G.R. No.

84818 December 18, 1989

PHILIPPINE COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITE CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
JOSE LUIS A. ALCUAZ, as NTC Commissioner, and NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS
COMMISSION, respondents.
REGALADO, J.:

FACTS:
By virtue of Republic Act No. 5514, PHILCOMSAT was granted "a franchise to establish, construct, maintain
and operate in the Philippines, at such places as the grantee may select, station or stations and associated
equipment and facilities for international satellite communications." Under this franchise, it was likewise granted
the authority to "construct and operate such ground facilities as needed to deliver telecommunications services
from the communications satellite system and ground terminal or terminals."
Under Section 5 of Republic Act No. 5514, petitioner was exempt from the jurisdiction of the then Public Service
Commission, now respondent NTC. However, pursuant to Executive Order No. 196 issued on June 17, 1987,
petitioner was placed under the jurisdiction, control and regulation of respondent NTC, including all its facilities
and services and the fixing of rates. Implementing said Executive Order No. 196, respondents required petitioner
to apply for the requisite certificate of public convenience and necessity covering its facilities and the services it
renders, as well as the corresponding authority to charge rates therefor.
PETITIONER THEN APPLIED FOR PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY TO continue to operate and maintain the
above mentioned facilities, provide the services and charge therefor the aforesaid rates therein applied for, which
was granted by the NTC for a period of 6 months, extended by six months and another six months thereafter.
However, in the same order granting the last latter extension, the NTC directed the petitioner to charge modified
reduced rates through a reduction of fifteen percent (15%) on the present authorized rates.
Petitioner appealed stating that that the order mandating a reduction of certain rates is undue delegation not of
legislative but of quasi-judicial power to respondent NTC, thus, notice and hearing are necessary and the absence
thereof results in a violation of due process.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was undue delegation of quasi-judicial power
RULING:
NO. While respondents may fix a temporary rate pending final determination of the application of petitioner, such
rate-fixing order, temporary though it may be, is not exempt from the statutory procedural requirements of notice
and hearing, as well as the requirement of reasonableness. Assuming that such power is vested in NTC, it may
not exercise the same in an arbitrary and confiscatory manner. Categorizing such an order as temporary in nature
does not perforce entail the applicability of a different rule of statutory procedure than would otherwise be applied
to any other order on the same matter unless otherwise provided by the applicable law. In the case at bar, the
applicable statutory provision is Section 16(c) of the Public Service Act which provides:
Section 16. Proceedings of the Commission, upon notice and hearing the Commission shall have
power, upon proper notice and hearing in accordance with the rules and provisions of this Act,
subject to the limitations and exceptions mentioned and saving provisions to the contrary:
xxx xxx xxx
 (c) To fix and determine individual or joint rates, ... which shall be imposed, observed and followed
thereafter by any public service; ...
While it may be true that for purposes of rate-fixing respondents may have other sources of information or data,
still, since a hearing is essential, respondent NTC should act solely on the basis of the evidence before it and not
on knowledge or information otherwise acquired by it but which is not offered in evidence or, even if so adduced,
petitioner was given no opportunity to controvert.
Consequently, the challenged order, particularly on the issue of rates provided therein, being violative of the due
process clause is void and should be nullified.
G.R. No. 96754 June 22, 1995
CONGRESSMAN JAMES L. CHIONGBIAN
vs.
HON. OSCAR M. ORBOS
MENDOZA, J.:
FACTS:
Pursuant to Art. X, §18 of the 1987 Constitution, Congress passed R.A. No. 6734, the Organic Act for the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, calling for a plebiscite to be held in several provinces, four of which
voted in favor of creating an autonomous region. These are the provinces of Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu
and Tawi-Tawi. In accordance with the constitutional provision, these provinces became the Autonomous Region
in Muslim Mindanao.
On the other hand, with respect to provinces and cities not voting in favor of the Autonomous Region, Art. XIX,
§ 13 of R.A. No. 6734 provides, “The provinces and cities which in the plebiscite do not vote for inclusion in the
Autonomous Region shall remain in the existing administrative regions. Provided, however, that the President
may, by administrative determination, merge the existing regions.”
Pursuant to the authority granted by this provision, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued on October 12, 1990
Executive Order No. 429, "providing for the Reorganization of the Administrative Regions in Mindanao." Under
this Order, as amended by E.O. No. 439 —
(1) Misamis Occidental, at present part of Region X, will become part of Region IX.
(2) Oroquieta City, Tangub City and Ozamiz City, at present parts of Region X will become parts
of Region IX.
(3) South Cotobato, at present a part of Region XI, will become part of Region XII.
(4) General Santos City, at present part of Region XI, will become part of Region XII.
(5) Lanao del Norte, at present part of Region XII, will become part of Region IX.
(6) Iligan City and Marawi City, at present part of Region XII, will become part of Region IX.
The petitioner contended that there is no law which authorizes the President to pick certain provinces and cities
within the existing regions — some of which did not even take part in the plebiscite as in the case of the province
of Misamis Occidental and the cities of Oroquieta, Tangub and Ozamiz — and restructure them to new
administrative regions. Additionally, the transfer of the provinces of Misamis Occidental from Region X to
Region IX; Lanao del Norte from Region XII to Region IX, and South Cotobato from Region XI to Region XII
are alterations of the existing structures of governmental units, in other words, reorganization. Furthermore,
they submit that while the authority necessarily includes the authority to merge, the authority to merge does not
include the authority to reorganize. Therefore, the President's authority under RA 6734 to "merge existing
regions" cannot be construed to include the authority to reorganize them. To do so will violate the rules of statutory
construction.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Art. XIX, §13 of R.A. No. 6734 is unconstitutional because (1) it unduly delegates legislative
power to the President by authorizing him to "merge [by administrative determination] the existing regions"
RULING:
NO. It will be useful to recall first the nature of administrative regions and the basis and purpose for their
creation. On September 9, 1968, R.A. No. 5435 was passed "authorizing the President of the Philippines, with the
help of a Commission on Reorganization, to reorganize the different executive departments, bureaus, offices,
agencies and instrumentalities of the government, including banking or financial institutions and corporations
owned or controlled by it." The purpose was to promote "simplicity, economy and efficiency in the government."
Thus the creation and subsequent reorganization of administrative regions have been by the President pursuant to
authority granted to him by law. In conferring on the President the power "to merge [by administrative
determination] the existing regions" following the establishment of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao,
Congress merely followed the pattern set in previous legislation dating back to the initial organization of
administrative regions in 1972. The power conferred on the President is similar to the power to adjust municipal
boundaries which has been described in Pelaez v. Auditor General or as "administrative in nature."
There is, therefore, no abdication by Congress of its legislative power in conferring on the President the power to
merge administrative regions.
G.R. No. 127325 March 19, 1997
MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, ALEXANDER PADILLA, and MARIA ISABEL
ONGPIN, petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, JESUS DELFIN, ALBERTO PEDROSA & CARMEN PEDROSA, in
their capacities as founding members of the People's Initiative for Reforms, Modernization and Action
(PIRMA), respondents.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
FACTS:
On 6 December 1996, Atty. Jesus Delfin filed with COMELEC a petition to amend Constitution, to lift term limits
of elective officials, by people’s initiative. Delfin wanted COMELEC to control and supervise said people’s
initiative the signature-gathering all over the country. The proposition is: “Do you approve of lifting the term
limits of all elective government officials, amending for the purpose Sections 4 ) and 7 of Article VI, Section 4
of Article VII, and Section 8 of Article 8 of Article X of the 1987 Philippine Constitution?” Said Petition for
Initiative will first be submitted to the people, and after it is signed by at least 12% total number of registered
voters in the country, it will be formally filed with the COMELEC.
The Delfin Petition further alleged that the provisions sought to be amended are Sections 4 and 7 of Article
VI, Section 4 of Article VII,and Section 8 of Article X of the Constitution. Attached to the petition is a copy of a
"Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution" embodying the proposed amendments which consist in the
deletion from the aforecited sections of the provisions concerning term limits, and with propositions.

COMELEC in turn ordered Delfin for publication of the petition.

During the hearing, Senator Roco, filed a Motion to Dismiss the Delfin Petition on the ground that it is not the
initiatory petition properly cognizable by the COMELEC. Likewise, Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago,
Alexander Padilla, and Maria Isabel Ongpin — filed this special civil action for prohibition raising the following
arguments:
a. Constitutional provision on people’s initiative to amend the Constitution can only be implemented by law to
be passed by Congress. No such law has been passed.
b. Republic Act No. 6735 provides for 3 systems on initiative but failed to provide any subtitle on initiative on
the Constitution, unlike in the other modes of initiative. This deliberate omission indicates matter of people’s
initiative was left to some future law.
c. COMELEC has no power to provide rules and regulations for the exercise of people’s initiative. Only Congress
is authorized by the Constitution to pass the implementing law.
d. People’s initiative is limited to amendments to the Constitution, not to revision thereof. Extending or lifting of
term limits constitutes a revision
e. Congress nor any government agency has not yet appropriated funds for people’s initiative.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the delegation of the power to the COMELEC is valid
RULING:
NO. Empowering the COMELEC, an administrative body exercising quasi-judicial functions, to promulgate rules
and regulations is a form of delegation of legislative authority under no. 5 above. However, in every case of
permissible delegation, there must be a showing that the delegation itself is valid. It is valid only if the law (a) is
complete in itself, setting forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out, or implemented by the delegate; and
(b) fixes a standard — the limits of which are sufficiently determinate and determinable — to which the delegate
must conform in the performance of his functions. A sufficient standard is one which defines legislative policy,
marks its limits, maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it. It indicates the circumstances
under which the legislative command is to be effected.
Insofar as initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution is concerned, R.A. No. 6735 miserably failed to
satisfy both requirements in subordinate legislation. The delegation of the power to the COMELEC is then invalid.
COMELEC RESOLUTION NO. 2300, INSOFAR AS IT PRESCRIBES RULES AND REGULATIONS ON
THE CONDUCT OF INITIATIVE ON AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION, IS VOID.
It logically follows that the COMELEC cannot validly promulgate rules and regulations to implement the exercise
of the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution through the system of initiative. It
does not have that power under R.A. No. 6735.
COMELEC ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN
ENTERTAINING THE DELFIN PETITION.
Even if it be conceded ex gratia that R.A. No. 6735 is a full compliance with the power of Congress to implement
the right to initiate constitutional amendments, or that it has validly vested upon the COMELEC the power of
subordinate legislation and that COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is valid, the COMELEC acted without
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in entertaining the Delfin Petition.
Under Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution and Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 6735, a petition for initiative
on the Constitution must be signed by at least 12% of the total number of registered voters of which every
legislative district is represented by at least 3% of the registered voters therein. The Delfin Petition does not
contain signatures of the required number of voters. Delfin himself admits that he has not yet gathered signatures
and that the purpose of his petition is primarily to obtain assistance in his drive to gather signatures. Without the
required signatures, the petition cannot be deemed validly initiated.

G.R. No. 168056 September 1, 2005

ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST (Formerly AASJAS) OFFICERS SAMSON S. ALCANTARA and ED
VINCENT S. ALBANO, Petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA; HONORABLE SECRETARY
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE CESAR PURISIMA; and HONORABLE COMMISSIONER OF
INTERNAL REVENUE GUILLERMO PARAYNO, JR., Respondent.
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
FACTS:
Before R.A. No. 9337 took effect, petitioners ABAKADA GURO Party List, et al., filed a petition for prohibition
on May 27, 2005. They question the constitutionality of Sections 4, 5 and 6 of R.A. No. 9337, amending Sections
106, 107 and 108, respectively, of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC). Section 4 imposes a 10% VAT
on sale of goods and properties, Section 5 imposes a 10% VAT on importation of goods, and Section 6 imposes
a 10% VAT on sale of services and use or lease of properties. These questioned provisions contain a
uniform proviso authorizing the President, upon recommendation of the Secretary of Finance, to raise the VAT
rate to 12%, effective January 1, 2006, after any of the following conditions have been satisfied, to wit:
. . . That the President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Finance, shall, effective January 1, 2006,
raise the rate of value-added tax to twelve percent (12%), after any of the following conditions has been satisfied:
(i) Value-added tax collection as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the previous year exceeds
two and four-fifth percent (2 4/5%); or
(ii) National government deficit as a percentage of GDP of the previous year exceeds one and one-half percent (1
½%).
Petitioners argue that the law is unconstitutional, as it constitutes abandonment by Congress of its exclusive
authority to fix the rate of taxes under Article VI, Section 28(2) of the 1987 Philippine Constitution.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there is undue delegation by Congress of its exclusive power to tax through the grant of the stand-
by authority to the President to increase the VAT rate
RULING:
NO. To determine whether or not there is an undue delegation of legislative power, the inquiry must be directed
to the scope and definiteness of the measure enacted. The legislative does not abdicate its functions when it
describes what job must be done, who is to do it, and what is the scope of his authority. For a complex
economy, that may be the only way in which the legislative process can go forward. A distinction has rightfully
been made between delegation of power to make the laws which necessarily involves a discretion as to what
it shall be, which constitutionally may not be done, and delegation of authority or discretion as to its
execution to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law, to which no valid objection can be made.
The case before the Court is not a delegation of legislative power. It is simply a delegation of ascertainment of
facts upon which enforcement and administration of the increase rate under the law is contingent. The legislature
has made the operation of the 12% rate effective January 1, 2006, contingent upon a specified fact or condition.
It leaves the entire operation or non-operation of the 12% rate upon factual matters outside of the control of the
executive.
G.R. No. 180046 April 2, 2009
REVIEW CENTER ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA and COMMISSION ON HIGHER EDUCATION
represented by its Chairman ROMULO L. NERI, Respondents.
CPA REVIEW SCHOOL OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. (CPAR), PROFESSIONAL REVIEW AND
TRAINING CENTER, INC. (PRTC), ReSA REVIEW SCHOOL, INC. (ReSA), CRC-ACE REVIEW
SCHOOL, INC. (CRC-ACE) Petitioners-Intervenors.
PIMSAT COLLEGES, Respondent-Intervenor.
CARPIO, J.:
FACTS:
On 11 and 12 June 2006, the Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) conducted the Nursing Board
Examinations nationwide. In June 2006, licensure applicants wrote the PRC to report that handwritten copies of
two sets of examinations were circulated during the examination period among the examinees reviewing at the
R.A. Gapuz Review Center and Inress Review Center. George Cordero, Inress Review Center’s President, was
then the incumbent President of the Philippine Nurses Association. The examinees were provided with a list of
500 questions and answers in two of the examinations’ five subjects, particularly Tests III (Psychiatric Nursing)
and V (Medical-Surgical Nursing). The PRC later admitted the leakage and traced it to two Board of Nursing
members.3 On 19 June 2006, the PRC released the results of the Nursing Board Examinations. On 18 August
2006, the Court of Appeals restrained the PRC from proceeding with the oath-taking of the successful examinees
set on 22 August 2006.
Consequently, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (President Arroyo) replaced all the members of the PRC’s
Board of Nursing. President Arroyo also ordered the examinees to re-take the Nursing Board Examinations.
On 8 September 2006, President Arroyo issued EO 566 which authorized the CHED to supervise the
establishment and operation of all review centers and similar entities in the Philippines.
On 3 November 2006, the CHED, through its then Chairman Carlito S. Puno (Chairman Puno), approved CHED
Memorandum Order No. 49, series of 2006 (IRR).
In a letter dated 24 November 2006, the Review Center Association of the Philippines (petitioner), an organization
of independent review centers, asked the CHED to "amend, if not withdraw" the IRR arguing, among other things,
that giving permits to operate a review center to Higher Education Institutions (HEIs) or consortia of HEIs and
professional organizations will effectively abolish independent review centers. Chairman Puno wrote petitioner,
through its President Jose Antonio Fudolig (Fudolig), that to suspend the implementation of the IRR would be
inconsistent with the mandate of EO 566.
ISSUE:
Whether EO 566 is an unconstitutional exercise by the Executive of legislative power as it expands the CHED’s
jurisdiction
RULING:
YES. Section 20, Title I of Book III of EO 292 speaks of other powers vested in the President under the law. The
exercise of the President’s residual powers under this provision requires legislation,as the provision clearly states
that the exercise of the President’s other powers and functions has to be "provided for under the law." There is
no law granting the President the power to amend the functions of the CHED. The President may not amend RA
7722 through an Executive Order without a prior legislation granting her such power.
The President has no inherent or delegated legislative power to amend the functions of the CHED under RA 7722.
Legislative power is the authority to make laws and to alter or repeal them, and this power is vested with the
Congress under Section 1, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which states:
Section 1. The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate
and a House of Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the people by the provision on initiative and
referendum.
Since EO 566 is an invalid exercise of legislative power, the RIRR is also an invalid exercise of the CHED’s
quasi-legislative power.
Administrative agencies exercise their quasi-legislative or rule-making power through the promulgation of rules
and regulations. The CHED may only exercise its rule-making power within the confines of its jurisdiction under
RA 7722. The RIRR covers review centers and similar entities which are neither institutions of higher education
nor institutions offering degree-granting programs.