LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.

Before Us are the following consolidated petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
qualification as sOn July 21, 1986, July 23, 1986, and July 28, 1986, the petitioners petitioned the
National Labor Relations Commission for reinstatement and payment of various benefits, including
minimum wage, overtime pay, holiday pay, thirteen-month pay, and emergency cost of living
allowance pay, against the respondent, the California Manufacturing Company. 1

On October 7, 1986, after the cases had been consolidated, the California Manufacturing Company
(California) filed a motion to dismiss as well as a position paper denying the existence of an
employer-employee relation between the petitioners and the company and, consequently, any
liability for payment of money claims. 2 On motion of the petitioners, Livi Manpower Services, Inc.
was impleaded as a party-respondent.

It appears that the petitioners were, prior to their stint with California, employees of Livi Manpower
Services, Inc. (Livi), which subsequently assigned them to work as "promotional merchandisers" 3 for
the former firm pursuant to a manpower supply agreement. Among other things, the agreement
provided that California "has no control or supervisions whatsoever over [Livi's] workers with respect
to how they accomplish their work or perform [Californias] obligation"; 4 the Livi "is an independent
contractor and nothing herein contained shall be construed as creating between [California] and
[Livi] . . . the relationship of principal[-]agent or employer[-]employee'; 5 that "it is hereby agreed that
it is the sole responsibility of [Livi] to comply with all existing as well as future laws, rules and
regulations pertinent to employment of labor" 6 and that "[California] is free and harmless from any
liability arising from such laws or from any accident that may befall workers and employees of [Livi]
while in the performance of their duties for [California].7

It was further expressly stipulated that the assignment of workers to California shall be on a
"seasonal and contractual basis"; that "[c]ost of living allowance and the 10 legal holidays will be
charged directly to [California] at cost "; and that "[p]ayroll for the preceeding [sic] week [shall] be
delivered by [Livi] at [California's] premises." 8

The petitioners were then made to sign employment contracts with durations of six months, upon the
expiration of which they signed new agreements with the same period, and so on. Unlike regular
California employees, who received not less than P2,823.00 a month in addition to a host of fringe
benefits and bonuses, they received P38.56 plus P15.00 in allowance daily.

The petitioners now allege that they had become regular California employees and demand, as a
consequence whereof, similar benefits. They likewise claim that pending further proceedings below,
they were notified by California that they would not be rehired. As a result, they filed an amended
complaint charging California with illegal dismissal.

California admits having refused to accept the petitioners back to work but deny liability therefor for
the reason that it is not, to begin with, the petitioners' employer and that the "retrenchment" had
been forced by business losses as well as expiration of contracts.9 It appears that thereafter, Livi re-
absorbed them into its labor pool on a "wait-in or standby" status. 10

Amid these factual antecedents, the Court finds the single most important issue to be: Whether the
petitioners are California's or Livi's employees.

The labor arbiter's decision, 11 a decision affirmed on appeal, 12 ruled against the existence of any
employer-employee relation between the petitioners and California ostensibly in the light of the
manpower supply contract, supra, and consequently, against the latter's liability as and for the
money claims demanded. In the same breath, however, the labor arbiter absolved Livi from any
obligation because the "retrenchment" in question was allegedly "beyond its control ." 13 He assessed
against the firm, nevertheless, separation pay and attorney's fees.

We reverse.

The existence of an employer-employees relation is a question of law and being such, it cannot be
made the subject of agreement. Hence, the fact that the manpower supply agreement between Livi
and California had specifically designated the former as the petitioners' employer and had absolved
the latter from any liability as an employer, will not erase either party's obligations as an employer, if
an employer-employee relation otherwise exists between the workers and either firm. At any rate,
since the agreement was between Livi and California, they alone are bound by it, and the petitioners
cannot be made to suffer from its adverse consequences.

This Court has consistently ruled that the determination of whether or not there is an employer-
employee relation depends upon four standards: (1) the manner of selection and engagement of the
putative employee; (2) the mode of payment of wages; (3) the presence or absence of a power of
dismissal; and (4) the presence or absence of a power to control the putative employee's
conduct. 14 Of the four, the right-of-control test has been held to be the decisive factor. 15

II
RULING

For the sake of expediency, we will be discussing first the merits of the petition in G.R. No. 146718.

G.R. No. 146718

Civil Case No. Q-28580 involved Muñoz’s complaint for the annulment of the deeds of absolute sale
dated December 28, 197240 and July 16, 1979,41 the cancellation of the spouses Go’s TCT No. 258977,
and the restoration and revival of Muñoz’s TCT No. 186306. The final judgment of RTC-Branch 95 in Civil
Case No. Q-28580 was in favor of Muñoz and against Emilia M. Ching and the spouses Go. The problem
arose when during the pendency of the said case, title and possession of the subject property were
transferred from the spouses Go, to BPI Family, and finally, to the spouses Chan. BPI Family and the
spouses Chan were never impleaded as parties and were not referred to in the dispositive portion of the
final judgment in Civil Case No. Q-28580.

Muñoz questions in G.R. No. 146718: (1) the Order dated August 21, 1995 denying her Motion for
Contempt against the spouses Chan, Second Motion for Contempt against Samuel Go Chan and Atty.
Yabut, and Motion for an Alias Writ of Execution and Application for Surrender of the Owner’s Duplicate
Copy of TCT No. 53297; and (2) the Order dated October 3, 1995 denying her Motion for Clarificatory
Order, both issued by the RTC-Branch 95 in Civil Case No. Q-28580, and upheld by the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 40019. In sum, Muñoz was seeking in her aforementioned motions: (1) a categorical
order from the RTC-Branch 95 that the final judgment in Civil Case No. Q-28580 be executed against the
spouses Chan; and (2) the surrender and cancellation of the spouses Chan’s TCT No. 53297 and
restoration of Muñoz’s TCT No. 186306.

There is no merit in Muñoz’s petition in G.R. No. 146718.

Civil Case No. Q-28580 is an action for reconveyance of real property. In Heirs of Eugenio Lopez, Sr. v.
Enriquez,42 we described an action for reconveyance as follows:
An action for reconveyance is an action in personam available to a person whose property has been
wrongfully registered under the Torrens system in another’s name. Although the decree is recognized as
incontrovertible and no longer open to review, the registered owner is not necessarily held free from liens.
As a remedy, an action for reconveyance is filed as an ordinary action in the ordinary courts of justice and
not with the land registration court. Reconveyance is always available as long as the property has not
passed to an innocent third person for value. A notice of lis pendens may thus be annotated on the
certificate of title immediately upon the institution of the action in court. The notice of lis pendens will
avoid transfer to an innocent third person for value and preserve the claim of the real owner. 43 (Emphases
ours.)

in his capacity as titular and spiritual head of I.N.K. Herein petitioners Conrado Pineda, et al. never
became parties thereto. Any and all orders and writs of execution, which the respondent judge may issue
in that case can, therefore, be enforced only against those parties and not against the herein petitioners
Conrado Pineda, et al. In issuing the assailed Order dated 22 April 1998, which directed the issuance of
the 2nd Alias Writ of Execution to eject non-parties (herein petitioners), the respondent judge clearly went
out of bounds and committed grave abuse of discretion.

The nature of the injunction suit — Civil Case No. Q-45767 — as an action in personam in the RTC
remains to be the same whether it is elevated to the CA or to this Court for review. An action in personam
does not become an action in rem just because a pronouncement confirming I.N.K.'s title to Lot 671 was
made by this Court in the Calalang decision. Final rulings may be made by this Court, as the Highest
Court of the Land, in actions in personam but such rulings are binding only as against the parties therein
and not against the whole world. Here lies another grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
respondent judge when he relied on the Calalang decision in his assailed Order dated 07 May 1998 as if
it were binding against the whole world, saying:

"After evaluating the arguments of both parties, decisive on the incident is the decision of the Supreme
Court in favor of the respondent I.N.K., represented by its titular and spiritual head Bishop Eraño G.
Manalo, sustaining its ownership over the subject Lot 671. This Court could do no less but to follow and
give substantial meaning to its ownership which shall include all dominical rights by way of a Writ of
Execution. To delay the issuance of such writ is a denial of justice due the I.N.K."

As a final word, this decision shall not be misinterpreted as disturbing or modifying our ruling in Calalang.
The final ruling on I.N.K.'s ownership and title is not at all affected. Private respondent I.N.K., as the true
and lawful owner of Lot 671 as ruled by the Court in Calalang, simply has to file the proper action against
the herein petitioners to enforce its property rights within the bounds of the law and our rules. I.N.K.'s
recourse of asking for the issuance of an alias writ of execution against the petitioners in Civil Case No.
Q-45767 and the respondent judge's orders in said case, granting I.N.K.'s prayer and enforcing the alias
writ of execution against the present petitioners, constitutes blatant disregard of very fundamental rules
and must therefore be stricken down.54 (Emphases ours.)

Consistent with Pineda, and as appositely recommended by the RTC-Branch 95 and the Court of Appeals
in the present case, Muñoz’s legal remedy is to directly assail in a separate action the validity of the
certificates of title of BPI Family and the spouses Chan.

G.R. No. 142676

G.R. No. 142676 is Muñoz’s appeal of the dismissal of Civil Case No. 8286, the forcible entry case she
instituted against Samuel Go Chan and Atty. Yabut before the MeTC.

There is forcible entry or desahucio when one is deprived of physical possession of land or building by
qualification as complainant belies respondent’s claim of independent contractorship.”
However, independent contractors often present themselves to possess unique skills, expertise or talent to
distinguish them from ordinary employees. The specific selection and hiring of SONZA, because of his
unique skills, talent and celebrity status not possessed by ordinary employees, is a circumstance indicative, but
not conclusive, of an independent contractual relationship. If SONZA did not possess such unique skills,
talent and celebrity status, ABS-CBN would not have entered into the Agreement with SONZA but would
have hired him through its personnel department just like any other employee.

B. Payment of Wages
ABS-CBN directly paid SONZA his monthly talent fees with no part of his fees going to MJMDC. SONZA
asserts that this mode of fee payment shows that he was an employee of ABS-CBN. SONZA also points out
that ABS-CBN granted him benefits and privileges “which he would not have enjoyed if he were truly the
subject of a valid job contract.”

All the talent fees and benefits paid to SONZA were the result of negotiations that led to the Agreement. If
SONZA were ABS-CBN’s employee, there would be no need for the parties to stipulate on benefits such as
“SSS, Medicare, x x x and 13th month pay” which the law automatically incorporates into every employer-
employee contract. Whatever benefits SONZA enjoyed arose from contract and not because of an employer-
employee relationship. In addition, SONZA’s talent fees are so huge and out of the ordinary that they
indicate more an independent contractual relationship rather than an employer-employee relationship. ABS-
CBN agreed to pay SONZA such huge talent fees precisely because of SONZA’s unique skills, talent and
celebrity status not possessed by ordinary employees.

C. Power of Dismissal

for certiorari of Samuel Go Chan and Atty. Yabut in Civil Case No. Q-94-20632 from the prohibition. The
liberality in the interpretation and application of the rules applies only in proper cases and under justifiable
causes and circumstances. While it is true that litigation is not a game of technicalities, it is equally true
that every case must be prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed procedure to insure an orderly and
speedy administration of justice.63

Nonetheless, even though the peculiar circumstances extant herein do not justify the dismissal of Civil
Case No. 8286, they do require limiting pro hac vice the reliefs the MeTC may accord to Muñoz in the
event that she is able to successfully prove forcible entry by Samuel Go Chan and Atty. Yabut into the
subject property (i.e., that the sheriff actually turned-over to Muñoz the possession of the subject property
on January 10, 1994, and that she was deprived of such possession by Samuel Go Chan and Atty. Yabut
on February 2, 1994 by means of force, intimidation, threat, strategy, and stealth). Taking into account
our ruling in G.R. No. 146718 – that the final judgment in Civil Case No. Q-28580 does not extend to the
spouses Chan, who were not impleaded as parties to the said case – the MeTC is precluded from
granting to Muñoz relief, whether preliminary or final, that will give her possession of the subject property.
Otherwise, we will be perpetuating the wrongful execution of the final judgment in Civil Case No. Q-
28580. Based on the same reason, Muñoz can no longer insist on the reinstatement of the MeTC Order
dated May 16, 1994 granting a preliminary mandatory injunction that puts her in possession of the subject
property during the course of the trial. Muñoz though may recover damages if she is able to prove
wrongful deprivation of possession of the subject property from February 2, 1994 until the finality of this
decision in G.R. No. 146718.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, we:

(1) GRANT Emerita Muñoz’s petition in G.R. No. 142676. We REVERSE and SET ASIDE the
Decision dated July 21, 1995 and Resolution dated March 9, 2000 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 35322, which affirmed the Orders dated June 10, 1994 and August 5, 1994 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 88 of Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-94-20632. We DIRECT the
Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 33 of Quezon City to reinstate Emerita Muñoz’s complaint for
forcible entry in Civil Case No. 8286 and to resume the proceedings only to determine whether or
not Emerita Muñoz was forcibly deprived of possession of the subject property from February 2,
1994 until finality of this judgment, and if so, whether or not she is entitled to an award for
damages for deprivation of possession during the aforementioned period of time; and

(2) DENY Emerita Munoz’s petition in G.R. No. 146718 for lack of merit, and AFFIRM the
Decision dated September 29, 2000 and Resolution dated January 5, 2001 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 40019, which in turn, affirmed the Orders dated August 21, 1995 and
October 3, 1995 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 95 of Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-
28580.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.