Expulsion

Case Title: People vs. Malasugui, G.R. No. 44335, 30

Case Villavicencio vs. Lukban, G.R. No. 14639, 25 March 1919
Title:
Facts:
Facts: the Mayor of the City of Manila, ordered the deportation of
170 prostitutes to Davao. As to preserve the morals of the
people of Manila. They prayed for a writ of habeas corpus
to be issued against the respondents to compel them to
bring back the 170 women who were deported to Mindanao
against their will.
Issue/s: WON Lukban had the authority as a Mayor to deport these
people to another locality.
Ruling: NO. Lukban committed a grave abuse of discretion by
deporting the prostitutes to a new domicile against their will.
Philippine penal law specifically punishes any public officer
who, not being expressly authorized by law or regulation,
compels any person to change his residence. All the
elements in Article 127 are present.
July 1936
A Chinese merchant, was found lying on the
ground, with several wounds in the head. The
accused was arrested shortly in the same day,
and after he had been brought to Lieutenant
Jacaria, who had already been informed that
he had just redeemed two pairs of bracelets
from some pawnshops of Cotabato and that he
carried money, said lieutenant asked him for
the bracelets and he then voluntarily and
without protest produced what now appear in
the record.
He was later searched, without opposition or
protest on his part, and it was discovered that
he also had the pocketbook, containing P92 in
bills, Tan Why's identification card and a
memorandum of amounts with some Chinese
characters.

Issue/s: WON defendant be arrested and search for

Violation of Domicile
Case U.S. vs. Macaspac, G.R. No. 3878, 16 November
Title: 1907
Facts: lieutenant of the barrio, was at the gate of the yard
of Apolonia Ico's house, and stated that he intended
to enter the house and search it. The landlady
objected to such search, in the presence of 2 other
persons. But in spite of her opposition to such search
the defendant, not being provided with and showing
no order of court, insisted upon entering the said
dwelling under a threat that he would procure a
search warrant; thereupon he entered and
proceeded to search the house and inspect some
jars and baskets therein contained.
Issue/s: WON Macaspac had the authority to make search
even without a search warrant.
evidence of his crime without warrant
Ruling: Yes. When Lieutenant Jacaria asked him
what other things he carried, after having
voluntarily placed the two pairs of bracelets on
the table, and Sergeant Urangut felt his body,
he did not show the least opposition. It follows,
therefore, that the lower court committed no
error in accepting as evidence, not only
because the appellant did not object to the
taking from him when searched, but also
because the effects found in his possession of
a person detained or arrested are perfectly
admissible as evidence against him, if they
constitute the corpus delicti or are pertinent or
relevant thereto.
It is certainly repugnant to maintain the
opposite view because it would amount to

Ruling: NO. Atanacio Macaspac, as lieutenant of the barrio,

had no authority to make such search, nor was he
provided at the time he made the search with a judicial
order, hence he abused the power he had in his official
capacity as lieutenant of the barrio when, contrary to
the wishes of the injured party, he entered her dwelling
to execute a search for which he was not clothed with
authority, nor provided with the necessary judicial
order.

1
 Case Geroche vs. People, G.R. No. 179080, 26 November 2014 Case Title: Alvarez vs. Court of First Instance, G.R. No.
Title: 45358, 29 January 1937

Facts: Baleriano Limbag testified that the crime happened around
10:00 o’clock in the evening inside his house. He roused
from sleep when petitioners, who were not armed with
search warrant, suddenly entered the house by destroying
the main door. The petitioners mauled him, striking with a
garand rifle, which caused his injuries. They looked for
firearms but instead found and took away his airgun. It was
alleged in the Information that petitioner Geroche was a
Barangay Captain while petitioners Garde and Marfil were
members of Citizen Armed Forces Geographical Unit
(CAFGU).
Defense they conducted a roving footpatrol, together with other
of the barangay officials, due to the rampant cattle rustling in the
Petition area. At the time, they recovered a stolen carabao.
ers:
Facts: The chief of the secret service (DOJ)
presented to respondent judge an affidavit
alleging that petitioner kept in his house books,
documents, other papers used by him in
connection with his activities as a money-
lender, charging usurious rates of interest in
violation of the law. He did not swear to the
truth of his statements upon his own personal
knowledge of the facts. Upon the affidavit in
question, respondent judge issued the
warrant, ordering the search of petitioner’s
house as well as the seizure of the books and
documents mentioned.
Issue/s: WON there is probable cause for the issuance
of the search warrant.

issue/s: whether or not all the accused were public officers (to
constitute the crime of violation of domicile)
Ruling: Yes. In their judicial admissions, in their testimony before
the open court as well as in the pleadings they filed, neither
Geroche denied that he was a barangay captain nor Garde
and Marfil refuted that they were CAFGU members. In
holding such positions, they are considered as public
officers/employees.
Search warrants maliciously obtained and abuse in the service of those
legally obtained
Ruling: No. the affidavit which served as the exclusive
basis of the search warrant, is insufficient and
fatally defective by reason of the manner in
which the oath was made. Therefore, the
search warrant in question and the
subsequent seizure of the books, documents,
and other papers are illegal and do not in any
way warrant the deprivation to which the
petitioner was subjected. The warrant issued
is likewise illegal because it was based only on
the affidavit of the agent who had no personal
knowledge of the facts.

Case Title: U.S. vs. Addison, G.R. No. 9951, 3 December

1914

Facts: The appellant subscribed and swore to an affidavit

wherein he stated that he saw various bottles
containing compounds of opium in an aparador
situated in the house of John McStay.
On the same day, CFI issued a search warrant,
based upon that affidavit, directing the sheriff to
search the house of McStay and seize the opium.
In compliance with this warrant the sheriff
proceeded immediately to search the house, but
found nothing of a contraband nature, and so
reported to the court.

Issue/s: WON there is probable cause for the issuance of

the search warrant.

Ruling: No. Art. 129 of RPC requires that both malice and
absence of probable cause must exist concurrently
in order to justify a conviction. If the appellant’s act
in making the affidavit was malicious and
unfounded, but there was probable cause for such
act, he must be acquitted.
" Malice cannot be inferred from the fact that no
opium was found in the house of the complainant
by the sheriff. Addison was induced by the internal-
revenue agent to make the affidavit. In so doing he
was carrying out his obligation as an "informer,"
and as such informer he had reasonable cause to
believe that he would be rewarded therefor in
accordance with certain provisions of the Opium
Law.
We must, therefore, conclude that there was an
absence of malice on the part of the defendant in
making the affidavit and that there existed probable
cause for making the affidavit.

2
Case Title: People vs. Sy Juco, G.R. No. 41957, 28
August 1937
Facts: An agent of BIR, filed for a search warrant
based on the information from a reliable
source alleging that certain fraudulent
bookletters and papers or records were being
kept in a building in Binondo, Manila occupied
by the accused. CFI Manila through Judge
Albert issued a search warrant directing peace
officers to seize the to deliver them to the
court, for the proper action to be taken in due
time. After making the required search the
officers concerned seized, among things, an
art metal filing cabinet claimed by Attorney
Teopisto B. Remo to be his and to contain
some letters, documents and papers
belonging to his clients.
Issue/s: WON the search and seizure were valid.
Ruling: NO. The affidavit did not state that the books,
documents or records referred to therein are
being used or are intended to be used in the
commission of fraud against the Government.
It assumes that the entire building is occupied
by the defendant against whom the warrant
was exclusively issued when the only ground
upon which such assumption is based on is a
mere hearsay and when in fact part thereof
was occupied by the appellant.
The search warrant did not ask that the things
belonging to the appellant and to others also
be searched. The warrant has gone beyond
what had been applied for, and the agents who
executed it performed acts not authorized by
the warrant. The search warrant was
unreasonable, it being evident that its purpose
was solely to fish for evidence or search for it
by exploration. Search warrants have not been
designed for such purpose.
Doctrine
Case Title: Stonehill vs. Diokno, G.R. No. L-19550, 19
June 1967
Facts: respondent-judges issued on different dates, a
total of 42 search warrants against petitioners
and/or the corporations to which they were
officers, directed to any peace officer to search
the petitioners and/or the premises of their
offices, warehouses and/or residences to take
possession documents, papers and articles as
“the subject of the offense; stolen or
embezzled and proceeds and fruits of the
offense; or used or intended to be used as the
means of committing the offense” in violation
of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Custom
Laws, Internal Revenue and RPC. Petitioners
alleged that the aforementioned search
warrants were null and void as contravening to
the Constitution and ROC because (1) they do
not describe with particularity the things that
are to be seized and (2) searches and seizures
were made in an illegal manner.
Issue/s: Whether the issued search warrants were
valid.
Ruling: The Court split the documents seized into two
major groups (a) those found and seized in the
offices of the corporation and (b) those found
and seized in the residences of the petitioner.
(a) The court holds that petitioners have no
cause of action to assail the legality of the
contested warrants and of the seizures made
for the simple reason that said corporations
have their respective personalities separate
and distinct from the personality of the
petitioners. Legality of the seizure can be
contested only by the party whose rights have
been impaired and that the objection to an
unlawful search and seizure is purely
personal, (b) The search warrant is not valid
since the constitutional requirements have not
been complied by the warrant in question, no
specific offense had been alleged in the
applications. The averments thereof with
respect to the offense committed were
abstract, as a consequence it's impossible for
the judges who issued the warrants to have
found the existence of probable cause.
3
Case Title: Bache & Co. vs. Ruiz, G.R. No. L-32409, 27
February 1971
Facts: At the time that the respondents where
requesting for the issuance of a search
warrant against The petitioners the respondent
judge was hearing a certain case and
instructed his deputy clerk of court to take the
depositions of the respondents after the
session adjourned. Respondent judge was
informed that the positions were taken and
after hearing the stenographic notes read by
his deputy clerk of court. Respondent judge
then issued the question search warrant
petitioners lawyer respondent judge then
issued the search warrant.
Issue/s: Whether the search warrant was invalid.
Ruling: Yes. Implementing rules of revised ROC
requires the judge, before issuing a search
warrant to “personally examine on oath or
affirmation the complainant and any witnesses
he may produce. Personal examination by the
judge is necessary to enable him to determine
the existence or nonexistence of probable
cause. Spac personal examination by the
judge is necessary to enable him to determine
the existence or nonexistence of probable
cause. The determination of whether or not
probable cause exists calls for the exercise of
judgment after a judicial appraisal of fact and
should not be allowed to be delegated in the
observan The determination of whether or not
probable cause exists calls for the exercise of
judgment after a judicial appraisal of fact and
should not be allowed to be delegated in the
absence of any rule to the contrary. In the case
at bar, the judge did not conduct personal
examination but his participation was limited
only to listening to the stenographic notes
which cannot be considered personal
examination.
Case Title: Burgos vs. Chief of Staff, G.R. No. 64261, 26
December 1984
Facts: Petitioners assail the validity of the two search
warrants issued by respondent judge under
which the premises of the businesses
“Metropolitan Mail” and “We Forum’
newspapers were searched and all the
equipment used in publishing newspapers and
articles that were allegedly used in subversive
activities were seized. Petitioners alleged that
respondent judge could not have found
probable cause since the surveillance
conducted in the premises provided
insufficient basis and that search warrants
under consideration were in the nature of
general warrants.
Issue/s: Whether there is probable cause for the
issuance of the search warrant.
Ruling: No. Probable cause for a search is defined as
such facts and circumstances which would
lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to
believe that an offense has been committed
and that the objects sought in connection with
the offense are in the place sought to be
searched. And when the search warrant
applied for is directed against a newspaper
publisher or editor in connection with the
publication of subversive materials, as in the
case ate bar, the application and/or its
supporting affidavits must contain a
specification, stating with particularity the
alleged subversive material he has published
or intending to publish. Mere generalization
will not suffice.Thus, the broad statement that
there were equipment used as a means for
committing an offense in violation of PD 885 is
a mere conclusion of law and does not satisfy
the existence of probable cause.
Case Title: Corro vs. Lising, G.R. No. L-69899, 15 July
1985
Facts: Respondent judge Lising upon application of
Lt. Col. Castillo issued a search warrant which
authorizes the search and seizure of printed
copies of Philippine Times; manuscripts, drafts
of their articles, newspaper dummies,
subversive documents; typewriters,
duplicating machines,etc. Which have been
used as an instrument and means of
committing the crime of inciting to sedition.
Petitioner then filed an urgent motion to recall
such warrant and to return those that were
seized because those were not in any way
connected with the offense of inciting to
sedition.
Issue/s: Whether there is sufficient probable cause for
the issuance of search warrant.
Ruling: No. The court held that the affidavit of Lt. Col.
Castillo which stated that said periodicals of
petitioner Corro contains articles tending to
incite distrust and hatred for the Government
of the Philippines or any of its duly constituted
authorities are mere conclusions of law and
will not satisfy the requirement of probable
cause. The search warrant under
consideration was in the nature of a general
warrant which is constitutionally objectionable.
4
Case Title: Posadas vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. Case Title: People vs. Fernandez, G.R. No. 113474, 13
89139, 2 August 1990 December 1994

Facts: Pat. Ungab and Pat. Umpar, both members of
the Integrated National Police (INP) were
conducting a surveillance when they spotted
petitioner carrying a “buri bag” acting
suspiciously. They approached the petitioner
and identified themselves as members of INP.
The petitioner then attempted to flee but was
thwarted by the two. Upon checking the bag,
they found 2 guns, ammunitions and tear gas.
Petitioner was taken to Davao where he was
prosecuted and found guilty.
Issue/s: Whether the right against unreasonable
searches and seizures of the petitioner has
been violated.
Facts: The accused-appellant was found guilty of the
crimes Homicide and Illegal Possession of
Firearms after shooting during a drinking spree
where the victim is part of. Immediately after the
incident, accused-appellant fled and hid in the
forest. 4 days later, the police received a
confidential report on the hiding place of the
accused-appellant. Acting on the information, 3
patrolmen rushed to the house and cordoned it.
He was arrested and taken to the police
headquarters after the accused-appellant gave
himself up and after the patrolmen yielded
firearms. Fernandez denied the shooting and
declared that he was gravely ill with malaria at
the time of the incident.

Ruling: No.The court held that there was probable Issue/s: WON the trial court acted without jurisdiction
cause when the petitioner acted suspiciously in admitting evidence that were constitutionally
and attempted to flee with the buri bag, that he inadmissible.
was concealing something illegal in the bag
and it was the right and duty of the police Ruling: No. The court ruled that although the patrolmen
officers to inspect the same. Thus, since the were not armed with a warrant of arrest, without
case at bar is under the exceptions, the any protest, however, accused-appellant came
constitutional guarantee against unreasonable out of the house and gave himself up to the
searches and seizures has not been violated. police officers. The owner of the house then
turned over his luggage to said police
authorities. With the acquiescence of accused-
CPJC
appellant, his suitcase was searched and it
Case Title: People vs. De Gracia, G.R. No. 102009-10, 6 yielded the subject firearm and ammunition. He
July 1994 then signed and acknowledged a Receipt
certifying that one homemade shotgun with one
Facts: A team from NCR Defense Command were (1) live ammunition and one (1) empty shell was
conducting a surveillance pursuant to an confiscated from him.
intelligence report received by them that the
Eurocar Sales Office was being occupied by
RAM-SFP (ultra-rightist element against the
government). After they were fired at by a
group of five men, a raiding team raided the
Eurocar Sales Office, finding and confiscating
ammunition, dynamites, M-shells and
“Molotov” bombs inside one of the four rooms
then arrested the appellant who was
suspiciously peeping through a door, holding a
gun. No search warrant was secured by the
raiding team because according to them at
that time, there was so much disorder.

Issue/s: Whether the search and seizure was valid.

Ruling: Yes. The raid was actually precipitated by

intelligence reports. Prior to the raid, there was
a surveillance conducted where the team was
fired at by a group of men. Under the foregoing
circumstances, it is the opinion of the court that
the instant case falls under one of the
exceptions to the prohibition of the warrantless
search. In the first place, the military
operatives, taking into account the facts
obtained in this case, had reasonable grounds
to believe that a crime was being committed.
There was consequently more than sufficient
probable cause to warrant their actions.
Furthermore, under the situation then
prevailing under such urgency and exigency of
the moment, a search warrant could be
lawfully dispensed with.

5
Case Title: People vs. Chua Ho San, G.R. No. 128222, Case Title: People vs. Aruta, G.R. No. 120915, 3 April
17 June 1999 1998

Facts: Chua Ho San (hereafter CHUA) prays for his
acquitttal and the reversal of the judgment of
10 February 1997 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of San Fernando, La Union, Branch 66,
finding him guilty of transporting, without
appropriate legal authority, the regulated
substance methamphetamine hydrochloride,
in violation of Section 15, 1 Article III of
Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise known as
the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 as further
amended by R.A. No. 7659,2 and sentencing
him to "die by lethal injection."
Before this Court, CHUA posits that the RTC
erred in (1) admitting as competent evidence
the 29 plastic packets of methamphetamine
hydrochloride since they were indubitably
"forbidden fruits;" (2) granting weight and
credence to the testimonies of prosecution
witnesses despite glaring inconsistencies on
material points; and in (3) appreciating
conspiracy between him and an organized
syndicate in the illicit commerce of prohibited
drugs since this was not alleged in the
information.
Issue/s: Whether the warrantless arrest, search and
seizure conducted under the facts of the case at
bar constitutes a valid exemption from the
warrant requirement.
Facts: The accused-appellant was convicted of
violation of the dangerous drugs of 1972. In
her contention, she stated that while she was
about to cross the road, an old woman asked
her for help in carrying a shoulder bag before
she was arrested by the police. Aside from
stating that she has no knowledge of the
identity of the old woman, the woman was
nowhere to be found. Also, no search warrant
was presented.
Issue/s: WON the warrantless search resulting in the
arrest of accused-appellant violated the latter’s
constitutional rights.
Ruling: No. The essential requisite of probable cause
must still be satisfied before a warrantless
search and seizure can be lawfully conducted.
The accused cannot be said to be committing a
crime, she was merely crossing the street and
was not acting suspiciously for the Narcom
agents to conclude that she was committing a
crime. There was no legal basis to effect a
warrantless arrest of the accused’s bag, there
was no probable cause and the accused was not
lawfully arrested. The police had more than 24
hours to procure a search warrant and they did
not do so. The seized marijuana was illegal and
inadmissible evidence.

Ruling: No. In cases of in fragrante delicto, arrests, a

peace officer or a private person may without a
warrant, arrest a person, when, in his presence,
the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit
an offense. The arresting officer, therefore, must
have personal knowledge of such facts14 or as
recent case law15 adverts to, personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances
convincingly indicative or constitutive of
probable cause. Guided by these principles, this
Court finds that there are no facts on record
reasonably suggestive or demonstrative of
CHUA's participation in on going criminal
enterprise that could have spurred police
officers from conducting the obtrusive search.
The RTC never took the pains of pointing to
such facts, but predicated mainly its decision on
the finding that was "accused was caught red-
handed carrying the bagful of [s]habu when
apprehended." In short, there is no probable
cause.

6
Case Title: People vs. Escano, G.R. No. 129756-58, 28 Case Title: People vs. Molina, G.R. No. 133917, 19
January 2000 February 2001

Facts: Accused-appellants Virgilio T. Usana and Jerry Facts: The accused-appellant were found guilty of
C. Lopez, together with Julian D. Escaño, were violating the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 for
charged before the Regional Trial Court of having in their possession, 946.9 grams of
Makati City, Branch with violation of Section 4, marijuana while riding a trisikad.
Article II of Republic Act No. 6425,1 as
amended. Escaño and Usana were also Issue/s: WON the accused-appellants manifested
charged in Criminal Case No. 95-937 and No. outward indication that would justify their
95-938 with illegal possession of firearms and arrest, and the seizure of prohibited drugs that
ammunition in violation of Presidential Decree were in their possession.
No. 1866.
Ruling: NO. Accused-appellants manifested no
The accusatory portion of the Information reads
outward indication that would justify their
as follows:That on or about the 5th day of April,
arrest. In holding a bag on board a trisikad,
1995, in the City of Makati, Metro Manila,
accused-appellants could not be said to be
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
committing, attempting to commit, or have
Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
committed a crime. There was no probable
conspiring and confederating together and all of
cause in arresting the accused thus making
them mutually helping and aiding one another,
the arrest illegal. Because the arrest was
without being authorized by law, did then and
illegal, so was the search made by the police
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell,
officers. This being the case, the evidence is
distribute and transport 3.3143 kilograms of
inadmissible and the accused are found not
"HASHISH", a prohibited drug, in violation of the
guilty of the alleged offense.
above-cited law.

Issue/s: Whether the trial court, assuming that the

hashish is admissible in evidence, erred in
finding appellants to have conspired with
Escaño.

Ruling: Yes. The trial court erred in its decision. Despite

the validity of the search, we cannot affirm the
conviction of Usana and Lopez for violation of
R.A. No. 6425, as amended. The following facts
militate against a finding of conviction: (1) the
car belonged to Escaño; (2) the trunk of the car
was not opened soon after it was stopped and
after the accused were searched for firearms;
(3) the car was driven by a policeman from the
place where it was stopped until the police
station; (4) the car's trunk was opened, with the
permission of Escaño, without the presence of
Usana and Lopez; and (5) after arrival at the
police station and until the opening of the car's
trunk, the car was in the possession and control
of the police authorities. No fact was adduced to
link Usana and Lopez to the hashish found in the
trunk of the car. Their having been with Escaño
in the latter's car before the "finding" of the
hashish sometime after the lapse of an
appreciable time and without their presence left
much to be desired to implicate them to the
offense of selling, distributing, or transporting
the prohibited drug.

7
Case Title: Caballes vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
136292, 15 January 2002
Facts: Sgt. Victorino Noceja and Pat. Alex de Castro,
while on a routine patrol in Barangay
Sampalucan, Pagsanjan, spotted a passenger
jeep unusually covered with “kakawati”
leaves.Suspecting that the jeep was loaded with
smuggled goods, the two police officers flagged
down the vehicle. The jeep was driven by
appellant. When asked what was loaded on the
jeep, he did not answer, and appeared nervous.
The court a quo rendered judgment finding the
accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Theft. The CA affirmed the judgment of
conviction.
Petitioner now comes to the Court contending
that the flagging down of his vehicle by police
officers who were on routine patrol, merely on
“suspicion” that “it might contain smuggled
goods,” does not constitute probable cause that
will justify a warrantless search and seizure.
Issue/s: Whether the evidence taken from the
warrantless search is admissible against the
appellant.
Ruling: No. None of the foregoing circumstances is
obtaining in the case at bar. The police officers
did not merely conduct a visual search or visual
inspection of herein petitioner’s vehicle.They
had to reach inside the vehicle, lift the kakawati
leaves and look inside the sacks before they
were able to see the cable wires. It cannot be
considered a simple routine check. The vehicle
of the petitioner was flagged down because the
police officers who were on routine patrol
became suspicious when they saw that the back
of the vehicle was covered with kakawati leaves
which, according to them, was unusual and
uncommon.
We hold that the fact that the vehicle looked
suspicious simply because it is not common for
such to be covered with kakawati leaves does
not constitute “probable cause” as would justify
the conduct of a search without a warrant.
Case Title: People vs. Macalaba, G.R. No. 146284-86, 20
January 2003
Facts: The accused-appellant were found guilty of
violating the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. The
evidence showed that on the basis of an
intelligent information that a carnapped vehicle
was driven by the accused who was also a
suspect of drug pushing, the members of the
CIDG of Laguna went looking for the carnapped
car. While the accused was fumbling about in his
clutch bag for the registration papers of the car,
the CIDG agents saw four transparent sachets
of shabu.
Issue/s: WON the court erred in admitting the evidence
presented by the prosecution although it was
obtained in violation of his constitutional rights.
Ruling: No. According to the SC, the warrantless arrest
of, or warrantless search and seizure conducted
on the accused constitute a valid exemption
from the warrant requirement. They spotted the
suspected carnapped car, which was indeed
driven by the accused. The sachets of shabu
found in the car were therefore in plain view of
the law enforcers.
Case Title: People vs. Lapitaje, G.R. No. 132042, 19
February 2003
Facts: Accused-appellants were found guilty of
Robbery with Homicide by the trial court for
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to
gain by means of force, threat and intimidation,
entering the store of Domingo Colonia and
killing one Nelson Saavedra. Witnesses were
presented and both parties gave their
testimonies and alibis.
Accused-appellants were brought into custody
without a warrant of arrest. Subsequently,
firearms were seized by the police without a
search warrant. It was alleged that those were
the weapons used in the perpetration of the
crime.
Issue/s: Whether the firearms seized by the custody can
be admissible evidence without a warrant.
Ruling: The court held that the firearms seized by the
police was inadmissible as evidence, being
acquired without a warrant. This mentioned, the
trial court erred in convicting the defendants of
Robbery with homicide. The inadmissibility of
the firearms as evidence would cause the failure
of the prosecution to bind all the accused of the
crime charged. Only those proven beyond
reasonable doubt by the testimonies and
witnesses were held guilty of the court
8
Case Title: People vs. Tudtud, G.R. No. 144037, 26
September 2003
Facts: The accused-appellant and his companion were
charged with illegal possession of prohibited
drugs. According to Tudtud's neighbours, he
was engaged in selling marijuana. PO1 Desierto
informed them that the police had received
information that stocks of illegal drugs would be
arriving that night.
The police approached the suspects and
identified themselves as police officers. The
man who resembled Tudtud’s description
denied that he was carrying any drugs. PO1
Desierto asked if he could see the contents of
the box. Tudtud then said “it was alright” and let
them see the box which contained bundles of
dried fish, one wrapped in a plastic bag and
another in newspapers. When the bundles were
unwrapped, there contained marijuana leaves.
Issue/s: Whether or not Tudtud’s implied acquiescence
(Tudtud’s statement of “it’s alright”) is
considered a waiver.
Ruling: NO. The right against unreasonable searches
and seizures is secured by Sec. 2, Art. 3 of the
Constitution. Appellants implied acquiescence,
if at all, could not have been more than mere
passive conformity given under coercive or
intimidating circumstances and is, thus,
considered no consent at all within the purview
of the constitutional guarantee. Consequently,
appellants lack of objection to the search and
seizure is not tantamount to a waiver of his
constitutional right or a voluntary submission to
a warrantless search and seizure.
As the search of appellant’s box does not come
under the recognized exceptions to a valid
warrantless search, the marijuana leaves
obtained thereby are inadmissible in evidence.
And as there is no evidence other than the
hearsay testimony of the arresting officers and
their informant, the conviction of appellants
cannot be sustained.
Doctrine Acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights
is not to be presumed. The fact that a person
failed to object to a search does not amount to
permission thereto.
Case Title: People vs. Suzuki, G.R. No. 120670, 23
October 2003
Facts: Appellant Suzuki and Koketsu, both Japanese
nationals, were at the pre-departure area of
NAIA. Suzuki was undergoing through security
check at the NAIA when the attention of
NARCOM personnel were caught by the alarm
signifying that there was metallic substance or
object in the baggage or a person. Appellant
was frisked but no illegal object was found.
However, upon checking his package marked
with “Bongbong’s Piaya with his consent,
eighteen small packs, 17 of which were wrapped
in aluminum foil. One of the foils contained dried
fruiting tops which looked like marijuana. Upon
seeing this, appellant ran outside the pre-
departure area but he was chased by PO3
Poyugao, SPO1 Linda and Donato Barnezo of
the PASCOM.
Issue/s: Whether there was an unreasonable search and
seizure conducted against Suzuki.
Ruling: None. Passengers attempting to board an
aircraft routinely pass through metal detectors;
their carry-on baggage as well as checked
luggage are routinely subjected to x-ray scans.
Should these procedures suggest the
presence of suspicious objects, physical
searches are conducted to determine what the
objects are. There is little question that such
searches are reasonable, given their minimal
intrusiveness, the gravity of the safety
interests involved, and the reduced privacy
expectations associated with airline travel.
Indeed, travelers are often notified through
airport public address systems, signs and
notices in their airline tickets that they are
subject to search and, if any prohibited
materials or substances are found, such would
be subject to seizure. These announcements
place passengers on notice that ordinary
constitutional protections against warrantless
searches and seizures do not apply to routine
airport procedures.
Clearly, the PASCOM agents have the right
under the law to conduct search of prohibited
materials or substances. To simply refuse
passengers carrying suspected illegal items to
enter the pre-departure area, as claimed by
appellant, is to deprive the authorities of their
duty to conduct search, thus sanctioning
impotence and ineffectivity of the law
enforcers, to the detriment of society
9
Case Title: Salvador vs. People, G.R. No. 146706, 15 Case Title: Dimacuha vs. People, G.R. No. 143705, 23
July 2005 February 2007

Facts: Special Mission Group from the PAF Special
Operations Squadron conducted routine
surveillance operations at the Manila Domestic
Airport to check on reports of alleged drug
trafficking and smuggling being facilitated by
certain PAL personnel. 3 persons had boarded
the Airbus 300, the team leader reported that
the three (3) persons who earlier boarded the
Airbus 300 had disembarked with their
abdominal areas bulging and then boarded an
airplane tow truck with its lights off.
The team blocked and stopped the tow truck.
The team leader identified himself and asked
the four (4) persons on board to alight, and
approached Aurelio Mandin whose uniform
was partly open, showing a girdle. Then, a
package wrapped in brown packaging tape
fell. Suspecting that the package contained
smuggled items, the leader yelled to his
teammates, “Positive!” Thereupon, the rest of
the team surrounded petitioner and his two co-
accused who surrendered without a fight. The
team searched their bodies and found that the
three were wearing girdles beneath their
uniforms, all containing packets wrapped in
packaging tape. Mandin yielded five (5)
packets, while petitioner and Santos had four
(4) each. The team confiscated the packets
and brought all the accused to the
PAFSECOM Office.
Issue/s: Whether or not the seized items are
admissible in evidence.
Ruling: Yes. it should be noted that during the incident
in question, the special mission of the PAF
operatives was to conduct a surveillance
operation to verify reports of drug trafficking
and smuggling by certain PAL personnel in the
vicinity of the airport. In other words, the
search made by the PAF team on petitioner
and his co-accused was in the nature of a
customs search. As such, the team properly
conducted the search and seizure without a
search warrant since it exercised police
authority under the customs law. Law
enforcers who are tasked to effect the
enforcement of the customs and tariff laws are
authorized to search and seize, without a
search warrant, any article, cargo or other
movable property when there is reasonable
cause to suspect that the said items have been
introduced into the Philippines in violation of
the tariff and customs law. They may likewise
conduct a warrantless search of any vehicle or
person suspected of holding or conveying the
said articles, as in the case at bar.
Facts: Petitioner Ruby E. Dimacuha seeks her acquittal
by a reversal of the October 22, 1999 decision
of the Court of Appeals which affirmed her
earlier conviction by the Regional Trial Court of
Marikina, Metro Manila, for violations of
Sections 152 and 163 of Article III of Republic
Act (RA) No. 6425, otherwise known as the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 197. On August 10,
1995, petitioner delivered 1.15 grams of
methamphetamine hydrochloride at the gate of
one Benito Marcelo where the police officers
were surveilling in the operation. Later on, she
was caught together with her companion during
the exchanging of items. She was brought them
to the police headquarters.
Issue/s: Whether the warrantless arrest of petitioner was
justified.
Ruling: Yes. Petitioner contends that the arrest and the
search conducted incidental to her arrest were
illegal. the petitioner was caught in flagrante
delicto while in the act of delivering 1.15 grams
and in actual possession of another 10.78
grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride
(shabu) as a result of an entrapment operation
conducted by the police on the basis of
information received from Benito Marcelo
regarding petitioner's illegal drug trade.
Petitioner's arrest, therefore, was lawful and the
subsequent seizure of a bag of shabu inserted
inside the cover of her checkbook was justified
and legal in light of the prevailing rule that an
officer making an arrest may take from the
person arrested any property found upon his
person in order to find and seize things
connected with the crime. The seized regulated
drug is, therefore, admissible in evidence, being
the fruit of the crime.

Doctrine Jurisprudence provides for privileged areas

where searches and seizures may lawfully be
effected without a search warrant. These
recognized exceptions include: (1) search of
moving vehicles; (2) search in plain view; (3)
customs searches; (4) waiver or consented
searches; (5) stop-and-frisk situations; and (6)
search incidental to a lawful arrest.

10
Case Title: Valdez vs. People, G.R. No. 170180, 23
November 2007
Facts: Case brought to Court by appeal against the
CA’s affirmation of the RTC decision finding the
accused guilty of violating sec. 11 of the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972; Possession of
Dangerous Drugs. Accused appeals that the
evidence is inadmissible because it was
obtained without a warrant.
Accused was apprehended by three barangay
tanods while the latter were doing their routine
patrol on the highway. The Tanods alleged that
they inspected the bag of the accused due to
suspicion they got while the latter alighted from
a bus on the highway. The bag contained more
or less 25 grams of dried marijuana leaves
wrapped in cellophane and paper.
The testimonies provided by two of the three
tanods differ on when, how and where the bag
was opened. One tanod says the bag was
opened at the highway the other says the
accused was brought to the house of their
Chairman first. Both versions constitute a
warrantless search.
Issue/s: Whether the seized marijuana leaves are
admissible evidence.
Ruling: No, CA decision reversed, accused acquitted.
Warrantless search may only render admissible
evidence if it is incidental to a lawful arrest. The
court finds that the arrest in the case was
unlawful because all testimonies conclude that
at the time the accused was apprehended he
was not committing any crime, nor was he found
to have just committed a crime, or attempting to
commit an offense that would have made
enough cause to make a warrantless arrest.
Doctrine (1) Warrantless search may only render
admissible evidence if it is incidental to a lawful
arrest.
(2) It is indispensable to ascertain whether/not
the search conducted was lawful, otherwise any
piece of evidence becomes inadmissible.
Case Title: Valeroso vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 164815, 3
September 2009
Facts: The prosecution claims that they saw Valeroso
about to board a tricyle. * * Disuanco and his team
approached Valeroso. They put him under arrest,
informed him of his constitutional rights, and bodily
searched him. They found a Charter Arms revolver
with five (5) pieces of live ammunition, tucked in his
waist .
The version of the defense, which the Court gave
credence ,Valeroso was arrested by virtue of a
warrant of arrest allegedly for kidnapping with
ransom. At that time, Valeroso was sleeping inside
the boarding house of his children. He was
awakened by the arresting officers who were
heavily armed. They pulled him out of the room,
placed him beside the faucet outside the room, tied
his hands, and then put him under the care of
Disuanco. The other police officers remained inside
the room and ransacked the locked cabinet where
they found the subject rearm and ammunition. With
such discovery, Valeroso was charged with illegal
possession of firearm and ammunition.
Issue/s: Whether the constitutional right against
unreasonable search and seizure have been
violated by the arresting police officers.
Ruling: Yes. Although ,Art. 3 Sec. 2 of the Constitution
states, the general rule is that "any evidence
obtained in violation of this or the preceding section
shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose
in any proceeding.”
The above proscription is not, however, absolute.
The following are the well recognized instances
where searches and seizures are allowed even
without a valid warrant: a.) Warrantless search
incidental to a lawful arrest; b) Seizure of evidence
in plain view; c) Search of a moving vehicle; d)
Consented warrantless search; e)Customs search;
f) Stop and frisk; g) Exigent and emergency
circumstances; h)Search of vessels and aircraft;
and i) Inspection of buildings and other premises
for the enforcement of fire, sanitary and building
regulation.
It is worthy to note that the purpose of the exception
(warrantless search as an incident to a lawful
arrest) is to protect the arresting officer from being
harmed by the person arrested, who might be
armed with a concealed weapon, and to prevent
the latter from destroying evidence within reach.
The exception, therefore, should not be strained
beyond what is needed to serve its purpose. In the
case before us, search was made in the locked
cabinet which cannot be said to have been within
Valeroso's immediate control. Thus, the search
exceeded the bounds of what may be considered
as an incident to a lawful arrest.
In light of the enumerated exceptions, and applying
the test of reasonableness laid down above, the
warrantless search and seizure of the firearm and
ammunition is not valid. ACQUITTED.
Doctrine A warrantless search is in derogation of a
constitutional right, peace officers who conduct it
cannot invoke regularity in the performance of
offcial function
11

Case Title: Sales vs. People, G.R. No. 191023, 6
February 2013
Facts: Accused appeals against the CA’s decision of
affirming the RTC in convicting him for
violating sec. 11 of the Dangerous Drugs Act
of 1974; Possession of Dangerous Drugs.
Accused had a scheduled flight to boracay and
was subject to airport routine security check.
According to the friskers the accused was
suspicious because he seemed nervous
passing through the metal detectors due this
they did a body search to further speculate.
The male frisker requested for the accused to
show the contents of his pocket after feeling a
bulge on the right hand pocket of his shorts,
they found marijuana fruiting tops rolled in
paper.
Accused contends that the CA failed to
ascertain if the obtained marijuana fruiting tops
from him were the same evidence passed on
for Chemical Analysis. The accused stresses
that the Chemist testifies to have received the
evidence from a police officer different from the
officers who first got hold of it, thus opening the
possibility of substitution.
He also argues that the friskers meticulously
conducted a body check to him when others
were spared from the same kind of search. He
upholds his testimony that he was framed and
denies ownership of the marijuana fruiting
tops.
Issue/s: Whether the change of custody of the evidence
affects the case resolution.
Ruling: No, petition for certiorari denied, CA decision
affirmed.
The court explains the rule in RA 9165 and its
IRR only requires that the chain of custody does
not get broken; from the time of seizure, to
receipt in forensic laboratory, to safekeeping, to
presentation in court for destruction. The court
also cites People v. Hernandez which held that
people who came into possession of the drugs
after its seizure does not need to take the
witness stand so long as it was established to
have not broken the chain of custody, all
persons who were in custody monitored or
identified, and all pieces of evidence were
identified properly. The Court cited People v.
Delmonte, what is of utmost importance is the
preservation of the integrity and evidentiary
value of the seized items to be used in
determining the guilt/innocence of the accused.
The Court was satisfied with the facts
established in court, complementing the rule
established.
The protection against warrantless search does
not apply to airport security checks because
passengers are given notice in tickets etc. that
they are subject to search, and seizures if
prohibited items are found.
The court was not persuaded in the petitioner’s
defense of frame up there being no evidence to
his allegation, also no testimonies corroborating
the same.
MFGR
Case Title: Martinez vs. People, G.R. No. 198694, 13
February 2013
Facts: Petitioner was charged for possession of
dangerous drugs. Private respondents ),
conducted a routine foot patrol along Balingkit
Street, Malate, Manila. In the process, they
heard a man shouting " Putang ina mo limang
daan naba ito ? " For purportedly violating
Section 844 of the Revised Ordinance of the
City of Manila which punishes breaches of the
peace, the man, later identied as Ramon, was
apprehended and asked to empty his pockets.
The police ocers were able to recover from him
a small transparent plastic sachet containing
white crystalline substance suspected to be
shabu.
Ramon was charged with possession of
dangerous drugs. RTC convicted Ramon of
the crime of possession of dangerous drugs as
charged. CA affirmed his conviction.
Issue/s: Whether the warrantless arrest is valid.
Ruling: No. The SC held that it may be gleaned from
the facts that private respondent arrested
petitioner for breach of peace under Sec. 844
of the Revised Ordinance of the City of Manila.
It cannot be said that the act of shouting in a
thickly-populated place, with many people
conversing with each other on the street,
would constitute any of the acts punishable
under Section 844 of the Manila City
Ordinance as above-quoted the words he
allegedly shouted does not fall under the acts
punishable by the said ordinance. It bears
stressing that no one present at the place of
arrest ever complained that Ramon's shouting
disturbed the public.On the contrary, a
disinterested member of the community even
testfied that Ramon was merely standing in
front of the store when a man in civilian
clothes , approached Ramon, immediately
handcuffed and took him away. The
determination of probable cause is not a
blanket-license to withhold liberty or to conduct
unwarranted fishing expeditions
On the final note the Court said, indeed, while
it is true that the legality of arrest depends
upon the reasonable discretion of the officer or
functionary to whom the law at the moment
leaves the decision to characterize the nature
of the act or deed of the person for the urgent
purpose of suspending his liberty, 20 20 this
should not be exercised in a whimsical
manner, else a person's liberty be subjected to
ubiquitous abuse.
GHR
12
Searching domicile without witnesses
Case Title: Pita vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 80806, 5
October 1989
Facts: Petitioner is the publisher of Pinoy playboy
magazine who files an appeal before the Court
against the CA’s affirmation of the RTC’s
denial of his petition for injunctive relief.
Manila Mayor Bagatsing initiated an anti-smut
campaign which confiscated ‘obscene’
materials being sold on the sidewalks along U-
belt (Recto) among the seized magazines
were pinoy playboy.
The petitioner invokes his right to freedom of
speech and against unreasonable searches
and seizures. In the original case respondent
Mayor Bagatsing responded in his defense
that the campaign was pursuant to P.D. No.
960 which ordered the seizure of pornographic
articles or films which are immoral, obscene or
indecent. Mayor Bagatsing also stressed that
the sidewalk vendors voluntarily surrendered
the concerned magazines and that the
petitioner’s establishment (domicile) was not
raided.
Issue/s: Whether ‘violating’ P.D. No. 960 provides a
context of an incidental lawful arrest which
may permit a warrantless seizure.
Ruling: No, The Court cited Burgos v. Chief of Staff,
AFP which held that search and seizures may
only be done through a judicial warrant, not
defective ones and definitely not in the
absence of one.
The Court explains there was no valid
warrantless seizure because there was no crime
being committed nor were there charges filed
against anyone unless the magazines were
identified to be obscene, indecent or immoral it
must first be proven in court to be such that falls
within the ambit of the crimes that P.D. No. 960
penalizes.
Doctrine Warrantless search must have been an
incident to a lawful arrest, and the arrest must
be on account of a crime committed.
MFGR
GHR
Case Title: People vs. Gesmundo, G.R. No. 89373, 9
March 1993
Facts: Accused-appellant( 7 months pregnant) was
charged for for violation of Section 4, Article II
of Republic Act No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs
Act of 1972). Prior to the actual date of arrest,
private respondents police officers allegedly
caught accused-appellant selling marijuana to
their civilian informer. The day after, they
obtained a search warrant.
Accused-appellant was in the terrace of their
house when a jeep with policemen on board
arrived. Accused appellant invited some of
them to enter the house while one police
officer was left in the jeep that was parked near
the house. While seated at the sala, was
showing to accused-appellant something
which he claimed to be a search warrant when
someone uttered the following words "ito na"
coming from the direction where the kitchen of
the house is. She, together with Police Officer
“A” proceeded to the kitchen and saw P.O. “B”
holding a plastic bag with four other
companions who entered the house through
the back door which was opened at that time.
PO “B” handed the bag toPO “A” who, after
examining the contents, confronted the
accused-appellant and insisted that the plastic
bag came from her. She denied the same but
was charged and convicted before the RTC
later on. Hence this petition
Issue/s: Whether the search and seizure is valid,
considering the fact that evidence was
obtained without witnesses.
Ruling: No.The accused-appellant that the marijuana
supposedly seized by the raiding police team
in her possession, was planted by the police
officers.
On direct examination, however, there were
inconsistencies as to how much marijuana
was recovered and where. PO B said that it
was inside the plastic bag covered by a basin.
PO C said that it was on top of the dining table
, placed inside a plastic bag and covered by a
metal basin. In all their testimonies, there was
no mention of any marijuana obtained from a
ower pot placed on top of a biscuit can inside
a hole at the backyard of the accused's house
as stated in their investigation report.
Apparently, the search of the accused-
appellant's house was conducted in violation
of Section 7, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court
which specifically provides that no search of a
house, room or any other premises shall be
made except in the presence of the lawful
occupant thereof or any member of his family
or in the absence of the latter, in the presence
of two (2) witnesses of sufficient age and
discretion residing in the same locality. This
requirement is mandatory to ensure regularity
in the execution of the search warrant.
Violation of said rule is in fact punishable under
Article 130 of the Revised Penal Code
13
Prohibition, interruption and dissolution of peaceful meetings.
Case Title: Evangelista vs. Earnshaw, G.R. No. 36453, 28
September 1932
Facts: Petitioner files for mandamus ordering the
respondent mayor to issue a permit to hold
meetings in Plaza Moriones. Petitioner
requested to hold the concerned meeting in his
capacity as the president of the ‘Communist
Party’ in the Philippines.
The respondent mayor denied the issuance of
the requested permit because on account of
the previous meetings he allowed the petitioner
to hold, all were seditious in nature inciting
laborers to unite and overthrow the current
government. The respondent mayor also
prohibited all kinds of meetings from the
‘Communist Party.’
The respondent also stressed that after an
investigation the communist party was found to
be an illegal association whose principal object
is to incite the revolt of the labor class.
Issue/s: Whether the respondent mayor acted with
better judgement in refusing to issue the permit
requested to hold a meeting.
Ruling: Yes, petition denied. Appealed decision
affirmed.
The Court notes that the respondent mayor
should be praised instead criticised for refusing
to disturb the peace of the state as such
assemblage constitutes effect which are
unforeseen; thus may connote an imminent
danger consequently the need to repress such
assemblage.
The Court cited People v. Perez that the right of
peaceful assemblage is not absolute; when the
intention and effect of the act is seditious, the
constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech
does not apply / must give way to maintain
(peace) “the prestige of constituted authority, the
supremacy of the constitution and the laws, and
the existence of the state.
GHR
Case Title: People vs. Evangelista, G.R. No. 36277, 26
October 1932
Facts: A parade was to be held by the communists
but as the permit for the parade had been
revoked, a Constabulary officer appeared with
his soldiers at the place to prevent the holding
of the parade.The appellant had a
conversation with the officer. Instead of telling
the people to retire, he raised his fist. and then
said: "Comrades or brethren, the municipal
president, Mr. Aquino, has allowed us to hold
the parade, but for reason unknown to me, the
permit has been revoked. This shows that the
big ones are persecuting and oppressing us,
who are small, which they have no right to do."
Officer arrested evangelista which caused the
mass began to advance against the
Constabulary officer and soldiers. CFI
convicted appellant for violation of Section
8(responsibility of leaders and organizers)
Bts. Pambansa Blg. 880 a.k.a AN ACT
ENSURING THE FREE EXERCISE BY THE
PEOPLE OF THEIR RIGHT PEACEABLY TO
ASSEMBLE AND PETITION THE
GOVERNMENT FOR OTHER PURPOSES.
Hence this petition.
Issue/s: Whether the act of the constabulary officers in
arresting evangelista is considered as violation
of Art. 131 Prohibition, interruption and
dissolution of peaceful meetings.
Ruling: NO. The SC held that the statements made by
the accused on the occasion above related
are clearly seditious. the disorder took place
on May 1, 1931, that is, several months after
the inauguration of the Communist Party and
after the communists had already filled the
minds of their followers with their revolting
ideas in several meetings. That the said
utterances were really inciting the people
to revolt, is shown by the fact that the mass,
not only shouted a protest against the
officers of the law, but did actually advance
against them, and the latter had to use force
in order to enforce the law
Doctrine
14
Case Title: Ignacio vs. Ela, G.R. No. L-6858, 31 May
1956
Facts: Petitioner files for mandamus against the
respondent Mayor and enjoin the latter in
issuing a permit for them to conduct a meeting
in the Public Plaza of Sta. Cruz and the use of
its kiosk. Petitioners file on behalf of Jehovah’s
witness arguing that they are being deprived of
a constitutional right to freedom of speech,
worship and assembly.
Respondent Mayor in his response explained
that they did not refuse the request instead
offered an alternative; the northernmost part of
the plaza to avoid untoward incidents being
the requested area to hold the place is near a
catholic church.
Issue/s: Whether the respondent mayor deprived the
petitioner of their right to freedom of speech,
assembly, and worship.
Ruling: No, decision appealed from affirmed.
The Court explains that the guaranty to the
rights concerned is not absolute; as its
enjoyment ends when it impairs or endangers
the rights of others having equal rights.
The court emphasizes that the state may
regulate the enjoyment of such rights to
ensure the promotion of health, morals, peace,
education … and general welfare of the
people. Such regulation is called ‘Police
Power.’
Case Title: Navarro vs. Villegas, G.R. No. L-31687, 26
February 1970
Facts: The petitioner, acting in behalf of the Movement of
a Democratic Philippines, wrote a letter to the
respondent Mayor, applying to hold a rally at Plaza
Miranda. On the same day, the respondent wrote a
reply, denying his request on the grounds that, they
have temporarily adopted the policy of not issuing
any permit for the use of Plaza Miranda for rallies
or demonstration during weekdays due to the
events that happened from the past week. On the
same letter, the respondent gave the petitioner an
option to use the Sunken Garden near Intamuros
for its rally, and for it to be held earlier for it to end
before dark. The petitioner filed suit contesting the
Mayor’s action on the ground that it violates the
petitioner’s right to peaceable assembly and
petition the government for redress of grievances
(Article 3, Section 1 (8)) and of the petitioner’s right
to the equal protection of the law (Article 3, Section
1).
Issue/s: Whether or not the respondents act on denying the
request of the petitioner violates the petitioners’
right to peaceable assembly and the right to the
equal protection of the law.
Ruling: The respondent Mayor has not denied nor
absolutely refused the permit sought by petitioner.
As stated in Primicias v. Fugoso, 80 Phil.
75,respondent Mayor possesses reasonable
discretion to determine or specify the streets or
public places to be used for the assembly in order
to secure convenient use thereof by others and
provide adequate and proper policing to minimize
the risks of disorder and maintain public safety and
order. The respondent Mayor has expressly stated
his willingness to grant permits for peaceful
assemblies at Plaza Miranda during Saturdays,
Sundays and holidays when they would not cause
unnecessarily great disruption of the normal
activities of the community and has further offered
Sunken Gardens as an alternative to Plaza
Miranda as the site of the demonstration sought to
be held.
That experiences in connection with present
assemblies and demonstrations do not warrant the
Court’s disbelieving respondent Mayor’s appraisal
that a public rally at Plaza Miranda, as compared to
one at the Sunken Gardens as he suggested,
poses a clearer and more imminent danger of
public disorders,breaches of the peace, criminal
acts, and even bloodshed as an aftermath of such
assemblies, and petitioner has manifested that it
has no means of preventing such disorders. That,
consequently, every time that such assemblies are
announced, the community is placed in such a
state of fear and tension that offices are closed
early and employees dismissed, storefronts
boarded up, classes suspended, and
transportation disrupted, to the general detriment of
the public: That civil rights and liberties can exist
and be preserved only in an order society.
The right to peaceably assemble is not absolute
and may be regulated.
15
Case Title: Reyes vs. Bagatsing, G.R. No. L-65366, 9 November
1983

Facts: Retired Justice Reyes files a petition for mandamus

with prayers of mandatory injunction due the
respondent mayor of manila’s inaction to his request
on behalf of the Anti-Bases Coalition to hold a
peaceful rally. The rally shall commence at Luneta,
and from there parade to the gates of the US
embassy where 2 speeches will be delivered and
after a petition will be presented to a representative of
the embassy or any personnel who may be there so
that it may be delivered to the United States
Ambassador. The rally was dated October 26, and
the oral arguments was heard in the Court October
25 which released a minute resolution granting the
mandatory injunction allowing them to conduct the
rally.

The oral arguments found out that the request was

answered October 19 explaining that there were
incessant intelligence reports that there would be
subversive elements to infiltrate/interrupt gatherings
of large masses.

The respondent mayor to his defense explained they

allowed the rally provided it will be held in a confined
place, also citing Manila City Ordinance No. 7925
which prohibits holding rallies in front of foreign
missions or chancery within a radius of 500 feet
corollary to our abidance in Vienna Convention of
Diplomatic Relations adopted 1986.

Issue/s: Whether the Court is justified in releasing the minute

resolution granting the mandatory injunction to the
petitioner.

Ruling: Yes. The Court explains that previous restraint on

communication may be done if there is a clear and
present danger of a substantive evil consequential or
relative to an assemblage being requested. The Court
stresses that the licensing authority or the mayor in this
case to issue permits in allowing peaceful assembly is
not devoid against the constitutional guarantee to
freedom of speech but it is not unfettered.

The Court elaborates that the incessant threats of

subversion and interruption of meetings were not
sufficient to pose an imminent danger. The Court
factors out the application of Manila City Ordinance No.
7925 because no facts pertaining to the distance of the
US embassy to its gates show conclusive against the
500 feet radius prohibition. Even if such ordinance
follows the Vienna Convention of Diplomatic Relations
ordinance itself is subject to the question of
constitutionality versus the right to freedom of speech /
assembly, yet such discourse is not wanting in this
case.

The Court takes consideration of the past successful

peace rallies held by the Anti-base coalitions, and the
existing duty of the police force to extend protection to
its participants.

The Court cited also the successful peace-rallies held

by the US embassy, where peaceful exercise of
freedom of speech were assured by Gen. Narciso
Cabrera.

Doctrine The guarantee to the right of freedom of speech,

assembly and worship is not absolute in the light of
instances where there is clear and present danger of
a substantive evil consequential or relative to the
assemblage requested.

16
Offending the religious feelings

Case Title: People vs. Baes, G.R. No. L-46000, 25 May

1939

Facts: That on April 14, 1937, at about 9 o’;clock

a.m., in the municipality of Lumban, Province
of Laguna, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this court, the aforesaid
accused, while holding the funeral of one who
in life was called Antonio Macabigtas, in
accordance with the rites of religious sect
known as the “Church of Christ”, willfully,
unlawfully, and criminally caused the funeral to
pass, as it in fact passed, through the
churchyard fronting the Roman Catholic
Church, which churchyard belongs to the said
Church, and is devoted to the religious worship
thereof, against the opposition of the
undersigned complainant who, through force
and threats of physical violence by the
accused, was compelled to allow the funeral to
pass through the said churchyard. An act
committed in grave profanation of the place, in
open disregard of the religious feelings of the
Catholics of this municipality, and in violation
of Article 133 of the Revised Penal Code.

Issue/s: Whether or not the acts complained of

constitute the crime defined and penalized by
Article 133 of the Revised Penal Code

Ruling: Whether or of the act complained of is

offensive to the religious feelings of the
Catholics, is a question of fact which must be
judged only according to the feelings of the
Catholics and not those of other faithful ones,
for it is possible that certain acts may offend
the feelings of those who profess a certain
religion, while not otherwise offensive to the
feelings of those professing another faith.

The Court, therefore, take the view that the

facts alleged in the complaint constitute the
offense defined and penalized in Article 133 of
the Revised Penal Code, and should the fiscal
file an information alleging the said facts and a
trial be thereafter held at which the said facts
should be conclusively established, the court
may find the accused guilty of the offense
complained of, or that of coercion, or that of
trespass under Article 281 of the Revised
Penal Code, as may be proper, pursuant to
Section 29 of General Orders, No. 58. “An act
is said to be notoriously offensive to the
religious feelings of the faithful when a person
ridicules or makes light of anything constituting
a religious dogma; works or scoffs at anything
devoted to religious ceremonies; plays with or
damages or destroys any object of veneration
by the faithful”

Doctrine “ACTS NOTORIOUSLY OFFENSIVE TO

THE FEELINGS OF THE FAITHFUL” – the
acts must be directed against religious
practice or dogma or ritual for the purpose of
ridicule, as mocking or scoffing at or
attempting to damage an object of religious
veneration.

17
Crimes Against Public Order (Title III)

Case Title: Macag-anan vs. People, G.R. No. L-77317-

50, 29 July 1987

Facts: Petitioners were charged and convicted in 33

cases for estafa through falsification of public
and commercial documents (Article 315, in
relation to Article 171, Revised Penal Code).
The petitioners claimed that they were given
amnesty by the President but failed to produce
the authenticated documents. They alleged that
the President approved their letter for executive
clemency but the documents were destroyed.

Petitioners apparently claim that their

applications for amnesty were filed under
Presidential Decree No. 1082 and not under
Presidential Decree No. 1182.

Issue/s: Whether the amnesty granted by the

President is valid in virtue of PD 1082?

Ruling: It appears sufficiently clear that the offenses

for which amnesty may be granted under the
provisions of P.D. 1082 are acts penalized
under existing law which were done in
furtherance or in the course of resistance to
the duly constituted authorities of the Republic
by members and supporters of the Moro
National Liberation Front (MNLF) and the
Bangsa Moro Army and other "anti-
government groups with similar motivations
and aims." The "resistance to the duly
constituted authorities of the Republic"
referred to herein is typified by the offenses of
rebellion or insurrection or sedition or
conspiracy to commit rebellion or sedition, all
offenses with a political character and all of
which are embraced in Title 3 of the Revised
Penal Code entitled "Crimes Against Public
Order. "

In the present case, nowhere has it been

indicated in the records nor has it been
demonstrated now that the insurgents have
been convicted of acts constituting crimes
against public order or acts.

Doctrine If any, may be given to supposed acts of the

former President which were in conflict with or
in violation of decrees issued by that same
former President. So viewed, this Court has no
alternative save to declare that the supposed
acts of the former President done in 1985 in
clear conflict with the restrictions embodied in
the very decrees promulgated by that same
former President, cannot be given any legal
effect.

NOTE : the former President did in fact act in

contravention of the decrees here involved by
granting the amnesty claimed by petitioners,
and that by such acts, he may indeed have
aroused expectations (however unjustified
under the terms of existing law) in the minds of
the petitioners. If such be the case, then the
appropriate recourse of the petitioners is not to
this Court, nor to any other court, but rather to
the Executive Department of the governmen

18
Rebellion, insurrection, and Coup d’état
Case Title: People vs. Hernandez, G.R. Nos. L-6025-26,
18 July 1956
Facts: In two information the accused and several
others were charged of Rebellion with Multiple
Murder, Arsons and Robberies and rebellion
with murders, arsons and kidnappings
respectively. Hernandez is the president of
Congress of Labor Organizations which is an
affiliate of Hukbong Magpalaya ng Bayan.
The CLO plays merely the role of propagation
by lectures, meetings and organization of
committees of education by Communists; if, as
stated, the CLO merely allowed Communist
Party leaders to act as organizers in the
different factories.
Issue/s: Whether anyone's membership in the
Communist Party per se render Hernandez or
any Communist guilty of conspiracy to commit
rebellion under the provisions of Article 136 of
the Revised Penal Code?
Ruling: No. The advocacy of Communism or
Communistic theory and principle is not to be
considered as a criminal act of conspiracy
unless transformed or converted into an
advocacy of action. In the very nature of things,
mere advocacy of a theory or principle is
insufficient unless the communist advocates
action, immediate and positive, the actual
agreement to start an uprising or rebellion or an
agreement forged to use force and violence in
an uprising of the working class to overthrow
constituted authority and seize the reins of
Government itself. Only when the Communist
advocates action and actual uprising, war or
otherwise, does he become guilty of conspiracy
to commit rebellion.
Doctrine ADDITIONAL: The question as to whether the
fact that Hernandez delivered speeches of
propaganda in favor of Communism and in favor
of rebellion can be considered as a criminal act
of conspiracy to commit rebellion as defined in
the law. In this respect, the mere fact of his
giving and rendering speeches favoring
Communism would not make him guilty of
conspiracy, because there was no evidence that
the hearers of his speeches of propaganda then
and there agreed to rise up in arms for the
purpose of obtaining the overthrow of the
democratic government as envisaged by the
principles of Communism.
Case Title: People vs. Geronimo, G.R. No. L-8936, 23
October 1956
Facts: Geronimo and several others being members
of Communist Party were charged with the
complex crime of rebellion with murders,
robberies, and kidnapping.
Issue/s: Whether or not the accused are guilty of
complex crime of rebellion or a simple
rebellion?
Ruling: The Accused is only liable for simple rebellion.
The court discussed that there are crimes that
can be complexed with rebellion if it arises
from a separate intent that is not necessary.
Not every act of violence is to be deemed
absorbed in the crime of rebellion solely
because it happens to be committed
simultaneously with or in the course of the
rebellion. If the killing, robbing, etc. were done
for private purposes or profit, without any
political motivation, the crime would be
separately punishable and would not be
absorbed by the rebellion. But ever then, the
individual misdeed could not be taken with the
rebellion to constitute a complex crime, for the
constitutive acts and intent would be unrelated
to each other and the individual crime would
not be a means necessary for committing the
rebellion as it would not be done in preparation
or in furtherance of the latter.
The accused avowed having committed the
overt acts charged in all five counts but that he
only admitted committing them in fact “as a
necessary means”, “in connection and in
furtherance of the rebellion”, as expressly
alleged by the prosecution.This is not only
because the information expressly alleged the
necessary connection between the overt acts
and the political ends pursued by the accused,
but in addition, it failed to charge that the
Appellant was impelled by private motives.
Wherefore, such overt acts must be taken as
essential ingredients of the single crime of
rebellion, and the accused pleaded guilty to
this crime alone. Hence, there being no
complex crime, the Appellant can only be
sentenced for the lone crime of rebellion.
19
Case Title: Peple vs. Rodriguez, G.R. No. L-13981, 25
April 1960
Facts: Accused was charged with illegal possession
of firearms and ammunition. He filed to motion
to quash on the ground that the crime with
which he is charged is already alleged as a
component element or ingredient of the crime
of rebellion.
Issue/s: Whether illegal use of firearm is absorbed by
rebellion?
Ruling: Yes. An examination of the record discloses
that the crime with which the accused is
charged in the present case which is that of
illegal possession of firearm and ammunition is
already absorbed as a necessary element or
ingredient in the crime of rebellion which the
accused is charged with other persons in a
separate case.
Considering that, "any or all of the acts
described in Art. 135, when committed as a
means to or in furtherance of the subversive
ends described in Art. 134, become absorbed
in the crime of rebellion, and can not be
regarded or penalized as distinct crimes in
themselves . . . and can not be considered as
giving rise to a separate crime that, under Art.
48 of the code, would constitute a complex one
with that of rebellion"
Case Title: People vs. Cruz, G.R. No. L-11870, 16
October 1961
Facts: Charged with complex crime of rebellion, with
multiple murder, robberies and arsons The
accused being then ranking officers and/or
members of, or otherwise affiliated with the
Communist Party of the Philippines and the
"Hukbong Mapagpalaya Ng Bayan (HMB)"
otherwise known as the Hukbalahap (HUK),
the latter being the armed force of said
Communist Party, having come to an
agreement and having decided to commit the
crime of rebellion, and, thereby conspiring and
confederating among themselves together
with all of the 31 accused.
Pursuant to such conspiracy, have risen
publicly and taken up arms against the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines
to attain said purpose by then and there
making armed raids, sorties, ambushes and
attacks against the Philippine Constabulary,
the Civilian Guards, the Police and Army
patrols and other detachments constituted and
organized by the government of the
Philippines, as well as upon ordinary civilians,
and as a necessary means to commit the
crime of Rebellion in connection therewith
and in the furthermore thereof, have the and
there committed wanton acts of murders,
pillages, lootings, plunders, arsons and
planned destructions of private and public
properties to create and spread disorders,
terrors, confusions, chaos and fear among
the population and by the use of force and
intimidation, organized different barrio
organizations to secure supplies and materials
for the support and maintenance of said
uprisings
Issue/s: Whether they are only guilty of simple
rebellion?
Ruling: Yes, the acts imputed to them were performed
as a means to commit the crime of rebellion
and in furtherance thereof, although as Huk
Commanders, appellants Benito Cruz and
Fermin Tolentino fall under the first paragraph
of Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code,
which prescribes the penalty of prision mayor
and a fine not exceeding P20,000, whereas
appellant Paterno Cruz comes under the
second paragraph of said article, which
prescribes the penalty of prision mayor in its
minimum period
20
Case Title: People vs. Paz, G.R. No. L-17320, 31 May
1965
Facts: Accused and several others were charged of
murder. They kill one Tranquilino Dayrit by
tying his hands and struck by a balisong. The
counsel of Paz presented a motion to quash
on the ground that the offense charged there
in was allegedly committed in the course of the
rebellious activities as a Huk; hence, said
accused should be prosecuted for the crime of
rebellion only and not of murder.
In the instant appeal, accused contends that
the killing of the victim was done in connection
with the subversive movement of the
Hukbalahaps or HMB. Hence, he should be
held liable only for the crime of simple rebellion
under Article 134 and/or Article 130 of the
Revised Penal Code, and the information
against him be dismissed.
Issue/s: Whether the murder of Dayrit is absorbed by
rebellion?
Ruling: No. The prosecution established that the killing
of Dayrit was motivated by the personal or
private quarrel ,which accused Sulpicio Tita has
with Dayrit during his lifetime,
The guilt of those accused is clear even upon his
own version that he merely stood guard while his
companions stabbed and killed Dayrit. His
avowed conduct in going with the band to the
house of the deceased, and standing guard
while Dayrit was seized, abducted from his
house, and killed, is adequate proof of his
participation as conspirator, and of his
responsibility as co-principal in the murder.
Doctrine
Case Title: People vs. Lava, G.R. No. L-4974-8, 16 May
1969
Facts: Jose Lava, being then high ranking officers or
otherwise members of the Communist Party of
the Philippines (PKP) of which the "Hukbong
Mapagpalaya ng Bayan" (HMB) otherwise or
formerly known as theHukbalahap (Huks), with
the primordial objective of the Communist
Party of the Philippines and of its armed force,
the HMB, was to overthrow the Philippine
Government by armed struggle was caught by
the Philippine constabulary for his criminal
acts consisting of attacks against Philippine
Constabulary, murders, robberies, kidnapping,
arson which indicted by the trial court the
complex crime of the complex crime of
rebellion with murders, robberies and arsons,
enumerating there in eight counts regarding
specific acts of murder, robbery and arson and
penalty of reclusion perpetua. Lava, the
appellants also contend that the information
against them charge more than one offense
Issue/s: WON the trial court decision stating that Lava
is guilty of the complex crime of rebellion with
murders, robberies and arsons be modified
Ruling: Yes. The appeal of Lava should be upheld.
The question, of whether or not a person may
be prosecuted and held guilty of the crime of
rebellion complexed with murder, arson,
robbery and/or other common crimes, is now
settled. In the case of People vs. Hernandez,
etc., et al., the Court held that the crime of
rebellion cannot be complexed with other
common crimes. The accused in the
Hernandez case were charged, as are
appellants in the instant cases, "with the crime
of rebellion with multiple murder, arsons, and
robberies
Court has held that acts of murder, arson,
robbery, physical injuries, etc. are absorbed by,
and form part and parcel of, the crime of
rebellion if committed as a means to or in
furtherance of the rebellion charged. Inasmuch
as the acts specified in said Article 135
constitute, we repeat, one single crime, it follows
necessarily that said acts offer no occasion for
the application of Article 48, which requires
therefor the commission of, at least, two crimes.
Hence, this court has never in the past,
convicted any person of the "complex crime of
rebellion with murder". What is more, it appears
that in every one of the cases of rebellion
published in the Philippine Reports, the
defendants were convicted of simple rebellion,
although they had killed several persons,
sometimes peace officers. (U.S. vs. Lagnason,
3 Phil. 472; U.S. vs. Baldello, 3 Phil.509; U.S.
vs. Ayala, 6 Phil. 151; League vs. People, 73
Phil. 155).
The decision appealed from is modified.
Appellant, Jose Lava is found guilty as principal
in the commission of the crime of simple
rebellion and is sentenced of prision mayor, and
a fine of P20,000, with the accessories provided
by law
21

Case Title: Garcia-Padilla vs. Enrile, G.R. No. L-61388,
20 April 1983
Facts: On July 6, 1982, 9 out of 14 detainees herein
were arrested when 3 teams of PC/INP
conducted a raid at the house of Dra. Parong.
The following day, the other 4 detainees were
arrested. And on July 15 1982, Tom Vasquez
was arrested. All 14 detainees were detained
at the PC/INP Command Headquarters in
Nueva Ecija until their transfer to an
undisclosed place. Hence the present petition
of Josefina Garcia-Padila, mother of the
detained petitioner Sabino Padilla, Jr., for writ
of habeas corpus.
Case Title: People vs. Manglallan, G.R. No. L-38538, 15
April 1988
Facts: Manglallan and three others, members of the
NPA, were directed by Ka-Daniel, a NPA
leader, to go to Barrio Punti and kill one
Apolonio Ragual who was suspected to be a
Philippine Constabulary informer. said four,
armed with guns, one after another shot
Ragual which caused the latter's death. The
accused then placed on the body of Ragual a
writing and drawing warning the people and
the PC of their activities.
Issue/s: WON the crime committed is a political
offense and not murder.

Issue/s: 1. WON petitioners' detention legal
2. WON the issuance of a Presidential
Commitment Order (PCO) has provided
the legal basis of the detention of herein
detainees following their arrest for
Proclamation No. 2045 covered offenses
Ruling: 1. Yes. The absence of a judicial warrant is no
legal impediment to arresting or capturing
persons committing overt acts of violence
against government forces, or any other milder
acts but equally in pursuance of the rebellious
movement. The detainees were identified as
members of the Communist Party of the
Philippines engaged in subversive activities.
Upon their arrest, they were caught in flagrante
delicto as they left on top of the conference table
numerous subversive documents and other
papers, including on how they would infiltrate
the youth and student sectors
Ruling: Yes. The crime committed was not murder but
the crime of rebellion.
Appellant could not be held liable only for being
a member in the NPA punishable under the Anti-
Subversion Act as he took up arms against the
government by committing murder, as in this
case, which thus holds him liable for the graver
offense of rebellion. Nevertheless, should thus
be credited this mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender as evidence shown that he
voluntarily surrendered to Lt. Lee Barnes after
several months of hiding

2. The suspension of the privilege of the

privilege of the writ of habeas corpus raises a
political, not a judicial, question and that the right
to bail cannot be invoked during such a period.
PD 1836 and LOI 1211 have vested, assuming
a law is necessary, in the President the power of
preventive arrest incident to the suspension of
the privilege of the writ. It was also stressed that
the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus must, indeed, carry with it the
suspension of the right to bail, if the
government’s campaign to suppress the
rebellion is to be enhanced and rendered
effective. If the right to bail may be demanded
during the continuance of the rebellion, and
those arrested, captured and detained in the
course thereof will be released, they would,
without the least doubt, rejoin their comrades in
the field thereby jeopardizing the success of
government efforts to bring to an end the
invasion, rebellion or insurrection.

22
Case Title: Enrile vs. Amin, G.R. No. 93335, 13 September 1990

Facts: · Senator Juan Ponce Enrile was charged of having committed rebellion complexed with
murder with RTC of Quezon City. Another information was filed charging him with violation of
Pres. Decree 1829 with RTC of Makati City because he allegedly harbored and concealed in
his house Ex. Lt. Gregorio “Gringo” Honasan, who was suspected of having committed a crime.
Allegations:
a) Rebellion Case:
Ø In the evening of Dec.1, 1989, fugitive Honasan and some 100 rebel soldiers attended the
mass and birthday party held at the residence of Sen. Enrile.
Ø Honasan conferred with Sen. Enrile accompanied by about 100 fully armed rebel soldiers
wearing white armed patches.
Ø These facts led the prosecution to conclude that Enrile and Honasan were co-conspirators in
the failed Dec. coup.

b) Violation of PD 1829 Case:

Ø Sen. Enrile entertained and accommodated Col. Honasanby giving him food and comfort on
Dec.1, 1989 in his house.

· Omnibus Motion filed by Sen. Enrile (a). To hold in abeyance the issuance of warrant of
arrest pending personal determination by the court of probable cause; and (b). To dismiss the
case and expunge the information from the record. The court denied the omnibus motion. Sen.
Enrile filed Motion for Reconsideration and to Quash/Dismiss but was also denied.

· Enrile’s arguments on his appeal to the Supreme Court on certiorari:

The alleged harboring or concealing by Sen. Enrile of Col. Honasan in a supposed meeting on
Dec.1, 1989 is ABSORBED in, or is a COMPONENT ELEMENT of, the “complexed” rebellion
presently charged against Sen. Enrile as alleged co-conspirator of Col. Honasan on the basis of
the same meeting on Dec.1 1989. The orderly administration of Justice requires that there be
only one prosecution for all the component acts of rebellion.

Judge Amin sustained the charge of violation of PD No. 1829 notwithstanding the rebellion
case filed against the petitioner on the theory that the former involves a special law while the
latter is based on the Revised Penal Code or a general law.

Issue/s: Whether or not Sen. Enrile could be separately charged of violation of PD 1829
nothwithstanding the rebellion case earlier filed against him

Ruling: No. The violation of PD 1829 is absorbed in the crime of rebellion.

The SC reiterated the long standing proscription against splitting the component offenses of
rebellion and subjecting them to separate prosecutions. The Hernandez case remains a binding
doctrine to prohibit the complexing of rebellion with any other offense committed on the occasion
thereof, either as means necessary to its commission or as an intended effect of an activity that
constitutes rebellion.

Sen. Enrile’s act of harboring or concealing Col. Honasan is a mere component of rebellion or
an act done in furtherance of the rebellion, it cannot therefore be made the basis of a separate
charge. All crimes, whether punishable under a special law or general law, which are mere
components or ingredients, or committed in furtherance thereof, become absorbed in the crime
of rebellion and cannot be isolated and charged as separate crimes in themselves. Thus: “This
does not detract, however, from the rule that the ingredients of a crime form part and parcel
thereof, and hence, are absorbed by the same and cannot be punished either separately
therefrom or by the application of Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code.

1
Case People vs. Donato, G.R. No. 79269, 5 June 1991
Title:
Facts: Private respondent Rodolfo Salas, alias "Commander
Bilog", and his co-accused raised publicly and took arms
throughout the country against the Government of the
Republic of the Philippines for the purpose of
overthrowing the present Government. From 1970 to
present, accused in their capacities as leader, conspired
and engaged themselves in war against the forces of the
government, destroying property or committing serious
violence, and other acts in the pursuit of their unlawful
purpose
Information was then filed charging them for the crime of
rebellion. A petition for habeas corpus for private
respondent and his co-accused was filed however it was
dismissed on the basis of the agreement of the parties
under which herein private respondent “will remain in legal
custody and will face trial before the court having
jurisdiction over his person” and the warrants for the arrest
of his co-accused are deemed recalled and they shall
submit themselves to the court having jurisdiction over their
person. Private respondent filed a petition for bail which
respondent judge granted.
Issue/s: Whether the right to bail may, under certain
circumstances, be denied to a person who is charged with
an otherwise bailable offense, and whether such right
may be waived.
Ruling: We agreed with the respondent court that bail cannot be
denied to the private respondent for he is charged with
the crime of rebellion as defined in Article 134 of the RPC
to which is attached the penalty of prision mayor and a
fine not exceeding P20,000.00. Thus, before conviction
bail is either a matter of right or of discretion. It is a matter
of right when the offense charged is punishable by any
penalty lower than reclusion perpetua. To that extent the
right is absolute.
Further, right to bail may be waived as it is a constitutional
right. It is a right which is personal to the accused and
whose waiver would not be contrary to law, public order,
public policy, morals, or good customs, or prejudicial to a
third person with a right recognized by law.
Case Title: People vs. Avila, G.R. No. 84612, 11 March
1992
Facts: The appellant, armed with a .45 caliber pistol,
shot Governor Murillo at the head that caused
the latter’s death.
During the trial, appellants contend that they
committed rebellion, not murder, the shooting
and killing of the late Governor Murillo being a
means to or in furtherance of rebellion or in
pursuance of the objectives of the rebels. It ruled
that the crime committed could not be rebellion
because there was no evidence presented
showing that at the time Governor Murillo was
fatally shot, an uprising or rebellion was on-
going where the rebels and the armed forces of
the government were actually fighting or locked
in combat.
But, evidence shown that appellants were on a
mission to kill the Governor as they were
ordered to “liquidate” the latter Governor
because of the latter’s “corruption” in not giving
on time the salaries of the employees in the
provincial government.
Issue/s: WON the trial court erred in convicting the
appellants of the crime of murder.
Ruling: Yes. In the instant appeal, while we find the
appellants guilty of rebellion, we also find that
their case falls under the "second group"
referred to in paragraph two (2) of Article 135,
the evidence having shown that they belonged
to the liquidating squad of the NPA, tasked to
operate in Tandag, and that they killed the
victim, Governor Murillo, in compliance with
the orders of their senior officer, one
Commander Celo of the NPA.
2

Case Title: People vs. Asuncion, G.R. Nos. 83837-42, 22 April
1992
Facts: Accused were charged with Subversion under R.A.
1700 for being members of the Communist Party. They
were also charged with six separate informations for
violation of P.D. 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms).
The accused argued that the filing of two (2) separate
informations for each accused violate the rule on double
jeopardy, and that illegal possession of firearms should
be absorbed in the charge of violation of R.A. 1700. This
claim was based on the SC’s ruling in People v.
Hernandez, that the possession of illegal firearms is a
constitutive ingredient of the crime of Rebellion and,
hence, absorbed by the same and cannot be punished
separately.
Issue/s:
Whether illegal possession of firearms is absorbed in
subversion.
Ruling: No. Violation of R.A. 1700 is a crime distinct from that
of actual rebellion. Rebellion is committed by rising
publicly and taking up arms against the Government
while the Anti-Subversion Act (R.A. 1700 ) punishes
affiliation or mere membership in a subversive
organization. To espouse the theory of the accused that
force and violence are the very essence of subversion
loses its distinction from rebellion.Rising publicly and
taking arms against the Government is the very element
of the crime of rebellion. On the other hand, R.A. 1700
was enacted to outlaw the Communist Party of the
Philippines (CPP), other similar associations and its
successors because their existence and activities
constitute a clear, present and grave danger to national
security.
The rule on jeopardy will not apply because the two
informations are separate and distinct.
Case People vs. Lovedioro, G.R. No. 112235, 29 November
Title: 1995
Facts:
The accused together with his other companions were
charged of the crime of murder for killing a Police Informer.
The accused contended that the deceased identified him
as a member of the NPA and that the killing was "a means
to or in furtherance of subversive ends," (said killing) should
have been deemed absorbed in the crime of rebellion under
Arts. 134 and 135 of the Revised Penal Code. Finally,
claiming that the accused did not fire the fatal shot but
merely acted as a look-out in the liquidation of the
deceased. Therefore, he should have been charged merely
as a participant in the commission of the crime of rebellion
under paragraph 2 of Article 135 of the RPC.
Issue/s: Whether the accused is guilty of murder and not rebellion.
Ruling:
The lower court is correct in in holding the accused liable
for the crime of murder. Political motive should be first
established especially when the intention of the accused in
his appeal is to lower his penalty. Mere membership in the
NPA is not sufficient to prove the political motive of the
accused. The killing of the deceased offered no contribution
to the achievement of the NPA’s subversive aims, in fact,
there were no known acts of the victim’s that can be
considered as offending to the NPA.
Case Title: People vs. Quijada, G.R. Nos. 115008-09, 24
July 1996
Facts:
The accused was charged with murder and Illegal
possession of firearms for killing the deceased
using an unlicensed firearm.
Issue/s: Whether the two informations should be treated as
separate and distinct from each other.
Ruling: Yes. The SC held that one who kills another with
the use of an unlicensed firearm commits two
separate offenses of (1) either homicide or murder
under the Revised Penal Code, and (2) aggravated
illegal possession of firearm under the second
paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866. If an
accused is prosecuted for homicide or murder and
for aggravated illegal possession of firearm, they at
the same are separate offenses, with the first
punished under RPC and the second under a
special law; hence, the constitutional bar against
double jeopardy will not apply.
The second paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. No.
1866 does not warrant and support a conclusion
that it intended to treat "illegal possession and
resultant killing" "as a single and integrated
offense" of illegal possession with homicide or
murder.
3
Case Title: Office of the Provincial Prosecutor vs. CA,
G.R. No. 125796, 27 December 2000
Facts:
The accused were charged with murder for
killing a corporal and 4 counts of frustrated
murder by firing bullets at four sergeants
The accused who are claimed as members of
the NPA at the time of encounter claimed that
they should be charged of rebellion and not
murder/frustrated murder. The provincial
prosecutor disregarded the political motivation
which made the crime committed rebellion.
Issue/s: Whether the Prosecutor erred in filing the
information against the accused as Murder and
Multiple Frustrated Murder instead of the crime
of rebellion.
Ruling: The proceedings in the case at bar is still in the
pre-arraignment stage. The court did not resolve
whether the crime committed was murder and
frustrated murder or rebellion. It ruled that what
the real crime is must await the presentation of
evidence at the trial or at the hearing on the
application for bail.
Mere allegation that the accused were members
of the CCP/NPA who engaged government
troops in a firefight resulting in the death of a
government trooper and the wounding of four
others does not necessarily mean that the killing
and wounding of the victims was made in
furtherance of a rebellion. The political
motivation for the crime must be shown in order
to justify finding the crime committed to be
rebellion.
Case Gonzales vs. Abaya, G.R. No. 164007, 10 August 2006
Title:
Facts:
More than 300 heavily armed junior officers entered the premises
of the Oakwood Luxury Apartments They disarmed the security
guards and planted explosive devices around the
building.President Arroyo then issued Proclamation No. 427
declaring a state of rebellion.
DOJ filed with RTC Makati an Information for coup d’etat against
those soldiers while respondent General Abaya issued a Letter
Order creating a Pre-Trial Investigation Panel tasked to determine
the propriety of filing with the military tribunal charges for violations
of the Articles of War. The Pre-Trial Investigation Panel
recommended that, following the "doctrine of absorption," those
charged with coup d’etat before the RTC should not be charged
before the military tribunal for violation of the Articles of War.
The Pre-Trial Investigation Panel recommended that, following the
"doctrine of absorption," those charged with coup d’etat before the
RTC should not be charged before the military tribunal for violation
of the Articles of War. RTC then issued an Order stating that all
charges before the court martial against the accused are declared
not service-connected, but rather absorbed and in furtherance of
the alleged crime of coup d’etat.
The AFP approved the recommendation that those involved be
prosecuted before a general court martial for violation of Article 96
of the Articles of War. The mutineers filed a Prohibition praying that
respondents be ordered to desist from charging them with violation
of Article 96 maintaining that since the RTC has made a
determination in its Order that the offense for violation of Article 96
of the Articles of War is not service-connected, but is absorbed in
the crime of coup d’etat, the military tribunal cannot compel them
to submit to its jurisdiction.
Issue/s
: 1.)Whether violation of Article 96 (conduct unbecoming an officer
and a gentleman) of the Articles of War is service-connected and
therefore under the jurisdiction of the Court Martial.
2.)Whether the lower court’s declaration that Article 96 of the
Articles of War is "absorbed and in furtherance of the alleged crime
of coup d'etat," constitutes grave abuse of discretion.
Ruling: 1.Yes. This is expressly provided in Section 1of R.A. No. 7055. It
bears stressing that the charge against the petitioners concerns
the alleged violation of their solemn oath as officers to defend the
Constitution and the duly-constituted authorities. Such violation
allegedly caused dishonor and disrespect to the military
profession. In short, the charge has a bearing on their professional
conduct or behavior as military officers. Equally indicative of the
"service-connected" nature of the offense is the penalty prescribed
for the same - dismissal from the service - imposable only by the
military court. Such penalty is purely disciplinary in character,
evidently intended to cleanse the military profession of misfits and
to preserve the stringent standard of military discipline.
2. Yes.The RTC, in making such declaration, practically amended
the law which expressly vests in the court martial the jurisdiction
over "service-connected crimes or offenses." It is only the
Constitution or the law that bestows jurisdiction on the court,
tribunal, body or officer over the subject matter or nature of an
action which can do so.
Doctrin Delineation of jurisdiction between the civil courts and the court
e martial over crimes or offenses committed by military personnel.
4
Case Title: Ladlad vs. Velasco, G.R. No. 172070-72, 1
June 2007
Facts: Note: The Beltran Petition is the more
relevant set of fact.
These are consolidated petitions for writs of
prohibition and certiorari to enjoin petitioners'
prosecution for Rebellion and to set aside the
rulings of DOJ and the RTC Makati City on the
investigation and prosecution of petitioners'
cases.
Following President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo’s
declaration of a "State of National Emergency,"
Beltran was arrested without a warrant and the
arresting officers did not inform Beltran of the
crime was subjected to an inquest at the Quezon
City Hall of Justice for inciting to sedition under
Article 142 of the RPC based on a speech
Beltran allegedly gave during a rally the
anniversary of EDSA Revolution. The inquest
was based on the joint affidavit of Beltran’s
arresting officers who claimed to have been
present at the rally.
The inquest prosecutor indicted Beltran and filed
the corresponding Information with the MeTC
Quezon City.
Beltran was then subjected to a second inquest,
this time for Rebellion. The inquest was based
on two letters alleging the petitioners as "leaders
and promoters" of a foiled plot to overthrow the
Arroyo government. DOJ panel of prosecutors
issued a Resolution finding probable cause to
indict Beltran and San Juan
"leaders/promoters" of Rebellion.
Issue/s: 1.)Whether the inquest proceeding against
Beltran Rebellion was valid .
2.) Whether an allegation of being a member of
CCP is sufficient to convict someone of
rebellion.
Ruling: 1.)No.The Inquest Proceedings against Beltran
for REBELLION is void . Inquest proceedings
are proper only when the accused has been
lawfully arrested without warrant. Section 5,
Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure (a) When, in his presence, the
person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense; (b) When an offense has just been
committed and he has probable cause to believe
based on personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances that the person to be arrested
has committed it; and In cases falling under
paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person
arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith
delivered to the nearest police station or jail and
shall be proceeded against in accordance with
section 7 of Rule 112.
2.)No.The affidavit by Cachuela that Beltran was
seen at the CPP’s "10th Plenum" and that the
arms of CPP members were purchased partly
from contributions by Congressional members,
like Beltran was not enough to indict him for for
taking part in an armed uprising against the
government. Even if true,it is not rebellion but a
conspiracy to commit rebellion.
Doctrine
Case Title: Southern Hemisphere vs. Anti-Terrorism
Council, G.R. No. 178552, 5 October 2010
Facts: Petitioners assail the constitutionality of RA
9372 or The Human Security Act of 2007 for
being intrinsically vague and impermissibly
broad. The definition of the crime of terrorism
under RA 9372 in terms like “widespread and
extraordinary fear and panic among the
populace” and “coerce the government to give
in to an unlawful demand” are nebulous,
leaving law enforcement agencies with no
standard to measure the prohibited acts.
Issue/s: Can the Human Security Act of 2007 be
facially challenged on the grounds of
vagueness and overbreadth doctrines?
Ruling: No. A facial invalidation of a statute is allowed
only in free speech cases, wherein certain
rules of constitutional litigation are rightly
excepted.
In Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan it was held that:
A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a
vague statute and to one which is overbroad
because of possible “chilling effect” upon
protected speech. The possible harm to
society in permitting some unprotected speech
to go unpunished is outweighed by the
possibility that the protected speech of others
may be deterred, and perceived grievances
left to fester because of possible inhibitory
effects of overly broad statutes.
as
This rationale does not apply to penal statutes
and that RA 9372 regulates conduct not
speech. Criminal statutes have general in
terrorem effect resulting from their very
existence, and, if facial challenge is allowed for
this reason alone, the State may well be
prevented from enacting laws against socially
harmful conduct. In the area of criminal law,
the law cannot take chances as in the area of
free speech.
5
 Sedition
Case Title: Lagman vs. Medialdea, G.R. No. 231658, 27
July 2017
Facts: On May 23, 2017, President Rodrigo Duterte
issued Proclamation No. 216, declaring Martial
Law in the whole island of Mindanao and the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus therein. On May 25, the
president submitted a written report to
Congress on the factual basis of the Martial
Law declaration.
The President stated in his Report that the
Maute terrorist group took over a hospital in
Marawi City; established several checkpoints
within the city; burned down certain
government and private facilities and inflicted
casualties on the part of Government forces;
and started flying the flag of the Islamic State
of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in several areas,
thereby indicating a removal of allegiance from
the Philippine Government and their capability
to deprive the duly constituted authorities.
After the submission of the Report and the
briefings, the Senate declared that it found “no
compelling reason to revoke Proclamation
216.
Issue/s: Are terrorism or acts attributable to terrorism
equivalent to actual rebellion and; Whether or
not there are sufficient factual basis for the
proclamation of martial law or the suspension
of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus?
Ruling: Yes. Rebellion is only one of the various
means by which terrorism can be committed.
Terrorism neither negates nor absorbs
rebellion while rebellion is one of the predicate
crimes of terrorism, one cannot absorb the
other as they have different elements.
Based on the foregoing, the Court holds that
the parameters for the declaration of martial
law and suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus have been properly and fully
complied with. A review of the aforesaid facts
similarly leads the Court to conclude that the
President, in issuing Proclamation No. 216,
had sufficient factual basis tending to show
that actual rebellion exists. The President's
conclusion, that there was an armed public
uprising, the culpable purpose of which was
the removal from the allegiance of the
Philippine Government a portion of its territory
and the deprivation of the President from
performing his powers and prerogatives, was
reached after a tactical consideration of the
facts. In fine, the President satisfactorily
discharged his burden of proof. After all, what
the President needs to satisfy is only the
standard of probable cause for a valid
declaration of martial law and suspension of
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
Case Title: U.S. vs. Lapus, G.R. No. 1222, 21 January
1906
Facts: In a complaint filed by the provincial fiscal in
the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija
among others, Mateo Lapus, Bonifacio
Bautista, Rufino Ordoñez, Victorino Manalang,
and Pedro Bautista were charge with the crime
of sedition. The complaint alleged that on the
night of June 3, 1902, a band composed of
about four hundred men, among whom were
the accused, armed with guns, revolvers,
talibones, bolos, and clubs, raided the town of
Cabiao; that said band went through the
streets of the town firing shots, yelling, and
frightening the inhabitants thereof; that some
of said band went to the house of the municipal
president, while others raided several houses,
taking captive sixty or seventy of the
inhabitants thereof; that they roamed about the
streets of the town threatening and intimidating
the people.
The reason of the uprising was that the rich
people were loaning money at usurious terms
to their farm laborers, and when the latter were
unable to pay the loan they compelled their
children to work for them as servants; that if
the wealthy landowners continued oppressing
the poor they would not stop disturbing the
towns, because the law must be equally
applied to rich and poor.
The association called "Santa Iglesia" to which
the accused belonged, was organized for the
purpose of performing acts of hatred and
vengeance against the authorities and the
wealthy people in the towns, as occurred to the
residents of the town of Cabiao, in which were
put in practice and execution acts tending to
such political-social ends.
Issue/s: Are the acts of the defendants constitute the
crime of sedition?
Ruling: Yes. The facts as stated constitute the crime
of sedition provided for in paragraphs 3 and 4
of section 5 and punished by section 6 of Act
No. 292 of the Civil Commission. The
appellants were members of an illegal
association and had publicly and tumultuously
attacked the town of Cabiao and roamed over
its streets, firing shots, yelling, and threatening
the residents with death, and thereby
frightening them. They performed acts of
violence on the persons of the president and
other residents of the town, against the law
and the supreme authority and with political-
social purposes against private persons or any
social class. For these reasons the acts
performed by the defendants constitute
sedition as defined by the aforesaid sections
of Act No. 292. The crime of sedition was
consummated, even though the object of the
defendants was not realized.
6
Case People vs. Cabrera, G.R. No. L-17855, 4 March 1922
Title:
Facts: A policeman posted on Calle Real had an encounter
with some constabulary soldiers, resulting in the death
of a constabulary private. This encounter engendered
on the part of the constabulary soldiers a desire for
revenge against the police force in Mainila. They
escaped from the barracks with their guns and made an
attack upon the police force. They fired in the direction
of the intersection of Calles Real and Cabildo, killing a
policeman and a civilian. They also fired upon a passing
street car, slaying one and wounding other innocent
passengers. They attacked the Luneta Police Station
and the office of the secret service.
Issue/s: Whether or not the crime committed is sedition?
Ruling: Yes. The crime committed is sedition. The object of the
uprising was to inflict an act of hate or revenge upon the
persons of the policemen who were public officers or
employees.
The object of the uprising in this case is that one stated
in par. 3 of Art. 139. Note also that in sedition, the
offenders need not be private individuals
Case People vs. Tahil, G.R. No. 28166, 2 November 1928
Title:
Facts: Commander Green, with a group of soldiers, stationed
himself about 50 meters in front of the fort where he
found a red flag flying and demanded the surrender of
Datu Tahil, a warrant of arrest having been issued
against him and his followers. He did not receive any
reply to his intimation, and in turn, a group of armed
Moros appeared at the left flank of the Constabulary
soldiers in the act of attacking them but were repelled. It
was again intimated that Datu Tahil surrender, but again
no answer was received and then a large group of
Moros appeared in an aggressive attitude, being
likewise repelled
Issue/s: Whether or not Datu Tahil and his men guilty of
sedition?
Ruling: Yes. The object of sedition in this case is stated in par.
2 of Art. 139. It was held that having resisted the judicial
warrant of arrest by means of force and thereby
prevented the officers, charged with the duty of arresting
them, from performing or from freely exercising their
functions. Datu tahil and his men committed the crime of
sedition.
Case People vs. Mendoza, G.R. No. L-2371, 5 May 1950
Title:
Facts Five persons, armed with carbine and Tommy gun,
: attacked a truck wherein eight policemen, the chief of
police and other passengers were riding. Two policemen,
the truck operator and two children were killed and two
policemen were wounded. The accused were charged with
the crime of sedition with multiple murder and double
frustrated murder
Issue Whether or not the accused guilty of sedition?
/s:
Rulin No. It was held that there was no sedition because the
g: purpose of the attack was not known. The elements of
sedition of public uprising and an object of sedition must
concur. In this case there was no object of sedition thus no
sedition. The accused were held liable for five murders and
two frustrated murders.
Case People vs. Umali, G.R. No. L-5803, 29 November 1954
Title:
Facts Punzalan, the mayor of the Tiaong, and Umali were political
: rivals. Umali has ordered the Huks to kill Punzalan as he
felt that the latter would win in the upcoming election. About
30 armed men raided and fired at the house of Punzalan.
Punzalan was able to escape.
Issue Issue: WON the defendants were guilty of rebellion.
/s:
Rulin No, the Court is convinced that the crime committed here
g was not rebellion but rather that of Sedition. The purpose of
the raid and the act of the raiders in rising publicly and taking
up arms was not exactly against the Government and for the
purpose of doing things defined in Article 134 of the Revised
Penal Code. The raiders did not even attack the Presidencia,
the seat of the local Government. Rather, the object was to
attain by means of force, intimidation, etc., one object , to wit:
to inflict an act of hate or revenge upon the person or
property of a public official, namely Punzalan who was then
mayor of Tiaong.
Case Title: Ponsica vs. Ignalaga, G.R. No. L-72301, 31
July 1987
Facts: Municipal Mayor of Escalante, Negros Occidental
issued as arrest order of the accused. The order
was based on the complaint of a Military Station
Commander which says that demonstrators in
front of the municipal building committed the
felony of inciting to sedition. Witnesses told in their
sworn statements that the rallyists were shouting
anti-government slogans and seditious words.
Issue/s: WON the petitioners committed the felony of
inciting to sedition.
Ruling: No.The petitioners are correct in their claim that
the testimonies did not contain any facts
demonstrating the actuality of the crime of inciting
to sedition. The content of the sworn statements
are generalities and mere conclusions, not
positive averments of particular facts within their
personal knowledge. They do not identify the
specific persons supposed to have perpetrated
the crime charged.
7
Inciting to sedition
Case U.S. vs. Tolentino, G.R. No. 1451, 6 March 1906
Title:
Facts: Aurelio Tolentino, the writer of theatrical work
entitled Kahapon Ngayon at Bukas, was accused to be
guilty of violation of section 8 of Act No. 292 of the
Philippine Commission through uttering seditious words
and writings, publishing and circulating scurrilous libels
against the Government of the United States and the
Insular Government of the Philippine Islands. The Court
finds that the drama inculcates a spirit of hatred and
enmity against the American people and the Government
of the United States in the Philippines. It also found that
the principal object and intent of its author was to incite
the people of the Philippine Islands to open and armed
resistance to the constituted authorities, and to induce
them to conspire together for the secret organization of
armed forces, to be used when the opportunity presented
itself, for the purpose of overthrowing the present
Government and setting up another in its stead.
Tolentino’s counsel defends that the drama
was a purely and artistic production and it was presented
merely for the instruction and entertainment of the public.
Issue/s: WON Tolentino is guilty as charged
Ruling: Yes. The public presentation of the drama took place in
the month of May, 1903, less than two years after the
establishment of the Civil Government. The smouldering
embers of a widespread and dangerous insurrection were
not yet entirely extinguished, and here and there
throughout the Islands occasional outbreaks still required
the use of the armed forces of the Government for their
suppression. The manner and form in which the drama
was presented renders absurd the pretense that it was
merely or even principally a literary or artistic production,
and the clumsy devices, the allegorical figures, the
apparent remoteness, past and future, of the events
portrayed, could not and in fact were not intended to leave
the audience in doubt as to its present and immediate
application, nor should they blind this court to the true
purpose and intent of the author and director of the play.
Case People vs. Perez, G.R. No. 21049, 22 December 1923
Title:
Facts: Isaac Perez, while holding a discussion with several
persons on political matters, has uttered the statement:
"The Filipinos, like myself, must use bolos for cutting off
Wood's head for having recommended a bad thing for the
Filipinos, for he has killed our independence."
Issue/s: WON the accused is guilty of sedition
Ruling: Yes. There is a seditious tendency in the words used,
which could easily produce disaffection among the people
and a state of feeling incompatible with a disposition to
remain loyal to the Government and obedient to the laws.
Criticism is permitted to penetrate even to the foundations
of Government. Criticism, no matter how severe, on the
Executive, the Legislature, and the Judiciary, is within the
range of liberty of speech, unless the intention and effect
be seditious. But when the intention and effect of the act
is seditious, the constitutional guarantees of freedom of
speech and press and of assembly and petition must yield
to punitive measures designed to maintain the prestige of
constituted authority, the supremacy of the constitution
and the laws, and the existence of the State.
Case Title: People vs. Engelista, G.R. No. 36277, 26
October 1932
Facts: A parade was to be held by the communists in
the municipality of Caloocan, but their permit
was revoked by the Constabulary officer.
Evangelista, the leader, said that the officer has
no right to do so. The others then shouted “let
us fight them!”. Evangelista and Ramos, who
was one of those who shouted the quoted text,
were arrested. In effect, the other communists
advanced against the officer and the soldiers,
and the latter used water pumps to disperse
them.
Issue/s: WON the charge of sedition against the accused
is correct
Ruling: Yes. That the said utterances were really inciting
the people to revolt, is shown by the fact that the
mass, not only shouted a protest against the
officers of the law, but did actually advance
against them, and the latter had to use force in
order to enforce the law. There was an
inducement to fight, an actual though
unexpected fight and resistance against the
authorities.
Case Title: U.S. vs. Nabong, G.R. No. 36426, 3
November 1932
Facts: During a meeting, Nabong said that there is a
need to overthrow the present government, and
whips must be used to leave marks on their
sides. Members of the Constabulary have heard
his statements, thus, Nabong was arrested.
Issue/s: WON accused is guilty of the offense of sedition
Ruling: Yes. It was the purpose of the speaker to incite
his hearers to the overthrow of organized
government by unlawful means. The words
used by the appellant manifestly tended to
induce the people to resist and use violence
against the agents of the Constabulary
Doctrine It is not necessary, in order to be seditious, that
the words used should in fact result in a rising of
the people against the constituted authorities.
The law is not aimed merely at actual
disturbance, and its purpose is also to punish
utterances which may endanger public order.
8
Case Title: Primicias vs. Fugoso, G.R. No. L-1800, 27 January 1948

Facts: The Mayor of the City of Manila, herein respondent refused to allow petitioner’s group, Coalesced
Minority Parties to hold a public meeting at Plaza Miranda on, to petition the government for
redress of grievances. Aggrieved by this, petitioners filed a petition for writ of mandamus with the
Supreme Court. The Court granted a writ owing to the urgency of the case without prejudice to
writing later an extended and detailed decision.

The Philippine Legislature delegated the power to enact ordinances in exercising police power to
the Municipal Board of Manila through Section 2439 of the Administrative Code. Likewise Under
the above delegated power, the Municipal Board of the City of Manila, enacted sections 844 and
1119. Section of the Revised Ordinances of 1927 prohibits as an offense against public peace,
and section 1262 of the same Revised Ordinance penalizes as a misdemeanor, "any act, in any
public place, meeting, or procession, tending to disturb the peace or excite a riot; or collect with
other persons in a body or crowd for any unlawful purpose; or disturb or disquiet any congregation
engaged in any lawful assembly." And section 1119 provides the following:

"SEC. 1119 Free for use of public — The streets and public places of the city shall be kept free
and clear for the use of the public, and the sidewalks and crossings for the pedestrians, and the
same shall only be used or occupied for other purposes as provided by ordinance or regulation:
Provided, that the holding of athletic games, sports, or exercise during the celebration of national
holidays in any streets or public places of the city and on the patron saint day of any district in
question, may be permitted by means of a permit issued by the Mayor, who shall determine the
streets or public places or portions thereof, where such athletic games, sports, or exercises may
be held: And provided, further, That the holding of any parade or procession in any streets or public
places is prohibited unless a permit therefor is first secured from the Mayor who shall, on every
such occasion, determine or specify the streets or public places for the formation, route, and
dismissal of such parade or procession: And provided, finally, That all applications to hold a parade
or procession shall be submitted to the Mayor not less than twenty-four hours prior to the holding
of such parade or procession."

Issue/s: Can the City Mayor of Manila refuse to issue a permit for “public meeting” based on the
abovementioned ordinance?

Ruling: No, the provision does not confer upon the Mayor the power to refuse to grant the permit, but only
the discretion, in issuing the permit, to determine or specify the streets or public places where the
parade or procession may pass or the meeting may be held.

Doctrine The Court adopted the ruling of the Supreme Court of Wisconsin in State ex rel. Garrabad vs.
Dering, 84 Wis., 585; 54 N.W., 110:

"The objections urged in the case of City of Baltimore vs. Radecke, 49 Md., 217, were also, in
substance, the same, for the ordinance in that case upon its face committed to the unrestrained
will of a single public officer the power to determine the rights of parties under it, when there was
nothing in the ordinance to guide or cintrol his action, and it was held void because "it lays down
no rules by which its impartial execution can be secured, or partiality and oppression prevented."
and that "when we remember that action or nonaction may proceed from enmity or prejudice, from
partisan zeal or animosity, from favoritism and other improper influences and motives easy of
concealment and difficult to be detected and exposed, it becomes unnecessary to suggest or to
comment upon the injustice capable of being wrought under cover of such a power, for that
becomes apparent to every one who gives to the subject a moment's consideration. In fact, an
ordinance which clothes a single individual with such power hardly falls within the domain of law,
and we are constrained to pronounce it inoperative and void." ... In the exercise of police power,
the council may, in its discretion, regulate the exercise of such rights in a reasonable manner, but
can not suppress them, directly or indirectly, by attempting to commit the power of doing so to the
mayor or any other officer. The discretion with which the council is vested is a legal discretion, to
be exercised within the limits of the law, and not a discretion to transcend it or to confer upon any
city officer and arbitrary authority, making him in its exercise a petty tyrant."

1
Case title Espuelas vs. People, G.R. No. L-2990, 17 December 1951
Facts: Article 142 of the Revised Penal Code punishes those who
shall write, publish or circulate scurrilous libels against the
Government of the Philippines or any of the duly
constituted authorities thereof or which suggest or incite
rebellious conspiracies or riots or which tend to stir up the
people against the lawful authorities or to disturb the peace
of the community.
The appellant Oscar Espuelas y Mendoza was, after trial,
convicted in the Court of First Instance of Bohol of a
violation of the above article. The conviction was affirmed
by the Court of Appeals, because according to said court.
"About the time compromised between June 9 and June
24, 1947, both dates inclusive, in the town of Tagbilaran,
Bohol, Oscar Espuelas y Mendoza had his picture taken,
making it to appear as if he were hanging lifeless at the end
of a piece of rope suspended form the limb of the tree,
when in truth and in fact, he was merely standing on a
barrel (Exhibit A, C-I). After securing copies of his
photograph, Espuelas sent copies of same to several
newspapers and weeklies of general circulation (Exhibit C,
F, G, H, I), not only in the Province of Bohol but also
throughout the Philippines and abroad, for their publication
with a suicide note or letter, wherein he made to appear
that it was written by a fictitious suicide, Alberto Reveniera
and addressed to the latter's supposed wife translation of
which letter or note in hereunder reproduced:
“Dearest wife and children, bury me five meters deep. Over
my grave don't plant a cross or put floral wreaths, for I don't
need them.
Please don't bury me in the lonely place. Bury me in the
Catholic cemetery. Although I have committed suicide, I still
have the right to burried among Christians.
But don't pray for me. Don't remember me, and don't feel
sorry. Wipe me out of your lives.
My dear wife, if someone asks to you why I committed
suicide, tell them I did it because I was not pleased with the
administration of Roxas. Tell the whole world about this.
And if they ask why I did not like the administration of
Roxas, point out to them the situation in Central Luzon, the
Leyte.
Dear wife, write to President Truman and Churchill. Tell
them that here in the Philippines our government is infested
with many Hitlers and Mussolinis.
Teach our children to burn pictures of Roxas if and when
they come across one.
I committed suicide because I am ashamed of our
government under Roxas. I cannot hold high my brows to
the world with this dirty government.
I committed suicide because I have no power to put under
Juez de Cuchillo all the Roxas people now in power. So, I
sacrificed my own self.”
Issue/s: Is appellant’s act violative of Article 125 of the RPC?
Ruling: Yes. His statement is a scurrilous libel against the
Government. 1 It calls our government one of crooks and
dishonest persons (dirty) infested with Nazis and a
Fascistis i.e. dictators.
And the communication reveals a tendency to produce
dissatisfaction or a feeling incompatible with the disposition
to remain loyal to the government. 2
Doctrine Libel Against the Government may be committed with a
publication attacking its lawful authorities to incite the
people to go against it.
Case Umil vs. Ramos, G.R. No. 81567, 3 October 1991
Title:
Facts: There are eight (8) petitioners for habeas corpus filed before
the Court, which have been consolidated because of the
similarity of issues raised, praying for the issuance of the writ of
habeas corpus, ordering the respective respondents to produce
the bodies of the persons named therein and to explain why
they should not be set at liberty without further delay.
In their respective Returns, the respondents uniformly assert
that the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is not available to
the petitioners as they have been legally arrested and are
detained by virtue of valid informations filed in court against
them.
The petitioners counter that their detention is unlawful as their
arrests were made without warrant and, that no preliminary
investigation was first conducted, so that the informations filed
against them are null and void.
Petitioners are detained for crimes committed for being
members of and related to the Communist Party of the
Philippines and the New Peoples’ Army.
Issue/s: Were the arrests were lawful?
Ruling: Yes. These are lawful arrests because petitioners were caught
in flagrante delicto.
The arrest of a person without a warrant of arrest or previous
complaint is recognized in law. The occasions or instances when
such an arrest may be effected are clearly spelled out in Section
5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, as amended, which provides:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or
a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be
arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has
escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving
final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending,
or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to
another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person
arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the
nearest police station or jail, and he shall be proceeded against
in accordance with Rule 112, Section 7.
Doctrine An arrest without a warrant of arrest, under Section 5
paragraphs (a) and (b) of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, as
amended, is justified when the person arrested is caught in
flagranti delicto, viz., in the act of committing an offense; or
when an offense has just been committed and the person
making the arrest has personal knowledge of the facts
indicating that the person arrested has committed it. The
rationale behind lawful arrests, without warrant, was stated by
this Court in the case of People vs. Kagui Malasugui 1 thus:
To hold that no criminal can, in any case, be arrested and
searched for the evidence and tokens of his crime without a
warrant, would be to leave society, to a large extent, at the
mercy of the shrewdest, the most expert, and the most
depraved of criminals, facilitating their escape in many
instances.
The record of the instant cases would show that the persons in
whose behalf these petitions for habeas corpus have been filed,
had freshly committed or were actually committing an offense,
when apprehended, so that their arrests without a warrant were
clearly justified, and that they are, further, detained by virtue of
valid informations filed against them in court.
2
Case Title: Soriano vs. Laguardia, G.R. No. 164785, 29 April 2009

Facts: On August 10, 2004, at around 10:00 p.m., petitioner, as host of the program Ang Dating Daan, aired on UNTV
37, made the following remarks:
Lehitimong anak ng demonyo; sinungaling;
Gago ka talaga Michael, masahol ka pa sa putang babae o di ba. Yung putang babae ang gumagana lang doon
yung ibaba, [dito] kay Michael ang gumagana ang itaas, o di ba! O, masahol pa sa putang babae yan. Sabi ng lola
ko masahol pa sa putang babae yan. Sobra ang kasinungalingan ng mga demonyong ito.1 x x x
Two days after, before the MTRCB, separate but almost identical affidavit-complaints were lodged by Jessie L.
Galapon and seven other private respondents, all members of the Iglesia ni Cristo (INC),2 against petitioner in
connection with the above broadcast. Respondent Michael M. Sandoval, who felt directly alluded to in petitioner’s
remark, was then a minister of INC and a regular host of the TV program Ang Tamang Daan.3 Forthwith, the MTRCB
sent petitioner a notice of the hearing on August 16, 2004 in relation to the alleged use of some cuss words in the
August 10, 2004 episode of Ang Dating Daan.4

After a preliminary conference in which petitioner appeared, the MTRCB, by Order of August 16, 2004, preventively
suspended the showing of Ang Dating Daan program for 20 days, in accordance with Section 3(d) of Presidential
Decree No. (PD) 1986, creating the MTRCB, in relation to Sec. 3, Chapter XIII of the 2004 Implementing Rules and
Regulations (IRR) of PD 1986 and Sec. 7, Rule VII of the MTRCB Rules of Procedure.5 The same order also set the
case for preliminary investigation.

The following day, petitioner sought reconsideration of the preventive suspension order, praying that Chairperson
Consoliza P. Laguardia and two other members of the adjudication board recuse themselves from hearing the
case.6 Two days after, however, petitioner sought to withdraw7 his motion for reconsideration, followed by the filing
with this Court of a petition for certiorari and prohibition,8 docketed as G.R. No. 164785, to nullify the preventive
suspension order thus issued.

On September 27, 2004, in Adm. Case No. 01-04, the MTRCB issued a decision, disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, a Decision is hereby rendered, finding respondent Soriano liable for his
utterances and thereby imposing on him a penalty of three (3) months suspension from his program, "Ang Dating
Daan".

Co-respondents Joselito Mallari, Luzviminda Cruz and UNTV Channel 37 and its owner, PBC, are hereby
exonerated for lack of evidence.

SO ORDERED.

Petitioner then filed this petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for injunctive relief.

Issue/s: 1. Whether Soriano’s speech is covered by religious freedom.

2. Whether his speech is protected by free speech.

Ruling: 1. There is nothing in petitioner’s statements subject of the complaints expressing any particular religious
belief, nothing furthering his avowed evangelical mission. The fact that he came out with his statements
in a televised bible exposition program does not automatically accord them the character of a religious
discourse. Plain and simple insults directed at another person cannot be elevated to the status of religious
speech. Even petitioner’s attempts to place his words in context show that he was moved by anger and
the need to seek retribution, not by any religious conviction. His claim, assuming its veracity, that some
INC ministers distorted his statements respecting amounts Ang Dating Daan owed to a TV station does
not convert the foul language used in retaliation as religious speech. We cannot accept that petitioner
made his statements in defense of his reputation and religion, as they constitute no intelligible defense
or refutation of the alleged lies being spread by a rival religious group. They simply illustrate that petitioner
had descended to the level of name-calling and foul-language discourse. Petitioner could have chosen
to contradict and disprove his detractors, but opted for the low road.
2. The Court finds that petitioner’s statement can be treated as obscene, at least with respect to the average
child. Hence, it is, in that context, unprotected speech.

Doctrine Miller v. California which established basic guidelines, to wit: (a) whether to the average person, applying
contemporary standards would find the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (b) whether the
work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state
law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. But, it
would be a serious misreading of Miller to conclude that the trier of facts has the unbridled discretion in determining
what is "patently offensive." x x x What remains clear is that obscenity is an issue proper for judicial determination
and should be treated on a case to case basis and on the judge’s sound discretion.

1
Acts tending to prevent the meeting of Congress and similar bodies

Case Title: People vs. Alipit, G.R. No. 18853, 22 August 1922

Facts: The information herein is as follows:

That on or about the 30th of May, 1920, in the municipality of Cabuyao, Province of Laguna, Philippine Islands, the
defendants Exequiel Alipit and Victorio D. Alemus, being the municipal president and the chief of police respectively
of the said municipality of Cabuyao, did willfully, unlawfully, maliciously and acting under a previous agreement and
conspiracy entered into between themselves and assisting and cooperating with each other, after the accused
Exequiel Alipit had fired his revolver in the air, enter the session room of the municipality building of Cabuyao
wherein the municipal council of Cabuyao was holding a meeting presided over by the vice-president, Manuel Basa,
and once in said room, the aforesaid accused Exequiel Alipit and Victorio D. Alemus, abusing their authority as
municipal president and chief of police respectively, the former with a revolver in his hand, and both using violence
and intimidation not only upon the person of said vice-president Manuel Basa, but also upon those of the councilors
present at the aforesaid meeting, and without any justifiable motive or legal authority and by means of force,
arrested said vice-president Manuel Basa and compelled him to submit himself to the arrest against the latter's will
and over his protest and that of each and everyone of the councilors and took him to the jail of the municipal building
of Cabuyao, the accused Victorio D. Alemus taking at the same time possession of all the papers concerning the
meeting that was being held by the municipal council of Cabuyao, by which acts the defendants succeeded in
interrupting and dissolving the aforesaid meeting.

After the usual proceedings, the trial court found the defendant guilty of coercion through illegal detention and
sentenced them, under articles 497, in connection with article 89, of the Penal Code, to five months of arresto
mayor and fine of 1,500 pesetas, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, the accessory penalties and
costs.

Petitioner contends that his act of preventing the meeting was because it suffered from a legal defect that not all
councilors were present.

Issue/s: Whether petitioner was convicted under the proper crime.

Ruling: We are of the opinion that the law violated by the accused is Act No. 1755, which in its section 1, says:

Any person who willfully or by force or fraud prevent or attempts to prevent the meeting of the Philippine
Commission or the organizing or meeting of the Philippine Assembly or of any Insular legislative body of the
Philippine Islands hereafter established, or the meeting or organizing of any provincial board or municipal or
township council, and any person who willfully disturbs the Philippine Commission or the Philippine Assembly, or
in Insular legislative body of the Philippine Islands hereafter established, or any provincial board or municipal or
township council, while in session, or who is guilty of any disorderly conduct in the immediate view or presence of
any such body tending to interrupt the proceedings of such body or to impair the respect due to its authority, shall
be punished by a fine of not more than two thousand pesos or by imprisonment for not more than five years, or by
both, in the discretion of the court.

And in view of the allegations contained in the information herein, the accused may, and must, be convicted of a
violation of said section 1 of this Act and punished accordingly.

Doctrine No one is allowed to prevent a meeting of the legislature by using violence.

1
Disturbance of proceedings

Case Decena vs. Malanyaon, A.M. No. RTJ-02-1669, 14 April 2004

Title:

Facts: The complainants have lodged an administrative complaint for conduct unbecoming a judge against Hon. Nilo A.
Malanyaon, the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 32, in Pili, Camarines Sur.1

In their joint complaint-affidavit dated April 10, 2007,2 the complainants averred that complainant Rey C. Decena
had brought an administrative case in Regional Office No. V of the Civil Service Commission in Legaspi City, Albay
against Judge Malanyaon’s wife, Dr. Amelita C. Malanyaon (Dr. Amelita), then the Assistant Provincial Health Officer
of the Province of Camarines Sur; that during the hearing of the administrative case on May 4, 2006, Judge
Malanyaon sat beside his daughter, Atty. Ma. Kristina C. Malanyaon, the counsel of Dr. Amelita in the case; and that
the events that then transpired were as recounted in the joint complaint-affidavit, to wit:

During the early stage of the hearing when the hearing officer, Atty. Dennis Masinas Nieves, brought up the matter
regarding Dr. Malanyaon’s manifestation or motion (to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction), Judge Malanyaon
coached her daughter in making manifestations/motions before the hearing officer, by scribbling on some piece of
paper and giving the same to the former, thus prompting her daughter to rise from her seat and/or ask permission
from the officer to speak, and then make some manifestations while reading or glancing on the paper given by Judge
Malanyaon. At one point, Judge Malanyaon even prompted her daughter to demand that Atty. Eduardo Loria, the
collaborating counsel of our principal counsel, Atty. Mary Ailyne Zamora, be required to produce his PTR number.

When our principal counsel, Atty. Zamora, arrived and took over from Atty. Loria, she inquired regarding the
personality of Judge Malanyaon, being seated at the lawyer’s bench beside Atty. Malanyaon, Judge Malanyaon then
proudly introduced himself and manifested that he was the "counsel of the respondent’s counsel". Atty. Zamora
proceeded to raise the propriety of Judge Malanyaon’s sitting with and assisting his daughter in that hearing, being
a member of the judiciary, to which Judge Malanyaon loudly retorted that he be shown any particular rule that
prohibits him from sitting with his daughter at the lawyers’ bench. He insisted that he was merely "assisting" her
daughter, who "just passed the bar", defend the respondent, and was likewise helping the latter defend herself.

Issue/s: Whether respondent judge is guilty of gross misconduct.

Ruling: Yes.

The following actuations of Judge Malanyaon constituted conduct unbecoming of a judge.

First was Judge Malanyaon’s occupying a seat beside his daughter that was reserved for the lawyers during the
hearing. Such act displayed his presumptuousness, and probably even his clear intention to thereby exert his
influence as a judge of the Regional Trial Court on the hearing officer in order for the latter to favor his wife’s cause.
That impression was definitely adverse against the Judiciary, whose every judicial officer was presumed to be a
subject of strict scrutiny by the public. Being an incumbent RTC Judge, he always represented the Judiciary, and
should have acted with greater circumspection and self-restraint, simply because the administrative hearing was
unavoidably one in which he could not but be partisan. Simple prudence should have counselled him to avoid any
form of suspicion of his motives, or to suppress any impression of impropriety on his part as an RTC judge by not
going to the hearing himself.

Second was Judge Malanyaon’s admission that his presence in that hearing was to advise his daughter on what to
do and say during the hearing, to the point of coaching his daughter. In the process, he unabashedly introduced
himself as the "counsel of the respondent’s counsel" upon his presence being challenged by the adverse counsel,
stating that his daughter was still inexperienced for having just passed her Bar Examinations. Such excuse,
seemingly grounded on a "filial" duty towards his wife and his daughter, did not furnish enough reason for him to
forsake the ethical conduct expected of him as a sitting judge. He ought to have restrained himself from sitting at
that hearing, being all too aware that his sitting would have him cross the line beyond which was the private practice
of law.

Doctrine Section 3527 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court expressly prohibits sitting judges like Judge Malanyaon from
engaging in the private practice of law or giving professional advice to clients. Section 11, Canon 4 (Propriety), of
the New Code of Judicial Conduct and Rule 5.0730 of the Code of Judicial Conduct reiterate the prohibition from
engaging in the private practice of law or giving professional advice to clients. The prohibition is based on sound
reasons of public policy, considering that the rights, duties, privileges and functions of the office of an attorney are
inherently incompatible with the high official functions, duties, powers, discretion and privileges of a sitting judge. It
also aims to ensure that judges give their full time and attention to their judicial duties, prevent them from extending
favors to their own private interests, and assure the public of their impartiality in the performance of their functions.
These objectives are dictated by a sense of moral decency and desire to promote the public interest.

Thus, an attorney who accepts an appointment to the Bench must accept that his right to practice law as a member
of the Philippine Bar is thereby suspended, and it shall continue to be so suspended for the entire period of his
incumbency as a judge. The term practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court or to participation in
court proceedings, but extends to the preparation of pleadings or papers in anticipation of a litigation, the giving of
legal advice to clients or persons needing the same, the preparation of legal instruments and contracts by which
legal rights are secured, and the preparation of papers incident to actions and special proceedings.

1

Violation of parliamentary immunity
Case Title: Osmena vs. Pendatun, G.R. No. L-17144, 28 October
1960
Facts: A Special Committee under House Resolution No. 59
was created to substantiate the charges against
Congressman Sergio Osmena, Jr. The latter delivered a
privilege speech in which he said that the delivery of
justice under the President’s administration is for sale,
and people tend to always go away with the law inter
alia. The Special Committee upheld House Resolution
No. 175 which states that the Congressman is guilty of
serious disorderly behavior.
Issue/s: Whether or not his colleagues can discipline him
despite parliamentary immunity.
Ruling: Yes. Rules of House, Rule XVII, Sec. 7 recognizes the
power of the House to hold a member responsible “for
words spoken in debate.” Unparliamentary conduct can
be censured, committed to prison, suspended or even
expelled by the votes of his colleauges.
Doctrine Parliamentary immunity only guarantees complete
freedom of expression without the fear of being
prosecuted criminally or civilly before the courts or any
other outside the Congressional Hall.
Illegal associations
Case Title: People vs. Evangelista, G.R. No. 36277, 26 October
1932
Facts: A parade was to be held by the communists in the
Municipality of Caloocati, but their permit for the
parade had been revoked. A Constabulary officer
appeared with other soldiers to prevent the holding of
the parade. Appellant Evangelista talked to the officer
and told the latter if he could just have few words with
his people to inform them regarding the status of the
parade. Instead, he raised his fist and he told the
people the government’s disposition towards them and
that they should fight the government.
Issue/s: Whether or not the acts of the appellants are for the
purpose of committing any of the acts punishable
under the Code.
Ruling: Yes. Supreme Court held that the statements made
by the accused are seditious for it took several months
after the inauguration of the Communist Party. The
utterances were really inciting the people to revolt.
Doctrine
Case Title: Aquino vs. Enrile, G.R. No. L-35546, 17
September 1974
Facts: The cases are all petitions for habeas corpus
for having been arrested and detained by
military by virtue of Proclamation 1081. The
petitioners were arrested and held pursuant to
General Order Np. 2 of the President for being
participants in the conspiracy to seize the
political and state power.
Issue/s: Whether the detention of the petitioners legal
under the declaration of Martial Law.
Ruling: Yes. The power to detain persons even
without charges for the acts related to the
situation which justifies the marial law
(rebellion for example) implies the power to
impose upon the released detainees
conditions or restrictions which are germane to
and necessary to carry out the purpose of the
proclamation.
Doctrine
Direct assaults
Case Title: U.S. vs. Tabiana, G.R. No. 11847, 1 February
1918
Facts: Defendant Tabiana was served a warrant of
arrest for trivial misdemeanor where there was
an alleged trespassing the complainant’s
cattle by Tabiana’s cattle.
The warrant was served by two policemen and
there Tabiana showed irritation and negotiated
with the police that he will just proceed to the
municipal building later. After a while, Tabiana
did not proceed as he was with friends in his
residence. The policemen fetched Tabiana but
it was late so no one was there. Tabiana went
home. The policemen came for the second
time at the appellant’s house and there
Tabiana hit the police in his breast. Appellant’s
brother-in-law also followed and hit the same
police on his back.
The CFI convicted appellants of attack upon
agents of public authority.
Issue/s: Whether or not the acts constitute “force
against them (public authority)”
Ruling: No. The Supreme Court held that the proper
crime was resistance and serious obedience
to public authority. If force shall be considered
without context, attack upon agents of public
authority shall always be the crime being an
element of it. However, Supreme Court
reasons that there is also force in resistance
and serious obedience to public authority in
which gravity is just the same as in the facts
of the case.
Doctrine
1
Case Title: U.S. vs. Gumban, G.R. No. 13658, 9 Case Title: Sarcupuedes vs. People, G.R. No. L-3857, 22
November 1918 October 1951

Facts: Municipal President Gumban was in the barrio
of Pavia inspecting animals quarantined. Then,
a report came saying a carabao has been
brought to the area in a police station for
destroying a planted area. The brothers of the
owner of the carabao protested to the president
because the carabao was brought in a
quarantine area. However, the Gumban agreed
that it was just right it was brought there and
promised whether the carabao could be
withdrawn by tomorrow. The accused Gumban
slap on the face Municipal President Gumban.
The lower court convicted the accused guilty of
assault upon an agent of authority under Art.
249, par. 2.
Issue/s: Whether or not the lower court erred in
applying Art. 249, par. 2 in the case.
Facts: Hilarion Sarcepuedes laid hands on Lucrecia
L. Bustamante, a teacher-nurse, in the school
building of the town by hitting Her twice on the
face with his raincoat and violently pushing her
to the window. The assault took place because
Lucrecia had ordered the closing of a pathway
across her land thru which Hilarion and his wife
used to pass in going to and from the school,
closing which Hilarion deeply resented. It
seems that Hilarion Sarcepuedes sought
Lucrecia Bustamante at the school premises
to demand an explanation. One word led to
another and to the criminal employment of
force already described.
Issue/s: Whether direct assault took place Bustamante
was assaulted while engaged in the
performance of her official duties as a school
nurse

Ruling: Yes. The proper charge would be Art. 250,
par. 3. It is essential in assault upon agents of
authority, force was employed. It is important
to consider whether the force used is or is not
sufficient to constitute an assault upon agents
of authority. In this case, there is no need to
determine what force was used because Art.
250, par. 3 already specifies that the force is
laying of hands upon a person in authority.
Doctrine The distinction between an assault and
resistance to agents in authority lies largely in
the amount of force employed in each case.
Ruling: YES, A teacher-nurse of an elementary public
school whose duty, among others, is to give
health instruction to the pupils, to instruct
teachers about how to give first aid treatment
in the school clinic, and to look after the
sanitary facilities of the school, is a person in
authority under article 152 of the Revised
Penal Code. She was pounced upon "while
engaged in the performance"of her official
duties, within the meaning of Article 148.
Doctrine If such insult was directed to be detrimental to
a person acting in a public function, it is
chargeable as direct assault

Case Title: People vs. Hernandez, G.R. Nos. 39840-41,

23 December 1933

Facts: Defendant is a governor who was served a

writ of execution because of non-payment in
another case. It was the defendant himself
who ordered that his execution be suspended
while waiting for a telegram from Collector of
Internal Revenue. The policemen who were in
aid of the deputy sheriff were asked by the
appellant to go and proceed to their other
work.

When the sheriff himself went inside the house,

he tried to carry the piano and chairs as an
attachment but was not successful because he
was held by the governor at one had. The
governor asked the police to arrest the sheriff for
trespass to dwelling

Issue/s: Whether the act of the governor constitutes as

resistance to an agent in authority.

Ruling: No. Supreme Court acquitted the governor.

The sheriff has no discretion to choose which
can be attached, the law allows the judgement
debtor to direct which property can be
attached. The Supreme Court held that the
sheriff acted arbitrarily.

Doctrine

2

Case Title: Justo vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-8611,
28 June 1956
Facts: Offended party is a duly appointed district
supervisor of the Bureau of Public Schools.
was leaving the office in order to take his meal
when he saw the appellant conversing with.
Severino Caridad, academic supervisor.
Caridad said that there was no vacancy,
except that of the position of shop teacher.
Upon hearing Caridad' answer, the appellant
sharply addressed the complainant thus:
"Shet, you are a double crosser. One who
cannot keep his promise." The appellant then
grabbed a lead paper weight from the table of
Caridad and challenged the offended party to
go out. The appellant left Caridad's office,
followed by De la Cuesta. When they were in
front of the table of one Carlos Bueno, a clerk
in the division office, De la Cuesta asked the
appellant to put down the paper weight but
instead the appellant grabbed the neck and
collar of the polo shirt of the complainant which
was torn. Carlos Bueno separated the
protagonists, but not before the complainant
had boxed the, appellant several times.
Case Title: People vs. Ortiz, G.R. No. L-15344, 30 May
1960
Facts: Accused attack the offended parties, a
qualified inspector and a qualified poll watcher
of a precinct during a poll canvassing through
boxing.
Issue/s: Can Direct assault be complexed/aggravated
Ruling: Yes, Where it is alleged in the information that
the accused by laying hands upon election
inspectors and watchers in public places had
cause serious disturbance and interrupted or
disturbed public performances and functions,
they are thus charged with the complex crime
of assault upon a person in authority with
disturbance of public order.
Doctrine Direct assault is committed without causing
disturbances as to doing a public uprising

Issue/s: Whether direct assault took place.

Ruling: YES, The character of person in authority is

not assumed or laid off at will, but attaches to
a public official until he ceases to be in office.
Assuming that the complainant was not
actually performing the duties of his office
when assaulted, this fact does not bar the
existence of the crime of assault upon a
person in authority; so long as the impelling
motive of the attack is the performance of
official duty.

Doctrine This is apparent from the phraseology of

Article 148 of our Revised Penal Code, in
penalizing attacks upon person in authority
"while engaged in the performance of official
duties or on occasion of such performance",
the words "on occasion" signifying "because"
or "by reason" of the past performance of
official duty, even if at the very time of the
assault no official duty was being discharged

3
 Case People vs. Lunar, G.R. No. L-15579, 29 May 1972
Case Title: People vs. Balbar, G.R. Nos. L-20216-7, 29 Title:
November 1967
Facts: A riot in prison took place. The accused, together with
Facts: - Defendant allegedly entered the room two men attacked and stabbed the Cpl Pablo, a prison
where schoolteacher was conducting her guard. The prison guard was brought to the hospital but
classes. Without warning and right after died afterwards. Lunar and one of the accused escaped
complainant had finished writing on the prison after the incident. Shortly thereafter, they were
blackboard defendant allegedly placed captured.
his arms around her and kissed her on
the eye. Defendant allegedly brought out Issue/s: If it is a complex crime of murder with assault upon an
his “daga” (a local dagger) and pursued agent of a person in authority?
complainant, catching up with her before
Ruling: Yes.The killing of Cpl. Pablo was premeditated and
she was able to get out of the room.
means, methods, and forms were employed to insure the
Defendant embraced her again, at the
success of the conspiracy to break jail. Thus, it constitutes
same time holding on to his “daga”. They
murder. Moreover, at the time of assault, Cpl Pablo is an
both fell to the floor, as a result of which
agent of a person in authority. He was in the discharge of
complainant sustained slight physical
his official duties as desk sergeant in charge of peace and
injuries.
order.
- Two informations, one for Direct Assault
Upon A Person in Authority and another
Doctrine Aggravating circumstances such as abuse of superior
for Acts of Lasciviousness (Criminal
strength and insult to public authorities are absorbed in
Cases Nos. 823 and 841 respectively)
Direct Assault. They are elements of the offense.
were filed by the Assistant Provincial
Fiscal against defendant before the
Court of First Instance of Batangas, the
latter charge upon written complaint filed
Case People vs. Renegado, G.R. No. L-27031, 31 May 1974
by the offended party, duly sworn to
Title:
before the Clerk of Court.
- Defendant was arguing that such
Facts: Lira, a school teacher asked Renegado, the school clerk
information should be quashed for it is
to prepare and type their test questions. Renegado
not indicated that the offended party is a
answered that he had much work to do. In reply, Lira
teacher
reminded Renegado of the Principal’s instructions and
Issue/s: Is direct assault quashable even no such made a remark “you can finish your work if you only sit
indication was indicated in the information down and work”. The remark made Renegado so angry.
The day after, Renegado saw the victim in the canteen
Ruling: YES, Where an information for direct assault upon and stabbed him.
a person in authority sufficiently alleges that the
accused knew the complainant was a school Issue/s: Whether Lira is in the discharge of his functions when the
teacher, was in her classroom and engaged in the assault took place?
performance of her duties when she was assaulted,
Ruling: The assault or attack was committed on the occasion of
it is error to quash the same upon the ground of
the performance of Lira’s duties as a teacher. Lira
absence of express allegation that accused had
reminded Renegado of his tasks and duties. As a teacher
knowledge that she was a person in authority, and
of the school, Lira had the authority to call the attention of
the case should be remanded for trial on the merits,
an employee of the institution to comply with his duties
for it matters not that such knowledge on his part is
and be efficient. As such, Renegado was convicted of
not expressly alleged. It matters not that such
murder with assault on a person in authority.
knowledge on his part is not expressly alleged,
complainant’s status as a person in authority being
a matter of law and not of fact, ignorance whereof
Case People vs. Court of First Instance, G.R. No. L-41045, 28
could not excuse non-compliance on his part (Art.
Title: November 1975
3, Civil Code). This article applies to all kinds of
domestic laws, whether civil or penal, and whether
Facts: The provincial fiscal of Quezon, on behalf of the People,
substantive or remedial, for reasons of expediency,
sought a petition for certiorari on acquitting the
policy and necessity.
respondents for direct assault upon public authorities due
to deficient information.

Issue/s: Whether the information filed for direct assault is

Case Title: People vs. Baladhay, G.R. No. 8644-CR, 12 deficient?
September 1970
Ruling: Yes. The information must allege that the accused knew
Facts: School teacher officially travelling for school the position of authority held by the offended party. It is
reports and properties upon a lawful order of an essential element of the crime. Since information was
superior. lacking, petition was dismissed.

Issue/s: Whether Direct assault may be charged although

outside classroom

Ruling: YES, Teachers are not limited to confinement in

classroom and such duty was discharged to him by
a superior are to be held outside the classroom

4
Case People vs. Lanseta, G.R. No. L-30413, 22 January
Title: 1980
Facts: Javier stabbed and shot a member of the Manila
Police Department. He was found guilty of robbery
with homicide with attendant aggravating
circumstance of treachery, disregard of the respect
due the offended party on account of his rank, and
cruelty. Javier was sentenced to death. Thus this
instant case for review.
Issue/s: Whether or not there is direct assault on public
authorities?
Ruling: Yes. The attack to an agent of a person in authority
while the latter is engaged in the performance of his
duties is direct assault defined in Art. 148 of the
Revised Penal Code. Thus, the aggravating
circumstance of disregard of the respect due the
offended party on account of his rank is inherent.
However, the complex crime was not expressly
charged the information. Therefore, there can be no
conviction. Accused was convicted of simple
homicide only since robbery has not been proved
and direct assault was not alleged.
Doctrine The aggravating circumstance of disregard of the
respect due the offended party on account of his rank
is inherent in direct assault. The crime charged must
expressly be included in the information.
Case People vs. Seda, G.R. Nos. 44810-12, 21 May 1984
Title:
Facts: The accused were charged of murder with direct
assault, murder, and attempted murder committed
on the same occasion. He shot the chief of police and
his daughters.
Issue/s: Whether there was direct assault?
Ruling: No. The police officer was shot when he fetched his
daughters. Although, the police officer was resented
by the accused, he was not in the discharge of his
duties during the attack. Therefore, it is only murder.
Doctrine One of the elements of direct assault is that the
person in authority (PA) or an agent of a person in
authority (APA) was in the performance of his duties.
The ill motive must be against the performance of
APA or PA’s duties.
Case People vs. Hecto, G.R. No. L-52787, 28 February
Title: 1985
Facts: The accused were sentenced the penalty of death.
They were found guilty of murder with direct assault
upon person in authority. The barangay captain
asked the accused to pay the slaughter fee that
resulted to a heated argument. Few days later, while
Caridad (victim) accompanies his nephew to the
child’s parents, he was shot.
Issue/s: Whether the victim was in the performance of his
duties?
Ruling: Yes. The attack was occasioned by the official
duties done by him. As a barangay captain, it was his
duty to enforce laws and ordinances within the
barangay. Therefore, they are convicted of murder
with direct assault upon person in authority.
Case Title: People vs. Rodil, G.R. No. L-35156, 20 November
1981
Facts: Lt. Masana, wearing civilian clothes approached Rodil
and introduced himself as a member of the Philippine
Constabulary. He asked about the license of a gun
tucked in Rodil’s waist. Instead of answering the
question, he attempted to draw the gun. Another soldier
immediately grabbed Rodil’s gun and gave it to Masana.
Thereafter, they sat on a table facing each other. During
the course of discussion, the accused stabbed Masana.
Issue/s: Was it a complex crime of murder/homicide with
assault upon authorities?
Ruling: No. The crime is merely homicide. The accused and
the victim are facing each other when the attack took
place. The victim was able to ward off and it was so
strong that the accused bumped his head on a table
nearby.
The information does not allege that the accused knew
at the time or before the assault that the victim was an
agent of a person in authority. It simply alleged that Lt.
Masana was attacked while in the performance of his
duties. Thus, only the aggravating circumstance of
contempt to public authorities or, insult or disregard of
the respect due the offended party on account of his
rank was appreciated.
Doctrine If the information only includes the attack on a public
authority in the discharge of his functions, it is only
appreciated as an aggravating circumstance. It is not
a complex crime with assault upon authorities.
Case Title: People vs. Regala, G.R. No. L-23693, 27 April 1982
Facts: The victim while maintaining peace and order at the exit
gate of the Plaza Magallanes where the crime took
place, was in complete PC uniform at the time the
accused attacked and stabbed him by reason of the
latter's act of pushing the accused and his co-accused
so as to prevent them from entering the plaza through
its exit gate.
Issue/s: Is the accused guilty of complex crime of homicide with
assault upon an agent of a person in authority?
Ruling: Appellant cannot be convicted of the complex crime of
homicide with assault upon an agent of a person in
authority because the information filed against appellant
did not allege the essential elements of assault that the
accused then knew that, before or at the time of the
assault, the victim was an agent of a person in authority.
The fact that the evidence established by the
prosecution was not objected by the accused party does
not cure the defect in the information in violation of his
constitutional right to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him.
Conviction: Homicide aggravated by the
circumstance of in contempt or with insult to the
public authorities or as an insult or in disregard of
the respect due to the offended party on account of
his rank.
Doctrine The knowledge that the victim is an agent of a person in
authority must be alleged in the information or else the
required knowledge could only be appreciated as an
aggravating circumstance of in contempt or with insult to
the public authorities.
5
Case Title: People vs. Abalos, G.R. No. 88189, 9 July
1996
Facts: Appellant and his father were having a heated
argument in a fiesta when the victim, police
officer Labine, arrived and asked what was
happening. Appellant got a wood and swung it
to the victim causing his death.
Issue/s: Is the accused guilty of complex crime of direct
assault with murder?
Ruling: Yes. The victim was in the performance of his
duty during the assault by maintaining peace
and order during the fiesta and the accused
testified that he personally knew the victim to be
a policeman.
Doctrine The elements of the second form of committing
assault are that there must be an attack, use of
force, or serious intimidation or resistance upon
a person in authority or his agent; the assault
was made when the said person was performing
his duties or on the occasion of such
performance; and the accused knew that the
victim is a person in authority or his agent, that
is, that the accused must have the intention to
offend, injure or assault the offended party as a
person in authority or an agent of a person in
authority.
Case Title: People vs. Sion, G.R. No. 109617, 11 August
1997
Facts: Appellants were convicted of murder for
attacking the victim with their carried stones
and bladed weapons causing the latter’s
death. Appellants appealed in the SC that their
crime should be mitigated by their voluntary
surrender to a Kagawad Lagman.
Issue/s: Is a Kagawad a person in authority?
Ruling: Yes. Section 388 of the Local Government
Code of 1991 expands the definition of
persons in authority under Article 152 of the
RPC to Punong Barangay, Sangguniang
s
Barangay Members, and members of the
Lupong Tagapamayapa in each barangay.
Hence, appellants surrendering to a kagawad,
a Sangguniang Barangay member, shall be
given the benefit of a mitigating circumstance
of voluntary surrender in their sentence.
Case People vs. Recto, G.R. No. 129069, 17 October 2001
Title:
Facts Among others, the appellant was charged of direct assault with
: frustrated murder in two informations. He assaulted and shot
with a pugakang Melchor Recto, knowing that he is a barangay
chief tanod, and Percival Obre knowing that he is the barangay
captain. He is then charged with direct assault with murder for
the assault and shooting of one Macalipay knowing that he is a
barangay kagawad. Trial court ruling: two counts of the
complex crime of qualified direct assault with frustrated
homicide, one count of the complex crime of qualified
direct assault with murder, inter alia.
Issue Did the lower court correctly convicted the appellant of qualified
/s: direct assault with frustrated homicide?
Rulin No. The barangay tanod chief was clearly an agent of a person
g: in authority. However, contrary to the findings of the trial court,
he was not "engaged in the performance of his official duties" at
the time he was shot. Neither was he attacked "on the occasion
of such performance," as he was on the way home when he
arrived at the scene of the crime and was hiding when things
were transpiring. Hence he was a bystander in the
happenstance of the crime. Crime committed is only attempted
homicide.
Yes. In the assault done to the barangay captain, the trial court
correctly held a qualified direct assault because he was
attacked during the occasion of performing his duties that is,
pacifying the appellant to keep the peace between the two
groups.
Doctr Direct assault, a crime against public order, may be committed
ine in two ways: first, by "any person or persons who, without a
public uprising, shall employ force or intimidation for the
attainment of any of the purposes enumerated in defining the
crimes of rebellion and sedition;" and second, by any person or
persons who, without a public uprising, "shall attack, employ
force, or seriously intimidate or resist any person in authority or
any of his agents, while engaged in the performance of official
duties, or on occasion of such performance. The second mode,
on the other hand, is the more common form of assault, and is
aggravated when: (a) the assault is committed with a weapon,
or (b) when the offender is a public officer or employee, or (c)
when the offender lays a hand upon a person in authority.
C Rivera vs. People, G.R. No. 138553, 30 June 2005
F Inspector Leygo was conducting patrol when he stopped a truck
driver unloading chicken manure and escorted him to the police hq
for violating a municipal ordinance. Subsequently police officers
noticed again the truck proceeding to Shilan, La Trinidad Benguet
escorted by the accused who ordered the truck driver to do so,
making him believe that he was the boss of Leygo. The latter then
stopped them and warned the accused that he was being arrested
for violating an ordinance. Accused uttered insulting words and
punched the inspector on his lip.
I Was the accused guilty of direct assault?
R Yes. Lt. Leygo was in performing his duties when the assault
transpired and was even wearing his police uniform while on board
a police car.
D Medical certificate is only corroborative in character and is not an
indispensable element of the crime of direct assault filed against
petitioner. The unequivocal piece of evidence against petitioner is
no less Lt. Leygo’s credible and consistent testimony that he was
punched on his face by the petitioner.
6
Case Title: Gelig vs. People, G.R. No. 173150, 28 July
2010

Facts: Lydia confronted Gemma after learning from

Roseller that Gemma called him a "sissy" while
in class. Lydia slapped Gemma in the cheek and
pushed her, thereby causing her to fall and hit a
wall divider. Subsequently, Gemma suffered
incomplete abortion.
Trial Court: Complex crime of direct assault with
unintentional abortion.
CA: Lydia cannot be held liable for direct assault
since Gemma descended from being a person
in authority to a private individual when, instead
of pacifying Lydia or informing the principal of
the matter, she engaged in a fight with Lydia.

Issue/s: Is Lydia guilty of direct assault with unintentional

abortion?

Ruling: Yes. The fact remains that at the moment Lydia

initiated her tirades, Gemma was busy attending
to her official functions as a teacher. She tried
to pacify Lydia by offering her a seat so that they
could talk properly, but Lydia refused and
instead uttered hurtful words. When Lydia
continued with her behavior, Gemma merely
retaliated in kind as would a similarly situated
person. Lydia aggravated the situation by
slapping Gemma and violently pushing her
against a wall divider while she was going to the
principal's office. Crime committed: direct
assault

Case Title: Conquilla vs. Bernardo, A.M. No. MTJ-09-

1737, 9 February 2011

Facts: In this case, the crime charged against

complainant was direct assault against a public
school teacher, who is a person in authority
under Article 152 of the Revised Penal Code. On
8 July 2008, respondent judge conducted a
preliminary investigation and found probable
cause to hold the complainant for trial for the
crime of direct assault. Respondent judge then
issued a warrant of arrest dated 8 July 2008,
with the bail fixed at P12,000.

Issue/s: Did the judge commit gross ignorance of the

law?

Ruling: Yes. Under Article 148 of the Revised Penal

Code, when the assault is committed against a
person in authority while engaged in the
performance of his official duties or on the
occasion of such performance, the imposable
penalty is prision correccional in its medium and
maximum periods. The duration of the penalty of
prision correccional in its medium and maximum
periods is 2 years, 4 months and 1 day to 6
years. It was therefore incumbent upon
respondent judge to forward the records of the
case to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor
for preliminary investigation, instead of
conducting the preliminary investigation himself.