RULE 80 (7 cases)

1. Heirs of Belinda v. Lacuata Gabriel, GR NO. 162934; November 11, 2005

DOCTRINE: The new Rules have broadened the basis for the appointment of an
administrator, and such appointment is allowed when there is delay in granting letters
testamentary or administration by any cause, e.g., parties cannot agree among
themselves. Nevertheless, the discretion to appoint a special administrator or not lies in
the probate court.

FACTS: Crisanta Gabriel died intestate at Malabon City, leaving behind a sizable
inheritance consisting mostly of real estate and shares of stock. She was survived by her
mother Crisanta Santiago, her brother Mariano Yanga Jr. and husband Lorenzo
Almoradie.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY: Her mother, Crisanta Santiago, commenced an intestate

proceeding before the RTC Malabon City. She alleged, among others, that to her
knowledge, her daughter died intestate leaving a sizable estate and that such estate
was being managed by her wastrel and incompetent son-in-law, Lorenzo, and by two
other equally incompetent persons. She prayed that letters of administration be issued
to her son, Mariano Jr., the brother of the deceased, and that she be awarded her
share of the estate of her daughter after due hearing. However, the RTC appointed
Lorenzo as administrator. However, the marriage between Crisanta and Lorenzo was
declared void for being bigamous. The RTC then removed Lorenzo as administrator and
appointed Mariano, Jr. in his stead.

Belinda Castillo, claiming to be the only legitimate child of Lorenzo and Crisanta, filed a
motion for intervention. Resolution on this motion was, however, held in abeyance
pending some incidents in the CA.

Roberto Gabriel, the legally adopted son of Crisanta Gabriel, filed before the RTC of
Malabon City a petition for probate of an alleged will and for the issuance of letters
testamentary in his favor (Spec. Proc. No. 211-MN). He alleged that he discovered his
mother’s will where he was instituted as the sole heir of the testatrix, and designated as
alternate executor for the named executor therein, Francisco S. Yanga, a brother of
Crisanta, who had predeceased the latter sometime in 1985 or 1986.

Belinda Castillo died. The two (2) special proceedings were consolidated. RTC issued an
Order dismissing the intestate proceedings. Mariano Yanga, Jr. questioned the dismissal
of the intestate proceedings before the appellate court via a petition for certiorari.
July 1991, the probate court appointed Roberto Y. Gabriel as special administrator of
his mother’s estate.

May 2001, the heirs of Belinda, namely, Bena Jean, Daniel, Melchor, Michael, and
Danibel, all surnamed Castillo, filed a Motion praying that they be substituted as party-
litigants in lieu of their late mother Belinda.

April 2001, Roberto Gabriel died. His widow, Dolores L. Gabriel, filed a Manifestation and
Motion informing the probate court of Roberto's death and prayed that she be
admitted as substitute in place of her late husband, and be appointed as administratrix
of the estate of Crisanta as well.

August 2001, the heirs of Belinda opposed Dolores’ manifestation and motion. They
averred that she was not Crisanta's next of kin, let alone the lawful wife of the late
Roberto. Dolores refuted these allegations thru her Reply.

August 2001, Bena Jean filed a Motion praying that she be appointed administratrix of
the estate of her grandmother Crisanta.

October 2001, Dolores opposed the motion of Bena Jean, claiming that the latter has
neither proven her kinship with Crisanta Gabriel nor shown any particular qualification
to act as administratrix of the estate.
November 1991, the CA dismissed the petition for certiorari of Mariano Yanga, Jr.

In a Resolution dated December 5, 2001, the lower court appointed Dolores as special
administratrix upon a bond. The probate court merely noted the motion for substitution
filed by the heirs of Belinda, stating that they were "mere strangers to the case" and that
their cause could better be ventilated in a separate proceeding.

The heirs of Belinda moved to reconsider. Dolores took her oath on Jan. 2002.

The probate court denied the MR. The heirs then filed with the CA a petition for
certiorari with prayer for a temporary restraining order or/and preliminary injunction
against Dolores and the probate court (CA-G.R. SP No. 70645). They prayed, among
others, that Bena Jean be appointed as the regular administratrix of Crisanta estate.
Petitioner likewise prays for such other just, fair and equitable relief under the premises.
The appellate court dismissed the petition.

Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari against the appointment of Dolores.
The petitioners argue that since the respondent does not have any right to inherit from
their grandmother, either by her own right or by the right of representation, she is not
qualified to be appointed as administratrix of the estate; in contrast, they are Crisanta
Gabriel’s only compulsory heirs. They insist that the respondent’s late husband, Roberto,
was just a nephew of the decedent and not a legally adopted son as he claimed to
be. Even assuming
 this claim was true, the fact that the respondent is not naturally
related to the decedent by blood in the direct descending line makes it unfair to
appoint her as the special administratrix. Citing jurisprudence, the petitioners explain
that the principal consideration in the appointment of administrator of a deceased
person’s estate is the applicant’s interest therein. This is the same consideration which
Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court takes into account in establishing the order of
preference in the appointment of such administrators. The underlying assumption
behind this rule, the petitioners insist, is that those who will reap the benefit of a wise,
speedy, economical administration of the estate, or suffer the consequences of waste,
improvidence or mismanagement, have the highest interest and most influential motive
to administer the estate correctly. Lastly, the petitioners posit that since CA-G.R. SP No.
25897 had long been dismissed by the CA, a regular administrator of the said estate
should now be appointed

ISSUE: W/N the appointment of Dolores as Special Administrtrix is proper?

HELD: Yes. The SC held that the appointment is proper and the petition is without merit.
The ruling of the CA is correct. The Court has repeatedly held that the appointment of a
special administrator lies in the sound discretion of the probate court. A special
administrator is a representative of a decedent appointed by the probate court to
care for and preserve his estate until an executor or general administrator is appointed.
When appointed, a special administrator is regarded not as a representative of the
agent of the parties suggesting the appointment, but as the administrator in charge of
the estate, and, in fact, as an officer of the court. As such officer, he is subject to the
supervision and control of the probate court and is expected to work for the best
interests of the entire estate, especially its smooth administration and earliest settlement.
The principal object of appointment of temporary administrator is to preserve the estate
until it can pass into hands of person fully authorized to administer it for the benefit of
creditors and heirs. In many instances, the appointment of administrators for the estates
of decedents frequently become involved in protracted litigations, thereby exposing
such estates to great waste and losses unless an authorized agent to collect the debts
and preserve the assets in the interim is appointed. The occasion for such an
appointment, likewise, arises where, for some cause, such as a pendency of a suit
concerning the proof of the will, regular administration is delayed as provided under
Section 1, Rule 80 of the Revised Rules of Court.
The new Rules have broadened the basis for the appointment of an administrator, and
such appointment is allowed when there is delay in granting letters testamentary or
administration by any cause, e.g., parties cannot agree among themselves.
Nevertheless, the discretion to appoint a special administrator or not lies in the probate
court. This was elucidated in De Guzman v. Guadiz, Jr.

The probate court has ample jurisdiction to appoint respondent as special

administratrix. The deceased Crisanta Yanga-Gabriel left a document purporting to be
her will where her adopted son, Roberto, was named as the sole heir of all her
properties. However, pending probate of the will, Roberto died leaving his widow, the
respondent herein, as his sole heir. Thus, the respondent has much stake in Crisanta’s
estate in case the latter’s will is allowed probate. It needs to be emphasized that in the
appointment of a special administrator (which is but temporary and subsists only until a
regular administrator is appointed), the probate court does not determine the shares in
the decedent’s estate, but merely appoints who is entitled to administer the estate. The
issue of heirship is one to be determined in the decree of distribution, and the findings of
the court on the
 relationship of the parties in the administration as to be the basis of
distribution. Thus, the preference of respondent is sound, that is, not whimsical, or
contrary to reason, justice, equity or legal principle.

The petitioners’ strenuous invocation of Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court is

misplaced. The rule refers to the appointment of regular administrators of estates;
Section 1, Rule 80, on the other hand, applies to the appointment of a special
administrator. It has long been settled that the appointment of special administrators is
not governed by the rules regarding the appointment of regular administrators. Thus, in
Roxas v. Pecson, this Court ruled:

It is well settled that the statutory provisions as to the prior or preferred right of certain
persons to the appointment of administrator under Section 1, Rule 81, as well as the
statutory provisions as to causes for removal of an executor or administrator under
section 653 of Act No. 190, now Section 2, Rule 83, do not apply to the selection or
removal of special administrator. ... As the law does not say who shall be appointed as
special administrator and the qualifications the appointee must have, the judge or
court has discretion in the selection of the person to be appointed, discretion which
must be sound, that is, not whimsical or contrary to reason, justice or equity.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 70645, dated October 30, 2003, and its Resolution of March 26, 2004 are
AFFIRMED.
 2. Corona vs. Court of Appeals, GR NO. 59821; August 30, 1982

DOCTRINE: The executrix’s choice of Special Administrator, considering her own inability
to serve and the wide latitude of discretion given her by the testratix in her will, is
entitled to the highest consideration. Objection to Nenita Alonte’s appointment on
grounds of impracticality and lack of kinship are overshadowed by the fact that justice
and equality demand that the side of the deceased wife and the faction of the
surviving husband be represented in the management of the decedent’s estate.The
executrix’s choice of Special Administrator, considering her own inability to serve and
the wide latitude of discretion given her by the testratix in her will, is entitled to the
highest consideration. Objection to Nenita Alonte’s appointment on grounds of
impracticality and lack of kinship are overshadowed by the fact that justice and
equality demand that the side of the deceased wife and the faction of the surviving
husband be represented in the management of the decedent’s estate.

FACTS: Dolores Luchangco Vitug died in New York, USA, leaving two wills: one
holographic will dated excluding her husband, respondent Romarico Vitug, as one of
her heirs, and the other, a formal will disinheriting her husband, respondent Romarico for
immoral conduct amounting to concubinage. Decedent Dolores bequathe her
properties in equal shares to her sisters and nieces and appointed her niece Rowena F.
Corona, herein petitioner, as her executrix. R

Rowena filed a petition for probate of wills before CFI of Rizal and for the appointment
of Nenita P. Alonte as administrator because she (Rowena) is presently employed in the
UN New York City. Upon Rowena’s urgent motion the probate court appointed Nenita
Alonte as Special Adminstratix. The surviving husband, responded Romarico filed an
opposition and a motion praying that the petition for probate be denied. Romarico
further prayed for his appointment as Special Adminstratix because Nenita Alonte
appointed adminstratix is not related to the heirs and has no interest to be protected.
The surviving spouse is the one qualified to administer. The Probate Court set aside the
order appointing Alonte and appointed instead Romarico as Special Adminstrator for
reasons that under Sec. 6 Rule 78 ROC, the surviving spouse is in the first order of
preference for appointment as admistrator; that the disinheritance is not among the
disqualification for appointment of administrator. Petitioner moved for reconsideration
but was denied. Petitioner resorted to a Petition for certiorari before the CA. But the CA
found no grave abuse for discretion on the part of the probate court. Hence petitioner
elevated the case for review on Certiorari.

ISSUE: W/N the petition has merit

HELD: This Court, in resolving to give due course to the Petition taking into account the
allegations, arguments and issues raised by the parties, is of the considered opinion that
petitioner’s nominee, Nenita F. Alonte, should be appointed as co-Special
Administrator. The executrix’s choice of Special Administrator, considering her own
inability to serve and the wide latitude of discretion given her by the testatrix in her Will
(Annex "A-1), is entitled to the highest consideration. Objections to Nenita’s
appointment on grounds of impracticality and lack of kinship are overshadowed by the
fact that justice and equity demand that the side of the deceased wife and the faction
of the surviving husband be represented in the management of the decedent’s estate.

the Special Administrators that while they may have respective interests to protect, they
are officers of the Court subject to the supervision and control of the Probate Court and
are expected to work for the best interests of the entire estate, its smooth
administration, and its earliest settlement.

3. Vda de Roxas vs. Pecson, GR NO. 2211; December 20, 1948

DOCTRINE: As under the law only one general administrator may be appointed to
administer, liquidate and distribute the estate of a deceased spouse, it clearly follows
that only one special administrator may be appointed to administer temporarily said
estate, because a special administrator is but a temporary administrator who is
appointed to act in lieu of the general administrator.

FACTS: Pablo Roxas died leaving properties in Bulacan. The other respondents Maria
and Pedro Roxas, sister and brother respectively of the deceased, filed on August 3,
1946, a petition for the administration of the latter's estate, in special intestate
proceeding No. 1707 of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, and Maria Roxas was
appointed special administratrix upon an ex-parte petition. On August 10, 1946, the
petitioner Natividad Vda. de Roxas, widow of Pablo M. Roxas, filed a petition for the
probate of an alleged will of her deceased husband, and for her appointment as
executrix of his estate designated is said will, and the petition was docketed as special
proceeding No. 172 of the same court.

On December 29, 1947, the respondents Maria and Pedro Roxas renewed their petition
for the appointment of Maria Roxas as special administratrix or special co-administratrix,
and on May 5, 1948, the respondent judge rendered his resolution appointing the
petitioner Natividad I. Vda. de Roxas as special administratrix only of all the conjugal
properties of the deceased, and Maria Roxas as special administratrix of all capital or
properties belonging exclusively to the deceased Pablo M. Roxas.

ISSUE: W/N Respondent judge acted in excess of the court's jurisdiction in appointing
two special co-administratices of the estate of the deceased Pablo Roxas, one of the
capital or properties belonging exclusively to the deceased, and another of his
conjugal properties with his wife (now widow), the petitioner.

HELD: YES. There is nothing wrong in that the respondent judge, in exercising his
discretion and appointing the petitioner as special administratrix, had taken into
consideration the beneficial interest of the petitioner in the estate of the decedent and
her being designated in the will as executrix thereof. But the respondent's subsequent
act of appointing her as special administratrix only of the conjugal or community
property, and Maria Roxas as special administratrix of the capital or exclusive property
of the decedent, does not seem to be in conformity with logic or reason. The petitioner
has or claims to have the same beneficial interest after the decision of the court
disapproving the will, which is now pending on appeal, as she had prior to it, because
the decision is not yet final and may be reversed by the appellate court.

As under the law only one general administrator may be appointed to administer,
liquidate and distribute the estate of a deceased spouse, it clearly follows that only one
special administrator may be appointed to administer temporarily said estate, because
a special administrator is but a temporary administrator who is appointed to act in lieu
of the general administrator. "When there is delay in granting letters testamentary or of
administration occasioned by an appeal from the allowance or disallowance of will, or
from any other cause, the court may appoint a special administrator to collect and
take charge of the estate of the deceased until the questions causing the delay are
decided and executors or administrators thereupon appointed," (sec. 1, Rule 81).
Although his powers and duties are limited to "collect and take charge of the goods,
chattels, rights, credits, and estate of the deceased and preserve the same for the
executor or administrator afterwards appointed, and for that purpose may commence
and maintain suits as administrator, and may sell such perishable and other property as
the court orders sold. A special administrator shall not be liable to pay any debts of the
deceased." (Section 2, Rule 81.)

4. Ocampo vs. Ocampo, GR NO. 187879; July 5, 2010

DOCTRINE: Under the Family Code, if the properties are acquired during the marriage,
the presumption is that they are conjugal. Hence, the burden of proof is on the party
claiming that they are not conjugal.

FACTS: On September 10, 1990, petitioner Virginia Sy Ocampo (Virginia) filed a Petition
for Declaration of Nullity of her Marriage with Deogracio Ocampo (Deogracio) before
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 87, on the ground of psychological
incapacity, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-90-6616. On January 22, 1993, the trial court
rendered a Decision4 declaring the marriage between Virginia and Deogracio as null
and void, On March 4, 2004, Deogracio filed a Motion for Reconsideration. On March
22, 2004, the trial court denied anew the motion for reconsideration. In the disputed
Decision dated August 11, 2010, the Court of Appeals denied Virginia's appeal. Virginia
moved for reconsideration, but was denied in a Resolution dated October 5, 2011.

ISSUE: W/N respondent should be deprived of his share in the conjugal partnership of
gains by reason of bad faith and psychological perversity.

HELD: NO. Article 105 of the Family Code explicitly mandates that the Family Code shall
apply to conjugal partnerships established before the Family Code without prejudice to
vested rights already acquired under the Civil Code or other laws. Thus, under the
Family Code, if the properties are acquired during the marriage, the presumption is that
they are conjugal. Hence, the burden of proof is on the party claiming that they are not
conjugal. This is counter-balanced by the requirement that the properties must first be
proven to have been acquired during the marriage before they are presumed
conjugal.

In the instant case, both the trial and appellate courts agreed that the subject
properties were in fact acquired during the marriage of Virginia and Deogracio. We
give due deference to factual findings of trial courts, especially when affirmed by the
appellate court, as in this case. A reversal of this finding can only occur if petitioners
show sufficient reason for us to doubt its correctness. There is none, in this case.

Likewise, we note that the former spouses both substantially agree that they acquired
the subject properties during the subsistence of their marriage. 17The certificates of titles
and tax declarations are not sufficient proof to overcome the presumption under
Article 116 of the Family Code. All properties acquired by the spouses during the
marriage, regardless in whose name the properties are registered, are presumed
conjugal unless proved otherwise. The presumption is not rebutted by the mere fact
that the certificate of title of the property or the tax declaration is in the name of one of
the spouses only. Article 116 expressly provides that the presumption remains even if the
property is "registered in the name of one or both of the spouses."18 Thus, the failure of
Virginia to rebut this presumption, said properties were obtained by the spouses' joint
efforts, work or industry, and shall be jointly owned by them in equal shares.
Accordingly, the partition of the former spouses' properties on the basis of co-
ownership, as ordered by the RTC and the appellate court, should be affirmed, and not
on the regime of conjugal partnership of gains.

5. Tan vs. Hon Gregorio, GR NO. 166520; March 14, 2008

DOCTRINE: This Court has consistently ruled that the order of preference in the
appointment of a regular administrator as provided in the afore-quoted provision does
not apply to the selection of a special administrator.The preference under Section 6,
Rule 78 of the Rules of Court for the next of kin refers to the appointment of a regular
administrator, and not of a special administrator, as the appointment of the latter lies
entirely in the discretion of the court, and is not appealable.

FACTS: Gerardo Tan dies, leaving no will. Private respondents, who are claiming to be
the children of Gerardo Tan, filed with the RTC a Petition for the issuance of letters of
administration. . Petitioners, claiming to be legitimate heirs of Gerardo Tan, filed an
Opposition to the Petition. Private respondents then moved for the appointment of a
special administrator, asserting the need for a special administrator to take possession
and charge of Gerardo’s estate until the Petition can be resolved by the RTC or until the
appointment of a regular administrator. They prayed that their attorney-in-fact,
Romualdo D. Lim (Romualdo), be appointed as the special administrator. Petitioners
filed an Opposition to private respondents’ Motion for Appointment, arguing that none
of the private respondents can be appointed as the special administrator since they
are not residing in the country. Petitioners contend further that Romualdo does not
have the same familiarity, experience or competence as that of their co-petitioner
Vilma C. Tan (Vilma) who was already acting as de facto administratrix of his estate
since his death.

Atty. Clinton Nuevo (Nuevo), as court-appointed commissioner, issued directives to

Vilma, in her capacity as de facto administratrix:

1) requiring the de facto administratrix Ms. Vilma Tan to deposit in the fiduciary
account of the Court all money and or cash at hand or deposited in the bank(s) which
rightfully belong to the estate of the decedent within five (5) days from receipt hereof

2) requiring the same administratrix to deposit in the same account the proceeds of
all sugarcane harvest or any crop harvest

3) relative to the foregoing, the same de facto administratrix is also required to

submit a financial report to the Commission as regards the background of the cash at
hand or deposited in bank.

The RTC, acting on the private respondents’ Urgent Ex-parte Motion to resolve pending
incident, gave Vilma another 10 days to comply with the directive of Atty. Nuevo.
Again, no compliance has been made.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the foregoing Order, claiming that
petitioner Vilma should be the one appointed as special administratix as she was
allegedly next of kin of the deceased. respondent Judge Francisco Gedorio (Gedorio),
in his capacity as RTC Executive Judge, issued an Order6 denying petitioners’ Motion for
Reconsideration. Petitioners instituted with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari
and Prohibition assailing the, again insisting on petitioner Vilma’s right to be appointed
as special administratix. Petitioners likewise prayed for the issuance of preliminary
injunction and/or temporary restraining order (TRO) to enjoin Romualdo from entering
the estate and acting as special administrator thereof. the Court of Appeals issued a
Decision denying petitioners. Petitioners filed the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari.

ISSUE: W/N the petition has merit

HELD: Petitioners contend that they should be given priority in the administration of the
estate since they are allegedly the legitimate heirs of the late Gerardo, as opposed to
private respondents, who are purportedly Gerardo’s illegitimate children. Petitioners rely
on the doctrine that generally, it is the nearest of kin, whose interest is more
preponderant, who is preferred in the choice of administrator of the decedent’s estate.

The appeal is devoid of merit. The order of preference petitioners speak of is found in
Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court, which provides:

SEC. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted.—If no executor is named

in the will, or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give
bond, or a person dies intestate, administration shall be granted:

(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both,
in the discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving husband or wife,
or next of kin, requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to serve;

(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or the
person selected by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or
widow, or next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after the death of the person to
apply for administration or to request that administration be granted to some
other person, it may be granted to one or more of the principal creditors, if
competent and willing to serve;

(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be granted
to such other person as the court may select.

However, this Court has consistently ruled that the order of preference in the
appointment of a regular administrator as provided in the afore-quoted provision does
not apply to the selection of a special administrator. The preference under Section 6,
Rule 78 of the Rules of Court for the next of kin refers to the appointment of a regular
administrator, and not of a special administrator, as the appointment of the latter lies
entirely in the discretion of the court, and is not appealable.

Not being appealable, the only remedy against the appointment of a special
administrator is Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which was what petitioners
filed with the Court of Appeals. Certiorari, however, requires nothing less than grave
abuse of discretion, a term which implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment which is equivalent to an excess or lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion
must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual
refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law.

We agree with the Court of Appeals that there was no grave abuse of discretion on the
part of respondent Judge Gedorio in affirming Judge Menchavez’s appointment of
Romualdo as special administrator.

6. Testate estate of Monasterio vs. Vda. De Gurrea, GR NO. 21917;

DOCTRINE: The deceased Carlos Gurrea has left a document purporting to be his will,
seemingly, is still pending probate. So, it cannot be said, as yet, that he has died
intestate. Again, said document names Marcelo Pijuan as executor thereof, and it is not
claimed that he is incompetent therefor. What is more, he has not only not refused the
trust, but, has, also, expressly accepted it, by applying for his appointment as executor,
and, upon his appointment as special administrator, has assumed the duties thereof. It
may not be amiss to note that the preference accorded by the aforementioned
provision of the Rules of Court to the surviving spouse refers to the appoint of a regular
administrator or administratrix, not to that of a special administrator, and that the order
appointing the latter lies within the discretion of the probate court, and is not
appealable.

FACTS: In 1932, appellant Manuela Ruiz — hereinafter referred to as Mrs. Gurrea — and
Carlos Gurrea were married in Spain, where they lived together until 1945, when he
abandoned her and came, with their son Teodoro, to the Philippines. Here he lived
maritally with Rizalina Perez by whom he had two (2) children. Having been informed by
her son Teodoro, years later, that his father was residing in Pontevedra, Negros
Occidental, Manuela came to the Philippines, in June, 1960; but, Carlos Gurrea refused
to admit her to his residence in said municipality. Hence, she stayed with their son,
Teodoro, in Bacolod City.

Presently, or on July 29, 1960, she instituted, against Carlos Gurrea, Civil Case No. 5820
of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, for support and the annulment of
some alleged donations of conjugal property, in favor of his common-law wife, Rizalina.
In due course, said court issued an order granting Mrs. Gurrea a monthly alimony,
pendente lite, of P2,000.00 which, on May 17, 1961, was reduced by the Court of
Appeals to P1,000.00.

Carlos Gurrea died on March 7, 1962, leaving a document purporting to be his last will
and testament, in which he named Marcelo Pijuan as executor thereof and disinherited
Mrs. Gurrea and their son, Teodoro. Soon thereafter, or on April 24, 1962, Pijuan instituted
Special Proceedings No. 6582 of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, for the
probate of said will. Thereafter Pijuan was, upon his ex parte motion, appointed special
administrator of the estate, without bond. Oppositions to the probate of the will were
filed by Mrs. Gurrea, her son, Teodoro, and one Pilar Gurrea, as an alleged illegitimate
daughter of the deceased.

On July 16, 1962, Mrs. Gurrea filed in said Special Proceedings No. 6582, a motion
alleging that the aforementioned alimony, pendente lite, of P1,000 a month, had been
suspended upon the death of Carlos Gurrea, and praying that the Special
Administrator be ordered to continue paying it pending the final determination of the
case. This motion having been denied in an order dated February 2, 1963, Mrs. Gurrea
moved for a reconsideration thereof. Moreover, on February 27, 1963, she moved for
her appointment as administratrix of the estate of the deceased. In an order dated
April 20, 1963, said motion for reconsideration was denied. The lower court, likewise,
denied, for the time being, the motion of Mrs. Gurrea for her appointment as
administratrix, in view of the provision of the will of the deceased designating another
person as executor thereof. Hence this appeal from said orders of February 2 and April
20, 1963.

ISSUE:
W/N the lower court erred in denying her petition for support
W/N she can be appointed as administratix

HELD: Manuela is entitled to support. The court is bound by law to assume that the
estate of the deceased consists of property belonging to the conjugal parnertship, one
half of which belong presumptively to Manuela, aside from such part of the share of the
deceased in said partnership as may belong to ther as one of the compulsory heirs, if
his alleged will were not allowed to probate, or, even if probated, if the provision
therein disinherting her were nullified. Manuela should not be appointed administrator.
In the case at bar. The deceased Carlos Gurrea has left a document purporting to be
his will, seemingly, is still pending probate. So, it cannot be said, as yet, that he has died
intestate. Again, said document names Marcelo Pijuan as executor thereof, and it is not
claimed that he is incompetent therefor. What is more, he has not only not refused the
trust, but, has, also, expressly accepted it, by applying for his appointment as executor,
and, upon his appointment as special administrator, has assumed the duties thereof. It
may not be amiss to note that the preference accorded by the aforementioned
provision of the Rules of Court to the surviving spouse refers to the appoint of a regular
administrator or administratrix, not to that of a special administrator, and that the order
appointing the latter lies within the discretion of the probate court, and is not
appealable.

7. Co vs. Hon. Rosario, GR NO. 160671; April 30, 2008

FACTS: On March 4, 1998, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, appointed
petitioner and Vicente O. Yu, Sr. as the special administrators of the estate of the
petitioner’s father, Co Bun Chun. However, on motion of the other heirs, the trial court
set aside petitioner’s appointment as special co-administrator. Petitioner consequently,
nominated his son, Alvin Milton Co (Alvin, for brevity), for appointment as co-
administrator of the estate. On August 31, 1998, the RTC appointed Alvin as special co-
administrator.

Almost four years thereafter, the RTC, acting on a motion filed by one of the heirs,
issued its January 22, 2002 Order revoking and setting aside the appointment of Alvin.
The trial court reasoned that Alvin had become unsuitable to discharge the trust given
to him as special co-administrator because his capacity, ability or competence to
perform the functions of co-administrator had been beclouded by the filing of several
criminal cases against him, which, even if there was no conviction yet, had provided
the heirs ample reason to doubt his fitness to handle the subject estate with utmost
fidelity, trust and confidence.

Aggrieved, petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the said Order, but this was
denied in the RTC Order of May 14, 2002. Subsequently, petitioner brought the matter to
the CA on petition for certiorari under Rule 65. In the aforesaid challenged October 28,
2003 Decision, the appellate court affirmed the revocation of the appointment and
dismissed the petition. Thus, the instant petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.

ISSUE: Whether or not Alvin is fit to be a special administrator due to the filing of a
criminal case against him without conviction.

HELD: Yes, he is unfit and may be removed.

We affirm the appellate court’s ruling that the trial court did not act with grave abuse of
discretion in revoking Alvin’s appointment as special co-administrator.
Settled is the rule that the selection or removal of special administrators is not governed
by the rules regarding the selection or removal of regular administrators. Courts may
appoint or remove special administrators based on grounds other than those
enumerated in the Rules, at their discretion. As long as the said discretion is exercised
without grave abuse, higher courts will not interfere with it.
In this case, we find that the trial court’s judgment on the issue of Alvin’s removal as
special co-administrator is grounded on reason, equity, justice and legal principle.
In ruling to revoke the appointment of Alvin Milton Co, the lower court took into
consideration the fiduciary nature of the office of a special administrator which
demands a high degree of trust and confidence in the person to be appointed. The
court a quo observed that, burdened with the criminal charges of falsification of
commercial documents leveled against him (sic), and the corresponding profound
duty to defend himself in these proceedings, Alvin Milton Co’s ability and qualification
to act as special co-administrator of the estate of the decedent are beclouded, and
the recall of his appointment is only proper under the attendant circumstances. Such
reasoning by the court a quo finds basis in actual logic and probability.
The Court finds no grave abuse of discretion attending such ruling, as it was reached
based on the court a quo’s own fair assessment of the circumstances attending the
case below, and the applicable laws.
RULE 81 (2 cases)

1. Maxima Tan vs. Go Chiong Lee; GR NO. 21969; September 25, 1924

Facts: During the lifetime of the deceased Go Bung Kiu, Go Chiong Lee was his
encargado. Go Bung Kiu died in China on April 15, 1920. On April 26, 1920, Go Chiong
Lee(defandant) was appointed special administrator of the estate, with Tio Liok, Ang
Changco, and Manuel Go Tianuy as sureties on his bond.
On May 25, 1920, Go Chiong Lee's status with reference to the estate was changed to
that of administrator. On the same date, Go Chiong Lee filed a motion in which he
prayed that he be allowed to operate two stores belonging to the estate. The court
granted the administrator the authority to which he asked, but on the original copy of
the order, the judge added in ink the following words: "Se exige como condicion de
continuar dicho poder condedido al administrador su informe por escrito que debe
presentarse el primero de julio y de cada mes siguiente." Another bond with the same
sureties was filed by the administrator, and letters of administration were issued in his
favor. Go Chiong Lee continued to discharge his duties administrator until he was
relieved by Maximina Tan (petitioner) on October 28, 1921.
The committee on claims rendered its report and the court order the estate of the
deceased Go Bung Kiu, under administration to pay the creditors. The debt of the
estate was P69,029. But defendant only paid creditors P16,700.
According to public account, under the administration of defendant Go Chiong Lee,
when he took the estate, it was worth P28,467 but after he left the administration of the
estate, it was P8,693, or a loss of P19,773. Petitioner now claims cost from defendant
and the surety bondsmen on 4 different causes of action.

Issue: Whether or not Go Chiong Lee and the bondsmen are liable.

Held: Yes he is liable. But only on the amount of P6,375, and not the P54,700 being
claimed
First & third cause of action were disallowed. The standard of responsibility of the
administrator is best measured as in essence the responsibility of a bailee. Like any
bailee, he must pursue his discretion honestly and in good faith, or he will become
personally liable, to those who are interested in the estate, for waste, conversion, or
embezzlement. But where an administrator, entrusted with the carrying on of an estate,
acts in good faith and in accordance with the usual rules and methods obtaining in
such business, he will not be held liable for losses incurred.
SC found that the personal responsibility of the former administrator and the sureties on
his bond for losses incurred by the estate during his administration, has not been
proved.
Second cause of action, the plaintiff sought to recover the value of 850 sacks of corn
which Go Chiong Lee, it is said, failed to inventory. Claim allowed
The administrator who has qualified shall, within three months after his appointment,
return to the court a true inventory of the real estate.The administrator is accountable
on his bond along with the sureties for the performance of these legal obligations.
The issue is squarely one of fact, and as is customary in such cases, we follow the
findings of the trial court if proof to substantiate such findings appears in the record.
Here, such proof exists.
Fourth cause of action. (disallowed) The defendant did attempt to comply with the
order of the court as to the payment to the creditors. The anomaly, however, is that,
while some of the creditors have been paid entirely and other partially, some of them
received absolutely nothing on account of the hit and miss method followed by the
administrator.
The general rule is that a personal representative will be protected in the payment of a
claim which has been duly allowed or ordered paid by the court, although it should not
have been paid in full, unless it is made to appear that such allowance of the claim, or
order for the payment thereof, was obtained through his collusion or bad faith.

2. Luzon Surety Company vs. Pastor Quebar G.R. No. L-40517 January 31, 1984

Doctrine:(Bond case) The proper determination of the liability of the surety and of the
principal on the bond must depend primarily upon the language of the bond itself. The
bonds herein were required by Section 1 of Rule 81 of the Rules of Court.

Section 1 of Rule 81 of the Rules of Court requires the administrator/executor to put up a

bond for the purpose of indemnifying the creditors, heirs, legatees and the estate. It is
conditioned upon the faithful performance of the administrator's trust

Facts: Luzon Surety Company issued two administrator's bond on behalf of the
defendant-appellant Pastor T. Quebrar, as administrator in Special Proceedings Nos.
3075 and 3076. In consideration of the suretyship wherein the plaintiff-appellee Luzon
Surety Company, Inc. was bound jointly and severally with the defendant appellant
Pastor T. Quebrar, the latter, together with Francisco Kilayko, executed two indemnity
agreements, where among other things, they agreed jointly and severally to pay the
plaintiff-appellee.
On October 17, 1962, the defendants-appellants ordered a motion for cancellation
and/or reduction of executor's bonds on the ground that "the heirs of these testate
estates have already received their respective shares". On October 20, 1962, the Court
of First Instance of Negros Occidental acting on the motions filed by the defendants-
appellants ordered the bonds cancelled.
Plaintiff-appellee's demand payment but defendants refused. Case was filed on the
ultimate issue - "whether or not the administrator's bonds were in force and effect from
and after the year that they were filed and approved by the court up to 1962, when
they were cancelled." The defendants-appellants offered P1,800.00 by way of
amicable settlement which the plaintiff-appellee refused.
Lower Court ruled in favor of Luzon Surety. They found that the bonds were in force and
defendants are liable for them as they benefited from the bonds. Not judicial bonds
under Rule 82 sec 1.
Defendants-appellants appealed to the Court of Appeals. CA Ruled that the bonds in
question herein contain practically the very same conditions in Sec. 1, Rule 81 of the
Rules of Court.

Issue: Whether defendant is liable for the surety bond.

Held: Yes. Section 1 of Rule 81 of the Rules of Court requires the administrator/executor
to put up a bond for the purpose of indemnifying the creditors, heirs, legatees and the
estate. It is conditioned upon the faithful performance of the administrator's trust.
Having in mind the purpose and intent of the law, the surety is then liable under the
administrator's bond, for as long as the administrator has duties to do as such
administrator/executor. Since the liability of the sureties is co-extensive with that of the
administrator and embraces the performance of every duty he is called upon to
perform in the course of administration, it follows that the administrator is still duty bound
to respect the indemnity agreements entered into by him in consideration of the
suretyship
The sureties of an administration bond are liable only as a rule, for matters occurring
during the term covered by the bond. And the term of a bond does not usually expire
until the administration has been closed and terminated in the manner directed by law.
Thus, as long as the probate court retains jurisdiction of the estate, the bond
contemplates a continuing liability notwithstanding the non-renewal of the bond by the
defendants-appellants.

It must be remembered that the probate court possesses an all-embracing power over
the administrator's bond and over the administration proceedings and it cannot be
devoid of legal authority to execute and make that bond answerable for the every
purpose for which it was filed. It is the duty of the courts of probate jurisdiction to guard
jealously the estate of the deceased persons by intervening in the administration
thereof in order to remedy or repair any injury that may be done thereto.

To allow the defendants-appellants to evade their liability under the Indemnity

Agreements by non-payment of the premiums would ultimately lead to giving the
administrator the power to diminish or reduce and altogether nullify his liability under
the Administrator's Bonds.
RULE 82 (2 Cases)

1. Co. vs. Hon. Rosario, GR NO. 160671; April 30, 2008

DOCTRINE: May remove as special administrator if there is a pending criminal case for
falsification of documents. The selection or removal of special administrators is not
governed by the rules regarding the selection or removal of regular administrators.
Courts may appoint or remove special administrators based on grounds other than
those enumerated in the Rules, at their discretion. As long as the said discretion is
exercised without grave abuse, higher courts will not interfere with it.

FACTS: On March 4, 1998, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, appointed
petitioner and Vicente O. Yu, Sr. as the special administrators of the estate of the
petitioner’s father, Co Bun Chun. However, on motion of the other heirs, the trial court
set aside petitioner’s appointment as special co-administrator. Petitioner consequently,
nominated his son, Alvin Milton Co (Alvin, for brevity), for appointment as co-
administrator of the estate. On August 31, 1998, the RTC appointed Alvin as special co-
administrator.

Almost four years thereafter, the RTC, acting on a motion filed by one of the heirs,
issued its January 22, 2002 Order revoking and setting aside the appointment of Alvin.
The trial court reasoned that Alvin had become unsuitable to discharge the trust given
to him as special co-administrator because his capacity, ability or competence to
perform the functions of co-administrator had been beclouded by the filing of several
criminal cases against him, which, even if there was no conviction yet, had provided
the heirs ample reason to doubt his fitness to handle the subject estate with utmost
fidelity, trust and confidence.

Aggrieved, petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the said Order, but this was
denied in the RTC Order of May 14, 2002. Subsequently, petitioner brought the matter to
the CA on petition for certiorari under Rule 65. In the aforesaid challenged October 28,
2003 Decision, the appellate court affirmed the revocation of the appointment and
dismissed the petition. Thus, the instant petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.

ISSUE: Whether or not Alvin is fit to be a special administrator due to the filing of a
criminal case against him without conviction.

HELD: Yes, he is unfit and may be removed.

We affirm the appellate court’s ruling that the trial court did not act with grave abuse of
discretion in revoking Alvin’s appointment as special co-administrator.
Settled is the rule that the selection or removal of special administrators is not governed
by the rules regarding the selection or removal of regular administrators. Courts may
appoint or remove special administrators based on grounds other than those
enumerated in the Rules, at their discretion. As long as the said discretion is exercised
without grave abuse, higher courts will not interfere with it.
In this case, we find that the trial court’s judgment on the issue of Alvin’s removal as
special co-administrator is grounded on reason, equity, justice and legal principle.
In ruling to revoke the appointment of Alvin Milton Co, the lower court took into
consideration the fiduciary nature of the office of a special administrator which
demands a high degree of trust and confidence in the person to be appointed. The
court a quo observed that, burdened with the criminal charges of falsification of
commercial documents leveled against him (sic), and the corresponding profound
duty to defend himself in these proceedings, Alvin Milton Co’s ability and qualification
to act as special co-administrator of the estate of the decedent are beclouded, and
the recall of his appointment is only proper under the attendant circumstances. Such
reasoning by the court a quo finds basis in actual logic and probability.
The Court finds no grave abuse of discretion attending such ruling, as it was reached
based on the court a quo’s own fair assessment of the circumstances attending the
case below, and the applicable laws.

2. Ocampo vs. Ocampo, GR NO. 187879; July 5, 2010

FACTS: Jose Ocampo and Juana Llander-Ocampo have ten children, including the
petitioners and respondents to this case. In the celebration of their marriage, they
acquired several properties, all of which are owned in common by their children.
However, the residential/commercial lot in Nabua, Camarines Sur is ostensibly owned
by Fidela Ocampo, although the latter acknowledges that the same is co-owned by
her and her siblings.
Aside from the first complaint that they have filed before the trial court, petitioners also
filed a supplemental complaint where they allege that Fidela Ocampo cancelled the
first TCT of the lot in Nabua and issued a new one in the form of Deed of Donation Inter
Vivos in favor of Belen Ocampo-Barrito and her spouse Vicente Barrito. Both the donor
of the donee are notoriously aware that the lot is still under dispute in the petitioners' first
complaint, nevertheless, the two still pursued the donation. Petitioners also allege that
the transfer of ownership from Fidela to Belen, daughter of another defendant
Felicidad, is tainted with fraud, actual and deliberate, to deprive plaintiffs of their
legitimate share therein, knowing as they do that the same are a co-ownership of the
original parties plaintiffs and defendants herein.
Defendants, on the other hand, allege that Fidela has been the absolute owner of the
property since 1949, and that its title is free from all encumbrances and adverse claims.
In 1984, Fidela conveyed the property to Belen via a Deed of Donation Inter Vivos and
since September 13, 1987, Belen has been the absolute owner of the same property.
In its decision, the Appellate Court said that other than the Acknowledgment of Co-
ownership executed by Respondent Fidela Ocampo, no documentary evidence was
offered to establish petitioners’ claim of co-ownership. It also said that respondents
were able to give clear proof of their ownership of the property: the Transfer Certificate
of Title and the corresponding Tax Declaration in the name of Fidela, and later of Belen
Ocampo-Barrito.

ISSUE: Where a deed of donation inter vivos entered in bad faith deprives the heirs of
their hereditary shares, is said deed valid?

HELD: The Petition has no merit. Belen presented a Deed of Donation Inter Vivos
executed on January 13, 1984, between herself as donee and Fidela as donor. This act
shows the immediate source of the former’s claim of sole ownership of the property.
A donation as a mode of acquiring ownership results in an effective transfer of title to
the property from the donor to the donee. Petitioners stubbornly rely on the
Acknowledgement of Co-ownership allegedly executed by Fidela in favor of her
siblings. What they overlook is the fact that at the time of the execution of the
Acknowledgement -- assuming that its authenticity and due execution were proven --
the property had already been donated to Belen. The Deed of Donation, which is the
prior document, is clearly inconsistent with the document relied upon by petitioners. We
agree with the RTC’s ratiocination:
"On the claim of plaintiffs that defendant Fidela Ocampo herself made a written
acknowledgement for her co-ownership over all the properties disputed with plaintiffs in
this case, the same cannot be considered as a declaration against Fidela’s interest
since the alleged acknowledgement was written and executed on 24 December 1985
when she was no longer the owner of the property as the year previous, on 13 January
1984, she had already donated all her properties to defendant Belen Ocampo-Barrito,
so that, in effect, she had no more properties with which she can have an interest to
declare against."