G.R. No. L-57438 January 3, 1984 objection on the ground that petitioner actually received P14,000.

jection on the ground that petitioner actually received P14,000.00 for the sale of a
residential land and not P12,000.00 only as stated in the deed of sale and reported by him
FELICIANO FRANCISCO, petitioner, in his inventory. The respondent Judge found the claim to be true, and, in his order of
vs. April 17, 1980 relieved the petitioner as guardian.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and PELAGIO FRANCISCO, respondents.
On motion of petitioner, however, the respondent Judge reconsidered his finding, relying
Nicomedes M. Jajardo for petitioner. on the deed of sale as the best evidence of the price paid for the sale of the land. in his
order dated September 12, 1980, respondent judge acknowledged that his finding was
"rather harsh and somewhat unfair to the said guardian." Nevertheless, respondent Judge
Crescini & Associates Law Office for private respondent.
ordered the retirement of petitioner on the ground of old age. The order states in part as
follows:

"... considering the rather advanced age of the present guardian, this Court is inclined and
GUERRERO, J.:
so decrees, that he should nevertheless be, as he is hereby, retired to take effect upon the
appointment by this court and the assumption of office of his replacement, who shall be
This petition for review on certiorari seeks the annulment of the decision and resolution taken from the recommendees of the parties herein. For this purpose, the present
of the defunct Court of Appeals, now Intermediate Appellate Court, dated April 27, 1981. guardian is hereby given twenty (20) days from receipt of a copy of this order within
and June 26, 1981. respectively, dismissing the petition for certiorari filed by petitioner which to submit his proposal for a replacement for himself and to comment on
Feliciano Francisco docketed as CA-G.R. No. 12172 entitled "Feliciano Francisco versus petitioner's recommendee and the latter a like period within which to comment on the
Judge Jesus R. De Vega and Pelagio Francisco". In the said petition for certiorari, petitioner present guardian's proposed substitute, after which the matter will be deemed submitted
Feliciano Francisco challenged the validity of the Order of the Court of First Instance of for resolution and final action by the court.
Bulacan, Fifth Judicial District, Branch II, now Regional Trial Court, granting execution
pending appeal of its decision by relieving petitioner Feliciano Francisco as guardian of
SO ORDERED."
incompetent Estefania San Pedro and appointing respondent herein, Pelagio Francisco, in
his instead.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, contending that he was only 72 years of age
and still fit to continue with the management of the estate of his ward as he had done
The antecedent facts as recited in the appealed decision of the Court of Appeals showed
with zeal for the past twelve years. In an order dated November 13, 1980 the court
that:
denied his motion. Accordingly, on December 17, 1980, petiti/ner filed a notice of appeal
'from the order issued by the court on November 13, 1980' and paid the appeal bond. On
Petitioner is the duly appointed guardian of the incompetent Estefania San Pedro in February 2, 1981 he filed the record on appeal.
Special Proceedings No. 532 of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan presided over by
respondent Judge. On August 30, 1974 respondent Pelagio Francisco, claiming to be a first
Meanwhile, on January 27, 1981, the court, on motion of private respondent, required
cousin of Estefania San Pedro, together with two others, said to be nieces of the
petitioner to submit within three days his nomination for guardian of Estefania San Pedro
incompetent, petitioned the court for the removal of petitioner and for the appointment
as required in its order of September 12, 1980. In issuing the order, the court stated that
in his stead of respondent Pelagio Francisco. Among other grounds, the petition was
'an indefinite discontinuance in office would defeat the intent and purpose of the said
based on the failure of the guardian to submit an inventory of the estate of his ward and
order of September 12, 1980 relieving the present guardian.
to render an accounting.
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, this petition. (referring to CA-
It would seem that petitioner subsequently rendered an accounting but failed to submit
G.R. No. SP-1217)"
an inventory, for which reason the court on March 20, 1975 gave petitioner ten (10) days
within which to do so, otherwise he would be removed from guardianship Petitioner
thereafter submitted an inventory to which respondent Pelagio Francisco filed an
On December 5, 1980, before the appeal was perfected, Pelagio Francisco filed an
"Omnibus Motion" with the court a quo with the prayer (1) to restrain guardian from
exercising office; (2) order guardian to surrender to court all properties of the ward; and
(3) appoint new guardian . 2
Petitioner, on December 9, 1980 filed his opposition to the omnibus motion claiming that
the same was premature. 3 The trial court, however, disregarded the opposition and
required petitioner on January 27, 1981 to submit within three (3) days his nomination for
guardian of Estefania San Pedro as required in its order of September 12, 1980, the court
holding that "an indefinite continuance in office would defeat the intent and purpose of
the said order of September 12, 1980, relieving the present guardian." 4
Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the said order, 5 but the trial court overruled the
same on March 4, 1981. Subsequently, on March 11, 1981, 6 the court a quo appointed
respondent Pelagio Francisco as the new guardian of the person and property of the
incompetent Estefania San Pedro. 7
On March 13, 1981, petitioner filed with the defunct Court of Appeals a petition for
certiorari challenging the validity of the order of the trial court granting the execution
pending appeal of its decision and appointing respondent Pelagio Francisco as the new
guardian despite the fact that respondent is five (5) years older than petitioner, docketed
as CA-G.R. No. 12172.
The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition on April 23, 1981, the pertinent portion of its
decision reading as follows:
The Rules of Court authorizes executions pending appeal "upon good reasons to be stated
in a special order." (Rule 39, Sec. 2). In the case at bar, the retirement of petitioner was
ordered on the ground of old age. When this ground is considered in relation to the delay
of the petitioner in the making of an accounting and the submission of an inventory, the
order amounts to a finding that petitioner, considering his "rather advanced age," was no
longer capable of managing the estate of his ward. Rule 97, Sec. 2). Given this finding, it is
clear that petitioner's continuance in office would not be in the best interest of the ward.
It is of course true that the order of removal is not yet final. Considering the time -it
normally takes for appeals to be finally determined as well as the purpose of the order
under appeal, which would be frustrated if it is not immediately executed, we cannot say
that respondent acted with grave and irreparable damage and that the order of
September 12, 1980 is not yet final, petitioner has not demonstrated that in ordering
execution pending appeal, the respondent Judge committed a grave abuse of discretion.
Indeed, the granting of execution pending appeal ties within the sound discretion of a
court. Appellate courts win not interfere to discretion, unless it modify control or inquire
into the exercise of this be shown that there has been an abuse of that discretion. (2
Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 260 [1979].
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED, without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED. 8
Petitioner subsequently filed another motion for reconsideration advancing the following
arguments: that to grant execution pending appeal would render petitioner's appeal moot
and academic that "advanced age" was not one of the, grounds raised by private
respondent in the court below; that the court a quo abuse its discretion in appointing
respondent as guardian despite the fact that private respondent is five (5) years older
than petitioner.9
The respondent appellate court, in its resolution dated June 26, 1981, denied petitioner's
motion for reconsideration, the court finding it unnecessary to repeat the discussion of
the arguments which it had already considered and only entertained the argument
regarding the competency of the respondent as the new guardian. On this point,
respondent Court ruled:
The order of March 11, 1981 appointing respondent Francisco as guardian was never
assailed in the petition in this case. As already stated, this case concerns the validity only
of the orders of January 27, 1981 and March 4, 1981 which required petitioner to
recommend his own replacement, otherwise the court would appoint a new guardian. It
does not appear that petitioner objected to the appointment of respondent Francisco on
the ground now invoked, namely, that Francisco is in fact older than petitioner. Nor does
it appear that petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the order of March 11,
1981, calling attention to the fact that respondent Francisco is older than petitioner, In
short, the point now raised does not appear to have been urged in the lower court so that
the latter could have rectified the error, if it was error at all, For this reason, it is not
proper ground for certiorari before this Court, much less for a motion for reconsideration.
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED. 10
In the petition at bar, petitioner contends that (a) The Honorable Court of Appeals has
committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that the removal of petitioner as guardian
of the ward Estefania San Pedro on the ground of old age is a good ground for the
execution of the decision pending appeal; and (b) The Honorable Court of Appeals
committed grave misapprehension and misinterpretation of facts when it declared that
petitioner did not question the appointment of private respondent as guardian in his
stead on the ground that the latter is older than the former by five (5) years.
A guardianship is a trust relation of the most sacred character, in which one person, called
a "guardian" acts for another called the "ward" whom the law regards as incapable of
managing his own affairs. A guardianship is designed to further the ward's well-being, not
that of the guardian, It is intended to preserve the ward's property, as wen as to render
any assistance that the ward may personally require. It has been stated that while custody
involves immediate care and control, guardianship indicates not only those
responsibilities, but those of one in loco parentis as well.
Having in mind that guardianship proceeding is instituted for the benefit and welfare of
the ward, the selection of a guardian must, therefore, suit this very purpose. Thus, in
determining the selection of a guardian, the court may consider the financial situation,
the physical condition, the sound judgment, prudence and trustworthiness, the morals,
character and conduct, and the present and past history of a prospective appointee, as
wen as the probability of his, being able to exercise the powers and duties of guardian for
the full period during which guardianship will be necessary.
A guardian is or becomes incompetent to serve the trust if he is so disqualified by mental
incapacity, conviction of crime, moral delinquency or physical disability as to be prevented
from properly discharging the duties of his office. A guardian, once appointed may be
removed in case he becomes insane or otherwise incapable of discharging his trust or
unsuitable therefor, or has wasted or mismanaged the estate, or failed for thirty (30) days
after it is due to render an account or make a return.
We agree with the trial court and the appellate court that there is need for petitioner
Feliciano Francisco to be retired from the guardianship over the person and property of
incompetent Estefania San Pedro. The conclusion reached by the trial court about the
"rather advanced age" of petitioner at 72 years old (petitioner is now 76 years old) finding
him unfit to continue the trust cannot be disturbed. As correctly pointed out by the
appellate court, this finds direct support in the delay of the accounting and inventory
made by petitioner. To sustain petitioner as guardian would, therefore, be detrimental to
the ward. While age alone is not a control criterion in determining a person's fitness or
qualification to be appointed or be retained as guardian, it may be a factor for
consideration.
Considering the difficult and complicated responsibilities and duties of a guardian, We
sustain the immediate retirement of petitioner Feliciano Francisco as guardian, affirming
thereby the rulings of both the trial court and the appellate court.
With respect to the issue of execution pending appeal in appointing respondent Pelagio
Francisco as guardian to succeed petitioner while the latter's appeal was still pending, We
hold and rule that respondent appellate court correctly sustained the propriety of said
execution pending appeal. Upon urgent and compelling reasons, execution pending
appeal is a matter of sound discretion on the part of the trial court, and the appellate
court will not interfere, control or inquire into the exercise of this discretion, unless there
has been an abuse thereof, which We find none herein.
Inasmuch as the primary objective for the institution of guardianship is for the protection
of the ward, there is more than sufficient reason for the immediate execution of the lower
court's judgment for the replacement of the first guardian. We agree with the reason
given by the appellate court in sustaining execution pending appeal that "an indefinite
continuance in office would defeat the intent and purpose of the order of September 12,
1980, relieving the present guardian (Feliciano Francisco)."
As to the issue concerning the appointment of respondent Pelagio Francisco as the new
guardian, We likewise agree with the respondent appellate court in denying in its
resolution of June 26, 1981 for lack of merit the motion for reconsideration filed by
petitioner questioning the appointment of private respondent Pelagio Francisco. We also
find no abuse of discretion committed by the appellate court.
The rule is well-established that appellate courts may not entertain issues brought before
it for the first time on appeal. (Jose Matienzo vs. Martin Servidad, 107 SCRA 276; Garcian
vs. Court of Appeals, 102 SCRA 597; Director of Lands vs. Dano 96 SCRA 160).
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the assailed decision and resolution of the
respondent court dated April 27, 1981 and June 26, 1981, respectively, are hereby
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Makasiar (Chairman), Concepcion, Jr. and De Castro, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
ABAD SANTOS, J., concurring:
I concur and I would have simply denied the petition for lack of merit without an
extended decision.
Aquino, J., concur. The removal of a guardian, like the removal of an administrator, may
be immediately executory (Borromeo Bros. Estate, Inc. vs. CA, 105 Phil. 466).
Escolin J., concurs in the result.
Separate Opinions
ABAD SANTOS, J., concurring:
I concur and I would have simply denied the petition for lack of merit without an
extended decision.
Aquino, J., concur. The removal of a guardian, like the removal of an administrator, may
be immediately executory (Borromeo Bros. Estate, Inc. vs. CA, 105 Phil. 466).
Escolin J., concurs in the result.
G.R. No. 184528 April 25, 2012
NILO OROPESA, Petitioner,
vs.
CIRILO OROPESA, Respondent.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure of the Decision1 dated February 29, 2008, as well as the Resolution2 dated
September 16, 2008, both rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 88449,
entitled "NILO OROPESA vs. CIRILO OROPESA." The Court of Appeals’ issuances affirmed
the Order3 dated September 27, 2006 and the Order4 dated November 14, 2006 issued
by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Parañaque City, Branch 260 in SP. Proc. Case No. 04-
0016, which dismissed petitioner Nilo Oropesa’s petition for guardianship over the
properties of his father, respondent Cirilo Oropesa (a widower), and denied petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration thereof, respectively.
The facts of this case, as summed in the assailed Decision, follow:
On January 23, 2004, the (petitioner) filed with the Regional Trial Court of Parañaque City,
a petition for him and a certain Ms. Louie Ginez to be appointed as guardians over the
property of his father, the (respondent) Cirilo Oropesa. The case was docketed as SP Proc.
No. 04-0016 and raffled off to Branch 260.
In the said petition, it is alleged among others that the (respondent) has been afflicted
with several maladies and has been sickly for over ten (10) years already having suffered a
stroke on April 1, 2003 and June 1, 2003, that his judgment and memory [were] impaired
and such has been evident after his hospitalization; that even before his stroke, the
(respondent) was observed to have had lapses in memory and judgment, showing signs of
failure to manage his property properly; that due to his age and medical condition, he
cannot, without outside aid, manage his property wisely, and has become an easy prey for
deceit and exploitation by people around him, particularly Ms. Ma. Luisa Agamata, his
girlfriend.
In an Order dated January 29, 2004, the presiding judge of the court a quo set the case for
hearing, and directed the court social worker to conduct a social case study and submit a
report thereon.
Pursuant to the abovementioned order, the Court Social Worker conducted her social
case study, interviewing the (petitioner) and his witnesses. The Court Social Worker
subsequently submitted her report but without any finding on the (respondent) who
refused to see and talk to the social worker.
On July 6, 2004, the (respondent) filed his Opposition to the petition for guardianship. On
August 3, 2004, the (respondent) filed his Supplemental Opposition.
Thereafter, the (petitioner) presented his evidence which consists of his testimony, and
that of his sister Gianina Oropesa Bennett, and the (respondent’s) former nurse, Ms. Alma
Altaya.
After presenting evidence, the (petitioner) filed a manifestation dated May 29, 2006
resting his case. The (petitioner) failed to file his written formal offer of evidence.
Thus, the (respondent) filed his "Omnibus Motion (1) to Declare the petitioner to have
waived the presentation of his Offer of Exhibits and the presentation of his Evidence
Closed since they were not formally offered; (2) To Expunge the Documents of the
Petitioner from the Record; and (3) To Grant leave to the Oppositor to File Demurrer to
Evidence.
In an Order dated July 14, 2006, the court a quo granted the (respondent’s) Omnibus
Motion. Thereafter, the (respondent) then filed his Demurrer to Evidence dated July 23,
2006.5 (Citations omitted.)
The trial court granted respondent’s demurrer to evidence in an Order dated September
27, 2006. The dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, considering that the petitioner has failed to provide sufficient evidence to
establish that Gen. Cirilo O. Oropesa is incompetent to run his personal affairs and to
administer his properties, Oppositor’s Demurrer to Evidence is GRANTED, and the case is
DISMISSED.6
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but this was denied by the trial court in an Order
dated November 14, 2006, the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, considering that the Court record shows that petitioner-movant has failed
to provide sufficient documentary and testimonial evidence to establish that Gen. Cirilo
Oropesa is incompetent to run his personal affairs and to administer his properties, the
Court hereby affirms its earlier Order dated 27 September 2006.
Accordingly, petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED for lack of merit.7
Unperturbed, petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals but his appeal was
dismissed through the now assailed Decision dated February 29, 2008, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered the instant appeal is DISMISSED. The assailed orders of
the court a quo dated September 27, 2006 and November 14, 2006 are AFFIRMED.8
A motion for reconsideration was filed by petitioner but this was denied by the Court of
Appeals in the similarly assailed Resolution dated September 16, 2008. Hence, the instant
petition was filed.
Petitioner submits the following question for consideration by this Court:
WHETHER RESPONDENT IS CONSIDERED AN "INCOMPETENT" PERSON AS DEFINED UNDER
SECTION 2, RULE 92 OF THE RULES OF COURT WHO SHOULD BE PLACED UNDER
GUARDIANSHIP9
After considering the evidence and pleadings on record, we find the petition to be
without merit.
Petitioner comes before the Court arguing that the assailed rulings of the Court of Appeals
should be set aside as it allegedly committed grave and reversible error when it affirmed
the erroneous decision of the trial court which purportedly disregarded the overwhelming
evidence presented by him showing respondent’s incompetence.
In Francisco v. Court of Appeals,10 we laid out the nature and purpose of guardianship in
the following wise:
A guardianship is a trust relation of the most sacred character, in which one person, called
a "guardian" acts for another called the "ward" whom the law regards as incapable of
managing his own affairs. A guardianship is designed to further the ward’s well-being, not
that of the guardian. It is intended to preserve the ward’s property, as well as to render
any assistance that the ward may personally require. It has been stated that while custody
involves immediate care and control, guardianship indicates not only those
responsibilities, but those of one in loco parentis as well.11
In a guardianship proceeding, a court may appoint a qualified guardian if the prospective
ward is proven to be a minor or an incompetent.
A reading of Section 2, Rule 92 of the Rules of Court tells us that persons who, though of
sound mind but by reason of age, disease, weak mind or other similar causes, are
incapable of taking care of themselves and their property without outside aid are
considered as incompetents who may properly be placed under guardianship. The full text
of the said provision reads:
Sec. 2. Meaning of the word "incompetent." – Under this rule, the word "incompetent"
includes persons suffering the penalty of civil interdiction or who are hospitalized lepers,
prodigals, deaf and dumb who are unable to read and write, those who are of unsound
mind, even though they have lucid intervals, and persons not being of unsound mind, but
by reason of age, disease, weak mind, and other similar causes, cannot, without outside
aid, take care of themselves and manage their property, becoming thereby an easy prey
for deceit and exploitation.
We have held in the past that a "finding that a person is incompetent should be anchored
on clear, positive and definite evidence."12 We consider that evidentiary standard
unchanged and, thus, must be applied in the case at bar.
In support of his contention that respondent is incompetent and, therefore, should be
placed in guardianship, petitioner raises in his Memorandum13 the following factual
matters:
a. Respondent has been afflicted with several maladies and has been sickly for
over ten (10) years already;
b. During the time that respondent was hospitalized at the St. Luke’s Medical
Center after his stroke, he purportedly requested one of his former colleagues
 who was visiting him to file a loan application with the Armed Forces of the
Philippines Savings and Loan Association, Inc. (AFPSLAI) for payment of his
hospital bills, when, as far as his children knew, he had substantial amounts of
money in various banks sufficient to cover his medical expenses;
c. Respondent’s residence allegedly has been left dilapidated due to lack of care
and management;
d. The realty taxes for respondent’s various properties remain unpaid and
therefore petitioner and his sister were supposedly compelled to pay the
necessary taxes;
e. Respondent allegedly instructed petitioner to sell his Nissan Exalta car for the
reason that the former would be purchasing another vehicle, but when the car
had been sold, respondent did not procure another vehicle and refused to
account for the money earned from the sale of the old car;
f. Respondent withdrew at least $75,000.00 from a joint account under his name
and his daughter’s without the latter’s knowledge or consent;
g. There was purportedly one occasion where respondent took a kitchen knife to
stab himself upon the "orders" of his girlfriend during one of their fights;
h. Respondent continuously allows his girlfriend to ransack his house of groceries
and furniture, despite protests from his children.14
Respondent denied the allegations made by petitioner and cited petitioner’s lack of
material evidence to support his claims. According to respondent, petitioner did not
present any relevant documentary or testimonial evidence that would attest to the
veracity of his assertion that respondent is incompetent largely due to his alleged
deteriorating medical and mental condition. In fact, respondent points out that the only
medical document presented by petitioner proves that he is indeed competent to run his
personal affairs and administer his properties. Portions of the said document, entitled
"Report of Neuropsychological Screening,"15 were quoted by respondent in his
Memorandum16 to illustrate that said report in fact favored respondent’s claim of
competence, to wit:
General Oropesa spoke fluently in English and Filipino, he enjoyed and participated
meaningfully in conversations and could be quite elaborate in his responses on many of
the test items. He spoke in a clear voice and his articulation was generally
comprehensible. x x x.
xxxx
General Oropesa performed in the average range on most of the domains that were
tested. He was able to correctly perform mental calculations and keep track of number
sequences on a task of attention. He did BEST in visuo-constructional tasks where he had
to copy geometrical designs using tiles. Likewise, he was able to render and read the
correct time on the Clock Drawing Test. x x x.
xxxx
x x x Reasoning abilities were generally intact as he was able to suggest effective solutions
to problem situations. x x x.17
With the failure of petitioner to formally offer his documentary evidence, his proof of his
father’s incompetence consisted purely of testimonies given by himself and his sister
(who were claiming interest in their father’s real and personal properties) and their
father’s former caregiver (who admitted to be acting under their direction). These
testimonies, which did not include any expert medical testimony, were insufficient to
convince the trial court of petitioner’s cause of action and instead lead it to grant the
demurrer to evidence that was filed by respondent.
Even if we were to overlook petitioner’s procedural lapse in failing to make a formal offer
of evidence, his documentary proof were comprised mainly of certificates of title over real
properties registered in his, his father’s and his sister’s names as co-owners, tax
declarations, and receipts showing payment of real estate taxes on their co-owned
properties, which do not in any way relate to his father’s alleged incapacity to make
decisions for himself. The only medical document on record is the aforementioned
"Report of Neuropsychological Screening" which was attached to the petition for
guardianship but was never identified by any witness nor offered as evidence. In any
event, the said report, as mentioned earlier, was ambivalent at best, for although the
report had negative findings regarding memory lapses on the part of respondent, it also
contained findings that supported the view that respondent on the average was indeed
competent.
In an analogous guardianship case wherein the soundness of mind of the proposed ward
was at issue, we had the occasion to rule that "where the sanity of a person is at issue,
expert opinion is not necessary [and that] the observations of the trial judge coupled with
evidence establishing the person’s state of mental sanity will suffice."18
Thus, it is significant that in its Order dated November 14, 2006 which denied petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration on the trial court’s unfavorable September 27, 2006 ruling, the
trial court highlighted the fatal role that petitioner’s own documentary evidence played in
disproving its case and, likewise, the trial court made known its own observation of
respondent’s physical and mental state, to wit:
The Court noted the absence of any testimony of a medical expert which states that Gen.
Cirilo O. Oropesa does not have the mental, emotional, and physical capacity to manage
his own affairs. On the contrary, Oppositor’s evidence includes a Neuropsychological
Screening Report which states that Gen. Oropesa, (1) performs on the average range in
most of the domains that were tested; (2) is capable of mental calculations; and (3) can
provide solutions to problem situations. The Report concludes that Gen. Oropesa
possesses intact cognitive functioning, except for mildly impaired abilities in memory,
reasoning and orientation. It is the observation of the Court that oppositor is still sharp,
alert and able.19 (Citation omitted; emphasis supplied.)
There was no error on the part of the trial court when it dismissed the petition for
guardianship without first requiring respondent to present his evidence precisely because
the effect of granting a demurrer to evidence other than dismissing a cause of action is,
evidently, to preclude a defendant from presenting his evidence since, upon the facts and
the law, the plaintiff has shown no right to relief.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED. The assailed Decision
dated February 29, 2008 as well as the Resolution dated September 16, 2008 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 88449 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

It is axiomatic that, as a general rule, "only questions of law may be raised in a petition for
review on certiorari because the Court is not a trier of facts."20 We only take cognizance
of questions of fact in certain exceptional circumstances;21 however, we find them to be
absent in the instant case. It is also long settled that "factual findings of the trial court,
when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, will not be disturbed by this Court. As a rule, such
findings by the lower courts are entitled to great weight and respect, and are deemed
final and conclusive on this Court when supported by the evidence on record."22 We
therefore adopt the factual findings of the lower court and the Court of Appeals and rule
that the grant of respondent’s demurrer to evidence was proper under the circumstances
obtaining in the case at bar.

Section 1, Rule 33 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 1. Demurrer to evidence. – After the plaintiff has completed the presentation of
his evidence, the defendant may move for dismissal on the ground that upon the facts
and the law the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. If his motion is denied, he shall have
the right to present evidence. If the motion is granted but on appeal the order of dismissal
is reversed he shall be deemed to have waived the right to present evidence.

A demurrer to evidence is defined as "an objection by one of the parties in an action, to

the effect that the evidence which his adversary produced is insufficient in point of law,
whether true or not, to make out a case or sustain the issue."23 We have also held that a
demurrer to evidence "authorizes a judgment on the merits of the case without the
defendant having to submit evidence on his part, as he would ordinarily have to do, if
plaintiff’s evidence shows that he is not entitled to the relief sought."24 1âwphi1
 There is no controversy as to the facts that gave rise to the present Petition, determined
by the Court of Appeals to be as follows:
G.R. No. 151243 April 30, 2008
LOLITA R. ALAMAYRI, petitioner,
vs.
ROMMEL, ELMER, ERWIN, ROILER and AMANDA, all surnamed PABALE, respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court filed by petitioner Lolita R. Alamayri (Alamayri) seeking the reversal and setting
aside of the Decision,2 dated 10 April 2001, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
58133; as well as the Resolution,3 dated 19 December 2001 of the same court denying
reconsideration of its aforementioned Decision. The Court of Appeals, in its assailed
Decision, upheld the validity of the Deed of Absolute Sale, dated 20 February 1984,
executed by Nelly S. Nave (Nave) in favor of siblings Rommel, Elmer, Erwin, Roiler and
Amanda, all surnamed Pabale (the Pabale siblings) over a piece of land (subject property)
in Calamba, Laguna, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-3317 (27604); and,
thus, reversed and set aside the Decision,4 dated 2 December 1997, of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Pasay City, Branch 119 in Civil Case No. 675-84-C.5 The 2 December 1997
Decision of the RTC declared null and void the two sales agreements involving the subject
property entered into by Nave with different parties, namely, Sesinando M. Fernando
(Fernando) and the Pabale siblings; and ordered the reconveyance of the subject property
to Alamayri, as Nave’s successor-in-interest.
This is a Complaint for Specific Performance with Damages filed by Sesinando M.
Fernando, representing S.M. Fernando Realty Corporation [Fernando] on
February 6, 1984 before the Regional Trial Court of Calamba, Laguna presided
over by Judge Salvador P. de Guzman, Jr., docketed as Civil Case No. 675-84-C
against Nelly S. Nave [Nave], owner of a parcel of land located in Calamba,
Laguna covered by TCT No. T-3317 (27604). [Fernando] alleged that on January 3,
1984, a handwritten "Kasunduan Sa Pagbibilihan" (Contract to Sell) was entered
into by and between him and [Nave] involving said parcel of land. However,
[Nave] reneged on their agreement when the latter refused to accept the partial
down payment he tendered to her as previously agreed because she did not
want to sell her property to him anymore. [Fernando] prayed that after trial on
the merits, [Nave] be ordered to execute the corresponding Deed of Sale in his
favor, and to pay attorney’s fees, litigation expenses and damages.
[Nave] filed a Motion to Dismiss averring that she could not be ordered to
execute the corresponding Deed of Sale in favor of [Fernando] based on the
following grounds: (1) she was not fully apprised of the nature of the piece of
paper [Fernando] handed to her for her signature on January 3, 1984. When she
was informed that it was for the sale of her property in Calamba, Laguna covered
by TCT No. T-3317 (27604), she immediately returned to [Fernando] the said
piece of paper and at the same time repudiating the same. Her repudiation was
further bolstered by the fact that when [Fernando] tendered the partial down
payment to her, she refused to receive the same; and (2) she already sold the
property in good faith to Rommel, Elmer, Erwin, Roller and Amanda, all
surnamed Pabale [the Pabale siblings] on February 20, 1984 after the complaint
was filed against her but before she received a copy thereof. Moreover, she
alleged that [Fernando] has no cause of action against her as he is suing for and
in behalf of S.M. Fernando Realty Corporation who is not a party to the alleged
Contract to Sell. Even assuming that said entity is the real party in interest, still,
[Fernando] cannot sue in representation of the corporation there being no
evidence to show that he was duly authorized to do so.
Subsequently, [the Pabale siblings] filed a Motion to Intervene alleging that they
are now the land owners of the subject property. Thus, the complaint was
amended to include [the Pabale siblings] as party defendants. In an Order dated
April 24, 1984, the trial court denied [Nave’s] Motion to Dismiss prompting her to
file a Manifestation and Motion stating that she was adopting the allegations in
her Motion to Dismiss in answer to [Fernando’s] amended complaint.
Thereafter, [Nave] filed a Motion to Admit her Amended Answer with
Counterclaim and Cross-claim praying that her husband, Atty. Vedasto
Gesmundo be impleaded as her co-defendant, and including as her defense
undue influence and fraud by reason of the fact that she was made to appear as
widow when in fact she was very much married at the time of the transaction in
issue. Despite the opposition of [Fernando] and [the Pabale siblings], the trial
court admitted the aforesaid Amended Answer with Counterclaim and Cross-
claim.
Still unsatisfied with her defense, [Nave] and Atty. Vedasto Gesmundo filed a
Motion to Admit Second Amended Answer and Amended Reply and Cross-claim
against [the Pabale siblings], this time including the fact of her incapacity to
contract for being mentally deficient based on the psychological evaluation
report conducted on December 2, 1985 by Dra. Virginia P. Panlasigui, M. A., a
clinical psychologist. Finding the motion unmeritorious, the same was denied by
the court a quo.
[Nave] filed a motion for reconsideration thereof asseverating that in Criminal
Case No. 1308-85-C entitled "People vs. Nelly S. Nave" she raised therein as a
defense her mental deficiency. This being a decisive factor to determine once
and for all whether the contract entered into by [Nave] with respect to the
subject property is null and void, the Second Amended Answer and Amended
Reply and Cross-claim against [the Pabale siblings] should be admitted.
Before the motion for reconsideration could be acted upon, the proceedings in
this case was suspended sometime in 1987 in view of the filing of a Petition for
Guardianship of [Nave] with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 36 of Calamba,
Laguna, docketed as SP No. 146-86-C with Atty. Vedasto Gesmundo as the
petitioner. On June 22, 1988, a Decision was rendered in the said guardianship
proceedings, the dispositive portion of which reads:
"Under the circumstances, specially since Nelly S. Nave who now resides
with the Brosas spouses has categorically refused to be examined again
at the National Mental Hospital, the Court is constrained to accept the
Neuro-Psychiatric Evaluation report dated April 14, 1986 submitted by
Dra. Nona Jean Alviso-Ramos and the supporting report dated April 20,
1987 submitted by Dr. Eduardo T. Maaba, both of the National Mental
Hospital and hereby finds Nelly S. Nave an incompetent within the
purview of Rule 92 of the Revised Rules of Court, a person who, by
reason of age, disease, weak mind and deteriorating mental processes
cannot without outside aid take care of herself and manage her
properties, becoming thereby an easy prey for deceit and exploitation,
said condition having become severe since the year 1980. She and her
estate are hereby placed under guardianship. Atty. Leonardo C. Paner is
hereby appointed as her regular guardian without need of bond, until
further orders from this Court. Upon his taking his oath of office as
regular guardian, Atty. Paner is ordered to participate actively in the
pending cases of Nelly S. Nave with the end in view of protecting her
interests from the prejudicial sales of her real properties, from the
overpayment in the foreclosure made by Ms. Gilda Mendoza-Ong, and
in recovering her lost jewelries and monies and other personal effects.
SO ORDERED."
Both [Fernando] and [the Pabale siblings] did not appeal therefrom, while the
appeal interposed by spouses Juliano and Evangelina Brosas was dismissed by
this Court for failure to pay the required docketing fees within the reglementary
period.
In the meantime, [Nave] died on December 9, 1992. On September 20, 1993,
Atty. Vedasto Gesmundo, [Nave’s] sole heir, she being an orphan and childless,
executed an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication pertaining to his inherited properties
from [Nave].
On account of such development, a motion for the dismissal of the instant case
and for the issuance of a writ of execution of the Decision dated June 22, 1988 in
SP No. 146-86-C (petition for guardianship) was filed by Atty. Vedasto Gesmundo
on February 14, 1996 with the court a quo. [The Pabale siblings] filed their
Opposition to the motion on grounds that (1) they were not made a party to the
guardianship proceedings and thus cannot be bound by the Decision therein; and
(2) that the validity of the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by the late [Nave] in
their favor was never raised in the guardianship case.
The case was then set for an annual conference. On January 9, 1997, Atty.
Vedasto Gesmundo filed a motion seeking the court’s permission for his
substitution for the late defendant Nelly in the instant case. Not long after the
parties submitted their respective pre-trial briefs, a motion for substitution was
filed by Lolita R. Alamayre (sic) [Alamayri] alleging that since the subject property
was sold to her by Atty. Vedasto Gesmundo as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute
Sale, she should be substituted in his stead. In refutation, Atty. Vedasto
Gesmundo filed a Manifestation stating that what he executed is a Deed of
Donation and not a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of [Alamayri] and that the
same was already revoked by him on March 5, 1997. Thus, the motion for
substitution should be denied.
 On July 29, 1997, the court a quo issued an Order declaring that it cannot make a
ruling as to the conflicting claims of [Alamayri] and Atty. Vedasto Gesmundo.
After the case was heard on the merits, the trial court rendered its Decision on
December 2, 1997, the dispositive portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1. Declaring the handwritten Contract to Sell dated January 3, 1984
executed by Nelly S. Nave and Sesinando Fernando null and void and of
no force and effect;
2. Declaring the Deed of Absolute Sale dated February 20, 1984
executed by Nelly S. Nave in favor of the [Pabale siblings] similarly null
and void and of no force and effect;
3. Recognizing Ms. Lolita P. [Alamayri] as the owner of the property
covered by TCT No. 111249 of the land records of Calamba, Laguna;
4. Ordering the [Pabale siblings] to execute a transfer of title over the
property in favor of Ms. Lolita P. [Alamayri] in the concept of
reconveyance because the sale in their favor has been declared null and
void;
5. Ordering the [Pabale siblings] to surrender possession over the
property to Ms. [Alamayri] and to account for its income from the time
they took over possession to the time the same is turned over to Ms.
Lolita [Alamayri], and thereafter pay the said income to the latter;
6. Ordering [Fernando] and the [Pabale siblings], jointly and severally, to
pay Ms. [Alamayri]:
a. attorney’s fees in the sum of P30,000.00; and
b. the costs.6
S.M. Fernando Realty Corporation, still represented by Fernando, filed an appeal with the
Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 58133, solely to question the portion of the
2 December 1997 Decision of the RTC ordering him and the Pabale siblings to jointly and
severally pay Alamayri the amount of P30,000.00 as attorney’s fees.
The Pabale siblings intervened as appellants in CA-G.R. CV No. 58133 averring that the
RTC erred in declaring in its 2 December 1997 Decision that the Deed of Absolute Sale
dated 20 February 1984 executed by Nave in their favor was null and void on the ground
that Nave was found incompetent since the year 1980.
The Court of Appeals, in its Decision, dated 10 April 2001, granted the appeals of S.M.
Fernando Realty Corporation and the Pabale siblings. It ruled thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal filed by S. M. Fernando Realty
Corporation, represented by its President, Sesinando M. Fernando as well as the
appeal interposed by Rommel, Elmer, Erwin, Roller and Amanda, all surnamed
Pabale, are hereby GRANTED. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay
City, Branch 119 in Civil Case No. 675-84-C is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE
and a new one rendered upholding the VALIDITY of the Deed of Absolute Sale
dated February 20, 1984.
No pronouncements as to costs.7
Alamayri sought reconsideration of the afore-quoted Decision of the appellate court,
invoking the Decision,8 dated 22 June 1988, of the RTC in the guardianship proceedings,
docketed as SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C, which found Nave incompetent, her condition
becoming severe since 1980; and thus appointed Atty. Leonardo C. Paner as her guardian.
Said Decision already became final and executory when no one appealed therefrom.
Alamayri argued that since Nave was already judicially determined to be an incompetent
since 1980, then all contracts she subsequently entered into should be declared null and
void, including the Deed of Sale, dated 20 February 1984, which she executed over the
subject property in favor of the Pabale siblings.
According to Alamayri, the Pabale siblings should be bound by the findings of the RTC in
its 22 June 1988 Decision in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C, having participated in the said
guardianship proceedings through their father Jose Pabale. She pointed out that the RTC
explicitly named in its orders Jose Pabale as among those present during the hearings held
on 30 October 1987 and 19 November 1987 in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C. Alamayri thus filed
on 21 November 2001 a Motion to Schedule Hearing to Mark Exhibits in Evidence so she
could mark and submit as evidence certain documents to establish that the Pabale siblings
are indeed the children of Jose Pabale.
Atty. Gesmundo, Nave’s surviving spouse, likewise filed his own Motion for
Reconsideration of the 10 April 2001 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
58133, asserting Nave’s incompetence since 1980 as found by the RTC in SP. PROC. No.
146-86-C, and his right to the subject property as owner upon Nave’s death in accordance
with the laws of succession. It must be remembered that Atty. Gesmundo disputed before
the RTC the supposed transfer of his rights to the subject property to Alamayri, but the
court a quo refrained from ruling thereon.
In a Resolution, dated 19 December 2001, the Court of Appeals denied for lack of merit
the Motions for Reconsideration of Alamayri and Atty. Gesmundo.
Hence, Alamayri comes before this Court via the present Petition for Review
on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, with the following assignment of errors:
I xxxx
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE FINDING THAT NELLY S.
NAVE WAS INCOMPETENT IN SPECIAL PROCEEDING NO. 146-86-C ON JUNE 22,
1988 CANNOT RETROACT TO AFFECT THE VALIDITY OF THE DEED OF SALE SHE
EXECUTED ON FEBRUARY 20, 1984 IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENTS PABALES.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE DECISION IN SPECIAL
PROCEEDING NO. 146-86-C DATED JUNE 22, 1988 IS NOT BINDING ON
RESPONDENTS PABALES.
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DENYING PETITIONER’S MOTION TO
SCHEDULE HEARING TO MARK DOCUMENTARY EXHIBITS IN EVIDENCE TO
ESTABLISH THE IDENTITY OF JOSE PABALE AS THE FATHER OF RESPONDENTS
PABALES.9
It is Alamayri’s position that given the final and executory Decision, dated 22 June 1988, of
the RTC in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C finding Nave incompetent since 1980, then the same
fact may no longer be re-litigated in Civil Case No. 675-84-C, based on the doctrine of res
judicata, more particularly, the rule on conclusiveness of judgment.
This Court is not persuaded.
Res judicata literally means "a matter adjudged; a thing judicially acted upon or decided; a
thing or matter settled by judgment." Res judicata lays the rule that an existing final
judgment or decree rendered on the merits, and without fraud or collusion, by a court of
competent jurisdiction, upon any matter within its jurisdiction, is conclusive of the rights
of the parties or their privies, in all other actions or suits in the same or any other judicial
tribunal of concurrent jurisdiction on the points and matters in issue in the first suit.10
It is espoused in the Rules of Court, under paragraphs (b) and (c) of Section 47, Rule 39,
which read:
SEC. 47. Effect of judgments or final orders. – The effect of a judgment or final
order rendered by a court of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce the
judgment or final order, may be as follows:
(b) In other cases, the judgment or final order is, with respect to the matter
directly adjudged or as to any other matter that could have been raised in
relation thereto, conclusive between the parties and their successors in interest
by title subsequent to the commencement of the action or special proceeding,
litigating the same thing and under the same title and in the same capacity; and
(c) In any other litigation between the same parties or their successors in
interest, that only is deemed to have been adjudged in a former judgment or
final order which appears upon its face to have been so adjudged, or which was
actually and necessarily included therein or necessary thereto.
The doctrine of res judicata thus lays down two main rules which may be stated as
follows: (1) The judgment or decree of a court of competent jurisdiction on the merits
concludes the parties and their privies to the litigation and constitutes a bar to a new
action or suit involving the same cause of action either before the same or any other
tribunal; and (2) Any right, fact, or matter in issue directly adjudicated or necessarily
involved in the determination of an action before a competent court in which a judgment
or decree is rendered on the merits is conclusively settled by the judgment therein and
cannot again be litigated between the parties and their privies whether or not the claims
or demands, purposes, or subject matters of the two suits are the same. These two main
rules mark the distinction between the principles governing the two typical cases in which
a judgment may operate as evidence.11 In speaking of these cases, the first general rule
above stated, and which corresponds to the afore-quoted paragraph (b) of Section 47,
Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, is referred to as "bar by former judgment"; while the second
general rule, which is embodied in paragraph (c) of the same section and rule, is known as
"conclusiveness of judgment."
The Resolution of this Court in Calalang v. Register of Deeds provides the following
enlightening discourse on conclusiveness of judgment:
The doctrine res judicata actually embraces two different concepts: (1) bar by
former judgment and (b) conclusiveness of judgment.
The second concept — conclusiveness of judgment — states that a fact or
question which was in issue in a former suit and was there judicially passed upon
and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, is conclusively settled by
the judgment therein as far as the parties to that action and persons in privity
with them are concerned and cannot be again litigated in any future action
between such parties or their privies, in the same court or any other court of
concurrent jurisdiction on either the same or different cause of action, while the
judgment remains unreversed by proper authority. It has been held that in order
that a judgment in one action can be conclusive as to a particular matter in
another action between the same parties or their privies, it is essential that the
issue be identical. If a particular point or question is in issue in the second action,
and the judgment will depend on the determination of that particular point or
question, a former judgment between the same parties or their privies will be
final and conclusive in the second if that same point or question was in issue and
adjudicated in the first suit (Nabus vs. Court of Appeals, 193 SCRA 732 [1991]).
Identity of cause of action is not required but merely identity of issues.
Justice Feliciano, in Smith Bell & Company (Phils.), Inc. vs. Court of Appeals (197
SCRA 201, 210 [1991]), reiterated Lopez vs. Reyes (76 SCRA 179 [1977]) in regard
to the distinction between bar by former judgment which bars the prosecution of
a second action upon the same claim, demand, or cause of action, and
conclusiveness of judgment which bars the relitigation of particular facts or
issues in another litigation between the same parties on a different claim or
cause of action.
The general rule precluding the relitigation of material facts or questions
which were in issue and adjudicated in former action are commonly
applied to all matters essentially connected with the subject matter of
the litigation. Thus, it extends to questions necessarily implied in the
final judgment, although no specific finding may have been made in
reference thereto and although such matters were directly referred to
in the pleadings and were not actually or formally presented. Under this
rule, if the record of the former trial shows that the judgment could not
have been rendered without deciding the particular matter, it will be
considered as having settled that matter as to all future actions between
the parties and if a judgment necessarily presupposes certain premises,
they are as conclusive as the judgment itself.12
Another case, Oropeza Marketing Corporation v. Allied Banking Corporation, further
differentiated between the two rules of res judicata, as follows:
There is "bar by prior judgment" when, as between the first case where the
judgment was rendered and the second case that is sought to be barred, there is
identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action. In this instance, the
judgment in the first case constitutes an absolute bar to the second action.
Otherwise put, the judgment or decree of the court of competent jurisdiction on
the merits concludes the litigation between the parties, as well as their privies,
and constitutes a bar to a new action or suit involving the same cause of action
before the same or other tribunal.
But where there is identity of parties in the first and second cases, but no identity
of causes of action, the first judgment is conclusive only as to those matters
actually and directly controverted and determined and not as to matters merely
involved therein. This is the concept of res judicata known as "conclusiveness of
judgment." Stated differently, any right, fact, or matter in issue directly
adjudicated or necessarily involved in the determination of an action before a
competent court in which judgment is rendered on the merits is conclusively
settled by the judgment therein and cannot again be litigated between the
parties and their privies whether or not the claim, demand, purpose, or subject
matter of the two actions is the same.13
In sum, conclusiveness of judgment bars the re-litigation in a second case of a fact or
question already settled in a previous case. The second case, however, may still proceed
provided that it will no longer touch on the same fact or question adjudged in the first
case. Conclusiveness of judgment requires only the identity of issues and parties, but not
of causes of action.
Contrary to Alamayri’s assertion, conclusiveness of judgment has no application to the
instant Petition since there is no identity of parties and issues between SP. PROC. No. 146-
86-C and Civil Case No. 675-84-C.
No identity of parties
SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C was a petition filed with the RTC by Atty. Gesmundo for the
appointment of a guardian over the person and estate of his late wife Nave alleging her
incompetence.
A guardian may be appointed by the RTC over the person and estate of a minor or an
incompetent, the latter being described as a person "suffering the penalty of civil
interdiction or who are hospitalized lepers, prodigals, deaf and dumb who are unable to
read and write, those who are of unsound mind, even though they have lucid intervals,
and persons not being of unsound mind, but by reason of age, disease, weak mind, and
other similar causes, cannot, without outside aid, take care of themselves and manage
their property, becoming thereby an easy prey for deceit and exploitation."14
Rule 93 of the Rules of Court governs the proceedings for the appointment of a guardian,
to wit:
Rule 93
APPOINTMENT OF GUARDIANS
SECTION 1. Who may petition for appointment of guardian for resident. – Any
relative, friend, or other person on behalf of a resident minor or incompetent
who has no parent or lawful guardian, or the minor himself if fourteen years of
age or over, may petition the court having jurisdiction for the appointment of a
general guardian for the person or estate, or both, of such minor or incompetent.
An officer of the Federal Administration of the United States in the Philippines
may also file a petition in favor of a ward thereof, and the Director of Health, in
favor of an insane person who should be hospitalized, or in favor of an isolated
leper.
SEC. 2. Contents of petition. – A petition for the appointment of a general
guardian must show, so far as known to the petitioner:
(a) The jurisdictional facts;
(b) The minority or incompetency rendering the appointment necessary
or convenient;
(c) The names, ages, and residences of the relatives of the minor or
incompetent, and of the persons having him in their care;
(d) The probable value and character of his estate;
(e) The name of the person for whom letters of guardianship are prayed.
The petition shall be verified; but no defect in the petition or verification shall
render void the issuance of letters of guardianship.
SEC. 3. Court to set time for hearing. Notice thereof. – When a petition for the
appointment of a general guardian is filed, the court shall fix a time and place for
hearing the same, and shall cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the
persons mentioned in the petition residing in the province, including the minor if
above 14 years of age or the incompetent himself, and may direct other general
or special notice thereof to be given.
SEC. 4. Opposition to petition. – Any interested person may, by filing a written
opposition, contest the petition on the ground of majority of the alleged minor,
competency of the alleged incompetent, or the unsuitability of the person for
whom letters are prayed, and may pray that the petition be dismissed, or that
letters of guardianship issue to himself, or to any suitable person named in the
opposition.
SEC. 5. Hearing and order for letters to issue. – At the hearing of the petition the
alleged incompetent must be present if able to attend, and it must be shown that
the required notice has been given. Thereupon the court shall hear the evidence
of the parties in support of their respective allegations, and, if the person in
question is a minor or incompetent it shall appoint a suitable guardian of his
person or estate, or both, with the powers and duties hereinafter specified.
xxxx
SEC. 8. Service of judgment. – Final orders or judgments under this rule shall be
served upon the civil registrar of the municipality or city where the minor or
incompetent person resides or where his property or part thereof is situated.
A petition for appointment of a guardian is a special proceeding, without the usual
parties, i.e., petitioner versus respondent, in an ordinary civil case. Accordingly, SP. PROC.
No. 146-86-C bears the title: In re: Guardianship of Nelly S. Nave for Incompetency,
Verdasto Gesmundo y Banayo, petitioner, with no named respondent/s.
Sections 2 and 3 of Rule 93 of the Rules of Court, though, require that the petition contain
the names, ages, and residences of relatives of the supposed minor or incompetent and
those having him in their care, so that those residing within the same province as the
minor or incompetent can be notified of the time and place of the hearing on the petition.
The objectives of an RTC hearing a petition for appointment of a guardian under Rule 93
of the Rules of Court is to determine, first, whether a person is indeed a minor or an
incompetent who has no capacity to care for himself and/or his properties; and, second,
who is most qualified to be appointed as his guardian. The rules reasonably assume that
the people who best could help the trial court settle such issues would be those who are
closest to and most familiar with the supposed minor or incompetent, namely, his
relatives living within the same province and/or the persons caring for him.
It is significant to note that the rules do not necessitate that creditors of the minor or
incompetent be likewise identified and notified. The reason is simple: because their
presence is not essential to the proceedings for appointment of a guardian. It is almost a
given, and understandably so, that they will only insist that the supposed minor or
incompetent is actually capacitated to enter into contracts, so as to preserve the validity
of said contracts and keep the supposed minor or incompetent obligated to comply
therewith.
Hence, it cannot be presumed that the Pabale siblings were given notice and actually took
part in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C. They are not Nave’s relatives, nor are they the ones caring
for her. Although the rules allow the RTC to direct the giving of other general or special
notices of the hearings on the petition for appointment of a guardian, it was not
established that the RTC actually did so in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C.
Alamayri’s allegation that the Pabale siblings participated in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C rests
on two Orders, dated 30 October 198715 and 19 November 1987,16 issued by the RTC in
SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C, expressly mentioning the presence of a Jose Pabale, who was
supposedly the father of the Pabale siblings, during the hearings held on the same dates.
However, the said Orders by themselves cannot confirm that Jose Pabale was indeed the
father of the Pabale siblings and that he was authorized by his children to appear in the
said hearings on their behalf.
Alamayri decries that she was not allowed by the Court of Appeals to submit and mark
additional evidence to prove that Jose Pabale was the father of the Pabale siblings.
It is true that the Court of Appeals has the power to try cases and conduct hearings,
receive evidence and perform any and all acts necessary to resolve factual issues raised in
cases falling within its original and appellate jurisdiction, including the power to grant and
conduct new trials or further proceedings. In general, however, the Court of Appeals
conducts hearings and receives evidence prior to the submission of the case for
judgment.17 It must be pointed out that, in this case, Alamayri filed her Motion to
Schedule Hearing to Mark Exhibits in Evidence on 21 November 2001. She thus sought to
submit additional evidence as to the identity of Jose Pabale, not only after CA-G.R. CV No.
58133 had been submitted for judgment, but after the Court of Appeals had already
promulgated its Decision in said case on 10 April 2001.
The parties must diligently and conscientiously present all arguments and available
evidences in support of their respective positions to the court before the case is deemed
submitted for judgment. Only under exceptional circumstances may the court receive new
evidence after having rendered judgment;18 otherwise, its judgment may never attain
finality since the parties may continually refute the findings therein with further evidence.
Alamayri failed to provide any explanation why she did not present her evidence earlier.
Merely invoking that the ends of justice would have been best served if she was allowed
to present additional evidence is not sufficient to justify deviation from the general rules
of procedure. Obedience to the requirements of procedural rules is needed if the parties
are to expect fair results therefrom, and utter disregard of the rules cannot justly be
rationalized by harking on the policy of liberal construction.19 Procedural rules are tools
designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases. Courts and litigants alike are thus enjoined
to abide strictly by the rules. And while the Court, in some instances, allows a relaxation in
the application of the rules, this, we stress, was never intended to forge a bastion for
erring litigants to violate the rules with impunity. The liberality in the interpretation and
application of the rules applies only to proper cases and under justifiable causes and
circumstances. While it is true that litigation is not a game of technicalities, it is equally
true that every case must be prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed procedure to
insure an orderly and speedy administration of justice.20
Moreover, contrary to Alamayri’s assertion, the Court of Appeals did not deny her Motion
to Schedule Hearing to Mark Exhibits in Evidence merely for being late. In its Resolution,
dated 19 December 2001, the Court of Appeals also denied the said motion on the
following grounds:
While it is now alleged, for the first time, that the [herein respondents Pabale
siblings] participated in the guardianship proceedings considering that the Jose
Pabale mentioned therein is their late father, [herein petitioner Alamayri]
submitting herein documentary evidence to prove their filiation, even though
admitted in evidence at this late stage, cannot bind [the Pabale siblings] as verily,
notice to their father is not notice to them there being no allegation to the effect
that he represented them before the Calamba Court.21
As the appellate court reasoned, even if the evidence Alamayri wanted to submit do
prove that the Jose Pabale who attended the RTC hearings on 30 October 1987 and 19
November 1987 in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C was the father of the Pabale siblings, they
would still not confirm his authority to represent his children in the said proceedings.
Worth stressing is the fact that Jose Pabale was not at all a party to the Deed of Sale dated
20 February 1984 over the subject property, which was executed by Nave in favor of the
Pabale siblings. Without proper authority, Jose Pabale’s presence at the hearings in SP.
PROC. No. 146-86-C should not bind his children to the outcome of said proceedings or
affect their right to the subject property.
Since it was not established that the Pabale siblings participated in SP. PROC. No. 146-86- siblings on 20 February 1984. The burden of proving otherwise falls upon Alamayri, which
C, then any finding therein should not bind them in Civil Case No. 675-84-C. she dismally failed to do, having relied entirely on the 22 June 1988 Decision of the RTC in
SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C.
No identity of issues
Alamayri capitalizes on the declaration of the RTC in its Decision dated 22 June 1988 in SP.
Neither is there identity of issues between SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C and Civil Case No. 675- PROC. No. 146-86-C on Nave’s condition "having become severe since the year
84-C that may bar the latter, by conclusiveness of judgment, from ruling on Nave’s 1980."25 But there is no basis for such a declaration. The medical reports extensively
competency in 1984, when she executed the Deed of Sale over the subject property in quoted in said Decision, prepared by: (1) Dr. Nona Jean Alviso-Ramos, dated 14 April
favor the Pabale siblings. 1986,26 and (2) by Dr. Eduardo T. Maaba, dated 20 April 1987,27 both stated that upon
their examination, Nave was suffering from "organic brain syndrome secondary to
In SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C, the main issue was whether Nave was incompetent at the time cerebral arteriosclerosis with psychotic episodes," which impaired her judgment. There
of filing of the petition with the RTC in 1986, thus, requiring the appointment of a was nothing in the said medical reports, however, which may shed light on when Nave
guardian over her person and estate. began to suffer from said mental condition. All they said was that it existed at the time
Nave was examined in 1986, and again in 1987. Even the RTC judge was only able to
observe Nave, which made him realize that her mind was very impressionable and
In the cross-claim of Nave and Atty. Gesmundo against the Pabale siblings in Civil Case No.
capable of being manipulated, on the occasions when Nave visited the court from 1987 to
675-84-C, the issue was whether Nave was an incompetent when she executed a Deed of
1988. Hence, for this Court, the RTC Decision dated 22 June 1988 in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-
Sale of the subject property in favor of the Pabale siblings on 20 February 1984, hence,
C may be conclusive as to Nave’s incompetency from 1986 onwards, but not as to her
rendering the said sale void.
incompetency in 1984. And other than invoking the 22 June 1988 Decision of the RTC in
SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C, Alamayri did not bother to establish with her own evidence that
While both cases involve a determination of Nave’s incompetency, it must be established
Nave was mentally incapacitated when she executed the 20 February 1984 Deed of Sale
at two separate times, one in 1984 and the other in 1986. A finding that she was
over the subject property in favor of the Pabale siblings, so as to render the said deed
incompetent in 1986 does not automatically mean that she was so in 1984. In Carillo v.
void.
Jaojoco,22 the Court ruled that despite the fact that the seller was declared mentally
incapacitated by the trial court only nine days after the execution of the contract of sale, it
All told, there being no identity of parties and issues between SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C and
does not prove that she was so when she executed the contract. Hence, the significance
Civil Case No. 675-84-C, the 22 June 1988 Decision in the former on Nave’s incompetency
of the two-year gap herein cannot be gainsaid since Nave’s mental condition in 1986 may
by the year 1986 should not bar, by conclusiveness of judgment, a finding in the latter
vastly differ from that of 1984 given the intervening period.
case that Nave still had capacity and was competent when she executed on 20 February
1984 the Deed of Sale over the subject property in favor of the Pabale siblings. Therefore,
Capacity to act is supposed to attach to a person who has not previously been declared
the Court of Appeals did not commit any error when it upheld the validity of the 20
incapable, and such capacity is presumed to continue so long as the contrary be not
February 1984 Deed of Sale.
proved; that is, that at the moment of his acting he was incapable, crazy, insane, or out of
his mind.23 The burden of proving incapacity to enter into contractual relations rests
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Review is hereby DENIED. The
upon the person who alleges it; if no sufficient proof to this effect is presented, capacity
Decision, dated 10 April 2001, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 58133, is
will be presumed.24
hereby AFFIRMED in toto. Costs against the petitioner Lolita R. Alamayri.
Nave was examined and diagnosed by doctors to be mentally incapacitated only in 1986,
SO ORDERED.
when the RTC started hearing SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C; and she was not judicially declared
an incompetent until 22 June 1988 when a Decision in said case was rendered by the RTC,
resulting in the appointment of Atty. Leonardo C. Paner as her guardian. Thus, prior to
1986, Nave is still presumed to be capacitated and competent to enter into contracts such
as the Deed of Sale over the subject property, which she executed in favor of the Pabale
G.R. No. 110427 February 24, 1997
The Incompetent, CARMEN CAÑIZA, represented by her legal guardian, AMPARO
EVANGELISTA, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS (SPECIAL FIRST DIVISION), PEDRO ESTRADA and his wife, LEONORA
ESTRADA, respondents.
NARVASA, C.J.:
On November 20, 1989, being then ninety-four (94) years of age, Carmen Cañiza, a
spinster, a retired pharmacist, and former professor of the College of Chemistry and
Pharmacy of the University of the Philippines, was declared incompetent by judgment1 of
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 107,2 in a guardianship proceeding
instituted by her niece, Amparo A. Evangelista.3 She was so adjudged because of her
advanced age and physical infirmities which included cataracts in both eyes and
senile dementia. Amparo A. Evangelista was appointed legal guardian of her person and
estate.
Cañiza was the owner of a house and lot at No. 61 Tobias St., Quezon City. On September
17, 1990, her guardian Amparo Evangelista commenced a suit in the Metropolitan Trial
Court (MetroTC) of Quezon City (Branch 35) to eject the spouses Pedro and Leonora
Estrada from said premises.4 The complaint was later amended to identify the
incompetent Cañiza as plaintiff, suing through her legal guardian, Amparo Evangelista.
The amended Complaint5 pertinently alleged that plaintiff Cañiza was the absolute owner
of the property in question, covered by TCT No. 27147; that out of kindness, she had
allowed the Estrada Spouses, their children, grandchildren and sons-in-law to temporarily
reside in her house, rent-free; that Cañiza already had urgent need of the house on
account of her advanced age and failing health, "so funds could be raised to meet her
expenses for support, maintenance and medical treatment;" that through her guardian,
Cañiza had asked the Estradas verbally and in writing to vacate the house but they had
refused to do so; and that "by the defendants' act of unlawfully depriving plaintiff of the
possession of the house in question, they . . (were) enriching themselves at the expense
of the incompetent, because, while they . . (were) saving money by not paying any rent
for the house, the incompetent . . (was) losing much money as her house could not be
rented by others." Also alleged was that the complaint was "filed within one (1) year from
the date of of first letter of demand dated February 3, 1990."
In their Answer with Counterclaim, the defendants declared that they had been living in
Cañiza's house since the 1960's; that in consideration of their faithful service they had
been considered by Cañiza as her own family, and the latter had in fact executed a
holographic will on September 4, 1988 by which she "bequeathed" to the Estradas the
house and lot in question.
Judgment was rendered by the MetroTC on April 13, 1992 in Cañiza's favor,6 the Estradas
being ordered to vacate the premises and pay Cañiza P5,000.00 by way of attorney's fees.
But on appeal,8 the decision was reversed by the Quezon City Regional Trial Court, Branch
96.9 By judgment rendered on October 21, 1992, 10 the RTC held that the "action by
which the issue of defendants' possession should be resolved is accion publiciana, the
obtaining factual and legal situation . . demanding adjudication by such plenary action for
recovery of possession cognizable in the first instance by the Regional Trial Court."
Cañiza sought to have the Court of Appeals reverse the decision of October 21, 1992, but
failed in that attempt. In a decision 11 promulgated on June 2, 1993, the Appellate
Court 12 affirmed the RTC's judgment in toto. It ruled that (a) the proper remedy for
Cañiza was indeed an accion publiciana in the RTC, not an accion interdictal in the
MetroTC, since the "defendants have not been in the subject premises as mere tenants or
occupants by tolerance, they have been there as a sort of adopted family of Carmen
Cañiza," as evidenced by what purports to be the holographic will of the plaintiff; and (b)
while "said will, unless and until it has passed probate by the proper court, could not be
the basis of defendants' claim to the property, . . it is indicative of intent and desire on the
part of Carmen Cañiza that defendants are to remain and are to continue in their
occupancy and possession, so much so that Cañiza's supervening incompetency can not
be said to have vested in her guardian the right or authority to drive the defendants
out." 13
Through her guardian, Cañiza came to this Court praying for reversal of the Appellate
Court's judgment. She contends in the main that the latter erred in (a) holding that she
should have pursued an accion publiciana, and not an accion interdictal; and in (b) giving
much weight to "a xerox copy of an alleged holographic will, which is irrelevant to this
case." 14
In the responsive pleading filed by them on this Court's requirement, 15 the Estradas
insist that the case against them was really not one of unlawful detainer; they argue that
since possession of the house had not been obtained by them by any "contract, express or
implied," as contemplated by Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, their occupancy of
the premises could not be deemed one "terminable upon mere demand (and hence never
became unlawful) within the context of the law." Neither could the suit against them be
deemed one of forcible entry, they add, because they had been occupying the property
with the prior consent of the "real owner," Carmen Cañiza, which "occupancy can even
ripen into full ownership once the holographic will of petitioner Carmen Cañiza is
admitted to probate." They conclude, on those postulates, that it is beyond the power of
Cañiza's legal guardian to oust them from the disputed premises.
Carmen Cañiza died on March 19, 1994, 16 and her heirs — the aforementioned guardian,
Amparo Evangelista, and Ramon C. Nevado, her niece and nephew, respectively — were
by this Court's leave, substituted for her. 17
Three issues have to be resolved: (a) whether or not an ejectment action is the
appropriate judicial remedy for recovery of possession of the property in dispute; (b)
assuming desahucio to be proper, whether or not Evangelista, as Cañiza's legal guardian
had authority to bring said action; and (c) assuming an affirmative answer to both
questions, whether or not Evangelista may continue to represent Cañiza after the latter's
death.
I 14. By the defendants' act of unlawfully depriving the plaintiff of the
It is axiomatic that what determines the nature of an action as well as which court has
jurisdiction over it, are the allegations of the complaint and the character of the relief
sought. 18 An inquiry into the averments of the amended complaint in the Court of origin
is thus in order. 19
The amended Complaint alleges: 20
6. That the plaintiff Carmen Cañiza, is the sole and absolute owner of a
house and lot at No. 61 Scout Tobias, Quezon City, which property is
now the subject of this complaint;
xxx xxx xxx
9. That the defendants, their children, grandchildren and sons-in-law,
were allowed to live temporarily in the house of plaintiff Carmen Cañiza,
for free, out of her kindness;
10. That the plaintiff, through her legal guardian, has duly notified the
defendants, for them to vacate the said house, but the two (2) letters of
demand were ignored and the defendants refused to vacate the same. .
.
11. That the plaintiff, represented by her legal guardian, Amparo
Evangelista, made another demand on the defendants for them to
vacate the premises, before Barangay Captain Angelina A. Diaz of
Barangay Laging Handa, Quezon City, but after two (2) conferences, the
result was negative and no settlement was reached. A photocopy of the
Certification to File Action dated July 4, 1990, issued by said Barangay
Captain is attached, marked Annex "D" and made an integral part
hereof;
12. That the plaintiff has given the defendants more than thirty (30)
days to vacate the house, but they still refused to vacate the premises,
and they are up to this time residing in the said place;
13. That this complaint is filed within one (1) year from the date of first
letter of demand dated February 3, 1990 (Annex "B") sent by the
plaintiff to the defendants, by her legal guardian — Amparo Evangelista;
possession of the house in question, they are enriching themselves at
the expense of the incompetent plaintiff because, while they are saving
money by not paying any rent for the house, the plaintiff is losing much
money as her house could not be rented by others;
15. That the plaintiff's health is failing and she needs the house urgently,
so that funds could be raised to meet her expenses for her support,
maintenance and medical treatment;
16. That because of defendants' refusal to vacate the house at No. 61
Scout Tobias, Quezon City, the plaintiff, through her legal guardian, was
compelled to go to court for justice, and she has to spend P10,000.00 as
attorney's fees.
Its prayer 21 is quoted below:
WHEREFORE, in the interest of justice and the rule of law, plaintiff,
Carmen Cañiza, represented by her legal guardian, Amparo Evangelista,
respectfully prays to this Honorable Court, to render judgment in favor
of plaintiff and against the defendants as follows:
 1. To order the defendants, their children, grandchildren, sons-in-law
and other persons claiming under them, to vacate the house and
premises at No. 6 1 Scout Tobias, Quezon City, so that its possession can
be restored to the plaintiff Carmen Cañiza; and
2. To pay attorney's fees in the amount of P10,000.00;
3. To pay the costs of the suit.
In essence, the amended complaint states:
1) that the Estradas were occupying Cañiza's house by tolerance —
having been "allowed to live temporarily . . (therein) for free, out of . .
(Cañiza's) kindness;"
2) that Cañiza needed the house "urgently" because her "health . . (was)
failing and she . . (needed) funds . . to meet her expenses for her
support, maintenance and medical treatment;"
3) that through her general guardian, Cañiza requested the Estradas
several times, orally and in writing, to give back possession of the house;
4) that the Estradas refused and continue to refuse to give back the
house to Cañiza, to her continuing prejudice; and
5) that the action was filed within one (1) year from the last demand to
vacate.
Undoubtedly, a cause of action for desahucio has been adequately set out. It is settled
that in an action for unlawful detainer, it suffices to allege that the defendant is unlawfully
withholding possession from the plaintiff is deemed sufficient, 22 and a complaint for
unlawful detainer is sufficient if it alleges that the withholding of possession or the refusal
to vacate is unlawful without necessarily employing the terminology of the law. 23
The Estradas' first proffered defense derives from a literal construction of Section 1, Rule
70 of the Rules of Court which inter alia authorizes the institution of an unlawful detainer
suit when "the possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the
expiration or termination of the right to hold possession, by virtue of any contract,
express or implied." They contend that since they did not acquire possession of the
property in question "by virtue of any contract, express or implied" — they having been,
to repeat, "allowed to live temporarily . . (therein) for free, out of . . (Cañiza's) kindness"
— in no sense could there be an "expiration or termination of . . (their) right to hold
possession, by virtue of any contract, express or implied." Nor would an action for forcible
entry lie against them, since there is no claim that they had "deprived (Cañiza) of the
possession of . . (her property) by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth.
The argument is arrant sophistry. Cañiza's act of allowing the Estradas to occupy her
house, rent-free, did not create a permanent and indefeasible right of possession in the
latter's favor. Common sense, and the most rudimentary sense of fairness clearly require
that that act of liberality be implicitly, but no less certainly, accompanied by the necessary
burden on the Estradas of returning the house to Cañiza upon her demand. More than
once has this Court adjudged that a person who occupies the land of another at the
latter's tolerance or permission without any contract between them is necessarily bound
by an implied promise that he will vacate upon demand, failing which a summary action
for ejectment is the proper remedy against him. 24 The situation is not much different
from that of a tenant whose lease expires but who continues in occupancy by tolerance of
the owner, in which case there is deemed to be an unlawful deprivation or withholding of
possession as of the date of the demand to vacate. 25 In other words, one whose stay is
merely tolerated becomes a deforciant illegally occupying the land or property the
moment he is required to leave. 26 Thus, in Asset Privatization Trust vs. Court of
Appeals, 27 where a company, having lawfully obtained possession of a plant upon its
undertaking to buy the same, refused to return it after failing to fulfill its promise of
payment despite demands, this Court held that "(a)fter demand and its repudiation, . .
(its) continuing possession . . became illegal and the complaint for unlawful detainer filed
by the
. . (plant's owner) was its proper remedy.
It may not be amiss to point out in this connection that where there had been more than
one demand to vacate, the one-year period for filing the complaint for unlawful detainer
must be reckoned from the date of the last demand, 28 the reason being that the lessor
has the option to waive his right of action based on previous demands and let the lessee
remain meanwhile in the premises. 29 Now, the complaint filed by Cañiza's guardian
alleges that the same was "filed within one (1) year from the date of the first letter of
demand dated February 3, 1990." Although this averment is not in accord with law
because there is in fact a second letter of demand to vacate, dated February 27, 1990, the
mistake is inconsequential, since the complaint was actually filed on September 17, 1990,
well within one year from the second (last) written demand to vacate.
The Estradas' possession of the house stemmed from the owner's express permission.
That permission was subsequently withdrawn by the owner, as was her right; and it is
immaterial that the withdrawal was made through her judicial guardian, the latter being
indisputably clothed with authority to do so. Nor is it of any consequence that Carmen
Cañiza had executed a will bequeathing the disputed property to the Estradas; that
circumstance did not give them the right to stay in the premises after demand to vacate
on the theory that they might in future become owners thereof, that right of ownership
being at best inchoate, no transfer of ownership being possible unless and until the will is
duly probated.
Thus, at the time of the institution of the action of desahucio, the Estradas had no legal
right to the property, whether as possessors by tolerance or sufferance, or as owners.
They could not claim the right of possession by sufferance; that had been legally ended.
They could not assert any right of possession flowing from their ownership of the house;
their status as owners is dependent on the probate of the holographic will by which the
property had allegedly been bequeathed to them — an event which still has to take place;
in other words, prior to the probate of the will, any assertion of possession by them would
be premature and inefficacious.
In any case, the only issue that could legitimately be raised under the circumstances was
that involving the Estradas' possession by tolerance, i.e., possession de facto, not de jure.
It is therefore incorrect to postulate that the proper remedy for Cañiza is not ejectment
but accion publiciana, a plenary action in the RTC or an action that is one for recovery of
the right to possession de jure.
II
The Estradas insist that the devise of the house to them by Cañiza clearly denotes her
intention that they remain in possession thereof, and legally incapacitated her judicial
guardian, Amparo Evangelista, from evicting them therefrom, since their ouster would be
inconsistent with the ward's will.
A will is essentially ambulatory; at any time prior to the testator's death, it may be
changed or revoked; 30 and until admitted to probate, it has no effect whatever and no
right can be claimed thereunder, the law being quite explicit: "No will shall pass either real
or personal property unless it is proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules of
Court" (ART. 838, id.). 31 An owner's intention to confer title in the future to persons
possessing property by his tolerance, is not inconsistent with the former's taking back
possession in the meantime for any reason deemed sufficient. And that in this case there
was sufficient cause for the owner's resumption of possession is apparent: she needed to
generate income from the house on account of the physical infirmities afflicting her,
arising from her extreme age.
Amparo Evangelista was appointed by a competent court the general guardian of both the
person and the estate of her aunt, Carmen Cañiza. Her Letters of Guardianship 32 dated
December 19, 1989 clearly installed her as the "guardian over the person and
properties of the incompetent CARMEN CANIZA with full authority to take possession of
the property of said incompetent in any province or provinces in which it may be situated
and to perform all other acts necessary for the management of her properties . . " 33 By
that appointment, it became Evangelista's duty to care for her aunt's person, to attend to
her physical and spiritual needs, to assure her well-being, with right to custody of her
person in preference to relatives and friends. 34 It also became her right and duty to get
possession of, and exercise control over, Cañiza's property, both real and personal, it
being recognized principle that the ward has no right to possession or control of his
property during her incompetency. 35 That right to manage the ward's estate carries with
it the right to take possession thereof and recover it from anyone who retains it, 36 and
bring and defend such actions as may be needful for this purpose. 37
Actually, in bringing the action of desahucio, Evangelista was merely discharging the duty
to attend to "the comfortable and suitable maintenance of the ward" explicitly imposed
on her by Section 4, Rule 96 of the Rules of Court, viz.:
Sec. 4. Estate to be managed frugally, and proceeds applied to
maintenance of ward. — A guardian must manage the estate of his ward
frugally and without waste, and apply the income and profits thereof, so
far as maybe necessary, to the comfortable and suitable maintenance of
the ward and his family, if there be any; and if such income and profits
be insufficient for that purpose, the guardian may sell or encumber the
real estate, upon being authorized by order to do so, and apply to such
of the proceeds as may be necessary to such maintenance.
Finally, it may be pointed out in relation to the Estradas's defenses in the ejectment
action, that as the law now stands, even when, in forcible entry and unlawful detainer
cases, the defendant raises the question of ownership in his pleadings and the question of
possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the Metropolitan
Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts nevertheless have
the undoubted competence to resolve "the issue of ownership . . only to determine the
issue of possession." 38
III
As already stated, Carmen Cañiza passed away during the pendency of this appeal. The
Estradas thereupon moved to dismiss the petition, arguing that Cañiza's death
automatically terminated the guardianship, Amaparo Evangelista lost all authority as her
judicial guardian, and ceased to have legal personality to represent her in the present
appeal. The motion is without merit.
While it is indeed well-established rule that the relationship of guardian and ward is
necessarily terminated by the death of either the guardian or the ward, 39 the rule
affords no advantage to the Estradas. Amparo Evangelista, as niece of Carmen Cañiza, is
one of the latter's only two (2) surviving heirs, the other being Cañiza's nephew, Ramon C.
Nevado. On their motion and by Resolution of this Court 40 of June 20, 1994, they were in
fact substituted as parties in the appeal at bar in place of the deceased, in accordance
with Section 17, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, viz.: 41

Sec. 18. Death of a party. — After a party dies and the claim is not
thereby extinguished, the court shall order, upon proper notice, the
legal representative of the deceased to appear and be substituted for
the deceased within a period of thirty (30) days, or within such time as
may be granted. If the legal representative fails to appear within said
time, the court may order the opposing party to procure the
appointment of a legal representative of the deceased within a time to
be specified by the court, and the representative shall immediately
appear for and on behalf of the interest of the deceased. The court
charges involved in procuring such appointment, if defrayed by the
opposing party, may be recovered as costs. The heirs of the deceased
may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased, without requiring
the appointment of an executor or administrator and the court may
appoint guardian ad litem for the minor heirs.

To be sure, an ejectment case survives the death of a party. Cañiza's demise did not
extinguish the desahucio suit instituted by her through her guardian. 42 That action, not
being a purely personal one, survived her death; her heirs have taken her place and now
G.R. No. L-33152 January 30, 1982
represent her interests in the appeal at bar.
LUIS PARCO and VIRGINIA BAUTISTA, petitioners,
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated
vs.
on June 2, 1993 — affirming the Regional Trial Court's judgment and dismissing
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. UNION C. KAYANAN, Judge, COURT OF FIRST
petitioner's petition for certiorari — is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the Decision dated
INSTANCE OF QUEZON (BRANCH IV), CALAUAG, and FRANCISCO RODRIGUEZ, JR., Legal
April 13, 1992 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 35, in Civil Case No.
Guardian of the Incompetent SOLEDAD RODRIGUEZ, respondents.
3410 is REINSTATED and AFFIRMED. Costs against private respondents.

SO ORDERED.
DE CASTRO, J.:
Narvasa, C.J., Davide, Jr., Melo, Francisco and Panganiban, JJ., concur.
By this petition for review on certiorari, petitioners seek to set aside the Resolution of the
Court of Appeals dated January 20, 1971 1 which revived and declared in full force and
effect its decision on August 20, 1970 2 dismissing the petition for certiorari with
preliminary injunction in CA-G.R. No. 43732, entitled "Luis Parco, et al. vs. Hon. Judge of
the Court of First Instance of Quezon, Branch IV, Calauag, et al., " and pray that the
decision dated April 15, 1969 3 and all subsequent orders 4 issued by respondent Judge of
Branch IV-Calauag, Court of First Instance of Quezon in Special Proceedings No. 2641 be
declared as null and void.
This case, G. R. No. L-33152, started from Special Proceedings No. 2641. a guardianship
proceedings for the incompetent Soledad Rodriguez of Sriaya, Quezon, which originally
pertained to Branch 1, Court of First Instance of Quezon, then presided by the late Hon.
Judge Vicente Arguelles, 5 later on succeded by Hon. Judge Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera
(now Associate Justice of the Supreme Court). In 1966, respondent Judge of Branch IV-
Calauag of the Court of First Instance of Quezon, Hon. Union C. Kayanan, took cognizance
of Special Proceedings No. 2641 when the Secretary of Justice authorized respondent
Judge to help unclog the docket of Branch I at Lucena City, Quezon.
For clarity, We have hereunder summarized the sequence of events and material dates as
it appears in the records from the time respondent Judge of Branch IV of the Court of First
Instance of Quezon took cognizance of Special Proceedings No. 2641.
On December 20, 1966, respondent Judge authorized and approved, upon motion of
Fransisco Rodriguez, Jr. (guardian of Soledad Rodriguez), hereinafter referred to as private
respondent, the sale to Luis Parco and Virginia Bautista, hereinafter referred to as the
petitioners, of Lot Nos. 3437 (613 sq. meters) and 4389 (4,068 sq. meters) covered by TCT
Nos. 16939 and 18035, respectively, for the sum of P4,400.00 for the support,
maintenance and medical treatment of the ward Soledad Rodriguez.
On January 6, 1967, respondent Judge again approved and authorized, upon motion of
private respondent, the sale to petitioners of Lot No. 1207 covered by TCT No. 16944
containing an area of 63,598 sq. meters, more or less, for the same reason. All the sales of
the three (3) lots being absolute, new transfer certificates of title were issued in the name
of petitioners.
On May 13, 1968, or almost one year and five months from the approval of the sale of Lot
Nos. 3437, 4389, and 1207, private respondent filed an urgent petition in the Court of
First Instance of Quezon, Ninth Judicial District, invoking Section 6 Rule 96 of the Revised
Rules of Court, praying that an order be immediately issued requiring petitioners to
appear before the court so that they can be examined as regards the three (3) lots in
question which are allegedly in danger of being lost, squandered, concealed and
embezzled and upon failure to do so or to comply with any order that may be issued in
relation therewith to hold them in contempt of court. The pertinent allegations read as
follows:
xxx xxx xxx
1. That as legal guardian (private respondent) of the abovenamed
incompetent and upon authorization by this Hon. Court he has
transferred in good faith to the spouses LUIS PARCO and VIRGINIA (UY)
BAUTISTA, both of Atimonan, Quezon, the titles over the following
realties belonging to his ward, namely:
a. A parcel of land (Lot No. 3437 of the Cadastral
Survey of Sariaya) with the improvements thereon
situated in the Municipality of Sariaya ... containing an
area of Six Hundred Thirteen (613) sq. meters, more or
less;
b. A parcel of land (Lot No. 4389 of the Cadastral
Survey of Sariaya) situated in the Municipality of
Sariaya ... containing an area of Four Thousand And
Sixty-Eight (4,068) sq. meters, more or less;
c. A parcel of land (Lot No. 1207 of the Cadastral
Survey of Sariaya) situated in the Municipality of
Sariaya ... containing an area of Sixty-three Thousand
Five Hundred and Ninety-eight (63,598) sq. meters,
more or less.
2. That anent the first TWO (2) PARCELS above-described he transferred
the titles thereto in favor of the recited spouses under a loan agreement
(not an absolute sale thereto and with the express commitment in
writing that he can recover the same within three (3) months from
December 19, 1966, ...
That prior to the expiration of the cited period of three months, he tried
to recover the stated two parcels of land from them, however, the same
was not carried out because he was then transacting with them the sale
of PARCEL THREE and under the Agreement that they will not sell cede,
or convey the mentioned two (2) lots to anyone (except to petitioner
now private respondent herein) and once the stated PARCEL THREE has
been sold at the price of P48,000.00 the borrowed amount of P4,400.00
shall be deducted therefrom and said two parcels shall be returned to
him;
3. That recently, he discovered that the cited couple, in bad faith and in
violation of their agreement and of the trust and confidence which he
had reposed upon them, have fraudulently ceded and transferred the
titles over the stated two parcels of land to another person, allegedly for
a price of (over P30,000.00) and in spite of his repeated request upon
them to reconvey to him the titles thereto or to turn over to him the
total proceeds they have received (minus the sum of P4,400.00), they
have maliciously and unjustly refused to do so, and are intending to
keep and retain said amount for their own personal use and benefit;
4. That as already adverted to in the previous paragraph hereof, the
mentioned couple induced him to transfer to them the title of parcel
three, so that they can sell the same for the agreed price of P48,000.00
and believing in good faith that the cited spouses are honest and
trustworthy, he agreed and executed the requisite document
transferring the title to them subject to the following conditions:
a. They shall pay to him the amount of Twelve
Thousand (Pl2,000.00) Pesos after they have secured a
buyer of the property, ...
b. They shall pay to NIEVES ALCALA and PURA
AGCAOILE (who are private respondent's agents and
representatives in negotiating the sale of parcel three)
the sum of Fifteen Thousand (P15,000.00) Pesos after
they have sold the realty, ...
5. That recently, he discovered that the cited couple have already sold
and ceded the mentioned parcel three to another person, and despite
his repeated request upon them to pay and deliver to him or to Nieves
Alcala the sum of money specified in the foregoing paragraph, they have
maliciously and unjustly failed and refused to do so, and have
fraudulently retained the said amount of money for thier own personal
use and benefit;
6. That the enumerated parcels of land together with all the proceeds
derived therefrom, undeniably belonged to his ward as trust properties,
which are subject to the disposition of this Hon. Court, and due to the
mentioned fraudulent, malicious and dishonest acts of the above-
named couple, are in danger of being lost, squandered, concealed and
embezzled;
xxx xxx xxx
In an answer dated June 5, 1968, petitioners contended mainly, among others, that the
three lots have been conveyed to them by deeds of absolute sale which were duly
approved by the guardianship court.
Pre-trial hearings were set for possible amicable settlement beginning on September 6,
1968 but was postponed and reset to October 9, 1968 on petitioners' counsel motion. On
October 9, 1968, both parties and their counsels appeared but failed to reach any
amicable settlement. Again, the pre-trial hearing was reset to November 28 and 29, 1968
but was likewise postponed to January 8, 1969 at petitioners' counsel motion.
On January 8, 1969, for failure to petitioners and their counsel to appear although there
was a telegram requesting for postponement, respondent Judge issued an
order, 6 authorizing private respondent to present evidence before the Clerk of Court who
was instructed to make the corresponding report which shall be made as the basis of this
decision.
In a petition dated January 30, 1969, petitioners prayed for the reconsideration of the
order of January 8, 1969 pointing out, among others, that there was a First Order dated
July 29, 1968, 7 issued by then Judge Ameurfina M. Herrera, Presiding Judge of Branch I,
Court of First Instance of Quezon that said branch "will henceforth take cognizance of this
case" and thus, asked for the transfer of the incident sought before Branch IV to Branch I
for proper action.
On February 20, 1969, respondent Judge, finding the petition for reconsideration well-
grounded, issued an order directing the Clerk of Court to transmit the records of the case
to the Court of First Instance, Branch I, Lucena City, quoted below:
ORDER
Acting on the Petition for Reconsideration filed by counsel for the
respondent on February 4, 1969, considering that Hon. A. Melencio-
Herrera, Presiding Judge of Branch 1, CFI, Lucena City, issued an order
on July 29, 1968, the dispositive portion of which is quoted as follows.
'WHEREFORE, it is hereby confirmed that this court will henceforth take
cognizance of this case,' and considering that this special proceedings
actually belongs to Branch I, although incidents therein were taken
cognizance of by the Presiding Judge of CFI, Branch IV when he was
holding court session in Lucena City and notwithstanding Administrative
Order No. 261 dated October 7, 1968 which states that 'This
 administrative order shall not apply to cases pending in the different
salas which have been partially tried and shall remain therein for final
disposition', because to case was originally filed during the incumbency
of the late Judge Vicente Arguelles, finding therefore the said petition to
be well-grounded, the Clerk of Court is hereby authorized to transmit
these records to the Deputy Clerk of Court, CFI, Branch I, of Lucena City.
SO ORDERED.
Given at Calauag, Quezon this 20th day of February, 1969.
(SGD.) UNION C. KAYANAN Judge
On March 24, 1969, Private respondent, without the assistance of a counsel, filed before
Branch IV, Court of First Instance of Quezon an amended petition praying that the three
(3) lots subject matter of the original urgent petition be ordered reconveyed to the ward
in said Special Proceedings No. 2641 for he was informed that petitioners win transfer and
properties to third person.
On March 26, 1969, the Clerk of Court of Branch IV, Court of First Instance of Quezon,
issued the notice of hearing of the amended petition filed by private respondent dated
March 24, 1969 notifying counsel for both parties that the case will be heard before
Branch IV on April 10, 1969 at 2:30 p.m. at Calauag, Quezon. On the date set for hearing,
counsels for both parties appeared but for failure of the petitioners to appear respondent
Judge issued an order 8 reiterating its previous order dated January 8, 1969 allowing
private respondent to present his evidence ex-parte and considered the case submitted
for resolution.
On April 15, 1969, respondent Judge rendered a decision 9 on the basis of the report of
the Clerk of Court dated February 19, 1969 ordering petitioners to reconvey the three (3)
parcels of land to private respondent.
On June 14, 1969, petitioners moved to reconsider the decision stating, among others,
that respondent Judge has no authority to take cognizance of the case which, according to
petitioners, is an issue raised in the petition for reconsideration of the court order of
January 8, 1969, and that the decision was without legal basis. Petitioners prayed that the
case or incident be transferred to the proper court which had taken cognizance of this
case.
On June 23, 1969, respondent Judge denied the petition for reconsideration for lack of
merit. Petitioners' counsel received the said order of denial on June 26, 1969.
Meanwhile, on June 21, 1969, private respondent filed an urgent motion in Branch IV
praying that petitioners be required to appear before the court to be examined as regards
the properties of the ward and to explain why they should not be cited for contempt for
not complying with a final order of the court directing the reconveyance of the three (3)
parcels of land to private respondent.
On June 23, 1969, respondent Judge, acting on the urgent motion, issued an
order 10 directing petitioners to explain why they should not be cited for contempt of
court pursuant to par. (b) Section 3 Rule 71 of the Revised Rules of Court.
On June 27, 1969, petitioners filed an urgent motion claiming that the urgent motion for
contempt of court was premature considering that the decision ordering the
reconveyance of the properties in question has not yet become final and executory and is
still subject to appeal. In their prayer for the setting aside of the order of June 23, 1969,
petitioners informed the court that they win appeal the decision to the Court of Appeals
and that the corresponding notice of appeal, appeal bond and the record on appeal will
be filed in due time.
The following day, June 28, 1969, petitioners filed the notice of appeal and appeal bond
with a manifestation that the record on appeal will be filed in due time.
On July 3, 1963, respondent Judge issued an order 11 denying for lack of merit petitioners'
urgent motion of June 27, 1969, thus declaring that the order dated June 23, 1969 stands
considering that petitioners' right to appeal has already lapsed. In the same order,
petitioners were given ten (10) days upon receipt to explain why they should not be cited
for contempt pursuant to Section 4, Rule 71 in relation to Section 6, Rule 96 of the
Revised Rules of Court.
On July 7, 1969, petitioners filed a petition for extension of ten (10) days to expire on July
20, 1969 within which to file the record on appeal. In an order 12 dated July 9, 1969,
respondent Judge denied the said petition for having been filed beyond the reglementary
period.
On July 10, 1969, petitioners filed an unverified second petition for reconsideration of the
decision dated April 15, 1969 and the order of July 3, 1969 contending that Branch IV lost
its jurisdiction over the raise from the time the order dated February 20, 1969 was issued
by Judge A. Melencio- Herrera; that the proceedings under Section 6 Rule 96 do not
authorize the Hon. Court (Branch IV) to determine the question of right over the property
or to order delivery thereof; that the purpose is merely to elicit information or secure
evidence from the person suspected of having embezzled, concealed or conveyed away
any personal property of the ward; that if the court finds sufficient evidence showing
ownership on the part of the ward, it is the duty of the guardian to bring the proper
action.
On the other hand, on July 17, 1969, a motion for reconsideration of the order dated July
9, 1969 was filed by petitioners claiming that all the pleadings related to the intended
appeal were filed within the period allowed by the Revised Rules of Court. After an
opposition was filed, respondent Judge issued an order on 13 July 18, 1969 denying the
second petition for reconsideration for lack of basis and on the ground that the period to
appeal either the decision or any of the previous orders had already expired.
On August 20, 1969, petitioners went to the Court of Appeals on a petition for certiorari
with preliminary injunction pleading nullity of the decision of the Court of First Instance,
Branch IV,
Quezon dated April 15, 1969 on grounds of lack of jurisdiction and grave abuse of
discretion in denying their right of appeal.
On September 27, 1969, the Court of Appeals dismissal the petition for lack of
merit. 14 On motion by petitioners, the dismissal was reconsidered in a split resolution
dated December 15, 1969 thereby giving due course to the petition, and private
respondent was required to answer.
After private respondent filed their answer and the parties submitted their respective
memoranda, the Court of Appeals, in a three-to-two vote decision 15 dated August 21,
1970 dismissed the petition.
On motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners, the Court of Appeals, in a split
resolution 16 dated October 10, 1970 granted the motion for reconsideration and set
aside the decision dated August 20,1970.
However, upon motion for reconsideration filed by private respondent, the Court of
Appeals, in a three-to-two vote resolution 17 dated January 20, 1971, reverted to its
decision of August 21, 1970 dismissing the petition.
Hence, the instant petition for review on the following assignment of errors, to wit:
I
THE MAJORITY OF THE DIVISION OF FIVE JUSTICES OF THE COURT OF
APPEALS ERRED IN SUSTAINING THE RETENTION BY THE RESPONDENT
JUDGE OF BRANCH IV-CALAUAG OF THE CASE OF BRANCH I-LUCENA
CITY AFTER HE ORDERED THE RETURN OF THE CASE TO BRANCH
I,LUCENA CITY TO WHICH THE CASE BELONGS AND AFTER THE
PRESIDING JUDGE OF BRANCH I LUCENA CITY HAD RESUMED AND
EXERCISED HER JURISDICTION OVER SAID CASE.
II
ASSUMING THAT THE RESPONDENT JUDGE COULD LEGALLY AND
VALIDLY RETAIN JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE OF BRANCH I LUCENA
CITY DESPITE THE CIRCUMSTANCES ADVERTED TO IN THE FIRST
ASSIGNED ERROR, THE MAJORITY OF THE DIVISION OF FIVE JUSTICES OF
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN SANCTIONING THE RESPONDENT
JUDGE'S ASSUMPTION OF JURISDICTION TO ADJUDICATE THE ISSUE OF
OWNERSHIP AND/OR ORDER RECONVEYANCE OF PETITIONERS'
PROPERTY SOLD TO THEM AND TITLED IN THEIR NAMES,
NOTWITHSTANDING THE LIMITED JURISDICTION OF A GUARDIANSHIP
COURT.
III
THE MAJORITY OF THE DIVISION OF FIVE JUSTICES OF THE COURT OF
APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE JUDICIAL AUTHORITY AND
APPROVAL OF THE SALES ARE CONCLUSIVE UPON THE VALIDITY AND
REGULARITY OF SAID SALES BETWEEN THE PARTIES AND THEIR
SUCCESSORS IN INTEREST.
IV
THE MAJORITY OF THE DIVISION OF FIVE JUSTICES OF THE COURT OF
APPEALS ERRED IN SANCTIONING BY SILENCE THE QUESTIONED ORDER
OF THE RESPONDENT JUDGE ENFORCING HIS DECISION BY CONTEMPT
PROCEEDINGS.
THE MAJORITY OF THE DIVISION OF FIVE JUSTICES OF THE COURT OF
APPEALS ERRED IN SANCTIONING DENIAL OF PETITIONERS' RIGHT TO
APPEAL.
This petition was given due course in view of the peculiar incidents during its trial stage
where, as borne out by the records, two (2) branches of the Court of First Instance of
Quezon Province, 9th Judicial District assert jurisdiction over Special Proceedings No.
2641, which, when the decision rendered by one branch was brought in the Court of
Appeals on certiorari with preliminary injunction, the Special Division of Five Justices, in a
three-to-two vote resolution in four (4) occasions after its dismissal for lack of merit on
September 27, 1968, reconsidered the same and was given due course on December 15,
1968, again dismissed on August 21, 1970, but again reconsidered on October 10, 1970,
until finally dismissed on January 20, 1971 when the Special Division of Five reverted to its
August 21, 1970 resolution. The Special Division was equally split on the issue whether or
not the Court of First Instance, Branch IV, Calauag, Quezon, acting with limited jurisdiction
as a guardianship court under Section 6 Rule 96 of the Rules of Court, has the authority to
adjudicate the question of ownership and order the reconveyance of the three (3) parcels
of land in question to private respondent, guardian of the ward Soledad Rodriguez. On
these two (2) principal issues, We are called upon to finally resolve the legal controversy
peculiar on this case.
After the parties submitted their respective briefs, the case was deemed submitted for
decision on October 28, 1971.
In a Resolution 18 of this Court dated November 29, 1978, the urgent manifestation and
motion of Leonisa S. Rodriguez, the surviving spouse of Mario Rodriguez (brother of the
ward) that the ward Soledad Rodriguez died on September 15, 1970 and private
respondent Francisco Rodriguez, Jr. died on October 24, 1973; and that the heirs of the
ward be substituted as the private respondents in this case was noted. To begin with, the
principal issue al hand is whether or not respondent Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Quezon, Branch IV-Calauag has the authority or power to take further action in Special
Proceedings No. 2641 after the Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Quezon,
Branch I-Lucena City asserted its jurisdiction by issuing two (2) orders dated July 29, 1968
and respondent Judge correspondingly ordered the return of the case to Branch I in an
order dated February 20,1969.
Petitioners maintain that respondent Judge of Branch IV, Court of First Instance of Quezon
has no power or authority to retain jurisdiction over Special Proceedings No. 2641 which,
at its inception, originally pertained to Branch I-Lucena City, Court of First Instance of
Quezon. To support such chum, petitioners contend that the Second Order dated July 29,
1968 requiring private respondent for an inventory and accounting of the ward's property
confirms that the Presiding Judge of Branch I has resumed its jurisdiction over said case,
more so, when respondent Judge ordered on February 20, 1969 the transmittal of the
records of the case to the Deputy Clerk of Court, Court of First Instance, Branch I-Lucena
City.
Private respondent, on the other hand, justifies the retention of jurisdiction by
respondent Judge over Special Proceedings No. 2641 contending, among others, that the
two (2) orders dated July 29, 1968 issued by then Judge A. Melencio-Herrera are not
sufficient bases for claiming that Branch IV has been deprived of its, jurisdiction because
jurisdiction is vested upon the court not upon any particular branch or judge thereof and
the issuance of such orders constitute undue interference with the processes and
proceedings already undertaken by respondent Judge; that petitioners are guilty of
estoppel when they failed to raise the issue of jurisdiction from the very beginning and
when they voluntarily appeared before respondent Judge, filed their answer and other
pleadings, and moved for postponements of the scheduled dates of hearing.
We sustain petitioners' stand. Of course, jurisdiction is vested in the court not in any
particular branch or judge, and as a corollary rule, the various branches of the Court of
First Instance of a judicial district are a coordinate and co-equal courts 19 one branch
stands on the same level as the other. Undue interference by one on the proceedings and
processes of another is prohibited by law. In the language of this Court, the various
branches of the Court of First Instance of a province or city, having as they have the same
or equal authority and exercising as they do concurrent and coordinate jurisdiction should
not, cannot, and are not permitted to interfere with their respective cases, much less with
their orders or judgments. 20 A contrary rule would obviously lead to confusion and might
seriously hinder the administration of justice. A judge is competent to act so long as the
case remains before him, but after it passed from his branch to the other, the case could
be acted upon by the judge of the latter branch. 21 Otherwise, an anomalous situation
would occur at the detriment of the party litigants who are likewise confused where to
appear and plead their cause.
In the case before Us, there is no dispute that both Branch I and Branch IV of the Court of
First Instance of Quezon, have jurisdiction over the subject matter, a guardianship
proceedings under Section 1, Rule 92 of the Rules of Court and Section 44(a) of the
Judiciary Act of 1948. While it is recognized that when a case is filed in one branch,
jurisdiction over the case does not attach to the branch or judge alone, to the exclusion of
the other branches, 22 We are of the view however, considering the unusual
circumstances and incidents attendant in this case the situation in the case at bar is
different. Here, it must be noted that the Presiding Judge of Branch I asserted and
resumed its prior jurisdiction by issuing two (2) orders, one of which requires private
respondent to render an inventory and accounting of the property of the ward. On the
other hand, respondent Judge of Branch IV, in confirmation of such resumption of
jurisdiction, ordered the return of the records of Special Proceedings No. 2641 to Branch
I-Lucena City, Court of First Instance of Quezon, but, instead of regularly relinquishing
jurisdiction over the case, respondent Judge continued to take further action on the case
in total disregard of the two (2) orders of the Presiding Judge of Branch I. Should one
branch be permitted to equally assert, assume or retain jurisdiction over a case or
controversy over which another coordinate or co-equal branch has already resumed its
jurisdiction, We would then sanction undue interference by one branch over another.
With that, the judicial stability of the decrees or orders of the courts would be a
meaningless precept in a well-ordered administration of justice.
There is no question that the prior proceedings had in Branch IV by respondent Judge
were valid and regular as they were admittedly authorized by the Secretary of Justice. It
must be emphasized however, that Branch IV lost its jurisdiction over Special Proceedings
No. 2641 when respondent Judge ordered the return of the records to Branch I after
having been informed in a motion for reconsideration filed on January 30, 1969 of the
existence of the two (2) orders issued by the Presiding Judge of Branch 1. From that point
of time, all subsequent proceedings and processes in connection with or related to Special
Proceedings No. 2641 undertaken by the respondent Judge became irregular. It
amounted to an undue interference with the processes and proceedings of Branch I.
Nevertheless, from the standpoint of the pertinent law on the matter, it may be observed
that the detail of respondent Judge of Branch IV stationed permanently in Calauag,
Quezon to Branch I in Lucena City, Quezon authoritatively rests on the provision of
Section 51 of the Judiciary Act of 1948 which reads:
Section 51. Detail of judge to another district or province.-Whenever a
judge stationed in. any province or branch of a court in a province shag
certify to the Secretary of Justice that the condition of the docket in his
court is such as to require the assistance of an additional judge, or when
there is any vacancy in any court or branch of a court in a province, the
Secretary of Justice may, in the interest of justice, with the approval of
the Supreme Court and for a period of not more than three months for
each time, assign any judge of any court or province, whose docket
permits his temporary absence from said court, to hold sessions in the
court needing such assistance or whether such vacancy exists. No judge
so detailed shall take cognizance of any case when any of the parties
thereto objects and the objection is sustained by the Supreme Court.
(emphasis supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
Apparently, when the circumstances contemplated under Section 51 of the Judiciary Act
of 1948 occur, the detailed Judge holds sessions in the court needing such assistance or
where such vacancy exists as if he is the presiding judge of that particular branch where
the clogged docket or vacancy exists. The detailed Judge does not hold sessions therein as
if he is the Presiding Judge of the branch where he is originally or permanently
designated. In the case before Us, respondent Judge Kayanan was duly authorized to help
unclog the docket of Branch I stationed in Lucena City, Quezon which at that time was
rendered vacant due to the death of Judge Vicente Arguelles. When respondent Judge
Kayanan took cognizance of the cases left by Judge Arguelles, pending the designation of
a replacement, he merely sits as a judge of Branch I, Court of First Instance of Quezon
Province. In the event of designation of a new Presiding Judge of Branch 1, accepted
practice and procedure of speedy administration of justice requires that the detailed
judge turns over the cases he took cognizance of to the new Presiding Judge. Justification
for the continued retention of jurisdiction over those cases in the case at bar appears to
be not convincing.
We find no plausible indication how estoppel could operate against petitioners. It is true
that petitioners filed their answer to the urgent petition of private respondent and
appeared before respondent Judge of Branch IV without questioning the latter's authority
to hear the case. The answer to the urgent petition of private respondent dated May 13,
1968 was filed by petitioners on June 5, 1968 or almost two (2) months before Judge
Melencio-Herrera of Branch I issued the two (2) orders dated July 29, 1968 asserting
jurisdiction over the case. The appearances of petitioners and counsel in the sala of
respondent Judge during the intervening period from July 29, 1968 were apparently due
to the fact that petitioners came to know only of the two orders of Branch I when they
examined the records of the case prompted by the manifestation of the counsel of private
respondent, in the course of the proceedings in Branch IV, to submit for an accounting in
connection with the administration of the properties of the ward Soledad Rodriguez.
Petitioners manifested such information to respondent Judge in a petition for
reconsideration of the order of January 8, 1968 authorizing the presentation of
evidence ex parte. The silence or inaction of petitioners was therefore due to their lack of
knowledge of respondent Judge's lack of authority to retain or take further action on the
case. Such lack of authority was confirmed when respondent Judge, acting on the petition
for reconsideration dated January 30, 1969, issued on February 20, 1969 an order
authorizing the return of the records of the case to Branch I. In claiming that the records
referred to by the order concern the first portion of the records of Special Proceedings
No. 2641 and not the second portion containing the urgent petition filed by private
respondent on May 13, 1968, private respondent would then encourage split jurisdiction
of courts which is abhorred by the law.
Assuming that Branch IV-Calauag, Court of First Instance of Quezon has jurisdiction over
Special Proceedings No. 2641 notwithstanding the attendant circumstances adverted to
earlier, We now dwell on another issue, which standing alone would decisively resolve the
assigned errors raised in this petition, that is, whether or not Branch IV exercising limited
and special, jurisdiction as a guardianship court under Section 6 Rule 96 of the Rules of
Court has jurisdiction to order the delivery or reconveyance of the three parcels of land in
question to the ward, represented herein by private respondent.
In two leading cases, Castillo vs. Bustamante, 64 Phil. 839 and Cui vs. Piccio et al, 91 Phil.
712, this Court laid the rule on the issue raised before Us as interpreted in the light of
Section 6 Rule 96 of the Rules of Court which reads:
 Section 6. Proceedings when person suspected of embezzling or
concealing property of the ward.— Upon complaint of the guardian or
ward, or of any person having actual or prospective interest in the
estate of the ward as creditor, heir, or otherwise, that anyone is
suspected of having embezzled, concealed, or conveyed away any
money, goods, or interest, or a written instrument, belonging to the
ward or his estate, the court may cite the suspected person to appear
for examination touching such money, goods, interests, or instrument,
and make such orders as will secure the estate against such
embezzlement, concealment or conveyance.
In Cui vs. Piccio et al., supra, this Court held that the jurisdiction of the court in
guardianship proceedings, ordinarily, is to cite persons suspected of having embezzled,
concealed or conveyed the property belonging to the ward for the purpose of obtaining
information which may be used in an action later to be instituted by the guardian to
protect the right of the ward. Generally, the guardianship court exercising special and
limited jurisdiction cannot actually order the delivery of the property of the ward found to
be embezzled, concealed or conveyed. In a categorical language of this Court, only in
extreme cases, where property clearly belongs to the ward or where his title thereto has
been already judicially decided, may the court direct its delivery to the guardian. 23 In
effect, there can only be delivery or return of the embezzled, concealed or conveyed
property of the ward, where the right or title of said ward is clear and undisputable.
However, where title to any property said to be embezzled, concealed or conveyed is in
dispute, under the Cui case, the determination of said title or right whether in favor of the
person said to have embezzled, concealed or conveyed the property must be determined
in a separate ordinary action and not in guardianship proceedings.
In the case at bar, We are not prepared to say, at this premature stage, whether or not,
on the basis alone of the pleadings of the parties in the trial court, the title or right of the
ward Soledad Rodriguez over the three (3) parcels of land in question is clear and
undisputable. What is certain here is the fact that the sale of the properties in question
were duly approved by the respondent Judge in accordance with the provisions on selling
and encumbering of the property of the ward under Rule 97 of the Rules of Court. It must
be noted that while the original urgent petition dated May 13, 1968 prayed for the
examination of petitioners herein regarding the alleged concealing, conveyancing and
embezzling of the questioned properties, the amended petition dated March 24, 1969
asked for reconveyance.
Moreover, it may be observed that private respondent contended that the sale of the first
two lots was actually a loan agreement with right of recovery while that of the third lot
was subject to condition, hence, a fictitious or simulated sale. On the other hand,
according to petitioners, the sales were all absolute and protected by the Torrens System
since new transfer certificate of titles were issued in their name. Apparently, there is a
cloud of doubt as to who has a better right or title to the disputed properties. This, We
believe, requires the determination of title or ownership of the three parcels of land in
dispute which is beyond the jurisdiction of the guardianship court and should be threshed
out in a separate ordinary action not a guardianship proceedings as held in Cui vs. Piccio
supra.
The ruling in Castillo vs. Bustamante, 64 Phil. 839, relied upon by private respondent finds
no application in the instant case. As differentiated from the case at bar, in Castillo case,
the right or title of the ward to the property in dispute was clear and undisputable as the
same was donated to her through compromise agreement approved by the court which
title had the authority of res judicata. As enunciated above, the right or title of the ward
to the properties in question is in dispute and as such should be determined in a separate
ordinary action.
Furthermore, private respondent's claim that petitioners are barred by laches to raise the
issue of jurisdiction is without merit. In support of such claim, private respondent invoked
the exception laid down in Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy, 23 SCRA 29, to the rule that the lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter is fatal and may be raised at any stage of the
proceedings; that it is conferred only by law, and in the manner prescribed by law and an
objection on the lack of jurisdiction cannot be waived by the parties; and the infirmity
cannot be cured by silence, acquiescence, or even by express consent, or win of the
parties. 24
The doctrine laid down in Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy, supra, and in the latter case of Rodriguez
vs. Court of Appeals, 29 SCRA 419 is not applicable in the case at bar. In Tijam case, the
appellant had all the opportunity to challenged the court's jurisdiction in the court a
quo as well as in the Court of Appeals but instead invoked its jurisdiction to obtain
affirmative relief and submitted its case for final adjudication on the merits. It was only
after an adverse decision was rendered by the Court of Appeals and fifteen (15) years
later from the inception of the case that it finally chose to raise the question of j
jurisdiction. I t is clear that t the circumstances present in Tijam case are not present here.
The petitioners in the instant case challenged the authority of the trial court to take
further cognizance of the case the moment they become aware of Branch I assuming
jurisdiction. The lack of jurisdiction was raised in a petition for reconsideration of the
order dated January 8, 1969, in a petition for reconsideration of the decision dated April
15, 1969, in a second petition for reconsideration of the said decision, and alleged as an
additional ground in the petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals. In any case, the
operation of the principle of estoppel on the question of jurisdiction seemingly depends
upon whether the lower court actually had jurisdiction. If it had no jurisdiction, but the
case was tried and decided upon the theory that it had jurisdiction, the parties are not
barred, on appeal, from assailing such jurisdiction, for the same must exist as a matter of
law, and may not be conferred by consent of the parties or by estoppel. 25
As respondent trial court has no jurisdiction, We deem it unnecessary to pass upon the
assigned errors raised in the petition.
WHEREFORE, the Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated January 20, 1971 is hereby
reversed and set aside, and the decision rendered by respondent Judge of Branch IV-
Calauag, Court of First Instance of Quezon dated April 15, 1969 and the orders issued
thereafter are declared null and void, and the case is hereby remanded to Branch I-Lucena
City, Court of First Instance of Quezon for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
Barredo (Chairman), Concepcion, Jr., Abad Santos, Ericta and Escolin, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
AQUINO, J.:, dissenting:
I dissent. I vote for the affirmance of the decision of Judge Union C. Kayanan, Calauag
Branch IV of the Court of First Instance of Quezon Province dated April 15, 1969 in Special
Proceeding No. 2641, entitled "Guardianship of the Incompetent Soledad Rodriguez,
Francisco Rodriguez, Jr., Guardian".
In that decision, Judge Kayanan ordered the spouses Luis Parco and Virginia Bautista to
reconvey Lot No. 3437 (613 square meters), Lot No. 4389 (4,069 square meters) and Lot
No. 1207 (63,598 square meters), all of the Sariaya, Tayabas cadastre, to the guardian
Francisco Rodriguez, Jr. upon the latter's payment to the said spouses of the sum of
twelve thousand pesos which he had borrowed from them (p. 65, Rollo).
Since the ward died intestate on September 15, 1970 and the guardian died on October
24, 1973, the reconveyance should be made to the ward's heirs, namely, her sisters,
Concepcion Rodriguez- Sapalo and Milagros Rodriguez-Sanchez, and the children of the
ward's deceased brother Mario Rodriguez (who died on March 8, 1972), namely, Mario,
Jr., Ramoncito, Liza and Rodulfo, all surnamed Rodriguez, represented by their guardian,
their mother, Leonisa S. Rodriguez (pp. 232-236, Rollo). Said heirs should pay the Parco
spouses the sum of twelve thousand pesos as a condition for the reconveyance.
It should be noted that the said guardianship proceedings was assigned originally to
Branch I presided over by Judge Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera. It was transferred to
Branch IV presided over by Judge Kayanan who was detailed at Lucena City to assist in
decongesting the dockets of Branches I and II.
Judge Kayanan had authorized the sale of the three lots to the Parco spouses so that the
proceeds of the sale could be used for the maintenance of the ward. it turned out that the
sales or transfers were made under certain conditions which were violated by the Parco
spouses.
A copy of Judge Kayanan's decision was received by petitioners' counsel on May 29, 1969.
Sixteen days later or on June 14, they filed a motion for reconsideration. The order
denying that motion was received by the petitioners on June 26. They filed their notice of
appeal and appeal bond on June 28 (pp- 86 and 92, CA Rollo).
The last day for submitting the record on appeal was July 10. The petitioners asked for a
ten-day extension within which to file their record on appeal Instead of submitting it, they
filed on July 10 a second motion for reconsideration on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
The lower court denied the motion for extension of time within which to file the record on
appeal It also denied the second motion for reconsideration in its order of July 18, 1969.
The petitioners did not file any record on appeal They filed on August 20, 1969 a petition
for certiorari in the Court of Appeals to set aside the said decision of April 15. The Court of
Appeals in its extended resolution of September 27, 1969 dismissed the petition on the
ground that the petitioners' remedy was an appeal which they had abandoned.
That resolution was reconsidered. The petition was given due course. The Court of
Appeals in its decision of August 21, 1970 dismissed the petition. (Per Justice Eulogio
Serrano with Alvendia and Nolasco JJ., concurring. Justice Enriquez and Yatco dissented.)
Petitioners' motion for the reconsideration of that decision was denied in the resolution
of January 20, 197 1. (Per Justice Eulogio Serrano with Justices Nolasco and Soriano
concurring. Justices Enriquez and Alvendia dissented.)
The petitioners appealed to this Court. The decision of the Court of Appeals should be
affirmed because (1) the petitioners inexcusably did not file a record on appeal (2) the
question as to whether the guardianship court should set aside the conveyances to the
petitioners is not a jurisdictional question but merely a procedural matter which could be
waived (Lachenal vs. Salas, L-42257 June 14, 1976, 71 SCRA 262) and (3) the petitioners
and the guardian hoodwinked the guardianship court to the ward's prejudice.
It is the duty of the courts, in the exercise of the State's prerogative to protect persons
under disability (parents patriae) to set aside the transfers to the petitioners and thus
avoid unjust enrichment at the expense of the ward and do justice in this case.
Technicalities should be eschewed.
As to the power of a branch of the Court of First Instance to act in a case transferred to it
from another sala of the same court, see Eleazar vs. Zandueta, 48 Phil. 193; Hizon
Mercado vs. Ocampo, 72 Phil. 318; San Miguel Brewery, Inc. vs. Court of Industrial
Relations, 91 Phil. 178.
Separate Opinions
AQUINO, J.:, dissenting:
I dissent. I vote for the affirmance of the decision of Judge Union C. Kayanan, Calauag
Branch IV of the Court of First Instance of Quezon Province dated April 15, 1969 in Special
Proceeding No. 2641, entitled "Guardianship of the Incompetent Soledad Rodriguez,
Francisco Rodriguez, Jr., Guardian".
In that decision, Judge Kayanan ordered the spouses Luis Parco and Virginia Bautista to
reconvey Lot No. 3437 (613 square meters), Lot No. 4389 (4,069 square meters) and Lot
No. 1207 (63,598 square meters), all of the Sariaya, Tayabas cadastre, to the guardian
Francisco Rodriguez, Jr. upon the latter's payment to the said spouses of the sum of
twelve thousand pesos which he had borrowed from them (p. 65, Rollo).
Since the ward died intestate on September 15, 1970 and the guardian died on October
24, 1973, the reconveyance should be made to the ward's heirs, namely, her sisters,
Concepcion Rodriguez- Sapalo and Milagros Rodriguez-Sanchez, and the children of the
ward's deceased brother Mario Rodriguez (who died on March 8, 1972), namely, Mario,
Jr., Ramoncito, Liza and Rodulfo, all surnamed Rodriguez, represented by their guardian,
their mother, Leonisa S. Rodriguez (pp. 232-236, Rollo). Said heirs should pay the Parco
spouses the sum of twelve thousand pesos as a condition for the reconveyance.
It should be noted that the said guardianship proceedings was assigned originally to
Branch I presided over by Judge Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera. It was transferred to
Branch IV presided over by Judge Kayanan who was detailed at Lucena City to assist in
decongesting the dockets of Branches I and II.
Judge Kayanan had authorized the sale of the three lots to the Parco spouses so that the
proceeds of the sale could be used for the maintenance of the ward. it turned out that the
sales or transfers were made under certain conditions which were violated by the Parco
spouses.
A copy of Judge Kayanan's decision was received by petitioners' counsel on May 29, 1969.
Sixteen days later or on June 14, they filed a motion for reconsideration. The order
denying that motion was received by the petitioners on June 26. They filed their notice of
appeal and appeal bond on June 28 (pp- 86 and 92, CA Rollo).
The last day for submitting the record on appeal was July 10. The petitioners asked for a
ten-day extension within which to file their record on appeal Instead of submitting it, they
filed on July 10 a second motion for reconsideration on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
The lower court denied the motion for extension of time within which to file the record on
appeal It also denied the second motion for reconsideration in its order of July 18, 1969.
The petitioners did not file any record on appeal They filed on August 20, 1969 a petition
for certiorari in the Court of Appeals to set aside the said decision of April 15. The Court of
Appeals in its extended resolution of September 27, 1969 dismissed the petition on the
ground that the petitioners' remedy was an appeal which they had abandoned.
That resolution was reconsidered. The petition was given due course. The Court of
Appeals in its decision of August 21, 1970 dismissed the petition. (Per Justice Eulogio
Serrano with Alvendia and Nolasco JJ., concurring. Justice Enriquez and Yatco dissented.)
Petitioners' motion for the reconsideration of that decision was denied in the resolution
of January 20, 197 1. (Per Justice Eulogio Serrano with Justices Nolasco and Soriano
concurring. Justices Enriquez and Alvendia dissented.)
The petitioners appealed to this Court. The decision of the Court of Appeals should be
affirmed because (1) the petitioners inexcusably did not file a record on appeal (2) the
question as to whether the guardianship court should set aside the conveyances to the
petitioners is not a jurisdictional question but merely a procedural matter which could be
waived (Lachenal vs. Salas, L-42257 June 14, 1976, 71 SCRA 262) and (3) the petitioners
and the guardian hoodwinked the guardianship court to the ward's prejudice.
It is the duty of the courts, in the exercise of the State's prerogative to protect persons
under disability (parents patriae) to set aside the transfers to the petitioners and thus
avoid unjust enrichment at the expense of the ward and do justice in this case.
Technicalities should be eschewed.

As to the power of a branch of the Court of First Instance to act in a case transferred to it
from another sala of the same court, see Eleazar vs. Zandueta, 48 Phil. 193; Hizon
Mercado vs. Ocampo, 72 Phil. 318; San Miguel Brewery, Inc. vs. Court of Industrial
Relations, 91 Phil. 178.