CO-OWNERSHIP
CASE DOCTRINE
Since a co-owner is entitled to sell his
undivided share, a sale of the entire property
by one co-owner without the consent of the
other co-owners is not null and void. However,
only the rights of the other co-owner-seller are
transferred, thereby making the buyer a co-
owner of the property.
The proper action in cases like this is not for
the nullification of the sale or for the recovery
of possession of the thing owned in common
from the third person who substituted the co-
owner/s who alienated their shares, but the
division of the common property as if it
continued to remain in the possession of the
co-owners who possessed and administered
it (Mainit vs. Bandoy)
HEIRS OF
PROTACIO Thus, it is now settled that the appropriate
GO, SR. et. al. recourse of co-owners in cases where their
v. SERVACIO consent were not secured in a sale of the
and GO entire property as well as in a sale merely of
the undivided shares of some of the co-
owners is an action for PARTITION under Rule
69 of the Revised Rules of Court.
xxx [I]f it turns out that the property alienated or
mortgaged really would pertain to the share of the
surviving spouse, then said transaction is valid. If
it turns out that there really would be, after
liquidation, no more conjugal assets then the
whole transaction is null and void. But if it turns
out that half of the property thus alienated or
mortgaged belongs to the husband as his share in
the conjugal partnership, and half should go to the
estate of the wife, then that corresponding to the
husband is valid, and that corresponding to the
other is not. Since all these can be determined
only at the time the liquidation is over, it follows
logically that a disposal made by the surviving
spouse is not void ab initio. Thus, it has been held
that the sale of conjugal properties cannot be
made by the surviving spouse without the legal
requirements. The sale is void as to the share of
the deceased spouse (except of course as to that
portion of the husbands share inherited by her as
the surviving spouse). The buyers of the property
that could not be validly sold become trustees of
FACTS
Gaviola and Protacio, Jr. entered into a contract of
sale of a parcel of land. 23 years later, Protacio, Jr
executed an Affidavit of Renunciation and Waiver
affirming under oath that it was his father Protacio
Go, Sr.(Married to Marta Go) who purchased the said
property. Subsequently, Protacio Go together with
his son Rito Go sold a portion of the property to
herein respondent Ester Servacio. On March 2, 2001,
the petitioners demanded the return of the property,
but Servacio refused to heed their demand; hence
this case for the annulment of sale of the property.
The contention of the petitioner was that following
Protacio, Jr.’s renunciation, the property became
conjugal property; and that the sale of the property to
Servacio without the prior liquidation of the
community property between Protacio, Sr. and Marta
was null and void pursuant to Article 130 of the
Family Code. Servacio and Rito countered that
Article 130 of the Family Code was inapplicable; that
the want of the liquidation prior to the sale did not
render the sale invalid, because the sale was valid to
the extent of the portion that was finally allotted to the
vendors as his share; and that the sale did not also
prejudice any rights of the petitioners as heirs,
considering that what the sale disposed of was within
the aliquot portion of the property that the vendors
were entitled to as heirs.
The RTC declared that the property was the conjugal
property of Protacio, Sr. and Marta, not the exclusive
property of Protacio, Sr. Nonetheless, the RTC
affirmed the validity of the sale of the property.
Aggrieved, the petitioners went all the way up to the
Supreme Court.
ISSUES HELD
Whether Article DENIED.
130 of the Family
Code was The appeal lacks merit.
applicable.
Under Article 130 in relation to Article 105 of the Family Code, any
disposition of the conjugal property after the dissolution of the conjugal
partnership must be made only after the liquidation; otherwise, the
disposition is void. Upon Marta’s death in 1987, the conjugal
partnership was dissolved, pursuant to Article 175 (1) of the Civil Code,
and an implied ordinary co-ownership ensued among Protacio, Sr. and
the other heirs of Marta with respect to her share in the assets of the
conjugal partnership pending a liquidation following its liquidation.
Protacio, Sr., although becoming a co-owner with his children in
respect of Marta’s share in the conjugal partnership, could not yet
assert or claim title to any specific portion of Marta’s share without an
actual partition of the property being first done either by agreement or
by judicial decree. Until then, all that he had was an ideal or abstract
quota in Marta’s share. Nonetheless, a co-owner could sell his
undivided share; hence, Protacio, Sr. had the right to freely sell and
dispose of his undivided interest, but not the interest of his co-owners.
Consequently, the sale by Protacio, Sr. and Rito as co-owners without
the consent of the other co-owners was not necessarily void, for the
rights of the selling co-owners were thereby effectively transferred,
making the buyer (Servacio) a co-owner of Marta’s share. Article 105
of the Family Code, supra, expressly provides that the applicability of
the rules on dissolution of the conjugal partnership is “without prejudice
to vested rights already acquired in accordance with the Civil Code or
other laws.” Indeed, such a declaration prejudices the rights of
Servacio who had already acquired the shares of Protacio, Sr. and Rito
in the property subject of the sale.
The proper action in cases like this is not for the nullification of the sale
or for the recovery of possession of the thing owned in common from
the third person who substituted the co-owner or co-owners who
alienated their shares, but the DIVISION of the common property as if
it continued to remain in the possession of the co-owners who
possessed and administered it [Mainit v. Bandoy, supra] In the
meanwhile, Servacio would be a trustee for the benefit of the co-heirs
of her vendors in respect of any portion that might not be validly sold
to her.
 said portion for the benefit of the husbands other
heirs, the cestui que trust ent.
Baloloy vs
Hular Under Article 487 of the New Civil
Code, any of the co-owners may bring
an action in ejectment. This article
covers all kinds of actions for the
recovery of possession, including an
accion publiciana and a reinvidicatory
action. A co-owner may bring such an
action without the necessity of joining all
the other co-owners as co-plaintiffs
because the suit is deemed to be
instituted for the benefit of all.
Lacbayan vs The first phase of a partition and/or
Samoy accounting suit is taken up with the
determination of whether or not a co-
ownership in fact exists, and a
partition is proper (i.e., not otherwise
legally proscribed) and may be made by
voluntary agreement of all the parties
interested in the property. This phase
may end with a declaration that plaintiff
is not entitled to have a partition either
because a co-ownership does not exist,
or partition is legally prohibited. It may
end, on the other hand, with an
adjudgment that a co-ownership does in
truth exist, partition is proper in the
T h i s i s a p e t i t i o n f o r r e vi e w o n c e r t i o r a r i
o n t h e d e c is i o n o f t h e C A . Th e
r e s p o n d e n t A l f r e d o H u l a r f i l e d a complaint
for quieting of title of real property with damages
against the children and heirs of
I l u m i n a d o B a l o l o y a n d petitioners Reynaldo
and Adelina. The respondent alleged inhis
complaint that his father, Astrologo Hular, was
the owner of a parcel of residential land located in
Juban, Sorsogon, with an area of 287 square
meters, and that such lot was part of Lot No.
3347 of the Juban Cadastre. The respondent
alleged t h a t I l u m i n a d o B a l o l o y, t h e
p e t i t i o n e r s ’ p r e d e c e s s o r - i n - interest, was
able to secure a Free Patent over the property
through fraud on March 1, 1968, on the basis
of which the Register of Deeds issued Original
Certificate of Title (OCT) No.P-16540 in his name.
Subsequently, the respondent later
discovered that in the cadastral survey of lands
in Juban, the property of his father, which actually
consisted of 1,405 square meters was made to
form part of Lot No. 3353, the property of
Iluminado Baloloy. According to the respondent,
even if the residential land was made to form part
of Lot No. 3353 registered under the name o f
I l u m i n a d o B a l o l o y, h e h a d a c q u i r e d
ownership of the p r o p e r t y b y
acquisitive prescription, as he and
h i s predecessors had been in continuous,
uninterrupted and open possession of the
property in the concept of owners for more than
60 years. Hence, this petition.
Betty Lacbayan (petitioner) and Bayani S. Samoy
(respondent) had an illicit relationship.
During their relationship, they, together with three
more incorporators, were able to establish a
manpower services company.
The company acquired five parcels of land were
registered in petitioner and respondent’s names,
ostensibly as husband and wife.
When their relationship turned sour, they decided to
divide the said properties and terminate their
business partnership by executing a Partition
Agreement.
Initially, respondent agreed to petitioner’s proposal
that the properties in Malvar St. and Don Enrique
W hether all It is the contention of the respondent that the subject
the property was sold by Lagata to his father, Astrologo Hular, in
indispensable 1961. Hence, when his parents died intestate, they were
parties had survived by their children. Article 1078 of the Civil Code
b e e n impleaded provides that where there are two or more heirs, the whole
by the respondent estate of the decedent is, before partition, owned in common
in the trial court? by such heirs, subject to the payment of the debts of the
deceased. Until a division is made, the respective share of
each cannot be determined and every co-owner exercises,
together with his co-participants, joint ownership over the pro
indiviso property, in addition to the use and enjoyment of the
same.
Under Article 487 of the New Civil Code, any of the co-owners
may bring an action in ejectment. This article covers all kinds
of actions for the recovery of possession, including an accion
publiciana and a reinvidicatory action. A co-owner may bring
such an action without the necessity of joining all the other
co-owners as co-plaintiffs because the suit is deemed to be
instituted for the benefit of all.
In this case, the respondent alone filed the complaint,
claiming sole ownership over the subject property and praying
that he be declared the sole owner thereof. There is no proof
that the other co-owners had waived their rights over the
subject property or conveyed the same to the respondent or
such co-owners were aware of the case in the trial court.
1. WON an action RTC & CA: In favor of Samoy as the sole owner of the properties.
for partition
precludes a 1. Until and unless this issue of co-ownership is definitely and finally
settlement on the resolved, it would be premature to effect a partition of the disputed
issue of properties.[30] More importantly, the complaint will not even lie if
ownership.
the claimant, or petitioner in this case, does not even have any
2. Would a rightful interest over the subject properties.[31]
resolution on the
issue of ownership
subject the 2. No. There is no dispute that a Torrens certificate of title cannot be
Torrens title collaterally attacked,[32] but that rule is not material to the case at
issued over the bar. What cannot be collaterally attacked is the certificate of
disputed realties title and not the title itself.[33] The certificate referred to is that
 premises and an accounting of rents
and profits received by the defendant
from the real estate in question is in
order. x x x
The second phase commences when
it appears that the parties are unable
to agree upon the partition directed
by the court. In that event[,] partition
shall be done for the parties by the
[c]ourt with the assistance of not
more than three (3) commissioners.
This second stage may well also deal
with the rendition of the accounting
itself and its approval by the [c]ourt
after the parties have been accorded
opportunity to be heard thereon, and
an award for the recovery by the
party or parties thereto entitled of
their just share in the rents and
profits of the real estate in question.
(Municipality of Bian vs. Garcia).
A co-owner cannot devote common
property to his or her exclusive use to the
prejudice of the co-ownership. In our view, a co-
owner cannot give valid consent to another to
build a house on the co-owned property, which is
an act tantamount to devoting the property to his
or her exclusive use.
Article 486 states each co-owner may
use the thing owned in common provided he does
so in accordance with the purpose for which it is
intended and in such a way as not to injure the
interest of the co-ownership or prevent the other
LEONOR B. co-owners from using it according to their
CRUZ vs. rights. Giving consent to a third person to
Heights be assigned to the latter, while the ownership
over the three other properties will go to respondent.
However, when Lacbayan wanted additional
demands to be included in the partition agreement,
Samoy refused.
Feeling aggrieved, petitioner filed a complaint for
judicial partition of the said properties.
Petitioner’s contention: She claimed that they started
to live together as husband and wife in 1979 without
the benefit of marriage and worked together as
business partners, acquiring real properties
amounting to P15,500,000.00.
Respondent’s contention: He purchased the
properties using his own personal funds.
RTC and CA ruled in favor or respondent.
The antecedent facts of the case are as
follows.
Petitioner Leonor B. Cruz, Luz Cruz and Norma
Maligaya are the co-owners of a parcel of land
covering an area of 1,435 square meters located at
Barangay Mahabang Ludlod, Taal, Batangas.[5] With
the consent of Norma Maligaya, one of the
aforementioned co-owners, respondent Teofila M.
Catapang built a house on a lot adjacent to the
abovementioned parcel of land.
to a collateral document issued by the Register of Deeds known as the TCT.
attack? In contrast, the title referred to by law means ownership which is,
more often than not, represented by that document.[34] Petitioner
apparently confuses title with the certificate of title. Title as a
concept of ownership should not be confused with the
certificate of title as evidence of such ownership although both
are interchangeably used.[35]
Moreover, placing a parcel of land under the mantle of the Torrens
system does not mean that ownership thereof can no longer be
disputed. Ownership is different from a certificate of title, the latter
only serving as the best proof of ownership over a piece of land.
The certificate cannot always be considered as conclusive
evidence of ownership.[36] In fact, mere issuance of the certificate
of title in the name of any person does not foreclose the possibility
that the real property may be under co-ownership with persons not
named in the certificate, or that the registrant may only be a
trustee, or that other parties may have acquired interest over the
property subsequent to the issuance of the certificate of
title.[37] Needless to say, registration does not vest ownership over
a property, but may be the best evidence thereof.
Moreover, to follow petitioners argument would be to allow
respondent not only to admit against his own interest but that of
his legal spouse as well, who may also be lawfully entitled co-
ownership over the said properties. Respondent is not allowed by
law to waive whatever share his lawful spouse may have on the
disputed properties. Petitioner does not have any right to insist on
the contents of an agreement she intentionally refused to sign.
Whether consent GRANTED
given by a co-
owner of a parcel MCTC & RTC: Cruz
of land to a person CA: Catapang
to construct a
house on the co- Consent of only one co-owner will not warrant the dismissal of
owned property the complaint for forcible entry filed against the builder. The consent given
warrants the by Norma Maligaya in the absence of the consent of petitioner and Luz
dismissal of a Cruz did not vest upon respondent any right to enter into the co-owned
forcible entry case property. Her entry into the property still falls under the classification
filed by another through strategy or stealth.
co-owner against
that person. Respondents entry into the property without the permission of
petitioner could appear to be a secret and clandestine act done in
connivance with co-owner Norma Maligaya whom respondent allowed
TEOFILA M. construct a house on the co-owned property will
CATAPANG injure the interest of the co-ownership and prevent
(2008) other co-owners from using the property in
accordance with their rights.
Quisumbing,
J. Under Article 491, none of the co-owners
shall, without the consent of the others, make
alterations in the thing owned in common. It
necessarily follows that none of the co-owners can,
without the consent of the other co-owners, validly
consent to the making of an alteration by another
person, such as respondent, in the thing owned in
common. Alterations include any act of strict
dominion or ownership and any encumbrance or
disposition has been held implicitly to be an act of
alteration.[19] The construction of a house on the co-
owned property is an act of dominion. Therefore, it is
an alteration falling under Article 491 of the Civil
Code. There being no consent from all co-owners,
respondent had no right to construct her house on
the co-owned property.
petitioner contends that the consent and knowledge to stay in her house. Entry into the land effected clandestinely without
of co-owner Norma Maligaya cannot defeat the the knowledge of the other co-owners could be categorized as
action for forcible entry since it is a basic principle in possession by stealth.[20] Moreover, respondents act of getting only the
the law of co-ownership that no individual co-owner consent of one co-owner, her sister Norma Maligaya, and allowing the
can claim title to any definite portion of the land or latter to stay in the constructed house, can in fact be considered as a
thing owned in common until partition. strategy which she utilized in order to enter into the co-owned
property. As such, respondents acts constitute forcible entry.
respondent in her memorandum[17] counters that the
complaint for forcible entry cannot prosper because
her entry into the property was not through strategy or
stealth due to the consent of one of the co-
owners. She further argues that since Norma Maligaya
is residing in the house she built, the issue is not
just possession de facto but also one of possession de
jure since it involves rights of co-owners to enjoy the
property.

Sanchez vs. Sanchez Roman defines co-ownership as
CA, Hon. the right of common dominion which two or more
Alvaro, and persons have in a spiritual part of a thing, not
Teria (2003) materially or physically divided.[12] Manresa
defines it as the manifestation of the private right
Bellosillo, J. of ownership, which instead of being exercised by
the owner in an exclusive manner over the things
subject to it, is exercised by two or more owners
and the undivided thing or right to which it refers
is one and the same.[13]
The characteristics of co-ownership are: (a)
plurality of subjects, who are the co-owners, (b)
unity of or material indivision, which means that
there is a single object which is not materially
divided, and which is the element which binds the
subjects, and, (c) the recognition of ideal shares,
which determines the rights and obligations of the
co-owners.[14]
In co-ownership, the relationship of such co-
owner to the other co-owners is fiduciary in
character and attribute. Whether established by
law or by agreement of the co-owners, the
property or thing held pro-indiviso is impressed
with a fiducial nature so that each co-owner
becomes a trustee for the benefit of his co-owners
and he may not do any act prejudicial to the
interest of his co-owners.[15]
Petitioner, constructed a house on a lot owned by her
parents-in-law. The lot has the following co-owners:
Eliseo Sanchez married to Celia Sanchez, Marilyn
Sanchez married to Nicanor Montalban, Lilian
Sanchez, widow, Nenita Sanchez, single, Susana
Sanchez married to Fernando Ramos, and Felipe
Sanchez.
In 1995, the lot was registered in the name of private
respondent by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale
supposed to have been executed on 23 June 1995
by all six co-owners in her favor.
Petitioner claimed that she did not affix her signature
on the document and subsequently refused to vacate
the lot, thus prompting private respondent to file an
action for recovery of possession.
MeTC: In favor of private respondent declaring that
the sale was valid only to the extent of 5/6 of the lot
and the other 1/6 remaining as the property of
petitioner, on account of her signature in the Deed of
Absolute Sale having been established as a forgery.
RTC: Affirm the above decision as the counsel of
petitioner failed to present.
CA: Dismissed the appeal on the ground of lack of
merit.
Whether or not the Article 493 of the Civil Code gives the owner of an undivided
CA committed interest in the property the right to freely sell and dispose of it, i.e., his
grave abuse of undivided interest. He may validly lease his undivided interest to a third
discretion. party independently of the other co-owners.[18] But he has no right to
sell or alienate a concrete, specific or determinate part of the thing
owned in common because his right over the thing is represented by a
quota or ideal portion without any physical adjudication.[19]
Although assigned an aliquot but abstract part of the property, the
metes and bounds of petitioners lot has not been designated. As she
was not a party to the Deed of Absolute Sale voluntarily entered into
by the other co-owners, her right to 1/6 of the property must be
respected. Partition needs to be effected to protect her right to her
definite share and determine the boundaries of her property. Such
partition must be done without prejudice to the rights of private
respondent Virginia Teria as buyer of the 5/6 portion of the lot under
dispute.
 Thus, the legal effect of an agreement to
preserve the properties in co-ownership is to
create an express trust among the heirs as co-
owners of the properties. Co-ownership is a form
of trust and every co-owner is a trustee for the
others.[16]
Before the partition of a land or thing held in
common, no individual or co-owner can claim title
to any definite portion thereof. All that the co-
owner has is an ideal or abstract quota or
proportionate share in the entire land or thing.[17]
Heirs of Salud
Dizon Salamat
vs. Natividad
Dizon Tamayo
(1998)
Romero, J.
Agustin Dizon dies, leaving behind properties to be
divided among his 5 children. Eduardo, in a private
document and Gaudencio in a notarized document
sold their hereditary rights therein to their sister
Salud.
Petitioners instituted action for COMPULSARY
JUDICIAL PARTITION of real properties registered
in the name of Agustin because of respondent
Natividad (1 of the 5 heirs) to agree to the formal
distribution of the properties of Agustin among his
heirs. Her refusal stemmed from her desire to keep
for herself a parcel of land claiming that her father
ORALLY donated it to her, supported by a private
document signed and executed by Eduardo. The
authenticity of such document is questioned by
respondents.
Trial court granted the partition and gave the land to
Natividad, as claimed. CA affirmed the trial court’s
decision.
Art 749 of the Civil Code reads:
In order that the donation of an immovable may be valid, it must be
made in a public document, specifying therein the property donated
and the value of the charges which the donee must satisfy.
In any case, assuming that Agustin really made the donation to
respondent, albeit orally, respondent cannot still claim ownership over
the property. While it is true that a void donation may be the basis of
ownership which may ripen into title by prescription, it is well settled
that possession, to constitute the foundation of a prescriptive right,
must be adverse and under a claim of title.
Respondent was never in adverse and continous possession of the
property. It is undeniable that petitioners and respondent, being heirs
of the deceased, are co-owners of the properties left by the latter. A
co-ownership is a form of a trust, with each owner being a trustee for
each other and possession of a co-owner shall not be regarded as
adverse to other co-owners but in fact is beneficial to them.
The elements in order that a co-owner’s possession may be deemed
adverse to the cestui que trust or the co-owner are:
(1) that he has performed unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting
to ouster cestui que trust or other co-owners
(2) that such positive acts or repudiation have been made known to
the cestui que trust or other co-owners and
(3) that the evidence thereon must be clear and convincing. Nothing
is present in the case.
**It is well settled that tax declarations or realty tax payments are not
conclusive evidence of ownership
 HEIRS OF Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires Emilio Restar died intestate, leaving eight children-
FLORES possession of things in good faith and with just compulsory heirs. Restar’s eldest child, Flores, on
RESTAR v. title for a period of ten years while extraordinary the basis of a Joint Affidavit he executed with Helen
HEIRS OF acquisitive prescription only requires Restar, caused the cancellation of Tax Declaration in
DOLORES R. uninterrupted adverse possession for thirty years. Restar’s name. The same covers a 5,918 square
CICHON meter parcel of land in Aklan which was among the
properties left by Restar. Flores thereafter sought the
475 SCRA 73 issuance of another Tax Declaration in his name.
(2005) Flores later on died.
Ten years later, the heirs of Flores’ sisters, Dolores
R. Cichon, et. al. (Heirs of Cichon) filed a Complaint
against Flores’ heirs for “partition of the lot,
declaration of nullity of documents, ownership with
damages and preliminary injunction” before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Aklan alleging that the
widow Esmenia appealed to them to allow her to hold
on to the lot to finance the education of her children,
to which they agreed on the condition that after the
children had finished their education, it would be
divided into eight equal parts; and upon their demand
for partition of the lot, the defendants Flores‘ heirs
refused, they claiming that they were the lawful
owners thereof as they had inherited it from Flores.
Flores‘ heirs claimed that they had been in
possession of the lot in the concept of owner for more
than thirty (30) years and have been paying realty
taxes since time immemorial. And they denied having
shared with the plaintiffs the produce of the lot or that
upon Flores’ death in 1989, Esmenia requested the
plaintiffs to allow her to hold on to it to finance her
children’s education, they contending that by 1977,
the children had already finished their respective
courses.
The RTC of Kalibo, Aklan held that Flores and his
heirs had performed acts sufficient to constitute
repudiation of the co-ownership, concluded that they
had acquired the lot by prescription. The Court of
Appeals reversed the decision finding that there was
no adequate notice by Flores to his co-heirs of the
repudiation of the co-ownership and neither was
there a categorical assertion by the defendants of
their exclusive right to the entire lot that barred the
plaintiffs’ claim of ownership.
Whether or not Acquisitive prescription of dominion and other real rights may be
Heirs of Flores ordinary or extraordinary. Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires
acquired possession of things in good faith and with just title for a period of ten
ownership over years. Without good faith and just title, acquisitive prescription can only
the lot by be extraordinary in character which requires uninterrupted adverse
extraordinary possession for thirty years.
prescription
When Restar died in 1935, his eight children became pro indiviso co-
owners of the lot by intestate succession. Heirs of Chichon never
possessed the lot, however, much less asserted their claim thereto
until January 21, 1999 when they filed the complaint for partition
subject of the present petition. In contrast, Flores took possession of
the lot after Restar’s death and exercised acts of dominion thereon —
tilling and cultivating the land, introducing improvements,
and enjoying the produce thereof. Flores’ possession thus ripened into
ownership through acquisitive prescription after the lapse of thirty years
in accordance with the earlier quoted Article 1137 of the New Civil
Code.
Heirs of Cichon did not deny that aside from the verbal partition of one
parcel of land in Carugdog, Lezo, Aklan way back in 1945, they also
had an amicable partition of the lands of Emilio Restar in Cerrudo and
Palale, Banga Aklan on September 28, 1973 (exhibit “20”). If they were
able to demand the partition, why then did they not demand the
inclusion of the land in question in order to settle once and for all the
inheritance from their father Emilio Restar, considering that at that time
all of the brothers and sisters, the eight heirs of Emilio Restar, were
still alive and participated in the signing of the extra-judicial partition?
Indeed, the following acts of Flores show possession adverse to his
co-heirs: the cancellation of the tax declaration certificate in the name
of Restar and securing another in his name; the execution of a Joint
Affidavit stating that he is the owner and possessor thereof to the
exclusion of respondents; payment of real estate tax and irrigation fees
without respondents having ever contributed any share therein; and
continued enjoyment of the property and its produce to the exclusion
of respondents. And Flores’ adverse possession was continued by his
heirs.
The trial court’s finding and conclusion that Flores and his heirs had for
more than 38 years possessed the land in open, adverse and
continuous possession in the concept of owner — which length of
possession had never been questioned, rebutted or disputed by any of
the heirs of Cichon, being thus duly supported by substantial evidence,
he and his heirs have become owner of the lot by extraordinary
prescription. It is unfortunate that respondents slept on their rights.
Dura lex sed lex.
 EASEMENT
CASE DOCTRINE FACTS ISSUES HELD

Chan vs. CA A person cannot, by his own acts, isolate Chan filed a petition to stop company from fencing its Is Chan legally No. Arts. 649 and 650 of the NCC provides the requisites so that the
and Ph Rabbit property from a public highway and then property and depriving her of access to the highway, entitled to a right owner of an estate may claim a compulsory right of way. In the instant
Business claim an easement of way through an and to sell to her the subject lot. Between her of way? case, Chan filed to satisfy some requirements such as: petitioner is not
Lines, Inc. adjacent estate. property and the highway is the lot of the company. without adequate outlet to a public highway; that she caused her own
Her only access to the highway was a very small isolation by closing her access through the other property, and; that
opening, so she claimed that of being entitled to a she failed to prove that she made a valid tender of the proper
wider easement right of way. indemnity.

Company contended that Chan had another access Hence, for failure to satisfy the requisites, Chan is not legally entitled
to the highway without passing his lot; that it cannot to an easement right of way.
be acquired by prescription, and; that they had
another access to the highway to which she closed
during the pendency of the case.