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G.R. No. X92_1 July 30, 1979 - IN RE: SYCIP, SALAZAR, FELICIANO,
HERNANDEZ & CASTILLO, ET AL.:

EN BANC

[G.R. No. X92-1. July 30, 1979.]

PETITION FOR AUTHORITY TO CONTINUE USE OF THE FIRM NAME "SYCIP,

SALAZAR, FELICIANO, HERNANDEZ & CASTILLO." LUCIANO E. SALAZAR,
FLORENTINO P, FELICIANO, BENILDO G. HERNANDEZ. GREGORIO R.
CASTILLO. ALBERTO P. SAN JUAN, JUAN C. REYES, JR., ANDRES G.
GATMAITAN, JUSTINO H. CACANINDIN, NOEL A. LAMAN, ETHELWOLDO E.
FERNANDEZ, ANGELITO C. IMPERIO, EDUARDO R. CENIZA, TRISTAN A.
CATINDIG, ANCHETA K. TAN, and ALICE V. PESIGAN, petitioners.

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR AUTHORITY TO CONTINUE USE OF

THE FIRM NAME "OZAETA, ROMULO, DE LEON, MABANTA & REYES."
RICARDO J. ROMULO, BENJAMIN M. DE LEON, ROMAN MABANTA, JR.,
JOSE MA. REYES, JESUS S. J. SAYOC, EDUARDO DE LOS ANGELES, and
JOSE F. BUENAVENTURA, petitioners.

RESOLUTION

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:

Two separate Petitions were filed before this Court 1) by the surviving partners of Atty.
Alexander Sycip, who died on May 5, 1975, and 2) by the surviving partners of Atty.
Herminio Ozaeta, who died on February 14, 1976, praying that they be allowed to
continue using, in the names of their firms, the names of partners who had passed
away. In the Court’s Resolution of September 2, 1976, both Petitions were ordered
consolidated. chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library

Petitioners base their petitions on the following arguments: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1. Under the law, a partnership is not prohibited from continuing its business under a
firm name which includes the name of a deceased partner; in fact, Article 1840 of the
Civil Code explicitly sanctions the practice when it provides in the last paragraph that: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The use by the person or partnership continuing the business of the partnership name,
or the name of a deceased partner as part thereof, shall not of itself make the individual
property of the deceased partner liable for any debts contracted by such person or
partnership." 1

2. In regulating other professions, such as accountancy and engineering, the legislature

has authorized the adoption of firm names without any restriction as to the use, in such
firm name, of the name of a deceased partner; 2 the legislative authorization given to
those engaged in the practice of accountancy — a profession requiring the same degree
of trust and confidence in respect of clients as that implicit in the relationship of attorney
and client — to acquire and use a trade name, strongly indicates that there is no
fundamental policy that is offended by the continued use by a firm of professionals of a
firm name which includes the name of a deceased partner, at least where such firm
name has acquired the characteristics of a "trade name." 3

3. The Canons of Professional Ethics are not transgressed by the continued use of the
name of a deceased partner in the firm name of a law partnership because Canon 33 of
the Canons of Professional Ethics adopted by the American Bar Association declares
that:
jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

". . . The continued use of the name of a deceased or former partner when permissible
by local custom, is not unethical, but care should be taken that no imposition or
deception is practiced through this use. . . ." 4

4. There is no possibility of imposition or deception because the deaths of their

respective deceased partners were well-publicized in all newspapers of general
circulation for several days; the stationeries now being used by them carry new
letterheads indicating the years when their respective deceased partners were
connected with the firm; petitioners will notify all leading national and international law
directories of the fact of their respective deceased partners’ deaths. 5

5. No local custom prohibits the continued use of a deceased partner’s name in a

professional firm’s name; 6 there is no custom or usage in the Philippines, or at least in
the Greater Manila Area, which recognizes that the name of a law firm necessarily
identifies the individual members of the firm. 7

6. The continued use of a deceased partner’s name in the firm name of law
partnerships has been consistently allowed by U.S. Courts and is an accepted practice
in the legal profession of most countries in the world. 8

The question involved in these Petitions first came under consideration by this Court in
1953 when a law firm in Cebu (the Dean case) continued its practice of including in its
firm name that of a deceased partner, C.D. Johnston. The matter was resolved with this
Court advising the firm to desist from including in their firm designation the name of C.
D. Johnston, "who has long been dead." cralaw virtua1aw library

The same issue was raised before this Court in 1958 as an incident in G. R. No. L-
11964, entitled Register of Deeds of Manila v. China Banking Corporation. The law firm
of Perkins & Ponce Enrile moved to intervene as amicus curiae. Before acting thereon,
the Court, in a Resolution of April 15, 1957, stated that it "would like to be informed why
the name of Perkins is still being used although Atty. E. A. Perkins is already dead." In a
Manifestation dated May 21, 1957, the law firm of Perkins and Ponce Enrile, raising
substantially the same arguments as those now being raised by petitioners, prayed that
the continued use of the firm name "Perkins & Ponce Enrile" be held proper.

On June 16, 1958, this Court resolved: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"After carefully considering the reasons given by Attorneys Alfonso Ponce Enrile and
Associates for their continued use of the name of the deceased E. G. Perkins, the Court
found no reason to depart from the policy it adopted in June 1953 when it required
Attorneys Alfred P. Deen and Eddy A. Deen of Cebu City to desist from including in their
firm designation, the name of C. D. Johnston, deceased. The Court believes that, in
view of the personal and confidential nature of the relations between attorney and client
and the high standards demanded in the canons of professional ethics, no practice
should be allowed which even in a remote degree could give rise to the possibility of
deception. Said attorneys are accordingly advised to drop the name "PERKINS" from
their firm name." cralaw virtua1aw library

Petitioners herein now seek a re-examination of the policy thus far enunciated by the
Court.

The Court finds no sufficient reason to depart from the rulings thus laid down.

A. Inasmuch as "Sycip, Salazar, Feliciano, Hernandez and Castillo" and "Ozaeta,

Romulo, De Leon, Mabanta and Reyes" are partnerships, the use in their partnership
names of the names of deceased partners will run counter to Article 1815 of the Civil
Code which provides: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Art. 1815. Every partnership shall operate under a firm name, which may or may not
include the name of one or more of the partners.

"Those who, not being members of the partnership include their names in the firm name,
shall be subject to the liability of a partner." cralaw virtua1aw library

It is clearly tacit in the above provision that names in a firm name of a partnership must
either be those of living partners and, in the case of non-partners, should be living
persons who can be subjected to liability. In fact, Article 1825 of the Civil Code prohibits
a third person from including his name in the firm name under pain of assuming the
liability of a partner. The heirs of a deceased partner in a law firm cannot be held liable
as the old members to the creditors of a firm particularly where they are non-lawyers.
Thus, Canon 34 of the Canons of Professional Ethics "prohibits all agreement for the
payment to the widow and heirs of a deceased lawyer of a percentage, either gross or
net, of the fees received from the future business of the deceased lawyer’s clients, both
because the recipients of such division are not lawyers and because such payments will
not represent service or responsibility on the part of the recipient." Accordingly, neither
the widow nor the heirs can be held liable for transactions entered into after the death of
their lawyer-predecessor. There being no benefits accruing, there can be no
corresponding liability.chanrobles law library : red

Prescinding the law, there could be practical objections to allowing the use by law firms
of the names of deceased partners. The public relations value of the use of an old firm
name can tend to create undue advantages and disadvantages in the practice of the
profession. An able lawyer without connections will have to make a name for himself
starting from scratch. Another able lawyer, who can join an old firm, can initially ride on
that old firm’s reputation established by deceased partners.

B. In regards to the last paragraph of Article 1840 of the Civil Code cited by petitioners,
supra, the first factor to consider is that it is within Chapter 3 of Title IX of the Code
entitled "Dissolution and Winding Up." The Article primarily deals with the exemption
from liability in cases of a dissolved partnership, of the individual property of the
deceased partner for debts contracted by the person or partnership which continues the
business using the partnership name or the name of the deceased partner as part
thereof. What the law contemplates therein is a hold-over situation preparatory to formal
reorganization.

Secondly, Article 1840 treats more of a commercial partnership with a good will to
protect rather than of a professional partnership, with no saleable good will but whose
reputation depends on the personal qualifications of its individual members. Thus, it has
been held that a saleable goodwill can exist only in a commercial partnership and
cannot arise in a professional partnership consisting of lawyers. 9

"As a general rule, upon the dissolution of a commercial partnership the succeeding
partners or parties have the right to carry on the business under the old name, in the
absence of a stipulation forbidding it, (s)ince the name of a commercial partnership is a
partnership asset inseparable from the good will of the firm . . .." (60 Am Jur 2d, s 204,
p. 115) (Emphasis supplied)

On the other hand,

". . . a professional partnership the reputation of which depends on the individual skill of
the members, such as partnerships of attorneys or physicians, has no good will to be
distributed us a firm asset on its dissolution, however intrinsically valuable such skill and
reputation may be, especially where there is no provision in the partnership agreement
relating to good will as an asset. . . ." (ibid, s 203, p. 115) (Emphasis supplied).

C. A partnership for the practice of law cannot be likened to partnerships formed by

other professionals or for business. For one thing, the law on accountancy specifically
allows the use of a trade name in connection with the practice of accountancy. 10

"A partnership for the practice of law is not a legal entity. It is a mere relationship or
association for a particular purpose. . . . It is not a partnership formed for the purpose of
carrying on trade or business or of holding property." 11 Thus, it has been stated that
"the use of a nom de plume, assumed or trade name in law practice is improper." 12

"The usual reason given for different standards of conduct being applicable to the
practice of law from those pertaining to business is that the law is a ‘profession.’ . . .

"Dean Pound, in his recently published contribution to the Survey of the Legal
Profession, (The Lawyer from Antiquity to Modern Times, p. 5) defines a profession as
‘a group of men pursuing a learned art as a common calling in the spirit of public
service, — no less a public service because it may incidentally be a means of
livelihood.’

x x x

"Primary characteristics which distinguish the legal profession from business are: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1. A duty of public service, of which the emolument is a by-product, and in which one
may attain the highest eminence without making much money.

2. A relation as an ‘officer of court’ to the administration of justice involving thorough

sincerity, integrity, and reliability.

3. A relation to clients in the highest degree fiduciary.

4. A relation to colleagues at the bar characterized by candor, fairness, and

unwillingness to resort to current business methods of advertising and encroachment on
their practice, or dealing directly with their clients." 13

"The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is in the nature of a
privilege or franchise. 14 It is limited to persons of good moral character with special
qualifications duly ascertained and certified. 15 The right does not only presuppose in its
possessor integrity, legal standing and attainment, but also the exercise of a special
privilege, highly personal and partaking of the nature of a public trust." 16

D. Petitioners cited Canon 33 of the Canons of Professional Ethics of the American Bar
Association 17 in support of their petitions.

It is true that Canon 33 does not consider as unethical the continued use of the name of
a deceased or former partner in the firm name of a law partnership when such a
practice is permissible by local custom but the Canon warns that care should be taken
that no imposition or deception is practiced through this use.

It must be conceded that in the Philippines, no local custom permits or allows the
continued use of a deceased or former partner’s name in the firm names of law
partnerships. Firm names, under our custom, identify the more active and/or more
senior members or partners of the law firm. A glimpse at the history of the firms of
petitioners and of other law firms in this country would show how their firm names have
evolved and changed from time to time as the composition of the partnership changed.

"The continued use of a firm name after the death of one or more of the partners
designated by it is proper only where sustained by local custom and not where by
custom this purports to identify the active members. . . .

"There would seem to be a question, under the working of the Canon, as to the
propriety of adding the name of a new partner and at the same time retaining that of a
deceased partner who was never a partner with the new one." (H.S. Drinker, op. cit.,
supra, at pp. 207-208) (Emphasis supplied)

The possibility of deception upon the public, real or consequential, where the name of a
deceased partner continues to be used cannot be ruled out. A person in search of legal
counsel might be guided by the familiar ring of a distinguished name appearing in a firm
title.
E. Petitioners argue that U.S. Courts have consistently avowed the continued use of a
deceased partner’s name in the firm name of law partnerships. But that is so because it
is sanctioned by custom.

In the case of Mendelsohn v. Equitable Life Assurance Society (33 N.Y.S. 2d 733) which
petitioners Salazar, Et. Al. quoted in their memorandum, the New York Supreme Court
sustained the use of the firm name Alexander & Green even if none of the present ten
partners of the firm bears either name because the practice was sanctioned by custom
and did not offend any statutory provision or legislative policy and was adopted by
agreement of the parties The Court stated therein: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The practice sought to be proscribed has the sanction of custom and offends no
statutory provision or legislative policy. Canon 33 of the Canons of Professional Ethics
of both the American Bar Association and the New York State Bar Association provides
in part as follows: ‘The continued use of the name of a deceased or former partner,
when permissible by local custom is not unethical, but care should be taken that no
imposition or deception is practiced through this use.’ There is no question as to local
custom. Many firms in the city use the names of deceased members with the approval
of other attorneys, bar associations and the courts. The Appellate Division of the First
Department has considered the matter and reached the conclusion that such practice
should not be prohibited. (Emphasis supplied)

x x x

"Neither the Partnership Law nor the Penal Law prohibits the practice in question. The
use of the firm name herein is also sustainable by reason of agreement between the
partners." 18

Not so in this jurisdiction where there is no local custom that sanctions the practice.
Custom has been defined as a rule of conduct formed by repetition of acts, uniformly
observed (practiced) as a social rule, legally binding and obligatory. 19 Courts take no
judicial notice of custom. A custom must be proved as a fact, according to the rules of
evidence. 20 A local custom as a source of right cannot be considered by a court of
justice unless such custom is properly established by competent evidence like any other
fact. 21 We find such proof of the existence of a local custom. and of the elements
requisite to constitute the same, wanting herein. Merely because something is done as
a matter of practice does not mean that Courts can rely on the same for purposes of
adjudication as a juridical custom. Juridical custom must be differentiated from social
custom. The former can supplement statutory law or be applied in the absence of such
statute. Not so with the latter.

Moreover, judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws form part of the legal
system. 22 When the Supreme Court in the Deen and Perkins cases issued its
Resolutions directing lawyers to desist from including the names of deceased partners
in their firm designation, it laid down a legal rule against which no custom or practice to
the contrary, even if proven, can prevail. This is not to speak of our civil law which
clearly ordains that a partnership is dissolved by the death of any partner. 23 Customs
which are contrary to law, public order or public policy shall not be countenanced. 24

The practice of law is intimately and peculiarly related to the administration of justice
and should not be considered like an ordinary "money-making trade." cralaw virtua1aw library
". . . It is of the essence of a profession that it is practiced in a spirit of public service.’A
trade’ . . .’aims primarily at personal gain; a profession at the exercise of powers
beneficial to mankind.’ If, as in the era of wide free opportunity, we think of free
competitive self assertion as the highest good, lawyer and grocer and farmer may seem
to be freely competing with their fellows in their calling in order each to acquire as much
of the world’s good as he may within the limits allowed him by law. But the member of a
profession does not regard himself as in competition with his professional brethren. He
is not bartering his services as is the artisan nor exchanging the products of his skill and
learning as the farmer sells wheat or corn. There should be no such thing as a lawyers
or physicians’ strike. The best service of the professional man is often rendered for no
equivalent or for a trifling equivalent and it is his pride to do what he does in a way
worthy of his profession even if done with no expectation of reward. This spirit of public
service in which the profession of law is and ought to be exercised is a prerequisite of
sound administration of justice according to law. The other two elements of a
profession, namely, organization and pursuit of a learned art have their justification in
that they secure and maintain that spirit."25 cralaw:red

In fine, petitioners’ desire to preserve the identity of their firms in the eyes of the public
must bow to legal and ethical impediments.

ACCORDINGLY, the petitions filed herein are denied and petitioners advised to drop the
names "SYCIP" and "OZAETA" from their respective firm names. Those names may,
however, be included in the listing of individuals who have been partners in their firms
indicating the years during which they served as such. chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, Concepcion Jr., Santos, Fernandez, Guerrero and De Castro, JJ., concur.

Fernando, C.J. and Abad-Santos, J., took no part.

CERTIFICATION

FERNANDO, C.J.:

The petitions are denied, as there are only four votes for granting them, seven of the
.Justices being of the contrary view, as explained in the plurality opinion of Justice
Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera. It is out of delicadeza that the undersigned did not
participate in the disposition of these petitions, as the law office of Sycip, Salazar,
Feliciano, Hernandez and Castillo started with the partnership of Quisumbing, Sycip,
and Quisumbing, the senior partner, the late Ramon Quisumbing, being the father-in-law
of the undersigned, and the most junior partner then, Norberto J. Quisumbing, being his
brother-in-law. For the record, the undersigned wishes to invite the attention of all
concerned, and not only of petitioners, to the last sentence of the opinion of Justice
Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera: ‘Those names [Sycip and Ozaeta] may, however, be
included in the listing of individuals who have been partners in their firms indicating the
years during which they served as such." It represents a happy compromise.

Separate Opinions

AQUINO, J., dissenting: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

I dissent. The fourteen members of the law firm, Sycip, Salazar, Feliciano, Hernandez &
Castillo, in their petition of June 10, 1975, prayed for authority to continue the use of
that firm name, notwithstanding the death of Attorney Alexander Sycip on May 5, 1975
(May he rest in peace). He was the founder of the firm which was originally known as
the Sycip Law Office.

On the other hand, the seven surviving partners of the law firm, Ozaeta, Romulo, De
Leon, Mabanta & Reyes, in their petition of August 13, 1976, prayed that they be
allowed to continue using the said firm name notwithstanding the death of two partners,
former Justice Roman Ozaeta and his son, Herminio, on May 1, 1972 and February 14,
1976, respectively.

They alleged that the said law firm was a continuation of the Ozaeta Law Office which
was established in 1957 by Justice Ozaeta and his son and that, as to the said law firm,
the name Ozaeta has acquired an institutional and secondary connotation.

Article 1840 of the Civil Code, which speaks of the use by the partnership of the name
of a deceased partner as part of the partnership name, is cited to justify the petitions.
Also invoked is the canon that the continued use by a law firm of the name of a
deceased partner, "when permissible by local custom, is not unethical" as long as "no
imposition or deception is practiced through this use" (Canon 33 of the Canons of Legal
Ethics).

I am of the opinion that the petition may be granted with the condition that it be indicated
in the letterheads of the two firms (as the case may be) that Alexander Sycip, former
Justice Ozaeta and Herminio Ozaeta are dead or the period when they served as
partners should be stated therein.

Obviously, the purpose of the two firms in continuing the use of the names of their
deceased founders is to retain the clients who had customarily sought the legal services
of Attorneys Sycip and Ozaeta and to benefit from the goodwill attached to the names of
those respected and esteemed law practitioners. That is a legitimate motivation.

The retention of their names is not illegal per se. That practice was followed before the
war by the law firm of James Ross. Notwithstanding the death of Judge Ross the
founder of the law firm of Ross, Lawrence, Selph and Carrascoso, his name was
retained in the firm name with an indication of the year when he died. No one
complained that the retention of the name of Judge Ross in the firm name was illegal or
unethical.

Barredo, Makasiar and Antonio, JJ., concur.

Endnotes:

1. See Memorandum of Salazar, Et Al., p. 5; see also Petition of Romulo,

Et Al., p. 3.

2. Citing Sec. 16-A, Public Act No. 3105, as amended by Commonwealth

Act No. 342; Sec. 39, Commonwealth Act No. 294; Sec. 23, Republic Act
No. 318; Sec. 39, Republic Act No. 184.

3. Memorandum of Salazar, Et Al., pp. 7-8.

4. Memorandum of Salazar, Et Al., pp. 8-10; Petition of Romulo, Et Al., pp.
3-4.

5. Memorandum of Salazar, Et Al., p. 13; Petition of Romulo, Et Al., p. 4.

6. Petition of Romulo, Et Al., p. 4.

7. Memorandum of Salazar, Et Al., p. 11.

8. Memorandum of Salazar, Et Al., pp. 6-7 and pp. 16-18; Petition of

Romulo. Et. Al., p. 5.

9. Seddal v. Keating, 8 App. Div. 2d 44, 185 NYS 2d 630, affd 7 NY 2d 846,
196 NYS 2d 98, 164 NE 2d 860.

10. Section 16-A, Commonwealth Act No. 342.

11. In re Crawford’s Estate, 184 NE 2d 779, 783.

12. H.S. Drinker, Legal Ethics (1953), p. 206; see also Canon 33, par. 2,
Canons of Professional Ethics.

13. H.S. Drinker, Legal Ethics (1953) pp. 4-5.

14. 7 C.J.S. 708.

15. 5 Am Jur 270.

16. In re Lavine, 41 P2d 161, all cited in Martin, Legal and Judicial Ethics,
Fifth Ed., p. 8.

17. Canons 1 to 32 which were adopted by the American Bar Association

in 1908 were also adopted by the Philippine Bar Association in 1917. The
American Bar Association adopted Canons 33 to 45 in 1928, Canon 46 in
1933 and Canon 47 in 1937. On April 20, 1946, when Canons 33 to 97
where already in effect, the Revised Constitution of the Philippine Bar
Association was approved and it provided that the Association "adopts and
makes its own the Code of Ethics of the American Bar Association." (Martin
Legal and Judicial Ethics, Fifth Ed. p. 341).

18. 33 N.Y.S. 2d 733, 734.

19. JBL Reyes & RC Puno, Outline of Philippine Civil Law, Fourth Ed., Vol.
1, p. 7.

20. Article 12, Civil Code.

21. Patriarca v. Orate, 7 Phil. 390, 395 (1907).

22. Art. 8, Civil Code.

23. Art. 1830, Civil Code.

24. Art. 11, Civil Code.

25. Roscoe Pound, The Lawyer From Antiquity To Modern Times, (1953),
pp. 9-10.

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G.R. No. L-34355 July 30,

1979 - PEOPLE OF THE PHIL.
v. ADELANDO RAMOS

G.R. No. L-34628 July 30,

1979 - PHILIPPINE VIRGINIA
TOBACCO ADMINISTRATION
v. FELICIANO S. GONZALES,
ET AL.

G.R. No. L-34785 July 30,

1979 - PEOPLE OF THE PHIL.
v. RENATO A. BARRIOS, ET
AL.

G.R. No. L-35279 July 30,

1979 - PEOPLE OF THE PHIL.
v. PORFIRIO DUMDUM, JR.,
ET AL.

G.R. No. L-39144 July 30,

1979 - PEOPLE OF THE PHIL.
v. REYNALDO AREVALO, ET
AL.

G.R. No. L-41432 July 30,

1979 - IVOR ROBERT DAYTON
GIBSON v. PEDRO A.
REVILLA, ET AL.

G.R. No. L-42800 July 30,

1979 - LIM SE, ET L. v.
MANUEL A. ARGEL, ET AL.

G.R. No. L-43665 July 30,

1979 - AMPARO S. JOCOBA v.
WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION
COMMISSION, ET AL.

G.R. No. L-43955-56 July 30,

1979 - RENATO LAZATIN v.
JOSE C. CAMPOS, JR., ET AL.

G.R. Nos. L-44550-51 & L-

44552-53 July 30, 1979 - NORA
AGUILAR MATURA v.
ALFREDO C. LAYA, ET AL.

G.R. No. L-44625 July 30,

1979 - BRUNO B. PACOLI v.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHIL., ET
AL.

G.R. No. L-44702 July 30,

1979 - FACUNDO A. DALISAY
v. FRANCISCO Z.
CONSOLACION, ET AL.

G.R. No. L-46096 July 30,

1979 - EUFEMIO T. CORREA v.
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
OF BULACAN, ET AL.
 G.R. No. L-46200 July 30,
1979 - FELIXBERTO VILLONES
v. EMPLOYEES’
COMPENSATION
COMMISSION, ET AL.

G.R. Nos. L-46430-31 July 30,

1979 - FRANCISCA ALSUA-
BETTS, ET AL. v. COURT OF
APPEALS, ET AL.

G.R. No. L-47121 July 30,

1979 - RODOLFO BERMUDEZ
v. COURT OF APPEALS, ET
AL.

G.R. No. L-47385 July 30,

1979 - ST. PETER MEMORIAL
PARK, INC., ET AL. v. REGINO
CLEOFAS, ET AL.

G.R. Nos. L-48235-36 July 30,

1979 - FAUSTINO M.
MERACAP v. INTERNATIONAL
CERAMICS MFG. CO., INC., ET
AL.

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