REYES v.

CA
G.R. No. 96492 November 26, 1992

Doctrine: As an exception to the scope of the Rules of Evidence, Section 16 of P.D. No. 946 provides that the
rules of court shall not be applicable even in a suppletory character in Agrarian cases.

FACTS: Juan Mendoza, father of defendant Olympio Mendoza, is the owner of two farm lots in Pampanga.
The lots were tenanted and cultivated by Julian dela Cruz, late husband of plaintiff Eufrocina dela Cruz.

Eufrocina filed a complaint alleging that upon the death of Julian, she succeeded him as bona
fide tenant of the farm lots;; and that Olympio Mendoza, in conspiracy with the other defendants,
prevented her daughter Violeta and her workers through force, intimidation, strategy and stealth, from
entering and working on the subject premises;; and that until the filing of the instant case, defendants
had refused to vacate and surrender the lots, thus violating her tenancy rights. Plaintiff therefore prayed
for judgment for the recovery of possession and damages with a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction
in the meantime.

Petitioners in this case were duly elected and/or appointed barangay officials in Pampanga,
denied interference in the tenancy relationship existing between plaintiff and defendant Mendoza,
particularly in the cultivation of the latter's farm lots. They asked for the case to be dismissed claiming
that they have always exercised fairness, equity, reason and impartiality in the discharge of their official
functions. For his part, defendant Mendoza raised abandonment, sublease and mortgage of the farm lots
without his consent and approval, and non-payment of rentals, irrigation fees and other taxes due the
government, as his defenses.

The agrarian court ordered the defendants to restore possession of the farm lots to Eufrocina.
This decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. On appeal, the petitioners questioned the favorable
consideration given to the affidavits of Eufrocina and Efren Tecson, since the affiants were not presented
and subjected to cross-examination.

ISSUE:
1. Whether the lower court erred in giving favorable consideration to the affidavits o Eufrocina and Efren
Tecson even if the affiant was not subjected to cross-examination? – NO.

RATIO: The trial court did not err when it favorably considered the affidavits of Eufrocina and Efren
Tecson although the affiants were not presented and subjected to cross-examination. Section 16 of P.D.
No. 946 provides that the "Rules of Court shall not be applicable in agrarian cases even in a suppletory
character." The same provision states that "In the hearing, investigation and determination of any
question or controversy, affidavits and counter-affidavits may be allowed and are admissible in evidence".
Sec. 2, Rule 128 of the Rules of Court provides that the rules of evidence shall be the same in all courts
and in all trials and hearings, except as otherwise provided by the law or these rules. Section 16 of P.D.
No. 946 is covered by the phrase “except as otherwise provided by the law”.

ANALYSIS:
There will be no change in the decision of this case as there is no proposed change in Sec. 2, Rule 128 of
the current Rules of Court.
 PEOPLE v. TURCO
G.R. No. 137757 August 14, 2000

Doctrine: Since admissibility of evidence is determined by its relevance and competence, admissibility is,
therefore, an affair of logic and law. On the other hand, the weight to be given to such evidence, once
admitted, depends on judicial evaluation within the guidelines provided in Rule 133 and jurisprudence laid
down by the Court. Thus, while evidence may be admissible, it may be entitled to little or no weight at all.
FACTS: Accused-appellant Rodegelio Turco, Jr. (aka "Totong") was charged with the crime of rape. By the
use of force, threat and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously grab the
undersigned complainant by her neck, cover her mouth and forcibly make her lie down, after which the
said accused mounted on top of her and removed her short pant and panty. Thereafter, the said accused,
by the use of force, threat and intimidation, inserted his penis into the vagina of the undersigned
complainant and finally succeeded to have carnal knowledge of her, against her will.

Upon reaching home, the victim discovered that her short pants and panty were filled with blood.
For almost ten days, she kept to herself the harrowing experience, until she had the courage to tell her
brother-in-law, who in turn told the victim’s father about the incident. Thereafter, they did not waste time
and immediately asked the victim to see a doctor for medical examination. After the issuance of the
medical certificate, they filed a complaint against the accused charging him with rape.

The trial court convicted the accused stating that the defense of “sweetheart theory” was a mere
concoction of the accused in order to exculpate him from his criminal liability. Appealing his conviction,
the accused-appellant argues that the trial court erred because no actual proof was presented that the
rape of the complainant actually happened considering that although a medical certificate was presented,
the medico-legal officer who prepared the same was not presented in court to explain the same.

ISSUE:
1. Whether the trial court erred in admitting the medical certificate in evidence although the medico-legal
officer who prepared the same was not presented in court? – NO.

RATIO: There is a distinction between admissibility of evidence and the probative value thereof. Evidence
is admissible when it is relevant to the issue and is not excluded by the law or the rules (Section 3, Rule
128, Rules of Court) or is competent. Since admissibility of evidence is determined by its relevance and
competence, admissibility is, therefore, an affair of logic and law. On the other hand, the weight to be
given to such evidence, once admitted, depends on judicial evaluation within the guidelines provided in
Rule 133 and the jurisprudence laid down by the Court. Thus, while evidence may be admissible, it may
be entitled to little or no weight at all. Conversely, evidence which may have evidentiary weight may be
inadmissible because a special rule forbids its reception.

But although the medical certificate is an exception to the hearsay rule, hence admissible as
evidence, it has very little probative value due to the absence of the examining physician. Nevertheless, it
cannot be said that the prosecution relied solely on the medical certificate. It is enough that the evidence
on hand convinces the court that conviction is proper. In the instant case, the victim's testimony alone is
credible and sufficient to convict.

ANALYSIS:
There will be no change in the decision of this case as there is no proposed change in Sec. 3, Rule 128 of
the current Rules of Court;; and that the proposed amendments to Rule 133 will not affect the weight to
be given on the medical certificate as such will depend upon the discretion of the court.
 (3) Agustin v. Court of Appeals

FACTS: Respondents Fe Angela and her son Martin Prollamante sued Martin's alleged biological father,
petitioner Arnel L. Agustin, for support and support pendente lite before the Regional Trial Court. Arnel
supposedly impregnated Fe. Despite Arnel's insistence on abortion, Fe decided otherwise and gave birth to
their child out of wedlock, Martin. The baby's birth certificate was purportedly signed by Arnel as the father.
Arnel shouldered the pre-natal and hospital expenses but later refused Fe's repeated requests for Martin's
support despite his adequate financial capacity and even suggested to have the child committed for adoption.
Arnel also denied having fathered the child. While Fe was carrying five-month old Martin at the parking lot,
Arnel sped off in his van, with the open car door hitting Fe's leg. Fe was diagnosed with leukemia and has,
since then, been undergoing chemotherapy.
Fe and Martin sued Arnel for support. Arnel denied having sired Martin because his affair and
intimacy with Fe had allegedly ended long before Martin's conception. Arnel admitted that their relationship
started in 1993 but "he... never really fell in love with (Fe) not only because (she) had at least one secret lover,
a certain Jun, but also because she proved to be scheming and overly demanding and possessive.
What started as a romantic liaison between... two consenting adults eventually turned out to be a case
of fatal attraction where (Fe) became so obsessed with (Arnel), to the point of even entertaining the idea of
marrying him, that she resorted to various devious ways and means to alienate (him) from his wife and family.
Unable to bear the prospect of losing his wife and children, Arnel terminated the affair although he still treated
her as a friend. Arnel and his entire family went to the United States for a vacation. Upon their return in June
2000, Arnel learned that Fe was telling people that he had impregnated her. Exasperated, Fe started calling
Arnel's wife and family.
Fe followed Arnel to the Capitol Hills Golf and Country Club parking lot to demand that he
acknowledge Martin as his child. According to Arnel, he could not get through Fe and the discussion became
so heated that he had no "alternative but to move on but without bumping or hitting any part of her body."
Finally, Arnel claimed that the signature and the community tax... certificate (CTC) attributed to him
in the acknowledgment of Martin's birth certificate were falsified. Fe and Martin moved for the issuance of an
order directing all the parties to submit themselves to DNA paternity testing
Arnel opposed said motion by invoking his constitutional right against self-incrimination. The trial
court denied the motion to dismiss the complaint and ordered the parties to submit themselves to DNA
paternity testing at the expense of the applicants. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court.
ISSUE: Whether DNA paternity testing can be ordered in a proceeding for support without violating petitioner's
constitutional right to privacy and right against self-incrimination.
RULING: Court upheld the constitutionality of compulsory DNA testing and the admissibility of the results
thereof as evidence.
Historically, it has mostly been in the areas of legality of searches and seizures, and the infringement
of privacy of communication where the constitutional right to privacy has been critically at issue. Petitioner's
case involves neither and, as already stated, his argument that his right against self-incrimination is in
jeopardy holds no water.
DNA testing is so commonly accepted that, in some instances, ordering the procedure has become a
ministerial act.
The growing sophistication of DNA testing technology finally provides a much needed equalizer for
such ostracized and abandoned progeny. We have long believed in the merits of DNA testing and have
repeatedly expressed as much in the past.
 (4) Lopez vs. Hessen

FACTS: On the afternoon of October 15, 1958, in Colfax County, New Mexico, appealee, Heesen, negligently
permitted the rifle to discharge while hunting and that as a proximate result of the joint and concurrent
negligence of both appellees, appellant, Lopez and Sears, sustained a severe and disabling wound and injury to
his chest, requiring hospital and surgical care. Appellant demanded damages in the amount of $55,000
against both appellees, jointly and severally.

Appellee, Heesen, answered denying the allegations of the third amended complaint. Appellee, Sears,
also answered denying the allegations and raising additional affirmative defenses, to-wit: That appellant's
injuries were caused by an unavoidable accident; that the negligence of appellee, Heesen, was the sole cause
thereof; that the rifle involved was of a recognized quality and of proper design and functioned properly by all
commercial sporting arms standards when used with reasonable care; that rifles of this type had been
manufactured by the millions and used by hunters generally and by the government of the United States and
foreign countries; that the safety mechanism and its qualities were patent and obvious, and had been seen and
inspected by Heesen prior to the accident;

Appellant, in the third amended complaint, alleged that the Higgins Model 51 rifle was in a dangerous
and defective condition due to its negligent manufacture, design, assembly or maintenance, in that the safety
mechanism thereof moved readily and in a dangerous manner from "safe" to "fire" position. This is an
allegation of an ultimate issue of fact which the jury had to decide. Here is an issue, the proper understanding
of which by a jury composed of six men and six ladies, requires specialized knowledge or experience and
cannot be determined independently merely from deductions made and inferences drawn on the basis of
ordinary knowledge. The jury was instructed that expert testimony is intended only to assist them in coming to
a correct conclusion upon facts which are of a technical nature, but that the opinion of experts was not
binding upon them and the jury must determine the weight to be given to such testimony.

Appellant introduced evidence tending to prove that the safety device on the Higgins Model 51 rifle is
easy to knock off safety, making the rifle dangerous. Appellant's witness, Frank Doyle, over appellee's, Sears',
objection, expressed the opinion that the safety device, without the telescopic sight, is not a safe piece, in that
the projection is too long and it is too prone to be knocked from "safe" to "fire" position. There is also testimony
of certain tests made with the Higgins Model 51 and the witness, Ira Kessler, expressed the opinion that the
Higgins Model 51 was unsafe without the telescopic sight. Another witness, Robert Allen, testified as to the
manner in which the safety lever of the Higgins Model 51 moved from "safe" to "fire" position without his
knowledge.

Appellee, Sears, introduced testimony of witnesses who were either experts in the small arms field or
experts in gun designing. The witness, Paul A. La Violette, Jr., testified that he is a gun designer employed by
High Standard Manufacturing Company who manufacture the Higgins Model 51 for Sears. He qualified as an
expert gun designer with many years' experience with other rifle manufacturers and in factories designing and
building weapons of the small arms design. La Violette has two gun patents pending. La Violette testified that
the safety device on the Higgins Model 51 is supplied to High Standard Manufacturing Company by
FabriqueNationale of Belgium. He also testified extensively as to the advantages of the safety device of the
Higgins Model 51 and stated that six different makes of guns have the same modified leaf safety device as does
the Higgins Model 51. The manufacturers of these guns are F.N. Mauser, Colt, Marlin, Nato and Weatherby.
The evidence also shows that since 1951, 75,572 Higgins Model 51 rifles with the modified leaf safety device
have been sold by High Standard Manufacturing Company to appellee, Sears. High Standard Manufacturing
Company has never been sued by reason of the design of the Higgins Model 51 rifle. There is also opinion
evidence that the Higgins Model 51 rifle is safe by all commercial sporting goods standards.

ISSUE: Whether or not the expert testimony can be admitted as evidence by the jury?

RULING: YEAH! Appellant's witnesses testified at great length in what respect they considered the safety
mechanism "dangerous," "unsafe," and "defective," and expressed the opinion that the safety mechanism was
not a safe piece and was unsafe without the telescopic sight. Appellees' expert witnesses likewise testified in
great detail as to the safety mechanism and they were of the opinion that the safety mechanism on the Higgins
Model 51 rifle was safe by all commercial sporting goods standards, was suitable for hunting, and was not
negligently or defectively designed. Thus the jury was free to adopt either view and then fix the liability.

Appellant's witnesses testified at great length in what respect they considered the safety mechanism
"dangerous," "unsafe," and "defective," and expressed the opinion that the safety mechanism was not a safe
piece and was unsafe without the telescopic sight. Appellees' expert witnesses likewise testified in great detail
as to the safety mechanism and they were of the opinion that the safety mechanism on the Higgins Model 51
rifle was safe by all commercial sporting goods standards, was suitable for hunting, and was not negligently or
defectively designed. Thus the jury was free to adopt either view and then fix the liability.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in permitting the experts to express their opinion.
 STATE v. BALL
339 S.w2d 783 November 14, 1960
Doctrine: The remoteness of the flight goes to the weight of the evidence rather than to its admissibility.
The mere possession of a quantity of money is in itself no indication that the possessor was the
taker of money charged as taken, because in general all money of the same denomination and material is
alike, and the hypothesis that the money found is the same as the money taken is too forced and
extraordinary to be receivable.

FACTS: A jury has found William Arthur Ball guilty of robbery in the first degree;; the jury also found prior
felony convictions and, therefore, a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment was imposed.
Two colored men, one of them tall and the other short, entered the Krekeler Jewelry Store. The taller
man spent ten or fifteen minutes selecting and buying a cigarette lighter, he also talked about buying and
looked at watches and rings. As the taller man looked at jewelry and made his purchase the shorter man
looked in the cases and moved about in the store. Later in the day, as John Krekeler was placing rings and
watches in the safe preparatory to closing the store two men entered, one of them tall and the other short,
and Krekeler immediately recognized them as the two men who had been in the store earlier, especially the
taller man. He recognized the taller man's narrow-brimmed, tall hat, brown jacket, gray shirt and
particularly a scar on his face. The shorter man started to walk behind the counter and as Krekeler
intercepted him he "drew a long barreled blue .38 and stuck it in my fact."

Both men followed Krekeler, the shorter man with the gun in "his back," directing him to the
watch repair department and finally into the rest room in the rear of the store. He was told not to turn
around and stood facing the wall. He could hear jewelry being dumped into a bag and the "jingle" of the
cash register. The two men left Krekeler in the rest room and after hearing the door slam he called the
police. The two men had taken watches and rings and cash from the register. Krekeler identified the
appellant from pictures, and three weeks later, after his capture, in a hospital and upon the trial
positively identified him as the taller of the two holdup men.

One of appellant's sufficiently preserved claims in his motion for a new trial has to do with his
arrest and the testimony of the two arresting officers. About three weeks after the robbery, police officers
in a squad car saw Ball walking on Easton Avenue. The officers stopped him, told him that they were
officers and that he was under arrest. As officer Powell faced and searched Ball officer Ballard "holstered"
his gun and attempted "to cuff" him. Ball shoved Powell over and ran, the officers ran after him, Powell
being closest. Powell yelled, "halt Ball, you're under arrest," and fired one shot high in the air but Ball
continued running and Powell fired four more shots, two at his legs, one at his buttocks, and he finally
fell from a bullet in his back. It is claimed that this evidence was not material or relevant, that it was too
remote from the date of the robbery to indicate a consciousness of guilt and since it was of course
prejudicial that he is entitled to a new trial. But unexplained flight and resisting arrest even thirty days
after the supposed commission of a crime is a relevant circumstance.

Also, the appellant objects in his motion for a new trial that a police officer was permitted to
testify that $258.02 in currency and two pennies were taken from his person. It is said that the
introduction of these exhibits was "immaterial and irrelevant, neither tended to prove nor disprove any of
the issues involved in this case;; that said money as seized at the time of the arrest was neither identified
by Mr. Krekeler nor by any other person as the money which was allegedly stolen from the A. L. Krekeler
& Sons Jewelry Company on the 15th day of October, 1958;; that said evidence was considered by this
jury to the prejudice of this defendant convincingly."

ISSUES:
1. Whether Ball’s flight from arrest days after the incident is inadmissible for remoteness to the time of
the commission of the crime? – NO.
2. Whether the articles found in Ball’s person at the time of his arrest are inadmissible for being irrelevant
and immaterial? – YES.

RATIO: Unexplained flight and resisting arrest even thirty days after the supposed commission of the
crime is a relevant circumstance. The remoteness of the flight goes to the weight of the evidence rather
than to its admissibility.

The proof of the money here was evidently on the theory that Ball did not have or was not likely to
have such a sum of money on his person prior to the commission of the offense. As to this the facts were
that he had been out of the penitentiary about eight months and the inference the state would draw is
that he had no visible means of support and no employment and could not possibly have $258.02 except
from robberies.
Of course, there was no such proof and Ball claimed that he had worked intermittently for a custodian or
janitor of an apartment house and that he had won the $258.02 in a series of crap games at a named
place. Not only was Krekeler unable to identify the money or any of the items on Ball's person as having
come from the jewelry store so that in fact they were not admissible in evidence, the charge here was that
Ball and his accomplice took jewelry of the value of $4,455.21 and $140 in cash from the cash register.
There was no proof as to the denomination of the money in the cash register, it was simply a total of
$140. Here nineteen days had elapsed, there was no proof that Ball had suddenly come into possession of
the $258.02 and in all these circumstances "The mere possession of a quantity of money is in itself no
indication that the possessor was the taker of money charged as taken, because in general all money of
the same denomination and material is alike, and the hypothesis that the money found is the same as the
money taken is too forced and extraordinary to be receivable."

The admission of the evidence in the circumstances of this record infringed the right to a fair trial
and for that reason the judgment is reversed and the cause remanded.

ANALYSIS:
The money would still be not admissible if the proposed Rules of Evidence were applied, specifically the
rule on admissibility (Sec. 3, Rule 128) and relevance (Sec. 4, Rule 128).
#7. G.R. No. 81561. January 18, 1991.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ANDRE MARTI

Facts:
On August 14, 1987, the appellant and his common-law wife, Shirley Reyes went to Manila Packaging and
Export Forwarders to send packages to Zurich, Switzerland. It was received by Anita Reyes and ask if she
could inspect the packages. Shirley refused and eventually convinced Anita to seal the package making it
ready for shipment. Before being sent out for delivery, Job Reyes, husband of Anita and proprietor of the
courier company, conducted an inspection of the package as part of standard operating procedures. Upon
opening the package, he noticed a suspicious odor which made him took sample of the substance he found
inside. He reported this to the NBI and invited agents to his office to inspect the package. In the presence of
the NBI agents, Job Reyes opened the suspicious package and found dried-marijuana leaves inside. A case was
filed against Andre Marti in violation of R.A. 6425 and was found guilty by the court a quo. Andre filed an
appeal in the Supreme Court claiming that his constitutional right of privacy was violated and that the
evidence acquired from his package was inadmissible as evidence against him.
Issue:
Can the Constitutional Right of Privacy be enforced against private individuals?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held based on the speech of Commissioner Bernas that the Bill of Rights governs the
relationship between the individual and the state.
The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures therefore applies as a restraint directed
only against the government and its agencies tasked with the enforcement of the law. It is not meant to be
invoked against acts of private individuals. It will be recalled that Mr Job Reyes was the one who opened the
box in the presence of the NBI agents in his place of business. The mere presence of the NBI agents did not
convert the reasonable search effected by Mr. Reyes into a warrantless search and seizure proscribed by the
constitution. Merely to observe and look at that which is in plain sight is not a search.
The judgement of conviction finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged was
AFFIRMED.
 #8. Briccio “Ricky” A. Pollo v. Karina Constantino-David, G.R. No. 181881, October 18, 2011
DECISION
(En Banc)

I. THE FACTS

[This case involves a search of office computer assigned to a government employee who was then
charged administratively and was eventually dismissed from the service. The employee’s personal files stored in
the computer were used by the government employer as evidence of his misconduct.]

On January 3, 2007, an anonymous letter-complaint was received by the respondent Civil Service
Commission (CSC) Chairperson alleging that the “chief of the Mamamayan muna hindi mamaya na division” of
Civil Service Commission Regional Office No. IV (CSC-ROIV) has been lawyering for public officials with
pending cases in the CSC. Chairperson David immediately formed a team with background in information
technology and issued a memorandum directing them “to back up all the files in the computers found in the
[CSC-ROIV] Mamamayan Muna (PALD) and Legal divisions.”

The team proceeded at once to the CSC-ROIV office and backed up all files in the hard disk of
computers at the Public Assistance and Liaison Division (PALD) and the Legal Services Division. This was
witnessed by several employees. At around 10:00 p.m. of the same day, the investigating team finished their
task. The next day, all the computers in the PALD were sealed and secured. The diskettes containing the
back-up files sourced from the hard disk of PALD and LSD computers were then turned over to Chairperson
David. It was found that most of the files in the 17 diskettes containing files copied from the computer
assigned to and being used by the petitioner, numbering about 40 to 42 documents, were draft pleadings or
letters in connection with administrative cases in the CSC and other tribunals. Chairperson David thus issued
a Show-Cause Order requiring the petitioner to submit his explanation or counter-affidavit within five days
from notice.

Petitioner filed his Comment, denying that he is the person referred to in the anonymous letter-
complaint. He asserted that he had protested the unlawful taking of his computer done while he was on leave,
citing the letter dated January 8, 2007 in which he informed Director Castillo of CSC-ROIV that the files in his
computer were his personal files and those of his sister, relatives, friends and some associates and that he is
not authorizing their sealing, copying, duplicating and printing as these would violate his constitutional right
to privacy and protection against self-incrimination and warrantless search and seizure. He pointed out that
though government property, the temporary use and ownership of the computer issued under a Memorandum
of Receipt is ceded to the employee who may exercise all attributes of ownership, including its use for personal
purposes. In view of the illegal search, the files/documents copied from his computer without his consent [are]
thus inadmissible as evidence, being “fruits of a poisonous tree.”

The CSC found prima facie case against the petitioner and charged him with Dishonesty, Grave
Misconduct, Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service and Violation of R.A. No. 6713 (Code
of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees). Petitioner then filed an Omnibus Motion
(For Reconsideration, to Dismiss and/or to Defer) assailing the formal charge as without basis having
proceeded from an illegal search, which is beyond the authority of the CSC Chairman, such power pertaining
solely to the court. The CSC denied this omnibus motion.

On March 14, 2007, petitioner filed an Urgent Petition before the Court of Appeals (CA) assailing both
the January 11, 2007 Show-Cause Order and February 26, 2007 Resolution as having been issued with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to excess or total absence of jurisdiction. On July 24, 2007, the CSC issued a
Resolution finding petitioner GUILTY of Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, Conduct Prejudicial to the Best
Interest of the Service and Violation of Republic Act 6713. He is meted the penalty of DISMISSAL FROM
THE SERVICE with all its accessory penalties. This Resolution was also brought to the CA by herein
petitioner.

By a Decision dated October 11, 2007, the CA dismissed the petitioner’s petition for certiorari after
finding no grave abuse of discretion committed by respondents CSC officials. His motion for reconsideration
having been denied by the CA, petitioner brought this appeal before the Supreme Court.

II. THE ISSUE

Was the search conducted on petitioner’s office computer and the copying of his personal files without
his knowledge and consent – alleged as a transgression on his constitutional right to privacy – lawful?

III. THE RULING

[The Supreme Court DENIED the petition and AFFIRMED the CA, which in turn upheld the CSC
resolution dismissing the petitioner from service. The High Tribunal held that the search on petitioner’s office
computer and the copying of his personal files were both LAWFUL and DID NOT VIOLATE his constitutional
right to privacy.]

The right to privacy has been accorded recognition in this jurisdiction as a facet of the right protected
by the guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure under Section 2, Article III of the 1987
Constitution. The constitutional guarantee is not a prohibition of all searches and seizures but only of
“unreasonable” searches and seizures.

[The Supreme Court then discussed the American cases that served as jurisprudential bases for its
ruling:

That the Fourth Amendment [of the U.S. Constitution] equally applies to a government workplace was
addressed in the 1987 case of O’Connor v. Ortega. In O’Connor the [U.S. Supreme] Court recognized that
“special needs” authorize warrantless searches involving public employees for work-related reasons. The [U.S.
Supreme] Court thus laid down a balancing test under which government interests are weighed against the
employee’s reasonable expectation of privacy. This reasonableness test implicates neither probable cause nor
the warrant requirement, which are related to law enforcement.

O’Connor was applied in subsequent cases raising issues on employees’ privacy rights in the
workplace. One of these cases involved a government employer’s search of an office computer, United States
v. Mark L. Simons where the defendant Simons, an employee of a division of the Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA), was convicted of receiving and possessing materials containing child pornography. In this case, the US
Supreme Court held that the search remains valid under the O’Connor exception to the warrant requirement
because evidence of the crime was discovered in the course of an otherwise proper administrative
inspection. Simons’ violation of the agency’s Internet policy happened also to be a violation of criminal law; this
does not mean that said employer lost the capacity and interests of an employer. The warrantless entry into
Simons’ office was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment standard announced in O’Connor because at the
inception of the search, the employer had “reasonable grounds for suspecting” that the hard drive would yield
evidence of misconduct, as the employer was already aware that Simons had misused his Internet access to
download over a thousand pornographic images. The retrieval of the hard drive was reasonably related to the
objective of the search, and the search was not excessively intrusive. Thus, while Simons had a reasonable
expectation of privacy in his office, he did not have such legitimate expectation of privacy with regard to the files
in his computer.]

Applying the analysis and principles announced in O’Connor and Simons to the case at bar, we now
address the following questions: (1) Did petitioner have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his office and
computer files?; and (2) Was the search authorized by the CSC Chair, [which involved] the copying of the
contents of the hard drive on petitioner’s computer, reasonable in its inception and scope?

(1) NO, the petitioner had no reasonable expectation of privacy in his office and computer files.

Petitioner failed to prove that he had an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy either in his office or
government-issued computer which contained his personal files. Petitioner did not allege that he had a
separate enclosed office which he did not share with anyone, or that his office was always locked and not open
to other employees or visitors. Neither did he allege that he used passwords or adopted any means to prevent
other employees from accessing his computer files. On the contrary, he submits that being in the public
assistance office of the CSC-ROIV, he normally would have visitors in his office like friends, associates and
even unknown people, whom he even allowed to use his computer which to him seemed a trivial request. He
described his office as “full of people, his friends, unknown people” and that in the past 22 years he had been
discharging his functions at the PALD, he is “personally assisting incoming clients, receiving documents,
drafting cases on appeals, in charge of accomplishment report, Mamamayan Muna Program, Public Sector
Unionism, Correction of name, accreditation of service, and hardly had any time for himself alone, that in fact
he stays in the office as a paying customer.” Under this scenario, it can hardly be deduced that petitioner had
such expectation of privacy that society would recognize as reasonable.

Moreover, even assuming arguendo, in the absence of allegation or proof of the aforementioned factual
circumstances, that petitioner had at least a subjective expectation of privacy in his computer as he claims,
such is negated by the presence of policy regulating the use of office computers [CSC Office Memorandum No.
10, S. 2002 “Computer Use Policy (CUP)”], as in Simons. The CSC in this case had implemented a policy that
put its employees on notice that they have no expectation of privacy in anything they create, store, send or
receive on the office computers, and that the CSC may monitor the use of the computer resources using both
automated or human means. This implies that on-the-spot inspections may be done to ensure that the
computer resources were used only for such legitimate business purposes.

(2) YES, the search authorized by the respondent CSC Chair, which involved the copying of the
contents of the hard drive on petitioner’s computer, was reasonable in its inception and scope.

The search of petitioner’s computer files was conducted in connection with investigation of work-
related misconduct prompted by an anonymous letter-complaint addressed to Chairperson David regarding
anomalies in the CSC-ROIV where the head of the Mamamayan Muna Hindi Mamaya Na division is supposedly
“lawyering” for individuals with pending cases in the CSC. A search by a government employer of an
employee’s office is justified at inception when there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that it will turn
up evidence that the employee is guilty of work-related misconduct.

Under the facts obtaining, the search conducted on petitioner’s computer was justified at its inception
and scope. We quote with approval the CSC’s discussion on the reasonableness of its actions, consistent as it
were with the guidelines established by O’Connor:

Even conceding for a moment that there is no such administrative policy, there is no doubt in the
mind of the Commission that the search of Pollo’s computer has successfully passed the test of reasonableness
for warrantless searches in the workplace as enunciated in the above-discussed American authorities. It bears
emphasis that the Commission pursued the search in its capacity as a government employer and that it
was undertaken in connection with an investigation involving a work-related misconduct, one of the
circumstances exempted from the warrant requirement. At the inception of the search, a complaint was
received recounting that a certain division chief in the CSCRO No. IV was “lawyering” for parties having
pending cases with the said regional office or in the Commission. The nature of the imputation was serious,
as it was grievously disturbing. If, indeed, a CSC employee was found to be furtively engaged in the practice
of “lawyering” for parties with pending cases before the Commission would be a highly repugnant scenario,
then such a case would have shattering repercussions. It would undeniably cast clouds of doubt upon the
institutional integrity of the Commission as a quasi-judicial agency, and in the process, render it less effective
in fulfilling its mandate as an impartial and objective dispenser of administrative justice. It is settled that a
court or an administrative tribunal must not only be actually impartial but must be seen to be so, otherwise
the general public would not have any trust and confidence in it.

Considering the damaging nature of the accusation, the Commission had to act fast, if only to
arrest or limit any possible adverse consequence or fall-out. Thus, on the same date that the complaint was
received, a search was forthwith conducted involving the computer resources in the concerned regional
office. That it was the computers that were subjected to the search was justified since these furnished
the easiest means for an employee to encode and store documents. Indeed, the computers would be a
likely starting point in ferreting out incriminating evidence. Concomitantly, the ephemeral nature of
computer files, that is, they could easily be destroyed at a click of a button, necessitated drastic and
immediate action. Pointedly, to impose the need to comply with the probable cause requirement would
invariably defeat the purpose of the wok-related investigation.

Thus, petitioner’s claim of violation of his constitutional right to privacy must necessarily fail. His
other argument invoking the privacy of communication and correspondence under Section 3(1), Article III of
the 1987 Constitution is also untenable considering the recognition accorded to certain legitimate intrusions
into the privacy of employees in the government workplace under the aforecited authorities. We likewise find
no merit in his contention that O’Connor and Simons are not relevant because the present case does not
involve a criminal offense like child pornography. As already mentioned, the search of petitioner’s computer
was justified there being reasonable ground for suspecting that the files stored therein would yield
incriminating evidence relevant to the investigation being conducted by CSC as government employer
of such misconduct subject of the anonymous complaint. This situation clearly falls under the exception
to the warrantless requirement in administrative searches defined in O’Connor.
 GAANAN v. IAC
G.R. No. L-69809 October 16, 1986

Doctrine: The phrase "device or arrangement" in Section 1 of RA No. 4200, although not exclusive to that
enumerated therein, should be construed to comprehend instruments of the same or similar nature, that is,
instruments the use of which would be tantamount to tapping the main line of a telephone. It refers to
instruments whose installation or presence cannot be presumed by the party or parties being overheard
because, by their very nature, they are not of common usage and their purpose is precisely for tapping,
intercepting or recording a telephone conversation.

FACTS: This petition for certiorari asks for an interpretation of Republic Act (RA) No. 4200, otherwise
known as the Anti-Wiretapping Act, on the issue of whether or not an extension telephone is among the
prohibited devices in Section 1 of the Act, such that its use to overhear a private conversation would
constitute unlawful interception of communications between the two parties using a telephone line.

Complainant Atty. Tito Pintor and his client Manuel Montebon were in the living room of
complainant's residence discussing the terms for the withdrawal of the complaint for direct assault which
they filed against Leonardo Laconico. After they had decided on the proposed conditions, complainant
made a telephone call to Laconico.

That same morning, Laconico telephoned appellant, who is a lawyer, to come to his office and
advise him on the settlement of the direct assault case because his regular lawyer, Atty. Leon Gonzaga,
went on a business trip. According to the request, appellant went to the office of Laconico where he was
briefed about the problem.

When complainant called up, Laconico requested appellant to secretly listen to the telephone
conversation through a telephone extension so as to hear personally the proposed conditions for the
settlement. Appellant heard complainant enumerate the following conditions for withdrawal of the
complaint for direct assault.

Appellant executed on the following day an affidavit stating that he heard complainant demand
P8,000.00 for the withdrawal of the case for direct assault. Laconico attached the affidavit of appellant to
the complainant for robbery/extortion which he filed against complainant. Since appellant listened to the
telephone conversation without complainant's consent, complainant charged appellant and Laconico with
violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Act.

After trial on the merits, the lower court, found both Gaanan and Laconico guilty of violating
Section 1 of Republic Act No. 4200. The two were each sentenced to one (1) year imprisonment with costs.
Not satisfied with the decision, the petitioner appealed to the appellate court, which affirmed the decision
of the trial court, holding that the communication between the complainant and accused Laconico was
private in nature and, therefore, covered by Rep. Act No. 4200;; that the petitioner overheard such
communication without the knowledge and consent of the complainant;; and that the extension telephone
which was used by the petitioner to overhear the telephone conversation between complainant and
Laconico is covered in the term "device' as provided in Rep. Act No. 4200.

ISSUE:
1. Whether an extension telephone is a prohibited device? – NO.

RATIO: The petitioner contends that telephones or extension telephones are not included in the
enumeration of "commonly known" listening or recording devices, nor do they belong to the same class of
enumerated electronic devices contemplated by law. He maintains that in 1964, when Senate Bill No. 9
(later Rep. Act No. 4200) was being considered in the Senate, telephones and extension telephones were
already widely used instruments, probably the most popularly known communication device.

Whether or not listening over a telephone party line would be punishable was discussed on the floor of the
Senate. Yet, when the bill was finalized into a statute, no mention was made of telephones in the
enumeration of devices "commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph, detectaphone or walkie talkie or
tape recorder or however otherwise described." The omission was not a mere oversight. Telephone party
lines were intentionally deleted from the provisions of the Act.
 The respondent People argue that an extension telephone is embraced and covered by the term
"device" within the context of the aforementioned law because it is not a part or portion of a complete set
of a telephone apparatus. It is a separate device and distinct set of a movable apparatus consisting of a
wire and a set of telephone receiver not forming part of a main telephone set which can be detached or
removed and can be transferred away from one place to another and to be plugged or attached to a main
telephone line to get the desired communication corning from the other party or end.

The law refers to a "tap" of a wire or cable or the use of a "device or arrangement" for the purpose
of secretly overhearing, intercepting, or recording the communication. There must be either a physical
interruption through a wiretap or the deliberate installation of a device or arrangement in order to
overhear, intercept, or record the spoken words.

An extension telephone cannot be placed in the same category as a dictaphone, dictagraph or the
other devices enumerated in Section 1 of RA No. 4200 as the use thereof cannot be considered as
"tapping" the wire or cable of a telephone line. The telephone extension in this case was not installed for
that purpose. It just happened to be there for ordinary office use. It is a rule in statutory construction
that in order to determine the true intent of the legislature, the particular clauses and phrases of the
statute should not be taken as detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and every part thereof
must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts.

Hence, the phrase "device or arrangement" in Section 1 of RA No. 4200, although not exclusive to
that enumerated therein, should be construed to comprehend instruments of the same or similar nature,
that is, instruments the use of which would be tantamount to tapping the main line of a telephone. It
refers to instruments whose installation or presence cannot be presumed by the party or parties being
overheard because, by their very nature, they are not of common usage and their purpose is precisely for
tapping, intercepting or recording a telephone conversation.

ANALYSIS:
The case is an example where evidence is excluded virtue statutory rule of exclusion, as Section 4 of the
Anti-Wiretapping Act provides. This rule of exclusion will not be affected nor was incorporated in the
proposed rules of evidence, it being sufficient that the rules refer to Statutes as sources of rules of
exclusion.
 SALCEDO-ORTANEZ v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 110662 August 4, 1994
Doctrine: Tape recordings made absent the consent of both parties to the conversation or communication is
held inadmissible under Section 4 of the Anti-Wiretapping Law.

FACTS: Private respondent Rafael S. Ortanez filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a complaint for
annulment of marriage with damages against petitioner Teresita Salcedo-Ortanez, on grounds of lack of
marriage license and/or psychological incapacity of the petitioner. Private respondent, after presenting his
evidence, orally formally offered in evidence Exhibits "A" to "M". Among the exhibits offered by private
respondent were three (3) cassette tapes of alleged telephone conversations between petitioner and unidentified
persons.

Petitioner submitted her Objection/Comment to private respondent's oral offer of evidence which
the trial court admitted all of private respondent's offered evidence. The trial court issued the assailed
order admitting all of the evidence offered by private respondent, including tape recordings of telephone
conversations of petitioner with unidentified persons. These tape recordings were made and obtained
when private respondent allowed his friends from the military to wire tap his home telephone.

ISSUE:
1. Whether the tape recordings are admissible as evidence? –NO.

RATIO: Tape recordings are not inadmissible per se. They and any other variant thereof can be admitted
in evidence for certain purposes, depending on how they are presented and offered and on how the trial
judge utilizes them in the interest of truth and fairness and the even handed administration of justice.
The Anti-Wiretapping Law expressly makes such tape recordings inadmissible in evidence. The relevant
provisions of Rep. Act No. 4200 are as follows:

“Sec. l. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any
private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other
device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or
spoken word by using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or
detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape-recorder, or however otherwise described. . .

Sec. 4. Any communication or spoken word, or the existence, contents, substance,

purport, or meaning of the same or any part thereof, or any information therein
contained, obtained or secured by any person in violation of the preceding sections of this
Act shall not be admissible in evidence in any judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative or
administrative hearing or investigation.”

Clearly, the lower courts failed to consider the afore-quoted provisions of the law in admitting in
evidence the cassette tapes in question. Absent a clear showing that both parties to the telephone
conversations allowed the recording of the same, the inadmissibility of the subject tapes is mandatory
under Rep. Act No. 4200.

ANALYSIS:
The case is another example where evidence is excluded virtue of the statutory rule of exclusion under
Section 4 of the Anti-Wiretapping Law. This rule of exclusion will not be affected nor was incorporated in
the proposed rules of evidence, it being sufficient that the rules refer to Statutes as sources of rules of
exclusion.
 RAMIREZ v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 93833 September 28, 1995

Doctrine: Violation of Anti- Wiretapping Law may be committed by a party to a private conversation or
communication (not necessarily by a third party) by which the other party’s consent was not obtained in the
process. Absent such consent, then such recording will be held inadmissible as evidence. Moreover, private
communications as protected by the Anti-Wiretapping Law, includes private conversations.

FACTS: A civil case damages was filed by petitioner Socorro D. Ramirez in the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City alleging that the private respondent, Ester S. Garcia, in a confrontation in the latter's office,
allegedly vexed, insulted and humiliated her in a "hostile and furious mood" and in a manner offensive to
petitioner's dignity and personality," contrary to morals, good customs and public policy. In support of
her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the event. The transcript on which the civil case
was based was culled from a tape recording of the confrontation made by petitioner.

As a result of petitioner's recording of the event and alleging that the said act of secretly taping
the confrontation was illegal, private respondent filed a criminal case before the Regional Trial Court of
Pasay City for violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Law. Petitioner vigorously argues, as her "main and
principal issue" that the applicable provision in the law does not apply to the taping of a private
conversation by one of the parties to the conversation. She contends that the provision merely refers to
the unauthorized taping of a private conversation by a party other than those involved in the
communication, i.e. a third party. In relation to this, petitioner avers that the substance or content of the
conversation must be alleged in the Information, otherwise the facts charged would not constitute a
violation of R.A. 4200. Finally, petitioner argues that R.A. 4200 penalizes the taping of a "private
communication," not a "private conversation" and that consequently, her act of secretly taping her
conversation with private respondent was not illegal under the said act.

ISSUE:
1. Whether the tape recordings are admissible in evidence? – NO.
2. Whether there was a violation of RA4200? – YES.

RATIO: Section 1 of R.A. 4200 entitled, "An Act to Prohibit and Penalized Wire Tapping and Other Related
Violations of Private Communication and Other Purposes," provides:

Sec. 1. It shall be unlawfull for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any
private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other
device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or
spoken word by using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or
detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or however otherwise described.

The aforestated provision clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for any person, not authorized
by all the parties to any private communication to secretly record such communication by means of a
tape recorder. The law makes no distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized by the statute
ought to be a party other than or different from those involved in the private communication. The
statute's intent to penalize all persons unauthorized to make such recording is underscored by the use of
the qualifier "any". Consequently, as respondent Court of Appeals correctly concluded, "even a (person)
privy to a communication who records his private conversation with another without the knowledge of the
latter (will) qualify as a violator" under this provision of R.A. 4200.

In addition, a perusal of the Senate Congressional Records, supports the respondent court's
conclusion that in enacting R.A. 4200 our lawmakers indeed contemplated to make illegal, unauthorized
tape recording of private conversations or communications taken either by the parties themselves or by
third persons.

Finally, petitioner's contention that the phrase "private communication" in Section 1 of R.A. 4200
does not include "private conversations" narrows the ordinary meaning of the word "communication" to a
point of absurdity. The word communicate comes from the latin word communicare, meaning "to share or
to impart." In its ordinary signification, communication connotes the act of sharing or imparting
signification, communication connotes the act of sharing or imparting, as in a conversation, or signifies
the "process by which meanings or thoughts are shared between individuals through a common system of
symbols (as language signs or gestures)" These definitions are broad enough to include verbal or non-
verbal, written or expressive communications of "meanings or thoughts" which are likely to include the
emotionally-charged exchange between petitioner and private respondent, in the privacy of the latter's
office. Any doubts about the legislative body's meaning of the phrase "private communication" are,
furthermore, put to rest by the fact that the terms "conversation" and "communication" were
interchangeably used by Senator Tañada in his Explanatory Note to the bill.

ANALYSIS:
The case is another example where evidence is excluded virtue of the statutory rule of exclusion under
Section 4 of the Anti-Wiretapping Law. This rule of exclusion will not be affected nor was incorporated in
the proposed rules of evidence, it being sufficient that the rules refer to Statutes as sources of rules of
exclusion.
 CITY OF MANILA v. GARCIA
G.R. No. L-26053 February 21, 1967

Doctrine: All courts must take judicial notice of ordinances falling or applicable within the parameters of
their respective jurisdiction.

FACTS: Plaintiff City of Manila owns of parcels of land, forming one compact area, bordering Kansas,
Vermont & Singalong streets in Malate, and covered by Torrens Titles Nos. 49763, 37082 & 37558.

Shortly after liberation from 1945 to 1947, defendants entered upon these premises without plaintiff's
knowledge and consent. They built houses of second-class materials, again without plaintiff's knowledge
and consent, and without the necessary building permits from the city. There they lived thru the years to the
present.

Epifanio de los Santos Elementary School is close, though not contiguous, to the said property.
Came the need for this school's expansion became pressing. Plaintiff's City Engineer, pursuant to the
Mayor's directive to clear squatters' houses on city property, gave each of defendants thirty (30) days to
vacate and remove his construction or improvement on the premises. This was followed by the City
Treasurer's demand on each defendant was made and demand for the payment of the amount due by
reason of the occupancy and to vacate in fifteen (15) days. Defendants refused. Hence, this suit to recover
possession.

The city's evidence on this point is Exhibit E, the certification of the Chairman, Committee on
Appropriations of the Municipal Board. That document recites that the amount of P100,000.00 had been
set aside in Ordinance 4566, the 1962-1963 Manila City Budget, for the construction of an additional
building of the Epifanio de los Santos Elementary School. It is indeed correct to say that the court below,
at the hearing, ruled out the admissibility of said document. But then, in the decision under review, the
trial judge obviously revised his views. He there declared that there was need for defendants to vacate the
premises for school expansion;; he cited the very document, Exhibit E.

ISSUE:
1. Whether Exhibit E is admissible as evidence? – YES.
2. Whether the City Of Manila is entitled to said land? –YES.

RATIO: Exhibit E, as evidence, is admissible as evidence. The trial judge was duty bound to take —
judicial notice of Ordinance 4566. The reason being that the city charter of Manila requires all courts
sitting therein to take judicial notice of all ordinances passed by the municipal board of Manila. And,
Ordinance 4566 itself confirms the certification aforesaid that an appropriation of P100,000.00 was set
aside for the "construction of additional building" of the Epifanio de los Santos Elementary School.

Defendants have absolutely no right to remain in the premises. The excuse that they have
permits from the mayor is at best flimsy. The permits to occupy are recoverable on thirty days' notice.
They have been asked to leave;; they refused to heed. It is in this factual background that we say that the
city's need for the premises is unimportant. The city's right to throw defendants out of the area cannot be
gainsaid. The city's dominical right to possession is paramount. If error there was in the finding that the
city needs the land, such error is harmless and will not justify reversal of the judgment below.

ANALYSIS:
The case was properly decided under the current rules of evidence under judicial notice. Judicial notice
deals with matters which need not be proved in court while admitting the same as evidence in court. In
the case at bar, the court had the right to take judicial notice over Exhibit C in lieu of the Ordinance
which expressly ordered that all the courts sitting should take judicial notice of all the ordinances passed.
Under the proposed rules of evidence, the case would have been decided the same way since the changes
made only specified and improved the wording under Section l of Judicial Notice, when mandatory,”…the
official acts of the legislative, executive and judicial departments of the GOVERNMENT OF THE
Philippines…”
 BAGUIO v. VDA. DE JALAGAT
G.R. No. L-28100 November 29, 1971

Doctrine: Courts may take judicial notice of the previous cases decided with finality of a judgment in a case
previously pending and decided by it.

FACTS: The case started with the complaint for the quieting of title to real property filed by plaintiff, now
appellant, Gabriel Baguio. A motion to dismiss filed by defendants, now appellees, on the ground that the
cause of action is barred by a prior judgment. This was the argument advanced: "The instant complaint or
case, besides being clearly unfounded and malicious, is identical to or the same as that Civil Case No.

1574 filed by the same plaintiff and against Melecio alias Mening Jalagat, now deceased and whose legal
heirs and successors in interest are the very defendants in the instant complaint for 'Recovery of
Possession and Ownership of Real Estate' and entitled Gabriel Baguio, plaintiff, versus Melecio alias
Mening Jalagat, defendant, involving practically the same property and practically the same parties as
defendants are the widow and the children, respectively, thus the legal or forced heirs of the deceased
Melecio Jalagat. That the said case, which is identical to or is the same case as the instant one, has
already been duly and finally terminated as could be clear from [an] order of this Honorable Court. There
was an opposition on the part of plaintiff made on the ground that for prior judgment or res judicata to
suffice as a basis for dismissal it must be apparent on the face of the complaint.

ISSUE:
1. Whether a lower court may take judicial notice of such previous case decided by him resulting in the
judgment relied upon? – YES.

RATIO: The law would lend itself to a well-deserved reproach if the Rules of Court would sanction such a
proceeding distinguished by nothing but its futility. It ought to be clear even to appellant that under the
circumstances, the lower court certainly could take judicial notice of the finality of a judgment in a case
that was previously pending and thereafter decided by it. That was all that was done by the lower court in
decreeing the dismissal. Certainly such an order is not contrary to law. A citation from the comments of
former Chief Justice Moran is relevant. Thus: "Courts have also taken judicial notice of previous cases to
determine whether or not the case pending is a moot one, or whether or not a previous ruling is
applicable in the case under consideration."

In addition, appellant undoubtedly had recourse to a remedy which under the law then in force
could be availed of. It would have served the cause of justice better, not to mention the avoidance of
needless expense on his part and the vexation to which appellees were subjected if he did reflect a little
more on the matter. Then the valuable time of this Tribunal would not have been frittered away on a
useless find hopeless appeal. It has, ever been the guiding principle from Alonso v. Villamor, that a litigant
should not be allowed to worship at the altar of technicality. That is not to dispense justice according to
law. Parties, and much more so their counsel, should ever keep such an imperative of our legal system in
mind.

Teehankee Concurring;; The lower court properly took judicial notice of the case resolved by it
wherein admittedly the same lower court dismissed an identical complaint filed over the same property by
the same plantiff against the same defendants (who are the legal or forced heirs of the now deceased
Melecio Jalagat, defendant in the prior case). Such judicial notice taken by the lower court is sanctioned
under Rule 129, section 1. It in effect supplants the evidence on motion that Rule 133, section 7 Rule
133, section 7, which provides that "(W)hen a motion is based on facts not appearing of record the court
may hear the matter on affidavits or depositions presented by the respective parties, but the court may
direct that the matter be heard wholly or partly on oral testimony or depositions." When the ground of the
dismissal motion is, a prior judgment rendered by the same court — a fact known to the court and to the
parties as well, as in the case at bar — the taking of judicial notice of said prior judgment by the same
court constitutes the very evidence needed to dispose of the dismissal motion.

ANALYSIS:
The case was properly decided under the current rules of evidence in that the court appropriately took
judicial notice of the case since it was capable of unquestionable demonstration in dealing with the said
case considering that it dealt with a previous case related to the one in the case at bar. There is no
change in the proposed rules.
 PRIETO v. ARROYO
G.R. No. L-17885 June 30, 1965
Doctrine: The general rule is that courts are not authorized to take judicial notice in the adjudication of cases pending before them, of the contents of other cases, even w

FACTS: Zeferino Arroyo, Sr. filed a petition for registration of several parcels of land. After the proper
proceedings covering said lot, the same was issued in his name. In the same year and in the same Court,
Gabriel P. Prieto filed a petition for registration of an adjoining parcel of land, and as a result an Original
Certificate of Title was issued in his name as well. After the death of Zeferino Arroyo, Sr., his OCT was
cancelled and in lieu thereof a TCT was issued in the names of his heirs, the defendants in this case, all
surnamed Arroyo. The heirs filed a case in which they claimed that the technical description set forth in
their transfer certificate of title and in the original certificate of their predecessor did not conform with that
embodied in the decision of the land registration court, and was less in area by some 157 square meters.
They therefore prayed that said description be corrected pursuant to Section 112 of the Land Registration
Act;; that their certificate of title be cancelled and another one issued to them containing the correct
technical description. The court issued an order directing the Register of Deeds to "change, upon payment of
his fees, the description in the TCT so as to make it conform to that embodied in the decision of the Court
and to correct therein the spelling of the name of one of the petitioners from 'Miden Arroyo' to 'Meden
Arroyo'.

On the other hand, Prieto filed against the defendants a petition to annul the order wherein at the
hearing of the petition neither he nor his counsel appeared. Consequently, the trial court on the same day
issued an order dismissing the petition for failure to prosecute. Consequently, Prieto filed against the
same defendants the present action for annulment and that he also prayed that the 157 square meters
allegedly taken from his lot by virtue of said order be reconveyed to him. Defendants moved to dismiss the
complaint on the ground of res judicata. Plaintiff opposed, and the court granted the motion. It is from the
order of dismissal, plaintiff having failed to secure its reconsideration, that the appeal has been taken.
Appellant contends that said order could not have the effect of a judgment because the Court did not
acquire jurisdiction over the persons of the respondents therein, defendants-appellees here, as they did
not file any opposition or responsive pleading in that case. Appellees, on the other hand, allege that they
had voluntarily submitted to the court's jurisdiction after they were served copies of the petition.

ISSUE:
1. Whether it was proper to dismiss the complaint on res adjudicata? – YES.

RATIO: In the first place, as a general rule, courts are not authorized to take judicial notice in the
adjudication of cases pending before them, of the contents of other cases, even when such cases have
been tried or are pending in the same court, and notwithstanding the fact that both cases may have been
tried or are actually pending before the same judge. Secondly, if appellant had really wanted the court to
take judicial notice of such records, he should have presented the proper request or manifestation to that
effect instead of sending, by counsel, a telegraphic motion for postponement of hearing, which the court
correctly denied. Finally, the point raised by counsel is now academic, as no appeal was taken from the
order dismissing his first petition, and said order had long become final when the complaint in the
present action was filed. In addition, the contention that the causes of action in the two suits are different
is untenable. Both are based on the alleged nullity of Special Proceedings;; in both appellant seeks that
the order of correction of the title of appellees be set aside. Of no material significance is the fact that in
the complaint in the instant case there is an express prayer for reconveyance of some 157 square meters
of land, taken from appellant as a result of such correction of title. There being identity of parties, subject
matter and cause of action between the two cases, the order of dismissal issued in the first constitutes a
bar to the institution of the second.

ANALYSIS:
The case was properly decided under the current rules of evidence under Section 3 where hearing
necessary for the court to take judicial notice. The current law provides that when the parties would want
the court to take judicial notice of matters relevant to the case then they may announce such intention
and be heard thereon. In the case at bar, there was a failure to request or announce such intention.
Under the proposed rules of evidence, this case would have been decided in the same way since the
changes made were clarifications in the application of the current rules in its wording in that the
announcement or request for the court to take judicial notice should be done during the pre-trial or trial
by the court on its own initiative or by motion by the parties.
 YAO-KEE v. SY-GONZALES
167 SCRA 736 November 24, 1988

Doctrine: Philippine courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws, it must be alleged and proved as any
other fact.

FACTS: Sy Kiat, a Chinese national, died intestate, leaving real and personal properties in the
Philippines. The deceased had two families: first with his common law wife Asuncion Gillego and
petitioner Yao Kee, a Chinese National. A petition for the grant of letters of administration was filed by
respondents, children of Gillego. In said the petition, they alleged that they are the heirs of the deceased
and they do not recognize the marriage of the deceased to the Yao Kee nor the filiation of the children to
the deceased.

Yao Kee and her children, the petitioners, opposed the grant of the letters of administration. The
petitioners allege that Yao Kee is the lawful wife of the deceased and that they are legitimate children. As
proof of the marriage petitioners presented the testimony of Yao Kee, her younger brother Gan Ching, the
statements made by Gillego herself that the marriage was in accordance with chinese custom, the
certificate of alien registration and lastly a certification issued by the Chinese embassy that Yao Kee and
Sy Kiat were married in China. The Probate Court found that Yao Kee was lawfully married to the
deceased and the children are legitimate. On the other hand, the respondents are illegitimate. The court
appointed Sze Sook Wah, eldest of the petitioners as administrator. The Court of Appeals set aside the
judgment and declared all the children as acknowledged natural children. However, the appellate court
held that Yao Kee cannot be declared the lawful wife since the marriage had not been proven to be valid in
accordance with Chinese law.

ISSUE:
1. Whether the marriage of Yao Kee to the deceased had been conclusively proven? – NO.
2. Whether foreign law may be taken as judicial notice? – NO.

RATIO: The evidence presented by the petitioners may very well prove the fact of marriage between Yao
Kee and Sy Kiat. However, the same do not suffice to establish the validity of said marriage in accordance
with Chinese law or custom.

To establish a valid foreign marriage two things must be proven: 1. The existence of foreign law as
a question of fact and 2. The alleged foreign evidence by convincing evidence. Here, the petitioners failed
to discharge the burden of proving the validity of the foreign marriage. Moreover, the courts cannot take
judicial notice of foreign law. Foreign law is a question of fact and must be alleged and proved as any
other fact.Thus, in the absence of foreign law, Philippine law shall govern the resolution of the case. Here,
since Yao Kee herself admitted that there was no solemnizing officer, as understood in the Philippines,
when the marriage was celebrated such marriage cannot be recognized here.

ANALYSIS:
The case was properly decided according to the current and proposed rules of evidence. Changes made
under the proposed rules of evidence did not affect the doctrine of this case.
 TABUENA v. COURT OF APPEALS
196 SCRA 650 May 6, 1991

Doctrine: In the adjudication of a case, a court is not authorized to take judicial notice of the contents of the
record of another case except: 1. When in the absence of objection, with the knowledge of the opposing
party, said other case is clearly referred to in a pending action and adopted and read into the record of the
latter, 2. When the original record of the other case is actually withdrawn and admitted as part of the record
of the pending case.

FACTS: In 1926, Juan Peralta sold to Alfredo Tabernilla a parcel of land. Tabernilla allowed Peralta’s
mother, Damasa Timtiman to stay on the land, which she did until she died. Following the death of
Timtiman, her son and half brother of Peralta petitioner Tabuena took possession of the lot claiming to be
the absolute owner through inheritance. Tabuena refused to surrender the property to Tabernilla.

Respondent Emiliano Tabernilla, heir of Alfredo filed a complaint to recover the property. The trial
court ordered Tabuena to vacate the lot.The Court of appeals affirmed and upheld the use of the trial
court of testimony of Tabuena given in an earlier case to bolster its findings.

ISSUE:
1. Whether it was proper for the court to take judicial notice of testimony in a previous case with the
same court? – NO.

RATIO: As a general rule, courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of the contents of the records
of other cases, even when such cases have been tried or are pending in the same court, and whether
pending before the same judge. Nevertheless, the court may take judicial notice of records of other cases
only when, in the absence of objection, with the knowledge of the opposing party or at the request or with
the consent of both parties, the case is clearly referred to or the original of the records are withdrawn
from the archives and admitted as part of the records of the pending case.

Here, the court erred since Tabuena was unaware that his testimony in a previous case was being
considered in the present case. The justification of the appellate court in admitting the records is that
such was merely corroborative. However, the evidence which the record is sought to be corroborative is in
itself inadmissible because they were not formally offered into evidence: a letter stating payment of 600
pesos, a Spanish document and a deed of conveyance executed by Tabernilla and Timtiman.

Thus, the Supreme Court here reversed and dismissed the case for recovery of property for failure
of plaintiff-respondents to substantiate their allegations.

ANALYSIS:
The case was properly decided under the current and proposed rules of evidence. The changes in the
proposed rules did not affect the doctrine of this case.
 PEOPLE v. GODOY
250 SCRA 676 December 6, 1995

Doctrine: The Court takes judicial cognizance of the fact that in rural areas in the Philippines, young ladies
are strictly required to act with circumspection and prudence. Great caution is observed so that their
reputations shall remain untainted. Any breath of scandal which brings dishonor to their character
humiliates their entire families.

FACTS: This is an automatic review of the decision of the RTC in view of the death sentence imposed
upon Danny Godoy, who was charged in two separate informations with rape and another for kidnapping
with serious illegal detention.

Complainant Mia Taha alleged that Godoy, her Physics Teacher and a married man raped her first
on Jan. 2l, l994 in her cousin‘s boarding house wherein upon entering the back door, Godoy
pointed a knife at her. As Godoy removed her panties and brought out his penis to rape her, a knife was
pointed at her neck. As such, she was not able to resist. The next day, Godoy came by their house and
asked the permission of her parents if she can join him in soliciting funds, since Mia was a candidate for
Ms. Palawan National School (PNS). Mia‘s parents allowed her to go with Godoy and she was allegedly
brought to the Sunset Garden Motel where she was repeatedly raped again. After three days, they
transferred to Edward‘s subdivision where she was kept in a lodging house and was again raped.

During this time, a police blotter had already been placed for the missing Mia. She was later
released by Godoy after a certain Naem interceded and only after her parents agreed to settle the case. It
was after Mia‘s return that her parents accompanied her to a medico-legal which found lacerations in her
vagina concluding that —she just had sexual intercourse. She and her mother Helen went to the police and
executed sworn statements stating that the accused Godoy had raped and abducted Mia.
Godoy denied that he raped Mia Taha. He admitted having had sex with her and that they indeed
stayed in Sunset Gardens and in Edward‘s Subdivision, but it was because they were lovers and that Mia
had consented to their having sex. To support his claim that they were lovers, he presented two letters
supposedly delivered to him in the provincial jail while he was detained by Mia‘s cousin Lorna. There Mia
explained that it was her parents who forced her to testify against him.

The delivery of the letter was denied by Lorna but the defense presented the provincial jail guard
on duty on the supposed date of the delivery and testified that indeed Lorna had visited Godoy on said
date. Several witnesses were also presented including two former teachers of Mia who knew the
handwriting on the two said letters as belonging to Mia having been their former student and where thus
familiar with her handwriting particularly those made in her test papers. Other witnesses were presented
by the defense attesting that they saw the two together in a manner that was affectionate and cordial,
prior to the said —kidnapping and even during such.

ISSUE:
1. Whether the guilt of the accused was proven beyond reasonable doubt? – NO.

RATIO: There are three guiding principles that guide an appellate court in the reviewing evidence
presented in a prosecution for rape, namely: a) while rape is a most detestable crime, it must be borne in
mind that it is an accusation easy to be made, hard to be proved, but harder to be defended by the party
accused, though innocent;; b) the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme
caution;; and c) that the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits and cannot be
allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense.

Here, the prosecution had failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt the accused had sexual
intercourse with the complainant against her will.

The defense of the accused is the sweetheart theory. Together with the letters sent by the
complainant to the accused and the several inconsistencies in the testimony of the complainant are
strong indications of the innocence of the accused. The letters written by complainant to the accused are
very revealing to the extent that it can be safely presumed that the rape charge was merely an offshoot of
the discovery by her parents of the intimate relationship between her and accused. In order to avoid
retribution from her parents, together with the moral pressure exerted upon her by her mother, she was
forced to concoct her account of the alleged rape.
 The Court takes judicial cognizance of the fact that in rural areas in the Philippines, young ladies
are strictly required to act with circumspection and prudence. Great caution is observed so that their
reputations shall remain untainted. Any breath of scandal which brings dishonor to their character
humiliates their entire families. It could precisely be that complainant's mother wanted to save face in the
community where everybody knows everybody else, and in an effort to conceal her daughter's indiscretion
and escape the wagging tongues of their small rural community, she had to weave the scenario of this
rape drama.

ANALYSIS:
The case was properly decided under the current rules of evidence. The doctrine in this case will not be
affected by changes in the proposed rules.
 BPI-FAMILY SAVINGS BANK v. COURT OF APPEALS
330 SCRA 507 April 12, 2000

Doctrine: Courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of the contents of the records of other cases, even
when such cases have been tried or are pending in the same court, and notwithstanding the fact that both
cases may have been heard or are actually pending before the same judge. Nevertheless, Section 2 of Rule
129 states that judicial notice should be taken of matters which are ought to be known by judges by reason
of their judicial functions.
FACTS: This case involves a claim for tax refund in the amount of P112,491. In the 1989 Income Tax
Return of petitioner it appeared that it had a total refundable amount of P297,492. Petitioner declared in
the same tax refund that the total refundable amount was to be applied as tax credit to the succeeding
taxable year of 1990. However, petitioner filed a claim for tax refund because P112,491 of the total
refundable amount was not applied as tax credit because the company had incurred losses in 1990. The
Court of Tax Appeals dismissed the petition on the ground that petitioner failed to present as evidence its
Corporate Annual Income Tax Return for 1990 to establish the fact that it had yet to credit the amount to
its 1990 tax liability. The Court of Appeals affirmed the CTA.

ISSUE:
1. Whether petitioner is entitled to the refund of P112,491, representing excess creditable withholding tax
paid for the taxable year 1989? – YES.

RATIO: The Supreme Court found that the petitioner presented sufficient evidence to prove its claim of
tax credit. Among which were the testimony of the manager of petitioner’s accounting department;
certification of its vice-president;; quarterly returns for the first two quarters of 1990. More importantly, a
copy of the Final Adjustment Return for l990 was attached to petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration
filed before the CTA. The said return clearly showed that petitioner incurred losses in 1990.

With regard to judicial notice, petitioner also called the attention of the Court to a decision
rendered by the Tax Court whereby it found that the same petitioner incurred losses in 1990. The
respondents CTA,CA and Commissioner of Internal Revenue however contend that the Supreme Court
should not take judicial notice of the said decision.

The SC held that as a rule “courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of the contents of the
records of other cases, even when such cases have been tried or are pending in the same court, and
notwithstanding the fact that both cases may have been heard or are actually pending before the same
judge.” Be that as it may, Section 2 of Rule l29 of the Rules of Court provides that courts may
take judicial notice of matters ought to be known to judges because of their judicial functions. In this
case, a copy of the CTA decision was attached to the Petition for Review filed before the SC. The SC stated
however that such fact was not the sole basis of petitioner’s case. It was merely one more bit of
information showing that petitioner did not use its 1989 refund to pay its taxes for 1990.

ANALYSIS:
This case was decided under the current Rules and even if decided under the proposed Rules,
there would be no change to the result thereof considering that there were no amendments made to
Section 2 of Rule 129 on discretionary judicial notice.
 CALAMBA STEEL CENTER, INC. VS CIR
GR No. 151857
APRIL 28, 2005

Topic: Judicial Notice

FACTS:

Petitioner a domestic corporation engaged in the manufacture of steel blanks for use by manufactures of
automotive, electrical, electronics in industrial and household appliances. On June 4, 1996, petitioner filed an
amended corporate income tax return declaring a net taxable income of P9, 461,597.00, tax credits of P6,
471,246.00 and tax due in the amount of P3, 311, 559.00. Petitioner believed that for the year 1995, several of
its clients withheld taxes from their income payments to petitioner and remitted the same to the Bureau of
internal Revenue in the sum of P3, 159, 687.00. Petitioner further alleged that due to its income/loss positions
for the three quarters of 1996, it was unable to use the excess tax paid for and its behalf by the withholding
agents. Thus an administrative claim was filed by the petitioner on April 10, 1997 for the refund of P3, 159,
687.00 representing the excess or unused creditable withholding taxes.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner is entitled to the refund of such claim exiting in 1995 for the year 1997

HELD:

Yes. It is undisputed that the petitioner had excess withholding taxes for the year 1995 and was thus entitled
to a tax refund to be used in 1997.The CA and CTA could have taken judicial notice of 1996 final adjustment
return which has been attached in the CTA Case No. 5799. As a rule, “courts are not authorized to take
judicial notice of the contents of the records of other cases, even when such cases have been tried or are
pending in the same court and notwithstanding the fact that both cases may have been heard or are actually
pending before the same judge. However, this rule admits of exceptions, as when reference to such records is
sufficiently made without abjection of the opposing party. At the case at bar, there was no objection on the
part of BIR in the inclusion of the said 1996 final adjustment return in the petitioner’s reply to the comment
before the CA. Despite the clear reference, the respondent failed to question such.
 People vs. Tundag, G.R. Nos. 135695-96. October 12, 2000
Doctrnie: In this case, judicial notice of the age of the victim is improper, despite the defense counsel’s
admission. As required by Section 3 of Rule 129, as to any other matters such as age, a hearing is required
before courts can take judicial notice of such fact.
Facts: The complainant here was raped by her father twice. The first was on September 5, 1997 and the
second was on November 7, 1997. The first incident happened while she was sleeping. She was threatened by
his father using a knife. The second raped happened after washing the dishes. Afterwards, she told about it to
her neighbor and was advised to seek the help of the police. She was 13 years old back then. The prosecution
was not able to obtain birthcertificate and she herself doesnt know her exact age. The Defense agree with the
judicial notice. The RTC convicted him for two counts of rape and sentenced him to death.

Issue: won the RTC correctly took judicial notice about her age.

Held: No. Judicial notice is the cognizance of certain facts which judges may properly take and act on without
proof because they already know them. Under the Rules of Court, judicial notice may either be mandatory or
discretionary.

With respect to other matters not falling within the mandatory or discretionary judicial notice, the court can
take judicial notice of a fact pursuant to the procedure in Section 3 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court which
requires that — SEC. 3. Judicial notice, when hearing necessary. — During the trial, the court, on its own
initiative, or on request of a party, may announce its intention to take judicial notice of any matter and allow
the parties to be heard thereon. After the trial, and before judgment or on appeal, the proper court, on its own
initiative or on request of a party, may take judicial notice of any matter and allow the parties to be heard
thereon if such matter is decisive of a material issue in the case.

In this case, judicial notice of the age of the victim is improper, despite the defense counsel’s admission
thereof, acceding to the prosecution’s motion. As required by Section 3 of Rule 129, as to any other matters
such as age, a hearing is required before courts can take judicial notice of such fact. Generally, the age of the
victim may be proven by the birth or baptismal certificate of the victim, or in the absence thereof, upon
showing that said documents were lost or destroyed, by other documentary or oral evidence sufficient for the
purpose.
 LUCIDO v. CALUPITAN
27 SCRA 149 March 17, 1914

Doctrine: Pleadings are to be treated as statements of real issues in the cause and hence as admissions of
the parties, having weight according to the circumstances of each case. On the same principle, where
amended pleadings have been filed, allegations in the original pleadings are held admissible, but in such
case the original pleadings can have no effect unless formally offered in evidence.

FACTS: In this case Rosales and Zolaivar were execution purchasers of the properties of Lucido. A public
document was executed and signed by all the parties including the defendant Calupitan, wherein it was
stated that Rosales and Zolaivar, with the consent of Lucido, sold all their rights and obligations
pertaining to the property in question to Calupitan. On the same day, Lucido and Calupitan executed a
document whereby the latter agreed to furnish a loan in favor of the former. This was done in order for
Lucido to redeem the property from the execution purchasers. The agreement likewise stated that
Calupitan would take possession of the major portion of the land as his security and that Lucido would
be given three years to redeem the property. Thereafter, Lucido filed for the recovery of the properties from
Calupitan. The lower court held that the properties should be returned to Lucido.

ISSUE:
1. Whether the agreement between Lucido and Calupitan was a sale with right to redeem? – YES.

RATIO: The Supreme Court found that the agreement between Lucido and Calupitan was one of sale with
right to redeem. To bolster this finding, the Supreme Court mentioned the fact that Calupitan himself
considered this transaction as a sale with right to redeem as found in his original answer to the
complaint. This original answer was introduced in evidence by the plaintiff Lucido over the objection of
Calupitan. Its admission was proper, especially in view of the fact that it was signed by Calupitan himself,
who was at the time acting as his own attorney.

According to Jones on Evidence, as cited by the Supreme Court, pleadings are to be treated as
statements of real issues in the cause and hence as admissions of the parties, having weight according to
the circumstances of each case. On the same principle, where amended pleadings have been filed,
allegations in the original pleadings are held admissible, but in such case the original pleadings can have
no effect unless formally offered in evidence, as was done in this case.

ANALYSIS:
The decision would be the same under the current as well as the proposed Rules of Evidence. Both
provide that “an admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the proceedings in the
same case, does not require proof,” unless “by showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that
no such admission was made.
 TORRES v. COURT OF
APPEALS G.R. No. L-37420
July 31, 1984

Doctrine: If a complaint is amended, the original complaint loses its character as a judicial admission, which
would have required no proof, and becomes merely an extrajudicial admission, the admissibility of which,
as evidence, requires its formal offer.

FACTS: Margarita Torres was married to Claro Santillan. They had two children, Vicente and
Antonina. Claro died and Margarita became a widow. Antonina had six children while Vicente had
none. The children of Antonina and Vicente are the respondents in this case because Antonina died
before the case was instituted.After Claro’s death, Margarita cohabited with Leon Arvisu Arbole.
Before getting married they had a child named Macaria Torres, who is the petitioner in this case.
Years after, Margarita married Leon. This case is centered on the ownership of Lot No. 551 in Tanza,
Cavite. It was originally leased by the government to Margarita Torres, who was its actual occupant.
Subsequently, the government sold it to Margarita. Margarita then died. Afterwards, Leon Arbole
paid several installments of the purchase price. Before he died, he sold all his rights and interest in
one-half (1/2) portion of the lot to Macaria Torres. Vicente Santillan then executed an Affidavit
claiming possession of the lot and a transfer certificate of title was then issued in the name of the
legal heirs of Margarita Torres. Vicente and the children of Antonina then filed a complaint for
Forcible Entry against Macaria with the Justice of the Peace. The said court decided against Macaria,
so she appealed to the Court of First Instance. Macaria then instituted an action for partition of the
lot. The Court of First Instance jointly tried the ejectment and partition cases and gave Macaria one--
third (1/3) potion of the lot and the respondents two-thirds (2/3). Macaria asked for a
reconsideration which was granted based on a finding that Macaria was a legitimated child of Arbole
and Margarita Torres. Her share in the property was increased to two-thirds of the lot.

The private respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals which found that Macaria was not a
legitimated child and reduced her share to half of the lot. Macaria is now claiming she and Vicente
and Antonina are brothers and sisters and they are the legal heirs and nearest of relatives of
Maragarita based on a statement found in the private respondents’ original complaint for forcible
entry. It read: “That the plaintiffs are the legal heirs and nearest of kin of Margarita Torres, who died
at Tanza, Cavite, on December 20, l93l.” When the private respondents amended their complaint,
this part was deleted.

ISSUE:
1. Whether the statement in the original complaint, after being deleted in the amended complaint,
may still be treated as a judicial admission? – NO.

RATIO: When a complaint is amended, the Amended Complaint takes the place of the original. The
latter is regarded as abandoned and ceases to perform any further function as a pleading. The
original complaint no longer forms part of the record. If a party wishes to utilize the original
complaint, the said party should offer it in evidence. Having been amended, the original complaint
lost its character as a judicial admission, which would have required no proof, and became merely an
extrajudicial admission, the admissibility of which, as evidence, required its formal offer. Contrary to
Torres' submission, therefore there can be no estoppel by extrajudicial admission made in the
original complaint, for failure to offer it in evidence.

Teehankee Dissent: The respondents’ admission did not cease to be a judicial admission
simply because respondents subsequently deleted the same in their amended complaint. The original
complaint, although replaced by an amended complaint, does not cease to be a part of the judicial
record, not having been expunged therefrom.

ANALYSIS:
According to Rule 10, Section 8 of the Rules of Court, an amended pleading supersedes the pleading
that it amends. It also says that admissions in superseded pleadings may be received in evidence
against the pleader. Rule 129, Section 4 on the other hand, says that a written admission made by a
party in the course of proceedings in the same case does not require proof. Taking these two
provisions together, it would seem that Teehankee’s stand that the admission continued to be a
judicial admission despite being absent in the amended complaint is the proper interpretation of the
evidentiary rule.

The Proposed Rules of Evidence with respect to judicial admissions expanded the coverage of judicial
admissions by using the word oral, instead of verbal to denote what is included. It also expanded the
foundations for contradicting an admission by including the ground that the imputed admission was
not intended. Thus, with respect to the application of this case, both the current and proposed rules
of evidence would show that Teehankee’s dissent is the proper view. It must be pointed out that this
case was decided in 1984, under a different set of evidentiary rules.