Eleuterio Dura died on December 31, 1932 leaving a therefore, could not fit make effective any action
any action against
widow, Andrea Azur, and some collateral relatives as
heirs. On the occasion of his death he they initiated the
proceedings on their intestate before the Court of First
Instance of Camarines Sur, having been named the
property widow administrator. I know I form the
corresponding appraisal and claims commission before
which Timothy Arroyo filed a claim for services rendered
as a domestic servant to the aforementioned spouses for
a period of 12 years, counted from the year 1921 until
that the mentioned Eleuterio Dura died. According to
Arroyo, his services were hired verbally at the rate of P10
per month with no deadline for payment, being
intelligence of the parties that such services could be
paid later, pray in money, pray in species, that is a piece
of farmland. Timothy's services encompassed from the
purely homemade to those of tillage and collection in the
plantations of coconut and abaca and palaeros lands of
their masters. Timothy did not receive any payment in
life of Eleuterio.
The appraisal and claims commission proceeded to
consider the claim of Arroyo in his session of January 16,
1939, and after the hearing issued an order of payment
in favor of the claimant in the amount of P1,200,
rejecting the opposition presented by the deceased's
collateral relatives. Opponents, not satisfied with the
ruling issued by the appraisal commission and claims,
appealed the same for before the Court of First Instance
of Camarines Sur. Reproduced the claim before said
Court through the initiation of the corresponding
lawsuit, the opponents again raised their opposition
asking among other things that said lawsuit will be
dismissed for having filed out of time. The widow,
included as a defendant in its concept of judicial
administrator of assets, I make sure your answer by
admitting the verbal service lease contract alleged by the
plaintiff, but fixing the monthly salary at P8.
The Court rejected the motion for dismissal and
proceeded to see the claim in its background. After
articulating the plaintiff's evidence consistent mainly in
his testimony and that of the superstite spouse, Andrea
Azur, - evidence that came to substantially establish the
terms of the contract – the opponents and defendants
called for the dismissal of the lawsuit for the reason of
that the evidence did not sufficiently establish the right
of action of the plaintiff. The Court favorably considered
the motion dismissing the claim by the rationale that
there was no written contract between the parties and,
the intestate in accordance with the statute for prevent
fraud (article 335, Law No. 190, and article 21, rule 123,
Regulations of the Courts). Against the ruling thus
rendered, the plaintiff has filed the present appeal.
The first question that arises is whether or not the court
was right to dismiss the claimant's claim so only because
the leasing of services alleged by this was not formalized
through a contract written between the parties. The
lower court seems to have the idea that the contract in
issue falls under the law on frauds just because the
services alleged by the plaintiff lasted more than a year.
This is a mistake. Article 21, rule 123, Regulation of the
Courts, which becomes a reproduction of article 335 of
the Code of Civil Procedure, says the following:
"SEC. 21. Agreements which must be evidenced by
writing. — The following agreements cannot be proved
except by writing, or by some note or memorandum
thereof, subscribed by the party sought to be charged, or
by his agent, or by secondary evidence of its contents:
"(a) An agreement that by its terms is not to be
performed within a year from the making thereof;"
There is no doubt that the contract at hand is not of this
kind. Result clearly of records that the sue ante entered
the service of the spouses Eleuterio Dura and Andrea
Azur as a domestic servant through a monthly salary of
P10 without term determined. There was nothing in this
verbal contract on leasing services indicating that it could
not be fulfilled within one year from its granting. The
contract was precisely based on monthly payments and
for domestic purposes and immediate land work. These
tasks and tasks were of such a nature that They could be
evacuated immediately within a year. The mere fact that
services, have been repeated and prolonged for several
years and that the amount of The same has not been
paid, it could not have the effect of converting the
contract into one of those included under the law on
fraud for the denes of the enforceability of the
obligations arising from said contract. But still: it is rule
and doctrine well established that the law on fraud is
only applicable to short contracts (executory contracts)
and not those that have already been fully or partially
consummated (executed contracts). There is no doubt
that in the present case the contract had already been
executed partially, since the servant or lessor had already
rendered the benefits and services that were forced and
only missing the obligation to pay the price by the owner
or lessee, that is Eleuterio Dura or its Candidates in law
(Almirol and Carino against Monserlat 48 Jur. Fil., 70).
Once the first question was resolved, this is that the
court made an error in dismiss the matter, the other
issue we have to determine and resolve is whether we
must pass judgment in the fund adjudicating the rights of
the parties, or if We must order the return of this file to
the Court of origin to give Opportunity for defendants
sued to practice their tests, having they reserved the
right to present them when submitting their motion to
dismissal It is stated in the records that when the lawyer
of the opponents requested the dismissal of the matter
because the contract was not proven, stated next: "We
submit the motion for dismissal without waiving our
right to present evidence. "The Court reserved its
decision. Some time later, it issued its self estimating the
motion of dismissal, thus making unnecessary the
Presentation of evidence by the defendants.
We have given this plocesal question the most careful
consideration taking into account its transcendental
importance and its derivations. We estimate imperative
in the interest of the administration of justice to establish
a doctrine that does not Doubt or wrong place.
Fortunately, our jurisprudence on this particular is well
defined and all we have to do in the present case it is to
reassemble it, or in any case to implement it. In the
matter of Moody, Aronson & Co. against Hotel Bilbao in
which a question similar to the one at hand was raised
We said the following:
"With everything in mind, we believe that better results
will be obtained if the defendant is charged to the
defendant who files a motion for dismissal. To the
defendant who, after the plaintiff has presented his
evidence, It presents a motion for dismissal, which the
lower court considers in its decision, and who in appeal
of the plaintiff, the sentence is revoked, is not You can
allow him to present evidence in his defense. The
defendant, when presenting a motion of dismissal
chooses, in effect, to abide by the insufficiency of
Claimant's claims. Otherwise the result would be to
invite a unnecessary litigation. As a shining example we
have the case that concerns us in that it is about P400,
raised in appeal in two instances, and that, also, if we
access the defense request, it must be seen again with
the possibility that there is still another appeal.
"The efforts of the courts must concentrate on
establishing rules to avoid long and expensive litigation
and to help the prompt dispatch of matters. "(Moody,
Aronson & Co. v. Hotel Bilbao, 50 Jur. Fil., 208, 210.) The
Preinserts considerations were made by this Court after
a brief analysis of the turn of our jurisprudence on this
procedural point. Of this analysis shows that the rule was
first considered in the causes criminals; then it was
applied in electoral matters given its character of
urgency; and for the first time the principle was extended
to civil affairs ordinary in the aforementioned judgment
of Moody, Aronson & Co. against Hotel Bilbao, of March
30, 1927.
Then the same question was raised again in the case of
Gonzalez Castro v. Azaola (63 Jur. Fil., 890 [1936]) This
Court will then reaffirm the doctrine sitting on the
aforementioned affair of Moody, with the sole difference
that, instead of immediately issue judgment on the
merits, I choose to order the return of the file to the
Court for the practice of the defendant's evidence for the
reason of that this, when presenting his motion for
dismissal in the lower court, had reserved the right to
present your evidence in case you were not successful
said motion in the first instance or on appeal. But it is
noteworthy that the Court did this with obvious disgust
and so So to provide what seemed to be a case concrete
and equity contingent. But, in unequivocal terms, the
procedure and the decisive and final pronouncement
was made that
"It is the feeling of this Court that in cases like that of the
present case, the Court you must require the defendant
to present their evidence instead of issuing a decision on
his motion for dismissal, in order to avoid that later, if If
the Court found the decision wrong, it had to return the
case to Originating court for further proceedings, by
virtue of the reservation made by the defendant, who
should not have been allowed, when submitting his
motion to dismissal. "
This doctrine admits only an inference or interpretation
and is that from now on no reservation would be
allowed, but if by mistake it was allowed, it would no
longer could be invoked as a legal reason for the matter
to be returned to the lower court for the purposes of the
articulation of the reserved tests. If the doctrine is not
interpreted in this way, it would never be applied with all
rigor, because if a Court of First Instance was wrong again
allowing equal reserve and we conclude, as in the
present case, to have to revoke the decision of said
Court, one could always invoke equity for the return of
the matter, and thus successively, without any limitation
of character. Hence the need to put a ceiling, a "ceiling"
definitive, telminant, in the application of the rule, and
we believe that the This case offers that opportunity.
Perhaps it is said that the appellants in the case at hand
could have proceeded disoriented by the lack of a fixed
and inflexible rule, but this excuse It has no value if it is
taken into account that when this file was opened (1939)
and the doctrine laid down in the aforementioned case
of Gonzalez C'astro against Azaola (1936) was in full
force. Already then everyone was advel tido cle which
was the feeling of this Court in cases of this nature, and
what would be its procedure if it arose An analogous
situation. Therefore, the clemandados to the presental
motion of dismissal with the attachment of the reserve
to articulate their evidence eventually, they did so by
paving the risk of rejection of said reservation in appeal
as we do today. The intention of the Court was clear,
strict and Clecisive: avoid multiplication and
prolongation of lawsuits, always odious thing not only
because of the disturbance and anomaly that they cause
in the life and business of the individual, but also for what
they cost in money and in both the citizen as to the state.
The words already transcribed from this Court in
Moody's case at speak clel calval; io of the litigator in a
P400 lawsuit for the clemency that the Forward the file
to the court of origin, they have perfect application to
the case that we occupies The amount litigated here is a
little more than P1,000. The plaintiff served as a
domestic servant for 12 consecutive years to establish
his right to This amount of money. His master or principal
died in 1932 and since then the servant He has been
trying to collect what is owed. In 1939 he filed his
complaint with the commission of appraisal and claims
of the intestate and there won; but the heirs of
InadoFine, except the widow, did not comply with the
verdict of the commission and the matter It was raised
on appeal to the Court of First Instance. Here already, the
claimant I present all your evidence; the opponents,
instead of refuting them, raise a motion of dismissal
under the allegation that the action was ineffective for
not having concluded a written contract between the
servant and his master, reserving, however, the right to
articulate your evidence in the event that your motion
does not prosper. The Court agrees to the motion and
the lawsuit is dismissed, making unnecessary the
presentation of evidence by defendants or opponents.
The matter is brought before Us on appeal; we find the
decision of the Court wrong, but as He puts that
reservation, they tell us that the matter must not be
decided in its substance, but the file must be returned to
the lower court to give opportunity to defendants to
present their evidence, with the possibility that the
matter will return again to this Supreme Court in ulla,
new elevation. And in the meantime they have passed
valuable years - since 1932 - and probably some more
time elapses, without the plaintiff see the sign of his
eagerness, as if in his case it were repeated until certain
point the torture of Tantalo, that is, when it seems that
the goal is within reach of her hands, she vanishes like a
mirage, like a deceptive illusion of eyes Certainly a
judicial procedure that can give rise to the anguish of this
Torment should not be tolerated any longer.
Our conclusion, then, is that the rule must be reaffirmed
and implemented with all rigor. When the defendant
interposes what is called demurrer to the sufficiency of
the plaintiff's evidence filing a motion for a ruling by
reason that such evidence is insufficient or ineffective to
substantiate the demand, not You have the right to
reserve the presentation of your evidence but must
adhere to the consequences of said demurrer for both
the favorable and the adverse. If the motion thrives and
the decision is upheld on appeal, the matter ends
definitely; but it also ends in the same way if the decision
is revoked and The Court of Appeal will find that there is
sufficient evidence and grounds to issue a judgment in
the fund in favor of the plaintiff. Naturally the effect of
all this is eliminate in these cases the so-called reserve of
evidence, forcing the parties to settle all your disputes in
one view.
Perhaps it is said that this makes it purely academic to
demurish the sufficiency of the tests allowed in our rules
and procedural practices.
We understand that no. Because there will always be
cases in which the party that chooses to use that
resource relies and relies on it entirely, considering it
superfluous to articulate evidence. Only it is already
known that under the rule that concerns us the resource
has no tactical value, for the purpose of testing, but is
direct and final.
Is there sufficient self-evidence so that we can issue a
judgment on the merits of the matter? This question is
asked because the rule presupposes that lequisito: that
in the cars there is a basis for a decision in the
background. And that base exists. We have two
undisputed testimonies in support of the lawsuit: that of
the same plaintiff, and that of Andrea Azur, widow of the
principal and administrator of the intestate. Here is what
the widow said about the plaintiff's services-
"Q. Since when has Plaintiff Timoteo Arroyo served as a
farmer for you and your husband Eleuterio Dura? - R.
Since 1921.
"Q. Until your husband Eleuterio Dura died? - R. Yes, sir.
"Q. What was the nature of the job of the plaintiff
Timoteo Arroyo while he has served you and your
husband? - R. When it was time to pick up the fruits of
the coconuts, he picked them up, then to coconut oil and
other jobs From home.
"Q. During the time of] palay sowing, what jobs did
Timoteo Arroyo do? - R. During the tillage he plowed the
land, planted it with palay and transported the seeds.
"Q. And during the time when the Ique abaca benefited
the plaintiff Timoteo Arroyo? - R. Did he help in the
benefit of the abaca and clean the abacales.
"Q. Do you mean that the plaintiff Timoteo Arroyo has
worked from the time he entered the service of you and
your husband until his death? - R. Yes, sir.
"Q. Has the complainant TirAoteo Arroyo been paid for
his work and services as your laborer? - R. We had agreed
to give him a salary of P10 per month, but in the event
that we could not give him or pay him P10 per month, we
would give land in payment of their services.
"Mr. DE LEON: We ask that the witness statement be
discarded unless that alleged agreement is contained in
a written contract.
'' COURT: There is no place.
"Mr. DE LEON: Exception.
Mr. CONOWON:
"Q. During the life or life of your late husband Eleuterio
Dura, do you remember whether he has set any amount
as payment or compensation for the services provided by
the plaintiff Timoteo Arroyo, or not?
"Mr. DE LEON: Objection, unless that contract is in
writing.
"JUDGED: You can answer.
"Mr. DE LEON: Exception.
"A. Yes, sir; it has been set at P10 per month.
Mr. CONOWON:
"Q. The plaintiff Timoteo Arroyo has already been paid
for the services provided by him and your husband
during his life? - R. He has not paid you yet." (T. n. T., Pp.
3-5.)
It is very doubtful that these tests could be passed,
although defendants and opponents were allowed to
refute them. No reason is revealed in the case that the
widow had to testify against the interests of the
intestate, and naturally also against her interests as a
widow and heiress, as it were not under the imperatives
of truth and a right conscience. We have reviewed the
plaintiff's evidence in greater detail and are perfectly
convinced that the lease of services in question has been
well established, as well as the fact that so far no
payment has been made according to the terms of the
agreement. In fact, it can be presumed that the
opponents had no serious evidence to present against
the plaintiff's right of action; so they chose to raise the
motion of dismissal without articulating any evidence.
In the order appealed, the assertion is made that the
"compensation (of the appellant) had not been
previously agreed upon," and from this it seems that one
wishes to deduce that the contract in question was not
perfected because there was no certain price, by virtue
of the provisions of article 1544 of the Civil Code that
says: "in the lease of works or services, one of the parties
is obliged to execute a work or provide the other with a
service for a certain price." But this article has been
interpreted in the sense that there is a certain price not
only when its certainty is fixedly determined but also
when it can be known with reference to another certain
thing, or that its signaling is left to the discretion of a
certain person, according to the Article 1447 of the Civil
Code. There is also a certain price when it can be signaled
and determined under the uses and customs of the
place. Moreover, it has been stated that "from the
contracts that are presumed concluded by the tacit
consent of the parties, obligations are born that may give
cause for an action to demand compliance with the
courts," and that "services accepted and performed by a
individual in favor of another, and not knowing that they
were free, the latter is obliged to remunerate them
under the unnamed contract of faci ut des or the lease of
services tacitly contracted, "in which case the courts shall
determine the reasonable value of the services. (Perez v
Pomar, 2 Jul. Fil., 713; Smith and Reyes v. Lopez and
Lopez de Pineda, 5 Jur. Fil., 80, citing the ruling of
October 18, 1899 of the Supreme Court of Spain; Herrer
against Cruz Herrera, 7 Jur. Fil., 282; Majarabas against
Leonardo, 11 Jur. Fil., 278; Imperial against Alejandre, 14
Jur. Fil., 206; G. Urrutia and Compania against Pasig
Steamer & Lighter Co., 22 Jur. Fil., 338; Sellner v.
Gonzalez, 27 Jur. Fil., O83). In the case at hand, it has
been proven that in the place where the services were
rendered, the daily salary used for farm servants was
P0.50 per day. In any case, the monthly salary of P10
which, as it turns out from the evidence, was as agreed
between the parties, is clearly reasonable, even in the
absence of prior express stipulation. It is the least that a
domestic and farm servant deserves to charge anywhere
in this Archipelago. To give less than that would be to
foster a certain type of greed that works against the
dictates of the most basic agrarian justice and is the
determining cause of the social peace concerns and
disturbances in some of our rural communities.
However, the testimonies of the plaintiff and the widow
are challenged because they, according to the law, could
not testify as witnesses against the intestate; and it is
argued that when both testimonies have been
eliminated, no reliable evidence remains in the case in
favor of the lawsuit. Let us examine these objections one
by one.
The objection against the widow's testimony is based on
rule 123, article 26, subsection (d), Court Rules, which
reads as follows: "the husband cannot be examined for
or against his wife without the her consent, the wife
cannot be examined either in favor or in her husband's
without his consent. " Obviously the rule is not applicable
today, because the husband having died, there is no
longer a marital relationship, "the widow is not the wife
and, therefore, can testify like any other witness well in
favor, well in against the intestate of her husband
"(Williams vs. Moore [Mo. App.], 203 SW, 824, 835.)
"(Sec. 151) (c) Death of one spouse. — As a general rule,
after the death of one spouse, the other is held a
competent witrless either for or against decedent's
interest in any litigation eoncerning decedent's estate,
except as his or her eompetency may be affected by the
rules against the disclosure of confidential
communications, or testimony as to communications or
transactions with persons since deceased." (Corpus Juris,
Vol. 70, p. 124.)
The objection against the widow's testimony is based on
rule 123, article 26, subsection (d), Court Rules, which
reads as follows: "the husband cannot be examined for
or against his wife without the her consent, the wife
cannot be examined either in favor or in her husband's
without his consent. " Obviously the rule is not applicable
in the present easo, because the husband having died,
there is no longer a marital relationship, "the widow is
not the wife and, therefore, the objection against the
testimony of the plaintiff, founded on the rule 123,
article 26, subsection (c), formerly article 383, par. 7,
Code of Civil Procedure, which prescribes the following:
"the parties or the causes of these in a trial or action, or
the persons in whose favor follow said judgment or
action against the executor or administrator or
replesentante of a deceased or mentally incapacitated
person, about the claim or claim against the assets of
said deceased or mentally incapacitated person, cannot
declare regarding a factual issue that had occurred
before of the death of that person or before the other
has been mentally incapacitated. "It is argued that under
this rule there is no He could allow the plaintiff to testify
about the verbal lease of services contract - a matter of
fact that occurred before the death of Eleuterio Dura. "If
death has sealed the lips of one of the parties, the law
follows the procedure of sealing them also to the other"
(Maxilom v. Tabotabo, 9 Jur. Fil., 399, 403). The objection
would be valid and good if in the present case the
circumstance does not mediate that the widow herself,
by herself and as a defendant in her concept of
administrator of the intestate, expressly waives the
privilege, declaring in favor of the plaintiff. How to
impose against the actor that interdiction if the same
party to whom the law tries to protect under the mantle
of privilege, has stated the benefits of dic has intel
diction? As things stand now, the main issue in favor of
the petition is the testimony of the administrator or legal
representative of the deceased who is at the same time
a superstite spouse. Actually, Timothy's testimony is
nothing more than a corroboration and can be perfectly
suppressed, without suffering, in his defiance, the
substantivity and effectiveness of the plaintiff's right to
act. Testify like any other witness either in favor, or in
against the intestate of her husband "(Williams vs.
Moore [Mo. App.], 203 SW, 824, 835.)
The last question raised by the appealed opponents will
refer to the expiration of the claimant's right of action for
having filed the claim out of time before the Court of First
Instance, under the terms of the Civil Procedure Code as
amended by Law No. 4229. According to the opponents,
the claimant was notified of his appeal against the
resolution of the appraisal and claims commission on
June 3, 1939, and the claim was not reproduced in the
form of a lawsuit before the Court of First Instance
except September or September 1939, that is 93 days
later. It is argued that the Court ruled that jurisdiction
over the matter. Nor is this claim sustainable because the
aforementioned article, as it has been reformed,
authorizes the Court to indicate the period within which
the claimant must present his claim and this is what
happened in the present case: the claim was filed within
the fixed term. by the Court.

In merit of the foregoing, the intestate of Eleuterio Dura

is condemned to pay the plaintiff and appellant the sum
of P1,440 as compensation for his services for 12 years,
at the end of P10 per month, plus legal interests since the
interposition of the claim , and the costs of the trial. If
the intestate lacks funds to face said payment, the
administrator is authorized to assign the applicant an
equivalent land, granting the corresponding deed to that
effect with the approval of the Court. With the costs
borne by the appeals. That's how it is ordered.

Moran, Pres., Paras, Jaranilla, Feria and Pablo, MM., Are

satisfied.

CD