SPL | digest | rollan.josh.liwag.saquilabon.taclas.

torres

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 141066. February 17, 2005.]
EVANGELINE LADONGA, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondent.
FACTS
- March 27, 1991, three Informations for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 were filed against the
Spouses Ladonga with the RTC
- The cases were consolidated and jointly tried. When arraigned on June 26, 1991, the
two accused pleaded not guilty to the crimes charged.
- The prosecution presented as its lone witness complainant Alfredo Oculam. He
testified that: in 1989, spouses Adronico 6 and Evangeline Ladonga became his
regular customers in his pawnshop business in Tagbilaran City, Bohol
- sometime in May 1990, the Ladonga spouses obtained three (3) loans.
- the three checks bounced upon presentment for the reason "CLOSED ACCOUNT"; 11
when the Ladonga spouses failed to redeem the check, despite repeated demands,
he filed a criminal complaint against them. 12

PETITIONER’S CONTENTION:
1. Petitioner staunchly insists that she cannot be held criminally liable for violation of B.P.
Blg. 22 because she had no participation in the drawing and issuance of the three
checks subject of the three criminal cases, a fact proven by the checks themselves.
2. She contends that the Court of Appeals gravely erred in applying the principle of
conspiracy, as defined under the RPC, to violations of B.P. Blg. 22.
3. She posits that the application of the principle of conspiracy would enlarge the scope
of the statute and include situations not provided for or intended by the lawmakers,
such as penalizing a person, like petitioner, who had no participation in the drawing or
issuance of checks

RTC: RTC rendered a joint decision finding the Ladonga spouses guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of violating B.P. Blg. 22.

CA: Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction of petitioner. 18 It held that the provisions of the
penal code were made applicable to special penal laws.

ISSUE:
I. Whether the conspiracy principle is applicable in violations of Batas Pambansa Bilang
22. -YES!
II. Whether Petitioner is guilty of conspiring in violating the BP22. -NO!

HELD:
I.
The Office of the Solicitor General disagrees with petitioner and echoes the declaration
of the Court of Appeals that some provisions of the Revised Penal Code, especially with the
addition of the second sentence in Article 10, are applicable to special laws. It submits that
B.P. Blg. 22 does not provide any prohibition regarding the applicability in a suppletory
character of the provisions of the Revised Penal Code to it.
Article 10 of the RPC reads as follows:
ART. 10. Offenses not subject to the provisions of this Code. —
Offenses which are or in the future may be punishable under special laws are
not subject to the provisions of this Code. This Code shall be supplementary
to such laws, unless the latter should specially provide the contrary.
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The article is composed of two clauses. The first provides that offenses which in the
future are made punishable under special laws are not subject to the provisions of the RPC,
while the second makes the RPC supplementary to such laws. While it seems that the two
clauses are contradictory, a sensible interpretation will show that they can perfectly be
reconciled. cHATSI

The first clause should be understood to mean only that the special penal laws
are controlling with regard to offenses therein specifically punished. Said clause only
restates the elemental rule of statutory construction that special legal provisions prevail over
general ones. 24 Lex specialis derogant generali. In fact, the clause can be considered as a
superfluity, and could have been eliminated altogether. The second clause contains the soul
of the article. The main idea and purpose of the article is embodied in the provision that the
"code shall be supplementary" to special laws, unless the latter should specifically provide the
contrary.
B.P. Blg. 22 does not expressly proscribe the suppletory application of the
provisions of the RPC. Thus, in the absence of contrary provision in B.P. Blg. 22, the
general provisions of the RPC which, by their nature, are necessarily applicable, may
be applied suppletorily. Indeed, in the recent case of Yu vs. People, 31 the Court applied
suppletorily the provisions on subsidiary imprisonment under Article 39 32 of the RPC to B.P.
Blg. 22.

II.
Article 8 of the RPC provides that "a conspiracy exists when two or more persons come
to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it." To be held
guilty as a co-principal by reason of conspiracy, the accused must be shown to have performed
an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the complicity. 34 The overt act or acts of the
accused may consist of active participation in the actual commission of the crime itself or may
consist of moral assistance to his co-conspirators by moving them to execute or implement
the criminal plan. 35
In the present case, the prosecution failed to prove that petitioner performed any
overt act in furtherance of the alleged, conspiracy.
Conspiracy must be established, not by conjectures, but by positive and conclusive
evidence. 37 Conspiracy transcends mere companionship and mere presence at the
scene of the crime does not in itself amount to conspiracy. 38 Even knowledge,
acquiescence in or agreement to cooperate, is not enough to constitute one as a party to a
conspiracy, absent any active participation in the commission of the crime with a view to the
furtherance of the common design and purpose. 39
The rule is firmly entrenched that a judgment of conviction must be predicated on the
strength of the evidence for the prosecution and not on the weakness of the evidence for the
defense. The proof against him must survive the test of reason; the strongest suspicion must
not be permitted to sway judgment. The conscience must be satisfied that on the defense
could be laid the responsibility for the offense charged; that not only did he perpetrate the act
but that it amounted to a crime. What is required then is moral certainty.
Petitioner Evangeline Ladonga is ACQUITTED of the charges against her under B.P.
Blg. 22 for failure of the prosecution to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
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PEOPLE VS SIMON

FACTS OF THE CASE:

- Simon sunga was charged under the dangerous drugs act after selling a marijuana to
a Narcotic command in consideration of 40 php. It was later on confirmed via
laboratory
All started to transpire when NARCOM informed the police unit in CAMP olivas of the illegal
drug activities of this certain ALYAS PUSA at STO. CRISTO Pampanga. The team went on
to meet the informant and all went to sto cristo and when they have reached the meet up
place. The confidential informer pointed the appellant to lopez who then asked him whether
he has marijuana to which the appellant affirmed.

ISSUE OF THE CASE

- whether this court, at the present stage, apply the provisions of said Article 22 to reduce
the penalty to be imposed on appellant.
RULING OF THE CASE:
- Yes because although RA 6425 was implemented as a special law, it has always been
an accepted rule that by for force of the article 10, the benefits provided in article 22
also applies and shall give retroactive effect to crimws punishable by special laws
although such benefits does not apply to those of habitual delinquent.
- Moreover, the court also reasoned out that there was an error in matter of imposable
penalties, there is here an overlapping error in the provisions on the penalty of
reclusion perpetua by reason of its dual imposition, that is, as the maximum of the
penalty where the marijuana is less than 750 grams, and also as the minimum of the
penalty where the marijuana involved is 750 grams or more.
-
- Another issue: Whether mitigating, aggravating, other circumstances could be applied
in this case
-
- RULING: NOPE, Since the penalties then provided by the special laws concerned
did not provide for the minimum, medium or maximum periods, it would
consequently be impossible to consider the aforestated modifying
circumstances whose main function is to determine the period of the penalty in
accordance with the rules in Article 64 of the Code.
-
- The suppletory effect of the Revised Penal Code to special laws, as provided in
Article 10 of the former, cannot be invoked where there is a legal or physical
impossibility of, or a prohibition in the special law against, such supplementary
application.
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Topic: SPL; mala in se vs. mala prohibita

DUNLAO vs. CA

FACTS:
Dunlao is a duly-licensed retailer and wholesaler of scrap iron in Davao City using the business
name “Dunlao Enterprise.”

On October 25, 1986 at about 2:30 p.m, Fortunato Mariquit and Carlito Catog, both employees
of Lourdes Farms, were instructed by its proprietor, to go to Dunlao’s premises together with
some police officers to verify information received that some farrowing crates and G.I. pipes
stolen from Lourdes Farms were to be found thereat.

Upon arrival at Dunlao’s compound, the group saw the farrowing crates and pipes inside the
compound. They also found assorted lengths of G.I. pipes inside a cabinet in Dunlao’s shop
and another pile outside the shop but within the compound.

After he was informed by the police operatives that said pipes were owned by Lourdes Farms
and had been stolen from it, Dunlao voluntarily surrendered the items. These were then taken
to the police station.

Subsequently a case was filed accusing Dunlao of violation of the Anti-Fencing Law. Upon
arraignment, Dunlao pleaded NOT GUILTY.

Trial ensued and the trial court rendered judgment finding the accused guilty of the said crime
which was then affirmed by the CA. Hence, this petition.

DUNLAO'S CONTENTION: There's no intent to gain, hence, did not violate RA 1612.

OTHER PARTY's CONTENTION: Intent to gain is immaterial in special laws because it is the
act alone, irrespective of the motives which constitutes the offense.

ISSUE: Whether intent to gain is necessary in order for the accused to be found guilty of
violation of Republic Act 1612?

HELD:
No, intent to gain is NOT necessary in order for the accused to be found guilty of violation of
Republic Act 1612.

CRIMINAL LAW; ANTI-FENCING LAW (P.D. NO. 1612); FENCING; DEFINED. — Under
Presidential Decree 1612, "fencing is the act of any person who, with intent to gain for himself
or for another, shall buy, receive, possess, keep, acquire, conceal, sell or dispose of, or shall
buy and sell, or in any other manner deal in any article, item, object or anything of value which
he knows, or should be known to him, to have been derived from the proceeds of the crime of
robbery or theft."
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INTENT TO GAIN NEED NOT BE PROVED IT BEING A SPECIAL LAW. — Contrary to

petitioner's contention, intent to gain need not be proved in crimes punishable by a special law
such as P.D. 1612. In the case of Lim v. Court of Appeals (22 SCRA 286, 287 [1993]) involving
violation of the Anti-Fencing Law, we said: "On the aspect of animus furandi, petitioner is of
the belief that this element was not clearly established by the People's evidence and he,
therefore, draws the conclusion that respondent court seriously erred in presuming the
existence of intent to gain. Again, this supposition ignores the fact that intent to gain is a mental
state, the existence of which is demonstrated by the overt acts of a person. And what was the
external demeanor which petitioner showed from which the trial court and respondent court
inferred animus furandi? These circumstances were vividly spelled in the body of the judgment
which petitioner chose to blandly impugn and over which he remains indifferent even at this
crucial stage. Withal, the sinister mental state is presumed from the commission of an unlawful
act in bringing out the tires from his bodega which were loaded on his pick-up. At any rate,
dolo is not required in crimes punished by a special statute like the Anti-Fencing Law of 1979
because it is the act alone, irrespective of the motives which constitutes the offense.

MERE POSSESSION OF THE STOLEN ARTICLES IS ENOUGH TO GIVE RISE TO A

PRESUMPTION OF FENCING. — The law does not require proof of purchase of the stolen
articles by petitioner, as mere possession thereof is enough to give rise to a presumption of
fencing. It was incumbent upon petitioner to overthrow this presumption by su cient and
convincing evidence but he failed to do so. All petitioner could offer, by way of rebuttal, was a
mere denial and his incredible testimony that a person aboard a jeep unloaded the pipes in
front of his establishment and left them there.

Contrary to petitioner’s contention, intent to gain need not be proved in crimes punishable by
a special law such as P.D. 1612.

FELONIES; MALA IN SE; DISTINGUISHED FROM MALA PROHIBITA — The law has long
divided crimes into acts wrong in themselves called "acts mala in se," and acts which would
not be wrong but for the fact that the positive law forbids them, called "acts mala prohibita."
This distinction is important with reference to the intent with which a wrongful act is done. The
rule on the subject is that in acts mala in se, the intent governs, but in acts mala prohibita, the
only inquiry is, has the law been violated? When an act is illegal, the intent of the offender is
immaterial.
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People v Quijada

Case where a dance was held in a basketball court and Quijada kept on pestering Iroy’s sister
and Quijada killed the brother.


He was convicted of two separate offenses of murder and illegal use of firearm aggravated
with illegal use of firearm.

Accused-appellant Daniel Quijada appeals from the decision of 30 September 1993 of Branch
1 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bohol convicting him of the two offenses separately
charged in two informations, viz., murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code and
illegal possession of firearm in its aggravated from under P.D. No. 1866.

ISSUE: Whether the Trial court erred in holding the accused liable for the two crimes?

HELD: Yes. Murder and homicide are defined and penalized by the Revised Penal Code
46 as crimes against persons. They are mala in se because malice or dolo is a
necessary ingredient therefor. On the other hand, the offense of illegal possession of
firearm is defined and punished by a special penal law, 48 P.D. No. 1866. It is a malum
prohibitum 49 which the lawmaker, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos, in the exercise
of his martial law powers, so condemned not only because of its nature but also
because of the larger policy consideration of containing or reducing, if not eliminating,
the upsurge of crimes vitally affecting public order and safety due to the proliferation
of illegally possessed and manufactured firearms, ammunition, and explosives. If intent
to commit the crime were required, enforcement of the decree and its policy or purpose would
be difficult to achieve. Hence, there is conceded wisdom in punishing illegal possession of
firearm without taking into account the criminal intent of the possessor. All that is needed is
intent to perpetrate the act prohibited by law, coupled, of course, by animus possidendi.
However, it must be clearly understood that this animus possidendi is without regard
to any other criminal or felonious intent which an accused may have harbored in
possessing the firearm.

The unequivocal intent of the second par of section 1. of PD 1866 is to respect and
preserve homicide or murder as a distinct offense penalized under the RPC and to
increasae the penalty for illegal possession of firearm where such a firearm is used in
killing a person.

Its clear language yields no intention of the lawmaker to repeal or modify, pro tanto,
Articles 248 and 249 of the RPC in such a way that if an unlicensed firearm is used in
the commission of homicide or murder, either of these crimes, as the case may be,
would only serve to aggravate the offense of illegal possession of firearm and would
not anymore be separately punished.


The words of the subject provision are palpably clear to exclude any suggestion that
either of the crimes of homicide and murder, as crimes mala in se under the RPC is
obliterated as such and reduced as a mere aggravating circumstance in
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illegalpossession of firearm whene v e r t h e unlicensed firearm is used in killing a

person. The only purpose of the provision is to increase the penalty prescribed in 1St
par of sec 1reclusion temporal in its max to reclusion perpetua to death.

The killing of a person with the use of an unlicensed firearm cannot serve to increase
the penalty for homicide or murder but rather, by express provision of P.D. No. 1866,
shall increase the penalty for illegal possession of firearm. When an accused is
prosecuted for homicide or murder and for aggravated illegal possession of firearm,
the constitutional bar against double jeopardy will not apply since these offenses are
quite different from one another, with the first punished under the Revised Penal Code
and the second under a special law.

REGALADO

1. CRIMINAL LAW; FELONIES; LESSER OFFENSE MAY ABSORB A GRAVER OFFENSE;

DOCTRINE APPLIED TO OFFENSES PUNISHABLE BY RA 1866. — In the scheme of
penalties under the Revised Penal Code, it is accepted that a lesser offense may absorb a
graver offense. Neither should the fact that the aggravated form of illegal possession of an
unlicensed :rearm is a malum prohibitum punished by a special law inveigh against the
doctrine of absorption we have adopted in Barros. In fact, as hereinbefore quoted, Tac-an
recognized that the killing should be taken into account to increase the penalty to death
because of the explicit provision of Presidential Decree No. 1866.

2. ID.; ID.; DISTINCTION BETWEEN MALA IN SE AND MALA PROHIBITA OFFENSES

THAT THE FIRST REFERS TO THOSE OFFENSES IN THE REVISED PENAL CODE NO
LONGER APPLIES. — Nor should we hold a "judicial prejudice" from the fact that the two
forms of illegal possession of :rearms in Presidential Decree No. 1866 are mala prohibita. On
this score, I believe it is time to disabuse our minds of some superannuated concepts of the
difference between mala in se and mala prohibita. I :nd in these cases a felicitous occasion to
point out this misperception thereon since even now there are instances of incorrect
assumptions creeping into some of our decisions that if the crime is punished by the Revised
Penal Code, it is necessarily a malum in se and, if provided for by a special law, it is a malum
prohibitum. It was from hornbook lore that we absorbed the distinctions given by text writers,
claiming that: (1) mala in se require criminal intent on the part of the offender; in mala prohibita,
the mere commission of the prohibited act, regardless of intent, is suFcient; and (2) mala in
se refer to felonies in the Revised Penal Code, while mala prohibita are offenses punished
under special laws. The :rst distinction is still substantially correct, but the second is not
accurate. In fact, even in the Revised Penal Code there are felonies which are actually and
essentially mala prohibita. To illustrate, in time of war, and regardless of his intent, a person
who shall have correspondence with a hostile country or territory occupied by enemy troops
shall be punished therefor. An accountable public oFcer who voluntarily fails to issue the
required receipt for any sum of money oFcially collected by him, regardless of his intent, is
liable for illegal exaction. Unauthorized possession of picklocks or similar tools, regardless of
the possessor's intent, is punishable as such illegal possession. These are felonies under the
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Revised Penal Code but criminal intent is not required therein. On the other hand, I need not
mention anymore that there are now in our statutes so many offenses punished under special
laws but wherein criminal intent is required as an element, and which offenses are accordingly
mala in se although they are not felonies provided for in the Code.

3. ID.; RA 1866; HOMICIDE OR MURDER WITH THE USE OF UNLICENSED FIREARM;

PENALTY TO BE IMPOSED, SINGLE; REASON. — I cannot agree with the rationalization of
the majority that two separate penalties must be imposed on the same accused because he
is supposed to have committed two separate offenses of (1) illegal possession with murder,
and (2) the same murder per se. The unusual justi:cation is that in the :rst offense, the murder
is not considered as a separate offense but only to increase the penalty for the illegal
possession, and in the second offense, that same murder shall now be considered as a
separate offense in itself. To make this theory palatable, the example is given that if the murder
is committed with an unlicensed :rearm, the death penalty is imposable, whereas if it is
committed with a licensed :rearm, the penalty shall only be reclusion perpetua. This concern
is evidently due to the fact that Republic Act No. 7659, which "reimposed" the death penalty
for certain heinous crimes, does not include the offense that we have termed as aggravated
form of illegal possession of :rearms which is provided for in the second paragraph of Section
1, Presidential Decree No. 1866. It has always been my position that the death penalty was
not "abolished" by the 1987 Constitution, since I had some participation in formulating the
provision involved. It merely provides that the same shall not "be imposed, unless, for
compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter provides for it," that is,
authorizes its imposition. Meanwhile, all laws which provided for the death penalty remained
in force and were maintained in the statute books despite that constitutional provision since it
did not by itself have the effect of amending, or repealing them. Some of those laws were later
expressly repealed or amended by the President in the exercise of her then legislative powers
and, thereafter, some were repealed or modi:ed by Congress, which even added other
heinous crimes with capital penalties. However, other laws like Presidential Decree No. 1866,
which were not thus repealed or amended, retain their present provisions and effects, except
that the death penalty provided by them would in the meantime be reduced t o reclusion
perpetua. Republic Act No. 7659 did not "reimpose" the death penalty on murder. Article 248
of the Penal Code which provided for the penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period
to death for that crime, was amended by Republic Act No. 7659, merely to increase the penalty
to reclusion perpetua to death, but it remained in full force even during the interim except for
the fact that the penalty of death could not then be imposed. That is why the title of Republic
Act No. 7659 is "An act to Impose the Death Penalty in Certain Heinous Crimes, Amending
for that purpose, the Revised Penal Code, . . ." The same is true with respect to the aggravated
form of illegal possession of :rearms, except that the imposition of the death penalty
thereunder is still proscribed. Even if we were to indulge the majority in its thesis on the effects
of Republic Act No. 7659 on Presidential Decree No. 1866, that is, that by the non-inclusion
in the former of the aggravated form of illegal possession with murder the death penalty cannot
justify the recourse it has adopted as a judicial dictum. The second paragraph of the
aforestated Section 1 expressly and unequivocally provides for such illegal possession and
resultant killing as a single integrated offense which is punished as such. The majority not only
created two offenses by dividing a single offense into two but, worse, it resorted to the
unprecedented and invalid act of treating the original offense as a single integrated crime and
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then creating another offense by using a component crime which is also an element of the
former.

HERMOSISIMA, JR. , J., concurring opinion:

LEGISLATIVE; GUIDING PRINCIPLE IN THE EXERCISE OF POWER TO DETERMINE AND

DEFINE CRIMES AND PENALTIES. — In the exercise of its right, duty and power to
determine and de:ne crimes and their corresponding penalties, the lawmaking body is initially
and usually guided by the general condition of penal liability under the legal maxim, "actus non
facit reum, nisi mens sit rea," which, if freely translated, means that "an act is not criminal
unless the mind is criminal." On the basis of this, which is commonly known as the mens rea
doctrine, our Revised Penal Code was enacted to largely penalize unlawful acts accompanied
by evil intent which are denominated en masse as crimes mala in se. The paramount
consideration here is the existence of a malicious intention borne out by the concurrence of
freedom, intelligence and intent which altogether make up the "criminal mind" behind the
resultant "criminal act."

3. CRIMINAL LAW; FELONIES; CRIMES MALUM PROHIBITUM; HOW DETERMINED.

Whether or not in a given case the statute is to be construed as forbidding the doing of an act
and criminalizing the same without regard to the intent of the perpetrator of the act, is to be
determined by the court by considering the subject matter of the prohibition as well as the
language of the statute, thereby ascertaining the intention of the lawmaker. The index of
whether or not a crime is malum prohibitum is not its form, that is, whether or not it is found in
the Revised Penal Code or in a special penal statute, but the legislative intent that underlies
its continuing existence as part of the law of the land.

4. ID.; P.D. 1866; MERE POSSESSION OF UNLICENSED FIREARM, ILLEGAL. — We have

not just a few times precisely delineated the malum prohibitum nature of P.D. No. 1866,
which is a codi:cation of the laws on unlawful possession of unlicensed :rearms,
among others. The aforecited public policy concern justi:ed the blanket prohibition in
P.D. No. 1866 against mere possession of unlicensed :rearms, among others, without
regard to the criminal intent of the possessor. Indeed, what is being punished is the
illegal possession, among others, of unlicensed firearms.

5. ID.; ID.; QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES. — The circumstances (1) that homicide or

murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed :rearm and (2) that the illegal
possession of unlicensed :rearm is committed in furtherance of, or incident to, or in
connection with the crimes of rebellion, insurrection or subversion, only qualify or
aggravate the offense of Illegal Possession of Unlicensed Firearm for purposes of
increasing the penalty therefor. These circumstances do not create another offense or
a special kind of illegal possession or another form of illegal possession. When either
of such circumstances is attendant under the premises of a case, such circumstance
only authorizes and justi:es the imposition of a higher penalty. It only has the effect of
upgrading the penalty and not of supplying an additional, separate element of a new or
another offense.
 SPL | digest | rollan.josh.liwag.saquilabon.taclas.torres

6. ID.; ID.; ID.; NO SPECIAL COMPLEX CRIME OF ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF

UNLICENSED FIREARM USED IN HOMICIDE. — There is no such thing as a special
complex crime of illegal possession of unlicensed :rearm used in homicide, or murder for that
matter.
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ZARI vs. FLORES

FACTS:
Hon. Remigio E. Zari, Presiding Judge of Branch VI City Court of Quezon City, recommended
the dismissal from the service of Mr. Diosdado S. Flores, Deputy Clerk of Court of Branch VI,
City Court, on grounds of moral turpitude and persistent attempts to unduly influence the
complainant amounting to undue interest in cases pending before Branch VI and gross
discourtesy to superior officers as manifested by his uncalled for and unjustified use of strong
and contemptuous language in addressing the City Judges.

ISSUE: Whether respondent’s acts constitute grounds for dismissal from the service (moral
turpitude)?

HELD:
Yes.

“And in this connection, the Court has consistently adopted the definition in Black’s Law
Dictionary of ‘moral turpitude’ as: . . . an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private
duties which a man owes his fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and
customary rule of right and duty between man and woman or conduct contrary to justice,
honesty, modesty or good morals.

“Not every criminal act, however, involves moral turpitude. It is for this reason that ‘as to what
crime involves moral turpitude, is for the Supreme Court to determine.’ In resolving the
foregoing question, the Court is guided by one of the general rules that crimes mala in se
involve moral turpitude, while crimes mala prohibita do not, the rationale of which was set forth
in in this case to wit:
“’It (moral turpitude) implies something immoral in itself, regardless of the fact that it is
punishable by law or not. It must not be merely mala prohibita, but the act itself must be
inherently immoral. The doing of the act itself, and not its prohibition by statute fixes the moral
turpitude. Moral turpitude does not, however, include such acts as are not of themselves
immoral but whose illegality lies in their being positively prohibited.’”

In his affidavit subscribed and sworn to before then City Judge Oscar A. Inocentes on June
10, 1969, the respondent stated
that I am a person of good moral character and integrity and
have no administrative, criminal or police record . This claim is not true because the
respondent had been convicted of libel inCriminal Case No. Q-7171, of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Branch IV, in a sentence dated April28, 1967. This prevarication in a sworn
statement is a ground for serious disciplinary action. That in his accomplished Civil Service
Form No. 212 which was subscribed and sworn to, the respondent admits having acted as
counsel for three companies; and that the giving of legal advice by notaries and others who
are not admitted to the practice of law is dangerous to the welfare of the community, because
such persons have not demonstrated their capacity by submitting to examinations lawfully
established in the practice of law. The respondent's conviction for libel shows his propensity
to speak ill of others as reflected in his letter toJudge Minerva C. Genovea, then Executive
Judge of the City Court of Quezon City which contains defamatory and uncalled for language.
 SPL | digest | rollan.josh.liwag.saquilabon.taclas.torres

The handwritten notes of the respondent regarding different cases pending in Branch VI of the
City Court of Quezon City, presided by the complainant, show that the respondent had exerted
undue influence in the disposition of the cases mentioned therein.

Respondent, Diosdado S. Flores, is dismissed as Deputy Clerk of Court of Branch VI of the

City Court of Quezon City, with forfeiture of all retirement privileges and with prejudice to
reinstatement in the national and local governments, as well as, in any government
instrumentality or agency including government owned or controlled corporations.
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Rolando P. Dela Torre vs. Commission on Elections

G.R. No. 121592. July 5, 1996

FACTS:
Petitioner Rolando Dela Torre via the petition for certiorari seeks the nullification of two
resolutions issued by the COMELEC allegedly with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction in a case for disqualification filed against him before the COMELEC.

The first assailed resolution declared Dela Torre disqualified from running for the position of
Mayor of Cavinti, Laguna in the last May 8, 1995 elections, citing Sec. 40 (a) of the Local
Government Code of 1991 as a ground:
“(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude
or for an offense punishable by one year or more of imprisonment within two
years after serving sentence.”

In disqualifying Dela Torre, COMELEC held that:

“Documentary evidence established that Dela Torres was found guilty for
violation of P.D. 1612 or Anti-Fencing Law and his conviction is final. There
exists legal grounds to disqualify him as candidate for Mayor of Cavinti,
Laguna. Although there is dearth of jurisprudence involving the violation of the
Anti-Fencing Law, the nature of the offense under the said law with which Dela
Torre was convicted certainly involves moral turpitude.”

Dela Torre claimed that Sec. 40 (a) of the Local Government Code does not apply to his case
inasmuch as the probation granted to him which suspended the execution of the judgment of
conviction and all other legal consequences, rendered Sec. 40 (a) inapplicable.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the crime of fencing involves moral turpitude.
2. Whether or not a grant of probation affects Sec. 40 (a)’s applicability.

HELD:
1. YES. Moral turpitude, as defined by Black’s Law Dictionary, is “an act of baseness,
vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to
society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty
between man and woman or conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good
morals.”
In Zari v. FLores: It implies something immoral in itself, regardless of the fact that it is
punishable by law or not. It must not be merely mala prohibita, but the act itself must
be inherently immoral. The doing of the act itself, and not its prohibition by statute fixes
the moral turpitude. Moral turpitude, however, include such acts as are not of
themselves immoral but whose illegality lies in their being positively prohibited.
In International Rice Research Institute v. NLRC: There are crimes which are mala
in se and yet but rarely involve moral turpitude and there are crimes which involve
moral turpitude and are mala prohibita only. Whether or not a crime involves moral
turpitude is ultimately a question of fact and frequently depends on all the
circumstances surrounding the violation of the statute.
 SPL | digest | rollan.josh.liwag.saquilabon.taclas.torres

Inasmuch as Dela Torre does not assail his conviction, he in effect admitted all the
elements of the crime of fencing.

Fencing is the act of any person who, with intent to gain for himself or for another,
shall buy, receive, possess, keep, acquire, conceal, sell or dispose of, or shall buy and
sell, or in any manner deal in any article, item, object, or anything of value which he
knows, or should be known to him, to have been derived from the proceeds of the
crime of robbery or theft. The elements are:
1. A crime of robbery or theft has been committed;
2. The accused who is not a principal or accomplice in the crime
of robbery or theft, buys, receives, keeps, acquires, conceals, sells or
disposes, or buys and sells, or in any manner deals in any article, item,
object or anything of value, which have been derived from the proceeds
of the said crime;
3. The accused knows or should have known that the said article,
item, object or anything of value has been derived from the proceeds of
the crime of robbery or theft; and
4. There is, on the part of the accused, intent to gain for himself or
for another.

Moral turpitude is deducible from the 3rd element. Actual knowledge by the “fence” of
the fact that property received is stolen displays the same degree of malicious
deprivation of one’s rightful property as that which animated the robbery or theft which,
by their very nature, are crimes of moral turpitude.

2. NO. The legal effect of probation is only to suspend the execution of the sentence.
Dela Torre’s conviction of fencing which is a crime of moral turpitude and falling under
the disqualification found in Sec. 40 (a), subsists and remains totally unaffected
notwithstanding the grant of probation. In fact, a judgment of conviction in a criminal
case ipso facto attains finality when the accused applies for probation, although it is
not executory pending resolution of the application for probation.

The instant petition for certiorari is DISMISSED.

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THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 110592. January 23, 1996.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. YOLANDA

VELASCO Y PAMINTUAN, accused-appellant.

FACTS:

- After close surveillance by the Narcotics Unit of Station 7 of the Western Police District
Command confirmed reports that appellant, notoriously tagged as the "Shabu Queen"
of Quiricada, Tondo, was indeed illicitly peddling the prohibited drug, a crack team
composed of Pat. Ricardo Godoy, Pfc. Lamberto Gan, Pat. Renato Yumang, and Pat.
Eduardo Chiapoco launched a buy-bust operation in the afternoon of June 28, 1991.
- Pat. Godoy was the designated poseur-buyer while the rest stealthily positioned
themselves around the area
- Donning a basketball outfit as disguise and accompanied by a confidential informant,
Pat. Godoy searched for appellant and found her in an alley beside a creek near her
house on Quiricada St. apparently preparing to launder some clothes.
- Pat. Godoy told appellant that he wanted to buy shabu and gave her a fifty peso
marked bill. Appellant asked him to wait for a while and went inside her house. When
she returned, she reached into her pocket and gave Pat. Godoy less than a gram of
shabu wrapped in aluminum foil known in street parlance as a deck.
- After the exchange and upon Pat. Godoy's pre-arranged signal, his couching
teammates rushed to the scene and immediately apprehended the appellant. When
the police officers asked appellant to open her pockets, they found five more decks of
shabu.
- Appellant was then brought to the police precinct for investigation by Pat. Vicente
Rodriguez, the officer-in-charge of the Narcotics and Anti-hoodlum Section.

RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION:

1. Appellant claimed that on June 28, 1991, between 2:30 and 3:00 P.M., she was at
home laundering clothes in her kitchen when police officers, with their guns drawn,
suddenly barged into her house. Two officers held her and frisked her body for shabu
while the other two went upstairs, ransacked her room and even stole some pieces of
jewelry belonging to her sister and nieces.
2. She claimed that no shabu was found on her person nor anywhere within the premises
of her house. The police officers allegedly brought her outside and asked her to locate
a certain Minang.
3. Unable to point to Minang whom appellant claims she does not know, the police
officers took her instead.
4. so she posits that there being no valid warrantless arrest, the search incidental
thereto which yielded several decks of "shabu" is, perforce, illegal.
 SPL | digest | rollan.josh.liwag.saquilabon.taclas.torres

RTC: The trial court nonetheless found that her defenses could not offset the positive
testimony of Pat. Godoy that his unit received information concerning accused-appellant's
drug pushing activities from a confidential informant, that they verified the information by
surveillance and that the buy-bust operation was conducted strictly as planned and as
described in the arrest report and joint affidavit of apprehension. Thus, her conviction.

ISSUE: Whether R.A. 7691 operated to divest the Regional Trial Court of jurisdiction over
appellant's case. -NO!

HELD:

It has been consistently held as a general rule that the jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal
action is to be determined by the law in force at the time of the institution of the action. 23
Where a court has already obtained and is exercising jurisdiction over a controversy, its
jurisdiction to proceed to the final determination of the cause is not affected by new legislation
placing jurisdiction over such proceedings in another tribunal. The exception to the rule is
where the statute expressly provides, or is construed to the effect that it is intended to operate
as to actions pending before its enactment. Where a statute changing the jurisdiction of a
court has no retroactive effect, it cannot be applied to a case that was pending prior to
the enactment of a statute.

A perusal of R.A. 7691 will show that its retroactive provisions apply only to civil
cases that have not yet reached the pre-trial stage. 25 Neither from an express proviso nor
by implication can it be understood as having retroactive application to criminal cases pending
or decided by the Regional Trial Courts prior to its effectivity. Thus, the general rule enunciated
above is the controlling doctrine in the case at bar. At the time the case against the
appellant was commenced by the filing of the information on July 3, 1991, the Regional
Trial Court had jurisdiction over the offense charged, inasmuch as Section 39 of R.A.
6425 (the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 prior to the amendments introduced by R.A. 7659
and R.A. 7691), provided that:

"Sec. 39. Jurisdiction. — The Court of First Instance, Circuit Criminal

Court, and Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court shall have concurrent
original jurisdiction over all cases involving offenses punishable under this
Act: Provided, That in cities or provinces where there are Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Courts, the said courts shall take exclusive cognizance
of cases where the offenders are under sixteen years of age. cdta

xxx xxx xxx

It must be stressed that the abovementioned provision vested concurrent

jurisdiction upon the said courts regardless of the imposable penalty. In fine, the
jurisdiction of the trial court (RTC) over the case of the appellant was conferred by the
aforecited law then in force (R.A. 6425 before amendment) when the information was filed.
Jurisdiction attached upon the commencement of the action and could not be ousted by
the passage of R.A. 7691 reapportioning the jurisdiction of inferior courts, the application
of which to criminal cases is, to stress, prospective in nature.
__

PEOPLE VS BRACAMONTE
 SPL | digest | rollan.josh.liwag.saquilabon.taclas.torres

FACTS OF THE CASE

• Appellant Bracamonte , together with his accomplices, was charged with Roberry with
double homicide
• The incident happened somewhere in September wherein the appellant together with his
accomplices entered the house violate and by means of vilence, intimidation, took a 600
pesos worth of necklace and a ring worth of 440 which belongs to viletas son. After what
has transpired, the appellant and his accomplices decided to stab Jayvee, son of violeta,
and also to Risalinas

ISSUE:
-whether or not death penalty could be imposed in this case

Ruling:
• Capital punishment could not be imposed in this case because the crime was
committed way back in septemper 1987 while RA 7659 took effect on December
1993
• If the death penalty is to impose to the appellant it would violate the basic rule in
criminal law, if new law imposes a heavier penalty, the penalty provided in the
law at the time of the commission of the offense shall be the one that must be
applied.
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Topics:
EXPRESSION UNIUS EST EXCLUSIO ALTERIUS = The express mention of one thing in a law means the
exclusion of others not expressly mentioned

penal laws are to be construed strictly against the State and liberally in favor of the accused

CENTENO vs. VILLALON-PORNILLOS

FACTS:
The officers of a group of elderly men of a civic organization known as the Samahang Katandaan ng
Nayon ng Tikay launched a fund drive for the purpose of renovating the chapel of Barrio Tikay,
Malolos, Bulacan. Martin Centeno, the chairman of the group, approached Judge Adoracion Angeles,
a resident of Tikay, and solicited from her a contribution of P1,500.00. It is admitted that the
solicitation was made without a permit from the Department of Social Welfare and Development. As
a consequence, an information was filed against Centeno, for violation of PD No. 1564 or the
Solicitation Permit Law.

Centeno filed a motion to quash the information on the ground that the facts alleged therein do not
constitute an offense, claiming that PD No. 1564 only covers solicitations made for charitable or
public welfare purposes, but not those made for a religious purpose such as the construction of a
chapel.

Other party's contention: "charitable purposes" shall be construed as to include a religious purpose.

ISSUE: Whether the phrase "charitable purposes" be construed in its broadest sense so as to include
a religious purpose?

RULING: No, the phrase "charitable purposes" shall NOT be construed in its broadest sense so as to
include a religious purpose.

Presidential Decree No. 1564 (which amended Act No. 4075, otherwise known as the Solicitation
Permit Law), provides as follows:
"Sec. 2. Any person, corporation, organization, or association desiring to solicit or receive contributions
for charitable or public welfare purposes shall first secure a permit from the Regional Offices of the
Department of Social Services and Development as... provided in the Integrated Reorganization Plan.

Presidential Decree No. 1564 merely stated "charitable or public welfare purposes," only goes to show
that the framers of the law in question NEVER INTENDED to include solicitations for religious purposes
within its coverage. Otherwise, there is no reason why it would not have so stated expressly.
 SPL | digest | rollan.josh.liwag.saquilabon.taclas.torres

Indeed, it is an elementary rule of statutory construction that the express mention of one person,
thing, act, or consequence excludes all others. This rule is expressed in the familiar maxim "expressio
unius est exclusio... alterius." Where a statute, by its terms, is expressly
limited to certain matters, it may not, by interpretation or construction, be extended to others. The
rule proceeds from the premise that the legislature would not have made specified enumerations in
a statute had... the intention been not to restrict its meaning and to confine its terms to those
expressly mentioned.

It will be observed that the 1987 Constitution, as well as several other statutes, treat the words
"charitable" and "religious" separately and independently of each other.

"religious purpose" is not... interchangeable with the expression "charitable purpose." While it is true
that there is no religious purpose which is not also a charitable purpose, yet the converse is not equally
true, for there may be a "charitable" purpose which is not "religious"... in the legal sense of the term.

Accordingly, the term "charitable" should be strictly construed so as to exclude solicitations for
"religious" purposes. Thereby, we adhere to the fundamental doctrine underlying virtually all penal
legislations that such... interpretation should be adopted as would favor the accused. For, it is a well-
entrenched rule that penal laws are to be construed strictly against the State and liberally in favor of
the accused. They are not to be extended or enlarged by implications, intendments, analogies or
equitable considerations. If the statute is ambiguous and admits of two reasonable but contradictory
constructions, that which operates in favor of a party accused under its provisions is to be preferred.
The principle is that acts in and of themselves innocent and lawful cannot be... held to be criminal
unless there is a clear and unequivocal expression of the legislative intent to make them such.
Whatever is not plainly within the provisions of a penal statute should be regarded as without its
intendment.

The purpose of strict construction is not to enable a guilty person to escape punishment through a
technicality but to provide a precise definition of forbidden acts. The word "charitable" is a matter of
description rather... than of precise definition, and each case involving a determination of that which
is charitable must be decided on its own, particular facts and circumstances. 
 Solicitation for religious
purposes may be subject to proper regulation by the State in the exercise of police power. However,
in the case at bar, considering that solicitations intended for a religious purpose are not within the
coverage of Presidential Decree No. 1564, as earlier demonstrated, petitioner cannot be held
criminally liable therefor and therefore acquitted.

cda
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SARIO MALINIAS, petitioner,

vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, TEOFILO CORPUZ, ANACLETO TANGILAG and
VICTOR DOMINGUEZ, respondents.

FACTS:

On July 31, 1998, Sario Malinias and Roy S. Pilando, who were candidates for governor and
congress representative positions, respectively, filed a complaint with the COMELEC's Law
Department against Victor Dominguez, Anacleto Tangilag and others for their violation of the
following laws:

1. Section 25 of R.A. No. 6646; and

2. Sections 232 and 261 (i) of B.P. Blg. 881.

Dominguez was then the incumbent Congressman of Poblacion, Sabangan, Mountain

Province. Corpuz was then the Provincial Director of the Philippine National Police in Mountain
Province while Tangilag was then the Chief of Police of the Municipality of Bontoc, Mountain
Province.

The petitioners said that due to said violations, their supporters were deprived from
participating in the canvassing of election returns as they were blocked by a police checkpoint
in the course of their way to the canvassing site at the Provincial Capitol Building in Bontoc,
Mountain Province.

Among the private respondents, only Corpuz and Tangilag submitted their joint Counter-
Affidavit, wherein they admitted that they ordered the establishment of checkpoints all over
the province to enforce the COMELEC Gun Ban and its other pertinent rules pursuant to
COMELEC Res. No. 2968 purposive of the maintenance of peace and order around the
vicinity of the canvassing site.

Also, they said that the presence of the policemen within the said area is to prevent some
groups who were reportedly had the intention to disrupt the canvass proceedings. They
claimed that such a response was not unwarranted as this has already happened in the past,
wherein, in fact, the petitioners were among them.

COMELEC’s Ruling:

After investigating the allegations, COMELEC ruled to dismiss the petition against the
respondents for insufficiency of evidence to establish probable cause. Malinias filed an MR
but it was also denied for failure of adducing additional evidence thereon.

Not satisfied with the same, Malinias filed to SC a petition for review on certiorari on this case.

ISSUE:

Whether the allegation of the petitioner (violation of the law) is included in the acts defined as
punishable criminal election offenses?

RULING: No.

SC AFFIRMED the decision of COMELEC and found the conduct of its investigation and ruling
on the case to be in accord with its jurisdiction and duties under the law. In this case,
 SPL | digest | rollan.josh.liwag.saquilabon.taclas.torres

COMELEC did not commit any grave abuse of discretion as there is nothing capricious or
despotic in the manner of their resolution of the said complaint, hence, SC cannot issue the
extraordinary writ of certiorari.

On the said violations, the only evidence that was successfully presented by the petitioner is
the mass-affidavits of his supporters, which were considered self-serving and cannot be
admitted by the court thus, the same are not enough to prove his claims.

Also, the allege violation of the respondents of Sec. 25 of R.A. 6646 and Sec. 232 of B.P.
Blg. No. 881 are not included in the acts defined as punishable criminal election
offenses under Sec. 27 of R.A. 6646 and Sec. 261 and 262 of B.P. Blg. No. 881,
respectively.

Here, Sec. 25 merely highlights one of the rights of a political party or candidate during
elections whereas, the violation of Sec. 232, which enumerates the persons who are not
allowed inside the canvassing site, can only be subjected to an administrative
disciplinary action and cannot be punished by imprisonment as provided for under Sec.
264 of the same law.

Moreover, it is clear in the defense of the respondents that they did not violate Sec. 261
(i), a criminal offense, which prohibits any officer or employee of political offices or
police force from intervening in any election campaign or from engaging in any partisan
activity except to vote or maintain public order.

In the said defense, the respondents said that setting up the checkpoints was done to
enforce the COMELEC's firearms ban, pursuant to COMELEC Resolution No. 2968 and
not to prejudice any candidate from participating in the canvassing. As such, the
actions of the respondents are deemed lawful and not in excess of their authority.

Ruling related to Statutory Construction

Under the rule of statutory construction of expressio unius est exclusio alterius, there is no
ground to order the COMELEC to prosecute private respondents for alleged violation of
Section 232 of B.P. Blg. 881 precisely because this is a non-criminal act.

"It is a settled rule of statutory construction that the express mention of one person, thing, or
consequence implies the exclusion of all others. The rule is expressed in the familiar maxim,
expressio unius est exclusio alterius.

The rule of expressio unius est exclusio alterius is formulated in a number of ways. One
variation of the rule is the principle that what is expressed puts an end to that which is implied.
Expressium facit cessare tacitum. Thus, where a statute, by its terms, is expressly limited to
certain matters, it may not, by interpretation or construction, be extended to other matters.