1. IN RE WILL OF THE DECEASED
Each of the pages moreover
LUCINA ANDRADA, LUCILA
ARCE
(1921)
FACTS:
Lucina Andrada died on June 5, 1919
and soon thereafter a petition was
presented to the Court of First Instance
of Capiz by Lucila Arce to establish a
document purporting to be the last will
and testament of the deceased. Upon
hearing the petition, Judge Villareal,
declared that the document in question
had not been executed in conformity
with the requirements of section 618 of
the Coe of Civil Procedure, as amended
by Act No. 2645 of the Philippine
Legislature. He therefore refused to
admit the purported will to probate, and
the petitioner appealed. virtualaw
ISSUE:
Whether there was compliance with the
requirements of the law pertaining to
the attestation clause which requires
that it must state the number of pages
upon which the will was written.
HELD:
No. The attesting clause of the will in
question is incorporated in the will
itself, constituting the last paragraph
thereof; and its defect consists in the
fact that it does not state the number of
sheets or pages upon which the will is
written, though it does state that the
testatrix and the instrumental witnesses
signed on every page, as is in fact
obvious from an inspection of the
instrument.
bears successively the Visayan words,
"isa," "duha," "tatlo," "apat," "lima,"
which mean respectively "one," "two,"
"three," "four," "five," Visayan being the
dialect in which the instrument is
written.
By section 618 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, as amended by Act No. 2645,
it is required that each and every page of
the will shall be numbered correlatively
in letters and that the attesting clause
shall state the number of sheets or pages
used.
The law plainly says that the attestation
shall state the number of sheets or pages
used, the evident purpose being to
safeguard the document from the
possibility of the interpolation of
additional pages or the omission of
some of the pages actually used. It is
true that this point is also safeguarded
by the other two requirements that the
pages shall be consecutively lettered and
that each page shall be singed on the left
margin by the testator and the
witnesses. It results that the trial judge
did not err in refusing probate of the
will, and the judgment must be affirmed.
2. SINGSON VS FLORENTINO
FACTS:
On January 13, 1948, Leona Singson
died in Vigan, Ilocos Sur leaving a will.
In said will the deceased instituted as
heirs her brothers Evaristo, Dionisio and
Manuel, her nieces Rosario F. de
Donateo, Emilia Florentino and
Trinidad Florentino de Paz, her
grandniece Consolacion Florentino, and
some servants. She named her brothers
Evaristo and Manuel as executors of the
will. On February 2, l948, Manuel
Dingson filed a petition for the probate
of said will.
On March 6, 1948, Emilia Florentino,
Trinidad Florentino de Paz and Josefina
Florentino Vda. de Lim, daughters of a
sister of the deceased, opposed the
petition alleging among other grounds
that the signatures appearing in the will
are not the genuine signatures of the
deceased, and that the will has not been
executed in accordance with the
formalities of the law.
After due trial, the court found that the
will has been executed in accordance
and admitted the same to probate. The
oppositors appealed to the Court of
Appeals, but the case was later certified
to SC for the reason that it involves
purely questions of law.
ISSUE:
(1) One point raised by oppositors
refers to the alleged failure of the
attestation clause to state the number of
the sheets or pages in which the will is
written which, it is claimed, is fatal
because it is contrary to the express
requirement of the law.
WHETHER OR NOT THEIR
CONTENTION WAS CORRECT
HELD:
NO.
The law referred to is Article 618 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by
Act No. 2645, which requires that the
attestation clause shall state the number
of pages or sheets upon which the will is
written, which requirement has been
held to be mandatory as an effective
safeguard against the possibility of
interpolation or omission of some of the
pages of the will to the prejudice of the
heirs to whom the property is intended
to be bequeathed. The ratio decidendi of
these cases seems to be that the
attestation clause must contain a
statement of the number of sheets or
pages composing the will and that if this
is missing or is omitted, it will have the
effect of invalidating the will if the
deficiency cannot be supplied, not by
evidence aliunde, but by a consideration
or examination of the will itself. But
here the situation is different. While the
attestation clause does not state the
number of sheets or pages upon which
the will is written, however, the last part
of the body of the will contains a
statement that it is composed of eight
pages, which circumstance in our
opinion takes this case out of the rigid
rule of construction and places it within
the realm of similar case where a broad
and more liberal view has been adopted
to prevent the will of the testator from
being defeated by purely technical
considerations
Considering the form in which
the will in question is written, the
conclusion is inescapable that the will
has been drafted in substantial
compliance with the law. This opinion is
bolstered up when we examine the will
itself which shows on its face that it is
really and actually composed of eight
pages duly signed by the testatrix and
her instrumental witnesses.
3. GONZALES VS GONZALES
SYLLABUS
1. WILLS; ATTESTATION CLAUSE
MADE BY TESTATOR AND SIGNED BY
WITNESSES, SUBSTANTIALLY
COMPLIES WITH LAW. — An
attestation clause made by the testator
himself more than by the instrumental
witnesses, but signed by the latter right
under the signature of the testator,
substantially complies with the
requirements of law.
2. STATEMENT OF SHEETS OR PAGES
IN BODY OF WILL HELD SUFFICIENT
WHEN CONSIDERED IN
CONNECTION WITH ATTESTATION
CLAUSE. — The statement in the
ultimate paragraph of the will as to the
number of the sheets or pages used is
sufficient attestation which may be
considered in conjunction with the last
paragraph which was herein held as the
attestation clause. The law does not
require the attestation to be contained in
a single clause.
3. TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY;
TESTIMONY OF ATTENDING
PHYSICIAN PREVAILS OVER THAT
OF TESTAMENTARY WITNESSES. —
Where the family physician attended the
testatrix during her last illness and saw
her on the day when the alleged
document of revocation was executed,
the testimony of the attesting witnesses
tending to imply that the testatrix was of
sound mind at the time said document
was executed, cannot prevail over the
contrary testimony of the attending
physician.
FACTS:
On November 27, 1948, Manuela Ibarra
Vda. de Gonzales (hereafter to be
referred to as testatrix) died at the age of
about seventy-eight years, leaving five
children, namely, Alejandro Gonzales,
Jr., Manuel Gonzales, Leopoldo
Gonzales, Manolita Gonzales de
Carungcong, and Juan Gonzales. The
estate left by her is estimated at
P150,000.
On December 22, 1948, Manuel
Gonzales filed in the Court of First
Instance of Rizal a petition (Special
Proceeding No. 837) for the probate of
an alleged will executed by the testatrix
on November 16, 1942 (Exhibit B —
Manuel Gonzales), devising to Manuel
Gonzales the greater portion of the
estate, without impairing the legitimes
of the other children.
On December 31, 1948, Manolita G. de
Carungcong died in the same court a
petition (Special Proceeding No. 838)
for the probate of another alleged will
executed by the testatrix on May 5, 1945
(Exhibit 1 — Manolita G. Carungcong),
leaving to Manolita G. de Carungcong
the greater bulk of the estate, without
impairing the legitimes of the other
children.
In his opposition filed on February 16,
1949, Alejandro Gonzales, Jr. sought the
disallowance of the wills executed on
November 16, 1942, and May 5, 1945, on
the ground that, assuming their validity,
they had been revoked by the testatrix in
an instrument executed by her on
November 18, 1948 (Exhibit 2 —
Alejandro and Juan Gonzales), with the
result that her estate should be
distributed as if she died intestate.
With the exception of Leopoldo
Gonzales, the children of the testatrix
filed mutual oppositions to one or the
other instruments tending to negative
their respective positions. After a joint
hearing, the Court of First Instance of
Rizal rendered a decision with the
following dispositive pronouncements:
"All facts considered in the light of the
evidence presented and in the manner in
which the witnesses testified the court
concludes and holds:
"First: That Exhibit B — Manuel
Gonzales, though validity executed on
November 16, 1942, was revoked by
Exhibit 1 — Manolita G. Carungcong in
accordance with the provisions of
section 623 of the Code of Civil
Procedure.
"Second: That Exhibit 2 — Alejandro
and Juan Gonzales being executed
without the knowledge and
testamentary capacity of the testatrix
and being contrary to the provisions of
section 618 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, the said document is hereby
declared null and void.
"Third: That Exhibit 1 — Manolita G.
Carungcong having been executed in
accordance with law the same is hereby
declared as the true and last will and
testament of the deceased Manuela
Ibarra Viuda de Gonzales, and said will
is hereby admitted probate.”
From this judgment petitioner Manuel
Gonzales and oppositors Alejandro
Gonzales, Jr. and Juan Gonzales have isa sa mga dahon o pagina nitong aking
appealed. The appeal as to Juan testamento.
Gonzales was dismissed in view of his
failure to pay the proportionate share of
the printing cost of the record on appeal. " (Sgd.) MANUELA Y. VDA. DE
GONZALES

In the parts material to the present

appeal (in the SC), the will executed by MANUELA IBARRA VDA. DE
the testatrix on May 5, 1945, is of the GONZALES"
following form and tenor:
Mga Saksi o Testigos:

" (Sgd.) BIENVENIDO DE LOS REYES

"IKALABING-DALAWA. Na ang aking
Huling BILIN AT TESTAMENTONG ito
ay binubuo ng PITONG (7) dahon o
"(Sgd.) TAHIMIK T. SAYOC
pagina na may bilang na sunod-sunod at
ang bawa‟t dahon o pagina ay mayroong
tunay kong lagda o firma, gayon din ang
lahat ñg aking saksi o testigos. "(Sgd.) LUIS GAERLAN"

"SA KATUNAYAN ng lahat ng It is contended for the appellants that

isinasaysay ko dito ay aking nilagdaan
ito dito sa Imus, Kavite, Filipinas
ñgayong ika-5 ñg Mayo ng taong 1945,
na nakaharap dito sa ating paglagda o
pagfirma ang tatlong saksi o testigos. At
aking ding nilagdaan o pinirmahan ang
tagilirang kaliwa ng lahat at bawa‟t
dahon o pagina nitong testamento kong
ito sa harap ng lahat at bawa‟t isang
saksi o testigos at ang lahat at bawa‟t isa
naman sa kanila ay nangagsilagda o
nagsifirma din dito bilang saksi ko sa
harap ko at sa harap ng lahat at bawa‟t
isa sa kanila, at ganoon din silang mga
saksi ko ay nangag-lagda o nagsi-firma
sa tagilirang kaliwa ng lahat at bawa‟t
this will does not contain any attestation
clause; that, assuming the concluding
paragraph to be the attestation clause, it
is not valid because it is the act of the
testatrix and not of the witnesses, and
because it does not state the number of
sheets or pages of the will.
ISSUES:
(1) WHETHER OR NOT THERE IS
SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE WITH
THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE LAW
(2) WHETHER OR NOT THE WILL
(EXHIBIT 1 — MANOLITA G.
CARUNGCONG) HAS BEEN REVOKED
BY THE TESTATRIX IN THE
INSTRUMENT OF NOVEMBER 18,
1948
(EXHIBIT 2 — ALEJANDRO AND
JUAN GONZALES)
HELD:
(1) YES.
AS TO THE ISSUE OF ATTESTATION
CLAUSE
The clause above quoted is the
attestation clause referred to in the law
which, in our opinion, substantially
complies with its requirements. The only
apparent anomaly we did is that it
appears to be an attestation made by the
testator himself more than by the
instrumental witnesses. This apparent
anomaly, however, is not in our opinion
serious nor substantial as to affect the
validity of the will, it appearing that
right under the signature of the testator,
there appear the signatures of the three
instrumental witnesses.
"„Instrumental witness, as defined by
Escriche in his Diccionario Razonada de
Legislacion, y Jurisprudencia, Vol. 4, p.
1115, is one who takes part in the
execution of an instrument or writing"
(in re will of Tan Diuco, 45 Phil., 807,
809). An instrumental witness,
therefore, does not merely attest to the
signature of the testator but also to the
proper execution of the will. The fact
that the three instrumental witnesses
have signed the will immediately under
the signature of the testator, shows that
they have in fact attested not only to the
genuineness of his signature but also to
the due execution of the will as
embodied in the attestation clause
AS TO THE ISSUE OF NUMBER OF
PAGES
The attestation clause contained in the
body of the will being thus valid, the
statement in the penultimate paragraph
of the will hereinabove quoted as to the
number of sheets or pages used, is
sufficient attestation which may be
considered in conjunction with the last
paragraph. It is significant that the law
does not require the attestation to be
contained in a single clause. While
perfection in the drafting of a will may
be desirable, unsubstantial departure
from the usual forms should be ignored,
especially where the authenticity of the
will is not assailed, as in this case.
The result reached in respect of the
sufficiency of the will (Exhibit 1 —
Manolita G. Carungcong) necessarily
disposes of the contention of appellant
Manuel Gonzales that the trial court
erred in not admitting to probate the
will (Exhibit B — Manuel Gonzales),
since the latter will must be considered
revoked by the subsequent will (Exhibit
1 — Manolita G. Carungcong).
(2) NO. THERE WAS NO
REVOCATION.
Appellee Manolita G. de Carungcong,
like Manuel Gonzales (as appellee),
contends that the testatrix lacked the
testamentary capacity when she
allegedly executed the instrument of
revocation, and their contention was
sustained by the trial court. We have
examined the record and found no valid
reason for reversing the finding of said
court which had the benefit of observing
and hearing the witnesses testify. Upon
the other hand, the following
considerations amply support the
appealed decision:
1. For more than ten years prior to
her death, the testatrix had suffered
from hypertension. On November 14,
1948, she had aphasia and on November
15, 1948, she was taken to the hospital
upon advice of the family physician, Dr.
Jose C. Leveriza. In the letter
introducing her to the hospital
authorities, Dr. Leveriza stated that the
testatrix was suffering from
hypertension and cerebral thrombosis.
Particularly on November 18, 1948,
when the alleged instrument of
revocation was executed by her, the
testatrix was in a comatose and
unconscious state and could not talk or
understand.
2. While appellant Alejandro Gonzales,
Jr. has attempted to show that Dr.
Leveriza was not an expert, the latter‟s
testimony remains uncontradicted. The
fact that the testimony of the attesting
witnesses tends to imply that the
testatrix was of sound mind at the time
the alleged instrument of revocation was
executed, cannot prevail over the
findings of the attending physician, Dr.
Leveriza, because even Dr. Ramon C.
Talavera (an attesting witness) testified
that although he had not examined the
testatrix, her case appeared serious; that
he had a hunch that "they were taking
advantage of the last moment of the
deceased and they were trying to make
me an instrument in the
accomplishment of their aims," and that
he had the idea that the testatrix was in
doubtful condition because he "could
only judge from the people going there.”
It is also argued that if the testatrix was
in a comatose condition, Dr. Leveriza
would not have ordered to "let her sit on
bed or on a chair and let her turn on her
side sometime." However, Dr. Leveriza
has given the reason for this
prescription, namely, to avoid hypostatic
pneumonia.
4. MOLO vs MOLO
Topic: Doctrine of Dependent Relative
Revocation
FACTS
1. Marcos Molo executed 2 wills, one in
August 1918 and another in June 1939.
The latter will contained a revocation
clause which expressly revoked the will
in 1918. He died without any forced
heirs but he was survived by his wife,
herein petitioner Juana. The oppositors
to the probate were his nephews and
nieces.
2. Only a carbon copy of the second will
was found. The widow filed a petition
for the probate of the 1939 will. It was
admitted to probate but subsequently
set aside on ground that the petitioner
failed to prove its due execution.
3. As a result, the petitioner filed
another petition for the probate of the
1918 will this time. Again the oppositors
alleged that said will had already been
revoked under the 1939 will. They
contended that despite the disallowance
of the 1939 will, the revocation clause is
valid and thus effectively nullified the
1918 will.
ISSUE
WON the 1918 will can still be valid
despite the revocation in the subsequent
disallowed 1939 will
HELD
Yes.The court applied the doctrine laid
down in Samson v. Naval that a
subsequent will,containing a clause
revoking a previous will, having been
disallowed for the reason that it was not
executed in accordance with law cannot
produce the effect of annulling the
previous will, inasmuch as the said
revocatory clause is void.
There was no valid revocation in this
case. No evidence was shown that the
testator deliberately destroyed the
original 1918 will because of his
knowledge of the revocatory clause
contained in the will executed in
1939.The earlier will can still be
probated under the principle of
dependent relative revocation.The
doctrine applies when a testator cancels
or destroys a will or executes an
instrument intended to revoke a will
with the intention to make a new
testamentary disposition as substitute
for the old, and the new disposition fails
of effect for some reason.
5. VELAYO BERNARDO vs SIOJO
Topic: Reserva Troncal
FACTS
The appellant herein was not a party to
either the action for partition or the
compromise agreement between the
appellee and Pablo Aguirre, yet in spite
of the fact that these two understood the
reservable nature of all the lands in
question; they made it appear in their
written agreement that the appellant
herein was present in the court when
said agreement was made and that she
had given her consent thereto,
renouncing whatever right she might
have in said lands. It was likewise stated
in the compromise agreement that Pablo
Aguirre would deliver a certain portion
of the sum of P3,250 to the appellant
herein. This compromise agreement was
approved by the then presiding judge
and was made a part of the decision
rendered therein which terminated the
litigation.

ISSUE
WON the compromise agreement
waiving the Petitioner‟s right to the
reservable property is valid.
HELD
The parties admit that all the lands
partake of the character of reservable
property having been inherited by an
ascendant who was found to reserve
them for the benefit of relatives within
the third degree belonging to the line
from which such property came, in
accordance with article 811 of the Civil
Code.
On the other hand, the relatives within
the third degree in whose favor the right
is reserved cannot dispose of the
property, first because it is in no way,
either actually, constructively or
formally, in their possession; and
moreover, because they have no title of
ownership or of fee simple which they
can transmit to another, on the
hypothesis that only when the person
who must reserve the right should die
before them will they acquire it, thus
creating a fee simple, and only then will
they take their place in the succession of
the descendant of whom they are
relatives within the third degree, that is
to say, a second contingent place in said
legitimate succession in the fashion of
aspirants to a possible future legacy.
Renunciation of the right over the
reserved property by the reservatario
during the lifetime of the reservista is
void and prohibited by article 1271 of the
CC forbidding the execution of contracts
with respect to future inheritances.
The contract thus executed was null and
void or without effect for the reason that
it anticipated the transfer or waiver of
reservable property during the lifetime
of the reserver thereof.
6. ANTONIA ARMAS Y
CALISTERIO,
v.
MARIETTA CALISTERIO,
FACTS:
Teodorico Calistero died intestate,
leaving several parcels of land. He
was survived by his wife, Marietta.
Teodorico was the second husband of
Marietta who was previously married to
William Bounds in January 1946.
The latter disappeared without a trace in
February 1947. 11 years later from
the disappearance of Bounds, Marietta
and Teodorico got married without
Marietta securing a court declaration of
Bounds‟ presumptive death.
Antonia Armas, surviving sister of
Teodorico filed a petition claiming to be
the sole surviving heir of the latter and
that the marriage between Marietta and
her brother, being allegedly bigamous is
by itself null and void. She prayed that
her son be appointed as administrator of
the estate of the decedent
and inheritance be adjudicated to her.
ISSUE:
WON Marietta and Teodorico‟s
marriage was void due to the absence of
the declaration of presumptive death
RULING:
No. The marriage between the
respondent and decedent was
solemnized in 1958 where the law in
force at the time was the Civil Code and
 not the Family Code. Article 256 of the
Family Code limits its retroactive effect
only to cases where it would not
prejudice or impair vested or acquired
rights in accordance with the Civil Code
and other laws. Since the Civil Code
provides that declaration of presumptive
death is not essential before contracting
marriage where at least 7 consecutive
years of absence of the spouse is enough
to remarry, then Marietta‟s marriage
with Teodorico is valid and therefore she
has a right to claim a portion of
Teodorico‟s estate.
7. JOHNNY S. RABADILLA vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, et.al.
FACTS:
 Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, in a codicil (a
supplement to a will; an appendix) of
Aleja Belleza, was instituted devisee of
Lot No. 1392 with an area of 511,855
square meters with the obligation to
deliver 100 piculs of sugar to herein
private respondent every year during the
latter's lifetime.
 The codicil provides that the obligation
is imposed not only on the instituted
heir but also to his successors-in-
interest and that in case of failure to
deliver, private respondent shall seize
the property and turn it over to the
testatrix's "near descendants."
 Dr. Rabadilla died and was survived by
his wife and children, one of whom is
herein petitioner.
 Private respondent, alleging failure of
the heirs to comply with their obligation,
filed a complaint with the RTC praying
for the reconveyance of the subject
property to the surviving heirs of the
testatrix.
 During the pre-trial, a compromise
agreement was concluded between the
parties wherein the lessee of the
property assumed the delivery of 100
piculs of sugar to private respondent;
however, only partial delivery was made.
 The trial court dismissed the complaint
for lack of cause of action stating that,
“While there may be the non-
performance of the command as
mandated, exaction from them (the
petitioners), simply because they are the
children of Jorge Rabadilla, the title
holder/owner of the lot in question, does
not warrant the filing of the present
complaint.”
 The CA, reversed the decision and held
that the institution of Dr. Rabadilla is in
the nature of a modal institution and a
cause of action in favor of private
respondent arose when petitioner failed
to comply with their obligation under
the codicil, and in ordering the reversion
of Lot 1392 to the estate of testatrix.
Thus, the present petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not private respondent has a
legally demandable right against the
petitioner, as one of the compulsory
heirs of Dr. Rabadilla.
HELD:
YES.It is a general rule under the law on
succession that successional rights are
transmitted from the moment of death
of the decedent and compulsory heirs
are called to succeed by operation of
law. The legitimate children and
descendants, in relation to their
legitimate parents, and the widow or
widower, are compulsory heirs. Thus,
the petitioner, his mother and sisters, as
compulsory heirs of the instituted heir,
Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, succeeded the latter
by operation of law, without need of
further proceedings, and the
successional rights were transmitted to
them from the moment of death of the
decedent, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla.
Under Article 776 of the New Civil Code,
inheritance includes all the property,
rights and obligations of a person, not
extinguished by his death. Conformably,
whatever rights Dr. Jorge Rabadilla had
by virtue of subject Codicil were
transmitted to his forced heirs, at the
time of his death. And since obligations
not extinguished by death also form part
of the estate of the decedent; corollarily,
the obligations imposed by the Codicil
on the deceased Dr. Jorge Rabadilla,
were likewise transmitted to his
compulsory heirs upon his death.
In the said Codicil, testatrix Aleja
Belleza devised Lot No. 1392 to Dr.
Jorge Rabadilla, subject to the condition
that the usufruct thereof would be
delivered to the herein private
respondent every year. Upon the death
of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, his compulsory
heirs succeeded to his rights and title
over said property, and they also
assumed his (decedent's) obligation to
deliver the fruits of the lot involved to
herein private respondent. Such
obligation of the instituted heir
reciprocally corresponds to the right of
private respondent over the usufruct,
the fulfillment or performance of which
is now being demanded by the latter
through the institution of the case at
bar. Therefore, private respondent has a
cause of action against petitioner and
the trial court erred in dismissing the
complaint below.
8. ALVARADO vs. GAVIOLA
September 14, 1993
FACTS:
The testator did not read the final draft
of the will himself. Instead, private
respondent, as the lawyer who drafted
the 8-paged document, read the same
aloud in the presence of the testator, the
3 instrumental witnesses and the notary
public. The latter 4 followed the reading
with their own respective copies
previously furnished them.
Said will was admitted to probate.
Later on, a codicil was executed, and by
that time, the testator was already
suffering from glaucoma. But the
disinheritance and revocatory clauses
were unchanged. As in the case of the
notarial will, the testator did not
personally read the final draft of the
codicil. Instead, it was private
respondent who read it aloud in his
presence and in the presence of the
three instrumental witnesses (same as
those of the notarial will) and the notary
public who followed the reading using
their own copies.
ISSUE:
Was there substantial compliance
to the reading of the will?
HELD:
Article 808 not only applies to blind
testators, but also to those who, for one
reason or another, are incapable of
reading their wills. Hence, the will
should have been read by the notary
public and an instrumental witness.
However, the spirit behind the law was
served though the letter was not. In this
case, there was substantial compliance.
Substantial compliance is acceptable
where the purpose of the law has been
satisfied, the reason being that the
solemnities surrounding the execution
of wills are intended to protect the
testator from all kinds of fraud and
trickery but are never intended to be so
rigid and inflexible as to destroy the
testamentary privilege.
In this case, private respondent
read the testator's will and codicil aloud
in the presence of the testator, his three
instrumental witnesses, and the notary
public. Prior and subsequent thereto,
the testator affirmed, upon being asked,
that the contents read corresponded
with his instructions. Only then did the
signing and acknowledgement take
place
9. ROXAS v. ROXAS
FACTS:
Pablo M. Roxas died leaving
properties in Bulacan. The other
respondents Maria and Pedro Roxas,
sister and brother respectively of the
deceased, filed a petition for the
administration of the latter's estate, in
special intestate proceeding, and Maria
Roxas was appointed special
administratrix upon an ex-parte
petition. On August 10, 1946, the
petitioner Natividad Vda. de Roxas,
widow of Pablo M. Roxas, filed a
petition for the probate of an alleged will
of her deceased husband, and for her
appointment as executrix of his estate
designated is said will.
In said will the deceased
bequeathed one-half of his estate to his
widow, the herein petitioner, and the
other half to Reynaldo Roxas, an
adulterous child 9 years old of the
decedent. Upon agreement of both
parties, the intestate proceeding was
dismissed and ordered closed by the
court.
Respondents filed a motion for
reconsideration of the order of the court
appointing the petitioner as special
administratrix, with an alternative
prayer that Maria Roxas be appointed as
special co-administratrix, which motion
was not acted upon.
After hearing on December 15,
1947, the respondent judge rendered a
decision denying the probate of the will
presented by the petitioner on the
ground that the attesting witnesses did
not sign their respective names in the
presence of the testator, from which the
petitioner has appealed, and the appeal
is now pending.
 Respondents Maria and Pedro
Roxas renewed their petition for the
appointment of Maria Roxas as special
administratrix or special co-
administratrix, and on May 5, 1948, the
respondent judge rendered his
resolution appointing the petitioner
Natividad I. Vda. de Roxas as special
administratrix only of all the conjugal
properties of the deceased, and Maria
Roxas as special administratrix of all
capital or properties belonging
exclusively to the deceased Pablo M.
Roxas.
ISSUE:
The present petition for certiorari
has been filed with this Court against the
last order or resolution of the Court of
First Instance of Bulacan based on the
ground that the respondent judge acted
in excess of the court's jurisdiction in
appointing two special co-
administratices of the estate of the
deceased Pablo Roxas, one of the capital
or properties belonging exclusively to
the deceased, and another of his
conjugal properties with his wife (now
widow), the petitioner.
RULING:
There is nothing wrong in that the
respondent judge, in exercising his
discretion and appointing the petitioner
as special administratrix, had taken into
consideration the beneficial interest of
the petitioner in the estate of the
decedent and her being designated in
the will as executrix thereof. But the
respondent's subsequent act of
appointing her as special administratrix
only of the conjugal or community
property, and Maria Roxas as special
administratrix of the capital or exclusive
property of the decedent, does not seem
to be in conformity with logic or reason.
The petitioner has or claims to have the
same beneficial interest after the
decision of the court disapproving the
will, which is now pending on appeal, as
she had prior to it, because the decision
is not yet final and may be reversed by
the appellate court.
Besides, even if the will is not probated,
the widow in the present case would
have, under the law, the right of usufruct
over one-half of the exclusive property
of the decedent, besides her share in the
conjugal partnership. The beneficial
interest required as a qualification for
appointment as administrator of the
estate of a decedent is the interest in the
whole estate and not only in some part
thereof. The petitioner being entitled to
one-half in usufruct of all the exclusive
properties of the decedent, she would
have as much if not more interest in
administering the entire estate correctly,
in order to reap the benefit of a wise,
speedy, economical administration of
the state, and not suffer the
consequences of the waste,
improvidence or mismanagement
thereof. The good or bad administration
of the property may affect rather the
fruits than the naked ownership of a
property.
However, for the decision of the
question involved in this proceeding it is
not necessary for us to determine
whether or not the respondent judge has
acted with grave abuse of discretion in
rendering the resolution complained of
for the reasons just stated, in view of our
conclusion that the respondent judge
acted in excess of the court's jurisdiction
in appointing two separate special
administratices of the estate of the
decedent: one of the conjugal or
community property and another of the
capital or exclusive property of the
deceased Pablo M. Roxas.
According to section 2, Rule 75, taken
from section 685 of the former Code of
Civil Procedure, Act No. 190, as
amended, "when the marriage is
dissolved by the death of the husband or
wife, the community property shall be
inventoried, administered, and
liquidated, and the debts thereof paid, in
the testate or intestate proceedings of
the deceased spouse." That is the reason
why, according to section 4, Rule 78, the
"letters testamentary, or letters of
administration with the will annexed,
shall extend to all the estate of the
testator in the Philippines," and section
6, Rule 79, provides for appointment of
one administrator in case of intestacy,
except in certain cases in which two or
more joint, but not separate and
independent, administrators may be
appointed under section 3, Rule 82.
Therefore the administrator appointed
to administer and liquidate the exclusive
property of a deceased spouse shall also
administer, liquidate and distribute the
community property, because the estate
of a deceased spouse which is to be
settled, that is, administered, liquidated
and distributed, consists not only of the
exclusive properties of the decedent, but
also of one-half of the assets of the
conjugal partnership, if any, which may
pertain to the deceased, as determined
after the liquidation thereof in
accordance with the provisions of
articles 1421 to 1424 of the Civil Code.
There is absolutely no reason for
appointing two separate administrators,
specially if the estate to be settled is that
of a deceased husband as in the present
case, for according to articles 1422 and
1423 of the Civil Code, only after the
dowry and parapherna of the wife and
the debts, charges, and obligations of
the conjugal partnership have been paid,
the capital or exclusive property of the
husband may be liquidated and paid in
so far as the inventoried estate may
reach; and if the estate inventoried
should not be sufficient to pay the dowry
and the parapherna of the wife and the
debts, charges and obligations of the
partnership, the provision of Title XVII
of the Civil Code relating to concurrence
and preference of credits shall be
observed. If two separate administrators
are appointed as done in the present
case, in every action which one of them
may institute to recover properties or
credit of the deceased, the defendant
may raise the question or set up the
defense that the plaintiff has no cause of
action, because the property or credit in
issue belongs to the class which is being
administered by the other
administrator, which can not be done if
the administrator of the entire estate is the exclusive property of the decedent,
only one. and therefore the respondent judge
acted in excess of the court's jurisdiction
As under the law only one general in rendering or issuing the order
administrator may be appointed to complained of, and therefore said order
administer, liquidate and distribute the is hereby set aside, with costs against the
estate of a deceased spouse, it clearly respondents. So ordered
follows that only one special
administrator may be appointed to
administer temporarily said estate,
because a special administrator is but a 10. Mendoza v. de Los Santos
temporary administrator who is G.R. No. 176422 |March 20, 2013
appointed to act in lieu of the general
administrator. "When there is delay in
granting letters testamentary or of
Topic: Applicability of Reserva Troncal;
administration occasioned by an appeal
First cousins of the descendant/
from the allowance or disallowance of
prepositus are fourth degree relatives
will, or from any other cause, the court
and cannot be considered reservees/
may appoint a special administrator to
reservatarios
collect and take charge of the estate of
the deceased until the questions causing
the delay are decided and executors or
administrators thereupon appointed," Facts:
(sec. 1, Rule 81). Although his powers
The subject parcel of land in this case
and duties are limited to "collect and
was in the name of respondent but co-
take charge of the goods, chattels, rights,
owned by Victoria Pantaleon, who
credits, and estate of the deceased and
bought one-half of the property from
preserve the same for the executor or
petitioner Maria Mendoza and her
administrator afterwards appointed, and
siblings. Petitioners who are
for that purpose may commence and
grandchildren of Placido Mendoza
maintain suits as administrator, and
(Placido) and Dominga Mendoza
may sell such perishable and other
(Dominga) alleged that the properties
property as the court orders sold. A
were part of Placido and Dominga‟s
special administrator shall not be liable
properties that were subject of an oral
to pay any debts of the deceased."
partition and subsequently adjudicated
(Section 2, Rule 81.)lawphil.net
to Exequiel. After Exequiel‟s death, it
In view of all the foregoing, we hold that passed on to his spouse Leonor and only
the court below has no power to appoint daughter, Gregoria; but thereafter went
two special administratices of the estate to Gregoria when Leonor died after.
of a deceased husband or wife, one of Gregoria died intestate, and thereafter,
the community property and another of respondent, who is Leonor‟s sister,
adjudicated unto herself all these
properties as the sole surviving heir of
Leonor and Gregoria.
Hence, petitioners claim that the
properties should have been reserved by
respondent in their behalf and must now
revert back to them, applying Article 891
of the Civil Code on reserva troncal. The
RTC granted their action for Recovery of
Possession by Reserva Troncal,
Cancellation of TCT and Reconveyance
but on appeal to the CA, however,
reversed and set aside the RTC decision
and dismissed the complaint filed by
petitioners and also denied their motion
for reconsideration.
Issue:
1. Won the CA grievously erred in
holding that the subject properties are
not reservable properties, coming as
they do from the family line of the
petitioners Mendozas. - NO
2. Won CA grievously erred in holding
that the petitioners Mendozas do not
have a right to the subject properties by
virtue of the law on reserva troncal. - NO
Held:
1. The CA is correct. Based on the
circumstances of the present case,
Article 891 on Reserva Troncal is not
applicable. The persons involved in
reserva troncal are: (1) The ascendant or
brother or sister from whom the
property was received by the descendant
by lucrative or gratuitous title; (2) The
descendant or prepositus (propositus)
who received the property; (3) The
reservor (reservista), the other
ascendant who obtained the property
from the prepositus by operation of law;
and (4) The reservee (reservatario) who
is within the third degree from the
prepositus and who belongs to the (linea
o tronco) from which the property came
and for whom the property should be
reserved by the reservor.
It should be pointed out that the
ownership of the properties should be
reckoned only from Exequiel‟s as he is
the ascendant from where the first
transmission occurred, or from whom
Gregoria inherited the properties in
dispute. The law does not go farther
than such ascendant/brother/sister in
determining the lineal character of the
property. It was also immaterial for the
CA to determine whether Exequiel
predeceased Placido and Dominga or
whether Gregoria predeceased Exequiel.
What is pertinent is that Exequiel owned
the properties and he is the ascendant
from whom the properties in dispute
originally came. Gregoria, on the other
hand, is the descendant who received
the properties from Exequiel by
gratuitous title.
Moreover, Article 891 simply requires
that the property should have been
acquired by the descendant or
prepositus from an ascendant by
gratuitous or lucrative title. A
transmission is gratuitous or by
gratuitous title when the recipient does
not give anything in return. At risk of
being repetitious, what was clearly
established in this case is that the
properties in dispute were owned by
Exequiel (ascendant). After his death,
Gregoria (descendant/prepositus)
acquired the properties as inheritance.
2. Petitioners, Mendoza et al cannot be
considered reservees/ reservatarios as
they are not relatives within the third
degree of Gregoria from whom the
properties came. The person from whom
the degree should be reckoned is the
descendant/prepositus―the one at the
end of the line from which the property
came and upon whom the property last
revolved by descent. It is Gregoria in
this case. Petitioners are Gregoria‟s
fourth degree relatives, being her first
cousins. First cousins of the prepositus
are fourth degree relatives and are not
reservees or reservatarios.
They cannot even claim representation
of their predecessors Antonio and
Valentin as Article 891 grants a personal
right of reservation only to the relatives
up to the third degree from whom the
reservable properties came. The only
recognized exemption is in the case of
nephews and nieces of the prepositus,
who have the right to represent their
ascendants (fathers and mothers) who
are the brothers/sisters of the prepositus
and relatives within the third degree.
11. Arellano vs Pascual
FACTS:
Angel N. Pascual Jr. died intestate on
January 2, 1999 leaving his siblings as
heirs, namely: a) petitioner Amelia who
is represented by her daughters; b)
Agnes c) Nona d)Francisco and Miguel
Pascual. In a petition for “Judicial
Settlement of Intestate Estate and
Issuance of Letters of Administration,”
filed by the respondents before the RTC
of Makati, there is an allegation that the
donation to petitioner is an advance of
her legitime. The said property is now
registered under the name of the
petitioner.
Provisionally passing, however, upon
the question of title to the donated
property only for the purpose of
determining whether it formed part of
the decedent‟s estate, the probate court
found the Deed of Donation valid in
light of the presumption of validity of
notarized documents. It thus went on to
hold that it is subject to collation; An
appeal to the CA was made, questioning
the order of the trial court to include the
property subject of the donation as part
of the advance inheritance of the
petitioner.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the property subject of
the donation is subject of collation.
HELD:
No. The decedent left no compulsory
heir who is entitled to legitime, he was at
liberty to donate all his properties, even
if nothing was left for his siblings-
collateral relatives to inherit. His
donation to petitioner, assuming that it
was valid, is deemed as donation made
to a “stranger,” chargeable against the
free portion of the estate. There being no
compulsory heir, however, the donated
property is not subject to collation. The
term collation has two distinct concepts:
first, it is a mere mathematical operation
by the addition of the value of donations
made by the testator to the value of the
hereditary estate; and second,it is the
return to the hereditary estate of
property disposed of by lucrative title by
the testator during his lifetime. The
purposes of collation are to secure
equality among the compulsory heirs in
so far as is possible, and to determine
the free portion, after finding the
legitime, so that in officious donations
may be reduced. Collation takes place
when there are compulsory heirs, one of
its purposes being to determine the
legitime and the free portion. If there is
no compulsory heir, there is no legitime
to be safeguarded. The decedent‟s
remaining estate should thus be
partitioned equally among his heirs-
siblings-collateral relatives, herein
petitioner and respondents, pursuant to
Art. 1003 and 1004 of the NCC.
12. G.R. No. L-65800 October 3,
1986
PARTENZA LUCERNA VDA. DE
TUPAS, petitioner-appellant, vs.
BRANCH XLIII of the HON.
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
NEGROS OCCIDENTAL,
respondent, and TUPAS
FOUNDATION, INC., private
respondent-appellee.
Abraham D. Caña for petitioner-
appellant.
Jose R. Edis for private respondent-
appellee
FACTS:
Epifanio R. Tupas died on August 20,
1978 in Bacolod City, childless, leaving
his widow, Partenza Lucerna, as his only
surviving compulsory heir. He also left a
will dated May 18, 1976, which was
admitted to probate on September 30,
1980 in Special Proceedings No. 13994
of the Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental. Among the assets listed in
his will were lots Nos. 837, 838 and 839
of the Sagay Cadastre, admittedly his
private capital. However, at the time of
his death, these lots were no longer
owned by him, he having donated them
the year before (on August 2, 1977) to
the Tupas Foundation, Inc., which had
thereafter obtained title to said lots.
Claiming that said donation had left her
practically destitute of any inheritance,
Tupas' widow brought suit against
Tupas Foundation, Inc. in the same
Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental (docketed as Civil Case No.
16089) to have the donation declared
inofficious insofar as it prejudiced her
legitime, therefore reducible " ... by one-
half or such proportion as ... (might be
deemed) justified ... and " ... the
resulting deduction ... " restored and
conveyed or delivered to her. The
complaint also prayed for attorney's fees
and such other relief as might be proper.
The Trial Court did not see things her
way. Upon the facts above stated, on
which the parties stipulated, 1 said Court
dismissed the complaint for lack of
merit, rejecting her claim on several
grounds, viz.:
... (1) Article 900 relied upon by plaintiff
is not applicable because the properties
which were disposed of by way of
donation one year before the death of
Epifanio Tupas were no longer part of
his hereditary estate at the time of his
death on August 20, 1978; (2) the
donation properties were Epifanio's
capital or separate estate; and (3) Tupas
Foundation, Inc. being a stranger and
not a compulsory heir, the donation
inter vivos made in its favor was not
subject to collation under Art. 106 1, C.C
Issue: whether or not a donation inter
vivos by a donor now deceased is
inofficious and should be reduced at the
instance of the donor's widow.
Ruling: YES!!!
A person's prerogative to make
donations is subject to certain
limitations, one of which is that he
cannot give by donation more than he
can give by will (Art. 752, Civil Code). If
he does, so much of what is donated as
exceeds what he can give by will is
deemed inofficious and the donation is
reducible to the extent of such excess,
though without prejudice to its taking
effect in the donor's lifetime or the
donee's appropriating the fruits of the
thing donated (Art. 771, Civil Code).
Such a donation is, moreover,
collationable that is, its value is
imputable into the hereditary estate of
the donor at the tune of his death for the
purpose of determining the legitime of
the forced or compulsory heirs and the
freely disposable portion of the estate.
This is true as well of donations to
strangers as of gifts to compulsory heirs,
although the language of Article 1061 of
the Civil Code would seem to limit
collation to the latter class of donations.
Since it is clear that the questioned
donation is collationable and that,
having been made to a stranger (to the
donor) it is, by law 7 chargeable to the
freely disposable portion of the donor's
estate, to be reduced insofar as
inofficious, i.e., it exceeds said portion
and thus impairs the legitime of the
compulsory heirs, in order to find out
whether it is inofficious or not, recourse
must be had to the rules established by
the Civil Code for the determination of
the legitime and, by extension, of the
disposable portion. These rules are set
forth in Articles 908, 909 and 910 of the
Code, on the basis of which the following
step-by-step procedure has been
correctly outlined:
(1) determination of the value of the
property which remains at the time of
the testator's death;
(2) determination of the obligations,
debts, and charges which have to be paid
out or deducted from the value of the
property thus left;
(3) the determination of the difference
between the assets and the liabilities,
giving rise to the hereditary estate;
(4) the addition to the net value thus
found, of the value, at the time they were
made, of donations subject to collation;
and
(5) the determination of the amount of
the legitimes by getting from the total
thus found the portion that the law
provides as the legitime of each
respective compulsory heir.
13. G.R. No. L-46903 July
23, 1987
BUHAY DE ROMA, petitioner, vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS and FELICIDAD
CARINGAL, as Guardian of
Rosalinda de Roma, respondents.
CRUZ, J.:
Facts:
Candelaria de Roma had two legally
adopted daughters, Buhay de Roma and
Rosalinda de Roma. She died intestate
on April 30, 1971, and administration
proceedings were instituted in the Court
of First Instance of Laguna by the
private respondent as guardian of
Rosalinda. Buhay was appointed
administratrix and in due time filed an
inventory of the estate. This was
opposed by Rosalinda on the ground
that certain properties earlier donated
by Candelaria to Buhay, and the fruits
thereof, had not been included. The
properties in question consisted of seven
parcels of coconut land.
The issue was resolved in favor of the
petitioner by the trial court, which
held that the decedent, when she made
the donation in favor of Buhay,
expressly prohibited collation.
On appeal, the order of the trial court
was reversed, the respondent court
holding that the deed of donation
contained no express prohibition to
collate as an exception to Article 1062.
 Article 1062. Collation shall not
take place among compulsory
heirs if the donor should have so
expressly provided, or if the
donor should repudiate the
inheritance, unless the donation
should be reduced as inofficious.
Accordingly, it ordered collation and
equally divided the net estate of the
decedent, including the fruits of the
donated property, between Buhay and
Rosalinda.
***(to fully appreciate the case ibutang
nlng nako ang reproduction sa sulod sa
deed of donation, no need to basa, for
reference lang)
IKALAWA. Na alang-alang sa
aking pagmamahal, pagtingin at
pagsisilbi sa akin ng aking anak
na si BUHAY DE ROMA, kasal
kay Arabella Castaneda, may
karampatang gulang,
mamamayang Pilipino at
naninirahan at may pahatirang-
sulat din dito sa Lunsod ng San
Pablo sa pamamagitan ng
kasulatang ito ay kusang-loob
kong ibinibigay, ipinagkakaloob
at inililipat sa nabanggit na
BUHAY DE ROMA, sa kanyang
mga kahalili at tagapagmana, sa
pamamagitan ng
pagbibigay na di na
mababawing muli, ang lahat
ng mga lagay ng lupa na sinasabi
sa itaas, sa ilalim ng kasunduan
na ngayon pa ay siya na ang
nagmamay-aring tunay ng mga
lupang ito at kanya nang maaring
ipalipat ang mga hoja
declaratoria ng mga lupang ito sa
kanyang pangalan, datapwa't
samantalang ako ay nabubuhay,
ay ako rin ang makikinabang sa
mga mapuputi at mamomosesion
sa mga nasabing lupa;
IKATLO. Na pinagtibay ko na ako
ay marami pang ibang mga pag-
aari sa sapat pang aking ikabuhay
at sa pagbibigay kong ito ay hindi
masisira ang legitimate ng mga
tao na dapat magmana sa akin,
sapagkat ang mga lupang
sinasabi sa itaas ay bahagui ng
aking kabuhayan na ako ay may
layang ipamigay kahit na
kaninong tao na kung tawagin ay
Libre Disposicion
Issue: whether these lands are subject
to collation
Ruling: YES SUBJECT TO
COLLATION
We agree with the respondent court that
there is nothing in the above provisions
expressly prohibiting the collation of the
donated properties. As the said court
correctly observed, the phrase "sa
pamamagitan ng pagbibigay na di na
mababawing muli" merely described the
donation as "irrevocable" and should not
be construed as an express prohibition
against collation. The fact that a
donation is irrevocable does not
necessarily exempt the subject thereof
from the collation required under Article
1061.

We surmise from the use of such terms

as "legitime" and "free portion" in the
deed of donation that it was prepared by
a lawyer, and we may also presume he
understood the legal consequences of
the donation being made. It is
reasonable to suppose, given the precise
language of the document, that he would
have included therein an express
prohibition to collate if that had been
the donor's intention.

Anything less than such express

prohibition will not suffice under the
clear language of Article 1062.1awphil
The suggestion that there was an
implied prohibition because the
properties donated were imputable to
the free portion of the decedent's estate
merits little consideration. Imputation is
not the question here, nor is it claimed
that the disputed donation is officious
The sole issue is whether or not there
was an express prohibition to collate,
and we see none.

The intention to exempt from collation

should be expressed plainly and
unequivocally as an exception to the
general rule announced in Article 1062.
Absent such a clear indication of that
intention, we apply not the exception
but the rule, which is categorical
enough.