G.R. No.

160739 July 17, 2013

ANITA MANGILA, Petitioner,

vs.
JUDGE HERIBERTO M. PANGILINAN, ASST. CITY PROSECUTOR II LUCIA JUDY
SOLINAP, and NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (DIRECTOR REYNALDO
WYCOCO), Respondents.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

Restraint that is lawful and pursuant to a court process cannot be inquired into through
habeas corpus.

Antecedents

On June 16, 2003, seven criminal complaints charging petitioner Anita Mangila and four
others with syndicated estafa in violation of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, in
relation to Presidential Decree No. 1689, and with violations of Section 7(b) of Republic Act
No. 8042 (Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipino Act of 1995) were filed in the Municipal
Trial Court in Cities in Puerto Princesa City (MTCC), docketed as Criminal Cases No. 16916
to No. 16922. The complaints arose from the recruiting and promising of employment by
Mangila and the others to the private complainants as overseas contract workers in
Toronto, Canada, and from the collection of visa processing fees, membership fees and on-
line application the private complainants without lawful authority from the Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration (POEA).1

On the following day, June 17, 2003, Judge Heriberto M. Pangilinan, Presiding Judge of the
MTCC, conducted a preliminary investigation on the complaints. After examining Miguel
Aaron Palayon, one of the complainants, Judge Pangilinan issued a warrant for the arrest of
Mangila and her cohorts without bail.2 On the next day, the entire records of the cases,
including the warrant of arrest, were transmitted to the City Prosecutor of Puerto Princesa
City for further proceedings and appropriate action in accordance with the prevailing rules. 3

As a consequence, Mangila was arrested on June 18, 2003 and detained at the
headquarters on Taft Avenue, Manila of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). 4

Claiming that Judge Pangilinan did not have the authority to conduct the preliminary
investigation; that the preliminary investigation he conducted was not yet completed when
he issued the warrant of arrest; and that the issuance of the warrant of arrest was without
sufficient justification or without a prior finding of probable cause, Mangila filed in the Court
of Appeals (CA)a petition for habeas corpus to obtain her release from detention. Her
petition averred that the remedy of habeas corpus was available to her because she could
no longer file a motion to quash or a motion to recall the warrant of arrest considering that
Judge Pangilinan had already forwarded the entire records of the case to the City
Prosecutor who had no authority to lift or recall the warrant.5
In its resolution promulgated on October 14, 2003,6 the CA denied the petition for habeas
corpus for its lack of merit, explaining:

As a general rule, a writ of habeas corpus will not be granted where relief may be had or
could have been procured by resort to another general remedy. As pointed out in Luna vs.
Plaza, if petitioner is detained by virtue of a warrant of arrest, which is allegedly invalid, the
remedy available to her is not a petition for habeas corpus but a petition to quash the
warrant of arrest or a petition for a reinvestigation of the case by the Municipal Judge or by
the Provincial Fiscal.

Section 5, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that the Municipal
Judge who conducted the preliminary investigation shall transmit his resolution, together
with the record of the case, including the warrant of arrest, to the Provincial Prosecutor, who
shall review the same and order the release of an accused who is detained if no probable
cause is found against him. Thus, the proper remedy available to petitioner is for her to file
with the Provincial Prosecutor a motion to be released from detention on the grounds
alleged in the instant petition.

WHEREFORE, the petition for habeas corpus is DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.7

Mangila moved for the reconsideration of the denial of her petition for habeas corpus, 8 but
the CA denied the motion on November 19, 2003.9

Hence, this appeal via petition for review on certiorari.

Issue

Did the CA err in ruling that habeas corpus was not the proper remedy to obtain the release
of Mangila from detention?

Ruling of the Court

The petition for review lacks merit.

The high prerogative writ of habeas corpus has been devised as a speedy and effective
remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint. In Caballes v. Court of Appeals,10 the
Court discoursed on the nature of the special proceeding of habeas corpus in the following
manner:

A petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus is a special proceeding governed by
Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, as amended. In Ex Parte Billings, it was held that habeas
corpus is that of a civil proceeding in character. It seeks the enforcement of civil rights.
Resorting to the writ is not to inquire into the criminal act of which the complaint is made,
but into the right of liberty, notwithstanding the act and the immediate purpose to be served
is relief from illegal restraint. The rule applies even when instituted to arrest a criminal
prosecution and secure freedom. When a prisoner petitions for a writ of habeas corpus, he
thereby commences a suit and prosecutes a case in that court.

Habeas corpus is not in the nature of a writ of error; nor intended as substitute for the trial
court’s function. It cannot take the place of appeal, certiorari or writ of error. The writ cannot
be used to investigate and consider questions of error that might be raised relating to
procedure or on the merits. The inquiry in a habeas corpus proceeding is addressed to the
question of whether the proceedings and the assailed order are, for any reason, null and
void. The writ is not ordinarily granted where the law provides for other remedies in the
regular course, and in the absence of exceptional circumstances. Moreover, habeas corpus
should not be granted in advance of trial. The orderly course of trial must be pursued and
the usual remedies exhausted before resorting to the writ where exceptional circumstances
are extant. In another case, it was held that habeas corpus cannot be issued as a writ of
error or as a means of reviewing errors of law and irregularities not involving the questions
of jurisdiction occurring during the course of the trial, subject to the caveat that constitutional
safeguards of human life and liberty must be preserved, and not destroyed. It has also been
held that where restraint is under legal process, mere errors and irregularities, which do not
render the proceedings void, are not grounds for relief by habeas corpus because in such
cases, the restraint is not illegal.

Habeas corpus is a summary remedy. It is analogous to a proceeding in rem when

instituted for the sole purpose of having the person of restraint presented before the judge
in order that the cause of his detention may be inquired into and his statements final. The
writ of habeas corpus does not act upon the prisoner who seeks relief, but upon the person
who holds him in what is alleged to be the unlawful authority. Hence, the only parties before
the court are the petitioner (prisoner) and the person holding the petitioner in custody, and
the only question to be resolved is whether the custodian has authority to deprive the
petitioner of his liberty. The writ may be denied if the petitioner fails to show facts that he is
entitled thereto ex merito justicias.

A writ of habeas corpus, which is regarded as a "palladium of liberty," is a prerogative writ

which does not issue as a matter of right but in the sound discretion of the court or judge. It
is, however, a writ of right on proper formalities being made by proof. Resort to the writ is
not to inquire into the criminal act of which a complaint is made but unto the right of liberty,
notwithstanding the act, and the immediate purpose to be served is relief from illegal
restraint. The primary, if not the only object of the writ of habeas corpus ad subjuciendum, is
to determine the legality of the restraint under which a person is held. 11 (Bold underscoring
supplied for emphasis)

The object of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into the legality of the detention, and, if
the detention is found to be illegal, to require the release of the detainee. Equally well-
settled however, is that the writ will not issue where the person in whose behalf the writ is
sought is out on bail, or is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or
judge with jurisdiction or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record. 12

There is no question that when the criminal complaints were lodged against Mangila and
her cohorts on June 16, 2003,Judge Pangilinan, as the Presiding Judge of the MTCC, was
empowered to conduct preliminary investigations involving "all crimes cognizable by the
proper court in their respective territorial jurisdictions." His authority was expressly provided
in Section 2, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, to wit:

Section 2.Officers authorized to conduct preliminary investigations.

– The following may conduct preliminary investigations:

(a) Provincial or City Prosecutors and their assistants;

(b) Judges of the Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts;

(c) National and Regional State Prosecutors; and

(d) Other officers as may be authorized by law.

Their authority to conduct preliminary investigations shall include all crimes cognizable by
the proper court in their respective territorial jurisdictions. (2a)

Under Section 6(b) of Rule 112of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the
investigating judge could issue a warrant of arrest during the preliminary investigation even
without awaiting its conclusion should he find after an examination in writing and under oath
of the complainant and the witnesses in the form of searching questions and answers that a
probable cause existed, and that there was a necessity of placing the respondent under
immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice. In the context of this rule,
1âwphi1

Judge Pangilinan issued the warrant of arrest against Mangila and her cohorts.
Consequently, the CA properly denied Mangila’s petition for habeas corpus because she
had been arrested and detained by virtue of the warrant issued for her arrest by Judge
Pangilinan, a judicial officer undeniably possessing the legal authority to do so.

It is relevant to point out at this juncture that the authority of the MTC and MTCC judges to
conduct preliminary investigations was removed only effective on October 3, 2005 pursuant
to A.M. No. 05-8-26-SC.

With Mangila’s arrest and ensuing detention being by virtue of the order lawfully issued by
Judge Pangilinan, the writ of habeas corpus was not an appropriate remedy to relieve her
from the restraint on her liberty. This is because the restraint, being lawful and pursuant to a
court process, could not be inquired into through habeas corpus. To quote the dictum
enunciated by Justice Malcolm in Quintos v. Director of Prisons:13

The writ of habeas corpus secures to a prisoner the right to have the cause of his detention
examined and determined by a court of justice, and to have ascertained if he is held under
lawful authority. The function of habeas corpus, where the party who has appealed to its aid
is in custody under process, does not extend beyond an inquiry into the jurisdiction of the
court by which it was issued and the validity of the process upon its face. It is not a writ of
error. xxx (Bold underscoring supplied for emphasis)

Accordingly, Section 4, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court explicitly states:

Section 4.When writ not allowed or discharge authorized. — If it appears that the person
alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by
a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record, and that the court or
judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render the judgment, or make the order, the writ
shall not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears after the writ is allowed, the person shall
not be discharged by reason of any informality or defect in the process, judgment, or order.
Nor shall anything in this rule be held to authorize the discharge of a person charged with or
convicted of an offense in the Philippines, or of a person suffering imprisonment under
lawful judgment. (Bold underscoring supplied for emphasis)

Still, Mangila harps on the procedural flaws supposedly committed by Judge Pangilinan in
her attempt to convince the Court on her entitlement to the issuance of the writ of habeas
corpus. She insists that the illegality and invalidity of the warrant of arrest because of its
having been issued without an exhaustive examination of the complainants and the
witnesses in writing and under oath; without a prior finding of probable cause; and without
consideration of the necessity for its issuance in order not to frustrate the ends of justice
were enough reasons for granting the writ of habeas corpus.14

Mangila fails to persuade.

To begin with, Judge Pangilinan issued the order of arrest after examining Palayon, one of
the complainants against Mangila and her cohorts. If he, as the investigating judge,
considered Palayon’s evidence sufficient for finding probable cause against her and her
cohorts, which finding the Court justifiably presumes from his act of referring the case and
its records to the Office of the City Prosecutor on the day immediately following the
preliminary investigation he conducted, her petition for habeas corpus could not be the
proper remedy by which she could assail the adequacy of the adverse finding. Even
granting that there was a failure to adhere to the law or rule, such failure would not be the
equivalent of a violation of her constitutional rights.15

Secondly, it was not procedurally correct for her to impugn the issuance of the warrant of
arrest by hinting that the investigating judge did not at all consider the necessity of
determining the existence of probable cause for its issuance due to time constraints and in
order not to frustrate the ends of justice, for that consideration was presumed.

And, lastly, it was clear that under Section 5,16 Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, the resolution of the investigating judge was not final but was still subject to the
review by the public prosecutor who had the power to order the release of the detainee if no
probable cause should beultimately found against her. In the context of the rule, Mangila
had no need to seek the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus to secure her release from
detention. Her proper recourse was to bring the supposed irregularities attending the
conduct of the preliminary investigation and the issuance of the warrant for her arrest to the
attention of the City Prosecutor, who had been meanwhile given the most direct access to
the entire records of the case, including the warrant of arrest, following Judge Pangilinan’s
transmittal of them to the City Prosecutor for appropriate action. 17 We agree with the CA,
therefore, that the writ of habeas corpus could not be used as a substitute for another
available remedy.18
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the resolutions promulgated on October 14, 2003 and
November 19, 2003 in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 79745; and ORDERS the petitioner to pay the
costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.