TOPIC Art.

2131
CASE NO. G.R. 98382
CASE NAME PNB v. CA & De la Cruz (1993)
MEMBER Bea Asis

DOCTRINE
The rule is that statutory provisions governing publication of notice of mortgage foreclosure sales must
be strictly complied with, and those even slight deviations therefrom will invalidate the notice and render
the sale at least voidable.

Recit Ready Digest:

Two parcels of land under the common names of the respondent Epifanio dela Cruz, his brother
and sister were mortgaged to the Petitioner Philippine National Bank, the same also became the
subject of an extrajudicial foreclosure. Epifanio filed a complaint for reconveyance of the two parcels
of land. He alleges that the posting requirements were not followed in accordance with Act No. 3135, which
requires posting of notices of sale once a week for at least three consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general
circulation. The Court ruled in favor of Epifanio. The Notices of Sale of were published on March 28, April
11 and April 12, 1969. The first date falls on a Friday while the second and third dates are on a Friday and
Saturday, respectively. Section 3 of Act No. 3135 requires that the notice of auction sale shall be
"published once a week for at least three consecutive weeks". Evidently, petitioner bank failed to
comply with this legal requirement. The publication effected on April 11, 1969 cannot be construed as
sufficient advertisement for the second week because the period for the first week should be reckoned from
March 28, 1969 until April 3, 1969 while the second week should be counted from April 4, 1969 until April
10, 1969. It is clear that the announcement on April 11, 1969 was both theoretically and physically
accomplished during the first day of the third week and cannot thus be equated with compliance in law.
The rule is that statutory provisions governing publication of notice of mortgage foreclosure sales must be
strictly complied with, and those even slight deviations therefrom will invalidate the notice and render the
sale at least voidable.

FACTS
• Epifanio De La Cruz mortgaged two lots to PNB. The lots were under the common names of
Epifanio, his brother (Delfin) and his sister (Maria). The mortgage was made possible because of
the grant by the latter to Epifanio of a special power of attorney to mortgage the lots to the defendant
• Epifanio defaulted in his payments so PNB foreclosed on the properties and sold it to third parties.
Epifanio then filed a complaint with CFI for the reconveyance of the parcels of land which he
mortgaged to PNB.
o He alleged that PNB had unlawfully foreclosed them and that they did not comply with the
requirement of posting notices of sale.
• Under Section 3 of Act No. 31351 on extra-judicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage, notices of
sale are required to be posted for not less than twenty days in at least three public places of
the municipality or city where the property is situated, and if such property is worth more
than four hundred pesos, such notices shall also be published once a week for at least three
consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the municipality or city.
• The CFI dismissed the petition. However, it was reversed by the CA who said:
o The Notices of Sale of appellant's foreclosed properties were published on March 28, April
11 and April 12, 1969 in issues of the newspaper "Daily Record". The date March 28, 1969

1
An Act to Regulate the Sale of Property under Special Powers Inserted in or Annexed to Real Estate
Mortgages, as amended by Act No. 4118

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 falls on a Friday while the dates April 11 and 12, 1969 are on a Friday and Saturday,
respectively. Section 3 of Act No. 3135 requires that the notice of auction sale shall be
"published once a week for at least three consecutive weeks". Evidently, defendant-
appellee bank failed to comly with this legal requirement.
• Moreover, the CA declared the auction sale as void because PNB was the highest bidder and
purchaser. Hence current petition.
• According to PNB, there is no breach of the proviso since after the first publication on March 28,
1969, the second notice was published on April 11, 1969 (the last day of the second week), while
the third publication on April 12, 1969 was announced on the first day of the third week. Petitioner
thus concludes that there was no violation from the mere happenstance that the third publication
was made only a day after the second publication since it is enough that the second publication be
made on any day within the second week and the third publication, on any day within the third
week.
• Epifanio, on the other hand, argues that the period between each publication must never be less
than seven consecutive days.
• The rule is that statutory provisions governing publication of notice of mortgage foreclosure sales
must be strictly complied with, and those even slight deviations therefrom will invalidate the notice
and render the sale at least voidable.

ISSUE/S and HELD

Whether there was a valid compliance with the required publication – NO

RATIO

• PNB is of the erroneous impression that the day on which the first publication was made, or on
March 28, 1969, should be excluded pursuant to Article 13 of the New Civil Code.
• It must be conceded that Article 13 is completely silent as to the definition of what is a "week".
In Concepcion vs. Zandueta, this term was interpreted to mean as a period of time consisting of
seven consecutive days — a definition which dovetails with the ruling in E.M. Derby and Co. vs.
City of Modesto, et al. Following the interpretation in Derby as to the publication of an ordinance
for "at least two weeks" in some newspaper that:

. . . here there is no date or event suggesting the exclusion of the first day's publication
from the computation, and the cases above cited take this case out of the rule stated in
Section 12, Code Civ. Proc. which excludes the first day and includes the last;

• the publication effected on April 11, 1969 cannot be construed as sufficient advertisement for the
second week because the period for the first week should be reckoned from March 28, 1969 until
April 3, 1969 while the second week should be counted from April 4, 1969 until April 10, 1969.
It is clear that the announcement on April 11, 1969 was both theoretically and physically
accomplished during the first day of the third week and cannot thus be equated with compliance
in law.
• Indeed, where the word is used simply as a measure of duration of time and without reference to
the calendar, it means a period of seven consecutive days without regard to the day of the week
on which it begins (1 Tolentino, supra at p. 467 citing Derby).
• It would have been absurd to exclude March 28, 1969 as reckoning point, in line with the third
paragraph of Article 13 of the New Civil Code, for the purpose of counting the first week of
publication as to the last day thereof fall on April 4, 1969 because this will have the effect of
extending the first week by another day. This could not have been the unwritten intention of the
lawmakers when Act No. 3135 was enacted.

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DISPOSTIVE PORTION
WHEREFORE, the petitions for certiorari and intervention are hereby dismissed and the decision of the
Court of Appeals dated April 17, 1991 is hereby affirmed in toto.

Other notes:

Art. 13., Civil Code

When the laws speak of years, months, days or nights, it shall be understood that years are of three hundred
sixty-five days each; months, of thirty days; days, of twenty-four hours; and nights from sunset to sunrise.

If months are designated by their name, they shall be computed by the number of days which they
respectively have.

In computing a period, the first day shall be excluded, and the last day included.