Documente Academic
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
ANNOTATED
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* EN BANC.
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4 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Poe-Llamanzares vs. Commission on Elections
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Same; Same; View that a person can have but one (1) domicile
at a time. Once established, the domicile remains until a new one is
acquired.·A personÊs domicile of origin is the domicile of his
parents. It is not easily lost and continues even if one has lived and
maintained residences in different places. Absence from the
domicile to pursue a profession or business, to study or to do other
things of a temporary or semi-permanent nature, and even travels
abroad, does not constitute loss of residence. In contrast,
immigration to a foreign country with the intention to live there
permanently constitutes an abandonment of domicile in the
Philippines. In order to qualify to run for public office in the
Philippines, an immigrant to a foreign country must waive such
status as manifested by some act or acts independent of and done
prior to the filing of the certificate of candidacy. A person can have
but one domicile at a time. Once established, the domicile remains
until a new one is acquired. In order to acquire a domicile by choice,
there must concur: (a) physical presence in the new place, (b) an
intention to remain there (animus manendi), and (c) an intention to
abandon the former domicile (animus non revertendi). Without clear
and positive proof of the concurrence of these requirements, the
domicile of origin continues.
Balikbayan Program; View that Republic Act (RA) No. 6768
enacted on 3 November 1989, instituted a Balikbayan Program
under the administration of the Department of Tourism (DOT) to
attract and encourage overseas Filipinos to come and visit their
motherland.·R.A. 6768, enacted on 3 November 1989, instituted a
Balikbayan Program under the administration of the Department of
Tourism to attract and encourage overseas Filipinos to come and
visit their motherland. Under R.A. 6768, the term balikbayan
covers Filipino citizens who have been continuously out of the
Philippines for a period of at least one year; Filipino overseas
workers; and former Filipino citizens and their family who had been
naturalized in a foreign country and comes or returns to the
Philippines. The law provided various privileges to the balikbayan:
1. Tax-free maximum purchase in the amount of US$1,000 or its
equivalent in other acceptable foreign currencies at Philippine duty-
free shops; 2. Access to a special promotional/ incentive program
provided by the national flag air carrier; 3. Visa-free entry to the
Philippines for a period of one year for foreign passport holders,
with the exception of restricted nationals; 4. Travel tax exemption;
and 5. Access to especially designated reception areas at the
authorized ports of entry for the expeditious processing of
documents. It is emphasized in the law that the privileges granted
thereunder shall be in addition to the benefits enjoyed by the
balikbayan under existing laws, rules and regulations. R.A. 9174
dated 7 November 2002 amended R.A. 6768 by extending further
the privileges of a balikbayan to include: 1. Kabuhayan shopping
privilege through an additional tax-exempt purchase in the
maximum amount of US$2,000 or its equivalent in Philippine peso
and other acceptable foreign currencies, exclusively for the
purchase of livelihood tools at all government-owned and -
controlled/operated duty-free
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the reasons for the loss of their citizenship and the mode
prescribed by the applicable law for the reacquisition thereof.
Same; Same; Same; View that as stated in the early case Roa v.
Collector of Customs, 23 Phil. 315 (1912), a natural-born citizen is
one who has become such at the moment of birth.·Naturalized
citizens are former aliens or foreigners who had to undergo a rigid
procedure, in which they had to adduce sufficient evidence to prove
that they possessed all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications to become Filipino citizens as provided by law. In
contrast, as stated in the early case Roa v. Collector of Customs, 23
Phil. 315 (1912), a natural-born citizen is one who has become such
at the moment of birth.
Adoption; View that upon the entry of an adoption decree, the
law creates a relationship in which adopted children are deemed
„born of‰ their adoptive parents.·It must be emphasized that
adoption severs all legal ties between the biological parents and the
adoptee and vests those rights in the adopter. Section 17 of R.A.
8552, in particular, provides that the „adoptee shall be considered
the legitimate son/daughter of the adopter for all intents and
purposes and as such is entitled to all the rights and obligations
provided by law to legitimate sons/daughter born to them without
discrimination of any kind.‰ Hence, upon the entry of an adoption
decree, the law creates a relationship in which adopted children are
deemed „born of‰ their adoptive parents.
Same; Citizenship; Natural-born Citizens; View that as to
whether petitioner also reacquired her natural-born status, the
Court must apply the ruling in Bengson III v. HRET, 357 SCRA 545
(2001), which allowed the applicant to reacquire not only his
citizenship, but also his original natural-born status.·As to
whether petitioner also reacquired her natural-born status, the
Court must apply the ruling in Bengson III v. HRET, 357 SCRA 545
(2001), which allowed the applicant to reacquire not only his
citizenship, but also his original natural-born status. In that case,
the Court noted that those who reacquire Philippine citizenship
must be considered natural-born or naturalized citizens, since the
Constitution does not provide a separate category for them.
Between the two categories, the Court found it more appropriate to
consider them natural-born citizens, since they were not required to
go through the tedious naturalization procedure provided under the
law.
Same; Same; Same; View that there are only two (2) classes of
citizens under the Constitution · those who are natural-born and
those who are naturalized.·It has been argued that the taking of
an oath under R.A. 9225, as petitioner has done, should be
considered as an „act to acquire or perfect citizenship‰ under
Section 2, Article IV of the present Constitution. As previously
discussed, however, there are only two classes of citizens under the
Constitution · those who are natural-born and those who are
naturalized. The „act‰ ad-
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VOL. 786, MARCH 8, 2016 27
Poe-Llamanzares vs. Commission on Elections
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Same; Same; Same; View that petitioner Poe would like to apply
to her situation several international law conventions that
supposedly point to her entitlement to a natural-born Filipino
citizenship, notwithstanding her lack of biological ties to a Filipino
father or mother.·Generally accepted principles of international
law „may refer to rules of customary law, to general principles of
law x x x, or to logical propositions resulting from judicial reasoning
on the basis of existing international law and municipal analogies.‰
And it has been observed that, certainly, it is this judicial reasoning
that has been the anchor of Philippine jurisprudence on the
determination of generally accepted principles of international law
and consequent application of the incorporation clause. Petitioner
Poe would like to apply to her situation several international law
conventions that supposedly point to her entitlement to a natural-
born Filipino citizenship, notwithstanding her lack of biological ties
to a Filipino father or mother. In effect, she wants to carve an
exception to the ÂÂjus sanguinis‰ principle through that generally
accepted principles of international law which, under the theory of
incorporation, is considered by the Constitution as part of the law of
the land. Basic is the principle in statutory construction that
specific provisions must prevail over general ones, to wit: A special
and specific provision prevails over a general provision irrespective
of their relative positions in the statute. Generalia specialibus non
derogant. Where there is in the same statute a particular
enactment and also a general one which in its most comprehensive
sense would include what is embraced in the former, the particular
enactment must be operative, and the general enactment must be
taken to affect only such cases within its general language as are
not within the provisions of the particular enactment.
Same; Same; Same; View that petitioner Poe cannot find succor
in the provisions of the 1930 Hague Convention on Certain
Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws and the 1961
Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, in claiming natural-
born Filipino citizenship.·Petitioner Poe cannot find succor in the
provisions of the 1930 Hague Convention on Certain Questions
Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws and the 1961
Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, in claiming natural-
born Filipino citizenship primarily for the following reasons: firstly,
the Philippines has not ratified said International Conventions;
secondly, they espouse a presumption by fiction of law which is
disputable and not based on the physical fact of biological ties to a
Filipino parent; thirdly, said conventions are not self-executing as
the Contracting State is granted the discretion to determine by
enacting a domestic or national law the conditions and manner by
which citizenship is to be granted; and fourthly, the citizenship, if
acquired by virtue of such conventions will be akin to a citizenship
falling under Section 1(4), Article IV of the 1987 Constitution,
recognizing citizenship by naturalization in accordance with law or
by a special act of Congress.
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Poe-Llamanzares vs. Commission on Elections
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former Filipino citizen and his or her family who had been
naturalized in a foreign country and comes or returns to the
Philippines. In other words, a balikbayan may be a Filipino citizen
or a former Filipino who has been naturalized in a foreign country.
Notably, the law itself provides that a former Filipino citizen may
„come or return‰ to the Philippines · this means that he/she may
be returning to permanently reside in the country or may just visit
for a temporary stay.
Same; View that a Filipino balikbayan, by virtue of his
Philippine citizenship, has the right to permanently reside in any
part of the Philippines. Conversely, a foreigner-balikbayan, though a
former Philippine citizen, may only acquire this right by applying
for an immigrant visa and an immigrant certificate of residence
(ICR) or by reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. Evidently, the
nature of the stay of a foreigner-balikbayan who avails of the visa-
free entry privilege is only temporary, unless he acquires an
immigrant visa or until he reacquires Philippine citizenship.·RA
No. 6768, as amended, further provides for the privilege of a visa-
free entry to the Philippines for a period of one (1) year for foreign
passport holders, with the exception of restricted nationals. I stress
in this regard that not all balikbayans enter the Philippines via a
visa-free entry, as the privilege applies only to foreign passport
holders and not to Filipino citizens bearing Philippine passports
upon entry. The distinction is significant because a Filipino
balikbayan, by virtue of his Philippine citizenship, has the right to
permanently reside in any part of the Philippines. Conversely, a
foreigner-balikbayan, though a former Philippine citizen,
may only acquire this right by applying for an immigrant
visa and an immigrant certificate of residence or by
reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. Evidently, the nature of
the stay of a foreigner-balikbayan who avails of the visa-free entry
privilege is only temporary, unless he acquires an immigrant visa or
until he reacquires Philippine citizenship.
Citizenship; Domicile; View that Poe reacquired Philippine
citizenship only on July 18, 2006 when the Bureau of Immigration
and Deportation (BID) granted her Republic Act (RA) No. 9225
application; Under RA No. 9225, a person acquires the right to
establish domicile in the Philippines upon reacquiring Philippine
citizenship. Prior to this, a former Philippine citizen has no right to
reside in the Philippines save only temporarily as our Immigration
laws allow.·Poe reacquired Philippine citizenship only on July 18,
2006 when the BID granted her RA No. 9225 application. Under
Section 5(2) of RA No. 9225, the right to enjoy full civil and political
rights that attach to Philippine citizenship begins only upon its
reacquisition. Thus, under RA No. 9225, a person acquires the right
to establish domicile in the Philippines upon reacquiring Philippine
citizenship. Prior to this, a former Philippine citizen has no right to
reside in the Philippines save only temporarily as our Immigration
laws allow. In this light, the COMELEC correctly ruled that July
18, 2006 is the earliest possible date for
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natural impulse to claim oneÊs own child, the sad reality is that
there are still many parents who abandon their child, depriving
said child not only of parental love and care, but also identity and
pedigree. Every opportunity should thus be given to the innocent
child to trace his/her parentage and determine compliance with the
Constitution. This opportunity and this privilege should not be
time-bound, and should be afforded to every foundling at any stage
of his/her life. Thus, even if the Court rules on her citizenship now,
that ruling can be changed or altered any time when there is
certainty or definiteness about her biological lineage because there
is generally no res judicata in matters of citizenship. As the Court
has declared in Moy Ya Lim Yao v. Commissioner of Immigration, 41
SCRA 292 (1971), whenever the citizenship of a person is material
or indispensable in a judicial or administrative case, the ruling
therein as to the personÊs citizenship is generally not considered as
res judicata. Thus, it may be threshed out again and again as the
occasion demands, stock being taken of the fact that the requisites
enumerated in In re Petition for Naturalization of Zita Ngo Burca v.
Republic, 51 SCRA 248 (1973), reiterated in Go, Sr. v. Ramos, 598
SCRA 266 (2009), are all present.
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Poe-Llamanzares vs. Commission on Elections
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Same; View that being still a citizen of the United States (U.S.)
at the time of her return to the Philippines on May 24, 2005,
petitioner remained entitled to the rights, privileges, and the
protection the US government extends to its nationals, including the
right to residence; Absent compelling evidence to show that he/she
had reestablished domicile in another country, it should therefore be
presumed that he/she continues to be domiciled in the country he/she
is a citizen of.·I further observe that the need for stronger proof
becomes more apparent when the person involved is one who has
been domiciled in another country as part of his/her naturalization
as a citizen therein. As such, while citizenship and residency are
different from and independent of each other · this, being the key
premise in the CourtÊs rulings in Japzon v. COMELEC, 576 SCRA
331 (2009), and Caballero v. COMELEC, 771 SCRA 213 (2015) · I
do believe that „one may invariably affect the other.‰ Being still a
citizen of the US at the time of her return to the Philippines on May
24, 2005, petitioner remained entitled to the rights, privileges, and
the protection the US government extends to its nationals,
including the right to residence. In fact, from May 24, 2005 to
October 20, 2010, petitioner availed of this privilege when she
returned to the US, on separate dates, significantly, for no less than
five times. To my mind, the ability to enjoy the privileges of foreign
citizenship at any time, while remaining under that status, conjures
a reasonable presumption that the latter continues to avail of these
privileges, which, among others, include the privilege to reside in
that foreign country. Hence, absent compelling evidence to show
that he/she had reestablished domicile in another country, it should
therefore be presumed that he/she continues to be domiciled in the
country he/she is a citizen of.
Election Law; Residence; Cancellation of Certificate of
Candidacy; Misrepresentation; Honest Mistake; View that while
petitioner may later impugn an admission against interest, the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) found that her residency
declaration in her 2012 Certificate of Candidacy (CoC) could not be
borne out of an „honest mistake‰; the falsity of the material
representation already justifies the cancellation of petitionerÊs CoC.
·It is certainly not patent and grave error for the COMELEC to
regard a CoC as a notarized document and accord it the
presumption of regularity. Also, while petitioner may later impugn
an admission against interest, the COMELEC found that her
residency declaration in her 2012 CoC could not be borne out of an
„honest mistake,‰ in light of the following considerations: (a) the
bulk, if not all, of the evidence she presented were executed before
she reacquired her Philippine citizenship, which cannot be done in
light of Coquilla, among others; (b) while she made statements
acknowledging that there was a mistake in her 2015 CoC, they were
nonetheless delivered at a time when, at the very least, the
possibility of her running for President was already a matter of
public knowledge; and (c) petitioner was a well-educated woman
and a high-ranking official with a competent staff and a band of
legal advisers and is not entirely unacquainted with Philippine
politics, and thus, would know how to fill-up a pro forma CoC in
2012. As I
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see it, these reasons are not barren of any considerable merit.
At the very least, they are plausible enough to negate the finding
that the conclusion amounted to grave abuse of discretion. Besides,
I believe that the falsity of the material representation already
justifies the cancellation of petitionerÊs CoC. As above intimated, a
candidateÊs intent is immaterial to a Section 78 analysis.
Remedial Law; Burden of Evidence; Foundlings; View that
while petitioner did not bear the initial burden of proving that she
made a false material representation on her citizenship in her 2015
Certificate of Candidacy (CoC), as that burden belonged to those who
filed the petitions to deny due course to or cancel her CoC before the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC), the burden of evidence
shifted to her when she voluntarily admitted her status as a
foundling.·In this case, petitioner has shown no evidence of blood
relation to a Filipino parent to prove that she acquired Filipino
citizenship by birth under the jus sanguinis principle. While
petitioner did not bear the initial burden of proving that she made a
false material representation on her citizenship in her 2015 CoC, as
that burden belonged to those who filed the petitions to deny due
course to or cancel her CoC before the COMELEC, the burden of
evidence shifted to her when she voluntarily admitted her status as
a foundling. Under Section 1, Article IV of the 1935 Constitution,
which governs petitionerÊs case, foundlings are not included in the
enumeration of who are considered as Filipino citizens.
Citizenship; Natural-born Citizens; Foundlings; View that
without any proof of blood relation to a Filipino parent, and without
any mention in the 1935 Constitution that foundlings are considered
or are even presumed to be Filipino citizens by birth, the
Commission on ElectionsÊ (COMELECÊs) finding that petitioner was
not a natural-born citizen cannot be taken as patently unreasonable
and grossly baseless so as to amount to grave abuse of discretion.·
Without any proof of blood relation to a Filipino parent, and without
any mention in the 1935 Constitution that foundlings are
considered or are even presumed to be Filipino citizens by birth, the
COMELECÊs finding that petitioner was not a natural-born citizen
cannot be taken as patently unreasonable and grossly baseless so as
to amount to grave abuse of discretion. As it is apparent, the
COMELEC, with good reason, relied on the plain text of the 1935
Constitution based on the statutory construction axioms of expressio
unius est exclusio alterius and verba legis non est recedendum, as
well as firmly abided by the jus sanguinis principle which, as
repeatedly stated, necessitates proof of blood relation, of which
petitioner presented none. Accordingly, its analysis was grounded
on sound legal basis and therefore unreflective of grave abuse of
discretion.
Same; Same; Same; View that while petitioner argues that
foundlings should be considered as natural-born Filipinos based on
the intent of the framers of the 1935 Constitution, it should be
pointed out that the 1935 Constitution, as it was adopted in its final
form, never carried over any proposed provision on
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that she could exert time and extraordinary expense to find the
parents who might have abandoned her, this will not apply to all
foundlings. Thus, this approach will concede that we will have a
class of citizens who are stateless due to no fault of theirs.
Same; Same; Foundlings; View that an interpretation that
foundlings are not natural-born Filipino citizens would mean that
we should teach our foundling citizens to never aspire to serve the
country in any of the above capacities.·An interpretation that
foundlings are not natural-born Filipino citizens would mean that
we should teach our foundling citizens to never aspire to serve the
country in any of the above capacities. This is not only inconsistent
with the text of our ConstitutionÊs citizenship provisions, which
required only evidence of citizenship and not of the identities of the
parents. It unnecessarily creates a classification of citizens with
limited rights based on the circumstances of their births. This is
discriminatory. Our Constitution provides that citizens shall have
equal protection of the law and equal access to opportunities for
public service.
Same; Same; Same; Equal Protection of the Laws; View that
apart from the anonymity of their biological parents, there is no
substantial distinction between foundlings and children with known
Filipino parents, all of whom are protected by the state from birth.·
The equal protection clause guarantees that „persons under like
circumstances and falling within the same class are treated alike,
in terms of Âprivileges conferred and liabilities enforced.Ê It is a
guarantee against Âundue favor and individual or class privilege, as
well as hostile discrimination or oppression of inequality.ʉ Apart
from the anonymity of their biological parents, there is no
substantial distinction between foundlings and children with known
Filipino parents, all of whom are protected by the state from birth.
The foundlingsÊ fortuitous inability to identify their biological
parents who abandoned them cannot be the basis of a law or an
interpretation that has the effect of treating them as less entitled to
the rights and protection given by the state. To base a classification
on this circumstance would be to sanction statelessness and the
marginalization of a particular class who, by force of chance, was
already made to start life under tragic circumstances.
International Law; Treaties; View that ratification of treaties by
the Senate makes it legally effective and binding by transformation.
·Treaties are „international agreement[s] concluded between
states in written form and governed by international law, whether
embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related
instruments and whatever its particular designation.‰ They require
concurrence by the Senate before they become binding upon the
state. Thus, Article VII, Section 21 of the Constitution provides:
SECTION 21. No treaty or international agreement shall be valid
and effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the
Members of the Senate. Ratification of treaties by the Senate makes
it legally effective and binding by transformation.
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Same; Same; View that it does not matter that petitioner owns
residential properties in the United States (U.S.), or even that she
actually uses them as temporary places of abode. What matters is
that petitioner has established and continues to maintain domicile
in the Philippines.·Even on the assumption that the remaining
properties in the United States may indeed be characterized as
petitionerÊs residence, ValdezÊs assertion fails to appreciate the basic
distinction between residence and domicile. It is this distinction
that permits a person to maintain a separate residence
simultaneously with his or her domicile. Ultimately, it does not
matter that petitioner owns residential properties in the United
States, or even that she actually uses them as temporary places of
abode. What matters is that petitioner has established and
continues to maintain domicile in the Philippines.
Citizenship; Natural-born Citizens; Foundlings; Presumptions;
View that the principles of constitutional construction favor an
interpretation that foundlings like petitioner are natural-born
citizens of the Philippines absent proof resulting from evidence
tpreso the contrary.·Relying on the single fact of being an
abandoned newborn is unreasonable, arbitrary, and discriminatory.
It fails to consider all other pieces of evidence submitted by
petitioner for the fair and unbiased consideration of the
Commission on Elections. The principles of constitutional
construction favor an interpretation that foundlings like petitioner
are natural-born citizens of the Philippines absent proof resulting
from evidence to the contrary. Such proof must show that both ·
not only one · of petitionerÊs parents were foreigners at the time of
her birth. Without conceding that foundlings are not · even
presumptively · natural-born Filipinos, petitioner has presented
substantial evidence that her biological parents are Filipinos.
Same; Same; Same; View that our Constitution and our
domestic laws, including the treaties we have ratified, enjoin us from
interpreting our citizenship provisions in a manner that promotes
exclusivity and an animus against those who were abandoned and
neglected.·Petitioner never had to go through our naturalization
processes. Instead, she has been treated as a Filipino citizen upon
birth, subject to our laws. Administrative bodies, the Commission
on Elections, the President, and most importantly, the electorate
have treated her as a Filipino citizen and recognized her natural-
born status. Not being a Filipino by naturalization, therefore,
petitioner could have acquired Filipino citizenship because her
parent/s, from her birth, has/have always been considered Filipino
citizen/s who, in accordance with our jus sanguinis principle,
bestowed natural-born citizenship to her under Article IV, Section
1(1) to (3) of the Constitution. Our Constitution and our domestic
laws, including the treaties we have ratified, enjoin us from
interpreting our citizenship provisions in a manner that promotes
exclusivity and an animus against those who were abandoned and
neglected.
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occasion, does not give her the right to claim such former
domicile as her residence.·The facts that Poe did not renounce her
US citizenship until 2010 and used her US passport between 2006
and 2010 do not affect her establishment of domicile in the
Philippines. The circumstance that Poe, after leaving the US and
fixing her residence in the Philippines, may have had what is called
a „floating intention‰ to return to her former domicile upon some
indefinite occasion, does not give her the right to claim such former
domicile as her residence. It is her establishment of domicile in the
Philippines with the intention of remaining here for an indefinite
time that severed the respondentÊs domiciliary relation with her
former home. This is consistent with the basic rule that she could
have only one domicile at a time.
Same; Same; View that a foreign national can establish
domicile here without undergoing naturalization.·I now discuss
the effect of the fact that Poe entered the country in May 2005 as an
American citizen under the balikbayan visa-free program. There is
no dispute among the parties that citizenship and residence are
distinct concepts. A foreign national can establish domicile here
without undergoing naturalization. Where there is disagreement is
whether Poe could have established her domicile in the Philippines
in May 2005 considering that her entry was through the balikbayan
program, which is valid for one year. Respondents, on the one hand,
believe it was not possible because of the temporary nature of her
stay. For them, Poe should have first secured an Immigrant
Certificate of Residence or repatriated earlier than July 2006. On
the other hand, Poe contends that to require either would be to add
a fourth requisite to the establishment of domicile.
Balikbayan Program; View that with the amendments
introducing the reintegration provisions, a balikbayan is no longer
precluded from developing an intent to stay permanently in the
Philippines.·The amendments introduced by RA 9174 to RA 6768
differentiate the present case from Coquilla v. COMELEC, 385
SCRA 607 (2002). In that case, decided prior to the enactment of RA
9174, the Court concluded that a visa-free balikbayan visitor could
not have established domicile in the Philippines prior to a waiver of
his nonresident status. This is because under RA 6768, the only
declared purpose was „to attract and encourage overseas Filipinos
to come and visit their motherland.‰ Coupled with the one-year
visa-free limit, this most likely led to the CourtÊs interpretation that
a balikbayanÊs entry was merely temporary. However, with the
amendments introducing the reintegration provisions,
a balikbayan is no longer precluded from developing an intent to
stay permanently in the Philippines. Therefore, Poe, who entered
the Philippines after the effectivity of RA 9174, had the ability to
establish a lawful domicile in the Philippines even prior to her
reacquisition of Filipino citizenship.
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statement, this Court found in that case that Mitra did not
commit any deliberate material misrepresentation in his certificate
of candidacy. Moreover, this Court held that the COMELEC gravely
abused its discretion in its appreciation of the evidence which led it
to conclude that Mitra was not a resident of Aborlan, Palawan. The
COMELEC, too, failed to critically consider whether Mitra
deliberately attempted to mislead, misinform or hide a fact that
would otherwise render him ineligible for the position of Governor
of Palawan. In Jalover v. Osmeña, 736 SCRA 267 (2014), the
requirement of intent to deceive was restated, thus: Separate from
the requirement of materiality, a false representation under Section
78 must consist of a „deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or
hide a fact, which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible.‰ In
other words, it must be made with the intention to deceive the
electorate as to the would-be candidateÊs qualifications for public
office. x x x These cases show that there must be a deliberate
attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise
render a candidate ineligible. Therefore, the requirement of intent
cannot be disposed of by a simple finding that there was false
representation of a material fact; to be sure, there must also be a
showing of the candidateÊs intent to deceive as animating the
making of the false material representation.
Same; Same; Same; Burden of Proof; View that contrary to the
rules of evidence, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) shifted
the burden of proof to the petitioner, ascribing to her the onus of
showing that she had the qualifications to run for President, instead
of requiring the respondents to prove the three (3) elements that
furnish the grounds for denial of due course or cancellation of
certificate of candidacy (CoC).―Contrary to the rules of evidence,
the COMELEC shifted the burden of proof to the petitioner,
ascribing to her the onus of showing that she had the qualifications
to run for President, instead of requiring the respondents to prove
the three elements that furnish the grounds for denial of due course
or cancellation of certificate of candidacy. Burden of proof is the
duty of a party to present evidence on the facts in issue necessary to
establish his claim or defense by the amount of evidence required by
law. This Court has consistently held, and it is an established rule,
that the burden of evidence may shift depending upon the
exigencies of the case in the course of trial; however, the burden of
proof remains with the party upon whom it is originally imposed ·
he who seeks the affirmative of an issue. In this case, as with other
election cases, the burden of proof is placed upon the parties
seeking the denial of due course or cancellation of a certificate of
candidacy.
Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Certiorari; Grave Abuse of
Discretion; View that to impute intent to mislead upon a person who
represents what she knows to the best of her knowledge and belief to
be true, as supported by the evidence, is to commit grave abuse of
discretion.―The totality of evidence presented by the petitioner
points to a decision and action to establish a new domi-
111
112
113
PEREZ, J.:
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The Facts
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47 Id., at p. 29.
48 Id., at p. 27; COMELEC First Division Resolution, supra note 1 at
p. 6.
49 Id., at p. 30; id.
50 Id.
51 Id., at p. 27; COMELEC First Division Resolution, supra note 1 at
p. 6.
52 Id., at p. 31; id.
53 Comment, supra note 5 at p. 9.
54 Petition for Certiorari, supra note 1 at p. 31.
55 Id., at p. 32; Comment, supra note 5 at p. 10.
56 Id.; COMELEC First Division Resolution, supra note 1 at p. 6.
57 Id.; id., at p. 7.
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58 Id.; id.
59 Comment (on the Petition in G.R. No. 221697) filed by respondent
Elamparo, dated January 6, 2016, p. 7.
60 COMELEC Second Division Resolution dated December 1, 2015 in
SPA No. 15-001 (DC), p. 7.
61 Id., at pp. 7-8.
62 Id., at p. 7.
63 Id.
64 Id., at p. 8.
65 Id.
66 Petition for Certiorari in G.R. No. 221697, p. 7.
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122
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123
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126
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96 Id.
97 Id.
98 Id.
99 Id., at pp. 9-10.
100 Id., at p. 10.
101 Id.
102 Id.
103 The 11 December 2015 Resolution of the COMELEC First
Division was concurred in by Commissioners Louie Tito F. Guia and Ma.
Rowena Amelia V. Guanzon. Presiding Commissioner Christian Robert S.
Lim issued a Separate Dissenting Opinion.
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111 Statistics from the PSA or its predecessor agencies are admissible
evidence. See Herrera v. Commission on Elections, 376 Phil. 443; 318
SCRA 336 (1999) and Bagabuyo v. Commission on Elections, 593 Phil.
678; 573 SCRA 290 (2008). In the latter case, the Court even took judicial
notice of the figures.
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122 See Exhibit „1‰ in SPA No. 15-001 (DC) and SPA No. 15-00 (DC).
123 See Exhibit „2‰ in SPA No. 15-001 (DC) and SPA No. 15-00 (DC).
124 Razon, Jr. v. Tagitis, 621 Phil. 536, 600; 606 SCRA 598, 673
(2009), citing Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the
Philippines v. Duque III, 561 Phil. 386, 398; 535 SCRA 265, 289 (2007).
125 Article 38.1, paragraphs (b) and (c) of the Statute of the
International Court of Justice.
126 Mijares v. Ranada, 495 Phil. 372, 395; 455 SCRA 397, 421 (2005).
127 Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the Philippines v.
Duque III, supra at p. 400; p. 291.
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Article 7
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Article 24
Article 14
Article 2
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141 692 Phil. 407, 420; 678 SCRA 267, 280 (2012).
142 551 Phil. 368, 381; 523 SCRA 390, 404 (2007).
143 531 Phil. 407, 417; 500 SCRA 9, 19 (2006).
144 Parreño v. Commission on Audit, supra.
145 Bengson III v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, supra
note 140 at p. 646; p. 552.
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On Residence
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168 Ugdoracion, Jr. v. COMELEC, 575 Phil. 253, 265-266; 552 SCRA
231, 242-243 (2008).
169 In Mitra v. COMELEC, [636 Phil. 753; 622 SCRA 744 (2010)], it
was ruled that the residence requirement can be complied with through
an incremental process including acquisition of business interest in the
pertinent place and lease of feedmill building as residence.
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