CONFLICT OF LAWS (2020) CASE DIGEST
WALDEMAR GRAVADOR
EH401
RENVOI
Aznar vs. Garcia
G.R. No. L-16749, January 31, 1963
FACTS:
Edward Christensen died testate. The estate was
distributed by Executioner Aznar according to the
will, which provides that: Php 3,600 be given to
HELEN Christensen as her legacy, and the rest of
his estate to his daughter LUCY Christensen, as
pronounced by CFI Davao.
Opposition to the approval of the project of
partition was filed by Helen, insofar as it deprives
her of her legitime as an acknowledged natural
child, she having been declared by us an
acknowledged natural child (in a separate case) of
the deceased Edward in an earlier case.
As to his citizenship, we find that the citizenship
that he acquired in California when he resided in
Sacramento from 1904 to 1913, was never lost by
his stay in the Philippines, and the deceased
appears to have considered himself as a citizen of
California by the fact that when he executed his will
he declared that he was a citizen of that State; so
that he appears never to have intended to abandon
his California citizenship by acquiring another. But
at the time of his death, he was domiciled in the
Philippines.
ISSUE:
Whether or not PH law should apply
RULING:
PH Law. The law that governs the validity of his
testamentary dispositions is defined in Article 16
of the Civil Code of the Philippines, which is as
follows:
ART. 16. Real property as well as personal
property is subject to the law of the country
where it is situated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions,
both with respect to the order of succession and to
the amount of successional rights and to the
intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall
be regulated by the national law of the person
whose succession is under consideration, whatever
Estanuts by BEANIZA|CADELEÑA|ESTAVILLA|MELENDEZ|SABUSAY
Read the Full Text
ATTY.
may be the nature of the property and regardless of
the country where said property may be found.
The application of this article in the case at bar
requires the determination of the meaning of the
term “national law” is used therein.
The decision of CFI Davao, sustains the contention
of the executor-appellee that under the California
Probate Code, a testator may dispose of his
property by will in the form and manner he desires.
But HELEN invokes the provisions of Article 946 of
the Civil Code of California, which is as follows:
If there is no law to the contrary, in the
place where personal property is situated, it
is deemed to follow the person of its owner,
and is governed by the law of his domicile.
It is argued on executor’s behalf that as the
deceased Christensen was a citizen of the State of
California, the internal law thereof, which is that
given in the Kaufman case, should govern the
determination of the validity of the testamentary
provisions of Christensen’s will, such law being in
force in the State of California of which Christensen
was a citizen. Appellant, on the other hand, insists
that Article 946 should be applicable, and in
accordance therewith and following the doctrine of
the renvoi, the question of the validity of the
testamentary provision in question should be
referred back to the law of the decedent’s domicile,
which is the Philippines.
We note that Article 946 of the California Civil Code
is its conflict of laws rule, while the rule applied in
In re Kaufman, its internal law. If the law on
succession and the conflict of laws rules of
California are to be enforced jointly, each in its own
intended and appropriate sphere, the principle
cited In re Kaufman should apply to citizens living
in the State, but Article 946 should apply to such of
its citizens as are not domiciled in California but in
other jurisdictions. The rule laid down of resorting
to the law of the domicile in the determination of
matters with foreign element involved is in accord
with the general principle of American law that the
domiciliary law should govern in most matters or
rights which follow the person of the owner.
Appellees argue that what Article 16 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines pointed out as the national
law is the internal law of California. But as above
explained the laws of California have prescribed
UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
CONFLICT OF LAWS (2020) CASE DIGEST
EH401
two sets of laws for its citizens, one for residents
therein and another for those domiciled in other
jurisdictions.
It is argued on appellees’ (Aznar and LUCY) behalf
that the clause “if there is no law to the contrary in
the place where the property is situated” in Sec.
946 of the California Civil Code refers to Article 16
of the Civil Code of the Philippines and that the law
to the contrary in the Philippines is the provision in
said Article 16 that the national law of the deceased
should govern. This contention cannot be
sustained.
As explained in the various authorities cited above,
the national law mentioned in Article 16 of our Civil
Code is the law on conflict of laws in the California
Civil Code, i.e., Article 946, which authorizes the
reference or return of the question to the law of the
testator’s domicile. The conflict of laws rule in
California, Article 946, Civil Code, precisely refers
back the case, when a decedent is not domiciled in
California, to the law of his domicile, the
Philippines in the case at bar. The court of the
domicile cannot and should not refer the case back
to California; such action would leave the issue
incapable of determination because the case will
then be like a football, tossed back and forth
between the two states, between the country of
which the decedent was a citizen and the country
of his domicile.
The Philippine court must apply its own law as
directed in the conflict of laws rule of the state of
the decedent, if the question has to be decided,
especially as the application of the internal law of
California provides no legitime for children while
the Philippine law, Arts. 887(4) and 894, Civil Code
of the Philippines, makes natural children legally
acknowledged forced heirs of the parent
recognizing them.
In arriving at the conclusion that the domicile of the
deceased is the Philippines, we are persuaded by
the fact that he was born in New York, migrated to
California and resided there for nine years, and
since he came to the Philippines in 1913 he
returned to California very rarely and only for
short visits (perhaps to relatives), and considering
that he appears never to have owned or acquired a
home or properties in that state, which would
indicate that he would ultimately abandon the
Philippines and make home in the State of
California.
Estanuts by BEANIZA|CADELEÑA|ESTAVILLA|MELENDEZ|SABUSAY
Read the Full Text
ATTY. WALDEMAR GRAVADOR
We therefore find that as the domicile of the
deceased Edward, a citizen of California, is the
Philippines, the validity of the provisions of his will
depriving his acknowledged natural child, the
appellant HELEN, should be governed by the
Philippine Law, the domicile, pursuant to Art. 946
of the Civil Code of California, not by the internal
law of California.
Bellis vs. Bellis
G.R. L-23678, June 6, 1967
FACTS:
Amos Bellis, born in Texas, was a citizen of the State
of Texas and of the United States. He had 5
legitimate children with his wife, Mary Mallen,
whom he had divorced, 3 legitimate children with
his 2nd wife, Violet Kennedy and finally, 3
illegitimate children.
Prior to his death, Amos Bellis executed a will in the
Philippines in which his distributable estate should
be divided in trust in the following order and
manner:
a. $240,000 to his 1st wife Mary Mallen;
b. P120,000 to his 3 illegitimate children at
P40,000 each;
c. The remainder shall go to his surviving children
by his 1st and 2nd wives, in equal shares.
Subsequently, Amos Bellis died a resident of San
Antonio, Texas, USA. His will was admitted to
probate in the Philippines. The People’s Bank and
Trust Company, an executor of the will, paid the
entire bequest therein.
Preparatory to closing its administration, the
executor submitted and filed its “Executor’s Final
Account, Report of Administration and Project of
Partition” where it reported, inter alia, the
satisfaction of the legacies. Among the 3
illegitimate children, Mari Cristina and Miriam
Palma Bellis filed their respective opposition to the
project partition on the ground that they were
deprived of their legitimes as illegitimate
children.
The lower court denied their respective motions
for reconsideration. Relying upon Art. 16 of the
Civil Code, it applied the national law of the
UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
CONFLICT OF LAWS (2020)
decedent, which in this case is Texas law, which
did not provide for legitimes.
ISSUE:
Whether Texan Law of Philippine Law must apply.
RULING:
Texan Law
1. It is not disputed that the decedent was both a
national of Texas and a domicile thereof at the
time of his death. So that even assuming Texas has
a conflict of law rule providing that the same would
not result in a reference back (renvoi) to Philippine
Law, but would still refer to Texas Law.
Nonetheless, if Texas has conflict rule adopting the
situs theory (lex rei sitae) calling for the application
of the law of the place where the properties are
situated, renvoi would arise, since the properties
here involved are found in the Philippines. In the
absence, however of proofs as to the conflict of law
rule of Texas, it should not be presumed different
from ours. Appellants’ position is therefore not
rested on the doctrine of renvoi. As stated, they
never invoked nor even mentioned it in their
arguments. Rather, they argue that their case falls
under the circumstances mentioned in the third
paragraph of Article 17 in relation to Article 16 of
the Civil Code.
Art 16. Real property as well as personal
property is subject to the law of the country
where it is situated.
However, intestate and testamentary
successions, both with respect to the order of
succession and to the amount of successional
rights and to the intrinsic validity of
testamentary provisions, shall be regulated
by the national law of the person whose
succession is under consideration, whatever
may be the nature of the property and
regardless of the country wherein said
property may be found.
Art. 1039. Capacity to succeed is governed by
the law of the nation of the decedent.
2. Appellants would also point out that the
decedent executed two wills — one to govern his
Texas estate and the other his Philippine estate —
Estanuts by BEANIZA|CADELEÑA|ESTAVILLA|MELENDEZ|SABUSAY
Read the Full Text
CASE DIGEST ATTY. WALDEMAR GRAVADOR
EH401
arguing from this that he intended Philippine law
to govern his Philippine estate.
Assuming that such was the decedent's intention in
executing a separate Philippine will, it would not
alter the law, for as this Court ruled in Miciano vs.
Brimo, 50 Phil. 867, 870, a provision in a foreigner's
will to the effect that his properties shall be
distributed in accordance with Philippine law and
not with his national law, is illegal and void, for
his national law cannot be ignored in regard to
those matters that Article 10 — now Article 16 —
of the Civil Code states said national law should
govern.
The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis,
was a citizen of the State of Texas, U.S.A., and that
under the laws of Texas, there are no forced heirs
or legitimes. Accordingly, since the intrinsic
validity of the provision of the will and the amount
of successional rights are to be determined under
Texas law, the Philippine law on legitimes cannot
be applied to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis.
Llorente vs Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 124371, November 23, 2000
FACTS:
Lorenzo Llorente, married to Paula, was an enlisted
serviceman of the US Navy. He departed for the US
and subsequently acquired American citizenship.
He visited the Philippines and found out that Paula
was pregnant, and was living in and having an
adulterous relationship with his brother, Ceferino.
(What a hoe!) Paula gave birth to a boy named
Crisologo.
Lorenzo refused to forgive Paula, they signed and
agreed the following:
1.) All the family allowances allotted by the United
States Navy as part of Lorenzo's salary and all other
obligations for Paula's daily maintenance and
support would be suspended;
2.) They would dissolve their marital union in
accordance with judicial proceedings;
3.) They would make a separate agreement
regarding their conjugal property acquired during
their marital life; and
UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
CONFLICT OF LAWS (2020) CASE DIGEST
EH401
4.) Lorenzo would not prosecute Paula for her
adulterous act since she voluntarily admitted her
fault and agreed to separate from Lorenzo
peacefully.
Lorenzo returned to the US and got a divorce. He
returned to the Philippines and married Alicia.
Alicia had no knowledge of the first marriage. They
live as husband and wife for 25 years and produced
3 children. Lorenzo executed a last will and
testament which favors Alicia and their children. It
was filed for probate, but before it can be
terminated, Lorenzo died.
Paula filed with the same court a petition 22 for
letters of administration over Lorenzo's estate in
her favor. Paula contended (1) that she was
Lorenzo's surviving spouse, (2) that the various
property were acquired during their marriage, (3)
that Lorenzo's will disposed of all his property in
favor of Alicia and her children, encroaching on her
legitime and 1/2 share in the conjugal property.
WOW THE AUDACITY!
The Regional Trial Court declared that the divorce
decree is inapplicable in the Philippines and Paula
was also declared as the primary, compulsory heir
and administrator of Lorenzo’s estate (Walai bahin
si Alicia). The trial court also declared the intrinsic
disposition of the will void . The Court of Appeals
affirmed this ruling.
REMEMBER AMERICAN CITIZEN JUD NI SI ENZO
TILL SA IYA DEATH!!
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in
declaring the intrinsic disposition of the will void.
RULING:
Foreign laws do not prove themselves in our
jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to
take judicial notice of them; they must be alleged
and proved. In this case, the Court of Appeals and
the trial court called to the fore the renvoi doctrine,
where the case was "referred back" to the law of
the decedent's domicile, in this case, Philippine law.
The trial court stated that the law of New York was
not sufficiently proven, in the same breath it made
the categorical, albeit equally unproven statement
Estanuts by BEANIZA|CADELEÑA|ESTAVILLA|MELENDEZ|SABUSAY
Read the Full Text
ATTY. WALDEMAR GRAVADOR
that "American law" follows the 'domiciliary
theory' hence, Philippine law applies when
determining the validity of Lorenzo's will.
However, there is no such thing as one American
law. The "national law" indicated in Article 16 of
the Civil Code cannot possibly apply to general
American law. There is no such law governing the
validity of testamentary provisions in the United
States. Each State of the union has its own law
applicable to its citizens and in force only within
the State. It can therefore refer to no other than the
law of the State of which the decedent was a
resident. Also, there is no showing that the
application of the renvoi doctrine is called for or
required by New York State law.
Validity of the Divorce Decree
Jurisprudence states that only Philippine nationals
are covered by the policy against absolute divorces,
the same being considered contrary to our concept
of public policy and morality. In the same case, the
Court ruled that aliens may obtain divorces abroad,
provided they are valid according to their national
law. The divorce obtained by Lorenzo from his first
wife Paula was valid and recognized in this
jurisdiction as a matter of comity.
Validity of the Will
Whether the will is intrinsically valid and who shall
inherit from Lorenzo are issues best proved by
foreign law which must be pleaded and proved.
Whether the will was executed in accordance with
the formalities required is answered by referring to
Philippine law. In fact, the will was duly probated.
The clear intent of Lorenzo to bequeath his
property to his second wife and children by her is
glaringly shown in the will he executed. His wishes
will not be frustrated, since he was a foreigner, not
covered by our laws on "family rights and duties,
status, condition and legal capacity."
The case was REMANDED, to determine the intrinsic
validity of Lorenzo N. Llorente's will and
determination of the parties' successional rights
allowing proof of foreign law. So bitin siya!
UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
CONFLICT OF LAWS (2020) CASE DIGEST
EH401
CITIZENSHIP AND DOMICILE
Poe-Llamanzares vs COMELEC
G.R. No. 221697, 221698-700, March 8, 2016
You know na nga taas jud kaayo ni nga case so issues
about quo warranto og COMELEC jurisdiction kay gi
omit, facts and issues relevant to the subject matter
ra ang gibutang. Master na kaayo ni ninyo nga kaso
oy kinaon sa consti og admin! Haha.
FACTS:
Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares was
found abandoned as a newborn infant; she was
then registered as a foundling. When she was 5
years old she was adopted by Fernando Poe, Jr. and
Susan Roces. Years later, Grace Poe pursued her
education abroad and she married Teodoro
Llamanzares, a citizen of both Philippines and the
USA. She was naturalized as a US citizen later on.
Upon learning her father’s deteriorating medical
condition she went back in the country.
Unfortunately, her father died, and there she
decided to reside permanently here in the
Philippines.
They came home in the Philippines. She took an
oath of allegiance under R.A. 9225, and she
registered as a voter in Brgy. Sta. Lucia, Sasn Juan
City. Later on, Pres. Aquino appointed her as a
chairperson of the MTRCB, she executed an
Affidavit of Renunciation of Allegiance to the
United States of America and Renunciation of
American Citizenship.
Grace Poe decided to join the political arena in the
country, she ran and won first place as a Senator in
the 2012 elections. On 2015, she filed a Certificate
of Candidacy, vying for the highest office in the
land, as President. Several cases triggered when
she filed her Certificate of Candidacy, specifically
G.R No. 221697 and G.R. No. 221698-700. Common
to both petitions for disqualification are the
question the citizenship of Grace Poe.
G.R. No. 221697
It was argued in this petition that she is not a
natural-born Filipino as she was a foundling and
international law does not confer natural-born
status to a foundling. On this reasoning, she cannot
validly acquire citizenship pursuant to R.A. 9225 as
she was not a Filipino in the first place. Assuming
Estanuts by BEANIZA|CADELEÑA|ESTAVILLA|MELENDEZ|SABUSAY
Read the Full Text
ATTY. WALDEMAR GRAVADOR
that she was a natural-born Filipino, she is deemed
to have lost the status when she was naturalized in
the US.
G.R. No. 221698-700
Here it was argued that the Philippines adhere jus
sanguinis, persons of unknown parentage cannot
be considered as natural born since blood is
determinative of the natural-born status. The fact
that the 1935 Constitution did not expressly
included them, it was intended that they were to be
excluded. She also cannot seek international
treaties as they are not self-executing and local
legislations are necessary to give them effect.
As a defense, Grace Poe stated that as a customary
international law, foundlings are entitled to a
nationality and are presumed to be citizens of the
country where they are found. She also insisted
that she could legally re-establish her domicile of
choice in the Philippines even before she
renounced her American citizenship as long as the
three determinants for a change of domicile are
complied with. She reasoned out that there was no
requirement that renunciation of foreign
citizenship is a prerequisite for the acquisition of a
new domicile of choice.
The COMELEC cancelled her Certificate of
Candidacy as she was not a natural-born Filipino
citizen, for committing material misrepresentation
and she failed to complete the requirement of
residency.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Grace Poe is a natural-born citizen.
Whether or not Grace Poe satisfied the period of
residence requirement for President.
RULING:
Yes.
Grace Poe as a foundling, is a natural-born citizen
(Citizenship)
Based on statistical data and circumstantial
evidence, the majority population in Iloilo, where
Grace Poe was found, was Filipino (99% certainty).
She also has typical Filipino features: height (in
UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
CONFLICT OF LAWS (2020) CASE DIGEST
EH401
short mubo), flat nasal bridge, straight black hair,
almond shaped eyes and an oval face.
As a matter of law, foundlings are as a class,
natural-born citizens. During the 1934
Constitutional Convention, foundlings were not
included as their numbers were not enough to
merit specific mention, and there was no restrictive
words that exclude them. Moreover, it was believed
that the rules of international law were already
clear to the effect that illegitimate children
followed the citizenship of the mother, and that
foundlings followed the nationality of the place
where they were found, thereby making
unnecessary the inclusion in the Constitution of the
proposed amendment.
The concept of a foundling is presumed to have the
"nationality of the country of birth," and a
foundling is presumed born of citizens of the
country where he is found, are generally accepted
principles of international law. As such, they are
indeed laws of our country pursuant to our
incorporation clause.
The COMELEC also reasoned that since the
applicant must perform an act, what is reacquired
is not "natural-born" citizenship but only plain
"Philippine citizenship." However jurisprudence
states that repatriation results in the recovery of
the original nationality. This means that a
naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be
restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino
citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a
natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine
citizenship, he will be restored to his former status
as a natural-born Filipino. Natural-born status may
not be continuous.
Grace Poe satisfied the period of residency
(Residency)
This is an election law case guys so Residence and
Domicile kay synonymous ra. Thanks Atty. Guji!
When Grace Poe immigrated to the US in 1991 she
lost her original domicile. There are three
requisites to apply for a new domicile: 1.) residence
or bodily presence; 2.) an intention to remain
there; and 3.) an intention to abandon the old
domicile. To successfully effect a change of
domicile, one must demonstrate an actual removal
or an actual change of domicile; a bona 􀁅de
intention of abandoning the former place of
Estanuts by BEANIZA|CADELEÑA|ESTAVILLA|MELENDEZ|SABUSAY
Read the Full Text
ATTY. WALDEMAR GRAVADOR
residence and establishing a new one and definite
acts which correspond with the purpose.
There must basically be animus manendi coupled
with animus non revertendi. The purpose to remain
in or at the domicile of choice must be for an
indefinite period of time; the change of residence
must be voluntary; and the residence at the place
chosen for the new domicile must be actual.
Grace Poe presented voluminous and
overwhelming evidence that she had abandoned
her US domicile, some are:
1. Correspondence with a freight company to for
the shipment of their household items.
2. E-mail with the Philippine Bureau of Animal
Industry inquiring on how to ship their dog.
FYI naa siya iro nga si Perry, maltese, og si
Patchot, bichon fries (atay morag pagkaon).
3. Enrollment of her children in Philippine schools
4. Condominium title
5. E-mail to the US Postal Service confirming their
request for the change of address.
6. Sold their family home abroad
There was also no material representation on her
COC, as she misunderstood the date required in the
2013 COC as the period of residence as of the day
she submitted that COC in 2012. She said that she
reckoned residency from April-May 2006 which
was the period when the U.S. house was sold and
her husband returned to the Philippines. In that
regard, she was advised by her lawyers in 2015
that residence could be counted from 25 May 2005.
This is bolstered by the change which the
COMELEC itself introduced in the 2015 COC which
is now "period of residence in the Philippines up to
the day before May 09, 2016." The COMELEC would
not have revised the query if it did not
acknowledge that the first version was vague.
Grace Poe could have reckoned residence from a
date earlier than the sale of her U.S. house and the
return of her husband is plausible given the
evidence that she had returned a year before. Such
evidence, to repeat, would include her passport
and the school records of her children.
UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
CONFLICT OF LAWS (2020)
There is precedent after all where a candidate's
mistake as to period of residence made in a COC
was overcome by evidence. It is the fact of
residence, not a statement in a certificate of
candidacy which ought to be decisive in
determining whether or not an individual has
satisfied the constitution's residency qualification
requirement." Nge accommodated jk !
Edgar San Luis vs. Felicidad San Luis
G.R. No. 134029, February 6, 2007
Facts:
The instant case involves the settlement of the
estate of Felicisimo T. San Luis (Felicisimo), who
was the former governor of the Province of Laguna.
During his lifetime, Felicisimo contracted three
marriages. His first marriage was with Virginia
Sulit, out of which were born six children, namely:
Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar, Linda, Emilita and Manuel.
Virginia herein predeceased Felicisimo.
Five years later, he married Merry Lee Corwin, with
whom he had a son, Tobias. However, Merry Lee,
an American citizen, filed a Complaint for Divorce
before the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of
Hawaii, United States of America (U.S.A.), which
issued a Decree Granting Absolute Divorce and
Awarding Child Custody to her.
Felicisimo then married respondent Felicidad San
Luis at Wilshire Boulevard, Los Angeles, California,
U.S.A. He had no children with Felicidad he but
lived with her for 18 years from the time of their
marriage up to his death.
Thereafter, Felicidad sought the dissolution of their
conjugal partnership assets and the settlement of
Felicisimo’s estate. She filed a petition for letters of
administration before RTC of Makati City.
Respondent alleged that she is the widow of
Felicisimo and that at the time of his death, the
decedent was residing at 100 San Juanico Street,
New Alabang Village, Alabang, Metro Manila. She
prayed that the conjugal partnership assets be
liquidated and that letters of administration be
issued to her.
Rodolfo and Linda, the children of Felicisimo by his
first marriage, filed a motion to dismiss on the
grounds of improper venue and failure to state a
cause of action. Rodolfo claimed that the petition
should’ve been filed in the Province of Laguna as
Estanuts by BEANIZA|CADELEÑA|ESTAVILLA|MELENDEZ|SABUSAY
Read the Full Text
CASE DIGEST ATTY. WALDEMAR GRAVADOR
EH401
this was Felicisimo's place of residence prior to his
death. He further claimed that Felicidad has no
legal personality to file because she was only a
mistress. Felicisimo was still legally married to
Merry Lee when he died.
Ruling of the RTC:
RTC dismissed the petition for letters of
administration. It held that, at the time of his death,
Felicisimo was the duly elected governor and a
resident of the Province of Laguna. Hence, the
petition should have been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna
and not in Makati City. That respondent was
without legal capacity to file because her marriage
with Felicisimo was bigamous, thus, void ab initio.
Further, the decree of absolute divorce dissolving
Felicisimo's marriage to Merry Lee was not valid in
the Philippines and did not bind Felicisimo who
was a Filipino citizen. It also ruled that paragraph
2, Article 26 of the Family Code cannot be
retroactively applied because it would impair the
vested rights of Felicisimo's legitimate children.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals:
The appellate court ruled that under Section 1, Rule
73 of the Rules of Court, the term "place of
residence" of the decedent, for purposes of Axing
the venue of the settlement of his estate, refers to
the personal, actual or physical habitation, or
actual residence or place of abode of a person as
distinguished from legal residence or domicile. It
noted that although Felicisimo discharged his
functions as governor in Laguna, he actually
resided in Alabang, Muntinlupa. Thus, the petition
for letters of administration was properly filed in
Makati City.
It was also held that Felicisimo had legal capacity
to marry Felicidad by virtue of paragraph 2, Article
26 of the Family Code and the rulings in Van Dorn
v. Romillo, Jr. and Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera. The
marriage between Felicisimo and Merry Lee was
validly dissolved by virtue of the decree of absolute
divorce issued by the Family Court of the State of
Hawaii. As a result, under paragraph 2, Article 26,
Felicisimo was capacitated to contract a
subsequent marriage with respondent.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the venue was properly laid.
UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS
CONFLICT OF LAWS (2020) CASE DIGEST
EH401
Whether or not Felicidad has legal capacity to file
the petition for letters of administration.
RULING:
Rodolfo and Edgar (sons of Felicisimo) contend
that pursuant to jurisprudence, "residence" is
synonymous with "domicile" which denotes a
permanent residence to which when absent, one
intends to return. They claim that a person can only
have one domicile at any given time. Since
Felicisimo never changed his domicile, the petition
for letters of administration should have been filed
in Sta. Cruz, Laguna. That Felicidad’s marriage to to
their father was void and bigamous and thus, she
has no legal capacity to file.
Under Section 1, 39 Rule 73 of the Rules of Court,
the petition for letters of administration of the
estate of Felicisimo should be filed in the Regional
Trial Court of the province "in which he resides at
the time of his death.” For purposes of fixing the
venue of the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo,
residence is not synonymous with "domicile." Such
contention only applies for election cases and not
the case at bar. "Resides" should be viewed or
understood in its popular sense, meaning, the
personal, actual or physical habitation of a person,
actual residence or place of abode. It signifies
physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat.
Residence simply requires bodily presence as an
inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires
bodily presence in that place and also an intention
to make it one's domicile.
Evidences were presented indicating the address
of Felicisimo was at "100 San Juanico, Ayala
Alabang, Muntinlupa." Felicisimo was a resident of
Alabang, Muntinlupa for purposes of fixing the
venue of the settlement of his estate. Consequently,
the subject petition for letters of administration
was validly filed in the RTC Makati City which has
territorial jurisdiction over Alabang, Muntinlupa as
per Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 3.
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the
1985 case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. The Van Dorn
case involved a marriage between a Filipino citizen
and a foreigner. The Court held therein that a
divorce decree validly obtained by the alien spouse
is valid in the Philippines, and consequently, the
Filipino spouse is capacitated to remarry under
Philippine law. (Legislative Intent)
Estanuts by BEANIZA|CADELEÑA|ESTAVILLA|MELENDEZ|SABUSAY
Read the Full Text
ATTY. WALDEMAR GRAVADOR
The divorce decree allegedly obtained by Merry
Lee allowed Felicisimo to remarry, would have
vested Felicidad with the legal personality.
However, the records show that there is
insufficient evidence to prove the validity of the
divorce obtained by Merry Lee as well as the
marriage of respondent and Felicisimo under the
laws of the U.S.A. It held that presentation solely of
the divorce decree (photocopy) is insuffcient and
that proof of its authenticity and due execution
must be presented as provided under the Rules.
Even assuming that Felicisimo was not capacitated
to marry, nevertheless, we find that the Felicidad
has the legal personality to file the subject petition,
as she may be considered the co-owner of
Felicisimo as regards the properties that were
acquired through their joint efforts during their
cohabitation.
The case was remanded RTC for further reception
of evidence on the divorce decree obtained by
Merry Lee and the marriage of respondent and
Felicisimo. Felicidad would qualify as an interested
person who has a direct interest in the estate of
Felicisimo by virtue of their cohabitation. Thus,
wherein capacity to marry of Felicisimo is proven
but her marriage with him is not, co-ownership
may be based on Article 144 (equal, joint
contributions). This provision governs the
property relations between parties who live
together as husband and wife without the benefit
of marriage, or their marriage is void from the
beginning.
If Felicisimo is proven to be incapacitated to
marry, Article 148 of the Family Code will apply.
The regime of limited co-ownership of property
governing the union of parties who are not legally
capacitated to marry each other, but who
nonetheless live together as husband and wife,
applies to properties acquired during said
cohabitation in proportion to their respective
contributions. Co-ownership will only be up to the
extent of the proven actual contribution of money,
property or industry. Absent proof of the extent
thereof, their contributions and corresponding
shares shall be presumed to be equal.
UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS