1. Cayetano v.

Monsod
G.R. No. 100113 | September 3, 1991
FACTS:
Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the position of
Chairman of the COMELEC in a letter received by the Secretariat of the Commission on
Appointments on April 25, 1991. Petitioner Renato Cayetano opposed the nomination because
allegedly Monsod does not possess the required qualification of having been engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten years. Atty. Monsod has worked as a lawyer in the law office of his
father (1960-1963); an operations officer with the World Bank Group (1963-1970); Chief Executive
Officer of an investment bank (1970-1986); legal or economic consultant on various companies
(1986); Secretary General of NAMFREL (1986); member of Constitutional Commission (1986-
1987); National Chairman of NAMFREL (1987); and member of the quasi-judicial Davide
Commission (1990).

On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the nomination of Monsod as

Chairman of the COMELEC.On June 18, 1991, he took his oath of office. On the same day, he
assumed office as Chairman of the COMELEC.Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments of Monsod’s nomination, petitioner as a citizen and taxpayer, filed
the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition praying that said confirmation and the consequent
appointment of Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections be declared null and void.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent posseses the required qualification of having engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten years.

HELD:
The Supreme Court ruled that Atty. Monsod possessed the required qualification. In the case of
Philippine Lawyers Association vs. Agrava: The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of
cases or litigation in court. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters
connected with the law incorporation services, assessment and condemnation services,
contemplating an appearance before judicial body, the foreclosure of mortgage, enforcement of a
creditor’s claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in
attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice.

Practice of law means any activity, in or out court, which requires the application of law, legal
procedure, knowledge, training and experience. “To engage in the practice of law is to perform
those acts which are characteristics of the profession. In general, a practice of law requires a
lawyer and client relationship, it is whether in or out of court. As such, the petition is dismissed.

2. Alcantara v De Vera
A.C. No. 5859
November 23, 2010

NATURE: Review of the Resolution of the Board of Governors of the IBP finding the respondent
liable for professional malpractice and gross misconduct and recommended his disbarment

FACTS:
1. The respondent (Atty. Eduardo De Vera) is a member of the Bar and was the former counsel of
Rosario P. Mercado in a civil case filed in 1984 with the Regional Trial Court of Davao City and an
administrative case filed before the Securities and Exchange Commission, Davao City Extension
Office

2. Pursuant to a favorable decision, a writ of execution pending appeal was issued in favor of
Rosario P. Mercado. Herein respondent, as her legal counsel, garnished the bank deposits of the
defendant, but did not turn over the proceeds to Rosario.

3. Rosario demanded respondent to turn over the proceeds of the garnishment, but the latter
refused claiming that he had paid part of the money to the judge while the balance was his,
as attorney’s fees.

4. Rosario filed an administrative case against respondent.

5. IBP Board of Governors: Respondent is guilty of infidelity in the custody and handling of
client’s funds and recommending to the Court his one-year suspension from the practice of
law.

6. Following the release of the aforesaid IBP Resolution, the respondent filed a series of lawsuits
against the Mercado family except George Mercado.

7. The respondent also instituted cases against the family corporation, the corporation’s
accountant and the judge who ruled against the reopening of the case where respondent tried to
collect the balance of his alleged fee from Rosario

8. Later on, the respondent also filed cases against the chairman and members of the IBP Board
of Governors who voted to recommend his suspension from the practice of law for one year.

9. Complainants allege that the respondent committed barratry, forum shopping, exploitation of
family problems, and use of intemperate language when he filed several frivolous and
unwarranted lawsuits against the complainants and their family members, their lawyers, and the
family corporation. They maintain that the primary purpose of the cases is to harass and to
exact revenge for the one-year suspension from the practice of law meted out by the IBP
against the respondent. Thus, they pray that the respondent be disbarred for malpractice and
gross misconduct under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court

10. Respondent denied the claims. He denies he has committed barratry by instigating or stirring
up George Mercado to file lawsuits against the complainants. He insists that the lawsuits that he
and George filed against the complainants were not harassment suits but were in fact filed in good
faith and were based on strong facts

11. Also, the respondent denies that he has engaged in forum shopping. He argues that he was
merely exhausting the remedies allowed by law and that he was merely constrained to seek relief
elsewhere by reason of the denial of the trial court to reopen the civil case so he could justify his
attorney’s fees

12. Further, he denies that he had exploited the problems of his client’s family. He argues that the
case that he and George Mercado filed against the complainants arose from their perception of
unlawful transgressions committed by the latter for which they must be held accountable for the
public interest

ISSUE: Whether De Vera acts constitute as professional malpractice and gross misconduct, thus
he should be disbarred.

HELD: YES.

1. It is worth stressing that the practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the
State upon those who show that they possess, and continue to possess, the qualifications
required by law for the conferment of such privilege. Membership in the bar is a privilege
burdened with conditions. A lawyer has the privilege and right to practice law only during
good behavior and can only be deprived of it for misconduct ascertained and declared by
judgment of the court after opportunity to be heard has been afforded him. Without
invading any constitutional privilege or right, an attorney’s right to practice law may be
resolved by a proceeding to suspend or disbar him, based on conduct rendering him unfit to
hold a license or to exercise the duties and responsibilities of an attorney. It must be
understood that the purpose of suspending or disbarring an attorney is to remove from the
profession a person whose misconduct has proved him unfit to be entrusted with the duties
and responsibilities belonging to an office of an attorney, and thus to protect the public and
those charged with the administration of justice, rather than to punish the attorney. In
Maligsa v. Cabanting, we explained that the bar should maintain a high standard of legal
proficiency as well as of honesty and fair dealing. A lawyer brings honor to the legal
profession by faithfully performing his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to his
clients. To this end a member of the legal profession should refrain from doing any act
which might lessen in any degree the confidence and trust reposed by the public in the
fidelity, honesty and integrity of the legal profession. An attorney may be disbarred or
suspended for any violation of his oath or of his duties as an attorney and counselor, which
include statutory grounds enumerated in Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.

2. In the present case, the respondent committed professional malpractice and gross
misconduct particularly in his acts against his former clients after the issuance of the IBP
Resolution suspending him from the practice of law for one year. In summary, the
respondent filed against his former client, her family members, the family corporation of his
former client, the Chairman and members of the Board of Governors of the IBP who issued
 the said Resolution, the Regional Trial Court Judge in the case where his former client
received a favorable judgment, and the present counsel of his former client, a total of
twelve (12) different cases in various fora which included the Securities and Exchange
Commission; the Provincial Prosecutors Office of Tagum, Davao; the Davao City
Prosecutors Office; the IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline; the Department of Agrarian
Reform; and the Supreme Court

3. In addition to the twelve (12) cases filed, the respondent also re-filed cases which had
previously been dismissed. The respondent filed six criminal cases against members of the
Mercado family separately [xxx] all the aforementioned cases are re-filing of previously
dismissed cases.

4. Now, there is nothing ethically remiss in a lawyer who files numerous cases in different fora,
as long as he does so in good faith, in accordance with the Rules, and without any ill-motive
or purpose other than to achieve justice and fairness. In the present case, however, we
find that the barrage of cases filed by the respondent against his former client and others
close to her was meant to overwhelm said client and to show her that the respondent does
not fold easily after he was meted a penalty of one year suspension from the practice of
law.

5. The nature of the cases filed by the respondent, the fact of re-filing them after being
dismissed, the timing of the filing of cases, the fact that the respondent was in conspiracy
with a renegade member of the complainants’ family, the defendants named in the cases
and the foul language used in the pleadings and motions all indicate that the respondent
was acting beyond the desire for justice and fairness. His act of filing a barrage of cases
appears to be an act of revenge and hate driven by anger and frustration against his former
client who filed the disciplinary complaint against him for infidelity in the custody of a client’s
funds.

6. The cases filed by the respondent against his former client involved matters and information
acquired by the respondent during the time when he was still Rosario’s counsel. Information
as to the structure and operations of the family corporation, private documents, and other
pertinent facts and figures used as basis or in support of the cases filed by the respondent
in pursuit of his malicious motives were all acquired through the attorney-client relationship
with herein complainants. Such act is in direct violation of the Canons and will not be
tolerated by the Court.

3. DOMINADOR P. BURBE vs. ATTY. ALBERTO C. MAGULTA

AC No. 99-634. June 10, 2002
FACTS:

On September 1998, respondent agreed to legally represent petitioner Dominador Burbe in a

money claim and possible civil case against certain parties for breach of contract. In consequence
to such agreement, Atty. Alberto C. Magulta prepared the demand letter and some other legal
papers, for which services he was accordingly paid and an amount of P25,000.00 for the required
filing fee. A week later, petitioner was informed by the respondent that the complaint had already
been filed in court, and that he should receive notice of its progress. The petitioner waited for
several months for the notice from the court but there was no progress in the case, he was also
inquired repeatedly in the respondent’s Law Office, however he was told to just wait.

The petitioner decided to go to the Office of the Clerk of Court with the draft of Atty. Magulta’s
complaint to personally verify the progress of the case, and there told that there was no record at
all of a case filed by Atty. Alberto C. Magulta on his behalf, copy of the Certification dated May 27,
1999. As such, the petitioner confronted the latter. The respondent admitted that he has not at all
filed the complaint because he had spent the money for the filing fee for his own purpose he
offered to reimburse him by issuing two (2) checks, postdated June 1 and June 5, 1999, in the
amounts of P12,000.00 and P8,000.00.

The petitioner filed a case against Atty. Magulta for misrepresentation, dishonesty and oppressive
conduct. The respondent denied the allegations and alleged that he was never been paid by
complainant for his acceptance and legal fees and that the amount he had paid was a deposit for
the acceptance fee

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent Atty. Magulta is liable for misrepresentation of funds given to him
for the filing fee.

HELD:
YES. Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that lawyers shall hold in
trust all moneys of their clients and properties that may come into their possession.
Lawyers who convert the funds entrusted to them are in gross violation of professional ethics
and are guilty of betrayal of public confidence in the legal profession. It may be true that they have
a lien upon the client’s funds, documents and other papers that have lawfully come into their
possession; that they may retain them until their lawful fees and disbursements have been paid;
and that they may apply such funds to the satisfaction of such fees and disbursements. However,
these considerations do not relieve them of their duty to promptly account for the moneys they
received. Their failure to do so constitutes professional misconduct. In any event, they must still
exert all effort to protect their client’s interest within the bounds of law.
Respondent fell short of this standard when he converted into his legal fees the filing fee
entrusted to him by his client and thus failed to file the complaint promptly. The fact that the former
returned the amount does not exculpate him from his breach of duty.

4. PEOPLE V. VILLANUEVA- DISBARMENT

Category: Legal Ethics

FACTS:
On Sept. 4, 1959, the Chief of Police of Alaminos, Laguna, charged SImplicio Villanueva with
crime of Malicious Mischiedf, before the Justice of the Peace Court of said Municipality. Said
accused was represented by counsel de oficio, but later on replaced by counsel de parte. The
complainant in the same case was representry by City Attorney Ariston Fule of San Pablo City,
having entered his appearance as private-prosecutor, having secuting the permission of the the
Secretary of Justice.
Counsel for the accused presented a “Motion in inhibit Fiscal Fule from Acting as Private
prosecutor in this case, “this time invoking sec. 32, Rule 127, now sec. 35, Rule 138, Revised
Rules, which bars certain attorneys from practicing.

ISSUE: Whether of not Atty. Fule violate sec. 32 of Rule 127 now Sec. 35, Rule 138, revised
Rules of Court, which bars certain attorneys from practicing.

RULING:
The Court holds that the appearance of Attorney Fule did not constitute private practice, within the
meaning and contemplation of the Rules. Practice is more than isolated appearance, for it
consists in frequent or customary action, a succession of acts of the same kind. The word private
practiceof law implies that one must have presented himself to be in the active and continued
practice of the legal profession and that his professional services are available to the public for
compensation, as a source of his livelihood or in consideration of his said services. It has never
been refuted that City Attorney Fule had been given permission by his immediate supervisor, the
Secretary of Justice, to represent the complainant in the case at bar, who is a relative.

Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Fule violated sec. 32 of Rule 127, now Sec. 35, Rule 138, Revised Rules of
Court, which bars certain attorneys from practicing

Held:
No. The court believe that the isolated appearance of City Attorney Fule did not constitute
private practice within the meaning and contemplation of the Rules. Practice is more than an
isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary actions, a succession of acts of the
same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual. Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of
statute has been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one's self out to the public, as
customarily and demanding payment for such services. The appearance as counsel on one
occasion is not conclusive as determinative of engagement in the private practice of law. As the
Solicitor General stated in his observation, the word private practice of law implies that one must
have presented himself to be in the active and continued practice of the legal profession and that
his professional services are available to the public for a compensation, as a source of his
livelihood or in consideration of his said services.For one thing, it has never been refuted that City
Attorney Fule had been given permission by his immediate superior, the Secretary of Justice, to
represent the complainant in the case at bar, who is a relative.CONFORMABLY WITH ALL THE
FOREGOING, the decision appealed from should be, as it is hereby affirmed, in all respects, with
costs against appellant.
5. PETITION FOR AUTHORITY TO CONTINUE USE OF THE FIRM NAME “SYCIP, SALAZAR,
FELICIANO, HERNANDEZ & CASTILLO".
PETITION FOR AUTHORITY TO CONTINUE USE OF THE FIRM NAME “SYCIP, SALAZAR,
FELICIANO, HERNANDEZ & CASTILLO.”
July 30, 1979

Facts:
Petitions were filed by the surviving partners of Atty. Alexander Sycip, who died on May 5, 1975
and by the surviving partners of Atty. Herminio Ozaeta, who died on February 14, 1976, praying
that they be allowed to continue using, in the names of their firms, the names of partners who had
passed away.
Petitioners contend that the continued use of the name of a deceased or former partner when
permissible by local custom, is not unethical but care should be taken that no imposition or
deception is practiced through this use. They also contend that no local custom prohibits the
continued use of a deceased partner’s name in a professional firm’s name; there is no custom or
usage in the Philippines, or at least in the Greater Manila Area, which recognizes that the name of
a law firm necessarily identifies the individual members of the firm.
Issue:
WON the surviving partners may be allowed by the court to retain the name of the partners who
already passed away in the name of the firm? NO

Held:
In the case of Register of Deeds of Manila vs. China Banking Corporation, the SC said:
The Court believes that, in view of the personal and confidential nature of the relations between
attorney and client, and the high standards demanded in the canons of professional ethics, no
practice should be allowed which even in a remote degree could give rise to the possibility of
deception. Said attorneys are accordingly advised to drop the names of the deceased partners
from their firm name.
The public relations value of the use of an old firm name can tend to create undue advantages and
disadvantages in the practice of the profession. An able lawyer without connections will have to
make a name for himself starting from scratch. Another able lawyer, who can join an old firm, can
initially ride on that old firm’s reputation established by deceased partners.
The court also made the difference from the law firms and business corporations:
A partnership for the practice of law is not a legal entity. It is a mere relationship or association for
a particular purpose. … It is not a partnership formed for the purpose of carrying on trade or
business or of holding property.” Thus, it has been stated that “the use of a nom de plume,
assumed or trade name in law practice is improper.
We find such proof of the existence of a local custom, and of the elements requisite to constitute
the same, wanting herein. Merely because something is done as a matter of practice does not
mean that Courts can rely on the same for purposes of adjudication as a juridical custom.
Petition suffers legal and ethical impediment.

6. IN THE MATTER OF THE DISQUALIFICATION OF BAR EXAMINEE HARON S. MELING

IN THE MATTER OF THE DISQUALIFICATION OF BAR EXAMINEE HARON S. MELING IN

THE 2002 BAR EXAMINATIONS AND FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION AS MEMBER OF THE
PHILIPPINE SHARI’A BAR,

ATTY. FROILAN R. MELENDREZ, petitioner,

B.M. No. 1154. June 8, 2004
Facts:
On October 14, 2002, Atty. Froilan R. Melendrez (Melendrez) filed with the Office of the Bar
Confidant (OBC) a Petition to disqualify Haron S. Meling (Meling) from taking the 2002 Bar
Examinations and to impose on him the appropriate disciplinary penalty as a member of the
Philippine Shari’a Bar.

In the Petition, Melendrez alleges that Meling did not disclose in his Petition to take the 2002 Bar
Examinations that he has three (3) pending criminal cases before the Municipal Trial Court in
Cities (MTCC), Cotabato City, namely: Criminal Cases Noa. 15685 and 15686, both for Grave
Oral Defamation, and Criminal Case No. 15687 for Less Serious Physical Injuries.

The above-mentioned cases arose from an incident which occurred on May 21, 2001, when
Meling allegedly uttered defamatory words against Melendrez and his wife in front of media
practitioners and other people. Meling also purportedly attacked and hit the face of Melendrez’
wife causing the injuries to the latter.

Furthermore, Melendrez alleges that Meling has been using the title “Attorney” in his
communications, as Secretary to the Mayor of Cotabato City, despite the fact that he is not a
member of the Bar. Attached to the Petition is an indorsement letter which shows that Meling used
the appellation and appears on its face to have been received by the Sangguniang Panglungsod
of Cotabato City on November 27, 2001.

Pursuant to this Court’s Resolution dated December 3, 2002, Meling filed his Answer with the
OBC.

In his Answer, Meling explains that he did not disclose the criminal cases filed against him by
Melendrez because retired Judge Corocoy Moson, their former professor, advised him to settle his
misunderstanding with Melendrez. Believing in good faith that the case would be settled because
the said Judge has moral ascendancy over them, he being their former professor in the College of
Law, Meling considered the three cases that actually arose from a single incident and involving the
same parties as “closed and terminated.” Moreover, Meling denies the charges and adds that the
acts complained of do not involve moral turpitude.

As regards the use of the title “Attorney,” Meling admits that some of his communications really
contained the word “Attorney” as they were, according to him, typed by the office clerk.

In its Report and Recommendation dated December 8, 2003, the OBC disposed of the charge of
non-disclosure against Meling in this wise:

The reasons of Meling in not disclosing the criminal cases filed against him in his petition to take
the Bar Examinations are ludicrous. He should have known that only the court of competent
jurisdiction can dismiss cases, not a retired judge nor a law professor. In fact, the cases filed
against Meling are still pending. Furthermore, granting arguendo that these cases were already
dismissed, he is still required to disclose the same for the Court to ascertain his good moral
character. Petitions to take the Bar Examinations are made under oath, and should not be taken
lightly by an applicant.

Issue: WON the imposition of appropriate sanctions upon Haron S. Meling is proper and shall
subsequently barred him from taking his lawyer’s oath and signing on the Roll of Attorneys

Held:

The Petition is GRANTED insofar as it seeks the imposition of appropriate sanctions upon Haron
S. Meling as a member of the Philippine Shari’a Bar. Accordingly, the membership of Haron S.
Meling in the Philippine Shari’a Bar is hereby SUSPENDED until further orders from the Court, the
suspension to take effect immediately. Insofar as the Petition seeks to prevent Haron S. Meling
from taking the Lawyer’s Oath and signing the Roll of Attorneys as a member of the Philippine Bar,
the same is DISMISSED for having become moot and academic.

Rationale:

Practice of law, whether under the regular or the Shari’a Court, is not a matter of right but merely a
privilege bestowed upon individuals who are not only learned in the law but who are also known to
possess good moral character. The requirement of good moral character is not only a condition
precedent to admission to the practice of law, its continued possession is also essential for
remaining in the practice of law.

The disclosure requirement is imposed by the Court to determine whether there is satisfactory
evidence of good moral character of the applicant. The nature of whatever cases are pending
against the applicant would aid the Court in determining whether he is endowed with the moral
fitness demanded of a lawyer. By concealing the existence of such cases, the applicant then
flunks the test of fitness even if the cases are ultimately proven to be unwarranted or insufficient to
impugn or affect the good moral character of the applicant.

7. In re: Amparo 65 SCRA 120 (1974)

FACTS: Amparo is a bar examinee who was caught by the head watcher reading a piece of paper
during the bar examination in Criminal Law. He refuses to surrender the paper until the head
watcher threatened to report him to the authorities. The paper contains the list of duration of
penalties and formula computing them, which Amparo justifies as just a piece of paper that fell out
of his pocket as he tried to get his handkerchief. A report was filed and an investigation ensued.

ISSUE: WON Amparo is guilty for his actions.

RULING: Yes. He violated Rule 133, section 10 prohibiting examinees from bringing papers,
books, or notes into the examination room. Amparo committed an overt act indicative of an
attempt to cheat by reading notes. The report of the bar showed that he did not passed the bar
thus the court ordered he will not be allowed to re-take the bar the following year.
8. In Re: Lanuevo 66 SCRA 254 August 29, 1975

FACTS: This is an administrative proceeding against Victorio Lanueva who was the Bar Confidant
during the 1971 Bar Examination emanating from the revelation of one Oscar Landicho, a bar
examinee of the same bar exam, in his confidential letter that the result of the bar exam of one of
the bar examinee later identified as Ramon Galang was raised before the result was released to
make him pass the bar. Acting upon said letter, the court called the 5 bar examiners and the Bar
Confident Lanuevo to submit their sworn statements on the matter. It appears that each of the 5
bar examiners were approached by Lanuevo with the examination booklet asking them to re-
evaluate the grades of the bar examiner explaining that it is a practice policy in bar exams that he
will review the grades obtained in all subjects by an examinee and when he finds a candidate to
have extraordinary high grades in other subjects and low grade in one subject he can bring it to
the examiner for reconsideration to help the candidate pass. In good faith of trust and confidence
to the authority of Lanuevo, the examiners re-evaluated the exam of the candidate and reconsider
the grade they give for each subject matter. Further investigation also revealed that Ramon
Galang was charged with crime of slight physical injuries in the Mla. MTC but did not revealed the
information in his application to take the bar examination.

ISSUE: WON Lanuevo has the authority to ask bar examiners to re-evaluate and re-correct the
examination result of a bar candidate.

RULING: The court ruled that it is evident that Lanuevo has deceptively staged a plot to convince
each examiner individually to re-evaluate the grades of Galang in order to help him pass the bar
without prior authorization of the Court. His duty as a Bar Confident is limited only as a custodian
of the examination notebooks after they are corrected by the examiners where he is tasked to tally
the general average of the bar candidate. All requests for re-evaluation of grades from the bar
exam shall be made by the candidate themselves. With the facts fully established that Lanuevo
initiated the re-evaluation of the exam answers of Galang without the authority of the Court, he has
breached the trust and confidence given to him by the court and was disbarred with his name
stricken out from the rolls of attorneys. Galang was likewise disbarred for fraudulently concealing
the criminal charges against him in his application for the bar exam while under oath constituting
perjury. The court believed that the 5 bar examiners acted in good faith and thereby absolved from
the case but reminded to perform their duties with due care.

IN RE: VICTORIO LANUEVO(former Bar confidant)

RAMON GALANG (1971 Bar Examinee) flunked in 1969, 1966-76, 1962-64 Bar exam

FACTS: 1. Administrative proceeding against Victorio Lanuevo for disbarment.

2. Admitted having brought the five examination notebooks of Ramon E. Galang
back to the respective examiners for re-evalution or re-checking.
3. The five examiners admitted having re-evaluated or re-checked the notebook to
him by the Bar Confidant, stating that he has the authority to do the same and
that the examinee concerned failed only in his particular subject and was on the
borderline of passing.
 4. Ramon galang was able to pass the 1971 bar exam because of Lanuevo’s move
but the exam results bears that he failed in 5 subjects namely in (Political, Civil,
Mercantile, Criminal & Remedial).
5. Galang on the otherhand, denied of having charged of Slight Physical Injuries on
Eufrosino de Vera, a law student of MLQU.

RULING: The court disbarred Lanuevo – has no authority to request the examiners to re-
evaluate grades of examinees w/o prior authority from Supreme Court.
He does not possess any discretion with respect to the matter of admission of examinees
to the bar. He does not a have any business evaluating the answers of the examinees.

Consequently, Galang was also disbarred Sec. 2 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Curt
of 1964, candidates for admission to the bar must be of good moral character. Galang has a
pending criminal cases of Physical Injuries, he committed perjury when he declared under oath
that he had no pending criminal case this resulted him to revoked his license.

9. IN RE CUNANAN
94 PHIL. 534

FACTS:
Congress passed Rep. Act No. 972, or what is known as the Bar Flunkers Act, in 1952. The title of
the law was, “An Act to Fix the Passing Marks for Bar Examinations from 1946 up to and including
1955.”
Section 1 provided the following passing marks:
1946-1951………………70%
1952 …………………….71%
1953……………………..72%
1954……………………..73%
1955……………………..74%
Provided however, that the examinee shall have no grade lower than 50%.
Section 2 of the Act provided that “A bar candidate who obtained a grade of 75% in any subject
shall be deemed to have already passed that subject and the grade/grades shall be included in the
computation of the general average in subsequent bar examinations.”
ISSUE:
Whether of not, R.A. No. 972 is constitutional.
RULING:
Section 2 was declared unconstitutional due to the fatal defect of not being embraced in the title of
the Act. As per its title, the Act should affect only the bar flunkers of 1946 to 1955 Bar
examinations. Section2 establishes a permanent system for an indefinite time. It was also struck
down for allowing partial passing, thus failing to take account of the fact that laws and
jurisprudence are not stationary.
As to Section1, the portion for 1946-1951 was declared unconstitutional, while that for 1953 to
1955 was declared in force and effect. The portion that was stricken down was based under the
following reasons:
The law itself admits that the candidates for admission who flunked the bar from 1946 to 1952 had
inadequate preparation due to the fact that this was very close to the end of World War II;
The law is, in effect, a judgment revoking the resolution of the court on the petitions of the said
candidates;
The law is an encroachment on the Court’s primary prerogative to determine who may be admitted
to practice of law and, therefore, in excess of legislative power to repeal, alter and supplement the
Rules of Court. The rules laid down by Congress under this power are only minimum norms, not
designed to substitute the judgment of the court on who can practice law; and
The pretended classification is arbitrary and amounts to class legislation.
As to the portion declared in force and effect, the Court could not muster enough votes to declare
it void. Moreover, the law was passed in 1952, to take effect in 1953. Hence, it will not revoke
existing Supreme Court resolutions denying admission to the bar of an petitioner. The same may
also rationally fall within the power to Congress to alter, supplement or modify rules of admission
to the practice of law.

IN RE: CUNANAN
FACTS OF THE CASE:
In the manner of the petitions for Admission to the Bar of unsuccessful candidates of 1946 to
1953; Albino Cunanan et. al petitioners.

In recent years few controversial issues have aroused so much public interest and concern as
R.A. 972 popularly known as the “Bar Flunkers’ Act of 1953.” Generally a candidate is deemed
passed if he obtains a general ave of 75% in all subjects w/o falling below 50% in any
subject, although for the past few exams the passing grades were changed depending on the
strictness of the correcting of the bar examinations (1946- 72%, 1947- 69%, 1948- 70% 1949-
74%, 1950-1953 – 75%).

Believing themselves to be fully qualified to practice law as those reconsidered and passed by the
S.C., and feeling that they have been discriminated against, unsuccessful candidates who
obtained averages of a few percentages lower than those admitted to the bar went to congress for,
and secured in 1951 Senate Bill no. 12, but was vetoed by the president after he was given advise
adverse to it. Not overriding the veto, the senate then approved senate bill no. 372 embodying
substantially the provisions of the vetoed bill. The bill then became law on June 21, 1953

Republic Act 972 has for its object, according to its author, to admit to the Bar those candidates
who suffered from insufficiency of reading materials and inadequate preparations. By and
large, the law is contrary to public interest since it qualifies 1,094 law graduates who had
inadequate preparation for the practice of law profession, as evidenced by their failure in the
exams.

ISSUES OF THE CASE:

Due to the far reaching effects that this law would have on the legal profession and the
administration of justice, the S.C. would seek to know if it is CONSTITUTIONAL.
 An adequate legal preparation is one of the vital requisites for the practice of the law that
should be developed constantly and maintained firmly.
 The Judicial system from which ours has been derived, the act of admitting, suspending,
disbarring, and reinstating attorneys at law in the practice of the profession is concededly judicial.
 The Constitution, has not conferred on Congress and the S.C. equal responsibilities
concerning the admission to the practice of law. The primary power and responsibility
which the constitution recognizes continue to reside in this court.
 Its retroactivity is invalid in such a way, that what the law seeks to “cure” are not the rules set
in place by the S.C. but the lack of will or the defect in judgment of the court, and this power is not
included in the power granted by the Const. to Congress, it lies exclusively w/in the judiciary.
 Reasons for UNCONSTITUTIONALITY:
1. There was a manifest encroachment on the constitutional responsibility of the Supreme
Court.
2. It is in effect a judgment revoking the resolution of the court, and only the S.C. may revise or
alter them, in attempting to do so R.A. 972 violated the Constitution.
3. That congress has exceeded its power to repeal, alter, and supplement the rules on
admission to the bar (since the rules made by congress must elevate the profession, and those
rules promulgated are considered the bare minimum.)
4. It is a class legislation
5. Art. 2 of R.A. 972 is not embraced in the title of the law, contrary to what the constitution
enjoins, and being inseparable from the provisions of art. 1, the entire law is void.

HELD:

Under the authority of the court:

1. That the portion of art. 1 of R.A. 972 referring to the examinations of 1946 to 1952 and all of
art. 2 of the said law are unconstitutional and therefore void and w/o force and effect.
2. The part of ART 1 that refers to the examinations subsequent to the approval of the law (1953-
1955) is valid and shall continue in force. (those petitions by the candidates who failed the bar
from 1946 to 1952 are denied, and all the candidates who in the examination of 1953 obtained a
GEN Ave. of 71.5% w/o getting a grade of below 50% in any subject are considered as having
passed whether they have filed petitions for admissions or not.)
16 07 2010

10. JAVELLANA v. LUTERO G.R. No. L-23956 ; July 21, 1967

FACTS: On March 1963, the Roman Archbishop in Jaro, Iloilo filed a Detainer Complaintagainst
Elpidio Javellana in the municipal court which was presided by Judge Nicolas Lutero. The
hearing was reset four times, all at the behest of Elpidio Javellana’s lawyer (Atty. Jose Hautea)
who gave reasons as flimsy as a painful right toe, and unfinished business transactions in
Manila. This last postponement was granted by the municipal court, with a warning that no
further postponements shall be allowed. When the case was called for trial on August 27, 1963,
neither the defendant nor his counsel appeared. One Atty. Romy Peña was present in court –
who verbally moved for the postponement of the trial on the ground that Atty. Hautea was in
Manila attending to a business transaction. The plaintiff's counsel objected to the motion on the
ground that the defendant and his counsel were well aware of the court's previous admonition
that no further postponement of the case would be granted, and then manifested that the
witnesses and the evidence for the plaintiff were ready for presentation on that date. Thus, the
verbal motion was denied, and plaintiff was directed to adduce his evidence. During the hearing,
a telegram arrived from Atty. Hautea asking for a postponement of the hearing. However, the
hearing still continued. The court on the same date rendered judgment for the plaintiff and
against the defendant. About 50 days later, the defendant thru his same counsel filed a
PETITION FOR RELIEF (from the judgment of the municipal court) with the CFI of Iloilo, praying
that the decision in question be set aside, that the detainer case be set for trial on the merits,
and, pending determination of the petition, that an injunction issue restraining the enforcement of
the decision. Counsel for the petitioner averred that his absence on the date of the trial was
excusable as he attended to a very urgent business transaction in Manila; that before his
departure for the latter city, he verbally informed the respondent judge that his return to Iloilo
might be delayed and that he might not

ELPIDIO JAVELLANA, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
NICOLAS LUTERO, Judge of the Municipal Court of Iloilo City and the ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF JARO, defendants-
appellees.

Hautea and Hinojales for plaintiff-appellant.

Luisito C. Hofileña for defendants-appellees.

CASTRO, J.:

This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo (CC 6425) dismissing a petition for relief directed against the judgment
rendered by the municipal court of Iloilo City in its civil case 7220.

On March 29, 1963 the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Jaro, Iloilo filed a detainer complaint against Elpidio Javellana with the municipal court of
Iloilo City, presided by Judge Nicolas Lutero. The hearing, originally set for April 30, 1963, was postponed to May 24 for failure of the defendant
to receive summons, and then postponed again to June 27 for the same reason. It was thereafter postponed to July 16, then to July 24, and
finally to August 27, all at the behest of the defendant's Atty. Jose Hautea, on the grounds that "he has not finished his business transactions in
Manila" and that "he hurt his right foot toe." The last postponement was granted by the municipal court with the warning that no further
postponement would be entertained.

When the case was called for trial on August 27, 1963, neither the defendant nor his counsel Atty. Hautea appeared although one Atty. Romy
Peña who was present in court verbally moved for the postponement of the trial on the ground that Atty. Hautea was in Manila attending to a
business transaction. The plaintiff's counsel objected to the motion on the ground that the defendant and his counsel were well aware of the
court's previous admonition that no further postponement of the case would be granted, and then manifested that the witnesses and the
evidence for the plaintiff were ready for presentation on that date. The verbal motion for postponement was denied and the plaintiff was directed
to adduce his evidence. During the presentation of the plaintiff's evidence, the municipal court received a telegram from Atty. Hautea requesting
postponement of the hearing. The trial proceeded nevertheless, and, on the basis of the plaintiff's evidence, the court on the same date
rendered judgment for the plaintiff and against the defendant. The latter's counsel received a copy of the decision on September 9, 1963. On the
following September 11, he filed a motion to set aside judgment and for new trial. This motion was denied on September 26; a copy of the order
of denial was received by him on the same date.

On November 16, 1963, or about 50 days later, the defendant thru his same counsel filed a petition for relief (from the judgment of the municipal
court)with the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, praying that the decision in question be set aside, that the detainer case be set for trial on the
merits, and, pending determination of the petition, that an injunction issue restraining the enforcement of the decision. Counsel for the petitioner
averred that his absence on the date of the trial was excusable as he attended to a very urgent business transaction in Manila; that before his
departure for the latter city, he verbally informed the respondent judge that his return to Iloilo might be delayed and that he might not arrive on
time for the trial of the case as set; that he called at both the law office and the residence of the counsel for the private respondent to inform him
of the desired postponement and the reason therefor, but the latter was in Bacolod at the time; that he exercised utmost diligence and
precaution in the sense that while in Manila he sent a telegram to the respondent judge, asking for postponement; and that notwithstanding all
the foregoing, the municipal court nevertheless proceeded with the trial in his absence and that of his client, allowed the private respondent to
present his evidence ex parte, and rendered a decision against the petitioner, thus depriving the latter of his day in court. Counsel for the
petitioner further asserted that his client has a good and substantial defense, which is, that the complainant had given his client an option to buy
the premises subject-matter of the complaint below, and that a reopening of the case would cause the private respondent no real injury.

This petition was given due course, the respondents were required to file their answers, and a cease-and-desist order was issued as prayed for.
On February 22, 1964, after due hearing, the Court of First Instance rendered judgment dismissing the petition.1äwphï1.ñët

Hence the present recourse.

From the perspective of the environmental circumstances obtaining in this case, the present appeal is palpably devoid of merit.

A counsel for any party in a judicial controversy, by mandate of the canons of legal ethics, and with due regard for the elementary standards of
fair play, is duty bound to prepare for trial with diligence and deliberate speed. This norm of conduct is no less applicable in a detainer case,
such as the one at bar, even if the issues are essentially simple and uncomplicated. It is obvious that the counsel for the petitioner-appellant has
been remiss in this respect.

The case was set for trial six times. Thrice it was postponed at the behest of the said counsel. The last postponement was granted on July 24,
1963 with the unequivocal admonition by the judgment that no further postponement would be countenanced. The case was reset for hearing on
August 27, 1963, which means that the appellant's counsel had more than a month's time to so adjust his schedule of activities as to obviate a
conflict between his business transactions and his calendar of hearings. Came August 27, and neither he nor the appellant appeared at the trial.
His absence on the latter date was not occasioned by illness or some other supervening occurrence which unavoidably and justifiably prevented
him from appearing in court.

In our view, it was the bounden duty of the said counsel, under the circumstances, to give preferential attention to the case. As things were, he
regarded the municipal court as a mere marionette that must ever await his pleasure. This attitude on his part is censurable as it reveals more
than just a modicum of disrespect for the judiciary and the established machinery of justice.

Nor is his censurable conduct mitigated by the appearance in court on August 27 of another attorney who verbally moved for postponement nor
by his telegram received by the municipal judge on the same date asking for continuance. These circumstances, upon the contrary, emphasize
his presumptuousness vis-a-vis the municipal judge.

It is thus crystal-clear from the foregoing disquisition that the petitioner-appellant was not deprived of his day in court, and that the respondent
municipal judge did not err in proceeding with the trial, allowing the private respondent to present his evidence ex parte, and thereafter rendering
decision for the plaintiff-appellee. It follows that the petitioner was not entitled to the remedy of a petition for relief.

Moreover, after the denial of his motion to set aside judgment and for new trial, the appellant had ample time to appeal; instead he allowed the
judgment to become final and executory. His argument that an appeal would have been futile as there was no evidence upon which such appeal
could be based, merits scant consideration. An appeal from the decision of a municipal court to the Court of First Instance has the effect of
vacating the decision (sec. 9, Rule 40, view Rules of Court; sec. 9, Rule 40, of the old Rules), and the action is to be tried de novo without
regard to the proof presented in the municipal court or the conclusions reached thereon (Colegio de San Jose vs. Sison, 56 Phil. 344, 351; Lizo
vs. Carandang, 73 Phil. 649; Crisostomo vs. Director of Prisons, 41 Phil. 368). To grant the appellant's petition for relief would amount to
reviving his right to appeal which he had irretrievably lost through the gross inaction of his counsel (see Espinosa vs. Yatco, etc., et al., L-16435,
Jan. 31, 1963, and the cases therein cited). This in law cannot be done.

Accordingly, the decision appealed from is affirmed. As this appeal is patently frivolous and dilatory, this Court, under the authority of section 3
of Rule 142 of the Rules of Court, hereby assesses treble costs against the petitioner-appellant Elpidio Javellana, said costs to be paid by his
counsel, Atty. Jose Hautea.

11. De Roy vs Court of Appeals 157 SCRA 757

Facts: The firewall of a burned-out building owned by petitioner, Felisa Perdosa De Roy,
collapsed and destroyed the tailoring shop of private respondents, Luis Bernal, Sr., et al., resulting
in injuries to their family and death of Marissa Bernal, a daughter. Private respondents had been
warned by petitioners to vacate their shop but the former failed to do so.
Given the facts, the First Judicial Region rendered judgment finding petitioners guilty of gross
negligence and awarding damages to private respondents. This decision was affirmed in toto by
the Court of Appeals. On the last day of the 15-day period to file an appeal, petitioners filed a
motion for extension of tie to file a motion for reconsideration, which was denied by the appellate
court. They again filed for a motion for reconsideration but was subsequently denied.
Petitioner filed for a special civic action for certiorari to declare null and void the previous decision
and claimed that the appellate court committed grave abuse of discretion. They contended that the
rule enunciated in the Habaluyas case should not be made to apply to the case at bar owing to the
non-publication of the Habaluyas decision in the Official Gazette. Also they argued that the
petitioners had the “last clear chance” to avoid the accident if only they heeded the warning to
vacate the shop.
Issues: Whether or not the rule in the Habaluyas decision, stating that the 15-day period for
appealing or filing a motion for reconsideration cannot be extended, could be applied to the case
at bar.
Held: The ruling in the Habaluyas case should be made to apply to the case at bar,
notwithstanding the non-publication of the Habaluyas decision in the Official Gazette.
Ratio:
 There is no law requiring the publication of Supreme Court decisions in the Official Gazette
before they can be binding and as a condition to their becoming effective. It is the duty of
the counsel as lawyer in active law practice to keep abreast of decisions of the Supreme
Court, which are published in the advance reports of Supreme Court decisions (G.R.’s) and
in pubications as the Supreme Court Reports Annotated (SCRA) and law journals.
 The ruling in the Habaluyas case was that the 15-day period for appealing or filing a motion
for reconsideration cannot be extended. Such motion may be filed only in cases pending in
the Supreme Court as the court of last resort, which in its discretion may grant or deny the
extension requested. Such decision was given prospective application to subsequent cases
like Lacsamana vs Second Special Cases Division of the Intermediate Appellate Court and
Bacaya vs Intermediate Appellate Court.
 With regard to the contention on the “last clear chance” of private respondents to avoid the
accident, this should be disregarded, since the doctrine of “last clear chance”, wich has
been applied to vehicular accidents, is inapplicable to this case.

12. A.C. No. 5687 February 03, 2005

FELIX E. EDQUIBAL, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ROBERTO FERRER, JR., Respondent.

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

In a letter-complaint1 under oath dated January 8, 2002, Felix E. Edquibal, complainant, charged
Atty. Roberto Ferrer, Jr., respondent, with professional misconduct and neglect of duty.

Complainant alleged that he engaged the services of respondent to assist his mother Ursula
Edquibal in cases she filed against his sister Delia Edquibal-Garcia involving a certain real
property in Masinloc, Zambales. His mother obtained favorable judgments in four (4) out of the five
(5) cases handled by respondent. However, in Civil Case No. RTC-1495-I (filed with the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 70, Iba, Zambales), the trial judge rendered a decision adverse to his mother.
Respondent then advised complainant to appeal to the Court of Appeals and that the cost involved
is ₱4,000.00. When complainant informed respondent that he does not have enough money, the
latter said ₱2,000.00 would be sufficient for the moment. After receiving the money from
complainant, respondent told him just to wait for the result. The appeal was docketed as CA-G.R.
CV No. 65019.

When complainant failed to hear from respondent in January 2001, he went to the Court of
Appeals to follow-up the appealed case. He then learned that the appeal was dismissed for failure
of the appellant to file the required appellant’s brief.

In his comment2 dated June 2, 2003, respondent denied that he filed an appeal, on behalf of
complainant’s mother, with the Court of Appeals or received ₱2,000.00. What happened was that
complainant told him that there is someone in the Court of Appeals who can help him regarding
his appeal. Respondent claimed that he "did his best" for complainant’s mother and did not even
ask for attorney’s fees.

On July 30, 2003, we referred the complaint to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report, and recommendation.

In his Report and Recommendation dated March 19, 2004, Atty. Leland R. Villadolid, IBP
Commissioner, made the following findings:

"It is clear from the records of this case that per the records of CA G-R. CV No. 65019,
Respondent is the counsel of record of defendants-appellants therein (including Complainant’s
mother). In the Resolution dated 31 August 000, it was explicitly noted that ‘(N)otice sent to
counsel for defendants-appellants requiring him to file appellant’s brief within forty-five (45) days
from receipt thereof was received by him on March 16, 2000.’ If it is true that Respondent never
agreed to handle the appeal, upon receipt of said notice, Respondent should have immediately
manifested to the Court of Appeals that he is not handling the appeal on behalf of said defendants-
appellants. Thus, Section 2, Rule 44 of the Rules of Civil Procedure clearly states that ‘[T]he
counsel and guardians ad litem of the parties in the court of origin shall be respectively considered
as their counsel and guardians ad litem in the Court of Appeals.’ By failing to do so, the Court of
Appeals had every reason to assume that he was likewise representing defendants-appellants in
the appeal. Accordingly, his failure to timely file the required appellants’ brief resulted in the
dismissal of the appeal.

The facts of this case clearly show that Respondent violated Canon 17 and 18 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility (‘CPR’).

Undoubtedly, Respondent’s failure to exercise due diligence in protecting and attending to the
interest of Complainant (Complainant’s mother) caused the latter material prejudice. It should be
remembered that the moment a lawyer takes a client’s cause, he covenants that he will exert all
effort for its prosecution until its final conclusion. A lawyer who fails to exercise due diligence or
abandons his client’s cause makes him unworthy of the trust reposed in him by the latter. x x x"

Atty. Villadolid recommended to the IBP Board of Governors that respondent be reprimanded "for
failure to act with reasonable diligence in representing the cause of complainant;" and that
respondent be directed to "return the amount of ₱2,000.00 as and by way of restitution to
complainant."
In its Resolution No. XVI-2004-383 dated July 30, 2004, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and
approved the Report and Recommendation of Atty. Villadolid, thus:

"RESOLVED TO ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report
and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made
part of the Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the
evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering the respondent’s failure to
act with reasonable diligence in representing the cause of complainant, Atty. Roberto Ferrer, Jr., is
hereby REPRIMANDED and Ordered to Return the amount of ₱2,000,00 by way of Restitution to
complainant."3

We sustain the Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors except as to the penalty recommended.

Records show that respondent was the counsel of record for the appellants, complainant’s
mother and other relatives in CA-G.R. CV No. 65019. The Resolution of the Court of Appeals
dated August 31, 2000 clearly states that the "notice sent to counsel for defendants-appellants
requiring him to file appellant’s brief within forty-five (45) days from receipt thereof, was
received by him on March 16, 2000."4 However, respondent failed to file the appellants’ brief
despite receipt of such notice.

Section 2, Rule 44 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, provides:

SEC. 2. Counsel and guardians. – The counsel and guardians ad litemof the parties in the court
of origin shall be respectively considered as their counsel and guardians ad litemin the Court
of Appeals. When others appear or are appointed, notice thereof shall be served immediately on
the adverse party and filed with the court.

If it were true that respondent did not agree to represent the appellants in CA-G.R. CV No. 65019,
why did he not file with the Court of Appeals a motion to withdraw as their counsel? Obviously, his
negligence, which resulted in the dismissal of the appeal, caused prejudice to his clients. Likewise,
respondent’s failure to inform complainant of the status of his mother’s appeal is inexcusable.

It bears stressing that the lawyer-client relationship is one of trust and confidence. Thus, there is a
need for the client to be adequately and fully informed about the developments in his case. 5 A
client should never be left groping in the dark, for to do so would be to destroy the trust, faith, and
confidence reposed in the lawyer so retained in particular and the legal profession in general.

Respondent violated Canons 17 and 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provide:

"Canon 17 - A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust
and confidence reposed in him.

Canon 18 – A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.

Rule 18.03 – A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable.

Rule 18.04 – A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond
within a reasonable time to his client’s request for information."

Diligence is "the attention and care required of a person in a given situation and is the opposite of
negligence."6 A lawyer serves his client with diligence by adopting that norm of practice expected
of men of good intentions. He thus owes entire devotion to the interest of his client, warm zeal in
the defense and maintenance of his rights, and the exertion of his utmost learning, skill, and ability
to ensure that nothing shall be taken or withheld from him, save by the rules of law legally
applied.7 It is axiomatic in the practice of law that the price of success is eternal diligence to the
cause of the client.

The practice of law does not require extraordinary diligence (exactissima diligentia) or that
"extreme measure of care and caution which persons of unusual prudence and circumspection
use for securing and preserving their rights."8 All that is required is ordinary diligence (diligentia) or
that degree of vigilance expected of a bonus pater familias. Yet, even by this lesser standard,
respondent’s failure to attend to his client’s appeal is clearly wanting.

In People v. Cawili,9 we held that the failure of counsel to submit the brief within the reglementary
period is an offense that entails disciplinary action. People v. Villar, Jr.10 characterized a lawyer’s
failure to file a brief for his client as inexcusable neglect. In Blaza v. Court of Appeals,11 we held
that the filing of a brief within the period set by law is a duty not only to the client, but also to the
court. gr_ Perla Compania de Seguros, Inc. v. Saquilaban 12 reiterated Ford v. Daitol13 and In re:
Santiago F. Marcos14 in holding that an attorney’s failure to file brief for his client constitutes
inexcusable negligence.

In cases involving a lawyer’s failure to file a brief or other pleading before an appellate court, we
did not hesitate to suspend the erring member of the Bar from the practice of law for three
months,15 six months,16 or even disbarment in severely aggravated cases.17

Accordingly and considering the circumstances of this case, we find a need to scale the
recommended penalty upward. Here, we are convinced that respondent deserves the penalty of
suspension for three (3) months.

WHEREFORE, ATTY. ROBERTO FERRER, JR. is hereby found guilty of professional misconduct
and neglect of duty. He is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3) months with a
WARNING that a repetition of the same or a similar offense shall be dealt with more severely. He
is further DIRECTED to return immediately to the complainant the amount of ₱2,000.00.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
and all courts throughout the country.

SO ORDERED.

13. EMILIANO COURT TOWNHOUSES HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION (ETCHA) vs. ATTY.

MICHAEL DIONEDA Adm. Case No. 5162. March 20, 2003
NOVEMBER 28, 2017

FACTS:
On 29 September 1997 ECTHA and respondent Dioneda entered into a Retainer’s
Agreement wherein respondent lawyer agreed to handle the case of the complainant against LVF
Realty, Mr. Tinsay and BPI Family Savings Bank by way of filing a Complaint-in-Intervention,
for P20,000.00 as attorney’s fees and P1,000.00 as appearance fee per hearing. It was further
agreed that respondent lawyer would update the complaint and work on the development of the
case.
In its Complaint ECTHA alleged that Atty. Dioneda, after receiving the amount of P20,000.00, did
nothing for the development of the case and to update the complaint on the status of ECTHA’s
intended Complaint-in-Intervention. Due to the insistence of the members of the Association, Mr.
Fernando Garcia, ECTHA President, was compelled to check the records of the case in the RTC,
and secured a certification from the Branch Clerk of Court that there was no motion for
intervention filed in the case. On behalf of ECTHA Mr. Garcia repeatedly made oral demands for
respondent to return the amount of P20,000.00 because he did not do anything to protect the
rights and interests of the Association.
Respondent Dioneda only made oral promises to pay, and in August 1999 he could no longer be
contacted and the personnel in his office simply made excuses to Mr. Garcia. After receiving the
demand letter of ECTHA respondent immediately called up the residence of Mr. Garcia and
informed him that he could get the money and the records of the case at his office. However,
respondent informed ECTHA that a portion of the amount to be returned would be deducted as a
reasonable fee for the efforts exerted by him. According to respondent, no representative of the
complainant showed up at his law office. The matter was referred to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines for investigation. Hearings were set on at least five (5) separate dates. Despite due
notice, respondent never attended the IBP administrative hearings.

ISSUE:
Did Atty. Dioneda violate Canons 17 and 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility?

RULING:
YES. Respondent’s lamentable attitude towards his client’s case is clearly evident from his
apparent disinterest in his own case for disbarment. Dioneda never bothered to present evidence
in his defense. He disregarded all notices sent to him by the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline,
which were personally served at his office address. He never appeared before the Commission
despite several opportunities to do so and explain his side. It is reasonable to conclude that under
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, respondent committed an infringement of ethical standards. The
act of receiving money as acceptance fee for legal services in handling the case of complainant
ECTHA against LVF Realty, Mr. Tinsay and BPI Family Bank and subsequently failing to render
such service is a clear violation of Canons 17 and 18 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Not only that. The acts of inexcusable negligence in legal matters entrusted to him
and disloyalty to his client constitute major breaches of respondent’s oath as a lawyer. These acts
that are inimical to his client’s interests render respondent liable. Acceptance of money from a
client establishes an attorney-client relationship and gives rise to the duty of fidelity to the client’s
cause. The canons of the legal profession require that once an attorney agrees to handle a case,
he should undertake the task with zeal, care and utmost devotion. Indeed, respondent neglected
a legal matter entrusted to him by failing to file the Complaint-in-Intervention he undertook to
handle, thus making him liable under Rule 18.03 of Canon 18. Thus, respondent Atty. Michael
Dioneda is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months, which shall take effect from
the date of notice of receipt of the finality of this Decision, with a WARNING that repetition of the
same or similar acts will merit a more severe penalty, and is ORDERED to RETURN to
complainant Emiliano Court Townhouses Homeowners Association the amount of Twenty
Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00), with interest of twelve percent (12%) per annum from the date of
promulgation of this Decision until the full amount as directed, is returned.
14. Licudan v Court of Appeals

Facts:
 Atty. Teodoro Domalanta was the counsel of his sister and brother-in-law. He represented
them in two civil cases and in both, he obtained judgment in favor of his clients.
 He filed a petition for Attorney’s Lien with Notification to his Clients which provided that:
o He is entitled to own 97.5 sq.m of his client’s share of the lot in question
o He shall have usufructuary right for 10 years of his client’s share of the lot in question
o All the damages accruing to his client if for the undersigned counsel
 A series of hearings were made and the trial court ruled in favor of the lawyer.
 10 months after, the heirs of the lawyer’s (deceased) clients filed a motion to set aside the
orders of the trial court.
 The lawyer stressed the fact that the payment of the professional services was pursuant to
a contract which could no longer be disturbed as it has already been implemented and
since then had become final
 CA ruled in favor of the lawyer, dismissing the appeal of the petitioners.
 Instant petition: The petitioners now fault the respondent court for its failure to exercise its
inherent power to review and determine the propriety of the respondents’ lawyer’s fees
 They also accuse their lawyer of having committed an unfair advantage or legal fraud by
virtue of the Contract for Professional Services devised by him.
 According to the petitioners, they may have won the cases (where the lawyer represented
them) but would lose the entire property won in the litigation to their lawyer.
o They would be deprived of their house and lot and the recovered damages since
everything would just go to lawyer’s fees.
o Furthermore, a portion of the land that they would recover would still go to lawyer’s
fees since it pertains to the lawyer’s son by way of usufruct for 10 years.

Issues:
1. W/N the attorney’s fees in this case is reasonable, being in the nature of contingent fees

Held:
1. No. The attorney’s fees in this case is unconscionable and unreasonable.
a. The instant petition is granted, and the Court of Appeals’ decision reversed and set
aside.
b. Atty. Domalanta is awarded reasonable attorney’s fees in the amount of P20,000.
Ratio:

 The contract relating to the lawyer’s fees entered into by Domalanta and his clients cannot
become final as it pertains to a contingent fee which is always subject to the supervision of
the Court with regard to its reasonableness (Section 13, Canon of Professional Ethics).
o Under Canon 20 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer shall charge only
fair and reasonable fees
 Considering the extent of the services rendered, the case the lawyer handled was just a
simple case if partition and no special skill nor any unusual effort was required.
o There is no doubt, then, that Atty. Domalanta took advantage of the situation to
promote his own personal interests.
o There should never be an instance where a lawyer gets as attorney’s fees the entire
property involved in the litigation. It is unconscionable for the client to lose everything
he won to the fees of his own lawyer
 The practice of law is a profession rather than a trade.
o The Courts have the responsibility to guard against the charging of unreasonable and
excessive fees by lawyers for their services as counsels
o A lawyer shall at all times uphold integrity and dignity in the legal profession