A.M. No.

MTJ-11-1786 June 22, 2011

FELICISIMA R. DIAZ vs. JUDGE GERARDO E. GESTOPA, JR.
PERALTA, J.:

FACTS: On April 27, 2009, Felicisima Diaz filed an unlawful detainer case before the MTC of Naga, Cebu
against Spouses Ruel & Diana Betito and Isidro Pungkol. During the pre-trial conference, Diaz was
represented by her nephew, Elmer Llanes due to her heart ailment. Conversely, Judge Gestopa
recommended the case for barangay conciliation, pursuant to Section 408 (g) of the Local Government
Code. Also, Judge Gestopa concluded that since the subject property is in Naga, and that Diaz has
always been a resident of Naga, it is therefore proper to refer the case for barangay conciliation.

Diaz moved for reconsideration and argued that the referral of the case to the lupon is a violation of the
Rules on Summary Procedure. She stressed that she is no longer a resident of Naga and is now actually
residing in Dumlog, Talisay City, Cebu. She further pointed out that the case had already been previously
referred to the lupon. In fact, a Certification to File Action had been issued on May 20, 2008. She further
admitted that she did not attach the certificate to the complaint since she believed that the same was not
required anymore, considering that the parties are not residents of the same barangay or municipality.

Judge Gestopa denied the motion for reconsideration.

Dissatisfied, Diaz filed an administrative complaint against Judge Gestopa because the latter exhibited
gross ignorance of the law in referring the case back to barangay conciliation when clearly she is not a
resident of Naga.

ISSUE: Whether or not the instant case shall be referred to barangay conciliation.

RULING: NEGATIVE. There is no doubt an unlawful detainer case is covered by the Revised Rules on
Summary Procedure. The Rule on Summary Procedure clearly and undoubtedly provides for the period
within which judgment should be rendered. Section 10 thereof provides:

SEC. 10. Rendition of judgment. - Within thirty (30) days after receipt of the last affidavits
and position papers, or the expiration of the period for filing the same, the court shall
render judgment.

However, should the court find it necessary to clarify certain material facts, it may, during
the said period, issue an order specifying the matters to be clarified, and require the
parties to submit affidavits or other evidence on the said matters within ten (10) days from
receipt of said order. Judgment shall be rendered within fifteen (15) days after the receipt
of the last clarificatory affidavits, or the expiration of the period for filing the same.

The court shall not resort to the clarificatory procedure to gain time for the rendition of the
judgment.

It is thus very clear that the period for rendition of judgments in cases falling under summary procedure is
30 days. This is in keeping with the spirit of the rule which aims to achieve an expeditious and
inexpensive determination of the cases falling thereunder.

Indeed, in Farrales v. Camarista, the Court explained that while the last paragraph of the afore-cited
provision apparently gives the Court discretion to refer the case to the lupon for amicable settlement
although it may not fall within the authority of the lupon, the referral of said subject civil case to the lupon
is saliently an unsound exercise of discretion, considering that the matter falls under the Rule on
Summary Procedure. The reason is because the Rule on Summary Procedure was promulgated for the
purpose of achieving "an expeditious and inexpensive determination of cases." The fact that unlawful
detainer cases fall under summary procedure, speedy resolution thereof is thus deemed a matter of
public policy. To do otherwise would ultimately defeat the very essence of the creation of the Rules on
Summary Procedure.

To further strengthen and emphasize the objective of expediting the adjudication of cases falling under
the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, Sections 7 and 8 mandated preliminary conference which is
precisely for the purpose of giving room for a possible amicable settlement, to wit:

SEC. 7. Preliminary conference; appearance of parties. - Not later than thirty (30) days
after the last answer is filed, a preliminary conference shall be held. The rules on pre-trial
in ordinary cases shall be applicable to the preliminary conference unless inconsistent
with the provisions of this Rule.

The failure of the plaintiff to appear in the preliminary conference shall be a cause for the
dismissal of his complaint. The defendant who appears in the absence of the plaintiff
shall be entitled to judgment on his counterclaim in accordance with Section 6 hereof. All
cross-claims shall be dismissed.

If a sole defendant shall fail to appear, the plaintiff shall be entitled to judgment in
accordance with Section 6 hereof. This Rule shall not apply where one of two or more
defendants sued under a common cause of action who had pleaded a common defense
shall appear at the preliminary conference.

SEC. 8. Record of preliminary conference. - Within five (5) days after the termination of
the preliminary conference, the court shall issue an order stating the matters taken up
therein, including but not limited to:

a).....Whether the parties have arrived at an amicable settlement, and if so, the terms
thereof;

b).....The stipulations or admissions entered into by the parties;

c).....Whether, on the basis of the pleadings and the stipulations and admissions made by
the parties, judgment may be rendered without the need of further proceedings, in which
event the judgment shall be rendered within thirty (30) days from issuance of the order;

d).....A clear specification of material facts which remain controverted; and

e).....Such other matters intended to expedite the disposition of the case.

Thus, there was no reason anymore to refer the case back to the barangay for the sole purpose of
amicable settlement, because the abovementioned Sections 7 and 8 provided already for such action.

Furthermore, considering that complainant had already manifested in court, albeit belatedly, the presence
of what it considered to be a valid Certification to File Action in court due to unsuccessful conciliation,
respondent's act of referring the case to barangay conciliation rendered its purpose moot and academic.
 G.R. No. 183623 June 25, 2012
LETICIA B. AGBAYANI vs. COURT OF APPEALS, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE and LOIDA
MARCELINA J. GENABE
REYES, J.:

FACTS: Leticia Agbayani and Loida Marcelina Genabe were both employees of the RTC Branch 275 Las
Piñas City, working as Court Stenographer and Legal Researcher II, respectively. On December 29,
2006, Agbayani filed a criminal complaint for grave oral defamation against Genabe before the Office of
the City Prosecutor (OP). The OP found probable cause for the filing of the Information for grave oral
defamation against Genabe. Upon a petition for review filed by Genabe, the DOJ Undersecretary Ernesto
L. Pineda found that the subject utterances of respondent constitute only slight oral defamation. As such,
the case should be dismissed for non-compliance with the provisions of Katarungang Pambarangay of
Republic Act No. 7160 (LGC) because as shown by the records, the parties are residents of Las Piñas
City.

However, the complaint-affidavit failed to show that the case was previously referred to the barangay for
conciliation in compliance with Sections 408 and 409, paragraph (d), of the LGC. The records of the case
likewise show that the case is not one of the exceptions enumerated under Section 408 of the LGC.

The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied. She then filed a petition for certiorari
with the CA but was dismissed.

ISSUE: Whether or not the case is within the ambit of the provisions of Katarungang Pambarangay of the
LGC.

RULING: AFFIRMATIVE. Undeniably, both petitioner Agbayani and respondent Genabe are residents of
Las Piñas City and both work at the RTC, and the incident which is the subject matter of the case
happened in their workplace. Agbayani’s complaint should have undergone the mandatory barangay
conciliation for possible amicable settlement with respondent Genabe, pursuant to Sections 408 and 409
of Republic Act No. 7160 or the Local Government Code of 1991 which provide:

Sec. 408. Subject Matter for Amicable Settlement; Exception thereto. – The lupon of each barangay shall
have authority to bring together the parties actually residing in the same city or municipality for amicable
settlement of all disputes, except: x x x

Sec. 409. Venue. x x x (d) Those arising at the workplace where the contending parties are employed or x
x x shall be brought in the barangay where such workplace or institution is located.

Administrative Circular No. 14-93, issued by the Supreme Court on July 15, 1993 states that:

All disputes are subject to Barangay conciliation pursuant to the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law
[formerly P.D. 1508, repealed and now replaced by Secs. 399-422, Chapter VII, Title I, Book III, and Sec.
515, Title I, Book IV, R.A. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991], and prior
recourse thereto is a pre-condition before filing a complaint in court or any government offices, except in
the following disputes:

[1] Where one party is the government, or any subdivision or instrumentality thereof;

[2] Where one party is a public officer or employee and the dispute relates to the performance of
his official functions;
 [3] Where the dispute involves real properties located in different cities and municipalities, unless
the parties thereto agree to submit their difference to amicable settlement by an appropriate
Lupon;

[4] Any complaint by or against corporations, partnerships or juridical entities, since only
individuals shall be parties to Barangay conciliation proceedings either as complainants or
respondents [Sec. 1, Rule VI, Katarungang Pambarangay Rules];

[5] Disputes involving parties who actually reside in barangays of different cities or municipalities,
except where such barangay units adjoin each other and the parties thereto agree to submit their
differences to amicable settlement by an appropriate Lupon;

[6] Offenses for which the law prescribes a maximum penalty of imprisonment exceeding one [1]
year or a fine of over five thousand pesos ([₱]5,000.00);

[7] Offenses where there is no private offended party;

[8] Disputes where urgent legal action is necessary to prevent injustice from being committed or
further continued, specifically the following:

[a] Criminal cases where accused is under police custody or detention [See Sec.
412(b)(1), Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law];

[b] Petitions for habeas corpus by a person illegally deprived of his rightful custody over
another or a person illegally deprived of or on acting in his behalf;

[c] Actions coupled with provisional remedies such as preliminary injunction, attachment,
delivery of personal property and support during the pendency of the action; and

[d] Actions which may be barred by the Statute of Limitations.

[9] Any class of disputes which the President may determine in the interest of justice or upon the
recommendation of the Secretary of Justice;

[10] Where the dispute arises from the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) [Secs. 46 &
47, R. A. 6657];

[11] Labor disputes or controversies arising from employer-employee relations [Montoya vs.
Escayo, 171 SCRA 442; Art. 226, Labor Code, as amended, which grants original and exclusive
jurisdiction over conciliation and mediation of disputes, grievances or problems to certain offices
of the Department of Labor and Employment];

[12] Actions to annul judgment upon a compromise which may be filed directly in court [See
Sanchez vs. [Judge] Tupaz, 158 SCRA 459]."

The compulsory process of arbitration is a pre-condition for the filing of the complaint in court. Where the
complaint (a) did not state that it is one of excepted cases, or (b) it did not allege prior availment of said
conciliation process, or (c) did not have a certification that no conciliation had been reached by the
parties, the case should be dismissed.

Here, petitioner Agbayani failed to show that the instant case is not one of the exceptions enumerated
above.