subordinates" of former President Marcos.

Moreover, during the raid conducted on Dimaano’s residence,

there were items seized that were not included in the search warrant.
Respondents therefore seek these items to be excluded from evidence
for being illegally seized.

Notably, the search and seizure was conducted on March 3, 1986

or five days after the EDSA revolution. According to the Republic, the
items seized are admissible since at the time of their seizure, private
respondents did not enjoy any constitutional right. What was in place
at the time of the seizure was a revolutionary government and it
effectively withheld the operation of the 1973 Constitution which was
the basis of respondents’ exclusionary right.

Held:
PCGG Jurisdiction
1. PCGG has no jurisdiction to investigate and cause the filing of a
forfeiture petition against Ramas and Dimaano for unexplained
wealth under RA No. 1379.
 a. Ramas is not a ‘subordinate’ as the term is contemplated
under EO No. 1.

b. Mere position held by a military officer does not

automatically make him a "subordinate" as this term is used in
EO No.1 absent a showing that he enjoyed close association with
former President Marcos.

c. There must be a prima facie showing that Ramas unlawfully

accumulated wealth by virtue of his close association or
relation with former Pres. Marcos and/or his wife.

d. Such close association is manifested either by Ramas'

complicity with former President Marcos in the accumulation of
ill-gotten wealth by the deposed President or byformer
President Marcos' acquiescence in Ramas' own accumulation of
ill-gotten wealth if any.

2. The proper government agencies, and not the PCGG, should

investigate and prosecute forfeiture petitions not falling under EO
No. 1 and its amendments. The preliminary investigation of
unexplained wealth amassed on or before 25 February 1986 falls
under the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman, while the authority to
file the corresponding forfeiture petition rests with the Solicitor
General.

3. The right of the State to forfeit unexplained wealth under RA No.

1379 is not subject to prescription, laches or estoppel

Rights under the Revolutionary Government (Legality of the seizure)

4. The Bill of Rights under the 1973 Constitution was not operative
during the interregnum

a. The EDSA Revolution took place on February 23-25, 1986. The

INTERREGNUM refers to period after the actual and effective
take-over of power by the revolutionary government following
the cessation of resistance by loyalist forces up to March 24,
1986 -- immediately before the adoption of the Provisional
Constitution).
 b. During the interregnum, a person could not invoke any
exclusionary right under a Bill of Rights because there was
neither a constitution nor a Bill of Rights during the interregnum
During the interregnum, the directives and orders of the
revolutionary government were the supreme law because no
constitution limited the extent and scope of such directives and
orders.

5. Nevertheless, even during the interregnum the Filipino people

continued to enjoy, under the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (Covenant) and the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights (Declaration), almost the same rights found in the
Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution.

a. The Declaration, to which the Philippines is a signatory, provides in

its Article 17(2) that “no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his
property.”

b. Although the signatories to the Declaration did not intend it as a

legally binding document, being only a declaration, the Court has
interpreted the Declaration as part of the ‘generally accepted
principles of international law’ (customary international law) and
binding on the State. Thus, the revolutionary government was also
obligated under international law to observe the rights of individuals
under the Declaration.

6. After the EDSA Revolution, the resulting government was a

revolutionary government bound by no constitution or legal limitations
except treaty obligations that the revolutionary government, as the de
jure government in the Philippines, assumed under international law.

7. The search warrant, issued during the interregnum, was valid.

However, the seizure of the items not included in the warrant was
void, unless these items are contraband per se, which they are not.
[G.R. No. 139325. April 12, 2005]
PRISCILLA C. MIJARES, LORETTA ANN P. ROSALES, HILDA B. NARCISO,
SR. MARIANI DIMARANAN, SFIC, and JOEL C. LAMANGAN in their
behalf and on behalf of the Class Plaintiffs in Class Action No.
MDL 840, United States District Court of Hawaii, petitioners, vs.
HON. SANTIAGO JAVIER RANADA, in his capacity as Presiding
Judge of Branch 137, Regional Trial Court, Makati City, and the
ESTATE OF FERDINAND E. MARCOS, through its court appointed
legal representatives in Class Action MDL 840, United States
District Court of Hawaii, namely: Imelda R. Marcos and Ferdinand
Marcos, Jr., respondents.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:

Our martial law experience bore strange unwanted fruits, and we

have yet to finish weeding out its bitter crop. While the restoration of
freedom and the fundamental structures and processes of democracy
have been much lauded, according to a significant number, the
changes, however, have not sufficiently healed the colossal damage
wrought under the oppressive conditions of the martial law period.
The cries of justice for the tortured, the murdered, and
the desaparecidos arouse outrage and sympathy in the hearts of the
fair-minded, yet the dispensation of the appropriate relief due them
cannot be extended through the same caprice or whim that
characterized the ill-wind of martial rule. The damage done was not
merely personal but institutional, and the proper rebuke to the
iniquitous past has to involve the award of reparations due within the
confines of the restored rule of law.

The petitioners in this case are prominent victims of human rights

violations[1] who, deprived of the opportunity to directly confront the
man who once held absolute rule over this country, have chosen to do
battle instead with the earthly representative, his estate. The clash has
been for now interrupted by a trial court ruling, seemingly comported
to legal logic, that required the petitioners to pay a whopping filing fee
of over Four Hundred Seventy-Two Million Pesos (P472,000,000.00) in
order that they be able to enforce a judgment awarded them by a
foreign court. There is an understandable temptation to cast the
struggle within the simplistic confines of a morality tale, and to employ
short-cuts to arrive at what might seem the desirable solution. But
easy, reflexive resort to the equity principle all too often leads to a
result that may be morally correct, but legally wrong.

Nonetheless, the application of the legal principles involved in this

case will comfort those who maintain that our substantive and
procedural laws, for all their perceived ambiguity and susceptibility to
myriad interpretations, are inherently fair and just. The relief sought by
the petitioners is expressly mandated by our laws and conforms to
established legal principles. The granting of this petition for certiorari is
warranted in order to correct the legally infirm and unabashedly unjust
ruling of the respondent judge.

The essential facts bear little elaboration. On 9 May 1991, a

complaint was filed with the United States District Court (US District
Court), District of Hawaii, against the Estate of former Philippine
President Ferdinand E. Marcos (Marcos Estate). The action was
brought forth by ten Filipino citizens[2] who each alleged having
suffered human rights abuses such as arbitrary detention, torture and
rape in the hands of police or military forces during the Marcos
regime.[3] The Alien Tort Act was invoked as basis for the US District
Courts jurisdiction over the complaint, as it involved a suit by aliens for
tortious violations of international law.[4] These plaintiffs brought the
action on their own behalf and on behalf of a class of similarly situated
individuals, particularly consisting of all current civilian citizens of the
Philippines, their heirs and beneficiaries, who between 1972 and 1987
were tortured, summarily executed or had disappeared while in the
custody of military or paramilitary groups. Plaintiffs alleged that the
class consisted of approximately ten thousand (10,000) members;
hence, joinder of all these persons was impracticable.

The institution of a class action suit was warranted under Rule 23(a)
and (b)(1)(B) of the US Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the provisions
of which were invoked by the plaintiffs. Subsequently, the US District
Court certified the case as a class action and created three (3) sub-
classes of torture, summary execution and disappearance
victims.[5] Trial ensued, and subsequently a jury rendered a verdict and
an award of compensatory and exemplary damages in favor of the
plaintiff class. Then, on 3 February 1995, the US District Court, presided
by Judge Manuel L. Real, rendered a Final Judgment (Final
Judgment) awarding the plaintiff class a total of One Billion Nine
Hundred Sixty Four Million Five Thousand Eight Hundred Fifty Nine
Dollars and Ninety Cents ($1,964,005,859.90). The Final Judgment was
eventually affirmed by the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in
a decision rendered on 17 December 1996.[6]

On 20 May 1997, the present petitioners filed Complaint with the

Regional Trial Court, City of Makati (Makati RTC) for the enforcement
of the Final Judgment. They alleged that they are members of the
plaintiff class in whose favor the US District Court awarded
damages.[7] They argued that since the Marcos Estate failed to file a
petition for certiorari with the US Supreme Court after the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals had affirmed the Final Judgment, the decision of the
US District Court had become final and executory, and hence should be
recognized and enforced in the Philippines, pursuant to Section 50,
Rule 39 of the Rules of Court then in force.[8]

On 5 February 1998, the Marcos Estate filed a motion to dismiss,

raising, among others, the non-payment of the correct filing fees. It
alleged that petitioners had only paid Four Hundred Ten Pesos
(P410.00) as docket and filing fees, notwithstanding the fact that they
sought to enforce a monetary amount of damages in the amount of
over Two and a Quarter Billion US Dollars (US$2.25 Billion). The Marcos
Estate cited Supreme Court Circular No. 7, pertaining to the proper
computation and payment of docket fees. In response, the petitioners
claimed that an action for the enforcement of a foreign judgment is
not capable of pecuniary estimation; hence, a filing fee of only Four
Hundred Ten Pesos (P410.00) was proper, pursuant to Section 7(c) of
Rule 141.[9]

On 9 September 1998, respondent Judge Santiago Javier

Ranada[10] of the Makati RTC issued the subject Order dismissing the
complaint without prejudice. Respondent judge opined that contrary
to the petitioners submission, the subject matter of the complaint was
indeed capable of pecuniary estimation, as it involved a judgment
rendered by a foreign court ordering the payment of definite sums of
money, allowing for easy determination of the value of the foreign
judgment. On that score, Section 7(a) of Rule 141 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure would find application, and the RTC estimated the proper
amount of filing fees was approximately Four Hundred Seventy Two
Million Pesos, which obviously had not been paid.

Not surprisingly, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration,

which Judge Ranada denied in an Order dated 28 July 1999. From this
denial, petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorariunder Rule 65 assailing
the twin orders of respondent judge.[11] They prayed for the annulment
of the questioned orders, and an order directing the reinstatement of
Civil Case No. 97-1052 and the conduct of appropriate proceedings
thereon.

Petitioners submit that their action is incapable of pecuniary

estimation as the subject matter of the suit is the enforcement of a
foreign judgment, and not an action for the collection of a sum of
money or recovery of damages. They also point out that to require the
class plaintiffs to pay Four Hundred Seventy Two Million Pesos
(P472,000,000.00) in filing fees would negate and render inutile the
liberal construction ordained by the Rules of Court, as required by
Section 6, Rule 1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, particularly the
inexpensive disposition of every action.

Petitioners invoke Section 11, Article III of the Bill of Rights of the
Constitution, which provides that Free access to the courts and quasi-
judicial bodies and adequate legal assistance shall not be denied to any
person by reason of poverty, a mandate which is essentially defeated
by the required exorbitant filing fee. The adjudicated amount of the
filing fee, as arrived at by the RTC, was characterized as indisputably
unfair, inequitable, and unjust.

The Commission on Human Rights (CHR) was permitted to

intervene in this case.[12] It urged that the petition be granted and a
judgment rendered, ordering the enforcement and execution of the
District Court judgment in accordance with Section 48, Rule 39 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. For the CHR, the Makati RTC erred in
interpreting the action for the execution of a foreign judgment as a
new case, in violation of the principle that once a case has been
decided between the same parties in one country on the same issue
with finality, it can no longer be relitigated again in another
country.[13] The CHR likewise invokes the principle of comity, and of
vested rights.

The Courts disposition on the issue of filing fees will prove a useful
jurisprudential guidepost for courts confronted with actions enforcing
foreign judgments, particularly those lodged against an estate. There is
no basis for the issuance a limited pro hac vice ruling based on the
special circumstances of the petitioners as victims of martial law, or on
the emotionally-charged allegation of human rights abuses.

An examination of Rule 141 of the Rules of Court readily evinces that

the respondent judge ignored the clear letter of the law when he
concluded that the filing fee be computed based on the total sum
claimed or the stated value of the property in litigation.

In dismissing the complaint, the respondent judge relied on Section

7(a), Rule 141 as basis for the computation of the filing fee of over P472
Million. The provision states:

SEC. 7. Clerk of Regional Trial Court.-

(a) For filing an action or a permissive counterclaim or money
claim against an estate not based on judgment, or for filing with
leave of court a third-party, fourth-party, etc., complaint, or a
complaint in intervention, and for all clerical services in the same
time, if the total sum claimed, exclusive of interest, or the started
value of the property in litigation, is:
1. Less than P 100,00.00 P 500.00
2. P 100,000.00 or more - P 800.00
but less than P 150,000.00
3. P 150,000.00 or more but - P 1,000.00
less than P 200,000.00
4. P 200,000.00 or more but
less than P 250,000.00 - P 1,500.00
5. P 250,000.00 or more but
less than P 300,00.00 - P 1,750.00
6. P 300,000.00 or more but
not more than P 400,000.00 - P 2,000.00
7. P 350,000.00 or more but not
more than P400,000.00 - P 2,250.00
 8. For each P 1,000.00 in excess of
P 400,000.00 - P 10.00
...
(Emphasis supplied)

Obviously, the above-quoted provision covers, on one hand,

ordinary actions, permissive counterclaims, third-party, etc. complaints
and complaints-in-interventions, and on the other, money claims
against estates which are not based on judgment. Thus, the relevant
question for purposes of the present petition is whether the action
filed with the lower court is a money claim against an estate not based
on judgment.

Petitioners complaint may have been lodged against an estate, but

it is clearly based on a judgment, the Final Judgment of the US District
Court. The provision does not make any distinction between a local
judgment and a foreign judgment, and where the law does not
distinguish, we shall not distinguish.

A reading of Section 7 in its entirety reveals several instances

wherein the filing fee is computed on the basis of the amount of the
relief sought, or on the value of the property in litigation. The filing fee
for requests for extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage is based on the
amount of indebtedness or the mortgagees claim.[14] In special
proceedings involving properties such as for the allowance of wills, the
filing fee is again based on the value of the property.[15] The aforecited
rules evidently have no application to petitioners complaint.

Petitioners rely on Section 7(b), particularly the proviso on actions

where the value of the subject matter cannot be estimated. The
provision reads in full:

SEC. 7. Clerk of Regional Trial Court.-

(b) For filing
1. Actions where the value
of the subject matter
cannot be estimated --- P 600.00
2. Special civil actions except
judicial foreclosure which
 shall be governed by
paragraph (a) above --- P 600.00
3. All other actions not
involving property --- P 600.00

In a real action, the assessed value of the property, or if there is none,

the estimated value, thereof shall be alleged by the claimant and shall
be the basis in computing the fees.

It is worth noting that the provision also provides that in real

actions, the assessed value or estimated value of the property shall be
alleged by the claimant and shall be the basis in computing the fees.
Yet again, this provision does not apply in the case at bar. A real action
is one where the plaintiff seeks the recovery of real property or an
action affecting title to or recovery of possession of real
property.[16] Neither the complaint nor the award of damages
adjudicated by the US District Court involves any real property of the
Marcos Estate.

Thus, respondent judge was in clear and serious error when he

concluded that the filing fees should be computed on the basis of the
schematic table of Section 7(a), as the action involved pertains to a
claim against an estate based on judgment. What provision, if any, then
should apply in determining the filing fees for an action to enforce a
foreign judgment?

To resolve this question, a proper understanding is required on the

nature and effects of a foreign judgment in this jurisdiction.

The rules of comity, utility and convenience of nations have

established a usage among civilized states by which final judgments of
foreign courts of competent jurisdiction are reciprocally respected and
rendered efficacious under certain conditions that may vary in
different countries.[17] This principle was prominently affirmed in the
leading American case of Hilton v. Guyot[18] and expressly recognized in
our jurisprudence beginning with Ingenholl v. Walter E. Olsen &
Co.[19] The conditions required by the Philippines for recognition and
enforcement of a foreign judgment were originally contained in
Section 311 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which was taken from the
California Code of Civil Procedure which, in turn, was derived from the
California Act of March 11, 1872.[20] Remarkably, the procedural rule
now outlined in Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Civil Procedure has
remained unchanged down to the last word in nearly a century.
Section 48 states:

SEC. 48. Effect of foreign judgments. The effect of a judgment of a

tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to pronounce the
judgment is as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment upon a specific thing, the judgment is
conclusive upon the title to the thing;
(b) In case of a judgment against a person, the judgment is
presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their
successors in interest by a subsequent title;

In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence

of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud,
or clear mistake of law or fact.

There is an evident distinction between a foreign judgment in an

action in rem and one in personam. For an action in rem, the foreign
judgment is deemed conclusive upon the title to the thing, while in an
action in personam, the foreign judgment is presumptive, and not
conclusive, of a right as between the parties and their successors in
interest by a subsequent title.[21]However, in both cases, the foreign
judgment is susceptible to impeachment in our local courts on the
grounds of want of jurisdiction or notice to the party,[22] collusion,
fraud,[23] or clear mistake of law or fact.[24] Thus, the party aggrieved by
the foreign judgment is entitled to defend against the enforcement of
such decision in the local forum. It is essential that there should be an
opportunity to challenge the foreign judgment, in order for the court in
this jurisdiction to properly determine its efficacy.[25]

It is clear then that it is usually necessary for an action to be filed in

order to enforce a foreign judgment[26], even if such judgment has
conclusive effect as in the case of in rem actions, if only for the purpose
of allowing the losing party an opportunity to challenge the foreign
judgment, and in order for the court to properly determine its
efficacy.[27] Consequently, the party attacking a foreign judgment has
the burden of overcoming the presumption of its validity.[28]

The rules are silent as to what initiatory procedure must be

undertaken in order to enforce a foreign judgment in the Philippines.
But there is no question that the filing of a civil complaint is an
appropriate measure for such purpose. A civil action is one by which a
party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right,[29] and
clearly an action to enforce a foreign judgment is in essence a
vindication of a right prescinding either from a conclusive judgment
upon title or the presumptive evidence of a right.[30] Absent perhaps a
statutory grant of jurisdiction to a quasi-judicial body, the claim for
enforcement of judgment must be brought before the regular
courts.[31]

There are distinctions, nuanced but discernible, between the cause

of action arising from the enforcement of a foreign judgment, and that
arising from the facts or allegations that occasioned the foreign
judgment. They may pertain to the same set of facts, but there is an
essential difference in the right-duty correlatives that are sought to be
vindicated. For example, in a complaint for damages against a
tortfeasor, the cause of action emanates from the violation of the right
of the complainant through the act or omission of the respondent. On
the other hand, in a complaint for the enforcement of a foreign
judgment awarding damages from the same tortfeasor, for the
violation of the same right through the same manner of action, the
cause of action derives not from the tortious act but from the foreign
judgment itself.

More importantly, the matters for proof are different. Using the
above example, the complainant will have to establish before the court
the tortious act or omission committed by the tortfeasor, who in turn
is allowed to rebut these factual allegations or prove extenuating
circumstances. Extensive litigation is thus conducted on the facts, and
from there the right to and amount of damages are assessed. On the
other hand, in an action to enforce a foreign judgment, the matter left
for proof is the foreign judgment itself, and not the facts from which it
prescinds.
 As stated in Section 48, Rule 39, the actionable issues are generally
restricted to a review of jurisdiction of the foreign court, the service of
personal notice, collusion, fraud, or mistake of fact or law. The
limitations on review is in consonance with a strong and pervasive
policy in all legal systems to limit repetitive litigation on claims and
issues.[32] Otherwise known as the policy of preclusion, it seeks to
protect party expectations resulting from previous litigation, to
safeguard against the harassment of defendants, to insure that the
task of courts not be increased by never-ending litigation of the same
disputes, and in a larger sense to promote what Lord Coke in
the Ferrers Case of 1599 stated to be the goal of all law: rest and
quietness.[33] If every judgment of a foreign court were reviewable on
the merits, the plaintiff would be forced back on his/her original cause
of action, rendering immaterial the previously concluded litigation.[34]

Petitioners appreciate this distinction, and rely upon it to support

the proposition that the subject matter of the complaintthe
enforcement of a foreign judgmentis incapable of pecuniary
estimation. Admittedly the proposition, as it applies in this case, is
counter-intuitive, and thus deserves strict scrutiny. For in all practical
intents and purposes, the matter at hand is capable of pecuniary
estimation, down to the last cent. In the assailed Order, the
respondent judge pounced upon this point without equivocation:

The Rules use the term where the value of the subject matter cannot
be estimated. The subject matter of the present case is the judgment
rendered by the foreign court ordering defendant to pay plaintiffs
definite sums of money, as and for compensatory damages. The Court
finds that the value of the foreign judgment can be estimated; indeed,
it can even be easily determined. The Court is not minded to distinguish
between the enforcement of a judgment and the amount of said
judgment, and separate the two, for purposes of determining the
correct filing fees. Similarly, a plaintiff suing on promissory note for P1
million cannot be allowed to pay only P400 filing fees (sic), on the
reasoning that the subject matter of his suit is not the P1 million, but
the enforcement of the promissory note, and that the value of such
enforcement cannot be estimated.[35]
 The jurisprudential standard in gauging whether the subject matter
of an action is capable of pecuniary estimation is well-entrenched. The
Marcos Estate cites Singsong v. Isabela Sawmill and Raymundo v. Court
of Appeals, which ruled:

[I]n determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which

is not capable of pecuniary estimation this Court has adopted the
criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the principal action or
remedy sought. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the
claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether
jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the courts of first instance
would depend on the amount of the claim. However, where the basic
issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of money,
where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the
principal relief sought, this Court has considered such actions as cases
where the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of
money, and are cognizable exclusively by courts of first instance (now
Regional Trial Courts).

On the other hand, petitioners cite the ponencia of Justice JBL

Reyes in Lapitan v. Scandia,[36] from which the rule
in Singsong and Raymundo actually derives, but which incorporates this
additional nuance omitted in the latter cases:

xxx However, where the basic issue is something other than the right
to recover a sum of money, where the money claim is purely incidental
to, or a consequence of, the principal relief sought, like in suits to have
the defendant perform his part of the contract (specific performance)
and in actions for support, or for annulment of judgment or to
foreclose a mortgage, this Court has considered such actions as cases
where the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of
money, and are cognizable exclusively by courts of first instance.[37]

Petitioners go on to add that among the actions the Court has

recognized as being incapable of pecuniary estimation include legality
of conveyances and money deposits,[38] validity of a mortgage,[39] the
right to support,[40] validity of documents,[41] rescission of
contracts,[42] specific performance,[43] and validity or annulment of
judgments.[44] It is urged that an action for enforcement of a foreign
judgment belongs to the same class.

This is an intriguing argument, but ultimately it is self-evident that

while the subject matter of the action is undoubtedly the enforcement
of a foreign judgment, the effect of a providential award would be the
adjudication of a sum of money. Perhaps in theory, such an action is
primarily for the enforcement of the foreign judgment, but there is a
certain obtuseness to that sort of argument since there is no denying
that the enforcement of the foreign judgment will necessarily result in
the award of a definite sum of money.

But before we insist upon this conclusion past beyond the point of
reckoning, we must examine its possible ramifications. Petitioners raise
the point that a declaration that an action for enforcement of foreign
judgment may be capable of pecuniary estimation might lead to an
instance wherein a first level court such as the Municipal Trial Court
would have jurisdiction to enforce a foreign judgment. But under the
statute defining the jurisdiction of first level courts, B.P. 129, such
courts are not vested with jurisdiction over actions for the
enforcement of foreign judgments.

Sec. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts

and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in civil cases. Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:

(1) Exclusive original jurisdiction over civil actions and probate

proceedings, testate and intestate, including the grant of
provisional remedies in proper cases, where the value of the
personal property, estate, or amount of the demand does not
exceed One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) or, in Metro
Manila where such personal property, estate, or amount of the
demand does not exceed Two hundred thousand pesos
(P200,000.00) exclusive of interest damages of whatever kind,
attorney's fees, litigation expenses, and costs, the amount of
which must be specifically alleged: Provided, That where there
are several claims or causes of action between the same or
different parties, embodied in the same complaint, the amount of
the demand shall be the totality of the claims in all the causes of
 action, irrespective of whether the causes of action arose out of
the same or different transactions;

(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over cases of forcible entry and

unlawful detainer: Provided, That when, in such cases, the
defendant raises the question of ownership in his pleadings and
the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding
the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved
only to determine the issue of possession.

(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve

title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein
where the assessed value of the property or interest therein does
not exceed Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil
actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not
exceed Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of interest,
damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses
and costs: Provided, That value of such property shall be
determined by the assessed value of the adjacent lots.[45]

Section 33 of B.P. 129 refers to instances wherein the cause of action

or subject matter pertains to an assertion of rights and interests over
property or a sum of money. But as earlier pointed out, the subject
matter of an action to enforce a foreign judgment is the foreign
judgment itself, and the cause of action arising from the adjudication
of such judgment.

An examination of Section 19(6), B.P. 129 reveals that the instant

complaint for enforcement of a foreign judgment, even if capable of
pecuniary estimation, would fall under the jurisdiction of the Regional
Trial Courts, thus negating the fears of the petitioners. Indeed, an
examination of the provision indicates that it can be relied upon as
jurisdictional basis with respect to actions for enforcement of foreign
judgments, provided that no other court or office is vested jurisdiction
over such complaint:

Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. Regional Trial Courts shall exercise
exclusive original jurisdiction:
xxx
(6) In all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court,
tribunal, person or body exercising jurisdiction or any court, tribunal,
person or body exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions.

Thus, we are comfortable in asserting the obvious, that the

complaint to enforce the US District Court judgment is one capable of
pecuniary estimation. But at the same time, it is also an action based
on judgment against an estate, thus placing it beyond the ambit of
Section 7(a) of Rule 141. What provision then governs the proper
computation of the filing fees over the instant complaint? For this case
and other similarly situated instances, we find that it is covered by
Section 7(b)(3), involving as it does, other actions not involving
property.

Notably, the amount paid as docket fees by the petitioners on the

premise that it was an action incapable of pecuniary estimation
corresponds to the same amount required for other actions not
involving property. The petitioners thus paid the correct amount of
filing fees, and it was a grave abuse of discretion for respondent judge
to have applied instead a clearly inapplicable rule and dismissed the
complaint.

There is another consideration of supreme relevance in this case,

one which should disabuse the notion that the doctrine affirmed in this
decision is grounded solely on the letter of the procedural rule. We
earlier adverted to the the internationally recognized policy of
preclusion,[46] as well as the principles of comity, utility and
convenience of nations[47] as the basis for the evolution of the rule
calling for the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments. The
US Supreme Court in Hilton v. Guyot[48] relied heavily on the concept of
comity, as especially derived from the landmark treatise of Justice
Story in his Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws of 1834.[49] Yet the
notion of comity has since been criticized as one of dim contours[50] or
suffering from a number of fallacies.[51] Other conceptual bases for the
recognition of foreign judgments have evolved such as the vested
rights theory or the modern doctrine of obligation.[52]

There have been attempts to codify through treaties or multilateral

agreements the standards for the recognition and enforcement of
foreign judgments, but these have not borne fruition. The members of
the European Common Market accede to the Judgments
Convention, signed in 1978, which eliminates as to participating
countries all of such obstacles to recognition such as reciprocity
and rvision au fond.[53] The most ambitious of these attempts is
the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, prepared in 1966 by the
Hague Conference of International Law.[54] While it has not received
the ratifications needed to have it take effect,[55] it is recognized as
representing current scholarly thought on the topic.[56] Neither the
Philippines nor the United States are signatories to the Convention.

Yet even if there is no unanimity as to the applicable theory behind

the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments or a universal
treaty rendering it obligatory force, there is consensus that the viability
of such recognition and enforcement is essential. Steiner and Vagts
note:

. . . The notion of unconnected bodies of national law on private

international law, each following a quite separate path, is not one
conducive to the growth of a transnational community encouraging
travel and commerce among its members. There is a contemporary
resurgence of writing stressing the identity or similarity of the values
that systems of public and private international law seek to further a
community interest in common, or at least reasonable, rules on these
matters in national legal systems. And such generic principles as
reciprocity play an important role in both fields.[57]

Salonga, whose treatise on private international law is of worldwide

renown, points out:

Whatever be the theory as to the basis for recognizing foreign

judgments, there can be little dispute that the end is to protect the
reasonable expectations and demands of the parties. Where the
parties have submitted a matter for adjudication in the court of one
state, and proceedings there are not tainted with irregularity, they may
fairly be expected to submit, within the state or elsewhere, to the
enforcement of the judgment issued by the court.[58]
 There is also consensus as to the requisites for recognition of a
foreign judgment and the defenses against the enforcement thereof.
As earlier discussed, the exceptions enumerated in Section 48, Rule 39
have remain unchanged since the time they were adapted in this
jurisdiction from long standing American rules. The requisites and
exceptions as delineated under Section 48 are but a restatement of
generally accepted principles of international law. Section 98 of The
Restatement, Second, Conflict of Laws, states that a valid judgment
rendered in a foreign nation after a fair trial in a contested proceeding
will be recognized in the United States, and on its face, the term valid
brings into play requirements such notions as valid jurisdiction over the
subject matter and parties.[59] Similarly, the notion that fraud or
collusion may preclude the enforcement of a foreign judgment finds
affirmation with foreign jurisprudence and commentators,[60] as well as
the doctrine that the foreign judgment must not constitute a clear
mistake of law or fact.[61] And finally, it has been recognized that public
policy as a defense to the recognition of judgments serves as an
umbrella for a variety of concerns in international practice which may
lead to a denial of recognition.[62]

The viability of the public policy defense against the enforcement of

a foreign judgment has been recognized in this jurisdiction.[63] This
defense allows for the application of local standards in reviewing the
foreign judgment, especially when such judgment creates only a
presumptive right, as it does in cases wherein the judgment is against a
person.[64] The defense is also recognized within the international
sphere, as many civil law nations adhere to a broad public policy
exception which may result in a denial of recognition when the foreign
court, in the light of the choice-of-law rules of the recognizing court,
applied the wrong law to the case.[65] The public policy defense can
safeguard against possible abuses to the easy resort to offshore
litigation if it can be demonstrated that the original claim is noxious to
our constitutional values.

There is no obligatory rule derived from treaties or conventions that

requires the Philippines to recognize foreign judgments, or allow a
procedure for the enforcement thereof. However, generally accepted
principles of international law, by virtue of the incorporation clause of
the Constitution, form part of the laws of the land even if they do not
derive from treaty obligations.[66] The classical formulation in
international law sees those customary rules accepted as binding result
from the combination two elements: the established, widespread, and
consistent practice on the part of States; and a psychological element
known as the opinion juris sive necessitates (opinion as to law or
necessity). Implicit in the latter element is a belief that the practice in
question is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law
requiring it.[67]

While the definite conceptual parameters of the recognition and

enforcement of foreign judgments have not been authoritatively
established, the Court can assert with certainty that such an
undertaking is among those generally accepted principles of
international law.[68] As earlier demonstrated, there is a widespread
practice among states accepting in principle the need for such
recognition and enforcement, albeit subject to limitations of varying
degrees. The fact that there is no binding universal treaty governing
the practice is not indicative of a widespread rejection of the principle,
but only a disagreement as to the imposable specific rules governing
the procedure for recognition and enforcement.

Aside from the widespread practice, it is indubitable that the

procedure for recognition and enforcement is embodied in the rules of
law, whether statutory or jurisprudential, adopted in various foreign
jurisdictions. In the Philippines, this is evidenced primarily by Section
48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which has existed in its current form
since the early 1900s. Certainly, the Philippine legal system has long
ago accepted into its jurisprudence and procedural rules the viability of
an action for enforcement of foreign judgment, as well as the
requisites for such valid enforcement, as derived from internationally
accepted doctrines. Again, there may be distinctions as to the rules
adopted by each particular state,[69] but they all prescind from the
premise that there is a rule of law obliging states to allow for, however
generally, the recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment. The
bare principle, to our mind, has attained the status of opinio juris in
international practice.

This is a significant proposition, as it acknowledges that the

procedure and requisites outlined in Section 48, Rule 39 derive their
efficacy not merely from the procedural rule, but by virtue of the
incorporation clause of the Constitution. Rules of procedure are
promulgated by the Supreme Court,[70] and could very well be
abrogated or revised by the high court itself. Yet the Supreme Court is
obliged, as are all State components, to obey the laws of the land,
including generally accepted principles of international law which form
part thereof, such as those ensuring the qualified recognition and
enforcement of foreign judgments.[71]

Thus, relative to the enforcement of foreign judgments in the

Philippines, it emerges that there is a general right recognized within
our body of laws, and affirmed by the Constitution, to seek recognition
and enforcement of foreign judgments, as well as a right to defend
against such enforcement on the grounds of want of jurisdiction, want
of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.

The preclusion of an action for enforcement of a foreign judgment

in this country merely due to an exhorbitant assessment of docket fees
is alien to generally accepted practices and principles in international
law. Indeed, there are grave concerns in conditioning the amount of
the filing fee on the pecuniary award or the value of the property
subject of the foreign decision. Such pecuniary award will almost
certainly be in foreign denomination, computed in accordance with the
applicable laws and standards of the forum.[72] The vagaries of
inflation, as well as the relative low-income capacity of the Filipino, to
date may very well translate into an award virtually unenforceable in
this country, despite its integral validity, if the docket fees for the
enforcement thereof were predicated on the amount of the award
sought to be enforced. The theory adopted by respondent judge and
the Marcos Estate may even lead to absurdities, such as if applied to an
award involving real property situated in places such as the United
States or Scandinavia where real property values are inexorably high.
We cannot very well require that the filing fee be computed based on
the value of the foreign property as determined by the standards of
the country where it is located.

As crafted, Rule 141 of the Rules of Civil Procedure avoids

unreasonableness, as it recognizes that the subject matter of an action
for enforcement of a foreign judgment is the foreign judgment itself,
and not the right-duty correlatives that resulted in the foreign
judgment. In this particular circumstance, given that the complaint is
lodged against an estate and is based on the US District Courts Final
Judgment, this foreign judgment may, for purposes of classification
under the governing procedural rule, be deemed as subsumed under
Section 7(b)(3) of Rule 141, i.e., within the class of all other actions not
involving property. Thus, only the blanket filing fee of minimal amount
is required.

Finally, petitioners also invoke Section 11, Article III of the

Constitution, which states that [F]ree access to the courts and quasi-
judicial bodies and adequate legal assistance shall not be denied to any
person by reason of poverty. Since the provision is among the
guarantees ensured by the Bill of Rights, it certainly gives rise to a
demandable right. However, now is not the occasion to elaborate on
the parameters of this constitutional right. Given our preceding
discussion, it is not necessary to utilize this provision in order to grant
the relief sought by the petitioners. It is axiomatic that the
constitutionality of an act will not be resolved by the courts if the
controversy can be settled on other grounds[73] or unless the resolution
thereof is indispensable for the determination of the case.[74]

One more word. It bears noting that Section 48, Rule 39

acknowledges that the Final Judgment is not conclusive yet, but
presumptive evidence of a right of the petitioners against the Marcos
Estate. Moreover, the Marcos Estate is not precluded to present
evidence, if any, of want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party,
collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. This ruling, decisive as it
is on the question of filing fees and no other, does not render verdict
on the enforceability of the Final Judgment before the courts under the
jurisdiction of the Philippines, or for that matter any other issue which
may legitimately be presented before the trial court. Such issues are to
be litigated before the trial court, but within the confines of the
matters for proof as laid down in Section 48, Rule 39. On the other
hand, the speedy resolution of this claim by the trial court is
encouraged, and contumacious delay of the decision on the merits will
not be brooked by this Court.
 WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed orders are
NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE, and a new order REINSTATING Civil Case
No. 97-1052 is hereby issued. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.

[1]
Priscilla Mijares is a judge of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay, Loretta Ann P. Rosales an incumbent member
of the House of Representatives, and Joel Lamangan a noted film director.
[2]
Namely Celsa Hilao, Josefina Hilao Forcadilla, Arturo P. Revilla, Jr., Rodolfo G. Benosa, Danila M. Fuente,
Renato Pineda, Domiciano Amparo, Chistopher Sorio, Jose Duran, and Adora Faye De Vera. Rollo, pp. 42-
47.
[3]
Except for Celsa Hilao, who instead alleged that her daughter, Liliosa Hilao, had been tortured then executed
by military personnel during martial law. Id. at 42-43.
[4]
Id. at 42.
[5]
Id. at 35.
[6]
The Opinion was authored by Circuit Judge Betty B. Fletcher and concurred in by Circuit Judge Harry
Pragerson. Circuit Judge Pamela Ann Rymer filed an opinion concurring and dissenting in part, her
dissent centering on the methodology used for computing compensatory damages. Rollo, pp. 84-132.
[7]
Under Section 58 of the US Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the judgment for compensatory damages in a
class suit is awarded to a randomly selected. Petitioner Joel Lamangan was among the randomly
selected claimants of the Torture subclass awarded damages by the US District Court. See Rollo, p. 71.
[8]
Now Section 48, Rule 39, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
[9]
Since increased to P600.00.
[10]
Now an Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals.
[11]
Petitioners correctly note that they are precluded from filing an appeal on certiorari under Section 1, Rule 41
of the Rules of Civil Procedure, which bars an appeal taken from an order dismissing an action without
prejudice and dictates the aggrieved party to file an appropriate civil action under Rule 65 instead. See
Rollo, p. 9
[12]
In a Resolution dated 4 December 2000. Rollo, p. 282.
[13]
Id. at 205.
[14]
See Section 7(c), Rule 141.
[15]
See Section 7(d), id.
[16]
Gochan v. Gochan, 423 Phil. 491, 502 (2001).
[17]
Philippine Aluminum Wheels v. Fasgi Enterprises, Inc., G.R. No. 137378, 12 October 2000, 342 SCRA 722,
734; citing Jovito R Salonga, Rex Bookstore, Manila, Philippines, 1995 Edition, p. 543.
[18]
159 U.S. 113 (1895)
[19]
47 Phil. 189 (1925). While the Philippine Supreme Court in this case refused to enforce the judgment of the
Hongkong Court on the ground of mistake of law or fact, it was reversed on appeal to the US Supreme
Court.
[20]
Id. JJ. Malcolm and Avancea, dissenting.
[21]
See also Borthwick v. Hon. Castro-Bartolome, G.R. No. L-57338, 23 July 1987, 152 SCRA 129, 235; Philippine
International Shipping Corp. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 77085, 26 April 1989, 172 SCRA 810, 819.
[22]
Ultimately, matters of remedy and procedure such as those relating to the service of summons or court
process upon the defendant, the authority of counsel to appear and represent a defendant and the
formal requirements in a decision are governed by the lex fori or the internal law of the forum. Asiavest
Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad v. Court of Appeals, 414 Phil. 13, 29 (1991).
[23]
Fraud, to hinder the enforcement within this jurisdiction of a foreign judgment, must be extrinsic, i.e., fraud
based on facts not controverted or resolved in the case where judgment is rendered, or that which
would go to the jurisdiction of the court or would deprive the party against whom judgment is rendered
a chance to defend the action to which he has a meritorious case or defense. In fine, intrinsic fraud, that
is, fraud which goes to the very existence of the cause of action such as fraud in obtaining the consent
to a contract is deemed already adjudged, and it, therefore, cannot militate against the recognition or
enforcement of the foreign judgment. Philippine Aluminum Wheels v. Fasgi Enterprises, Inc., supra note
17.
[24]
See, e.g., Nagarmull v. Binalbagan-Isabela Sugar Co., 144 Phil. 72, 77 (1970); Ingenholl v. Walter E. Olsen and
Company, Inc., supra note 20.
[25]
Roeher v. Rodriguez, G.R. No. 142820, 20 June 2003, 404 SCRA 495, 503.
[26]
An action must be brought in the second state upon the judgment recovered in the first. J. Salonga, Private
International Law (3rd ed., 1967), at 500; citing Goodrich, 600, 601; Chesire, 628; II Beale, 1377. But see E.
Scoles and P. Hay, Conflict of Laws (2nd ed., 1982), at 969, which recognizes that civil law countries
provide a procedure to give executory force to the foreign judgment, as distinguished from the Anglo-
American common law (but not statutory) practice of requiring an action on the judgment.
[27]
See Philsec Investment Corp. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 103493, 19 June 1997, 274 SCRA 102, 110.
[28]
Northwest Orient Airlines v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112573, 9 February 1995, 241 SCRA 192, 199.
[29]
See Section 3(a), Rule 1, Rules of Civil Procedure.
[30]
Every ordinary civil action must be based on a cause of action. Section 1, Rule 2, Rules of Civil Procedure. A
cause of action is the act or omission by which a party violates a right of another. Section 2, Rule 2, Rules
of Civil Procedure.
[31]
See Pacific Asia Overseas Shipping Corp. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 76595. 6 May 1988, 161 SCRA 122, 133.
[32]
Soles & Hay, supra note 27, at 916.
[33]
Ibid.
[34]
Salonga, supra note 27, at 514; citing Cheshire, 803.
[35]
Rollo, p. 30. Emphasis omitted.
[36]
133 Phil. 526 (1968).
[37]
Id. at 528.
[38]
Rollo, at 326, citing Arroz v. Alojado, 19 SCRA 711 (1967).
[39]
Ibid citing Bunayog v. Tunas, 106 Phil. 715 (1959)
[40]
Id. citing Baito v. Sarmiento, 109 Phil. 148 (1960).
[41]
Id. citing De Rivera v. Halili, 9 SCRA 59 (1963).
[42]
Id. citing Bautista v. Lim, 88 SCRA 479 (1979) and De Leon v. Court of Appeals, 287 SCRA 94 (1998).
[43]
Id. citing Amorganda v. Court of Appeals, 166 SCRA 203 (1988); Ortigas & Company v. Herrera, 120 SCRA 89
(1983).
[44]
Id. citing Mercado v. Ubay, 187 SCRA 719 (1990) and Filipino Pipe Workers Union v. Batario, Jr., 163 SCRA 789
(1988).
[45]
As amended by Rep. Act No. 7691.
[46]
Supra note 32.
[47]
Supra note 17.
[48]
Supra note 18.
[49]
H. Steiner & D. Vagts, Transnational Legal Problems: Materials and Text (2nd ed., 1976), at 775.
[50]
Ibid.
[51]
See Salonga, supra note 27, at 66.
[52]
Id. at 502-503.
[53]
Scoles & Hays, supra note 27, at 970.
[54]
Steiner & Vagts, supra note 51, at 808. A decision rendered in one of the Contracting States shall be entitled
to recognition and enforcement in another Contracting State under the terms of this Convention (1) if
the decision was given by a court considered to have jurisdiction within the meaning of this Convention,
and (2) if it is no longer subject to ordinary forms of review in the State of origin. Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, Chapter II, Article
4.
[55]
To date, only Cyprus, the Netherlands, Portugal and Kuwait have either ratified or acceded to the
Convention.
[56]
Steiner & Vagts, supra note 51.
[57]
Steiner & Vagts, supra note 51,at 776.
[58]
Salonga, supra note 51, at 502.
[59]
Steiner & Vagts, supra note 27, at 779. A policy common to all legal systems is to provide for the final
resolution of disputes. The policy is furthered by each nations adoption of a view of jurisdiction in the
international sense which recognizes the foreign courts assertion of jurisdiction as satisfying its own
notions of due process in circumstances in which it itself would have asserted jurisdiction. Soles &
Hay, supra note 27, at 976; citing Hay, International versus Interstate Conflicts Law in the United States,
35 Rabels Zeitschrift 429,450 n. 101 (1971) and Cherun v. Frishman, 236 F. Supp. 292 (D.D.C. 1964).
Salonga, in affirming the rule of want of jurisdiction, cites the commentaries of Cheshire, Wolff,
Goodrich and Nussbaum.
[60]
See, e.g., Salonga, supra note 27 at 513.
[61]
Ibid; citing Henderson v. Henderson, 6 Q.B. (1844) 288; Vanquelin v. Bouard, 15 C.B. (N.S. 1863) 341;
Godard v. Gray, L.R. 6 Q.B. 139 (1870); Vadala v. Lawes 25 Q.B.D. (1890) 319, 316; cf. Chandler v. Peketz,
297 U.S. 609, 56 S.Ct., 80 L.Ed. 881 (1936); Cheshire, 661-664; Wolff, 268; Goodrich, 603.
[62]
Soles & Hay, supra note 27, at 978.
[63]
Thus, when the foreign law, judgment or contract is contrary to a sound and established public policy of the
forum, the said foreign law, judgment or order shall not be applied. Bank of America v. American Realty
Corp., 378 Phil. 1279, 1296 (1999); citing Philippine Conflict of Laws, Eight Edition, 1996, Paras, page
46. Las sentencias de tribunals extranjeros no pueden ponerse en vigor en Filipinas si son contrarias a las
leyes, costumbres y orden pblico. Si dichas decisiones, por la simple teora de reciprocidad, cortesa judicial y
urbanidad internacional son base suficiente para que nuestros tribunales decidan a tenor de las mismas,
entonces nuestros juzgados estaran en la pobre tessitura de tener que dictar sentencias contrarias a
nuestras leyes, costumbres y orden pblico. Esto es absurdo. Querubin v. Querubin, 87 Phil. 124, 133. (1950).
[64]
See Section 48, Rule 39, Rules of Civil Procedure.
[65]
Soles & Hays, supra note 27, at 979.
[66]
[It] is generally recognized that, subject to [exceptions], a rule of general customary international law is
binding on all States, whether or not they have participated in the practice from which it sprang. H.
Thirlway, The Sources of International Law, International Law (ed. by M.Evans, 1st ed., 2003), at 124.
[67]
Not only must the acts concerned amount to a settled practice, but they must also be such, or be carried out
in such a way, as to be evidence of a belief that this practice is rendered obligatory by the existence of a
rule of law requiring it. The need for such a belief, i.e., the existence of a subjective element, is implicit in
the very notion of the opinion juris sive necessitatis. North Sea Continental Shelf, Judgment, ICJ Reports
1969, p. 3, para. 77; cited in H. Thirlway, ibid.
[68]
The problems that arise in the enforcement of foreign judgments are generally to be solved by the
principles of international law. The Philippines by its Constitution, adopts the generally accepted
principles of international law. F. Gupit, Enforcement of Foreign Judgments and Arbitral Awards, XXIII J.
Integ. Bar. Phil. 3, at 69.
[69]
Divergent practices do not necessarily preclude recognition of a customary norm. In reviewing the question
of the existence of customary rules forbidding the use of force or intervention, the International Court
of Justice pertinently held: It is not to be expected that in the practice of States the application of the
rules in question should have been perfect, in the sense that States should have refrained, with
complete consistency, from the use of force or from intervention in each others internal affairs. The
Court does not consider that, for a rule to be established as customary, the corresponding practice
must be in absolutely rigorous conformity with the rule. In order to deduce the existence of customary
rules, the Court deems it sufficient that the conduct of States, should, in general, be consistent with
such rules, and that instances of State conduct inconsistent with a given rule should generally have
been treated as breaches of that rule, not as indications of recognition of a new rule. (emphasis
supplied) Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of
America), Merits, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1986, p. 14, para. 186; citing in H. Thirlway, supra note 66.
[70]
And other inferior courts, relative to their jurisdictions.
[71]
Sec. 2, Art. II, 1987 Const., which states The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy,
adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and adheres
to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity with all nations.
[72]
Indeed, the valuation of foreign money judgments remains a matter of debate in international law. In the
United States, Section 144 of the Restatement, Second, Conflicts of Laws (1971) adopts the rule that the
forum would convert the currency into local currency as of the date of the award. However, this rule
has been criticized. In England, the judgment debtor may now effect payment either in the foreign
currency in the amount due or in local currency equivalent to the foreign currency on the date of
payment. French and German law similarly permit the expression of a judgment in foreign currency.
Soles & Hays, supra note 27, at 973.
[73]
Ty v. Trampe, 321 Phil. 81 (1995).
[74]
Tarrosa v. Singson, G.R. No. 111243, 25 May 1994, 232 SCRA 553, 557.
Subject: Section 7(a), Rule 141 is not the basis in the computation of
filing fees in the present case; Effects of a foreign judgment;
Enforcement of a foreign judgment; Subject matter of an action is
incapable of pecuniary estimation, guiding principles; The complaint to
enforce the US District Court judgment is one capable of pecuniary
estimation; Computation of filing fees is governed by Section 7(b)(3) of
Rule 141 involving 'other actions not involving property'; International
principles relating to the recognition and enforcement of foreign
judgments; Defenses against the enforcement of a foreign judgment;
“Public policy" as a defense to the enforcement of foreign judgments;
Recognition of foreign judgments is a matter of compliance with
generally accepted principles of international law; Section 11, Article III
of the Constitution; Decision not determinative of the enforceability of
the US Judgment but only on the question on correctness of filing fees

Facts:
The petitioners in this case are victims of human rights violations
under the martial law regime. In 1991, they filed a class suit with the
United States District Court of Hawaii, against the Estate of former
Philippine President Ferdinand E. Marcos (Marcos Estate). The action
was brought forth by ten Filipino citizens who each alleged having
suffered human rights abuses such as arbitrary detention, torture and
rape in the hands of police or military forces during the Marcos regime.
The Alien Tort Act was invoked as basis for the US District Court's
jurisdiction over the complaint, as it involved a suit by aliens for
tortious violations of international law. Subsequently a jury rendered a
verdict and an award of compensatory and exemplary damages in
favor of the plaintiff class. A Final Judgment was rendered by the US
Court awarding the plaintiff class a total of USD 1,964,005,859.90

In 1997, petitioners filed a Complaint with the Makati RTC for the
enforcement of the US Final Judgment. The Marcos Estate filed a
motion to dismiss, raising, among others, the non-payment of the
correct filing fees. It alleged that petitioners had only paid P410 as
docket and filing fees. In response, the petitioners claimed that an
action for the enforcement of a foreign judgment is not capable of
pecuniary estimation; hence, a filing fee of only P410 was proper,
pursuant to Section 7(c) of Rule 141.
 The Makati RTC issued the assailed Order dismissing the complaint
without prejudice. It found that the subject matter of the complaint
was indeed capable of pecuniary estimation and Section 7(a) of Rule
141 of the Rules of Civil Procedure would find application. The RTC
required the petitioners to pay a filing fee of over P472 Million, which
had not been paid. Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration,
which was denied. Hence, the present petition.

Petitioners submit that their action is incapable of pecuniary

estimation as the subject matter of the suit is the enforcement of a
foreign judgment, and not an action for the collection of a sum of
money or recovery of damages. They also point out that to require the
class plaintiffs to pay the P472 Million in filing fees would negate the
liberal construction ordained by the Rules of Court.

Held:
Section 7(a), Rule 141 is not the basis in the computation of filing fees
in the present case
1. The Makati RTC judge relied on Section 7(a), Rule 141 as basis for the
computation of the filing fee of over P472 Million. An examination of
Rule 141 of the Rules of Court readily evinces that the respondent judge
ignored the clear letter of the law when he concluded that the filing
fee be computed based on the total sum claimed or the stated value of
the property in litigation.

2. Section 7(a), Rule 141 covers, on one hand, ordinary actions,

permissive counterclaims, third-party, etc. complaints and complaints-
in-interventions, and on the other, money claims against estates which
are not based on judgment. Thus, the relevant question is whether the
action filed with the lower court is a "money claim against an estate
not based on judgment." Petitioners' complaint may have been lodged
against an estate, but it is clearly based on a judgment, the Final
Judgment of the US District Court. The provision does not make any
distinction between a local judgment and a foreign judgment, and
where the law does not distinguish, we shall not distinguish.

3. relief sought, or on the value of the property in litigation. The

aforecited rules evidently have no application to petitioners'
complaint. The Makati RTC Judge erred when he concluded that the
filing fees should be computed on the basis of the schematic table of
Section 7(a), as the action involved pertains to a claim against an
estate based on judgment

Effects of a foreign judgment

4. The rules of comity, utility and convenience of nations have
established a usage among civilized states by which final judgments of
foreign courts of competent jurisdiction are reciprocally respected and
rendered efficacious under certain conditions that may vary in
different countries. This principle was prominently affirmed in the
leading American case of Hilton v. Guyot and expressly recognized in
our jurisprudence beginning withIngenholl v. Walter E. Olsen & Co. The
procedural rule for recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment
is now outlined in Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

5. There is an evident distinction between a foreign judgment in an

action in rem and one in personam. For anaction in rem, the foreign
judgment is deemed conclusive upon the title to the thing, while in
an action in personam, the foreign judgment is presumptive, and not
conclusive, of a right as between the parties and their successors in
interest by a subsequent title.

6. However, in both cases, the foreign judgment is susceptible to

impeachment in our local courts on the grounds of want of jurisdiction
or notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
Thus, the party aggrieved by the foreign judgment is entitled to defend
against the enforcement of such decision in the local forum. It is
essential that there should be an opportunity to challenge the foreign
judgment, in order for the court in this jurisdiction to properly
determine its efficacy.

Enforcement of a foreign judgment

7. It is usually necessary for an action to be filed in order to enforce a
foreign judgment, even if such judgment has conclusive effect as in the
case of in rem actions, if only for the purpose of allowing the losing
party an opportunity to challenge the foreign judgment, and in order
for the court to properly determine its efficacy. Consequently, the
party attacking a foreign judgment has the burden of overcoming the
presumption of its validity.
8. The rules are silent as to what initiatory procedure must be
undertaken in order to enforce a foreign judgment in the Philippines.
But there is no question that the filing of a civil complaint is an
appropriate measure for such purpose. A civil action is one by which a
party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, and
clearly an action to enforce a foreign judgment is in essence a
vindication of a right prescinding either from a "conclusive judgment
upon title" or the "presumptive evidence of a right." Absent perhaps a
statutory grant of jurisdiction to a quasi-judicial body, the claim for
enforcement of judgment must be brought before the regular courts.

9. There are distinctions, nuanced but discernible, between the cause

of action arising from the enforcement of a foreign judgment, and that
arising from the facts or allegations that occasioned the foreign
judgment. They may pertain to the same set of facts, but there is an
essential difference in the right-duty correlatives that are sought to be
vindicated. For example, in a complaint for the enforcement of a
foreign judgment awarding damages from a tortfeasor, the cause of
action derives not from the tortious act but from the foreign judgment
itself.

10. As stated in Section 48, Rule 39, the actionable issues are generally
restricted to a review of jurisdiction of the foreign court, the service of
personal notice, collusion, fraud, or mistake of fact or law. The
limitations on review is in consonance with a strong and pervasive
policy in all legal systems to limit repetitive litigation on claims and
issues. Otherwise known as the policy of preclusion, it seeks to protect
party expectations resulting from previous litigation, to safeguard
against the harassment of defendants, to insure that the task of courts
not be increased by never-ending litigation of the same disputes, and –
in a larger sense – to promote what Lord Coke in the Ferrer's Case of
1599 stated to be the goal of all law: "rest and quietness." If every
judgment of a foreign court were reviewable on the merits, the
plaintiff would be forced back on his/her original cause of action,
rendering immaterial the previously concluded litigation.

Subject matter of an action is incapable of pecuniary estimation,

guiding principles
11. The jurisprudential standard in gauging whether the subject matter
of an action is capable of pecuniary estimation is well-entrenched. In
determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is
not capable of pecuniary estimation this Court has adopted the
criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the principal action or
remedy sought. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the
claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether
jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the courts of first instance
would depend on the amount of the claim. However, where the basic
issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of
money, where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence
of, the principal relief sought, [like in suits to have the defendant
perform his part of the contract (specific performance) and in actions
for support, or for annulment of judgment or to foreclose a mortgage,]
this Court has considered such actions as cases where the subject of
the litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, and are
cognizable exclusively by courts of first instance (now Regional Trial
Courts). (see Singsong vs. Isabela Sawmill and Raymundo v. Court of
Appeals)

The complaint to enforce the US District Court judgment is one

capable of pecuniary estimation
12. It is self-evident that while the subject matter of the action is
undoubtedly the enforcement of a foreign judgment, the effect of a
providential award would be the adjudication of a sum of money.
Perhaps in theory, such an action is primarily for "the enforcement of
the foreign judgment," but there is a certain obtuseness to that sort of
argument since there is no denying that the enforcement of the
foreign judgment will necessarily result in the award of a definite sum
of money.

13. Petitioners raise the point that a declaration that an action for
enforcement of foreign judgment may be capable of pecuniary
estimation might lead to an instance wherein a first level court such as
the Municipal Trial Court would have jurisdiction to enforce a foreign
judgment. But under the statute defining the jurisdiction of first level
courts, B.P. 129, such courts are not vested with jurisdiction over
actions for the enforcement of foreign judgments.
14. An examination of Section 19(6), B.P. 129 reveals that the instant
complaint for enforcement of a foreign judgment, even if capable of
pecuniary estimation, would fall under the jurisdiction of the Regional
Trial Courts. The provision [serves as] as jurisdictional basis with
respect to actions for enforcement of foreign judgments, provided
that no other court or office is vested jurisdiction over such complaint:

Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. — Regional Trial Courts shall exercise
exclusive original jurisdiction:
Xxx

(6) In all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court,
tribunal, person or body exercising jurisdiction or any court, tribunal,
person or body exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions.

Computation of filing fees is governed by Section 7(b)(3) of Rule 141

involving 'other actions not involving property'
15. The complaint to enforce the US District Court judgment is one
capable of pecuniary estimation. But at the same time, it is also an
action based on judgment against an estate, thus placing it beyond the
ambit of Section 7(a) of Rule 141. What provision then governs the
proper computation of the filing fees over the instant complaint?

16. As crafted, Rule 141 of the Rules of Civil Procedure avoids

unreasonableness, as it recognizes that the subject matter of an action
for enforcement of a foreign judgment is the foreign judgment itself,
and not the right-duty correlatives that resulted in the foreign
judgment. In this particular circumstance, given that the complaint is
lodged against an estate and is based on the US District Court's Final
Judgment, this foreign judgment may, for purposes of classification
under the governing procedural rule, be deemed as subsumed under
Section 7(b)(3) of Rule 141, i.e., within the class of "all other actions not
involving property." Thus, only the blanket filing fee of minimal
amount is required.

17. Notably, the amount paid as docket fees by the petitioners on the
premise that it was an action incapable of pecuniary estimation
corresponds to the same amount required for "other actions not
involving property." Thepetitioners thus paid the correct amount of
filing fees, and it was a grave abuse of discretion for the Makati RTC
Judge to have applied instead a clearly inapplicable rule and dismissed
the complaint.

International principles relating to the recognition and enforcement

of foreign judgments
18. We earlier adverted to the the internationally recognized policy of
preclusion, as well as the principles of comity, utility and convenience of
nations as the basis for the evolution of the rule calling for the
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments. The US Supreme
Court in Hilton v. Guyot relied heavily on the concept of comity, as
especially derived from the landmark treatise of Justice Story in his
Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws of 1834. Yet the notion of
"comity" has since been criticized as one "of dim contours" or
suffering from a number of fallacies. Other conceptual bases for the
recognition of foreign judgments have evolved such as thevested rights
theory or the modern doctrine of obligation.

19. There have been attempts to codify through treaties or multilateral

agreements the standards for the recognition and enforcement of
foreign judgments, but these have not borne fruition. The most
ambitious of these attempts is the Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters,
prepared in 1966 by the Hague Conference of International Law. While
it has not received the ratifications needed to have it take effect, it is
recognized as representing current scholarly thought on the topic.
Neither the Philippines nor the United States are signatories to the
Convention. Yet even if there is no unanimity as to the applicable
theory behind the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments
or a universal treaty rendering it obligatory force, there is consensus
that the viability of such recognition and enforcement is essential.

Defenses against the enforcement of a foreign judgment

20. The exceptions enumerated in Section 48, Rule 39 have remain
unchanged since the time they were adapted in this jurisdiction from
long standing American rules, to wit:

SEC. 48. Effect of foreign judgments. — The effect of a judgment of a

tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to pronounce the
judgment is as follows:
Xxx

In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence

of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud,
or clear mistake of law or fact.

21. The requisites and exceptions as delineated under Section 48 are

but a restatement of generally accepted principles of international law.
Section 98 of The Restatement, Second, Conflict of Laws, states that
"a valid judgment rendered in a foreign nation after a fair trial in a
contested proceeding will be recognized in the United States," and on
its face, the term "valid" brings into play requirements such notions
as valid jurisdiction over the subject matter and parties. Similarly, the
notion that fraud or collusion may preclude the enforcement of a
foreign judgment finds affirmation with foreign jurisprudence and
commentators, as well as the doctrine that the foreign judgment must
not constitute "a clear mistake of law or fact."

“Public policy" as a defense to the enforcement of foreign judgments

22. It has been recognized that "public policy" as a defense to the
recognition of judgments serves as an umbrella for a variety of
concerns in international practice which may lead to a denial of
recognition.

23. The viability of the public policy defense against the enforcement
of a foreign judgment has been recognized in this jurisdiction. This
defense allows for the application of local standards in reviewing the
foreign judgment, especially when such judgment creates only a
presumptive right, as it does in cases wherein the judgment is against a
person. The defense is also recognized within the international sphere,
as many civil law nations adhere to a broad public policy exception
which may result in a denial of recognition when the foreign court, in
the light of the choice-of-law rules of the recognizing court, applied the
wrong law to the case. The public policy defense can safeguard against
possible abuses to the easy resort to offshore litigation if it can be
demonstrated that the original claim is noxious to our constitutional
values.
Recognition of foreign judgments is a matter of compliance with
generally accepted principles of international law
24. There is no obligatory rule derived from treaties or conventions
that requires the Philippines to recognize foreign judgments, or allow a
procedure for the enforcement thereof. However, generally accepted
principles of international law, by virtue of the incorporation clause of
the Constitution, form part of the laws of the land even if they do not
derive from treaty obligations. The classical formulation in
international law sees those customary rules accepted as binding result
from the combination two elements: (i) the established, widespread,
and consistent practice on the part of States; and (ii) a psychological
element known as the opinion juris sive necessitates (opinion as to law
or necessity). Implicit in the latter element is a belief that the practice
in question is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law
requiring it

25. While the definite conceptual parameters of the recognition and

enforcement of foreign judgments have not been authoritatively
established, the Court can assert with certainty that such an
undertaking is among those generally accepted principles of
international law. There is a widespread practice among states
accepting in principle the need for such recognition and enforcement,
albeit subject to limitations of varying degrees. The fact that there is no
binding universal treaty governing the practice is not indicative of a
widespread rejection of the principle, but only a disagreement as to
the imposable specific rules governing the procedure for recognition
and enforcement. There may be distinctions as to the rules adopted by
each particular state, but they all prescind from the premise that there
is a rule of law obliging states to allow for, however generally, the
recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment.

26. The bare principle, to our mind, has attained the status of opinio
juris in international practice. This is a significant proposition, as it
acknowledges that the procedure and requisites outlined in Section
48, Rule 39 derive their efficacy not merely from the procedural rule,
but by virtue of the incorporation clause of the Constitution.

27. The preclusion of an action for enforcement of a foreign judgment

in this country merely due to an exhorbitant assessment of docket fees
is alien to generally accepted practices and principles in international
law. Indeed, there are grave concerns in conditioning the amount of
the filing fee on the pecuniary award or the value of the property
subject of the foreign decision. The vagaries of inflation, as well as the
relative low-income capacity of the Filipino, to date may very well
translate into an award virtually unenforceable in this country, despite
its integral validity, if the docket fees for the enforcement thereof
were predicated on the amount of the award sought to be enforced.

Section 11, Article III of the Constitution

28. Petitioners also invoke Section 11, Article III of the Constitution,
which states that "[F]ree access to the courts and quasi-judicial bodies
and adequate legal assistance shall not be denied to any person by
reason of poverty." Since the provision is among the guarantees
ensured by the Bill of Rights, it certainly gives rise to a demandable
right. However, now is not the occasion to elaborate on the
parameters of this constitutional right. Given our preceding
discussion, it is not necessary to utilize this provision in order to grant
the relief sought by the petitioners. It is axiomatic that the
constitutionality of an act will not be resolved by the courts if the
controversy can be settled on other grounds or unless the resolution
thereof is indispensable for the determination of the case.

Decision not determinative of the enforceability of the US Judgment

but only on the question on correctness of filing fees
29. It bears noting that Section 48, Rule 39 acknowledges that
the Final Judgment is not conclusive yet, but presumptive evidence of a
right of the petitioners against the Marcos Estate. Moreover, the
Marcos Estate is not precluded to present evidence, if any, of want of
jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear
mistake of law or fact. This ruling, decisive as it is on the question of
filing fees and no other, does not render verdict on the enforceability
of the Final Judgment before the courts under the jurisdiction of the
Philippines, or for that matter any other issue which may legitimately
be presented before the trial court. Such issues are to be litigated
before the trial court, but within the confines of the matters for proof
as laid down in Section 48, Rule 39.
G.R. No. L-31195 June 5, 1973
PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS EMPLOYMENT ORGANIZATION,
NICANOR TOLENTINO, FLORENCIO, PADRIGANO RUFINO, ROXAS
MARIANO DE LEON, ASENCION PACIENTE, BONIFACIO VACUNA,
BENJAMIN PAGCU and RODULFO MUNSOD, petitioners,
vs.
PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS CO., INC. and COURT OF INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS, respondents.
L.S. Osorio & P.B. Castillo and J.C. Espinas & Associates for petitioners.
Demetrio B. Salem & Associates for private respondent.

MAKASIAR, J.:

The petitioner Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization

(hereinafter referred to as PBMEO) is a legitimate labor union
composed of the employees of the respondent Philippine Blooming
Mills Co., Inc., and petitioners Nicanor Tolentino, Florencio Padrigano,
Rufino Roxas, Mariano de Leon, Asencion Paciente, Bonifacio Vacuna,
Benjamin Pagcu and Rodulfo Munsod are officers and members of the
petitioner Union.

Petitioners claim that on March 1, 1969, they decided to stage a mass

demonstration at Malacañang on March 4, 1969, in protest against
alleged abuses of the Pasig police, to be participated in by the workers
in the first shift (from 6 A.M. to 2 P.M.) as well as those in the regular
second and third shifts (from 7 A.M. to 4 P.M. and from 8 A.M. to 5
P.M., respectively); and that they informed the respondent Company
of their proposed demonstration.

The questioned order dated September 15, 1969, of Associate Judge

Joaquin M. Salvador of the respondent Court reproduced the following
stipulation of facts of the parties — parties —

3. That on March 2, 1969 complainant company learned of the

projected mass demonstration at Malacañang in protest
against alleged abuses of the Pasig Police Department to be
participated by the first shift (6:00 AM-2:00 PM) workers as
well as those working in the regular shifts (7:00 A.M. to 4:00
PM and 8:00 AM to 5:00 PM) in the morning of March 4,
1969;

4. That a meeting was called by the Company on March 3,

1969 at about 11:00 A.M. at the Company's canteen, and
those present were: for the Company: (1) Mr. Arthur L. Ang
(2) Atty. S. de Leon, Jr., (3) and all department and section
heads. For the PBMEO (1) Florencio Padrigano, (2) Rufino
Roxas, (3) Mariano de Leon, (4) Asencion Paciente, (5)
Bonifacio Vacuna and (6) Benjamin Pagcu.

5. That the Company asked the union panel to confirm or

deny said projected mass demonstration at Malacañang on
March 4, 1969. PBMEO thru Benjamin Pagcu who acted as
spokesman of the union panel, confirmed the planned
demonstration and stated that the demonstration or rally
cannot be cancelled because it has already been agreed upon
in the meeting. Pagcu explained further that the
demonstration has nothing to do with the Company because
the union has no quarrel or dispute with Management;

6. That Management, thru Atty. C.S. de Leon, Company

personnel manager, informed PBMEO that the
demonstration is an inalienable right of the union guaranteed
by the Constitution but emphasized, however, that any
demonstration for that matter should not unduly prejudice
the normal operation of the Company. For which reason, the
Company, thru Atty. C.S. de Leon warned the PBMEO
representatives that workers who belong to the first and
regular shifts, who without previous leave of absence
approved by the Company, particularly , the officers present
who are the organizers of the demonstration, who shall fail
to report for work the following morning (March 4, 1969)
shall be dismissed, because such failure is a violation of the
existing CBA and, therefore, would be amounting to an illegal
strike;

7. That at about 5:00 P.M. on March 3, 1969, another meeting

was convoked Company represented by Atty. C.S. de Leon,
 Jr. The Union panel was composed of: Nicanor Tolentino,
Rodolfo Munsod, Benjamin Pagcu and Florencio Padrigano. In
this afternoon meeting of March 3, 1969, Company reiterated
and appealed to the PBMEO representatives that while all
workers may join the Malacañang demonstration, the
workers for the first and regular shift of March 4, 1969 should
be excused from joining the demonstration and should
report for work; and thus utilize the workers in the 2nd and
3rd shifts in order not to violate the provisions of the CBA,
particularly Article XXIV: NO LOCKOUT — NO STRIKE'. All
those who will not follow this warning of the Company shall
be dismiss; De Leon reiterated the Company's warning that
the officers shall be primarily liable being the organizers of
the mass demonstration. The union panel countered that it
was rather too late to change their plans inasmuch as the
Malacañang demonstration will be held the following
morning; and

8. That a certain Mr. Wilfredo Ariston, adviser of PBMEO sent

a cablegram to the Company which was received 9:50 A.M.,
March 4, 1969, the contents of which are as follows:
'REITERATING REQUEST EXCUSE DAY SHIFT EMPLOYEES
JOINING DEMONSTRATION MARCH 4, 1969.' (Pars. 3-8,
Annex "F", pp. 42-43, rec.)

Because the petitioners and their members numbering about 400

proceeded with the demonstration despite the pleas of the
respondent Company that the first shift workers should not be
required to participate in the demonstration and that the workers in
the second and third shifts should be utilized for the demonstration
from 6 A.M. to 2 P.M. on March 4, 1969, respondent Company prior
notice of the mass demonstration on March 4, 1969, with the
respondent Court, a charge against petitioners and other employees
who composed the first shift, charging them with a "violation of
Section 4(a)-6 in relation to Sections 13 and 14, as well as Section 15, all
of Republic Act No. 875, and of the CBA providing for 'No Strike and No
Lockout.' " (Annex "A", pp. 19-20, rec.). The charge was accompanied
by the joint affidavit of Arthur L. Ang and Cesareo de Leon, Jr. (Annex
"B", pp. 21-24, rec.). Thereafter, a corresponding complaint was filed,
dated April 18, 1969, by Acting Chief Prosecutor Antonio T. Tirona and
Acting Prosecutor Linda P. Ilagan (Annex "C", pp. 25-30, rec.)

In their answer, dated May 9, 1969, herein petitioners claim that they
did not violate the existing CBA because they gave the respondent
Company prior notice of the mass demonstration on March 4, 1969;
that the said mass demonstration was a valid exercise of their
constitutional freedom of speech against the alleged abuses of some
Pasig policemen; and that their mass demonstration was not a
declaration of strike because it was not directed against the
respondent firm (Annex "D", pp. 31-34, rec.)

After considering the aforementioned stipulation of facts submitted by

the parties, Judge Joaquin M. Salvador, in an order dated September
15, 1969, found herein petitioner PBMEO guilty of bargaining in bad
faith and herein petitioners Florencio Padrigano, Rufino Roxas,
Mariano de Leon, Asencion Paciente, Bonifacio Vacuna, Benjamin
Pagcu, Nicanor Tolentino and Rodulfo Munsod as directly responsible
for perpetrating the said unfair labor practice and were, as a
consequence, considered to have lost their status as employees of the
respondent Company (Annex "F", pp. 42-56, rec.)

Herein petitioners claim that they received on September 23, 1969, the
aforesaid order (p. 11, rec.); and that they filed on September 29, 1969,
because September 28, 1969 fell on Sunday (p. 59, rec.), a motion for
reconsideration of said order dated September 15, 1969, on the ground
that it is contrary to law and the evidence, as well as asked for ten (10)
days within which to file their arguments pursuant to Sections 15, 16
and 17 of the Rules of the CIR, as amended (Annex "G", pp. 57-60, rec. )
In its opposition dated October 7, 1969, filed on October 11, 1969 (p. 63,
rec.), respondent Company averred that herein petitioners received on
September 22, 1969, the order dated September 17 (should be
September 15), 1969; that under Section 15 of the amended Rules of
the Court of Industrial Relations, herein petitioners had five (5) days
from September 22, 1969 or until September 27, 1969, within which to
file their motion for reconsideration; and that because their motion for
reconsideration was two (2) days late, it should be accordingly
dismissed, invoking Bien vs. Castillo,1 which held among others, that a
motion for extension of the five-day period for the filing of a motion
for reconsideration should be filed before the said five-day period
elapses (Annex "M", pp. 61-64, rec.).

Subsequently, herein petitioners filed on October 14, 1969 their written

arguments dated October 11, 1969, in support of their motion for
reconsideration (Annex "I", pp. 65-73, rec.).

In a resolution dated October 9, 1969, the respondent en

banc dismissed the motion for reconsideration of herein petitioners for
being pro forma as it was filed beyond the reglementary period
prescribed by its Rules (Annex "J", pp. 74-75, rec.), which herein
petitioners received on October 28, 196 (pp. 12 & 76, rec.).

At the bottom of the notice of the order dated October 9, 1969, which
was released on October 24, 1969 and addressed to the counsels of the
parties (pp. 75-76, rec.), appear the requirements of Sections 15, 16 and
17, as amended, of the Rules of the Court of Industrial Relations, that a
motion for reconsideration shall be filed within five (5) days from
receipt of its decision or order and that an appeal from the decision,
resolution or order of the C.I.R., sitting en banc, shall be perfected
within ten (10) days from receipt thereof (p. 76, rec.).

On October 31, 1969, herein petitioners filed with the respondent court
a petition for relief from the order dated October 9, 1969, on the
ground that their failure to file their motion for reconsideration on
time was due to excusable negligence and honest mistake committed
by the president of the petitioner Union and of the office clerk of their
counsel, attaching thereto the affidavits of the said president and clerk
(Annexes "K", "K-1" and "K-2", rec.).

Without waiting for any resolution on their petition for relief from the
order dated October 9, 1969, herein petitioners filed on November 3,
1969, with the Supreme Court, a notice of appeal (Annex "L", pp. 88-
89, rec.).

I
There is need of briefly restating basic concepts and principles which
underlie the issues posed by the case at bar.
(1) In a democracy, the preservation and enhancement of the dignity
and worth of the human personality is the central core as well as the
cardinal article of faith of our civilization. The inviolable character of
man as an individual must be "protected to the largest possible extent
in his thoughts and in his beliefs as the citadel of his person."2

(2) The Bill of Rights is designed to preserve the ideals of liberty,

equality and security "against the assaults of opportunism, the
expediency of the passing hour, the erosion of small encroachments,
and the scorn and derision of those who have no patience with general
principles."3

In the pithy language of Mr. Justice Robert Jackson, the purpose of the
Bill of Rights is to withdraw "certain subjects from the vicissitudes of
political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and
officials, and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the
courts. One's rights to life, liberty and property, to free speech, or free
press, freedom of worship and assembly, and other fundamental rights
may not be submitted to a vote; they depend on the outcome of no
elections."4 Laski proclaimed that "the happiness of the individual, not
the well-being of the State, was the criterion by which its behaviour
was to be judged. His interests, not its power, set the limits to the
authority it was entitled to exercise."5

(3) The freedoms of expression and of assembly as well as the right to

petition are included among the immunities reserved by the sovereign
people, in the rhetorical aphorism of Justice Holmes, to protect the
ideas that we abhor or hate more than the ideas we cherish; or as
Socrates insinuated, not only to protect the minority who want to talk,
but also to benefit the majority who refuse to listen.6 And as Justice
Douglas cogently stresses it, the liberties of one are the liberties of all;
and the liberties of one are not safe unless the liberties of all are
protected.7

(4) The rights of free expression, free assembly and petition, are not
only civil rights but also political rights essential to man's enjoyment of
his life, to his happiness and to his full and complete fulfillment. Thru
these freedoms the citizens can participate not merely in the periodic
establishment of the government through their suffrage but also in the
administration of public affairs as well as in the discipline of abusive
public officers. The citizen is accorded these rights so that he can
appeal to the appropriate governmental officers or agencies for
redress and protection as well as for the imposition of the lawful
sanctions on erring public officers and employees.

(5) While the Bill of Rights also protects property rights, the primacy of
human rights over property rights is recognized.8 Because these
freedoms are "delicate and vulnerable, as well as supremely precious in
our society" and the "threat of sanctions may deter their exercise
almost as potently as the actual application of sanctions," they "need
breathing space to survive," permitting government regulation only
"with narrow specificity."9

Property and property rights can be lost thru prescription; but human
rights are imprescriptible. If human rights are extinguished by the
passage of time, then the Bill of Rights is a useless attempt to limit the
power of government and ceases to be an efficacious shield against
the tyranny of officials, of majorities, of the influential and powerful,
and of oligarchs — political, economic or otherwise.

In the hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights of free expression and of

assembly occupy a preferred position as they are essential to the
preservation and vitality of our civil and political institutions; 10 and
such priority "gives these liberties the sanctity and the sanction not
permitting dubious intrusions." 11

The superiority of these freedoms over property rights is underscored

by the fact that a mere reasonable or rational relation between the
means employed by the law and its object or purpose — that the law is
neither arbitrary nor discriminatory nor oppressive — would suffice to
validate a law which restricts or impairs property rights. 12 On the other
hand, a constitutional or valid infringement of human rights requires a
more stringent criterion, namely existence of a grave and immediate
danger of a substantive evil which the State has the right to prevent.
So it has been stressed in the main opinion of Mr. Justice Fernando
in Gonzales vs. Comelec and reiterated by the writer of the opinion
in Imbong vs. Ferrer. 13 It should be added that Mr. Justice Barredo
in Gonzales vs. Comelec, supra, like Justices Douglas, Black and
Goldberg in N.Y. Times Co. vs. Sullivan, 14 believes that the freedoms of
speech and of the press as well as of peaceful assembly and of petition
for redress of grievances are absolute when directed against public
officials or "when exercised in relation to our right to choose the men
and women by whom we shall be governed," 15 even as Mr. Justice
Castro relies on the balancing-of-interests test. 16 Chief Justice Vinson is
partial to the improbable danger rule formulated by Chief Judge
Learned Hand, viz. — whether the gravity of the evil, discounted by its
improbability, justifies such invasion of free expression as is necessary
to avoid the danger. 17

II
The respondent Court of Industrial Relations, after opining that the
mass demonstration was not a declaration of strike, concluded that by
their "concerted act and the occurrence temporary stoppage of work,"
herein petitioners are guilty bargaining in bad faith and hence violated
the collective bargaining agreement with private respondent Philippine
Blooming Mills Co., inc.. Set against and tested by foregoing principles
governing a democratic society, such conclusion cannot be sustained.
The demonstration held petitioners on March 4, 1969 before
Malacañang was against alleged abuses of some Pasig policemen, not
against their employer, herein private respondent firm, said
demonstrate was purely and completely an exercise of their freedom
expression in general and of their right of assembly and petition for
redress of grievances in particular before appropriate governmental
agency, the Chief Executive, again the police officers of the
municipality of Pasig. They exercise their civil and political rights for
their mutual aid protection from what they believe were police
excesses. As matter of fact, it was the duty of herein private
respondent firm to protect herein petitioner Union and its members
fro the harassment of local police officers. It was to the interest herein
private respondent firm to rally to the defense of, and take up the
cudgels for, its employees, so that they can report to work free from
harassment, vexation or peril and as consequence perform more
efficiently their respective tasks enhance its productivity as well as
profits. Herein respondent employer did not even offer to intercede
for its employees with the local police. Was it securing peace for itself
at the expenses of its workers? Was it also intimidated by the local
police or did it encourage the local police to terrorize or vex its
workers? Its failure to defend its own employees all the more
weakened the position of its laborers the alleged oppressive police
who might have been all the more emboldened thereby subject its
lowly employees to further indignities.

In seeking sanctuary behind their freedom of expression well as their

right of assembly and of petition against alleged persecution of local
officialdom, the employees and laborers of herein private respondent
firm were fighting for their very survival, utilizing only the weapons
afforded them by the Constitution — the untrammelled enjoyment of
their basic human rights. The pretension of their employer that it
would suffer loss or damage by reason of the absence of its employees
from 6 o'clock in the morning to 2 o'clock in the afternoon, is a plea for
the preservation merely of their property rights. Such apprehended
loss or damage would not spell the difference between the life and
death of the firm or its owners or its management. The employees'
pathetic situation was a stark reality — abused, harassment and
persecuted as they believed they were by the peace officers of the
municipality. As above intimated, the condition in which the employees
found themselves vis-a-vis the local police of Pasig, was a matter that
vitally affected their right to individual existence as well as that of their
families. Material loss can be repaired or adequately compensated. The
debasement of the human being broken in morale and brutalized in
spirit-can never be fully evaluated in monetary terms. The wounds
fester and the scars remain to humiliate him to his dying day, even as
he cries in anguish for retribution, denial of which is like rubbing salt on
bruised tissues.

As heretofore stated, the primacy of human rights — freedom of

expression, of peaceful assembly and of petition for redress of
grievances — over property rights has been sustained. 18 Emphatic
reiteration of this basic tenet as a coveted boon — at once the shield
and armor of the dignity and worth of the human personality, the all-
consuming ideal of our enlightened civilization — becomes Our duty, if
freedom and social justice have any meaning at all for him who toils so
that capital can produce economic goods that can generate happiness
for all. To regard the demonstration against police officers, not against
the employer, as evidence of bad faith in collective bargaining and
hence a violation of the collective bargaining agreement and a cause
for the dismissal from employment of the demonstrating employees,
stretches unduly the compass of the collective bargaining agreement,
is "a potent means of inhibiting speech" and therefore inflicts a moral
as well as mortal wound on the constitutional guarantees of free
expression, of peaceful assembly and of petition. 19

The collective bargaining agreement which fixes the working shifts of

the employees, according to the respondent Court Industrial Relations,
in effect imposes on the workers the "duty ... to observe regular
working hours." The strain construction of the Court of Industrial
Relations that a stipulated working shifts deny the workers the right to
stage mass demonstration against police abuses during working hours,
constitutes a virtual tyranny over the mind and life the workers and
deserves severe condemnation. Renunciation of the freedom should
not be predicated on such a slender ground.

The mass demonstration staged by the employees on March 4, 1969

could not have been legally enjoined by any court, such an injunction
would be trenching upon the freedom expression of the workers, even
if it legally appears to be illegal picketing or strike. 20 The respondent
Court of Industrial Relations in the case at bar concedes that the mass
demonstration was not a declaration of a strike "as the same not
rooted in any industrial dispute although there is concerted act and the
occurrence of a temporary stoppage work." (Annex "F", p. 45, rec.).

The respondent firm claims that there was no need for all its
employees to participate in the demonstration and that they
suggested to the Union that only the first and regular shift from 6 A.M.
to 2 P.M. should report for work in order that loss or damage to the
firm will be averted. This stand failed appreciate the sine qua non of an
effective demonstration especially by a labor union, namely the
complete unity of the Union members as well as their total presence at
the demonstration site in order to generate the maximum sympathy
for the validity of their cause but also immediately action on the part of
the corresponding government agencies with jurisdiction over the
issues they raised against the local police. Circulation is one of the
aspects of freedom of expression. 21 If demonstrators are reduced by
one-third, then by that much the circulation of the issues raised by the
demonstration is diminished. The more the participants, the more
persons can be apprised of the purpose of the rally. Moreover, the
absence of one-third of their members will be regarded as a substantial
indication of disunity in their ranks which will enervate their position
and abet continued alleged police persecution. At any rate, the Union
notified the company two days in advance of their projected
demonstration and the company could have made arrangements to
counteract or prevent whatever losses it might sustain by reason of
the absence of its workers for one day, especially in this case when the
Union requested it to excuse only the day-shift employees who will join
the demonstration on March 4, 1969 which request the Union
reiterated in their telegram received by the company at 9:50 in the
morning of March 4, 1969, the day of the mass demonstration (pp. 42-
43, rec.). There was a lack of human understanding or compassion on
the part of the firm in rejecting the request of the Union for excuse
from work for the day shifts in order to carry out its mass
demonstration. And to regard as a ground for dismissal the mass
demonstration held against the Pasig police, not against the company,
is gross vindictiveness on the part of the employer, which is as
unchristian as it is unconstitutional.

III
The respondent company is the one guilty of unfair labor practice.
Because the refusal on the part of the respondent firm to permit all its
employees and workers to join the mass demonstration against alleged
police abuses and the subsequent separation of the eight (8)
petitioners from the service constituted an unconstitutional restraint
on the freedom of expression, freedom of assembly and freedom
petition for redress of grievances, the respondent firm committed an
unfair labor practice defined in Section 4(a-1) in relation to Section 3 of
Republic Act No. 875, otherwise known as the Industrial Peace Act.
Section 3 of Republic Act No. 8 guarantees to the employees the right
"to engage in concert activities for ... mutual aid or protection"; while
Section 4(a-1) regards as an unfair labor practice for an employer
interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise their rights
guaranteed in Section Three."

We repeat that the obvious purpose of the mass demonstration staged

by the workers of the respondent firm on March 4, 1969, was for their
mutual aid and protection against alleged police abuses, denial of
which was interference with or restraint on the right of the employees
to engage in such common action to better shield themselves against
such alleged police indignities. The insistence on the part of the
respondent firm that the workers for the morning and regular shift
should not participate in the mass demonstration, under pain of
dismissal, was as heretofore stated, "a potent means of inhibiting
speech." 22

Such a concerted action for their mutual help and protection deserves
at least equal protection as the concerted action of employees in
giving publicity to a letter complaint charging bank president with
immorality, nepotism, favoritism an discrimination in the appointment
and promotion of ban employees. 23 We further ruled in the Republic
Savings Bank case, supra, that for the employees to come within the
protective mantle of Section 3 in relation to Section 4(a-1) on Republic
Act No. 875, "it is not necessary that union activity be involved or that
collective bargaining be contemplated," as long as the concerted
activity is for the furtherance of their interests. 24

As stated clearly in the stipulation of facts embodied in the questioned

order of respondent Court dated September 15, 1969, the company,
"while expressly acknowledging, that the demonstration is an
inalienable right of the Union guaranteed by the Constitution,"
nonetheless emphasized that "any demonstration for that matter
should not unduly prejudice the normal operation of the company"
and "warned the PBMEO representatives that workers who belong to
the first and regular shifts, who without previous leave of absence
approved by the Company, particularly the officers present who are
the organizers of the demonstration, who shall fail to report for work
the following morning (March 4, 1969) shall be dismissed, because
such failure is a violation of the existing CBA and, therefore, would be
amounting to an illegal strike (;)" (p. III, petitioner's brief). Such threat
of dismissal tended to coerce the employees from joining the mass
demonstration. However, the issues that the employees raised against
the local police, were more important to them because they had the
courage to proceed with the demonstration, despite such threat of
dismissal. The most that could happen to them was to lose a day's
wage by reason of their absence from work on the day of the
demonstration. One day's pay means much to a laborer, more
especially if he has a family to support. Yet, they were willing to forego
their one-day salary hoping that their demonstration would bring
about the desired relief from police abuses. But management was
adamant in refusing to recognize the superior legitimacy of their right
of free speech, free assembly and the right to petition for redress.

Because the respondent company ostensibly did not find it necessary

to demand from the workers proof of the truth of the alleged abuses
inflicted on them by the local police, it thereby concedes that the
evidence of such abuses should properly be submitted to the
corresponding authorities having jurisdiction over their complaint and
to whom such complaint may be referred by the President of the
Philippines for proper investigation and action with a view to
disciplining the local police officers involved.

On the other hand, while the respondent Court of Industrial Relations

found that the demonstration "paralyzed to a large extent the
operations of the complainant company," the respondent Court of
Industrial Relations did not make any finding as to the fact of loss
actually sustained by the firm. This significant circumstance can only
mean that the firm did not sustain any loss or damage. It did not
present evidence as to whether it lost expected profits for failure to
comply with purchase orders on that day; or that penalties were
exacted from it by customers whose orders could not be filled that day
of the demonstration; or that purchase orders were cancelled by the
customers by reason of its failure to deliver the materials ordered; or
that its own equipment or materials or products were damaged due to
absence of its workers on March 4, 1969. On the contrary, the
company saved a sizable amount in the form of wages for its hundreds
of workers, cost of fuel, water and electric consumption that day. Such
savings could have amply compensated for unrealized profits or
damages it might have sustained by reason of the absence of its
workers for only one day.

IV
Apart from violating the constitutional guarantees of free speech and
assembly as well as the right to petition for redress of grievances of
the employees, the dismissal of the eight (8) leaders of the workers for
proceeding with the demonstration and consequently being absent
from work, constitutes a denial of social justice likewise assured by the
fundamental law to these lowly employees. Section 5 of Article II of the
Constitution imposes upon the State "the promotion of social justice
to insure the well-being and economic security of all of the people,"
which guarantee is emphasized by the other directive in Section 6 of
Article XIV of the Constitution that "the State shall afford protection to
labor ...". Respondent Court of Industrial Relations as an agency of the
State is under obligation at all times to give meaning and substance to
these constitutional guarantees in favor of the working man; for
otherwise these constitutional safeguards would be merely a lot of
"meaningless constitutional patter." Under the Industrial Peace Act,
the Court of Industrial Relations is enjoined to effect the policy of the
law "to eliminate the causes of industrial unrest by encouraging and
protecting the exercise by employees of their right to self-organization
for the purpose of collective bargaining and for the promotion of their
moral, social and economic well-being." It is most unfortunate in the
case at bar that respondent Court of Industrial Relations, the very
governmental agency designed therefor, failed to implement this
policy and failed to keep faith with its avowed mission — its raison
d'etre — as ordained and directed by the Constitution.

V
It has been likewise established that a violation of a constitutional right
divests the court of jurisdiction; and as a consequence its judgment is
null and void and confers no rights. Relief from a criminal conviction
secured at the sacrifice of constitutional liberties, may be obtained
through habeas corpus proceedings even long after the finality of the
judgment. Thus, habeas corpus is the remedy to obtain the release of
an individual, who is convicted by final judgment through a forced
confession, which violated his constitutional right against self-
incrimination; 25 or who is denied the right to present evidence in his
defense as a deprivation of his liberty without due process of
law, 26 even after the accused has already served sentence for twenty-
two years. 27

Both the respondents Court of Industrial Relations and private firm

trenched upon these constitutional immunities of petitioners. Both
failed to accord preference to such rights and aggravated the
inhumanity to which the aggrieved workers claimed they had been
subjected by the municipal police. Having violated these basic human
rights of the laborers, the Court of Industrial Relations ousted itself of
jurisdiction and the questioned orders it issued in the instant case are a
nullity. Recognition and protection of such freedoms are imperative on
all public offices including the courts 28 as well as private citizens and
corporations, the exercise and enjoyment of which must not be
nullified by mere procedural rule promulgated by the Court Industrial
Relations exercising a purely delegate legislative power, when even a
law enacted by Congress must yield to the untrammelled enjoyment of
these human rights. There is no time limit to the exercise of the
freedoms. The right to enjoy them is not exhausted by the delivery of
one speech, the printing of one article or the staging of one
demonstration. It is a continuing immunity to be invoked and exercised
when exigent and expedient whenever there are errors to be rectified,
abuses to be denounced, inhumanities to be condemned. Otherwise
these guarantees in the Bill of Rights would be vitiated by rule on
procedure prescribing the period for appeal. The battle then would be
reduced to a race for time. And in such a contest between an employer
and its laborer, the latter eventually loses because he cannot employ
the best an dedicated counsel who can defend his interest with the
required diligence and zeal, bereft as he is of the financial resources
with which to pay for competent legal services. 28-a

VI
The Court of Industrial Relations rule prescribes that motion for
reconsideration of its order or writ should filed within five (5) days
from notice thereof and that the arguments in support of said motion
shall be filed within ten (10) days from the date of filing of such motion
for reconsideration (Sec. 16). As above intimated, these rules of
procedure were promulgated by the Court of Industrial Relations
pursuant to a legislative delegation. 29

The motion for reconsideration was filed on September 29, 1969, or

seven (7) days from notice on September 22, 1969 of the order dated
September 15, 1969 or two (2) days late. Petitioners claim that they
could have filed it on September 28, 1969, but it was a Sunday.

Does the mere fact that the motion for reconsideration was filed two
(2) days late defeat the rights of the petitioning employees? Or more
directly and concretely, does the inadvertent omission to comply with
a mere Court of Industrial Relations procedural rule governing the
period for filing a motion for reconsideration or appeal in labor cases,
promulgated pursuant to a legislative delegation, prevail over
constitutional rights? The answer should be obvious in the light of the
aforecited cases. To accord supremacy to the foregoing rules of the
Court of Industrial Relations over basic human rights sheltered by the
Constitution, is not only incompatible with the basic tenet of
constitutional government that the Constitution is superior to any
statute or subordinate rules and regulations, but also does violence to
natural reason and logic. The dominance and superiority of the
constitutional right over the aforesaid Court of Industrial Relations
procedural rule of necessity should be affirmed. Such a Court of
Industrial Relations rule as applied in this case does not implement or
reinforce or strengthen the constitutional rights affected,' but instead
constrict the same to the point of nullifying the enjoyment thereof by
the petitioning employees. Said Court of Industrial Relations rule,
promulgated as it was pursuant to a mere legislative delegation, is
unreasonable and therefore is beyond the authority granted by the
Constitution and the law. A period of five (5) days within which to file a
motion for reconsideration is too short, especially for the aggrieved
workers, who usually do not have the ready funds to meet the
necessary expenses therefor. In case of the Court of Appeals and the
Supreme Court, a period of fifteen (15) days has been fixed for the
filing of the motion for re hearing or reconsideration (See. 10, Rule 51;
Sec. 1, Rule 52; Sec. 1, Rule 56, Revised Rules of Court). The delay in the
filing of the motion for reconsideration could have been only one day if
September 28, 1969 was not a Sunday. This fact accentuates the
unreasonableness of the Court of Industrial are concerned.

It should be stressed here that the motion for reconsideration dated

September 27, 1969, is based on the ground that the order sought to
be reconsidered "is not in accordance with law, evidence and facts
adduced during the hearing," and likewise prays for an extension of
ten (10) days within which to file arguments pursuant to Sections 15, 16
and 17 of the Rules of the Court of Industrial Relations (Annex "G", pp.
57-60, rec.); although the arguments were actually filed by the herein
petitioners on October 14, 1969 (Annex "I", pp. 70-73, rec.), long after
the 10-day period required for the filing of such supporting arguments
counted from the filing of the motion for reconsideration. Herein
petitioners received only on October 28, 1969 the resolution dated
October 9, 1969 dismissing the motion for reconsideration for
being pro forma since it was filed beyond the reglementary period
(Annex "J", pp. 74-75, rec.)

It is true that We ruled in several cases that where a motion to

reconsider is filed out of time, or where the arguments in suppf such
motion are filed beyond the 10 day reglementary period provided for
by the Court of Industrial Relations rules, the order or decision subject
of29-a reconsideration becomes final and unappealable. But in all these
cases, the constitutional rights of free expression, free assembly and
petition were not involved.

It is a procedural rule that generally all causes of action and defenses

presently available must be specifically raised in the complaint or
answer; so that any cause of action or defense not raised in such
pleadings, is deemed waived. However, a constitutional issue can be
raised any time, even for the first time on appeal, if it appears that the
determination of the constitutional issue is necessary to a decision of
the case, the very lis mota of the case without the resolution of which
no final and complete determination of the dispute can be made. 30 It is
thus seen that a procedural rule of Congress or of the Supreme Court
gives way to a constitutional right. In the instant case, the procedural
rule of the Court of Industrial Relations, a creature of Congress, must
likewise yield to the constitutional rights invoked by herein petitioners
even before the institution of the unfair labor practice charged against
them and in their defense to the said charge.

In the case at bar, enforcement of the basic human freedoms sheltered

no less by the organic law, is a most compelling reason to deny
application of a Court of Industrial Relations rule which impinges on
such human rights. 30-a

It is an accepted principle that the Supreme Court has the inherent

power to "suspend its own rules or to except a particular case from its
operation, whenever the purposes of justice require." 30-b Mr. Justice
Barredo in his concurring opinion in Estrada vs. Sto. Domingo. 30-
c reiterated this principle and added that
 Under this authority, this Court is enabled to cove with all
situations without concerning itself about procedural niceties
that do not square with the need to do justice, in any case,
without further loss of time, provided that the right of the
parties to a full day in court is not substantially impaired. Thus,
this Court may treat an appeal as a certiorari and vice-versa. In
other words, when all the material facts are spread in the
records before Us, and all the parties have been duly heard, it
matters little that the error of the court a quo is of judgment or
of jurisdiction. We can then and there render the appropriate
judgment. Is within the contemplation of this doctrine that as
it is perfectly legal and within the power of this Court to
strike down in an appeal acts without or in excess of
jurisdiction or committed with grave abuse of discretion, it
cannot be beyond the admit of its authority, in appropriate
cases, to reverse in a certain proceed in any error of judgment
of a court a quo which cannot be exactly categorized as a flaw
of jurisdiction. If there can be any doubt, which I do not
entertain, on whether or not the errors this Court has found
in the decision of the Court of Appeals are short of being
jurisdiction nullities or excesses, this Court would still be on
firm legal grounds should it choose to reverse said decision
here and now even if such errors can be considered as mere
mistakes of judgment or only as faults in the exercise of
jurisdiction, so as to avoid the unnecessary return of this case
to the lower court for the sole purpose of pursuing the
ordinary course of an appeal. (Emphasis supplied). 30-d

Insistence on the application of the questioned Court industrial

Relations rule in this particular case at bar would an unreasoning
adherence to "Procedural niceties" which denies justice to the herein
laborers, whose basic human freedoms, including the right to survive,
must be according supremacy over the property rights of their
employer firm which has been given a full hearing on this case,
especially when, as in the case at bar, no actual material damage has
be demonstrated as having been inflicted on its property rights.

If We can disregard our own rules when justice requires it, obedience
to the Constitution renders more imperative the suspension of a Court
of Industrial Relations rule that clash with the human rights sanctioned
and shielded with resolution concern by the specific guarantees
outlined in the organic law. It should be stressed that the application in
the instant case Section 15 of the Court of Industrial Relations rules
relied upon by herein respondent firm is unreasonable and therefore
such application becomes unconstitutional as it subverts the human
rights of petitioning labor union and workers in the light of the peculiar
facts and circumstances revealed by the record.

The suspension of the application of Section 15 of the Court of

Industrial Relations rules with reference to the case at is also
authorized by Section 20 of Commonwealth Act No. 103, the C.I.R.
charter, which enjoins the Court of Industrial Relations to "act
according to justice and equity and substantial merits of the case,
without regard to technicalities or legal forms ..."

On several occasions, We emphasized this doctrine which was re-

stated by Mr. Justice Barredo, speaking for the Court, in the 1970 case
of Kapisanan, etc. vs. Hamilton, etc., et. al., 30-e thus:

As to the point that the evidence being offered by the

petitioners in the motion for new trial is not "newly
discovered," as such term is understood in the rules of
procedure for the ordinary courts, We hold that such
criterion is not binding upon the Court of Industrial Relations.
Under Section 20 of Commonwealth Act No. 103, 'The Court
of Industrial Relations shall adopt its, rules or procedure and
shall have such other powers as generally pertain to a court
of justice: Provided, however, That in the hearing,
investigation and determination of any question or
controversy and in exercising any duties and power under
this Act, the Court shall act according to justice and equity
and substantial merits of the case, without regard to
technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound by any
technical rules of legal evidence but may inform its mind in
such manner as it may deem just and equitable.' By this
provision the industrial court is disengaged from the rigidity of
the technicalities applicable to ordinary courts. Said court is not
even restricted to the specific relief demanded by the
 parties but may issue such orders as may be deemed
necessary or expedient for the purpose of settling the
dispute or dispelling any doubts that may give rise to future
disputes. (Ang Tibay v. C.I.R., G.R. No. 46496, Feb. 17, 1940;
Manila Trading & Supply Co. v. Phil. Labor, 71 Phil. 124.) For
these reasons, We believe that this provision is ample enough
to have enabled the respondent court to consider whether or
not its previous ruling that petitioners constitute a minority
was founded on fact, without regard to the technical
meaning of newly discovered evidence. ... (Alonso v. Villamor,
16 Phil. 315; Chua Kiong v. Whitaker, 46 Phil. 578). (emphasis
supplied.)

To apply Section 15 of the Court of Industrial Relations rules with

"pedantic rigor" in the instant case is to rule in effect that the poor
workers, who can ill-afford an alert competent lawyer, can no longer
seek the sanctuary of human freedoms secured to them by the
fundamental law, simply because their counsel — erroneously
believing that he received a copy of the decision on September 23,
1969, instead of September 22, 1969 - filed his motion for
reconsideration September 29, 1969, which practically is only one day
late considering that September 28, 1969 was a Sunday.

Many a time, this Court deviated from procedure technicalities when

they ceased to be instruments of justice, for the attainment of which
such rules have been devised. Summarizing the jurisprudence on this
score, Mr. Justice Fernando, speaking for a unanimous Court in Palma
vs. Oreta, 30-f Stated:

As was so aptly expressed by Justice Moreland in Alonso v.

Villamor (16 Phil. 315 [1910]. The Villamor decision was cited
with approval in Register of Deeds v. Phil. Nat. Bank, 84 Phil.
600 [1949]; Potenciano v. Court of Appeals, 104 Phil. 156
[1958] and Uy v. Uy, 14243, June 30, 1961, 2 SCRA 675.),
decided as far back as 1910, "technicality. when it deserts its
proper-office as an aid to justice and becomes its great
hindrance and chief enemy, deserves scant consideration
from courts." (Ibid., p, 322.) To that norm, this Court has
remained committed. The late Justice Recto in Blanco v.
 Bernabe, (63 Phil. 124 [1936]) was of a similar mind. For him
the interpretation of procedural rule should never "sacrifice
the ends justice." While "procedural laws are no other than
technicalities" view them in their entirety, 'they were
adopted not as ends themselves for the compliance with
which courts have organized and function, but as means
conducive to the realization the administration of the law and
of justice (Ibid., p.,128). We have remained steadfastly
opposed, in the highly rhetorical language Justice Felix, to "a
sacrifice of substantial rights of a litigant in altar of
sophisticated technicalities with impairment of the sacred
principles of justice." (Potenciano v. Court of Appeals, 104
Phil. 156, 161 [1958]). As succinctly put by Justice Makalintal,
they "should give way to the realities of the situation."
(Urbayan v. Caltex, L-15379, Aug. 31, 1962, 5 SCRA 1016, 1019).
In the latest decision in point promulgated in 1968, (Udan v.
Amon, (1968, 23 SCRA citing McEntee v. Manotok, L-14968,
Oct. 27, 1961, 3 SCRA 272.) Justice Zaldivar was partial to an
earlier formulation of Justice Labrador that rules of
procedure "are not to be applied in a very rigid, technical
sense"; but are intended "to help secure substantial justice."
(Ibid., p. 843) ... 30-g

Even if the questioned Court of Industrial Relations orders and rule

were to be given effect, the dismissal or termination of the
employment of the petitioning eight (8) leaders of the Union is harsh
for a one-day absence from work. The respondent Court itself
recognized the severity of such a sanction when it did not include the
dismissal of the other 393 employees who are members of the same
Union and who participated in the demonstration against the Pasig
police. As a matter of fact, upon the intercession of the Secretary of
Labor, the Union members who are not officers, were not dismissed
and only the Union itself and its thirteen (13) officers were specifically
named as respondents in the unfair labor practice charge filed against
them by the firm (pp. 16-20, respondent's Brief; Annexes "A", "B" and
"C", pp. 20-30, rec.). Counsel for respondent firm insinuates that not all
the 400 or so employee participated in the demonstration, for which
reason only the Union and its thirteen (13) officers were specifically
named in the unfair labor practice charge (p. 20, respondent's brief). If
that were so, then many, if not all, of the morning and regular shifts
reported for work on March 4, 1969 and that, as a consequence, the
firm continued in operation that day and did not sustain any damage.
The appropriate penalty — if it deserves any penalty at all — should
have been simply to charge said one-day absence against their vacation
or sick leave. But to dismiss the eight (8) leaders of the petitioner
Union is a most cruel penalty, since as aforestated the Union leaders
depend on their wages for their daily sustenance as well as that of
their respective families aside from the fact that it is a lethal blow to
unionism, while at the same time strengthening the oppressive hand of
the petty tyrants in the localities.

Mr. Justice Douglas articulated this pointed reminder:

The challenge to our liberties comes frequently not from

those who consciously seek to destroy our system of
Government, but from men of goodwill — good men who
allow their proper concerns to blind them to the fact that
what they propose to accomplish involves an impairment of
liberty.

... The Motives of these men are often commendable. What

we must remember, however, is thatpreservation of liberties
does not depend on motives. A suppression of liberty has the
same effect whether the suppress or be a reformer or an
outlaw. The only protection against misguided zeal is a
constant alertness of the infractions of the guarantees of
liberty contained in our Constitution. Each surrender of liberty
to the demands of the moment makes easier another, larger
surrender. The battle over the Bill of Rights is a never ending
one.

... The liberties of any person are the liberties of all of us.

... In short, the Liberties of none are safe unless the liberties of
all are protected.

... But even if we should sense no danger to our own liberties,

even if we feel secure because we belong to a group that is
 important and respected, we must recognize that our Bill of
Rights is a code of fair play for the less fortunate that we in all
honor and good conscience must be observe. 31

The case at bar is worse.

Management has shown not only lack of good-will or good intention,

but a complete lack of sympathetic understanding of the plight of its
laborers who claim that they are being subjected to indignities by the
local police, It was more expedient for the firm to conserve its income
or profits than to assist its employees in their fight for their freedoms
and security against alleged petty tyrannies of local police officers. This
is sheer opportunism. Such opportunism and expediency resorted to
by the respondent company assaulted the immunities and welfare of
its employees. It was pure and implement selfishness, if not greed.
Of happy relevance is the 1967 case of Republic Savings Bank vs.
C.I.R., 32 where the petitioner Bank dismissed eight (8) employees for
having written and published "a patently libelous letter ... to the Bank
president demanding his resignation on the grounds of immorality,
nepotism in the appointment and favoritism as well as discrimination in
the promotion of bank employees." Therein, thru Mr. Justice Castro,
We ruled:

It will avail the Bank none to gloat over this admission of the
respondents. Assuming that the latter acted in their
individual capacities when they wrote the letter-charge they
were nonetheless protected for they were engaged in
concerted activity, in the exercise of their right of self
organization that includes concerted activity for mutual aid
and protection, (Section 3 of the Industrial Peace Act ...) This
is the view of some members of this Court. For, as has been
aptly stated, the joining in protests or demands, even by a
small group of employees, if in furtherance of their interests as
such, is a concerted activity protected by the Industrial Peace
Act. It is not necessary that union activity be involved or that
collective bargaining be contemplated. (Annot., 6 A.L.R. 2d 416
[1949]).
xxx xxx xxx
 Instead of stifling criticism, the Bank should have allowed the
respondents to air their grievances.

xxx xxx xxx

The Bank defends its action by invoking its right to discipline
for what it calls the respondents' libel in giving undue
publicity to their letter-charge. To be sure, the right of self-
organization of employees is not unlimited (Republic Aviation
Corp. vs. NLRB 324 U.S. 793 [1945]), as the right of the
employer to discharge for cause (Philippine Education Co. v.
Union of Phil. Educ. Employees, L-13773, April 29, 1960) is
undenied. The Industrial Peace Act does not touch the
normal exercise of the right of the employer to select his
employees or to discharge them. It is directed solely against
the abuse of that right by interfering with the countervailing
right of self organization (Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB 313
U.S. 177 [1941])...

xxx xxx xxx

In the final sum and substance, this Court is in unanimity that
the Bank's conduct, identified as an interference with the
employees' right of self-organization or as a retaliatory
action, and/or as a refusal to bargain collectively, constituted
an unfair labor practice within the meaning and intendment
of section 4(a) of the Industrial Peace Act. (Emphasis
supplied.) 33

If free expression was accorded recognition and protection to fortify

labor unionism in the Republic Savings case, supra, where the
complaint assailed the morality and integrity of the bank president no
less, such recognition and protection for free speech, free assembly
and right to petition are rendered all the more justifiable and more
imperative in the case at bar, where the mass demonstration was not
against the company nor any of its officers.

WHEREFORE, judgement is hereby rendered:

(1) setting aside as null and void the orders of the respondent Court of
Industrial Relations dated September 15 and October 9, 1969; and
(2) directing the re instatement of the herein eight (8) petitioners, with
full back pay from the date of their separation from the service until re
instated, minus one day's pay and whatever earnings they might have
realized from other sources during their separation from the service.
With costs against private respondent Philippine Blooming Company,
Inc.

Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando and Esguerra, JJ., concur.

Makalintal, C.J, took no part.

Separate Opinions

BARREDO, J., dissenting:

I bow in respectful and sincere admiration, but my sense of duty
compels me to dissent.

The background of this case may be found principally in the stipulation

of facts upon which the decision under review is based. It is as follows:

1. That complainant Philippine Blooming Mills, Company, Inc.,

is a corporation existing and operating under and by virtue of
the laws of the Philippines with corporate address at 666
Muelle de Binondo, Manila, which is the employer of
respondent;

2. That Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization

PBMEO for short, is a legitimate labor organization, and the
respondents herein are either officers of respondent PBMEO
or members thereof;

3. That on March 2, 1969 complainant company learned of the

projected mass demonstration at Malacañang in protest
against alleged abuses of the Pasig Police Department to be
participated by the first shift (6:00 AM — 2:00 PM workers as
well as those working in the regular shifts (7:00 A.M. to 4:00
PM and 8:00 AM to 5:00 PM in the morning of March 4, 1969;

4. That a meeting was called by the Company on March 3,

1969 at about 11:00 A.M. at the Company's canteen, and
those present were: for the Company: (1) Mr. Arthur L. Ang,
(2) Atty. Cesareo S. de Leon, Jr. (3) and all department and
section heads. For the PBMEO (1) Florencio Padrigano, (2)
Rufino Roxas, (3) Mariano de Leon, (4) Asencion Paciente, (5)
Bonifacio Vacuna and (6) Benjamin Pagcu.

5. That the Company asked the union panel to confirm or

deny said projected mass demonstration at Malacañang on
March 4, 1969. PBMEO thru Benjamin Pagcu who acted as the
spokesman of the union panel, confirmed the planned
demonstration and stated that the demonstration or rally
cannot be cancelled because it has already been agreed upon
in the meeting. Pagcu explained further that the
demonstration has nothing to do with the Company because
the union has no quarrel or dispute with Management;

6. That Management, thru Atty. C.S. de Leon, Company

personnel manager, informed PBMEO that the
demonstration is an inalienable right of the union guaranteed
by the Constitution but emphasized, however, that any
demonstration for that matter should not unduly prejudice
the normal operation of the Company. For which reason, the
Company, thru Atty. C.S. de Leon, warned the PBMEO
representatives that workers who belong to the first and
regular shifts, who without previous leave of absence
approved by the Company, particularly the officers present
who are the organizers of the demonstration, who shall fail
to report for work the following morning (March 4, 1969)
shall be dismissed, because such failure is a violation of the
existing CBA and, therefore, would be amounting to an illegal
strike;

7. That at about 5:00 P.M. on March 3, 1969, another meeting

was convoked. Company represented by Atty. C.S. de Leon,
Jr. The Union panel was composed of: Nicanor Tolentino,
Rodulfo Munsod, Benjamin Pagcu and Florencio Padrigano. In
this afternoon meeting of March 3, 1969, Company reiterated
and appealed to the PBMEO representatives that while all
workers may join the Malacañang demonstration, the
 workers for the first and regular shift of March 4, 1969 should
be excused from joining the demonstration and should
report for work; and thus utilize the workers in the 2nd and
3rd shifts in order not to violate the provisions of the CBA,
particularly Article XXIV "NO LOCKOUT — NO STRIKE". All
those who will not follow this warning of the Company shall
be dismissed; De Leon reiterated the Company's warning that
the officers shall be primarily liable being the organizers of
the mass demonstration. The union panel countered that it
was rather too late to change their plans inasmuch as the
Malacañang demonstration will be held the following
morning; and

8. That a certain Mr. Wilfredo Ariston, adviser of PBMEO sent

a cablegram to the Company which was received 9:50 A.M.,
March 4, 1969, the contents of which are as follows:
'REITERATING REQUEST EXCUSE DAY SHIFT EMPLOYEES
JOINING DEMONSTRATION MARCH 4, 1969.

Additionally, the trial court found that "the projected demonstration

did in fact occur and in the process paralyzed to a large extent the
operations of the complainant company". (p. 5, Annex F).

Upon these facts the Prosecution Division of the Court of Industrial

Relations filed with said court a complaint for Unfair Labor Practice
against petitioners charging that: .

3. That on March 4, 1969, respondents (petitioners herein)

particularly those in the first shift, in violation of the existing
collective bargaining agreement and without filing the
necessary notice as provided for by law, failed to report for
work, amounting to a declaration of strike;

4. That the above acts are in violation of Section 4(a)

subparagraph 6, in relation to Sections 13, 14 and 15 of
Republic Act No. 875, and of the collective bargaining
agreement. (Pars. 3 and 4, Annex C.)
After due hearing, the court rendered judgment, the dispositive part of
which read's:

IN VIEW HEREOF, the respondent Philippine Blooming Mills

Employees Organization is found guilty of bargaining in bad
faith and is hereby ordered to cease and desist from further
committing the same and its representatives namely:
respondent Florencio Padrigano, Rufino Roxas, Mariano de
Leon, Asencion Paciente, Bonifacio Vacuna, Benjamin Pagcu,
Nicanor Tolentino and Rodulfo Monsod who are directly
responsible for perpetrating this unfair labor practice act, are
hereby considered to have lost their status as employees of
the Philippine Blooming Mills, Inc. (p. 8, Annex F.)

Although it is alleged in the petition herein that petitioners were

notified of this decision on September 23, 1969, there seems to be no
serious question that they were actually served therewith on
September 22, 1969. In fact, petitioners admitted this date of notice in
paragraph 2 of their Petition for Relief dated October 30, 1969 and filed
with the industrial court on the following day. (See Annex K.)

It is not controverted that it was only on September 29, 1969, or seven

(7) days after they were notified of the court's decision, that
petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration with the industrial
court; as it is also not disputed that they filed their "Arguments in
Support of the Respondents' Motion for Reconsideration" only on
October 14, 1969. (See Annex I.) In other words, petitioners' motion for
reconsideration was filed two (2) days after the lapse of the five (5)
day period provided for the filing thereof in the rules of the Court of
Industrial Relations, whereas the "Arguments" were filed five (5) days
after the expiration of the period therefor also specified in the same
rules.

Accordingly, the first issue that confronts the Court is the one raised by
respondent private firm, namely, that in view of the failure of
petitioners to file not only their motion for reconsideration but also
their arguments in support thereof within the periods respectively
fixed in the rules therefor, the Court of Industrial Relations acted
correctly and within the law in rendering and issuing its impugned
order of October 9, 1969 dismissing petitioners' motion for
reconsideration.

Respondent's contention presents no problem. Squarely applicable to

the facts hereof is the decision of this Court in Elizalde & Co. Inc. vs.
Court of Industrial Relations1 wherein it was ruled that:

August 6, 1963. Petitioner received a copy of the decision of

the then Associate Judge Arsenio I. Martinez, the dispositive
part of which was set forth earlier in this opinion.

August 12, 1963. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration.

No arguments were advanced in support thereof.

August 21, 1963. Petitioner moved for additional time to file

its arguments in support of its motion to reconsider.

August 27, 1963. Petitioner filed its arguments in support of

its aforesaid motion seeking reconsideration.

September 16, 1963. CIR en banc resolved to dismiss the

motion for reconsideration. Ground therefor was that the
arguments were filed out of time.

October 3, 1963. Petitioner filed its notice of appeal and at

the same time lodged the present petition with this Court.

Upon respondent Perlado's return and petitioner's brief

(respondents did not file their brief), the case is now before
us for resolution.

1. That the judgment appealed from is a final judgment — not

merely an interlocutory order — there is no doubt. The fact
that there is need for computation of respondent Perlado's
overtime pay would not render the decision incomplete. This
in effect is the holding of the Court in Pan American World
Airways System (Philippines) vs. Pan American Employees
Association, which runs thus: 'It is next contended that in
ordering the Chief of the Examining Division or his
representative to compute the compensation due, the
Industrial Court unduly delegated its judicial functions and
thereby rendered an incomplete decision. We do not believe
so. Computation of the overtime pay involves a mechanical
function, at most. And the report would still have to be
submitted to the Industrial Court for its approval, by the very
terms of the order itself. That there was no specification of
the amount of overtime pay in the decision did not make it
incomplete, since this matter should necessarily be made
clear enough in the implementation of the decision (see
Malate Taxicab & Garage, Inc. vs. CIR, et al.,
L-8718, May 11, 1956).

2. But has that judgment reached the stage of finality in the

sense that it can no longer, be disturbed?

CIR Rules of Procedure, as amended, and the jurisprudence

of this Court both answer the question in the affirmative.
Section 15 of the CIR Rules requires that one who seeks to
reconsider the judgment of the trial judge must do so within
five (5) days from the date on which he received notice of the
decision, subject of the motion. Next follows Section 16
which says that the motion must be submitted with
arguments supporting the same. But if said arguments could
not be submitted simultaneously with the motion, the same
section commands the 'the movant shall file the same within
ten (10) days from the date of the filing of his motion for
reconsideration.' Section 17 of the same rules admonishes a
movant that "(f)ailure to observe the above-specified periods
shall be sufficient cause for dismissal of the motion for
reconsideration or striking out of the answer and/or the
supporting arguments, as the case may be".

Not that the foregoing rules stand alone. Jurisprudence has

since stabilized the enforceability thereof. Thus, in Bien vs.
Castillo, (97 Phil. 956) we ruled that where a pro forma
motion for reconsideration was filed out of time its denial is
in order pursuant to CIR rules, regardless of whether the
arguments in support of said motion were or were not filed
on time. Pangasinan Employees Laborers & Tenants
Association (PELTA) vs. Martinez, (L-13846, May 20, 1960)
pronounced that where a motion to reconsider is filed out of
time, the order or decision subject of reconsideration comes
final. And so also, where the arguments in support of the
motion for reconsideration are filed beyond the ten-day
reglementary period, the pre forma motion for
reconsideration although seasonably filed must nevertheless
be denied. This in essence is our ruling in Local 7, Press &
Printing Free Workers (FFW) vs. Tabigne. The teaching
in Luzon Stevedoring Co., Inc. vs. Court of Industrial Relations,
is that where the motion for reconsideration is denied upon
the ground that the arguments in support thereof were filed
out of time, the order or decision subject of the motion
becomes "final and unappealable".

We find no difficulty in applying the foregoing rules and

pronouncements of this Court in the case before us. On
August 6, petitioner received a copy of the judgment of
Judge Arsenio I. Martinez aforesaid. Petitioner's motion to
reconsider — without arguments in support thereof — of
August 12 was filed on time. For, August 11, the end of the
five-day reglementary period to file a motion for
reconsideration, was a Sunday. But, actually, the written
arguments in support of the said motion were submitted to
the court on August 27. The period from August 12 to August
27, is a space of fifteen (15) days. Surely enough, said
arguments were filed out of time — five (5) days late. And
the judgment had become final.

3. There is, of course, petitioner's motion of August 21, 1963

seeking extension of time within which to present its
arguments in support of its motion. Counsel in his petition
before this Court pleads that the foregoing motion was
grounded on the 'extremely busy and difficult schedule of
counsel which would not enable him to do so within the
stated ten-day reglementary period. The arguments were
only filed on August 27 — five (5) days late, as aforesaid.
 The foregoing circumstances will not avail petitioner any. It is
to be noted that the motion for expansion of time was filed
only on August 21, that is, one day before the due date which
is August 22. It was petitioner's duty to see to it that the court
act on this motion forthwith or at least inquire as to the fate
thereof not later than the 22nd of August. It did not. It merely
filed its arguments on the 27th.

To be underscored at this point is that "obviously to speed up

the disposition of cases", CIR "has a standing rule against the
extension of the ten-day period for filing supporting
arguments". That no-extension policy should have placed
petitioner on guard. It should not have simply folded its arms,
sit by supinely and relied on the court's generosity. To
compound petitioner's neglect, it filed the arguments only on
August 27, 1953, knowing full well that by that time the
reglementary period had expired.

Petitioner cannot complain against CIR's ruling of September

16, 1963 dismissing the motion for reconsideration on the
ground that the supporting arguments were filed out of time.
That ruling in effect denied the motion for extension.

We rule that CIR's judgment has become final and

unappealable. We may not review the same.

Notwithstanding this unequivocal and unmistakable precedent, which

has not been in any way modified, much less revoked or reversed by
this Court, the main opinion has chosen not only to go into the merits
of petitioners' pose that the respondent court erred in holding them
guilty of bargaining in bad faith but also to ultimately uphold
petitioners' claim for reinstatement on constitutional grounds.

Precisely because the conclusions of the main opinion are predicated

on an exposition of the constitutional guarantees of freedoms of
speech and peaceful assembly for redress of grievances, so scholarly
and masterful that it is bound to overwhelm Us unless We note
carefully the real issues in this case, I am constrained, over and above
my sincere admiration for the eloquence and zeal of Mr. Justice
Makasiar's brilliant dissertation, to dutifully state that as presented by
petitioners themselves and in the light of its attendant circumstances,
this case does not call for the resolution of any constitutional issue.
Admittedly, the invocation of any constitutional guarantee, particularly
when it directly affects individual freedoms enshrined in the bill of
rights, deserves the closest attention of this Court. It is my
understanding of constitutional law and judicial practices related
thereto, however, that even the most valuable of our constitutional
rights may be protected by the courts only when their jurisdiction over
the subject matter is unquestionably established and the applicable
rules of procedure consistent with substantive and procedural due
process are observed. No doubt no constitutional right can be
sacrificed in the altar of procedural technicalities, very often fittingly
downgraded as niceties but as far as I know, this principle is applied to
annul or set aside final judgments only in cases wherein there is a
possible denial of due process. I have not come across any instance,
and none is mentioned or cited in the well-documented main opinion,
wherein a final and executory judgment has been invalidated and set
aside upon the ground that the same has the effect of sanctioning the
violation of a constitutional right, unless such violation amounts to a
denial of due process.

Without support from any provision of the constitution or any law or

from any judicial precedent or reason of principle, the main opinion
nudely and unqualifiedly asserts, as if it were universally established
and accepted as an absolute rule, that the violation of a constitutional
right divests the court of jurisdiction; and as a consequence its
judgment is null and void and confers no rights". Chavez vs. Court of
Appeals, 24 SCRA 663, which is mentioned almost in passing, does
uphold the proposition that "relief from a criminal conviction secured
at the sacrifice of constitutional liberties, may be obtained through
habeas corpus proceedings even after the finality of the judgment".
And, of course, Chavez is correct; as is also Abriol vs. Homeres2 which, in
principle, served as its precedent, for the very simple reason that in
both of those cases, the accused were denied due process. In Chavez,
the accused was compelled to testify against himself as a witness for
the prosecution; in Abriol, the accused was denied his request to be
allowed to present evidence to establish his defense after his demurrer
to the People's evidence was denied.
As may be seen, however, the constitutional issues involved in those
cases are a far cry from the one now before Us. Here, petitioners do
not claim they were denied due process. Nor do they pretend that in
denying their motion for reconsideration, "the respondent Court of
Industrial Relations and private firm trenched upon any of their
constitutional immunities ...," contrary to the statement to such effect
in the main opinion. Indeed, neither in the petition herein nor in any of
the other pleading of petitioners can any direct or indirect assertion be
found assailing the impugned decision of the respondent court as
being null and void because it sanctioned a denial of a valued
constitutional liberty.
In their petition, petitioners state the issue for Our resolution as
follows:

Petitioners herein humbly submit that the issue to be

resolved is whether or not the respondent Court en
banc under the facts and circumstances, should consider the
Motion for Reconsideration filed by your petitioners.
Petitioners, therefore, in filing this petition for a writ of
certiorari, humbly beg this Honorable Court to treat this
petition under Rule 43 and 65 of the Rules of Court.
xxx xxx xxx

The basic issue therefore is the application by the Court en

banc of the strict and narrow technical rules of procedure
without taking into account justice, equity and substantial
merits of the case.

On the other hand, the complete argument submitted by

petitioners on this point in their brief runs thus:

III
ISSUES
1. Does the refusal to heed a warning in the exercise of a
fundamental right to peaceably assemble and petition the
government for redress of grievances constitute bargaining
in bad faith? and,
Do the facts found by the court below justify the declaration
and conclusion that the union was guilty of bargaining in bad
faith meriting the dismissal of the persons allegedly
responsible therefore?

2. Was there grave abuse of discretion when the respondent

court refused to act one way or another on the petition for
relief from the resolution of October 9, 1969?

IV
ARGUMENT
The respondent Court erred in finding the petition union guilty
of bargaining in bad faith and consequently dismissing the
persons allegedly responsible therefor, because such conclusion
is country to the evidence on record; that the dismissal of
leaders was discriminatory.

As a result of exercising the constitutional rights of freedom

to assemble and petition the duly constituted authorities for
redress of their grievances, the petitioners were charged and
then condemned of bargaining in bad faith.

The findings that petitioners were guilty of bargaining in bad

faith were not borne out by the records. It was not even
alleged nor proven by evidence. What has been alleged and
which the respondent company tried to prove was that the
demonstration amounted to a strike and hence, a violation of
the provisions of the "no-lockout — no strike" clause of the
collective bargaining agreement. However, this allegation
and proof submitted by the respondent company were
practically resolved when the respondent court in the same
decision stated categorically:

'The company alleges that the walkout because of

the demonstration is tantamount to a declaration of
a strike. We do not think so, as the same is not
rooted in any industrial dispute although there is a
concerted act and the occurrence of a temporary
stoppage of work.' (Emphasis supplied, p. 4, 5th
paragraph, Decision.)
 The respondent court's findings that the petitioner
union bargained in bad faith is not tenable because:

First, it has not been alleged nor proven by the respondent

company; .

Second, before the demonstration, the petitioner union and

the respondent company convened twice in a meeting to
thresh out the matter of demonstration. Petitioners
requested that the employees and workers be excused but
the respondent company instead of granting the request or
even settling the matter so that the hours of work will not be
disrupted, immediately threatened the employees of mass
dismissal;

Third, the refusal of the petitioner union to grant the request

of the company that the first shift shall be excluded in the
demonstration is not tantamount to bargaining in bad faith
because the company knew that the officers of the union
belonged to the first shift, and that the union cannot go and
lead the demonstration without their officers. It must be
stated that the company intends to prohibit its officers to
lead and join the demonstration because most of them
belonged to the first shift; and

Fourth, the findings of the respondent court that the

demonstration if allowed will practically give the union the
right to change the working conditions agreed in the CBA is a
conclusion of facts, opinionated and not borne by any
evidence on record. The demonstration did not practically
change the terms or conditions of employment because it
was only for one (1) day and the company knew about it
before it went through. We can even say that it was the
company who bargained in bad faith, when upon
representation of the Bureau of Labor not to dismiss the
employees demonstrating, the company tacitly approved the
same and yet while the demonstration was in progress, the
company filed a ULP Charge and consequently dismissed
those who participated.
Records of the case show that more or less 400 members of
the union participated in the demonstration and yet, the
respondent court selected the eight officers to be dismissed
from the union thus losing their status as employees of the
respondent company. The respondent court should have
taken into account that the company's action in allowing the
return of more or less three hundred ninety two (392)
employees/members of the union is an act of condonation
and the dismissal of the eight (8) officers is an act of
discrimination (Phil. Air Lines Inc., vs. Phil. Air Lines
Employees Association, G.R. No. L-8197, Oct. 31, 1958).
Seemingly, from the opinion stated in the decision by the
court, while there is a collective bargaining agreement, the
union cannot go on demonstration or go on strike because it
will change the terms and conditions of employment agreed
in the CBA. It follows that the CBA is over and above the
constitutional rights of a man to demonstrate and the
statutory rights of a union to strike as provided for in
Republic Act 875. This creates a bad precedent because it will
appear that the rights of the union is solely dependent upon
the CBA.

One of the cardinal primary rights which must be respected in

proceedings before the Court of Industrial Relations is that
"the decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at
the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed
to the parties affected." (Interstate Commerce Commission
vs. L & N R. Co., 227 U.S. 88, 33 S. Ct. 185, 57 Law ed. 431.)
Only by confining the administrative tribunal to the evidence
disclosed to the parties, can the latter be protected in their
rights to know and meet the case against them. (Ang Tibay
vs. CIR, G.R. No. L-45496, February 27, 1940.)

The petitioners respectfully and humbly submit that there is

no scintilla of evidence to support the findings of the
respondent court that the petitioner union bargained in bad
faith. Corollary therefore, the dismissal of the individual
petitioners is without basis either in fact or in law.
Additionally, in their reply they also argued that:

1) That respondent court's finding that petitioners have been

guilty of bargaining in bad faith and consequently lost their
status as employees of the respondent company did not
meet the meaning and comprehension of "substantial merits
of the case." Bargaining in bad faith has not been alleged in
the complaint (Annex "C", Petition) nor proven during the
hearing of the can. The important and substantial merit of
the case is whether under the facts and circumstances
alleged in respondent company's pleadings, the
demonstration done by the petitioners amounted to on
"illegal strike" and therefore in violation of the "no strike —
no lock out" clause of the Collective Bargaining Agreement.
Petitioners respectfully reiterate and humbly submit, that the
respondent court had altogether opined and decided that
such demonstration does not amount to a strike. Hence, with
that findings, petitioners should have been absolved of the
charges against them. Nevertheless, the same respondent
court disregarding, its own findings, went out of bounds by
declaring the petitioners as having "bargained in faith." The
stand of the respondent court is fallacious, as it follows the
principle in logic as "non-siquitor";

2) That again respondents wanted to impress that the

freedom to assemble peaceably to air grievances against the
duly constituted authorities as guaranteed in our Constitution
is subject to the limitation of the agreement in the Collective
Bargaining Agreement. The fundamental rights of the
petitioners to free speech and assembly is paramount to the
provision in the Collective Bargaining Agreement and such
attempt to override the constitutional provision would be
null and void. These fundamental rights of the petitioners
were not taken into consideration in the deliberation of the
case by the respondent court;

Thus, it is clear from the foregoing contentions that petitioners are not
raising any issue of due process. They do not posit that the decision of
the industrial court is null and void on that constitutional ground. True
it is that they fault the respondent court for having priced the
provisions of the collective bargaining agreement herein involved over
and above their constitutional right to peaceably assemble and
petition for redress of their grievances against the abuses of the Pasig
police, but in no sense at all do they allege or contend that such action
affects its jurisdiction in a manner that renders the proceedings a
nullity. In other words, petitioners themselves consider the alleged
flaw in the court's action as a mere error of judgment rather than that
of jurisdiction which the main opinion projects. For this Court to
roundly and indignantly condemn private respondent now for the
grievous violation of the fundamental law the main opinion sees in its
refusal to allow all its workers to join the demonstration in question,
when that specific issue has not been duly presented to Us and
properly argued, is to my mind unfair and unjust, for the simple reason
that the manner this case was brought to Us does not afford it the
opportunity to be heard in regard to such supposed constitutional
transgression.

To be sure, petitioners do maintain, that respondent court committed

an error of jurisdiction by finding petitioners guilty of bargaining in bad
faith when the charge against them alleged in the complaint was for
having conducted a mass demonstration, which "amounted to a
strike", in violation of the Collective Bargaining Agreement, but
definitely, this jurisdictional question has no constitutional color.
Indeed, We can even assume for the sake of argument, that the trial
judge did err in not giving preferential importance to the fundamental
freedoms invoked by the petitioners over the management and
proprietary attributes claimed by the respondent private firm — still,
We cannot rightly hold that such disregard of petitioners' priceless
liberties divested His Honor of jurisdiction in the premises. The
unbending doctrine of this Court is that "decisions, erroneous or not,
become final after the period fixed by law; litigations would be
endless, no questions would be finally settled; and titles to property
would become precarious if the losing party were allowed to reopen
them at any time in the future".3

I only have to add to this that the fact that the error is in the
interpretation, construction or application of a constitutional precept
not constituting a denial of due process, should not make any
difference. Juridically, a party cannot be less injured by an overlooked
or erroneously sanctioned violation of an ordinary statute than by a
misconstrued or constitutional injunction affecting his individual,
freedoms. In both instances, there is injustice which should be
intolerable were it not for the more paramount considerations that
inform the principle of immutability of final judgments. I dare say this
must be the reason why, as I have already noted, the main opinion
does not cite any constitutional provision, law or rule or any judicial
doctrine or principle supporting its basic holding that infringement of
constitutional guarantees, other than denial of due process, divests
courts of jurisdiction to render valid judgments.

In this connection, it must be recalled that the teaching of Philippine

Association of Colleges and Universities vs. Secretary of
Education,4 following Santiago vs. Far Eastern Broadcasting,5 is that "it is
one of our (the Supreme Court's) decisional practices that unless a
constitutional point is specifically raised, insisted upon and adequately
argued, the court will not consider it". In the case at bar, the
petitioners have not raised, they are not insisting upon, much less have
they adequately argued the constitutional issues so extendedly and
ably discussed in the main opinion.

Indeed, it does not seem wise and sound for the Supreme Court to
hold that the erroneous resolution by a court of a constitutional issue
not amounting to a denial of due process renders its judgment or
decision null and void, and, therefore, subject to attack even after said
judgment or decision has become final and executory. I have actually
tried to bring myself into agreement with the views of the
distinguished and learned writer of the main opinion, if only to avoid
dissenting from his well prepared thesis, but its obvious incongruity
with settled jurisprudence always comes to the fore to stifle my effort.
As a matter of fact, for a moment, it appeared to me as if I could go
along with petitioners under the authority of our constitutionally
irreducible appellate jurisdiction under Section 2(5) of Article VII of the
Philippines6 (reenacted practically ipssisimis verbis in Section 5(2) of the
1973 Constitution), only to realize upon further reflection that the very
power granted to us to review decisions of lower courts involving
questions of law(and these include constitutional issues not affecting
the validity of statutes, treaty, executive agreement, etc.) is not
unqualified but has to be exercised only in the manner provided in the
law of the Rules of Court. In other words, before We can exercise
appellate jurisdiction over constitutional issues, no matter how
important they may be, there must first be a showing of compliance
with the applicable procedural law or rules, among them, those
governing appeals from the Court of Industrial Relations involved
herein. Consequently, if by law or rule, a judgment of the industrial
court is already final and executory, this Court would be devoid of
power and authority to review, much less alter or modify the same,
absent any denial of due process or fatal defect of jurisdiction. It must
be borne in mind that the situation confronting Us now is not merely
whether or not We should pass upon a question or issue not
specifically raised by the party concerned, which, to be sure, could be
enough reason to dissuade Us from taking pains in resolving the same;
rather, the real problem here is whether or not We have jurisdiction to
entertain it. And, in this regard, as already stated earlier, no less than
Justice Conrado Sanchez, the writer of Chavez, supra., which is being
relied upon by the main opinion, already laid down the precedent
in Elizalde vs. Court, supra, which for its four-square applicability to the
facts of this case, We have no choice but to follow, that is, that in view
of reconsideration but even their argument supporting the same
within the prescribed period, "the judgment (against them)has
become final, beyond recall".

Indeed, when I consider that courts would be useless if the finality and
enforceability of their judgments are made contingent on the
correctness thereof from the constitutional standpoint, and that in
truth, whether or not they are correct is something that is always
dependent upon combined opinion of the members of the Supreme
Court, which in turn is naturally as changeable as the members
themselves are changed, I cannot conceive of anything more
pernicious and destructive to a trustful administration of justice than
the idea that, even without any showing of denial of due process or
want of jurisdiction of the court, a final and executory judgment of
such court may still be set aside or reopened in instances other than
those expressly allowed by Rule 38 and that of extrinsic fraud under
Article 1146(1) of the Civil Code.7 And just to emphasize the policy of
the law of respecting judgments once they have become final, even as
this Court has ruled that final decisions are mute in the presence of
fraud which the law abhors,8 it is only when the fraud is extrinsic and
not intrinsic that final and executory judgments may be set aside,9and
this only when the remedy is sought within the prescriptive period. 10
Apropos here is the following passage in Li Kim Those vs. Go Sin Kaw, 82
Phil. 776:
Litigation must end and terminate sometime and
somewhere, and it is essential to an effective and efficient
administration of justice that once a judgment has become
final, the winning party be not, through a mere subterfuge,
deprived of the fruits of the verdict. Courts must therefore
guard against any scheme calculated to bring about that
result. Constituted as they are to put an end to controversies,
courts should frown upon any attempt to prolong them.
Likewise the stern admonition of Justice George Malcolm in Dy Cay v.
Crossfield, 38 Phil. 521, thus:
... Public policy and sound practice demand that, at the risk of
occasional errors, judgments of courts should become final at
some definite date fixed by law. The very object for which
courts were instituted was to put an end to controversies. To
fulfill this purpose and to do so speedily, certain time limits,
more or less arbitrary, have to be set up to spur on the
slothful. 'If a vacillating, irresolute judge were allowed to thus
keep causes ever within his power, to determine and
redetermine them term after term, to bandy his judgments
about from one party to the other, and to change his
conclusions as freely and as capriciously as a chamelon may
change its hues, then litigation might become more
intolerable than the wrongs it is intended to redress.' (See
Arnedo vs. Llorente and Liongson (1911), 18 Phil., 257.).

My disagreement with the dissenters in Republic vs. Judge de los

Angeles,

L-26112, October 4, 1971, 41 SCRA 422, was not as to the unalterability

and invulnerability of final judgments but rather on the correct
interpretation of the contents of the judgment in question therein.
Relevantly to this case at bar, I said then:
 The point of res adjudicata discussed in the dissents has not
escaped my attention. Neither am I overlooking the point of
the Chief Justice regarding the dangerous and inimical
implications of a ruling that would authorize the revision,
amendment or alteration of a final and executory judgment. I
want to emphasize that my position in this opinion does not
detract a whit from the soundness, authority and binding
force of existing doctrines enjoining any such modifications.
The public policy of maintaining faith and respect in judicial
decisions, which inform said doctrines, is admittedly of the
highest order. I am not advocating any departure from them.
Nor am I trying to put forth for execution a decision that I
believe should have been rather than what it is. All I am doing
is to view not the judgment of Judge Tengco but the decision
of this Court in G.R. No. L-20950, as it is and not as I believe it
should have been, and, by opinion, I would like to guide the
court a quo as to what, in my own view, is the true and
correct meaning and implications of decision of this Court,
not that of Judge Tengco's.

The main opinion calls attention to many instant precisely involving

cases in the industrial court, wherein the Court refused to be
constrained by technical rules of procedure in its determination to
accord substantial justice to the parties I still believe in those decisions,
some of which were penned by me. I am certain, however, that in none
of those precedents did this Court disturb a judgment already final and
executory. It too obvious to require extended elucidation or even
reference any precedent or authority that the principle of immutability
of final judgments is not a mere technicality, and if it may considered to
be in a sense a procedural rule, it is one that is founded on public policy
and cannot, therefore, yield to the ordinary plea that it must give
priority to substantial justice.

Apparently vent on looking for a constitutional point of due process to

hold on, the main opinion goes far as to maintain that the long existing
and constantly applied rule governing the filing of motions for
reconsideration in the Court of Industrial Relations, "as applied in this
case does not implement on reinforce or strengthen the constitutional
rights affected, but instead constricts the same to the point of
nullifying the enjoyment thereof by the petitioning employees. Said
Court on Industrial Relations Rule, promulgated as it was pursuant to
mere legislative delegation, is unreasonable and therefore is beyond
the authority granted by the Constitution and the law. A period of five
(5) days within which to file a motion for reconsideration is too short,
especially for the aggrieve workers, who usually do not have the ready
funds to meet the necessary expenses therefor. In case of the Court of
Appeal and the Supreme Court, a period of fifteen (15) days has been
fixed for the filing of the motion for re-hearing or reconsideration (Sec.
10, Rule 51; Sec. 1, Rule 52; Sec. 1, Rule 56, Revised Rules of Court). The
delay in the filing of the motion for reconsideration could have been
only one day if September 28, 1969 was not a Sunday. This fact
accentuates the unreasonableness of the Court of Industrial Relations
Rule insofar as circumstances of the instant case are concerned."
I am afraid the zeal and passion of these arguments do not justify the
conclusion suggested. Viewed objectively, it can readily be seen that
there can hardly be any factual or logical basis for such a critical view of
the rule in question. Said rule provides:

MOTIONS FOR RECONSIDERATION

Sec. 15. The movant shall file the motion, in six copies, within
five (5) days from the date on which he receives notice of the
order or decision, object of the motion for reconsideration,
the same to be verified under oath with respect to the
correctness of the allegations of fact, and serving a copy
thereof, personally or by registered mail, on the adverse
party. The latter may file an answer, in six (6) copies, duly
verified under oath.

Sec. 16. Both the motion and the answer shall be submitted
with arguments supporting the same. If the arguments can
not be submitted simultaneously with said motions, upon
notice Court, the movant shall file same within ten (10) days
from the date of the filing of his motion for reconsideration.
The adverse party shall also file his answer within ten (10)
days from the receipt by him of a copy of the arguments
submitted by the movant.
 Sec. 17. After an answer to the motion is registered, or after
ten (10) days from the receipt of the arguments in support of
said motion having been filed, the motion shall be deemed
submitted for resolution of the Court in banc, unless it is
considered necessary to bear oral arguments, in which case
the Court shall issue the corresponding order or notice to
that effect.

Failure to observe the above-specified periods shall be

sufficient cause for dismissal of the motion for
reconsideration or striking out of the answer and/or the
supporting arguments, as the case may be. (As amended
April 20, 1951, Court of Industrial Relations.).

As implemented and enforced in actual practice, this rule, as everyone

acquainted with proceedings in the industrial court well knows,
precisely permits the party aggrieved by a judgment to file no more
than a pro-forma motion for reconsideration without any argument or
lengthy discussion and with barely a brief statement of the
fundamental ground or grounds therefor, without prejudice to
supplementing the same by making the necessary exposition, with
citations laws and authorities, in the written arguments the be filed
(10) days later. In truth, such a pro-forma motion has to effect of just
advising the court and the other party that the movant does not agree
with the judgment due to fundamental defects stated in brief and
general terms. Evidently, the purpose of this requirement is to apprise
everyone concerned within the shortest possible time that a
reconsideration is to sought, and thereby enable the parties concerned
to make whatever adjustments may be warranted by the situation, in
the meanwhile that the litigation is prolonged. It must borne in mind
that cases in the industrial court may involve affect the operation of
vital industries in which labor-management problems might require
day-to-day solutions and it is to the best interests of justice and
concerned that the attitude of each party at every imports juncture of
the case be known to the other so that both avenues for earlier
settlement may, if possible, be explored.
There can be no reason at all to complain that the time fixed by the
rule is short or inadequate. In fact, the motion filed petitioners was no
more than the following:

MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

COME NOW movant respondents, through counsel, to this

Honorable Court most respectfully moves for the
RECONSIDERATION of the Order of this Honorable Court
dated September 17, 1969 on the ground that the same is not
in accordance with law, evidence and facts adduced during
the hearing of the above entitled case.
Movant-respondents most respectfully move for leave to file
their respective arguments within ten (10) days pursuant to
Section 15, 16 & 17 as amended of the Rules of Court.
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that this Motion for
Reconsideration be admitted.

Manila, September 27, 1969.

To say that five (5) days is an unreasonable period for the
filing of such a motion is to me simply incomprehensible.
What worse in this case is that petitioners have not even
taken the trouble of giving an explanation of their inability to
comply with the rule. Not only that, petitioners were also late
five (5) days in filing their written arguments in support of
their motion, and, the only excuse offered for such delay is
that both the President of the Union and the office clerk who
took charge of the matter forgot to do what they were
instructed to do by counsel, which, according to this Court, as
I shall explain anon "is the most hackneyed and habitual
subterfuge employed by litigants who fail to observe the
procedural requirements prescribed by the Rules of Court".
(Philippine Airlines, Inc. vs. Arca, infra). And yet, very
indignantly, the main opinion would want the Court to
overlook such nonchalance and indifference.

In this connection, I might add that in my considered opinion, the rules

fixing periods for the finality of judgments are in a sense more
substantive than procedural in their real nature, for in their operation
they have the effect of either creating or terminating rights pursuant
to the terms of the particular judgment concerned. And the fact that
the court that rendered such final judgment is deprived of jurisdiction
or authority to alter or modify the same enhances such substantive
character. Moreover, because they have the effect of terminating
rights and the enforcement thereof, it may be said that said rules
partake of the nature also of rules of prescription, which again are
substantive. Now, the twin predicates of prescription are inaction or
abandonment and the passage of time or a prescribed period. On the
other hand, procrastination or failure to act on time is unquestionably
a form of abandonment, particularly when it is not or cannot be
sufficiently explained. The most valuable right of a party may be lost by
prescription, and be has no reason to complain because public policy
demands that rights must be asserted in time, as otherwise they can be
deemed waived.

I see no justification whatsoever for not applying these self-evident

principles to the case of petitioners. Hence, I feel disinclined to adopt
the suggestion that the Court suspend, for the purposes of this case
the rules aforequoted of the Court of Industrial Relations. Besides, I
have grave doubts as to whether we can suspend rules of other courts,
particularly that is not under our supervisory jurisdiction, being
administrative agency under the Executive Department Withal, if, in
order to hasten the administration of substance justice, this Court did
exercise in some instances its re power to amend its rules, I am
positively certain, it has done it for the purpose of reviving a case in
which the judo has already become final and executory.

Before closing, it may be mentioned here, that as averred their

petition, in a belated effort to salvage their Petitioners filed in the
industrial court on October 31, 1969 a Petition for relief alleging that
their failure to file "Arguments in Support of their Motion for
Reconsideration within the reglementary period or five (5), if not seven
(7), days late "was due to excusable negligence and honest mistake
committed by the President of the respondent Union and on office
clerk of the counsel for respondents as shown attested in their
respective affidavits", (See Annexes K, and K-2) which in brief,
consisted allegedly of the President's having forgotten his
appointment with his lawyer "despite previous instructions and of the
said office employee having also coincidentally forgotten "to do the
work instructed (sic) to (him) by Atty. Osorio" because he "was busy
with clerical jobs". No sympathy at all can be evoked these allegations,
for, under probably more justification circumstances, this Court ruled
out a similar explanation previous case this wise:

We find merit in PAL's petition. The excuse offered

respondent Santos as reason for his failure to perfect in due
time appeal from the judgment of the Municipal Court, that
counsel's clerk forgot to hand him the court notice, is the
most hackneyed and habitual subterfuge employed by
litigants who fail to observe procedural requirements
prescribed by the Rules of Court. The uncritical acceptance of
this kind of common place excuses, in the face of the
Supreme Court's repeated rulings that they are neither
credible nor constitutive of excusable negligence (Gaerlan vs.
Bernal, L-4039, 29 January 1952; Mercado vs. Judge Domingo,
L-19457, December 1966) is certainly such whimsical exercise
of judgment to be a grave abuse of discretion. (Philippine Air
Lines, Inc. Arca, 19 SCRA 300.)

For the reason, therefore, that the judgment of the industrial court
sought to be reviewed in the present case has already become final
and executory, nay, not without the fault of the petitioners, hence, no
matter how erroneous from the constitutional viewpoint it may be, it is
already beyond recall, I vote to dismiss this case, without
pronouncement as to costs.

TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:

For having carried out a mass demonstration at Malacañang on March

4, 1969 in protest against alleged abuses of the Pasig police
department, upon two days' prior notice to respondent employer
company, as against the latter's insistence that the first shift 1should
not participate but instead report for work, under pain of dismissal, the
industrial court ordered the dismissal from employment of the eight
individual petitioners as union officers and organizers of the mass
demonstration.
Respondent court's order finding petitioner union guilty on
respondent's complaint of bargaining in bad faith and unfair labor
practice for having so carried out the mass demonstration,
notwithstanding that it concededly was not a declaration of strike nor
directed in any manner against respondent employer, and ordering the
dismissal of the union office manifestly constituted grave abuse of
discretion in fact and in law.

There could not be, in fact, bargaining in bad faith nor unfair labor
practice since respondent firm conceded that "the demonstration is an
inalienable right of the union guaranteed' by the Constitution" and the
union up to the day of the demonstration pleaded by cablegram to the
company to excuse the first shift and allow it to join the demonstration
in accordance with their previous requests.

Neither could there be, in law, a willful violation of the collective

bargaining agreement's "no-strike" clause as would warrant the union
leaders' dismissal, since as found by respondent court itself the mass
demonstration was not a declaration of a strike, there being no
industrial dispute between the protagonists, but merely the
occurrence of a temporary stoppage of work" to enable the workers
to exercise their constitutional rights of free expression, peaceable
assembly and petition for redress of grievance against alleged police
excesses.

Respondent court's en banc resolution dismissing petitioners' motion

for reconsideration for having been filed two days late, after expiration
of the reglementary five-day period fixed by its rules, due to the
negligence of petitioners' counsel and/or the union president should
likewise be set aside as a manifest act of grave abuse of discretion.
Petitioners' petition for relief from the normal adverse consequences
of the late filing of their motion for reconsideration due to such
negligence — which was not acted upon by respondent court —
should have been granted, considering the monstrous injustice that
would otherwise be caused the petitioners through their summary
dismissal from employment, simply because they sought in good faith
to exercise basic human rights guaranteed them by the Constitution. It
should be noted further that no proof of actual loss from the one-day
stoppage of work was shown by respondent company, providing basis
to the main opinion's premise that its insistence on dismissal of the
union leaders for having included the first shift workers in the mass
demonstration against its wishes was but an act of arbitrary
vindictiveness.

Only thus could the basic constitutional rights of the individual

petitioners and the constitutional injunction to afford protection to
labor be given true substance and meaning. No person may be
deprived of such basic rights without due process — which is but
"responsiveness to the supremacy of reason, obedience to the dictates
of justice. Negatively put, arbitrariness is ruled out and unfairness
avoided ... Due process is thus hostile to any official action marred by
lack of reasonableness. Correctly it has been identified as freedom
from arbitrariness."2

Accordingly, I vote for the setting aside of the appealed orders of the
respondent court and concur in the judgment for petitioners as set
forth in the main opinion.

Separate Opinions
BARREDO, J., dissenting:

I bow in respectful and sincere admiration, but my sense of duty

compels me to dissent.

The background of this case may be found principally in the stipulation

of facts upon which the decision under review is based. It is as follows:

1. That complainant Philippine Blooming Mills, Company, Inc.,

is a corporation existing and operating under and by virtue of
the laws of the Philippines with corporate address at 666
Muelle de Binondo, Manila, which is the employer of
respondent;

2. That Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization

PBMEO for short, is a legitimate labor organization, and the
respondents herein are either officers of respondent PBMEO
or members thereof;
3. That on March 2, 1969 complainant company learned of the
projected mass demonstration at Malacañang in protest
against alleged abuses of the Pasig Police Department to be
participated by the first shift (6:00 AM — 2:00 PM workers as
well as those working in the regular shifts (7:00 A.M. to 4:00
PM and 8:00 AM to 5:00 PM in the morning of March 4, 1969;

4. That a meeting was called by the Company on March 3,

1969 at about 11:00 A.M. at the Company's canteen, and
those present were: for the Company: (1) Mr. Arthur L. Ang,
(2) Atty. Cesareo S. de Leon, Jr. (3) and all department and
section heads. For the PBMEO (1) Florencio Padrigano, (2)
Rufino Roxas, (3) Mariano de Leon, (4) Asencion Paciente, (5)
Bonifacio Vacuna and (6) Benjamin Pagcu.

5. That the Company asked the union panel to confirm or

deny said projected mass demonstration at Malacañang on
March 4, 1969. PBMEO thru Benjamin Pagcu who acted as the
spokesman of the union panel, confirmed the planned
demonstration and stated that the demonstration or rally
cannot be cancelled because it has already been agreed upon
in the meeting. Pagcu explained further that the
demonstration has nothing to do with the Company because
the union has no quarrel or dispute with Management;

6. That Management, thru Atty. C.S. de Leon, Company

personnel manager, informed PBMEO that the
demonstration is an inalienable right of the union guaranteed
by the Constitution but emphasized, however, that any
demonstration for that matter should not unduly prejudice
the normal operation of the Company. For which reason, the
Company, thru Atty. C.S. de Leon, warned the PBMEO
representatives that workers who belong to the first and
regular shifts, who without previous leave of absence
approved by the Company, particularly the officers present
who are the organizers of the demonstration, who shall fail
to report for work the following morning (March 4, 1969)
shall be dismissed, because such failure is a violation of the
 existing CBA and, therefore, would be amounting to an illegal
strike;

7. That at about 5:00 P.M. on March 3, 1969, another meeting

was convoked. Company represented by Atty. C.S. de Leon,
Jr. The Union panel was composed of: Nicanor Tolentino,
Rodulfo Munsod, Benjamin Pagcu and Florencio Padrigano. In
this afternoon meeting of March 3, 1969, Company reiterated
and appealed to the PBMEO representatives that while all
workers may join the Malacañang demonstration, the
workers for the first and regular shift of March 4, 1969 should
be excused from joining the demonstration and should
report for work; and thus utilize the workers in the 2nd and
3rd shifts in order not to violate the provisions of the CBA,
particularly Article XXIV "NO LOCKOUT — NO STRIKE". All
those who will not follow this warning of the Company shall
be dismissed; De Leon reiterated the Company's warning that
the officers shall be primarily liable being the organizers of
the mass demonstration. The union panel countered that it
was rather too late to change their plans inasmuch as the
Malacañang demonstration will be held the following
morning; and

8. That a certain Mr. Wilfredo Ariston, adviser of PBMEO sent

a cablegram to the Company which was received 9:50 A.M.,
March 4, 1969, the contents of which are as follows:
'REITERATING REQUEST EXCUSE DAY SHIFT EMPLOYEES
JOINING DEMONSTRATION MARCH 4, 1969.

Additionally, the trial court found that "the projected demonstration

did in fact occur and in the process paralyzed to a large extent the
operations of the complainant company". (p. 5, Annex F).

Upon these facts the Prosecution Division of the Court of Industrial

Relations filed with said court a complaint for Unfair Labor Practice
against petitioners charging that: .

3. That on March 4, 1969, respondents (petitioners herein)

particularly those in the first shift, in violation of the existing
 collective bargaining agreement and without filing the
necessary notice as provided for by law, failed to report for
work, amounting to a declaration of strike;

4. That the above acts are in violation of Section 4(a)

subparagraph 6, in relation to Sections 13, 14 and 15 of
Republic Act No. 875, and of the collective bargaining
agreement. (Pars. 3 and 4, Annex C.)

After due hearing, the court rendered judgment, the dispositive part of
which read's:

IN VIEW HEREOF, the respondent Philippine Blooming Mills

Employees Organization is found guilty of bargaining in bad
faith and is hereby ordered to cease and desist from further
committing the same and its representatives namely:
respondent Florencio Padrigano, Rufino Roxas, Mariano de
Leon, Asencion Paciente, Bonifacio Vacuna, Benjamin Pagcu,
Nicanor Tolentino and Rodulfo Monsod who are directly
responsible for perpetrating this unfair labor practice act, are
hereby considered to have lost their status as employees of
the Philippine Blooming Mills, Inc. (p. 8, Annex F.)

Although it is alleged in the petition herein that petitioners were

notified of this decision on September 23, 1969, there seems to be no
serious question that they were actually served therewith on
September 22, 1969. In fact, petitioners admitted this date of notice in
paragraph 2 of their Petition for Relief dated October 30, 1969 and filed
with the industrial court on the following day. (See Annex K.)

It is not controverted that it was only on September 29, 1969, or seven

(7) days after they were notified of the court's decision, that
petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration with the industrial
court; as it is also not disputed that they filed their "Arguments in
Support of the Respondents' Motion for Reconsideration" only on
October 14, 1969. (See Annex I.) In other words, petitioners' motion for
reconsideration was filed two (2) days after the lapse of the five (5)
day period provided for the filing thereof in the rules of the Court of
Industrial Relations, whereas the "Arguments" were filed five (5) days
after the expiration of the period therefor also specified in the same
rules.

Accordingly, the first issue that confronts the Court is the one raised by
respondent private firm, namely, that in view of the failure of
petitioners to file not only their motion for reconsideration but also
their arguments in support thereof within the periods respectively
fixed in the rules therefor, the Court of Industrial Relations acted
correctly and within the law in rendering and issuing its impugned
order of October 9, 1969 dismissing petitioners' motion for
reconsideration.

Respondent's contention presents no problem. Squarely applicable to

the facts hereof is the decision of this Court in Elizalde & Co. Inc. vs.
Court of Industrial Relations1 wherein it was ruled that:

August 6, 1963. Petitioner received a copy of the decision of

the then Associate Judge Arsenio I. Martinez, the dispositive
part of which was set forth earlier in this opinion.

August 12, 1963. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration.

No arguments were advanced in support thereof.

August 21, 1963. Petitioner moved for additional time to file

its arguments in support of its motion to reconsider.

August 27, 1963. Petitioner filed its arguments in support of

its aforesaid motion seeking reconsideration.

September 16, 1963. CIR en banc resolved to dismiss the

motion for reconsideration. Ground therefor was that the
arguments were filed out of time.

October 3, 1963. Petitioner filed its notice of appeal and at

the same time lodged the present petition with this Court.

Upon respondent Perlado's return and petitioner's brief

(respondents did not file their brief), the case is now before
us for resolution.
1. That the judgment appealed from is a final judgment — not
merely an interlocutory order — there is no doubt. The fact
that there is need for computation of respondent Perlado's
overtime pay would not render the decision incomplete. This
in effect is the holding of the Court in Pan American World
Airways System (Philippines) vs. Pan American Employees
Association, which runs thus: 'It is next contended that in
ordering the Chief of the Examining Division or his
representative to compute the compensation due, the
Industrial Court unduly delegated its judicial functions and
thereby rendered an incomplete decision. We do not believe
so. Computation of the overtime pay involves a mechanical
function, at most. And the report would still have to be
submitted to the Industrial Court for its approval, by the very
terms of the order itself. That there was no specification of
the amount of overtime pay in the decision did not make it
incomplete, since this matter should necessarily be made
clear enough in the implementation of the decision (see
Malate Taxicab & Garage, Inc. vs. CIR, et al.,
L-8718, May 11, 1956).

2. But has that judgment reached the stage of finality in the

sense that it can no longer, be disturbed?

CIR Rules of Procedure, as amended, and the jurisprudence

of this Court both answer the question in the affirmative.

Section 15 of the CIR Rules requires that one who seeks to

reconsider the judgment of the trial judge must do so within
five (5) days from the date on which he received notice of the
decision, subject of the motion. Next follows Section 16
which says that the motion must be submitted with
arguments supporting the same. But if said arguments could
not be submitted simultaneously with the motion, the same
section commands the 'the movant shall file the same within
ten (10) days from the date of the filing of his motion for
reconsideration.' Section 17 of the same rules admonishes a
movant that "(f)ailure to observe the above-specified periods
shall be sufficient cause for dismissal of the motion for
reconsideration or striking out of the answer and/or the
supporting arguments, as the case may be".

Not that the foregoing rules stand alone. Jurisprudence has

since stabilized the enforceability thereof. Thus, in Bien vs.
Castillo, (97 Phil. 956) we ruled that where a pro forma
motion for reconsideration was filed out of time its denial is
in order pursuant to CIR rules, regardless of whether the
arguments in support of said motion were or were not filed
on time. Pangasinan Employees Laborers & Tenants
Association (PELTA) vs. Martinez, (L-13846, May 20, 1960)
pronounced that where a motion to reconsider is filed out of
time, the order or decision subject of reconsideration comes
final. And so also, where the arguments in support of the
motion for reconsideration are filed beyond the ten-day
reglementary period, the pre forma motion for
reconsideration although seasonably filed must nevertheless
be denied. This in essence is our ruling in Local 7, Press &
Printing Free Workers (FFW) vs. Tabigne. The teaching
in Luzon Stevedoring Co., Inc. vs. Court of Industrial Relations,
is that where the motion for reconsideration is denied upon
the ground that the arguments in support thereof were filed
out of time, the order or decision subject of the motion
becomes "final and unappealable".

We find no difficulty in applying the foregoing rules and

pronouncements of this Court in the case before us. On
August 6, petitioner received a copy of the judgment of
Judge Arsenio I. Martinez aforesaid. Petitioner's motion to
reconsider — without arguments in support thereof — of
August 12 was filed on time. For, August 11, the end of the
five-day reglementary period to file a motion for
reconsideration, was a Sunday. But, actually, the written
arguments in support of the said motion were submitted to
the court on August 27. The period from August 12 to August
27, is a space of fifteen (15) days. Surely enough, said
arguments were filed out of time — five (5) days late. And
the judgment had become final.
 3. There is, of course, petitioner's motion of August 21, 1963
seeking extension of time within which to present its
arguments in support of its motion. Counsel in his petition
before this Court pleads that the foregoing motion was
grounded on the 'extremely busy and difficult schedule of
counsel which would not enable him to do so within the
stated ten-day reglementary period. The arguments were
only filed on August 27 — five (5) days late, as aforesaid.

The foregoing circumstances will not avail petitioner any. It is

to be noted that the motion for expansion of time was filed
only on August 21, that is, one day before the due date which
is August 22. It was petitioner's duty to see to it that the court
act on this motion forthwith or at least inquire as to the fate
thereof not later than the 22nd of August. It did not. It merely
filed its arguments on the 27th.

To be underscored at this point is that "obviously to speed up

the disposition of cases", CIR "has a standing rule against the
extension of the ten-day period for filing supporting
arguments". That no-extension policy should have placed
petitioner on guard. It should not have simply folded its arms,
sit by supinely and relied on the court's generosity. To
compound petitioner's neglect, it filed the arguments only on
August 27, 1953, knowing full well that by that time the
reglementary period had expired.

Petitioner cannot complain against CIR's ruling of September

16, 1963 dismissing the motion for reconsideration on the
ground that the supporting arguments were filed out of time.
That ruling in effect denied the motion for extension.

We rule that CIR's judgment has become final and

unappealable. We may not review the same.

Notwithstanding this unequivocal and unmistakable precedent, which

has not been in any way modified, much less revoked or reversed by
this Court, the main opinion has chosen not only to go into the merits
of petitioners' pose that the respondent court erred in holding them
guilty of bargaining in bad faith but also to ultimately uphold
petitioners' claim for reinstatement on constitutional grounds.

Precisely because the conclusions of the main opinion are predicated

on an exposition of the constitutional guarantees of freedoms of
speech and peaceful assembly for redress of grievances, so scholarly
and masterful that it is bound to overwhelm Us unless We note
carefully the real issues in this case, I am constrained, over and above
my sincere admiration for the eloquence and zeal of Mr. Justice
Makasiar's brilliant dissertation, to dutifully state that as presented by
petitioners themselves and in the light of its attendant circumstances,
this case does not call for the resolution of any constitutional issue.
Admittedly, the invocation of any constitutional guarantee, particularly
when it directly affects individual freedoms enshrined in the bill of
rights, deserves the closest attention of this Court. It is my
understanding of constitutional law and judicial practices related
thereto, however, that even the most valuable of our constitutional
rights may be protected by the courts only when their jurisdiction over
the subject matter is unquestionably established and the applicable
rules of procedure consistent with substantive and procedural due
process are observed. No doubt no constitutional right can be
sacrificed in the altar of procedural technicalities, very often fittingly
downgraded as niceties but as far as I know, this principle is applied to
annul or set aside final judgments only in cases wherein there is a
possible denial of due process. I have not come across any instance,
and none is mentioned or cited in the well-documented main opinion,
wherein a final and executory judgment has been invalidated and set
aside upon the ground that the same has the effect of sanctioning the
violation of a constitutional right, unless such violation amounts to a
denial of due process.

Without support from any provision of the constitution or any law or

from any judicial precedent or reason of principle, the main opinion
nudely and unqualifiedly asserts, as if it were universally established
and accepted as an absolute rule, that the violation of a constitutional
right divests the court of jurisdiction; and as a consequence its
judgment is null and void and confers no rights". Chavez vs. Court of
Appeals, 24 SCRA 663, which is mentioned almost in passing, does
uphold the proposition that "relief from a criminal conviction secured
at the sacrifice of constitutional liberties, may be obtained through
habeas corpus proceedings even after the finality of the judgment".
And, of course, Chavez is correct; as is also Abriol vs. Homeres2 which, in
principle, served as its precedent, for the very simple reason that in
both of those cases, the accused were denied due process. In Chavez,
the accused was compelled to testify against himself as a witness for
the prosecution; in Abriol, the accused was denied his request to be
allowed to present evidence to establish his defense after his demurrer
to the People's evidence was denied.

As may be seen, however, the constitutional issues involved in those

cases are a far cry from the one now before Us. Here, petitioners do
not claim they were denied due process. Nor do they pretend that in
denying their motion for reconsideration, "the respondent Court of
Industrial Relations and private firm trenched upon any of their
constitutional immunities ...," contrary to the statement to such effect
in the main opinion. Indeed, neither in the petition herein nor in any of
the other pleading of petitioners can any direct or indirect assertion be
found assailing the impugned decision of the respondent court as
being null and void because it sanctioned a denial of a valued
constitutional liberty.

In their petition, petitioners state the issue for Our resolution as

follows:

Petitioners herein humbly submit that the issue to be

resolved is whether or not the respondent Court en
banc under the facts and circumstances, should consider the
Motion for Reconsideration filed by your petitioners.

Petitioners, therefore, in filing this petition for a writ of

certiorari, humbly beg this Honorable Court to treat this
petition under Rule 43 and 65 of the Rules of Court.

xxx xxx xxx

The basic issue therefore is the application by the Court en
banc of the strict and narrow technical rules of procedure
without taking into account justice, equity and substantial
merits of the case.
On the other hand, the complete argument submitted by
petitioners on this point in their brief runs thus:

III
ISSUES
1. Does the refusal to heed a warning in the exercise of a
fundamental right to peaceably assemble and petition the
government for redress of grievances constitute bargaining
in bad faith? and,
Do the facts found by the court below justify the declaration
and conclusion that the union was guilty of bargaining in bad
faith meriting the dismissal of the persons allegedly
responsible therefore?

2. Was there grave abuse of discretion when the respondent

court refused to act one way or another on the petition for
relief from the resolution of October 9, 1969?

IV
ARGUMENT
The respondent Court erred in finding the petition union guilty
of bargaining in bad faith and consequently dismissing the
persons allegedly responsible therefor, because such conclusion
is country to the evidence on record; that the dismissal of
leaders was discriminatory.

As a result of exercising the constitutional rights of freedom

to assemble and petition the duly constituted authorities for
redress of their grievances, the petitioners were charged and
then condemned of bargaining in bad faith.

The findings that petitioners were guilty of bargaining in bad

faith were not borne out by the records. It was not even
alleged nor proven by evidence. What has been alleged and
which the respondent company tried to prove was that the
demonstration amounted to a strike and hence, a violation of
the provisions of the "no-lockout — no strike" clause of the
collective bargaining agreement. However, this allegation
and proof submitted by the respondent company were
practically resolved when the respondent court in the same
decision stated categorically:

'The company alleges that the walkout because of

the demonstration is tantamount to a declaration of
a strike. We do not think so, as the same is not
rooted in any industrial dispute although there is a
concerted act and the occurrence of a temporary
stoppage of work.' (Emphasis supplied, p. 4, 5th
paragraph, Decision.)

The respondent court's findings that the petitioner

union bargained in bad faith is not tenable because:
First, it has not been alleged nor proven by the respondent
company; .

Second, before the demonstration, the petitioner union and

the respondent company convened twice in a meeting to
thresh out the matter of demonstration. Petitioners
requested that the employees and workers be excused but
the respondent company instead of granting the request or
even settling the matter so that the hours of work will not be
disrupted, immediately threatened the employees of mass
dismissal;

Third, the refusal of the petitioner union to grant the request

of the company that the first shift shall be excluded in the
demonstration is not tantamount to bargaining in bad faith
because the company knew that the officers of the union
belonged to the first shift, and that the union cannot go and
lead the demonstration without their officers. It must be
stated that the company intends to prohibit its officers to
lead and join the demonstration because most of them
belonged to the first shift; and

Fourth, the findings of the respondent court that the

demonstration if allowed will practically give the union the
right to change the working conditions agreed in the CBA is a
conclusion of facts, opinionated and not borne by any
evidence on record. The demonstration did not practically
change the terms or conditions of employment because it
was only for one (1) day and the company knew about it
before it went through. We can even say that it was the
company who bargained in bad faith, when upon
representation of the Bureau of Labor not to dismiss the
employees demonstrating, the company tacitly approved the
same and yet while the demonstration was in progress, the
company filed a ULP Charge and consequently dismissed
those who participated.

Records of the case show that more or less 400 members of

the union participated in the demonstration and yet, the
respondent court selected the eight officers to be dismissed
from the union thus losing their status as employees of the
respondent company. The respondent court should have
taken into account that the company's action in allowing the
return of more or less three hundred ninety two (392)
employees/members of the union is an act of condonation
and the dismissal of the eight (8) officers is an act of
discrimination (Phil. Air Lines Inc., vs. Phil. Air Lines
Employees Association, G.R. No. L-8197, Oct. 31, 1958).
Seemingly, from the opinion stated in the decision by the
court, while there is a collective bargaining agreement, the
union cannot go on demonstration or go on strike because it
will change the terms and conditions of employment agreed
in the CBA. It follows that the CBA is over and above the
constitutional rights of a man to demonstrate and the
statutory rights of a union to strike as provided for in
Republic Act 875. This creates a bad precedent because it will
appear that the rights of the union is solely dependent upon
the CBA.

One of the cardinal primary rights which must be respected in

proceedings before the Court of Industrial Relations is that
"the decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at
the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed
to the parties affected." (Interstate Commerce Commission
vs. L & N R. Co., 227 U.S. 88, 33 S. Ct. 185, 57 Law ed. 431.)
 Only by confining the administrative tribunal to the evidence
disclosed to the parties, can the latter be protected in their
rights to know and meet the case against them. (Ang Tibay
vs. CIR, G.R. No. L-45496, February 27, 1940.)

The petitioners respectfully and humbly submit that there is

no scintilla of evidence to support the findings of the
respondent court that the petitioner union bargained in bad
faith. Corollary therefore, the dismissal of the individual
petitioners is without basis either in fact or in law.

Additionally, in their reply they also argued that:

1) That respondent court's finding that petitioners have been

guilty of bargaining in bad faith and consequently lost their
status as employees of the respondent company did not
meet the meaning and comprehension of "substantial merits
of the case." Bargaining in bad faith has not been alleged in
the complaint (Annex "C", Petition) nor proven during the
hearing of the can. The important and substantial merit of
the case is whether under the facts and circumstances
alleged in respondent company's pleadings, the
demonstration done by the petitioners amounted to on
"illegal strike" and therefore in violation of the "no strike —
no lock out" clause of the Collective Bargaining Agreement.
Petitioners respectfully reiterate and humbly submit, that the
respondent court had altogether opined and decided that
such demonstration does not amount to a strike. Hence, with
that findings, petitioners should have been absolved of the
charges against them. Nevertheless, the same respondent
court disregarding, its own findings, went out of bounds by
declaring the petitioners as having "bargained in faith." The
stand of the respondent court is fallacious, as it follows the
principle in logic as "non-siquitor";

2) That again respondents wanted to impress that the

freedom to assemble peaceably to air grievances against the
duly constituted authorities as guaranteed in our Constitution
is subject to the limitation of the agreement in the Collective
 Bargaining Agreement. The fundamental rights of the
petitioners to free speech and assembly is paramount to the
provision in the Collective Bargaining Agreement and such
attempt to override the constitutional provision would be
null and void. These fundamental rights of the petitioners
were not taken into consideration in the deliberation of the
case by the respondent court;

Thus, it is clear from the foregoing contentions that petitioners are not
raising any issue of due process. They do not posit that the decision of
the industrial court is null and void on that constitutional ground. True
it is that they fault the respondent court for having priced the
provisions of the collective bargaining agreement herein involved over
and above their constitutional right to peaceably assemble and
petition for redress of their grievances against the abuses of the Pasig
police, but in no sense at all do they allege or contend that such action
affects its jurisdiction in a manner that renders the proceedings a
nullity. In other words, petitioners themselves consider the alleged
flaw in the court's action as a mere error of judgment rather than that
of jurisdiction which the main opinion projects. For this Court to
roundly and indignantly condemn private respondent now for the
grievous violation of the fundamental law the main opinion sees in its
refusal to allow all its workers to join the demonstration in question,
when that specific issue has not been duly presented to Us and
properly argued, is to my mind unfair and unjust, for the simple reason
that the manner this case was brought to Us does not afford it the
opportunity to be heard in regard to such supposed constitutional
transgression.

To be sure, petitioners do maintain, that respondent court committed

an error of jurisdiction by finding petitioners guilty of bargaining in bad
faith when the charge against them alleged in the complaint was for
having conducted a mass demonstration, which "amounted to a
strike", in violation of the Collective Bargaining Agreement, but
definitely, this jurisdictional question has no constitutional color.
Indeed, We can even assume for the sake of argument, that the trial
judge did err in not giving preferential importance to the fundamental
freedoms invoked by the petitioners over the management and
proprietary attributes claimed by the respondent private firm — still,
We cannot rightly hold that such disregard of petitioners' priceless
liberties divested His Honor of jurisdiction in the premises. The
unbending doctrine of this Court is that "decisions, erroneous or not,
become final after the period fixed by law; litigations would be
endless, no questions would be finally settled; and titles to property
would become precarious if the losing party were allowed to reopen
them at any time in the future".3

I only have to add to this that the fact that the error is in the
interpretation, construction or application of a constitutional precept
not constituting a denial of due process, should not make any
difference. Juridically, a party cannot be less injured by an overlooked
or erroneously sanctioned violation of an ordinary statute than by a
misconstrued or constitutional injunction affecting his individual,
freedoms. In both instances, there is injustice which should be
intolerable were it not for the more paramount considerations that
inform the principle of immutability of final judgments. I dare say this
must be the reason why, as I have already noted, the main opinion
does not cite any constitutional provision, law or rule or any judicial
doctrine or principle supporting its basic holding that infringement of
constitutional guarantees, other than denial of due process, divests
courts of jurisdiction to render valid judgments.

In this connection, it must be recalled that the teaching of Philippine

Association of Colleges and Universities vs. Secretary of
Education,4 following Santiago vs. Far Eastern Broadcasting,5 is that "it is
one of our (the Supreme Court's) decisional practices that unless a
constitutional point is specifically raised, insisted upon and adequately
argued, the court will not consider it". In the case at bar, the
petitioners have not raised, they are not insisting upon, much less have
they adequately argued the constitutional issues so extendedly and
ably discussed in the main opinion.

Indeed, it does not seem wise and sound for the Supreme Court to
hold that the erroneous resolution by a court of a constitutional issue
not amounting to a denial of due process renders its judgment or
decision null and void, and, therefore, subject to attack even after said
judgment or decision has become final and executory. I have actually
tried to bring myself into agreement with the views of the
distinguished and learned writer of the main opinion, if only to avoid
dissenting from his well prepared thesis, but its obvious incongruity
with settled jurisprudence always comes to the fore to stifle my effort.
As a matter of fact, for a moment, it appeared to me as if I could go
along with petitioners under the authority of our constitutionally
irreducible appellate jurisdiction under Section 2(5) of Article VII of the
Philippines6 (reenacted practically ipssisimis verbis in Section 5(2) of the
1973 Constitution), only to realize upon further reflection that the very
power granted to us to review decisions of lower courts involving
questions of law(and these include constitutional issues not affecting
the validity of statutes, treaty, executive agreement, etc.) is not
unqualified but has to be exercised only in the manner provided in the
law of the Rules of Court. In other words, before We can exercise
appellate jurisdiction over constitutional issues, no matter how
important they may be, there must first be a showing of compliance
with the applicable procedural law or rules, among them, those
governing appeals from the Court of Industrial Relations involved
herein. Consequently, if by law or rule, a judgment of the industrial
court is already final and executory, this Court would be devoid of
power and authority to review, much less alter or modify the same,
absent any denial of due process or fatal defect of jurisdiction. It must
be borne in mind that the situation confronting Us now is not merely
whether or not We should pass upon a question or issue not
specifically raised by the party concerned, which, to be sure, could be
enough reason to dissuade Us from taking pains in resolving the same;
rather, the real problem here is whether or not We have jurisdiction to
entertain it. And, in this regard, as already stated earlier, no less than
Justice Conrado Sanchez, the writer of Chavez, supra., which is being
relied upon by the main opinion, already laid down the precedent
in Elizalde vs. Court, supra, which for its four-square applicability to the
facts of this case, We have no choice but to follow, that is, that in view
of reconsideration but even their argument supporting the same
within the prescribed period, "the judgment (against them)has
become final, beyond recall".

Indeed, when I consider that courts would be useless if the finality and
enforceability of their judgments are made contingent on the
correctness thereof from the constitutional standpoint, and that in
truth, whether or not they are correct is something that is always
dependent upon combined opinion of the members of the Supreme
Court, which in turn is naturally as changeable as the members
themselves are changed, I cannot conceive of anything more
pernicious and destructive to a trustful administration of justice than
the idea that, even without any showing of denial of due process or
want of jurisdiction of the court, a final and executory judgment of
such court may still be set aside or reopened in instances other than
those expressly allowed by Rule 38 and that of extrinsic fraud under
Article 1146(1) of the Civil Code.7 And just to emphasize the policy of
the law of respecting judgments once they have become final, even as
this Court has ruled that final decisions are mute in the presence of
fraud which the law abhors,8 it is only when the fraud is extrinsic and
not intrinsic that final and executory judgments may be set aside,9and
this only when the remedy is sought within the prescriptive period. 10
Apropos here is the following passage in Li Kim Those vs. Go Sin Kaw, 82
Phil. 776:

Litigation must end and terminate sometime and

somewhere, and it is essential to an effective and efficient
administration of justice that once a judgment has become
final, the winning party be not, through a mere subterfuge,
deprived of the fruits of the verdict. Courts must therefore
guard against any scheme calculated to bring about that
result. Constituted as they are to put an end to controversies,
courts should frown upon any attempt to prolong them.

Likewise the stern admonition of Justice George Malcolm in Dy Cay v.

Crossfield, 38 Phil. 521, thus:

... Public policy and sound practice demand that, at the risk of
occasional errors, judgments of courts should become final at
some definite date fixed by law. The very object for which
courts were instituted was to put an end to controversies. To
fulfill this purpose and to do so speedily, certain time limits,
more or less arbitrary, have to be set up to spur on the
slothful. 'If a vacillating, irresolute judge were allowed to thus
keep causes ever within his power, to determine and
redetermine them term after term, to bandy his judgments
about from one party to the other, and to change his
 conclusions as freely and as capriciously as a chamelon may
change its hues, then litigation might become more
intolerable than the wrongs it is intended to redress.' (See
Arnedo vs. Llorente and Liongson (1911), 18 Phil., 257.).

My disagreement with the dissenters in Republic vs. Judge de los

Angeles,

L-26112, October 4, 1971, 41 SCRA 422, was not as to the unalterability

and invulnerability of final judgments but rather on the correct
interpretation of the contents of the judgment in question therein.
Relevantly to this case at bar, I said then:

The point of res adjudicata discussed in the dissents has not

escaped my attention. Neither am I overlooking the point of
the Chief Justice regarding the dangerous and inimical
implications of a ruling that would authorize the revision,
amendment or alteration of a final and executory judgment. I
want to emphasize that my position in this opinion does not
detract a whit from the soundness, authority and binding
force of existing doctrines enjoining any such modifications.
The public policy of maintaining faith and respect in judicial
decisions, which inform said doctrines, is admittedly of the
highest order. I am not advocating any departure from them.
Nor am I trying to put forth for execution a decision that I
believe should have been rather than what it is. All I am doing
is to view not the judgment of Judge Tengco but the decision
of this Court in G.R. No. L-20950, as it is and not as I believe it
should have been, and, by opinion, I would like to guide the
court a quo as to what, in my own view, is the true and
correct meaning and implications of decision of this Court,
not that of Judge Tengco's.

The main opinion calls attention to many instant precisely involving

cases in the industrial court, wherein the Court refused to be
constrained by technical rules of procedure in its determination to
accord substantial justice to the parties I still believe in those decisions,
some of which were penned by me. I am certain, however, that in none
of those precedents did this Court disturb a judgment already final and
executory. It too obvious to require extended elucidation or even
reference any precedent or authority that the principle of immutability
of final judgments is not a mere technicality, and if it may considered to
be in a sense a procedural rule, it is one that is founded on public policy
and cannot, therefore, yield to the ordinary plea that it must give
priority to substantial justice.

Apparently vent on looking for a constitutional point of due process to

hold on, the main opinion goes far as to maintain that the long existing
and constantly applied rule governing the filing of motions for
reconsideration in the Court of Industrial Relations, "as applied in this
case does not implement on reinforce or strengthen the constitutional
rights affected, but instead constricts the same to the point of
nullifying the enjoyment thereof by the petitioning employees. Said
Court on Industrial Relations Rule, promulgated as it was pursuant to
mere legislative delegation, is unreasonable and therefore is beyond
the authority granted by the Constitution and the law. A period of five
(5) days within which to file a motion for reconsideration is too short,
especially for the aggrieve workers, who usually do not have the ready
funds to meet the necessary expenses therefor. In case of the Court of
Appeal and the Supreme Court, a period of fifteen (15) days has been
fixed for the filing of the motion for re-hearing or reconsideration (Sec.
10, Rule 51; Sec. 1, Rule 52; Sec. 1, Rule 56, Revised Rules of Court). The
delay in the filing of the motion for reconsideration could have been
only one day if September 28, 1969 was not a Sunday. This fact
accentuates the unreasonableness of the Court of Industrial Relations
Rule insofar as circumstances of the instant case are concerned."

I am afraid the zeal and passion of these arguments do not justify the
conclusion suggested. Viewed objectively, it can readily be seen that
there can hardly be any factual or logical basis for such a critical view of
the rule in question. Said rule provides:

MOTIONS FOR RECONSIDERATION

Sec. 15. The movant shall file the motion, in six copies, within
five (5) days from the date on which he receives notice of the
order or decision, object of the motion for reconsideration,
the same to be verified under oath with respect to the
correctness of the allegations of fact, and serving a copy
 thereof, personally or by registered mail, on the adverse
party. The latter may file an answer, in six (6) copies, duly
verified under oath.

Sec. 16. Both the motion and the answer shall be submitted
with arguments supporting the same. If the arguments can
not be submitted simultaneously with said motions, upon
notice Court, the movant shall file same within ten (10) days
from the date of the filing of his motion for reconsideration.
The adverse party shall also file his answer within ten (10)
days from the receipt by him of a copy of the arguments
submitted by the movant.

Sec. 17. After an answer to the motion is registered, or after

ten (10) days from the receipt of the arguments in support of
said motion having been filed, the motion shall be deemed
submitted for resolution of the Court in banc, unless it is
considered necessary to bear oral arguments, in which case
the Court shall issue the corresponding order or notice to
that effect.

Failure to observe the above-specified periods shall be

sufficient cause for dismissal of the motion for
reconsideration or striking out of the answer and/or the
supporting arguments, as the case may be. (As amended
April 20, 1951, Court of Industrial Relations.).

As implemented and enforced in actual practice, this rule, as everyone

acquainted with proceedings in the industrial court well knows,
precisely permits the party aggrieved by a judgment to file no more
than a pro-forma motion for reconsideration without any argument or
lengthy discussion and with barely a brief statement of the
fundamental ground or grounds therefor, without prejudice to
supplementing the same by making the necessary exposition, with
citations laws and authorities, in the written arguments the be filed
(10) days later. In truth, such a pro-forma motion has to effect of just
advising the court and the other party that the movant does not agree
with the judgment due to fundamental defects stated in brief and
general terms. Evidently, the purpose of this requirement is to apprise
everyone concerned within the shortest possible time that a
reconsideration is to sought, and thereby enable the parties concerned
to make whatever adjustments may be warranted by the situation, in
the meanwhile that the litigation is prolonged. It must borne in mind
that cases in the industrial court may involve affect the operation of
vital industries in which labor-management problems might require
day-to-day solutions and it is to the best interests of justice and
concerned that the attitude of each party at every imports juncture of
the case be known to the other so that both avenues for earlier
settlement may, if possible, be explored.

There can be no reason at all to complain that the time fixed by the
rule is short or inadequate. In fact, the motion filed petitioners was no
more than the following:

MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

COME NOW movant respondents, through counsel, to this
Honorable Court most respectfully moves for the
RECONSIDERATION of the Order of this Honorable Court
dated September 17, 1969 on the ground that the same is not
in accordance with law, evidence and facts adduced during
the hearing of the above entitled case.

Movant-respondents most respectfully move for leave to file

their respective arguments within ten (10) days pursuant to
Section 15, 16 & 17 as amended of the Rules of Court.

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that this Motion for

Reconsideration be admitted.

Manila, September 27, 1969.

To say that five (5) days is an unreasonable period for the
filing of such a motion is to me simply incomprehensible.
What worse in this case is that petitioners have not even
taken the trouble of giving an explanation of their inability to
comply with the rule. Not only that, petitioners were also late
five (5) days in filing their written arguments in support of
their motion, and, the only excuse offered for such delay is
that both the President of the Union and the office clerk who
 took charge of the matter forgot to do what they were
instructed to do by counsel, which, according to this Court, as
I shall explain anon "is the most hackneyed and habitual
subterfuge employed by litigants who fail to observe the
procedural requirements prescribed by the Rules of Court".
(Philippine Airlines, Inc. vs. Arca, infra). And yet, very
indignantly, the main opinion would want the Court to
overlook such nonchalance and indifference.

In this connection, I might add that in my considered opinion, the rules

fixing periods for the finality of judgments are in a sense more
substantive than procedural in their real nature, for in their operation
they have the effect of either creating or terminating rights pursuant
to the terms of the particular judgment concerned. And the fact that
the court that rendered such final judgment is deprived of jurisdiction
or authority to alter or modify the same enhances such substantive
character. Moreover, because they have the effect of terminating
rights and the enforcement thereof, it may be said that said rules
partake of the nature also of rules of prescription, which again are
substantive. Now, the twin predicates of prescription are inaction or
abandonment and the passage of time or a prescribed period. On the
other hand, procrastination or failure to act on time is unquestionably
a form of abandonment, particularly when it is not or cannot be
sufficiently explained. The most valuable right of a party may be lost by
prescription, and be has no reason to complain because public policy
demands that rights must be asserted in time, as otherwise they can be
deemed waived.

I see no justification whatsoever for not applying these self-evident

principles to the case of petitioners. Hence, I feel disinclined to adopt
the suggestion that the Court suspend, for the purposes of this case
the rules aforequoted of the Court of Industrial Relations. Besides, I
have grave doubts as to whether we can suspend rules of other courts,
particularly that is not under our supervisory jurisdiction, being
administrative agency under the Executive Department Withal, if, in
order to hasten the administration of substance justice, this Court did
exercise in some instances its re power to amend its rules, I am
positively certain, it has done it for the purpose of reviving a case in
which the judo has already become final and executory.
Before closing, it may be mentioned here, that as averred their
petition, in a belated effort to salvage their Petitioners filed in the
industrial court on October 31, 1969 a Petition for relief alleging that
their failure to file "Arguments in Support of their Motion for
Reconsideration within the reglementary period or five (5), if not seven
(7), days late "was due to excusable negligence and honest mistake
committed by the President of the respondent Union and on office
clerk of the counsel for respondents as shown attested in their
respective affidavits", (See Annexes K, and K-2) which in brief,
consisted allegedly of the President's having forgotten his
appointment with his lawyer "despite previous instructions and of the
said office employee having also coincidentally forgotten "to do the
work instructed (sic) to (him) by Atty. Osorio" because he "was busy
with clerical jobs". No sympathy at all can be evoked these allegations,
for, under probably more justification circumstances, this Court ruled
out a similar explanation previous case this wise:

We find merit in PAL's petition. The excuse offered

respondent Santos as reason for his failure to perfect in due
time appeal from the judgment of the Municipal Court, that
counsel's clerk forgot to hand him the court notice, is the
most hackneyed and habitual subterfuge employed by
litigants who fail to observe procedural requirements
prescribed by the Rules of Court. The uncritical acceptance of
this kind of common place excuses, in the face of the
Supreme Court's repeated rulings that they are neither
credible nor constitutive of excusable negligence (Gaerlan vs.
Bernal, L-4039, 29 January 1952; Mercado vs. Judge Domingo,
L-19457, December 1966) is certainly such whimsical exercise
of judgment to be a grave abuse of discretion. (Philippine Air
Lines, Inc. Arca, 19 SCRA 300.)

For the reason, therefore, that the judgment of the industrial court
sought to be reviewed in the present case has already become final
and executory, nay, not without the fault of the petitioners, hence, no
matter how erroneous from the constitutional viewpoint it may be, it is
already beyond recall, I vote to dismiss this case, without
pronouncement as to costs.
TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:
For having carried out a mass demonstration at Malacañang on March
4, 1969 in protest against alleged abuses of the Pasig police
department, upon two days' prior notice to respondent employer
company, as against the latter's insistence that the first shift 1should
not participate but instead report for work, under pain of dismissal, the
industrial court ordered the dismissal from employment of the eight
individual petitioners as union officers and organizers of the mass
demonstration.

Respondent court's order finding petitioner union guilty on

respondent's complaint of bargaining in bad faith and unfair labor
practice for having so carried out the mass demonstration,
notwithstanding that it concededly was not a declaration of strike nor
directed in any manner against respondent employer, and ordering the
dismissal of the union office manifestly constituted grave abuse of
discretion in fact and in law.

There could not be, in fact, bargaining in bad faith nor unfair labor
practice since respondent firm conceded that "the demonstration is an
inalienable right of the union guaranteed' by the Constitution" and the
union up to the day of the demonstration pleaded by cablegram to the
company to excuse the first shift and allow it to join the demonstration
in accordance with their previous requests.

Neither could there be, in law, a willful violation of the collective

bargaining agreement's "no-strike" clause as would warrant the union
leaders' dismissal, since as found by respondent court itself the mass
demonstration was not a declaration of a strike, there being no
industrial dispute between the protagonists, but merely the
occurrence of a temporary stoppage of work" to enable the workers
to exercise their constitutional rights of free expression, peaceable
assembly and petition for redress of grievance against alleged police
excesses.

Respondent court's en banc resolution dismissing petitioners' motion

for reconsideration for having been filed two days late, after expiration
of the reglementary five-day period fixed by its rules, due to the
negligence of petitioners' counsel and/or the union president should
likewise be set aside as a manifest act of grave abuse of discretion.
Petitioners' petition for relief from the normal adverse consequences
of the late filing of their motion for reconsideration due to such
negligence — which was not acted upon by respondent court —
should have been granted, considering the monstrous injustice that
would otherwise be caused the petitioners through their summary
dismissal from employment, simply because they sought in good faith
to exercise basic human rights guaranteed them by the Constitution. It
should be noted further that no proof of actual loss from the one-day
stoppage of work was shown by respondent company, providing basis
to the main opinion's premise that its insistence on dismissal of the
union leaders for having included the first shift workers in the mass
demonstration against its wishes was but an act of arbitrary
vindictiveness.

Only thus could the basic constitutional rights of the individual

petitioners and the constitutional injunction to afford protection to
labor be given true substance and meaning. No person may be
deprived of such basic rights without due process — which is but
"responsiveness to the supremacy of reason, obedience to the dictates
of justice. Negatively put, arbitrariness is ruled out and unfairness
avoided ... Due process is thus hostile to any official action marred by
lack of reasonableness. Correctly it has been identified as freedom
from arbitrariness."2

Accordingly, I vote for the setting aside of the appealed orders of the
respondent court and concur in the judgment for petitioners as set
forth in the main opinion.

Footnotes
1 L-7428, May 24, 1955.
2 American Com. vs. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 421.
3 Justice Cardoso, Nature of Judicial Process, 90-93; Tanada and Fernando, Constitution of the
Philippines, 1952 ed., 71.
4 West Virginia State Board of Education vs. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638, Emphasis supplied.
5 Laski, The State in Theory and Practice, 35-36.
6 See Chafee on Freedom of Speech and Press, 1955, pp. 13-14.
7 Justice Douglas, A Living Bill of Rights (1961), p. 64, cited by Justice Castro in Chavez v. Court of
Appeals, 24 SCRA, 663, 692.
8 March vs. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 509; Tucker vs. Texas, 326 U.S. 517, 519-520.
9 NACCP vs. Button (Jan. 14, 1963), 371 U.S. 415, 433, 9 L. Ed. 2nd 405, 418.
10 Terminiello vs. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1.
11 Thomas vs. Collins (1945), 323 U.S., 516, 530, cited by Mr. Justice Castro in his concurring opinion in
Gonzales vs. Comelec, April 18, 1969, 27 SCRA 835, 895.
12 Edu vs. Ericta, L-32096, Oct. 24, 1970, 35 SCRA 481, 489; Ichong vs. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155, 1165-
66, 1175.
13 L-27833, April 18, 1969, 27 SCRA 835; L-32432, Sept. 11, 1970, 35 SCRA 28; Ignacio vs. Ela (1965), 99
Phil. 346; Primicias vs. Fugoso (1948), 80 Phil. 71; Terminiello vs. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1; Virginia State
Board of Education vs. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639; 87 Law. Ed. 1628, 1638.
14 March 9, 1964, 376 U.S. 254, 270; Greenbelt, etc. vs. Bresler (May 18, 1970), 398 U.S. 6, 20; see also
Justice Fernando, Bill of Rights, 1970 Ed., pp. 78-81, 96-113.
15 Gonzales vs. Comelec, supra.
16 Gonzales vs. Comelec, supra.
17 Dennis vs. U.S. (1951), 341 U.S. 494.
18 March vs. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501; Tucker vs. Texas, 326 U.S. 517.
19 Pickering vs. Board of Education 391 U.S. 563, 574, (1968).
20 Security Bank Employees Union-NATU vs. Security Bank and Trust Co., April 30, 1968, 23 SCRA 503,
515; Caltex vs. Lucero, April 28, 1962, 4 SCRA 1196, 1198-99; Malayang Manggagawa sa ESSO vs. ESSO
July 30, 1965, 14 SCRA 801,806, 807, De Leon vs. National Labor Union, 100 Phil., 792; PAFLU vs.
Barot, 99 Phil. 1008 Continental Manufacturing Employees Assoc., et. al. vs. C.I.R., et al., L-26849,
Sept. 30, 1970, 35 SCRA 204.
21 Sotto vs. Ruiz, 41 Phil. 468; Shuttleworth vs. Birmingham (1969), 394 U.S. 147; Largent vs. Texas,
318 U.S. (1943) 418; Jamison vs. Texas, (1943) 318 U.S. 413; Lovell vs. Griffin (1938) 303 U.S. 444;
Grosjean vs. American Press Co. (1936) 297 U.S. 233; Subido vs. Ozaeta, 80 Phil., 393; Justice
Fernando, Bill of Rights, 1970 Ed., pp. 90-93.
22 Pickering vs. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563, 574, 20 L. Ed. 2nd, 811, 820.
23 Republic Savings Bank vs. C.I.R. et. al., Sept. 27, 1967, 21 SCRA 226, 232, 233, 661, 662, 663-664, 211
21 SCRA 233.
25 Justice Sanchez in Chavez vs. Court of Appeals, 24 SCRA 663, 692, Aug. 19, 1968; see also
concurring opinion of Justice Castro; Camasura vs. Provost Marshall, 78 Phil. 131.
26 Abriol vs. Homeres, 84 Phil. 525, 1949.
27 Fay vs. Noia 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
28 West Virginia State Board of Education vs. Barnette, supra.
28-a Victorias Milling Co., Inc. vs. W.C.C. L-25665, May 22, 1969, 28 SCRA 285-298.
29 Sec. 20, Com. Act No. 103, as amended.
29a Elizalde & Co., Inc. vs. C.I.R., et. al., September 23, 1968, 25 SCRA 58, 61-63; Bien vs. Castillo, 97
Phil. 956; Pangasinan Employees, etc. vs. Martinez, May 20, 1960, 108 Phil. 89, Local 7, etc. vs.
Tabigne, Nov. 29, 1960, 110 Phil. 276; Luzon Stevedoring vs. C.I.R., July 26, 1963, 8 SCRA, 447; Manila
Metal, etc. vs. C.I.R., July 31, 1963, 8 SCRA 552.
30 People vs. Vera, 65 Phil. 56, 82; Mercado vs. Go Bio, 48 O.G. 5360.
30-a See Workmen's Ins. Co., Inc. vs. Augusto, L-31060, July 29, 1971, 40 SCRA 123, 127.
30-b Ronquillo vs. Marasigan, L-11621, May 31, 1962, 5 SCRA 304, 312, 312; Ordoveza vs. Raymundo, 63
Phil. 275.
30-c L-30570, July 29, 1969, 28 SCRA 890, 933-34.
30-d 28 SCRA 933-934.
30-e L-28714, June 13, 1970, 33 SCRA 887, 907-908.
30-f L-27807, Aug. 31, 1970, 34 SCRA 738, 742-3.
30-g 34 SCRA 742-743.
31 A Living Bill of Rights (1961), pp. 61, 62, 64; 24 SCRA, 690-692; Emphasis supplied.
32 21 SCRA 226-241. Sept. 27, 1967.
33 21 SCRA 232-237.
BARREDO, dissenting:
1 25 SCRA 58.
2 86 Phil. 525.
3 Daquis vs. Bustos, 94 Phil. 913, reiterated in Maramba vs. Lozano, 20 SCRA 474. See also Vicente vs.
Lucas, 95 Phil. 716.
4 97 Phil. 806, at p. 816.
5 73 Phil. 408.
6 Under which this case was filed.
7 Mauricio vs. Villanueva, 106 Phil. 1159, cited by Moran in Vol. 11, p. 246 (1970 ed.).
8 Garchitorena vs. Sotelo, 74 Phil. 25.
9 Amuran vs. Aquino, 38 Phil. 29; Javier vs. Parades, 52 Phil. 910; Domingo vs. David, 68 Phil. 134.
10 Quion v. Claridad, 74 Phil. 100.
TEEHANKEE, concurring:
1 The first shift comprised the workers from 6 A.M. to 2 P.M. Respondent company had no objection
to the two regular shifts workers (7 A.M. to 4 P.M. and 8 A.M. to 5 P.M.) being excused from work
for the mass demonstration.
2 Ermita-Malate Hotel Operators Ass'n. vs. City Mayor, 20 SCRA 849(1967), per Fernando, J.
Facts:
Petitioner Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization ( PBMEO)
is a legitimate labor union, composed of the employees of the
respondent Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc. (PBMCI).

On March 1, 1969, PBMEO decided to stage a mass demonstration at

Malacañang on March 4, 1969, in protest against alleged abuses of the
Pasig police, to be participated in by the workers in the first shift (from
6 A.M. to 2 P.M.) as well as those in the regular second (from 7 A.M. to
4 P.M.) and and third shifts (from 8 A.M. to 5 P.M.). They informed the
company - PBMCI - of their proposed demonstration.

A meeting was called by PBMCI on March 3, 1969. The union was

informed that any demonstration should not unduly prejudice the
normal operation of the company. For which reason, Atty. C.S. de
Leon, as PBMCI's spokesperson, warned the PBMEO representatives
that workers who belong to the first shifts, who without previous
leave of absence approved by the Company, who shall fail to report for
work the following morning (March 4, 1969) shall be dismissed,
because such failure is a violation of the existing CBA and, therefore,
would be amounting to an illegal strike.

Another meeting was called in the afternoon where PBMCI appealed

to the PBMEO representatives that the workers for the first shift of
March 4, 1969 should be excused from joining the demonstration and
should report for work in order not to violate the provisions of the CBA
providing for 'No Strike and No Lockout.' All those who will not follow
this warning of the Company shall be dismissed.

PBMEO proceeded with the demonstration as planned. PBMCI filed

charges in the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) against the union
members and officers composing the first shift for violating the CBA
provisions on strike/lockout.

The CIR issued an Order finding PBMEO guilty of bargaining in bad faith
and its officers (petitioners) as directly responsible for perpetrating the
said unfair labor practice and were, as a consequence, considered to
have lost their status as employees of the company.
Petitioners claim that they received on September 23, 1969 the
aforesaid order and that they filed on September 29, 1969, because
September 28, 1969 fell on Sunday, a motion for reconsideration (MR)
of said order.

PBMCI averred that petitioners received the order on September 22,

1969, thus the MR was filed beyond the 5 day period under Section 15
of the amended Rules of the Court of Industrial Relations. The CIR
dismissed the MR of petitioner for being pro forma and for being filed
out of time.

Petitioners filed with the CIR a petition for relief from the dismissal.
Without waiting for any resolution on their petition for relief, they filed
an appeal with the Supreme Court.

Held:
Primacy of right of free expression and of assembly over property
rights
1. In seeking sanctuary behind their freedom of expression as well as
their right of assembly and of petition against alleged persecution of
local officialdom, the employees and laborers of herein private
respondent firm were fighting for their very survival, utilizing only the
weapons afforded them by the Constitution. The pretension of their
employer that it would suffer loss or damage by reason of the absence
of its employees from 6 o'clock in the morning to 2 o'clock in the
afternoon, is a plea for the preservation merely of their property
rights.

2. In the hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights of free expression and of

assembly occupy a preferred position as they are essential to the
preservation and vitality of our civil and political institutions, and such
priority "gives these liberties the sanctity and the sanction not
permitting dubious intrusion

3. The rights of free expression, free assembly and petition, are not
only civil rights but also political rights essential to man's enjoyment of
his life, to his happiness and to his full and complete fulfillment. While
the Bill of Rights also protects property rights, the primacy of human
rights over property rights is recognized. Because these freedoms are
"delicate and vulnerable, as well as supremely precious in our society"
and the "threat of sanctions may deter their exercise almost as
potently as the actual application of sanctions," they "need breathing
space to survive," permitting government regulation only "with
narrow specificity." Property and property rights can be lost thru
prescription; but human rights are imprescriptible.

4. The superiority of these freedoms over property rights is

underscored by the fact that a mere reasonable or rational relation
between the means employed by the law and its object or
purpose that the law is neither arbitrary nor discriminatory nor
oppressive would suffice to validate a law which restricts or impairs
property rights. On the other hand, a constitutional or
valid infringement of human rights requires a more stringent criterion,
namely existence of a grave and immediate danger of a substantive
evil which the State has the right to prevent.

The mass demonstration by the petitioners was not in violation of the

CBA
5. The demonstration held by petitioners on March 4, 1969 before
Malacanang was against alleged abuses of some Pasig policemen, not
against their employer. Said demonstration was purely and completely
an exercise of their freedom of expression in general and of their right
of assembly and of petition for redress of grievances in particular
before the appropriate governmental agency, the Chief Executive,
against the police officers of the municipality of Pasig.

6. To regard the demonstration against police officers, not against the

employer, as evidence of bad faith in collective bargaining and hence a
violation of the collective bargaining agreement and a cause for the
dismissal from employment of the demonstrating employees,
stretches unduly the compass of the collective bargaining agreement,
as "a potent means of inhibiting speech" and therefore inflicts a moral
as well as mortal wound on the constitutional guarantees of free
expression, of peaceful assembly and of petition.

7. The mass demonstration staged by the employees on March 4, 1969

could not have been legally enjoined by any court, for such an
injunction would be trenching upon the freedom of expression of the
workers, even if it legally appears to be an illegal picketing or strike.
The CIR concedes that the mass demonstration was not a declaration
of a strike "as the same is not rooted in any industrial dispute although
there is a concerted act and the occurrence of a temporary stoppage
of work.

PBMCI is guilty of unfair labor practice

8. Because of the refusal on the part of PBMCI to permit all its
employees and workers to join the mass demonstration against alleged
police abuses and the subsequent separation of the eight (8)
petitioners from the service constituted an unconstitutional restraint
on their freedom of expression, freedom of assembly and freedom to
petition for redress of grievances, the company committed an unfair
labor practice defined in Section 4(a-1) in relation to Section 3 of
Republic Act No. 875, otherwise known as the Industrial Peace Act.
Section 3 thereof guarantees to the employees the right "to engage in
concerted activities for . . . mutual aid or protection"; while Section 4(a-
1) regards as an unfair labor practice for an employer "to interfere
with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their rights
guaranteed in Section Three." The threat of dismissal tended to coerce
the employees from joining the mass demonstration.

Dismissal of the union leaders was a denial of social justice

9. The dismissal of the eight (8) leaders of the workers for proceeding
with the demonstration and consequently being absent from work,
constitutes a denial of social justice likewise assured by the
fundamental law to these lowly employees. Section 5 of Article II of the
Constitution imposes upon the State "the promotion of social justice
to insure the well-being and economic security of all of the people,"
which guarantee is emphasized by the other directive in Section 6 of
Article XIV of the Constitution that "the State shall afford protection to
labor . . ." The Court of Industrial Relations as an agency of the State is
under obligation at all times to give meaning and substance to these
constitutional guarantees in favor of the working man.

10. Even if the questioned Court of Industrial Relations orders and rule
were to be given effect, the dismissal or termination of the
employment of the petitioning eight (8) leaders of the Union is harsh
for a one-day absence from work. The appropriate penalty if it
deserves any penalty at all should have been simply to charge said one-
day absence against their vacation or sick leave. But to dismiss the
eight (8) leaders of the petitioner Union is a most cruel penalty, since
as aforestated the Union leaders depend on their wages for their daily
sustenance as well as that of their respective families aside from the
fact that it is a lethal blow to unionism, while at the same time
strengthening the oppressive hand of the petty tyrants in the localities.

A violation of a constitutional right divests the court of jurisdiction

11. It has been established that a violation of a constitutional right

divests the court of jurisdiction; and as a consequence its judgment is
null and void and confers no rights. Both the Court of Industrial
Relations andPBMCI trenched upon the constitutional immunities of
petitioners. Both failed to accord preference to such rights and
aggravated the inhumanity to which the aggrieved workers claimed
they had been subjected by the municipal police. Having violated these
basic human rights of the laborers, the Court of Industrial Relations
ousted itself of jurisdiction and the questioned orders it issued in the
instant case are a nullity.

Procedural rules cannot prevail over the Constitution

12. The exercise and enjoyment of their rights must not be nullified by
a mere procedural rule promulgated by the Court of Industrial
Relations exercising a purely delegated legislative power, when even a
law enacted by Congress must yield to the untrammelled enjoyment of
these human rights. Otherwise, these guarantees in the Bill of Rights
would be vitiated by a rule on procedure prescribing the period for
appeal.

13. The motion for reconsideration was filed on September 29, 1969, or
seven (7) days from notice on September 22, 1969 of the order. Does
the mere fact that the MR was filed two (2) days late defeat the rights
of the petitioning employees? To accord supremacy to the foregoing
rules of the Court of Industrial Relations over basic human rights
sheltered by the Constitution, is not only incompatible with the basic
tenet of constitutional government that the Constitution is superior to
any statute or subordinate rules and regulations, but also does
violence to natural reason and logic. The dominance and superiority of
the constitutional right over the Court of Industrial Relations
procedural rule of necessity should be affirmed.

CIR may suspend application of its procedural rules as may be

equitable and just under the circumstances
14. The suspension of the application of Section 15 of the Court of
Industrial Relations rules with reference to the case at bar, is also
authorized by Section 20 of Commonwealth Act No. 103, the C.I.R.
charter. Under Section 20, 'The Court of Industrial Relations shall adopt
its rules or procedure and shall have such other powers as generally
pertain to a court of justice: Provided, however, That in the hearing,
investigation and determination of any question or controversy and in
exercising any duties and power under this Act, the Court shall act
according to justice and equity and substantial merits of the
case, without regard to technicalities or legal forms and shall not be
bound by any technical rules of legal evidence but may inform its mind
in such manner as it may deem just and equitable.' By this provision,
the industrial court is disengaged from the rigidity of the technicalities
applicable to ordinary courts. Said court is not even restricted to the
specific relief demanded by the parties but may issue such orders as
may be deemed necessary or expedient for the purpose of settling the
dispute or dispelling any doubts that may give rise to future
disputes. (see Ang Tibay v. C.I.R)

5 day period to file MR is unreasonable

15. Said Court of Industrial Relations rule, promulgated as it was
pursuant to a mere legislative delegation, is unreasonable and
therefore is beyond the authority granted by the Constitution and the
law. A period of five (5) days within which to file a motion for
reconsideration is too short, especially for the aggrieved workers, who
usually do not have the ready funds to meet the necessary expenses
therefor.
G.R. No. 89571 February 6, 1991
FRANCISCO LIM TUPAS and IGNACIO LIM TUPAS, petitioners,
vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Fernandez, Velasco & Grapilan for petitioners.
CRUZ, J.:

In its resolution dated October 12, 1989, the Court denied the petition
for certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court for failure to show
that the respondent court committed reversible error in its resolution
dated May 31, 1989.1The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration
on November 23, 1989, to which we required a Comment, which was
followed by a Reply and later a Rejoinder.

After considering the issues and the arguments of the parties in their
respective pleadings, we affirm that the respondent court was, indeed,
correct when it held that the appeal had been tardily made. The record
shows that the petitioners received a copy of the decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Pasay City on April 3, 1989, and that the motion
for reconsideration thereof was filed on April 17, 1989, or fourteen days
later. The order of May 3, 1989, denying the motion was received by
the petitioners' counsel on May 9, 1989. Instead of filing the petition
for review with the Court of Appeals within the remainder of the 15-day
reglementary period, that is, on May 10, 1989, the petitioner did so only
on May 23, 1989, or 14 days later. The petition was therefore clearly
tardy.

In Lacsamana v. Court of Appeals,2 which was promulgated on August

26, 1986, before the case at bar arose, we held:

APPEALS BY PETITION FOR REVIEW TO THE COURT OF APPEALS.

The final judgment or order of a regional trial court in an appeal

from the final judgment or order of a metropolitan trial court,
municipal trial court and municipal circuit trial court may be
appealed to the Court of Appeals through a petition for review in
accordance with Section 22 of BP no. 129 and Section 22(b) of the
Interim Rules, or to this Court through a petition for review
on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules. The reason
 for extending the period for the riling of a record on appeal is also
applicable to the filing of a petition for review with the Court of
Appeals. If a motion for reconsideration is filed with and denied by a
regional trial court, the movant has only the remaining period within
which to file a petition for review. Hence, it may be necessary to file
a motion with the Court of Appeals for extension of time to file such
petition for review (emphasis supplied.)

The petitioners' counsel did not file the petition for review within the
remaining period, which he should have known was only one day.
Neither did he move for an extension that would have been granted as
a matter of course. The petition for review being indisputably late, he
could not thereafter ask that it be treated as a petition
for certiorariunder Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which can be filed
within a reasonable time. This remedy cannot be employed as a
substitute for a lost appeal.3

It follows that for having themselves forfeited the right to appeal, the
petitioners cannot now plaintively claim that they have been denied
due process.

Rules of procedure are intended to ensure the orderly administration

of justice and the protection of substantive rights in judicial and
extrajudicial proceedings. It is a mistake to suppose that substantive
law and adjective law are contradictory to each other or, as has often
been suggested, that enforcement of procedural rules should never be
permitted if it will result in prejudice to the substantive rights of the
litigants. This is not exactly true; the concept is much misunderstood.
As a matter of fact, the policy of the courts is to give effect to both
kinds of law, as complementing each other, in the just and speedy
resolution of the dispute between the parties. Observance of both
substantive and procedural rights is equally guaranteed by due
process, whatever the source of such rights, be it the Constitution
itself or only a statute or a rule of court.4

The petitioners' argument that they should not be prejudiced by the

mistakes of their counsel because they are laymen and not familiar
with the intricacies of the law is not acceptable. If clients could
disauthorize their counsel on this ground, the administration of justice
could be hopelessly encumbered. The petitioners have not shown that
their counsel was exceptionally inept or motivated by bad faith or
excusably misled by the facts. There is no reason why we should not
apply the rule that clients should be bound by the acts of their counsel,
including his mistakes5

The petitioners' submission that their counsel's failure to appeal on

time should be regarded as excusable neglect or honest error is not
compatible with his impressive credentials. He is a prestigious member
of the bar and his conduct at the trial demonstrated his experience and
skill as a trial lawyer. The petitioners themselves describe him as "a
graduate of one of the top law schools in the country, a bar examiner
in Remedial Law, a law professor in Remedial Law and other law
subjects, a former National Officer of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and a seasoned practitioner for more than 30 years."6

The procedural mistake might have been understandable in an

ordinary lawyer but not in the case of the petitioners' former counsel.

Now petitioner wants us to nullify all of the antecedent

proceedings and recognize his earlier claims to the disputed
property on the justification that his counsel was grossly inept.
Such a reason is hardly plausible as the petitioner's new counsel
should know. Otherwise, all a defeated party would have to do to
salvage his case is claim neglect or mistake on the part of his
counsel as a ground for reversing the adverse judgment. There
would be no end to litigation if this were allowed as every
shortcoming of counsel could be the subject of challenge by his
client through another counsel who, if he is also found wanting,
would likewise be disowned by the same client through another
counsel, and so on ad infinitum. This would render court
proceedings indefinite, tentative and subject to reopening at any
time by the mere subterfuge of replacing counsel.7

It has not escaped the attention of the Court that the motion for
reconsideration of the decision of the trial court was filed on the
fourteenth day of the reglementary period and that the petition for
review was filed, presumably under the belief that a new 15-day period
had begun, fourteen days after the petitioners' counsel was notified of
the denial of the motion. This smacks of a dilatory tactic. It would seem
to the Court that if the petitioners felt so strongly that the said
decision was erroneous they would have demonstrated more spirit and
promptitude in assailing it. Instead, they waited to move for
reconsideration until the last hour and, ultimately, when the motion
was denied, filed the petition for review only when it was already too
late. Under these circumstances, equity cannot be extended to them
to soften the rigor of the law they have not chosen to observe.

For all its conceded merits, equity is available only in the absence of
law and not as its replacement.1âwphi1 Equity is described as justice
outside legality, which simply means that it cannot supplant although it
may, as often happens, supplement the law. We said in an earlier case,
and we repeat it now, that all abstract arguments based only on equity
should yield to positive rules, which pre-empt and prevail over such
persuasions. Emotional appeals for justice, while they may wring the
heart of the Court, cannot justify disregard of the mandate of the law
as long as it remains in force. The applicable maxim, which goes back
to the ancient days of the Roman jurists — and is now still reverently
observed — is "aequetas nunquam contravenit legis."8

It is clear that the respondent court did not commit any reversible
error in dismissing the petitioners' appeal on the ground of tardiness.
On the contrary, the challenged resolution is conformable to the
applicable law and jurisprudence that, despite the confusion of the
petitioners' former counsel, carried no esoteric meaning not available
to the ordinary practitioner.

WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is DENIED with finality. It

is so ordered.

Narvasa, Gancayco, Griño Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1
Benipayo, J., ponente; Melo and Pronove, JJ., concurring.
2
143 SCRA 643.
3
Pan Realty Corp. vs. CA, 167 SCRA 564: Del Pozo vs. Penaco, Ibid., p. 577.
4
Limpot vs. CA, 170 SCRA 369.
5
Aguila vs. CA, 160 SCRA 357-358.
6
Rollo, p. 16.
7
Aguila vs. CA, 160 SCRA 359.
8
Aguila vs. CA, supra.
G.R. Nos. 159017-18 March 9, 2011
PAULINO S. ASILO, JR., Petitioner,
vs. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and Spouses VISITACION AND
CESAR C. BOMBASI, Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 159059
VICTORIA BUETA VDA. DE COMENDADOR, IN REPRESENTATION OF
DEMETRIO T. COMENDADOR,Petitioner,
vs. VISITACION C. BOMBASI AND CESAR C. BOMBASI, Respondents.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:

At bench are appeals by certiorari1 from the Decision2 of the Fourth

Division of the Sandiganbayan; (1) finding Demetrio T.
Comendador3 (Mayor Comendador) and Paulino S. Asilo, Jr.4 guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Sec. 3(e) of Republic Act No.
3019; (2) dismissing the cases against accused Alberto S. Angeles;5 (3)
ordering the defendants Municipality of Nagcarlan, Laguna, Demetrio
T. Comendador and Paulino S. Asilo, Jr. to pay the plaintiffs now
respondents Visitacion C. Bombasi (Visitacion) and Cesar C. Bombasi
damages; and (4) dismissing the cases against the spouses Alida and
Teddy Coroza6 and Benita and Isagani Coronado.7

The factual antecedents of the case are:

On 15 March 1978, Private Respondent Visitacion’s late mother

Marciana Vda. De Coronado (Vda. De Coronado) and the Municipality
of Nagcarlan, Laguna (represented by the then Municipal Mayor
Crisostomo P. Manalang) entered into a lease contract whereby the
Municipality allowed the use and enjoyment of property comprising of
a lot and a store located at the corner of Coronado and E. Fernandez
Sts. at Poblacion, Nagcarlan, Laguna, in favor of the respondent’s
mother for a period of twenty (20) years beginning on 15 March 1978
until 15 March 1998, extendible for another 20 years.8

The lease contract provided that the late Vda. De Coronado could build
a firewall on her rented property which must be at least as high as the
store; and in case of modification of the public market, she or her heir/s
would be given preferential rights.
Visitacion took over the store when her mother died sometime in
1984.9 From then on up to January 1993, Visitacion secured the yearly
Mayor’s permits.10

Sometime in 1986, a fire razed the public market of Nagcarlan. Upon

Visitacion’s request for inspection on 15 May 1986, District Engineer
Marcelino B. Gorospe (Engineer Gorospe) of the then Ministry of Public
Works and Highways,11 Regional Office No. IV-A, found that the store of
Visitacion remained intact and stood strong. This finding of Engineer
Gorospe was contested by the Municipality of Nagcarlan.

The store of Visitacion continued to operate after the fire until 15

October 1993.

On 1 September 1993, Visitacion received a letter12 from Mayor

Comendador directing her to demolish her store within five (5) days
from notice. Attached to the letter were copies of Sangguniang Bayan
Resolution No. 15613dated 30 August 1993 and a Memorandum issued
by Asst. Provincial Prosecutor Marianito Sasondoncillo of Laguna.

The relevant provisos of the Resolution No. 156 states that:

NOW THEREFORE, be it RESOLVED, as it hereby resolved to authorize

Hon. Demetrio T. Comendador to enforce and order the Coronado’s to
demolish the building constructed on the space previously rented to
them in order to give way for the construction of a new municipal
market building.

RESOLVED FURTHER, to authorize Demetrio T. Comendador,

Honorable Mayor of Nagcarlan to file an Unlawful Detainer Case with
damages for the expenses incurred due to the delay in the completion
of the project if the Coronado’s continuously resists the order.

On 3 September 1993, Visitacion wrote a reply letter to Mayor

Comendador saying that: (1) the lease contract was still existing and
legally binding; (2) she was willing to vacate the store as long as same
place and area would be given to her in the new public market; and (3)
in case her proposals are not acceptable to Mayor Comendador, for
the latter to just file an unlawful detainer case against her pursuant to
Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 156. Pertinent portions of the letter
read:

x x x With all due respect to the resolution of the Municipal Council and
the opinion rendered by the Laguna Asst. Provincial Prosecutor, it is my
considered view, however, arrived at after consultation with my legal
counsel, that our existing lease contract is still legally binding and in full
force and effect. Lest I appear to be defiant, let me reiterate to you
and the council that we are willing to vacate the said building provided
that a new contract is executed granting to us the same space or lot
and the same area. I believe that our proposal is most reasonable and
fair under the circumstance. If you are not amenable to the said
proposal, I concur with the position taken by the Council for you to file
the appropriate action in court for unlawful detainer to enable our
court to finally thresh out our differences.141avvphi1

On 15 September 1993, Asst. Provincial Prosecutor Florencio Buyser

sent a letter to Visitacion ordering her to vacate the portion of the
public market she was occupying within 15 days from her receipt of the
letter; else, a court action will be filed against her.

On 11 October 1993, the Sangguniang Bayan of Nagcarlan, Laguna

issued Resolution No. 183 authorizing Mayor Comendador to demolish
the store being occupied by Visitacion using legal means. The
significant portion of the Resolution reads:

Kung kaya ang Sangguniang Bayan ay buong pagkakaisang IPINASIYA:

Ang pagbibigay kapangyarihan kay Kgg. Demetrio T. Comendador na
ipagiba ang anumang istrakturang nagiging sagabal sa mabilis at
maayos na pagbabangon ng pamilihang bayan.15

On 14 October 1993, Municipal Administrator Paulino S. Asilo, Jr. (Asilo)

also sent a letter16 to Visitacion informing her of the impending
demolition of her store the next day. Within the same day, Visitacion
wrote a reply letter17 to Asilo, alleging that there is no legal right to
demolish the store in the absence of a court order and that the
Resolutions did not sanction the demolition of her store but only the
filing of an appropriate unlawful detainer case against her. She further
replied that if the demolition will take place, appropriate
administrative, criminal and civil actions will be filed against Mayor
Comendador, Asilo and all persons who will take part in the demolition.
On 15 October 1993, Mayor Comendador relying on the strength of
Sangguniang Bayan Resolution Nos. 183 and 156 authorized the
demolition of the store with Asilo and Angeles supervising the work.
Engineer Winston Cabrega (Engineer Cabrega), a licensed civil
engineer, estimated the cost of the demolished property as amounting
to ₱437,900.0018

On 19 August 1994, Visitacion, together with her husband Cesar

Bombasi (Spouses Bombasi) filed with the Regional Trial Court of San
Pablo City, Laguna a Civil Case19 for damages with preliminary
injunction against the Municipality of Nagcarlan, Laguna, Mayor
Demetrio T. Comendador, Paulino S. Asilo, Jr., and Alberto S. Angeles.
The complaint was soon after amended to include the Spouses Benita
and Isagani Coronado and Spouses Alida and Teddy Coroza as formal
defendants because they were then the occupants of the contested
area.

The spouses prayed for the following disposition:

1. RESTRAINING or ENJOINING defendant Municipality and

defendant Municipal Mayor from leasing the premises subject of
lease Annex "A" hereof, part of which is now occupied by PNP
Outpost and by the Municipal Collectors’ Office, and the
equivalent adjacent area thereof, and to cause the removal of said
stalls;

2. UPHOLDING the right of plaintiffs to occupy the equivalent

corner area of the leased areas being now assigned to other
persons by defendants Municipality and/or by defendant
Municipal Mayor, and to allow plaintiffs to construct their stalls
thereon;

3. MAKING the injunction permanent, after trial;

4. ORDERING defendants to pay plaintiffs, jointly and severally,

the following –
 (a) ₱437,900.00 for loss of building/store and other items
therein;
(b) ₱200,000.00 for exemplary damages;
(c) ₱200,000.00 for moral damages;
(d) ₱30,.00 for attorney’s fees and ₱700.00 for every
attendance of counsel in court.

5. GRANTING further reliefs upon plaintiffs as justice and equity

may warrant in the premises.20

Spouses Bombasi, thereafter, filed a criminal complaint21 against Mayor

Comendador, Asilo and Angeles for violation of Sec. 3(e) of Republic
Act No. 3019 otherwise known as the "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act" before the Office of the Ombudsman. On 22 February 1996, an
Information22 against Mayor Comendador, Asilo and Angeles was filed,
which reads:

That on or about October 15, 1993, at Nagcarlan, Laguna, Philippines,

and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, all public officers, accused Demetrio T. Comendador, being
then the Municipal Mayor, accused Paulino S. Asilo, Jr. being then the
Municipal Administrator and accused Alberto S. Angeles being then the
Municipal Planning and Development Coordinator, all of the
Municipality of Nagcarlan, Laguna, committing the crime herein
charged in relation to, while in the performance and taking advantage
of their official functions, conspiring and confederating with each
other, and with evident bad faith, manifest partiality or through gross
inexcusable negligence, did then and there willfully, unlawfully,
criminally cause the demolition of a public market stall leased by the
municipal government in favor of one Visitacion Coronado-Bombasi
without legal or justifiable ground therefor, thus, causing undue injury
to the latter in the amount of PESOS: FOUR HUNDRED THIRTY SEVEN
THOUSAND AND NINE HUNDRED ONLY (₱437,900.00).

Upon their arraignments, all the accused entered their separate pleas
of "Not Guilty."

On 4 March 1997, the Sandiganbayan promulgated a Resolution

ordering the consolidation of Civil Case No. SP-4064 (94)23 with
Criminal Case No. 23267 pending before the Third Division pursuant to
Section 4, Presidential Decree No. 1606, which pertinently reads:

Any provision of law or Rules of Court to the contrary notwithstanding,

the criminal action and the corresponding civil action for the recovery
of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall at all times be
simultaneously instituted with, and jointly determined in the same
proceeding by the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate courts, the filing
of the criminal action being deemed to necessarily carry with it the
filing of the civil action, and no right to reserve the filing of such civil
action separately from the criminal action shall be recognized;
Provided, however, that where the civil action had heretofore been
filed separately but judgment therein has not yet been rendered, and
the criminal case is hereafter filed with the Sandiganbayan or the
appropriate court, said civil action shall be transferred to the
Sandiganbayan or the appropriate court as the case may be, for
consolidation and joint determination with the criminal action,
otherwise the separate civil action shall be deemed abandoned.24

During the pendency of the case, Alberto S. Angeles died on 16

November 1997. Accordingly, the counsel of Angeles filed a motion to
drop accused Angeles. On 22 September 1999, the Third Division of
Sandiganbayan issued an Order25 DISMISSING the case against
Angeles. The germane portion of the Order reads:

In view of the submission of the death certificate of accused/defendant

Alberto S. Angeles, and there being no objection on the part of the
Public Prosecutor, cases against deceased accused/defendant Angeles
only, are hereby DISMISSED.

The death of Mayor Comendador followed on 17 September 2002. As a

result, the counsel of the late Mayor filed on 3 March 2003 a
Manifestation before the Sandiganbayan informing the court of the
fact of Mayor Comendador’s death.

On 28 April 2003, the Sandiganbayan rendered a decision, the

dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as
follows:

In Criminal Case No. 23267, the court finds accused Demetrio T.

Comendador and Paulino S. Asilo, Jr. guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of violation of Sec. 3(e) of Republic Act. No. 3019 as amended, and in
the absence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, said accused are sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of 6 years and 2 months imprisonment as
minimum to 10 years and 1 day as maximum.

The order of the court dated September 22, 1999 dismissing the cases
against the accused Alberto S. Angeles, who died on November 16,
1997 is hereby reiterated.

In Civil Case No. 4064, defendants Municipality of Nagcarlan, Laguna,

Demetrio T. Comendador and Paulino S. Asilo, Jr. are hereby ordered
jointly and severally to pay plaintiff P437,900.00 as actual damages for
the destruction of the store; P100,000.00 as moral damages;
P30,000.00 as attorney’s fees, and to pay the cost of the suit. The
prayer for exemplary damages is denied as the court found no
aggravating circumstances in the commission of the crime.

In view of this court’s finding that the defendant spouses Alida and
Teddy Coroza are lawful occupants of the subject market stalls from
which they cannot be validly ejected without just cause, the complaint
against them is dismissed. The complaint against defendant spouses
Benita and Isagani Coronado is likewise dismissed, it appearing that
they are similarly situated as the spouses Coroza. Meanwhile, plaintiff
Visitacion Bombasi is given the option to accept market space being
given to her by the municipality, subject to her payment of the
appropriate rental and permit fees.

The prayer for injunctive relief is denied, the same having become
moot and academic.

The compulsory counterclaim of defendant Comendador is likewise

denied for lack of merit.26
Within the same day, Asilo, through his counsel, filed a Motion for
Reconsideration27 of the Decision alleging that there was only an error
of judgment when he complied with and implemented the order of his
superior, Mayor Comendador. He likewise alleged that there is no
liability when a public officer commits in good faith an error of
judgment. The Sandiganbayan, on its Resolution28 dated 21 July 2003
denied the Motion for Reconsideration on the ground that good faith
cannot be argued to support his cause in the face of the court’s finding
that bad faith attended the commission of the offense charged. The
Court further explained that the invocation of compliance with an
order of a superior is of no moment for the "demolition [order] cannot
be described as having the semblance of legality inasmuch as it was
issued without the authority and therefore the same was patently
illegal."29

The counsel for the late Mayor also filed its Motion for
Reconsideration30 on 12 May 2003 alleging that the death of the late
Mayor had totally extinguished both his criminal and civil liability. The
Sandiganbayan on its Resolution31granted the Motion insofar as the
extinction of the criminal liability is concerned and denied the
extinction of the civil liability holding that the civil action is an
independent civil action.

Hence, these Petitions for Review on Certiorari.32

Petitioner Asilo argues that in order to sustain conviction under Sec.

3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 or "The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act," the public officer must have acted with manifest partiality,
evident bad faith or gross negligence. He also contended that he and
his co-accused acted in good faith in the demolition of the market and,
thereby, no liability was incurred.

On the other hand, Petitioner Victoria argues that the death of Mayor
Comendador prior to the promulgation of the decision extinguished
NOT ONLY Mayor Comendador’s criminal liability but also his civil
liability. She also asserted good faith on the part of the accused public
officials when they performed the demolition of the market stall.
Lastly, she contended that assuming arguendo that there was indeed
liability on the part of the accused public officials, the actual amount of
damages being claimed by the Spouses Bombasi has no basis and was
not duly substantiated.

Liability of the accused public officials

under Republic Act No. 3019

Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 provides:

In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by

existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any
public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:

xxxx
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the
Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits,
advantage or preference in the discharge of his official, administrative
or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad
faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to
officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged
with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.

The elements of the offense are as follows: (1) that the accused are
public officers or private persons charged in conspiracy with them; (2)
that said public officers commit the prohibited acts during the
performance of their official duties or in relation to their public
positions; (3) that they caused undue injury to any party, whether the
Government or a private party; (4) OR that such injury is caused by
giving unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference to the other
party; and (5) that the public officers have acted with manifest
partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.33

We sustain the Sandiganbayan in its finding of criminal and civil

liabilities against petitioner Asilo and petitioner Mayor Comendador as
here represented by his widow Victoria Bueta.

We agree with the Sandiganbayan that it is undisputable that the first

two requisites of the criminal offense were present at the time of the
commission of the complained acts and that, as to the remaining
elements, there is sufficient amount of evidence to establish that there
was an undue injury suffered on the part of the Spouses Bombasi and
that the public officials concerned acted with evident bad faith when
they performed the demolition of the market stall.

Causing undue injury to any party, including the government, could

only mean actual injury or damage which must be established by
evidence.34

In jurisprudence, "undue injury" is consistently interpreted as "actual."

Undue has been defined as "more than necessary, not proper, [or]
illegal;" and injury as "any wrong or damage done to another, either in
his person, rights, reputation or property [that is, the] invasion of any
legally protected interest of another." Actual damage, in the context
of these definitions, is akin to that in civil law.35

It is evident from the records, as correctly observed by the

Sandiganbayan, that Asilo and Mayor Comendador as accused below
did not deny that there was indeed damage caused the Spouses
Bombasi on account of the demolition. We affirm the finding that:

xxx. Clearly, the demolition of plaintiff’s store was carried out without
a court order, and notwithstanding a restraining order which the
plaintiff was able to obtain. The demolition was done in the exercise of
official duties which apparently was attended by evident bad faith,
manifest partiality or gross inexcusable negligence as there is nothing
in the two (2) resolutions which gave the herein accused the authority
to demolish plaintiff’s store.

"Evident bad faith" connotes not only bad judgment but also palpably
and patently fraudulent and dishonest purpose to do moral obliquity or
conscious wrongdoing for some perverse motive or ill will.36 [It]
contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive
design or with some motive or self-interest or ill will or for ulterior
purposes.37

It is quite evident in the case at bar that the accused public officials
committed bad faith in performing the demolition.
First, there can be no merit in the contention that respondents’
structure is a public nuisance. The abatement of a nuisance without
judicial proceedings is possible if it is nuisance per se.38 Nuisance per se
is that which is nuisance at all times and under any circumstance,
regardless of location and surroundings.39 In this case, the market stall
cannot be considered as a nuisance per se because as found out by the
Court, the buildings had not been affected by the 1986 fire. This finding
was certified to by Supervising Civil Engineer Wilfredo A. Sambrano of
the Laguna District Engineer Office.40 To quote:

An inspection has been made on the building (a commercial

establishment) cited above and found out the following:

1. It is a two-storey building, sketch of which is attached.

2. It is located within the market site.
3. The building has not been affected by the recent fire.
4. The concrete wall[s] does not even show signs of being
exposed to fire.41

Second, the Sangguniang Bayan resolutions are not enough to justify

demolition. Unlike its predecessor law,42 the present Local Government
Code43 does not expressly provide for the abatement of
nuisance.44 And even assuming that the power to abate nuisance is
provided for by the present code, the accused public officials were
under the facts of this case, still devoid of any power to demolish the
store. A closer look at the contested resolutions reveals that Mayor
Comendador was only authorized to file an unlawful detainer case in
case of resistance to obey the order or to demolish the building using
legal means. Clearly, the act of demolition without legal order in this
case was not among those provided by the resolutions, as indeed, it is
a legally impossible provision.

Furthermore, the Municipality of Nagcarlan, Laguna, as represented by

the then Mayor Comendador, was placed in estoppel after it granted
yearly business permits45 in favor of the Spouses Bombasi. Art. 1431 of
the New Civil Code provides that, through estoppel, an admission or
representation is rendered conclusive upon the person making it, and
cannot be denied or disproved as against the person relying thereon.
The representation made by the municipality that the Spouses
Bombasi had the right to continuously operate its store binds the
municipality. It is utterly unjust for the Municipality to receive the
benefits of the store operation and later on claim the illegality of the
business.

The bad faith of the petitioners completes the elements of the criminal
offense of violation of Sec. 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019. The same bad
faith serves as the source of the civil liability of Asilo, Angeles, and
Mayor Comendador.

It must be noted that when Angeles died on 16 November 1997, a

motion to drop him as an accused was filed by his counsel with no
objection on the part of the prosecution. The Sandiganbayan acted
favorably on the motion and issued an Order dismissing all the cases
filed against Angeles. On the other hand, when Mayor Comendador
died and an adverse decision was rendered against him which resulted
in the filing of a motion for reconsideration by Mayor Comendador’s
counsel, the prosecution opposed the Motion specifying the ground
that the civil liability did not arise from delict, hence, survived the death
of the accused. The Sandiganbayan upheld the opposition of the
prosecution which disposition was not appealed.

We note, first off, that the death of Angeles and of Mayor Comendador
during the pendency of the case extinguished their criminal liabilities.
We now hold, as did the Sandiganbayan that the civil liability of Mayor
Comendador survived his death; and that of Angeles could have
likewise survived had it not been for the fact that the resolution of the
Sandiganbayan that his death extinguished the civil liability was not
questioned and lapsed into finality.

We laid down the following guidelines in People v. Bayotas:46

Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his

criminal liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon. As
opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the death of the accused
prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the civil
liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense
committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore."
Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the
death of (the) accused, if the same may also be predicated on a source
of obligation other than delict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code
enumerates these other sources of obligation from which the civil
liability may arise as a result of the same act or omission:

a) Law
b) Contracts
c) Quasi-contracts
d) Acts or omissions punished by law; and
e) Quasi-delicts. (Emphasis ours)

Where the civil liability survives, as explained [above], an action for

recovery therefore may be pursued but only by way of filing a separate
civil action47 and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure as amended. This separate civil action may be
enforced either against the executor/administrator or the estate of the
accused, depending on the source of obligation upon which the same
is based as explained above.

Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right
to file this separate civil action by prescription, in cases where during
the prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its extinction, the
private-offended party instituted together therewith the civil action. In
such case, the statute of limitations on the civil liability is deemed
interrupted during the pendency of the criminal case, conformably
with provisions of Article 1155 of the New Civil Code, which should
thereby avoid any apprehension on a possible privation of right by
prescription.

Upon death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction, the

criminal action is extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a
defendant to stand as the accused; the civil action instituted therein
for recovery of civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished,
grounded as it is on the criminal.48

The New Civil Code provisions under the Chapter, Human Relations,
were cited by the prosecution to substantiate its argument that the
civil action based therein is an independent one, thus, will stand
despite the death of the accused during the pendency of the case.

On the other hand, the defense invoked Section 4 of Presidential

Decree No. 1606, as amended by Republic Act No. 8249, in support of
its argument that the civil action was dependent upon the criminal
action, thus, was extinguished upon the death of the accused. The law
provides that:

Any provision of law or the Rules of Court to the contrary

notwithstanding, the criminal action and the corresponding civil action
for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall
at all times be simultaneously instituted with, and jointly determined in
the same proceeding by, the Sandiganbayan, the filing of the criminal
action being deemed to necessarily carry with it the filing of the civil
action, and no right to reserve the filing of such action shall be
recognized. (Emphasis ours)

We agree with the prosecution.

Death of Mayor Comendador during the pendency of the case could

have extinguished the civil liability if the same arose directly from the
crime committed. However, in this case, the civil liability is based on
another source of obligation, the law on human relations.49 The
pertinent articles follow:

Art. 31 of the Civil Code states:

When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act
or omission complained of as a felony, such civil action may proceed
independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result
of the latter.

And, Art. 32(6) states:

Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly
or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or
impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another person shall
be liable to the latter for damages:
(6) The right against deprivation of property without due process of
law;

xxxx
In any of the cases referred to in this article, whether or not the
defendant's act or omission constitutes a criminal offense, the
aggrieved party has a right to commence an entirely separate and
distinct civil action for damages, and for other relief. Such civil action
shall proceed independently of any criminal prosecution (if the latter
be instituted), and may be proved by a preponderance of evidence.

As held in Aberca v. Ver:

It is obvious that the purpose of the above codal provision [Art. 32 of
the New Civil Code] is to provide a sanction to the deeply cherished
rights and freedoms enshrined in the Constitution. Its message is clear;
no man may seek to violate those sacred rights with impunity. x x x.50
Indeed, the basic facts of this case point squarely to the applicability of
the law on human relations. First, the complaint for civil liability was
filed way AHEAD of the information on the Anti-Graft Law. And, the
complaint for damages specifically invoked defendant Mayor
Comendador’s violation of plaintiff’s right to due process. Thus:

xxxx
In causing or doing the forcible demolition of the store in question, the
individual natural defendants did not only act with grave abuse of
authority but usurped a power which belongs to our courts of justice;
such actuations were done with malice or in bad faith and constitute
an invasion of the property rights of plaintiff(s) without due process of
law.

xxxx
The Court is in one with the prosecution that there was a violation of
the right to private property of the Spouses Bombasi. The accused
public officials should have accorded the spouses the due process of
law guaranteed by the Constitution and New Civil Code. The
Sangguniang Bayan Resolutions as asserted by the defense will not, as
already shown, justify demolition of the store without court order. This
Court in a number of decisions51 held that even if there is already a writ
of execution, there must still be a need for a special order for the
purpose of demolition issued by the court before the officer in charge
can destroy, demolish or remove improvements over the contested
property.52 The pertinent provisions are the following:

Before the removal of an improvement must take place, there must be

a special order, hearing and reasonable notice to remove. Section
10(d), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides:

(d) Removal of improvements on property subject of execution. –

When the property subject of execution contains improvements
constructed or planted by the judgment obligor or his agent, the
officer shall not destroy, demolish or remove said improvements
except upon special order of the court, issued upon motion of the
judgment obligee after due hearing and after the former has failed to
remove the same within a reasonable time fixed by the court.

The above-stated rule is clear and needs no interpretation. If

demolition is necessary, there must be a hearing on the motion filed
and with due notices to the parties for the issuance of a special order
of demolition.53

This special need for a court order even if an ejectment case has
successfully been litigated, underscores the independent basis for civil
liability, in this case, where no case was even filed by the municipality.
The requirement of a special order of demolition is based on the
rudiments of justice and fair play. It frowns upon arbitrariness and
oppressive conduct in the execution of an otherwise legitimate act. It
is an amplification of the provision of the Civil Code that every person
must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties,
act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good
faith.54

Notably, the fact that a separate civil action precisely based on due
process violations was filed even ahead of the criminal case, is
complemented by the fact that the deceased plaintiff Comendador
was substituted by his widow, herein petitioner Victoria who specified
in her petition that she has "substituted him as petitioner in the above
captioned case." Section 1, Rule III of the 1985 Rules in Criminal
Procedure mentioned in Bayotas is, therefore, not applicable. Truly,
the Sandiganbayan was correct when it maintained the separate
docketing of the civil and criminal cases before it although their
consolidation was erroneously based on Section 4 of Presidential
Decree No. 1606 which deals with civil liability "arising from the offense
charged."

We must, however, correct the amount of damages awarded to the

Spouses Bombasi.

To seek recovery of actual damages, it is necessary to prove the actual

amount of loss with a reasonable degree of certainty, premised upon
competent proof and on the best evidence obtainable.55 In this case,
the Court finds that the only evidence presented to prove the actual
damages incurred was the itemized list of damaged and lost
items56 prepared by Engineer Cabrega, an engineer commissioned by
the Spouses Bombasi to estimate the costs.

As held by this Court in Marikina Auto Line Transport Corporation v.

People of the Philippines,57

x x x [W]e agree with the contention of petitioners that respondents

failed to prove that the damages to the terrace caused by the incident
amounted to ₱100,000.00. The only evidence adduced by respondents
to prove actual damages claimed by private respondent were the
summary computation of damage made by Engr. Jesus R. Regal, Jr.
amounting to ₱171,088.46 and the receipt issued by the BB
Construction and Steel Fabricator to private respondent for
₱35,000.00 representing cost for carpentry works, masonry, welding,
and electrical works. Respondents failed to present Regal to testify on
his estimation. In its five-page decision, the trial court awarded
₱150,000.00 as actual damages to private respondent but failed to
state the factual basis for such award. Indeed, the trial court merely
declared in the decretal portion of its decision that the "sum of
₱150,000.00 as reasonable compensation sustained by plaintiff for her
damaged apartment." The appellate court, for its part, failed to explain
how it arrived at the amount of ₱100,000.00 in its three-page decision.
Thus, the appellate court merely declared:
With respect to the civil liability of the appellants, they contend that
there was no urgent necessity to completely demolish the apartment
in question considering the nature of the damages sustained as a result
of the accident. Consequently, appellants continue, the award of
₱150,000.00 as compensation sustained by the plaintiff-appellee for
her damaged apartment is an unconscionable amount.

Further, in one case,58 this Court held that the amount claimed by the
respondent-claimant’s witness as to the actual amount of damages
"should be admitted with extreme caution considering that, because it
was a bare assertion, it should be supported by independent
evidence." The Court further said that whatever claim the respondent
witness would allege must be appreciated in consideration of his
particular self-interest.59 There must still be a need for the examination
of the documentary evidence presented by the claimants to support its
claim with regard to the actual amount of damages.

The price quotation made by Engineer Cabrega presented as an

exhibit60 partakes of the nature of hearsay evidence considering that
the person who issued them was not presented as a witness.61 Any
evidence, whether oral or documentary, is hearsay if its probative
value is not based on the personal knowledge of the witness but on
the knowledge of another person who is not on the witness stand.
Hearsay evidence, whether objected to or not, has no probative value
unless the proponent can show that the evidence falls within the
exceptions to the hearsay evidence rule.62 Further, exhibits do not fall
under any of the exceptions provided under Sections 37 to 47 of Rule
130 of the Rules of Court.

Though there is no sufficient evidence to award the actual damages

claimed, this Court grants temperate damages for ₱200,000.00 in view
of the loss suffered by the Spouses Bombasi. Temperate damages are
awarded in accordance with Art. 2224 of the New Civil Code when the
court finds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount
cannot, from the nature of the case, be proven with certainty. The
amount of temperate or moderated damages is usually left to the
discretion of the courts but the same should be reasonable, bearing in
mind that the temperate damages should be more than nominal but
less than compensatory.63 Without a doubt, the Spouses Bombasi
suffered some form of pecuniary loss in the impairment of their store.
Based on the record of the case,64the demolished store was housed on
a two-story building located at the market’s commercial area and its
concrete walls remained strong and not affected by the fire. However,
due to the failure of the Spouses Bombasi to prove the exact amount
of damage in accordance with the Rules of Evidence,65 this court finds
that ₱200,000.00 is the amount just and reasonable under the
circumstances.

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED. Accordingly, the Decision

of the Sandiganbayan dated 28 April 2003 is hereby AFFIRMED WITH
MODIFICATION. The Court affirms the decision finding the accused
Paulino S. Asilo, Jr. and Demetrio T. Comendador guilty of violating
Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019. We declare the finality of the
dismissal of both the criminal and civil cases against Alberto S. Angeles
as the same was not appealed. In view of the death of Demetrio T.
Comendador pending trial, his criminal liability is extinguished; but his
civil liability survives. The Municipality of Nagcarlan, Paulino Asilo and
Demetrio T. Comendador, as substituted by Victoria Bueta Vda. De
Comendador, are hereby declared solidarily liable to the Spouses
Bombasi for temperate damages in the amount of ₱200,000.00 and
moral damages in the amount of ₱100,000.00.

Costs against the petitioners-appellants.

SO ORDERED.
Footnotes
1
Additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro per raffle dated 7 March 2011.
Under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
2
The Decision dated 28 April 2003 was penned by Associate Justice Rodolfo G. Palattao with Associate
Justices Gregory S. Ong and Ma. Cristina G. Cortez-Estrada, concurring. Rollo (G.R. No. 159017-18), pp. 40-71.
3
Municipal Mayor of Nagcarlan, Laguna.
4
Municipal Administrator of Nagcarlan, Laguna.
5
Municipal Planning and Development Coordinator of Nagcarlan, Laguna.
6
Present occupants of the premises being claimed by Spouses Cesar and Visitacion Bombasi.
7
Id.
8
Kasulatan ng Kasunduan.
9
TSN, 11 August 1997, p. 24.
10
TSN, 31 July 1997, pp. 30-32.
11
Now Department of Public Works and Highways.
12
Formal Offer of Evidence as admitted by the Sandiganbayan, Exhibit "H-5."
13
Rollo (G.R. No. 159059), pp. 112-113.
14
Rollo (G.R. No. 159017-18), pp. 17-18.
15
Rollo (G.R. No. 159059), p. 115.
16
Id. at 116.
17
Rollo (G.R. No. 159017-18), p. 147.
18
₱400,000.00 representing the cost of the concrete building; ₱37,900.00 representing the cost of damage
and loss inside the building.
19
Civil Case No. SP-4064 (94).
20
Rollo (G.R. No. 159017-18), p. 91.
21
Docketed as Criminal Case No. 23267.
22
Records, pp. 1-2.
23
Then pending with the Regional Trial Court of San Pablo City, Laguna.
24
Rollo (G.R. No. 159059), p. 77.
25
Id. at 22.
26
Id. at 73-74.
27
Rollo (G.R. 159017-18), p. 72.
28
Id. at 81.
29
Resolution (Re: Motion for Reconsideration) of the Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division, dated 21 July 2003.
30
Rollo (G.R. No. 159059), pp. 81-87.
31
Id. at 75-80, dated 21 July 2003.
32
Rollo (G.R. No. 159017-18), pp. 3-39, dated 25 July 2003 filed by Paulino S. Asilo; Rollo (G.R. No. 159059), pp.
12-43, dated 5 September 2003 filed by Victoria Bueta Vda. De Comendador, widow of the late Mayor
Comendador.
33
Bustillo v. People, G.R. No. 160718, 12 May 2010.
34
Avila, Sr. v. Sandiganbayan, 366 Phil. 698, 703 (1999).
35
Llorente v. Sandiganbayan, 350 Phil. 820 (1998).
36
Sistoza v. Desierto, 437 Phil. 117, 132 (2002).
37
Air France v. Carrascoso, 124 Phil. 722, 737 (1966).
38
Parayno v. Jovellanos, G.R. No. 148408, 14 July 2006, 495 SCRA 85, 93.
39
Jurado, Civil Law Reviewer, 20th ed., 2006, p. 411.
40
Exhibit C-1 of the Prosecution. Records, Vol. II, p. 215.
41
Records, Vol. III, p. 180.
42
Local Government Code of 1983, Batas Pambansa Blg. 337.
43
Republic Act No. 7160.
44
Section 149 of Local Government Code of 1983. Powers and Duties. -
(I) The sangguniang bayan shall:
xxxx
(ee) Provide for the abatement of nuisance;
45
Records, Vol. III, pp. 187-196.
46
G.R. No. 102007, 2 September 1994, 236 SCRA 239, 255-256.
47
It must be noted that the independent civil action was instituted ahead of the criminal case before both
cases were jointly heard before the Sandiganbayan.
48
People v. Bayotas, supra note 58 at 251.
49
Preliminary Title, Chapter 2, Civil Code of the Philippines.
50
G.R. No. L-69866, 15 April 1988, 160 SCRA 590, 601, as quoted from Joseph Charmont French Legal
Philosophy, Mcmillan Co., New York, 1921, pp. 72-73.
51
Guariño v. Ragsac, A.M. No. P-08-2571, 27 August 2009, 597 SCRA 235; Torres v. Sicat, Jr., 438 Phil. 109
(2002).
52
Sec. 10, Rule 39(d), Rules of Court.
53
Guariño v. Ragsac, supra note 65 at 236.
54
Id. at 236-237.
55
Polo v. People, G.R. No. 160541, 24 October 2008, 570 SCRA 80, 84 citing People v. Tigle, 465 Phil. 368
(2004).
56
Exhibits "I" and "I-1" formally offered by the prosecution.
57
G.R. No. 152040, 31 March 2006, 486 SCRA 284, 296-297.
58
PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 358 Phil. 38 (1998).
59
Id. at 55.
60
Records, Vol. III, p. 217; Exhibit "I."
61
People v. Narciso, 330 Phil. 527, 536 (1996).
62
Philippine Home Assurance Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 327 Phil. 255, 267-268 (1996) citing Baguio v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 93417, 14 September 1993, 226 SCRA 366, 370.
63
College Assurance Plan v. Belfranlt Development, Inc., G.R. No. 155604, 22 November 2007, 538 SCRA 27,
40-41.
64
Memorandum Letter of Laguna District Engineer Wilfredo A. Sambrano. Records, Vol. III, p. 181.
65
Rule 132, Section 20, Proof of private document. — Before any private document offered as authentic is
received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved either:
(a) By anyone who saw the document executed or written; or
(b) By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker.
G.R. No. 153675 April 19, 2007
GOVERNMENT OF HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION,
represented by the Philippine Department of Justice, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. FELIXBERTO T. OLALIA, JR. and JUAN ANTONIO
MUÑOZ, Respondents.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

For our resolution is the instant Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, seeking to nullify the
two Orders of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 8, Manila
(presided by respondent Judge Felixberto T. Olalia, Jr.) issued in Civil
Case No. 99-95773. These are: (1) the Order dated December 20, 2001
allowing Juan Antonio Muñoz, private respondent, to post bail; and (2)
the Order dated April 10, 2002 denying the motion to vacate the said
Order of December 20, 2001 filed by the Government of Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region, represented by the Philippine
Department of Justice (DOJ), petitioner. The petition alleges that both
Orders were issued by respondent judge with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction as there is no provision in
the Constitution granting bail to a potential extraditee.

The facts are:

On January 30, 1995, the Republic of the Philippines and the then
British Crown Colony of Hong Kong signed an "Agreement for the
Surrender of Accused and Convicted Persons." It took effect on June
20, 1997.

On July 1, 1997, Hong Kong reverted back to the People’s Republic of

China and became the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.

Private respondent Muñoz was charged before the Hong Kong Court
with three (3) counts of the offense of "accepting an advantage as
agent," in violation of Section 9 (1) (a) of the Prevention of Bribery
Ordinance, Cap. 201 of Hong Kong. He also faces seven (7) counts of
the offense of conspiracy to defraud, penalized by the common law of
Hong Kong. On August 23, 1997 and October 25, 1999, warrants of
arrest were issued against him. If convicted, he faces a jail term of
seven (7) to fourteen (14) years for each charge.

On September 13, 1999, the DOJ received from the Hong Kong
Department of Justice a request for the provisional arrest of private
respondent. The DOJ then forwarded the request to the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) which, in turn, filed with the RTC of
Manila, Branch 19 an application for the provisional arrest of private
respondent.

On September 23, 1999, the RTC, Branch 19, Manila issued an Order of
Arrest against private respondent. That same day, the NBI agents
arrested and detained him.

On October 14, 1999, private respondent filed with the Court of

Appeals a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with
application for preliminary mandatory injunction and/or writ of habeas
corpus questioning the validity of the Order of Arrest.

On November 9, 1999, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision

declaring the Order of Arrest void.

On November 12, 1999, the DOJ filed with this Court a petition for
review on certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 140520, praying that the
Decision of the Court of Appeals be reversed.

On December 18, 2000, this Court rendered a Decision granting the

petition of the DOJ and sustaining the validity of the Order of Arrest
against private respondent. The Decision became final and executory
on April 10, 2001.

Meanwhile, as early as November 22, 1999, petitioner Hong Kong

Special Administrative Region filed with the RTC of Manila a petition
for the extradition of private respondent, docketed as Civil Case No.
99-95733, raffled off to Branch 10, presided by Judge Ricardo
Bernardo, Jr. For his part, private respondent filed, in the same case,- a
petition for bail which was opposed by petitioner.
After hearing, or on October 8, 2001, Judge Bernardo, Jr. issued an
Order denying the petition for bail, holding that there is no Philippine
law granting bail in extradition cases and that private respondent is a
high "flight risk."

On October 22, 2001, Judge Bernardo, Jr. inhibited himself from further
hearing Civil Case No. 99-95733. It was then raffled off to Branch 8
presided by respondent judge.

On October 30, 2001, private respondent filed a motion for

reconsideration of the Order denying his application for bail. This was
granted by respondent judge in an Order dated December 20, 2001
allowing private respondent to post bail, thus:

In conclusion, this Court will not contribute to accused’s further

erosion of civil liberties. The petition for bail is granted subject to the
following conditions:

1. Bail is set at Php750,000.00 in cash with the condition that

accused hereby undertakes that he will appear and answer the
issues raised in these proceedings and will at all times hold himself
amenable to orders and processes of this Court, will further
appear for judgment. If accused fails in this undertaking, the cash
bond will be forfeited in favor of the government;

2. Accused must surrender his valid passport to this Court;

3. The Department of Justice is given immediate notice and

discretion of filing its own motion for hold departure order before
this Court even in extradition proceeding; and

4. Accused is required to report to the government prosecutors

handling this case or if they so desire to the nearest office, at any
time and day of the week; and if they further desire, manifest
before this Court to require that all the assets of accused, real and
personal, be filed with this Court soonest, with the condition that
if the accused flees from his undertaking, said assets be forfeited
in favor of the government and that the corresponding
lien/annotation be noted therein accordingly.
SO ORDERED.

On December 21, 2001, petitioner filed an urgent motion to vacate the

above Order, but it was denied by respondent judge in his Order dated
April 10, 2002.

Hence, the instant petition. Petitioner alleged that the trial court
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in admitting private respondent to bail; that there is
nothing in the Constitution or statutory law providing that a potential
extraditee has a right to bail, the right being limited solely to criminal
proceedings.

In his comment on the petition, private respondent maintained that

the right to bail guaranteed under the Bill of Rights extends to a
prospective extraditee; and that extradition is a harsh process
resulting in a prolonged deprivation of one’s liberty.

Section 13, Article III of the Constitution provides that the right to bail
shall not be impaired, thus:

Sec. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable
by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before
conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on
recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be
impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.

Jurisprudence on extradition is but in its infancy in this jurisdiction.

Nonetheless, this is not the first time that this Court has an occasion to
resolve the question of whether a prospective extraditee may be
granted bail.

In Government of United States of America v. Hon. Guillermo G.

Purganan, Presiding Judge, RTC of Manila, Branch 42, and Mark B.
Jimenez, a.k.a. Mario Batacan Crespo,1 this Court, speaking through then
Associate Justice Artemio V. Panganiban, later Chief Justice, held that
the constitutional provision on bail does not apply to extradition
proceedings. It is "available only in criminal proceedings," thus:
x x x. As suggested by the use of the word "conviction," the
constitutional provision on bail quoted above, as well as Section 4,
Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, applies only when a person has been
arrested and detained for violation of Philippine criminal laws. It does
not apply to extradition proceedings because extradition courts do not
render judgments of conviction or acquittal.

Moreover, the constitutional right to bail "flows from the presumption

of innocence in favor of every accused who should not be subjected to
the loss of freedom as thereafter he would be entitled to acquittal,
unless his guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt" (De la Camara v.
Enage, 41 SCRA 1, 6, September 17, 1971, per Fernando, J., later CJ). It
follows that the constitutional provision on bail will not apply to a case
like extradition, where the presumption of innocence is not at issue.

The provision in the Constitution stating that the "right to bail shall not
be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
suspended" does not detract from the rule that the constitutional right
to bail is available only in criminal proceedings. It must be noted that
the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus finds
application "only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses
inherent in or directly connected with invasion" (Sec. 18, Art. VIII,
Constitution). Hence, the second sentence in the constitutional
provision on bail merely emphasizes the right to bail in criminal
proceedings for the aforementioned offenses. It cannot be taken to
mean that the right is available even in extradition proceedings that
are not criminal in nature.

At first glance, the above ruling applies squarely to private

respondent’s case. However, this Court cannot ignore the following
trends in international law: (1) the growing importance of the
individual person in public international law who, in the 20th century,
has gradually attained global recognition; (2) the higher value now
being given to human rights in the international sphere; (3) the
corresponding duty of countries to observe these universal human
rights in fulfilling their treaty obligations; and (4) the duty of this Court
to balance the rights of the individual under our fundamental law, on
one hand, and the law on extradition, on the other.
The modern trend in public international law is the primacy placed on
the worth of the individual person and the sanctity of human rights.
Slowly, the recognition that the individual person may properly be a
subject of international law is now taking root. The vulnerable doctrine
that the subjects of international law are limited only to states was
dramatically eroded towards the second half of the past century. For
one, the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials after World War II resulted in the
unprecedented spectacle of individual defendants for acts
characterized as violations of the laws of war, crimes against peace,
and crimes against humanity. Recently, under the Nuremberg principle,
Serbian leaders have been persecuted for war crimes and crimes
against humanity committed in the former Yugoslavia. These
significant events show that the individual person is now a valid subject
of international law.

On a more positive note, also after World War II, both international
organizations and states gave recognition and importance to human
rights. Thus, on December 10, 1948, the United Nations General
Assembly adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in which
the right to life, liberty and all the other fundamental rights of every
person were proclaimed. While not a treaty, the principles contained
in the said Declaration are now recognized as customarily binding
upon the members of the international community. Thus, in Mejoff v.
Director of Prisons,2 this Court, in granting bail to a prospective
deportee, held that under the Constitution,3the principles set forth in
that Declaration are part of the law of the land. In 1966, the UN
General Assembly also adopted the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights which the Philippines signed and ratified. Fundamental
among the rights enshrined therein are the rights of every person to
life, liberty, and due process.

The Philippines, along with the other members of the family of nations,
committed to uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value
the worth and dignity of every person. This commitment is enshrined
in Section II, Article II of our Constitution which provides: "The State
values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect
for human rights." The Philippines, therefore, has the responsibility of
protecting and promoting the right of every person to liberty and due
process, ensuring that those detained or arrested can participate in the
proceedings before a court, to enable it to decide without delay on the
legality of the detention and order their release if justified. In other
words, the Philippine authorities are under obligation to make
available to every person under detention such remedies which
safeguard their fundamental right to liberty. These remedies include
the right to be admitted to bail. While this Court in Purganan limited
the exercise of the right to bail to criminal proceedings, however, in
light of the various international treaties giving recognition and
protection to human rights, particularly the right to life and liberty, a
reexamination of this Court’s ruling in Purganan is in order.

First, we note that the exercise of the State’s power to deprive an

individual of his liberty is not necessarily limited to criminal
proceedings. Respondents in administrative proceedings, such as
deportation and quarantine,4 have likewise been detained.

Second, to limit bail to criminal proceedings would be to close our

eyes to our jurisprudential history. Philippine jurisprudence has
not limited the exercise of the right to bail to criminal proceedings
only. This Court has admitted to bail persons who are not involved
in criminal proceedings. In fact, bail has been allowed in this
jurisdiction to persons in detention during the pendency of
administrative proceedings, taking into cognizance the obligation
of the Philippines under international conventions to uphold
human rights.

The 1909 case of US v. Go-Sioco5 is illustrative. In this case, a Chinese

facing deportation for failure to secure the necessary certificate of
registration was granted bail pending his appeal. After noting that the
prospective deportee had committed no crime, the Court opined that
"To refuse him bail is to treat him as a person who has committed the
most serious crime known to law;" and that while deportation is not a
criminal proceeding, some of the machinery used "is the machinery of
criminal law." Thus, the provisions relating to bail was applied to
deportation proceedings.

In Mejoff v. Director of Prisons6 and Chirskoff v. Commission of

Immigration,7 this Court ruled that foreign nationals against whom no
formal criminal charges have been filed may be released on bail
pending the finality of an order of deportation. As previously stated,
the Court in Mejoff relied upon the Universal declaration of Human
Rights in sustaining the detainee’s right to bail.

If bail can be granted in deportation cases, we see no justification why

it should not also be allowed in extradition cases. Likewise, considering
that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights applies to deportation
cases, there is no reason why it cannot be invoked in extradition cases.
After all, both are administrative proceedings where the innocence or
guilt of the person detained is not in issue.

Clearly, the right of a prospective extraditee to apply for bail in this

jurisdiction must be viewed in the light of the various treaty obligations
of the Philippines concerning respect for the promotion and protection
of human rights. Under these treaties, the presumption lies in favor of
human liberty. Thus, the Philippines should see to it that the right to
liberty of every individual is not impaired.

Section 2(a) of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1069 (The Philippine

Extradition Law) defines "extradition" as "the removal of an accused
from the Philippines with the object of placing him at the disposal of
foreign authorities to enable the requesting state or government to
hold him in connection with any criminal investigation directed against
him or the execution of a penalty imposed on him under the penal or
criminal law of the requesting state or government."

Extradition has thus been characterized as the right of a foreign

power, created by treaty, to demand the surrender of one accused or
convicted of a crime within its territorial jurisdiction, and the
correlative duty of the other state to surrender him to the demanding
state.8 It is not a criminal proceeding.9 Even if the potential extraditee
is a criminal, an extradition proceeding is not by its nature criminal, for
it is not punishment for a crime, even though such punishment may
follow extradition.10 It is sui generis, tracing its existence wholly to
treaty obligations between different nations.11 It is not a trial to
determine the guilt or innocence of the potential extraditee.12 Nor is it
a full-blown civil action, but one that is merely administrative in
character.13 Its object is to prevent the escape of a person accused or
convicted of a crime and to secure his return to the state from which
he fled, for the purpose of trial or punishment.14

But while extradition is not a criminal proceeding, it is characterized by

the following: (a) it entails a deprivation of liberty on the part of the
potential extraditee and (b) the means employed to attain the
purpose of extradition is also "the machinery of criminal law." This is
shown by Section 6 of P.D. No. 1069 (The Philippine Extradition Law)
which mandates the "immediate arrest and temporary detention of
the accused" if such "will best serve the interest of justice." We further
note that Section 20 allows the requesting state "in case of urgency"
to ask for the "provisional arrest of the accused, pending receipt of
the request for extradition;" and that release from provisional arrest
"shall not prejudice re-arrest and extradition of the accused if a request
for extradition is received subsequently."

Obviously, an extradition proceeding, while ostensibly administrative,

bears all earmarks of a criminal process. A potential extraditee may be
subjected to arrest, to a prolonged restraint of liberty, and forced to
transfer to the demanding state following the
proceedings. "Temporary detention" may be a necessary step in the
process of extradition, but the length of time of the detention should
be reasonable.

Records show that private respondent was arrested on September 23,

1999, and remained incarcerated until December 20, 2001, when the
trial court ordered his admission to bail. In other words, he had been
detained for over two (2) years without having been convicted of any
crime. By any standard, such an extended period of detention is a
serious deprivation of his fundamental right to liberty. In fact, it was
this prolonged deprivation of liberty which prompted the extradition
court to grant him bail.

While our extradition law does not provide for the grant of bail to an
extraditee, however, there is no provision prohibiting him or her from
filing a motion for bail, a right to due process under the Constitution.
The applicable standard of due process, however, should not be the
same as that in criminal proceedings. In the latter, the standard of due
process is premised on the presumption of innocence of the accused.
As Purganancorrectly points out, it is from this major premise that the
ancillary presumption in favor of admitting to bail arises. Bearing in
mind the purpose of extradition proceedings, the premise behind the
issuance of the arrest warrant and the "temporary detention" is the
possibility of flight of the potential extraditee. This is based on the
assumption that such extraditee is a fugitive from justice.15 Given the
foregoing, the prospective extraditee thus bears the onus probandi of
showing that he or she is not a flight risk and should be granted bail.

The time-honored principle of pacta sunt servanda demands that the

Philippines honor its obligations under the Extradition Treaty it entered
into with the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. Failure to
comply with these obligations is a setback in our foreign relations and
defeats the purpose of extradition. However, it does not necessarily
mean that in keeping with its treaty obligations, the Philippines should
diminish a potential extraditee’s rights to life, liberty, and due process.
More so, where these rights are guaranteed, not only by our
Constitution, but also by international conventions, to which the
Philippines is a party. We should not, therefore, deprive an extraditee
of his right to apply for bail, provided that a certain standard for the
grant is satisfactorily met.

An extradition proceeding being sui generis, the standard of proof

required in granting or denying bail can neither be the proof beyond
reasonable doubt in criminal cases nor the standard of proof of
preponderance of evidence in civil cases. While administrative in
character, the standard of substantial evidence used in administrative
cases cannot likewise apply given the object of extradition law which is
to prevent the prospective extraditee from fleeing our jurisdiction. In
his Separate Opinion in Purganan, then Associate Justice, now Chief
Justice Reynato S. Puno, proposed that a new standard which he
termed "clear and convincing evidence" should be used in granting
bail in extradition cases. According to him, this standard should be
lower than proof beyond reasonable doubt but higher than
preponderance of evidence. The potential extraditee must prove by
"clear and convincing evidence" that he is not a flight risk and will
abide with all the orders and processes of the extradition court.
In this case, there is no showing that private respondent presented
evidence to show that he is not a flight risk. Consequently, this case
should be remanded to the trial court to determine whether private
respondent may be granted bail on the basis of "clear and convincing
evidence."

WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. This case is REMANDED to the

trial court to determine whether private respondent is entitled to bail
on the basis of "clear and convincing evidence." If not, the trial court
should order the cancellation of his bail bond and his immediate
detention; and thereafter, conduct the extradition proceedings with
dispatch.

SO ORDERED.

Footnotes
1
G.R. No. 148571, September 24, 2002, 389 SCRA 623, 664.
2
90 Phil. 70 (1951).
3
Sec. 2, Art. II states "The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national
policy, adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law
of the land and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom,
cooperation, and amity with all nations."
4
In cases involving quarantine to prevent the spread of communicable diseases, bail
is not available. See State v. Hutchinson, 18 So.2d. 723, 246 Ala. 48; Varholy v. Sweat, 15
So.2d. 267, 153 Fla. 571, Baker v. Strautz, 54 NE2d. 441, 386 lll. 360.
5
12 Phil. 490 (1909).
6
Supra, footnote 2.
7
90 Phil. 256 (1951).
8
Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 US 276, 78 L. Ed. 315, 54 S. Ct. 101; Terlindon v. Ames, 184
US 270, 46 L.Ed. 534, 22 S.Ct. 484; Fong Yue Ting v. US, 149 US 698, 37 L.Ed. 905, 13
S.Ct. 1016; Fitzpatrick v. Williams, 46 F2d. 40; US v. Godwin, 97 F. Supp. 252, affd. 191
F2d. 932; Dominguez v. State, 234 SW 701, 90 Tex. Crim. 92.
9
Secretary of Justice v. Lantion, G.R. No. 139465, October 17, 2000, 343 SCRA 377.
10
US ex rel Oppenheim v. Hecht, 16 F2d. 955, cert den. 273 US 969, 71 L. Ed. 883, 47 S.
Ct. 572.
11
State v. Chase, 107 So. 541, 91 Fla. 413; State v. Quigg, 108 So. 409, 91 Fla. 197.
12
Benson v. McMahon, 127 US 457, 32 L. Ed. 234, 8 S. Ct. 1240; Jimenez v. Aristequieta,
311 F2d. 547, stay den. 314 F2d. 649.
13
Spatola v. US, 741 F. Supp. 362, Affd. 925 F2d. 615.
14
Re Henderson, 145 NW 574, 27 ND 155; State ex rel Tresoder v. Remann, 4 P2d. 866,
165 Wash. 92.
15
Beaulieu v. Hartigan, 554 F.2d 1.
Government of Hong Kong vs. Olalia (2007)
G.R. No. 153675 | 2007-04-19

Subject:
Extradition; Grant of Bail Available in Extradition Proceedings;Standard
of Proof in Extradition Proceedings; Public International Law

Facts:
Juan Antonio Muñoz was charged before the Hong Kong Court with
three counts of the offense of "accepting an advantage as agent” and
seven counts of the offense of “conspiracy to defraud”.

An Order of Arrest was issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Manila
against Muñoz in lieu of the request received by the Department of
Justice (DOJ) from the Hong Kong Department of Justice for his
provisional arrest. On the same day of the issuance of the warrant, the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) arrested and detained him.

Upon petition of Muñoz, the Court of Appeals (CA) declared the Order
of Arrest void. The Supreme Court (SC), however, sustained the validity
of the Order of Arrest against Muñoz. This became final and executory
on April 10, 2001.

Meanwhile, the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HK-SAR)

filed with the RTC Manila a petition for the extradition of Muñoz. In
response, Muñoz filed a petition for bail. The same was denied for the
reason that there is no Philippine law granting bail in extradition cases
and that Muñoz is a high “flight risk”. Muñoz filed a motion for
reconsideration which the court granted. The Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region, in turn, filed an urgent motion to vacate the
said order granting bail but it was denied.

Hong Kong-SAR alleged that the RTC committed grave abuse of

discretion in admitting Muñoz to bail, that there is nothing in the
Constitution or statutory law providing that a potential extraditee has
a right to bail, the right being limited solely to criminal proceedings.

Muñoz on the other hand contends that the right to bail guaranteed
under the Bill of Rights extends to a prospective extraditee and that
extradition is a harsh process resulting in a prolonged deprivation of
one’s liberty.

Held:
Extradition
1. Extradition has been characterized as the right of a foreign power,
created by treaty, to demand the surrender of one accused or
convicted of a crime within its territorial jurisdiction, and the
correlative duty of the other state to surrender him to the demanding
state. It is not a criminal proceeding. Even if the potential extraditee is
a criminal, an extradition proceeding is not by its nature criminal, for it
is not punishment for a crime, even though such punishment may
follow extradition. It is sui generis, tracing its existence wholly to treaty
obligations between different nations. It is not a trial to determine the
guilt or innocence of the potential extraditee. Nor is it a full-blown civil
action, but one that is merely administrative in character. Its object is
to prevent the escape of a person accused or convicted of a crime and
to secure his return to the state from which he fled, for the purpose of
trial or punishment.

2. While extradition is not a criminal proceeding, it is characterized by

the following:

(a) It entails a deprivation of liberty on the part of the potential

extradite; and

(b) The means employed to attain the purpose of extradition is also

"the machinery of criminal law." This is shown by Section 6 of P.D. No.
1069 (The Philippine Extradition Law) which mandates the "immediate
arrest and temporary detention of the accused" if such "will best serve
the interest of justice. Section 20 allows the requesting state "in case
of urgency" to ask for the "provisional arrest of the accused, pending
receipt of the request for extradition;" and that release from
provisional arrest "shall not prejudice re-arrest and extradition of the
accused if a request for extradition is received subsequently."

3. An extradition proceeding, while ostensibly administrative, bears all

earmarks of a criminal process. A potential extraditee may be
subjected to arrest, to a prolonged restraint of liberty, and forced to
transfer to the demanding state following the proceedings.
"Temporary detention" may be a necessary step in the process of
extradition, but the length of time of the detention should be
reasonable.

Public International Law

4. The modern trend in public international law is the primacy placed
on the worth of the individual person and the sanctity of human rights.
Slowly, the recognition that the individual person may properly be a
subject of international law is now taking root. The vulnerable doctrine
that the subjects of international law are limited only to states was
dramatically eroded towards the second half of the past century.

Grant of Bail Available in Extradition Proceedings

5. While the court in Purganan limited the exercise of the right to bail to
criminal proceedings, however, in light of the various international
treaties giving recognition and protection to human rights, particularly
the right to life and liberty, a re-examination of the Court’s ruling
in Purganan is in order.

6. The State’s power to deprive an individual of his liberty is not

necessarily limited to criminal proceedings. Respondents in
administrative proceedings, such as deportation and quarantine,have
likewise been detained.

7. If bail can be granted in deportation cases, there is no justification

why it should not also be allowed in extradition cases. Likewise,
considering that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights applies to
deportation cases, there is no reason why it cannot be invoked in
extradition cases. After all, both are administrative proceedings where
the innocence or guilt of the person detained is not in issue.

8. The right of a prospective extraditee to apply for bail in this

jurisdiction must be viewed in the light of the various treaty obligations
of the Philippines concerning respect for the promotion and protection
of human rights. Under these treaties, the presumption lies in favor of
human liberty. Thus, the Philippines should see to it that the right to
liberty of every individual is not impaired.
9. The time-honored principle of pacta sunt servanda demands that the
Philippines honor its obligations under the Extradition Treaty it entered
into with the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. However, it
does not necessarily mean that in keeping with its treaty obligations,
the Philippines should diminish a potential extraditee’s rights to life,
liberty, and due process. An extraditee cannot be deprived of his right
to apply for bail, provided that a certain standard for the grant is
satisfactorily met.

Standard of proof in extradition proceedings

10. An extradition proceeding being sui generis, the standard of proof
required in granting or denying bail can neither be the proof beyond
reasonable doubt in criminal cases nor the standard of proof of
preponderance of evidence in civil cases. While administrative in
character, the standard of substantial evidence used in administrative
cases cannot likewise apply given the object of extradition law which is
to prevent the prospective extraditee from fleeing our jurisdiction. In
his Separate Opinion in the case of Government of United States of
America v. Purganan, then Associate Justice, now Chief Justice Reynato
S. Puno, proposed that a new standard which he termed "clear and
convincing evidence" should be used in granting bail in extradition
cases. According to him, this standard should be lower than proof
beyond reasonable doubt but higher than preponderance of evidence.

11. The potential extraditee must prove by "clear and convincing

evidence" that he is not a flight risk and will abide with all the orders
and processes of the extradition court.
G.R. No. L-19550 June 19, 1967
HARRY S. STONEHILL, ROBERT P. BROOKS, JOHN J. BROOKS and
KARL BECK, petitioners,
vs.
HON. JOSE W. DIOKNO, in his capacity as SECRETARY OF JUSTICE;
JOSE LUKBAN, in his capacity as Acting Director, National Bureau of
Investigation; SPECIAL PROSECUTORS PEDRO D. CENZON, EFREN I.
PLANA and MANUEL VILLAREAL, JR. and ASST. FISCAL MANASES G.
REYES; JUDGE AMADO ROAN, Municipal Court of Manila; JUDGE
ROMAN CANSINO, Municipal Court of Manila; JUDGE HERMOGENES
CALUAG, Court of First Instance of Rizal-Quezon City Branch, and
JUDGE DAMIAN JIMENEZ, Municipal Court of Quezon
City, respondents.
Paredes, Poblador, Cruz and Nazareno and Meer, Meer and Meer and
Juan T. David for petitioners.
Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General
Pacifico P. de Castro, Assistant Solicitor General Frine C. Zaballero,
Solicitor Camilo D. Quiason and Solicitor C. Padua for respondents.
CONCEPCION, C.J.:

Upon application of the officers of the government named on the

margin1 — hereinafter referred to as Respondents-Prosecutors —
several judges2 — hereinafter referred to as Respondents-Judges —
issued, on different dates,3 a total of 42 search warrants against
petitioners herein4 and/or the corporations of which they were
officers,5 directed to the any peace officer, to search the persons
above-named and/or the premises of their offices, warehouses and/or
residences, and to seize and take possession of the following personal
property to wit:

Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence,

receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters,
and other documents and/or papers showing all business
transactions including disbursements receipts, balance sheets and
profit and loss statements and Bobbins (cigarette wrappers).

as "the subject of the offense; stolen or embezzled and proceeds or

fruits of the offense," or "used or intended to be used as the means of
committing the offense," which is described in the applications
adverted to above as "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and
Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and the Revised Penal Code."
Alleging that the aforementioned search warrants are null and void, as
contravening the Constitution and the Rules of Court — because, inter
alia: (1) they do not describe with particularity the documents, books
and things to be seized; (2) cash money, not mentioned in the
warrants, were actually seized; (3) the warrants were issued to fish
evidence against the aforementioned petitioners in deportation cases
filed against them; (4) the searches and seizures were made in an
illegal manner; and (5) the documents, papers and cash money seized
were not delivered to the courts that issued the warrants, to be
disposed of in accordance with law — on March 20, 1962, said
petitioners filed with the Supreme Court this original action
for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and injunction, and prayed that,
pending final disposition of the present case, a writ of preliminary
injunction be issued restraining Respondents-Prosecutors, their agents
and /or representatives from using the effects seized as
aforementioned or any copies thereof, in the deportation cases already
adverted to, and that, in due course, thereafter, decision be rendered
quashing the contested search warrants and declaring the same null
and void, and commanding the respondents, their agents or
representatives to return to petitioners herein, in accordance with
Section 3, Rule 67, of the Rules of Court, the documents, papers, things
and cash moneys seized or confiscated under the search warrants in
question.

In their answer, respondents-prosecutors alleged, 6 (1) that the

contested search warrants are valid and have been issued in
accordance with law; (2) that the defects of said warrants, if any, were
cured by petitioners' consent; and (3) that, in any event, the effects
seized are admissible in evidence against herein petitioners, regardless
of the alleged illegality of the aforementioned searches and seizures.
On March 22, 1962, this Court issued the writ of preliminary injunction
prayed for in the petition. However, by resolution dated June 29, 1962,
the writ was partially lifted or dissolved, insofar as the papers,
documents and things seized from the offices of the corporations
above mentioned are concerned; but, the injunction was maintained as
regards the papers, documents and things found and seized in the
residences of petitioners herein.7
Thus, the documents, papers, and things seized under the alleged
authority of the warrants in question may be split into two (2) major
groups, namely: (a) those found and seized in the offices of the
aforementioned corporations, and (b) those found and seized in the
residences of petitioners herein.

As regards the first group, we hold that petitioners herein

have no cause of action to assail the legality of the contested warrants
and of the seizures made in pursuance thereof, for the simple reason
that said corporations have their respective personalities, separate and
distinct from the personality of herein petitioners, regardless of the
amount of shares of stock or of the interest of each of them in said
corporations, and whatever the offices they hold therein may
be.8 Indeed, it is well settled that the legality of a seizure can be
contested only by the party whose rights have been impaired
thereby,9 and that the objection to an unlawful search and seizure
is purely personal and cannot be availed of by third
parties. 10 Consequently, petitioners herein may not validly object to
the use in evidence against them of the documents, papers and things
seized from the offices and premises of the corporations adverted to
above, since the right to object to the admission of said papers in
evidence belongs exclusively to the corporations, to whom the seized
effects belong, and may not be invoked by the corporate officers in
proceedings against them in their individual capacity. 11 Indeed, it has
been held:

. . . that the Government's action in gaining possession of papers

belonging to the corporation did not relate to nor did it affect
the personal defendants. If these papers were unlawfully seized
and thereby the constitutional rights of or any one were invaded,
they were the rights of the corporation and not the rights of
the other defendants. Next, it is clear that a question of the
lawfulness of a seizure can be raised only by one whose rights have
been invaded. Certainly, such a seizure, if unlawful, could not
affect the constitutional rights of defendants whose property had
not been seized or the privacy of whose homes had not been
disturbed; nor could they claim for themselves the benefits of the
Fourth Amendment, when its violation, if any, was with reference
to the rights of another. Remus vs. United States (C.C.A.)291 F. 501,
 511. It follows, therefore, that the question of the admissibility of
the evidence based on an alleged unlawful search and seizure
does not extend to the personal defendants but
embraces only the corporation whose property was taken. . . . (A
Guckenheimer & Bros. Co. vs. United States, [1925] 3 F. 2d. 786,
789, Emphasis supplied.)

With respect to the documents, papers and things seized in the

residences of petitioners herein, the aforementioned resolution of
June 29, 1962, lifted the writ of preliminary injunction previously issued
by this Court, 12 thereby, in effect, restraining herein Respondents-
Prosecutors from using them in evidence against petitioners herein.
In connection with said documents, papers and things, two (2)
important questions need be settled, namely: (1) whether the search
warrants in question, and the searches and seizures made under the
authority thereof, are valid or not, and (2) if the answer to the
preceding question is in the negative, whether said documents, papers
and things may be used in evidence against petitioners herein.1
äwphï1.ñët
Petitioners maintain that the aforementioned search warrants are in
the nature of general warrants and that accordingly, the seizures
effected upon the authority there of are null and void. In this
connection, the Constitution 13provides:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,

papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures
shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon
probable cause, to be determined by the judge after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses
he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

Two points must be stressed in connection with this constitutional

mandate, namely: (1) that no warrant shall issue but upon
probable cause, to be determined by the judge in the manner set forth
in said provision; and (2) that the warrant shall particularly describe the
things to be seized.
None of these requirements has been complied with in the contested
warrants. Indeed, the same were issued upon applications stating that
the natural and juridical person therein named had committed a
"violation of Central Ban Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal
Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code." In other words,
no specific offense had been alleged in said applications. The
averments thereof with respect to the offense committed
were abstract. As a consequence, it was impossible for the judges who
issued the warrants to have found the existence of probable cause, for
the same presupposes the introduction of competent proof that the
party against whom it is sought has performed particular acts, or
committed specific omissions, violating a given provision of our
criminal laws. As a matter of fact, the applications involved in this case
do not allege any specific acts performed by herein petitioners. It
would be the legal heresy, of the highest order, to convict anybody of
a "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal
Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code," — as alleged in the
aforementioned applications — without reference to any determinate
provision of said laws or

To uphold the validity of the warrants in question would be to wipe out

completely one of the most fundamental rights guaranteed in our
Constitution, for it would place the sanctity of the domicile and the
privacy of communication and correspondence at the mercy of the
whims caprice or passion of peace officers. This is precisely the evil
sought to be remedied by the constitutional provision above quoted —
to outlaw the so-called general warrants. It is not difficult to imagine
what would happen, in times of keen political strife, when the party in
power feels that the minority is likely to wrest it, even though by legal
means.

Such is the seriousness of the irregularities committed in connection

with the disputed search warrants, that this Court deemed it fit to
amend Section 3 of Rule 122 of the former Rules of Court 14 by
providing in its counterpart, under the Revised Rules of Court 15 that "a
search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection
with one specific offense." Not satisfied with this qualification, the
Court added thereto a paragraph, directing that "no search warrant
shall issue for more than one specific offense."
The grave violation of the Constitution made in the application for the
contested search warrants was compounded by the description
therein made of the effects to be searched for and seized, to wit:

Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, journals,

correspondence, receipts, ledgers, portfolios, credit journals,
typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all
business transactions including disbursement receipts, balance
sheets and related profit and loss statements.

Thus, the warrants authorized the search for and seizure of records
pertaining to all business transactions of petitioners herein, regardless
of whether the transactions were legal or illegal. The warrants
sanctioned the seizure of all records of the petitioners and the
aforementioned corporations, whatever their nature, thus openly
contravening the explicit command of our Bill of Rights — that the
things to be seized be particularly described — as well as tending to
defeat its major objective: the elimination of general warrants.

Relying upon Moncado vs. People's Court (80 Phil. 1), Respondents-
Prosecutors maintain that, even if the searches and seizures under
consideration were unconstitutional, the documents, papers and
things thus seized are admissible in evidence against petitioners
herein. Upon mature deliberation, however, we are unanimously of the
opinion that the position taken in the Moncado case must be
abandoned. Said position was in line with the American common law
rule, that the criminal should not be allowed to go free merely
"because the constable has blundered," 16 upon the theory that the
constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures
is protected by means other than the exclusion of evidence unlawfully
obtained, 17 such as the common-law action for damages against the
searching officer, against the party who procured the issuance of the
search warrant and against those assisting in the execution of an illegal
search, their criminal punishment, resistance, without liability to an
unlawful seizure, and such other legal remedies as may be provided by
other laws.

However, most common law jurisdictions have already given up this

approach and eventually adopted the exclusionary rule, realizing that
this is the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional
injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. In the language
of Judge Learned Hand:

As we understand it, the reason for the exclusion of evidence

competent as such, which has been unlawfully acquired, is that
exclusion is the only practical way of enforcing the constitutional
privilege. In earlier times the action of trespass against the
offending official may have been protection enough; but that is
true no longer. Only in case the prosecution which itself controls
the seizing officials, knows that it cannot profit by their wrong will
that wrong be repressed.18

In fact, over thirty (30) years before, the Federal Supreme Court had
already declared:

If letters and private documents can thus be seized and held and
used in evidence against a citizen accused of an offense, the
protection of the 4th Amendment, declaring his rights to be
secure against such searches and seizures, is of no value, and, so
far as those thus placed are concerned, might as well be stricken
from the Constitution. The efforts of the courts and their officials to
bring the guilty to punishment, praiseworthy as they are, are not to
be aided by the sacrifice of those great principles established by
years of endeavor and suffering which have resulted in their
embodiment in the fundamental law of the land.19

This view was, not only reiterated, but, also, broadened in subsequent
decisions on the same Federal Court. 20After reviewing previous
decisions thereon, said Court held, in Mapp vs. Ohio (supra.):

. . . Today we once again examine the Wolf's constitutional

documentation of the right of privacy free from unreasonable
state intrusion, and after its dozen years on our books, are led by
it to close the only courtroom door remaining open to evidence
secured by official lawlessness in flagrant abuse of that basic right,
reserved to all persons as a specific guarantee against that very
same unlawful conduct. We hold that all evidence obtained by
searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by that
same authority, inadmissible in a State.

Since the Fourth Amendment's right of privacy has been declared

enforceable against the States through the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth, it is enforceable against them by the same
sanction of exclusion as it used against the Federal Government.
Were it otherwise, then just as without the Weeks rule the
assurance against unreasonable federal searches and seizures
would be "a form of words," valueless and underserving of
mention in a perpetual charter of inestimable human liberties, so
too, without that rule the freedom from state invasions of privacy
would be so ephemeral and so neatly severed from its conceptual
nexus with the freedom from all brutish means of coercing evidence
as not to permit this Court's high regard as a freedom "implicit in
the concept of ordered liberty." At the time that the Court held in
Wolf that the amendment was applicable to the States through
the Due Process Clause, the cases of this Court as we have seen,
had steadfastly held that as to federal officers the Fourth
Amendment included the exclusion of the evidence seized in
violation of its provisions. Even Wolf "stoutly adhered" to that
proposition. The right to when conceded operatively enforceable
against the States, was not susceptible of destruction by avulsion
of the sanction upon which its protection and enjoyment had
always been deemed dependent under the Boyd, Weeks and
Silverthorne Cases. Therefore, in extending the substantive
protections of due process to all constitutionally unreasonable
searches — state or federal — it was logically and constitutionally
necessarily that the exclusion doctrine — an essential part of the
right to privacy — be also insisted upon as an essential ingredient
of the right newly recognized by the Wolf Case. In short, the
admission of the new constitutional Right by Wolf could not tolerate
denial of its most important constitutional privilege, namely, the
exclusion of the evidence which an accused had been forced to give
by reason of the unlawful seizure. To hold otherwise is to grant the
right but in reality to withhold its privilege and enjoyment. Only last
year the Court itself recognized that the purpose of the
exclusionary rule to "is to deter — to compel respect for the
 constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available way — by
removing the incentive to disregard it" . . . .

The ignoble shortcut to conviction left open to the State tends to

destroy the entire system of constitutional restraints on which the
liberties of the people rest. Having once recognized that the right
to privacy embodied in the Fourth Amendment is enforceable
against the States, and that the right to be secure against rude
invasions of privacy by state officers is, therefore constitutional in
origin, we can no longer permit that right to remain an empty
promise. Because it is enforceable in the same manner and to like
effect as other basic rights secured by its Due Process Clause, we
can no longer permit it to be revocable at the whim of any police
officer who, in the name of law enforcement itself, chooses to
suspend its enjoyment. Our decision, founded on reason and truth,
gives to the individual no more than that which the Constitution
guarantees him to the police officer no less than that to which
honest law enforcement is entitled, and, to the courts, that judicial
integrity so necessary in the true administration of justice.
(emphasis ours.)

Indeed, the non-exclusionary rule is contrary, not only to the letter, but
also, to the spirit of the constitutional injunction against unreasonable
searches and seizures. To be sure, if the applicant for a search warrant
has competent evidence to establish probable cause of the
commission of a given crime by the party against whom the warrant is
intended, then there is no reason why the applicant should not comply
with the requirements of the fundamental law. Upon the other hand, if
he has no such competent evidence, then it is not possible for the
Judge to find that there is probable cause, and, hence, no justification
for the issuance of the warrant. The only possible explanation (not
justification) for its issuance is the necessity of fishing evidence of the
commission of a crime. But, then, this fishing expedition is indicative of
the absence of evidence to establish a probable cause.

Moreover, the theory that the criminal prosecution of those who

secure an illegal search warrant and/or make unreasonable searches or
seizures would suffice to protect the constitutional guarantee under
consideration, overlooks the fact that violations thereof are, in general,
committed By agents of the party in power, for, certainly, those
belonging to the minority could not possibly abuse a power they do
not have. Regardless of the handicap under which the minority usually
— but, understandably — finds itself in prosecuting agents of the
majority, one must not lose sight of the fact that the psychological and
moral effect of the possibility 21 of securing their conviction, is watered
down by the pardoning power of the party for whose benefit the
illegality had been committed.

In their Motion for Reconsideration and Amendment of the Resolution

of this Court dated June 29, 1962, petitioners allege that Rooms Nos. 81
and 91 of Carmen Apartments, House No. 2008, Dewey Boulevard,
House No. 1436, Colorado Street, and Room No. 304 of the Army-Navy
Club, should be included among the premises considered in said
Resolution as residences of herein petitioners, Harry S. Stonehill,
Robert P. Brook, John J. Brooks and Karl Beck, respectively, and that,
furthermore, the records, papers and other effects seized in the offices
of the corporations above referred to include personal belongings of
said petitioners and other effects under their exclusive possession and
control, for the exclusion of which they have a standing under the
latest rulings of the federal courts of federal courts of the United
States. 22

We note, however, that petitioners' theory, regarding their alleged

possession of and control over the aforementioned records, papers
and effects, and the alleged "personal" nature thereof, has Been
Advanced, not in their petition or amended petition herein, but in the
Motion for Reconsideration and Amendment of the Resolution of June
29, 1962. In other words, said theory would appear to be readjustment
of that followed in said petitions, to suit the approach intimated in the
Resolution sought to be reconsidered and amended. Then, too, some
of the affidavits or copies of alleged affidavits attached to said motion
for reconsideration, or submitted in support thereof, contain either
inconsistent allegations, or allegations inconsistent with the theory
now advanced by petitioners herein.

Upon the other hand, we are not satisfied that the allegations of said
petitions said motion for reconsideration, and the contents of the
aforementioned affidavits and other papers submitted in support of
said motion, have sufficiently established the facts or conditions
contemplated in the cases relied upon by the petitioners; to warrant
application of the views therein expressed, should we agree thereto.
At any rate, we do not deem it necessary to express our opinion
thereon, it being best to leave the matter open for determination in
appropriate cases in the future.

We hold, therefore, that the doctrine adopted in the Moncado case

must be, as it is hereby, abandoned; that the warrants for the search of
three (3) residences of herein petitioners, as specified in the Resolution
of June 29, 1962, are null and void; that the searches and seizures
therein made are illegal; that the writ of preliminary injunction
heretofore issued, in connection with the documents, papers and
other effects thus seized in said residences of herein petitioners is
hereby made permanent; that the writs prayed for are granted, insofar
as the documents, papers and other effects so seized in the
aforementioned residences are concerned; that the aforementioned
motion for Reconsideration and Amendment should be, as it is hereby,
denied; and that the petition herein is dismissed and the writs prayed
for denied, as regards the documents, papers and other effects seized
in the twenty-nine (29) places, offices and other premises enumerated
in the same Resolution, without special pronouncement as to costs.
It is so ordered.

Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar and Sanchez, JJ.,
concur.

CASTRO, J., concurring and dissenting:

From my analysis of the opinion written by Chief Justice Roberto
Concepcion and from the import of the deliberations of the Court on
this case, I gather the following distinct conclusions:

1. All the search warrants served by the National Bureau of

Investigation in this case are general warrants and are therefore
proscribed by, and in violation of, paragraph 3 of section 1 of
Article III (Bill of Rights) of the Constitution;

2. All the searches and seizures conducted under the authority of

the said search warrants were consequently illegal;
 3. The non-exclusionary rule enunciated in Moncado vs. People, 80
Phil. 1, should be, and is declared, abandoned;

4. The search warrants served at the three residences of the

petitioners are expressly declared null and void the searches and
seizures therein made are expressly declared illegal; and the writ
of preliminary injunction heretofore issued against the use of the
documents, papers and effect seized in the said residences is
made permanent; and

5. Reasoning that the petitioners have not in their pleadings

satisfactorily demonstrated that they have legal standing to move
for the suppression of the documents, papers and effects seized
in the places other than the three residences adverted to above,
the opinion written by the Chief
Justice refrains from expressly declaring as null and void the such
warrants served at such other places and as illegal the searches
and seizures made therein, and leaves "the matter open for
determination in appropriate cases in the future."

It is precisely the position taken by the Chief Justice summarized in the

immediately preceding paragraph (numbered 5) with which I am not in
accord.

I do not share his reluctance or unwillingness to expressly declare, at

this time, the nullity of the search warrants served at places other than
the three residences, and the illegibility of the searches and seizures
conducted under the authority thereof. In my view even the
exacerbating passions and prejudices inordinately generated by the
environmental political and moral developments of this case should
not deter this Court from forthrightly laying down the law not only for
this case but as well for future cases and future generations. All the
search warrants, without exception, in this case are admittedly
general, blanket and roving warrants and are therefore admittedly and
indisputably outlawed by the Constitution; and the searches and
seizures made were therefore unlawful. That the petitioners, let us
assume in gratia argumente, have no legal standing to ask for the
suppression of the papers, things and effects seized from places other
than their residences, to my mind, cannot in any manner affect, alter or
otherwise modify the intrinsic nullity of the search warrants and the
intrinsic illegality of the searches and seizures made thereunder.
Whether or not the petitioners possess legal standing the said
warrants are void and remain void, and the searches and seizures were
illegal and remain illegal. No inference can be drawn from the words of
the Constitution that "legal standing" or the lack of it is a determinant
of the nullity or validity of a search warrant or of the lawfulness or
illegality of a search or seizure.

On the question of legal standing, I am of the conviction that, upon the

pleadings submitted to this Court the petitioners have the requisite
legal standing to move for the suppression and return of the
documents, papers and effects that were seized from places other
than their family residences.

Our constitutional provision on searches and seizures was derived

almost verbatim from the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution. In the many years of judicial construction and
interpretation of the said constitutional provision, our courts have
invariably regarded as doctrinal the pronouncement made on the
Fourth Amendment by federal courts, especially the Federal Supreme
Court and the Federal Circuit Courts of Appeals.

The U.S. doctrines and pertinent cases on standing to move for the
suppression or return of documents, papers and effects which are the
fruits of an unlawful search and seizure, may be summarized as
follows; (a) ownership of documents, papers and effects gives
"standing;" (b) ownership and/or control or possession — actual or
constructive — of premises searched gives "standing"; and (c) the
"aggrieved person" doctrine where the search warrant and the sworn
application for search warrant are "primarily" directed solely and
exclusively against the "aggrieved person," gives "standing."

An examination of the search warrants in this case will readily show

that, excepting three, all were directed against the petitioners
personally. In some of them, the petitioners were named personally,
followed by the designation, "the President and/or General Manager"
of the particular corporation. The three warrants excepted named
three corporate defendants. But the
"office/house/warehouse/premises" mentioned in the said three
warrants were also the same "office/house/warehouse/premises"
declared to be owned by or under the control of the petitioners in all
the other search warrants directed against the petitioners and/or "the
President and/or General Manager" of the particular corporation. (see
pages 5-24 of Petitioners' Reply of April 2, 1962). The searches and
seizures were to be made, and were actually made, in the
"office/house/warehouse/premises" owned by or under the control of
the petitioners.

Ownership of matters seized gives "standing."

Ownership of the properties seized alone entitles the petitioners to

bring a motion to return and suppress, and gives them standing as
persons aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure regardless of
their location at the time of seizure. Jones vs. United States, 362 U.S.
257, 261 (1960) (narcotics stored in the apartment of a friend of the
defendant); Henzel vs. United States, 296 F. 2d. 650, 652-53 (5th Cir.
1961), (personal and corporate papers of corporation of which the
defendant was president), United States vs. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951)
(narcotics seized in an apartment not belonging to the
defendant); Pielow vs. United States, 8 F. 2d 492, 493 (9th Cir. 1925)
(books seized from the defendant's sister but belonging to the
defendant); Cf. Villano vs. United States, 310 F. 2d 680, 683 (10th Cir.
1962) (papers seized in desk neither owned by nor in exclusive
possession of the defendant).

In a very recent case (decided by the U.S. Supreme Court on December

12, 1966), it was held that under the constitutional provision against
unlawful searches and seizures, a person places himself or his property
within a constitutionally protected area, be it his home or his office, his
hotel room or his automobile:

Where the argument falls is in its misapprehension of the

fundamental nature and scope of Fourth Amendment protection.
What the Fourth Amendment protects is the security a man relies
upon when he places himself or his property within a
constitutionally protected area, be it his home or his office, his hotel
room or his automobile. There he is protected from unwarranted
 governmental intrusion. And when he puts some thing in his filing
cabinet, in his desk drawer, or in his pocket, he has the right to
know it will be secure from an unreasonable search or an
unreasonable seizure. So it was that the Fourth Amendment could
not tolerate the warrantless search of the hotel room in Jeffers,
the purloining of the petitioner's private papers in Gouled, or the
surreptitious electronic surveilance in Silverman. Countless other
cases which have come to this Court over the years have involved
a myriad of differing factual contexts in which the protections of
the Fourth Amendment have been appropriately invoked. No
doubt, the future will bring countless others. By nothing we say
here do we either foresee or foreclose factual situations to which
the Fourth Amendment may be applicable. (Hoffa vs. U.S., 87 S. Ct.
408 (December 12, 1966). See also U.S. vs. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 72 S.
Ct. 93 (November 13, 1951). (Emphasis supplied).

Control of premises searched gives "standing."

Independent of ownership or other personal interest in the records

and documents seized, the petitioners have standing to move for
return and suppression by virtue of their proprietary or leasehold
interest in many of the premises searched. These proprietary and
leasehold interests have been sufficiently set forth in their motion for
reconsideration and need not be recounted here, except to emphasize
that the petitioners paid rent, directly or indirectly, for practically all
the premises searched (Room 91, 84 Carmen Apts; Room 304, Army &
Navy Club; Premises 2008, Dewey Boulevard; 1436 Colorado Street);
maintained personal offices within the corporate offices (IBMC, USTC);
had made improvements or furnished such offices; or had paid for the
filing cabinets in which the papers were stored (Room 204, Army &
Navy Club); and individually, or through their respective spouses,
owned the controlling stock of the corporations involved. The
petitioners' proprietary interest in most, if not all, of the premises
searched therefore independently gives them standing to move for the
return and suppression of the books, papers and affects seized
therefrom.

In Jones vs. United States, supra, the U.S. Supreme Court delineated the
nature and extent of the interest in the searched premises necessary
to maintain a motion to suppress. After reviewing what it considered
to be the unduly technical standard of the then prevailing circuit court
decisions, the Supreme Court said (362 U.S. 266):

We do not lightly depart from this course of decisions by the

lower courts. We are persuaded, however, that it is unnecessarily
and ill-advised to import into the law surrounding the
constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches and
seizures subtle distinctions, developed and refined by the
common law in evolving the body of private property law which,
more than almost any other branch of law, has been shaped by
distinctions whose validity is largely historical. Even in the area
from which they derive, due consideration has led to the
discarding of those distinctions in the homeland of the common
law. See Occupiers' Liability Act, 1957, 5 and 6 Eliz. 2, c. 31, carrying
out Law Reform Committee, Third Report, Cmd. 9305. Distinctions
such as those between "lessee", "licensee," "invitee," "guest,"
often only of gossamer strength, ought not be determinative in
fashioning procedures ultimately referable to constitutional
safeguards. See also Chapman vs. United States, 354 U.S. 610, 616-
17 (1961).

It has never been held that a person with requisite interest in the
premises searched must own the property seized in order to have
standing in a motion to return and suppress. In Alioto vs. United States,
216 F. Supp. 48 (1963), a Bookkeeper for several corporations from
whose apartment the corporate records were seized successfully
moved for their return. In United States vs. Antonelli, Fireworks Co., 53
F. Supp. 870, 873 (W D. N. Y. 1943), the corporation's president
successfully moved for the return and suppression is to him of both
personal and corporate documents seized from his home during the
course of an illegal search:

The lawful possession by Antonelli of documents and property,

"either his own or the corporation's was entitled to protection
against unreasonable search and seizure. Under the
circumstances in the case at bar, the search and seizure were
unreasonable and unlawful. The motion for the return of seized
 article and the suppression of the evidence so obtained should be
granted. (Emphasis supplied).

Time was when only a person who had property in interest in either
the place searched or the articles seize had the necessary standing to
invoke the protection of the exclusionary rule. But in MacDonald vs.
Unite States, 335 U.S. 461 (1948), Justice Robert Jackson joined by
Justice Felix Frankfurter, advanced the view that "even a guest may
expect the shelter of the rooftree he is under against criminal
intrusion." This view finally became the official view of the U.S.
Supreme Court and was articulated in United States vs. Jeffers, 432 U.S
48 (1951). Nine years later, in 1960, in Jones vs. Unite States, 362 U.S.
257, 267, the U.S. Supreme Court went a step further. Jones was a
mere guest in the apartment unlawfully searched but the Court
nonetheless declared that the exclusionary rule protected him as well.
The concept of "person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure"
was enlarged to include "anyone legitimately on premise where the
search occurs."

Shortly after the U.S. Supreme Court's Jones decision the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the defendant organizer, sole
stockholder and president of a corporation had standing in a mail fraud
prosecution against him to demand the return and suppression of
corporate property. Henzel vs. United States, 296 F 2d 650, 652 (5th Cir.
1961), supra. The court conclude that the defendant had standing on
two independent grounds: First —he had a sufficient interest in the
property seized, and second — he had an adequate interest in the
premises searched (just like in the case at bar). A postal inspector had
unlawfully searched the corporation' premises and had seized most of
the corporation's book and records. Looking to Jones, the court
observed:

Jones clearly tells us, therefore, what is not required qualify one as
a "person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure." It tells us
that appellant should not have been precluded from objecting to
the Postal Inspector's search and seizure of the corporation's
books and records merely because the appellant did not show
ownership or possession of the books and records or a substantial
 possessory interest in the invade premises . . . (Henzel vs. United
States, 296 F. 2d at 651). .

Henzel was soon followed by Villano vs. United States, 310 F. 2d 680,
683, (10th Cir. 1962). In Villano, police officers seized two notebooks
from a desk in the defendant's place of employment; the defendant
did not claim ownership of either; he asserted that several employees
(including himself) used the notebooks. The Court held that the
employee had a protected interest and that there also was an invasion
of privacy. Both Henzel and Villano considered also the fact that the
search and seizure were "directed at" the moving defendant. Henzel vs.
United States, 296 F. 2d at 682; Villano vs. United States, 310 F. 2d at
683.

In a case in which an attorney closed his law office, placed his files in
storage and went to Puerto Rico, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit recognized his standing to move to quash as unreasonable
search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution a grand jury subpoena duces tecum directed to the
custodian of his files. The Government contended that the petitioner
had no standing because the books and papers were physically in the
possession of the custodian, and because the subpoena was directed
against the custodian. The court rejected the contention, holding that

Schwimmer legally had such possession, control and

unrelinquished personal rights in the books and papers as not to
enable the question of unreasonable search and seizure to be
escaped through the mere procedural device of compelling a
third-party naked possessor to produce and deliver
them. Schwimmer vs. United States, 232 F. 2d 855, 861 (8th Cir.
1956).

Aggrieved person doctrine where the search warrant s primarily directed

against said person gives "standing."

The latest United States decision squarely in point is United States vs.
Birrell, 242 F. Supp. 191 (1965, U.S.D.C. S.D.N.Y.). The defendant had
stored with an attorney certain files and papers, which attorney, by the
name of Dunn, was not, at the time of the seizing of the records,
Birrell's attorney. * Dunn, in turn, had stored most of the records at his
home in the country and on a farm which, according to Dunn's
affidavit, was under his (Dunn's) "control and management." The
papers turned out to be private, personal and business papers
together with corporate books and records of certain unnamed
corporations in which Birrell did not even claim ownership. (All of these
type records were seized in the case at bar). Nevertheless, the search
in Birrell was held invalid by the court which held that even though
Birrell did not own the premises where the records were stored, he
had "standing" to move for the return ofall the papers and properties
seized. The court, relying on Jones vs. U.S., supra; U.S. vs. Antonelli
Fireworks Co., 53 F. Supp. 870, Aff'd 155 F. 2d 631: Henzel vs. U.S.,
supra; and Schwimmer vs. U.S., supra, pointed out that

It is overwhelmingly established that the searches here in

question were directed solely and exclusively against Birrell. The
only person suggested in the papers as having violated the law
was Birrell. The first search warrant described the records as
having been used "in committing a violation of Title 18, United
States Code, Section 1341, by the use of the mails by one Lowell M.
Birrell, . . ." The second search warrant was captioned: "United
States of America vs. Lowell M. Birrell. (p. 198)

Possession (actual or constructive), no less than ownership, gives

standing to move to suppress. Such was the rule even before
Jones. (p. 199)

If, as thus indicated Birrell had at least constructive possession of

the records stored with Dunn, it matters not whether he had any
interest in the premises searched. See also Jeffers v. United States,
88 U.S. Appl. D.C. 58, 187 F. 2d 498 (1950), affirmed 432 U.S. 48, 72
S. Ct. 93, 96 L. Ed. 459 (1951).

The ruling in the Birrell case was reaffirmed on motion for reargument;
the United States did not appeal from this decision. The factual
situation in Birrell is strikingly similar to the case of the present
petitioners; as in Birrell, many personal and corporate papers were
seized from premises not petitioners' family residences; as
in Birrell, the searches were "PRIMARILY DIRECTED SOLETY AND
EXCLUSIVELY" against the petitioners. Still both types of documents
were suppressed in Birrell because of the illegal search. In the case at
bar, the petitioners connection with the premises raided is much closer
than in Birrell.

Thus, the petitioners have full standing to move for the quashing of all
the warrants regardless whether these were directed against
residences in the narrow sense of the word, as long as the documents
were personal papers of the petitioners or (to the extent that they
were corporate papers) were held by them in a personal capacity or
under their personal control.

Prescinding a from the foregoing, this Court, at all events, should order
the return to the petitioners all personal and private papers and effects
seized, no matter where these were seized, whether from their
residences or corporate offices or any other place or places.
The uncontradicted sworn statements of the petitioners in their,
various pleadings submitted to this Court indisputably show that
amongst the things seized from the corporate offices and other places
were personal and private papers and effects belonging to the
petitioners.

If there should be any categorization of the documents, papers and

things which where the objects of the unlawful searches and seizures, I
submit that the grouping should be: (a) personal or private papers of
the petitioners were they were unlawfully seized, be it their family
residences offices, warehouses and/or premises owned and/or
possessed (actually or constructively) by them as shown in all the
search and in the sworn applications filed in securing the void search
warrants and (b) purely corporate papers belonging to corporations.
Under such categorization or grouping, the determination of which
unlawfully seized papers, documents and things are personal/private of
the petitioners or purely corporate papers will have to be left to the
lower courts which issued the void search warrants in ultimately
effecting the suppression and/or return of the said documents.

And as unequivocally indicated by the authorities above cited, the

petitioners likewise have clear legal standing to move for the
suppression of purely corporate papers as "President and/or General
Manager" of the corporations involved as specifically mentioned in the
void search warrants.

Finally, I must articulate my persuasion that although the cases cited in

my disquisition were criminal prosecutions, the great clauses of the
constitutional proscription on illegal searches and seizures do not
withhold the mantle of their protection from cases not criminal in
origin or nature.

Footnotes
1
Hon. Jose W. Diokno, in his capacity as Secretary of Justice, Jose Lukban, in his
capacity as Acting Director, National Bureau of Investigation, Special Prosecutors
Pedro D. Cenzon, Efren I. Plana and Manuel Villareal, Jr. and Assistant Fiscal Maneses
G. Reyes, City of Manila.
2
Hon. Amado Roan, Judge of the Municipal (now City) Court of Manila, Hon. Roman
Cansino, Judge of the Municipal (now City) Court of Manila, Hon. Hermogenes
Caluag, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch, Hon.
Eulogio Mencias, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasig Branch, and Hon.
Damian Jimenez, Judge of the Municipal (now City) Court of Quezon City.
3
Covering the period from March 3 to March 9, 1962.
4
Harry S. Stonehill, Robert P. Brooks, John J. Brooks and Karl Beck.
5
U.S. Tobacco Corporation, Atlas Cement Corporation, Atlas Development
Corporation, Far East Publishing Corporation (Evening News), Investment Inc.,
Industrial Business Management Corporation, General Agricultural Corporation,
American Asiatic Oil Corporation, Investment Management Corporation, Holiday Hills,
Inc., Republic Glass Corporation, Industrial and Business Management Corporation,
United Housing Corporation, The Philippine Tobacco-Flue-Curing and Redrying
Corporation, Republic Real Estate Corporation and Merconsel Corporation.
6
Inter alia.
7
"Without prejudice to explaining the reasons for this order in the decision to be
rendered in the case, the writ of preliminary injunction issued by us in this case
against the use of the papers, documents and things from the following premises: (1)
The office of the U.S. Tobacco Corp. at the Ledesma Bldg., Arzobispo St., Manila; (2)
932 Gonzales, Ermita, Manila; (3) office at Atlanta St. bounded by Chicago, 15th &
14th Sts., Port Area, Manila; (4) 527 Rosario St., Mla.; (5) Atlas Cement Corp. and/or
Atlas Development Corp., Magsaysay Bldg., San Luis, Ermita, Mla.; (6) 205 13th St.,
Port Area, Mla.; (7) No. 224 San Vicente St., Mla.; (8) Warehouse No. 2 at Chicago &
23rd Sts., Mla.; (9) Warehouse at 23rd St., between Muelle de San Francisco &
Boston, Port Area, Mla.; (10) Investment Inc., 24th St. & Boston; (11) IBMC, Magsaysay
Bldg., San Luis, Mla.; (12) General Agricultural Corp., Magsaysay Bldg., San Luis,
Manila; (13) American Asiatic Oil Corp., Magsaysay Bldg., San Luis, Manila; (14) Room
91, Carmen Apts.; Dewey Blvd., Manila; (15) Warehouse Railroad St. between 17 & 12
Sts., Port Area, Manila; (16) Rm. 304, Army & Navy Club, Manila, South Blvd.; (17)
Warehouse Annex Bldg., 18th St., Port Area, Manila; (18) Rm. 81 Carmen Apts.; Dewey
Blvd., Manila; (19) Holiday Hills, Inc., Trinity Bldg., San Luis, Manila; (20) No. 2008
Dewey Blvd.; (21) Premises of 24th St. & Boston, Port Area, Manila; (22) Republic
Glass Corp., Trinity Bldg., San Luis, Manila; (23) IBMC, 2nd Floor, Trinity Bldg., San
 Luis, Manila; (24) IBMC, 2nd Flr., Gochangco Blg., 610 San Luis, Manila; (25) United
Housing Corp., Trinity Bldg., San Luis, Manila; (26) Republic Real Estate Corp., Trinity
Bldg., San Luis, Manila; (27) 1437 Colorado St., Malate, Manila; (28) Phil. Tobacco Flue-
Curing, Magsaysay Bldg., San Luis, Manila and (29) 14 Baldwin St., Sta. Cruz, Manila, in
the hearing of Deportation Cases Nos. R-953 and 955 against petitioners, before the
Deportation Board, is hereby lifted. The preliminary injunction shall continue as to the
papers, documents and things found in the other premises namely: in those of the
residences of petitioners, as follows: (1) 13 Narra Road, Forbes Park, Makati, Rizal; (2)
15 Narra Road, Forbes Park, Makati, Rizal; and (3) 8 Urdaneta Avenue, Urdaneta
Village, Makati, Rizal."
8
Newingham, et al. vs. United States, 4 F. 2d. 490.
9
Lesis vs. U.S., 6 F. 2d. 22.
10
In re Dooley (1931) 48 F 2d. 121; Rouda vs. U.S., 10 F. 60 2d 916; Lusco vs. U.S. 287 F.
69; Ganci vs. U.S., 287 F. Moris vs. U.S., 26 F. 2d 444.
11
U.S. vs. Gass 17 F. 2d. 997; People vs. Rubio, 57 Phil. 384, 394.
12
On March 22, 1962.
13
Section 1, paragraph 3, of Article III thereof.
14
Reading: . . . A search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause to be
determined by the judge or justice of the peace after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
15
. . . A search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection with one
specific offense to be determined by the judge or justice of the peace after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and persons or things
to be seized.
No search warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense. (Sec. 3, Rule 126.)
16
People vs. Defore, 140 NE 585.
17
Wolf vs. Colorado, 93 L. ed. 1782.
18
Pugliese (1945) 133 F. 2d. 497.
19
Weeks vs. United States (1914) 232 U.S. 383, 58 L. ed. 652, 34 S. Ct. 341; emphasis
supplied.
20
Gouled vs. United States (1921) 255 US 298, 65 L. ed, 647, 41 S. Ct. 261; Olmstead vs.
United States (1928) 277 US 438, 72 L. ed. 944, 48 S. Ct. 564, Wolf vs. Colorado, 338
US 25, 93 L. ed. 1782, 69 S. Ct. 1359; Elkins vs. United States, 364 US 206, 4 L. ed. 2d.
1669, 80 S. Ct. 1437 (1960); Mapp vs. Ohio (1961), 367 US 643, 6 L. ed. 2d. 1081, 81 S.
Ct. 1684.
21
Even if remote.
22
Particularly, Jones vs. U.S. 362 U.S. 257; Alioto vs. U.S., 216 Fed. Supp. 49: U.S. vs.
Jeffries, 72 S. Ct. 93: Villano vs, U.S., 300 Fed. 2d 680; and Henzel vs. U.S., 296 Fed. 2d
650.
CASTRO, J., CONCURRING AND DISSENTING:
*
Attorney-client relationship played no part in the decision of the case.
Stonehill v. Diokno (1967)
G.R. No. L-19550 | 1967-06-19

Subject:
Search Warrants; General Warrants; Right Against Unlawful Search is a
Personal Right; Exclusionary Rule

Facts:
Several judges issued 42 search warrants against Stonehill and other
petitioners to seize “books of accounts, financial records, vouchers,
correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit journals,
typewriters,and other documents and/or papers showing all business
transactions including disbursements receipts, balance sheets and
profit and loss statements and Bobbins (cigarette wrappers),” claiming
violations of “Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal
Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code.”

The documents were seized from two locations: (1) their corporate
offices and (2) the personal residences of the petitioners.

The respondent-judges claim that the warrants were valid, and any
possible defects are cured by Stonehill’s consent.

Held:
Right Against Unlawful Search is Personal
1. As regards the warrants issued to the corporations, we hold that
petitioners herein have no cause of action to assail the legality of the
contested warrants and of the seizures made in pursuance thereof, for
the simple reason that said corporations have their respective
personalities, separate and distinct from the personality of herein
petitioners, regardless of the amount of shares of stock or of the
interest of each of them in said corporations, and whatever the offices
they hold therein may be.

2. Indeed, it is well settled that the legality of a seizure can be

contested only by the party whose rights have been impaired thereby,
and that the objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely
personaland cannot be availed of by third parties.
Right Against Unreasonable Search
3. The Constitution [Art III, Sec 2] provides that “the right of the people
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no
warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the
judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant
and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”

4. Two points must be stressed in connection with this constitutional

mandate, namely: (1) that no warrant shall issue but upon probable
cause, to be determined by the judge in the manner set forth in said
provision; and (2) that the warrant shall particularly describe the things
to be seized.

General Warrants
5. The subject warrants were issued upon applications stating that the
natural and juridical persons therein named had committed a "violation
of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue
(Code) and Revised Penal Code." In other words, no specific offense
had been alleged in said applications. The averments thereof with
respect to the offense committed were abstract. As a consequence, it
was impossible for the judges who issued the warrants to have found
the existence of probable cause, for the same presupposes the
introduction of competent proof that the party against whom it is
sought has performed particular acts, or committed specific omissions,
violating a given provision of our criminal laws.

6. General search warrants are outlawed because they place the

sanctity of the domicile and the privacy of communication and
correspondence at the mercy of the whims, caprice or passion of
peace officers.

Exclusionary Rule: Inadmissibility of illegally seized items

7. The prosecutors, relying on Moncado vs. People's Court, maintain
that, even if the searches and seizures under consideration were
unconstitutional, the documents, papers and things thus seized are
admissible in evidence against petitioners. Said position was in line
with the American common law rule, that the criminal should not be
allowed to go free merely "because the constable has blundered," 1
upon the theory that the constitutional prohibition against
unreasonable searches and seizures is protected by means other than
the exclusion of evidence unlawfully obtained, such as the common-
law action for damages against the searching officer, against the party
who procured the issuance of the search warrant and against those
assisting in the execution of an illegal search.

8. The court declared that the doctrine adopted in the Moncado case is
abandoned. Most common law jurisdictions have already given up this
approach and have adopted the exclusionary rule, realizing that this is
the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction
against unreasonable searches and seizures. In the language of Justice
Hand: “As we understand it, the reason for the exclusion of evidence
competent as such, which has been unlawfully acquired, is that
exclusion is the only practical way of enforcing the constitutional
privilege.”

9. The non-exclusionary rule is contrary, not only to the letter, but,

also, to spirit of the constitutional injunction against unreasonable
searches and seizures. To be sure, if the applicant for a search warrant
has competent evidence to establish probable cause of the
commission of a given crime by the party against whom the warrant is
intended, then there is no reason why the applicant should not comply
with the requirements of the fundamental law. Upon the other hand, if
he has no such competent evidence, then it is not possible for the
judge to find that there is probable cause, and, hence, no justification
for the issuance of the warrant. The only possible explanation (not
justification) for its issuance is the necessity of fishing evidence of the
commission of a crime. But, then, this fishing expedition is indicative of
the absence of evidence to establish a probable cause.
G.R. No. L-24693 July 31, 1967
ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL AND MOTEL OPERATORS ASSOCIATION,
INC., HOTEL DEL MAR INC. and GO CHIU, petitioners-appellees,
vs.
THE HONORABLE CITY MAYOR OF MANILA, respondent-appellant.
VICTOR ALABANZA, intervenor-appellee.
Panganiban, Abad and Associates Law Office for respondent-appellant.
J. M. Aruego, Tenchavez and Associates for intervenor-appellee.
FERNANDO, J.:

The principal question in this appeal from a judgment of the lower

court in an action for prohibition is whether Ordinance No. 4760 of the
City of Manila is violative of the due process clause. The lower court
held that it is and adjudged it "unconstitutional, and, therefore, null
and void." For reasons to be more specifically set forth, such judgment
must be reversed, there being a failure of the requisite showing to
sustain an attack against its validity.

The petition for prohibition against Ordinance No. 4760 was filed on
July 5, 1963 by the petitioners, Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel
Operators Association, one of its members, Hotel del Mar Inc., and a
certain Go Chiu, who is "the president and general manager of the
second petitioner" against the respondent Mayor of the City of Manila
who was sued in his capacity as such "charged with the general power
and duty to enforce ordinances of the City of Manila and to give the
necessary orders for the faithful execution and enforcement of such
ordinances." (par. 1). It was alleged that the petitioner non-stock
corporation is dedicated to the promotion and protection of the
interest of its eighteen (18) members "operating hotels and motels,
characterized as legitimate businesses duly licensed by both national
and city authorities, regularly paying taxes, employing and giving
livelihood to not less than 2,500 person and representing an
investment of more than P3 million."1 (par. 2). It was then alleged that
on June 13, 1963, the Municipal Board of the City of Manila enacted
Ordinance No. 4760, approved on June 14, 1963 by the then Vice-Mayor
Herminio Astorga, who was at the time acting as Mayor of the City of
Manila. (par. 3).
After which the alleged grievances against the ordinance were set
forth in detail. There was the assertion of its being beyond the powers
of the Municipal Board of the City of Manila to enact insofar as it would
regulate motels, on the ground that in the revised charter of the City of
Manila or in any other law, no reference is made to motels; that
Section 1 of the challenged ordinance is unconstitutional and void for
being unreasonable and violative of due process insofar as it would
impose P6,000.00 fee per annum for first class motels and P4,500.00
for second class motels; that the provision in the same section which
would require the owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized
representative of a hotel, motel, or lodging house to refrain from
entertaining or accepting any guest or customer or letting any room or
other quarter to any person or persons without his filling up the
prescribed form in a lobby open to public view at all times and in his
presence, wherein the surname, given name and middle name, the
date of birth, the address, the occupation, the sex, the nationality, the
length of stay and the number of companions in the room, if any, with
the name, relationship, age and sex would be specified, with data
furnished as to his residence certificate as well as his passport number,
if any, coupled with a certification that a person signing such form has
personally filled it up and affixed his signature in the presence of such
owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized representative, with such
registration forms and records kept and bound together, it also being
provided that the premises and facilities of such hotels, motels and
lodging houses would be open for inspection either by the City Mayor,
or the Chief of Police, or their duly authorized representatives is
unconstitutional and void again on due process grounds, not only for
being arbitrary, unreasonable or oppressive but also for being vague,
indefinite and uncertain, and likewise for the alleged invasion of the
right to privacy and the guaranty against self-incrimination; that
Section 2 of the challenged ordinance classifying motels into two
classes and requiring the maintenance of certain minimum facilities in
first class motels such as a telephone in each room, a dining room or,
restaurant and laundry similarly offends against the due process clause
for being arbitrary, unreasonable and oppressive, a conclusion which
applies to the portion of the ordinance requiring second class motels
to have a dining room; that the provision of Section 2 of the challenged
ordinance prohibiting a person less than 18 years old from being
accepted in such hotels, motels, lodging houses, tavern or common inn
unless accompanied by parents or a lawful guardian and making it
unlawful for the owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized
representative of such establishments to lease any room or portion
thereof more than twice every 24 hours, runs counter to the due
process guaranty for lack of certainty and for its unreasonable,
arbitrary and oppressive character; and that insofar as the penalty
provided for in Section 4 of the challenged ordinance for a subsequent
conviction would, cause the automatic cancellation of the license of
the offended party, in effect causing the destruction of the business
and loss of its investments, there is once again a transgression of the
due process clause.

There was a plea for the issuance of preliminary injunction and for a
final judgment declaring the above ordinance null and void and
unenforceable. The lower court on July 6, 1963 issued a writ of
preliminary injunction ordering respondent Mayor to refrain from
enforcing said Ordinance No. 4760 from and after July 8, 1963.

In the a answer filed on August 3, 1963, there was an admission of the

personal circumstances regarding the respondent Mayor and of the
fact that petitioners are licensed to engage in the hotel or motel
business in the City of Manila, of the provisions of the cited Ordinance
but a denial of its alleged nullity, whether on statutory or constitutional
grounds. After setting forth that the petition did fail to state a cause of
action and that the challenged ordinance bears a reasonable relation,
to a proper purpose, which is to curb immorality, a valid and proper
exercise of the police power and that only the guests or customers not
before the court could complain of the alleged invasion of the right to
privacy and the guaranty against self incrimination, with the assertion
that the issuance of the preliminary injunction ex parte was contrary to
law, respondent Mayor prayed for, its dissolution and the dismissal of
the petition.

Instead of evidence being offered by both parties, there was

submitted a stipulation of facts dated September 28, 1964, which
reads:

1. That the petitioners Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators

Association, Inc. and Hotel del Mar Inc. are duly organized and
 existing under the laws of the Philippines, both with offices in the
City of Manila, while the petitioner Go Chin is the president and
general manager of Hotel del Mar Inc., and the intervenor Victor
Alabanza is a resident of Baguio City, all having the capacity to sue
and be sued;

2. That the respondent Mayor is the duly elected and incumbent

City Mayor and chief executive of the City of Manila charged with
the general power and duty to enforce ordinances of the City of
Manila and to give the necessary orders for the faithful execution
and enforcement of such ordinances;

3. That the petitioners are duly licensed to engage in the business

of operating hotels and motels in Malate and Ermita districts in
Manila;

4. That on June 13, 1963, the Municipal Board of the City of Manila
enacted Ordinance No. 4760, which was approved on June 14,
1963, by Vice-Mayor Herminio Astorga, then the acting City Mayor
of Manila, in the absence of the respondent regular City Mayor,
amending sections 661, 662, 668-a, 668-b and 669 of the
compilation of the ordinances of the City of Manila besides
inserting therein three new sections. This ordinance is similar to
the one vetoed by the respondent Mayor (Annex A) for the
reasons stated in its 4th Indorsement dated February 15, 1963
(Annex B);

5. That the explanatory note signed by then Councilor Herminio

Astorga was submitted with the proposed ordinance (now
Ordinance 4760) to the Municipal Board, copy of which is
attached hereto as Annex C;

6. That the City of Manila derived in 1963 an annual income of

P101,904.05 from license fees paid by the 105 hotels and motels
(including herein petitioners) operating in the City of
Manila.1äwphï1.ñët

Thereafter came a memorandum for respondent on January 22, 1965,

wherein stress was laid on the presumption of the validity of the
challenged ordinance, the burden of showing its lack of conformity to
the Constitution resting on the party who assails it, citing not only U.S.
v. Salaveria, but likewise applicable American authorities. Such a
memorandum likewise refuted point by point the arguments advanced
by petitioners against its validity. Then barely two weeks later, on
February 4, 1965, the memorandum for petitioners was filed reiterating
in detail what was set forth in the petition, with citations of what they
considered to be applicable American authorities and praying for a
judgment declaring the challenged ordinance "null and void and
unenforceable" and making permanent the writ of preliminary
injunction issued.

After referring to the motels and hotels, which are members of the
petitioners association, and referring to the alleged constitutional
questions raised by the party, the lower court observed: "The only
remaining issue here being purely a question of law, the parties, with
the nod of the Court, agreed to file memoranda and thereafter, to
submit the case for decision of the Court." It does appear obvious then
that without any evidence submitted by the parties, the decision
passed upon the alleged infirmity on constitutional grounds of the
challenged ordinance, dismissing as is undoubtedly right and proper
the untenable objection on the alleged lack of authority of the City of
Manila to regulate motels, and came to the conclusion that "the
challenged Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila, would be
unconstitutional and, therefore, null and void." It made permanent the
preliminary injunction issued against respondent Mayor and his agents
"to restrain him from enforcing the ordinance in question." Hence this
appeal.

As noted at the outset, the judgment must be reversed. A decent

regard for constitutional doctrines of a fundamental character ought
to have admonished the lower court against such a sweeping
condemnation of the challenged ordinance. Its decision cannot be
allowed to stand, consistently with what has hitherto been the
accepted standards of constitutional adjudication, in both procedural
and substantive aspects.

Primarily what calls for a reversal of such a decision is the absence of

any evidence to offset the presumption of validity that attaches to a
challenged statute or ordinance. As was expressed categorically by
Justice Malcolm: "The presumption is all in favor of validity x x x . The
action of the elected representatives of the people cannot be lightly
set aside. The councilors must, in the very nature of things, be familiar
with the necessities of their particular municipality and with all the
facts and circumstances which surround the subject and necessitate
action. The local legislative body, by enacting the ordinance, has in
effect given notice that the regulations are essential to the well being
of the people x x x . The Judiciary should not lightly set aside legislative
action when there is not a clear invasion of personal or property rights
under the guise of police regulation.2

It admits of no doubt therefore that there being a presumption of

validity, the necessity for evidence to rebut it is unavoidable, unless the
statute or ordinance is void on its face which is not the case here. The
principle has been nowhere better expressed than in the leading case
of O'Gorman & Young v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co.,3 where the
American Supreme Court through Justice Brandeis tersely and
succinctly summed up the matter thus: The statute here questioned
deals with a subject clearly within the scope of the police power. We
are asked to declare it void on the ground that the specific method of
regulation prescribed is unreasonable and hence deprives the plaintiff
of due process of law. As underlying questions of fact may condition
the constitutionality of legislation of this character, the resumption of
constitutionality must prevail in the absence of some factual
foundation of record for overthrowing the statute." No such factual
foundation being laid in the present case, the lower court deciding the
matter on the pleadings and the stipulation of facts, the presumption
of validity must prevail and the judgment against the ordinance set
aside.

Nor may petitioners assert with plausibility that on its face the
ordinance is fatally defective as being repugnant to the due process
clause of the Constitution. The mantle of protection associated with
the due process guaranty does not cover petitioners. This particular
manifestation of a police power measure being specifically aimed to
safeguard public morals is immune from such imputation of nullity
resting purely on conjecture and unsupported by anything of
substance. To hold otherwise would be to unduly restrict and narrow
the scope of police power which has been properly characterized as
the most essential, insistent and the least limitable of
powers,4 extending as it does "to all the great public needs."5 It would
be, to paraphrase another leading decision, to destroy the very
purpose of the state if it could be deprived or allowed itself to be
deprived of its competence to promote public health, public morals,
public safety and the genera welfare.6 Negatively put, police power is
"that inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it to
prohibit all that is hurt full to the comfort, safety, and welfare of
society.7

There is no question but that the challenged ordinance was precisely

enacted to minimize certain practices hurtful to public morals. The
explanatory note of the Councilor Herminio Astorga included as annex
to the stipulation of facts, speaks of the alarming increase in the rate
of prostitution, adultery and fornication in Manila traceable in great
part to the existence of motels, which "provide a necessary
atmosphere for clandestine entry, presence and exit" and thus become
the "ideal haven for prostitutes and thrill-seekers." The challenged
ordinance then proposes to check the clandestine harboring of
transients and guests of these establishments by requiring these
transients and guests to fill up a registration form, prepared for the
purpose, in a lobby open to public view at all times, and by introducing
several other amendatory provisions calculated to shatter the privacy
that characterizes the registration of transients and guests."
Moreover, the increase in the licensed fees was intended to discourage
"establishments of the kind from operating for purpose other than
legal" and at the same time, to increase "the income of the city
government." It would appear therefore that the stipulation of facts,
far from sustaining any attack against the validity of the ordinance,
argues eloquently for it.

It is a fact worth noting that this Court has invariably stamped with the
seal of its approval, ordinances punishing vagrancy and classifying a
pimp or procurer as a vagrant;8 provide a license tax for and regulating
the maintenance or operation of public dance halls;9 prohibiting
gambling;10 prohibiting jueteng;11 and monte;12 prohibiting playing of
panguingui on days other than Sundays or legal holidays;13 prohibiting
the operation of pinball machines;14 and prohibiting any person from
keeping, conducting or maintaining an opium joint or visiting a place
where opium is smoked or otherwise used,15 all of which are intended
to protect public morals.

On the legislative organs of the government, whether national or local,

primarily rest the exercise of the police power, which, it cannot be too
often emphasized, is the power to prescribe regulations to promote
the health, morals, peace, good order, safety and general welfare of
the people. In view of the requirements of due process, equal
protection and other applicable constitutional guaranties however, the
exercise of such police power insofar as it may affect the life, liberty or
property of any person is subject to judicial inquiry. Where such
exercise of police power may be considered as either capricious,
whimsical, unjust or unreasonable, a denial of due process or a
violation of any other applicable constitutional guaranty may call for
correction by the courts.

We are thus led to considering the insistent, almost shrill tone, in which
the objection is raised to the question of due process.16 There is no
controlling and precise definition of due process. It furnishes though a
standard to which the governmental action should conform in order
that deprivation of life, liberty or property, in each appropriate case, be
valid. What then is the standard of due process which must exist both
as a procedural and a substantive requisite to free the challenged
ordinance, or any governmental action for that matter, from the
imputation of legal infirmity sufficient to spell its doom? It is
responsiveness to the supremacy of reason, obedience to the dictates
of justice. Negatively put, arbitrariness is ruled out and unfairness
avoided. To satisfy the due process requirement, official action, to
paraphrase Cardozo, must not outrun the bounds of reason and result
in sheer oppression. Due process is thus hostile to any official action
marred by lack of reasonableness. Correctly it has been identified as
freedom from arbitrariness. It is the embodiment of the sporting idea
of fair play.17 It exacts fealty "to those strivings for justice" and judges
the act of officialdom of whatever branch "in the light of reason drawn
from considerations of fairness that reflect [democratic] traditions of
legal and political thought."18 It is not a narrow or "technical
conception with fixed content unrelated to time, place and
circumstances,"19 decisions based on such a clause requiring a "close
and perceptive inquiry into fundamental principles of our
society."20 Questions of due process are not to be treated narrowly or
pedantically in slavery to form or phrases.21

It would thus be an affront to reason to stigmatize an ordinance

enacted precisely to meet what a municipal lawmaking body considers
an evil of rather serious proportion an arbitrary and capricious exercise
of authority. It would seem that what should be deemed unreasonable
and what would amount to an abdication of the power to govern is
inaction in the face of an admitted deterioration of the state of public
morals. To be more specific, the Municipal Board of the City of Manila
felt the need for a remedial measure. It provided it with the enactment
of the challenged ordinance. A strong case must be found in the
records, and, as has been set forth, none is even attempted here to
attach to an ordinance of such character the taint of nullity for an
alleged failure to meet the due process requirement. Nor does it lend
any semblance even of deceptive plausibility to petitioners' indictment
of Ordinance No. 4760 on due process grounds to single out such
features as the increased fees for motels and hotels, the curtailment of
the area of freedom to contract, and, in certain particulars, its alleged
vagueness.

Admittedly there was a decided increase of the annual license fees

provided for by the challenged ordinance for hotels and motels, 150%
for the former and over 200% for the latter, first-class motels being
required to pay a P6,000 annual fee and second-class motels, P4,500
yearly. It has been the settled law however, as far back as 1922 that
municipal license fees could be classified into those imposed for
regulating occupations or regular enterprises, for the regulation or
restriction of non-useful occupations or enterprises and for revenue
purposes only.22 As was explained more in detail in the above Cu
Unjieng case: (2) Licenses for non-useful occupations are also
incidental to the police power and the right to exact a fee may be
implied from the power to license and regulate, but in fixing amount of
the license fees the municipal corporations are allowed a much wider
discretion in this class of cases than in the former, and aside from
applying the well-known legal principle that municipal ordinances must
not be unreasonable, oppressive, or tyrannical, courts have, as a
general rule, declined to interfere with such discretion. The desirability
of imposing restraint upon the number of persons who might
otherwise engage in non-useful enterprises is, of course, generally an
important factor in the determination of the amount of this kind of
license fee. Hence license fees clearly in the nature of privilege taxes
for revenue have frequently been upheld, especially in of licenses for
the sale of liquors. In fact, in the latter cases the fees have rarely been
declared unreasonable.23

Moreover in the equally leading case of Lutz v. Araneta24 this Court

affirmed the doctrine earlier announced by the American Supreme
Court that taxation may be made to implement the state's police
power. Only the other day, this Court had occasion to affirm that the
broad taxing authority conferred by the Local Autonomy Act of 1959 to
cities and municipalities is sufficiently plenary to cover a wide range of
subjects with the only limitation that the tax so levied is for public
purposes, just and uniform.25

As a matter of fact, even without reference to the wide latitude

enjoyed by the City of Manila in imposing licenses for revenue, it has
been explicitly held in one case that "much discretion is given to
municipal corporations in determining the amount," here the license
fee of the operator of a massage clinic, even if it were viewed purely as
a police power measure.26 The discussion of this particular matter may
fitly close with this pertinent citation from another decision of
significance: "It is urged on behalf of the plaintiffs-appellees that the
enforcement of the ordinance could deprive them of their lawful
occupation and means of livelihood because they can not rent stalls in
the public markets. But it appears that plaintiffs are also dealers in
refrigerated or cold storage meat, the sale of which outside the city
markets under certain conditions is permitted x x x . And surely, the
mere fact, that some individuals in the community may be deprived of
their present business or a particular mode of earning a living cannot
prevent the exercise of the police power. As was said in a case, persons
licensed to pursue occupations which may in the public need and
interest be affected by the exercise of the police power embark in
these occupations subject to the disadvantages which may result from
the legal exercise of that power."27
Nor does the restriction on the freedom to contract, insofar as the
challenged ordinance makes it unlawful for the owner, manager,
keeper or duly authorized representative of any hotel, motel, lodging
house, tavern, common inn or the like, to lease or rent room or portion
thereof more than twice every 24 hours, with a proviso that in all cases
full payment shall be charged, call for a different conclusion. Again,
such a limitation cannot be viewed as a transgression against the
command of due process. It is neither unreasonable nor arbitrary.
Precisely it was intended to curb the opportunity for the immoral or
illegitimate use to which such premises could be, and, according to the
explanatory note, are being devoted. How could it then be arbitrary or
oppressive when there appears a correspondence between the
undeniable existence of an undesirable situation and the legislative
attempt at correction. Moreover, petitioners cannot be unaware that
every regulation of conduct amounts to curtailment of liberty which as
pointed out by Justice Malcolm cannot be absolute. Thus: "One
thought which runs through all these different conceptions of liberty is
plainly apparent. It is this: 'Liberty' as understood in democracies, is
not license; it is 'liberty regulated by law.' Implied in the term is
restraint by law for the good of the individual and for the greater good
of the peace and order of society and the general well-being. No man
can do exactly as he pleases. Every man must renounce unbridled
license. The right of the individual is necessarily subject to reasonable
restraint by general law for the common good x x x The liberty of the
citizen may be restrained in the interest of the public health, or of the
public order and safety, or otherwise within the proper scope of the
police power."28

A similar observation was made by Justice Laurel: "Public welfare,

then, lies at the bottom of the enactment of said law, and the state in
order to promote the general welfare may interfere with personal
liberty, with property, and with business and occupations. Persons and
property may be subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens, in
order to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the
state x x x To this fundamental aim of our Government the rights of
the individual are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing without which life
is a misery, but liberty should not be made to prevail over authority
because then society will fall into anarchy. Neither should authority be
made to prevail over liberty because then the individual will fall into
slavery. The citizen should achieve the required balance of liberty and
authority in his mind through education and personal discipline, so that
there may be established the resultant equilibrium, which means peace
and order and happiness for all.29

It is noteworthy that the only decision of this Court nullifying

legislation because of undue deprivation of freedom to
contract, People v. Pomar,30 no longer "retains its virtuality as a living
principle. The policy of laissez faire has to some extent given way to the
assumption by the government of the right of intervention even in
contractual relations affected with public interest.31 What may be
stressed sufficiently is that if the liberty involved were freedom of the
mind or the person, the standard for the validity of governmental acts
is much more rigorous and exacting, but where the liberty curtailed
affects at the most rights of property, the permissible scope of
regulatory measure is wider.32 How justify then the allegation of a
denial of due process?

Lastly, there is the attempt to impugn the ordinance on another due

process ground by invoking the principles of vagueness or uncertainty.
It would appear from a recital in the petition itself that what seems to
be the gravamen of the alleged grievance is that the provisions are too
detailed and specific rather than vague or uncertain. Petitioners,
however, point to the requirement that a guest should give the name,
relationship, age and sex of the companion or companions as
indefinite and uncertain in view of the necessity for determining
whether the companion or companions referred to are those arriving
with the customer or guest at the time of the registry or entering the
room With him at about the same time or coming at any indefinite time
later to join him; a proviso in one of its sections which cast doubt as to
whether the maintenance of a restaurant in a motel is dependent upon
the discretion of its owners or operators; another proviso which from
their standpoint would require a guess as to whether the "full rate of
payment" to be charged for every such lease thereof means a full day's
or merely a half-day's rate. It may be asked, do these allegations suffice
to render the ordinance void on its face for alleged vagueness or
uncertainty? To ask the question is to answer it. From Connally v.
General Construction Co.33 to Adderley v. Florida,34 the principle has
been consistently upheld that what makes a statute susceptible to
such a charge is an enactment either forbidding or requiring the doing
of an act that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its
meaning and differ as to its application. Is this the situation before us?
A citation from Justice Holmes would prove illuminating: "We agree to
all the generalities about not supplying criminal laws with what they
omit but there is no canon against using common sense in construing
laws as saying what they obviously mean."35

That is all then that this case presents. As it stands, with all due
allowance for the arguments pressed with such vigor and
determination, the attack against the validity of the challenged
ordinance cannot be considered a success. Far from it. Respect for
constitutional law principles so uniformly held and so uninterruptedly
adhered to by this Court compels a reversal of the appealed decision.
Wherefore, the judgment of the lower court is reversed and the
injunction issued lifted forthwith. With costs.

Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro and

Angeles, JJ., concur.
Concepcion, C.J. and Dizon, J., are on leave.

Footnotes
1
The eighteen members are Waldorf Hotel, Hotel Monte Carlo, Golden Gate Motel, Miami Hotel, Palm
Spring Hotel, Flamingo Motel, Holiday Motel, Rainbow Motel, Palo Alto Hotel, Paradise Hotel, Mayfair
Hotel, Siesta Court, Sun Valley Hotel, Springfield Hotel, New Palace Hotel, Hotel del Mar Longbeach
Hotel and Ritz Motel.
2
U.S. V. Salaveria (1918), 39 Phil. 102, at p. 111. There was an affirmation of the presumption of validity of
municipal ordinance as announced in the leading Salaveria decision in Eboña v. Daet, (1950) 85 Phil. 369.
3
282 US 251, 328, January 5, 1931.
4
Cf. Ichong v. Hernandez, (1957) 101 Phil. 1155, at p. 1163. Also: "To Frankfurter the police power, true to
its etymology is the power to shape policy. It defies legal definition; as a response to the dynamic
aspects of society, it cannot be reduced to a constitutional formula. The law must be sensitive to life; in
resolving cases, it must not fall back upon sterile claims; its judgments are not derived from an abstract
duel between liberty and the police power. Instead, in a world of trusts and unions and large-scale
industry, it must meet the challenge of drastic social change. For him as for Holmes, 'society is more
than bargain and business' and the jurist's art rises to no higher peak than in vindicating interests not
represented by the items in a balance-sheet. In a progressive society, new interests emerge, new
attitudes appeal, social consciousness quickens. In the face of the unknown one cannot choose with
certainty. Nor as yet, has the whole of truth been brought up from its bottomless well and how fragile
in scientific proof is the ultimate validity of any particular economic adjustment. Social development is a
process of trial and error; in the making of policy the fullest possible opportunity must be given for the
play of the human mind. If Congress or legislature does not regulate, laissez faire — not the individual —
must be the regulator. (Hamilton, Preview of a Justice (1939) 48 Yale Law Journal, 819).
5
Noble state Bank v. Haskell, 219 U.S. 412.
6
U.S. v. Gomez-Jesus, (1915) 31 Phil. 218.
7
Rubi v. Provincial Board, (1918) 39 Phil. 660.
8
U.S. vs. Giner Cruz, (1918) 38 Phil. 677.
9
U.S. vs. Rodriguez, (1918) 38 Phil. 759. See also Sarmiento v. Belderol, L-15719, May 31, 1961; Lapera v.
Vicente, L-18102, June 30, 1962.
10
U.S. v. Pacis, (1915) 31 Phil. 524.
11
U.S. vs. Espiritu-Santo, (1912) 23 Phil. 610; U.S. vs. Joson, (1913) 26 Phil. 1; People vs. Chan Hong, (1938)
65 Phil. 625.
12
U.S. v. Tamparong, (1915) 31 Phil. 321.
13
U.S. v. Salaveria, (1918) 39 Phil. 102.
14
Uy Ha v. The City Mayor, L-14149, May 30, 1969; Miranda v. City of Manila, L-17252, May 31, 1961.
15
U.S. v. Ten Yu, (1912) 24 Phil. 1.
16
There is no occasion to consider even cursorily the alleged invasion of the right of privacy or the
prohibition against self-incrimination. Petitioners obviously are not the proper parties to do so. Nor may
such an incurable defect be remedied by an accommodating intervenor "who has always taken
advantage of as he exclusively relies on, the facilities, services and accommodations offered by
petitioner-motels. A general merchant, doing business not only in Baguio City but in the City of Manila,
has no legitimate cause for complaint. At least, not according to the case as it has been developed.
17
Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Holmes and the Supreme Court, (1938) pp. 32- 33.
18
Frankfurter, Hannah v. Larche, (1960) 363 U.S. 420, at 487.
19
Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, (1961) 367 U.S. 1230.
20
Bartkus v. Illinois, (1959) 359 U.S. 121.
21
Pearson v. McGraw, (1939) 308 U.S. 313.
22
Cu Unjieng v. Postpone, (1922) 42 Phil. 818, 828.
23
Citing Swarth v. People, 109 Ill. 621; Dennehy v. City of Chicago, 120 Ill. 627; 12 N.E., 227; United States
Distilling Co. v. City of Chicago, 112 Ill. 19: Drew County v. Bennet, 43 Ark. 364; Merced County v. Fleming,
Ill Cal. 46; 43 Pac. 392; Williams v. City Council of West Point, 68 Ga. 816; Cheny v. Shellbyville, 19 Ind. 84;
Wiley y. Owens, 39 Ind. 429; Sweet v. City of Wabash, 41 Ind. 7; Jones v. Grady, 25 La. Ann. 586;
Goldsmith v. City of New Orleans, 31 La. Ann. 646; People ex rel., Cramer v. Medberry, 39 N.Y.S. 207; 17
Misc. Rep., 8 ; McGuigan v. Town of Belmont, 89 Wis. 637; 62 N.W., 421; Ex parte Burnett 30 Ala. 461;
Craig v. Burnett 32 Ala., 728, and Muhlenbrinck v. Long Branch Commissioner, 42 N.J.L. 364; 36 Am.
Rep., 518. At pp. 829-830.
24
98 Phil. 148 (1955), citing Great Atl & Pac. Tea Co. v Grosjean, 301 U.S. 412, 81 L. Ed. 1193; U.S. v. Butler,
297 US 1, 80 L. Ed 477; M'Culloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat 316, 4 L. Ed 579. The Lutz decision was followed
in Republic v. Bacolod Murcia Milling, L-19824, July 9, 1966.
25
Ormoc Sugar Co. v. Municipal Board of Ormoc City, L-24322, July 21, 1967.
26
Physical Therapy Organization v. Municipal Board, (1957) 101 Phil. 1142.
27
Co Kian & Lee Ban v. City of Manila, (1955) 96 Phil. 649, 654, citing City of New Orleans v. Stafford, 27 L.
Ann. 417.
28
Rubi v. Provincial Board, (1919) 39 Phil. 660, at 706, citing Hall v. Geiger-Jones (1916), 242 U.S. 539;
Hardie-Tynes Manufacturing Co. vs. Cruz (1914), 189 Ala. 66.
29
Calalang v. Williams (1940), 70 Phil. 726, at 733-734.
30
46 Phil. 440 (1924). The Philippines was then under American sovereignty, American Supreme Court
decisions having thus an obligatory effect. No alternative was left to this Court except to follow the
then controlling decision in Adkins v. Children's Hospital (1924), 261 U.S. 525, which subsequently was
overruled in West Coast Hotel v. Parrish (1937), 300 U.S. 379.
31
Antamok Goldfields Mining Co. v. Court (1940), 70 Phil. 340, at 360, quoting a concurring opinion of
Justice Laurel in Ang Tibay v. Court, G.R. No. 46496.
32
Cf. "In weighing arguments of the parties it is important to distinguish between the due process clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment as an instrument for transmitting the principles of the First Amendment
and those cases in which it is applied for its own sake. The test of legislation which collides with the
Fourteenth Amendment because it also collides with the principles of the First, is much more definite
than the test when only the Fourteen is involved. Much of the vagueness of the due process clause
disappears when the specific prohibition of the First become its standard. The right of a State to
regulate, for example, a public utility may well include, so far as the due process test is concerned,
power to impose all of the restrictions which a legislature may have a 'rational basis' for adopting. But
freedoms of speech and of press, of assembly, and of worship may well be infringed on such slender
grounds. They are susceptible of restriction only to prevent an immediate danger to interests which the
state may lawfully protect." (West Virginia State Bd. of Edu v. Barnette, (1942), 319 U.S. 624, at 639).
33
269 U.S. 385 (1926).
34
17 L. ed. 2d 149, Nov. 14, 1966.
35
Roschen v. Ward (1929), 279 U. S. 337,339.
G.R. No. 81561 January 18, 1991
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee
vs.
ANDRE MARTI, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Reynaldo B. Tatoy and Abelardo E. Rogacion for accused-appellant.
BIDIN, J.:

This is an appeal from a decision * rendered by the Special Criminal

Court of Manila (Regional Trial Court, Branch XLIX) convicting accused-
appellant of violation of Section 21 (b), Article IV in relation to Section
4, Article 11 and Section 2 (e) (i), Article 1 of Republic Act 6425, as
amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act.

The facts as summarized in the brief of the prosecution are as follows:

On August 14, 1987, between 10:00 and 11:00 a.m., the appellant
and his common-law wife, Shirley Reyes, went to the booth of the
"Manila Packing and Export Forwarders" in the Pistang Pilipino
Complex, Ermita, Manila, carrying with them four (4) gift wrapped
packages. Anita Reyes (the proprietress and no relation to Shirley
Reyes) attended to them. The appellant informed Anita Reyes
that he was sending the packages to a friend in Zurich,
Switzerland. Appellant filled up the contract necessary for the
transaction, writing therein his name, passport number, the date
of shipment and the name and address of the consignee, namely,
"WALTER FIERZ, Mattacketr II, 8052 Zurich, Switzerland"
(Decision, p. 6)

Anita Reyes then asked the appellant if she could examine and
inspect the packages. Appellant, however, refused, assuring her
that the packages simply contained books, cigars, and gloves and
were gifts to his friend in Zurich. In view of appellant's
representation, Anita Reyes no longer insisted on inspecting the
packages. The four (4) packages were then placed inside a brown
corrugated box one by two feet in size (1' x 2'). Styro-foam was
placed at the bottom and on top of the packages before the box
was sealed with masking tape, thus making the box ready for
shipment (Decision, p. 8).
Before delivery of appellant's box to the Bureau of Customs
and/or Bureau of Posts, Mr. Job Reyes (proprietor) and husband of
Anita (Reyes), following standard operating procedure, opened the
boxes for final inspection. When he opened appellant's box, a
peculiar odor emitted therefrom. His curiousity aroused, he
squeezed one of the bundles allegedly containing gloves and felt
dried leaves inside. Opening one of the bundles, he pulled out a
cellophane wrapper protruding from the opening of one of the
gloves. He made an opening on one of the cellophane wrappers and
took several grams of the contents thereof (tsn, pp. 29-30, October
6, 1987; Emphasis supplied).

Job Reyes forthwith prepared a letter reporting the shipment to

the NBI and requesting a laboratory examination of the samples
he extracted from the cellophane wrapper (tsn, pp. 5-6, October
6, 1987).

He brought the letter and a sample of appellant's shipment to the

Narcotics Section of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), at
about 1:30 o'clock in the afternoon of that date, i.e., August 14,
1987. He was interviewed by the Chief of Narcotics Section. Job
Reyes informed the NBI that the rest of the shipment was still in
his office. Therefore, Job Reyes and three (3) NBI agents, and a
photographer, went to the Reyes' office at Ermita, Manila (tsn, p.
30, October 6, 1987).

Job Reyes brought out the box in which appellant's packages were
placed and, in the presence of the NBI agents, opened the top flaps,
removed the styro-foam and took out the cellophane wrappers from
inside the gloves. Dried marijuana leaves were found to have been
contained inside the cellophane wrappers (tsn, p. 38, October 6,
1987; Emphasis supplied).

The package which allegedly contained books was likewise

opened by Job Reyes. He discovered that the package contained
bricks or cake-like dried marijuana leaves. The package which
allegedly contained tabacalera cigars was also opened. It turned
out that dried marijuana leaves were neatly stocked underneath
the cigars (tsn, p. 39, October 6, 1987).
 The NBI agents made an inventory and took charge of the box and
of the contents thereof, after signing a "Receipt"
acknowledging custody of the said effects (tsn, pp. 2-3, October 7,
1987).

Thereupon, the NBI agents tried to locate appellant but to no avail.

Appellant's stated address in his passport being the Manila Central
Post Office, the agents requested assistance from the latter's Chief
Security. On August 27, 1987, appellant, while claiming his mail at the
Central Post Office, was invited by the NBI to shed light on the
attempted shipment of the seized dried leaves. On the same day the
Narcotics Section of the NBI submitted the dried leaves to the Forensic
Chemistry Section for laboratory examination. It turned out that the
dried leaves were marijuana flowering tops as certified by the forensic
chemist. (Appellee's Brief, pp. 9-11, Rollo, pp. 132-134).

Thereafter, an Information was filed against appellant for violation of

RA 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act.

After trial, the court a quo rendered the assailed decision.

In this appeal, accused/appellant assigns the following errors, to wit:

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE THE

ILLEGALLY SEARCHED AND SEIZED OBJECTS CONTAINED IN THE
FOUR PARCELS.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING APPELLANT DESPITE

THE UNDISPUTED FACT THAT HIS RIGHTS UNDER THE
CONSTITUTION WHILE UNDER CUSTODIAL PROCEEDINGS WERE
NOT OBSERVED.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING CREDENCE TO THE

EXPLANATION OF THE APPELLANT ON HOW THE FOUR PARCELS
CAME INTO HIS POSSESSION (Appellant's Brief, p. 1; Rollo, p. 55)

1. Appellant contends that the evidence subject of the imputed offense

had been obtained in violation of his constitutional rights against
unreasonable search and seizure and privacy of communication (Sec. 2
and 3, Art. III, Constitution) and therefore argues that the same should
be held inadmissible in evidence (Sec. 3 (2), Art. III).

Sections 2 and 3, Article III of the Constitution provide:

Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons,

houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the
judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to
be seized.

Sec. 3. (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall

be inviolable except upon lawful order of the court, or when
public safety or order requires otherwise as prescribed by law.

(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding

section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.

Our present constitutional provision on the guarantee against

unreasonable search and seizure had its origin in the 1935 Charter
which, worded as follows:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,

papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures
shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but
upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to
be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. (Sec. 1 [3],
Article III)

was in turn derived almost verbatim from the Fourth Amendment ** to

the United States Constitution. As such, the Court may turn to the
pronouncements of the United States Federal Supreme Court and
State Appellate Courts which are considered doctrinal in this
jurisdiction.

Thus, following the exclusionary rule laid down in Mapp v. Ohio by the
US Federal Supreme Court (367 US 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed. 1081
[1961]), this Court, in Stonehill v. Diokno (20 SCRA 383 [1967]), declared
as inadmissible any evidence obtained by virtue of a defective search
and seizure warrant, abandoning in the process the ruling earlier
adopted in Moncado v. People's Court (80 Phil. 1 [1948]) wherein the
admissibility of evidence was not affected by the illegality of its
seizure. The 1973 Charter (Sec. 4 [2], Art. IV) constitutionalized
the Stonehill ruling and is carried over up to the present with the
advent of the 1987 Constitution.

In a number of cases, the Court strictly adhered to the exclusionary

rule and has struck down the admissibility of evidence obtained in
violation of the constitutional safeguard against unreasonable
searches and seizures. (Bache & Co., (Phil.), Inc., v. Ruiz, 37 SCRA 823
[1971]; Lim v. Ponce de Leon, 66 SCRA 299 [1975]; People v. Burgos, 144
SCRA 1 [1986]; Roan v. Gonzales, 145 SCRA 687 [1987]; See also Salazar
v. Hon. Achacoso, et al., GR No. 81510, March 14, 1990).

It must be noted, however, that in all those cases adverted to, the
evidence so obtained were invariably procured by the State acting
through the medium of its law enforcers or other authorized
government agencies.

On the other hand, the case at bar assumes a peculiar character since
the evidence sought to be excluded was primarily discovered and
obtained by a private person, acting in a private capacity and without
the intervention and participation of State authorities. Under the
circumstances, can accused/appellant validly claim that his
constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizure has
been violated? Stated otherwise, may an act of a private individual,
allegedly in violation of appellant's constitutional rights, be invoked
against the State?
We hold in the negative. In the absence of governmental interference,
the liberties guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be invoked against
the State.

As this Court held in Villanueva v. Querubin (48 SCRA 345 [1972]:

1. This constitutional right (against unreasonable search and
seizure) refers to the immunity of one's person, whether citizen or
alien, from interference by government, included in which is his
residence, his papers, and other possessions. . . .

. . . There the state, however powerful, does not as such have the
access except under the circumstances above noted, for in the
traditional formulation, his house, however humble, is his
castle. Thus is outlawed any unwarranted intrusion by government,
which is called upon to refrain from any invasion of his dwelling and
to respect the privacies of his life. . . . (Cf. Schermerber v. California,
384 US 757 [1966] and Boyd v. United States, 116 US 616 [1886];
Emphasis supplied).

In Burdeau v. McDowell (256 US 465 (1921), 41 S Ct. 547; 65 L.Ed. 1048),

the Court there in construing the right against unreasonable searches
and seizures declared that:

(t)he Fourth Amendment gives protection against unlawful

searches and seizures, and as shown in previous cases, its
protection applies to governmental action. Its origin and history
clearly show that it was intended as a restraint upon the activities
of sovereign authority, and was not intended to be a limitation
upon other than governmental agencies; as against such authority
it was the purpose of the Fourth Amendment to secure the citizen
in the right of unmolested occupation of his dwelling and the
possession of his property, subject to the right of seizure by
process duly served.

The above ruling was reiterated in State v. Bryan (457 P.2d 661 [1968])
where a parking attendant who searched the automobile to ascertain
the owner thereof found marijuana instead, without the knowledge
and participation of police authorities, was declared admissible in
prosecution for illegal possession of narcotics.
And again in the 1969 case of Walker v. State (429 S.W.2d 121), it was
held that the search and seizure clauses are restraints upon the
government and its agents, not upon private individuals (citing People
v. Potter, 240 Cal. App.2d 621, 49 Cap. Rptr, 892 (1966); State v. Brown,
Mo., 391 S.W.2d 903 (1965); State v. Olsen, Or., 317 P.2d 938 (1957).

Likewise appropos is the case of Bernas v. US (373 F.2d 517 (1967). The
Court there said:

The search of which appellant complains, however, was made by a

private citizen — the owner of a motel in which appellant stayed
overnight and in which he left behind a travel case containing the
evidence***complained of. The search was made on the motel
owner's own initiative. Because of it, he became suspicious, called
the local police, informed them of the bag's contents, and made it
available to the authorities.

The fourth amendment and the case law applying it do not require
exclusion of evidence obtained through a search by a private
citizen. Rather, the amendment only proscribes governmental
action."

The contraband in the case at bar having come into possession of the
Government without the latter transgressing appellant's rights against
unreasonable search and seizure, the Court sees no cogent reason why
the same should not be admitted against him in the prosecution of the
offense charged.

Appellant, however, would like this court to believe that NBI agents
made an illegal search and seizure of the evidence later on used in
prosecuting the case which resulted in his conviction.
The postulate advanced by accused/appellant needs to be clarified in
two days. In both instances, the argument stands to fall on its own
weight, or the lack of it.

First, the factual considerations of the case at bar readily foreclose the
proposition that NBI agents conducted an illegal search and seizure of
the prohibited merchandise. Records of the case clearly indicate that it
was Mr. Job Reyes, the proprietor of the forwarding agency, who
made search/inspection of the packages. Said inspection was
reasonable and a standard operating procedure on the part of Mr.
Reyes as a precautionary measure before delivery of packages to the
Bureau of Customs or the Bureau of Posts (TSN, October 6 & 7, 1987,
pp. 15-18; pp. 7-8; Original Records, pp. 119-122; 167-168).

It will be recalled that after Reyes opened the box containing the illicit
cargo, he took samples of the same to the NBI and later summoned
the agents to his place of business. Thereafter, he opened the parcel
containing the rest of the shipment and entrusted the care and
custody thereof to the NBI agents. Clearly, the NBI agents made no
search and seizure, much less an illegal one, contrary to the postulate
of accused/appellant.

Second, the mere presence of the NBI agents did not convert the
reasonable search effected by Reyes into a warrantless search and
seizure proscribed by the Constitution. Merely to observe and look at
that which is in plain sight is not a search. Having observed that which
is open, where no trespass has been committed in aid thereof, is not
search (Chadwick v. State, 429 SW2d 135). Where the contraband
articles are identified without a trespass on the part of the arresting
officer, there is not the search that is prohibited by the constitution
(US v. Lee 274 US 559, 71 L.Ed. 1202 [1927]; Ker v. State of California 374
US 23, 10 L.Ed.2d. 726 [1963]; Moore v. State, 429 SW2d 122 [1968]).

In Gandy v. Watkins (237 F. Supp. 266 [1964]), it was likewise held that
where the property was taken into custody of the police at the specific
request of the manager and where the search was initially made by the
owner there is no unreasonable search and seizure within the
constitutional meaning of the term.

That the Bill of Rights embodied in the Constitution is not meant to be

invoked against acts of private individuals finds support in the
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission. True, the liberties
guaranteed by the fundamental law of the land must always be subject
to protection. But protection against whom? Commissioner Bernas in
his sponsorship speech in the Bill of Rights answers the query which he
himself posed, as follows:
 First, the general reflections. The protection of fundamental
liberties in the essence of constitutional democracy. Protection
against whom? Protection against the state. The Bill of Rights
governs the relationship between the individual and the state. Its
concern is not the relation between individuals, between a private
individual and other individuals. What the Bill of Rights does is to
declare some forbidden zones in the private sphere inaccessible to
any power holder. (Sponsorship Speech of Commissioner Bernas ,
Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. 1, p. 674; July 17,
1986; Emphasis supplied)

The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures

therefore applies as a restraint directed only against the government
and its agencies tasked with the enforcement of the law. Thus, it could
only be invoked against the State to whom the restraint against
arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power is imposed.

If the search is made upon the request of law enforcers, a warrant

must generally be first secured if it is to pass the test of
constitutionality. However, if the search is made at the behest or
initiative of the proprietor of a private establishment for its own and
private purposes, as in the case at bar, and without the intervention of
police authorities, the right against unreasonable search and seizure
cannot be invoked for only the act of private individual, not the law
enforcers, is involved. In sum, the protection against unreasonable
searches and seizures cannot be extended to acts committed by
private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful
intrusion by the government.

Appellant argues, however, that since the provisions of the 1935

Constitution has been modified by the present phraseology found in
the 1987 Charter, expressly declaring as inadmissible any evidence
obtained in violation of the constitutional prohibition against illegal
search and seizure, it matters not whether the evidence was procured
by police authorities or private individuals (Appellant's Brief, p. 8, Rollo,
p. 62).

The argument is untenable. For one thing, the constitution, in laying

down the principles of the government and fundamental liberties of
the people, does not govern relationships between individuals.
Moreover, it must be emphasized that the modifications introduced in
the 1987 Constitution (re: Sec. 2, Art. III) relate to the issuance of either
a search warrant or warrant of arrest vis-a-vis the responsibility of the
judge in the issuance thereof (SeeSoliven v. Makasiar, 167 SCRA 393
[1988]; Circular No. 13 [October 1, 1985] and Circular No. 12 [June 30,
1987]. The modifications introduced deviate in no manner as to whom
the restriction or inhibition against unreasonable search and seizure is
directed against. The restraint stayed with the State and did not shift
to anyone else.

Corolarilly, alleged violations against unreasonable search and seizure

may only be invoked against the State by an individual unjustly
traduced by the exercise of sovereign authority. To agree with
appellant that an act of a private individual in violation of the Bill of
Rights should also be construed as an act of the State would result in
serious legal complications and an absurd interpretation of the
constitution.

Similarly, the admissibility of the evidence procured by an individual

effected through private seizure equally applies, in pari passu, to the
alleged violation, non-governmental as it is, of appellant's
constitutional rights to privacy and communication.

2. In his second assignment of error, appellant contends that the lower

court erred in convicting him despite the undisputed fact that his rights
under the constitution while under custodial investigation were not
observed.

Again, the contention is without merit, We have carefully examined the

records of the case and found nothing to indicate, as an "undisputed
fact", that appellant was not informed of his constitutional rights or
that he gave statements without the assistance of counsel. The law
enforcers testified that accused/appellant was informed of his
constitutional rights. It is presumed that they have regularly performed
their duties (See. 5(m), Rule 131) and their testimonies should be given
full faith and credence, there being no evidence to the contrary. What
is clear from the records, on the other hand, is that appellant refused
to give any written statement while under investigation as testified by
Atty. Lastimoso of the NBI, Thus:

Fiscal Formoso:
You said that you investigated Mr. and Mrs. Job Reyes. What
about the accused here, did you investigate the accused together
with the girl?
WITNESS:
Yes, we have interviewed the accused together with the girl but
the accused availed of his constitutional right not to give any
written statement, sir. (TSN, October 8, 1987, p. 62; Original
Records, p. 240)

The above testimony of the witness for the prosecution was not
contradicted by the defense on cross-examination. As borne out by the
records, neither was there any proof by the defense that appellant
gave uncounselled confession while being investigated. What is more,
we have examined the assailed judgment of the trial court and
nowhere is there any reference made to the testimony of appellant
while under custodial investigation which was utilized in the finding of
conviction. Appellant's second assignment of error is therefore
misplaced.

3. Coming now to appellant's third assignment of error, appellant

would like us to believe that he was not the owner of the packages
which contained prohibited drugs but rather a certain Michael, a
German national, whom appellant met in a pub along Ermita, Manila:
that in the course of their 30-minute conversation, Michael requested
him to ship the packages and gave him P2,000.00 for the cost of the
shipment since the German national was about to leave the country
the next day (October 15, 1987, TSN, pp. 2-10).

Rather than give the appearance of veracity, we find appellant's

disclaimer as incredulous, self-serving and contrary to human
experience. It can easily be fabricated. An acquaintance with a
complete stranger struck in half an hour could not have pushed a man
to entrust the shipment of four (4) parcels and shell out P2,000.00 for
the purpose and for appellant to readily accede to comply with the
undertaking without first ascertaining its contents. As stated by the
trial court, "(a) person would not simply entrust contraband and of
considerable value at that as the marijuana flowering tops, and the
cash amount of P2,000.00 to a complete stranger like the Accused. The
Accused, on the other hand, would not simply accept such undertaking
to take custody of the packages and ship the same from a complete
stranger on his mere say-so" (Decision, p. 19, Rollo, p. 91). As to why he
readily agreed to do the errand, appellant failed to explain. Denials, if
unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, are negative self-
serving evidence which deserve no weight in law and cannot be given
greater evidentiary weight than the testimony of credible witnesses
who testify on affirmative matters (People v. Esquillo, 171 SCRA 571
[1989]; People vs. Sariol, 174 SCRA 237 [1989]).

Appellant's bare denial is even made more suspect considering that, as

per records of the Interpol, he was previously convicted of possession
of hashish by the Kleve Court in the Federal Republic of Germany on
January 1, 1982 and that the consignee of the frustrated shipment,
Walter Fierz, also a Swiss national, was likewise convicted for drug
abuse and is just about an hour's drive from appellant's residence in
Zurich, Switzerland (TSN, October 8, 1987, p. 66; Original Records, p.
244; Decision, p. 21; Rollo, p. 93).

Evidence to be believed, must not only proceed from the mouth of a

credible witness, but it must be credible in itself such as the common
experience and observation of mankind can approve as probable
under the circumstances (People v. Alto, 26 SCRA 342
[1968], citing Daggers v. Van Dyke, 37 N.J. Eg. 130; see also People v.
Sarda, 172 SCRA 651 [1989]; People v. Sunga, 123 SCRA 327 [1983]);
Castañares v. CA, 92 SCRA 567 [1979]). As records further show,
appellant did not even bother to ask Michael's full name, his complete
address or passport number. Furthermore, if indeed, the German
national was the owner of the merchandise, appellant should have so
indicated in the contract of shipment (Exh. "B", Original Records, p.
40). On the contrary, appellant signed the contract as the owner and
shipper thereof giving more weight to the presumption that things
which a person possesses, or exercises acts of ownership over, are
owned by him (Sec. 5 [j], Rule 131). At this point, appellant is therefore
estopped to claim otherwise.
Premises considered, we see no error committed by the trial court in
rendering the assailed judgment.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction finding appellant guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged is hereby AFFIRMED.
No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr. and Feliciano, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
* Penned by Judge Romeo J. Callejo.
** It reads: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized."
*** Forged checks.
[G.R. Nos. 112801-11. April 12, 1996]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. WONG CHUEN
MING, AU WING CHEUNG, TAN SOI TEE, LIM CHAN FATT, CHIN
KOK WEE, CHIN KIN YONG, YAP BOON AH, CHIN KONG SONG,
CHIN KIN FAH, CHAI MIN HUWA, and LIM NYUK
SUN, accused. WONG CHUEN MING and AU WING
CHEUNG, accused-appellants.

SYLLABUS
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHT TO COUNSEL AND
DUE PROCESS; NOT VIOLATED WHEN THERE IS NO PROOF THAT
THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS PREVIOUS
COUNSELS, WAS DIMINISHED BY THE FACT THAT THE LATTER ALSO
JOINTLY REPRESENTED THE OTHER ACCUSED. - Accused-appellants
contention that they were deprived of their right to counsel and due
process when their previous counsels also represented the other
accused despite conflicting interests is not well-taken. After going
over the lengthy transcripts taken during the trial, the Court is
satisfied that said counsels tried to present all the defenses available
to each of the accused and that they did not, in any way, put in
jeopardy accused-appellants constitutional right to counsel. It does
not appear from the records that the effectiveness of accused-
appellants previous counsels was diminished by the fact that they
also jointly represented the other accused.

2. ID.; ID.; RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED UNDER CUSTODIAL

INVESTIGATION; VIOLATION THEREOF RENDERS THE EVIDENCE
OBTAINED INADMISSIBLE. - At the outset, the Court holds that the
signatures of accused on the boxes, as well as on the plastic bags
containing shabu, are inadmissible in evidence. A careful study of
the records reveals that accused were never informed of their
fundamental rights during the entire time that they were under
investigation. Specifically, accused were not informed of their
Miranda rights i.e. that they had the right to remain silent and to
counsel and any statement they might make could be used against
them, when they were made to affix their signatures on the boxes
of Alpen Cereals while they were at the NAIA and again, on the
plastic bags when they were already taken in custody at Camp
Crame. By affixing their signatures on the boxes of Alpen Cereals
 and on the plastic bags, accused in effect made a tacit admission of
the crime charged for mere possession of shabu is punished by
law. These signatures of accused are tantamount to an
uncounselled extra-judicial confession which is not sanctioned by
the Bill of Rights (Section 12 [1][3], Article III, 1987
Constitution). They are, therefore, inadmissible as evidence for any
admission wrung from the accused in violation of their
constitutional rights is inadmissible against them.

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; EXTEND TO ALL PERSONS, BOTH ALIENS AND CITIZENS.
- The fact that all accused are foreign nationals does not preclude
application of the exclusionary rule because the constitutional
guarantees embodied in the Bill of Rights are given and extend to all
persons, both aliens and citizens.

4. ID.; ID.; RIGHT OF THE ACCUSED TO BE PRESUMED INNOCENT

PREVAILS OVER THE PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY IN THE
PERFORMANCE OF DUTIES. - Among the prosecution witnesses,
only customs examiner Danilo Gomez testified that all the seized
baggages, including those owned by accused-appellants Wong
Chuen Ming and Au Wing Cheung, contained a box or boxes of
shabu. His testimony was given credence by the trial court since he
was presumed to have performed his duties in a regular
manner. However, Gomez testimony inculpating accused-appellants
was not corroborated by other prosecution witnesses. Customs
collector Zenaida Bonifacio stated during cross-examination that
she cannot recall if each and everyone of accused were found in
possession of any box or boxes of Alpen Cereals. More significantly,
the testimony of NARCOM officer Capt. Rustico Francisco casts
doubt on the claim of Gomez that he recovered boxes of shabu
from the baggages of accused-appellants. While Capt. Francisco was
categorical in stating that boxes of shabu were recovered from the
baggages belonging to the other nine (9) accused Malaysians, he
admitted that he was not sure whether Gomez actually recovered
boxes of shabu from accused-appellants baggages. Hence, the
presumption of regularity in the performance of duties accorded to
Gomez cannot, by itself, prevail over the constitutional right of
accused-appellants to be presumed innocent especially in the light
of the foregoing testimonies of other prosecution witnesses.
APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Benjamin C. Santos & Ofelia Calcetas-Santos Law Offices and Santos,
Parungao, Aquino and Santos Law Offices for accused-appellants.
DECISION
PADILLA, J.:

Wong Chuen Ming and Au Wing Cheung appeal from a decision* of

the Regional Trial Court, Branch 109 of Pasay City, finding them, as well
as their co-accused, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating
Section 15, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, otherwise
known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.

Appellants Wong Chuen Ming and Au Wing Cheung, both British

(Hongkong) nationals, together with Tan Soi Tee, Chin Kok Wee, Lim
Chan Fatt, Chin Kin Yang, Yap Boon Ah, Chin Kong Song, Chin Kin Fah,
Chai Min Huwa and Lim Nyuk Sun, all Malaysian nationals, were
charged with unlawfully transporting into the country
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride or shabu. Eleven (11) separate
criminal informations were filed against all of the accused individually,
setting forth similar allegations:

That on or about the 7th day of September, 1991, about 1:00 oclock in
the afternoon in Pasay City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously transport without lawful authority
[3.40 kilograms in Criminal Case No. 91-1524 filed against Wong Chuen
Ming; 3.45 kilograms in Criminal Case No.91-1525 to 91-1534 filed against
all other accused individually], more or less of Methamphetamine
Hydrochloride, as (sic) regulated drug commonly known as SHABU.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[1]

At their respective arraignments, all accused with the assistance of

their counsels, pleaded not guilty to the charge. The counsel of
accused-appellant Au Wing Cheung earlier filed a petition for
reinvestigation and deferment of his arraignment but the same was
denied by the trial court for lack of merit. Accused-appellant Au Wing
Cheung was arraigned on 20 September 1991 and with the assistance
of counsel, he likewise entered a plea of not guilty.

The trial court conducted a joint and/or consolidated trial of all the
cases upon motion by the prosecution considering that the State had
common testimonial and documentary evidence against all
accused. The prosecution presented four (4) witnesses, namely, (1)
Danilo Gomez, a customs examiner assigned at the Ninoy Aquino
International Airport (NAIA) Customs Office; (2) Zenaida Reyes
Bonifacio, Chief of the Collection Division and Acting Duty Collector of
the Customs Office at the NAIA; (3) Elizabeth Ayonon, a forensic
chemist at the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory, and (4)
Capt. Rustico Francisco, Officer in Charge (OIC) of the Philippine
National Police Narcotics Command Detachment at the NAIA. The case
for the prosecution, as culled from the testimonies of its witnesses,
may be summarized as follows:

On 7 September 1991, at about 1:000 clock in the afternoon,

Philippine Air Lines (PAL) Flight PR No. 301 from Hongkong arrived at
the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA) in Pasay City, Metro
Manila. Among the many passengers who arrived on board said flight
were the eleven (11) accused, namely, Wong Chuen Ming, Au Wing
Cheung ,Tan Soi Tee, Chin Kok Wee, Lim Chan Fatt, Chin Kin Yong, Yap
Boon Ah, Chin Kong Song, Chin Kin Fah, Chai Min Huwa and Lim Nyuk
Sun. Their respective passports showed that Wong Chuen Ming and Au
Wing Cheung are the only British (Hongkong) nationals in the group
while the rest are all Malaysian nationals. Their passports also revealed
that all the accused Malaysians (except Lim Chan Fatt) originally came
from Malaysia, traveled to Singapore and Hongkong before
proceeding to Manila. Upon the other hand, Wong Chuen Ming and Au
Wing Cheung, as well as Lim Chan Fatt, directly came from Hongkong
to Manila. All accused arrived in Manila as a tour group arranged by
Select Tours International Co., Ltd. Accused-appellant Au Wing Cheung,
an employee of Select Tours International Co., Ltd. acted as their tour
guide.

After passing through and obtaining clearance from immigration

officers at the NAIA, the tour group went to the baggage claim area to
retrieve their respective checked-in baggages.They placed the same in
one pushcart and proceeded to Express Lane 5 which at that time was
manned by customs examiner Danilo Gomez. Au Wing Cheung handed
to Gomez the tour groups passengers manifest, their baggage
declarations and their passports.

Gomez testified that he instructed the tour group to place their

baggages on the examiners table for inspection. They were directed to
hold on to their respective baggages while they wait for their turn to
be examined. Chin Kong Songs baggage was first to be examined by
Gomez. Gomez put his hand inside the baggage and in the course of
the inspection, he found three (3) brown colored boxes similar in size
to powdered milk boxes underneath the clothes. The boxes were
marked Alpen Cereals and as he found nothing wrong with them,
Gomez returned them inside the baggage and allowed Chin Kong Song
to go. Following the same procedure, Gomez next examined the
baggage of Wong Chuen Ming. Gomez again found and pulled out two
(2) boxes of Alpen Cereals from said baggage and like in the previous
inspection, he found nothing wrong with them and allowed Wong
Chuen Ming to go. The third baggage to be examined belonged to Lim
Nyuk Sun. When Gomez pulled out another three (3) boxes of Alpen
Cereals from said baggage, he became suspicious and decided to open
one of the boxes with his cutter. Inside the box was a plastic bag
containing white crystalline substance. Alarmed, Gomez immediately
called the attention of Appraiser Oreganan Palala and Duty Collector
Zenaida Reyes Bonifacio to his discovery.[2]

Bonifacio testified that upon learning about the boxes containing

the white crystalline substance, she immediately ordered the tour
group to get their baggages and proceed to the district collectors
office. Chin Kong Song and Wong Chuen Ming, who were previously
cleared by Gomez, were also brought inside together with the rest of
the group. Inside the collectors office, Gomez continued to examine
the baggages of the other members of the tour group. He allegedly
found that each baggage contained one (1), two (2) or three (3) boxes
similar to those previously found in the baggages of Chin Kong Song,
Wong Chuen Ming and Lim Nyuk Sun. A total of thirty (30) boxes of
Alpen Cereals containing white crystalline substance were allegedly
recovered from the baggages of the eleven (11) accused. As Gomez
pulled out these boxes from their respective baggages, he bundled
said boxes by putting masking tape around them and handed them
over to Bonifacio. Upon receipt of these bundled boxes, Bonifacio
called out the names of accused as listed in the passengers manifest
and ordered them to sign on the masking tape placed on the boxes
allegedly recovered from their respective baggages. Also present at
this time were Capt. Rustico Francisco and his men, agents of the
Bureau of Customs and several news reporters. A few minutes later,
District Collector Antonio Marquez arrived with General Job Mayo and
then NBI Deputy Director Mariano Mison.[3]

Capt. Francisco testified that shortly after all boxes of Alpen Cereals
were recovered, he conducted a field test on a sample of the white
crystalline substance. His test showed that the substance was indeed
shabu. Capt. Francisco immediately informed the eleven (11) accused
that they were under arrest. Thereafter, all accused, as well as the
Alpen Cereals boxes which were placed inside a big box, were brought
to Camp Crame.[4]

At Camp Crame, accused were asked to identify their signatures on

the boxes and after having identified them, they were again made to
sign on the plastic bags containing white crystalline substance inside
the boxes bearing their signatures. The examination by Elizabeth
Ayonon, a forensic chemist at the Philippine National Police Crime
Laboratory at Camp Crame, confirmed that the white crystalline
substance recovered from accused was shabu.[5] The total weight of
shabu recovered was placed at 34.45 kilograms.[6]

For their part, the defense interposed by all accused was basically
anchored on the testimony of their co-accused Lim Chan Fatt, a
technician and self-confessed call boy, who admitted being responsible
for bringing the boxes of Alpen Cereals into the country although he
denied any knowledge that they contained shabu. Lim Chan Fatt
testified that except for Chin Kong Song and Lim Nyuk Sun, all other
accused were unknown or complete strangers to him until their trip to
the Philippines on 7 September 1991. With respect to Chin Kong Song
and Lim Nyuk Sun, Lim Chan Fatt allegedly met them at his boarding
house in Hongkong where the two (2) temporarily lived a few days
before said trip. According to Lim Chan Fatt, prior to their departure
date, a certain Ah Hong, a co-boarder and a Hongkong businessman,
approached him and asked him if he could kindly bring with him boxes
of cereals to the Philippines. Ah Hong promised Lim Chan Fatt that a
certain Ah Sing will get these boxes from him at the Philippine airport
and for this trouble, Ah Sing will see to it that Lim Chan Fatt will have a
good time in the Philippines. Ah Hong allegedly even opened one (1)
box to show that it really contained cereals. Lim Chan Fatt acceded to
Ah Hongs request as he allegedly found nothing wrong with
it. Consequently, Ah Hong delivered to Lim Chan Fatt thirty (30) boxes
of Alpen Cereals. Since his baggage could not accommodate all thirty
(30) boxes, Lim Chan Fatt requested Chin Kong Song and Lim Nyuk Sun
to accommodate some of the boxes in their baggages. Lim Chan Fatt
claimed that he entrusted five (5) boxes to Chin Kong Song and
another five (5) to Lim Nyuk Sun. He allegedly placed four (4) boxes
inside a hand carried plastic bag while the rest were put inside his
baggage.[7]

On the basis of this testimony, the defense endeavored to show

that only Lim Chan Fatt, Chin Kong Song and Lim Nyuk Sun were
responsible for bringing boxes of Alpen Cereals into the country and
even then they cannot be held liable for violation of Section 15, Article
II of R.A. No. 6425, as amended, as they allegedly had no knowledge
that these boxes contained shabu.

The defense also presented as witnesses accused Chin Kong Song

and Lim Nyuk Sun and accused-appellants Au Wing Cheung and Wong
Chuen Ming. Accused-appellants denied that boxes of Alpen Cereals
were recovered from their baggages. They claimed that they affixed
their signatures on the boxes only because they were threatened by
police authorities who were present during the examination inside the
collectors office. Accused-appellant Au Wing Cheung maintained that
he was a bona fide employee of Select Tours International Co., Ltd. and
that he had no prior knowledge that the tour group he was supposed
to accompany to the Philippines brought boxes containing
shabu.[8] For his part, accused-appellant Wong Chuen Ming tried to
dissociate himself from the other accused by testifying that he was not
a part of their group. He claimed that he was originally booked with
another travel agency, Wing Ann Travel Co., for a five-day Cebu
tour. This Cebu tour was allegedly cancelled due to insufficient number
of clients and accused-appellant was subsequently transferred to and
accommodated by Select Tours.[9] The other accused who did not take
the witness stand opted to adopt as their own all testimonial and
documentary evidence presented in court for the defense.

On 29 November 1991, the trial court rendered judgment, the

dispositive part of which reads as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

In view of all the foregoing evidences, the Court finds that the
prosecution has proven the guilt of all the accused in all the criminal
cases filed against them for Violation of Section 15, Art. III, R.A. 6425 as
amended and hereby sentences them as follows:

In Criminal Case No. 91-1524 entitled People of the

Philippines vs. WONG CHUEN MING, the Court sentences Wong Chuen
Ming to life imprisonment and a fine of Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00)
Pesos for Violation of Section 15, Art. III of R.A. 6425 as amended.
In Criminal Case No. 91-1525 entitled People of the Philippines vs. CHIN
KIN YONG, the Court hereby sentences Chin Kin Yong to life
imprisonment and a fine of Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00) Pesos for
Violation 15 (sic), Art. III, R.A. 6425 as amended.

In Criminal Case No. 91-1526 entitled People of the Philippines vs. AU

WING CHEUNG, the Court hereby sentences Au Wing Cheung to life
imprisonment and a fine of Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00) Pesos for
Violation of Section 15, Art. III, R.A. 6425 as amended.

In Criminal Case No. 91-1527 entitled People of the Philippines vs. YAP
BOON AH, the Court hereby sentences Yap Boon Ah to life
imprisonment and a fine of Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00) Pesos for
Violation of Section 15, Art. III, R.A. 6425 as amended.

In Criminal Case No. 91-1528 entitled People of the Philippines vs. TAN
SOT TEE, the Court hereby sentences Tan Soi Tee to life imprisonment
and a fine of Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00) Pesos for Violation of
Section 15, Art. III, R.A. 6425 as amended.

In Criminal Case No. 91-1529 entitled People of the Philippines vs. CHIN
KONG SONG, the Court hereby sentences Chin Kong Song to life
imprisonment and a fine of Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00) Pesos for
Violation of Section 15, Art. III, R.A. 6425 as amended.

In Criminal Case No. 91-1530 entitled People of the Philippines vs. CHIN
KOK WEE, the Court hereby sentences Chin Kok Wee to life
imprisonment and a fine of Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00) Pesos for
Violation of Section 15, Art. III, R.A. 6425 as amended.

In Criminal Case No. 91-1531 entitled People of the Philippines vs. CHIN
KIN FAH, the Court sentences Chin Kin Fah to life imprisonment and a
fine of Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00) Pesos for Violation of Section
15, Art. III, R.A. 6425 as amended.

In Criminal Case No. 91-1532 entitled People of the Philippines vs. LIM
CHAN FATT, the Court hereby sentences Lim Chan Fatt to life
imprisonment and a fine of Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00) Pesos for
Violation of Section 15, Art. III, R.A. 6425 as amended.

In Criminal Case No. 91-1533 entitled People of the Philippines vs. CHAI
MIN HUWA, the Court hereby sentences Chai Min Huwa to life
imprisonment and a fine of Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00) Pesos for
Violation of Section 15, Art. III, R.A. 6425 as amended.

In Criminal Case No. 91-1534 entitled People of the Philippines vs. LIM
NYUK SUN, the Court hereby sentences Lim Nyuk Sun to life
imprisonment and a fine of Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00) Pesos for
Violation of Section 15, R.A. 6425 as amended.

Likewise, the thirty (30) Alpen cereal boxes found to contain a total of
34.450 kilograms of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride or shabu is
hereby forfeited and the same is hereby ordered burned and/or
destroyed in the presence of this Court, representative of the
Department of Justice, National Bureau of Investigation, Dangerous
Drugs Board, Bureau of Customs and the Narcotics Command
(Narcom) at the San Lazaro crematorium before the same falls in the
hands of future victims and further compound the already epidemic
proportions of the drug menace in the country.

SO ORDERED.[10]
 Thereafter, all accused through counsel filed with the trial court
their joint notice of appeal.[11] However, on 7 April 1992, accused Chin
Kong Song, Lim Nyuk Sun, Chin Kok Wee and Chai Min Huwa withdrew
their notice of appeal.[12] This Court then directed those accused who
did not withdraw their appeal to file their respective appellants brief.
Only accused-appellants Wong Chuen Ming and Au Wing Cheung filed
their joint appeal brief, hence, the Court was constrained to dismiss the
appeal pertaining to accused Lim Chan Fatt, Ching Kin Yong, Tan Soi
Tee, Yap Boon Ah and Chin Kin Fah.[13] Consequently, the Court is now
only concerned with the appeal of accused-appellants Wong Chuen
Ming and Au Wing Cheung as the decision of the trial court has already
become final and executory with respect to accused Chin Kong Song,
Lim Nyuk Sun, Chin Kok Wee, Chai Min Huwa, Lim Chan Fatt, Chi Kin
Yong, Tan Soi Tee, Yap Boon Ah and Chin Kin Fah.

In their appeal brief, accused-appellants Wong Chuen Ming and Au

Wing Cheung make the following assignment of errors:

I.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO REALIZE THAT THE
JOINT REPRESENTATION BY PREVIOUS COUNSEL OF APPELLANTS
WITH THE GROUP OF NINE MALAYSIANS ACCUSED NOT ONLY
PREJUDICED THE FORMER BUT ALSO AMOUNTED TO THE
DEPRIVATION OF THEIR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE
COUNSEL AND DUE PROCESS.

II.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO HOLD THAT THE
APPREHENDING CUSTOMS OFFICERS VIOLATED APPELLANTS
MIRANDA RIGHTS.

III.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT EXCLUDING THE INADMISSIBLE
EVIDENCE OBTAINED IN VIOLATION OF APPELLANTS MIRANDA
RIGHTS.

IV.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED WHEN IT RELIED ON THE PRESUMPTION
OF REGULARITY IN THE DISCHARGE OF OFFICIAL DUTIES, DESPITE THE
PAUCITY AND LACK OF CREDIBILITY OF THE PROSECUTIONS
EVIDENCE.

V.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED WHEN IT DISREGARDED THE CLEAR
ABSENCE OF ANIMUS POSSIDENDI ON THE PART OF THE
APPELLANTS.[14]

Accused-appellants contention that they were deprived of their

right to counsel and due process when their previous counsels also
represented the other accused despite conflicting interests is not well-
taken. After going over the lengthy transcripts taken during the trial,
the Court is satisfied that said counsels tried to present all the defenses
available to each of the accused and that they did not, in any way, put
in jeopardy accused-appellants constitutional right to counsel. It does
not appear from the records that the effectiveness of accused-
appellants previous counsels was diminished by the fact that they also
jointly represented the other accused.

The Court, however, finds merit in the other contentions raised by

accused-appellants in their appeal brief. These contentions shall be
discussed jointly considering that the issues they raise are interrelated
and deal with the question of whether or not the guilt of accused-
appellants was proven beyond reasonable doubt.

At the outset, the Court holds that the signatures of accused on the
boxes, as well as on the plastic bags containing shabu, are inadmissible
in evidence. A careful study of the records reveal that accused were
never informed of their fundamental rights during the entire time that
they were under investigation. Specifically, accused were not informed
of their Miranda rights i.e. that they had the right to remain silent and
to counsel and any statement they might make could be used against
them, when they were made to affix their signatures on the boxes of
Alpen Cereals while they were at the NAIA and again, on the plastic
bags when they were already taken in custody at Camp Crame.
 Prosecution witness Danilo Gomez admitted this fatal lapse during
cross-examination:

Atty. Tomas:
What did you tell these passengers before you made them
sign this bunch of cartons?
A: It was Collector Bonifacio who call (sic) their names and as
soon as their luggages are examined and pulled, the three
boxes, I wrap it in a masking tape and requested them to sign
their names.
Q: You just told them to sign this matter?
A: Yes.
Q: No preliminaries?
A: No.
Q: At that time that each one of the passengers were made to sign,
was there any lawyer representing them?
A: None.
Q: You did not even inform them of their constitutional rights?
A: No.[15] (Italics supplied)
Capt. Rustico Francisco also admitted that he did not inform the
accused of their rights when he placed them under arrest:
Atty. Zoleta:
So, after the result of that sample examined which yielded
positive result, you immediately placed the accused under
arrest, is that correct?
A: I informed that that they are under arrest for bringing
transporting to the country suspected methamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu.
x x x xxx xxx
Q: How did you announce your authority to the accused?
A: I told Mr. Paul Au to tell his companions that we are placing
them under arrest for transporting methamphetamine
hydrochloride into the country.
Q: And it is at this very moment that you informed them of their
right, is that correct?
A: I did not inform them of their right.[16] (Italics supplied)
It is also not shown from the testimony of Elizabeth Ayonon that
accused were informed of their rights when they were again made to
affix their signatures on the plastic bags:
 Atty. Tomas:
You said all the signatures were already there when brought
to your laboratory for examination. With that answer, do you
mean to tell even the signature inside the cereal box and
transparent plastic bag were already there when you
examined said specimen?
A: Only the brown box labelled Alpen.
Q: Who made the signature inside the cereal box and on the
transparent plastic bag?
A: Me, sir, because I asked them to identify. The interpreter asked
them to identify their signature. So, in return I have to tell
them please affix your signature for proper identification since
they are reflected on the box.
Q: What did you tell the accused when you required them to
make their signatures?
A: The interpreter told them to affix their signature for proper
identification on the transparent plastic bag since their
signature appeared on the carton box.[17]

By affixing their signatures on the boxes of Alpen Cereals and on the

plastic bags, accused in effect made a tacit admission of the crime
charged for mere possession of shabu is punished by law. These
signatures of accused are tantamount to an uncounselled extra-judicial
confession which is not sanctioned by the Bill of Rights (Section
12[1][3], Article III, 1987 Constitution). They are, therefore, inadmissible
as evidence for any admission wrung from the accused in violation of
their constitutional rights is inadmissible against them.[18] The fact that
all accused are foreign nationals does not preclude application of the
exclusionary rule because the constitutional guarantees embodied in
the Bill of Rights are given and extend to all persons, both aliens and
citizens.[19]

Without the signatures of accused on the boxes of Alpen Cereals

and on the transparent plastic bags, the prosecution is left with the
testimonies of its witnesses to establish that all the eleven (11) accused
transported shabu into the country. Among the prosecution witnesses,
only customs examiner Danilo Gomez testified that all the seized
baggages, including those owned by accused-appellants Wong Chuen
Ming and Au Wing Cheung, contained a box or boxes of shabu. His
testimony was given credence by the trial court since he was presumed
to have performed his duties in a regular manner. However, Gomez
testimony inculpating accused-appellants was not corroborated by
other prosecution witnesses.

Customs collector Zenaida Bonifacio stated during cross-

examination that she cannot recall if each and everyone of accused
were found in possession of any box or boxes of Alpen
Cereals.[20] More significantly, the testimony of NARCOM officer Capt.
Rustico Francisco casts doubt on the claim of Gomez that he recovered
boxes of shabu from the baggages of accused-appellants:
Court:
Clarificatory questions from the Court, you said that you were
at the arrival area immediately after the arrival of all these
accused when your attention was called by the customs
examiner, is that correct?
A: Yes. Your Honor.
Court:
So that you can truly say that you could note or witness the
actual examinations of the baggages of all the accused
persons here?
A: Yes, Your Honor.
Court:
You realize, of course, the seriousness of the charges against
these persons?
A: Yes, Your Honor.
Court:
As a matter of fact, they could stay in jail for life?
A: Yes, Your Honor.
Court:
Now in all candor and sincerity, did you actually see with your
own two eyes any box being recovered from the bag of Au Wing
Cheung? If you are not sure, dont answer.
A: I am not sure.
Court:
How about from the bag of Wong Chuen Ming, the other tourist
from Hongkong. In all candor and sincerity did you actually see
with your own two eyes a box being recovered from his bag?
A: I am not sure.
 Court:
There are nine other accused in these cases. In all fairness and
sincerity, other than the two, did you actually see with your own
two eyes boxes of cereals being recovered from the bags of the
other Malaysians accused in these cases?
A: For the nine others, I am very sure, I am very sure that cereal
boxes containing shabu, I am very sure.
Court:
Without any exception?
A: Yes, Your Honor, for the nine.[21] (Italics supplied)
While Capt. Francisco was categorical in stating that boxes of shabu
were recovered from the baggages belonging to the other nine (9)
accused Malaysians, he admitted that he was not sure whether Gomez
actually recovered boxes of shabu from accused-appellants
baggages. Hence, the presumption of regularity in the performance of
duties accorded to Gomez cannot, by itself, prevail over the
constitutional right of accused-appellants to be presumed innocent
especially in the light of the foregoing testimonies of other
prosecution witnesses.[22]

There are other circumstances that militate against the conviction of

accused-appellants. First, accused-appellants are British (Hongkong)
nationals while all the other accused are Malaysians. It is difficult to
imagine how accused-appellants could have conspired with the other
accused, who are total strangers, when they do not even speak the
same language.Second, overwhelming evidence consisting of
testimonies of accused-appellant Au Wing Cheungs superiors was
presented to show that he was a bonafide employee of Select Tours
International Co., Ltd. Third, evidence showed that accused-appellant
Wong Chuen Ming was not originally part of the tour group arranged
by Select Tours but he was only accommodated by the latter at the last
minute when his package tour to Cebu was cancelled by Wing Ann
Travel Co. Finally, as testified to by Capt. Francisco, both accused-
appellants adamantly refused to sign on the transparent plastic bags
containing shabu:

Court:
 You made mention about two persons two of the accused
who refused to sign the plastic bags containing the suspected
shabu. Did you say that?
A: Yes, Your Honor.
Court:
Did you not go out of your way to inquire the reasons of the
two for not wanting to sign knowing of course that your duty
as a law officer is not only to see to it that the guilty are
prosecuted but to spare the innocent? Did you inquire why
they refused to sign?
A: I inquired.
Court:
What was the reason of the two?
A: They told me their baggages did not contain any prohibited
drugs.
Court:
Now again, think very carefully and try to recall vividly the time
when these two refused to sign and go over the faces of the
eleven accused and tell the court if you can remember or recall
the looks of the two accused who refused to sign. Before you
do that look very carefully at their faces.
A: Wong Chuen Ming, the one with the tattoo.
Q: Now, you mentioned two persons look at the faces of the 10
others. Aside from the one with a tattoo and look for the
other one.
A: The other one is the tour leader.[23]

All the foregoing circumstances taken together with the findings of

the Court persuade us to hold that accused-appellants participation in
the illegal transportation of shabu into the country has not been
proven beyond reasonable doubt. To paraphrase an admonition
expressed by the Court in a recent case, [m]uch as We share the
abhorrence of the disenchanted public in regard to the proliferation of
drug pushers (or drug smugglers, as in this case), the Court cannot
permit the incarceration of individuals based on insufficient factual
nexus of their participation in the commission of an offense.[24]

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED and

another one entered ACQUITTING Wong Chuen Ming and Au Wing
Cheung of the crime charged, based on reasonable doubt. Their
immediate release is hereby ORDERED unless they are detained for
some other lawful cause. Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Vitug, Kapunan, and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur.

* Penned by Judge Lilia C. Lopez.

[1] Informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 91-1524 to 91-1534 filed by Senior State Prosecutor George C.
Dee; Rollo, pp. 30-51. Brackets supplied.
[2] TSN, testimony of Danilo Gomez, 25 September 1991, pp. 4-13.
[3] TSN, testimony of Zenaida Reyes Bonifacio, 27 September 1991, pp. 4-11.
[4] TSN, testimony of Capt. Rustico Francisco, 2 October 1991 pp. 11-32.
[5] Exhibit NN- 1.
[6] Exhibit NN-7.
[7] TSN, testimony of Lim Chan Fatt, 14 October 1991, pp. 4-22.
[8] TSN, testimony of Au Wing Cheung.
[9] TSN, testimony of Wong Chuen Ming, 15 October 1991, pp. 13-20.
[10] RTC Decision, pp. 28-30; Rollo, pp. 88-90.
[11] Rollo, p. 92.
[12] Motion to Withdraw Notice of Appeal, Original Records, Volume III, pp. 35-36.
[13] Resolution dated 27 February 1995; Rollo, p. 280.
[14] Appeal Brief, p. 4; Rollo, p. 150.
[15] TSN, testimony of Danilo Gomez, 26 September 1991, p. 84.
[16] TSN, testimony of Capt. Rustico Francisco, 2 October 1991, pp. 32-33
[17] TSN, testimony of Elizabeth Ayonon, 26 September 1991, p. 44.
[18] People vs. Bandin, 226 SCRA 299 (1993); People vs. Bagano, 181 SCRA 747 (1990).
[19] Villegas vs. Hui Chiong Tasia Pao Ito, 86 SCRA 270 (1978).
[20] TSN, testimony of Zenaida Bonifacio, 27 September 1991, p. 62.
[21] TSN, testimony of Capt. Rustico Francisco, 30 October 1991, p. 14.
[22] People vs. Melosantos, 245 SCRA 560(1995);People vs. Salcedo, 145 SCRA 345 (1993).
[23] TSN, testimony of Capt. Rustico Francisco, 2 October 1991, p. 44.
[24] People vs. Melosantos, supra, at 587.