residence because respondent and Carlos Ui wanted to let the
SECOND DIVISION
[ADM. CASE No. 3319. June 8, 2000.]
LESLIE UI, Complainant, v. ATTY. IRIS BONIFACIO,
Respondent.
DECISION
DE LEON, JR., J.:
Before us is an administrative complaint for disablement against
Atty. Iris Bonifacio for allegedly carrying on an immoral
relationship with Carlos L. Ui, husband of complainant, Leslie Ui.
The relevant facts are:
On January 24, 1971 complainant Leslie Ui married Carlos L. Ui
at the Our Lady of Lourdes Church in Quezon City 1 and as a
result of their marital union, they had four (4) children, namely,
Leilani, Lianni, Lindsay and Carl Cavin, all surnamed Ui.
Sometime in December 1987, however, complainant found out
that her husband, Carlos Ui, was carrying on an illicit
relationship with respondent Atty. Iris Bonifacio with whom he
begot a daughter sometime in 1986, and that they had been
living together at No. 527 San Carlos Street, Ayala Alabang
Village in Muntinlupa City. Respondent who is a graduate of the
College of Law of the University of the Philippines was admitted
to the Philippine Bar in 1982.
Carlos Ui admitted to complainant his relationship with the
Respondent. Complainant then visited respondent at her office
in the later part of June 1988 and introduced herself as the legal
wife of Carlos Ui. Whereupon, respondent admitted to her that
she has a child with Carlos Ui and alleged, however, that
everything was over between her and Carlos Ui. Complainant
believed the representations of respondent and thought things
would turn out well from then on and that the illicit relationship
between her husband and respondent would come to an end.
However, complainant again discovered that the illicit
relationship between her husband and respondent continued,
and that sometime in December 1988, respondent and her
husband, Carlos Ui, had a second child. Complainant then met
again with respondent sometime in March 1989 and pleaded
with respondent to discontinue her illicit relationship with Carlos
Ui but to no avail. The illicit relationship persisted and
complainant even came to know later on that respondent had
been employed by her husband in his company.
A complaint for disbarment, docketed as Adm. Case No. 3319,
was then filed on August 11, 1989 by the complainant against
respondent Atty. Iris Bonifacio before the Commission on Bar
Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (hereinafter,
Commission) on the ground of immorality, more particularly, for
carrying on an illicit relationship with the complainant’s
husband, Carlos Ui. In her Answer, 2 respondent averred that
she met Carlos Ui sometime in 1983 and had known him all
along to be a bachelor, with the knowledge, however, that
Carlos Ui had children by a Chinese woman in Amoy, China, from
whom he had long been estranged. She stated that during one
of their trips abroad, Carlos Ui formalized his intention to marry
her and they in fact got married in Hawaii, USA in 1985. 3 Upon
their return to Manila, respondent did not live with Carlos Ui.
The latter continued to live with his children in their Greenhills
children gradually to know and accept the fact of his second
marriage before they would live together.
In 1986, respondent left the country and stayed in Honolulu,
Hawaii and she would only return occasionally to the Philippines
to update her law practice and renew legal ties. During one of
her trips to Manila sometime in June 1988, respondent was
surprised when she was confronted by a woman who insisted
that she was the lawful wife of Carlos Ui. Hurt and desolate upon
her discovery of the true civil status of Carlos Ui, respondent
then left for Honolulu, Hawaii sometime in July 1988 and
returned only in March 1989 with her two (2) children. On March
20, 1989, a few days after she reported to work with the law
firm 5 she was connected with, the woman who represented
herself to be the wife of Carlos Ui again came to her office,
demanding to know if Carlos Ui has been communicating with
her.
It is respondent’s contention that her relationship with Carlos Ui
is not illicit because they were married abroad and that after
June 1988 when respondent discovered Carlos Ui’s true civil
status, she cut off all her ties with him. Respondent averred that
Carlos Ui never lived with her in Alabang, and that he resided at
26 Potsdam Street, Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila. It was
respondent who lived in Alabang in a house which belonged to
her mother, Rosalinda L. Bonifacio; and that the said house was
built exclusively from her parents’ funds. 6 By way of
counterclaim, respondent sought moral damages in the amount
of Ten Million Pesos (Php10,000,000.00) against complainant for
having filed the present allegedly malicious and groundless
disbarment case against Respondent.
In her Reply 7 dated April 6, 1990, complainant states, among
others, that respondent knew perfectly well that Carlos Ui was
married to complainant and had children with her even at the
start of her relationship with Carlos Ui, and that the reason
respondent went abroad was to give birth to her two (2) children
with Carlos Ui.
During the pendency of the proceedings before the Integrated
Bar, complainant also charged her husband, Carlos Ui, and
respondent with the crime of Concubinage before the Office of
the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal, docketed as I.S. No. 89-5247, but
the same was dismissed for insufficiency of evidence to establish
probable cause for the offense charged. The resolution
dismissing the criminal complaint against respondent reads:
Complainant’s evidence had prima facie established the
existence of the "illicit relationship" between the respondents
allegedly discovered by the complainant in December 1987. The
same evidence however show that respondent Carlos Ui was still
living with complainant up to the latter part of 1988 and/or the
early part of 1989.
It would therefore be logical and safe to state that the
"relationship" of respondents started and was discovered by
complainant sometime in 1987 when she and respondent Carlos
were still living at No. 26 Potsdam Street, Northeast Greenhills,
San Juan, Metro Manila and they, admittedly, continued to live
together at their conjugal home up to early (sic) part of 1989 or
later 1988, when respondent Carlos left the same.
From the above, it would not be amiss to conclude that altho
(sic) the relationship, illicit as complainant puts it, had been
prima facie established by complainant’s evidence, this same
evidence had failed to even prima facie establish the "fact of
respondent’s cohabitation in the concept of husband and wife at
the 527 San Carlos St., Ayala Alabang house, proof of which is
necessary and indispensable to at least create probable cause
for the offense charged. The statement alone of complainant,
worse, a statement only of a conclusion respecting the fact of
cohabitation does not make the complainant’s evidence thereto
127
any better/stronger (U.S. v. Casipong and Mongoy, 20 Phil.
178).
It is worth stating that the evidence submitted by respondents
in support of their respective positions on the matter support
and bolster the foregoing conclusion/recommendation.
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully recommended that the
instant complaint be dismissed for want of evidence to establish
probable cause for the offense charged.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED. 8
Complainant appealed the said Resolution of the Provincial Fiscal
of Rizal to the Secretary of Justice, but the same was dismissed
9 on the ground of insufficiency of evidence to prove her
allegation that respondent and Carlos Ui lived together as
husband and wife at 527 San Carlos Street, Ayala Alabang,
Muntinlupa, Metro Manila.
In the proceedings before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline,
complainant filed a Motion to Cite Respondent in Contempt of
the Commission 10 wherein she charged respondent with
making false allegations in her Answer and for submitting a
supporting document which was altered and intercalated. She
alleged that in the Answer of respondent filed before the
Integrated Bar, respondent averred, among others, that she was
married to Carlos Ui on October 22, 1985 and attached a
Certificate of Marriage to substantiate her averment. However,
the Certificate of Marriage 11 duly certified by the State
Registrar as a true copy of the record on file in the Hawaii State
Department of Health, and duly authenticated by the Philippine
Consulate General in Honolulu, Hawaii, USA revealed that the
date of marriage between Carlos Ui and respondent Atty. Iris
Bonifacio was October 22, 1987, and not October 22, 1985 as
claimed by respondent in her Answer. According to complainant,
the reason for that false allegation was because respondent
wanted to impress upon the said IBP that the birth of her first
child by Carlos Ui was within the wedlock. 12 It is the contention
of complainant that such act constitutes a violation of Articles
183 13 and 184 14 of the Revised Penal Code, and also contempt
of the Commission; and that the act of respondent in making
false allegations in her Answer and submitting an
altered/intercalated document are indicative of her moral
perversity and lack of integrity which make her unworthy to be
a member of the Philippine Bar.
In her Opposition (To Motion To Cite Respondent in Contempt),
15 respondent averred that she did not have the original copy
of the marriage certificate because the same was in the
possession of Carlos Ui, and that she annexed such copy
because she relied in good faith on what appeared on the copy
of the marriage certificate in her possession.
Respondent filed her Memorandum 16 on February 22, 1995,
and raised the lone issue of whether or not she has conducted
herself in an immoral manner for which she deserves to be
barred from the practice of law. Respondent averred that the
complaint should be dismissed on two (2) grounds, namely:
(i) Respondent conducted herself in a manner consistent with
the requirement of good moral character for the practice of the
legal profession; and
(ii) Complainant failed to prove her allegation that respondent
conducted herself in an immoral manner. 17
In her defense, respondent contends, among others, that it was
she who was the victim in this case and not Leslie Ui because
she did not know that Carlos Ui was already married, and that
upon learning of this fact, respondent immediately cut-off all her
ties with Carlos Ui. She stated that there was no reason for her
to doubt at that time that the civil status of Carlos Ui was that
of a bachelor because he spent so much time with her, and he
was so open in his courtship.
On the issue of the falsified marriage certificate, respondent
alleged that it was highly incredible for her to have knowingly
attached such marriage certificate to her Answer had she known
that the same was altered. Respondent reiterated that there was
no compelling reason for her to make it appear that her marriage
to Carlos Ui took place either in 1985 or 1987, because the fact
remains that respondent and Carlos Ui got married before
complainant confronted respondent and informed the latter of
her earlier marriage to Carlos Ui in June 1988. Further,
respondent stated that it was Carlos Ui who testified and
admitted that he was the person responsible for changing the
date of the marriage certificate from 1987 to 1985, and
complainant did not present evidence to rebut the testimony of
Carlos Ui on this matter.
Respondent posits that complainant’s evidence, consisting of the
pictures of respondent with a child, pictures of respondent with
Carlos Ui, a picture of a garage with cars, a picture of a light
colored car with Plate No. PNS 313, a picture of the same car,
and portion of the house and ground, and another picture of the
same car bearing Plate No. PNS 313 and a picture of the house
and the garage, 19 does not prove that she acted in an immoral
manner. They have no evidentiary value according to her. The
pictures were taken by a photographer from a private security
agency and who was not presented during the hearings. Further,
the respondent presented the Resolution of the Provincial Fiscal
of Pasig in I.S. Case No. 89-5427 dismissing the complaint filed
by Leslie Ui against respondent for lack of evidence to establish
probable cause for the offense charged 20 and the dismissal of
the appeal by the Department of Justice 21 to bolster her
argument that she was not guilty of any immoral or illegal act
because of her relationship with Carlos Ui. In fine, respondent
claims that she entered the relationship with Carlos Ui in good
faith and that her conduct cannot be considered as willful,
flagrant, or shameless, nor can it suggest moral indifference.
She fell in love with Carlos Ui whom she believed to be single,
and, that upon her discovery of his true civil status, she parted
ways with him.
In the Memorandum 22 filed on March 20, 1995 by complainant
Leslie Ui, she prayed for the disbarment of Atty. Iris Bonifacio
and reiterated that respondent committed immorality by having
intimate relations with a married man which resulted in the birth
of two (2) children. Complainant testified that respondent’s
mother, Mrs. Linda Bonifacio, personally knew complainant and
her husband since the late 1970s because they were clients of
the bank where Mrs. Bonifacio was the Branch Manager. 23 It
was thus highly improbable that respondent, who was living with
her parents as of 1986, would not have been informed by her
own mother that Carlos Ui was a married man. Complainant
likewise averred that respondent committed disrespect towards
the Commission for submitting a photocopy of a document
containing an intercalated date.
In her Reply to Complainant’s Memorandum, 24 respondent
stated that complainant miserably failed to show sufficient proof
to warrant her disbarment. Respondent insists that contrary to
the allegations of complainant, there is no showing that
respondent had knowledge of the fact of marriage of Carlos Ui
to complainant. The allegation that her mother knew Carlos Ui
to be a married man does not prove that such information was
made known to Respondent.
Hearing on the case ensued, after which the Commission on Bar
Discipline submitted its Report and Recommendation, finding
that:
In the case at bar, it is alleged that at the time respondent was
courted by Carlos Ui, the latter represented himself to be single.
The Commission does not find said claim too difficult to believe
in the light of contemporary human experience.
128
Almost always, when a married man courts a single woman, he
represents himself to be single, separated, or without any firm
commitment to another woman. The reason therefor is not hard
to fathom. By their very nature, single women prefer single
men.
The records will show that when respondent became aware the
(sic) true civil status of Carlos Ui, she left for the United States
(in July of 1988). She broke off all contacts with him. When she
returned to the Philippines in March of 1989, she lived with her
brother, Atty. Teodoro Bonifacio, Jr. Carlos Ui and respondent
only talked to each other because of the children whom he was
allowed to visit. At no time did they live together.
Under the foregoing circumstances, the Commission fails to find
any act on the part of respondent that can be considered as
unprincipled or disgraceful as to be reprehensible to a high
degree. To be sure, she was more of a victim that (sic) anything
else and should deserve compassion rather than condemnation.
Without cavil, this sad episode destroyed her chance of having
a normal and happy family life, a dream cherished by every
single girl.
x x x"
Thereafter, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines issued a Notice of Resolution dated December 13,
1997, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED
and APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein
made part of this Resolution/Decision as Annex "A", and, finding
the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record
and the applicable laws and rules, the complaint for Gross
Immorality against Respondent is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Atty. Iris Bonifacio is REPRIMANDED for knowingly and willfully
attaching to her Answer a falsified Certificate of Marriage with a
stern warning that a repetition of the same will merit a more
severe penalty."
We agree with the findings aforequoted.
The practice of law is a privilege. A bar candidate does not have
the right to enjoy the practice of the legal profession simply by
passing the bar examinations. It is a privilege that can be
revoked, subject to the mandate of due process, once a lawyer
violates his oath and the dictates of legal ethics. The requisites
for admission to the practice of law are:
a. he must be a citizen of the Philippines;
b. a resident thereof;
c. at least twenty-one (21) years of age;
d. a person of good moral character;
e. he must show that no charges against him involving moral
turpitude, are filed or pending in court;
f. possess the required educational qualifications; and
g. pass the bar examinations. 25 (Emphasis supplied)
Clear from the foregoing is that one of the conditions prior to
admission to the bar is that an applicant must possess good
moral character. More importantly, possession of good moral
character must be continuous as a requirement to the
enjoyment of the privilege of law practice, otherwise, the loss
thereof is a ground for the revocation of such privilege. It has
been held: —
If good moral character is a sine qua non for admission to the
bar, then the continued possession of good moral character is
also a requisite for retaining membership in the legal profession.
Membership in the bar may be terminated when a lawyer ceases
to have good moral character. (Royong v. Oblena, 117 Phil.
865).
A lawyer may be disbarred for "grossly immoral conduct, or by
reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude." A
member of the bar should have moral integrity in addition to
professional probity. It is difficult to state with precision and to
fix an inflexible standard as to what is "grossly immoral conduct"
or to specify the moral delinquency and obliquity which render
a lawyer unworthy of continuing as a member of the bar. The
rule implies that what appears to be unconventional behavior to
the straight-laced may not be the immoral conduct that
warrants disbarment.
Immoral conduct has been defined as "that conduct which is
willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral
indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members
of the community." (7 C.J.S. 959).
In the case at bar, it is the claim of respondent Atty. Bonifacio
that when she met Carlos Ui, she knew and believed him to be
single. Respondent fell in love with him and they got married
and as a result of such marriage, she gave birth to two (2)
children. Upon her knowledge of the true civil status of Carlos
Ui, she left him
Simple as the facts of the case may sound, the effects of the
actuations of respondent are not only far from simple, they will
have a rippling effect on how the standard norms of our legal
practitioners should be defined. Perhaps morality in our liberal
society today is a far cry from what it used to be before. This
permissiveness notwithstanding, lawyers, as keepers of public
faith, are burdened with a higher degree of social responsibility
and thus must handle their personal affairs with greater caution.
The facts of this case lead us to believe that perhaps respondent
would not have found herself in such a compromising situation
had she exercised prudence and been more vigilant in finding
out more about Carlos Ui’s personal background prior to her
intimate involvement with him.
Surely, circumstances existed which should have at least
aroused respondent’s suspicion that something was amiss in her
relationship with Carlos Ui, and moved her to ask probing
questions. For instance, respondent admitted that she knew that
Carlos Ui had children with a woman from Amoy, China, yet it
appeared that she never exerted the slightest effort to find out
if Carlos Ui and this woman were indeed unmarried. Also,
despite their marriage in 1987, Carlos Ui never lived with
respondent and their first child, a circumstance that is simply
incomprehensible considering respondent’s allegation that
Carlos Ui was very open in courting her.
All these taken together leads to the inescapable conclusion that
respondent was imprudent in managing her personal affairs.
However, the fact remains that her relationship with Carlos Ui,
clothed as it was with what respondent believed was a valid
marriage, cannot be considered immoral. For immorality
connotes conduct that shows indifference to the moral norms of
society and the opinion of good and respectable members of the
community. 27 Moreover, for such conduct to warrant
disciplinary action, the same must be "grossly immoral," that is,
it must be so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or
so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree.
We have held that "a member of the Bar and officer of the court
is not only required to refrain from adulterous relationships . . .
but must also so behave himself as to avoid scandalizing the
public by creating the belief that he is flouting those moral
standards." 29 Respondent’s act of immediately distancing
herself from Carlos Ui upon discovering his true civil status
129
belies just that alleged moral indifference and proves that she
had no intention of flaunting the law and the high moral
standard of the legal profession. Complainant’s bare assertions
to the contrary deserve no credit. After all, the burden of proof
rests upon the complainant, and the Court will exercise its
disciplinary powers only if she establishes her case by clear,
convincing and satisfactory evidence. 30 This, herein
complainant miserably failed to do.
On the matter of the falsified Certificate of Marriage attached by
respondent to her Answer, we find improbable to believe the
averment of respondent that she merely relied on the photocopy
of the Marriage Certificate which was provided her by Carlos Ui.
For an event as significant as a marriage ceremony, any normal
bride would verily recall the date and year of her marriage. It is
difficult to fathom how a bride, especially a lawyer as in the case
at bar, can forget the year when she got married. Simply stated,
it is contrary to human experience and highly improbable.
Furthermore, any prudent lawyer would verify the information
contained in an attachment to her pleading, especially so when
she has personal knowledge of the facts and circumstances
contained therein. In attaching such Marriage Certificate with an
intercalated date, the defense of good faith of respondent on
that point cannot stand.
It is the bounden duty of lawyers to adhere unwaveringly to the
highest standards of morality. The legal profession exacts from
its members nothing less. Lawyers are called upon to safeguard
the integrity of the Bar, free from misdeeds and acts constitutive
of malpractice. Their exalted positions as officers of the court
demand no less than the highest degree of morality.
WHEREFORE, the complaint for disbarment against respondent
Atty. Iris L. Bonifacio, for alleged immorality, is hereby
DISMISSED.
However, respondent is hereby REPRIMANDED for attaching to
her Answer a photocopy of her Marriage Certificate, with an
altered or intercalated date thereof, with a STERN WARNING
that a more severe sanction will be imposed on her for any
repetition of the same or similar offense in the future.

SO ORDERED.

130
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
SBC Case No. 519 July 31, 1997
PATRICIA FIGUEROA, complainant,
vs.
SIMEON BARRANCO, JR., respondent.
RESOLUTION
ROMERO, J.:
In a complaint made way back in 1971, Patricia Figueroa
petitioned that respondent Simeon Barranco, Jr. be denied
admission to the legal profession. Respondent had passed the
1970 bar examinations on the fourth attempt, after unsuccessful
attempts in 1966, 1967 and 1968. Before be could take his oath,
however, complainant filed the instant petition averring that
respondent and she had been sweethearts, that a child out of
wedlock was born to them and that respondent did not fulfill his
repeated promises to many her.
The facts were manifested in hearings held before Investigator
Victor F. Sevilla in June and July 1971. Respondent and
complainant were townmates in Janiuay, Iloilo. Since 1953,
when they were both in their teens, they were steadies.
Respondent even acted as escort to complainant when she
reigned as Queen at the 1953 town fiesta. Complainant first
acceded to sexual congress with respondent sometime in 1960.
Their intimacy yielded a son, Rafael Barranco, born on
December 11, 1964.1 It was after the child was born,
complainant alleged, that respondent first promised he would
marry her after he passes the bar examinations. Their
relationship continued and respondent allegedly made more
than twenty or thirty promises of marriage. He gave only P10.00
for the child on the latter's birthdays. Her trust in him and their
relationship ended in 1971, when she learned that respondent
married another woman. Hence, this petition.
Upon complainant's motion, the Court authorized the taking of
testimonies of witnesses by deposition in 1972. On February 18,
1974, respondent filed a Manifestation and Motion to Dismiss
the case citing complainant's failure to comment on the motion
of Judge Cuello seeking to be relieved from the duty to take
aforesaid testimonies by deposition. Complainant filed her
comment required and that she remains interested in the
resolution of the present case. On June 18, 1974, the Court
denied respondent's motion to dismiss.
On October 2, 1980, the Court once again denied a motion to
dismiss on the ground of abandonment filed by respondent on
September 17, 1979.2 Respondent's third motion to dismiss was
noted in the Court's Resolution dated September 15, 1982.3 In
1988, respondent repeated his request, citing his election as a
member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Janiuay, Iloilo from 1980-
1986, his active participation in civic organizations and good
standing in the community as well as the length of time this case
has been pending as reasons to allow him to take his oath as a
lawyer.4
On September 29, 1988, the Court resolved to dismiss the
complaint for failure of complainant to prosecute the case for an
unreasonable period of time and to allow Simeon Barranco, Jr.
to take the lawyer's oath upon payment of the required fees.5
Respondent's hopes were again dashed on November 17, 1988
when the Court, in response to complainant's opposition,
resolved to cancel his scheduled oath-taking. On June 1, 1993,
the Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.
The IBP's report dated May 17, 1997 recommended the
dismissal of the case and that respondent be allowed to take the
lawyer's oath.
We agree.
Respondent was prevented from taking the lawyer's oath in
1971 because of the charge of gross immorality made by
complainant. To recapitulate, respondent bore an illegitimate
child with his sweetheart, Patricia Figueroa, who also claims that
he did not fulfill his promise to marry her after he passes the bar
examinations.
We find that these facts do not constitute gross immorality
warranting the permanent exclusion of respondent from the
legal profession. His engaging in premarital sexual relations with
complainant and promises to marry suggests a doubtful moral
character on his part but the same does not constitute grossly
immoral conduct. The Court has held that to justify suspension
or disbarment the act complained of must not only be immoral,
but grossly immoral. "A grossly immoral act is one that is so
corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so
unprincipled or disgraceful as to be reprehensible to a high
degree."6 It is a willful, flagrant, or shameless act which shows
a moral indifference to the opinion of respectable members of
the community.7
We find the ruling in Arciga v. Maniwang8 quite relevant because
mere intimacy between a man and a woman, both of whom
possess no impediment to marry, voluntarily carried on and
devoid of any deceit on the part of respondent, is neither so
corrupt nor so unprincipled as to warrant the imposition of
disciplinary sanction against him, even if as a result of such
relationship a child was born out of wedlock.9
Respondent and complainant were sweethearts whose sexual
relations were evidently consensual. We do not find
complainant's assertions that she had been forced into sexual
intercourse, credible. She continued to see and be respondent's
girlfriend even after she had given birth to a son in 1964 and
until 1971. All those years of amicable and intimate relations
refute her allegations that she was forced to have sexual
congress with him. Complainant was then an adult who
voluntarily and actively pursued their relationship and was not
an innocent young girl who could be easily led astray.
Unfortunately, respondent chose to marry and settle
permanently with another woman. We cannot castigate a man
for seeking out the partner of his dreams, for marriage is a
sacred and perpetual bond which should be entered into because
of love, not for any other reason.
We cannot help viewing the instant complaint as an act of
revenge of a woman scorned, bitter and unforgiving to the end.
It is also intended to make respondent suffer severely and it
seems, perpetually, sacrificing the profession he worked very
hard to be admitted into. Even assuming that his past
indiscretions are ignoble, the twenty-six years that respondent
has been prevented from being a lawyer constitute sufficient
punishment therefor. During this time there appears to be no
other indiscretion attributed to him.10 Respondent, who is now
sixty-two years of age, should thus be allowed, albeit belatedly,
to take the lawyer's oath.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.
Respondent Simeon Barranco, Jr. is ALLOWED to take his oath
as a lawyer upon payment of the proper fees. SO ORDERED.
131
132
EN BANC
A.C. No. 4585 November 12, 2004
MICHAEL P. BARRIOS, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. FRANCISCO P. MARTINEZ, respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
This is a verified petition1 for disbarment filed against Atty.
Francisco Martinez for having been convicted by final judgment
in Criminal Case No. 6608 of a crime involving moral turpitude
by Branch 8 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tacloban City.2
The dispositive portion of the same states:
WHEREFORE, this Court finds the accused Francisco Martinez
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime for (sic) violation
of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 charged in the Information. He is
imposed a penalty of one (1) year imprisonment and fine double
the amount of the check which is EIGHT THOUSAND (8,000.00)
PESOS, plus payment of the tax pursuant to Section 205 of the
Internal Revenue Code and costs against the accused.3
Complainant further submitted our Resolution dated 13 March
1996 and the Entry of Judgment from this Court dated 20 March
1996.
On 03 July 1996, we required4 respondent to comment on said
petition within ten (10) days from notice. On 17 February 1997,
we issued a second resolution5 requiring him to show cause why
no disciplinary action should be imposed on him for failure to
comply with our earlier Resolution, and to submit said
Comment. On 07 July 1997, we imposed a fine of P1,000 for
respondent's failure to file said Comment and required him to
comply with our previous resolution within ten days.6 On 27 April
1998, we fined respondent an additional P2,000 and required
him to comply with the resolution requiring his comment within
ten days under pain of imprisonment and arrest for a period of
five (5) days or until his compliance.7 Finally, on 03 February
1999, or almost three years later, we declared respondent
Martinez guilty of Contempt under Rule 71, Sec. 3[b] of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure and ordered his imprisonment until he
complied with the aforesaid resolutions.8
On 05 April 1999, the National Bureau of Investigation reported9
that respondent was arrested in Tacloban City on 26 March
1999, but was subsequently released after having shown proof
of compliance with the resolutions of 17 February 1997 and 27
April 1998 by remitting the amount of P2,000 and submitting
his long overdue Comment.
In the said Comment10 dated 16 March 1999, respondent stated
that:
1. He failed to respond to our Resolution dated 17 February 1997
as he was at that time undergoing medical treatment at Camp
Ruperto Kangleon in Palo, Leyte;
2. Complainant Michael Barrios passed away sometime in June
1997; and
3. Said administrative complaint is an offshoot of a civil case
which was decided in respondent's favor (as plaintiff in the said
case). Respondent avers that as a result of his moving for the
execution of judgment in his favor and the eviction of the family
of herein complainant Michael Barrios, the latter filed the
present administrative case.
In the meantime, on 11 September 1997, a certain Robert Visbal
of the Provincial Prosecution Office of Tacloban City submitted a
letter11 to the First Division Clerk of Court alleging that
respondent Martinez also stood charged in another estafa case
before the Regional Trial Court of Tacloban City, Branch 9, as
well as a civil case involving the victims of the Doña Paz tragedy
in 1987, for which the Regional Trial Court of Basey, Samar,
Branch 30 rendered a decision against him, his appeal thereto
having been dismissed by the Court of Appeals.
In the said Decision of Branch 30 of the Regional Trial Court of
Basey, Samar,12 it appears that herein respondent Atty. Martinez
offered his legal services to the victims of the Doña Paz tragedy
for free. However, when the plaintiff in the said civil case was
issued a check for P90,000 by Sulpicio Lines representing
compensation for the deaths of his wife and two daughters, Atty.
Martinez asked plaintiff to endorse said check, which was then
deposited in the account of Dr. Martinez, Atty. Martinez's wife.
When plaintiff asked for his money, he was only able to recover
a total of P30,000. Atty. Martinez claimed the remaining
P60,000 as his attorney's fees. Holding that it was "absurd and
totally ridiculous that for a simple legal service … he would
collect 2/3 of the money claim," the trial court ordered Atty.
Martinez to pay the plaintiff therein the amount of P60,000 with
interest, P5,000 for moral and exemplary damages, and the
costs of the suit.
Said trial court also made particular mention of Martinez's
dilatory tactics during the trial, citing fourteen (14) specific
instances thereof. Martinez's appeal from the above judgment
was dismissed by the Court of Appeals for his failure to file his
brief, despite having been granted three thirty (30)-day
extensions to do so.13
On 16 June 1999, we referred14 the present case to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report,
and recommendation.
The report15 of IBP Investigating Commissioner Winston D.
Abuyuan stated in part that:
Several dates for the hearing of the case were scheduled but
none of the parties appeared before the Commission, until finally
it was considered submitted for resolution last 27 June 2002. On
the same date respondent filed a motion for the dismissal of the
case on the ground that the complainant died sometime in June
1997 and that dismissal is warranted because "the case filed by
him does not survive due to his demise; as a matter of fact, it
is extinguished upon his death."
We disagree with respondent's contention.
Pursuant to Section 1, Rule 139-B of the Revised Rules of Court,
the Honorable Supreme Court or the IBP may motu proprio
initiate the proceedings when they perceive acts of lawyers
which deserve sanctions or when their attention is called by any
one and a probable cause exists that an act has been
perpetrated by a lawyer which requires disciplinary sanctions.
As earlier cited, respondent lawyer's propensity to disregard or
ignore orders of the Honorable Supreme Court for which he was
fined twice, arrested and imprisoned reflects an utter lack of
good moral character.
Respondent's conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude
(estafa and/or violation of BP Blg. 22) clearly shows his unfitness
to protect the administration of justice and therefore justifies
the imposition of sanctions against him (see In re: Abesamis,
102 Phil. 1182; In re: Jaramillo, 101 Phil. 323; In re: Vinzon, 19
SCRA 815; Medina vs. Bautista, 12 SCRA 1, People vs. Tuanda,
Adm. Case No. 3360, 30 Jan. 1990).
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully
recommended that respondent Atty. Francisco P. Martinez be
disbarred and his name stricken out from the Roll of Attorneys
immediately.
133
On 27 September 2003, the IBP Board of Governors passed a
Resolution16 adopting and approving the report and
recommendation of its Investigating Commissioner.
On 03 December 2003, respondent Martinez filed a Motion for
Reconsideration and/or Reinvestigation,17 in the instant case
alleging that:
1. The Report and Recommendation of the IBP Investigating
Commissioner is tantamount to a deprivation of property
without due process of law, although admittedly the practice of
law is a privilege;
2. If respondent is given another chance to have his day in court
and allowed to adduce evidence, the result/outcome would be
entirely different from that arrived at by the Investigating
Commissioner; and
3. Respondent is now 71 years of age, and has served the
judiciary in various capacities (from acting city judge to
Municipal Judges League Leyte Chapter President) for almost 17
years prior to resuming his law practice.
On 14 January 2004, we required18 complainant to file a
comment within ten days. On 16 February 2004, we received a
Manifestation and Motion19 from complainant's daughter, Diane
Francis Barrios Latoja, alleging that they had not been furnished
with a copy of respondent's Motion, notwithstanding the fact
that respondent ostensibly lives next door to complainant's
family. Required to Comment on 17 May 2004, respondent has
until now failed to do so.
The records show that respondent, indeed, failed to furnish a
copy of said Motion to herein complainant. The records also
show that respondent was given several opportunities to present
evidence by this Court20 as well as by the IBP.21 Indeed, he only
has himself to blame, for he has failed to present his case
despite several occasions to do so. It is now too late in the day
for respondent to ask this court to receive his evidence.
This court, moreover, is unwilling to exercise the same patience
that it did when it waited for his comment on the original
petition. At any rate, after a careful consideration of the records
of the instant case, we find the evidence on record sufficient to
support the IBP's findings.
Under Sec. 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, a member of the
Bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney
by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross
misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason
of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any
violation of the oath which he is required to take before
admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful
order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing
as an attorney for a party to a case without authority to do so.
In the present case, respondent has been found guilty and
convicted by final judgment for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 for
issuing a worthless check in the amount of P8,000. The issue
with which we are now concerned is whether or not the said
crime is one involving moral turpitude. 22
Moral turpitude "includes everything which is done contrary to
justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals."23 It involves "an act
of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a
man owes his fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to
the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man
and woman, or conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty,
or good morals."24
In People of the Philippines v. Atty. Fe Tuanda,25 where the
erring lawyer was indefinitely suspended for having been
convicted of three counts of violation of B.P. Blg. 22, we held
that conviction by final judgment of violation of B.P. Blg. 22
involves moral turpitude and stated:
We should add that the crimes of which respondent was
convicted also import deceit and violation of her attorney's oath
and the Code of Professional Responsibility under both of which
she was bound to "obey the laws of the land." Conviction of a
crime involving moral turpitude might not (as in the instant
case, violation of B.P. Blg. 22 does not) relate to the exercise of
the profession of a lawyer; however, it certainly relates to and
affects the good moral character of a person convicted of such
offense…26 (emphasis supplied)
Over ten years later, we reiterated the above ruling in Villaber
v. Commission on Elections27 and disqualified a congressional
candidate for having been sentenced by final judgment for three
counts of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 in accordance with Sec. 12 of
the Omnibus Election Code, which states:
SEC. 12. Disqualifications. — Any person who has been declared
by competent authority insane or incompetent, or has been
sentenced by final judgment for subversion, insurrection,
rebellion, or for any offense for which he has been sentenced to
a penalty of more than eighteen months, or for a crime involving
moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to be a candidate and to
hold any office, unless he has been given plenary pardon or
granted amnesty. (emphasis supplied)
Enumerating the elements of that crime, we held that the act of
a person in issuing a check knowing at the time of the issuance
that he or she does not have sufficient funds in, or credit with,
the drawee bank for the check in full upon its presentment, is a
manifestation of moral turpitude. Notwithstanding therein
petitioner's averment that he was not a lawyer, we nevertheless
applied our ruling in People v. Tuanda, to the effect that
(A) conviction for violation of B.P. Blg. 22, "imports deceit" and
"certainly relates to and affects the good moral character of a
person." [Indeed] the effects of the issuance of a worthless
check, as we held in the landmark case of Lozano v. Martinez,
through Justice Pedro L. Yap, "transcends the private interests
of the parties directly involved in the transaction and touches
the interests of the community at large. The mischief it creates
is not only a wrong to the payee or holder, but also an injury to
the public" since the circulation of valueless commercial papers
"can very well pollute the channels of trade and commerce,
injure the banking system and eventually hurt the welfare of
society and the public interest." Thus, paraphrasing Black's
definition, a drawer who issues an unfunded check deliberately
reneges on his private duties he owes his fellow men or society
in a manner contrary to accepted and customary rule of right
and duty, justice, honesty or good morals.28 (emphasis supplied)
In the recent case of Barrientos v. Libiran-Meteoro,29 we stated
that:
(T)he issuance of checks which were later dishonored for having
been drawn against a closed account indicates a lawyer's
unfitness for the trust and confidence reposed on her. It shows
a lack of personal honesty and good moral character as to render
her unworthy of public confidence. [Cuizon v. Macalino, A.C. No.
4334, 07 July 2004] The issuance of a series of worthless checks
also shows the remorseless attitude of respondent, unmindful to
the deleterious effects of such act to the public interest and
public order. [Lao v. Medel, 405 SCRA 227] It also manifests a
lawyer's low regard for her commitment to the oath she has
taken when she joined her peers, seriously and irreparably
tarnishing the image of the profession she should hold in high
esteem. [Sanchez v. Somoso, A.C. No. 6061, 03 October 2003]
Clearly, therefore, the act of a lawyer in issuing a check without
sufficient funds to cover the same constitutes such willful
dishonesty and immoral conduct as to undermine the public
confidence in law and lawyers. And while "the general rule is
that a lawyer may not be suspended or disbarred, and the court
may not ordinarily assume jurisdiction to discipline him for
misconduct in his non-professional or private capacity, where,
134
however, the misconduct outside of the lawyer's professional
dealings is so gross a character as to show him morally unfit for
the office and unworthy of the privilege which his licenses and
the law confer on him, the court may be justified in suspending
or removing him from the office of attorney."30
The argument of respondent that to disbar him now is
tantamount to a deprivation of property without due process of
law is also untenable. As respondent himself admits, the practice
of law is a privilege. The purpose of a proceeding for disbarment
is "to protect the administration of justice by requiring that those
who exercise this important function shall be competent,
honorable and reliable; men in whom courts and clients may
repose confidence."31 "A proceeding for suspension or
disbarment is not in any sense a civil action where the
complainant is plaintiff and the respondent lawyer is a
defendant. Disciplinary proceedings involve no private interest
and afford no redress for private grievance. They are undertaken
and prosecuted solely for the public welfare, and for the purpose
of preserving courts of justice from the official ministrations of
persons unfit to practice them."32 "Verily, lawyers must at all
times faithfully perform their duties to society, to the bar, to the
courts and to their clients. Their conduct must always reflect the
values and norms of the legal profession as embodied in the
Code of Professional Responsibility. On these considerations, the
Court may disbar or suspend lawyers for any professional or
private misconduct showing them to be wanting in moral
character, honesty, probity and good demeanor — or to be
unworthy to continue as officers of the Court."33
Nor are we inclined to look with favor upon respondent's plea
that if "given another chance to have his day in court and to
adduce evidence, the result/outcome would be entirely different
from that arrived at." We note with displeasure the inordinate
length of time respondent took in responding to our requirement
to submit his Comment on the original petition to disbar him.
These acts constitute a willful disobedience of the lawful orders
of this Court, which under Sec. 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court is in itself a cause sufficient for suspension or disbarment.
Thus, from the time we issued our first Resolution on 03 July
1996 requiring him to submit his Comment, until 16 March
1999, when he submitted said Comment to secure his release
from arrest, almost three years had elapsed.
It is revealing that despite the unwarranted length of time it took
respondent to comply, his Comment consists of all of two pages,
a copy of which, it appears, he neglected to furnish
complainant.34 And while he claims to have been confined while
undergoing medical treatment at the time our Resolution of 17
February 1997 was issued, he merely reserved the submission
of a certification to that effect. Nor, indeed, was he able to offer
any explanation for his failure to submit his Comment from the
time we issued our first Resolution of 03 July 1996 until 16
March 1999. In fact, said Comment alleged, merely, that the
complainant, Michael Barrios, passed away sometime in June
1997, and imputed upon the latter unsupported ill-motives for
instituting the said Petition against him, which argument has
already been resolved squarely in the abovementioned IBP
report.
Moreover, the IBP report cited the failure of both parties to
appear before the Commission as the main reason for the long
delay, until the same was finally submitted for Resolution on 27
June 2002. Respondent, therefore, squandered away seven
years to "have his day in court and adduce evidence" in his
behalf, which inaction also unduly delayed the court's prompt
disposition of this petition.
In Pajares v. Abad Santos,35 we reminded attorneys that "there
must be more faithful adherence to Rule 7, Section 5 of the
Rules of Court [now Rule 7, Section 3] which provides that the
signature of an attorney constitutes a certificate by him that he
has read the pleading and that to the best of his knowledge,
information and belief, there is good ground to support it; and
that it is not interposed for delay, and expressly admonishes
that for a willful violation of this rule an attorney may be
subjected to disciplinary action.36 It is noteworthy that in the
past, the Court has disciplined lawyers and judges for willful
disregard of its orders to file comments or appellant's briefs, as
a penalty for disobedience thereof. 37
For the same reasons, we are disinclined to take respondent's
old age and the fact that he served in the judiciary in various
capacities in his favor. If at all, we hold respondent to a higher
standard for it, for a judge should be the embodiment of
competence, integrity, and independence,38 and his conduct
should be above reproach.39 The fact that respondent has chosen
to engage in private practice does not mean he is now free to
conduct himself in less honorable – or indeed in a less than
honorable – manner.
We stress that membership in the legal profession is a
privilege,40 demanding a high degree of good moral character,
not only as a condition precedent to admission, but also as a
continuing requirement for the practice of law.41 Sadly, herein
respondent falls short of the exacting standards expected of him
as a vanguard of the legal profession.
The IBP Board of Governors recommended that respondent be
disbarred from the practice of law. We agree.
We come now to the matter of the penalty imposable in this
case. In Co v. Bernardino and Lao v. Medel, we upheld the
imposition of one year's suspension for non-payment of debt
and issuance of worthless checks, or a suspension of six months
upon partial payment of the obligation.42 However, in these
cases, for various reasons, none of the issuances resulted in a
conviction by the erring lawyers for either estafa or B.P. Blg. 22.
Thus, we held therein that the issuance of worthless checks
constitutes gross misconduct, for which a lawyer may be
sanctioned with suspension from the practice of law.
In the instant case, however, herein respondent has been found
guilty and stands convicted by final judgment of a crime
involving moral turpitude. In People v. Tuanda, which is similar
to this case in that both respondents were convicted for violation
of B.P. Blg. 22 which we have held to be such a crime, we
affirmed the order of suspension from the practice of law
imposed by the Court of Appeals, until further orders.
However, in a long line of cases, some of which were decided
after Tuanda, we have held disbarment to be the appropriate
penalty for conviction by final judgment for a crime involving
moral turpitude. Thus:
1. In In The Matter of Disbarment Proceedings v. Narciso N.
Jaramillo,43 we disbarred a lawyer convicted of estafa without
discussing the circumstances behind his conviction. We held
that:
There is no question that the crime of estafa involves moral
turpitude. The review of respondent's conviction no longer rests
upon us. The judgment not only has become final but has been
executed. No elaborate argument is necessary to hold the
respondent unworthy of the privilege bestowed on him as a
member of the bar. Suffice it to say that, by his conviction, the
respondent has proved himself unfit to protect the
administration of justice.44
2. In In Re: Dalmacio De Los Angeles,45 a lawyer was convicted
of the crime of attempted bribery in a final decision rendered by
the Court of Appeals. "And since bribery is admittedly a felony
involving moral turpitude (7 C.J.S., p. 736; 5 Am. Jur. p. 428),
this Court, much as it sympathizes with the plight of respondent,
is constrained to decree his disbarment as ordained by Section
25 of Rule 127."46
3. In Ledesma De Jesus-Paras v. Quinciano Vailoces,47 the erring
lawyer acknowledged the execution of a document purporting to
be a last will and testament, which later turned out to be a
135
forgery. He was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of falsification of public document, which the Court held
to be a crime involving moral turpitude, said act being contrary
to justice, honesty and good morals, and was subsequently
disbarred.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago,
Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Carpio-Morales,
Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, Chico-Nazario, and Garcia, JJ., concur.
Puno, J., on official leave.

4. In In Re: Disbarment Proceedings Against Atty. Diosdado Q. Corona, and Tinga, JJ., on leave.
Gutierrez,48 Atty. Gutierrez was convicted for murder. After
serving a portion of the sentence, he was granted a conditional
pardon by the President. Holding that the pardon was not
absolute and thus did not reach the offense itself but merely
remitted the unexecuted portion of his term, the court
nevertheless disbarred him.
5. In In Re: Atty. Isidro P. Vinzon,49 Atty. Vinzon was convicted
of the crime of estafa for misappropriating the amount of
P7,000.00, and was subsequently disbarred. We held thus:
Upon the other hand, and dealing now with the merits of the
case, there can be no question that the term "moral turpitude"
includes everything which is done contrary to justice, honesty,
or good morals. In essence and in all respects, estafa, no doubt,
is a crime involving moral turpitude because the act is
unquestionably against justice, honesty and good morals (In re
Gutierrez, Adm. Case No. 263, July 31, 1962; Bouvier's Law
Dictionary; In re Basa, 41 Phil. 275-76). As respondent's guilt
cannot now be questioned, his disbarment is inevitable.
(emphasis supplied)50
6. In In Re: Attorney Jose Avanceña,51 the conditional pardon
extended to the erring lawyer by the Chief Executive also failed
to relieve him of the penalty of disbarment imposed by this
court.
7. In In Re Disbarment of Rodolfo Pajo,52 a lawyer was charged
and found guilty of the crime of falsification of public document
for having prepared and notarized a deed of sale of a parcel of
land knowing that the supposed affiant was an impostor and that
the vendor had been dead for almost eight years. We ruled that
disbarment follows as a consequence of a lawyer's conviction by
final judgment of a crime involving moral turpitude, and since
the crime of falsification of public document involves moral
turpitude, we ordered respondent's name stricken off the roll of
attorneys.
8. In Adelina T. Villanueva v. Atty. Teresita Sta. Ana,53 we upheld
the recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors to disbar a
lawyer who had been convicted of estafa through falsification of
public documents, because she was "totally unfit to be a
member of the legal profession."54
9. In Victoriano P. Resurreccion v. Atty. Ciriaco C. Sayson,55 a
lawyer was disbarred for having been convicted of estafa by final
judgment for misappropriating the funds of his client.
In this case as well, we find disbarment to be the appropriate
penalty. "Of all classes and professions, the lawyer is most
sacredly bound to uphold the laws. He is their sworn servant;
and for him, of all men in the world, to repudiate and override
the laws, to trample them underfoot and to ignore the very
bands of society, argues recreancy to his position and office and
sets a pernicious example to the insubordinate and dangerous
elements of the body politic."56
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Francisco P. Martinez is hereby
dISBARRED and his name is ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll
of Attorneys. Let a copy of this Decision be entered in the
respondent's record as a member of the Bar, and notice of the
same be served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and on
the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts
in the country.
SO ORDERED.

136
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
A.C. No. 9115 September 17, 2014
REBECCA MARIE UY YUPANGCO-NAKPIL, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ROBERTO L. UY, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
This is an administrative case against respondent Atty. Roberto
L. Uy (respondent) for unprofessional and unethical conduct,
stemming from a complaint filed by private complainant
Rebecca Marie Uy Yupangco-Nakpil (Rebecca), represented by
her attorney-in-fact, Bella Asuncion Pollo (Bella).
The Facts
Rebecca is the natural niece and adopted daughter of the late
Dra. Pacita Uy y Lim (Pacita).1 She was adjudged as the sole
and exclusive legal heir of Paci ta by virtue of an Order2 dated
August 10, 1999 issued by the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 34 in SPEC. PROC. No. 95-7520 l (SP 95-75201). At the
time of her death, Pacita was a stockholder in several
corporations primarily engaged in acquiring, developing, and
leasing real properties, namely, Uy Realty Company, Inc.
(URCI), Jespajo Realty Corporation, Roberto L. Uy Realty and
Development Corporation, Jesus Uy Realty Corporation,
Distelleria La Jarolina, Inc., and Pacita Lim Uy Realty, Inc.3
In her Complaint4 filed on May 9, 2005,5 Rebecca, through her
attorney-in fact, Bella, averred that respondent, her alleged
illegitimate halfcousin,6 continuously failed and refused to
comply with the court order in SP 95-75201 declaring her as the
successor-in-interest to all of Pacita’s properties, as well as her
requests for the accounting and delivery of the dividends and
other proceeds or benefits coming from Pacita’s stockholdings in
the aforementioned corporations.7 She added that respondent
mortgaged a commercial property covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-133606 (subject property) in favor of
Philippine Savings Bank in the total amount of 54,000,000.00,8
despite an existing Trust Agreement9 executed on October 15,
1993 (subject Trust Agreement) wherein respondent, in his
capacity as President of URCI, already recognized her to be the
true and beneficial owner of the same.10 Accordingly, she
demanded that respondent return the said property by
executing the corresponding deed of conveyance in her favor
together with an inventory and accounting of all the proceeds
therefrom, but to no avail.11 In this relation, Rebecca claimed
that it was only on September 2, 2005 or after she had already
instituted various legal actions and remedies that respondent
and URCIagreed to transfer the subject property to her pursuant
to a compromise agreement.12
In his Answer With Compulsory Counterclaim,13 respondent
denied Rebecca’s allegations and raised the affirmative defenses
of forum shopping and prescription. He pointed out that Rebecca
had filed several cases raising the single issue on the correct
interpretation of the subject trust agreement. He also contended
that the parties’ transactions in this case were made way back
in 1993 and 1995 without a complaint having been filed until
Bella came into the picture and instituted various suits covering
the same issue.14 As such, he sought the dismissal of the
complaint, and further prayed for the payment of moral
damages and attorney’s fees by way of counterclaim.15
On September 8, 2005, Rebecca filed a Motion to Withdraw
Complaint16 in CBD Case No. 05-1484 for the reason that "the
facts surrounding the same arose out of a misunderstanding and
misapprehension of the real facts surrounding their dispute."17
However, on October 6, 2005, Bella filed a Manifestation with
Leave of Court to File Motion for Intervention,18 praying that the
investigation of the charges against respondent continue in
order to weed out erring members of the legal profession.19
The Report and Recommendation of the IBP
On October 8, 2007, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
Investigating Commissioner issuedhis Report and
Recommendation,20 finding respondent guilty of serious
misconduct in violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility (Code), and, thus, recommended the
penalty of suspension for a period of six (6) months.21
On matters of procedure, the Investigating Commissioner
opined that Rebecca’s motion to withdraw did notserve as a bar
for the further consideration and investigation ofthe
administrative case against respondent. As basis, he cites
Section 5, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court which provides that
"[n]o investigation shall be interrupted or terminated by reason
of the desistance, settlement, compromise, restitution,
withdrawal of the charges, or failure of the complainant to
prosecute the same." Separately, the Investigating
Commissioner denied the claim of forum shopping, noting that
disciplinary cases are sui generis and may, therefore, proceed
independently.22
On the merits of the charge, the Investigating Commissioner
observed that respondent lacked the good moral character
required from members of the Bar when the latter failed to
comply with the demands of Rebecca under the subject trust
agreement, not to mention his unworthy and deceitful acts of
mortgaging the subject property without the former’s consent.
In fine, respondent was found guilty of serious misconduct in
violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code, for which the above-
stated penalty was recommended.23
In a Resolution24 dated November 10, 2007, the IBP Board of
Governors adopted and approved the Investigating
Commissioner’s Report and Recommendation.
The Issue Before the Court
The basic issue in this case is whether or not respondent should
be held administratively liable.
The Court’s Ruling
Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code, as itis applied to the members
of the legal profession, engraves an overriding prohibition
against any form of misconduct, viz.:
CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION,
OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR
LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct.
The gravity of the misconduct – determinative as it is of the
errant lawyer’s penalty – depends on the factual circumstances
of each case.
Here, the Court observes that the squabble which gave rise to
the present administrative case largely constitutes an internal
affair, which had already been laid to rest by the parties. This is
clearly exhibited by Rebecca’s motion to withdraw filed in this
case as well as the compromise agreement forged in Civil Case
No. 04-108887 which involves the subject property’s alleged
disposition in violation of the subject trust agreement. As the
Court sees it, his failure to complywith the demands of Rebecca
– which she takes as an invocation of her rights under the
137
subject trust agreement – as well as respondent’s acts of
mortgaging the subject property without the former’s consent,
sprung from his own assertion of the rights he believed he had
over the subject property. The propriety of said courses of action
eludes the Court’s determination,for that matter had never been
resolved on its merits in view of the aforementioned settlement.
Rebecca even states in her motion to withdraw that the
allegations she had previously made arose out of a
"misapprehension of the real facts surrounding their dispute"
and even adds that respondent "had fully explained to [her] the
real nature and extent of her inheritance x x x toher entire
satisfaction," leading her to state that she is "now fully
convinced that [her] complaint has no basis in fact and in law."25
Accordingly, with the admitted misstatement of facts, the
observations of the Investigating Commissioner, as adopted by
the IBP, hardly hold water so as to support the finding of
"serious misconduct" which would warrant its recommended
penalty.1âwphi1
Be that as it may, the Court, nonetheless, finds that respondent
committed some form of misconduct by, as admitted,
mortgaging the subject property, notwithstanding the apparent
dispute over the same. Regardless of the merits of his own
claim, respondent should have exhibited prudent restraint
becoming of a legal exemplar. He should not have exposed
himself even to the slightest risk of committing a property
violation nor any action which would endanger the Bar's
reputation. Verily, members of the Bar are expected at all times
to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and
refrain from any act or omission which might lessen the trust
and confidence reposed by the public in the fidelity, honesty,
and integrity of the legal profession.26 By no insignificant
measure, respondent blemished not only his integrity as a
member of the Bar, but also that of the legal profession. In other
words, his conduct fell short of the exacting standards expected
of him as a guardian of law and justice. Although to a lesser
extent as compared to what has been ascribed by the IBP, the
Court still holds respondent guilty of violating Rule 1. 01, Canon
1 of the Code. Considering that this is his first offense as well as
the peculiar circumstances of this case, the Court believes that
a fine of ₱15,000.00 would suffice.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Roberto L. Uy is found GUILTY of
violating Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Accordingly, he is ordered to pay a FINE of
₱15,000.00 within ten (10) days from receipt of this Resolution.
Further, he is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same
or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this Resolution be attached to respondent's record
in this Court as attorney. Further, let copies of this Resolution
be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office
of the Court Administrator, which is directed to circulate them
to all the courts in the country for their information and
guidance.
SO ORDERED.
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice

138
EN BANC
A.C. No. 6486 September 22, 2004
EMMA T. DANTES, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. CRISPIN G. DANTES, respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Despite variations in the specific standards and provisions, one
requirement remains constant in all the jurisdictions where the
practice of law is regulated: the candidate must demonstrate
that he or she has "good moral character," and once he becomes
a lawyer he should always behave in accordance with the
standard. In this jurisdiction too, good moral character is not
only a condition precedent1 to the practice of law, but an
unending requirement for all the members of the bar. Hence,
when a lawyer is found guilty of grossly immoral conduct, he
may be suspended or disbarred.2
In an Affidavit-Complaint3 dated June 6, 2001, filed with the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), Emma T. Dantes, sought
the disbarment of her husband, Atty. Crispin G. Dantes on the
ground of immorality, abandonment, and violation of
professional ethics and law. The case was docketed as CBD Case
No. 01-851.
Complainant alleged that respondent is a philanderer.
Respondent purportedly engaged in illicit relationships with two
women, one after the other, and had illegitimate children with
them. From the time respondent’s illicit affairs started, he failed
to give regular support to complainant and their children, thus
forcing complainant to work abroad to provide for their
children’s needs. Complainant pointed out that these acts of
respondent constitute a violation of his lawyer’s oath and his
moral and legal obligation to be a role model to the community.
On July 4, 2001, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline issued
an Order4 requiring respondent to submit his answer to the
Affidavit-Complaint.
Respondent submitted his Answer5 on November 19, 2001.
Though admitting the fact of marriage with the complainant and
the birth of their children, respondent alleged that they have
mutually agreed to separate eighteen (18) years before after
complainant had abandoned him in their Balintawak residence
and fled to San Fernando, Pampanga. Respondent claimed that
when complainant returned after eighteen years, she insisted
that she be accommodated in the place where he and their
children were residing. Thus, he was forced to live alone in a
rented apartment.
Respondent further alleged that he sent their children to the best
school he could afford and provided for their needs. He even
bought two lots in Pampanga for his sons, Dandelo and Dante,
and gave complainant adequate financial support even after she
had abandoned him in 1983.
Respondent asserted that complainant filed this case in order to
force him to remit seventy percent (70%) of his monthly salary
to her.
Subsequently, the IBP conducted its investigation and hearings
on the complaint. Complainant presented her evidence, both
oral and documentary,6 to support the allegations in her
Affidavit-Complaint.
From the evidence presented by the complainant, it was
established that on January 19, 1979, complainant and
respondent were married7 and lived with the latter’s mother in
Balintawak. At that time, respondent was just a fourth year law
student. To make ends meet, complainant engaged in the buy
and sell business and relied on dole-outs from the respondent’s
mother.
Three children were born to the couple, namely, Dandelo, Dante
and Daisy, who were born on February 20, 1980,8 October 14,
19819 and August 11, 1983,10 respectively. Complainant
narrated that their relationship was marred by frequent quarrels
because of respondent’s extra-marital affairs.11 Sometime in
1983, she brought their children to her mother in Pampanga to
enable her to work because respondent had failed to provide
adequate support. From 1986 to 2001, complainant worked
abroad as a domestic helper.
Denying that there was a mutual agreement between her and
respondent to live separately, complainant asseverated that she
was just compelled to work abroad to support their children.
When she returned to the Philippines, she learned that
respondent was living with another woman. Respondent, then
bluntly told her, that he did not want to live with her anymore
and that he preferred his mistresses.
Complainant presented documentary evidence consisting of the
birth certificates of Ray Darwin, Darling, and Christian Dave,12
all surnamed Dantes, and the affidavits of respondent and his
paramour13 to prove the fact that respondent sired three
illegitimate children out of his illicit affairs with two different
women. Letters of complainant’s legitimate children likewise
support the allegation that respondent is a womanizer.14
In an Order dated April 17, 2002, respondent was deemed to
have waived his right to cross-examine complainant, after he
failed to appear during the scheduled hearings despite due
notice. He, however, submitted his Comment/Opposition to the
Complainant’s Formal Offer of Evidence with Motion to Exclude
the Evidence from the Records of the Proceedings15 on August
1, 2002.
Subsequently, on May 29, 2003, respondent submitted a Motion
to Adopt Alternative Dispute Resolution Mechanism.
Respondent’s motion was denied because it was filed after the
complainant had already presented her evidence.16 Respondent
was given a final chance to present his evidence on July 11,
2003. Instead of presenting evidence, respondent filed a Motion
for Reconsideration with Motion to Dismiss, which was likewise
denied for being a prohibited pleading under the Rules of
Procedure of the Commission on Bar Discipline. Respondent
submitted his Position Paper on August 4, 2003.
In respondent’s Position Paper,17 he reiterated the allegations in
his Answer except that this time, he argued that in view of the
resolution of the complaint for support with alimony pendente
lite18 filed against him by the complainant before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City,19 the instant administrative
case should be dismissed for lack of merit.
On July 7, 2004, the IBP submitted to us through the Office of
the Bar Confidant its Report20 and Resolution No. XVI-2004-230
involving CBD Case No. 01-851.21 The IBP recommended that
the respondent be suspended indefinitely from the practice of
law.
Except for the penalty, we find the above recommendation well-
taken.
The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
"Rule 1.01- A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct."
"Canon 7- A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and
dignity of the legal profession, and support the activities of the
Integrated Bar."
"Rule 7.03- A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely
reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in
139
public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the The power to disbar must be exercised with great caution, and
discredit of the legal profession." only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the
standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the Court
The Code of Professional Responsibility forbids lawyers from and as a member of the bar.33 Where a lesser penalty, such as
engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. temporary suspension, could accomplish the end desired,
Immoral conduct has been defined as that conduct which is so disbarment should never be decreed.34 However, in the present
willful, flagrant, or shameless as to show indifference to the case, the seriousness of the offense compels the Court to wield
opinion of good and respectable members of the community.22 its power to disbar as it appears to be the most appropriate
To be the basis of disciplinary action, the lawyer’s conduct must penalty.
not only be immoral, but grossly immoral. That is, it must be so
corrupt as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing Atty. Crispin G. Dantes
be reprehensible to a high degree23 or committed under such is hereby DISBARRED and his name is ORDERED STRICKEN
scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the common from the Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of this Decision be entered
sense of decency.24 in the respondent’s record as a member of the Bar, and notice
of the same be served on the Integrated Bar of the
In Barrientos vs. Daarol,25 we ruled that as officers of the court,
lawyers must not only in fact be of good moral character but Philippines, and on the Office of the Court Administrator for
must also be seen to be of good moral character and leading circulation to all courts in the country.
lives in accordance with the highest moral standards of the
community. More specifically, a member of the Bar and officer SO ORDERED.
of the court is not only required to refrain from adulterous
relationships or keeping mistresses but must also so behave
himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating the belief
that he is flouting those moral standards. If the practice of law
is to remain an honorable profession and attain its basic ideals,
those enrolled in its ranks should not only master its tenets and
principles but should also, in their lives, accord continuing
fidelity to them. The requirement of good moral character is of
much greater import, as far as the general public is concerned,
than the possession of legal learning.
It should be noted that the requirement of good moral character
has three ostensible purposes, namely: (i) to protect the public;
(ii) to protect the public image of lawyers; and (iii) to protect
prospective clients. A writer added a fourth: to protect errant
lawyers from themselves.26
Lawyers are expected to abide by the tenets of morality, not
only upon admission to the Bar but also throughout their legal
career, in order to maintain their good standing in this exclusive
and honored fraternity.27 They may be suspended from the
practice of law or disbarred for any misconduct, even if it
pertains to his private activities, as long as it shows him to be
wanting in moral character, honesty, probity or good
demeanor.28
Undoubtedly, respondent’s acts of engaging in illicit
relationships with two different women during the subsistence
of his marriage to the complainant constitutes grossly immoral
conduct warranting the imposition appropriate sanctions.
Complainant’s testimony, taken in conjunction with the
documentary evidence, sufficiently established respondent’s
commission of marital infidelity and immorality. Evidently,
respondent had breached the high and exacting moral standards
set for members of the law profession. He has made a mockery
of marriage which is a sacred institution demanding respect and
dignity.29
In Toledo vs. Toledo,30 we disbarred respondent for abandoning
his lawful wife and cohabiting with another woman who had
borne him a child. Likewise, in Obusan vs. Obusan,31 we ruled
that abandoning one’s wife and resuming carnal relations with a
paramour fall within that conduct which is willful, flagrant, or
shameless, and which shows moral indifference to the opinion
of the good and respectable members of the community.
We reiterate our ruling in Cordova vs. Cordova,32 that moral
delinquency which affects the fitness of a member of the bar to
continue as such, includes conduct that outrages the generally
accepted moral standards of the community as exemplified by
behavior which makes a mockery of the inviolable social
institution of marriage.

140
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.C. No. 1512 January 29, 1993
VICTORIA BARRIENTOS, complainant,
vs.
TRANSFIGURACION DAAROL, respondent.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
In a sworn complaint filed with this Court on August 20, 1975,
complainant Victoria C. Barrientos seeks the disbarment of
respondent Transfiguracion Daarol, ** a member of the
Philippine Bar, on grounds of deceit and grossly immoral
conduct.
After respondent filed his answer (Rollo, p. 12), the Court
Resolved to refer the case to the Solicitor General for
investigation, report and recommendation (Rollo, p. 18).
As per recommendation of the Solicitor General and for the
convenience of the parties and their witnesses who were
residing in the province of Zamboanga del Norte, the Provincial
Fiscal of said province was authorized to conduct the
investigation and to submit a report, together with transcripts
of stenographic notes and exhibits submitted by the parties, if
any (Rollo, p. 20).
On November 9, 1987, the Office of the Solicitor General
submitted its Report and Recommendation, viz.:
Evidence of the complainant:
. . . complainant Victoria Barrientos was single and a resident of
Bonifacio St., Dipolog City; that when she was still a teenager
and first year in college she came to know respondent
Transfiguracion Daarol in 1969 as he used to go to their house
being a friend of her sister Norma; that they also became
friends, and she knew the respondent as being single and living
alone in Galas, Dipolog City; that he was the General Manager
of Zamboanga del Norte Electric Cooperative, Inc. (ZANECO)
and subsequently transferred his residence to the ZANECO
compound at Laguna Blvd. at Del Pilar St., Dipolog City (pp.
109-111, tsn, September 30, 1976).
That on June 27, 1973, respondent came to their house and
asked her to be one of the usherettes in the Mason's convention
in Sicayab, Dipolog City, from June 28 to 30, 1973 and, she told
respondent to ask the permission of her parents, which
respondent did, and her father consented; that for three whole
days she served as usherette in the convention and respondent
picked her up from her residence every morning and took her
home from the convention site at the end of each day (pp. 112-
114, tsn, id.).
That in the afternoon of July 1, 1973, respondent came to
complainant's house and invited her for a joy ride with the
permission of her mother who was a former classmate of
respondent; that respondent took her to Sicayab in his jeep and
then they strolled along the beach, and in the course of which
respondent proposed his love to her; that respondent told her
that if she would accept him, he would marry her within six (6)
months from her acceptance; complainant told respondent that
she would think it over first; that from then on respondent used
to visit her in their house almost every night, and he kept on
courting her and pressed her to make her decision on
respondent's proposal; that on July 7, 1973, she finally accepted
respondent's offer of love and respondent continued his usual
visitations almost every night thereafter; they agreed to get
married in December 1973 (pp. 115-119, tsn, id.).
That in the morning of August 20, 1973, respondent invited her,
with the consent of her father, to a party at the Lopez Skyroom;
that at 7:00 p.m. of that day respondent fetched her from her
house and went to the Lopez Skyroom (pp. 119-121, tsn, id);
that at about 10:00 p.m. of that evening they left the party at
the Lopez Skyroom, but before taking her home respondent
invited her for a joy ride and took her to the airport at Sicayab,
Dipolog City; respondent parked the jeep by the beach where
there were no houses around; that in the course of their
conversation inside the jeep, respondent reiterated his promise
to marry her and then started caressing her downward and his
hand kept on moving to her panty and down to her private parts
(pp. 121-122, tsn. id.); that she then said: "What is this Trans?",
but he answered: "Day, do not be afraid of me. I will marry you"
and reminded her also that "anyway, December is very near,
the month we have been waiting for" ([p], 122, tsn, id.), then
he pleaded, "Day, just give this to me, do not be afraid" (ibid),
and again reiterated his promise and assurances, at the same
time pulling down her panty; that she told him that she was
afraid because they were not yet married, but because she loved
him she finally agreed to have sexual intercourse with him at
the back seat of the jeep; that after the intercourse she wept
and respondent again reiterated his promises and assurances
not to worry because anyway he would marry her; and at about
12:00 midnight they went home (pp.
122-124, tsn, id.).
After August 20, 1973, respondent continued to invite her to eat
outside usually at the Honeycomb Restaurant in Dipolog City
about twice or three times a week, after which he would take
her to the airport where they would have sexual intercourse;
that they had this sexual intercourse from August to October
1973 at the frequency of two or three times a week, and she
consented to all these things because she loved him and
believed in all his promises (pp. 125-127, tsn, id.).
Sometime in the middle part of September, 1973 complainant
noticed that her menstruation which usually occurred during the
second week of each month did not come; she waited until the
end of the month and still there was no menstruation; she
submitted to a pregnancy test and the result was positive; she
informed respondent and respondent suggested to have the
fetus aborted but she objected and respondent did not insist;
respondent then told her not to worry because they would get
married within one month and he would talk to her parents
about their marriage (pp. 129-132, tsn, id.).
On October 20, 1973, respondent came to complainant's house
and talked to her parents about their marriage; it was agreed
that the marriage would be celebrated in Manila so as not to
create a scandal as complainant was already pregnant;
complainant and her mother left for Manila by boat on October
22, 1973 while respondent would follow by plane; and they
agreed to meet in Singalong, Manila, in the house of
complainant's sister Delia who is married to Ernesto Serrano
(pp. 132-135, tsn, id.).
On October 26, 1973, when respondent came to see
complainant and her mother at Singalong, Manila, respondent
told them that he could not marry complainant because he was
already married (p. 137, tsn, id.); complainant's mother got
mad and said: "Trans, so you fooled my daughter and why did
you let us come here in Manila?" (p. 138, tsn, id.). Later on,
however, respondent reassured complainant not to worry
because respondent had been separated from his wife for 16
years and he would work for the annulment of his marriage and,
subsequently marry complainant (p. 139, tsn, id.); respondent
141
told complainant to deliver their child in Manila and assured her
of a monthly support of P250.00 (p. 140, tsn, id.); respondent
returned to Dipolog City and actually sent the promised support;
he came back to Manila in January 1974 and went to see
complainant; when asked about the annulment of his previous
marriage, he told complainant that it would soon be approved
(pp. 141-142, tsn, id.); he came back in February and in March
1974 and told complainant the same thing (p. 142, tsn, id.);
complainant wrote her mother to come to Manila when she
delivers the child, but her mother answered her that she cannot
come as nobody would be left in their house in Dipolog and
instead suggested that complainant go to Cebu City which is
nearer; complainant went to Cebu City in April 1974 and, her
sister Norma took her to the Good Shepherd Convent at Banawa
Hill; she delivered a baby girl on June 14, 1974 at the Perpetual
Succor Hospital in Cebu City; and the child was registered as
"Dureza Barrientos" (pp. 143-148, tsn, id.).
In the last week of June 1974 complainant came to Dipolog City
and tried to contact respondent by phone and, thru her brother,
but to no avail; as she was ashamed she just stayed in their
house; she got sick and her father sent her to Zamboanga City
for medical treatment; she came back after two weeks but still
respondent did not come to see her (tsn. 48-150, tsn, id.); she
consulted a lawyer and filed an administrative case against
respondent with the National Electrification Administration; the
case was referred to the Zamboanga del Norte Electric
Cooperative (ZANECO) and it was dismissed and thus she filed
the present administrative case (pp. 150-151, tsn, id.).
Evidence for the Respondent
The evidence of the respondent consists of his sole testimony
and one exhibit, the birth certificate of the child (Exh. 1).
Respondent declared substantially as follows: that he was born
on August 6, 1932 in Liloy, Zamboanga del Norte; that he
married Romualda Sumaylo in Liloy in 1955; that he had a son
who is now 20 years old; that because of incompatibility he had
been estranged from his wife for 16 years; that in 1953 he was
baptized as a moslem and thereby embraced the Islam Religion
(pp.
173-180 tsn, Jan. 13, 1977); that he came to know
complainant's father since 1952 because he was his teacher;
likewise he knew complainant's mother because they were
former classmates in high school; that he became acquainted
with complainant when he used to visit her sister, Norma, in
their house; they gradually became friends and often talked with
each other, and even talked about their personal problems; that
he mentioned to her his being estranged from his wife; that with
the consent of her parents he invited her to be one of the
usherettes in the Masonic Convention in Sicayab, Dipolog City
held on June 28-30, 1973 (pp. 185-192, tsn, id.); that the
arrangement was for him to fetch her from her residence and
take her home from the convention site; that it was during this
occasion that they became close to each other and after the
convention, he proposed his love to her on July 7, 1973; that
(sic) a week of courtship, she accepted his proposal and since
then he used to invite her (pp. 193-194, tsn, id.).
That in the evening of August 20, 1973, respondent invited
complainant to be his partner during the Chamber of Commerce
affair at the Lopez Skyroom; that at about 10:00 p.m. of that
evening after the affair, complainant complained to him of a
headache, so he decided to take her home but once inside the
jeep, she wanted to have a joy ride, so he drove around the city
and proceeded to the airport; that when they were at the
airport, only two of them, they started the usual kisses and they
were carried by their passion; they forgot themselves and they
made love; that before midnight he took her home; that
thereafter they indulged in sexual intercourse many times
whenever they went on joy riding in the evening and ended up
in the airport which was the only place they could be alone
(p. 195, tsn, id.).
That it was sometime in the later part of October 1973 that
complainant told him of her pregnancy; that they agreed that
the child be delivered in Manila to avoid scandal and respondent
would take care of expenses; that during respondent's talk with
the parents of complainant regarding the latter's pregnancy, he
told him he was married but estranged from his wife; that when
complainant was already in Manila, she asked him if he was
willing to marry her, he answered he could not marry again,
otherwise, he would be charged with bigamy but he promised to
file an annulment of his marriage as he had been separated from
his wife for 16 years; that complainant consented to have sexual
intercourse with him because of her love to him and he did not
resort to force, trickery, deceit or cajolery; and that the present
case was filed against him by complainant because of his failure
to give the money to support complainant while in Cebu waiting
for the delivery of the child and, also to meet complainant's
medical expenses when she went to Zamboanga City for medical
check-up (pp. 198-207, tsn, id.).
FINDING OF FACTS
From the evidence adduced by the parties, the following facts
are not disputed:
1. That the complainant, Victoria Barrientos, is single, a college
student, and was about 20 years and 7 months old during the
time (July-October 1975) of her relationship with respondent,
having been born on December 23, 1952; while respondent
Transfiguracion Daarol is married, General Manager of
Zamboanga del Norte Electric Cooperative, and 41 years old at
the time of the said relationship, having been born on August 6,
1932;
2. That respondent is married to Romualda A. Sumaylo with
whom be has a son; that the marriage ceremony was
solemnized on September 24, 1955 at Liloy, Zamboanga del
Norte by a catholic priest, Rev. Fr. Anacleto Pellamo, Parish
Priest thereat; and that said respondent had been separated
from his wife for about 16 years at the time of his relationship
with complainant;
3. That respondent had been known by the Barrientos family for
quite sometime, having been a former student of complainant's
father in 1952 and, a former classmate of complainant's mother
at the Andres Bonifacio College in Dipolog City; that he became
acquainted with complainant's sister, Norma in 1963 and
eventually with her other sisters, Baby and Delia and, her
brother, Boy, as he used to visit Norma at her residence; that
he also befriended complainant and who became a close friend
when he invited her, with her parents' consent, to be one of the
usherettes during the Masonic Convention in Sicayab, Dipolog
City from June 28 to 30, 1973, and he used to fetch her at her
residence in the morning and took her home from the
convention site after each day's activities;
4. That respondent courted complainant, and after a week of
courtship, complainant accepted respondent's love on July 7,
1973; that in the evening of August 20, 1973, complainant with
her parents' permission was respondent's partner during the
Chamber of Commerce affair at the Lopez Skyroom in the
Dipolog City, and at about 10:00 o'clock that evening, they left
the place but before going home, they went to the airport at
Sicayab, Dipolog City and parked the jeep at the beach, where
there were no houses around; that after the usual preliminaries,
they consummated the sexual act and at about midnight they
went home; that after the first sexual act, respondent used to
have joy ride with complainant which usually ended at the
airport where they used to make love twice or three times a
week; that as a result of her intimate relations, complainant
became pregnant;
5. That after a conference among respondent, complainant and
complainant's parents, it was agreed that complainant would
142
deliver her child in Manila, where she went with her mother on
October 22, 1973 by boat, arriving in Manila on the 25th and,
stayed with her brother-in-law Ernesto Serrano in Singalong,
Manila; that respondent visited her there on the 26th, 27th and
28th of October 1973, and again in February and March 1974;
that later on complainant decided to deliver the child in Cebu
City in order to be nearer to Dipolog City, and she went there in
April 1974 and her sister took her to the Good Shepherd Convent
at Banawa Hill, Cebu City; that on June 14, 1974, she delivered
a baby girl at the Perpetual Succor Hospital in Cebu City and,
named her "Dureza Barrientos"; that about the last week of June
1974 she went home to Dipolog City; that during her stay here
in Manila and later in Cebu City, the respondent defrayed some
of her expenses; that she filed an administrative case against
respondent with the National Electrification Administration;
which complaint, however, was dismissed; and then she
instituted the present disbarment proceedings against
respondent.
xxx xxx xxx
In view of the foregoing, the undersigned respectfully
recommend that after hearing, respondent Transfiguracion
Daarol be disbarred as a lawyer. (Rollo, pp. 28-51).
After a thorough review of the case, the Court finds itself in full
accord with the findings and recommendation of the Solicitor
General.
From the records, it appears indubitable that complainant was
never informed by respondent attorney of his real status as a
married individual. The fact of his previous marriage was
disclosed by respondent only after the complainant became
pregnant. Even then, respondent misrepresented himself as
being eligible to re-marry for having been estranged from his
wife for 16 years and dangled a marriage proposal on the
assurance that he would work for the annulment of his first
marriage. It was a deception after all as it turned out that
respondent never bothered to annul said marriage. More
importantly, respondent knew all along that the mere fact of
separation alone is not a ground for annulment of marriage and
does not vest him legal capacity to contract another marriage.
Interestingly enough. respondent lived alone in Dipolog City
though his son, who was also studying in Dipolog City, lived
separately from him. He never introduced his son and went
around with friends as though he was never married much less
had a child in the same locality. This circumstance alone belies
respondent's claim that complainant and her family were aware
of his previous marriage at the very start of his courtship. The
Court is therefore inclined to believe that respondent resorted
to deceit in the satisfaction of his sexual desires at the expense
of the gullible complainant. It is not in accordance with the
nature of the educated, cultured and respectable, which
complainant's family is, her father being the Assistant Principal
of the local public high school, to allow a daughter to have an
affair with a married man.
But what surprises this Court even more is the perverted sense
of respondent's moral values when he said that: "I see nothing
wrong with this relationship despite my being married." (TSN,
p. 209, January 13, 1977; Rollo, p. 47) Worse, he even
suggested abortion. Truly, respondent's moral sense is so
seriously impaired that we cannot maintain his membership in
the Bar. In Pangan v. Ramos (107 SCRA 1 [1981]), we held that:
(E)ven his act in making love to another woman while his first
wife is still alive and their marriage still valid and existing is
contrary to honesty, justice, decency and morality. Respondent
made a mockery of marriage which is a sacred institution
demanding respect and dignity.
Finally, respondent even had the temerity to allege that he is a
Moslem convert and as such, could enter into multiple marriages
and has inquired into the possibility of marrying complainant
(Rollo, p. 15). As records indicate, however, his claim of having
embraced the Islam religion is not supported by any evidence
save that of his self-serving testimony. In this regard, we need
only to quote the finding of the Office of the Solicitor General,
to wit:
When respondent was asked to marry complainant he said he
could not because he was already married and would open him
to a charge of bigamy (p. 200, tsn, January 13, 1977). If he
were a moslem convert entitled to four (4) wives, as he is now
claiming, why did he not marry complainant? The answer is
supplied by respondent himself. He said while he was a moslem,
but, having been married in a civil ceremony, he could no longer
validly enter into another civil ceremony without committing
bigamy because the complainant is a christian (p. 242, tsn,
January 13, 1977). Consequently, if respondent knew, that
notwithstanding his being a moslem convert, he cannot marry
complainant, then it was grossly immoral for him to have sexual
intercourse with complainant because he knew the existence of
a legal impediment. Respondent may not, therefore, escape
responsibility thru his dubious claim that he has embraced the
Islam religion. (Rollo,
p. 49).
By his acts of deceit and immoral tendencies to appease his
sexual desires, respondent Daarol has amply demonstrated his
moral delinquency. Hence, his removal for conduct unbecoming
a member of the Bar on the grounds of deceit and grossly
immoral conduct (Sec. 27, Rule 138, Rules of Court) is in order.
Good moral character is a condition which precedes admission
to the Bar (Sec. 2, Rule 138, Rules of Court) and is not dispensed
with upon admission thereto. It is a continuing qualification
which all lawyers must possess (People v. Tuanda, 181 SCRA
682 [1990]; Delos Reyes v. Aznar, 179 SCRA 653 [1989]),
otherwise, a lawyer may either be suspended or disbarred.
As we have held in Piatt v. Abordo (58 Phil. 350 [1933], cited in
Leda v. Tabang, 206 SCRA 395 [1992]):
It cannot be overemphasized that the requirement of good
character is not only a condition precedent to admission to the
practice of law; its continued possession is also essential for
remaining in the practice of law (People v. Tuanda, Adm. Case
No. 3360, 30 January 1990, 181 SCRA 692). As aptly put by Mr.
Justice George A. Malcolm: "As good character is an essential
qualification for admission of an attorney to practice, when the
attorney's character is bad in such respects as to show that he
is unsafe and unfit to be entrusted with the powers of an
attorney, the court retains the power to discipline him (Piatt v.
Abordo, 58 Phil. 350 [1933]).
Only recently, another disbarment proceeding was resolved by
this Court against a lawyer who convinced a woman that her
prior marriage to another man was null and void ab initio and
she was still legally single and free to marry him (the lawyer),
married her, was supported by her in his studies, begot a child
with her, abandoned her and the child, and married another
woman (Terre vs. Terre, Adm. Case No. 2349, July 3, 1992).
Here, respondent, already a married man and about 41 years
old, proposed love and marriage to complainant, then still a 20-
year-old minor, knowing that he did not have the required legal
capacity. Respondent then succeeded in having carnal relations
with complainant by deception, made her pregnant, suggested
abortion, breached his promise to marry her, and then deserted
her and the child. Respondent is therefore guilty of deceit and
grossly immoral conduct.
The practice of law is a privilege accorded only to those who
measure up to the exacting standards of mental and moral
fitness. Respondent having exhibited debased morality, the
Court is constrained to impose upon him the most severe
disciplinary action — disbarment.
143
The ancient and learned profession of law exacts from its
members the highest standard of morality. The members are, in
fact, enjoined to aid in guarding the Bar against the admission
of candidates unfit or unqualified because deficient either moral
character or education (In re Puno, 19 SCRA 439, [1967];
Pangan vs. Ramos, 107 SCRA 1 [1981]).
As officers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact be of good
moral character but must also be seen to be of good moral
character and must lead a life in accordance with the highest
moral standards of the community. More specifically, a member
of the Bar and an officer of the Court is not only required to
refrain from adulterous relationships or the keeping of
mistresses but must also behave himself in such a manner as to
avoid scandalizing the public by creating the belief that he is
flouting those moral standards (Tolosa vs. Cargo, 171 SCRA 21,
26 [1989], citing Toledo vs. Toledo, 7 SCRA 757 [1963] and
Royong vs. Oblena, 7 SCRA 859 [1963]).
In brief, We find respondent Daarol morally delinquent and as
such, should not be allowed continued membership in the
ancient and learned profession of law (Quingwa v. Puno, 19
SCRA 439 [1967]).
ACCORDINGLY, We find respondent Transfiguracion Daarol
guilty of grossly immoral conduct unworthy of being a member
of the Bar and is hereby ordered DISBARRED and his name
stricken off from the Roll of Attorneys. Let copies of this
Resolution be furnished to all courts of the land, the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines, the Office of the Bar Confidant and spread
on the personal record of respondent Daarol.
SO ORDERED.

144
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.C. No. 266 April 27, 1963
PAZ ARELLANO TOLEDO, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. JESUS B. TOLEDO, respondent.
PADILLA, J.:
This is a disbarment proceeding under Rule 128 of the Rules of
Court.
On 9 July 1956 Paz Arellano Toledo filed in this Court a sworn
complaint in the form of a letter alleging that she is the wife of
Jesus B. Toledo, a member of the Bar;1 that they were married
on 27 December 1946 while he was still a second year student
of law; that she supported him and spent for his studies; that
after passing the bar examination and becoming a full-fledged
member of the Bar he abandoned her; that he is at present
employed in the Bureau of Mines2 and stationed at Cagayan de
Oro City; and that he is cohabiting with another woman who had
borne him three children. She prayed that the respondent be
disbarred from the practice of law. On 11, July 1956, this Court
directed the respondent to answer the complaint within ten days
from receipt of notice and a copy of the complaint.3 The
respondent mailed his answer in the form of a letter, which was
received in this Court on 4, October 1956, averring that the
complaint was not in due form because "It does not set out
distinctly, clearly and concisely the legal causes for the
suspension or disbarment of a member of the Philippine Bar as
provided in the Rules of Court hence his "answer could not be
made in the logical sequence of a formal pleading;" that there
seems to be an irregularity in the filing of the complaint because
while the letter-complaint was dated 25, June 1956, and
received at the Docket Section of this Court on 2, July 1956, by
an employee whose initials are "A.L."4 It was subscribed and
sworn to before a notary public on a later date, 5 July 1956; and
the alleged information furnished by Esperanza D. Almonte that
the respondent was cohabiting with another woman who had
borne him three children is not true because her very informant,
whose true name is Leoncia D. Almonte, executed an affidavit
to the effect that the respondent was employed in the Bureau of
Lands, not in the Bureau of Mines, and that the three children
referred to by the complainant were the children of Mr. and Mrs.
Ruperto Ll. Jose, with whom the respondent was boarding.
Attached to his answer are the affidavit of Leoncia D. Almonte
and a copy of his answer to a complaint filed by the complainant
with the Director of Lands for abandonment and immorality. In
9 October 1956, this Court referred the case to the Solicitor
General for investigation, report and recommendation and on 11
October 1956 the record of the case was received by the Office
of the Solicitor General. On 19 November 1956, 10 December
1956, 7, 8, 14, and 15 February 1957, 18 March 1957 and 5
August 1957, the office of the Solicitor General conducted
hearings during which the complainant presented her evidence
both oral and documentary and the respondent, who appeared
in his own behalf, cross-examined her witnesses. The
respondent did not present evidence in his behalf but reserved
the right to present it under the provisions of Section 6, Rule
128. After finding that there is sufficient ground to proceed
against the respondent, on 24 July 1958 the Solicitor General
filed a complaint in this Court charging the respondent with
abandonment of his wife and immorality for cohabiting with
another woman by whom he has a child, and praying that he be
disbarred or suspended from the practice of law. On 30 July
1958 the Clerk of Court sent to the respondent by mail a copy
of the complaint filed by the Solicitor General and directed him
to answer the same within 15 days from receipt thereof,
pursuant to Section 5, Rule 128. On 28 August 1958 the
respondent filed in this Court a motion to dismiss the complaint
on the ground "that the charges contained therein are not based
on and supported by the facts and evidence adduced at the
investigation conducted by the Office of the Solicitor General."
On 2 September 1958 this Court set the case for hearing on 17
September 1958 at 9:30 o'clock in the morning. On 13
September 1958 the respondent filed a motion praying that his
motion to dismiss filed on 28 August 1958 be first resolved or,
that, should it be denied, he be given a period of ten days within
which to file an answer; that upon receipt of his answer the case
be returned to the Solicitor General for reception of his evidence
pursuant to Section 6, Rule 128; and that the hearing of the
case set for 17 September 1958 at 9:30 o'clock in the morning
be held in abeyance pending resolution of his motion. At the
hearing of the case on 17 September 1958, counsel for the
respondent appeared and was given a period of 15 days within
which to submit a written memorandum in lieu of oral argument,
and the Solicitor General the same period of time from receipt
of a copy of the respondent's memorandum within which to
reply. On 22 October 1958, within the extension of time
previously granted, the respondent filed his memorandum and
on 17 November 1958, also within the extension of time
previously granted, the Solicitor General, his memorandum in
reply.
Section 6, Rule 128, provides:
The evidence produced before the Solicitor General in his
investigation may be considered, by the Supreme Court in the
final decision of the case, if the respondent had an opportunity
to object and cross-examine. If in the respondent's answer no
statement is made as to any intention of introducing additional
evidence, the case shall be set down for hearing, upon the filing
of such answer or upon the expiration of the time to file the
same. (Emphasis supplied)
The above-quoted rule in no uncertain terms requires the
respondent in disbarment or suspension proceedings from the
practice of law to file an answer to the complaint filed by the
Solicitor General after investigation and, should he desire to
present evidence in his behalf, to expressly say so in the answer.
Instead of doing what the rule requires, the respondent filed a
motion to dismiss without stating that he intended to present
evidence in his behalf, thereby waiving his right. The fact that
at the close of the hearing conducted by the Solicitor General,
he made of record his desire to present evidence in his behalf,
is not sufficient. The correct manner and proper time for him to
make known his intention is by and in the answer seasonably
filed in this Court.
The complainant testified as follows: On 27 December 1946 she,
a dentist by profession, and the respondent, then a second year
law student, were married civilly in Camiling, Tarlac, by the
Justice of the Peace (Exhibit A). For a period of two weeks after
their wedding, they lived in the house of her parents at No. 76
General del Pilar street in Camiling. After two weeks, the
respondent went to Manila to resume his studies at the Far
Eastern University,5 and she remained in Camiling to practice
her profession. While the respondent was still studying, he
either returned to Camiling once a week or she came to Manila
twice a week to visit with each other. Sometimes the respondent
stayed with her in Camiling for a week, and when she came to
Manila to buy dental materials she slept with him at his boarding
house or at the house on Economia street where he on lived with
his brother Cleto and Aniceto and cousin Felisa Bacera, who
cooked their meals for them. They were in good terms until
about three or four months before his graduation. On the day of
his graduation, he showed her indifference and humiliated and
embarrassed her by calling her a "provinciana" and telling her
that she was a nuisance whenever she came to see him.
Nevertheless, being his wife, she continued to see him while he
145
was reviewing for the bar examinations. She specifically
mentioned that three days before the last examination, she
came to see him. A week after the bar examinations, she again
came to see him. Since then they became actually separated
and she never saw him again until the hearing of the case.
Through Mrs. Esperanza Almonte, she learned that the
respondent was employed in the Bureau of Lands and stationed
at Cagayan de Oro City. The respondent never wrote to her and
asked her to follow him at his place of work and she did not care
to either.
Marina Payot gave the following testimony: From 28 February
to 3 June 1955 she lived and worked as maid, laundress and
cook for the respondent, his family composed of himself, Mrs.
Corazon Toledo and their child in Malaybalay, Bukidnon. The
respondent and Corazon Toledo lived as husband and wife, and
have a child named Angie who was less than a year old at the
time she lived with them. The couple slept together in the same
room with their daughter Angie and ate their meals together
although sometimes Corazon ate alone when the respondent
was out somewhere. The respondent used to call Corazon
"Honey" and Corazon used to call the respondent "Jess".
Corazon Toledo is not the same person as the complainant.
Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing
stipulation of facts be admitted and approved by this Honorable
Court, without prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence
to prove their case not covered by this stipulation of facts.
1äwphï1.ñët
Lino Domingo testified in the following manner: He is employed
as operator-mechanic in the Bureau of Public Highways in
Malaybalay, Bukidnon, and has resided there since 1952. He
knows the respondent because he headed a survey party that
surveyed public lands in Malaybalay for distribution to the
landless. Sometime in March 1955 he went to the respondent's
place of residence and office at Moreno street, where his friend
Mr. Nieva, an Ilocano, also resided to apply for a parcel of public
land, and about ten times he went to the respondent's place of
residence and office. Among those who lived with the
respondent were Mrs. Corazon Toledo, Mr. Nieva, a maid and
Mr. Abad (the latter only slept at the place whenever he was in
town). He knew that Corazon Toledo, who is not the same
person as Paz Arellano Toledo, was the wife of the respondent.
At the respondent's place of residence and office, he saw a room
where the respondent, Corazon and a baby slept and where
man's pajamas and shirts were hung. One day at about 2:00
o'clock in the afternoon, while the respondent and his (the
witness') friend Mr. Abad were repairing the front mudguard and
seats of a station wagon behind the respondent's place of
residence and office, his friend Mr. Abad introduced him to the
respondent. He helped Abad place the seats of the station wagon
in their proper places and while he was helping Abad, he heard
the respondent address Corazon as "Mama" and ask her for
money to buy cigarettes. His friends Nieva and Abad used to
address Corazon as "Mrs. Toledo."
The respondent admits that he is married to the complainant (p.
14, t.s.n.).The fact that he is cohabiting with another woman
who had borne him a child has been established by the
testimony of Marina Payot and Lino Domingo, whose sincerity
and truthfulness have been put to a severe and searching test
by the investigating Solicitor in the presence of the respondent
who appeared in his own behalf and cross-examined the
witnesses during the investigation. Asked by the investigating
Solicitor how she came to testify at the investigation, or whether
anybody taught or coached her on what to testify or whether
she testified because of any promise of reward or consideration,
Marina Payot without hesitation and in a straight forward
manner answered that the complainant, Mr. Domingo and Mr.
Reyes (the latter is the complainant's counsel) spoke to her and
told her to tell nothing but the truth about the respondent's
affair with his paramour in Malaybalay; that nobody taught or
coached her on what to testify at the investigation; and that she
was not promised anything by way of reward or consideration
or given money for testifying. Going further in his investigation,
the Solicitor asked the witness how she was treated by the
respondent to find out if she harbors any ill-feeling or grudge
against him and his alleged paramour, which could be a motive
for falsely testifying against them, and she answered that she
was well treated by the Toledos; that they considered her a
sister; that they paid regularly her salary of P15 a month; that
they bought her a dress during the town fiesta on May 15; that
Corazon never scolded her for she was a woman of few words,
was kind and did not know how to get angry; and that the reason
she left them was because she just felt lonesome for her
parents. Further testing her credibility, the Solicitor asked how
the respondent's paramour looked, and she described her as a
woman of fair complexion. Comparing her (Corazon) to the
complainant, she said that the complainant was more beautiful
but Corazon was not ugly and that the latter had a nicer figure,
because she was stouter and taller than the complainant. To find
out if it was another and not the respondent who lived with
Corazon, the Solicitor asked her if she had not seen Teodoro
Nieva, who lived with the respondent and Corazon in the same
house, kiss or embrace Corazon, and she replied that she had
not.
Testing the credibility of Lino Domingo, the investigating
Solicitor asked him whether he was related to Claudio Arellano,
brother of the complainant, and Lino readily answered that he
is his brother-in-law and added that he (Lino) is the cousin of
the wife of Claudio. Asked if he had been asked by the
complainant to testify at the hearing, he frankly answered in the
affirmative. Questioned as to the description of the respondent's
paramour, the witness stated that Corazon is fair in complexion,
five feet tall; that she is taller and fairer in complexion, more
beautiful and has a nicer figure than the complainant.
The testimony of these two witnesses are worthy of credence.
Marina Payot is a simple girl of eighteen years, a mere maid,
scant in education, and understands little English. She did not
even finish the sixth grade of the elementary course. The sharp
and incisive questions propounded to her by the investigating
Solicitor and the lengthy cross-examination to which she was
subjected by the respondent himself would have revealed
herself if she was lying. The apparent inconsistencies in her
answers may be attributed to her innocence and simple-
mindedness and her failure to understand the questions
propounded to her. Moreover, she could not be expected to
remember the dates asked of her in the same way that a person
of more than average intelligence would. Add to this the fact
that she was subjected to a thorough examination by three
lawyers and her confusion was compounded. Lino Domingo's
frank and ready answers to the questions propounded by the
Solicitor show sincerity and do not reveal any intention to
pervert the truth. And even if his testimony be discarded, still
the testimony of Marina Payot stands unrebutted.
The annexes attached to the respondent's memorandum cannot
be taken into consideration for they were not properly
introduced in evidence during the investigation.
The respondent, by abandoning his lawful wife and cohabiting
with another woman who had borne him a child, has failed to
maintain the highest degree of morality expected and required
of a member of the Bar.6
THEREFORE, the respondent is disbarred from the practice of
law.
Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera,
Paredes, Dizon, Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur.
Bengzon, C.J., took no part.
146
Republic of the Philippines that he did not live with Natividad. He resided with his sister at
Cypress Village, San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City.
SUPREME COURT
On the other hand, he claimed that he was constrained to leave
Manila the conjugal home because he could not endure the nagging of
EN BANC his wife, their violent quarrels, her absences from the conjugal
home (she allegedly went to Baguio, Luneta and San Andres
Adm. Case No. 1392 April 2, 1984 Street) and her interference with his professional obligations.
PRECIOSA R. OBUSAN, complainant, The case was investigated by the Office of the Solicitor General.
He filed a complaint for disbarment against the respondent.
vs.
Obusan did not answer the complaint. He waived the
GENEROSO B. OBUSAN, JR., respondent. presentation of additional evidence. His lawyer did not file any
memorandum.
Roger Castuciano for complainant.
After an examination of the record, we find that the complainant
Roemo J. Callejo for respondent. has sustained the burden of proof. She has proven his
abandonment of her and his adulterous relations with a married
woman separated from her own husband.
AQUINO, J.:ñé+.£ªwph!1
Respondent was not able to overcome the evidence of his wife
This is a disbarment case filed in 1974 by Preciosa Razon against that he was guilty of grossly immoral conduct. Abandoning one's
her husband Generoso B. Obusan, Jr. on the ground of adultery wife and resuming carnal relations with a former paramour, a
or grossly immoral conduct. He was admitted to the bar in 1968. married woman, fails within "that conduct which is willful,
flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to
In 1967, when Generoso B. Obusan, Jr. was working in the
the opinion of the good and respectable members of the
Peoples Homesite and Housing Corporation, he became
community" (7 C.J.S. 959; Arciga vs. Maniwang Adm. Case No.
acquainted with Natividad Estabillo who represented to him that
1608, August 14, 1981, 106 SCRA 591).
she was a widow. They had carnal relations. He begot with her
a son who was born on November 27, 1972. He was named John Thus, a lawyer was disbarred when he abandoned his lawful wife
Obusan (Exh. D). Generoso came to know that Natividad's and cohabited with another woman who had borne him a child.
marriage to Tony Garcia was subsisting or undissolved. He failed to maintain the highest degree of morality expected
and required of a member of the bar (Toledo vs. Toledo, 117
Four days after the birth of the child or on December 1, 1972,
Phil. 768).
Generoso, 33, married Preciosa, 37, in a civil ceremony. The
marriage was ratified in a religious ceremony held on December WHEREFORE, respondent is disbarred. His name is stricken off
30,1972 (Exh. C and C-1) the Roll of Attorneys.
The couple lived with the wife's mother at 993 Sto. Cristo Street, SO ORDERED
Tondo, Manila for more than one year. In the evening of April
13, 1974, when his wife was out of the house, lawyer Obusan
asked permission from his mother-in-law to leave the house and
take a vacation in his hometown, Daet, Camarines Norte. Since
then, he has never returned to the conjugal abode.
Preciosa immediately started looking for her husband. After
much patient investigation and surveillance, she discovered that
he was living and cohabiting with Natividad in an apartment
located at 85-A Felix Manalo Street, Cubao, Quezon City. He had
brought his car to that place.
The fact that Obusan and Natividad lived as husband and wife
was corroborated by Linda Delfin, their housemaid in 1974;
Remedios Bernal, a laundress, and Ernesto Bernal, a plumber,
their neighbors staying at 94 Felix Manalo Street. The three
executed the affidavits, Exhibits A, B and F, which were
confirmed by their testimonies.
Romegil Q. Magana, a pook leader, testified that Obusan
introduced himself as the head of the family (25-30 tsn Nov. 26,
1976). His name is at the head of the barangay list (Exh. E, G
and H). Nieves Cacnio the owner of the apartment, came to
know Obusan as Mr. Estabillo. She Identified five photographs,
Exhibits I to I-D where respondent Obusan appeared as the man
wearing eyeglasses.
Respondent's defense was that his relationship with Natividad
was terminated when he married Preciosa. He admitted that
from time to time he went to 85-A Felix Manalo Street but only
for the purpose of giving financial assistance to his son, Jun-Jun.
Lawyer Rogelio Panotes, the ninong of Jun-Jun, corroborated
respondent's testimony.
He denied the testimonies of the maid, the laundress and the
plumber. He claims that they were paid witnesses. He declared

147
148
EN BANC
[A.C. No. 2349. July 3, 1992.]
DOROTHY B. TERRE, Complainant, v. ATTY. JORDAN
TERRE, Respondent.
Public Attorney’s Office for complainant.
SYLLABUS
1. LEGAL ETHICS; ADMINISTRATIVE COMPLAINT; GROSSLY
IMMORAL CONDUCT; PENALTY OF DISBARMENT IMPOSED IN
CASE AT BAR. — We believe and so hold that the conduct of
respondent Jordan Terre in inveigling complainant Dorothy Terre
to contract a second marriage with him; in abandoning
complainant Dorothy Terre after she had cared for him and
supported him through law school, leaving her without means
for the safe delivery of his own child; in contracting a second
marriage with Helina Malicdem while his first marriage with
complainant Dorothy Terre was subsisting, constituted "grossly
immoral conduct" under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court, affording more than sufficient basis for disbarment of
respondent Jordan Terre. He was unworthy of admission to the
Bar in the first place. The Court will correct this error forthwith.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM, J.:
In a sworn complaint filed with this Court on 24 December 1981,
complainant Dorothy B. Terre charged respondent Jordan Terre,
a member of the Philippine Bar with "grossly immoral conduct,"
consisting of contracting a second marriage and living with
another woman other than complainant, while his prior marriage
with complainant remained subsisting.
The Court resolved to require respondent to answer the
complaint. 1 Respondent successfully evaded five (5) attempts
to serve a copy of the Court’s Resolution and of the complaint
by moving from one place to another, such that he could not be
found nor reached in his alleged place of employment or
residence. 2 On 24 April 1985, that is after three (3) years and
a half, with still no answer from the respondent, the Court noted
respondent’s success in evading service of the complaint and
the Court’s Resolution and thereupon resolved to "suspend
respondent Atty. Jordan Terre from the practice of law until after
he appears and/or files his answer to the complaint against him"
in the instant case. 3
On 28 September 1985, respondent finally filed an Answer with
a Motion to Set Aside and/or Lift Suspension Order. In his
Answer, Atty. Terre averred that he had contracted marriage
with complainant Dorothy Terre on 14 June 1977 upon her
representation that she was single; that he subsequently
learned that Dorothy was married to a certain Merlito A.
Bercenilla sometime in 1968; that when he confronted Dorothy
about her prior marriage, Dorothy drove him out of their
conjugal residence; that Dorothy had mockingly told him of her
private meetings with Merlito A. Bercenilla and that the child she
was then carrying (i.e., Jason Terre) was the son of Bercenilla;
that believing in good faith that his marriage to complainant was
null and void ab initio, he contracted marriage with Helina
Malicdem at Dasol, Pangasinan. 4
In her reply, complainant Dorothy denied that Jason Terre was
the child of Merlito A. Bercenilla and insisted that Jason was the
child of respondent Jordan Terre, as evidenced by Jason’s Birth
Certificate and physical resemblance to Respondent. Dorothy
further explained that while she had given birth to Jason Terre
at the PAFGH registered as a dependent of Merlito Bercenilla,
she had done so out of extreme necessity and to avoid risk of
death or injury to the fetus which happened to be in a difficult
breech position. According to Dorothy, she had then already
been abandoned by respondent Jordan Terre, leaving her
penniless and without means to pay for the medical and hospital
bills arising by reason of her pregnancy.
The Court denied respondent’s Motion to Set Aside or Lift the
Suspension Order and instead referred, by a Resolution dated 6
January 1986, the complaint to the Office of the Solicitor General
for investigation, report and recommendation. 5
Then Solicitor Pio C. Guerrero was appointed investigator by the
Office of the Solicitor General. He set the case for hearing on 7
July 1986 with notice to both parties. On 7 July 1986,
complainant Dorothy appeared and presented her evidence ex
parte, since respondent did not so appear. 6 The Investigating
Solicitor scheduled and held another hearing on 19 August 1986,
where he put clarificatory questions to the complainant;
respondent once again did not appear despite notice to do so.
Complainant finally offered her evidence and rested her case.
The Solicitor set still another hearing for 2 October 1986,
notifying respondent to present his evidence with a warning that
should he fail once more to appear, the case would be deemed
submitted for resolution. Respondent did not appear on 2
October 1986. The Investigating Solicitor accordingly considered
respondent to have waived his right to present evidence and
declared the case submitted for resolution. The parties were
given time to submit their respective memoranda. Complainant
Dorothy did so on 8 December 1986. Respondent Terre did not
file his memorandum.
On 26 February 1990, the Office of the Solicitor General
submitted its "Report and Recommendation" to this Court. The
Report summarized the testimony of the complainant in the
following manner:
"Complainant Dorothy Terre took the witness stand and testified
substantially as follows: she and respondent met for the first
time in 1979 as fourth year high school classmates in Cadiz City
High School (tsn, July 7, 1986, p. 9); she was then married to
Merlito Bercenilla, while respondent was single (id.); respondent
was aware of her marital status (ibid, p. 14); it was then that
respondent started courting her but nothing happened of the
courtship (ibid, p. 10); they [complainant and respondent]
moved to Manila were they respectively pursued their education,
respondent as a law student at the Lyceum University (tsn, July
7, 1986, p. 12, 15-16); respondent continued courting her, this
time with more persistence (ibid, p. 11); she decided nothing
would come of it since she was married but he [respondent]
explained to her that their marriage was void ab initio since she
and her first husband were first cousins (ibid. p . 12); convinced
by his explanation and having secured favorable advice from her
mother and ex-in-laws, she agreed to marry him [respondent]
(ibid, 12-13, 16); in their marriage license, despite her
[complainant’s] objection, he [respondent] wrote ‘single’ as her
status explaining that since her marriage was void ab initio,
there was no need to go to court to declare it as such (ibid, 14-
15); they were married before Judge Priscilla Mijares of the City
Court of Manila on June 14, 1977 (Exhibit A; tsn, July 7, 1986,
pp. 16-17); Jason Terre was born of their union on June 25,
1981 (Exhibit B, tsn, July 7, 1986, p. 18); all through their
married state up to the time he [respondent] disappeared in
1981, complainant supported respondent, in addition to the
allowance the latter was getting from his parents (ibid, pp. 19-
20); she was unaware of the reason for his disappearance until
she found out later that respondent married a certain Vilma [sic]
149
Malicdem (Exhibit C, tsn, July 7, 1986, pp. 21-22); she then filed
a case for abandonment of minor with the City Fiscal of Pasay
City (ibid, p. 23) which was subsequently filed before Branch II
of the City Court of Pasay City as Criminal Case No. 816159
(Exhibit D; tsn, July 7, 1986, p. 24); she likewise filed a case for
bigamy against respondent and Helina Malicdem with the office
of the Provincial Fiscal of Pangasinan, where a prima facie case
was found to exist (Exhibit E; tsn, July 7, pp. 25-26);
additionally, complainant filed an administrative case against
respondent with the Commission on Audit where he was
employed, which case however was considered closed for being
moot and academic when respondent was considered
automatically separated from the service for having gone on
absence without official leave (Exhibit F; tsn, July 7, 1986, pp.
28-29)." 7
There is no dispute over the fact that complainant Dorothy Terre
and respondent Jordan Terre contracted marriage on 14 July
1977 before Judge Priscila Mijares. There is further no dispute
over the fact that on 3 May 1981, respondent Jordan Terre
married Helina Malicdem in Dasol, Pangasinan. When the second
marriage was entered into, respondent’s prior marriage with
complainant was subsisting, no judicial action having been
initiated or any judicial declaration obtained as to the nullity of
such prior marriage of respondent with complainant.
Respondent Jordan Terre sought to defend himself by claiming
that he had believed in good faith that his prior marriage with
complainant Dorothy Terre was null and void ab initio and that
no action for a judicial declaration of nullity was necessary.
The Court considers this claim on the part of respondent Jordan
Terre as a spurious defense. In the first place, respondent has
not rebutted complainant’s evidence as to the basic facts which
underscores the bad faith of respondent Terre. In the second
place, that pretended defense is the same argument by which
he had inveigled complainant into believing that her prior
marriage to Merlito A. Bercenilla being incestuous and void ab
initio (Dorothy and Merlito being allegedly first cousins to each
other), she was free to contract a second marriage with the
Respondent. Respondent Jordan Terre, being a lawyer, knew or
should have known that such an argument ran counter to the
prevailing case law of this court which holds that for purposes
of determining whether a person is legally free to contract a
second marriage, a judicial declaration that the first marriage
was null and void ab initio is essential. 8 Even if we were to
assume, arguendo merely, that Jordan Terre held that mistaken
belief in good faith, the same result will follow. For if we are to
hold Jordan Terre to his own argument, his first marriage to
complainant Dorothy Terre must be deemed valid, with the
result that his second marriage to Helina Malicdem must be
regarded as bigamous and criminal in character.
That the moral character of respondent Jordan Terre was deeply
flawed is shown by other circumstances. As noted, he convinced
the complainant that her prior marriage to Bercenilla was null
and void ab initio, that she was still legally single and free to
marry him. When complainant and respondent had contracted
their marriage, respondent went through law school while being
supported by complainant, with some assistance from
respondent’s parents. After respondent had finished his law
course and gotten complainant pregnant, respondent
abandoned the complainant without support and without the
wherewithal for delivering his own child safely in a hospital.
Thus, we agree with the Solicitor General that respondent
Jordan Terre, by his actions, "eloquently displayed, not only his
unfitness to remain as a member of the Bar, but likewise his
inadequacy to uphold the purpose and responsibility of his
gender" because marriage is a basic social institution. 9 .
In Pomperada v. Jochico, 10 the Court, in rejecting a petition to
be allowed to take the oath as a member of the Bar and to sign
the Roll of Attorneys, said through Mme. Justice Melencio-
Herrera:
"It is evident that respondent fails to meet the standard of moral
fitness for membership in the legal profession. Whether the
marriage was a joke as respondent claims, or a trick played on
her as claimed by complainant, it does not speak well of
respondent’s moral values. Respondent had made a mockery of
marriage, a basic social institution which public policy cherishes
and protects (Article 216, Civil Code)." 11
In Bolivar v. Simbol, 12 the Court found the respondent there
guilty of "grossly immoral conduct" because he made "a dupe of
complainant, living on her bounty and allowing her to spend for
his schooling and other personal necessities while dangling
before her the mirage of a marriage, marrying another girl as
soon as he had finished his studies, keeping his marriage a
secret while continuing to demand money from complainant. .
.." The Court held such acts "indicative of a character not worthy
of a member of the Bar." 13
We believe and so hold that the conduct of respondent Jordan
Terre in inveigling complainant Dorothy Terre to contract a
second marriage with him; in abandoning complainant Dorothy
Terre after she had cared for him and supported him through
law school, leaving her without means for the safe delivery of
his own child; in contracting a second marriage with Helina
Malicdem while his first marriage with complainant Dorothy
Terre was subsisting, constituted "grossly immoral conduct"
under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, affording
more than sufficient basis for disbarment of respondent Jordan
Terre. He was unworthy of admission to the Bar in the first place.
The Court will correct this error forthwith.
WHEREFORE, the Court Resolved to DISBAR respondent Jordan
Terre and to STRIKE OUT his name from the Roll of Attorneys.
A copy of this decision shall be spread on the personal record of
respondent Jordan Terre in the Bar Confidant’s Office. A copy of
this resolution shall also be furnished to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines and shall be circularized to all the courts of the
land.
Narvasa, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Padilla,
Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero,
Nocon, and Bellosillo, JJ., concur.
150
EN BANC
[A.C. No. 2697. April 19, 1991.]
ATTY. JOSE S. SANTOS, Complainant, v. ATTY. CIPRIANO
A. TAN, Respondent.
SYLLABUS
1. LEGAL ETHICS; ATTORNEYS; SUSPENSION; IMMORALITY;
PENALTY OF ONE-YEAR SUSPENSION FROM PRACTICE OF,
INSTEAD OF DISBARMENT, IMPOSED FOR HUMANITARIAN
REASONS; LAW CASE AT BAR. — A thorough review of the
record of the case duly heard before the Office of the Solicitor
General in several protracted hearings, reveals the existence of
a ground for disbarment against Respondent. The findings are
clear and convincing that respondent entered into a second
marriage despite the existence of his first marriage and that he
begot a child with the second woman. Definitely, such factual
findings have put serious doubt on respondent’s moral
character. Respondent’s main defense of alibi is rather too weak
a reason that he did not engage in an immoral act. As earlier
said, respondent has neither categorically denied that Norma
Olea is his wife nor Noel Olea Tan is his son with Norma. It
appears, however, that respondent has retired from government
service on March 27, 1983. He was sixty-five (65) years old on
September 16, 1982, and therefore, at the time of the rendition
of this report, respondent is now seventy two (72) years old.
Considering that respondent has retired and is in the twilight of
his life, disbarment would be too harsh a penalty to impose on
Respondent. Suspension from the practice of law would be
proper for humanitarian reasons if respondent is still actively
engaged in practice. It is respectfully recommended that
respondent be adjudged guilty of immoral conduct, unbecoming
of a lawyer, and accordingly impose the penalty of one (1) year
suspension from the active practice of law. We agree with the
said findings of the Solicitor General including his favorable and
compassionate consideration of the advanced age of the
Respondent.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
Complainant Atty. Jose S. Santos instituted on November 20,
1984 these disbarment proceedings against respondent Atty.
Cipriano A. Tan for alleged gross misconduct.
Specifically, the complainant who was then Acting Director of
the Bureau of Agrarian Legal Assistance under the Ministry (now
Department) of Agrarian Reform, charged the respondent with
having committed acts of immorality, falsification, and bigamy.
In the said complaint, Atty. Santos stated that the respondent,
while employed as Trial Attorney IV, with the Judicial Cases
Division under the aforesaid Department, maintained amorous
relationship with a married clerk, a certain Norma O. Pihid (nee
Olea), who was then directly under him. Eventually, the
respondent got married to Norma O. Pihid on April 27, 1981
before the Municipal Mayor of Meycauayan, Bulacan,
purportedly in an attempt to cover up their illicit relations. 1
The complainant, moreover, alleged that the respondent
falsified his marriage contract with Norma O. Pihid by
deliberately misrepresenting himself as single, thus, deceiving
the said mayor into solemnizing the said marriage. 2 In the
information sheet, however, prepared and filed by the
respondent prior to his employment, he clearly stated therein
that he was married to one Emilia Benito Tan and had begotten
eight (8) children with the latter. 3
Consequently, the complainant likewise charged the respondent
with bigamy since it appears from the records of the Local Civil
Registrar that he had previously contracted marriage with the
said Emilia A. Benito on January 6, 1941. The complainant
asserted that the said marriage continued to be valid and
binding between the said contracting parties when the
respondent entered into a subsequent marriage with Norma O.
Pihid on April 27, 1981. 4
Finally, the complainant averred that the respondent’s second
wife, Norma O. Pihid, gave birth to a child by the respondent on
November 21, 1981 at the Children’s Medical Center in Quezon
City, as evidenced by the birth certificate of the said child
indicating his name to be Noel Olea Tan. 5
On January 9, 1985, the Court acting on the said complaint for
disbarment required the respondent to submit his Answer.
The respondent in an Answer dated February 28, 1985, denied
having married Norma O. Pihid on April 27, 1981 and having
fathered a child by the name of Noel Olea Tan, although he
admitted being married to Emilia A. Benito. 6
As regards the charges of bigamy and falsification of official
documents, the respondent argued that the same were issues
that were properly the subject of a criminal case filed by the
complainant against him which was pending before the Regional
Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch VI, and therefore raised
a prejudicial question in the present controversy. 7
Anent the charge of maintaining amorous relationship with
Norma O. Pihid, the respondent contended that the same charge
had been previously resolved in an Order dated October 1, 1982
issued by the Minister (now Secretary) of the Ministry (now
Department) of Agrarian Reform. In the said order, the
allegation of immorality which was originally the content of an
anonymous letter-complaint was dismissed for being devoid of
merit.
The respondent, in turn, suggested that the real and actual
motive behind the said complaint was traceable to the strong
resentment harbored by the complainant against the former
whose services as Chief Trial Attorney of the said Ministry (now
Department) was extended even beyond his retirement age at
the request of the then Minister (now Secretary) Conrado F.
Estrella. The respondent contended that he and the complainant
did not see eye to eye with respect to the handling and
prosecution of agrarian cases. 8
By way of a counter-complaint, the respondent charged the
complainant with acts unbecoming of a lawyer and a member of
the Philippine Bar such as obtaining and utilizing confidential
documents without the necessary authorization, introducing a
falsified document as evidence in a court proceeding, and
executing an affidavit-complaint containing false statements.
The respondent further assailed the complainant for filing the
said complaint based on inadmissible and unfounded charges. 9
On March 25, 1985, the Court resolved to refer the said
complaint to the Solicitor General for investigation, report and
recommendation.
The Report and Recommendation submitted by the Solicitor
General on February 23, 1990, in part, states:
x x x
151
A thorough review of the record of the case duly heard before
the Office of the Solicitor General in several protracted hearings,
reveals the existence of a ground for disbarment against
Respondent.
Aside from claiming that the documents presented by
complainant were allegedly unauthenticated, hearsay, self-
serving, and his defense of alibi at the time of the marriage on
April 27, 1981, respondent has miserably failed in refuting the
same and at the same time presenting strong evidence to
convince the Solicitor General of the falsity of the charges
against him.
On April 27, 1981 respondent claims that he was attending a
government case at the then CFI of Caloocan City (Exh. 9-A,
rec.) while his alleged second wife was at the Court of Appeals
on official business (Exhs. 6 & 11-A, rec.)
There are serious doubts in entertaining the aforesaid defense.
A glance at the daily time records (Exhs. 9-A and 11-A, rec.)
reveals that both entries of respondent and Norma Olea were
indicated on the line covering April 26, 1981; secondly,
penmanship of the alleged entries for April 27, 1981 are the
same; thirdly, the indicated time in’s of respondent and Norma
Olea were the same, i.e., 8:01 a.m.; fourthly, probability that
they were together is high because they were both out of the
office.
Assuming, arguendo, respondent’s alibi that they were married
in Meycauayan, Bulacan, it was highly probable and possible for
both to proceed to Meycauayan, Bulacan on April 27, 1981 since
the places where they were allegedly then is [sic] not impossibly
far from Meycauayan, Bulacan.
Respondent even failed to specify the alleged government case
he was attending at the CFI of Caloocan either by mentioning
the title of the case or by presenting other evidence aside from
his self-serving testimony.
With respect to the Birth Certificate (Exh. A) of respondent’s
alleged son, the former has not made a categorical denial that
Noel Olea Tan is NOT his son. He only argues that the birth
certificate is not authentic. Evidence for complainant, however,
shows that Exhibit A-5 was presented to show the authenticity
of the Birth Certificate contrary to respondent’s claim (pls. see
Certification dated July 24, 1985 found at the back of the Birth
Certificate). Likewise, respondent has not made any categorical
denial of his amorous relationship with Norma Olea despite the
existence of his first marriage with Emilia Benito Tan.
For immorality to be a ground for disbarment, it must be so
gross, e.g., it is 90 corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal
act or so unprincipled or disgraceful as to be reprehensible to a
high degree (Reyes v. Wong, 63 SCRA 667 [1975])
The circumstances of the case definitely has put respondent’s
moral character in doubt despite non-conviction of the criminal
case for bigamy against Respondent. The reputation of a lawyer
must be such that he be of good moral character during the
continuance of his practice and the exercise of the privilege.
The findings are clear and convincing that respondent entered
into a second marriage despite the existence of his first marriage
and that he begot a child with the second woman. Definitely,
such factual findings have put serious doubt on respondent’s
moral character. Respondent’s main defense of alibi is rather too
weak a reason that he did not engage in an immoral act. As
earlier said, respondent has neither categorically denied that
Norma Olea is his wife nor Noel Olea Tan is his son with Norma.
It appears, however, that respondent has retired from
government service on March 27, 1983. He was sixty-five (65)
years old on September 16, 1982 (Exh. 13, rec.), and therefore,
at the time of the rendition of this report, respondent is now
seventy two (72) years old.
Considering that respondent has retired and is in the twilight of
his life, disbarment would be too harsh a penalty to impose on
Respondent. Suspension from the practice of law would be
proper for humanitarian reasons if respondent is still actively
engaged in practice.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, it is
respectfully recommended that respondent be adjudged guilty
of immoral conduct, unbecoming of a lawyer, and accordingly
impose the penalty of one (1) year suspension from the active
practice of law. 10
We agree with the said findings of the Solicitor General including
his favorable and compassionate consideration of the advanced
age of the Respondent. Specifically, Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility provides that "a lawyer shall
not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct."
Whatever the alleged motives of the complainant are, the
respondent has failed to controvert and refute the charges made
by the former. Even granting arguendo that the complainant
was not well-motivated in instituting these disbarment
proceedings, the same does not exculpate him from any liability
resulting from his grossly immoral conduct.
As regards the respondent’s counter-complaint, the Solicitor
General in compliance with the Court’s Resolution dated October
1, 1990, submitted his Supplemental Report and
Recommendation on November 22, 1990, and found that the
charges against the complainant for acts unbecoming a member
of the Philippine Bar were all unsubstantiated. We agree with his
findings and recommendation on this regard which state:
No misconduct has been committed by Atty. Santos contrary to
Atty. Tan’s accusations which will warrant disciplinary action. If
at all, Atty. Tan’s charges were merely in defense of the charges
against him (immorality) which the Solicitor General has found
to be supported by the evidence. (cf.: Report and
Recommendation dated February 23, 1990, pp. 46-52, Records-
Adm. Cases).
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, it is
respectfully recommended that Atty. Tan’s counter-complaint
against Atty. Santos be DISMISSED for being unsubstantiated.
WHEREFORE, finding respondent Atty. Cipriano A. Tan guilty of
immoral conduct in disregard of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, he is hereby SUSPENDED from the active practice
of law for a period of one (1) year. The counter-complaint
against complainant Atty. Jose S. Santos is hereby DISMISSED
for lack of merit.
Let this Decision be spread upon the personal records of the
respondent and copies thereof furnished to all courts.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz,
Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Griño-
Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.
152
FIRST DIVISION
[A.C. No. 9000 : October 05, 2011]
TOMAS P. TAN, JR., COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. HAIDE V.
GUMBA, RESPONDENT.
RESOLUTION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before us is an administrative complaint for disbarment filed by
complainant Tomas P. Tan, Jr. against respondent Atty. Haide
B. Vista-Gumba for gross unethical conduct.
The facts are as follows.
Complainant, a self-made businessman with a tailoring shop in
Naga City, filed a verified Complaint[1] against respondent, also
a resident of Naga City, before the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP)-Camarines Sur Chapter. Pursuant to Section 1,
Paragraph 3,[2] Rule 139-B of the Revised Rules of Court, as
amended, the said Chapter forwarded the complaint to the IBP
Board of Governors for proper disposition.
Complainant narrated that sometime in August 2000,
respondent asked to be lent ?350,000.00. Respondent assured
him that she would pay the principal plus 12% interest per
annum after one year. She likewise offered by way of security
a 105-square-meter parcel of land located in Naga City, covered
by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 2055[3] and registered
in her father's name. Respondent showed complainant a Special
Power of Attorney[4] (SPA) executed by respondent's parents,
and verbally assured complainant that she was authorized to sell
or encumber the entire property. Complainant consulted one
Atty. Raquel Payte and was assured that the documents
provided by respondent were valid. Thus, complainant agreed
to lend money to respondent. With the help of Atty. Payte,
respondent executed in complainant's favor an "open" Deed of
Absolute Sale over the said parcel of land, attaching thereto the
SPA. Complainant was made to believe that if respondent fails
to pay the full amount of the loan with interest on due date, the
deed of sale may be registered. Accordingly, he gave the
amount of ?350,000.00 to respondent.
Respondent, however, defaulted on her loan obligation and
failed to pay the same despite complainant's repeated demands.
Left with no recourse, complainant went to the Register of Deeds
to register the sale, only to find out that respondent deceived
him since the SPA did not give respondent the power to sell the
property but only empowered respondent to mortgage the
property solely to banks. Complainant manifested that he had
lent money before to other people albeit for insignificant
amounts, but this was the first time that he extended a loan to
a lawyer and it bore disastrous results. He submitted that
respondent committed fraud and deceit or conduct unbecoming
of a lawyer.
Upon being ordered by the IBP to answer the above allegations,
respondent filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File a
Responsive Pleading[5] but no answer or comment was ever filed
by her before the IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD).
Likewise, the IBP-CBD allowed respondent to answer the
Amended Complaint subsequently filed by complainant but she
did not file any answer thereto.[6] She also chose not to attend
the mandatory conference hearings set on July 18, 2006, June
13, 2007 and January 25, 2008 despite due notice. Thus, she
was deemed to have waived her right to participate in the
proceedings.
On February 9, 2009, IBP Commissioner Jose I. De La Rama, Jr.
rendered his report[7] finding respondent guilty of violating
Canon 1, [8] Rule 1.01[9] and Canon 7[10] of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and recommending that she be
suspended from the practice of law for one year. Commissioner
De La Rama opined that while respondent appears to be a co-
owner of the property as evidenced by an annotation on the back
of TCT No. 2055 showing that half of the property has been sold
to her, it was evident that she employed deceit and dishonest
means to make complainant believe, by virtue of the SPA, that
she was duly authorized to sell the entire property.
On August 28, 2010, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and
approved the report and recommendation of Commissioner De
La Rama, Jr. in its Resolution No. XIX-2010-446:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously
ADOPTED and APPROVED the Report and Recommendation of
the Investigating Commissioner of the above entitled case,
herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding
the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record
and the applicable laws and rules, and considering Respondent's
violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and for her failure to submit verified
Answer and did not even participate in the mandatory
conference, Atty. Haide V. Gumba is SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for one (1) year.[11]
We agree with the findings and conclusion of the IBP, but find
that a reduction of the recommended penalty is called for,
pursuant to the principle that the appropriate penalty for an
errant lawyer depends on the exercise of sound judicial
discretion based on the surrounding facts.[12]
Well entrenched in this jurisdiction is the rule that a lawyer may
be disciplined for misconduct committed either in his
professional or private capacity. The test is whether his conduct
shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity,
and good demeanor, or whether it renders him unworthy to
continue as an officer of the court.[13] Verily, Canon 7 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility mandates all lawyers to uphold at
all times the dignity and integrity of the legal
profession. Lawyers are similarly required, under Rule 1.01,
Canon 1 of the same Code, not to engage in any unlawful,
dishonest and immoral or deceitful conduct.
Here, respondent's actions clearly show that she deceived
complainant into lending money to her through the use of
documents and false representations and taking advantage of
her education and complainant's ignorance in legal matters. As
manifested by complainant, he would have never granted the
loan to respondent were it not for respondent's
misrepresentation that she was authorized to sell the property
and if respondent had not led him to believe that he could
register the "open" deed of sale if she fails to pay the loan.[14] By
her misdeed, respondent has eroded not only complainant's
perception of the legal profession but the public's perception as
well. Her actions constitute gross misconduct for which she may
be disciplined, following Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised
Rules of Court, as amended, which provides:
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme
Court, grounds therefor. -- A member of the bar may be
disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the
Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross
misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason
of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any
violation of the oath which he is required to take before the
admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience appearing as
an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The
practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either
153
personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes
malpractice.
xxxx
We further note that after filing a Motion for Extension of Time
to File a Responsive Pleading, respondent wantonly disregarded
the lawful orders of the IBP-CBD to file her answer and to appear
for the mandatory conferences despite due notice. Respondent
should bear in mind that she must acknowledge the orders of
the IBP-CBD in deference to its authority over her as a member
of the IBP.[15]
Complainant now asks that respondent be disbarred. We find,
however, that suspension from the practice of law is sufficient
to discipline respondent. It is worth stressing that the power to
disbar must be exercised with great caution. Disbarment will be
imposed as a penalty only in a clear case of misconduct that
seriously affects the standing and the character of the lawyer as
an officer of the court and a member of the bar. Where any
lesser penalty can accomplish the end desired, disbarment
should not be decreed.[16] In this case, the Court finds the
penalty of suspension more appropriate but finds the
recommended penalty of suspension for one year too severe.
Considering the circumstances of this case, the Court believes
that a suspension of six months is sufficient. After all,
suspension is not primarily intended as a punishment, but as a
means to protect the public and the legal profession.[17]
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Haide B. Vista-Gumba is found
administratively liable for grave misconduct. She is
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for SIX (6) MONTHS,
effective immediately, with a warning that a repetition of the
same or a similar act will be dealt with more severely.
Let notice of this Resolution be spread in respondent's record as
an attorney in this Court, and notice thereof be served on the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and on the Office of the Court
Administrator for circulation to all the courts concerned.

SO ORDERED.

154
FIRST DIVISION
A.C. No. 8261, March 11, 2015
JESSIE T. CAMPUGAN AND ROBERT C. TORRES,
Complainants, v. ATTY. FEDERICO S. TOLENTINO, JR.,
ATTY. RENATO G. CUNANAN, ATTY. DANIEL F. VICTORIO,
JR., AND ATTY. ELBERT T. QUILALA, Respondents.
A.C. No. 8725
JESSIE T. CAMPUGAN AND ROBERT C. TORRES,
Complainants, v. ATTY. CONSTANTE P. CALUYA, JR., AND
ATTY. ELBERT T. QUILALA, Respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
In this consolidated administrative case, complainants Jessie T.
Campugan and Robert C. Torres seek the disbarment of
respondents Atty. Federico S. Tolentino, Jr., Atty. Daniel F.
Victorio, Jr., Atty. Renato G. Cunanan, Atty. Elbert T. Quilala and
Atty. Constante P. Caluya, Jr. for allegedly falsifying a court
order that became the basis for the cancellation of their
annotation of the notice of adverse claim and the notice of lis
pendens in the Registry of Deeds in Quezon City.
Antecedents
Atty. Victorio, Jr. had replaced Atty. Edgardo Abad as counsel of
the complainants in a civil action they brought to seek the
annulment of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. N-290546 of
the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City in the first week of January
2007 in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Quezon City (Civil Case
No. Q-07-59598). They impleaded as defendants Ramon and
Josefina Ricafort, Juliet Vargas and the Register of Deeds of
Quezon City. They caused to be annotated on TCT No. N-290546
their affidavit of adverse claim, as well as the notice of lis
pendens.1 Atty. Tolentino, Jr. was the counsel of defendant
Ramon and Josefina Ricafort.
In their sworn complaint for disbarment dated April 23, 2009
(later docketed as A.C. No. 8261),2 the complainants narrated
that as the surviving children of the late Spouses Antonio and
Nemesia Torres, they inherited upon the deaths of their parents
a residential lot located at No. 251 Boni Serrano Street, Murphy,
Cubao, Quezon City registered under Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. RT-64333(35652) of the Register of Deeds of Quezon
City;3 that on August 24, 2006, they discovered that TCT No.
RT-64333(35652) had been unlawfully cancelled and replaced
by TCT No. N-290546 of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City
under the names of Ramon and Josefina Ricafort;4 and that,
accordingly, they immediately caused the annotation of their
affidavit of adverse claim on TCT No. N-290546.
It appears that the parties entered into an amicable settlement
during the pendency of Civil Case No. Q-07-59598 in order to
end their dispute,5 whereby the complainants agreed to sell the
property and the proceeds thereof would be equally divided
between the parties, and the complaint and counterclaim would
be withdrawn respectively by the complainants (as the plaintiffs)
and the defendants. Pursuant to the terms of the amicable
settlement, Atty. Victorio, Jr. filed a Motion to Withdraw
Complaint dated February 26, 2008,6 which the RTC granted in
its order dated May 16, 2008 upon noting the defendants' lack
of objection thereto and the defendants' willingness to similarly
withdraw their counterclaim.7
The complainants alleged that from the time of the issuance by
the RTC of the order dated May 16, 2008, they could no longer
locate or contact Atty. Victorio, Jr. despite making several phone
calls and visits to his office; that they found out upon verification
at the Register of Deeds of Quezon City that new annotations
were made on TCT No. N-290546, specifically: (1) the
annotation of the letter-request appearing to be filed by Atty.
Tolentino, Jr.8 seeking the cancellation of the affidavit of adverse
claim and the notice of lis pendens annotated on TCT No. N-
290546; and (2) the arinotation of the decision dated May 16,
2008 rendered in Civil Case No. Q-07-59598 by the RTC, Branch
95, in Quezon City, granting the complainants' Motion to
Withdraw Complaint;9 and that a copy of the letter-request
dated June 30, 2008 addressed to Atty. Quilala, Registrar of
Deeds of Quezon City, disclosed that it was defendant Ramon
Ricafort who had signed the letter.
Feeling aggrieved by their discovery, the complainants filed an
appeal en consulta with the Land Registration Authority (LRA),
docketed as Consulta No. 4707, assailing the unlawful
cancellation of their notice of adverse claim and their notice of
lis pendens under primary entries PE-2742 and PE-3828-9,
respectively. The LRA set Consulta No. 4707 for hearing on
March 30, 2009, and directed the parties to submit their
respective memoranda and/or supporting documents on or
before such scheduled hearing.10 However, the records do not
disclose whether Consulta No. 4707 was already resolved, or
remained pending at the LRA.
Unable to receive any response or assistance from Atty. Victorio,
Jr. despite their having paid him for his professional services,
the complainants felt that said counsel had abandoned their
case. They submitted that the cancellation of their notice of
adverse claim and their notice of lis pendens without a court
order specifically allowing such cancellation resulted from the
connivance and conspiracy between Atty. Victorio, Jr. and Atty.
Tolentino, Jr., and from the taking advantage of their positions
as officials in the Registry of Deeds by respondents Atty. Quilala,
the Chief Registrar, and Atty. Cunanan, the acting Registrar and
signatory of the new annotations. Thus, they claimed to be
thereby prejudiced.
On July 6, 2009, the Court required the respondents to comment
on the verified complaint.11
Atty. Victorio, Jr. asserted in his Comment dated August 17,
200912 that complainant Robert Torres had been actively
involved in the proceedings in Civil Case No. Q-07-59598, which
included the mediation process; that the complainants, after
having aggressively participated in the drafting of the amicable
settlement, could not now claim that they had been deceived
into entering the agreement in the same way that they could
not feign ignorance of the conditions contained therein; that he
did not commit any abandonment as alleged, but had performed
in good faith his duties as the counsel for the complainants in
Civil Case No. Q-07-59598; that he should not be held
responsible for their representation in other proceedings, such
as that before the LRA, which required a separate engagement;
and that the only payment he had received from the
complainants were those for his appearance fees of P1,000.00
for every hearing in the RTC.
In his Comment dated August 24, 2009,13 Atty. Tolentino, Jr.
refuted the charge of conspiracy, stressing that he was not
acquainted with the other respondents, except Atty. Victorio, Jr.
whom he had met during the hearings in Civil Case No. Q-07-
59598; that although he had notarized the letter-request dated
June 30, 2008 of Ramon Ricafort to the Register of Deeds, he
had no knowledge about how said letter-request had been
disposed of by the Register of Deeds; and that the present
complaint was the second disbarment case filed by the
complainants against him with no other motive except to harass
and intimidate him.
Atty. Quilala stated in his Comment dated September 1, 200914
that it was Atty. Caluya, Jr., another Deputy Register of Deeds,
who was the actual signing authority of the annotations that
resulted in the cancellation of the affidavit of adverse claim and
the notice of lis pendens on TCT No. N-290546; that the
155
cancellation of the annotations was undertaken in the regular
course of official duty and in the exercise of the ministerial duty
of the Register of Deeds; that no irregularity occurred or was
performed in the cancellation of the annotations; and that the
Register of Deeds was impleaded in Civil Case No. Q-07-59598
only as a nominal party, thereby discounting any involvement in
the proceedings in the case.
Atty. Cunanan did not file any comment.15
As the result of Atty. Quilala's allegation in his Comment in A.C.
No. 8261 that it had been Atty. Caluya, Jr.'s signature that
appeared below the cancelled entries, the complainants filed
another sworn disbarment complaint dated August 26, 2010
alleging that Atty. Caluya, Jr. had forged the signature of Atty.
Cunanan.16 This disbarment complaint was docketed as A.C. No.
8725, and was later on consolidated with A.C. No. 826117
because the complaints involved the same parties and rested on
similar allegations against the respondents.
Atty. Quilala filed his Comment in A.C. No. 8725 to belie the
allegation of forgery and to reiterate the arguments he had
made in A.C. No. 8261.18 On his part, Atty. Caluya, Jr.
manifested that he adopted Atty. Quilala's Comment.19
Ruling
We dismiss the complaints for disbarment for being bereft of
merit.
Well entrenched in this jurisdiction is the rule that a lawyer may
be disciplined for misconduct committed either in his
professional or private capacity. The test is whether his conduct
shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity,
and good demeanor, or whether his conduct renders him
unworthy to continue as an officer of the Court.20 Verily, Canon
7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates all lawyers
to uphold at all times the dignity and integrity of the Legal
Profession. Lawyers are similarly required under Rule 1.01,
Canon 1 of the same Code not to engage in any unlawful,
dishonest and immoral or deceitful conduct. Failure to observe
these tenets of the Code of Professional Responsibility exposes
the lawyer to disciplinary sanctions as provided in Section 27,
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, as amended, viz.:
Section 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme
Court, grounds therefor. — A member of the bar may be
disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the
Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross
misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason
of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any
violation of the oath which he is required to take before the
admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience appearing as
an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The
practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either
personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes
malpractice.
The complainants' allegations of the respondents' acts and
omissions are insufficient to establish any censurable conduct
against them.
Section 10 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 (Property
Registration Decree) enumerates the general duties of the
Register of Deeds, as follows
Section 10. General functions of Registers of Deeds. - x x x
It shall be the duty of the Register of Deeds to immediately
register an instrument presented for registration dealing with
real or personal property which complies with all the requisites
for registration. He shall see to it that said instrument bears the
proper documentary science stamps and that the same are
properly canceled. If the instrument is not registrable, he shall
forthwith deny registration thereof and inform the presenter of
such denial in writing, stating the ground or reason therefor, and
advising him of his right to appeal by consulta in accordance
with Section 117 of this Decree. (Emphasis supplied)
The aforementioned duty of the Register of Deeds is ministerial
in nature.21 A purely ministerial act or duty is one that an officer
or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed
manner, in obedience to the mandate of a legal authority,
without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment upon the
propriety or impropriety of the act done. If the law imposes a
duty upon a public officer and gives him the right to decide how
or when the duty shall be performed, such duty is discretionary,
not ministerial. The duty is ministerial only when its discharge
requires neither the exercise of official discretion nor the
exercise of judgment.22
In Gabriel v. Register of Deeds of Rizal,23 the Court underscores
that registration is a merely ministerial act of the Register of
Deeds, explaining:
xxx [W]hether the document is invalid, frivolous or intended to
harass, is not the duty of a Register of Deeds to decide, but a
court of competent jurisdiction, and that it is his concern to see
whether the documents sought to be registered conform with
the formal and legal requirements for such documents.
In view of the foregoing, we find no abuse of authority or
irregularity committed by Atty. Quilala, Atty. Cunanan, and Atty.
Caluya, Jr. with respect to the cancellation of the notice of
adverse claim and the notice of lis pendens annotated on TCT
No. N-290546. Whether or not the RTC order dated May 16,
2008 or the letter-request dated June 30, 2008 had been
falsified, fraudulent or invalid was not for them to determine
inasmuch as their duty to examine documents presented for
registration was limited only to what appears on the face of the
documents. If, upon their evaluation of the letter-request and
the RTC order, they found the same to be sufficient in law and
t]o be in conformity with existing requirements, it became
obligatory for them to perform their ministerial duty without
unnecessary delay.24
Should they be aggrieved by said respondents' performance of
duty, complainants were not bereft of any remedy because they
could challenge the performance of duty by bringing the matter
by way of consulta with the LRA, as provided by Section 11725
of Presidential Decree No. 1529. But, as enunciated in Gabriel
v. Register of Deeds of Rizal,26 it was ultimately within the
province of a court of competent jurisdiction to resolve issues
concerning the validity or invalidity of a document registered by
the Register of Deeds.
The complainants charge Atty. Victorio, Jr. and Atty. Tolentino,
Jr. with having conspired with each other to guarantee that the
parties in Civil Case No. Q-59598 would enter into the amicable
settlement, and then to cause the cancellation of the affidavit of
adverse claim and notice of lis pendens annotated on TCT No.
N-290546. The complainants further fault Atty. Victorio, Jr. with
having abandoned their cause since the issuance of the RTC of
its order dated May 16, 2008.
The complainants' charges are devoid of substance.
Although it is not necessary to prove a formal agreement in
order to establish conspiracy because conspiracy may be
inferred from the circumstances attending the commission of an
act, it is nonetheless essential that conspiracy be established by
clear and convincing evidence.27 The complainants failed in this
regard. Outside of their bare assertions that Atty. Victorio, Jr.
and Atty. Tolentino, Jr. had conspired with each other in order
to cause the dismissal of the complaint and then discharge of
the annotations, they presented no evidence to support their
allegation of conspiracy. On the contrary, the records indicated
their own active pjarticipation in arriving at the amicable
156
settlement with the defendants in Civil Case No. Q-07-59598.
Hence, they could not now turn their backs on the amicable
settlement that they had themselves entered into.
Even assuming that Atty. Victorio, Jr. and Atty. Tolentino, Jr.
initiated ahd participated in the settlement of the case, there
was nothing wrong in their doing so. It was actually their
obligation as lawyers to do so, pursuant to Rule 1.04, Canon 1
of the Code of Professional Responsibility, viz.
RULE 1.04 - A lawyer shall encourage his clients to avoid, end
or settle a controversy if it will admit of a fair settlement.
In fine, the presumption of the validity of the amicable
settlement of the complainants and the defendants in Civil Case
No. Q-07-59598 subsisted.28
Anent the complainants' charge of abandonment against Atty.
Victorio, Jr., Rule 18.03 and Rule 18.04, Canon 18 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility are applicable, to wit:
CANON 18 - A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and
diligence.
Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted
to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render
him liable.
Rule 18.04 - A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status
of his case and shall respond within a reasonable time to the
client's request for information.
There is no issue that the complainants engaged the services of
Atty. Victorio, Jr. as their counsel in Civil Case No. Q-07-59598.
Atty. Victorio, Jr. served as such counsel. With Atty. Victorio, Jr.
assistance, the complainants obtained a fair settlement
consisting in receiving half of the proceeds of the sale of the
property in litis, without any portion of the proceeds accruing to
counsel as his legal fees. The complainants did not competently
and persuasively show any unfaithfulness on the part of Atty.
Victorio, Jr. as far as their interest in the litigation was
concerned. Hence, Atty. Victorio, Jr. was not liable for
abandonment.
Atty. Victorio, Jr. could not be faulted for the perceived
inattention to any other matters subsequent to the termination
of Civil Case No. Q-07-59598. Unless otherwise expressly
stipulated between them at any time during the engagement,
the complainants had no right to assume that Atty. Victorio, Jr.'s
legal representation was indefinite as to extend to his
representation of them in the LRA. The Law Profession did not
burden its members with the responsibility of indefinite service
to the clients; hence, the rendition of professional services
depends on the agreement between the attorney and the client.
Atty. Victorio, Jr.'s alleged failure to respond to the
complainants' calls or visits, or to provide them with his
whereabouts to enable them to have access to him despite the
termination of his engagement in Civil Case No. Q-07-59598 did
not equate to abandonment without the credible showing that
he continued to come under the professional obligation towards
them after the termination of Civil Case No. Q-07-59598.
WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the baseless disbarment
complaints against Atty. Federico S. Tolentino, Jr., Atty. Renato
G. Cunanan, Atty. Daniel F. Victorio, Jr., Atty. Elbert T. Quilala
and Atty. Constante P. Caluya, Jr.
SO ORDERED.

157
158
THIRD DIVISION
A.C. No. 6057 June 27, 2006
PETER T. DONTON, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. EMMANUEL O. TANSINGCO, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a disbarment complaint against respondent Atty.
Emmanuel O. Tansingco ("respondent") for serious misconduct
and deliberate violation of Canon 1,1 Rules 1.012 and 1.023 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility ("Code").
The Facts
In his Complaint dated 20 May 2003, Peter T. Donton
("complainant") stated that he filed a criminal complaint for
estafa thru falsification of a public document4 against Duane O.
Stier ("Stier"), Emelyn A. Maggay ("Maggay") and respondent,
as the notary public who notarized the Occupancy Agreement.
The disbarment complaint arose when respondent filed a
counter-charge for perjury5 against complainant. Respondent, in
his affidavit-complaint, stated that:
5. The OCCUPANCY AGREEMENT dated September 11, 1995
was prepared and notarized by me under the following
circumstances:
A. Mr. Duane O. Stier is the owner and long-time resident of a
real property located at No. 33 Don Jose Street, Bgy. San Roque,
Murphy, Cubao, Quezon City.
B. Sometime in September 1995, Mr. Stier – a U.S. citizen
and thereby disqualified to own real property in his name
– agreed that the property be transferred in the name of Mr.
Donton, a Filipino.
C. Mr. Stier, in the presence of Mr. Donton, requested me to
prepare several documents that would guarantee recognition of
him being the actual owner of the property despite the transfer
of title in the name of Mr. Donton.
D. For this purpose, I prepared, among others, the OCCUPANCY
AGREEMENT, recognizing Mr. Stier’s free and undisturbed use of
the property for his residence and business operations. The
OCCUPANCY AGREEMENT was tied up with a loan which Mr. Stier
had extended to Mr. Donton.6
Complainant averred that respondent’s act of preparing the
Occupancy Agreement, despite knowledge that Stier, being a
foreign national, is disqualified to own real property in his name,
constitutes serious misconduct and is a deliberate violation of
the Code. Complainant prayed that respondent be disbarred for
advising Stier to do something in violation of law and assisting
Stier in carrying out a dishonest scheme.
In his Comment dated 19 August 2003, respondent claimed that
complainant filed the disbarment case against him upon the
instigation of complainant’s counsel, Atty. Bonifacio A.
Alentajan,7 because respondent refused to act as complainant’s
witness in the criminal case against Stier and Maggay.
Respondent admitted that he "prepared and notarized" the
Occupancy Agreement and asserted its genuineness and due
execution.
In a Resolution dated 1 October 2003, the Court referred the
matter to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation.
The IBP’s Report and Recommendation
In her Report dated 26 February 2004 ("Report"), Commissioner
Milagros V. San Juan ("Commissioner San Juan") of the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline found respondent liable for taking
part in a "scheme to circumvent the constitutional prohibition
against foreign ownership of land in the Philippines."
Commissioner San Juan recommended respondent’s suspension
from the practice of law for two years and the cancellation of his
commission as Notary Public.
In Resolution No. XVI-2004-222 dated 16 April 2004, the IBP
Board of Governors adopted, with modification, the Report and
recommended respondent’s suspension from the practice of law
for six months.
On 28 June 2004, the IBP Board of Governors forwarded the
Report to the Court as provided under Section 12(b), Rule 139-
B8 of the Rules of Court.
On 28 July 2004, respondent filed a motion for reconsideration
before the IBP. Respondent stated that he was already 76 years
old and would already retire by 2005 after the termination of his
pending cases. He also said that his practice of law is his only
means of support for his family and his six minor children.
In a Resolution dated 7 October 2004, the IBP denied the motion
for reconsideration because the IBP had no more jurisdiction on
the case as the matter had already been referred to the Court.
The Ruling of the Court
The Court finds respondent liable for violation of Canon 1 and
Rule 1.02 of the Code.
A lawyer should not render any service or give advice to any
client which will involve defiance of the laws which he is bound
to uphold and obey.9 A lawyer who assists a client in a dishonest
scheme or who connives in violating the law commits an act
which justifies disciplinary action against the lawyer.10
By his own admission, respondent admitted that Stier, a U.S.
citizen, was disqualified from owning real property.11 Yet, in his
motion for reconsideration,12 respondent admitted that he
caused the transfer of ownership to the parcel of land to Stier.
Respondent, however, aware of the prohibition, quickly rectified
his act and transferred the title in complainant’s name. But
respondent provided "some safeguards" by preparing several
documents,13 including the Occupancy Agreement, that would
guarantee Stier’s recognition as the actual owner of the property
despite its transfer in complainant’s name. In effect, respondent
advised and aided Stier in circumventing the constitutional
prohibition against foreign ownership of lands14 by preparing
said documents.
Respondent had sworn to uphold the Constitution. Thus, he
violated his oath and the Code when he prepared and notarized
the Occupancy Agreement to evade the law against foreign
ownership of lands. Respondent used his knowledge of the law
to achieve an unlawful end. Such an act amounts to malpractice
in his office, for which he may be suspended.15
In Balinon v. De Leon,16 respondent Atty. De Leon was
suspended from the practice of law for three years for preparing
an affidavit that virtually permitted him to commit concubinage.
In In re: Santiago,17 respondent Atty. Santiago was suspended
from the practice of law for one year for preparing a contract
which declared the spouses to be single again after nine years
of separation and allowed them to contract separately
subsequent marriages.
WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. Emmanuel O.
Tansingco GUILTY of violation of Canon 1 and Rule 1.02 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, we SUSPEND
respondent Atty. Emmanuel O. Tansingco from the practice of
law for SIX MONTHS effective upon finality of this Decision.
159
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar
Confidant to be appended to respondent’s personal record as an
attorney, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Department
of Justice, and all courts in the country for their information and
guidance.
SO ORDERED.

160
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 1203. May 15, 1903. ]
In the matter of the suspension of HOWARD D. TERRELL
from the practice of law.
Solicitor-General Araneta for Government.
W . A. Kincaid for defendant.
SYLLABUS
1. ATTORNEYS; SUSPENSION. — The promotion of an
organization for the purpose of violating or evading the penal
laws amounts to such malpractice on the part of an attorney at
law as will justify removal or suspension.
and has not, therefore, been convicted of crime, and as the acts
with which he is charged in this proceeding, while unprofessional
and hence to be condemned, are not criminal in their nature, we
are of opinion that the ends of justice will be served by the
suspension of said Howard D. Terrell from the practice of law in
the Philippine Islands for the term of one year from the 7th day
of February, 1903.
It is therefore directed that the said Howard D. Terrell be
suspended form the practice of law for a term of one year from
February 7, 1903. It is so ordered.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

Howard D. Terrell, an attorney-at-law, was ordered to show

cause in the Court of First Instance. in the city of Manila, on the
5th day of February, 1903, why he should not be suspended as
a member of the bar of the city of Manila for the reasons:

First, that he had assisted in the organization of the "Centro

Bellas Artes" Club, after he had been notified that the said
organization was made for the purpose of evading the law then
in force in said city; and,
Secondly, for acting as attorney for said "Centro Bellas Artes"
during the time of and after its organization, which organization
was known to him to be created for the purpose of evading the
law.

The accused appeared on the return day, and by his counsel, W.

A. Kincaid, made answer to these charges, denying the same,
and filed affidavits in answer thereto. After reading testimony
given by said Howard D. Terrell, in the case of the United States
v. H. D. Terrell, 1 wherein he was charged with estafa, and after
reading the said affidavits in his behalf, and hearing his counsel,
the court below found, and decided as a fact, that the charges
aforesaid made against Howard D. Terrell were true, and
thereupon made an order suspending him from his office as a
lawyer in the Philippine Islands, and directed the clerk of the
court to transmit to this court a certified copy of the order of
suspension, as well as a full statement of the facts upon which
the same was based.
We have carefully considered these facts, and have reached the
conclusion that they were such as to justify the court below in
arriving at the conclusion that the knowledge and acts of the
accused in connection with the organization of the "Centro Bellas
Artes" Club were of such a nature and character as to warrant
his suspension from practice.
The promoting of organizations, with knowledge of their objects,
for the purpose of violating or evading the laws against crime
constitutes such misconduct on the part of an attorney, an
officer of the court, as amounts to malpractice or gross
misconduct in his office, and for which he may be removed or
suspended. (Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 21.) The assisting of
a client in a scheme which the attorney knows to be dishonest,
or the conniving at a violation of law, are acts which justify
disbarment.

In this case, however, inasmuch as the defendant in the case of

United States v. Terrelle was acquitted on the charge of estafa,
161
162
EN BANC
G.R. No. 159486-88 November 25, 2003
PRESIDENT JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN [SPECIAL
DIVISION], HON. MINITA CHICO-NAZARIO, HON.
EDILBERTO SANDOVAL, HON. TERESITA LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO, and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondents.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
On 23 September 2003, this Court issued its resolution in the
above-numbered case; it read:
"The case for consideration has been brought to this Court via a
Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court filed
by Joseph Ejercito Estrada, acting through his counsel Attorney
Alan F. Paguia, against the Sandiganbayan, et al. The Petition
prays –
"1. That Chief Justice Davide and the rest of the members of the
Honorable Court disqualify themselves from hearing and
deciding this petition;
"2. That the assailed resolutions of the Sandiganbayan be
vacated and set aside; and
"3. That Criminal Cases No. 26558, No. 26565 and No. 26905
pending before the Sandiganbayan be dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction.
"Attorney Alan F. Paguia, speaking for petitioner, asserts that
the inhibition of the members of the Supreme Court from
hearing the petition is called for under Rule 5.10 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct prohibiting justices or judges from participating
in any partisan political activity which proscription, according to
him, the justices have violated by attending the ‘EDSA 2 Rally’
and by authorizing the assumption of Vice-President Gloria
Macapagal Arroyo to the Presidency in violation of the 1987
Constitution. Petitioner contends that the justices have thereby
prejudged a case that would assail the legality of the act taken
by President Arroyo. The subsequent decision of the Court in
Estrada v. Arroyo (353 SCRA 452 and 356 SCRA 108) is,
petitioner states, a patent mockery of justice and due process.
"Attorney Paguia first made his appearance for petitioner when
he filed an Omnibus Motion on 19 May 2003, before the
Sandiganbayan, asking that ‘the appointment of counsels de
officio (sic) be declared functus officio’ and that, being the now
counsel de parte, he be notified of all subsequent proceedings
in Criminal Cases No. 26558, No. 26565 and No. 26905 pending
therein. Finally, Attorney Paguia asked that all the foregoing
criminal cases against his client be dismissed.
"During the hearing of the Omnibus Motion on 30 May 2003,
petitioner presented to the court several portions of the book,
entitled ‘Reforming the Judiciary,’ written by Justice Artemio
Panganiban, to be part of the evidence for the defense. On 9
June 2003, petitioner filed a motion pleading, among other
things, that –
"a) x x x President Estrada be granted the opportunity to prove
the ‘truth’ of the statements contained in Justice Artemio
Panganiban’s book, ‘REFORMING THE JUDICIARY,’ in relation to
the prejudgment committed by the Supreme Court justices
against President Estrada in the subject case/s of Estrada v.
Arroyo, 353 SCRA 452 and 356 SCRA 108; and,
"b) A subpoena ad testificandum and duces tecum be issued to
Justice Artemio Panganiban, Justice Antonio Carpio, Justice
Renato Corona, Secretary Angelo Reyes of the Department of
National Defense, Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo,
Senator Aquilino Pimentel, Jr., and Chief Justice Hilario Davide,
Jr. for them to testify and bring whatever supporting documents
they may have in relation to their direct and indirect
participation in the proclamation of Vice President Gloria
Macapagal Arroyo on January 20, 2001, as cited in the book of
Justice Panganiban, including the material events that led to
that proclamation and the ruling/s in the Estrada vs. Arroyo,
supra.’ (Rollo, pp. 6-7.)
"The ‘truth’ referred to in paragraph a) of the relief sought in the
motion of petitioner pertains to what he claims should have been
included in the resolution of the Sandiganbayan; viz:
‘The request of the movant is simply for the Court to include in
its Joint Resolution the TRUTH of the acts of Chief Justice
Davide, et al., last January 20, 2001 in:
‘a) going to EDSA 2;
‘b) authorizing the proclamation of Vice-President Arroyo as
President on the ground of ‘permanent disability’ even without
proof of compliance with the corresponding constitutional
conditions, e.g., written declaration by either the President or
majority of his cabinet; and
‘c) actually proclaiming Vice-President Arroyo on that same
ground of permanent disability.
‘It is patently unreasonable for the Court to refuse to include
these material facts which are obviously undeniable. Besides, it
is the only defense of President Estrada.’ (Petition, Rollo, pp. 13-
14.)
"On 2 July 2003, the Sandiganbayan issued an order denying
the foregoing motion, as well as the motion to dismiss, filed by
petitioner. Forthwith, petitioner filed a ‘Mosyong
Pangrekonsiderasyon’ of the foregoing order. According to
Attorney Paguia, during the hearing of his ‘Mosyong
Pangrekonsiderasyon’ on 11 June 2003, the three justices of the
Special Division of the Sandiganbayan made manifest their bias
and partiality against his client. Thus, he averred, Presiding
Justice Minita V. Chico-Nazario supposedly employed foul and
disrespectful language when she blurted out, ‘Magmumukha
naman kaming gago,’ (Rollo, p. 13.) and Justice Teresita
Leonardo-De Castro characterized the motion as insignificant
even before the prosecution could file its comments or
opposition thereto, (Rollo, p. 12.) remarking in open court that
to grant Estrada’s motion would result in chaos and disorder.
(Ibid.) Prompted by the alleged ‘bias and partial attitude’ of the
Sandiganbayan justices, Attorney Paguia filed, on 14 July 2003,
a motion for their disqualification. On 31 July 2003, petitioner
received the two assailed resolutions, i.e., the resolution
(Promulgated on 30 July 2003.) of 28 July 2003, denying
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of 6 July 2003; viz:
‘WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused-movant Joseph
Ejercito Estrada’s ‘Mosyong Pangrekonsiderasyon’ (Na
tumutukoy sa Joint Resolution ng Hulyo 2, 2003) dated July 6,
2003 is DENIED for lack of merit.’ (Rollo, p. 37.)
"and the resolution (Promulgated on 30 July 2003.) of 25 July
2003, denying petitioner’s motion for disqualification of 14 July
2003; viz:
‘WHEREFORE, prescinding from all the foregoing, the Court, for
want of merit, hereby DENIES the Motion for Disqualification.’
(Rollo, p. 48.)
"The instant petition assailing the foregoing orders must be
DISMISSED for gross insufficiency in substance and for utter
lack of merit. The Sandiganbayan committed no grave abuse of
discretion, an indispensable requirement to warrant a recourse
to the extraordinary relief of petition for certiorari under Rule 65
of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. On the one hand,
petitioner would disclaim the authority and jurisdiction of the
163
members of this tribunal and, on the other hand, he would
elevate the petition now before it to challenge the two
resolutions of the Sandiganbayan. He denounces the decision as
being a patent mockery of justice and due process. Attorney
Pagula went on to state that-
‘The act of the public officer, if LAWFUL, is the act of the public
office.1awp++i1 But the act of the public officer, if UNLAWFUL,
is not the act of the public office. Consequently, the act of the
justices, if LAWFUL, is the act of the Supreme Court. But the act
of the justices, if UNLAWFUL, is not the act of the Supreme
Court. It is submitted that the Decision in ESTRADA vs. ARROYO
being patently unlawful in view of Rule 5.10 of the CODE OF
JUDICIAL CONDUCT, is not the act of the Supreme Court but is
merely the wrong or trespass of those individual Justices who
falsely spoke and acted in the name of the Supreme Court.
(Urbano vs. Chavez, 183 SCRA [347]). Furthermore, it would
seem absurd to allow the Justices to use the name of the
Supreme Court as a shield for their UNLAWFUL act.’ (Petition,
Rollo, p. 11.)
"Criticism or comment made in good faith on the correctness or
wrongness, soundness or unsoundness, of a decision of the
Court would be welcome for, if well-founded, such reaction can
enlighten the court and contribute to the correction of an error
if committed. (In Re Sotto, 82 Phil 595.)
"The ruling in Estrada v. Arroyo, being a final judgment, has
long put to end any question pertaining to the legality of the
ascension of Arroyo into the presidency. By reviving the issue
on the validity of the assumption of Mme. Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo to the presidency, Attorney Paguia is vainly seeking to
breathe life into the carcass of a long dead issue.
"Attorney Paguia has not limited his discussions to the merits of
his client’s case within the judicial forum; indeed, he has
repeated his assault on the Court in both broadcast and print
media. Rule 13.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
prohibits a member of the bar from making such public
statements on any pending case tending to arouse public
opinion for or against a party. By his acts, Attorney Paguia may
have stoked the fires of public dissension and posed a potentially
dangerous threat to the administration of justice.
"It is not the first time that Attorney Paguia has exhibited similar
conduct towards the Supreme Court. In a letter, dated 30 June
2003, addressed to Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., and
Associate Justice Artemio V. Panganiban, he has demanded, in
a clearly disguised form of forum shopping, for several advisory
opinions on matters pending before the Sandiganbayan. In a
resolution, dated 08 July 2003, this Court has strongly warned
Attorney Alan Paguia, on pain of disciplinary sanction, to desist
from further making, directly or indirectly, similar submissions
to this Court or to its Members. But, unmindful of the well-meant
admonition to him by the Court, Attorney Paguia appears to
persist on end.
"WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is DISMISSED,
and the Court hereby orders Attorney Alan Paguia, counsel for
petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada, to SHOW CAUSE, within ten
days from notice hereof, why he should not be sanctioned for
conduct unbecoming a lawyer and an officer of the Court."
On 10 October 2003, Atty. Paguia submitted his compliance with
the show-cause order. In a three-page pleading, Atty. Paguia,
in an obstinate display of defiance, repeated his earlier claim of
political partisanship against the members of the Court.
Canon 5.10 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, which Atty. Paguia
has tirelessly quoted to give some semblance of validity for his
groundless attack on the Court and its members, provides -
"Rule 5.10. A judge is entitled to entertain personal views on
political questions. But to avoid suspicion of political
partisanship, a judge shall not make political speeches,
contribute to party funds, publicly endorse candidates for
political office or participate in other partisan political activities."
Section 79(b) of the Omnibus Election Code defines the term
"partisan political activities;" the law states:
"The term ‘election campaign’ or ‘partisan political activity’
refers to an act designed to promote the election or defeat of a
particular candidate or candidates to a public office which shall
include:
"(1) Forming organizations, associations, clubs, committees or
other groups of persons for the purpose of soliciting votes and/or
undertaking any campaign for or against a candidate;
"(2) Holding political caucuses, conferences, meetings, rallies,
parades, or other similar assemblies, for the purpose of soliciting
votes and/or undertaking any campaign or propaganda for or
against a candidate.
"(3) Making speeches, announcements or commentaries, or
holding interviews for or against the election of any candidate
for public office;
"(4) Publishing or distributing campaign literature or materials
designed to support or oppose the election of any candidate; or
"(5) Directly or indirectly soliciting votes, pledges or support for
or against a candidate."
It should be clear that the phrase "partisan political activities,"
in its statutory context, relates to acts designed to cause the
success or the defeat of a particular candidate or candidates who
have filed certificates of candidacy to a public office in an
election. The taking of an oath of office by any incoming
President of the Republic before the Chief Justice of the
Philippines is a traditional official function of the Highest
Magistrate. The assailed presence of other justices of the Court
at such an event could be no different from their appearance in
such other official functions as attending the Annual State of the
Nation Address by the President of the Philippines before the
Legislative Department.
The Supreme Court does not claim infallibility; it will not
denounce criticism made by anyone against the Court for, if
well-founded, can truly have constructive effects in the task of
the Court, but it will not countenance any wrongdoing nor allow
the erosion of our people’s faith in the judicial system, let alone,
by those who have been privileged by it to practice law in the
Philippines.1âwphi1
Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates
that the lawyer should observe and maintain the respect due to
the courts and judicial officers and, indeed, should insist on
similar conduct by others. In liberally imputing sinister and
devious motives and questioning the impartiality, integrity, and
authority of the members of the Court, Atty. Paguia has only
succeeded in seeking to impede, obstruct and pervert the
dispensation of justice.
The attention of Atty. Paguia has also been called to the
mandate of Rule 13.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
prohibiting a member of the bar from making such public
statements on a case that may tend to arouse public opinion for
or against a party. Regrettably, Atty. Paguia has persisted in
ignoring the Court’s well-meant admonition.
On the 7th September 2003 issue of the Daily Tribune, Atty.
Paguia wrote to say -
"What is the legal effect of that violation of President Estrada’s
right to due process of law? It renders the decision in Estrada
vs. Arroyo unconstitutional and void. The rudiments of fair play
were not observed. There was no fair play since it appears that
when President Estrada filed his petition, Chief Justice Davide
and his fellow justices had already committed to the other party
- GMA - with a judgment already made and waiting to be
164
formalized after the litigants shall have undergone the charade
of a formal hearing. After the justices had authorized the
proclamation of GMA as president, can they be expected to
voluntarily admit the unconstitutionality of their own act?"
Unrelentingly, Atty. Paguia has continued to make public
statements of like nature.
The Court has already warned Atty. Paguia, on pain of
disciplinary sanction, to become mindful of his grave
responsibilities as a lawyer and as an officer of the Court.
Apparently, he has chosen not to at all take heed.
WHEREFORE, Attorney Alan Paguia is hereby indefinitely
suspended from the practice of law, effective upon his receipt
hereof, for conduct unbecoming a lawyer and an officer of the
Court.
Let copies of this resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar
Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all courts of
the land through the Office of the Court Administrator.
SO ORDERED.

165
166
SECOND DIVISION
A.C. No. 4497 September 26, 2001
MR. and MRS. VENUSTIANO G. SABURNIDO, complainants,
vs.
ATTY. FLORANTE E. MADROÑO,1 respondent.
QUISUMBING, J.:
For our resolution is the administrative complaint2 for
disbarment of respondent, Atty. Florante E. Madroño filed by
spouses Venustiano and Rosalia Saburdino. Complainants allege
that respondent has been harassing them by filing numerous
complaints against them, in addition to committing acts of
dishonesty.
Complainant Venustiano Saburnido is a member of the
Philippine National Police stationed at Balingasag, Misamis
Oriental, while his wife Rosalia is a public school teacher.
Respondent is a former judge of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court,
Balingasag-Lagonglong, Misamis Oriental.
Previous to this administrative case, complainants also filed
three separate administrative cases against respondent.
In A. M. No. MTJ-90-383,3 complainant Venustiano Saburnido
filed charges of grave threats and acts unbecoming a member
of the judiciary against respondent. Respondent was therein
found guilty of pointing a high-powered firearm at complainant,
who was unarmed at the time, during a heated altercation.
Respondent was accordingly dismissed from the service with
prejudice to reemployment in government but without forfeiture
of retirement benefits.
Respondent was again administratively charged in the
consolidated cases of Sealana-Abbu v. Judge Madroño, A.M. No.
92-1-084-RTC and Sps. Saburnido v. Judge Madroño, A.M. No.
MTJ-90-486.4 In the first case, Assistant Provincial Prosecutor
Florencia Sealana-Abbu charged that respondent granted and
reduced bail in a criminal case without prior notice to the
prosecution. In the second case, the spouses Saburnido charged
that respondent, in whose court certain confiscated smuggled
goods were deposited, allowed other persons to take the goods
but did not issue the corresponding memorandum receipts.
Some of the goods were lost while others were substituted with
damaged goods. Respondent was found guilty of both charges
and his retirement benefits were forfeited.
In the present case, the spouses Saburnido allege that
respondent has been harassing them by filing numerous
complaints against them, namely:
1. Adm. Case No. 90-0755,5 for serious irregularity, filed by
respondent against Venustiano Saburnido. Respondent claimed
that Venustiano lent his service firearm to an acquaintance who
thereafter extorted money from public jeepney drivers while
posing as a member of the then Constabulary Highway Patrol
Group.
2. Adm. Case No. 90-0758,6 for falsification, filed by respondent
against Venustiano Saburnido and two others. Respondent
averred that Venustiano, with the help of his co-respondents in
the case, inserted an entry in the police blotter regarding the
loss of Venustiano's firearm.
3. Crim. Case No. 93-67, for evasion through negligence under
7
Article 224 of the Revised Penal Code, filed by respondent
against Venustiano Saburnido. Respondent alleged that
Venustiano Saburnido, without permission from his superior,
took into custody a prisoner by final Judgment who thereafter
escaped.
4. Adm. Case No. 95 33,8 filed by respondent against Rosalia
Saburnido for violation of the Omnibus Election Code.
Respondent alleged that Rosalia Saburnido served as
chairperson of the Board of Election Inspectors during the 1995
elections despite being related to a candidate for barangay
councilor.
At the time the present complaint was filed, the three actions
filed against Venustiano Saburnido had been dismissed while the
case against Rosalia Saburnido was still pending.
Complainants allege that respondent filed those cases against
them in retaliation, since they had earlier filed administrative
cases against him that resulted in his dismissal from the
judiciary. Complainants assert that due to the complaints filed
against them, they suffered much moral, mental, physical, and
financial damage. They claim that their children had to stop
going to school since the family funds were used up in attending
to their cases.
For his part, respondent contends that the grounds mentioned
in the administrative cases in which he was dismissed and his
benefits forfeited did not constitute moral turpitude. Hence, he
could not be disbarred therefor. He then argues that none of the
complaints he filed against complainants was manufactured. He
adds that he "was so unlucky that Saburnido was not
convicted."9 He claims that the complaint for serious irregularity
against Venustiano Saburnido was dismissed only because the
latter was able to antedate an entry in the police blotter stating
that his service firearm was lost. He also points out that
Venustiano was suspended when a prisoner escaped during his
watch. As for his complaint against Rosalia Saburnido,
respondent contends that by mentioning this case in the present
complaint, Rosalia wants to deprive him of his right to call the
attention of the proper authorities to a violation of the Election
Code.
In their reply, complainants reiterate their charge that the cases
against them were meant only to harass them. In addition,
Rosalia Saburnido stressed that she served in the BEI in 1995
only because the supposed chairperson was indisposed. She
stated that she told the other BEI members and the pollwatchers
that she was related to one candidate and that she would desist
from serving if anyone objected. Since nobody objected, she
proceeded to dispense her duties as BEI chairperson. She added
that her relative lost in that election while respondent's son won.
In a resolution dated May 22, 1996,10 we referred this matter to
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation,
report, and recommendation.
In its report submitted to this Court on October 16, 2000, the
IBP noted that respondent and his counsel failed to appear and
present evidence in the hearing of the case set for January 26,
2000, despite notice. Thus, respondent was considered to have
waived his right to present evidence in his behalf during said
hearing. Neither did respondent submit his memorandum as
directed by the IBP.
After evaluating the evidence before it, the IBP concluded that
complainants submitted convincing proof that respondent
indeed committed acts constituting gross misconduct that
warrant the imposition of administrative sanction. The IBP
recommends that respondent be suspended from the practice of
law for one year.
We have examined the records of this case and find no reason
to disagree with the findings and recommendation of the IBP.
A lawyer may be disciplined for any conduct, in his professional
or private capacity, that renders him unfit to continue to be an
officer of the court.11 Canon 7 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility commands all lawyers to at all times uphold the
dignity and integrity of the legal profession. Specifically, in Rule
7.03, the Code provides:
RULE 7.03. A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely
reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall be whether in
167
public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the
discredit of the legal profession.
Clearly, respondent's act of filing multiple complaints against
herein complainants reflects on his fitness to be a member of
the legal profession. His act evinces vindictiveness, a decidedly
undesirable trait whether in a lawyer or another individual, as
complainants were instrumental in respondent's dismissal from
the judiciary. We see in respondent's tenacity in pursuing
several cases against complainants not the persistence of one
who has been grievously wronged but the obstinacy of one who
is trying to exact revenge.
Respondent's action erodes rather than enhances public
perception of the legal profession. It constitutes gross
misconduct for which he may be suspended, following Section
27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, which provides:
SECTION 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by
Supreme Court, grounds therefor. — A member of the bar may
be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the
Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross
misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason
of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any
violation of the oath which he is required to take before
admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience appearing as
an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do.x x
x
Complainants ask that respondent be disbarred. However, we
find that suspension from the practice of law is sufficient to
discipline respondent.
The supreme penalty of disbarment is meted out only in clear
cases of misconduct that seriously affect the standing and
character of the lawyer as an officer of the court.12 While we will
not hesitate to remove an erring attorney from the esteemed
brotherhood of lawyers, where the evidence calls for it, we will
also not disbar him where a lesser penalty will suffice to
accomplish the desired end.13 In this case, we find suspension
to be a sufficient sanction against respondent. Suspension, we
may add, is not primarily intended as a punishment, but as a
means to protect the public and the legal profession.14
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Florante E. Madroño is found
GUILTY of gross misconduct and is SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for one year with a WARNING that a repetition
the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely.
Respondent's suspension is effective upon his receipt of notice
of this decision. Let notice of this decision be spread in
respondent's record as an attorney in this Court, and notice of
the same served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and on
the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all the
courts concerned.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Mendoza, Buena and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur

168
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
SERVICES OFFERED:
Manila CONSULTATION AND ASSISTANCE
TO OVERSEAS SEAMEN
FIRST DIVISION REPATRIATED DUE TO ACCIDENT,
A.C. No. 6672 September 4, 2009 INJURY, ILLNESS, SICKNESS, DEATH
AND INSURANCE BENEFIT CLAIMS
PEDRO L. LINSANGAN, Complainant, ABROAD.
1avvphi1
vs.
ATTY. NICOMEDES TOLENTINO, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.: (emphasis supplied)

This is a complaint for disbarment1 filed by Pedro Linsangan of Hence, this complaint.
the Linsangan Linsangan & Linsangan Law Office against Atty.
Respondent, in his defense, denied knowing Labiano and
Nicomedes Tolentino for solicitation of clients and encroachment
authorizing the printing and circulation of the said calling card.7
of professional services.
The complaint was referred to the Commission on Bar Discipline
Complainant alleged that respondent, with the help of paralegal
(CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
Fe Marie Labiano, convinced his clients2 to transfer legal
investigation, report and recommendation.8
representation. Respondent promised them financial assistance3
and expeditious collection on their claims.4 To induce them to Based on testimonial and documentary evidence, the CBD, in its
hire his services, he persistently called them and sent them text report and recommendation,9 found that respondent had
messages. encroached on the professional practice of complainant,
violating Rule 8.0210 and other canons11 of the Code of
To support his allegations, complainant presented the sworn
Professional Responsibility (CPR). Moreover, he contravened the
affidavit5 of James Gregorio attesting that Labiano tried to
rule against soliciting cases for gain, personally or through paid
prevail upon him to sever his lawyer-client relations with
agents or brokers as stated in Section 27, Rule 13812 of the Rules
complainant and utilize respondent’s services instead, in
of Court. Hence, the CBD recommended that respondent be
exchange for a loan of ₱50,000. Complainant also attached
reprimanded with a stern warning that any repetition would
"respondent’s" calling card:6
merit a heavier penalty.
Front
We adopt the findings of the IBP on the unethical conduct of
respondent but we modify the recommended penalty.
The complaint before us is rooted on the alleged intrusion by
NICOMEDES TOLENTINO respondent into complainant’s professional practice in violation
LAW OFFFICE of Rule 8.02 of the CPR. And the means employed by respondent
CONSULTANCY & MARITIME SERVICES in furtherance of the said misconduct themselves constituted
W/ FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE distinct violations of ethical rules.
Fe Marie L. Labiano
Paralegal Canons of the CPR are rules of conduct all lawyers must adhere
to, including the manner by which a lawyer’s services are to be
made known. Thus, Canon 3 of the CPR provides:
CANON 3 - A lawyer in making known his legal services shall use
only true, honest, fair, dignified and objective information or
statement of facts.
Time and time again, lawyers are reminded that the practice of
law is a profession and not a business; lawyers should not
advertise their talents as merchants advertise their wares.13 To
Tel: 362-7820 allow a lawyer to advertise his talent or skill is to commercialize
1st MIJI Mansion, 2nd Flr. Rm. M-
Fax: (632) 362- the practice of law, degrade the profession in the public’s
01
7821 estimation and impair its ability to efficiently render that high
6th Ave., cor M.H. Del Pilar
Cel.: (0926) character of service to which every member of the bar is called.14
Grace Park, Caloocan City
2701719
Rule 2.03 of the CPR provides:
RULE 2.03. A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act
designed primarily to solicit legal business.
Hence, lawyers are prohibited from soliciting cases for the
purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or
brokers.15 Such actuation constitutes malpractice, a ground for
Back disbarment.16
Rule 2.03 should be read in connection with Rule 1.03 of the
CPR which provides:
RULE 1.03. A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest,
encourage any suit or proceeding or delay any man’s cause.

169
This rule proscribes "ambulance chasing" (the solicitation of
almost any kind of legal business by an attorney, personally or
through an agent in order to gain employment)17 as a measure
to protect the community from barratry and champerty.18
Complainant presented substantial evidence19 (consisting of the
sworn statements of the very same persons coaxed by Labiano
and referred to respondent’s office) to prove that respondent
indeed solicited legal business as well as profited from referrals’
suits.
Although respondent initially denied knowing Labiano in his
answer, he later admitted it during the mandatory hearing.
wimpy slap on the wrist. The proposed penalty is grossly
incommensurate to its findings.
A final word regarding the calling card presented in evidence by
petitioner. A lawyer’s best advertisement is a well-merited
reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust based
on his character and conduct.27 For this reason, lawyers are only
allowed to announce their services by publication in reputable
law lists or use of simple professional cards.
Professional calling cards may only contain the following details:
(a) lawyer’s name;

Through Labiano’s actions, respondent’s law practice was (b) name of the law firm with which he is connected;
benefited. Hapless seamen were enticed to transfer (c) address;
representation on the strength of Labiano’s word that
respondent could produce a more favorable result. (d) telephone number and

Based on the foregoing, respondent clearly solicited
employment violating Rule 2.03, and Rule 1.03 and Canon 3 of
the CPR and Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.1avvphi1
With regard to respondent’s violation of Rule 8.02 of the CPR,
settled is the rule that a lawyer should not steal another lawyer’s
client nor induce the latter to retain him by a promise of better
service, good result or reduced fees for his services.20 Again the
Court notes that respondent never denied having these
seafarers in his client list nor receiving benefits from Labiano’s
"referrals." Furthermore, he never denied Labiano’s connection
to his office.21 Respondent committed an unethical, predatory
overstep into another’s legal practice. He cannot escape liability
under Rule 8.02 of the CPR.
(e) special branch of law practiced.28
Labiano’s calling card contained the phrase "with financial
assistance." The phrase was clearly used to entice clients (who
already had representation) to change counsels with a promise
of loans to finance their legal actions. Money was dangled to lure
clients away from their original lawyers, thereby taking
advantage of their financial distress and emotional vulnerability.
This crass commercialism degraded the integrity of the bar and
deserved no place in the legal profession. However, in the
absence of substantial evidence to prove his culpability, the
Court is not prepared to rule that respondent was personally and
directly responsible for the printing and distribution of Labiano’s
calling cards.

Moreover, by engaging in a money-lending venture with his WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino for
clients as borrowers, respondent violated Rule 16.04: violating Rules 1.03, 2.03, 8.02 and 16.04 and Canon 3 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility and Section 27, Rule 138 of
Rule 16.04 – A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client the Rules of Court is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice
unless the client’s interests are fully protected by the nature of of law for a period of one year effective immediately from
the case or by independent advice. Neither shall a lawyer lend receipt of this resolution. He is STERNLY WARNED that a
money to a client except, when in the interest of justice, he has repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt
to advance necessary expenses in a legal matter he is handling with more severely.
for the client.
Let a copy of this Resolution be made part of his records in the
The rule is that a lawyer shall not lend money to his client. The Office of the Bar Confidant, Supreme Court of the Philippines,
only exception is, when in the interest of justice, he has to and be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the
advance necessary expenses (such as filing fees, stenographer’s Office of the Court Administrator to be circulated to all courts.
fees for transcript of stenographic notes, cash bond or premium
for surety bond, etc.) for a matter that he is handling for the SO ORDERED.
client.
The rule is intended to safeguard the lawyer’s independence of
mind so that the free exercise of his judgment may not be
adversely affected.22 It seeks to ensure his undivided attention
to the case he is handling as well as his entire devotion and
fidelity to the client’s cause. If the lawyer lends money to the
client in connection with the client’s case, the lawyer in effect
acquires an interest in the subject matter of the case or an
additional stake in its outcome.23 Either of these circumstances
may lead the lawyer to consider his own recovery rather than
that of his client, or to accept a settlement which may take care
of his interest in the verdict to the prejudice of the client in
violation of his duty of undivided fidelity to the client’s cause.24
As previously mentioned, any act of solicitation constitutes
malpractice25 which calls for the exercise of the Court’s
disciplinary powers. Violation of anti-solicitation statutes
warrants serious sanctions for initiating contact with a
prospective client for the purpose of obtaining employment.26
Thus, in this jurisdiction, we adhere to the rule to protect the
public from the Machiavellian machinations of unscrupulous
lawyers and to uphold the nobility of the legal profession.
Considering the myriad infractions of respondent (including
violation of the prohibition on lending money to clients), the
sanction recommended by the IBP, a mere reprimand, is a
170
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 104599 March 11, 1994
JON DE YSASI III, petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (FOURTH
DIVISION), CEBU CITY, and JON DE YSASI, respondents.
F.B. Santiago, Nalus & Associates for petitioner.
Ismael A. Serfino for private respondent.
REGALADO, J.:
The adage that blood is thicker than water obviously stood for
naught in this case, notwithstanding the vinculum of paternity
and filiation between the parties. It would indeed have been the
better part of reason if herein petitioner and private respondent
had reconciled their differences in an extrajudicial atmosphere
of familial amity and with the grace of reciprocal concessions.
Father and son opted instead for judicial intervention despite the
inevitable acrimony and negative publicity. Albeit with distaste,
the Court cannot proceed elsewise but to resolve their dispute
with the same reasoned detachment accorded any judicial
proceeding before it.
The records of this case reveal that petitioner was employed by
his father, herein private respondent, as farm administrator of
Hacienda Manucao in Hinigaran, Negros Occidental sometime in
April, 1980. Prior thereto, he was successively employed as
sales manager of Triumph International (Phil.), Inc. and later as
operations manager of Top Form Manufacturing (Phil.), Inc. His
employment as farm administrator was on a fixed salary, with
other allowances covering housing, food, light, power,
telephone, gasoline, medical and dental expenses.
As farm administrator, petitioner was responsible for the
supervision of daily activities and operations of the sugarcane
farm such as land preparation, planting, weeding, fertilizing,
harvesting, dealing with third persons in all matters relating to
the hacienda and attending to such other tasks as may be
assigned to him by private respondent. For this purpose, he lived
on the farm, occupying the upper floor of the house there.
Following his marriage on June 6, 1982, petitioner moved to
Bacolod City with his wife and commuted to work daily. He
suffered various ailments and was hospitalized on two separate
occasions in June and August, 1982. In November, 1982, he
underwent fistulectomy, or the surgical removal of the fistula, a
deep sinuous ulcer. During his recuperation which lasted over
four months, he was under the care of Dr. Patricio Tan. In June,
1983, he was confined for acute gastroenteritis and, thereafter,
for infectious hepatitis from December, 1983 to January, 1984.
During the entire periods of petitioner's illnesses, private
respondent took care of his medical expenses and petitioner
continued to receive compensation. However, in April, 1984,
without due notice, private respondent ceased to pay the latter's
salary. Petitioner made oral and written demands for an
explanation for the sudden withholding of his salary from Atty.
Apolonio Sumbingco, private respondent's auditor and legal
adviser, as well as for the remittance of his salary. Both
demands, however, were not acted upon.
Petitioner then filed an action with the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC, for brevity), Regional Arbitration Branch No.
VI, Bacolod City, on October 17, 1984, docketed therein as RAB
Case No. 0452-84, against private respondent for illegal
dismissal with prayer for reinstatement without loss of seniority
rights and payment of full back wages, thirteenth month pay for
1983, consequential, moral and exemplary damages, as well as
attorney's fees.
On July 31, 1991, said complaint for illegal dismissal was
dismissed by the NLRC,1 holding that petitioner abandoned his
work and that the termination of his employment was for a valid
cause, but ordering private respondent to pay petitioner the
amount of P5,000.00 as penalty for his failure to serve notice of
said termination of employment to the Department of Labor and
Employment as required by Batas Pambansa Blg. 130 and
consonant with this Court's ruling in Wenphil Corporation vs.
National Labor Relations Commission, et al.2 On appeal to the
Fourth Division of the NLRC, Cebu City, said decision was
affirmed in toto.3
His motion for reconsideration4 of said decision having been
denied for lack of merit,5 petitioner filed this petition presenting
the following issues for resolution: (1) whether or not the
petitioner was illegally dismissed; (2) whether or not he is
entitled to reinstatement, payment of back wages, thirteenth
month pay and other benefits; and (3) whether or not he is
entitled to payment of moral and exemplary damages and
attorney's fees because of illegal dismissal. The discussion of
these issues will necessarily subsume the corollary questions
presented by private respondent, such as the exact date when
petitioner ceased to function as farm administrator, the
character of the pecuniary amounts received by petitioner from
private respondent, that is, whether the same are in the nature
of salaries or pensions, and whether or not there was
abandonment by petitioner of his functions as farm
administrator.
In his manifestation dated September 14, 1992, the Solicitor
General recommended a modification of the decision of herein
public respondent sustaining the findings and conclusions of the
Executive Labor Arbiter in RAB Case No. 0452-84,6 for which
reason the NLRC was required to submit its own comment on
the petition. In compliance with the Court's resolution of
November 16, 1992,7 NLRC filed its comment on February 12,
1992 largely reiterating its earlier position in support of the
findings of the Executive Labor Arbiter.8
Before proceeding with a discussion of the issues, the
observation of the labor arbiter is worth noting:
This case is truly unique. What makes this case unique is the
fact that because of the special relationship of the parties and
the nature of the action involved, this case could very well go
down (in) the annals of the Commission as perhaps the first of
its kind. For this case is an action filed by an only son, his
father's namesake, the only child and therefore the only heir
against his own father.9
Additionally, the Solicitor General remarked:
. . . After an exhaustive reading of the records, two (2)
observations were noted that may justify why this labor case
deserves special considerations. First, most of the complaints
that petitioner and private respondent had with each other, were
personal matters affecting father and son relationship. And
secondly, if any of the complaints pertain to their work, they
allow their personal relationship to come in the way.10
I. Petitioner maintains that his dismissal from employment was
illegal because of want of just cause therefor and non-
observance of the requirements of due process. He also charges
the NLRC with grave abuse of discretion in relying upon the
findings of the executive labor arbiter who decided the case but
did not conduct the hearings thereof.
171
Private respondent, in refutation, avers that there was
abandonment by petitioner of his functions as farm
administrator, thereby arming private respondent with a ground
to terminate his employment at Hacienda Manucao. It is also
contended that it is wrong for petitioner to question the factual
findings of the executive labor arbiter and the NLRC as only
questions of law may be appealed for resolution by this Court.
Furthermore, in seeking the dismissal of the instant petition,
private respondent faults herein petitioner for failure to refer to
the corresponding pages of the transcripts of stenographic
notes, erroneously citing Sections 15(d) and 16(d), Rule 44
(should be Section 16[c] and [d],
Rule 46 and Section 1[g], Rule 50) of the Rules of Court, which
provide that want of page references to the records is a ground
for dismissal of an appeal.
Prefatorily, we take advertence of the provisions of Article 221
of the Labor Code that technical rules of evidence prevailing in
courts of law and equity shall not be controlling, and that every
and all reasonable means to speedily and objectively ascertain
the facts in each case shall be availed of, without regard to
technicalities of law or procedure in the interest of due process.
It is settled that it is not procedurally objectionable for the
decision in a case to be rendered by a judge, or a labor arbiter
for that matter, other than the one who conducted the hearing.
The fact that the judge who heard the case was not the judge
who penned the decision does not impair the validity of the
judgment,11 provided that he draws up his decision and
resolution with due care and makes certain that they truly and
accurately reflect conclusions and final dispositions on the bases
of the facts of and evidence submitted in the case.12
Thus, the mere fact that the case was initially assigned to Labor
Arbiter Ricardo T. Octavio, who conducted the hearings therein
from December 5, 1984 to July 11, 1985, and was later
transferred to Executive Labor Arbiter Oscar S. Uy, who
eventually decided the case, presents no procedural infirmity,
especially considering that there is a presumption of regularity
in the performance of a public officer's functions,13 which
petitioner has not successfully rebutted.
We are constrained to heed the underlying policy in the Labor
Code relaxing the application of technical rules of procedure in
labor cases in the interest of due process, ever mindful of the
long-standing legal precept that rules of procedure must be
interpreted to help secure, not defeat, justice. For this reason,
we cannot indulge private respondent in his tendency to nitpick
on trivial technicalities to boost his arguments. The strength of
one's position cannot be hinged on mere procedural niceties but
on solid bases in law and jurisprudence.
The fundamental guarantees of security of tenure and due
process dictate that no worker shall be dismissed except for just
and authorized cause provided by law and after due process.14
Article 282 of the Labor Code enumerates the causes for which
an employer may validly terminate an employment, to wit:
(a) serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee
of the lawful orders of his employer or representative in
connection with his work; (b) gross and habitual neglect by the
employee of his duties; (c) fraud or willful breach by the
employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer or duly
authorized representative; (d) commission of a crime or offense
by the employee against the person of his employer or any
immediate member of his family or his duly authorized
representative; and (e) other causes analogous to the
foregoing.
The employer may also terminate the services of any employee
due to the installation of labor saving devices, redundancy,
retrenchment to prevent losses or the closing or cessation of
operation of the establishment or undertaking, unless the
closing is for the purpose of circumventing the pertinent
provisions of the Labor Code, by serving a written notice on the
workers and the Department of Labor and Employment at least
one (1) month before the intended date thereof, with due
entitlement to the corresponding separation pay rates provided
by law.15 Suffering from a disease by reason whereof the
continued employment of the employee is prohibited by law or
is prejudicial to his and his co-employee's health, is also a
ground for termination of his services provided he receives the
prescribed separation pay.16 On the other hand, it is well-settled
that abandonment by an employee of his work authorizes the
employer to effect the former's dismissal from employment.17
After a careful review of the records of this case, we find that
public respondent gravely erred in affirming the decision of the
executive labor arbiter holding that petitioner abandoned his
employment and was not illegally dismissed from such
employment. For want of substantial bases, in fact or
in law, we cannot give the stamp of finality and conclusiveness
normally accorded to the factual findings of an administrative
agency, such as herein public respondent NLRC,18 as even
decisions of administrative agencies which are declared "final"
by law are not exempt from judicial review when so warranted.
19
The following perceptive disquisitions of the Solicitor General on
this point deserve acceptance:
It is submitted that the absences of petitioner in his work from
October 1982 to December 1982, cannot be construed as
abandonment of work because he has a justifiable excuse.
Petitioner was suffering from perennial abscess in the peri-anal
around the anus and fistula under the medical attention of Dr.
Patricio Tan of Riverside Medical Center, Inc., Bacolod City (Tsn,
Vol. III, Dr. Tan, February 19, 1986 at 20-44).
This fact (was) duly communicated to private respondent by
medical bills sent to Hacienda Manucao (Tsn, Vol. III, Dr. Tan,
January 22, 1987 at 49-50).
During the period of his illness and recovery, petitioner stayed
in Bacolod City upon the instruction(s) of private respondent to
recuperate thereat and to handle only administrative matters of
the hacienda in that city. As a manager, petitioner is not really
obliged to live and stay 24 hours a day inside Hacienda Manucao.
xxx xxx xxx
After evaluating the evidence within the context of the special
circumstances involved and basic human experience,
petitioner's illness and strained family relation with respondent
Jon de Ysasi II may be considered as justifiable reason for
petitioner Jon de Ysasi III's absence from work during the period
of October 1982 to December 1982. In any event, such absence
does not warrant outright dismissal without notice and hearing.
xxx xxx xxx
The elements of abandonment as a ground for dismissal of an
employee are as follows:
(1) failure to report for work or absence without valid or
justifiable reason; and (2) clear intention to sever the employer-
employee tie (Samson Alcantara, Reviewer in Labor and Social
Legislation, 1989 edition, p. 133).
This Honorable Court, in several cases, illustrates what
constitute abandonment. In Dagupan Bus Company v. NLRC
(191 SCRA 328), the Court rules that for abandonment to arise,
there must be a concurrence of the intention to abandon and
some overt act from which it may be inferred that the employee
has no more interest to work. Similarly, in Nueva Ecija I Electric
Cooperative, Inc. v. NLRC (184 SCRA 25), for abandonment to
constitute a valid cause for termination of employment, there
must be a deliberate, unjustified refusal of the employee to
resume his employment. . . Mere absence is not sufficient; it
172
must be accompanied by overt acts unerringly pointing to the
fact that the employee simply does not want to work anymore.
There are significant indications in this case, that there is no
abandonment. First, petitioner's absence and his decision to
leave his residence inside Hacienda Manucao, is justified by his
illness and strained family relations. Second he has some
medical certificates to show his frail health. Third, once able to
work, petitioner wrote a letter (Annex "J") informing private
respondent of his intention to assume again his employment.
Last, but not the least, he at once instituted a complaint for
illegal dismissal when he realized he was unjustly dismissed. All
these are indications that petitioner had no intention to abandon
his employment.20
The records show that the parties herein do not dispute the fact
of petitioner's confinement in the hospital for his various
afflictions which required medical treatment. Neither can it be
denied that private respondent was well aware of petitioner's
state of health as the former admittedly shouldered part of the
medical and hospital bills and even advised the latter to stay in
Bacolod City until he was fit to work again. The disagreement as
to whether or not petitioner's ailments were so serious as to
necessitate hospitalization and corresponding periods for
recuperation is beside the point. The fact remains that on
account of said illnesses, the details of which were amply
substantiated by the attending physician,21 and as the records
are bereft of any suggestion of malingering on the part of
petitioner, there was justifiable cause for petitioner's absence
from work. We repeat, it is clear, deliberate and unjustified
refusal to resume employment and not mere absence that is
required to constitute abandonment as a valid ground for
termination of employment.22
With his position as farm administrator of Hacienda Manucao,
petitioner unmistakably may be classified as a managerial
employee23 to whom the law grants an amount of discretion in
the discharge of his duties. This is why when petitioner stated
that "I assigned myself where I want to go,"24 he was simply
being candid about what he could do within the sphere of his
authority. His duties as farm administrator did not strictly
require him to keep regular hours or to be at the office premises
at all times, or to be subjected to specific control from his
employer in every aspect of his work. What is essential only is
that he runs the farm as efficiently and effectively as possible
and, while petitioner may definitely not qualify as a model
employee, in this regard he proved to be quite successful, as
there was at least a showing of increased production during the
time that petitioner was in charge of farm operations.
If, as private respondent contends, he had no control over
petitioner during the years 1983 to 1984, this is because that
was the period when petitioner was recuperating from illness
and on account of which his attendance and direct involvement
in farm operations were irregular and minimal, hence the
supervision and control exercisable by private respondent as
employer was necessarily limited. It goes without saying that
the control contemplated refers only to matters relating to his
functions as farm administrator and could not extend to
petitioner's personal affairs and activities.
While it was taken for granted that for purposes of discharging
his duties as farm administrator, petitioner would be staying at
the house in the farm, there really was no explicit contractual
stipulation (as there was no formal employment contract to
begin with) requiring him to stay therein for the duration of his
employment or that any transfer of residence would justify the
termination of his employment. That petitioner changed his
residence should not be taken against him, as this is undeniably
among his basic rights, nor can such fact of transfer of residence
per se be a valid ground to terminate an employer-employee
relationship.
Private respondent, in his pleadings, asserted that as he was yet
uncertain of his son's intention of returning to work after his
confinement in the hospital, he kept petitioner on the payroll,
reported him as an employee of the hacienda for social security
purposes, and paid his salaries and benefits with the mandated
deductions therefrom until the end of December, 1982. It was
only in January, 1983 when he became convinced that petitioner
would no longer return to work that he considered the latter to
have abandoned his work and, for this reason, no longer listed
him as an employee. According to private respondent, whatever
amount of money was given to petitioner from that time until
April, 1984 was in the nature of a pension or an allowance or
mere gratuitous doles from a father to a son, and not salaries
as, in fact, none of the usual deductions were made therefrom.
It was only in April, 1984 that private respondent completely
stopped giving said pension or allowance when he was angered
by what he heard petitioner had been saying about sending him
to jail.
Private respondent capitalizes on the testimony of one Manolo
Gomez taken on oral deposition regarding petitioner's alleged
statement to him, "(h)e quemado los (p)ue(n)tes de Manucao"
("I have burned my bridges with Manucao") as expressive of
petitioner's intention to abandon his job. In addition to
insinuations of sinister motives on the part of petitioner in
working at the farm and thereafter abandoning the job upon
accomplishment of his objectives, private respondent takes the
novel position that the agreement to support his son after the
latter abandoned the administration of the farm legally converts
the initial abandonment to implied voluntary resignation.25
As earlier mentioned, petitioner ripostes that private respondent
undoubtedly knew about petitioner's illness and even paid for
his hospital and other medical bills. The assertion regarding
abandonment of work, petitioner argues, is further belied by his
continued performance of various services related to the
operations of the farm from May to the last quarter of 1983, his
persistent inquiries from his father's accountant and legal
adviser about the reason why his pension or allowance was
discontinued since April, 1984, and his indication of having
recovered and his willingness and capability to resume his work
at the farm as expressed in a letter dated September 14, 1984.26
With these, petitioner contends that it is immaterial how the
monthly pecuniary amounts are designated, whether as salary,
pension or allowance, with or without deductions, as he was
entitled thereto in view of his continued service as farm
administrator.27
To stress what was earlier mentioned, in order that a finding of
abandonment may justly be made there must be a concurrence
of two elements, viz.: (1) the failure to report for work or
absence without valid or justifiable reason, and (2) a clear
intention to sever the employer-employee relationship, with the
second element as the more determinative factor and being
manifested by some overt acts. Such intent we find dismally
wanting in this case.
It will be recalled that private respondent himself admitted being
unsure of his son's plans of returning to work. The absence of
petitioner from work since mid-1982, prolonged though it may
have been, was not without valid causes of which private
respondent had full knowledge. As to what convinced or led him
to believe that petitioner was no longer returning to work,
private respondent neither explains nor substantiates by any
reasonable basis how he arrived at such a conclusion.
Moreover, private respondent's claim of abandonment cannot be
given credence as even after January, 1983, when private
respondent supposedly "became convinced" that petitioner
would no longer work at the farm, the latter continued to
perform services directly required by his position as farm
administrator. These are duly and correspondingly evidenced by
such acts as picking up some farm machinery/equipment from
173
G.A. Machineries, Inc.,28 claiming and paying for additional farm
equipment and machinery shipped by said firm from Manila to
Bacolod through Zip Forwarders,29 getting the payment of the
additional cash advances for molasses for crop year 1983-1984
from Agrotex Commodities, Inc.,30 and remitting to private
respondent through
Atty. Sumbingco the sums collected along with receipts for
medicine and oil.31
It will be observed that all of these chores, which petitioner took
care of, relate to the normal activities and operations of the
farm. True, it is a father's prerogative to request or even
command his child to run errands for him. In the present case,
however, considering the nature of these transactions, as well
as the property values and monetary sums involved, it is
unlikely that private respondent would leave the matter to just
anyone. Prudence dictates that these matters be handled by
someone who can be trusted or at least be held accountable
therefor, and who is familiar with the terms, specifications and
other details relative thereto, such as an employee. If indeed
petitioner had abandoned his job or was considered to have
done so by private respondent, it would be awkward, or even
out of place, to expect or to oblige petitioner to concern himself
with matters relating to or expected of him with respect to what
would then be his past and terminated employment. It is hard
to imagine what further authority an employer can have over a
dismissed employee so as to compel him to continue to perform
work-related tasks:
It is also significant that the special power of attorney32 executed
by private respondent on June 26, 1980 in favor of petitioner,
specifically stating —
xxx xxx xxx
That I, JON de YSASI, Filipino, of legal age, married, and a
resident of Hda. Manucao, hereinafter called and referred to as
PRINCIPAL, am a sugarcane planter, BISCOM Mill District, and a
duly accredited planter-member of the BINALBAGAN-ISABELA
PLANTERS' ASSOCIATION, INC.;
That as such planter-member of BIPA, I have check/checks with
BIPA representing payment for all checks and papers to which I
am entitled to (sic) as such planter-member;
That I have named, appointed and constituted as by these
presents
I HEREBY NAME, APPOINT AND CONSTITUTE as my true and
lawful ATTORNEY-IN-FACT
JON de YSASI III
whose specimen signature is hereunder affixed, TO GET FOR ME
and in my name, place and stead, my check/checks
aforementioned, said ATTORNEY-IN-FACT being herein given
the power and authority to sign for me and in my name, place
and stead, the receipt or receipts or payroll for the said
check/checks. PROVIDED, HOWEVER, that my said ATTORNEY-
IN-FACT cannot cash the said check/checks, but to turn the
same over to me for my proper disposition.
That I HEREBY RATIFY AND CONFIRM the acts of my
Attorney-in-Fact in getting the said check/checks and signing
the receipts therefor.
That I further request that my said check/checks be made a
"CROSSED CHECK".
xxx xxx xxx
remained in force even after petitioner's employment was
supposed to have been terminated by reason of abandonment.
Furthermore, petitioner's numerous requests for an explanation
regarding the stoppage of his salaries and benefits,33 the
issuance of withholding tax reports,34 as well as correspondence
reporting his full recovery and readiness to go back to work,35
and, specifically, his filing of the complaint for illegal dismissal
are hardly the acts of one who has abandoned his work.
We are likewise not impressed by the deposition of Manolo
Gomez, as witness for private respondent, ascribing statements
to petitioner supposedly indicative of the latter's intention to
abandon his work. We perceive the irregularity in the taking of
such deposition without the presence of petitioner's counsel, and
the failure of private respondent to serve reasonably advance
notice of its taking to said counsel, thereby foreclosing his
opportunity to
cross-examine the deponent. Private respondent also failed to
serve notice thereof on the Regional Arbitration Branch No. VI
of the NLRC, as certified to by Administrative Assistant Celestina
G. Ovejera of said office.36 Fair play dictates that at such an
important stage of the proceedings, which involves the taking of
testimony, both parties must be afforded equal opportunity to
examine and cross-examine a witness.
As to the monthly monetary amounts given to petitioner,
whether denominated as salary, pension, allowance or ex gratia
handout, there is no question as to petitioner's entitlement
thereto inasmuch as he continued to perform services in his
capacity as farm administrator. The change in description of said
amounts contained in the pay slips or in the receipts prepared
by private respondent cannot be deemed to be determinative of
petitioner's employment status in view of the peculiar
circumstances above set out. Besides, if such amounts were
truly in the nature of allowances given by a parent out of concern
for his child's welfare, it is rather unusual that receipts therefor37
should be necessary and required as if they were ordinary
business expenditures.
Neither can we subscribe to private respondent's theory that
petitioner's alleged abandonment was converted into an implied
voluntary resignation on account of the father's agreement to
support his son after the latter abandoned his work. As we have
determined that no abandonment took place in this case, the
monthly sums received by petitioner, regardless of designation,
were in consideration for services rendered emanating from an
employer-employee relationship and were not of a character
that can qualify them as mere civil support given out of parental
duty and solicitude. We are also hard put to imagine how
abandonment can be impliedly converted into a voluntary
resignation without any positive act on the part of the employee
conveying a desire to terminate his employment. The very
concept of resignation as a ground for termination by the
employee of his employment38 does not square with the
elements constitutive of abandonment.
On procedural considerations, petitioner posits that there was a
violation by private respondent of the due process requirements
under the Labor Code for want of notice and hearing.39 Private
respondent, in opposition, argues that Section 2, Rule XIV, Book
V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code applies
only to cases where the employer seeks to terminate the
services of an employee on any of the grounds enumerated
under Article 282 of the Labor Code, but not to the situation
obtaining in this case where private respondent did not dismiss
petitioner on any ground since it was petitioner who allegedly
abandoned his employment.40
The due process requirements of notice and hearing applicable
to labor cases are set out in Rule XIV, Book V of the Omnibus
Rules Implementing the Labor Code in this wise:
Sec. 2. Notice of Dismissal. — Any employer who seeks to
dismiss a worker shall furnish him a written notice stating the
particular acts or omission(s) constituting the grounds for his
dismissal. In cases of abandonment of work, notice shall be
served at the worker's last known address.
xxx xxx xxx
174
Sec. 5. Answer and hearing. — The worker may answer the
allegations as stated against him in the notice of dismissal within
a reasonable period from receipt of such notice. The employer
shall afford the worker ample opportunity to be heard and to
defend himself with the assistance of his representative, if he so
desires.
Sec. 6. Decision to dismiss. — The employer shall immediately
notify a worker in writing of a decision to dismiss him stating
clearly the reasons therefor.
Sec. 7. Right to contest dismissal. — Any decision taken by the
employer shall be without prejudice to the right of the worker to
contest the validity or legality of his dismissal by filing a
complaint with the Regional Branch of the Commission.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 11. Report of dismissal. — The employer shall submit a
monthly report to the Regional Office having jurisdiction over
the place of work at all dismissals effected by him during the
month, specifying therein the names of the dismissed workers,
the reasons for their dismissal, the dates of commencement and
termination of employment, the positions last held by them and
such other information as may be required by the Ministry for
policy guidance and statistical purposes.
Private respondent's argument is without merit as there can be
no question that petitioner was denied his right to due process
since he was never given any notice about his impending
dismissal and the grounds therefor, much less a chance to be
heard. Even as private respondent controverts the applicability
of the mandatory twin requirements of procedural due process
in this particular case, he in effect admits that no notice was
served by him on petitioner. This fact is corroborated by the
certification issued on September 5, 1984 by the Regional
Director for Region VI of the Department of Labor that no notice
of termination of the employment of petitioner was submitted
thereto.41
Granting arguendo that there was abandonment in this case, it
nonetheless cannot be denied that notice still had to be served
upon the employee sought to be dismissed, as the second
sentence of Section 2 of the pertinent implementing rules
explicitly requires service thereof at the employee's last known
address, by way of substantial compliance. While it is conceded
that it is the employer's prerogative to terminate an employee,
especially when there is just cause therefor, the requirements
of due process cannot be lightly taken. The law does not
countenance the arbitrary exercise of such a power or
prerogative when it has the effect of undermining the
fundamental guarantee of security of tenure in favor of the
employee.42
On the executive labor arbiter's misplaced reliance on the
Wenphil case, the Solicitor General rejoins as follows:
The Labor Arbiter held thus:
While we are in full agreement with the respondent as to his
defense of implied resignation and/or abandonment, records
somehow showed that he failed to notify the Department of
Labor and Employment for his sons' (sic)/complainants' (sic)
aba(n)donment as required by BP 130. And for this failure, the
other requisite for a valid termination by an employer was not
complied with. This however, would not work to invalidate the
otherwise (sic) existence of a valid cause for dismissal. The
validity of the cause of dismissal must be upheld at all times
provided however that sanctions must be imposed on the
respondent for his failure to observe the notice on due process
requirement. (Wenphil Corp. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 80587).
(Decision Labor Arbiter, at 11-12, Annex "C" Petition), . . .
This is thus a very different case from Wenphil Corporation v.
NLRC, 170 SCRA 69. In Wenphil, the rule applied to the facts is:
once an employee is dismissed for just cause, he must not be
rewarded
re-employment and backwages for failure of his employer to
observe procedural due process. The public policy behind this is
that, it may encourage the employee to do even worse and
render a mockery of the rules of discipline required to be
observed. However, the employer must be penalized for his
infraction of due process. In the present case, however, not only
was petitioner dismissed without due process, but his dismissal
is without just cause. Petitioner did not abandon his employment
because he has a justifiable excuse.43
II. Petitioner avers that the executive labor arbiter erred in
disregarding the mandatory provisions of Article 279 of the
Labor Code which entitles an illegally dismissed employee to
reinstatement and back wages and, instead, affirmed the
imposition of the penalty of P5,000.00 on private respondent for
violation of the due process requirements. Private respondent,
for his part, maintains that there was error in imposing the fine
because that penalty contemplates the failure to submit the
employer's report on dismissed employees to the DOLE regional
office, as required under Section 5 (now, Section 11), Rule XIV
of the implementing rules, and not the failure to serve notice
upon the employee sought to be dismissed by the employer.
Both the Constitution and the Labor Code enunciate in no
uncertain terms the right of every worker to security of tenure.44
To give teeth to this constitutional and statutory mandates, the
Labor Code spells out the relief available to an employee in case
of its denial:
Art. 279. Security of Tenure. — In cases of regular employment,
the employer shall not terminate the services of an employee
except for a just cause or when authorized by this Title. An
employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled
to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other
privileges and to his full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and
to his other benefits of their monetary equivalent computed
from the time his compensation was withheld from him up to
the time of actual reinstatement.
Clearly, therefore, an employee is entitled to reinstatement with
full back wages in the absence of just cause for dismissal.45 The
Court, however, on numerous occasions has tempered the rigid
application of said provision of the Labor Code, recognizing that
in some cases certain events may have transpired as would
militate against the practicability of granting the relief
thereunder provided, and declares that where there are strained
relations between the employer and the employee, payment of
back wages and severance pay may be awarded instead of
reinstatement,46 and more particularly when managerial
employees are concerned.47 Thus, where reinstatement is no
longer possible, it is therefore appropriate that the dismissed
employee be given his fair and just share of what the law
accords him.48
We note with favor and give our imprimatur to the Solicitor
General's ratiocination, to wit:
As a general rule, an employee who is unjustly dismissed from
work shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority
rights and to his backwages computed from the time his
compensation was withheld up to the time of his reinstatement.
(Morales vs. NLRC, 188 SCRA 295). But in Pacific Cement
Company, Inc. vs. NLRC, 173 SCRA 192, this Honorable Court
held that when it comes to reinstatement, differences should be
made between managers and the ordinary workingmen. The
Court concluded that a company which no longer trusts its
managers cannot operate freely in a competitive and profitable
manner. The NLRC should know the difference between
managers and ordinary workingmen. It cannot imprudently
order the reinstatement of managers with the same ease and
liberality as that of rank and file workers who had been
175
terminated. Similarly, a reinstatement may not be appropriate
or feasible in case of antipathy or antagonism between the
parties (Morales, vs. NLRC, 188 SCRA 295).
In the present case, it is submitted that petitioner should not be
reinstated as farm administrator of Hacienda Manucao. The
present relationship of petitioner and private respondent (is) so
strained that a harmonious and peaceful employee-employer
relationship is hardly possible.49
III. Finally, petitioner insists on an award of moral damages,
arguing that his dismissal from employment was attended by
bad faith or fraud, or constituted oppression, or was contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy. He further prays for
exemplary damages to serve as a deterrent against similar acts
of unjust dismissal by other employers.
Moral damages, under Article 2217 of the Civil Code, may be
awarded to compensate one for diverse injuries such as mental
anguish, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, and social
humiliation, provided that such injuries spring from a wrongful
act or omission of the defendant which was the proximate cause
thereof.50 Exemplary damages, under Article 2229, are imposed
by way of example or correction for the public good, in addition
to moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages. They
are not recoverable as a matter of right, it being left to the court
to decide whether or not they should be adjudicated.51
We are well aware of the Court's rulings in a number of cases in
the past allowing recovery of moral damages where the
dismissal of the employee was attended by bad faith or fraud,
or constituted an act oppressive to labor, or was done in a
manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy,52 and
of exemplary damages if the dismissal was effected in a wanton,
oppressive or malevolent manner.53 We do not feel, however,
that an award of the damages prayed for in this petition would
be proper even if, seemingly, the facts of the case justify their
allowance. In the aforestated cases of illegal dismissal where
moral and exemplary damages were awarded, the dismissed
employees were genuinely without fault and were undoubtedly
victims of the erring employers' capricious exercise of power.
In the present case, we find that both petitioner and private
respondent can equally be faulted for fanning the flames which
gave rise to and ultimately aggravated this controversy, instead
of sincerely negotiating a peaceful settlement of their disparate
claims. The records reveal how their actuations seethed with
mutual antagonism and the undeniable enmity between them
negates the likelihood that either of them acted in good faith. It
is apparent that each one has a cause for damages against the
other. For this reason, we hold that no moral or exemplary
damages can rightfully be awarded to petitioner.
On this score, we are once again persuaded by the validity of
the following recommendation of the Solicitor General:
The Labor Arbiter's decision in RAB Case No. 0452-84 should be
modified. There was no voluntary abandonment in this case
because petitioner has a justifiable excuse for his absence, or
such absence does not warrant outright dismissal without notice
and hearing. Private respondent, therefore, is guilty of illegal
dismissal. He should be ordered to pay backwages for a period
not exceeding three years from date of dismissal. And in lieu of
reinstatement, petitioner may be paid separation pay equivalent
to one (1) month('s) salary for every year of service, a fraction
of six months being considered as one (1) year in accordance
with recent jurisprudence (Tan, Jr. vs. NLRC, 183 SCRA 651).
But all claims for damages should be dismissed, for both parties
are equally at fault.54
The conduct of the respective counsel of the parties, as revealed
by the records, sorely disappoints the Court and invites reproof.
Both counsel may well be reminded that their ethical duty as
lawyers to represent their clients with
zeal55 goes beyond merely presenting their clients' respective
causes in court. It is just as much their responsibility, if not more
importantly, to exert all reasonable efforts to smooth over legal
conflicts, preferably out of court and especially in consideration
of the direct and immediate consanguineous ties between their
clients. Once again, we reiterate that the useful function of a
lawyer is not only to conduct litigation but to avoid it whenever
possible by advising settlement or withholding suit. He is often
called upon less for dramatic forensic exploits than for wise
counsel in every phase of life. He should be a mediator for
concord and a conciliator for compromise, rather than a virtuoso
of technicality in the conduct of litigation.56
Rule 1.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility explicitly
provides that "(a) lawyer shall encourage his client to avoid, end
or settle the controversy if it will admit of a fair settlement." On
this point, we find that both counsel herein fell short of what
was expected of them, despite their avowed duties as officers of
the court. The records do not show that they took pains to
initiate steps geared toward effecting a rapprochement between
their clients. On the contrary, their acerbic and protracted
exchanges could not but have exacerbated the situation even as
they may have found favor in the equally hostile eyes of their
respective clients.
In the same manner, we find that the labor arbiter who handled
this regrettable case has been less than faithful to the letter and
spirit of the Labor Code mandating that a labor arbiter "shall
exert all efforts towards the amicable settlement of a labor
dispute within his jurisdiction."57 If he ever did so, or at least
entertained the thought, the copious records of the proceedings
in this controversy are barren of any reflection of the same.
One final word. This is one decision we do not particularly relish
having been obliged to make. The task of resolving cases
involving disputes among members of a family leaves a bad
taste in the mouth and an aversion in the mind, for no truly
meaningful and enduring resolution is really achieved in such
situations. While we are convinced that we have adjudicated the
legal issues herein squarely on the bases of law and
jurisprudence, sans sentimentality, we are saddened by the
thought that we may have failed to bring about the reconciliation
of the father and son who figured as parties to this dispute, and
that our adherence here to law and duty may unwittingly
contribute to the breaking, instead of the strengthening, of
familial bonds. In fine, neither of the parties herein actually
emerges victorious. It is the Court's earnest hope, therefore,
that with the impartial exposition and extended explanation of
their respective rights in this decision, the parties may
eventually see their way clear to an ultimate resolution of their
differences on more convivial terms.
WHEREFORE, the decision of respondent National Labor
Relations Commission is hereby SET ASIDE. Private respondent
is ORDERED to pay petitioner back wages for a period not
exceeding three (3) years, without qualification or deduction,58
and, in lieu of reinstatement, separation pay equivalent to one
(1) month for every year of service, a fraction of six (6) months
being considered as one (1) whole year.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Nocon and Puno, JJ., concur.
176
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-28546 July 30, 1975
VENANCIO CASTANEDA and NICETAS HENSON, petitioners,
vs.
PASTOR D. AGO, LOURDES YU AGO and THE COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents.
Quijano and Arroyo for petitioners.
Jose M. Luison for respondents.
CASTRO, J.:
The parties in this case, except Lourdes Yu Ago, have been
commuting to this Court for more than a decade.
In 1955 the petitioners Venancio Castañeda and Nicetas Henson
filed a replevin suit against Pastor Ago in the Court of First
Instance of Manila to recover certain machineries (civil case
27251). In 1957 judgment was rendered in favor of the
plaintiffs, ordering Ago to return the machineries or pay definite
sums of money. Ago appealed, and on June 30, 1961 this Court,
in Ago vs. Castañeda, L-14066, affirmed the judgment. After
remand, the trial court issued on August 25, 1961 a writ of
execution for the sum of P172,923.87. Ago moved for a stay of
execution but his motion was denied, and levy was made on
Ago's house and lots located in Quezon City. The sheriff then
advertised them for auction sale on October 25, 1961. Ago
moved to stop the auction sale, failing in which he filed a petition
for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. The appellate court
dismissed the petition and Ago appealed. On January 31,1966
this Court, in Ago vs. Court of Appeals, et al., L-19718, affirmed
the dismissal. Ago thrice attempted to obtain a writ of
preliminary injunction to restrain the sheriff from enforcing the
writ of execution "to save his family house and lot;" his motions
were denied, and the sheriff sold the house and lots on March
9, 1963 to the highest bidders, the petitioners Castañeda and
Henson. Ago failed to redeem, and on April 17, 1964 the sheriff
executed the final deed of sale in favor of the vendees
Castañeda and Henson. Upon their petition, the Court of First
Instance of Manila issued a writ of possession to the properties.
However, on May 2, 1964 Pastor Ago, now joined by his wife,
Lourdes Yu Ago, as his co-plaintiff, filed a complaint in the Court
of First Instance of Quezon City (civil case Q-7986) to annul the
sheriff's sale on the ground that the obligation of Pastor Ago
upon which judgment was rendered against him in the replevin
suit was his personal obligation, and that Lourdes Yu Ago's one-
half share in their conjugal residential house and lots which were
levied upon and sold by the sheriff could not legally be reached
for the satisfaction of the judgment. They alleged in their
complaint that wife Lourdes was not a party in the replevin suit,
that the judgment was rendered and the writ of execution was
issued only against husband Pastor, and that wife Lourdes was
not a party to her husband's venture in the logging business
which failed and resulted in the replevin suit and which did not
benefit the conjugal partnership.
The Court of First Instance of Quezon City issued an ex parte
writ of preliminary injunction restraining the petitioners, the
Register of Deeds and the sheriff of Quezon City, from
registering the latter's final deed of sale, from cancelling the
respondents' certificates of title and issuing new ones to the
petitioners and from carrying out any writ of possession. A
situation thus arose where what the Manila court had ordered to
be done, the Quezon City court countermanded. On November
1, 1965, however, the latter court lifted the preliminary
injunction it had previously issued, and the Register of deeds of
Quezon City cancelled the respondents' certificates of title and
issued new ones in favor of the petitioners. But enforcement of
the writ of possession was again thwarted as the Quezon City
court again issued a temporary restraining order which it later
lifted but then re-restored. On May 3, 1967 the court finally, and
for the third time, lifted the restraining order.
While the battle on the matter of the lifting and restoring of the
restraining order was being fought in the Quezon City court, the
Agos filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with this Court
under date of May 26, 1966, docketed as L-26116, praying for
a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the sheriff from
enforcing the writ of possession. This Court found no merit in
the petition and dismissed it in a minute resolution on June 3,
1966; reconsideration was denied on July 18, 1966. The
respondents then filed on August 2, 1966 a similar petition for
certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R.
37830-R), praying for the same preliminary injunction. The
Court of Appeals also dismissed the petition. The respondents
then appealed to this Court (L-27140). We dismissed the
petition in a minute resolution on February 8, 1967.
The Ago spouses repaired once more to the Court of Appeals
where they filed another petition for certiorari and prohibition
with preliminary injunction (CA-G.R. 39438-R). The said court
gave due course to the petition and granted preliminary
injunction. After hearing, it rendered decision, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, writ of preliminary injunction from enforcement of
the writ of possession on and ejectment from the one-half share
in the properties involved belonging to Lourdes Yu Ago dated
June 15, 1967 is made permanent pending decision on the
merits in Civil Case No. Q-7986 and ordering respondent Court
to proceed with the trial of Civil Case No. Q-7986 on the merits
without unnecessary delay. No pronouncement as to costs.
Failing to obtain reconsideration, the petitioners Castañeda and
Henson filed the present petition for review of the aforesaid
decision.
1. We do not see how the doctrine that a court may not interfere
with the orders of a co-equal court can apply in the case at bar.
The Court of First Instance of Manila, which issued the writ of
possession, ultimately was not interfered with by its co-equal
court, the Court of First Instance of Quezon City as the latter
lifted the restraining order it had previously issued against the
enforcement of the Manila court's writ of possession; it is the
Court of Appeals that enjoined, in part, the enforcement of the
writ.
2. Invoking Comilang vs. Buendia, et al.,1 where the wife was a
party in one case and the husband was a party in another case
and a levy on their conjugal properties was upheld, the
petitioners would have Lourdes Yu Ago similarly bound by the
replevin judgment against her husband for which their conjugal
properties would be answerable. The case invoked is not at par
with the present case. In Comilang the actions were admittedly
instituted for the protection of the common interest of the
spouses; in the present case, the Agos deny that their conjugal
partnership benefited from the husband's business venture.
3. Relying upon Omnas vs. Rivera, 67 Phil. 419, the Court of
Appeals held that a writ of possession may not issue until the
claim of a third person to half-interest in the property is
adversely determined, the said appellate court assuming that
Lourdes Yu Ago was a "stranger" or a "third-party" to her
husband. The assumption is of course obviously wrong, for,
besides living with her husband Pastor, she does not claim
ignorance of his business that failed, of the relevant cases in
177
which he got embroiled, and of the auction sale made by the
sheriff of their conjugal properties. Even then, the ruling in
Omnas is not that a writ of possession may not issue until the
claim of a third person is adversely determined, but that the writ
of possession being a complement of the writ of execution, a
judge with jurisdiction to issue the latter also has jurisdiction to
issue the former, unless in the interval between the judicial sale
and the issuance of the writ of possession, the rights of third
parties to the property sold have supervened. The ruling in
Omnas is clearly inapplicable in the present case, for, here,
there has been no change in the ownership of the properties or
of any interest therein from the time the writ of execution was
issued up to the time writ of possession was issued, and even
up to the present.
4. We agree with the trial court (then presided by Judge Lourdes
P. San Diego) that it is much too late in the day for the
respondents Agos to raise the question that part of the property
is unleviable because it belongs to Lourdes Yu Ago, considering
that (1) a wife is normally privy to her husband's activities; (2)
the levy was made and the properties advertised for auction sale
in 1961; (3) she lives in the very properties in question; (4) her
husband had moved to stop the auction sale; (5) the properties
were sold at auction in 1963; (6) her husband had thrice
attempted to obtain a preliminary injunction to restrain the
sheriff from enforcing the writ of execution; (7) the sheriff
executed the deed of final sale on April 17, 1964 when Pastor
failed to redeem; (8) Pastor had impliedly admitted that the
conjugal properties could be levied upon by his pleas "to save
his family house and lot" in his efforts to prevent execution; and
(9) it was only on May 2, 1964 when he and his wife filed the
complaint for annulment of the sheriff's sale upon the issue that
the wife's share in the properties cannot be levied upon on the
ground that she was not a party to the logging business and not
a party to the replevin suit. The spouses Ago had every
opportunity to raise the issue in the various proceedings
hereinbefore discussed but did not; laches now effectively bars
them from raising it.
Laches, in a general sense, is failure or neglect, for an
unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which,
by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done
earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a
reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party
entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert
it.2
5. The decision of the appellate court under review suffers from
two fatal infirmities.
(a) It enjoined the enforcement of the writ of possession to and
ejectment from the one-half share in the properties involved
belonging to Lourdes Yu Ago. This half-share is not in esse, but
is merely an inchoate interest, a mere expectancy, constituting
neither legal nor equitable estate, and will ripen into title when
only upon liquidation and settlement there appears to be assets
of the community.3 The decision sets at naught the well-settled
rule that injunction does not issue to protect a right not in esse
and which may never arise.4
(b) The decision did not foresee the absurdity, or even the
impossibility, of its enforcement. The Ago spouses admittedly
live together in the same house5 which is conjugal property. By
the Manila court's writ of possession Pastor could be ousted from
the house, but the decision under review would prevent the
ejectment of Lourdes. Now, which part of the house would be
vacated by Pastor and which part would Lourdes continue to stay
in? The absurdity does not stop here; the decision would actually
separate husband and wife, prevent them from living together,
and in effect divide their conjugal properties during coverture
and before the dissolution of the conjugal union.
6. Despite the pendency in the trial court of the complaint for
the annulment of the sheriff's sale (civil case Q-7986),
elementary justice demands that the petitioners, long denied
the fruits of their victory in the replevin suit, must now enjoy
them, for, the respondents Agos, abetted by their lawyer Jose
M. Luison, have misused legal remedies and prostituted the
judicial process to thwart the satisfaction of the judgment, to
the extended prejudice of the petitioners. The respondents, with
the assistance of counsel, maneuvered for fourteen (14) years
to doggedly resist execution of the judgment thru manifold
tactics in and from one court to another (5 times in the Supreme
Court).
We condemn the attitude of the respondents and their counsel
who,
far from viewing courts as sanctuaries for those who seek
justice, have tried to use them to subvert the very ends of
justice.6
Forgetting his sacred mission as a sworn public servant and his
exalted position as an officer of the court, Atty. Luison has
allowed himself to become an instigator of controversy and a
predator of conflict instead of a mediator for concord and a
conciliator for compromise, a virtuoso of technicality in the
conduct of litigation instead of a true exponent of the primacy
of truth and moral justice.
A counsel's assertiveness in espousing with candour and
honesty his client's cause must be encouraged and is to be
commended; what we do not and cannot countenance is a
lawyer's insistence despite the patent futility of his client's
position, as in the case at bar.
It is the duty of a counsel to advise his client, ordinarily a layman
to the intricacies and vagaries of the law, on the merit or lack of
merit of his case. If he finds that his client's cause is defenseless,
then it is his bounden duty to advise the latter to acquiesce and
submit, rather than traverse the incontrovertible. A lawyer must
resist the whims and caprices of his client, and temper his clients
propensity to litigate. A lawyer's oath to uphold the cause of
justice is superior to his duty to his client; its primacy is
indisputable.7
7. In view of the private respondents' propensity to use the
courts for purposes other than to seek justice, and in order to
obviate further delay in the disposition of the case below which
might again come up to the appellate courts but only to fail in
the end, we have motu proprio examined the record of civil case
Q-7986 (the mother case of the present case). We find that
(a) the complaint was filed on May 2, 1964 (more than 11 years
ago) but trial on the merits has not even started;
(b) after the defendants Castañedas had filed their answer with
a counterclaim, the plaintiffs Agos filed a supplemental
complaint where they impleaded new parties-defendants;
(c) after the admission of the supplemental complaint, the Agos
filed a motion to admit an amended supplemental complaint,
which impleads an additional new party-defendant (no action
has yet been taken on this motion);
(d) the defendants have not filed an answer to the admitted
supplemental complaint; and
(e) the last order of the Court of First Instance, dated April 20,
1974, grants an extension to the suspension of time to file
answer. (Expediente, p. 815)
We also find that the alleged causes of action in the complaint,
supplemental complaint and amended supplemental complaint
are all untenable, for the reasons hereunder stated. The
Complaint
Upon the first cause of action, it is alleged that the sheriff levied
upon conjugal properties of the spouses Ago despite the fact
that the judgment to be satisfied was personal only to Pastor
Ago, and the business venture that he entered into, which
178
resulted in the replevin suit, did not redound to the benefit of
the conjugal partnership. The issue here, which is whether or
not the wife's inchoate share in the conjugal property is leviable,
is the same issue that we have already resolved, as barred by
laches, in striking down the decision of the Court of Appeals
granting preliminary injunction, the dispositive portion of which
was herein-before quoted. This ruling applies as well to the first
cause of action of the complaint.
Upon the second cause of action, the Agos allege that on
January 5, 1959 the Castañedas and the sheriff, pursuant to an
alias writ of seizure, seized and took possession of certain
machineries, depriving the Agos of the use thereof, to their
damage in the sum of P256,000 up to May 5, 1964. This second
cause of action fails to state a valid cause of action for it fails to
allege that the order of seizure is invalid or illegal.
It is averred as a third cause of action that the sheriff's sale of
the conjugal properties was irregular, illegal and unlawful
because the sheriff did not require the Castañeda spouses to
pay or liquidate the sum of P141,750 (the amount for which they
bought the properties at the auction sale) despite the fact that
there was annotated at the back of the certificates of title a
mortgage of P75,000 in favor of the Philippine National Bank;
moreover, the sheriff sold the properties for P141,750 despite
the pendency of L-19718 where Pastor Ago contested the
amount of P99,877.08 out of the judgment value of P172,923.37
in civil case 27251; and because of said acts, the Agos suffered
P174,877.08 in damages.
Anent this third cause of action, the sheriff was under no
obligation to require payment of the purchase price in the
auction sale because "when the purchaser is the judgment
creditor, and no third-party claim has been filed, he need not
pay the amount of the bid if it does not exceed the amount of
his judgment." (Sec. 23, Rule 39, Rules of Court)
The annotated mortgage in favor of the PNB is the concern of
the vendees Castañedas but did not affect the sheriff's sale; the
cancellation of the annotation is of no moment to the Agoo.
Case L-19718 where Pastor Ago contested the sum of
P99,877.08 out of the amount of the judgment was dismissed
by this Court on January 31, 1966.
This third cause of action, therefore, actually states no valid
cause of action and is moreover barred by prior judgment.
The fourth cause of action pertains to moral damages allegedly
suffered by the Agos on account of the acts complained of in the
preceding causes of action. As the fourth cause of action derives
its life from the preceding causes of action, which, as shown, are
baseless, the said fourth cause of action must necessarily fail.
The Counterclaim
As a counterclaim against the Agos, the Castañedas aver that
the action was unfounded and as a consequence of its filing they
were compelled to retain the services of counsel for not less than
P7,500; that because the Agos obtained a preliminary injunction
enjoining the transfer of titles and possession of the properties
to the Castañedas, they were unlawfully deprived of the use of
the properties from April 17, 1964, the value of such deprived
use being 20% annually of their actual value; and that the filing
of the unfounded action besmirched their feelings, the pecuniary
worth of which is for the court to assess.
The Supplemental Complaint
Upon the first cause of action, it is alleged that after the filing of
the complaint, the defendants, taking advantage of the
dissolution of the preliminary injunction, in conspiracy and with
gross bad faith and evident intent to cause damage to the
plaintiffs, caused the registration of the sheriff's final deed of
sale; that, to cause more damage, the defendants sold to their
lawyer and his wife two of the parcels of land in question; that
the purchasers acquired the properties in bad faith; that the
defendants mortgaged the two other parcels to the Rizal
Commercial Banking Corporation while the defendants' lawyer
and his wife also mortgaged the parcels bought by them to the
Rizal Commercial Bank; and that the bank also acted in bad
faith.
The second cause of action consists of an allegation of additional
damages caused by the defendants' bad faith in entering into
the aforesaid agreements and transactions.
The Amended Supplemental Complaint
The amendment made pertains to the first cause of action of the
supplemental complaint, which is, the inclusion of a paragraph
averring that, still to cause damage and prejudice to the
plaintiffs, Atty. & Mrs. Juan Quijano, in bad faith sold the two
parcels of land they had previously bought to Eloy Ocampo who
acquired them also in bad faith, while Venancio Castañeda and
Nicetas Henson in bad faith sold the two other parcels to Juan
Quijano (60%) and Eloy Ocampo (40%) who acquired them in
bad faith and with knowledge that the properties are the subject
of a pending litigation.
Discussion on The Causes of Action
of The Supplemental Complaint And
The Amended Supplemental Complaint
Assuming hypothetically as true the allegations in the first cause
of action of the supplemental complaint and the amended
supplemental complaint, the validity of the cause of action would
depend upon the validity of the first cause of action of the
original complaint, for, the Agos would suffer no transgression
upon their rights of ownership and possession of the properties
by reason of the agreements subsequently entered into by the
Castañedas and their lawyer if the sheriff's levy and sale are
valid. The reverse is also true: if the sheriff's levy and sale are
invalid on the ground that the conjugal properties could not be
levied upon, then the transactions would perhaps prejudice the
Agos, but, we have already indicated that the issue in the first
cause of action of the original complaint is barred by laches, and
it must therefore follow that the first cause of action of the
supplemental complaint and the amended supplemental
complaint is also barred.
For the same reason, the same holding applies to the remaining
cause of action in the supplemental complaint and the amended
supplemental complaint.
ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the Court of Appeals under
review is set aside. Civil case Q-7986 of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal is ordered dismissed, without prejudice to the
re-filing of the petitioners' counterclaim in a new and
independent action. Treble costs are assessed against the
spouses Pastor Ago and Lourdes Yu Ago, which shall be paid by
their lawyer, Atty. Jose M. Luison. Let a copy of this decision be
made a part of the personal file of Atty. Luison in the custody of
the Clerk of Court.
Makasiar, Esguerra, Muñoz Palma and Martin, JJ., concur.
Teehankee, J., is on leave.
179