REMINGTON CORP. VS.

CASTANEDA
November 20, 2006
G.R. Nos. 169295-96
FACTS: Erlinda Castaneda instituted a complaint for illegal dismissal, underpayment of
wages, non-payment of overtime services, non-payment of SIL pay and non-payment of 13th
month pay against Remington Industrial Sales Corp. before the NLRC-NCR.
Erlinda alleged that she started working in 1983 as company cook for Remington, a
corporation engaged in the trading business and that she continuously worked with
Remington until she was unceremoniously prevented from reporting for work when
Remington transferred to a new site.
Remington denied that it dismissed Erlinda illegally. It posited that Erlinda was a domestic
helper, not a regular employee; Erlinda worked as a cook and this job had nothing to do with
Remington’s business of trading in construction or hardware materials, steel plates and wire
rope products.
In a Decision, the LA dismissed the complaint and ruled that the respondent was a domestic
helper under the personal service of Antonio Tan (the Managing Director), finding that her
work as a cook was not usually necessary and desirable in the ordinary course of trade and
business of the petitioner corporation, and that the latter did not exercise control over her
functions. On the issue of illegal dismissal, the labor arbiter found that it was the respondent
who refused to go with the family of Antonio Tan when the corporation transferred office and
that, therefore, respondent could not have been illegally dismissed.
ISSUE: is Castaneda a regular employee or a domestic servant?
HELD: The petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed Decisions of the CA are
AFFIRMED
She is a REGULAR EMPLOYEE
In Apex Mining Company, Inc. v. NLRC, this Court held that a househelper in the staff houses
of an industrial company was a regular employee of the said firm. We ratiocinated that:
Under Rule XIII, Section 1(b), Book 3 of the Labor Code, as amended, the terms
“househelper” or “domestic servant” are defined as follows:
“The term ‘househelper’ as used herein is synonymous to the term ‘domestic servant’ and
shall refer to any person, whether male or female, who renders services in and about the
employer’s home and which services are usually necessary or desirable for the maintenance
and enjoyment thereof, and ministers exclusively to the personal comfort and enjoyment of
the employer’s family.”
The foregoing definition clearly contemplates such househelper or domestic servant who is
employed in the employer’s home to minister exclusively to the personal comfort and
enjoyment of the employer’s family. Such definition covers family drivers, domestic servants,
laundry women, yayas, gardeners, houseboys and similar househelps.
xxx xxx xxx
The criteria is the personal comfort and enjoyment of the family of the employer in the home
of said employer. While it may be true that the nature of the work of a househelper, domestic
servant or laundrywoman in a home or in a company staffhouse may be similar in nature, the
difference in their circumstances is that in the former instance they are actually serving
thefamily while in the latter case, whether it is a corporation or a single proprietorship
engaged in business or industry or any other agricultural or similar pursuit, service is being
rendered in the staffhouses or within the premises of the business of the employer. In such
instance, they are employees of the company or employer in the business concerned entitled
to the privileges of a regular employee.
Petitioner contends that it is only when the househelper or domestic servant is assigned to
certain aspects of the business of the employer that such househelper or domestic servant
may be considered as such an employee. The Court finds no merit in making any such
distinction. The mere fact that the househelper or domestic servant is working within the
premises of the business of the employer and in relation to or in connection with its business,
as in its staffhouses for its guest or even for its officers and employees, warrants the
conclusion that such househelper or domestic servant is and should be considered as a
regular employee of the employer and NOT as a mere family househelper or domestic
servant as contemplated in Rule XIII, Section 1(b), Book 3 of the Labor Code, as amended.
In the case at bar, the petitioner itself admits in its position paper that respondent worked at
the company premises and her duty was to cook and prepare its employees’ lunch and
merienda. Clearly, the situs, as well as the nature of respondent’s work as a cook, who
caters not only to the needs of Mr. Tan and his family but also to that of the petitioner’s
employees, makes her fall squarely within the definition of a regular employee under the
doctrine enunciated in the Apex Mining case. That she works within company premises, and
that she does not cater exclusively to the personal comfort of Mr. Tan and his family, is
reflective of the existence of the petitioner’s right of CONTROL over her functions, which is
the PRIMARY indicator of the existence of an employer-employee relationship.
NOTES:
1THE OTHER ISSUE:
was there illegal dismissal? NO
Petitioner contends that there was abandonment on respondent’s part when she refused to
report for work when the corporation transferred to a new location in Caloocan City, claiming
that her poor eyesight would make long distance travel a problem. Thus, it cannot be held
guilty of illegal dismissal.
On the other hand, the respondent claims that when the petitioner relocated, she was no
longer called for duty and that when she tried to report for work, she was told that her
services were no longer needed. She contends that the petitioner dismissed her without a
just or authorized cause and that she was not given prior notice, hence rendering the
dismissal illegal.
We rule for the respondent.
As a regular employee, respondent enjoys the right to security of tenure under Article 279 of
the Labor Code and may only be dismissed for a just or authorized cause, otherwise the
dismissal becomes illegal and the employee becomes entitled to reinstatement and full
backwages computed from the time compensation was withheld up to the time of actual
reinstatement.
Abandonment is the deliberate and unjustified refusal of an employee to resume his
employment. It is a form of neglect of duty; hence, a just cause for termination of employment
by the employer under Article 282 of the Labor Code, which enumerates the just causes for
termination by the employer.
For a valid finding of abandonment, these two factors should be present:
(1) the failure to report for work or absence without valid or justifiable reason; and
(2) a clear intention to sever employer-employee relationship, with the second as the more
determinative factor which is manifested by overt acts from which it may be deduced that the
employee has no more intention to work. The intent to discontinue the employment must be
shown by clear proof that it was deliberate and unjustified. This, the petitioner failed to do in
the case at bar.
Alongside the petitioner’s contention that it was the respondent who quit her employment and
refused to return to work, greater stock may be taken of the respondent’s immediate filing of
her complaint with the NLRC. Indeed, an employee who loses no time in protesting her layoff
cannot by any reasoning be said to have abandoned her work, for it is well-settled that the
filing of an employee of a complaint for illegal dismissal with a prayer for reinstatement is
proof enough of her desire to return to work, thus, negating the employer’s charge of
abandonment.
In termination cases, the burden of proof rests upon the employer to show that the dismissal
is for a just and valid cause; failure to do so would necessarily mean that the dismissal was
illegal. The employer’s case succeeds or fails on the strength of its evidence and not on the
weakness of the employee’s defense. If doubt exists between the evidence presented by the
employer and the employee, the scales of justice must be tilted in favor of the latter
2It is well-settled that the application of technical rules of procedure may be relaxed to
serve the demands of substantial justice, particularly in labor cases. Labor cases must be
decided according to justice and equity and the substantial merits of the controversy.
Rules of procedure are but mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice.
Their strict and rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate
rather than promote substantial justice, must always be avoided.

REPUBLIC v. ASIAPRO COOPERATIVE, GR No. 172101, 2007-11-23

Facts:
Respondent Asiapro, as a cooperative, is composed of owners-members. Under its by-laws,
owners-members are of two categories, to wit: (1) regular member, who is entitled to all the
rights and privileges of membership; and (2) associate member, who has no right to vote and
be... voted upon and shall be entitled only to such rights and privileges provided in its by-
laws.[8] Its primary objectives are to provide savings and credit facilities and to develop other
livelihood services for its owners-members. In the discharge of the... aforesaid primary
objectives, respondent cooperative entered into several Service Contracts[9] with Stanfilco -
a division of DOLE Philippines, Inc. and a company based in Bukidnon. The owners-
members do not receive compensation or wages from the respondent... cooperative. Instead,
they receive a share in the service surplus[10] which the respondent cooperative earns from
different areas of trade it engages in, such as the income derived from the said Service
Contracts with Stanfilco. The owners-members get their... income from the service surplus
generated by the quality and amount of services they rendered, which is determined by the
Board of Directors of the respondent cooperative.
In order to enjoy the benefits under the Social Security Law of 1997, the owners-members of
the respondent cooperative, who were assigned to Stanfilco requested the services of the
latter to register them with petitioner SSS as self-employed and to remit their contributions
as... such. Also, to comply with Section 19-A of Republic Act No. 1161, as amended by
Republic Act No. 8282, the SSS contributions of the said owners-members were equal to the
share of both the employer and the employee.
On 26 September 2002, however, petitioner SSS through its Vice-President for Mindanao
Division, Atty. Eddie A. Jara, sent a letter[11] to the respondent cooperative, addressed to its
Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and General Manager Leo G. Parma, informing... the latter
that based on the Service Contracts it executed with Stanfilco, respondent cooperative is
actually a manpower contractor supplying employees to Stanfilco and for that reason, it is an
employer of its owners-members working with Stanfilco. Thus, respondent cooperative...
should register itself with petitioner SSS as an employer and make the corresponding report
and remittance of premium contributions in accordance with the Social Security Law of 1997.
On 9 October 2002,[12] respondent cooperative, through its counsel, sent... a reply to
petitioner SSS's letter asserting that it is not an employer because its owners-members are
the cooperative itself; hence, it cannot be its own employer. Again, on 21 October 2002,[13]
petitioner SSS sent a letter to respondent cooperative... ordering the latter to register as an
employer and report its owners-members as employees for compulsory coverage with the
petitioner SSS. Respondent cooperative continuously ignored the demand of petitioner SSS
Accordingly, petitioner SSS, on 12 June 2003, filed a Petition[14] before petitioner SSC
against the respondent cooperative and Stanfilco praying that the respondent cooperative or,
in the alternative, Stanfilco be directed to register as an employer and to... report respondent
cooperative's owners-members as covered employees under the compulsory coverage of
SSS and to remit the necessary contributions in accordance with the Social Security Law of
1997. The same was docketed as SSC Case No. 6-15507-03. Respondent cooperative
filed... its Answer with Motion to Dismiss alleging that no employer-employee relationship
exists between it and its owners-members, thus, petitioner SSC has no jurisdiction over the
respondent cooperative. Stanfilco, on the other hand, filed an Answer with Cross-claim
against the... respondent cooperative.
On 5 January 2006, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision granting the petition filed by
the respondent cooperative.
Issues:
Whether the petitioner SSC has jurisdiction over the petition-complaint filed before it by
petitioner SSS against the respondent cooperative.
Whether the respondent cooperative is estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of petitioner
SSC since it had already filed an Answer with Motion to Dismiss before the said body.
Ruling:
Petitioner SSC's jurisdiction is clearly stated in Section 5 of Republic Act No. 8282 as well as
in Section 1, Rule III of the 1997 SSS Revised Rules of Procedure.
Section 5 of Republic Act No. 8282 provides:
SEC. 5. Settlement of Disputes. (a) Any dispute arising under this Act with respect to
coverage, benefits, contributions and penalties thereon or any other matter related thereto,
shall be cognizable by the Commission, x x x.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Similarly, Section 1, Rule III of the 1997 SSS Revised Rules of Procedure states:
Section 1. Jurisdiction. Any dispute arising under the Social Security Act with respect to
coverage, entitlement of benefits, collection and settlement of contributions and penalties
thereon, or any other matter related thereto, shall... be cognizable by the Commission after
the SSS through its President, Manager or Officer-in-charge of the
Department/Branch/Representative Office concerned had first taken action thereon in writing.
(Emphasis supplied.)
It is clear then from the aforesaid provisions that any issue regarding the compulsory
coverage of the SSS is well within the exclusive domain of the petitioner SSC. It is important
to note, though, that the mandatory coverage under the SSS Law is premised on the
existence of an... employer-employee relationship[17] except in cases of compulsory
coverage of the self-employed.
It is axiomatic that the allegations in the complaint, not the defenses set up in the Answer or
in the Motion to Dismiss, determine which court has jurisdiction over an action; otherwise, the
question of jurisdiction would depend almost entirely upon the... defendant.[18] Moreover, it
is well-settled that once jurisdiction is acquired by the court, it remains with it until the full
termination of the case.[19] The said principle may be applied even to quasi-judicial bodies.
In this case, the petition-complaint filed by the petitioner SSS before the petitioner SSC
against the respondent cooperative and Stanfilco alleges that the owners-members of the
respondent cooperative are subject to the compulsory coverage of the SSS because they are
employees... of the respondent cooperative. Consequently, the respondent cooperative being
the employer of its owners-members must register as employer and report its owners-
members as covered members of the SSS and remit the necessary premium contributions in
accordance with the Social
Security Law of 1997. Accordingly, based on the aforesaid allegations in the petition-
complaint filed before the petitioner SSC, the case clearly falls within its jurisdiction. Although
the Answer with Motion to Dismiss filed by the respondent cooperative challenged the...
jurisdiction of the petitioner SSC on the alleged lack of employer-employee relationship
between itself and its owners-members, the same is not enough to deprive the petitioner
SSC of its jurisdiction over the petition-complaint filed before it. Thus, the petitioner SSC
cannot... be faulted for initially assuming jurisdiction over the petition-complaint of the
petitioner SSS.
Nonetheless, since the existence of an employer-employee relationship between the
respondent cooperative and its owners-members was put in issue and considering that the
compulsory coverage of the SSS Law is predicated on the existence of such relationship, it
behooves the... petitioner SSC to determine if there is really an employer-employee
relationship that exists between the respondent cooperative and its owners-members.
The question on the existence of an employer-employee relationship is not within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). Article 217 of the
Labor Code enumerating the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiters and the NLRC provides that:
ART. 217. JURISDICTION OF LABOR ARBITERS AND THE COMMISSION. - (a) x x x.
xxxx
Except claims for Employees Compensation, Social Security, Medicare and maternity
benefits, all other claims, arising from employer-employee relations, including those of
persons in domestic or household service, involving an amount exceeding five... thousand
pesos (P5,000.00) regardless of whether accompanied with a claim for reinstatement.[2
On the basis thereof, considering that the petition-complaint of the petitioner SSS involved
the issue of compulsory coverage of the owners-members of the respondent cooperative, this
Court agrees with the petitioner SSC when it declared in its Order dated 17 February 2004
that... as an incident to the issue of compulsory coverage, it may inquire into the presence or
absence of an employer-employee relationship without need of waiting for a prior
pronouncement or submitting the issue to the NLRC for prior determination. Since both the
petitioner SSC and... the NLRC are independent bodies and their jurisdiction are well-defined
by the separate statutes creating them, petitioner SSC has the authority to inquire into the
relationship existing between the worker and the person or entity to whom he renders service
to determine if the... employment, indeed, is one that is excepted by the Social Security Law
of 1997 from compulsory coverage.[
In determining the existence of an employer-employee relationship, the following elements
are considered: (1) the selection and engagement of the workers; (2) the payment of wages
by whatever means; (3) the power of dismissal; and (4) the power to control the worker's
conduct,... with the latter assuming primacy in the overall consideration.[25] The most
important element is the employer's control of the employee's conduct, not only as to the
result of the work to be done, but also as to the means and methods to... accomplish.[26] The
power of control refers to the existence of the power and not necessarily to the actual
exercise thereof. It is not essential for the employer to actually supervise the performance of
duties of the employee; it is enough that the... employer has the right to wield that power.[27]
All the aforesaid elements are present in this case.
First. It is expressly provided in the Service Contracts that it is the respondent cooperative
which has the exclusive discretion in the selection and engagement of the owners-members
as well as its team leaders who will be assigned at
Stanfilco.[28] Second. Wages are defined as "remuneration or earnings, however
designated, capable of being expressed in terms of money, whether fixed or ascertained, on
a time, task, piece or commission basis, or other... method of calculating the same, which is
payable by an employer to an employee under a written or unwritten contract of employment
for work done or to be done, or for service rendered or to be rendered."[29] In this case, the...
weekly stipends or the so-called shares in the service surplus given by the respondent
cooperative to its owners-members were in reality wages, as the same were equivalent to an
amount not lower than that prescribed by existing labor laws, rules and regulations,...
including the wage order applicable to the area and industry; or the same shall not be lower
than the prevailing rates of wages.[30] It cannot be doubted then that those stipends or
shares in the service surplus are indeed wages, because these are given to... the owners-
members as compensation in rendering services to respondent cooperative's client,
Stanfilco. Third. It is also stated in the above-mentioned Service Contracts that it is the
respondent cooperative which has the power to investigate, discipline and... remove the
owners-members and its team leaders who were rendering services at Stanfilco.[31] Fourth.
As earlier opined, of the four elements of the employer-employee relationship, the "control
test" is the most important. In the case at... bar, it is the respondent cooperative which has
the sole control over the manner and means of performing the services under the Service
Contracts with Stanfilco as well as the means and methods of work.[32] Also, the respondent
cooperative is... solely and entirely responsible for its owners-members, team leaders and
other representatives at Stanfilco.[33] All these clearly prove that, indeed, there is an
employer-employee relationship between the respondent cooperative and its... owners-
members.
It is true that the Service Contracts executed between the respondent cooperative and
Stanfilco expressly provide that there shall be no employer-employee relationship between
the respondent cooperative and its owners-members.[34] This Court, however,... cannot give
the said provision force and effect.
As previously pointed out by this Court, an employee-employer relationship actually exists
between the respondent cooperative and its owners-members. The four elements in the four-
fold test for the existence of an employment relationship have been complied with. The
respondent... cooperative must not be allowed to deny its employment relationship with its
owners-members by invoking the questionable Service Contracts provision, when in actuality,
it does exist. The existence of an employer-employee relationship cannot be negated by
expressly... repudiating it in a contract, when the terms and surrounding circumstances show
otherwise. The employment status of a person is defined and prescribed by law and not by
what the parties say it should be.[35]
It is settled that the contracting parties may establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and
conditions as they want, and their agreement would have the force of law between them.
However, the agreed terms and conditions must not be contrary to law, morals, customs,...
public policy or public order.[36] The Service Contract provision in question must be struck
down for being contrary to law and public policy since it is apparently being used by the
respondent cooperative merely to circumvent the compulsory coverage... of its employees,
who are also its owners-members, by the Social Security Law.
It bears stressing, too, that a cooperative acquires juridical personality upon its registration
with the Cooperative Development Authority.[38] It has its Board of Directors, which directs
and supervises its business; meaning, its Board of Directors is the... one in charge in the
conduct and management of its affairs.[39] With that, a cooperative can be likened to a
corporation with a personality separate and distinct from its owners-members. Consequently,
an owner-member of a cooperative can be an employee of... the latter and an employer-
employee relationship can exist between them.
In the present case, it is not disputed that the respondent cooperative had registered itself
with the Cooperative Development Authority, as evidenced by its Certificate of Registration
No. 0-623-2460.[40] In its by-laws,[41] its Board... of Directors directs, controls, and
supervises the business and manages the property of the respondent cooperative. Clearly
then, the management of the affairs of the respondent cooperative is vested in its Board of
Directors and not in its owners-members as a whole. Therefore,... it is completely logical that
the respondent cooperative, as a juridical person represented by its Board of Directors, can
enter into an employment with its owners-members.
In sum, having declared that there is an employer-employee relationship between the
respondent cooperative and its owners-member, we conclude that the petitioner SSC has
jurisdiction over the petition-complaint filed before it by the petitioner SSS. This being our
conclusion, it... is no longer necessary to discuss the issue of whether the respondent
cooperative was estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of the petitioner SSC when it filed its
Answer with Motion to Dismiss.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision
and the Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 87236, dated 5 January 2006
and 20 March 2006, respectively, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Orders of
the... petitioner SSC dated 17 February 2004 and 16 September 2004 are hereby
REINSTATED. The petitioner SSC is hereby DIRECTED to continue hearing the petition-
complaint filed before it by the petitioner SSS as regards the compulsory coverage of the
respondent cooperative and its... owners-members. No costs.
MANILA HOTEL vs NLRC
In May 1988, Marcelo Santos was an overseas worker in Oman. In June 1988, he was
recruited by Palace Hotel in Beijing, China. Due to higher pay and benefits, Santos agreed to
the hotel’s job offer and so he started working there in November 1988. The employment
contract between him and Palace Hotel was however without the intervention of the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA). In August 1989, Palace Hotel
notified Santos that he will be laid off due to business reverses. In September 1989, he was
officially terminated.
In February 1990, Santos filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against Manila Hotel
Corporation (MHC) and Manila Hotel International, Ltd. (MHIL). The Palace Hotel was
impleaded but no summons were served upon it. MHC is a government owned and controlled
corporation. It owns 50% of MHIL, a foreign corporation (Hong Kong). MHIL manages the
affair of the Palace Hotel. The labor arbiter who handled the case ruled in favor of Santos.
The National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) affirmed the labor arbiter.
ISSUE: Whether or not the NLRC has jurisdiction over the case.
HELD: No. The NLRC is a very inconvenient forum for the following reasons:
1.The only link that the Philippines has in this case is the fact that Santos is a Filipino;
2.However, the Palace Hotel and MHIL are foreign corporations – MHC cannot be held liable
because it merely owns 50% of MHIL, it has no direct business in the affairs of the Palace
Hotel. The veil of corporate fiction can’t be pierced because it was not shown that MHC is
directly managing the affairs of MHIL. Hence, they are separate entities.
3.Santos’ contract with the Palace Hotel was not entered into in the Philippines;
4.Santos’ contract was entered into without the intervention of the POEA (had POEA
intervened, NLRC still does not have jurisdiction because it will be the POEA which will hear
the case);
5.MHIL and the Palace Hotel are not doing business in the Philippines; their agents/officers
are not residents of the Philippines;
Due to the foregoing, the NLRC cannot possibly determine all the relevant facts pertaining to
the case. It is not competent to determine the facts because the acts complained of
happened outside our jurisdiction. It cannot determine which law is applicable. And in case a
judgment is rendered, it cannot be enforced against the Palace Hotel (in the first place, it was
not served any summons).
The Supreme Court emphasized that under the rule of forum non conveniens, a Philippine
court or agency may assume jurisdiction over the case if it chooses to do so provided:
(1) that the Philippine court is one to which the parties may conveniently resort to;
(2) that the Philippine court is in a position to make an intelligent decision as to the law and
the facts; and
(3) that the Philippine court has or is likely to have power to enforce its decision.
None of the above conditions are apparent in the case at bar.

PACIFIC CONSULTANTS INTERNATIONAL ASIA, INC. AND JENS PETER HENRICHSEN,

PETITIONERS, VS. KLAUS K. SCHONFELD, RESPONDENT.

FACTS

Respondent is a Canadian citizen and was a resident of New Westminster, British Columbia,
Canada. He had been a consultant in the field of environmental engineering and water
supply and sanitation. Pacicon Philippines, Inc. (PPI) is a corporation duly established and
incorporated in accordance with the laws of the Philippines. The primary purpose of PPI was
to engage in the business of providing specialty and technical services both in and out of the
Philippines. It is a subsidiary of Pacific Consultants International of Japan (PCIJ). The
president of PPI, Jens Peter Henrichsen, who was also the director of PCIJ, was based in
Tokyo, Japan.

On January 7, 1998, Henrichsen transmitted a letter of employment to respondent in Canada,

requesting him to accept the same and affix his conformity thereto. Respondent made some
revisions in the letter of employment and signed the contract. He then sent a copy to
Henrichsen. The letter of employment contains among others a stipulation which states:

“ Any question of interpretation, understanding or fulfillment of the conditions of employment,

as well as any question arising between the Employee and the Company which is in
consequence of or connected with his employment with the Company and which can not be
settled amicably, is to be finally settled, binding to both parties through written submissions,
by the Court of Arbitration in London.

Respondent arrived in the Philippines and assumed his position as PPI Sector Manager. He
was accorded the status of a resident alien.

As required by Rule XIV (Employment of Aliens) of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the
Labor Code, PPI applied for an Alien Employment Permit (Permit) for respondent before the
Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE).

On May 5, 1999, respondent received a letter from Henrichsen informing him that his
employment had been terminated effective August 4, 1999 for the reason that PCIJ and PPI
had not been successful in the water and sanitation sector in the Philippines. However, on
July 24, 1999, Henrichsen, by electronic mail, requested respondent to stay put in his job
after August 5, 1999, until such time that he would be able to report on certain projects and
discuss all the opportunities he had developed. Respondent continued his work with PPI until
the end of business hours on October 1, 1999.

Respondent filed with PPI several money claims, including unpaid salary, leave pay, air fare
from Manila to Canada, and cost of shipment of goods to Canada. PPI partially settled some
of his claims (US$5,635.99), but refused to pay the rest.

On December 5, 2000, respondent filed a Complaint for Illegal Dismissal against petitioners
PPI and Henrichsen with the Labor Arbiter. In his Complaint, respondent alleged that he was
illegally dismissed; PPI had not notified the DOLE of its decision to close one of its
departments, which resulted in his dismissal; and they failed to notify him that his
employment was terminated after August 4, 1999. Respondent also claimed for separation
pay and other unpaid benefits. He alleged that the company acted in bad faith and
disregarded his rights.

Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint on the following grounds: (1) the Labor
Arbiter had no jurisdiction over the subject matter; and (2) venue was improperly laid. It
averred that respondent was a Canadian citizen, a transient expatriate who had left the
Philippines. He was employed and dismissed by PCIJ, a foreign corporation with principal
office in Tokyo, Japan. Since respondent’s cause of action was based on his letter of
employment executed in Tokyo, Japan dated January 7, 1998, under the principle of lex loci
contractus, the complaint should have been filed in Tokyo, Japan. Petitioners claimed that
respondent did not offer any justification for filing his complaint against PPI before the NLRC
in the Philippines. Moreover, under Section 12 of the General Conditions of Employment
appended to the letter of employment dated January 7, 1998, complainant and PCIJ had
agreed that any employment-related dispute should be brought before the London Court of
Arbitration. Since even the Supreme Court had already ruled that such an agreement on
venue is valid, Philippine courts have no jurisdiction.

The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision granting petitioners’ Motion to Dismiss. The Labor
Arbiter found, among others, that the January 7, 1998 contract of employment between
respondent and PCIJ was controlling; the Philippines was only the “duty station” where
Schonfeld was required to work under the General Conditions of Employment. PCIJ
remained respondent’s employer despite his having been sent to the Philippines. Since the
parties had agreed that any differences regarding employer-employee relationship should be
submitted to the jurisdiction of the court of arbitration in London, this agreement is
controlling.

On appeal, the NLRC agreed with the disquisitions of the Labor Arbiter and affirmed the
latter’s decision in toto.

Respondent then filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with the CA. The CA found the
petition meritorious. Applying the four-fold test of determining an employer-employee
relationship, the CA declared that respondent was an employee of PPI. On the issue of
venue, the appellate court declared that, even under the January 7, 1998 contract of
employment, the parties were not precluded from bringing a case related thereto in other
venues. While there was, indeed, an agreement that issues between the parties were to be
resolved in the London Court of Arbitration, the venue is not exclusive, since there is no
stipulation that the complaint cannot be filed in any other forum other than in the Philippines.
It ordered the remand of the case to the Labor Arbiter for disposition of the merits of the case.

ISSUE

Whether or not the Philippine Labor Arbiter can take cognizance over the case
notwithstanding what was stated in the Employment Contract?

RULING

The settled rule on stipulations regarding venue, as held by this Court in the vintage case of
Philippine Banking Corporation v. Tensuan, is that while they are considered valid and
enforceable, venue stipulations in a contract do not, as a rule, supersede the general rule set
forth in Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of Court in the absence of qualifying or restrictive words.
They should be considered merely as an agreement or additional forum, not as limiting
venue to the specified place. They are not exclusive but, rather permissive. If the intention of
the parties were to restrict venue, there must be accompanying language clearly and
categorically expressing their purpose and design that actions between them be litigated only
at the place named by them.

In the instant case, no restrictive words like “only,” “solely,” “exclusively in this court,” “in no
other court save —,” “particularly,” “nowhere else but/except —,” or words of equal import
were stated in the contract. It cannot be said that the court of arbitration in London is an
exclusive venue to bring forth any complaint arising out of the employment contract.
Petitioners contend that respondent should have filed his Complaint in his place of
permanent residence, or where the PCIJ holds its principal office, at the place where the
contract of employment was signed, in London as stated in their contract. By enumerating
possible venues where respondent could have filed his complaint, however, petitioners
themselves admitted that the provision on venue in the employment contract is indeed merely
permissive.

Petitioners’ insistence on the application of the principle of forum non conveniens must be
rejected. The bare fact that respondent is a Canadian citizen and was a repatriate does not
warrant the application of the principle for the following reasons:

First. The Labor Code of the Philippines does not include forum non conveniens as a ground
for the dismissal of the complaint.

Second. The propriety of dismissing a case based on this principle requires a factual
determination; hence, it is properly considered as defense.

Third. In Bank of America, NT&SA, Bank of America International, Ltd. v. Court of Appeals,
this Court held that:

x x x [a] Philippine Court may assume jurisdiction over the case if it chooses to do so;
provided, that the following requisites are met: (1) that the Philippine Court is one to which
the parties may conveniently resort to; (2) that the Philippine Court is in a position to make
an intelligent decision as to the law and the facts; and, (3) that the Philippine Court has or is
likely to have power to enforce its decision. x x x

Admittedly, all the foregoing requisites are present in this case.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

FOOD TRADERS HOUSE, INC. vs. NLRC

BEBIANO M. BAÑEZ v. DOWNEY C. VALDEVILLA, GR No. 128024, 2000-05-09

Facts:
The orders of respondent judge[1] dated June 20, 1996 and October 16, 1996, taking
jurisdiction over an action for damages filed by an employer against its dismissed employee,
are assailed in this petition for certiorari under Rule 65... of the Rules of Court for having
been issued in grave abuse of discretion.
On November 13, 1995, private respondent filed a complaint for damages before the
Regional Trial Court ("RTC") of Misamis Oriental,... In declaring itself as having jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the instant controversy, respondent court stated:
A perusal of the complaint which is for damages does not ask for any relief under the Labor
Code of the Philippines. It seeks to recover damages as redress for defendant's breach of his
contractual obligation to plaintiff who was damaged and prejudiced. The Court believes
such... cause of action is within the realm of civil law, and jurisdiction over the controversy
belongs to the regular courts.
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the above Order was denied for lack of merit on
October 16, 1996. Hence, this petition.
Issues:
By way of assignment of errors, the petition reiterates the grounds raised in the Motion to
Dismiss dated January 30, 1996, namely, lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
action, res judicata, splitting of causes of action, and forum-shopping. The... determining
issue, however, is the issue of jurisdiction.
Ruling:
Presently, and as amended by R.A. 6715, the jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the NLRC in
Article 217 is comprehensive enough to... include claims for all forms of damages "arising
from the employer-employee relations".
we hold that by the designating clause "arising from the employer-employee relations" Article
217 should apply... with equal force to the claim of an employer for actual damages against
its dismissed employee, where the basis for the claim arises from or is necessarily connected
with the fact of termination, and should be entered as a counterclaim in the illegal dismissal...
case.
private respondent's claim against petitioner for actual damages arose from a prior employer-
employee relationship
Second, and more importantly, to allow respondent court to proceed with the instant action
for damages would be to open anew the factual issue of whether petitioner's installment sale
scheme resulted in business losses and the dissipation of private respondent's property.
In other words, the issue of actual... damages has been settled in the labor case, which is
now final and executory.
Evidently, the lawmaking authority had second thoughts about depriving the Labor Arbiters
and the NLRC of the jurisdiction to award damages in labor cases because that setup would
mean duplicity of suits, splitting the cause of action and possible conflicting findings and...
conclusions by two tribunals on one and the same claim.
Clearly, respondent court's taking jurisdiction over the instant case would bring about
precisely the harm that the lawmakers sought to avoid in amending the Labor Code to restore
jurisdiction over claims for damages of this nature to the NLRC.
Neither can we uphold the reasoning of respondent court that because the resolution of the
issues presented by the complaint does not entail application of the Labor Code or other
labor laws, the dispute is intrinsically civil. Article 217(a) of the Labor Code, as amended,...
clearly bestows upon the Labor Arbiter original and exclusive jurisdiction over claims for
damages arising from employer-employee relations ---in other words, the Labor Arbiter has
jurisdiction to award not only the reliefs provided by labor laws, but also damages governed
by... the Civil Code.[18]

PURIFICACION G. TABANG vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and

PAMANA GOLDEN CARE MEDICAL CENTER FOUNDATION, INC
DECISION
REGALADO, J.:

FACTS:
On October 30, 1990, the Board of Trustees issued a memorandum appointing petitioner as
Medical Director and Hospital Administrator of private respondents Pamana Golden Care
Medical Center in Calamba, Laguna.
Although the memorandum was silent as to the amount of remuneration for the position,
petitioner claims that she received a monthly retainer fee of five thousand pesos (P5,000.00)
from private respondent, but the payment thereof was allegedly stopped in November, 1991.
As medical director and hospital administrator, petitioner was tasked to run the affairs of the
aforesaid medical center and perform all acts of administration relative to its daily operations.
On May 1, 1993, petitioner was allegedly informed personally by Dr. Ernesto Naval that in a
special meeting held on April 30, 1993, the Board of Trustees passed a resolution relieving
her of her position as Medical Director and Hospital Administrator, and appointing the latter
and Dr. Benjamin Donasco as acting Medical Director and acting Hospital Administrator,
respectively. Petitioner averred that she thereafter received a copy of said board resolution.
On June 6, 1993, petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and non-payment of wages,
allowances and 13th month pay before the labor arbiter.
Respondent corporation moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter. It argued that petitioners position as Medical Director and
Hospital Administrator was interlinked with her position as member of the Board of Trustees,
hence, her dismissal is an intra-corporate controversy which falls within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).
Petitioner opposed the motion to dismiss, contending that her position as Medical Director
and Hospital Administrator was separate and distinct from her position as member of the
Board of Trustees. She claimed that there is no intra-corporate controversy involved since
she filed the complaint in her capacity as Medical Director and Hospital Administrator, or as
an employee of private respondent.
On April 26, 1994, the labor arbiter issued an order dismissing the complaint for lack of
jurisdiction. He ruled that the case falls within the jurisdiction of the SEC, pursuant to Section
5 of Presidential Decree No. 902-A. [1]
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was treated as an appeal by the labor arbiter who
consequently ordered the elevation of the entire records of the case to public respondent
NLRC for appellate review. [2]
On appeal, respondent NLRC affirmed the dismissal of the case on the additional ground that
the position of a Medical Director and Hospital Administrator is akin to that of an executive
position in a corporate ladder structure, hence, petitioners removal from the said position was
an intra-corporate controversy within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the SEC. [3]
Aggrieved by the decision, petitioner filed the instant petition which we find, however, to be
without merit.

ISSUE: Whether or not case at bar constitutes inta-corporate controversy

RULING:
We agree with the findings of the NLRC that it is the SEC which has jurisdiction over the
case at bar. The charges against herein private respondent partake of the nature of an intra-
corporate controversy. Similarly, the determination of the rights of petitioner and the
concomitant liability of private respondent arising from her ouster as a medical director
and/or hospital administrator, which are corporate offices, is an intra-corporate controversy
subject to the jurisdiction of the SEC.
Contrary to the contention of petitioner, a medical director and a hospital administrator are
considered as corporate officers under the by-laws of respondent corporation. Section 2(i),
Article I thereof states that one of the powers of the Board of Trustees is (t)o appoint a
Medical Director, Comptroller/Administrator, Chiefs of Services and such other officers as it
may deem necessary and prescribe their powers and duties. [4]
The president, vice-president, secretary and treasurer are commonly regarded as the
principal or executive officers of a corporation, and modern corporation statutes usually
designate them as the officers of the corporation.[5] However, other offices are sometimes
created by the charter or by-laws of a corporation, or the board of directors may be
empowered under the by-laws of a corporation to create additional offices as may be
necessary.[6]
It has been held that an office is created by the charter of the corporation and the officer is
elected by the directors or stockholders.[7] On the other hand, an employee usually occupies
no office and generally is employed not by action of the directors or stockholders but by the
managing officer of the corporation who also determines the compensation to be paid to such
employee.[8]
In the case at bar, considering that herein petitioner, unlike an ordinary employee, was
appointed by respondent corporations Board of Trustees in its memorandum of October 30,
1990,[9] she is deemed an officer of the corporation. Perforce, Section 5(c) of Presidential
Decree No. 902-A, which provides that the SEC exercises exclusive jurisdiction over
controversies in the election or appointment of directors, trustees, officers or managers of
corporations, partnerships or associations, applies in the present dispute. Accordingly,
jurisdiction over the same is vested in the SEC, and not in the Labor Arbiter or the NLRC.
Moreover, the allegation of petitioner that her being a member of the Board of Trustees was
not one of the considerations for her appointment is belied by the tenor of the memorandum
itself. It states: We hope that you will uphold and promote the mission of our foundation,
[10] and this cannot be construed other than in reference to her position or capacity as a
corporate trustee.
A corporate officers dismissal is always a corporate act, or an intra-corporate controversy,
and the nature is not altered by the reason or wisdom with which the Board of Directors may
have in taking such action.[11]Also, an intra-corporate controversy is one which arises
between a stockholder and the corporation. There is no distinction, qualification, nor any
exemption whatsoever. The provision is broad and covers all kinds of controversies between
stockholders and corporations. [12]
With regard to the amount of P5,000.00 formerly received by herein petitioner every month,
the same cannot be considered as compensation for her services rendered as Medical
Director and Hospital Administrator.The vouchers[13] submitted by petitioner show that the
said amount was paid to her by PAMANA, Inc., a stock corporation which is separate and
distinct from herein private respondent. Although the payments were considered advances to
Pamana Golden Care, Calamba branch, there is no evidence to show that the Pamana
Golden Care stated in the vouchers refers to herein respondent Pamana Golden Care
Medical Center Foundation, Inc.
Pamana Golden Care is a division of Pamana, Inc., while respondent Pamana Golden Care
Medical Center Foundation, Inc. is a non-stock, non-profit corporation. It is stated in the
memorandum of petitioner that Pamana, Inc. is a stock and profit corporation selling pre-
need plan for education, pension and health care. The health care plan is called Pamana
Golden Care Plan and the holders are called Pamana Golden Care Card Holders or, simply,
Pamana Members. [14]
It is an admitted fact that herein petitioner is a retained physician of Pamana, Inc., whose
patients are holders of the Pamana Golden Care Card. In fact, in her complaint[15] filed
before the Regional Trial Court of Calamba, herein petitioner is asking, among others, for
professional fees and/or retainer fees earned for her treatment of Pamana Golden Care card
holders.[16] Thus, at most, said vouchers can only be considered as proof of payment of
retainer fees made by Pamana, Inc. to herein petitioner as a retained physician of Pamana
Golden Care.
Moreover, even assuming that the monthly payment of P5,000.00 was a valid claim against
respondent corporation, this would not operate to effectively remove this case from the
jurisdiction of the SEC. In the case of Cagayan de Oro Coliseum, Inc. vs. Office of the
Minister of Labor and Employment, etc., et al.,[17] we ruled that (a)lthough the reliefs sought
by Chavez appear to fall under the jurisdiction of the labor arbiter as they are claims for
unpaid salaries and other remunerations for services rendered, a close scrutiny thereof
shows that said claims are actually part of the perquisites of his position in, and therefore
interlinked with, his relations with the corporation. In Dy, et al., vs. NLRC, et al., the Court
said: (t)he question of remuneration involving as it does, a person who is not a mere
employee but a stockholder and officer, an integral part, it might be said, of the corporation,
is not a simple labor problem but a matter that comes within the area of corporate affairs and
management and is in fact a corporate controversy in contemplation of the Corporation
Code.
WHEREFORE, the questioned resolution of the NLRC is hereby AFFIRMED, without
prejudice to petitioners taking recourse to and seeking relief through the appropriate remedy
in the proper forum.
SO ORDERED.
Romero, Puno, Mendoza, and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.

DAI-CHI vs VILLARAMA (RTC judge) and LIMJUCO

On July 29, 1993, the petitioner Daichi electronics filed a complaint for damages with RTC
branch 156 for an employee’s (Limjuco) violation of their contract in 1990 which stipulated
that the termination of service of an employee restricted him from working in a company
which has a similar set of products or ventures for a span of 2 years following the termination
of service.
The petitioner claimed that respondent became an employee of such a company called Angel
Sound with the same position as head of material management control before the 2 years
was up.
The petitioner sought to claim 100k in damages and prevent the former employee from
working in the rival business within the 1 year timespan.
The respondent court under villarama claimed that it had no jurisdiction because the
complaint was for damages from labor-employee relations and should be adjudicated under
the Labor Arbiter under Art 217 s 4 of the LC.
The petitioner asked for reversal because the case was recognizable under the regular
courts and that the cause of action didn’t arise from employee-employer relationships even if
the claim was in the employee’s contract.

Issue: Is the petitioner’s claim for damages one arising from employee-employer relations?

Decision: No, petition granted

1. Art 217 s4 of the LC stipulated that Labor Arbiters have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and
decide cases for workers with claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of
damages arising from employer-employee relations.
The court held that the cuase of action was under Civil Law, not the labor code. Why?
The petitioner sought to recover damages agreed upon in the contract as redress for
respondent’s breach of his contractual obligation to its damage and prejudice. He also didn’t
ask for relief under the Labor Code.
The applicable case law was Singapore airlines v Pano where the employer’s claim for
damages was based on wanton failure and refusal without just cause to report to duty
coupled with the averment that the employee maliciously and with bad faith violated the
contract. The employee didn’t report for duty as a course of convention training- quasi-delict
diba!
There must be a causal connection for claims provided in the RT217 S4 OF THE LC. Only
when there is such a connection with other claims can damages be considered as arising
from employer-employee relations.
2. In SMC v NLRC, the interpretation of Art 217 then was focused on in the phrase “all money
claims of workers” in par 3.
There was no phrase “arising from employer-employee relations at that time” (art 217
amended by bp blg 227, not yet the present labor code)

DOCTRINE: The use of noscitur a sociis wherein the entire universe of family claims
asserted by workers has been observed into the exclusive jurisdiction of labor arbiters.
Nos a soc was also used to limit par 3 (par 4 in the present labor code) of art 217 wherein it
was read in relation to par 1 (unfair labor practices), par 2 (terms and conditions of
employment), par 4 (household services) and par 5 (restrictions on activities of employees
and employers)
There was a unifying element which referred to cases out of employer-employee relations.
Money claims that didn’t arise out of such relations was to be taken in by regular courts. The
claims should have a causal connection with employer-employee relations
In Ocheda, the action based on tort or quasi-delict with no such causal connection was in the
juris of the regular courts.
In pepsi-cola, the action by employees against the malicious filing of the employer of a
criminal complaint against them was with the regular courts.
The rationale for the Dai-chi case was that the complaint for damages wasn’t anchored on
term of employee’s service but the effects of such term.
Cases decided under the earlier version of Art 217 was also consistent in allocating civil
disputes bet employers and employes to the realm of the regular courts. In Medina (1929),
the civil complaint for damagaes against the employer for slanderous remarks against the
employtess were tried in the civil courts. In Laron (1984), the court held that the Labor
Arbiters have no jurisdiction if the labor code wasn’t involved.
HUGO ET AL. vs LRTA

Facts:
Respondent Light Rail Transit Authority (LRTA), a government-owned and controlled
corporation, constructed a light rail transit system which traverses from Baclaran in
Parañaque City to Monumento in Kalookan City, Metro Manila pursuant to its mandate under
its charter, Executive Order No. 603, Series of 1980, as amended.
To effectively carry out its mandate, LRTA entered into a ten-year Agreement for the
Management and Operation of the Metro Manila Light Rail Transit System (the Agreement)
from June 8, 1984 until June 8, 1994 with Metro Transit Organization, Inc. (METRO).
One of the stipulations in the Agreement was:
METRO shall be free to employ such employees and officers as it shall deem
necessary in order to carry out the requirements of the Agreement. Such
employees and officers shall be the employees of METRO and not of LRTA.
METRO shall prepare a compensation schedule for the salaries and fringe
benefits of its personnel (Article 3, par. 3.05).
METRO thus hired its own employees including herein petitioners-members of the Pinag-
isangLakasngManggagawasa METRO, Inc.-National Federation of Labor, otherwise known
as PIGLAS-METRO, INC.-NFL-KMU (the Union), the certified exclusive collective bargaining
representative of METRO's rank-and-file employees.
When the Agreement expired on July 31, 2000, LRTA did not renew it. It instead took over the
management and operations of the light rail transit system, hiring new personnel for the
purpose. METRO thus considered the employment of all its personnel terminated effective
September 30, 2000.
Petitioners filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and unfair labor practice with prayer for
reinstatement and damages against METRO and LRTA before the NCR Arbitration Branch,
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).

Issue:
·Whether or not the Labor Arbiter's decision against LRTA was rendered without
jurisdiction.
Ruling:
The Labor Arbiter and the NLRC do not have jurisdiction over LRTA. Petitioners themselves
admitted in their complaint that LRTA "is a government agency organized and existing
pursuant to anoriginal charter (Executive Order No. 603)," and that they are employees of
METRO.
Light Rail Transit Authority v. Venus, Jr., which has a similar factual backdrop, holds that
LRTA, being a government-owned or controlled corporation created by an original charter, is
beyond the reach of the Department of Labor and Employment which has jurisdiction over
workers in the private sector, viz:
. . . [E]mployees of petitioner METRO cannot be considered as employees of
petitioner LRTA. The employees hired by METRO are covered by the Labor Code and
are under the jurisdiction of the Department of Labor and Employment, whereas the
employees of petitioner LRTA, a government-owned and controlled corporation
with original charter, are covered by civil service rules. Herein private respondent
workers cannot have the best of two worlds, e.g., be considered government
employees of petitioner LRTA, yet allowed to strike as private employees under our
labor laws. x xx.

x xxx
 . . . [I]t is inappropriate to pierce the corporate veil of petitioner METRO. x xx.

In the instant case, petitioner METRO, formerly Meralco Transit Organization,

Inc., was originally owned by the Manila Electric Company and registered with
the Securities and Exchange Commission more than a decade before the labor
dispute. It then entered into a ten-year agreement with petitioner LRTA in 1984.
And, even if petitioner LRTA eventually purchased METRO in 1989, both
parties maintained their separate and distinct juridical personality and allowed
the agreement to proceed. In 1990, this Court, in Light Rail Transit Authority v.
Commission on Audit (G.R. No. 88365, January 9, 1990), even upheld the
validity of the said agreement. Consequently, the agreement was extended
beyond its ten-year period. In 1995, METRO's separate juridical identity was
again recognized when it entered into a collective bargaining agreement with
the workers' union. All these years, METRO's distinct corporate personality
continued quiescently, separate and apart from the juridical personality of
petitioner LRTA.

The labor dispute only arose in 2000, after a deadlock occurred during the
collective bargaining between petitioner METRO and the workers' union. This
alone is not a justification to pierce the corporate veil of petitioner METRO and
make petitioner LRTA liable to private respondent workers. There are no
badges of fraud or any wrongdoing to pierce the corporate veil of petitioner
METRO.

x xxx

In sum, petitioner LRTA cannot be held liable to the employees of

petitioner METRO.
IN FINE, the Labor Arbiter's decision against LRTA was rendered without jurisdiction, hence,
it is void, thus rendering it improper for the remand of the case to the NLRC, as ordered by
the appellate court, for it (NLRC) to give due course to LRTA's appeal.
A final word. It bears emphasis that this Court's present Decision treats only with respect to
the Labor Arbiter's decision against respondent LRTA.

WPP MARKETING COMMUNICATIONS, INC., JOHN STEEDMAN, MARK WEBSTER, and

NOMINADA LANSANG, Petitioners, v. JOCELYN M. GALERA, Respondent.

FACTS: Petitioner is Jocelyn Galera (GALERA), an American citizen who was recruited from
the United States of America by private respondent John Steedman, Chairman-WPP
Worldwide and Chief Executive Officer of Mindshare, Co., a corporation based in Hong Kong,
China, to work in the Philippines for private respondent WPP Marketing Communications,
Inc. (WPP), a corporation registered and operating under the laws of Philippines.

Employment of GALERA with private respondent WPP became effective on September 1,

1999 solely on the instruction of the CEO and upon signing of the contract, without any
further action from the Board of Directors of private respondent WPP.
Four months had passed when private respondent WPP filed before the Bureau of
Immigration an application for petitioner GALERA to receive a working visa, wherein she was
designated as Vice President of WPP. Petitioner alleged that she was constrained to sign the
application in order that she could remain in the Philippines and retain her employment.

On December 14, 2000, petitioner GALERA alleged she was verbally notified by private
respondent STEEDMAN that her services had been terminated from private respondent
WPP. A termination letter followed the next day. Thus, a complaint for illegal dismissal was
filed against WPP.

The LA held that WPP, Steedman, Webster, and Lansang liable for illegal dismissal and
damages. Arbiter Madriaga stated that Galera was not only illegally dismissed but was also
not accorded due process. The NLRC reversed the LA decision. The NLRC stressed that
Galera was WPPs Vice-President, and therefore, a corporate officer at the time she was
removed by the Board of Directors. Such being the case, the imperatives of law require that
we hold that the Arbiter below had no jurisdiction over Galeras case as, again, she was a
corporate officer at the time of her removal.

On appeal, the CA reversed the NLRC decision. It ruled that a person could be considered a
"corporate officer" only if appointed as such by a corporations Board of Directors, or if
pursuant to the power given them by either the Articles of Incorporation or the By-Laws.

ISSUE:

Does the LA have jurisdiction over the case?

ELD: Under Section 25 of the Corporation Code, the corporate officers are the president,
secretary, treasurer and such other officers as may be provided in the by-laws.

An examination of WPPs by-laws resulted in a finding that Galeras appointment as a

corporate officer (Vice-President with the operational title of Managing Director of Mindshare)
during a special meeting of WPP's Board of Directors is an appointment to a non-existent
corporate office. WPPs by-laws provided for only one Vice-President. At the time of Galeras
appointment on 31 December 1999, WPP already had one Vice-President in the person of
Webster. Galera cannot be said to be a director of WPP also because all five directorship
positions provided in the by-laws are already occupied. Finally, WPP cannot rely on its
Amended By-Laws to support its argument that Galera is a corporate officer. The Amended
By-Laws provided for more than one Vice-President and for two additional directors. Even
though WPPs stockholders voted for the amendment on 31 May 2000, the SEC approved the
amendments only on 16 February 2001. Galera was dismissed on 14 December 2000. WPP,
Steedman, Webster, and Lansang did not present any evidence that Galeras dismissal took
effect with the action of WPP's Board of Directors.

Galera being an employee, then the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC have jurisdiction over the
present case.

***

WPPs dismissal of Galera lacked both substantive and procedural due process. Apart from
Steedman's letter dated 15 December 2000 to Galera, WPP failed to prove any just or
authorized cause for Galeras dismissal.

The law further requires that the employer must furnish the worker sought to be dismissed
with two written notices before termination of employment can be legally effected: (1) notice
which apprises the employee of the particular acts or omissions for which his dismissal is
sought; and (2) the subsequent notice which informs the employee of the employers decision
to dismiss him. Failure to comply with the requirements taints the dismissal with illegality.
WPPs acts clearly show that Galeras dismissal did not comply with the two-notice rule.

The employment permit must be acquired prior to employment.

The law and the rules are consistent in stating that the employment permit must be acquired
prior to employment. The Labor Code states: "Any alien seeking admission to the Philippines
for employment purposes and any domestic or foreign employer who desires to engage an
alien for employment in the Philippines shall obtain an employment permit from the
Department of Labor."

Galera cannot come to this Court with unclean hands. To grant Galeras prayer is to sanction
the violation of the Philippine labor laws requiring aliens to secure work permits before their
employment. We hold that the status quo must prevail in the present case and we leave the
parties where they are. Hence, Galera is not entitled to monetary awards. This ruling,
however, does not bar Galera from seeking relief from other jurisdictions.

GRANTED

PIONEER CONCRETE PHILS. vs ANTONIO D. TODARO

Facts:
Pioneer International Limited (PIL), an Australian company engaged in the ready-mix
concrete business, established herein petitioner PCPI to undertake its business in the
Philippines. PIL contacted respondent Todaro and asked if the latter is available to join them
in their intention to establish plant operations in the country to which the latter agreed.
Subsequently, PIL and Todaro came to an agreement wherein the former consented to
engage the services of the latter as consultant for 2-3 months, after which he would be
employed as manager of concrete operations should PIL decide to invest in the Philippines.
PIL started its operation however it refused to comply with its undertaking to employ Todaro
on a permanent basis. Respondent thus filed a complaint for sum of money and damages
against petitioner. Petitioner meanwhile contends that the case should fall with the NLRC as
the damages arose from an alleged breach of employment contract. Both the trial court and
CA ruled in favor of respondent.
Issue:
Whether or not there is employer-employee relationship between PIL and respondent.
Ruling: NO.
In the present case, no employer-employee relationship exists between petitioners and
respondent. In fact, in his complaint, private respondent is not seeking any relief under the
Labor Code, but seeks payment of damages on account of petitioners’ alleged breach of their
obligation under their agreement to employ him. It is settled that an action for breach of
contractual obligation is intrinsically a civil dispute. In the alternative, respondent seeks
redress on the basis of the provisions of Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code. Hence, it is
clear that the present action is within the realm of civil law, and jurisdiction over it belongs to
the regular courts.
This Court has consistently held that where no employer-employee relationship exists
between the parties and no issue is involved which may be resolved by reference to the
Labor Code, other labor statutes or any collective bargaining agreement, it is the Regional
Trial Court that has jurisdiction.

APEX MINING CO., INC. versus NLRC

FACTS:
? Private respondent Sinclita Candida was employed by petitioner Apex Mining Company, Inc
to perform laundry services at its staff house.
? On December 18, 1987, while she was attending to her assigned task and she was
hanging her laundry, she accidentally slipped and hit her back on a stone. As a result of the
accident she was not able to continue with her work. She was permitted to go on leave for
medication. ? De la Rosa offered her the amount of P 2,000.00 which was eventually
increased to P5,000.00 to persuade her to quit her job, but she refused the offer and
preferred to return to work.
? Petitioner did not allow her to return to work and dismissed her on February 4, 1988. ?
Private respondent filed a request for assistance with the Department of Labor and
Employment, which the latter rendered its Decision by ordering the Apex Mining Co. to pay
Candida the total amount of P55,161.42 for salary differential, emergency living allowance,
13th month pay differential and separation pay.
? Petitioner appealed the case before the NLRC, which was subsequently dismissed for lack
of merit.

ISSUE:
? Whether or not the private respondent should be treated as househelper or domestic
servant or a regular employee.

HELD:
? Under Rule XIII, Section l(b), Book 3 of the Labor Code, as amended, the term
"househelper" as used herein is synonymous to the term "domestic servant" and shall refer to
any person, whether male or female, who renders services in and about the employer's home
and which services are usually necessary or desirable for the maintenance and enjoyment
thereof, and ministers exclusively to the personal comfort and enjoyment of the employer's
family.
? The definition cannot be interpreted to include househelper or laundrywomen working in
staffhouses of a company, like private respondent who attends to the needs of the company's
guest and other persons availing of said facilities.
? The mere fact that the househelper or domestic servant is working within the premises of
the business of the employer and in relation to or in connection with its business, as in its
staffhouses for its guest or even for its officers and employees, warrants the conclusion that
such househelper or domestic servant is and should be considered as a regular employee.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and the appealed decision and resolution of
public respondent NLRC are hereby AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs

PURIFICACION Y. MANLIGUEZ v. CA, GR No. 92598, 1994-05-20

Facts:
This is an appeal by certiorari... in the Decision of the Department of Labor and Employment
(Region VII), ordering Inductocast Cebu, a partnership based in Mandaue City, to pay its
former employees a total of P232,908.00. As a consequence of the judgment, the labor...
department's regional sheriff levied the buildings and improvements standing on Lot 109,
Plan 11-5121-Amd., at Tipolo, Mandaue City.
Tipolo properties") were subsequently sold at public auction to said employees.
May 25, 1988, petitioners filed with the RTC of Cebu City, 7th Judicial Branch, a Complaint[3]
which sought the lifting of the levy over, and annulment of the sale of, the Tipolo properties.
Petitioners therein alleged that: they are the owners of the Lot 109; they entered into a lease
agreement with Inductocast Cebu over Lot 109... the lease agreement was terminated by...
petitioners in November, 1980 due to non-payment of rentals by Inductocast Cebu;[5]
thereafter, petitioners took actual possession of and occupied the Tipolo properties.
Atty. Danilo Pilapil, claiming to be the John Doe named in the Complaint, filed a motion to
dismiss on the ground that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the case
The buyers of the Tipolo properties, as intervenors, also filed a motion to dismiss on the
same ground.
Both motions, which were opposed by petitioners, were denied.
Issues:
what forum the case must be tried or heard
Ruling:
The Department of Labor is the agency upon which devolves the jurisdiction over disputes
emanating from and in relation with labor controversies to the exclusion of the regular...
courts.
"The issue in the case at bar concerns the levy of a property in pursuance to a writ of
execution, arising out of labor disputes. There can be no doubt that jurisdiction pertains to
the Department of Labor.
Principles:
It is at once evident that the Civil Case No. Ceb-6917 is not a labor case. No employer-
employee relationship exists... between petitioners and the other parties, and no issue is
involved which may be resolved by reference to the Labor Code, other labor statutes, or any
collective bargaining
It was not brought to reverse or modify the judgment of the Department of Labor and
Employment (DOLE). Neither did it question the validity of, or pray for, the quashal of the writ
of execution against Inductocast.
Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. ?- Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction:... x x x
(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of real property, or any
interest... therein, except actions for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or
buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon Metropolitan Trial
Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts;
Under Section 17, Rule 39, a third person who claims property levied upon on execution may
vindicate such claim by action. x x x The right of a person who claims to be the owner of
property levied upon on execution to file a third-party claim with the sheriff is not... exclusive,
and he may file an action to vindicate his claim even if the judgment creditor files an
indemnity bond in favor of the sheriff to answer for any damages that may be suffered by the
third-party claimant. By 'action,' as stated in the Rule, what is meant is a separate... and
independent action.
It is settled that the levy and sale of property by virtue of a writ of... attachment is lawful only
when the levied property indubitably belongs to the defendant. If property other than those of
the defendant is attached and sold by the sheriff, he acts beyond the limits of his and the
court's authority.

PNB vs. Cabansag

Facts:

Florence Cabansag went to Singapore as a tourist. While she was there, she looked for a job
and eventually applied with the Singapore Branch of the Philippine National Bank. PNB is a
private banking corporation organized and existing under Philippine laws. She was
eventually employed and was issued an employment pass. In her job offer, it was stated,
among others, that she was to be put on probation for 3 months and termination of her
employment may be made by either party after 1 day notice while on probation, and 1 month
notice or 1 month pay in lieu of notice upon confirmation. She accepted the terms and was
issued an OEC by the POEA. She was commended for her good work. However, she was
informed by Ruben Tobias, the bank president, that she would have to resign in line with
some cost cutting and realignment measures of the company. She refused but was informed
by Tobias that if she does not resign, he will terminate her instead.

Issues:
1W/N the arbitration branch of the NLRC has jurisdiction
2W/N the arbitration of the NLRC in the NCR is the proper venue
3W/N Cabansag was illegally dismissed

Ruling:

1Labor arbiters have original and exclusive jurisdiction over claims arising from employer-
employee relations including termination disputes involving all workers, including OFWs.
Here, Cabansag applied for and secured an OEC from the POEA through the Philippine
Embassy. The OEC authorized her working status in a foreign country and entitled her to all
benefits and processes under our statutes. Although she may been a direct hire at the
commencement of her employment, she became an OFW who was covered by Philippine
labor laws and policies upon certification by the POEA. When she was illegally terminated,
she already possessed the POEA employment certificate.
2A migrant worker “refers to a person who is to be engaged, is engaged or has been
engaged in a remunerated activity in a state of which he or she is not a legal resident; to be
used interchangeably with overseas Filipino worker.” Here, Cabansag was a Filipino, not a
legal resident of Singapore, and employed by petitioner in its branch office in Singapore. She
is clearly an OFW/migrant worker. Thus, she has the option where to file her Complaint for
illegal dismissal. She can either file at the Regional Arbitration Branch where she resides or
the RAB where the employer is situated. Thus, in filing her Complaint before the RAB office
in Quezon City, she has made a valid choice of proper venue.

3The appellate court was correct in holding that respondent was already a regular employee
at the time of her dismissal, because her three-month probationary period of employment had
already ended. This ruling is in accordance with Article 281 of the Labor Code: “An employee
who is allowed to work after a probationary period shall be considered a regular employee.”
Indeed, petitioner recognized respondent as such at the time it dismissed her, by giving her
one month’s salary in lieu of a one-month notice, consistent with provision No. 6 of her
employment Contract.