1978.
Carmelita's real parents are Juanito Austrial
ISABEL DE LA PUERTA v. CA +
261 Phil. 87
CRUZ, J.:
The basic issue involved in this case is the filiation
of private respondent Carmelita de la Puerta,
who claims successional rights to the estate of
her alleged grandmother.
Dominga Revuelta died on July 3, 1966, at the
age of 92, with a will leaving her properties to her
three surviving children, namely, Alfredo, Vicente
and Isabel, all surnamed de la Puerta. Isabel was
given the free portion in addition to her legitime
and was appointed executrix of the will.[1]
The petition for the probate of the will filed by
Isabel was opposed by her brothers, who averred
that their mother was already senile at the time
of the execution of the will and did not fully
comprehend its meaning. Moreover, some of the
properties listed in the inventory of her estate
belonged to them exclusively.[2]
Meantime, Isabel was appointed special
administratrix by the probate court.[3] Alfredo
subsequently died, leaving Vicente the lone
oppositor.[4]
On August 1, 1974, Vicente de la Puerta filed with
the Court of First Instance of Quezon a petition to
adopt Carmelita de la Puerta. After hearing, the
petition was granted.[5] However, the decision
was appealed by Isabel to the Court of Appeals.
During the pendency of the appeal, Vicente
died, prompting her to move for the dismissal of
the case.[6]
On November 20, 1981, Carmelita, having been
allowed to intervene in the probate proceedings,
filed a motion for the payment to her of a
monthly allowance as the acknowledged natural
child of Vicente de la Puerta.[7] At the hearing on
her motion, Carmelita presented evidence to
prove her claimed status to which Isabel was
allowed to submit counter-evidence.
On November 12, 1982, the probate court
granted the motion, declaring that it was
satisfied from the evidence at hand that
Carmelita was a natural child of Vicente de la
Puerta and was entitled to the amounts claimed
for her support. The court added that "the
evidence presented by the petitioner against it
(was) too weak to discredit the same."[8]
On appeal, the order of the lower court was
affirmed by the respondent court,[9] which is now
in turn being challenged in this petition before us.
The petitioner's main argument is that Carmelita
was not the natural child of Vicente de la Puerta,
who was married to Genoveva de la Puerta in
1938 and remained his wife until his death in
and Gloria Jordan.
Invoking the presumption of legitimacy, she
argues that Carmelita was the legitimate child of
Juanito Austrial and Gloria Jordan, who were
legally or presumably married. Moreover,
Carmelita could not have been a natural child of
Vicente de la Puerta because he was already
married at the time of her birth in 1962.
To prove her point, Isabel presented Amado
Magpantay, who testified that he was a
neighbor of Austrial and Jordan. According to
him, the two were living as husband and wife
and had three children, including a girl named
"Puti," presumably Carmelita. He said though that
he was not sure if the couple was legally
married.[10]
Another witness, Genoveva de la Puerta,
identified herself as Vicente de la Puerta's wife
but said they separated two years after their
marriage in 1938 and were never reconciled. In
1962, Gloria Jordan started living with Vicente de
la Puerta in his house, which was only five or six
houses away from where she herself was staying.
Genoveva said that the relationship between her
husband and Gloria was well known in the
community.[11]
In finding for Carmelita, the lower court declared
that:
... By her evidence, it was shown to the
satisfaction of the Court that she was born on
December 18, 1962 per her birth certificate (Exh.
A); that her father was Vicente de la Puerta and
her mother is Gloria Jordan who were living as
common law husband and wife until his death on
June 14, 1978; that Vicente de la Puerta was
married to, but was separated from, his legal wife
Genoveva de la Puerta; that upon the death of
Vicente de la Puerta on June 14, 1978 without
leaving a last will and testament, she was the
only child who survived him together with his
spouse Genoveva de la Puerta with whom he
did not beget any child; that she was treated by
Vicente de la Puerta as a true child from the time
of her birth until his father died; that the fact that
she was treated as a child of Vicente de la
Puerta is shown by the family pictures showing
movant with Vicente de la Puerta (Exhs. D, D-1
and D-2) and school records wherein he signed
the report cards as her parent (Exh. E and E-1);
that during the hearing of her adoption case in
Special Proceeding No. 0041 in Branch V of this
Court at Mauban Quezon, Vicente de la Puerta
categorically stated in court that Carmelita de la
Puerta is his daughter with Gloria Jordan (Exhs. B
and B-1); that it was Vicente de la Puerta during
his lifetime who spent for her subsistence, support
and education; x x x.[12]
This is a factual finding that we do not see fit to
disturb, absent any of those circumstances we
have laid down in a long line of decisions that will
1
justify reversal.[13] Among these circumstances
are: (1) the conclusion is a finding grounded
entirely on speculation, surmise conjecture; (2)
the inference made is manifestly mistaken; (3)
there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) the
judgment is based on a misapprehension of
facts; (5) the findings of fact are conflicting; (6)
the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of
the case and its findings are contrary to the
admissions of both appellant and appellees; (7)
the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are
contrary to those of the trial court; (8) said
findings of facts are conclusions without citation
of specific evidence on which they are based;
(9) the facts set forth in the petition as well as in
the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not
disputed by the respondents; and (10) the
findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are
premised on the supposed absence of evidence
and contradicted by the evidence on record.
The petitioner insists on the application of the
following provisions of the Civil Code to support
her thesis that Carmelita is not the natural child of
Vicente de la Puerta but the legitimate child of
Juanito Austrial and Gloria Jordan:
Art. 255. Children born after one hundred and
eighty days following the celebration of the
marriage, and before three hundred days
following its dissolution or the separation of the
spouses shall be presumed to be legitimate.
Against this presumption no evidence shall be
admitted other than that of the physical
impossibility of the husband's having access to his
wife within the first one hundred and twenty days
of the three hundred which preceded the birth
of the child.
This physical impossibility may be caused:
(1) By the impotence of the husband;
(2) By the fact that the husband and wife were
living separately, in such a way that access was
not possible;
(3) By the serious illness of the husband.
Art. 256. The child shall be presumed legitimate,
although the mother may have declared against
its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an
adulteress.
These rules are in turn based on the presumption
that Juanito and Gloria were married at the time
of Carmelita's birth in 1962, pursuant to Rule 131,
Sec. 5(bb) of the Rules of Court, providing that:
Sec. 5. Disputable presumptions. The following
presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted,
but may be contradicted and overcome by
other evidence:
xxx xxx xxx
(bb) That a man and woman deporting
themselves as husband and wife have entered
into a lawful contract of marriage;
But this last-quoted presumption is merely
disputable and may be refuted with evidence to
the contrary. As the Court sees it, such evidence
has been sufficiently established in the case at
bar.
The cases [14]cited by the petitioner are not
exactly in point because they involve situations
where the couples lived continuously as husband
and wife and so could be reasonably presumed
to be married. In the case before us, there was
testimony from Vicente's own wife that her
husband and Gloria lived together as a married
couple, thereby rebutting the presumption that
Gloria was herself the lawful wife of Juanito
Austrial.
Such testimony would for one thing show that
Juanito and Gloria did not continuously live
together as a married couple. Moreover, it is not
explained why, if he was really married to her,
Juanito did not object when Gloria left the
conjugal home and started openly consorting
with Vicente, and in the same neighborhood at
that. That was unnatural, to say the least. It was
different with Genoveva for she herself swore
that she had separated from Vicente two years
after their marriage and had long lost interest in
her husband. In fact, she even renounced in
open court any claim to Vicente's estate.[15]
The presumption of marriage between Juanito
and Gloria having been destroyed, it became
necessary for the petitioner to submit additional
proof to show that the two were legally married.
She did not.
Turning now to the evidence required to prove
the private respondent's filiation, we reject the
petitioner's contention that Article 278 of the Civil
Code is not available to Carmelita. It is error to
contend that as she is not a natural child but a
spurious child (if at all) she cannot prove her
status by the record of birth, a will, a statement
before a court of record, or any authentic
writing. On the contrary, it has long been settled
that:
The so-called spurious children or illegitimate
children other than natural children, commonly
known as bastards, include adulterous children or
those born out of wedlock to a married woman
cohabiting with a man other than her husband or
to a married man cohabiting with a woman
other than his wife. They are entitled to support
and successional rights (Art. 287, CC). But their
filiation must be duly proven. (Ibid, Art. 887)
How should their filiation be proven? Article 289
of the Civil Code allows the investigation of the
paternity or maternity of spurious children under
the circumstances specified in Articles 283 and
284 of the Civil Code. The implication is that the
2
rules on compulsory recognition of natural
children are applicable to spurious children.
Spurious children should not be in a better
position than natural children. The rules on proof
of filiation of natural children or the rule on
voluntary and compulsory acknowledgement for
natural children may be applied to spurious
children.[16]
This being so, we need not rule now on the
admissibility of the private respondent's
certificate of birth as proof of her filiation. That
status was sufficiently established by the sworn
testimony of Vicente de la Puerta at the hearing
of the petition for adoption on September 6,
1976, where he categorically declared as
follows:
Q - What relation if any do you have with
Carmelita de la Puerta?
A - She is my daughter.[17]
Finally, we move to the most crucial question, to
wit: May Carmelita de la Puerta claim support
and successional rights to the estate of Dominga
Revuelta?
According to Article 970 of the Civil Code:
Art. 970. Representation is a right created by
fiction of law, by virtue of which the
representative is raised to the place and the
degree of the person represented, and acquires
the rights which the latter would have if he were
living or if he could have inherited.
The answer to the question posed must be in the
negative. The first reason is that Vicente de la
Puerta did not predecease his mother; and the
second is that Carmelita is a spurious child.
It is settled that
In testamentary succession, the right of
representation can take place only in the
following cases: first, when the person
represented dies before the testator; second,
when the person represented is incapable of
succeeding the testator; and third, when the
person represented is disinherited by the testator.
In all of these cases, since there is a vacancy in
the inheritance, the law calls the children or
descendants of the person represented to
succeed by right of representation.[18]
xxx
The law is clear that there is representation only
when relatives of a deceased person try to
succeed him in his rights which he would have
had if still living. In the present case, however,
said deceased had already succeeded his aunt,
the testatrix herein, x x x It is a fact that at the
time of the death of the testatrix, Reynaldo
Cuison was still alive. He died two months after
her (testatrix's) death. And upon his death, he
transmitted to his heirs, the petitioners herein Elisa
Cuison et al., the legacy or the right to succeed
to the legacy. x x x In other words, the herein
petitioners-appellants are not trying to succeed
to the right to the property of the testatrix, but
rather to the right of the legatee Reynaldo
Cuison in said property.[19]
Not having predeceased Dominga Revuelta, her
son Vicente had the right to inherit from her
directly or in his own right. No right of
representation was involved, nor could it be
invoked by Carmelita upon her father's death,
which came after his own mother's death. It
would have been different if Vicente was
already dead when Dominga Revuelta died.
Carmelita could then have inherited from her in
representation of her father Vicente, assuming
the private respondent was a lawful heir.
But herein lies the crux, for she is not. As a spurious
child of Vicente, Carmelita is barred from
inheriting from Dominga because of Article 992
of the Civil Code, which lays down the barrier
between the legitimate and illegitimate families.
This article provides quite clearly:
Art. 992. An illegitimate child has no right to
inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children
and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall
such children or relatives inherit in the same
manner from the illegitimate child.
Applying this rule in Leonardo v. Court of
Appeals,[20] this Court declared:
... even if it is true that petitioner is the child of
Sotero Leonardo, still he cannot, by right of
representation, claim a share of the estate left by
the deceased Francisca Reyes considering that,
as found again by the Court of Appeals, he was
born outside wedlock as shown by the fact that
when he was born, his alleged putative father
and mother were not yet married, and what is
more, his alleged father's first marriage was still
subsisting. At most, petitioner would be an
illegitimate child who has no right to inherit ab
intestato from the legitimate children and
relatives of his father, like the deceased
Francisca Reyes.
The reason for this rule was explained in the
recent case of Diaz v. Intermediate Appellate
Court,[21] thus:
Article 992. of the New Civil Code provides a
barrier or iron curtain in that it prohibits absolutely
a succession ab intestato between the
illegitimate child and the legitimate children and
relatives of the father or mother of said legitimate
child. They may have a natural tie of blood, but
this is not recognized by law for the purpose of
Article 992. Between the legitimate family and
the illegitimate family there is presumed to be an
intervening antagonism and incompatibility. The
illegitimate child is disgracefully looked down
upon by the legitimate family; the family is in turn,
hated by the illegitimate child; the latter
3
considers the privileged condition of the former,
and the resources of which it is thereby deprived;
the former, in turn, sees in the illegitimate child
nothing but the product of sin, palpable
evidence of a blemish broken in life; the law does
no more than recognize this truth, by avoiding
further ground of resentment."[22]
Indeed, even as an adopted child, Carmelita
would still be barred from inheriting from
Dominga Revuelta for there would be no natural
kindred ties between them and consequently, no
legal ties to bind them either. As aptly pointed
out by Dr. Arturo M. Tolentino:
If the adopting parent should die before the
adopted child, the latter cannot represent the
former in the inheritance from the parents or
ascendants of the adopter. The adopted child is
not related to the deceased in that case,
because the filiation created by fiction of law is
exclusively between the adopter and the
adopted. "By adoption, the adopters can make
for themselves an heir, but they cannot thus
make one for their kindred."[23]
The result is that Carmelita, as the spurious
daughter of Vicente de la Puerta, has
successional rights to the intestate estate of her
father but not to the estate of Dominga
Revuelta. Her claims for support and inheritance
should therefore be filed in the proceedings for
the settlement of her own father's estate[24] and
cannot be considered in the probate of
Dominga Revuelta's will.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the
appealed decision is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE, with costs against the private respondent.
It is so ordered.
2. 74 Phil. 109
OZAETA, J.:
Don Vicente Singson Pablo, a lawyer
of Vigan, Ilocos Sur, died on April
15,1938, without any descendant or
ascendant, his nearest surviving
relatives being his widow Doña
Rosalia Rosario, four brothers, and four
nieces, the children of a deceased
sister. He left a will which was duly
probated, clause 8 of which reads as
follows:
"Octavo. Ordeno y mando que todos mis
bienes no dispuestos de otro modo en
este testamento, se distribuiran en
partes iguales a todos los que tienen
derecho a ello."
The widow, as administratrix,
presented a project of partition in
which the properties not disposed of in
the will were adjudicated to the four
brothers and the four nieces of the
deceased "in the proportion provided in
paragraph 8 of the will." The brothers,
appellants herein, objected to the
project of partition insofar as it
includes the nieces of the deceased, on
the ground that under clause 8 of the
will, in relation to article 751 of the Civil
Code, they were not entitled to any
share. The nieces also objected to the
project of partition, alleging that certain
other specified properties had been
omitted therefrom, which formed part of
the properties not disposed of and which
under clause 8 of the will "should be
distributed in equal parts to all who are
entitled thereto." The trial court
sustained the contention of the
nieces (appellees herein) and
ordered the administratrix "to amend
the project of partition so as to include
therein the said properties and that all
of those not disposed of in the
will be adjudicated in equal parts to
the brothers and nieces of the deceased."
The only question raised in this appeal
is the interpretation of clause 8 of the
will above quoted. Said clause provides
that "all of my properties not
disposed of otherwise in this testament
shall be distributed in equal parts to all
who are entitled thereto." In this
connection appellants invoke article 751
of the Civil Code, which provides that "a
disposition made in general terms in
favor of the testator's relatives shall be
understood as made in favor of those
nearest in degree."
The trial court noted that the testator,
who was a lawyer, did not use the word
"relatives" in the clause in question. We
do not need to decide here whether, had
the testator used the word "relatives,"
the nieces would be excluded. The
4
authorities differ on the interpretation
of article 751. Some hold that under said
article the nephews and nieces inherit by
representation together with the
brothers and sisters of the testator, as in
legal succession; while others, Manresa
among them, hold that said article
excludes nephews and nieces when
brothers and sisters survive. We think
the testator, by referring to "all who are
entitled thereto," instead of referring to
his "relatives," precisely meant to avoid
the uncertainty of the interpretation of
article 751 and to indicate his wish that
the residue of his estate be distributed in
equal parts to all who would have
been entitled to inherit from him had he
died intestate.
3. G.R. No. L-28265 November 5,
1928
NATIVIDAD CENTENO, ET AL.,
plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
MARTINA CENTENO, ET AL.,
defendants-appellees.
NICOLAS CENTENO, ET AL.,
intervenors-appellants.
Vicente Singson Pablo for appellants.
Antonio Belmonte for intervenors.
Vicente de Vera, Julio Borbon and
Maximino Mina for appellees.
VILLA-REAL, J.:
This is an appeal taken by the plaintiffs
Natividad Centeno in her own behalf
and as administratrix of the estate of her
deceased father, Valentin Centeno,
Jesus Centeno First, Rosalia and
Rosario Centeno, and by the intervenors
Nicolas, Emilio, Isaac and Jesus
Centeno Second, from the judgment of
the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur,
of which the following is the dispositive
part:
The agreement of partition in question
is hereby upheld, with the adjudications
to the parties thereto, and therefore the
partition prayed for in this civil case by
plaintiffs and intervenors respecting the
realty described in the sixth paragraph
of the original complaint is denied. The
other petition that said partition be held
void and of no effect in so far as it refers
only to the said portion adjucated to
defendants, is also denied.
It is held parcels Nos. 70, 86, and 95,
described in the aforementioned sixth
paragraphs of the original complaint,
are held by defendants pro indiviso; and
the others, Nos. 53, 54, 55, 60, 62, and
69, with the metes and bounds given in
the said sixth paragraph, which are in
possession of the plaintiff Jesus Centeno
First, as well as the others, Nos. 82, 85,
and 99, which are in the possession of
the defendant Telesforo Centeno.
The defendants' petition that the first 51
parcels of land described in the said
sixth paragraph of the original
complaint, reproduced in the last
amendatory complaint, be partitioned in
this case and parcel No. 116 described in
the inventory Exhibit F of the plaintiffs,
and 6 of the defendants, as well as the
said parcels Nos. 53, 54, 55, 60, 62, and
69, and the credits is denied; all of
which are considered and declared to
the pro indiviso (Exhibit 7 of the
defendants), without prejudice to said
partition being made in such manner as
they may agree upon.
It is ordered that the plaintiffs deliver to
defendants the two parcels of land
described in the latters' cross complaint
in their second cause of action, and said
two mares and harness cannot be
ordered delivered, because they are not
formally detailed and difficulties would
arise in the execution of such an order.
As Fabian Cabanilla and Simplicio
Gaberto possessors of parcels Nos. 76,
77, 59, and 100 claimed by plaintiffs and
intervenorst, were not made defendants
in this case, no pronouncement is here
5
made against them, nor as to parcels
Nos. 52, 66, 94, and 61, the possessors
of which are unknown. lawphi1.net
Defendants are absolved from the claims
with respect to parcels Nos. 105, 106,
107, 11, 57, 75, 93, 102, 112, 115, 56, 58,
63, 64, 65, 67, 68, 71, 72, 73, 74, 78, 79,
80, 81, 83, 84, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 96,
97, 98, 101, 103, 108, 109, 110, 113, and
114 (43) described in the complaint.
The pious legacy of parcel No. 104 made
by the testatrix Melchora Arroyo, is
upheld.
It is ordered that each of the parties,
plaintiffs, intervenors, and defendants,
pay a third part of the costs of the trial.
It is so ordered.
Plaintiffs support their appeal by
assigning nineteen alleged errors, and
the intervenors another nineteen, to the
trial court in its judgment, which we
shall discuss hereinafter:
In their second and last amended
complaint, the plaintiffs pray for
judgment on the cause of action therein
set forth: (a) Ordering the partion
between plaintiffs and intervenors in
accordance with the law and the wills of
Isaac Centeno and Melchora Arroyo of
all properties described in the sixth
paragraph of the original complaint,
together with the property constituting
the portion then adjudicated to the
defendants in the said partition; (b)
holding the said partion to be void and
of no effect, only insofar as it refers to
the portion adjudicated to the
defendants and ordering the latter to
deliver the property in their possession
numbered from 52 to 115, with all its
fruits, and to return what they have
unduly received in said erroneous
partition; (c) ordering the defendants to
pay the costs of the action; and (d)
granting plaintiffs such further remedy
not herein prayed for as may be just and
equitable.
In their second amended complaint the
intervenors pray for the causes of action
therein set forth that the voluntary
partition of the property left by the
deceased spouses Isaac Centeno and
Melchora Arroyo be declared null and
void, in so far as it respect the portion
adjudicated to the defendants, ordering
the latter to return to said plaintiffs and
intervenors what they have unduly
received in said partition.
In their amended answer, the
defendants generally and specifically
deny each and every one of the
allegations of the complaints of the
plaintiffs and the intervenors, with a
special defense and cross-complaint and
pray the court: (a) To absolve the said
defendants from the complaint entirely;
(b) to order the partition of the property
under Nos. 1 to 51, 53, 54, 55, 60, 61, 69,
116, 119 and 120 with their
corresponding fruits or their equivalent
in money, and that their respective
portions be adjucated and delivered to
these defendants, and that the credits of
the deceased so far collected be equally
distributed among the heirs; (c) that the
plaintiff Valentin Centeno be ordered to
deliver to said defendants Martina Jose
and Telesforo Centeno, the property
specified in paragraph 3 of the cross-
complaint, with all the fruits they
produced or should have produce from
1911 up to present date, or in default
thereof, to pay the value of said fruits
with the proper legal interest; (d) that
the plaintiff Valentin Centeno be
ordered to pay the costs of this action;
and (e) grant said defendants all such
further remedies with respect to their
rights as may be just and equitable.
The case having passed though all the
proper proceeding and after hearing the
evidence presented by the parties in
support of their respective claims, the
lower court rendered judgment, the
6
dispositive part of which is quoted
above.
The preponderance of the evidence
establishes the following pertinent facts
necessary to the solution of the
questions of fact and of law raised in the
present appeal.
Isaac Centeno and Melchora Arroyo
were husband and wife who brought no
property to the marriage but acquired
much property during their married life.
Isaac Centeno died on October 7, 1905,
and was survived by his wife Melchora
Arroyo, and their three son, Valentin,
Faustino and Antonio Centeno. Before
his death, that is, on June 30, 1904,
Isaac Centeno executed a will, one of the
clauses of which contained the following
provision: "I hereby named and institute
as my sole and universal heirs my three
sons Antonio, Valentin and Faustino
Centeno or their heirs, if any, to one-half
of the above-named property, provided,
that the same be divided equally among
my three said sons." (Exhibit D of
plaintiffs and Exhibit 4 of defendants.)
The will having been admitted to
probate and his widow Melchora Arroyo,
appointed administratrix of the property
left by him, said Melchora Arroyo, as
such administrator, filed with the court
a detailed inventory of all the property
left by her deceased husband which had
come into her possession. (Exhibit F of
plaintiffs and Exhibit 6 of defendants.)
On October 30, 1907, Antonio Centeno
died leaving a widow, Gabriela
Fernadez, and a will executed on
October 9, 1907, clauses 3 and 8 of
which are as follows:
Third. I declare that I was married once,
being still married to Dna. Gabriela
Fernandez y Bribiesca, and during our
union we had not a single child; I also
declared that although I said I have no
child, the God of pity has given me eight,
who are my children by another woman,
three of whom are called natural, who
are Martina, Jose (alias Pepe), and
Telesforo Centeno, because they were
born even before I married my aforesaid
wife, Dna. Gabriela the five are
Sisenando, Antonina, Gregorio, Jose
(alias Peping), and Gabriel Centeno, and
are called illegitimate, because they were
born after my marriage; nevertheless I
acknowledge them all for I have had
them since theit birth supporting and
bringing all of them, up until now.
Eight. Of my portion from my deceased
father Isaac Centeno Purugganan, and of
my future portion from my mother Dna.
Melchora Arroyo, I institute as my
universal heirs my three children called
natural, to have and to hold in fee
simple during their lives, under God's
blessing and my own. (Exhibit 9-b of
defendants.)
This will was probated on petition of his
mother Melchora Arroyo de Centeno,
and his widow, Gabriela Fernandez de
Centeno.
Melchora Arroyo de Centeno died on
December 8, 1909, leaving one son
named Valentin Centeno, and a will
executed on November 3, 1909, clause 3
of which provides:
(c) The third part shall be divided
equally, neither more nor less, among
my sons Antonio and Faustino Centeno,
may they rest in peace, and Valentin
Centeno. (Exhibit E of plaintiffs and
Exhibit 5 of defendants.)
This will was probated upon petition of
Valentin Centeno, one of the executors
named therein.
While testamentary proceedings for the
settlement of the estates of Isaac
Centeno and Melchora Arroyo were
being had, the heirs of both, desiring a
just and lawful partition in accordance
with the wills of both, submitted for its
approval to the Court of First Instance of
7
Ilocos Sur, in November, 1910 and
agreement of partition executed in
October, 1910 wherein Valentin
Centeno, Gabriela Fernandez de
Centeno widow of Antonio Centeno, and
the latter's acknowledged natural
children, Martina and Emilio A.
Centeno, and Asuncion Arcebal, widow
of Faustino Centeno, for herself and in
behalf of her minor son Jesus Centeno,
jr., interverned as parties. (Exhibit 7 of
defendants.)
On March 10, 1911, the court, acting on
the motion presented by said heirs,
ordered the publication in newspaper of
the largest circulation in the locality
once a week for three consecutive weeks,
of a notice of the filing in said court of
the agreement of partition of the testate
estate of the deceased spouses, Isaac
Centeno and Melchor Arroyo, so that
each and every person interested in said
property and those who might have
claims thereto may present themselves
before the court on the day appointed
and show cause if any, why said
agreement of partition should not be
approved or why said estate should not
be declared closed. (Exhibit 8-b of
defendants.) On March 8, 1911 in
pursuance of said order, the clerk of the
Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur set
the 8th of April 1911 for the hearing of
the approval of the said agreement of
partition. On April 20, 1911, the Court of
First Instance of Ilocos Sur issued the
following order:
All the heirs in this case and in No. 264
having bound themselves to answer for
all just claims agaist the estates the
subject matter of the aforesaid two
cases, and having complied with the
order of March 10, 1911 issued in the
present case with respect to the
publication in the newspapers of the
proper notification to those interested in
the estate or those holding any claim
against said estate, for the approval of
the scheme of partition filed by the heirs
the court, notwithstanding the
opposition of Pedro Arroyo to such
approval, hereby approves said scheme
of partition declaring said two cases
closed, without prejudice to the
oppositor, Pedro Arroyo, claiming his
rights and legal fees from said heirs.
It is so ordered. (Exhibit FF of plaintiffs
and Exhibit 8-c of defendants.)
On October 22, 1913 the said Court of
First Instance of Ilocos Sur issued also
the following order:
The present case being called for trial for
the approval of the account presented by
the administratrix Gabriela F. de
Centeno, the latter appeared with the
heirs name Telesforo and Sisenando
Centeno, and the legatee Antonina
Centeno, minor.
Inasmuch as said administratrix
declares that the aforesaid heirs
Telesforo and Sisenando, as well as the
other heirs not present, Martina and
Jose Centeno, have already received
their corresponding share of the
inheritance; and as the said present
heirs confirm this declaration of the
administratrix; and as the latter further
declares that she holds the legacy
corresponding to said Antonina and her
three brothers Gregorio, Jose (alias
Peping), and Gabriela, all surnamed
Centeno, the court orders that Mr.
Sisenando Centeno be appointed
guardian of the said minors with his
consent, and with the acquiescence of
the minor Antonio Centeno.
It is likewise ordered that the said heirs
file a statement showing those who have
already received their proper share of
the inheritance.
The administratrix is also ordered to
present the inventory of the property
given as a legacy to said minors, which
will be turned over to the guardian
appointed upon his giving bond, the
amount of which is to be fixed according
8
to the aforementioned inventory. So
ordered.
In the partition agreement submitted by
the heirs to the court and approved by
the latter, the property mentioned in
plaintiffs' account Exhibit G, was
adjudicated to Antonio Centeno, said
exhibit being singed by all the heirs who
took part in said agreement of partition.
Besides the property left by the deceased
spouses, Isaac Centeno and Melchora
Arroyo, which was partitioned among
the heirs, 115 parcels of land described
in the sixth paragraph of plaintiffs'
complaint remained undistributed, of
which fifty-one, marked Nos. 1 to 51,
were in the possession of the plaintiff
Valentin Centeno and is now held by his
sons, the herein plaintiffs, who took his
place after his death which occured in
the course of the present proceeding in
the lower court; two, designated Nos. 76
and 77 were in the power and possession
of Fabian Cabanilla who has had them in
his possession as owner for more than
ten years previous to the filing of the
complaint having inherited them from
his father, who, in turn, inherited them
from his father, having paid the land tax
on the same; two others, designated
Nos. 59 and 100, are held by Simplicio
Gaberto, who has been in possession
thereof from time immemorial without
any interruption of any kind, having
inherited them from his father.
As to those marked Nos. 52, 66 and 94,
there is no evidence showing who holds
and possesses them. Moreover the two
alleged possessors named are not parties
in the present suit.
The parcel of land marked No. 104, tax
No. 10318, is the same parcel bearing
the same tax number included in the
partion made in October, 1910 (Exhibit
7), destined to pious purposes by the
deceased Melchora Arroyo, according to
her will (Exhibit E of the plaintiffs).
The four parcels of land marked Nos.
105, 106, 107 and 111, and identified by
sworn declarations of ownership Nos.
10328, 10329, 10330 and 10335,
respectively, are the same parcels of
land referred to in the said partition
made in the month of October, 1910
(Exhibit 7 of defendants, designated as
the legacy of Martina Centeno one of the
defendants according to the will of the
deceased Isaac Centeno (Exhibit D of
plaintiffs).
The parcel of land marked Nos. 57, 75,
93, 102, 112 and 115 and identified by
sworn declarations of ownership Nos.
10374, 10474, 10533, 10549, 10388 and
10429, respectively, were adjudicated to
the defendants in the said partition
made in October, 1910 (Exhibit G of
defendants, who hold them).
The parces of land marked Nos. 53, 54,
55, 60, 62 and 69, and identified by
sworn declarations of ownership Nos.
10333, 10337, 10367, 10410, 10425 and
10459, respectively, and mentioned in
defendants' answer, are held by Jesus
Centeno First.
The declarations of ownership in the
name of Melchora Arroyo de Centeno of
the parcels designated by Nos. 82, 85
and 99, in the complaint were cancelled
and substituted by those numbered
37522, 39333 and 21058, respectively
(Exhibit 1 of the defendants). It does not
appear in whose posssession said
parcels are, but it is to be presumed that
they are held by Telesforo Centeno in
whose name the new declarations were
made. Neither does it appear how the
latter acquired them. As they are not
included in the partition they should be
considered as part of the undivided
share of Melchora Arroyo de Centeno in
the estate.
The parcels of land designated by Nos.
56, 58, 101 and 103 in the complaint
have been in possession of the herein
defendants Telesforo and Martina
9
Centeno since the death of the deceased
spouses Isaac Centeno since the death of
the deceased spouses Isaac Centeno and
Melchora Arroyo, which took place on
October 7, 1905 and December 8, 1909,
respectively, who have been gathering
their products and enjoying their fruits
exclusively. These four parcels of land
are not included in the inventory of the
conjugal property left by said deceased
spouses, which gives rise to the
presumption that said four parcels do
not belong to their share in the estate;
otherwise, Melchora Arroyo, who must
have known all the property of the
conjugal partnership, would have
included them in said inventory which
she submitted to the court.
The parcels of land bearing Nos. 70, 86
and 95, are the same ones designated by
Nos. 145, 132 and 135 in said inventory,
but which were not included in the
partition agreement. These three parcels
of land are in possession of the herein
defendants, but it does not appear that
said possession meets all the
requirements prescribed by law in order
that it may ripen into title.
The parcels of land Nos. 113 and 114,
which are also enumerated in the said
inventory, have been in possession of
the herein defendants since the death of
the spouses Isaac Centeno and Melchora
Arroyo, who have been gathering their
fruits and enjoying them exclusively.
The parcels of land designated in the
complaint by Nos. 63, 64, 65, 68, 71, 72,
73, 74, 78, 79, 80, 81, 83, 84, 87, 88, 89,
90, 91, 92, 96, 97, 98, 108, 109 and 110
also are not mentioned in the aforesaid
inventory and are possessed by the
defendants, who have been enjoying
their products exclusively.
As to the parcels of land Nos. 116, 119
and 120, which are the subject matter of
the defendants' cross-complaint said
three parcels belonged to the spouses
Isaac Centeno and Melchora Arroyo
during their lifetime and are now in the
possession of the plaintiffs. Two of said
parcels, those designated by Nos. 116
and 120 are identified with Nos. 57 and
251 in the inventory of the estate of Isaac
Centeno. The parcel of land No. 120 is
the same parcel No. 60 mentioned in the
complaint. The parcel of land 119 is the
same parcel land No. 23 is the same
complaint. The parcel of land No. 116
must be added to the one hundred and
fifteen parcels claimed in the complaint
as having belonged to the deceased
spouses Isaac Centeno and Melchora
Arroyo and is pro indiviso.
There are two more parcels of land with
sworn declarations of ownership Nos.
10375 and 10386, which appear in the
list of the properties adjudicated to
Antonio Centeno (Exhibit G of plaintiffs)
and which are in the possession of the
plaintiffs.
The chattels and cattle adjudicated to
Antonio Centeno in the scheme of
partition and which were in the
possession of Valentin Centeno have not
yet been delivered to the defendants.
With respect to the uncollected credits
which amount to P8,950 according to
the partition agreement Exhibit 7 of the
defendants, and the collection of which
was intrusted to Valentin Centeno, the
latter collected P300 owed by Pedro
Biloria, leaving P8,650 uncollected,
which is pro indiviso, as well as the
house and lot valued at P300 and
adjudicated in part payment of said
credit.
To summarize, then, it appears that the
only parcels of land which may be the
subject matter of the partition among
the parties are the following: Those
designated in the original complaint by
Nos. 1 to 51, and which are in possession
of the plaintiffs; those designated in said
original complaint by Nos. 53, 54, 55,
60, 62 and 69 which are in possession of
Jesus Centeno First; those designated in
10
said original complaint by Nos. 82, 85
and 99, which are in the possession of
Telesforo Centeno; those designated in
said original complaint by Nos. 70, 86
and 95, which are in the possession of
the defendants; and those designated in
the cross-complaint by Nos. 116, 119 and
120, which are in the possession of the
plaintiffs, the two last of which are
designated in the complaint as Nos. 23
and 60, respectively.
The credits should also be partitioned.
Before entering fully into a discussion of
the question of law raised by the
plaintiffs and the intervenors in their
respective briefs, it is well to decide the
legal question of procedure raised by
said parties as to whether or not the trial
court erred in not declaring the
defendants in default for not having
answered the plaintiffs' second amended
complaint and in permitting said
defendants to present their answer on
the day of the trial, upon oral motion
made in open court.
In maintaining the affirmative, the
plaintiffs-appellants invoke the
provisions of articles 10 and 11 of the
Rules of Courts of First Instance, which
require that all motions shall be in
writing and shall be filed with the proper
court making it appear that the adverse
party had notice thereof three days
before the time set for the hearing
thereof, and providing that unless it so
appears, no action shall be taken on
them.
The purpose of requiring such
conditions is doubtless to give sufficient
time and opportunity to the adverse
party to become informed of any motion
which may be presented in which he
may be interested, and may interpose
his objection should he so desire. When
a motion is made in open court and in
the presence of all the parties, it is not
necessary to make it in writing nor that
the adverse party be notified thereof,
since proceedings in Courts of First
Instance as courts of record, are reduced
to writing by the official court
stenographer, and the adverse party has
an opportunity to become informed of
said motion and of its nature and may
object to it at once if he so desires, or
may ask the court for a period within
which to file his opposition.
Since the defendants made the motion
for the admission of their answer to the
second amended complaint in open
court and in the presence of all the
parties, the trial court did not err in
granting it and admitting said answer
and in not declaring them in default, in
accordance with section 110 of the Code
of Civil Procedure.
Entering now upon the discussion of the
question on the merit, we may say at the
outset that with respect to the questions
of fact raised by the plaintiffs-appellants
and intervenors-appellants in their
repective briefs, we have examined the
evidence, both documentary and oral,
adduced at the trial by the respective
parties in support of their respective
contentions, and have found the
preponderance of the evidence fully
justifies the findings of fact made by the
trial court in its judgment, and they are
the same as set forth above.
Touching the questions of law raised
also by the plaintiffs- appellants and
intervenors-appellants in their
respective briefs, they may be reduced to
the following:
1. Are the defendants entitled, as
acknowledged natural children of
Antonio Centeno, to inherit from his
legitimate father Isaac Centeno?
2. Are said defendants entitled, as such
acknowledged natural children of
Antonio Centeno, to the reservation of
one-half of said hereditary portion
which Melchora Arroyo inherited from
her legitimate son Antonio Centeno
11
which hereditary portion the latter had
inherited from his likewise legitimate
father Isaac Centeno?
3. Are the defendants entitled, as such
acknowledged natural children of
Antonio Centeno, to represent their
natural father Antonio Centeno in the
inheritance of their natural
grandmother Melchora Arroyo,
legitimate mother of Antonio Centeno?
4. Is the partition made among the
plaintiffs, intervenors and defendants,
and duly approved by the court, of the
conjugal property left by the deceased
spouses Isaac Centeno and Melchora
Arroyo, valid?
5. Did the defendants acquire by
prescription the ownership of the
parcels of land adjudicated to them in
the partition, and of the parcels of land
included in the inventory of the
properties left by Isaac Centeno and not
adjudicated to them in the partition but
which are in the possession of said
defendants?
6. Are the defendants entitled, as
acknowledged natural children of
Antonio Centeno, to recover from the
heirs of Valentin Centeno the personal
and real property, cattle and credits
which were adjudicated to them in said
partition and which remained in the
possession of said Valentin Centeno?
7. Are said defendants entitled, as such
acknowledged natural children of
Antonio Centeno, to participate in the
conjugal property left by Isaac Centeno
and Melchora Arroyo included in the
inventory but not included in the
partition?
8. May the partition of the conjugal
property left by the spouses Isaac
Centeno and Melchora Arroyo and still
remaining pro indiviso be ordered in
these proceedings?
With regard to the first question, the
defendants-appellees did not inherit
from their natural granfather Isaac
Centno by intestate succession, but from
their natural father Antonio Centeno,
who acknowledged them in his will and
named them heirs to the property he
had inherited from his deceased father
Isaac Centeno, who had died before him.
The fact the inheritance left by Isaac
Centeno remained pro indiviso when
Antonio Centeno died, did not prevent
him from acquiring during his lifetime, a
right to inherit from his deceased father,
since article 657 plainly provides that
the rights to succession of any person
are transmitted from the moment of his
death.
As to the second question, the
defendants, as acknowledged natural
children of Antonio Centeno, are not
entitled to more than the half of the part
of the inheritance which could be freely
disposed of by their natural father, the
latter not having left any legitimate
decendants, but a legitimate ascendants,
who is his mother Melchora Arroyo,
without prejudice to the legitime of his
widow Gabriela Fernandez, in
accordance with article 841 in
connection with article 836 of the Civil
Code, the other half of his estate going to
his mother Melchora Arroyo as her
legitime, as provided in article 809 of
the same Code. Melchora Arroyo having
died, said defendants, as acknowledged
natural children of Antonio Centeno, are
not entitled to the reservation of the
hereditary portion which said Melchora
Arroyo acquired gratuitously from her
legitimate son Antonio Centeno who, in
turn, also acquired it gratuitously, from
his legitimate father Isaac Centeno,
according to the doctrine laid down and
Deocampo ([1920], 41 Phil., 915), as
follows:
RESERVABLE RIGHTS IN PROPERTY;
INHERITANCE BY RELATIVES
WITHIN THE THIRD DEGREE;
ILLEGITIMATE RELATIVES. — Article
12
811 of the Civil Code which provides that
any ascendants who inherits from his
descendants any property acquired by
the latter gratuitously from some other
ascendant, or from a brother or sister, is
obliged to reserve such of the property
as he may have acquired by operation of
law for the benefit of relatives within the
third degree belonging to the line from
which such property came,' does not
apply to illegitimate relatives. (See also
the decision of the Supreme Court of
Spain rendered of June 10, 1918.)
Passing now to the third question, while
it is true that in his will Antonio Centeno
named the herein defendants as his
heirs, not only with respect to the
hereditary portion given him in the will
of his father Isaac Centeno, but also with
respect to the hereditary portion of the
property left by his mother Melchora
Arroyo, which he would inherit,
nevertheless said testamentary
disposition with regard to the property
of this mother is void and of no effect,
because since his mother still lived, he
had not acquired any right to her
inheritance and therefore could not
dispose of said property, since it is a rule
of law that no one can dispose of
anything that does not belong to him.
(Sy Joc Lieng vs. Encarnacion, 16 Phil.,
137.)
Although Melchora Arroyo in her will
named her son Antonio Centeno as one
of her heirs, since he died before her, the
herein defendants, as acknowledged
natural children of said Antonio
Centeno have no right to represent their
deceased father, according to the
doctrine laid down by the Supreme
Court of Spain, in the judgment
rendered on June 10, 1918, supra, which
is as follows:
Considering that the truth of this
doctrine, and that the judgment
appealed from has not violated the laws
cited in the fifth, sixth and seventh
assignments of errors, is shown, besides
the text of article 807 already cited, by
that of articles 836, 944 of the same
Code, in comparison with articles 808,
843, and 941 thereof, because while the
first of these, in dealing with the
legitime due to legitimate children
includes the legitimate decendants
thereof, articles 843 and 941 in
connection with natural children
specifically provide that the portion
corresponding to them in the hereditary
estate of the parents who acknowledged
them is transmitted upon the death of
these children to their legitimate or
natural decendants. The latter's right,
however, to represent their natural
father in the hereditary estate of their
grandfather is not admitted because the
law does not call them to participate in
the latter's estate, and for a like reason,
in default of parents acknowledging the
natural child, the grandfather, according
to article 945, cannot inherit from the
granchild, — the doctrine laid down by
this court in its decision of February 13,
1903, to the effect that a natural child
whose deceased father was legitimate,
has no right to inherit from his
grandfather, even if the latter should die
without any surviving legitimate
decendants is a necessary consequence
of the aforecited legal provisions,
because, as children inherit in their own
right and grandchildren by
representation, it is clear that such
representation of the grandchildren only
refers to and includes those who are in
the same legal status as the person
represented, and never those who are in
a different legal status. (M. Ruiz, Civil
Code, vol. 7, p.175.)
Touching the fourth question, "the heirs
of the deceased Isaac Centeno and his
wife Melchora Arroyo de Centeno, also
deceased, desiring to make a just and
lawful partition, and in accord with the
wills of both," submitted to the
consideration and approval of the Court
of First Instance of Ilocos Sur an
agreement of partition of the pro
indiviso conjugal property left by the
13
deceased spouses as appearing in
instrument Exhibit 7 of the defendants.
Said partition agreement having been
submitted to the court, the latter
ordered the fixing of a day for the
hearing of the accompanying motion,
and the publication of a notice for the
appearance of all who might have an
interest therein, and the presentation of
the claims and objections they might
have. The day for the hearing having
arrived, and all the parties having been
heard, who stated that they bound
themselves to answer for all the just
claims against the two estates of Isaac
Centeno and Melchora Arroyo, the court
approved the partition and declared said
two testamentary proceedings closed by
its order dated April 20, 1911.
While it is true that the partition
agreement was made by all the heirs
extrajudicially, in submitting it to the
court for approval, and in being
approved by the latter after having
announced the hearing through
publication in the newspapers, said
extrajudicial agreement of partition
became judicial, and the order of the
court approving it and declaring the
respective testamentary proceedings
involving the estates of the deceased
spouses closed, became final and
absolute, and binding upon all the
parties who took part in the said
partition agreement, and acquiesced
therein. More than six years having
elapsed from the date the order of the
court approving the extrajudicial
agreement of partition became final
until the filing of the first complaint
praying for the annulment of said
partition, there is absolutely no legal
reason for setting aside said order which
must therefore be considered
irrevocable, and the partition made in
accordance with the agreement valid.
The fact that Jesus Centeno Second was
a minor at the time said agreement of
partition was entered into, does not
render it void with respect to him,
because he was represented by his
mother Asuncion Arcebal, who was his
natural guardian by law, although
without the right to the custody of his
property unless so authorized by the
court (sec. 553, Act No. 190), and when
the court approved said agreement, said
representation was impliedly approved
and the acts of the mother were
validated.
Neither does the fact that the defendants
were mere acknowledged natural
children, and therefore without the right
of equal participation with the legitimate
children, render said partition void.
Article 1081 of the Civil Code provides
that a partition made with the inclusion
of any person who was believed, but was
not, and heir shall be void. The herein
defendants-appellees were not strangers
to the inheritance for they were named
as heirs by their natural father, whom
they succeeded in his rights to the
hereditary portion which should have
gone to him from the unsettled estate
left by his deceased father Isaac
Centeno.
Furthermore, the plaintiffs and
intervenors cannot allege ignorance of
the condition of the defendants-
appellees as acknowledged natural
children, for this condition appeared
from the will of Antonio Centeno, and in
making the partition in the form in
which they made it, they desired to do
so, in a just, lawful manner, in
accordance with the wills of the
deceased spouses Isaac Centeno and
Melchora Arroyo, and they made it
appear so in the preable to the scheme
of partition, Exhibit 7 of the defendants.
It follows, then, that the defendants-
appellees not only were not strangers to
the inheritance, but that, with full
knowledge of their status of
acknowledge natural children, the
plaintiffs and intervenors adjudicated to
them the property appearing in the
agreement of partition, deeming it just,
14
legal, and in conformity with the wills of
their predecessors in interest, and said
partition is therefore legal and valid.
As to the fifth question, having arrived
at the conclusion that the partition made
among the plaintiffs, the intervenors,
and the defendants is valid and
irrevocable, it is needless to discuss
whether, in addition, said defendants
acquired rights of ownership to the
goods ajudicated to them and appearing
in Exhibit G of the plaintiffs, by
acquisitive prescription, and we shall
limit ourselves to considering the
conjugal property left by the deceased
spouses Isaac Centeno and Melchora
Arroyo, included in inventory Exhibit F
of the plaintiffs, and 6 of the defendants,
and not included in the scheme of
partition, Exhibit 7 of the defendants,
but which is in the latters' possession.
It cannot be doubted that if the
defendants have been in possession of
said property adversely, continuously,
publicly and as owners thereof for a
period of ten years, they have acquired
the ownership threof by prescription.
(Sec. 41, Act No. 190; Casanas vs.
Rosello [1927] 50 Phil., 97.)
Taking up now the sixth question after
the fourth has been solved by holding
that the partition among the plaintiffs,
intervenors, and defendants is legal and
valid, and since the personal and real
property, the cattle, and credits claimed
by the defendants in their cross-
complaint are included in said partition,
they are entitled to claim them from the
plaintiffs who now have them in their
possession. With respect to the seventh
question, the defendants, as natural
children of Antonio Centeno,
acknowledged by the latter as such and
named as his heirs in his will, are
entitled to one-half of the the hereditary
portion belonging to their natural father
from the estate of the deceased Isaac
Centeno, which was included in the
inventory of the property left by the
latter and which was not included in the
agreement of partition, the other half of
said hereditary portion of Antonio
Centeno belonging to his mother
Melchora Arroyo who survived him,
with said natural children.
As to the eight question, the plaintiffs
and intervenors in their respective
complaints pray for the annulment and
setting aside of the agreement of
partition entered into by and between
them and the defendants in October,
1910, in so far only as it refers to the
portion adjudicated to the latter; that it
be ordered that said defendants return
to said plaintiffs and intervenors what
they have received in excess; and that it
be ordered likewise that in accordance
with the wills of Isaac Centeno and
Melchora Arroyo, the property
mentioned in paragraph six of the
original complaint be partitioned
between the plaintiffs and intervenors,
together with the property constituting
the portion adjudicated in the said
partition.
The defendants in their cross-complaint
pray that the property designated by
Nos. 1 to 51, 53, 60, 62, 69, 116, 117, 118,
119 and 120, and their corresponding
fruits or their equivalent in money, be
partitioned, and that plaintiff Valentin
Centeno be ordered to deliver to said
defendants the property specified in
paragraph three of the cross-complaint,
with all the fruits produced, or which it
should have produced from the year 1911
up to the present time, or in its default
thereof to pay value of said fruits, plus
the proper legal interest thereon, and
the costs of the action.
As will be seen, the action instituted by
the plaintiffs and the intervenors,
respectively, is for the recovery of
property through the annulment of the
partition, and to have another partition
made. The defendants' cross-complaint
is for the recovery and partition of
undivided property. The ownership of
15
the property which is the subject matter
of the action for recovery having been
settled, and its delivery to the proper
party ordered, and the property
belonging in common and pro indiviso
to the parties determined, there in no
bar in law, either positive or adjective, to
the partition thereof.
In the case of Africa vs. Africa (42 Phil.,
934), this court enunciated the following
doctrine:
1. PARTITION; RECOVERY OF
PROPERTY; ACTION FOR. — An action
cannot be considered as one for the
partition of an inheritance, even though
it is so entitled and the prayer of the
complaint is to this effect, if any party to
the suit denies the pro indiviso character
of the estate whose partition is sought,
and claims exclusive title thereto, or to
any part thereof. In such case the action
becomes one for the recovery of
property in so far as the property
claimed exclusively by any of the parties
is concerned.
What this court meant in saying that an
action cannot be considered as one for
the partition of an inheritance, even
though it is so entitled and the prayer of
the complaint is to this effect, if any
party to the suit denies the pro indiviso
character of the estate of coownership is
not recognized by all the parties, but
that some claim to be exclusive owners
thereof, and it is found that there is no
property to partition, the action for
partition loses its character as such and
becomes one for the recovery of
property; but when the action is for the
recovery of property based upon the
annulment of a partition and at the
same time for the partition of the
property declared to be undivided
common property, it is not improper to
order the partition of the estate which
has been declared to be undivided
common property, since there is no
incompatibility between the action for
the recovery of property and for
partition of an inheritance, once the
court has declared that the property, the
recovery of which is sought, belongs to
the parties in common and pro indiviso.
The conjugal property which has just
been declared to be pro indiviso, and
which must be divided into two equal
parts for the purpose of ascertaining the
participation of the defendants
separating the one-half which
corresponds to Isaac Centeno from the
other half that belongs to Melchor
Arroyo. The defendants, as we have said,
are only entitled to the one-half of the
hereditary portion which belonged to
their natural father Antonio Centeno of
the conjugal property left by Isaac
Centeno, and not to the conjugal
property left by Melchora Arroyo. There
being three children who survived Isaac
Centeno, namely, Valentin, Faustino,
and Antonio Centeno, said one-half of
the conjugal property which still
remains undivided, left by Isaac
Centeno, must be divided into three
parts, one-third pertaining pro indiviso
to the children of Valentin Centeno, and
Faustino Centeno, respectively. Of the
one-third which belongs to Antonio
Centeno, one-half, that is, one-sixth of
the whole, is what belongs to the
defendants, and the other half, or the
other sixth part, to his legitimate mother
Melchora Arroyo, who inherited from
her legitimate son Antonio Centeno,
becuase he died before her saving always
the rights of Gabriela Fernandez, as
surviving spouse of Antonio Centeno.
As to the one-half of the undivided
conjugal property which belongs to
Melchora Arroyo, the only ones entitled
to it are the plaintiffs and intervenors.
Summarizing all the above, we are of the
opinion, and so hold: (1) That the
defendants, as acknowledged natural
children and named heirs of Antonio
Centeno in his will, are entitled to
inherit the one-half of hereditary
portion which their deceased natural
16
father had inherited from his legitimate
father by will; (2) that said defendants,
though they are acknowledged natural
children of Antonio Centeno, are not
entiltled to the reservation of the one-
half which Melchora Arroyo received as
her legitimate from the hereditary
portion which her son had received from
his father, Isaac Centeno also legitimate;
(3) that the defendants, thought they are
acknowledged natural children of
Antonio Centeno, are not entitled to
represent the latter in the inheritance of
his legitimate mother Melchora Arroyo;
(4) that the fact that defendants, as
acknowledged natural children of
Antonio Centeno, took part, together
with Valentin Centeno, legitimate
brother of said Antonio Centeno, and
with the children of Faustino Centeno,
another legitimate brother of said
deceased Antonio Centeno, in the
partition of the estates left by Isaac
Centeno and Melchora Arroyo, father
and mother Antonio, Valentin and
Faustino Centeno, does not make the
partition void; (5) that the partition
made between the heirs, while
extrajudicial at the beginning became
judicial on being approved by the court
after complying with the proper
requirements prescribed by the law, and
once all the periods have elapsed within
which the law permits its revocation for
any reason, it became final and
irrevocable; (6) that the fact that Jesus
Centeno Second, son of Faustino
Centeno, was a minor at the time the
agreement of partition was entered into,
does not make said agreement void,
since he was represented by his mother
Asuncion ARcebal, and when said
agreement was approved by the court,
said representation was implied
approved, and all her acts became
validated ipso facto; (7) that in the
absence of a preponderance of evidence
to the contrary, the defendants are
exclusive owners of the parcels of land
designated by Nos. 113 and 114, which
are included in the inventor of the estate
of Isaac Centeno, having acquired title
thereto by prescription; (8) that the
defendants, as cross-complaint, are
entitled to the ownership and possesion
of the two parcels of land described in
the third paragraph of the second cause
of action of the cross-complaint, as well
as the two mares and the harness which
are in possession of the plaintiffs; (9)
that the defendants are entitled to one-
sixth part of the undivided conjugal
property left by Isaac Centeno, which is
yet to be partitioned; (10) that the action
for the recovery of the undivided
property is not incompatible with the
action for partition, once the existence
of the community of the property of the
estate whose recovery and partition are
sought, has been declared.
For the foregoing, and with the sole
modification of orderinfg the partition of
the conjugal property left by the
deceased spouses Isaac Centeno and
Melchora Arroyo declared by lower
court to be pro indiviso, the judgment
appealed from is affirmed in all other
respects, without special pronoucement
as to costs. So ordered.
4. [G.R. No. L-51263. February 28,
1983.]
CRESENCIANO LEONARDO,
Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS,
MARIA CAILLES, JAMES BRACEWELL
and RURAL BANK OF PARAÑAQUE,
INC., Respondents.
Porfirio C. David for Petitioner.
Marquez & Marquez for Private
Respondent.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE;
FACTUAL FINDINGS OF THE COURT
OF APPEALS; GENERALLY NOT
DISTURBED ON REVIEW;
EXCEPTIONS. — It is a well-established
17
rule laid down by this Court in
numerous cases that findings of facts by
the Court of Appeals are, generally, final
and conclusive upon this Court. The
exceptions are. (1) when the conclusion
is a finding grounded entirely on
speculation; (2) when the inference
made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or
impossible; (3) when there is a grave
abuse of discretion; (4) when the
judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts; and (5) when
the Court of Appeals, in making its
findings, went beyond the issues of the
case and the same are contrary to the
submission of both appellant and
appellee. None of the abuse exceptions,
however, exists in the case at bar, hence,
there is no reason to disturb the findings
of facts of the Court of Appeals.
2. CIVIL LAW; INTESTATE
SUCCESSION; ILLEGITIMATE
CHILDREN NOT ENTITLED TO
INHERIT AB INTESTATO FROM THE
LEGITIMATE CHILDREN AND
RELATIVES OF HIS FATHER OR
MOTHER; CASE AT BAR. — Even if it is
true that petitioner is the child of Sotero
Leonardo, still he cannot, by right of
representation, claim a share of the
estate left by the deceased Francisca
Reyes considering that, as found by the
Court of Appeals, he was born outside
wedlock as shown by the fact that when
he was born on September 13, 1938, his
alleged putative father and mother were
not yet married, and what is more, his
alleged father’s first marriage was still
subsisting. At most , petitioner would be
an illegitimate child who has no right to
inherit ab intestato from the legitimate
children and relatives of his father like
the Deceased Francisco Reyes. (Article
992, Civil Code of the Philippines.)
DECISION
DE CASTRO, J.:
Petition for review on certiorari of the
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. No. 43476-R, promulgated on
February 21, 1979, reversing the
judgment of the Court of First Instance
of Rizal in favor of petitioner:chanrobles
virtualawlibrary
chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph
"(a) Declaring plaintiff Cresenciano
Leonardo as the great grandson and heir
of deceased FRANCISCA REYES,
entitled to one-half share in the estate of
said deceased, jointly with defendant
Maria Cailles;
"(b) Declaring the properties, subject
of this complaint, to be the properties of
the deceased FRANCISCA REYES and
not of defendants Maria Cailles and
James Bracewell;
"(c) Declaring null and void any sale of
these properties by defendant Maria
Cailles in so far as the share of
Cresenciano Leonardo are affected;
"(d) Ordering the partition within 30
days from the finality of this decision, of
the properties subject of this litigation,
between defendant Maria Cailles and
plaintiff Cresenciano Leonardo, share
and share alike;
"(e) Ordering defendants Maria Cailles
and James Bracewell, within 30 days
from the finality of this decision, to
render an accounting of the fruits of the
properties, and 30 days thereafter to pay
to plaintiff Cresenciano Leonardo his
one-half share thereof with interest of
6% per annum;
"(f) Ordering defendants Maria Cailles
and James Bracewell to pay jointly and
severally plaintiff Cresenciano Leonardo
the amount of P2,000.00 as attorney’s
fees;
"(g) Ordering defendants to pay the
costs; and
18

"(h) Dismissing defendants’
counterclaim." 1
From the record, it appears that
Francisca Reyes who died intestate on
July 12, 1942 was survived by two (2)
daughters, Maria and Silvestra Cailles,
and a grandson, Sotero Leonardo, the
son of her daughter, Pascuala Cailles
who predeceased her. Sotero Leonardo
died in 1944, while Silvestra Cailles died
in 1949 without any issue.
On October 29, 1964, petitioner
Cresenciano Leonardo, claiming to be
the son of the late Sotero Leonardo, filed
a complaint for ownership of properties,
sum of money and accounting in the
Court of First Instance of Rizal seeking
judgment (1) to be declared one of the
lawful heirs of the deceased Francisca
Reyes, entitled to one-half share in the
estate of said deceased jointly with
defendant, private respondent herein,
Maria Cailles, (2) to have the properties
left by said Francisca Reyes, described in
the complaint, partitioned between him
and defendant Maria Cailles, and (3) to
have an accounting of all the income
derived from said properties from the
time defendants took possession thereof
until said accounting shall have been
made, delivering to him his share
therein with legal interest.
Answering the complaint, private
respondent Maria Cailles asserted
exclusive ownership over the subject
properties and alleged that petitioner is
an illegitimate child who cannot succeed
by right of representation. For his part,
the other defendant, private respondent
James Bracewell, claimed that said
properties are now his by virtue of a
valid and legal deed of sale which Maria
Cailles had subsequently executed in his
favor. These properties were allegedly
mortgaged to respondent Rural Bank of
Parañaque, Inc. sometime in September
1963.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
After hearing on the merits, the trial
court rendered judgment in favor of the
petitioner, the dispositive portion of
which was earlier quoted, finding the
evidence of the private respondent
insufficient to prove ownership of the
properties in suit. From said judgment,
private respondents appealed to the
Court of Appeals which, as already
stated, reversed the decision of the trial
court" thereby dismissing petitioner’s
complaint. Reconsideration having been
denied by the appellate court, this
petition for review was filed on the
following assignment of
errors:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
I
"RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN
HOLDING THAT THE PROPERTIES IN
QUESTION ARE THE EXCLUSIVE
PROPERTIES OF PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS.
II
"RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN
HOLDING THAT PETITIONER HAS
NOT ESTABLISHED HIS FILIATION.
III
"RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN
HOLDING THAT PETITIONER, AS
THE GREAT GRANDSON OF
FRANCISCA REYES, HAS NO LEGAL
RIGHT TO INHERIT BY
REPRESENTATION."cralaw virtua1aw
library
To begin with, the Court of Appeals
found the subject properties to be the
exclusive properties of the private
respondents.
"There being two properties in this case
both will be discussed separately, as
each has its own distinct factual setting.
19
The first was bought in 1908 by Maria
Cailles under a deed of sale (Exh.’60’),
which describes it as follows:chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library
‘. . . radicada en la calle Desposorio de
este dicho Municipio dentro de los
limites y linderos siquientes: Por la
derecha a la entrada el solar de
Teodorico Reyes por la izquierda el solar
de Maria Calesa (Cailles) arriba citada
por la espalda la via ferrea del Railroad
Co., y la frente la dicha calle Desposorio’
"After declaring it in her name, Maria
Cailles paid the realty taxes starting
from 1918 up to 1948. Thereafter as she
and her son Narciso Bracewell, left for
Nueva Ecija, Francisca Reyes managed
the property and paid the realty tax of
the land. However, for unexplained
reasons, she paid and declared the same
in her own name. Because of this,
plaintiff decided to run after this
property, erroneously thinking that as
the great grandson of Francisca Reyes,
he had some proprietary right over the
same.
"The second parcel on the other hand,
was purchased by Maria Cailles in 1917
under a deed of sale (Exh.’3’) which
describes the property as
follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
‘. . . una parcela de terreno destinado al
beneficio de la sal, que linda por Norte
con la linea Ferrea y Salinar de Narciso
Mayuga, por Este con los de Narciso
Mayuga y Domingo Lozada, por Sur con
los de Domingo Lozada y Fruto Silverio
y por Oeste con el de Fruto Silverio y
Linea Ferrea, de una extension
superficial de 1229.00 metros
cuadrados.’
"After declaring it in her name, Maria
Cailles likewise paid the realty tax in
1917 and continued paying the same up
to 1948. Thereafter when she and her
son, Narciso Bracewell, established their
residence in Nueva Ecija, Francisca
Reyes administered the property and
like in the first case, declared in 1949 the
property in her own name. Thinking
that the property is the property of
Francisca Reyes, plaintiff filed the
instant complaint, claiming a portion
thereof as the same allegedly represents
the share of his father.
"As earlier stated, the court a quo
decided the case in favor of the plaintiff
principally because defendants’ evidence
do not sufficiently show that the 2
properties which they bought in 1908
and 1917, are the same as the properties
sought by the plaintiff.
"Carefully going over the evidence, We
believe that the trial judge
misinterpreted the evidence as to the
identification of the lands in question.
"To begin with, the deed of sale
(Exh.’60’) of 1908 clearly states that the
land sold to Maria Cailles is ‘en la calle
Desposorio’ in Las Piñas, Rizal which
was bounded by adjoining lands owned
by persons living at the time, including
the railroad track of the Manila Railroad
Co. (’la via ferrea del Railroad Co.’).
"With the exception of the area which
was not disclosed in the deed, the
description fits the land now being
sought by the plaintiff, as this property
is also located in Desposorio St. and is
bounded by the M.R.R. Co.
"With these natural boundaries, there is
indeed an assurance that the property
described in the deed and in the tax
declaration is one and the same
property.
"The change of owners of the adjoining
lands is immaterial since several
decades have already passed between
the deed and the declaration and ‘during
that period, many changes of abode
would likely have occurred.’
20
"Besides, it is a fact that defendants have
only one property in Desposorio St. and
they have paid the realty taxes of this
property from May 29, 1914 up to May
28, 1948. Hence, there is no reason to
doubt that this property is the same, if
not identical to the property in
Desposorio St. which is now being
sought after by the plaintiff.
"With respect to the other parcel which
Maria Cailles bought from Tranquilino
Mateo in 1917, it is true that there is no
similar boundaries to be relied upon. It
is however undeniable that after
declaring it in her name, Maria Cailles
began paying the realty taxes thereon on
July 24, 1917 until 1948." (Reference to
Exhibits omitted.) 2
Petitioner takes issue with the appellate
court on the above findings of fact,
forgetting that since the present petition
is one for review on certiorari, only
questions of law may be raised. It is a
well-established rule laid down by this
Court in numerous cases that findings of
facts by the Court of Appeals are,
generally, final and conclusive upon this
Court. The exceptions are: (1) when the
conclusion is a finding grounded
entirely on speculation; (2) when the
inference made is manifestly mistaken,
absurd or impossible; (3) when there is
a grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the
judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts; and (5) when
the Court of Appeals, in making its
findings, went beyond the issues of the
case and the same are contrary to the
submission of both appellant and
appellee. 3 None of the above
exceptions, however, exists in the case at
bar, hence, there is no reason to disturb
the findings of facts of the Court of
Appeals.
Anent the second assignment of error,
the Court of Appeals made the following
findings:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Going to the issue of filiation, plaintiff
claims that he is the son of Sotero
Leonardo, the son of one of the
daughters (Pascuala) of Francisca Reyes.
He further alleges that since Pascuala
predeceased Francisca Reyes, and that
his father, Sotero, who subsequently
died in 1944, survived Francisca Reyes,
plaintiff can consequently succeed to the
estate of Francisca Reyes by right of
representation.
"In support of his claim, plaintiff
submitted in evidence his alleged birth
certificate showing that his father is
Sotero Leonardo, married to Socorro
Timbol, his alleged mother.
"Since his supposed right will either rise
or fall on the proper evaluation of this
vital evidence, We have minutely
scrutinized the same, looking for that
vital link connecting him to the family
tree of the deceased Francisca Reyes.
However, this piece of evidence does not
in any way lend credence to his tale.
"This is because the name of the child
described in the birth certificate is not
that of the plaintiff but a certain ‘Alfredo
Leonardo’ who was born on September
13, 1938 to Sotero Leonardo and Socorro
Timbol. Other than his bare allegation,
plaintiff did not submit any durable
evidence showing that the ‘Alfredo
Leonardo’ mentioned in the birth
certificate is no other than he himself.
Thus, even without taking time and
space to go into further details, We may
safely conclude that plaintiff failed to
prove his filiation which is a
fundamental requisite in this action
where he is claiming to be an heir in the
inheritance in question." 4
That is likewise a factual finding which
may not be disturbed in this petition for
review in the absence of a clear showing
that said finding is not supported by
substantial evidence, or that there was a
grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the court making the finding of
21
fact.chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law
library
Referring to the third assignment of
error, even if it is true that petitioner is
the child of Sotero Leonardo, still he
cannot, by right of representation, claim
a share of the estate left by the deceased
Francisca Reyes considering that, as
found again by the Court of Appeals, he
was born outside wedlock as shown by
the fact that when he was born on
September 13, 1938, his alleged putative
father and mother were not yet married,
and what is more, his alleged father’s
first marriage was still subsisting. At
most, petitioner would be an illegitimate
child who has no right to inherit ab
intestato from the legitimate children
and relatives of his father, like the
deceased Francisca Reyes. (Article 992,
Civil Code of the Philippines.)
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court
of Appeals sought to be reviewed in this
petition is hereby affirmed, with costs
against the petitioner.chanrobles virtual
lawlibrary
SO ORDERED.
5. G.R. No. L-66574
ANSELMA DIAZ, guardian of VICTOR,
RODRIGO, ANSELMINA and MIGUEL,
all surnamed SANTERO, petitioners,
and FELIXBERTA PACURSA guardian
of FEDERICO SANTERO, et al.,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
and FELISA PAMUTI JARDIN,
respondents.
Ambrosia Padilla, Mempin & Reyes Law
Offices for petitioners.
Pedro S. Sarino for respondent F.P.
Jardin.
PARAS, J.:
Private respondent filed a Petition dated
January 23, 1976 with the Court of First
Instance of Cavite in Sp. Proc. Case No.
B-21, "In The Matter of the Intestate
Estate of the late Simona Pamuti Vda. de
Santero," praying among other things,
that the corresponding letters of
Administration be issued in her favor
and that she be appointed as special
Administratrix of the properties of the
deceased Simona Pamuti Vda. de
Santero.
It is undisputed: 1) that Felisa Pamuti
Jardin is a niece of Simona Pamuti Vda.
de Santero who together with Felisa's
mother Juliana were the only legitimate
children of the spouses Felipe Pamuti
and Petronila Asuncion; 2) that Juliana
married Simon Jardin and out of their
union were born Felisa Pamuti and
another child who died during infancy;
3) that Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero
is the widow of Pascual Santero and the
mother of Pablo Santero; 4) that Pablo
Santero was the only legitimate son of
his parents Pascual Santero and Simona
Pamuti Vda. de Santero; 5) that Pascual
Santero died in 1970; Pablo Santero in
1973 and Simona Santero in 1976; 6)
that Pablo Santero, at the time of his
death was survived by his mother
Simona Santero and his six minor
natural children to wit: four minor
children with Anselma Diaz and two
minor children with Felixberta Pacursa.
Judge Jose Raval in his Orders dated
December 1, 1976 1 and December 9,
1976 2 declared Felisa Pamuti Jardin as
the sole legitimate heir of Simona
Pamuti Vda. de Santero.
Before the trial court, there were 4
interrelated cases filed to wit:
a) Sp. Proc. No. B-4 — is the Petition
for the Letters of Administration of the
intestate Estate of Pablo Santero;
22
b) Sp. Proc. No. B-5 — is the Petition
for the Letters of Administration of the
Intestate Estate of Pascual Santero;
c) Sp. Proc. No. B-7 — is the Petition
for Guardianship over the properties of
an Incompetent Person, Simona Pamuti
Vda. de Santero;
d) Sp. Proc. No. B-21 — is the
Petition for Settlement of the Intestate
Estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de
Santero.
Felisa Jardin upon her Motion to
Intervene in Sp. Proceedings Nos. B-4
and B-5, was allowed to intervene in the
intestate estates of Pablo Santero and
Pascual Santero by Order of the Court
dated August 24, 1977.
Petitioner Anselma Diaz, as guardian of
her minor children, filed her
"Opposition and Motion to Exclude
Felisa Pamuti Jardin dated March 13,
1980, from further taking part or
intervening in the settlement of the
intestate estate of Simona Pamuti Vda.
de Santero, as well as in the intestate
estate of Pascual Santero and Pablo
Santero.
Felixberta Pacursa guardian for her
minor children, filed thru counsel, her
Manifestation of March 14, 1980
adopting the Opposition and Motion to
Exclude Felisa Pamuti, filed by Anselma
Diaz.
On May 20, 1980, Judge Ildefonso M.
Bleza issued an order excluding Felisa
Jardin "from further taking part or
intervening in the settlement of the
intestate estate of Simona Pamuti Vda.
de Santero, as well as in the intestate
estates of Pascual Santero and Pablo
Santero and declared her to be, not an
heir of the deceased Simona Pamuti
Vda. de Santero." 3
After her Motion for Reconsideration
was denied by the trial court in its order
dated November 1, 1980, Felisa P.
Jardin filed her appeal to the
Intermediate Appellate Court in CA-G.R.
No. 69814-R. A decision 4 was rendered
by the Intermediate Appellate Court on
December 14, 1983 (reversing the
decision of the trial court) the
dispositive portion of which reads —
WHEREFORE, finding the Order
appealed from not consistent with the
facts and law applicable, the same is
hereby set aside and another one
entered sustaining the Orders of
December 1 and 9, 1976 declaring the
petitioner as the sole heir of Simona
Pamuti Vda. de Santero and ordering
oppositors-appellees not to interfere in
the proceeding for the declaration of
heirship in the estate of Simona Pamuti
Vda. de Santero.
Costs against the oppositors-appellees.
The Motion for Reconsideration filed by
oppositors-appellees (petitioners
herein) was denied by the same
respondent court in its order dated
February 17, 1984 hence, the present
petition for Review with the following:
ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS
I. The Decision erred in ignoring the
right to intestate succession of
petitioners grandchildren Santero as
direct descending line (Art. 978) and/or
natural/"illegitimate children" (Art.
988) and prefering a niece, who is a
collateral relative (Art. 1003);
II. The Decision erred in denying the
right of representation of the natural
grandchildren Santero to represent their
father Pablo Santero in the succession to
the intestate estate of their grandmother
Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero (Art.
982);
III. The Decision erred in mistaking
the intestate estate of the grandmother
Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero as the
23
estate of "legitimate child or relative" of
Pablo Santero, her son and father of the
petitioners' grandchildren Santero;
IV. The Decision erred in ruling that
petitioner-appellant Felisa P. Jardin
who is a niece and therefore a collateral
relative of Simona Pamuti Vda. de
Santero excludes the natural children of
her son Pablo Santero, who are her
direct descendants and/or grand
children;
V. The Decision erred in applying
Art. 992, when Arts. 988, 989 and 990
are the applicable provisions of law on
intestate succession; and
VI. The Decision erred in considering
the orders of December 1 and December
9, 1976 which are provisional and
interlocutory as final and executory.
The real issue in this case may be briefly
stated as follows — who are the legal
heirs of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero
— her niece Felisa Pamuti Jardin or her
grandchildren (the natural children of
Pablo Santero)?
The dispute at bar refers only to the
intestate estate of Simona Pamuti Vda.
de Santero and the issue here is whether
oppositors-appellees (petitioners
herein) as illegitimate children of Pablo
Santero could inherit from Simona
Pamuti Vda. de Santero, by right of
representation of their father Pablo
Santero who is a legitimate child of
Simona Pamuti Vda, de Santero.
Now then what is the appropriate law on
the matter? Petitioners contend in their
pleadings that Art. 990 of the New Civil
Code is the applicable law on the case.
They contend that said provision of the
New Civil Code modifies the rule in
Article 941 (Old Civil Code) and
recognizes the right of representation
(Art. 970) to descendants, whether
legitimate or illegitimate and that Art.
941, Spanish Civil Code denied
illegitimate children the right to
represent their deceased parents and
inherit from their deceased
grandparents, but that Rule was
expressly changed and/or amended by
Art. 990 New Civil Code which expressly
grants the illegitimate children the right
to represent their deceased father (Pablo
Santero) in the estate of their
grandmother Simona Pamuti)." 5
Petitioners' contention holds no water.
Since the heridatary conflict refers solely
to the intestate estate of Simona Pamuti
Vda. de Santero, who is the legitimate
mother of Pablo Santero, the applicable
law is the provision of Art. 992 of the
Civil Code which reads as follows:
ART. 992. An illegitimate child has no
right to inherit ab intestato from the
legitimate children and relatives of his
father or mother; nor shall such children
or relatives inherit in the same manner
from the illegitimate child. (943a)
Pablo Santero is a legitimate child, he is
not an illegitimate child. On the other
hand, the oppositors (petitioners herein)
are the illegitimate children of Pablo
Santero.
Article 992 of the New Civil Code
provides a barrier or iron curtain in that
it prohibits absolutely a succession ab
intestato between the illegitimate child
and the legitimate children and relatives
of the father or mother of said legitimate
child. They may have a natural tie of
blood, but this is not recognized by law
for the purposes of Art. 992, Between
the legitimate family and the illegitimate
family there is presumed to be an
intervening antagonism and
incompatibility. The illegitimate child is
disgracefully looked down upon by the
legitimate family; the family is in turn,
hated by the illegitimate child; the latter
considers the privileged condition of the
former, and the resources of which it is
thereby deprived; the former, in turn,
sees in the illegitimate child nothing but
24
the product of sin, palpable evidence of
a blemish broken in life; the law does no
more than recognize this truth, by
avoiding further grounds of resentment.
6 illegitimate children. (Reflections on the
Thus, petitioners herein cannot
represent their father Pablo Santero in
the succession of the letter to the
intestate estate of his legitimate mother
Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero,
because of the barrier provided for
under Art. 992 of the New Civil Code.
In answer to the erroneous contention of
petitioners that Article 941 of the
Spanish Civil Code is changed by Article
990 of the New Civil Code, We are
reproducing herewith the Reflections of
the Illustrious Hon. Justice Jose B.L.
Reyes which also finds full support from
other civilists, to wit:
In the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 the
right of representation was admitted
only within the legitimate family; so
much so that Article 943 of that Code
prescribed that an illegitimate child can
riot inherit ab intestato from the
legitimate children and relatives of his
father and mother. The Civil Code of the
Philippines apparently adhered to this
principle since it reproduced Article 943
of the Spanish Code in its own Art. 992,
but with fine inconsistency, in
subsequent articles (990, 995 and 998)
our Code allows the hereditary portion
of the illegitimate child to pass to his
own descendants, whether legitimate or
illegitimate. So that while Art. 992
prevents the illegitimate issue of a
legitimate child from representing him
in the intestate succession of the
grandparent, the illegitimates of an
illegitimate child can now do so. This
difference being indefensible and
unwarranted, in the future revision of
the Civil Code we shall have to make a
choice and decide either that the
illegitimate issue enjoys in all cases the
right of representation, in which case
Art. 992 must be suppressed; or
contrariwise maintain said article and
modify Articles 995 and 998. The first
solution would be more in accord with
an enlightened attitude vis-a-vis
Reform of Hereditary Succession,
JOURNAL of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, First Quater, 1976, Volume
4, Number 1, pp. 40-41).
It is therefore clear from Article 992 of
the New Civil Code that the phrase
"legitimate children and relatives of his
father or mother" includes Simona
Pamuti Vda. de Santero as the word
"relative" includes all the kindred of the
person spoken of. 7 The record shows
that from the commencement of this
case the only parties who claimed to be
the legitimate heirs of the late Simona
Pamuti Vda. de Santero are Felisa
Pamuti Jardin and the six minor natural
or illegitimate children of Pablo Santero.
Since petitioners herein are barred by
the provisions of Article 992, the
respondent Intermediate Appellate
Court did not commit any error in
holding Felisa Pamuti-Jardin to be the
sole legitimate heir to the intestate
estate of the late Simona Pamuti Vda. de
Santero.
Lastly, petitioners claim that the
respondent Intermediate Appellate
Court erred in ruling that the Orders of
the Court a quo dated December 1, 1976
and December 9, 1976 are final and
executory. Such contention is without
merit. The Hon. Judge Jose Raval in his
order dated December 1, 1976 held that
the oppositors (petitioners herein) are
not entitled to intervene and hence not
allowed to intervene in the proceedings
for the declaration of the heirship in the
intestate estate of Simona Pamuti Vda.
de Santero. Subsequently, Judge Jose
Raval issued an order, dated December
9, 1976, which declared Felisa Pamuti-
Jardin to be the sole legitimate heir of
Simona Pamuti. The said Orders were
never made the subjects of either a
motion for reconsideration or a
25
perfected appeal. Hence, said orders
which long became final and executory
are already removed from the power of
jurisdiction of the lower court to decide
anew. The only power retained by the
lower court, after a judgment has
become final and executory is to order
its execution. The respondent Court did
not err therefore in ruling that the Order
of the Court a quo dated May 30, 1980
excluding Felisa Pamuti Jardin as
intestate heir of the deceased Simona
Pamuti Vda. de Santero "is clearly a total
reversal of an Order which has become
final and executory, hence null and void.
"

WHEREFORE, this petition is hereby

DISMISSED, and the assailed decision is
hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

26