CRIMINAL LAW 2 CASE BRIEF [TITLES 1-2] BY: Louie Ivan T.
Maiz
Based from the syllabus of Atty. Delfin Suarez
LAUREL vs MISA
FACTS:
Anastacio Laurel filed a petition for habeas corpus
contending that he cannot be prosecuted for the
crime of treason defined and penalized by the Article
114 of the Revised Penal Code on the grounds that the
sovereignty of the legitimate government and the
allegiance of Filipino citizens was then suspended, and
that there was a change of sovereignty over the
Philippines upon the proclamation of the Philippine
Republic.
ISSUE:
1. Is the absolute allegiance of the citizens
suspended during Japanese occupation?
2. Is the petitioner subject to Article 114 of the
Revised Penal Code?
HELD:
The absolute and permanent allegiance of the
inhabitants of a territory occupied by the enemy of
their legitimate government on sovereign is not
abrogated or severed by the enemy occupation
because the sovereignty of the government or
sovereign de jure is not transferred to the occupier.
There is no such thing as suspended allegiance.
The petitioner is subject to the Revised Penal Code for
the change of form of government does not affect the
prosecution of those charged with the crime of
treason because it is an offense to the same
government and same sovereign people.
PPL vs PEREZ
FACTS: The accused, together with the other Filipinos,
recruited, apprehended and commandeered
numerous girls and women against their will for the
purpose of using them, as in fact they were used, to
satisfy the immoral purpose and sexual desire of
Colonel Mini and Japanese soldiers.
The accused on 1942 brought EribertaRamo to Colonel
Mini the latter had nothing on but a "G" string; that
he,
Colonel Mini threatened her with a sword tied her to a
bed and with force succeeded in having carnal
knowledge with her; that on the following night, again
she was brought to Colonel Mini and again she was
raped. Several other women were also brought to the
colonel by the accused.
That on July 16, 1942, the two girls named Eduardo S.
Daohog and EutiquiaLamay, were taken by the
accused and his companion named Vicente Bullecer,
and delivered to the Japanese Officer, Dr. Takibayas to
satisfy his carnal appetite, but these two, the accused
Susano Perez and his companion Vicente Bullecer,
before delivering them to said Japanese Officer,
satisfied first their lust; the accused Susano Perez
raping Eduarda S. Daohog and his companion, Vicente
Bullecer, the other girl EutiquiaLamay.Eduarda S.
Daohog.
The Solicitor General argues that "to maintain and
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preserve the morale of the soldiers has always been,
and will always be, a fundamental concern of army
authorities, for the efficiency of rests not only on its
physical attributes but also, mainly, on the morale of
its soldiers".
ISSUE: WON the acts of Perez constitute the crime of
treason.
HELD. NO. As general rule, to be treasonous the
extent of the aid and comfort given to the enemies
must be to render assistance to them as enemies and
not merely as individuals and in addition, be directly in
furtherance of the enemies' hostile designs.
His "commandeering" of women to satisfy the lust of
Japanese officers or men or to enliven the
entertainment held in their honor was not treason
even though the women and the entertainment
helped to make life more pleasant for the enemies
and boost their spirit; he was not guilty any more than
the women themselves would have been if they
voluntarily and willingly had surrendered their bodies
or organized the entertainment.
Sexual and social relations with the Japanese did not
directly and materially tend to improve their war
efforts or to weaken the power of the United State.
The acts herein charged were not, by fair implication,
calculated to strengthen the Japanese Empire or its
army or to cripple the defense and resistance of the
other side. Intent of disloyalty is a vital ingredient in
the crime of treason, which, in the absence of
admission, may be gathered from the nature and
circumstances of each particular case. The accused
was convicted of rape.
PEOPLE V. PRIETO
FACTS:
The appellant was prosecuted for treason.
Two witnesses gave evidence but their statements do
not coincide in any single detail. The first witness
testified that the accused with other Filipino
undercovers and Japanese soldiers caught an
American aviator and had the witness carry the
American to town on a sled pulled by a carabao. That
on the way, the accused walked behind the sled and
asked the prisoner if the sled was faster than the
airplane; that the American was taken to the Kempetai
headquarters, after which he did not know what
happened to the flier.
The next witness, testified that he saw the accused
following an American and the accused were Japanese
and other Filipinos.
The lower court believes that the accused is “guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of treason
complexed by murder and physical injuries”, with “the
aggravating circumstances mentioned above”.
Apparently, the court has regarded the murders and
physical injuries charged in the information, not only
as crimes distinct from treason but also as modifying
circumstances. The Solicitor General agrees with the
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CRIMINAL LAW 2 CASE BRIEF [TITLES 1-2] BY: Louie Ivan T. Maiz
Based from the syllabus of Atty. Delfin Suarez
decision except as to the technical designation of the
crime. In his opinion, the offense committed by the
appellant is a “complex crime of treason with
homicide”.
Accused being a member of the Japanese Military
Police and acting as undercover man for the Japanese
forces with the purpose of giving and with the intent
to give aid and comfort feloniously and treasonably
lad, guide and accompany a patrol of Japanese
soldiers and Filipino undercovers for the purpose of
apprehending guerillas and locating their hideouts.
ISSUES;
1. Whether the “two-witness” rule was sufficiently
complied.
2. Whether the TC erred in ruling that the murders
and physical injuries were crimes distinct from
treason.
HELD:
1. NO, it was not sufficiently complied. The
witnesses evidently referred to two different
occasions. The two witnesses failed to corroborate
each other not only on the whole overt act but on any
part of it.
2. The execution of some of the guerilla suspects
mentioned and the infliction of physical injuries on
others are not offenses separate from treason. There
must concur both adherence to the enemy and giving
him aid and comfort. One without the other does not
make treason.
In the nature of things, the giving aid and comfort can
only be accomplished by some kind of action. Its very
nature partakes of a deed or physical activity as
opposed to a mental operation. This deed or physical
activity may be, and often is, in itself a criminal
offense under another penal statute or provision. Even
so, when the deed is charged as an element of treason
it becomes identified with the latter crime and cannot
be the subject of a separate punishment.
However, the brutality with the killing or physical
injuries were carried out may be taken as an
aggravating circumstances. Thus, the use of torture
and other atrocities on the victims instead of the usual
and less painful method of execution will be taken into
account to.
US vs BAUTISTA
Facts:
Appellants convicted in CFI Manila of conspiracy to
overthrow by force US government and
PHgovernment as defined in Act292. Francisco
Bautista was sentenced with Aniceto de Guzman
and Tomas Puzon to imprisonment with fine and hard
labor. During latter 1903 a
junta was organized and a conspiracy entered into by
Filipino residents in HK for overthrowing the
government by force of arms and establishing in its
stead a government known as Republica Universal
Democratica Filipina. Toward the end of 1903,
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ArtemioRicarte would come to Manila from Hong
Kong and hold meetingstofurther the conspiracy
hatched in HK, like for the plan to enlist a revolution
army and raising money for it. The conspirators took
to the field and offered armed resistance, only failing
because of their failure to combat and of the failure of
the people to rise en masse in response to their
propaganda. Bautista, a Manila resident, was an
intimate friend of Ricarte, notified by Ricarte of his
coming toManila, Bautista giving him money for the
trip, present in meetings, “held the people in
readiness.”Puzon distributed the bonds and appointed
certain officials for the revolutionary forces. Puzon
said heonly acted to not vex his friend, that “joking
tone,” that he did not know Ricarte was organizing
aconspiracy.
Issue:
Whether or not appellants are guilty.
Held:
No. Puzon himself signed a written statement at the
time he was arrested saying he was part of thenew
revolution presided over by Ricarte, that he was
brigadier-general, chief of signal corps sincethey were
childhood friends. Puzon did not deny this statement.
His confession was clear and in noway supports his
pretense that he was excited as not to know what he
was saying when he made it. The accused voluntarily
accepted the appointment and in doing so assumed all
obligations implied by such acceptance. “Mere
possession of such an appointment, when it is not
shown that the possessor executed some external act
by the virtue of the same, does not constitute
sufficient proof of the guilt of the defendant," applies
only the case of Enrique Camonas, against whom the
only evidence of record was ‘the fact that a so-called
appointment of sergeant was found at his house.’”It
may be the case that conspirators may send appoints
to an unsuspecting person in the hope that such
person would accept it, and the person is entirely
innocent of all intention to join. A genuine conspiracy
must be shown to exist, and it must be proven that
accused voluntarily accepted the appointment.
Thetwo-witness rule cannot apply in proving
conspiracy to commit treason, only in treason.
AnicetodeGuzmancannot be convicted on his
acceptance of a number of bonds from conspirators. It
does not mean he knew about the conspiracy,
receiving the wrapped bonds not knowing what they
were, then destroying them thereafter.
PPL vs. LOL-LO and SARAW
FACTS: On or about June 30, 1920, two boats left
matuta, a Dutch possession, for Peta, another Dutch
possession. In one of the boats was one individual, a
Dutch subject, and in the other boat eleven men,
women, and children, likewise subjects of Holland.
After a number of days of navigation, at about 7
o'clock in the evening, the second boat arrived
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CRIMINAL LAW 2 CASE BRIEF [TITLES 1-2] BY: Louie Ivan T. Maiz
Based from the syllabus of Atty. Delfin Suarez
between the Islands of Buang and Bukid in the Dutch
East Indies. There the boat was surrounded by
six vintas manned by twenty-four Moros all armed.
The Moros first asked for food, but once on the Dutch
boat, too for themselves all of the cargo, attacked
some of the men, and brutally violated two of the
women by methods too horrible to the described.
All of the persons on the Dutch boat, with the
exception of the two young women, were again placed
on it and holes were made in it, the idea that it would
submerge, although as a matter of fact, these people,
after eleven days of hardship and privation, were
succored violating them, the Moros finally arrived at
Maruro, a Dutch possession. Two of the Moro
marauder wereLol-lo, who also raped one of the
women, and Saraw. At Maruro the two women were
able to escape.
Lol-lo and Saraw later returned to their home in South
Ubian, Tawi-Tawi, Sulu, Philippine Islands. There they
were arrested and were charged in the Court of First
Instance of Sulu with the crime of piracy. A demurrer
was interposed by counsel de officio for the Moros,
based on the grounds that the offense charged was
not within the jurisdiction of the Court of First
Instance, nor of any court of the Philippine Islands,
and that the facts did not constitute a public offense,
under the laws in force in the Philippine Islands.
ISSUE: WON the crime of piracy was committed.
HELD. YES. All of the elements of the crime of piracy
are present. Pirates are in law hosteshumani generis.
Piracy is a crime not against any particular state but
against all mankind. It may be punished in the
competent tribunal of any country where the offender
may be found or into which he may be carried. The
jurisdiction of piracy unlike all other crimes has no
territorial limits. As it is against all so may it be
punished by all. Nor does it matter that the crime was
committed within the jurisdictional 3-mile limit of a
foreign state, "for those limits, though neutral to war,
are not neutral to crimes."
People vs. Rodriguez
Facts:
On or about 3:15am of Aug. 31, 1981,within the
territorial waters of Tawi-Tawi, the above named
Jaime Rodriguez and three others, being crew
members of the M/V Noria 767, conspiring and
confederating together and mutually helping one
another and armed with bladed weapons and high
caliber firearms, with intent to gain and by means
of violence and intimidation upon persons, did then
and there willfully and unlawfully, take, steal and carry
away equipments and other personal belongings of
the crew and passengers; that by reason of the said
piracy, accused did then and there, with intent to kill,
and with evident premeditation, treacherously attack,
assault, stab and shot the persons.
The acts of execution produced the death of several
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persons, and inflicted several physical injuries of
others that could have caused their death, but did not
by reason independent of the will of accused, that is,
by timely and able medical assistance rendered which
prevented death.
The three pleaded guilty and sentenced “to suffer the
extreme penalty of death.”
The case is now on automatic review.
Issue:
W/N plea of guilty is a mitigating circumstance?
Held:
No. PD 532, Anti-Piracy Law, amending Art.134 of RPC
provides:
“Piracy - The penalty of RT in its medium and
maximum periods shall be imposed…
a.) If rape, murder or homicide is committed as
a result or on the occasion of piracy,
b.) or when the offenders abandoned the victims
without means of saving themselves,
c.) or when the seizure is accomplished by firing upon
or boarding a vessel,
the mandatory penalty of death shall be imposed.”
Clearly the lower court committed no error in not
considering the guilty plea as a mitigating
circumstance under Art. 63 of RPC:
Rules for the application of indivisible penalties.
In all cases in which the law prescribes a single
indivisible penalty, it shall be applied by the courts
regardless of any mitigating or aggravating
circumstances that may have attended the
commission of the deed.
PPL vs SIYOH
Facts:
On July 10, 1979, the victims Antonio deGuzman,
DaniloHiolen, Rodolfo de Castro andAnastacio de
Guzman, who were travelingmerchants, were on their
way to Pilas Island, Basilanto sell the goods they
received from Alberto Aurea.They took their dinner
and slept that night in thehouse of accused Kiram at
Pilas Island. The next twodays, the group was
accompanied by KiramandSiyoh in selling their goods.
On the night of July 12, they again slept at Kiram’s
house, but Kiram was notthere. Kiram claimed he
spent the night at Siyoh’s house.
On July 13, De Guzman’s group went to Baluk-Baluk as
suggested by Kiram and returned to
Kiram’s house for the night, but Kiram did not sleep
with them. The following day, July 14, the groupagain
went to Baluk-Baluk with Kiram and Siyoh using
Kiram’s pump boat. While they were sellingtheir
goods,
the group saw Kiram and Siyohtalkingwith two
persons whose faces they could notrecognize. After
selling their goods, the group,together with Kiram and
Siyoh, prepared to return toPilas. On their way back,
De Guzman saw anotherpumpboat. Shortly after,
Kiram turned off the engineof their pumpboat and two
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CRIMINAL LAW 2 CASE BRIEF [TITLES 1-2] BY: Louie Ivan T. Maiz
Based from the syllabus of Atty. Delfin Suarez
shots were fired fromthe other pumpboat as it moved
towards them. DeGuzman recognized them to be the
same persons hesawKiram conversing with in Baluk-
Baluk.De Guzman and his companions weredivested of
their money and their goods by Kiram.Thereafter, the
accused ordered the victims toundress. Siyoh then
hacked Hiolen while Kiramhacked De Castro. De
Guzman jumped. He was ableto swim away even
though his back was injured.
Issue: W/N the accused are guilty beyond
reasonabledoubt.
Held: Yes.
1. If accused were culprits, they would have easily
robbed their victims at Kiram’shouseor on any
occasion that they were travellingtogether. Robbing
the victims at Kiram’s house would make Kiram and
his familyimmediately suspect and robbing
thembefore all the goods were sold would be
premature.
2. Accused immediately reported incident tothe PC.
The records do not support hisassertion.
3. Wife of the deceased victims stated inaffidavits that
De Guzman informed themshortly after the incident
that thecompanions of Siyoh and Kiram killed
theirhusbands.
4. That there is no evidence AnastaciodeGuzmanwas
killed together with the rest because his remains were
never recovered. There is no reason to suppose that
he is stillalive or that he died in a manner
differentfrom his companions. The number of persons
killed is not material. PD 532 considers qualified piracy
as a specialcomplex crime punishable by death
regardless of the number of victims.
UMIL vs RAMOS
Facts:
On 1 February 1988, military agents were dispatched
to the St. Agnes Hospital, Roosevelt Avenue, Quezon
City, to verify a confidential information which was
received by their office, about a "sparrow man" (NPA
member) who had been admitted to the said hospital
with a gunshot wound. That the wounded man in the
said hospital was among the five (5) male "sparrows"
who murdered two (2) Capcom mobile patrols the day
before, or on 31 January 1988 at about 12:00 o'clock
noon, before a road hump along Macanining St.,
Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City. The wounded man's
name was listed by the hospital management as
"Ronnie Javellon," twenty-two (22) years old of Block
10, Lot 4, South City Homes, Biñan, Laguna however it
was disclosed later that the true name of the
wounded man was Rolando Dural. In view of this
verification, Rolando Dural was transferred to the
Regional Medical Servicesof the CAPCOM, for security
reasons. While confined thereat, he was positively
identified by the eyewitnesses as the one who
murdered the 2 CAPCOM mobile patrols.
Issue: Whether or Not Rolando was lawfully arrested.
Maiz Notes 
Held: Rolando Dural was arrested for being a member
of the NPA, an outlawed subversive organization.
Subversion being a continuing offense, the arrest
without warrant is justified as it can be said that he
was committing as offense when arrested. The crimes
rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to
commit such crimes, and crimes or offenses
committed in furtherance therefore in connection
therewith constitute direct assaults against the state
and are in the nature of continuing crimes.
PEOPLE VS. BURGOS
Summary:
An informant identified a certain person as a member
of a subversive group who forcibly recruited him and
based on this information, the police went to arrest
the suspect. At the time of the arrest, the suspect was
merely plowing his field.
Rule of Law:
In a warrantless arrest, the officer arresting a person
who has just committed, is committing, or is about to
commit an offense must have personal knowledge of
that fact.
Facts:
Cesar Masamlok personally and voluntarily
surrendered to the authorities stating that he was
forcibly recruited by accused Ruben Burgos (D) as
member of the NPA, threatening him with the use of
firearm against his life, if he refused. Pursuant to this
information, PC-INP members went to the house of
the Burgos (D) and saw him plowing his field when
they arrived. One of the arresting offices called Burgos
(D) and asked him about the firearm. At first, Burgos
(D) denied having any firearm, but later, Burgos's (D)
wife pointed to a place below their house where a gun
was buried in the ground.
After recovery of said firearm, Burgos (D) pointed to a
stock pile of cogon where the officers recovered
alleged subversive documents. Burgos (D) further
admitted that the firearm was issued to him by Nestor
Jimenez, team leader of sparrow unit. Issues:
Is the warrantless arrest valid? Is the warrantless
search valid?
Ruling:
No. Under Section 6(a) of Rule 113, the officer
arresting a person who has just committed, is
committing, or is about to commit an offense must
have personal knowledge of that fact. The offense
must also be committed in his presence or within his
view. (Sayo vs. Chief of Police, 80 Phil. 859).
There is no such personal knowledge in this case.
Whatever knowledge was possessed by the arresting
officers, it came in its entirety from the information
furnished by Cesar Masamlok. The location of the
firearm was given by the wife of Burgos (D).
In arrests without a warrant under Section 6(b),
however, it is not enough that there is reasonable
ground to believe that the person to be arrested has
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CRIMINAL LAW 2 CASE BRIEF [TITLES 1-2] BY: Louie Ivan T. Maiz
Based from the syllabus of Atty. Delfin Suarez
committed a crime. A crime must in fact or actually
have been committed first. That a crime has actually
been committed is an essential precondition. It is not
enough to suspect that a crime may have been
committed. The fact of the commission of the offense
must be undisputed. The test of reasonable ground
applies only to the identity of the perpetrator.
In this case, the Burgos (D) was arrested on the sole
basis of Masamlok's verbal report. Masamlok led the
authorities to suspect that the accused had committed
a crime. They were still fishing for evidence of a crime
not yet ascertained. The subsequent recovery of the
subject firearm on the basis of information from the
lips of a frightened wife cannot make the arrest lawful.
If an arrest without warrant is unlawful at the moment
it is made, generally nothing that happened or is
discovered afterward can make it lawful. The fruit of a
poisoned tree is necessarily also tainted.
VILLAVICENCIO VS LUKABAN
Facts: Justo Lukban as Manila City's Mayor together
with Anton Hohmann, the city's Chiefof Police, took
custody of about 170 women at the night of October
25 beyond thelatters consent and knowledge and
thereafter were shipped to Mindanaospecifically in
Davao where they were signed as laborers. Said
women are inmatesof the houses of prostitution
situated in Gardenia Street, in the district of
Sampaloc.That when the petitioner filed for habeas
corpus, the respondent moved to dismissthe case
saying that those women were already out of their
jurisdiction and that ,itshould be filed in the city of
Davao instead.
The court ruled in favor of the petitioner with the
instructions; For the respondents to have fulfilled the
court's order, three optional courses wereopen: (1)
They could have produced the bodies of the persons
according to thecommand of the writ; or (2) they
could have shown by affidavit that on account
ofsickness or infirmity those persons could not safely
be brought before the court; or(3) they could have
presented affidavits to show that the parties in
question or theirattorney waived the right to be
present.
Issue: The writ of Habeas Corpus was filed by the
petitioner, with the prayer that therespondent
produce around 170 women whom Justo Lukbanet, al
deported toDavao. Liberty of abode was also raised
versus the power of the executive of theMunicipality
in deporting the women without their knowledge in
his capacity as Mayor.
Held:The court concluded the case by granting the
parties aggrieved the sum of 400pesos each, plus 100
pesos for nominal damage due to contempt of court.
Reasoning further that if the chief executive of any
municipality in the Philippinescould forcibly and
illegally take a private citizen and place him beyond
theboundaries of the municipality, and then, when
called upon to defend his officialaction, could calmly
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fold his hands and claim that the person was under no
restraintand that he, the official, had no jurisdiction
over this other municipality.
We believe the true principle should be that, if the
respondent is within the jurisdiction of the court and
has it in his power to obey the order of the court
andthus to undo the wrong that he has inflicted, he
should be compelled to do so. Even if the party to
whom the writ is addressed has illegally parted with
the custody of aperson before the application for the
writ is no reason why the writ should notissue. If the
mayor and the chief of police, acting under no
authority of law, could deport these women from the
city of Manila to Davao, the same officials must
necessarily have the same means to return them from
Davao to Manila. The respondents, within the reach of
process, may not be permitted to restrain a fellow
citizen of her liberty by forcing her to change her
domicile and to avow the act withimpunity in the
courts, while the person who has lost her birthright of
liberty has noeffective recourse. The great writ of
liberty may not thus be easily evaded.
STONEHILL v DIOKNO
FACTS: Respondents-Prosecutors issued, on different
dates,a total of 42 search warrants against petitioners
herein and/or the corporations of which they were
officers, directed to the any peace officer, to search
the persons above-named and/or the premises of
their offices, warehouses and/or residences, and to
seize and take possession of the following personal
property to wit:
Books of accounts, financial records,
vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers,
journals, portfolios, credit journals,
typewriters, and other documents and/or
papers showing all business transactions
including disbursements receipts, balance
sheets and profit and loss statements and
Bobbins (cigarette wrappers).
as "the subject of the offense; stolen or embezzled
and proceeds or fruits of the offense," or "used or
intended to be used as the means of committing the
offense," which is described in the applications
adverted to above as "violation of Central Bank Laws,
Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and
the Revised Penal Code."
Alleging that the aforementioned search warrants are
null and void, because, inter alia:
(1) they do not describe with particularity the
documents, books and things to be seized;
(2) cash money, not mentioned in the warrants, were
actually seized;
(3) the warrants were issued to fish evidence against
the aforementioned petitioners in deportation cases
filed against them;
(4) the searches and seizures were made in an illegal
manner; and
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CRIMINAL LAW 2 CASE BRIEF [TITLES 1-2] BY: Louie Ivan T. Maiz
Based from the syllabus of Atty. Delfin Suarez
(5) the documents, papers and cash money seized
were not delivered to the courts that issued the
warrants, to be disposed of in accordance with law.
In their answer, respondents-prosecutors alleged, 6 (1)
that the contested search warrants are valid and have
been issued in accordance with law; (2) that the
defects of said warrants, if any, were cured by
petitioners' consent; and (3) that, in any event, the
effects seized are admissible in evidence against
herein petitioners, regardless of the alleged illegality
of the aforementioned searches and seizures.
HELD:
Two points must be stressed in connection with this
constitutional mandate, namely: (1) that no warrant
shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined
by the judge in the manner set forth in said provision;
and (2) that the warrant shall particularly describe the
things to be seized.
None of these requirements has been complied with
in the contested warrants. Indeed, the same were
issued upon applications stating that the natural and
juridical person therein named had committed a
"violation of Central Ban Laws, Tariff and Customs
Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal
Code." In other words, no specific offense had been
alleged in said applications. The averments thereof
with respect to the offense committed were abstract.
As a consequence, it was impossible for the judges
who issued the warrants to have found the existence
of probable cause, for the same presupposes the
introduction of competent proof that the party against
whom it is sought has performed particular acts, or
committed specific omissions, violating a given
provision of our criminal laws. As a matter of fact, the
applications involved in this case do not allege any
specific acts performed by herein petitioners. It would
be the legal heresy, of the highest order, to convict
anybody of a "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff
and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and
Revised Penal Code," — as alleged in the
aforementioned applications — without reference to
any determinate provision of said laws.
To uphold the validity of the warrants in question
would be to wipe out completely one of the most
fundamental rights guaranteed in our Constitution, for
it would place the sanctity of the domicile and the
privacy of communication and correspondence at the
mercy of the whims caprice or passion of peace
officers.
BURGOS VS. CHIEF OF STAFF
Facts:
Two warrants were issued against petitioners for the
search on the premises of “Metropolitan Mail” and
“We Forum” newspapers and the seizure of items
alleged to have been used in subversive activities.
Petitioners prayed that a writ of preliminary
mandatory and prohibitory injunction be issued for
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the return of the seized articles, and that respondents
be enjoined from using the articles thus seized as
evidence against petitioner.
Petitioners questioned the warrants for the lack of
probable cause and that the two warrants issued
indicated only one and the same address. In addition,
the items seized subject to the warrant were real
properties.
Issue:
Whether or not the two warrants were valid to justify
seizure of the items.
Held:
The defect in the indication of the same address in the
two warrants was held by the court as a typographical
error and immaterial in view of the correct
determination of the place sought to be searched set
forth in the application. The purpose and intent to
search two distinct premises was evident in the
issuance of the two warrants.
As to the issue that the items seized were real
properties, the court applied the principle in the case
of Davao Sawmill Co. v. Castillo, ruling “that machinery
which is movable by nature becomes immobilized
when placed by the owner of the tenement, property
or plant, but not so when placed by a tenant,
usufructuary, or any other person having only a
temporary right, unless such person acted as the
agent of the owner.” In the case at bar, petitioners did
not claim to be the owners of the land and/or building
on which the machineries were placed. This being the
case, the machineries in question, while in fact bolted
to the ground remain movable property susceptible to
seizure under a search warrant.
However, the Court declared the two warrants null
and void.
Probable cause for a search is defined as such facts
and circumstances which would lead a reasonably
discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense
has been committed and that the objects sought in
connection with the offense are in the place sought to
be searched.
The Court ruled that the affidavits submitted for the
application of the warrant did not satisfy the
requirement of probable cause, the statements of the
witnesses having been mere generalizations.
Furthermore, jurisprudence tells of the prohibition on
the issuance of general warrants. (Stanford vs. State of
Texas). The description and enumeration in the
warrant of the items to be searched and seized did not
indicate with specification the subversive nature of
the said items.
PPL VS BAES
FACTS
That on April 14, 1937, at about 9 o'clock a.m., in this
municipality of Lumban, Province of Laguna,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this court,
the aforesaid accused, while holding the funeral of
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CRIMINAL LAW 2 CASE BRIEF [TITLES 1-2] BY: Louie Ivan T. Maiz
Based from the syllabus of Atty. Delfin Suarez

one who in life was called Antonio Macabigtas, in

accordance with the rites of religious sect known as
the "Church of Christ", willfully, unlawfully, and
criminally caused the funeral to pass, as it in fact
passed, through the chruchyard fronting the Roman
Catholic Church, which churchyard belongs to the said
Church, which churchyard belongs to the said Church
and is devoted to the religious worship thereof,
against the opposition of the undersigned complainant
who, through force and threats of physical violence by
the accused, was compelled to allow the funeral to
pass through the said churchyard. An act committed in
grave profanation of the place, in open disregard of
the religious feelings of the Catholics of this
municipality, and in violation of article 133 of the
Revised Penal Code.
FISCAL said:
The undersigned is of the opinion that the fact act
imputed to the accused does not constitute the
offense complained of considering the spirit of article
133 of the Revised Penal Code. At most they might be
chargeable with having threatened the parish priest,
or with having passed through a private property
without the consent of the owner.
Justice Albert, commenting on the article, has this to
say: "An act is said to be notoriously offensive to the
religious feelings of the faithful when a person
ridicules or makes light of anything constituting a
religious dogma; works or scoffs at anything devoted
to religious ceremonies; plays with or damages or
destroys any object of veneration by the faithful."
The mere act of causing the passage through the
churchyard belonging to the Church, of the funeral of
one who in life belonged to the Church of Christ,
neither offends nor ridicules the religious feelings of
those who belong to the Roman Catholic Church.
ISSUE: Is there a violation of 133 of RPC?
HELD: Whether or of the act complained of is
offensive to the religious feelings of the Catholics, is a
question of fact which must be judged only according
to the feelings of the Catholics and not those of other
faithful ones, for it is possible that certain acts may
offend the feelings of those who profess a certain
religion, while not otherwise offensive to the feelings
of those professing another faith. We, therefore, take
the view that the facts alleged in the complaint
constitute the offense defined and penalized in article
133 of the Revised Penal Code.

Maiz Notes  Page 7