Case Title: Date: 12 March 1975

Leonora Perido, et al. v. Maria Perido, et al.

G.R. No.: G.R. No. L-28248
Nature of Action: Appeal by Certiorari
Ponente: Makalintal, C.J.
Topic: Presumption of Marriage
Facts:
Lucio Perido of Himamaylan, Negros Occidental, married twice during his lifetime. His first wife was Benita Talorong, with
whom he begot three (3) children: Felix, Ismael, and Margarita. After Benita died Lucio married Marcelina Baliguat, with
whom he had five (5) children: Eusebio, Juan, Maria, Sofronia and Gonzalo. Lucio himself died in 1942, while his second
wife died in 1943.
Of the three (3) children belonging to the first marriage only Margarita Perido is still living. Her deceased brother, Felix
Perido, is survived by his children Inocencia, Leonora, Albinio, Paulino, Letia, Leticia, and Eufemia, all surnamed Perido.
Nicanora Perido, another daughter of Felix, is also deceased, but is survived by two (2) sons, Rolando and Eduardo Salde.
Margarita's other deceased brother, Ismael Perido, is survived by his children, namely: Consolacion, Alfredo, Wilfredo, and
Amparo. Susano Perido, another son of Ismael, is dead, but survived by his own son George Perido.
Of Lucio Perido's five (5) children by his second wife, two are already dead, namely: Eusebio and Juan. Eusebio is survived
by his children Magdalena Perido, Pacita Perido, Alicia Perido, Josefina Perido, Fe Perido, Teresa Perido, and Luz Perido,
while Juan is survived by his only child, Juan A. Perido.
On 15 August 1960, the children and grandchildren of the first and second marriages of Lucio Perido executed a document
denominated as “Declaration of Heirship and Extra-judicial Partition,” whereby they partitioned among themselves Lots
Nos. 458, 471, 506, 511, 509, 513-B, 807, and 808, all of the Cadastral Survey of Himamaylan, Occidental Negros.
The children belonging to the first marriage (petitioners) of Lucio Perido had second thoughts about the partition.
On 8 March 1962, they filed a complaint in the CFI of Negros Occidental, in which it was later amended on 22 February
1963, against the children of the second marriage (defendants). They prayed for the annulment of the so-called
“Declaration of Heirship and Extra-judicial Partition” and for another partition of the lots among themselves alone.
The petitioners alleged that they had been induced by the defendants to execute the document in question through
misrepresentation, false promises and fraudulent means. They claim that the lots which were partitioned belonged to the
conjugal partnership of the spouses Lucio Perido and Benita Talorong. They also claim that the five children of Lucio
Perido with Marcelina Baliguat were all illegitimate and therefore had no successional rights to the estate of Lucio Perido,
who died in 1942.
After trial, the CFI rendered its decision (dated 31 July 1865) annulling the “Declaration of Heirship and Extra-judicial
Partition”. However, it did not order the partition of the lots involved among the plaintiffs exclusively in view of its
findings that the five children of Lucio Perido with his second wife, Marcelina Baliguat, were legitimate. The CFI stated
that all the lots, except Lot No. 458, were the exclusive properties of Lucio Perido; and that 11/12 of Lot No. 458 belonged
to the conjugal partnership of Lucio Perido and his second wife, Marcelina Baliguat.
The petitioners appealed to the CA. But the CA, finding no reversible error in the CFI’s decision, had affirmed it.
Issue:
Whether the children and grandchildren of the second marriage of Lucio Perido were legitimate.
Ratio:
Yes . The petitioners insist that said children were illegitimate on the theory that the first three were born out of wedlock
even before the death of Lucio Perido's first wife, while the last two were also born out of wedlock and were not
recognised by their parents before or after their marriage.

In support of their contention they allege that Benita Talorong died in 1905, after the first three children were born, as
testified to by petitioner Margarita Perido and corroborated by petitioner Leonora Perido; that as late as 1923 Lucio
Perido was still a widower, as shown on the face of the certificates of title issued to him in said year; and Lucio Perido
married his second wife, Marcelina Baliguat, only in 1925, as allegedly established through the testimony of petitioner
Leonora Perido.

The SC had ruled that their (the petitioners’) petition cannot be sustained. The CA found that there was evidence to show
that Lucio Perido's wife, Benita Talorong, died during the Spanish regime. Under the circumstance, Lucio Perido had no
legal impediment to marry Marcelina Baliguat before the birth of their first child in 1900.

With respect to the civil status of Lucio Perido as stated in the certificates of title issued to him in 1923, the CA correctly
held that the statement was not conclusive to show that he was not actually married to Marcelina Baliguat. Furthermore,
it is weak and insufficient to rebut the presumption that persons living together husband and wife are married to each
other. This presumption, especially where legitimacy of the issue is involved, as in this case, may be overcome only by
cogent proof on the part of those who allege the illegitimacy.

1
In the case of Adong vs. Cheong Seng Gee, this Court explained the rationale behind this presumption, thus:

“The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is that of marriage. Marriage in this jurisdiction is not
only a civil contract, but it is a new relation, an institution in the maintenance of which the public is deeply interested.
Consequently, every intendment of the law leans toward legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together in
apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter-presumption or evidence special to the case, to be
in fact married. The reason is that such is the common order of society, and if the parties were not what they thus
hold themselves out as being, they would he living in the constant violation of decency and of law. A presumption
established by our Code of Civil Procedure is "that a man and woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have
entered into a lawful contract of marriage." (Sec. 334, No. 28) Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio — Always
presume marriage.”

While the alleged marriage ceremony in 1925, if true, might tend to rebut the presumption of marriage arising from
previous cohabitation, it is to be noted that both the trial court and the appellate court did not even pass upon the
uncorroborated testimony of petitioner Leonora Perido on the matter. The reason is obvious. Said witness, when asked
why she knew that Marcelina Baliguat was married to Lucio Perido only in 1925, merely replied that she knew it because
“during the celebration of the marriage by the Aglipayan priest (they) got flowers from (their) garden and placed in the
altar.” Evidently she was not even an eyewitness to the ceremony.

A person who was not at the marriage ceremony cannot testify as an eyewitness that the marriage did not take
place. In the absence of proof that marriage did not take place a man and a woman living together as husband and
wife are presumed married.

In view of the foregoing the CA did not err in concluding that the five children of Lucio Perido and Marcelina Baliguat were
born during their marriage and, therefore, legitimate.
Relevant Dissent-Concurring Opinion/Notes:
For this case, I only focused on the issue regarding the legitimacy of the children and grandchildren of the second marriage
since it is related to the topic (i.e., Presumption of Marriage).

2
Case Title: Date:
Dominga Fiel 26 March 1979
vs. G.R. No.: 56284-R
Julio Banawa, et al.
Nature of Action:
Ponente: Gutierrez, H.E.
Topic: Presumption of Marriage
Facts:
Dominga Fiel, who lived in a common law relationship with Natalio Banawa for twenty five years, filed a complaint on
March 3, 1971 for the annulment of a partition of the properties allegedly owned in common by her and the latter.

Natalio Banawa was a widower, before living with Dominga.

Natalio Banawa died on June 29, 1970, after living with Dominga since 1945. On Oct. 22, 1970, one of the nephews of
Natalio brought Atty. Catane to Dominga for the execution of a document of partition of the properties.

Dominga received 1/3 while 2/3 were given to the brothers and nephews of Natalio. Upon realization that she
received less than what she was supposed to, she filed this complaint. The lower court rendered a decision in favor of
Dominga (awarding her half). Appeal was taken by the defendants.

Issue:
WON the parties’ relationship should entitle Dominga to receive half of the properties
Ruling:
YES. Though Article 144 was not fully satisfied, on legal and equitable considerations, she should receive half.
Ratio:
Philippine law does not recognize common-law marriages. A man and woman not legally married who co-habit for
many years as husband and wife, who represent themselves to the public as husband and wife, and who are reputed to be
husband and wife in the community where they live may be considered legally “married” in common law jurisdictions but
not in the Philippines.

In the Philippines, the property of such “common-law relationships” are governed by Art. 144 of the Civil Code:
“When a man and a woman live together as husband and wife, but they are not married, or their marriage is void from
the beginning, the property acquired by either or both of them through their work or industry or their wages and salaries
shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.”
For Art. 144 to apply, two requisites must be satisfied:
1) The couple must not be incapacitated to contract marriage; and
2) That the properties must have been acquired through the work or industry of both or either of them.

As to the second requisite, the records show that Natalio set up a sari-sari store with Dominga, after disposing of his
properties from his “previous marriage” and became a widower.
As to the first requisite, Dominga admits that she was legally married to Eusebio Potestas and that Eusebio Potestas
was still alive when she testified in the trial court.

However, despite such failure to satisfy a requisite, the Court finds that “On the combined strength of legal and
equitable considerations, we rule that the co-ownership rules provided by Article 144 of the Civil Code are applicable.
Dominga should receive ½ of the fruits and earnings of her joint efforts with Natalio. The properties in part came from her
own sweat, brains and efforts.
As to the donations made by Natalio to Dominga during his lifetime, the same should be declared void. Art. 739 of the
Civil Code expressly provides that donations made between persons guilty of adultery or concubinage at the time of the
donation are void. Adultery or concubinage need not be proved in a criminal action, mere preponderance of evidence is
required. Furthermore, as stated in the ruling of Buenaventura v Bautista, the donations are contrary to public policy as
well since legally married spouses cannot donate to each other so should those not married.

Provision of law applicable to the topic:

Article 220. In case of doubt, all presumptions favor the solidarity of the family. Thus, every intendment of law or facts
leans toward the validity of marriage, the indissolubility of the marriage bonds, the legitimacy of children, the community
of property during marriage, the authority of parents over their children, and the validity of defense for any member of
the family in case of unlawful aggression.

3
Topic: Void Marriages; Bigamous Marriages
Case: People vs. Mendoza

Nature: The defendant, Arturo Mendoza, has appealed from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Laguna, finding
him guilty of the crime of bigamy.

Facts:
On August 5, 1936, the appellant and Jovita de Asis were married in Marikina, Rizal. On May 14, 1941, during the
subsistence of the first marriage, the appellant was married to Olga Lema in the City of Manila. On February 2, 1943, Jovita
de Asis died. On August 19, 1949, the appellant contracted another marriage with Carmencita Panlilio in Calamba, Laguna.
This last marriage gave rise to his prosecution for and conviction of the crime of bigamy.
The appellant contends that his marriage with Olga Lema on May 14, 1941 is null and void and, therefore, non-existent,
having been contracted while his first marriage with Jovita de Asis August 5, 1936 was still in effect, and that his third
marriage to Carmencita Panlilio on August 19, 1949 cannot be the basis of a charge for bigamy because it took place
after the death of Jovita de Asis. The Solicitor General, however, argues that, even assuming that appellant's second
marriage to Olga Lema is void, he is not exempt from criminal liability, in the absence of a previous judicial annulment
of said bigamous marriage.

Issue: Whether the appellant is exempt from criminal liability, in the absence of a previous judicial annulment of said
bigamous marriage?

HELD: Yes. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first spouse of such person
with any person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void from its performance, unless:
(a) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved;
(b) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage without the spouse
present having news of the absentee being alive, or the absentee being generally considered as dead and believed to be so
by the spouse present at the time of contracting such subsequent marriage, the marriage so contracted being valid in
either case until declared null and void by a competent court.
This statutory provision plainly makes a subsequent marriage contracted by any person during the lifetime of his first
spouse illegal and void from its performance, and no judicial decree is necessary to establish its invalidity, as distinguished
from mere annulable marriages. There is here no pretence that appellant's second marriage with Olga Lema was
contracted in the belief that the first spouse, Jovita de Asis, has been absent for seven consecutive years or generally
considered as dead, so as to render said marriage valid until declared null and void by a competent court.

Notes:
(Separate Opinion; Dissent; J Reyes)
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code punishes with prision mayor "any person who shall contract a second or subsequent
marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved".
Though the logical may say that where the former marriage was void there would be nothing to dissolve still it is not for the
spouses to judge whether that marriage was void or not. That judgment is reserved to the courts.

4
Case Title: Date: February 28, 1957
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-
appelle, G.R. No.: G.R. No. L-10016
vs.
PROCESO S. ARAGON, defendant-appellant. Nature of Action: Appeal from a judgment of the Court of First
Instance of Cebu finding appellant guilty of bigamy.

Ponente: LABRADOR, J.:

Topic: Void Marriages – Bigamous & Polygamous

Facts:

Herein accused under the name Proceso Rosima contracted a marriage to one Maria Gorrea(No. 1) in the Philippine
Independent Church in Cebu. While he is still married to Maria Gorrea, the accused now under the name of Proceso Aragon
contracted another marriage with Maria Faicol in Iloilo (No. 2).

He was able to maintain both relationships because the accused was then a traveling sales man. When No.1 died, and seeing
that the coast was clear in Cebu, Aragon brought No. 2 to Cebu from Iloilo, where she became a teacher-nurse. Maria Faicol
however, suffered injuries to her eyes because of physical maltreatment brought to her by Aragon. Due to the injuries she
was sent back to Iloilo to undergo treatment, in her absence the accused contracted a third marriage with a certain Jesusa C.
Maglasang (No. 3).

No. 2 filed a case for bigamy against the defendant. He then categorically denied in the court his marriage to No. 2 but
affirmed his marriage to No. 3.

The Court of First Instance of Cebu held that even in the absence of an express provision in Act No. 3613 authorizing the
filing of an action for judicial declaration of nullity of a marriage void ab initio, defendant could not legally contract
marriage with Jesusa C. Maglasang without the dissolution of his marriage to Maria Faicol, either by the death of the
latter or by the judicial declaration of the nullity of such marriage, at the instance of the latter.

Issue:
Should the defendant be held guilty for the crime of bigamy despite the fact that his marriage to the
complainant(No. 2) was void ab initio?

Ruling: (Direct Answer to Issue)

No

Ratio:
Appellant in this Court relies on the case of People vs. Mendoza, (95 Phil., 845; 50 Off. Gaz., [10] 4767). In this case the
majority of this Court declared:

The statutory provision (section 29 of the Marriage Law or Act No. 3613) plainly makes a subsequent marriage
contracted by any person during the lifetime of his first spouse illegal and void from its performance, and no judicial
decree is necessary to establish its invalidity, as distinguished from mere annullable marriages. There is here no
pretense that appellant's second marriage with Olga Lema was contracted in the belief that the first spouse, Jovita
de Asis, had been absent for seven consecutive years or generally considered as dead, so as to render said marriage
valid until declared null and void by a subsequent court.

We are of the very weighty reasons by Justice Alex Reyes in the dissent in the case above-quoted But this weighty reasons
notwithstanding, the very fundamental principle of strict construction of penal laws in favor of the accused, which principle
we may not ignore, seems to justify our stand in the above-cited case of People vs. Mendoza. Our Revised Penal Code is of
recent enactment and had the rule enunciated in Spain and in America requiring judicial declaration of nullity of ab
initio void marriages been within the contemplation of the legislature, an express provision to that effect would or should
have been inserted in the law. In its absence, we are bound by said rule of strict interpretation already adverted to.

It is to be noted that the action was instituted upon complaint of the second wife, whose marriage with the appellant was

5
not renewed after the death of the first wife and before the third marriage was entered into. Hence, the last marriage was a
valid one and appellant's prosecution for contracting this marriage can not prosper.

For the foregoing considerations, the judgment appealed from is hereby reversed and the defendant-appellant acquitted,
with costs de oficio, without prejudice to his prosecution for having contracted the second bigamous marriage. So ordered.

Relevant Dissent-Concurring Opinion/Notes:

REYES, A.J., dissenting:

I dissent.

Dissenting in the case of People vs. Mendoza, replied on by the majority, I there said:
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code punishes with prision mayor "any person who shall contract a second or
subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved."

Though the logician may say that there were the former marriage was void there would be nothing to dissolve, still
it is not for the spouses to judge whether that marriage was void or not. That judgment is reserved to the courts. As
Viada says, 'La satidad e importancia del matrimonio no permite que los casados juzguen por si mosmos de su
nulidad; esta ha de someterse [precisamente al juicio del Tribunalcompetente, y cuando este declare la nulidad del
matrimonio, y solo entonces, se tendra por nulo; mientras no exista esta declaracion, la presuncion esta siempre a
favor de la validez del matrimonio, yde consiguiente, el que contrae otro segundo antes de dicha declaracio de
nulidad, no puede menos de incurrir la pena de este articulo. (3 Viada, Codigo Penal, p. 275.)

"This is a sound opinion," says Mr. Justice Tuason in the case of People vs. Jose Cotas, (CA), 40 Off. Gaz. 3145, "and is
in line with the well-known rule established in cases of adultery, that "until by competent authority in a final
judgment the marriage contract is set aside, the offense to the vows taken and the attack on the family exists."

I may add that the construction placed by the majority upon the law penalizing bigamy would frustrate the legislative intent
rather than give effect thereto.

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Case Title: Date: May 30, 1983.
SERAFIA G. TOLENTINO, petitioner, vs. HON.
EDGARDO L. PARAS, MARIA G.R. No.: G.R. No. L-43905
CLEMENTE and THE LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF
PAOMBONG, BULACAN, respondents. Nature of Action: Petition for Review on Certiorari
Ponente: MELENCIO-HERRERA, J (1st Division)
Topic: Void marriages.
Facts:

1. Amado Tolentino had contracted a second marriage with private respondent herein, Maria Clemente on
November 1, 1948, while his marriage with petitioner Tolentino, celebrated on July 31, 1943, was still
subsisting.

2. Petitioner charged Amado with Bigamy.

3. Upon Amado's plea of guilty, he was sentenced to suffer the corresponding penalty.

4. After Amado had served the prison sentence imposed on him, he continued to live with private respondent until
his death on July 25, 1974. His death certificate carried the entry "Name of Surviving Spouse — Maria
Clemente.".

5. In a Special Proceedings for Correction of Entry, petitioner sought to correct the name of the surviving spouse in
the death certificate from "Maria Clemente" to "Serafia G. Tolentino", her name.

6. The lower Court dismissed the petition "for lack of the proper requisites under the law" and indicated the
need for a more detailed proceeding.

7. Conformably thereto, petitioner filed the case below against private respondent and the Local Civil Registrar for
her declaration as the lawful surviving spouse, and the correction of the death certificate of Amado.

8. In an Order, dated October 21, 1975, respondent Court, upon private respondent's instance, dismissed the case
for the following reasons:
a. the correction of the entry in the Office of the Local Civil Registrar is not the proper remedy because the
issue involved is marital relationship;
b. the Court has not acquired proper jurisdiction because as prescribed under Art. 108, read together with
Art. 412 of the Civil Code — publication is needed in a case like this, and up to now, there has been no
such publication; and
c. in a sense, the subject matter of this case has been aptly discussed in the Special Proceeding, which this
Court has already dismissed, also for lack of the proper requisites under the law.

9. Thus, petitioner's present recourse mainly challenging the grounds relied upon by respondent Court in ordering
dismissal.

Issue: WoN a judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity the second marriage between Amado and Maria
Clemente.

Ruling: NO. No judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of a void marriage.

Ratio:

For the merits. Considering that Amado, upon his own plea, was convicted for Bigamy, that sentence furnishes
the necessary proof of the marital status of petitioner and the deceased. There is no better proof of marriage
than the admission by the accused of the existence of such marriage. The second marriage that he contracted
with private respondent during the lifetime of his first spouse is null and void from the beginning and of no force
and effect. No judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of a void marriage. It can be safely
concluded, then, without need of further proof nor remand to the Court below, that private respondent is not the
surviving spouse of the deceased Amado, but petitioner. Rectification of the erroneous entry in the records of
the Local Civil Registrar may, therefore, be validly made.

Having arrived at the foregoing conclusion, the other issues raised need no longer be discussed. In fine, since

7
 there is no question regarding the invalidity of Amado's second marriage with private respondent and
that the entry made in the corresponding local register is thereby rendered false, it may be corrected.
While documents, such as death and birth certificates, are public and entries therein are presumed to be correct,
such presumption is merely disputable and will have to yield to more positive evidence establishing their
inaccuracy.
Notes:

For the remedy. Although petitioner's ultimate objective is the collection of entry contemplated in Article 412 of
the Civil Code and Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, she initially seeks a judicial declaration that she is the lawful
surviving spouse of the deceased, Amado, in order to lay the basis for the correction of the entry in the death
certificate of said deceased. The suit below is a proper remedy. It is of an adversary character as contrasted to a
mere summary proceeding. A claim of right is asserted against one who has an interest in contesting it. Private
respondent, as the individual most affected; is a party defendant, and has appeared to contest the petition and
defend her interests. The Local Civil Registrar is also a party defendant. The publication required by the Court
below pursuant to Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is not absolutely necessary for no other parties are involved.
After all, publication is required to bar indifferently all who might be minded to make an objection of any sort
against the right sought to be established. Besides, even assuming that this is a proceeding under Rule 108, it
was the Court that was called upon to order the publication, but it did not. In the ultimate analysis, Courts are
not concerned so much with the form of actions as with their substance.

8
Case Title: Date: August 19, 1986
LILIA OLIVA WIEGEL, petitioner,
vs. G.R. No. L-53703
THE HONORABLE ALICIA V. SEMPIO-DIY (as presiding Nature of Action: Petition for Certiorari
judge of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of
Caloocan City) and KARL HEINZ WIEGEL, respondents. Ponente: Paras, J. ; Second Division
Topic: Void Marriages
Facts:
 In an action (Family Case No. 483) filed before the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Caloocan City, respondent
Karl Heinz Wiegel asked for the declaration of Nullity of his marriage (celebrated on July, 1978 at the Holy Catholic
Apostolic Christian Church Branch in Makati, Metro Manila) with petitioner Lilia Oliva Wiegel on the ground of Lilia's
previous existing marriage to one Eduardo A. Maxion, the ceremony having been performed on June 25, 1972 at our
Lady of Lourdes Church in Quezon City.
 Lilia, while admitting the existence of said prior subsisting marriage claimed that said marriage was null and void. 
Lilia and Eduardo were forced to enter said marital union.
 In the pre-trial, the issue agreed upon by both parties was the status of the first marriage  Was said prior marriage
void or was it merely voidable?
 Contesting the validity of the pre-trial order, Lilia asked the respondent court for an opportunity to present evidence-
o that the first marriage was vitiated by force exercised upon both her and the first husband; and
o that the first husband was at the time of the marriage in 1972 already married to someone else.
 Respondent judge ruled against the presentation of evidence because the existence of force exerted on both parties of
the first marriage had already been agreed upon.
 Hence, the present petition for certiorari assailing the following Orders of the respondent Judge.
Issue:
Is first marriage of petitioner void or voidable?

Ruling: (Direct Answer to Issue)

Petitioner’s first marriage is voidable and therefore, valid until annulled.

Ratio:
 There is no need for petitioner to prove that her first marriage was vitiated by force committed against both parties
because assuming this to be so, the marriage will not be void but merely viodable (Art. 85, Civil Code), and therefore
valid until annulled.
 Since no annulment has yet been made, it is clear that when she married respondent she was still validly married to
her first husband, consequently, her marriage to respondent is VOID (Art. 80, Civil Code).
 There is likewise no need of introducing evidence about the existing prior marriage of her first husband at the time
they married each other, for then such a marriage though void still needs according to this Court, a judicial declaration
of such fact and for all legal intents and purposes she would still be regarded as a married woman at the time she
contracted her marriage with respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel.
 Accordingly, the marriage of petitioner and respondent would be regarded VOID under the law.
WHEREFORE, this petition is hereby DISMISSED, for lack of merit, and the Orders complained of are hereby AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED.
Relevant Dissent-Concurring Opinion/Notes:

9
Case Title: Date: 15 April 1988
Leonilo C. Donato
vs. G.R. No. 53642
Artemon Luna, Presiding Judge of the Manila CFI; Jose Nature of Action: Certiorari and Prohibition
Flaminiano, City Fiscal of Manila; Paz Abayan
Ponente:
Topic: Void Marriages
Facts:

The pertinent facts as set forth in the records follow. On January 23, 1979, the City Fiscal of Manila acting thru Assistant
City Fiscal Amado N. Cantor filed an information for bigamy against herein petitioner, Leonilo C. Donato with the Court
of First Instance of Manila. The information was filed based on the complaint of private respondent Paz B. Abayan.

On September 28, 1979, before the petitioner's arraignment, private respondent filed with the Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court of Manila a civil action for declaration of nullity of her marriage with petitioner contracted on September
26, 1978, based on the ground that private respondent consented to entering into the marriage, which was petitioner
Donato's second one, since she had no previous knowledge that petitioner was already married to a certain Rosalinda R.
Maluping on June 30, 1978.

Petitioner Donato's answer in the civil case for nullity interposed the defense that his second marriage was void since it
was solemnized without a marriage license and that force, violence, intimidation and undue influence were employed by
private respondent to obtain petitioner's consent to the marriage. Prior to the solemnization of the subsequent or second
marriage, petitioner and private respondent had lived together and deported themselves as husband and wife without the
benefit of wedlock for a period of at least five years as evidenced by a joint affidavit executed by them on September 26,
1978, for which reason, the requisite marriage license was dispensed with pursuant to Article 76 of the New Civil Code
pertaining to marriages of exceptional character.

Prior to the date set for the trial on the merits of Criminal Case No. 43554, petitioner filed a motion to suspend the
proceedings of said case contending that Civil Case No. E-02627 seeking the annulment of his second marriage
filed by private respondent raises a prejudicial question which must first be determined or decided before the
criminal case can proceed.

In an order dated April 7, 1980. Hon. Artemon D. Luna denied the motion to suspend the proceedings in Criminal Case No.
43554 for bigamy. Respondent judge's basis for denial is the ruling laid down in the case of Landicho vs. Relova. 1 The order
further directed that the proceedings in the criminal case can proceed as scheduled.

A motion for reconsideration was flied by herein petitioner thru counsel citing as one of his grounds for suspension of
proceedings the ruling laid down by this Court in the case of De la Cruz vs. Ejercito 2 which was a much later case than that
cited by respondent judge in his order of denial.
The motion for reconsideration of the said order was likewise denied in an order dated April 14, 1980, for lack of merit.
Hence, the present petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction.

Issue:
1. Whether or not the pending civil case for annulment raises a prejudicial question to merit the suspension of the
criminal case for bigamy.
2. Whether or not the second marriage could be considered void due to the presence of force, intimidation, and
violence as alleged
Ruling: (Direct Answer to Issue)
1. No, it does not
Ratio:
1. A prejudicial question has been defined to be one which arises in a case, the resolution of which question is a
logical antecedent of the issue involved in said case, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. 3 It
is one based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines
the guilt or innocence of the accused, and for it to suspend the criminal action, it must appear not only that said
case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based but also that
in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would
necessarily be determined. 4 A prejudicial question usually comes into play in a situation where a civil action and a
criminal action may proceed, because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be
determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or innocence of the accused in a criminal case.

The requisites of a prejudicial question do not obtain in the case at bar. It must be noted that the issue before
the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court touching upon the nullity of the second marriage is not determinative
10
 of petitioner Donato's guilt or innocence in the crime of bigamy. Furthermore, it was petitioner's second wife, the
herein private respondent Paz B. Abayan who filed the complaint for annulment of the second marriage on the
ground that her consent was obtained through deceit.

Petitioner Donato raised the argument that the second marriage should have been declared null and void on the
ground of force, threats and intimidation allegedly employed against him by private respondent only sometime
later when he was required to answer the civil action for anulment of the second marriage. In the case at bar,
petitioner has not even sufficiently shown that his consent to the second marriage has been obtained by the use of
threats, force and intimidation.

Petitioner Donato cannot apply the rule on prejudicial questions since a case for annulment of marriage
can be considered as a prejudicial question to the bigamy case against the accused only if it is proved that
the petitioner's consent to such marriage was obtained by means of duress, violence and intimidation in
order to establish that his act in the subsequent marriage was an involuntary one and as such the same
cannot be the basis for conviction. The preceding elements do not exist in the case at bar.

2. Donato has not sufficiently shown evidence that there was lack of consent to the second marriage and that such
consent was obtained through use of force and intimidation.

Obviously, petitioner merely raised the issue of prejudicial question to evade the prosecution of the criminal case.
The records reveal that prior to petitioner's second marriage on September 26, 1978, he had been living with
private respondent Paz B. Abayan as husband and wife for more than five years without the benefit of marriage.
Thus, petitioner's averments that his consent was obtained by private respondent through force, violence,
intimidation and undue influence in entering a subsequent marriage is belied by the fact that both petitioner and
private respondent executed an affidavit which stated that they had lived together as husband and wife without
benefit of marriage for five years, one month and one day until their marital union was formally ratified by the
second marriage and that it was private respondent who eventually filed the civil action for nullity.

Another event which militates against petitioner's contentions is the fact that it was only when Civil Case No. E-
02627 was filed on September 28, 1979, or more than the lapse of one year from the solemnization of the second
marriage that petitioner came up with the story that his consent to the marriage was secured through the use of
force, violence, intimidation and undue influence. Petitioner also continued to live with private respondent until
November 1978, when the latter left their abode upon learning that Leonilo Donato was already previously
married.

Accordingly, there being no prejudicial question shown to exit the order of denial issued by the respondent judge
dated April 14, 1980 should be sustained.

Relevant Dissent-Concurring Opinion/Notes:

11
Case Title: Date: July 3, 1992
DOROTHY B. TERRE, complainant, vs. ATTY.
JORDAN TERRE, respondent. G.R. No.: A.M. 2349
Ponente: Per Curiam
Nature of Action: disbarment
Topic: void marriages; bigamous
Facts:
 Dorothy and Jordan Terre met for the first time in 1979 as 4th yr high school classmates
o At that time, Dorothy was already married to Merlito Bercenilla
o Jordan was aware of the existence of said marriage, yet, he still pursued Dorothy
 Dorothy and Jordan pursued their education in Manila, where Jordan studied law at Lyceum University.
 Jordan continued courting Dorothy , this time with more persistence; she decided nothing would come of it since
she was married but he explained to her that their marriage was void ab initio since she and her first
husband were first cousins; convinced by his explanation and having secured favorable advice from her mother
and ex-in-laws, she agreed to marry him.
o In their marriage license, despite her objection, Jordan wrote "single" as her status explaining that since her
marriage was void ab initio, there was no need to go to court to declare it as such
o They were married before Judge Priscilla Mijares of the City Court of Manila on June 14, 1977
 Jason Terre was born of their union on June 25, 1981
 In the same year, Jordan disappeared.
 Dorothy was unaware of the reason for his disappearance until she found out later that Jordan married a certain
Vilma Malicdem
 As a result, Dorothy filed the following cases:
o A criminal case for abandonment of minor
o A criminal case for bigamy
o An administrative case before Commission on Audit, where Jordan was employed  this case was
dismissed for being moot since Jordan was automatically separated from his employment due to AWOL.
o This present case for disbarment for “gross immoral conduct,” for contracting a second marriage and living
with another woman other than complainant, while his prior marriage with complainant remained
subsisting.
 Jordan successfully evaded 5 attempts of service of the Court’s Resolution before he filed an Answer in this
disbarment case.
o Jordan claims that he had believed in good faith that his prior marriage with complainant Dorothy Terre
was null and void ab initio and that no action for a judicial declaration of nullity was necessary.
o He further claimed that the child she was then carrying (i.e., Jason Terre) was the son of Bercenilla
 In Dorothy’s Reply, she said that Jason Terre was the child of Merlito A. Bercenilla and insisted that
Jason was the child of respondent Jordan Terre, as evidenced by Jason's Birth Certificate and
physical resemblance to respondent. Dorothy further explained that while she had given birth to
Jason Terre at the PAFGH registered as a dependent of Merlito Bercenilla, she had done so out of
extreme necessity and to avoid risk of death or injury to the fetus which happened to be in a
difficult breech position. According to Dorothy, she had then already been abandoned by
respondent Jordan Terre, leaving her penniless and without means to pay for the medical and
hospital bills arising by reason of her pregnancy.

Issue: WON the marriage of Dorothy with Jordan is void for being bigamous?

Ruling: (Direct Answer to Issue) NO

Ratio:
 The Court considers this claim on the part of respondent Jordan Terre as a spurious defense. In the first place,
respondent has not rebutted complainant's evidence as to the basic facts which underscores the bad faith of
respondent Terre. In the second place, that pretended defense is the same argument by which he had inveigled
complainant into believing that her prior marriage to Merlito A. Bercenilla being incestuous and void ab initio
(Dorothy and Merlito being allegedly first cousins to each other), she was free to contract a second marriage with
the respondent. Respondent Jordan Terre, being a lawyer, knew or should have known that such an argument ran
counter to the prevailing case law of this Court which holds that for purposes of determining whether a person is
legally free to contract a second marriage, a judicial declaration that the first marriage was null and void ab initio is
essential. 8 Even if we were to assume, arguendo merely, that Jordan Terre held that mistaken belief in good faith,
the same result will follow. For if we are to hold Jordan Terre to his own argument, his first marriage to
complainant Dorothy Terre must be deemed valid, with the result that his second marriage to Helina Malicdem

12
 must be regarded as bigamous and criminal in character.

 That the moral character of respondent Jordan Terre was deeply flawed is shown by other circumstances. As noted,
he convinced the complainant that her prior marriage to Bercenilla was null and void ab initio, that she was still
legally single and free to marry him. When complainant and respondent had contracted their marriage, respondent
went through law school while being supported by complainant, with some assistance from respondent's parents.
After respondent had finished his law course and gotten complainant pregnant, respondent abandoned the
complainant without support and without the wherewithal for delivering his own child safely in a hospital.

 We believe and so hold that the conduct of respondent Jordan Terre in inveigling complainant Dorothy Terre to
contract a second marriage with him; in abandoning complainant Dorothy Terre after she had cared for him and
supported him through law school, leaving her without means for the safe delivery of his own child; in contracting a
second marriage with Helina Malicdem while his first marriage with complainant Dorothy Terre was subsisting,
constituted "grossly immoral conduct" under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, affording more than
sufficient basis for disbarment of respondent Jordan Terre. He was unworthy of admission to the Bar in the first
place. The Court will correct this error forthwith.

13
CASE NAME: REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. YOLANDA CADACIO GRANADA, Respondent.

CASE NUMBER/ DATE: G.R. No. 187512 dated June 13, 2012
PONENTE: SERENO, J.
NATURE OF THE ACTION: Petition to have Cyrus (husband) declared presumptively dead.

FACTS:
1. In May 1991, Yolanda Granada (respondent) met Cyrus Granada at Sumida Electric Philippines where both were
then working.
2. They got married at the Manila City Hall on 3 March 1993 and they begotten a son, Cyborg Dean Cadacio Granada.
3. Three years after they met (May 1994), Sumida Electric Philippines closed down. Cyrus went to Taiwan to seek
employment.
4. Yolanda claimed that from that time, she had not received any communication from her husband, notwithstanding
efforts to locate him. Her brother testified that he had asked the relatives of Cyrus regarding the latter’s
whereabouts, to no avail.
5. After nine (9) years of waiting, Yolanda filed a Petition to have Cyrus declared presumptively dead. The Petition
was raffled to Presiding Judge Avelino Demetria of RTC Branch 85, Lipa City.
6. On 7 February 2005, the RTC rendered a Decision declaring Cyrus as presumptively dead.
7. On 10 March 2005, petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
filed a Motion for Reconsideration of this Decision.
a. Petitioner argued: Yolanda had failed to exert earnest efforts to locate Cyrus and thus failed to prove her well-founded
belief that he was already dead.
b. RTC denied the motion.
8. Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal to elevate the case to the CA, presumably under Rule 41, Section 2(a) of the
Rules of Court.
a. Yolanda filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the CA had no jurisdiction over the appeal.
She argued: her Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death, based on Article 41 of the Family Code,
was a summary judicial proceeding, in which the judgment is immediately final and executory and, thus,
not appealable.
b. Ruling of the appellate court: granted Yolanda’s Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
i. Ground for dismissal: Republic v. Bermudez-Lorino
[A] petition for declaration of presumptive death under Rule 41 of the Family Code is a summary
proceeding. Thus, judgment thereon is immediately final and executory upon notice to the
parties.
c. Petitioner moved for reconsideration. The motion was denied.
9. The case is elevated on with the supreme Court based on Rule 45 Petition seeking the reversal of the Resolution
issued by the Court of Appeals (CA), which affirmed the grant by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of the Petition for
Declaration of Presumptive Death of the absent spouse of respondent.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not a ruling on the presumption of death is indeed a summary proceeding, hence “immediately final and
executory”;
2. Whether or not the CA, in affirming the decision of the RTC, erred in ruling for the declaration of Cyrus Granda’s
presumptive death.
RULING: YES/ YES.
1. [A] petition for declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse for the purpose of contracting a subsequent
marriage under Article 41 of the Family Code is a summary proceeding "as provided for" under the Family Code.
Taken together, Articles 41, 238, 247 and 253 of the Family Code provide that since a petition for declaration of
presumptive death is a summary proceeding, the judgment of the court therein shall be immediately final and
executory.
2. The Republic’s arguments are well-taken (see point highlighted in the facts). Nevertheless, we are constrained to
deny the Petition.
The RTC ruling on the issue of whether respondent was able to prove her "well-founded belief" that her absent
spouse was already dead prior to her filing of the Petition to declare him presumptively dead is already final and
can no longer be modified or reversed. Indeed, "[n]othing is more settled in law than that when a judgment
becomes final and executory, it becomes immutable and unalterable. The same may no longer be modified in any
respect, even if the modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or
law."
RATIO:
1. By express provision of law, the judgment of the court in a summary proceeding shall be immediately final and
executory. As a matter of course, it follows that no appeal can be had of the trial court's judgment in a summary
proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code. It
goes without saying, however, that an aggrieved party may file a petition for certiorari to question abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Such petition should be filed in the Court of Appeals in accordance
14
 with the Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts. To be sure, even if the Court's original jurisdiction to issue a writ of
certiorari is concurrent with the RTCs and the Court of Appeals in certain cases, such concurrence does not
sanction an unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum. From the decision of the Court of Appeals, the losing
party may then file a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court with the Supreme Court.
This is because the errors which the court may commit in the exercise of jurisdiction are merely errors of
judgment which are the proper subject of an appeal.
In sum, under Article 41 of the Family Code, the losing party in a summary proceeding for the declaration of
presumptive death may file a petition for certiorari with the CA on the ground that, in rendering judgment
thereon, the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. From the decision of
the CA, the aggrieved party may elevate the matter to this Court via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court.
Evidently then, the CA did not commit any error in dismissing the Republic’s Notice of Appeal on the ground that
the RTC judgment on the Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death of respondent’s spouse was immediately
final and executory and, hence, not subject to ordinary appeal.
2. The Civil Code provision merely requires either that there be no news that the absentee is still alive; or that the
absentee is generally considered to be dead and is believed to be so by the spouse present, or is presumed dead
under Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code. In comparison, the Family Code provision prescribes a "well-founded
belief" that the absentee is already dead before a petition for declaration of presumptive death can be granted. As
noted by the Court in that case, the four requisites for the declaration of presumptive death under the
Family Code are as follows:
a. That the absent spouse has been missing for four consecutive years, or two consecutive years if the
disappearance occurred where there is danger of death under the circumstances laid down in Article 391,
Civil Code;
b. That the present spouse wishes to remarry;
c. That the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the absentee is dead; and
d. That the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of the
absentee.
xxx
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph, the spouse present must
institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee,
without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.
The spouse present is, thus, burdened to prove that his spouse has been absent and that he has a well-founded
belief that the absent spouse is already dead before the present spouse may contract a subsequent marriage. The
law does not define what is meant by a well-grounded belief. Cuello Callon writes that "es menester que su creencia
sea firme se funde en motivos racionales."
The belief of the present spouse must be the result of proper and honest to goodness inquiries and efforts to
ascertain the whereabouts of the absent spouse and whether the absent spouse is still alive or is already dead.
Whether or not the spouse present acted on a well-founded belief of death of the absent spouse depends upon the
inquiries to be drawn from a great many circumstances occurring before and after the disappearance of the
absent spouse and the nature and extent of the inquiries made by present spouse. (Footnotes omitted,
underscoring supplied.)
Applying the foregoing standards to the present case, petitioner points out that respondent Yolanda did not
initiate a diligent search to locate her absent husband. While her brother Diosdado Cadacio testified to having
inquired about the whereabouts of Cyrus from the latter’s relatives, these relatives were not presented to
corroborate Diosdado’s testimony. In short, respondent was allegedly not diligent in her search for her husband.
Petitioner argues that if she were, she would have sought information from the Taiwanese Consular Office or
assistance from other government agencies in Taiwan or the Philippines. She could have also utilized mass media
for this end, but she did not. Worse, she failed to explain these omissions.
The Republic’s arguments are well-taken (see point highlighted in the facts). Nevertheless, we are constrained to
deny the Petition.
The RTC ruling on the issue of whether respondent was able to prove her "well-founded belief" that her absent
spouse was already dead prior to her filing of the Petition to declare him presumptively dead is already final and
can no longer be modified or reversed. Indeed, "[n]othing is more settled in law than that when a judgment
becomes final and executory, it becomes immutable and unalterable. The same may no longer be modified in any
respect, even if the modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or
law."
DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated 23
January 2009 and 3 April 2009 in CA-G.R. CV No. 90165 are AFFIRMED.

15
Case Title: Date: December 10, 2013

G.R. No.: No. 184621

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, Ponente: BRION, J., En Banc

vs. MARIA FE ESPINOSA CANTOR, respondent. Nature of Action: Petition for review on certiorari

Topic: Bigamous and Polygamous Marriages; Article 41.

Facts:

 The respondent and Jerry were married on September 20, 1997. They lived together as husband and wife in their
conjugal dwelling in Agan Homes, Koronadal City, South Cotabato.
 Sometime in January 1998, the couple had a violent quarrel brought about by:
(1) the respondent's inability to reach "sexual climax" whenever she and Jerry would have intimate moments; and
(2) Jerry's expression of animosity toward the respondent's father.

 After their quarrel, Jerry left their conjugal dwelling and this was the last time that the respondent ever saw him. Since
then, she had not seen, communicated nor heard anything from Jerry or about his whereabouts.
 On May 21, 2002, or more than four (4) years from the time of Jerry's disappearance, the respondent filed a petition for
her husband's declaration of presumptive death. She claimed that she had a well-founded belief that Jerry was already
dead.
 She alleged that she had inquired from her mother-in-law, her brothers-in-law, her sisters-in-law, as well as her
neighbors and friends, but to no avail. In the hopes of finding Jerry, she also allegedly made it a point to check the
patients' directory whenever she went to a hospital. All these earnest efforts, the respondent claimed, proved futile,
prompting her to file the petition in court.

RTC: After due proceedings, the RTC issued an order granting the respondent's petition and declaring Jerry presumptively
dead. It concluded that the respondent had a well-founded belief that her husband was already dead since more than four
(4) years had passed without the former receiving any news about the latter or his whereabouts.

CA: The case reached the CA through a petition for certiorari 6 filed by the petitioner, Republic of the Philippines, through
the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG). In its August 27, 2008 decision, the CA dismissed the petitioner's petition, finding
no grave abuse of discretion on the RTC's part, and, accordingly, fully affirmed the latter's order. The petitioner brought
the matter via a Rule 45 petition before this Court.

Issue: W/N the respondent had a well-founded belief that her spouse is already dead

Ruling: No. The Court is of the view that the respondent merely engaged in a "passive search" where she relied on
uncorroborated inquiries from her in-laws, neighbors and friends. She failed to conduct a diligent search because her
alleged efforts are insufficient to form a well-founded belief that her husband was already dead.

Ratio:

Before a judicial declaration of presumptive death can be obtained, it must be shown that the prior spouse had been
absent for four consecutive years and the present spouse had a well-founded belief that the prior spouse was already dead.
Under Article 41 of the Family Code, there are four (4) essential requisites for the declaration of presumptive death:

1. That the absent spouse has been missing for four consecutive years, or two consecutive years if the disappearance

16
occurred where there is danger of death under the circumstances laid down in Article 391, Civil Code;

2. That the present spouse wishes to remarry;

3. That the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the absentee is dead; and

4. That the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee.

The burden of proof rests on the present spouse to show that all the requisites under Article 41 of the Family Code are
present. Since it is the present spouse who, for purposes of declaration of presumptive death, substantially asserts the
affirmative of the issue, it stands to reason that the burden of proof lies with him/her. He who alleges a fact has the burden
of proving it and mere allegation is not evidence.

The law did not define what is meant by "well-founded belief." It depends upon the circumstances of each particular case.
To be able to comply with this requirement, the present spouse must prove that his/her belief was the result of diligent
and reasonable efforts and inquiries to locate the absent spouse and that based on these efforts and inquiries, he/she
believes that under the circumstances, the absent spouse is already dead. It requires exertion of active effort (not a mere
passive one).

In the case at bar, the respondent's "well-founded belief" was anchored on her alleged "earnest efforts" to locate Jerry,
which consisted of the following:

(1) She made inquiries about Jerry's whereabouts from her in-laws, neighbors and friends; and

(2) Whenever she went to a hospital, she saw to it that she looked through the patients' directory, hoping to find Jerry.

These efforts, however, fell short of the "stringent standard" and degree of diligence required by jurisprudence
for the following reasons:

First, the respondent did not actively look for her missing husband. She did not purposely undertake a diligent search for
her husband as her hospital visits were not planned nor primarily directed to look for him. This Court thus considers these
attempts insufficient to engender a belief that her husband is dead.

Second, she did not report Jerry's absence to the police nor did she seek the aid of the authorities to look for him. While a
finding of well-founded belief varies with the nature of the situation in which the present spouse is placed, under present
conditions, we find it proper and prudent for a present spouse, whose spouse had been missing, to seek the aid of the
authorities or, at the very least, report his/her absence to the police.

Third, she did not present as witnesses Jerry's relatives or their neighbors and friends, who can corroborate her efforts to
locate Jerry. Worse, these persons, from whom she allegedly made inquiries, were not even named.

17
Lastly, there was no other corroborative evidence to support the respondent's claim that she conducted a diligent search.
Neither was there supporting evidence proving that she had a well-founded belief other than her bare claims that she
inquired from her friends and in-laws about her husband's whereabouts.

Relevant Dissent-Concurring Opinion/Notes:

The requisite judicial declaration of presumptive death of the absent spouse (and consequently, the application of a
stringent standard for its issuance) is also for the present spouse's benefit. It is intended to protect him/her from a
criminal prosecution of bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code which might come into play if he/she
would prematurely remarry sans the court's declaration.

Upon the issuance of the decision declaring his/her absent spouse presumptively dead, the present spouse's good
faith in contracting a second marriage is effectively established. The decision of the competent court constitutes
sufficient proof of his/her good faith and his/her criminal intent in case of remarriage is effectively negated. 28 Thus, for
purposes of remarriage, it is necessary to strictly comply with the stringent standard and have the absent spouse judicially
declared presumptively dead.

18
Jones v. Hortiguela (1937)
Petition: Appeal from Order of Cebu CFI
In re Instate of the deceased Marciana Escaño.
Petitioner-appellant-appellee: ANGELITA JONES
Oppositor-appellant-appellee: FELIX HORTIGUELA, as administrator, widower and heir
Ponente: J. Concepcion
Date: 3 March 1937

Facts:
 December 1914 – Marciana marries Arthur Jones
o 10 January 1918 – Jones secured passport; never heard from again
 October 1919 – Proceedings to have Arthur judicially declared as missing
o 25 Oct 1919 – Court declared Arthur as an absentee with the proviso that said judicial declaration of
absence would not take effect until six months after its publication in the official newspapers [Art. 186,
Old Civil Code]
o 23 April 1921 – the court issued another order for the taking effect of the declaration of absence,
publication thereof having been made in the Official Gazette and in "El Ideal."
 6 May 1927 – Marciana and Felix marry
 Marciana Escaño had died intestate [w/o will]: judicial declaration of only two heirs (Order issued 9 May 1932):
o Felix Hortiguela (husband) – appointed judicial administrator of estate
 Charged P10,000 as administrator’s fees, approved 10 January 1933
 Project of Partition and Final Account approved, 26 June 1933
o Angelita Jones (daughter, by first marriage)
 3 March 1934 – Angelita filed a motion alleging that she was the only heir of her mother, Marciana:
o Never valid marriage between Mariana and Felix (null and void)
o Since no valid marriage, Felix not entitled to share in usufruct, 1/3 of inheritance
o Angelita was a minor during intestate proceedings – never assisted by counsel (Felix’s lawyers)
o Prayed for:
 Reopening of proceedings
 Her husband be appointed special administrator w/o bond
 Mariana-Felix marriage be declared null and void
 Partition of properties made by Felix be declared null and void; Angelita be declared only heir
 In case Mariana-Felix marriage not null and void, for Felix to not be entitled to usufruct; new
partition of properties; grant only P4/day administrator’s fees
 14 May 1935 – Cebu CFI denies:
o Motion to appoint new Admin.
o Setting aside original declaration of heirs
o Holding unwarranted declaring properties as paraphernal [control of wife] – reserving option for parties
to determine which are paraphernal and which are conjugal
o Setting aside order granting Admin. Fees = P10,000
o Ordering presentation of another project of partition
 Both parties appealed

Pertinent laws/provisions/concepts:
 Art 186 [Old Civil Code]  Declaration of Absence [Art. 384 to 386 in the new Civil Code?]

Art. 384. Two years having elapsed without any news about the absentee or since the receipt of the last news, and five
years in case the absentee has left a person in charge of the administration of his property, his absence may be declared.

Art. 385. The following may ask for the declaration of absence:
(1) The spouse present;
(2) The heirs instituted in a will, who may present an authentic copy of the same;
(3) The relatives who may succeed by the law of intestacy;
(4) Those who may have over the property of the absentee some right subordinated to the condition of his death. (185)

Art. 386. The judicial declaration of absence shall not take effect until six months after its publication in a newspaper of
general circulation. (186a)

Issues:
1. Was the Marciana-Felix marriage valid?
2. Was Felix entitled to inherit in usufruct – in testate or intestate succession.

19
Ruling:
1. YES.
 The requisite minimum 7 years had elapsed since the spouse from the previous
marriage had been absent.
 Note that marriage contract not registered in municipality of Malitbog, but this
is not a ground for having the marriage declared null and void – recall that the
marriage contract is neither an essential nor formal requisite. [See Madridejo vs.
De Leon (1931), and U. S. vs. De Vera (1914)]
2. YES
 By virtue of his valid marriage to Marciana.
 Consequently, Court Order approving Project of Partition and Final Account also valid.

Ratio Decidendi:
(1) “In accordance with the foregoing legal provision, the absence of Marciana Escaño's former husband should be
counted from January 10, 1918, the date on which the last news concerning Arthur W. Jones was received, and
from said date to May 6, 1927, more than nine years elapsed. Said marriage is, therefore, valid and lawful.”
 Angelita had tried to establish that the absence of Marciana’s previous husband should have begun to be
counted on 23 April 1921 – thus the gap between absence of the previous marriage
 But Angelita, seemed to have also presumed the death of the previous spouse as well, considering how
she treated Felix as her true stepfather [even living with Marciana and Felix
 Sec. 334, No. 24, of the Code of Civil Procedure, a person not heard from in seven years is presumed to be
dead.
(2) “Inasmuch as Felix Hortiguela was lawfully married to Marciana Escaño and was divorced from her at the time of
her death there is no doubt that he is entitled to inherit in usufruct, not only in testate but also in intestate
succession”

Opinions:

 No separate opinions.

Decision: reverses the appealed order of March 14, 1935, in so far as it set aside the order of January 10, 1933, relative to
the administrator's fees and the order of June 26, 1933, approving the final account and the project of portion…

Principles: Marriage when one spouse is absent.

20
Case Title: Date: August 31, 1948

Petition for the presumption of death of Nicolai G.R. No. L-1780

Szatraw. CONSUELO SORS, petitioner-appellant.
Nature of Action: Petition for the presumption of death
Ponente: PADILLA, J.

Topic: Reappearance of Absent Spouse

Facts:
Consuelo Sors is the lawful wife of Nicolas Szatraw, a Polish citizen, to whom she was married in Manila on November,
1936, and whom she bore a child named Alexis Szatraw. She alleged that on February, 1940, her husband departed from
the conjugal abode carrying the child along with him and never returned.

She made inquiries and and learned that her husband and child had left for Shanghai, however, upon information from
some Polish citizens who lived there, Szatraw had not been seen there. Thereafter, all her efforts to know the whereabouts
of her husband and child were put in vain.

Because of her husband's absence for more than seven years during which she has not heard any news from him and
about her child, she believes that he is dead, Consuelo Sors prays that her husband be declared dead and that her parental
authority over her child, should the latter be alive and later on appear, be preserved.

The evidence shows that she and her husband did not acquire any property during their marriage and that his life was not
insured.

Issue: W/N the petition for declaration that the petitioner's husband is presumptively dead should be allowed.

Ruling: (Direct Answer to Issue)

No. If a judicial decree declaring a person presumptively dead, because he had not been heard from in seven years, cannot
become final and executory even after the lapse of the reglementary period within which an appeal may be taken, for such
presumption is still disputable and remains subject to contrary proof, then a petition for such a declaration is useless,
unnecessary, superfluous and of no benefit to the petitioner. The Court should not waste its valuable time and be made to
perform a superfluous and meaningless act.
Ratio:
In this case, there is no right to be enforced nor is there a remedy prayed for by the petitioner against her absent husband.
Neither is there a prayer for the final determination of his right or status or for the ascertainment of a particular fact for
the petition does not pray for a declaration that the petitioner's husband is dead, but merely asks for a declaration that he
be presumed dead because he had been unheard from in seven years.
This declaration, even if judicially made, would not improve the petitioner's situation, because such a presumption is
already established by law. A judicial pronouncement to that effect, even if final and executory, would still be a prima facie
presumption only. It is still disputable. It is for that reason that it cannot be the subject of a judicial pronouncement or
declaration, if it is the only question or matter involved in a case, or upon which a competent court has to pass.
The latter must decide finally the controversy between the parties, or determine finally the right or status of a party or
establish finally a particular fact, out of which certain rights and obligations arise or may arise; and once such controversy
is decided by a final judgement, or such right or status determined, or such particular fact established, by a final decree,
then the judgement on the subject of the controversy, or the decree upon the right or status of a party or upon the
existence of a particular fact, becomes res judicata, subject to no collateral attack, except in a few rare instances especially
provided by law.

21
066 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. COURT
OF APPEALS and RORIDEL OLAVIANO MOLINA,
respondents. G.R. No. 108763 February 13,
1997
TOPIC: Psychological Incapacity
PONENTE: Panganiban, J.
Psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (nor
physical) incapacity and that (t)here is hardly any doubt that the
intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of
'psychological incapacity' to the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to
give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychological
condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated.

Psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity,

(b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability.
FACTS:
August 16, 1990: Respondent Roridel O. Molina filed a verified petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage to
Reynaldo Molina. The petition alleged that Roridel and Reynaldo were married on April 14, 1985 at the San Agustin
Church 4 in Manila; that a son, Andre O. Molina was born; that after a year of marriage, Reynaldo showed signs of
"immaturity and irresponsibility" as a husband and a father since he preferred to spend more time with his peers and
friends on whom he squandered his money; that he depended on his parents for aid and assistance, and was never honest
with his wife in regard to their finances, resulting in frequent quarrels between them; that sometime in February 1986,
Reynaldo was relieved of his job in Manila, and since then Roridel had been the sole breadwinner of the family; that in
October 1986 the couple had a very intense quarrel, as a result of which their relationship was estranged; that in March
1987, Roridel resigned from her job in Manila and went to live with her parents in Baguio City; that a few weeks later,
Reynaldo left Roridel and their child, and had since then abandoned them; that Reynaldo had thus shown that he was
psychologically incapable of complying with essential marital obligations and was a highly immature and habitually
quarrel some individual who thought of himself as a king to be served; and that it would be to the couple's best interest to
have their marriage declared null and void in order to free them from what appeared to be an incompatible marriage from
the start.

In his Answer, Reynaldo admitted that he and Roridel could no longer live together as husband and wife, but contended
that their misunderstandings and frequent quarrels were due to (1) Roridel's strange behavior of insisting on maintaining
her group of friends even after their marriage; (2) Roridel's refusal to perform some of her marital duties such as cooking
meals; and (3) Roridel's failure to run the household and handle their finances.

Stipulations during pre-trial:

1. That the parties herein were legally married on April 14, 1985 at the Church of St. Augustine, Manila;
2. That out of their marriage, a child named Albert Andre Olaviano Molina was born on July 29, 1986;
3. That the parties are separated-in-fact for more than three years;
4. That petitioner is not asking support for her and her child;
5. That the respondent is not asking for damages;
6. That the common child of the parties is in the custody of the petitioner wife.

Evidence for herein respondent wife consisted of her own testimony and that of her friends Rosemarie Ventura and Maria
Leonora Padilla as well as of Ruth G. Lalas, a social worker, and of Dr. Teresita Hidalgo-Sison, a psychiatrist of the Baguio
General Hospital and Medical Center. She also submitted documents. Reynaldo did not present any evidence as he
appeared only during the pre-trial conference.

The trial court rendered judgment declaring the marriage void. The appeal of petitioner was denied by the Court of
Appeals, which affirmed in toto the RTC's decision. Hence, the present recourse.

In his petition, the Solicitor General insists, "the CA made an erroneous and incorrect interpretation of the phrase
'psychological incapacity' (as provided under Art. 36 of the Family Code) and made an incorrect application thereof to the
facts of the case," adding that the appealed Decision tended "to establish in effect the most liberal divorce procedure
in the world which is anathema to our culture."

Petitioner Republic argues that "opposing and conflicting personalities" is not equivalent to psychological incapacity,
explaining that such ground "is not simply the neglect by the parties to the marriage of their responsibilities and duties,
but a defect in their psychological nature which renders them incapable of performing such marital responsibilities and
duties."

ISSUE: WON the marriage of Roridel Olaviano to Reynaldo Molina is void on the ground of psychological incapacity?

HELD: No. The marriage of Roridel Olaviano to Reynaldo Molina subsists and remains valid. In the case of Reynaldo, there
is no showing that his alleged personality traits were constitutive of psychological incapacity existing at the time of
marriage celebration. While some effort was made to prove that there was a failure to fulfill pre-nuptial impressions of
22
"thoughtfulness and gentleness" on Reynaldo's part of being "conservative, homely and intelligent" on the part of Roridel,
such failure of expectation is nor indicative of antecedent psychological incapacity. The evidence adduced by respondent
merely showed that she and her husband could nor get along with each other. There had been no showing of the gravity of
the problem; neither its juridical antecedence nor its incurability. The expert testimony of Dr. Sison showed no incurable
psychiatric disorder but only incompatibility, not psychological incapacity.

RATIO: The petition is meritorious. In Leouel Santos vs. Court of Appeals this Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice Vitug, ruled
that "psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (nor physical) incapacity . . . and that (t)here is
hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of 'psychological incapacity' to
the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is
celebrated." Justice Vitug wrote that "the psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical
antecedence, and (c) incurability."

In the present case, there is no clear showing to us that the psychological defect spoken of is an incapacity. It
appears to us to be more of a "difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of some marital
obligations. Mere showing of "irreconciliable differences" and "conflicting personalities" in no wise constitutes
psychological incapacity. It is not enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties
as married persons; it is essential that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological
(nor physical) illness.

The evidence adduced by respondent merely showed that she and her husband could nor get along with each
other. There had been no showing of the gravity of the problem; neither its juridical antecedence nor its
incurability. The expert testimony of Dr. Sison showed no incurable psychiatric disorder but only incompatibility,
not psychological incapacity. Dr. Sison testified:
Q It is therefore the recommendation of the psychiatrist based on your findings that it is better for the Court to
annul (sic) the marriage?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q There is no hope for the marriage?
A There is no hope, the man is also living with another woman.
Q Is it also the stand of the psychiatrist that the parties are psychologically unfit for each other but they are
psychologically fit with other parties?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q Neither are they psychologically unfit for their professions?
A Yes, Your Honor.

In the case of Reynaldo, there is no showing that his alleged personality traits were constitutive of psychological incapacity
existing at the time of marriage celebration. While some effort was made to prove that there was a failure to fulfill pre-
nuptial impressions of "thoughtfulness and gentleness" on Reynaldo's part of being "conservative, homely and intelligent"
on the part of Roridel, such failure of expectation is nor indicative of antecedent psychological incapacity. If at all, it merely
shows love's temporary blindness to the faults and blemishes of the beloved.

The following guidelines in the interpretation and application of Art. 36 of the Family Code are hereby handed down
for the guidance of the bench and the bar:

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is
rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family.
Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It
decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the
family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state.

The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes the permanence,
inviolability and solidarity

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged
in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the
Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological — not physical. Although its manifestations
and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was
mentally or physically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or
knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given
here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root
23
 cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature explained. Expert evidence
may be given qualified psychiatrist and clinical psychologists.

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. The
evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's." The manifestation
of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior
thereto.

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such
incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against
everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations,
not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a
pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not
be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of
marriage.

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential
obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional
outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, nor a
refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the
person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really
accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as
regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their
children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and
included in the text of the decision.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines,
while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by
the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which became effective in
1983 and which provides:
The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to assume the essential obligations of
marriage due to causes of psychological nature.
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws with the religious
faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight should be given
to decision of such appellate tribunal. Ideally — subject to our law on evidence — what is decreed as canonically
invalid should also be decreed civilly void.

This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose of the Family Code provision,
contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here, the State and the Church — while
remaining independent, separate and apart from each other — shall walk together in synodal cadence towards the
same goal of protecting and cherishing marriage and the family as the inviolable base of the nation.

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for
the state. No decision shall he handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted
in the decision, briefly staring therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the
petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification
within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General
shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.

In the instant case and applying Leouel Santos, we have already ruled to grant the petition. Such ruling becomes even more
cogent with the use of the foregoing guidelines.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The marriage of Roridel Olaviano to Reynaldo Molina subsists and remains valid.

CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE: see guidelines in the interpretation and application of Art. 36 of the Family Code

24
Case Title: Date: November 26, 2002
LENI O. CHOA, petitioner, vs. ALFONSO C. CHOA,
respondent. G.R. No.: G.R. No. 143376
Nature of Action: Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court
Ponente: Panganiban,J. (Third Division)
Topic: Psychological Incapacity
Facts:
Petitioner and respondent were married on March 15, 1981. Out of this union, two children were born, Cheryl Lynne and
Albryan. On October 27, 1993, respondent filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Negros Occidental a Complaint for
the annulment of his marriage to petitioner. Afterwards he filed an Amended Complaint dated November 8, 1993 for the
declaration of nullity of his marriage to petitioner based on her alleged psychological incapacity.

The case went to trial with respondent presenting his evidence in chief. After his last witness testified, he submitted his
Formal Offer of Exhibits dated February 20, 1998. Instead of offering any objection to it, petitioner filed a Motion to
Dismiss (Demurrer to Evidence) dated May 11, 1998. The lower court then allowed a number of pleadings to be filed
thereafter.

Finally, the RTC issued its December 2, 1998 Order denying petitioner’s Demurrer to Evidence. It held that "[respondent]
established a quantum of evidence that the [petitioner] must controvert." After her Motion for Reconsideration was denied
in the March 22, 1999 Order, petitioner elevated the case to the CA by way of a Petition for Certiorari.

The CA held that the denial of the demurrer was merely interlocutory; hence, certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
was not available. The proper remedy was for the defense to present evidence; and if an unfavorable decision was handed
down later, to take an appeal therefrom. In any event, no grave abuse of discretion was committed by respondent judge in
issuing the assailed Orders.

The CA also ruled that "the propriety of granting or denying a demurrer to evidence rests on the sound exercise of the
[trial] court’s discretion." Further, the "[p]etitioner failed to show that the issues in the court below [had] been resolved
arbitrarily or without basis."

Hence, this Petition.

Issue: Whether or not Alfonso Chua presented quantum evidence for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Leni on
the ground of psychological incapacity.
Ruling: (Direct Answer to Issue)
NO.
Ratio:
A demurrer to evidence is defined as "an objection or exception by one of the parties in an action at law, to the effect that
the evidence which his adversary produced is insufficient in point of law (whether true or not) to make out his case or
sustain the issue." The demurrer challenges the sufficiency of the plaintiff’s evidence to sustain a verdict. In passing upon
the sufficiency of the evidence raised in a demurrer, the court is merely required to ascertain whether there is competent
or sufficient proof to sustain the indictment or to support a verdict of guilt.

We have thoroughly reviewed the records of the present case, and we are convinced that the evidence against respondent
(herein petitioner) is grossly insufficient to support any finding of psychological incapacity that would warrant a
declaration of nullity of the parties’ marriage.

First. Respondent claims that the filing by petitioner of a series of charges against him are proof of the latter’s
psychological incapacity to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. These charges included Complaints for
perjury, false testimony, concubinage and deportation. According to him, the filing and the prosecution of these cases
clearly showed that his wife (herein petitioner) wanted not only to put him behind bars, but also to banish him from the
country. He contends that this "is very abnormal for a wife who, instead of protecting the name and integrity of her
husband as the father of her children, had acted to the contrary.

We do not agree. The documents presented by respondent during the trial do not in any way show the alleged
psychological incapacity of his wife. It is the height of absurdity and inequity to condemn her as psychologically
incapacitated to fulfill her marital obligations, simply because she filed cases against him. The evidence presented, even if
taken as true, merely establishes the prosecution of the cases against him. To rule that the filings are sufficient to establish
her psychological incapacity is not only totally erroneous, but also grave abuse of discretion bordering on absurdity.

Second. Neither is the testimony of respondent, taken by itself or in conjunction with his documentary offerings, sufficient

25
to prove petitioner’s alleged psychological incapacity.

Even if taken as true, the testimony of respondent basically complains about three aspects of petitioner’s personality;
namely, her alleged (1) lack of attention to their children, (2) immaturity and (3) lack of an "intention of procreative
sexuality." None of these three, singly or collectively, constitutes "psychological incapacity." Far from it.

In Santos v. CA, this Court clearly explained that "psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b)
juridical antecedence and (c) incurability." Said the Court:
"It should be obvious, looking at all the foregoing disquisitions, including, and most importantly, the
deliberations of the Family Code Revision Committee itself, that the use of the phrase ‘psychological
incapacity’ under Article 36 of the Code has not been meant to comprehend all such possible cases of
psychoses as, likewise mentioned by some ecclesiastical authorities, extremely low intelligence, immaturity,
and like circumstances (cited in Fr. Artemio Baluma's ‘Void and Voidable Marriages in the Family Code and
their Parallels in Canon Law,’ quoting from the Diagnostic Statistical Manual of Mental Disorder by the
American Psychiatric Association; Edward Hudson's ‘Handbook II for Marriage Nullity Cases’). Article 36 of
the Family Code cannot be taken and construed independently of but must stand in conjunction with,
existing precepts in our law on marriage. Thus correlated, ‘psychological incapacity’ should refer to no less
than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital
covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so
expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love,
respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law
has been to confine the meaning of ‘psychological incapacity’ to the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated."

Furthermore, in Republic v. Molina, we ruled that the psychological incapacity must be more than just a "difficulty," a
"refusal" or a "neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations. We stressed that a mere showing of irreconcilable
differences and conflicting personalities in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity.

In the case at bar, the evidence adduced by respondent merely shows that he and his wife could not get along with each
other. There was absolutely no showing of the gravity or juridical antecedence or incurability of the problems besetting
their marital union.

Sorely lacking in respondent’s evidence is proof that the psychological incapacity was grave enough to bring about the
disability of a party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. In Molina, we affirmed that "mild characterological
peculiarities, mood changes and occasional emotional outbursts cannot be accepted as root causes of psychological
incapacity. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill
will. In other words, there should be a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in
the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the
obligations essential to marriage."

Respondent’s pious peroration that petitioner "lacked the intention of procreative sexuality" is easily belied by the fact
that two children were born during their union. Moreover, there is absolutely no showing that the alleged "defect" was
already existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage.

Third. Most telling is the insufficiency, if not incompetency, of the supposed expert testimony presented by respondent.
His witness, Dr. Antonio M. Gauzon, utterly failed to identify and prove the root cause of the alleged psychological
incapacity. Specifically, his testimony did not show that the incapacity, if true, was medically or clinically permanent or
incurable. Neither did he testify that it was grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential
obligations of marriage.

His testimony established merely that the spouses had an "incompatibility," a "defect" that could possibly be treated or
alleviated through psychotherapy. We need not expound further on the patent insufficiency of the expert testimony to
establish the psychological incapacity of petitioner.

Furthermore, the assessment of petitioner by Dr. Gauzon was based merely on descriptions communicated to him by
respondent. The doctor never conducted any psychological examination of her. Neither did he ever claim to have done so.
In fact, his Professional Opinion began with the statement "[I]f what Alfonso Choa said about his wife Leni is true.

Obviously, Dr. Gauzon had no personal knowledge of the facts he testified to, as these had merely been relayed to him by
respondent. The former was working on pure suppositions and secondhand information fed to him by one side.
Consequently, his testimony can be dismissed as unscientific and unreliable.
26
Dr. Gauzon tried to save his credibility by asserting that he was able to assess petitioner’s character, not only through the
descriptions given by respondent, but also through the former’s at least fifteen hours of study of the voluminous transcript
of records of this case. Even if it took the good doctor a whole day or a whole week to examine the records of this case, we
still find his assessment of petitioner’s psychological state sorely insufficient and methodologically flawed.

As to respondent’s argument -- that because Dr. Gauzon’s testimony had never been objected to, the objection raised
thereafter was deemed waived -- the Supreme Court has already ruled on the matter. It held that although the question of
admissibility of evidence could not be raised for the first time on appeal, hearsay or unreliable evidence should be
disregarded whether objected to or not, because it has no probative value.

We are, of course, mindful of the ruling that a medical examination is not a conditio sine qua non to a finding of
psychological incapacity, so long as the totality of evidence presented is enough to establish the incapacity adequately.
Here, however, the totality of evidence presented by respondent was completely insufficient to sustain a finding of
psychological incapacity -- more so without any medical, psychiatric or psychological examination.

The trial court should have carefully studied and assessed the evidence presented by respondent and taken into account
the prevailing jurisprudence on the matter. It could then have easily concluded, as we conclude now, that it was useless to
proceed further with the tedious process of hearing contravening proof. His evidence was obviously, grossly and clearly
insufficient to support a declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity. Withal, it was grave abuse of
discretion for the RTC to deny the Demurrer and to violate or ignore this Court’s rulings in point. Indeed, continuing the
process of litigation would have been a total waste of time and money for the parties and an unwelcome imposition on the
trial court’s docket.

We have already ruled that grave abuse of discretion may arise when a lower court or tribunal violates or contravenes the
Constitution, the law or existing jurisprudence.53 Any decision, order or resolution of a lower court tantamount to
overruling a judicial pronouncement of the highest Court is unmistakably a very grave abuse of discretion.

There is no reason to believe that an appeal would prove to be a plain, speedy or adequate remedy in the case at bar. An
appeal would not promptly relieve petitioner from the injurious effects of the patently mistaken Orders maintaining the
baseless action of respondent. It would only compel her to go needlessly through a protracted trial, which would further
clog the court dockets with another futile case.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED and the assailed CA Decision REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondent’s
Demurrer to Evidence is GRANTED, and the case for declaration of nullity of marriage based on the alleged psychological
incapacity of petitioner is DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs.
Relevant Dissent-Concurring Opinion/Notes: N/A

27
Case Title: DIANA M. BARCELONA, petitioner, vs. COURT Date: September 24, 2003
OF APPEALS and TADEO R. BENGZON, respondents.
G.R. No.: 130087
Nature of Action:
Ponente: CARPIO, J.
Topic: Psychological Incapacity
Facts:

On 29 March 1995, private respondent Tadeo R. Bengzon (respondent Tadeo) filed a Petition for Annulment of Marriage
against petitioner Diana M. Barcelona (petitioner Diana). However, on 9 May 1995, respondent Tadeo filed a Motion to
Withdraw Petition which the trial court granted in its Order dated 7 June 1995.

On 21 July 1995, respondent Tadeo filed anew a Petition for Annulment of Marriage against petitioner Diana. Petitioner
Diana filed a Motion to Dismiss the second petition on two grounds. First, the second petition fails to state a cause of
action. Second, it violates SC Circular No. 04-94 on forum shopping (see Notes below for short discussion on the
procedural aspect of the case, just in case).

The trial court, through Judge Julieto P. Tabiolo, issued on 18 September 1996 an Order (first order) deferring resolution
of the Motion until the parties ventilate their arguments in a hearing. Petitioner Diana filed a motion for reconsideration.
However, the trial court, through Pairing Judge Rosalina L. Luna Pison, issued on 21 January 1997 an Order (second order)
denying the motion. In denying the motion for reconsideration, Judge Pison explained that when the ground for dismissal
is the complaints failure to state a cause of action, the trial court determines such fact solely from the petition itself. Judge
Pison held that contrary to petitioner Dianas claim, a perusal of the allegations in the petition shows that petitioner Diana
has violated respondent Tadeos right, thus giving rise to a cause of action. Judge Pison also rejected petitioner Dianas
claim that respondent Tadeo is guilty of forum shopping in filing the second petition. Judge Pison explained that when
respondent Tadeo filed the second petition, the first petition was no longer pending as it had been earlier dismissed
without prejudice.

The appellate court agreed with the trial court that the allegations in the second petition state a cause of action sufficient
to sustain a valid judgment if proven to be true. Hence, the petition for review with the Supreme Court.

Petitioner argues that following the rulings of Santos v. Court of Appeals, and Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina, the
SC adopted the new Rules on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages. She
cites Section 2, paragraph (d) of the new Rules, which provide:

“SEC. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages

What to allege. A petition under Article 36 of the Family Code shall specifically allege the complete facts showing that
either or both parties were psychologically incapacitated from complying with the essential marital obligations of
marriage at the time of the celebration of marriage even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its celebration.

The complete facts should allege the physical manifestations, if any, as are indicative of psychological incapacity
at the time of the celebration of the marriage but expert opinion need not be alleged. (Emphasis supplied)”

Petitioner Diana argues that the second petition falls short of the guidelines set forth in Santos and Molina. Specifically, she
contends that the second petition is defective because it fails to allege the root cause of the alleged psychological
incapacity. The second petition also fails to state that the alleged psychological incapacity existed from the celebration of
the marriage and that it is permanent or incurable. Further, the second petition is devoid of any reference of the grave
nature of the illness to bring about the disability of the petitioner to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Lastly,
the second petition did not even state the marital obligations which petitioner Diana allegedly failed to comply due to
psychological incapacity.

Respondent Tadeo argues that his petition does have a cause of action since his complaint contains the three essential
elements for a cause of action: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises; (2)
an obligation of the defendant to respect such right; and (3) the act or omission of the defendant violates the right of the
plaintiff.

Respondent Tadeo alleged that he and petitioner Diana were legally married at the Holy Cross Parish after a whirlwind
courtship as shown by the marriage contract attached to the petition. He further alleged that petitioner Diana was
psychologically incapacitated at the time of the celebration of their marriage to comply with the essential obligations of
marriage and such incapacity subsists up to the present time.
28
Issue: W/N the complaint filed by Respondent Tadeo was able to provide a cause of action

Ruling: Yes, the complaint contained a valid cause of action

Ratio:
The petition of Respondent Tadeo states a cause of action since it states the legal right of respondent Tadeo, the correlative
obligation of petitioner Diana, and the act or omission of petitioner Diana in violation of the legal right.

Respondent Tadeo’s petition alleged the non-complied marital obligations in this manner:

5. During their marriage, they had frequent quarrels due to their varied upbringing. Respondent, coming from a rich
family, was a disorganized housekeeper and was frequently out of the house. She would go to her sisters house or would
play tennis the whole day.

6. When the family had crisis due to several miscarriages suffered by respondent and the sickness of a child, respondent
withdrew to herself and eventually refused to speak to her husband.

7. On November 1977, the respondent, who was five months pregnant with Cristina Maria and on the pretext of re-
evaluating her feelings with petitioner, requested the latter to temporarily leave their conjugal dwelling. She further
insisted that she wanted to feel a little freedom from petitioners marital authority and influences. The petitioner argued
that he could occupy another room in their conjugal dwelling to accommodate respondents desire, but no amount of plea
and explanation could dissuade her from demanding that the petitioner leave their conjugal dwelling.

8. In his desire to keep peace in the family and to safeguard the respondents pregnancy, the petitioner was compelled to
leave their conjugal dwelling and reside in a condominium located in Greenhills.

9. This separation resulted in complete estrangement between the petitioner and the respondent. The petitioner waived
his right to the conjugal dwelling in respondents favor through an extrajudicial dissolution of their conjugal partnership of
gains. The separation in fact between the petitioner and the respondent still subsists to the present time.

10. The parties likewise agreed on the custody and support of the children. The extrajudicial dissolution of conjugal
partnership of gains is hereto attached as Annex C and taken as an integral part hereof.

11. The respondent at the time of the celebration of their marriage was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential obligation of marriage and such incapacity subsisted up to and until the present time. Such incapacity was
conclusively found in the psychological examination conducted on the relationship between the petitioner and the
respondent.

12. Under Article 36 of the Family Code, the marriage between the petitioner and the respondent is void ab initio and
needs to be annulled. This petition is in accordance with Article 39 thereof.

In determining whether the allegations of a complaint are sufficient to support a cause of action, it must be borne in mind
that the complaint does not have to establish or allege the facts proving the existence of a cause of action at the outset; this
will have to be done at the trial on the merits of the case. If the allegations in a complaint can furnish a sufficient basis by
which the complaint can be maintained, the same should not be dismissed regardless of the defenses that may be assessed
by the defendants. To sustain a motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action, the complaint must show that the claim
for relief does not exist rather than that a claim has been defectively stated or is ambiguous, indefinite or
uncertain (Emphasis supplied)

A defendant moving to dismiss a complaint on the ground of lack of cause of action hypothetically admits all the factual
averments in the complaint. Given the hypothetically admitted facts in the second petition, the trial court could render
judgment over the case

Relevant Dissent-Concurring Opinion/Notes:

The case was written focusing on the remedial law aspect since that was the issue raised by Petitioner Diana. Hence the
issue and ratio.

29
Republic vs. Quintero-Hamano
GR No. 149498, May 20, 2004

FACTS:

Lolita Quintero-Hamano filed a complaint in 1996 for declaration of nullity of her marriage with Toshio Hamano, a
Japanese national, on the ground of psychological incapacity. She and Toshio started a common-law relationship in Japan
and lived in the Philippines for a month. Thereafter, Toshio went back to Japan and stayed there for half of 1987. Lolita
then gave birth on November 16, 1987.

In 1988, Lolita and Toshio got married in MTC-Bacoor, Cavite. After a month of their marriage, Toshio returned to Japan
and promised to return by Christmas to celebrate the holidays with his family. Toshio sent money for two months and
after that he stopped giving financial support. She wrote him several times but never respondent. In 1991, she learned
from her friend that Toshio visited the country but did not bother to see her nor their child.

Toshio was no longer residing at his given address thus summons issued to him remained unserved. Consequently, in
1996, Lolita filed an ex parte motion for leave to effect service of summons by publication. The motion was granted and
the summons, accompanied by a copy of the petition, was published in a newspaper of general circulation giving Toshio 15
days to file his answer. Toshio filed to respond after the lapse of 60 days from publication, thus, Lolita filed a motion to
refer the case to the prosecutor for investigation.

ISSUE: Whether Toshio was psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital obligation.

HELD:

The Court is mindful of the 1987 Constitution to protect and strengthen the family as basic autonomous social institution
and marriage as the foundation of the family. Thus, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage.

Toshio’s act of abandonment was doubtlessly irresponsible but it was never alleged nor proven to be due to some kind of
psychological illness. Although as rule, actual medical examinations are not needed, it would have greatly helped Lolita
had she presented evidence that medically or clinically identified Toshio’s illness. This could have been done through an
expert witness. It is essential that a person show incapability of doing marital obligation due to some psychological, not
physical illness. Hence, Toshio was not considered as psychologically incapacitated.

30
Case Title: Republic v. Cesar Encelan Date: January 9, 2013
G.R. No.: 170022
Nature of Action: Petition for review on Certiorari
Nature of Action:
Topic: Psychological Incapacity
Facts:

Cesar and Lolita Encelan married each other on August 25, 1979. Out of their union, two children were born, Maricar and
Manny. To support his family, Cesar went to work in Saudi Arabia. While there, he learned that Lolita had been having an
affair with a certain Alvin. Lolita eventually left the conjugal home and went to live with Alvin. On June 16, 1995, Cesar filed
a petition for declaration of nullity of his marriage to Lolita on the ground of psychological incapacity. During trial, Cesar
testified on Lolita’s alleged psychological incapacity and abandonment; and narrated that he continued to support Lolita and
their children even after he learned of her infidelity. Lolita denied begin psychologically incapacitated, and averred that her
break up with Cesar was due to irreconcilable differences. To support his allegation of psychological incapacity on the part
of Lolita, Cesar presented Dr. Fareda Fatima Flores of the National Center for Mental Health who testified that “Lolita was
“not suffering from any form of major psychiatric illness[,]” but had been “unable to provide the expectations expected of her
for a good and lasting marital relationship”; her “transferring from one job to the other depicts some interpersonal
problems with co-workers as well as her impatience in attaining her ambitions”; and “her refusal to go with her husband
abroad signifies her reluctance to work out a good marital and family relationship.”

After trial, the RTC granted Cesar’s petition and declared the marriage between them null and void on the basis of Lolita’s
psychological incapacity. The Office of the Solicitor General seasonably appealed to the Court of Appeals, which initially
granted OSG’s appeal, but later on reversed itself and affirmed the RTC ruling, on the basis of two circumstances:(1) Lolita’s
unwarranted refusal to perform her marital obligations to Cesar; and (2) Lolita’s wilfull and deliberate act of abandoning the
conjugal dwelling.

The OSG appealed to the Supreme Court. It argues that Dr. Flores’ psychological evaluation report did not disclose that Lolita
had been suffering from a psychological illness nor did it establish its juridical antecedence, gravity and incurability;
infidelity and abandonment do not constitute psychological incapacity, but are merely grounds for legal separation.
Issue: Whether or not sufficient basis exists to nullify Cesar’s marriage to Lolita on the ground of psychological incapacity
Ruling: (Direct Answer to Issue)
NO.

Ratio:

Article 36 of the Family Code governs psychological incapacity as a ground for declaration of nullity of marriage. It provides
that “[a] marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after
its solemnization.”

In interpreting this provision, we have repeatedly stressed that psychological incapacity contemplates “downright
incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume the basic marital obligations”; ⁠ not merely the refusal, neglect or
difficulty, much less ill will, on the part of the errant spouse. ⁠ The plaintiff bears the burden of proving the juridical
antecedence (i.e., the existence at the time of the celebration of marriage), gravity and incurability of the condition of the
errant spouse.⁠

In this case, Cesar’s testimony failed to prove Lolita’s alleged psychological incapacity. Cesar testified on the dates when he
learned of Lolita’s alleged affair and her subsequent abandonment of their home, as well as his continued financial support
to her and their children even after he learned of the affair, but he merely mentioned in passing Lolita’s alleged affair with
Alvin and her abandonment of the conjugal dwelling.
In any event, sexual infidelity and abandonment of the conjugal dwelling, even if true, do not necessarily constitute
psychological incapacity; these are simply grounds for legal separation. To constitute psychological incapacity, it must be
shown that the unfaithfulness and abandonment are manifestations of a disordered personality that completely prevented
the erring spouse from discharging the essential marital obligations. No evidence on record exists to support Cesar’s
allegation that Lolita’s infidelity and abandonment were manifestations of any psychological illness.

Cesar mistakenly relied on Dr. Flores’ psychological evaluation report on Lolita to prove her alleged psychological
incapacity. The psychological evaluation, in fact, established that Lolita did not suffer from any major psychiatric illness. Dr.
Flores’ observation on Lolita’s interpersonal problems with co-workers, to our mind, does not suffice as a consideration for
the conclusion that she was — at the time of her marriage — psychologically incapacitated to enter into a marital union with
31
Cesar. Aside from the time element involved, a wife’s psychological fitness as a spouse cannot simply be equated with her
professional/work relationship; workplace obligations and responsibilities are poles apart from their marital counterparts.
While both spring from human relationship, their relatedness and relevance to one another should be fully established for
them to be compared or to serve as measures of comparison with one another. To be sure, the evaluation report Dr. Flores
prepared and submitted cannot serve this purpose. Dr. Flores’ further belief that Lolita’s refusal to go with Cesar abroad
signified a reluctance to work out a good marital relationship is a mere generalization unsupported by facts and is, in fact, a
rash conclusion that this Court cannot support.
Relevant Dissent-Concurring Opinion/Notes:

32
Yaptinchay v. Torres
Topic: Effect of Nullity

FACTS:
Teresita Yaptinchay (petitioner) asked the Pasay City, Rizal, CFI to appoint her, first, as Special Administratrix and then as
regular administratrix of the estate of Isidro Y. Yaptinchay who died in Hongkong on July 7, 1965 alleging that Isidro had
lived with her continuously, openly and publicly as husband and wife for 19 yrs (‗46-64—Taft Ave., Pasay City, and ‘64-
‘65—Russel Ave., Pasay City).

Isidro died without a will and left an estate in Philippines, HK and other places with estimated value of about P500K; and
left 3 daughters: Virginia, Mary and Asuncion. On July 7, 8 and 11, 1965, certain parties carted away from the residences
aforesaid personal properties belonging to Isidro together with others exclusively owned by Teresita. CFI granted such
appointment while Josefina Y. Yaptinchay, the alleged legitimate wife, and Ernesto Y. Yaptinchay and other children, of the
deceased opposed saying that Teresita, not being an heir of the decedent, had no right to institute the proceeding for the
settlement of the latter's estate, much less to procure appointment as administratrix thereof; and that having admittedly
cohabited with the deceased for a number of years said petitioner was not qualified to serve as administratrix for want of
integrity. Also, oppositors counter-petitioned for the appointment of Virginia, as special administratrix and of Josefina, as
regular administratrix.

HELD:

"When man and a woman live together as husband and wife, but they are not married, or their marriage is void from the
beginning, the property acquired by either or both of them through their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall
be governed by the rules on co-ownership."

But stock must be taken of the fact that the creation of the civil relationship envisaged in Article 144 is circumscribed by
conditions, the existence of which must first be shown before rights provided thereunder may be deemed to accrue. 13 One
such condition is that there must be a clear showing that the petitioner had, during cohabitation, really contributed to the
acquisition of the property involved. Until such right to co-ownership is duly established, petitioner's interests in the
property in controversy cannot be considered the "present right" or title that would make available the protection or aid
afforded by a writ of injunction. 14 For, the existence of a clear positive right especially calling for judicial protection is
wanting. Injunction indeed, is not to protect contingent or future rights; 15 nor is it a remedy to enforce an abstract right.

At any rate, it would seem to us that the interests of the parties would be better safeguarded if the controverted North
Forbes Park property be in the hands of the bonded administratrix in the estate proceedings. For then, her acts would be
subject to the control of the probate court.

having been constructed on the lot of Isidro Y. Yaptinchay (or of the conjugal partnership) at his instance, and during the
existence of his marriage with respondent Josefina Y. Yaptinchay, is part of the estate that should be under the control of
the special administratrix.

33
Case Title: Date: 26 June 2013
Minoru Fujiki v. Maria Paz Galela Marinay, Shinichi
Maekara, Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City, and G.R. No.: G.R. No. 196049
the Administrator and Civil Registrar General of Nature of Action: Petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
the National Statistics Office
Ponente: Carpio, J.
Topic: Void Marriages - Who Can Invoke Nullity?
Facts:
Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese national who married Maria Paz Galela Marinay (Marinay) in the Philippines on 23
January 2004. The marriage did not sit well with Fujiki’s parents. Thus, Fujiki could not bring his wife to Japan where he
resides. Eventually, they lost contact with each other.

In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara (Maekara). Without the first marriage being dissolved, Marinay
and Maekara were married on 15 May 2008 in Quezon City, Philippines. Maekara brought Marinay to Japan. However,
Marinay allegedly suffered physical abuse from Maekara. She left Maekara and started to contact Fujiki.

Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to re-establish their relationship.

In 2010, Fujiki helped Marinay obtain a judgment from a family court in Japan which declared the marriage between
Marinay and Maekara void on the ground of bigamy.

On 14 January 2011, Fujiki filed a petition in the RTC entitled: “Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of
Absolute Nullity of Marriage).” Fujiki prayed that (1) the Japanese Family Court judgment be recognised; (2) that the
bigamous marriage between Marinay and Maekara be declared void ab initio under Articles 35(4) and 41 of the Family
Code of the Philippines; and (3) for the RTC to direct the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City to annotate the Japanese
Family Court judgment on the Certificate of Marriage between Marinay and Maekara and to endorse such annotation to the
Office of the Administrator and Civil Registrar General in the National Statistics Office (NSO)

A few days after the filing of the petition, the RTC immediately issued an Order dismissing the petition. Citing from the
Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC;
Secs. 2 and 4), the RTC had based its ruling on improper venue (Sec. 4) and the lack of personality of Fujiki to file the
petition (Sec. 2).

Apparently, the RTC took the view that only “the husband or the wife,” in this case either Maekara or Marinay, can file the
petition to declare their marriage void, and not Fujiki.
Issue:
Whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to recognise a foreign judgment nullifying the subsequent
marriage between his or her spouse and a foreign citizen on the ground of bigamy.
Ruling:
Yes.
Ratio:
Since the recognition of a foreign judgment only requires proof of fact of the judgment, it may be made in a special
proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. Rule 1,
Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides that “[a] special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a
status, a right, or a particular fact.”

Rule 108 creates a remedy to rectify facts of a person’s life which are recorded by the State pursuant to the Civil Register
Law or Act No. 3753. These are facts of public consequence such as birth, death or marriage, which the State has an
interest in recording.

As noted by the Solicitor General, in Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas this Court declared that “[t]he recognition of the foreign divorce
decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact.”

Rule 108, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states:

Sec. 1. Who may file petition. — Any person interested in any act, event, order or decree concerning the civil status of
persons which has been recorded in the civil register, may file a verified petition for the cancellation or correction of
any entry relating thereto, with the Regional Trial Court of the province where the corresponding civil registry is
located. (Emphasis supplied)

The SC had ruled that Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognise the Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying
34
the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy because the judgment concerns his civil status as
married to Marinay. vFor the same reason he has the personality to file a petition under Rule 108 to cancel the entry of
marriage between Marinay and Maekara in the civil registry on the basis of the decree of the Japanese Family Court.

There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and material interest in maintaining the integrity of the marriage he
contracted and the property relations arising from it. There is also no doubt that he is interested in the cancellation of an
entry of a bigamous marriage in the civil registry, which compromises the public record of his marriage. The interest
derives from the substantive right of the spouse not only to preserve (or dissolve, in limited instances) his most intimate
human relation, but also to protect his property interests that arise by operation of law the moment he contracts marriage.
These property interests in marriage include the right to be supported “in keeping with the financial capacity of the family”
and preserving the property regime of the marriage.

Property rights are already substantive rights protected by the Constitution, but a spouse’s right in a marriage extends
further to relational rights recognized under Title III (“Rights and Obligations between Husband and Wife”) of the Family
Code.

A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC cannot “diminish, increase, or modify” the substantive right of the spouse to maintain the integrity of
his marriage. In any case, Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC preserves this substantive right by limiting the personality
to sue to the husband or the wife of the union recognized by law.

Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not preclude a spouse of a subsisting marriage to question the validity of a
subsequent marriage on the ground of bigamy. On the contrary, when Section 2(a) states that “[a] petition for declaration
of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife” - it refers to the husband or the wife of
the subsisting marriage.

Under Article 35(4) of the Family Code, bigamous marriages are void from the beginning. Thus, the parties in a bigamous
marriage are neither the husband nor the wife under the law. The husband or the wife of the prior subsisting marriage is
the one who has the personality to file a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage under Section 2(a) of
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.

Article 35(4) of the Family Code, which declares bigamous marriages void from the beginning, is the civil aspect of Article
349 of the Revised Penal Code, which penalises bigamy. Bigamy is a public crime. Thus, anyone can initiate prosecution
for bigamy because any citizen has an interest in the prosecution and prevention of crimes. If anyone can file a criminal
action which leads to the declaration of nullity of a bigamous marriage, there is more reason to confer personality to sue on
the husband or the wife of a subsisting marriage. The prior spouse does not only share in the public interest of prosecuting
and preventing crimes, he is also personally interested in the purely civil aspect of protecting his marriage.

When the right of the spouse to protect his marriage is violated, the spouse is clearly an injured party and is therefore
interested in the judgment of the suit. Juliano-Llave ruled that the prior spouse “is clearly the aggrieved party as the
bigamous marriage not only threatens the financial and the property ownership aspect of the prior marriage but most of
all, it causes an emotional burden to the prior spouse.” Being a real party in interest, the prior spouse is entitled to sue in
order to declare a bigamous marriage void. For this purpose, he can petition a court to recognise a foreign judgment
nullifying the bigamous marriage and judicially declare as a fact that such judgment is effective in the Philippines. Once
established, there should be no more impediment to cancel the entry of the bigamous marriage in the civil registry.
Relevant Dissent-Concurring Opinion/Notes:

35
Case Title: Date: 31 July 2013
AMELIA GARCIA-QUIAZON, JENNETH QUIAZON
and MARIA JENNIFER QUIAZON, Petitioners, G.R. No.: 189121
vs. Nature of Action: Petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
MA. LOURDES BELEN, for and in behalf of MARIA
LOURDES ELISE QUIAZON, Respondent. Ponente: Perez, J.
Topic: Void Marriages - Who Can Invoke Nullity?
Facts:
This case started as a Petition for Letters of Administration of the Estate of Eliseo Quiazon (Eliseo), filed by herein
respondents who are Eliseo’s common-law wife and daughter. The petition was opposed by herein petitioners Amelia
Garcia-Quaizon (Amelia) to whom Eliseo was married. Amelia was joined by her children, Jenneth Quiazon (Jenneth) and
Maria Jennifer Quiazon (Jennifer).

Eliseo died intestate on 12 December 1992.

On 12 September 1994, Maria Lourdes Elise Quiazon (Elise), represented by her mother, Ma. Lourdes Belen (Lourdes),
filed a Petition for Letters of Administration before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Las Piñas City. 3 In her Petition
docketed as SP Proc. No. M-3957, Elise claims that she is the natural child of Eliseo having been conceived and born at the
time when her parents were both capacitated to marry each other. Insisting on the legal capacity of Eliseo and Lourdes to
marry, Elise impugned the validity of Eliseo’s marriage to Amelia by claiming that it was bigamous for having been
contracted during the subsistence of the latter’s marriage with one Filipito Sandico (Filipito). To prove her filiation to the
decedent, Elise, among others, attached to the Petition for Letters of Administration her Certificate of Live Birth 4 signed by
Eliseo as her father. In the same petition, it was alleged that Eliseo left real properties worth P2,040,000.00 and personal
properties worth P2,100,000.00. In order to preserve the estate of Eliseo and to prevent the dissipation of its value, Elise
sought her appointment as administratrix of her late father’s estate.
On appeal, the decision of the trial court was affirmed in toto in the 28 November 2008 Decision rendered by the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R.CV No. 88589. In validating the findings of the RTC, the Court of Appeals held that Elise was able to prove
that Eliseo and Lourdes lived together as husband and wife by establishing a common residence in Las Pinas from 1975 up
to the time of Eliseo’s death in 1992.
Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals was correct in declaring that Amelia was not legally married to Eliseo on the grounds
of a preexisting marriage?
Ruling:
The
Ratio:
Both the RTC and the Court of Appeals found that Eliseo had been living with Lourdes, deporting themselves as husband
and wife, from 1972 up to the time of his death in 1995. This finding is consistent with the fact that in 1985, Eliseo filed an
action for judicial partition of properties against Amelia before the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 106, on the ground that
their marriage is void for being bigamous. That Eliseo went to the extent of taking his marital feud with Amelia before the
courts of law renders untenable petitioners’ position that Eliseo spent the final days of his life in Tarlac with Amelia and
her children. It disproves rather than supports petitioners’ submission that the lower courts’ findings arose from an
erroneous appreciation of the evidence on record. Factual findings of the trial court, when affirmed by the appellate court,
must be held to be conclusive and binding upon this Court.

Likewise unmeritorious is petitioners’ contention that the Court of Appeals erred in declaring Amelia’s marriage to Eliseo
as void ab initio. In a void marriage, it was though no marriage has taken place, thus, it cannot be the source of rights. Any
interested party may attack the marriage directly or collaterally. A void marriage can be questioned even beyond the
lifetime of the parties to the marriage. It must be pointed out that at the time of the celebration of the marriage of Eliseo
and Amelia, the law in effect was the Civil Code, and not the Family Code, making the ruling in Niñal v. Bayadog applicable
four-square to the case at hand. In Niñal, the Court, in no uncertain terms, allowed therein petitioners to file a petition for
the declaration of nullity of their father’s marriage to therein respondent after the death of their father, by
contradistinguishing void from voidable marriages, to wit:
Consequently, void marriages can be questioned even after the death of either party but voidable marriages can be assailed
only during the lifetime of the parties and not after death of either, in which case the parties and their offspring will be left
as if the marriage had been perfectly valid. That is why the action or defense for nullity is imprescriptible, unlike voidable
marriages where the action prescribes. Only the parties to a voidable marriage can assail it but any proper interested party
may attack a void marriage.

It was emphasized in Niñal that in a void marriage, no marriage has taken place and it cannot be the source of rights, such
that any interested party may attack the marriage directly or collaterally without prescription, which may be filed even
beyond the lifetime of the parties to the marriage.

Relevant Dissent-Concurring Opinion/Notes:

36
Case: Republic vs. Olaybar (February 10, 2014)
Topic: Procedure in action for declaration for nullity
Nature: Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court are the Regional Trial. The
assailed decision granted respondent Merlinda L. Olaybar's petition for cancellation of entries in the latter's marriage
contract; while the assailed order denied the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner Republic of the Philippines
through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
FACTS:
Respondent Olaybar requested from the National Statistics Office (NSO) a Certificate of No Marriage (CENOMAR) as one of
the requirements for her marriage with her boyfriend of five years. Upon receipt thereof, she discovered that she was
already married to a certain Ye Son Sune, a Korean National, on June 24, 2002, at the Office of the Municipal Trial Court in
Cities, Palace of Justice. She denied having contracted said marriage and claimed that she did not know the alleged
husband; she did not appear before the solemnizing officer; and, that the signature appearing in the marriage certificate is
not hers. She, thus, filed a Petition for Cancellation of Entries in the Marriage Contract, especially the entries in the wife
portion. Respondent impleaded the Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City, as well as her alleged husband, as parties to the case.
The RTC granted Olaybar’s petition and directed the Local Civil Registrar to cancel all the entries in the “wife” portion of
the alleged marriage contract. Petitioner, however, moved for the reconsideration of the assailed Decision on the grounds
that: (1) there was no clerical spelling, typographical and other innocuous errors in the marriage contract for it to fall
within the provisions of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court; and (2) granting the cancellation of all the entries in the wife
portion of the alleged marriage contract is, in effect, declaring the marriage void ab initio. The motion for reconsideration
was denied, hence this Petition for Review on certiorari under Rule 45.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the cancellation of entries in the marriage contract, which, in effect, nullifies the marriage, may be
undertaken in a Rule 108 proceeding? /
HELD:
YES. Aside from the certificate of marriage, no such evidence was presented to show the existence of marriage. Rather,
respondent showed by overwhelming evidence that no marriage was entered into and that she was not even aware of such
existence. The testimonial and documentary evidence clearly established that the only “evidence” of marriage, which is the
marriage certificate, was a forgery. While we maintain that Rule 108 cannot be availed of to determine the validity of
marriage, we cannot nullify the proceedings before the trial court where all the parties had been given the opportunity to
contest the allegations of respondent; the procedures were followed, and all the evidence of the parties had already been
admitted and examined. Respondent indeed sought, not the nullification of marriage, as there was no marriage to speak of,
but the correction of the record of such marriage to reflect the truth as set forth by the evidence. Otherwise stated, in
allowing the correction of the subject certificate of marriage by cancelling the wife portion thereof, the trial court did not,
in any way, declare the marriage void as there was no marriage to speak of.

37
Case Title: Date: February 06, 2004
LUCIO MORIGO y CACHO, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, respondent. G.R. No.: 145226
QUISUMBING, J.:
Nature of Action: This petition for review on certiorari seeks to
reverse the decision of the CA, which affirmed the judgment of
the RTC that found Morigo guilty of bigamy.
Topic: Requisite of valid remarriage
Facts:
Lucio (Morigo) and Lucia (Barrete) were board mates at Tagbilaran City, Bohol for four years. They re-established
contact in 1984 and became sweethearts. In 1990, Lucia came back to the Philippines and proposed to petition Lucio to
join her in Canada. They both agreed to get married and were thus married on August 30, 1990. Lucia returned to
Canada but left behind Lucio. She filed a petition for divorce against Lucio in Ontario, Canada which was granted and
took effect on February 17, 1992. Lucio then married Maria Jececha (Lumbago) at Tagbilaran. On September 21, 1993,
Lucio filed a civil case for judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage to Lucia, docketed as Civil Case No. 6020,
alleging that no marriage ceremony took place.

On October 19, 1993, Lucio was charged with bigamy before the RTC of Bohol. Initially, his motion for suspension of
arraignment on the ground of existence of a prejudicial question (Civil Case No. 6020) was granted, but it was later
reversed, and trial proceeded against him. After trial, the court convicted him as charged, ruling that want of a marriage
ceremony is not a defense in bigamy and the parties in the marriage should not be allowed to assume that their marriage
is void even if such be the fact but must first secure a judicial declaration of nullity of said marriage. Lucio also cannot
rely on the divorce decree, as the same is without force and effect when both parties are not domiciled in the country
which granted it and was merely resorted to for the purpose of obtaining a divorce.

On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC decision. During the pendency of his appeal, Civil Case No. 6020 was decided in his
favour. In that case, the RTC ruled that there was no valid marriage ceremony that took place since the parties merely
signed the marriage contract without the presence of the solemnising officer. The trial court held that the marriage was
therefore void, in accordance with Articles 3 and 15 of the Family Code. His motion for reconsideration denied by the CA,
he elevated his case to the Supreme Court.

Issue:
Whether or not Lucio is liable for Bigamy, in view of the finding in Civil Case No. 6020 (judicial declaration of nullity of
marriage) that his first marriage was void for having been no valid marriage ceremony.

Ruling: (Direct Answer to Issue)

No, he is not liable.

Ratio:

The trial court found that there was no actual marriage ceremony performed between Lucio and Lucia by a solemnizing
officer. Instead, what transpired was a mere signing of the marriage contract by the two, without the presence of a
solemnizing officer. The trial court thus held that the marriage is void ab initio, in accordance with Articles 3⁠5 and 4⁠6 of
the Family Code. As the dissenting opinion in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, correctly puts it, “This simply means that there was
no marriage to begin with; and that such declaration of nullity retroacts to the date of the first marriage. In other words,
for all intents and purposes, reckoned from the date of the declaration of the first marriage as void ab initio to the date of
the celebration of the first marriage, the accused was, under the eyes of the law, never married.” ⁠7 The records show that
no appeal was taken from the decision of the trial court in Civil Case No. 6020, hence, the decision had long become final
and executory.

The first element of bigamy as a crime requires that the accused must have been legally married. But in this case, legally
speaking, the petitioner was never married to Lucia Barrete. Thus, there is no first marriage to speak of. Under the
principle of retroactivity of a marriage being declared void ab initio, the two were never married “from the beginning.”
The contract of marriage is null; it bears no legal effect. Taking this argument to its logical conclusion, for legal purposes,
petitioner was not married to Lucia at the time he contracted the marriage with Maria Jececha. The existence and the
validity of the first marriage being an essential element of the crime of bigamy, it is but logical that a conviction for said
offense cannot be sustained where there is no first marriage to speak of. The petitioner, must, perforce be acquitted of
the instant charge.

The present case is analogous to, but must be distinguished from Mercado v. Tan.⁠8 In the latter case, the judicial
38
declaration of nullity of the first marriage was likewise obtained after the second marriage was already celebrated. We
held therein that:
A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is necessary before a subsequent one can be legally contracted.
One who enters into a subsequent marriage without first obtaining such judicial declaration is guilty of bigamy. This
principle applies even if the earlier union is characterized by statutes as “void.” ⁠9

It bears stressing though that in Mercado, the first marriage was actually solemnized not just once, but twice: first before
a judge where a marriage certificate was duly issued and then again six months later before a priest in religious rites.
Ostensibly, at least, the first marriage appeared to have transpired, although later declared void ab initio.

In the instant case, however, no marriage ceremony at all was performed by a duly authorized solemnizing officer.
Petitioner and Lucia Barrete merely signed a marriage contract on their own. The mere private act of signing a marriage
contract bears no semblance to a valid marriage and thus, needs no judicial declaration of nullity. Such act alone, without
more, cannot be deemed to constitute an ostensibly valid marriage for which petitioner might be held liable for bigamy
unless he first secures a judicial declaration of nullity before he contracts a subsequent marriage.

The law abhors an injustice and the Court is mandated to liberally construe a penal statute in favor of an accused and
weigh every circumstance in favor of the presumption of innocence to ensure that justice is done. Under the
circumstances of the present case, we held that petitioner has not committed bigamy.
Further, we also find that we need not tarry on the issue of the validity of his defense of good faith or lack of criminal
intent, which is now moot and academic.
Relevant Dissent-Concurring Opinion/Notes:

39
Case Title: Date: February 18, 2004.
VERONICO TENEBRO, petitioner, vs. THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondent. G.R. No.: G.R. No. 150758
Nature of Action: Petition for Review
Ponente: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J: (EN BANC)
Topic: Requisite of valid marriage.
Facts:

1. Petitioner Tenebro, contracted marriage with private complainant Leticia Ancajas on April 10, 1990. They lived
together continuously and without interruption until the latter part of 1991, when Tenebro informed Ancajas
that he had been previously married to a certain Hilda Villareyes on November 10, 1986.
2. Tenebro showed Ancajas a photocopy of a marriage contract between him and Villareyes.
3. Invoking this previous marriage, petitioner thereafter left the conjugal dwelling which he shared with Ancajas,
stating that he was going to cohabit with Villareyes.
4. On January 25, 1993, petitioner contracted yet another marriage, this one with a certain Nilda Villegas. When
Ancajas learned of this third marriage, she verified from Villareyes whether the latter was indeed married to
petitioner. In a handwritten letter, Villareyes confirmed that petitioner, Veronico Tenebro, was indeed her
husband.
5. Ancajas thereafter filed a complaint for bigamy against petitioner.
6. During the trial, petitioner admitted having cohabited with Villareyes from 1984-1988, with whom he sired two
children. However, he denied that he and Villareyes were validly married to each other, claiming that no
marriage ceremony took place to solemnize their union. He alleged that he signed a marriage contract
merely to enable her to get the allotment from his office in connection with his work as a seaman. He further
testified that he requested his brother to verify from the Civil Register in Manila whether there was any
marriage at all between him and Villareyes, but there was no record of said marriage.
7. The lower court found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of bigamy under Article 349 of
the Revised Penal Code.
8. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court that herein petitioner Veronico Tenebro was guilty
of the crime of bigamy for contracting second marriage to Leticia Ancajas while his marriage to Hilda Villareyes
was still subsisting and sentence to an indeterminate prison term.
9. Thus, petitioner interposed this petition for review by denying the existence of his first marriage to Villareyes
and by arguing that since his second marriage with Ancajas has ultimately been declared void ab initio on the
ground of the latter's psychological incapacity, he should be acquitted for the crime of bigamy.
10. Petitioner argues that this subsequent judicial declaration retroacts to the date of the celebration of the
marriage to Ancajas. As such, he argues that, since his marriage to Ancajas was subsequently declared void ab
initio, the crime of bigamy was not committed.
Issues:
1) WoN the mere fact that no record of the marriage between Tenebro and Villareyes (1 st) exists invalidates their
marriage. - NO
2) WoN the declaration of the nullity of Tenebro's marriage to Ancajas (2 nd) on the ground of psychological
incapacity is an indicator that their marriage lacks the essential requisites for validity. - NO
3) WoN Tenebro may still be held liable for bigamy notwithstanding the declaration of nullity of his marriage to
Ancajas (2nd) on the ground of psychological incapacity. – YES
Ruling:
1) NO. The mere fact that no record of a marriage exists does not invalidate the marriage, provided all requisites
for its validity are present. There was no evidence presented by the defense that would indicate that the
marriage between Tenebro and Villareyes lacked any requisite for validity, apart from the self-serving testimony
of the accused himself.
2) NO. All the essential and formal requisites for the validity of marriage were satisfied by petitioner and
Ancajas. Both were over 18 years of age, and they voluntarily contracted the second marriage with the
required license before Judge Alfredo B. Perez, Jr. of the City Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City, in the
presence of at least two witnesses.

3) YES. There is a recognition written into the law itself that such a marriage although void ab initio, may still
produce legal consequences. Among these legal consequences is incurring criminal liability for bigamy.
Ratio:

1) In affirming the decision of the Court of Appeals, the Court ruled that the marriage contract presented by the
prosecution served as positive evidence as to the existence of the marriage between Tenebro and Villareyes
(1st), which should be given greater credence than documents testifying merely as to the absence of any record

40
 of the marriage, especially considering that there is absolutely no requirement in the law that a marriage
contract needs to be submitted to the civil registrar as a condition precedent for the validity of a marriage. The
mere fact that no record of a marriage exists does not invalidate the marriage, provided all requisites for
its validity are present. There was no evidence presented by the defense that would indicate that the marriage
between Tenebro and Villareyes lacked any requisite for validity, apart from the self-serving testimony of the
accused himself.

2) The declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity is not an
indicator that petitioner's marriage to Ancajas (2nd) lacks the essential requisites for validity. The requisites
for the validity of a marriage are classified by the Family Code into essential (legal capacity of the contracting
parties and their consent freely given in the presence of the solemnizing officer) and formal (authority of the
solemnizing officer, marriage license, and marriage ceremony wherein the parties personally declare their
agreement to marry before the solemnizing officer in the presence of at least two witnesses). Under Article 5 of
the Family Code, any male or female of the age of eighteen years or upwards not under any of the impediments
mentioned in Articles 37 25 and 38 26 may contract marriage. In this case, all the essential and formal
requisites for the validity of marriage were satisfied by petitioner and Ancajas. Both were over eighteen
years of age, and they voluntarily contracted the second marriage with the required license before Judge Alfredo
B. Perez, Jr. of the City Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City, in the presence of at least two witnesses.

3) Although the judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity retroacts
to the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the vinculum between the spouses is concerned, it is
significant to note that the said marriage is not without legal effects. Among these legal consequences is
incurring criminal liability for bigamy. There is a recognition written into the law itself that such a marriage
although void ab initio, may still produce legal consequences.

 Pertinently, Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code criminalizes "any person who shall contract a second or
subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has
been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings". A plain
reading of the law, therefore, would indicate that the provision penalizes the mere act of contracting a
second or a subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage.
VITUG, J., separate opinion:

Absolute nullity of either the first or the second marriage prior to its judicial declaration as being void
constitute a valid defense. — Would the absolute nullity of either the first or the second marriage, prior to its
judicial declaration as being void, constitute a valid defense in a criminal action for bigamy? I believe that, except
for a void marriage on account of the psychological incapacity of a party or both parties to the marriage under
Article 36 of the Family Code (as so hereinafter explained), the answer must be in the affirmative. Void
marriages are inexistent from the very beginning, and no judicial decree is required to establish their nullity. As
early as the case of People vs. Aragon, this Court has underscored the fact that the Revised Penal Code itself does
not, unlike the rule then prevailing in Spain, require the judicial declaration of nullity of a prior void marriage
before it can be raised by way of a defense in a criminal case for bigamy. Had the law contemplated otherwise,
said the Court, "an express provision to that effect would or should have been inserted in the law, (but that in)
its absence, (the courts) are bound by (the) rule of strict interpretation" of penal statutes. In contrast to a
voidable marriage which legally exists until judicially annulled (and, therefore, not a defense in a bigamy charge
if the second marriage were contracted prior to the decree of annulment), the complete nullity, however, of a
previously contracted marriage, being void ab initio and legally inexistent, can outrightly be a defense in an
indictment for bigamy.

CARPIO, J., dissenting opinion:

Void marriage due to psychological incapacity cannot constitute a second marriage to sustain a conviction
therefor. — If the second marriage is void ab initio on grounds other than the existence of the first marriage,
then legally there exists no second marriage. Article 35 of the Family Code enumerates the marriages that are
"void from the beginning." The succeeding article, Article 36, declares that a marriage contracted by one
psychologically incapacitated "shall likewise be void." Article 1409 of the Civil Code declares "inexistent and
void from the beginning" contracts "expressly . . . declared void by law." Thus, a marriage contracted by one
psychologically incapacitated at the time of the marriage is legally inexistent and void from the beginning. Such
void marriage cannot constitute a second marriage to sustain a conviction for bigamy under Article 349 of the
Revised Penal Code.

CALLEJO, SR., J., separate dissenting opinion:

Bigamy does not exist if the second marriage is null and void ab initio. — The prosecution was burdened to
prove beyond reasonable doubt the corpus delicti, namely, all the elements of the crime. In this case, the
41
prosecution adduced evidence that the petitioner contracted marriage with Hilda and during the subsistence of
said marriage, he contracted a second marriage with the private respondent. However, the petitioner adduced in
evidence the decision of the Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No. AU-885 before the court a quo rendered
judgment convicting the petitioner of bigamy declaring null and void ab initio the petitioner's marriage with the
private respondent on the ground of the latter's psychological incapacity. Since the second marriage is null and
void ab initio, such marriage in contemplation of criminal law never existed and for that reason, one of the
essential elements of bigamy has disappeared.

42
Case Title: Date: July 3, 2013
JAMES WALTER P. CAPILI, PETITIONER,
vs. G.R. No. 183805
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND SHIRLEY TISMO- Nature of Action: Petition for Review on Certiorari
CAPILI, RESPONDENTS under Rule 45
Ponente: Peralta, J. ;Third Division
Topic: Requisite for Valid Remarriage
Facts:
 June 28, 2004 - Petitioner was charged with the crime of bigamy before the RTC of Pasig City in an Information which
reads: On or about December 8, 1999, in Pasig City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused being
previously united in lawful marriage with Karla Y. Medina-Capili and without said marriage having been legally dissolved
or annulled, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second marriage with Shirley G. Tismo, to
the damage and prejudice of the latter. Contrary to law.
 Petitioner thereafter filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings alleging that:
o there is a pending civil case for declaration of nullity of the second marriage before the RTC of Antipolo City
filed by Karla Y. Medina-Capili;
o in the event that the marriage is declared null and void, it would exculpate him from the charge of bigamy;
and
o the pendency of the civil case for the declaration of nullity of the second marriage serves as a prejudicial
question in the instant criminal case.
 The arraignment and pre-trial were reset by the RTC of Pasig City, in view of the filing of the Motion to Suspend
Proceedings filed by petitioner.
 The RTC of Antipolo City rendered a decision declaring the voidness or incipient invalidity of the second marriage
between petitioner and private respondent on the ground that a subsequent marriage contracted by the husband
during the lifetime of the legal wife is void from the beginning.
 The petitioner-accused filed his Manifestation and Motion (to Dismiss) praying for the dismissal of the criminal case
for bigamy filed against him on the ground that the second marriage between him and private respondent had already
been declared void by the RTC.
 July 7, 2006 - The RTC of Pasig City granted petitioner’s Manifestation and Motion to Dismiss.
 The private prosecutor opposed said Motion to Dismiss; the Motion stated, among others, that the issues raised in the
civil case are not similar or intimately related to the issue in this above-captioned case and that the resolution of the
issues in said civil case would not determine whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
 The RTC ruled that there is merit on the Motion to Dismiss and submitted that there is no more bigamy to speak of.
 Private respondent filed an appeal before the CA.
 February 1, 2008 - the CA reversed and set aside the RTC’s decision; remanded the case to the trial court for further
proceedings.
 Petitioner then filed a Motion for Reconsideration against said decision, but the same was denied.

Issue:
Whether or not the subsequent declaration of nullity of the second marriage is a ground for dismissal of the criminal case
for bigamy
Ruling: (Direct Answer to Issue)

No. The crime of bigamy was committed by petitioner from the time he contracted the second marriage with private
respondent. Thus, the finality of the judicial declaration of nullity of petitioner’s second marriage does not impede the
filing of a criminal charge for bigamy against him.

Ratio:
 Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code defines and penalizes the crime of bigamy as follows: Art. 349. Bigamy. – The
penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage
before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively
dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.
 The elements of the crime of bigamy, therefore, are: (1) the offender has been legally married; (2) the marriage has
not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead
according to the Civil Code; (3) that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and (4) that the second or
subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity.
 In the present case, it appears that all the elements of the crime of bigamy were present when the Information was
filed on June 28, 2004.
 It is undisputed that a second marriage between petitioner and private respondent was contracted on December 8,
1999 during the subsistence of a valid first marriage between petitioner and Karla Y. Medina-Capili contracted on
September 3, 1999.
43
 The RTC of Antipolo City itself declared the bigamous nature of the second marriage between petitioner and private
respondent. Thus, the subsequent judicial declaration of the second marriage for being bigamous in nature does not
bar the prosecution of petitioner for the crime of bigamy.
 Jarillo v. People - The Court affirmed the accused’s conviction for bigamy ruling that the crime of bigamy is
consummated on the celebration of the subsequent marriage without the previous one having been judicially declared
null and void. The subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was immaterial because prior to the
declaration of nullity, the crime had already been consummated. Moreover, petitioner’s assertion would only delay the
prosecution of bigamy cases considering that an accused could simply file a petition to declare his previous marriage
void and invoke the pendency of that action as a prejudicial question in the criminal case. The outcome of the civil case
for annulment of petitioner’s marriage to [private complainant] had no bearing upon the determination of petitioner’s
innocence or guilt in the criminal case for bigamy, because all that is required for the charge of bigamy to prosper is
that the first marriage be subsisting at the time the second marriage is contracted. Thus, under the law, a marriage,
even one which is void or voidable, shall be deemed valid until declared otherwise in a judicial proceeding. In this
case, even if petitioner eventually obtained a declaration that his first marriage was void ab initio, the point is, both the
first and the second marriage were subsisting before the first marriage was annulled.
 What makes a person criminally liable for bigamy is when he contracts a second or subsequent marriage during the
subsistence of a valid first marriage. It further held that the parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge
for themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the judgment of competent courts and only when the
nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration the presumption
is that the marriage exists. Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of the first
marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.
 It is a settled rule that the criminal culpability attaches to the offender upon the commission of the offense, and from
that instant, liability appends to him until extinguished as provided by law.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated February 1, 2008 and Resolution dated
July 24, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 30444 are hereby AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.
Relevant Dissent-Concurring Opinion/Notes:

44
Case Title Date: July 17, 2013
PEOPLE OF PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs.
EDGARDO V. ODTUHAN, Respondent. G.R. No.: 191566
Ponente: Peralta
Nature of Action: certiorari 45
Topic: void marriages; bigamous
Facts:
 2 July 1980 - Edgardo Odtuhan married Jasmin Modina
 28 October 1993 –Odtuhan married Eleanor Alagon
 August 1994 –Odtuhan filed a petition for annulment of his marriage with Modina
 23 February 1999 – RTC granted Odtuhan’s petition and declared his marriage with Modina void ab initio for lack
of a valid marriage license
 10 November 2003 – Alagon died.
 In the meantime, in June 2003, private complainant Evelyn Abesamis Alagon learned of respondent’s previous
marriage with Modina. She thus filed a Complaint-Affidavit charging Odtuhan with Bigamy.
 Odtuhan filed a motion to quash on 2 grounds: (1) that the facts do not charge the offense of bigamy; and (2) that
the criminal action or liability has been extinguished.
 RTC – denied the motion to quash
 On appeal, CA REVERSED RTC’s denial and ordered that the information in the bigamy case be quashed
Issue: WON the bigamy case should prosper despite the declaration of nullity of the 1 st marriage?
Ruling: (Direct Answer to Issue) YES; SC remanded the case for further proceedings
Ratio:
 The Family Code has settled once and for all the conflicting jurisprudence on the matter. A declaration of the
absolute nullity of a marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of action or a ground for defense. It has
been held in a number of cases that a judicial declaration of nullity is required before a valid subsequent marriage
can be contracted; or else, what transpires is a bigamous marriage, reprehensible and immoral.
 What makes a person criminally liable for bigamy is when he contracts a second or subsequent marriage during
the subsistence of a valid marriage. Parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its
nullity, for the same must be submitted to the judgment of competent courts and only when the nullity of the
marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration, the presumption is that
the marriage exists. Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the
first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy. If we allow respondent’s line of defense and the
CA’s ratiocination, a person who commits bigamy can simply evade prosecution by immediately filing a petition for
the declaration of nullity of his earlier marriage and hope that a favorable decision is rendered therein before
anyone institutes a complaint against him.
 Respondent, likewise, claims that there are more reasons to quash the information against him, because he
obtained the declaration of nullity of marriage before the filing of the complaint for bigamy against him. Again, we
cannot sustain such contention. In addition to the discussion above, settled is the rule that criminal culpability
attaches to the offender upon the commission of the offense and from that instant, liability appends to him until
extinguished as provided by law and that the time of filing of the criminal complaint or information is material
only for determining prescription.
 Thus, as held in Antone v. Beronilla:
o To conclude, the issue on the declaration of nullity of the marriage between petitioner and respondent
only after the latter contracted the subsequent marriage is, therefore, immaterial for the purpose of
establishing that the facts alleged in the information for Bigamy does not constitute an offense. Following
the same rationale, neither may such defense be interposed by the respondent in his motion to quash by
way of exception to the established rule that facts contrary to the allegations in the information are
matters of defense which may be raised only during the presentation of evidence.

CASE NAME: SALLY GO-BANGAYAN, Petitioner, vs. BENJAMIN BANGAYAN, JR., Respondent.
CASE NUMBER/ DATE: G.R. No. 201061 dated July 3, 2013
PONENTE: CARPIO, J.:
NATURE OF THE ACTION: Petition for declaration of a non-existent marriage and/or declaration of nullity of marriage
(based on lacking formal requisites to a valid marriage) with a prayer for partition of properties (in accordance to Article

45
148, FC), his appointment as Administrator of Properties during the pendency of the case, and declaration of Bernice and
Bentley as illegitimate children.
FACTS:
1. Benjamin Bangayan, Jr. alleged in his petition that he married Azucena Alegre in Caloocan City. They had three (3)
children: Rizalyn, Emmamylin, and Benjamin III.
2. In 1979 – Benjamin developed a relationship with Sally Go Bangayan. She was his customer in the auto parts and
supplies business owned by Benjamin’s family.
3. In 1981 – Azucena left for the US. By February of 1982, Benjamin and Sally lived together as husband and wife.
 Sally’s father was against the relationship.
 To appease Sally’s father, she brought Benjamin to Pasig where they signed a purported marriage
contract.
 Benjamin’s marriage to Azucena was known to Sally. She assured Benjamin that the marriage contract
would not be registered.
4. Benjamin and Sally’s marriage produced two (2) children: Bernice and Bentley. They also acquired four (4) real
properties throughout their co-habitation.
5. Their relationship ended in 1994 when Sally left for Canada bringing their 2 children with her.
6. Sally filed a CRIMINAL COMPLAINT for Bigamy and Falsification of Public Documents against Benjamin using their
simulated marriage contract as evidence.
7. In turn, Benjamin filed a PETITION for declaration of a non-existent marriage and/or declaration of nullity of
marriage before the trial court on the ground that his marriage to Sally was bigamous and that it lacked the formal
requisites to a valid marriage. Benjamin also asked the trial court for the partition of the properties he acquired
with Sally in accordance with Article 148 of the Family Code, for his appointment as administrator of the
properties during the pendency of the case, and for the declaration of Bernice and Bentley as illegitimate children.
 A total of 44 registered properties became the subject of the partition before the trial court. Aside from
the seven properties enumerated by Benjamin in his petition, Sally named 37 properties in her answer.
8. TC decision: in favor of Benjamin.
 The marriage between Benjamin and Sally was not bigamous because of the lack of a marriage license.
Hence, bigamy was not committed in this case.
 No ruling on the issue of the legitimacy status of Bernice and Bentley because they were not parties to the
case.
 Denied Sally’s claim for spousal support because she was not married to Benjamin.
 The trial court likewise denied support for Bernice and Bentley who were both of legal age and did not
ask for support.
 On the issue of partition: Sally could not claim the 37 properties she named in her answer as part of her
conjugal properties with Benjamin.
i. Sally was not legally married to Benjamin.
ii. The 37 properties that Sally was claiming were owned by Benjamin’s parents who gave the
properties to their children, including Benjamin, as advance inheritance.
iii. The 37 titles were in the names of Benjamin and his brothers and the phrase "married to Sally
Go" was merely descriptive of Benjamin’s civil status in the title.
iv. Two lots were bought by Benjamin using his own money and that Sally failed to prove any actual
contribution of money, property or industry in their purchase; and the two condominium units
(where Sally was a co- owner) were purchased from the earnings of Benjamin alone.
v. Other properties were part of the conjugal partnership of Bejamin with Azucena without
prejudice to Benjamin’s right to dispute his conjugal state with Azucena in a separate proceeding.
vi. Sally acted in bad faith because she knew that Benjamin was married to Azucena. Applying
Article 148 of the Family Code, the trial court forfeited Sally’s share in the properties in favor of
Bernice and Bentley while Benjamin’s share reverted to his conjugal ownership with Azucena.
9. CA Decision: partly granted the appeal.
 Sally still failed to present her evidence even after six (6) resetting of hearings.
 Benjamin’s action was based on his prior marriage to Azucena and there was no evidence that the
marriage was annulled or dissolved before Benjamin contracted the second marriage with Sally. Hence,
trial court committed no error in declaring Benjamin’s marriage to Sally null and void.
 The property relations of Benjamin and Sally was governed by Article 148 of the Family Code. Hence, only
the properties acquired by the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property or
industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contribution and the 37
properties being claimed by Sally rightfully belong to Benjamin and his siblings.
 As to the 7 properties claimed by both parties, 2 properties belong solely to Benjamin; and the 4
properties belong solely to Sally; and 1 property is owned by them in common and shall be shared
equally. The share of Benjamin shall accrue to the conjugal partnership under his existing marriage with
Azucena while Sally’s share shall accrue to her in the absence of a clear and convincing proof of bad faith.

46
ISSUES: (1) Whether or not Benjamin and Sally’s marriage is valid under the Section 35 of the Family Code. (2) Whether or
not the property relations of Benjamin and Sally in relation to the 7 properties both claimed by them to have acquired
during their relationship, would fall under Section 148 of the Family Code.
RULING: NO/ YES.
RATIO: ON THE VALIDITY OF MARRIAGE:We see no inconsistency in finding the marriage between Benjamin and Sally null
and void ab initio and, at the same time, non-existent. Under Article 35 of the Family Code, a marriage solemnized without
a license, except those covered by Article 34 where no license is necessary, "shall be void from the beginning." In this case,
the marriage between Benjamin and Sally was solemnized without a license. It was duly established that no marriage
license was issued to them and that Marriage License No. N-07568 did not match the marriage license numbers issued by
the local civil registrar of Pasig City for the month of February 1982. The case clearly falls under Section 3 of Article
3520 which made their marriage void ab initio. The marriage between Benjamin and Sally was also non-existent. Applying
the general rules on void or inexistent contracts under Article 1409 of the Civil Code, contracts which are absolutely
simulated or fictitious are "inexistent and void from the beginning." 21 Thus, the Court of Appeals did not err in sustaining
the trial court’s ruling that the marriage between Benjamin and Sally was null and void ab initio and non-existent.
Except for the modification in the distribution of properties, the Court of Appeals affirmed in all aspects the trial court’s
decision and ruled that "the rest of the decision stands."22 While the Court of Appeals did not discuss bigamous marriages,
it can be gleaned from the dispositive portion of the decision declaring that "the rest of the decision stands" that the Court
of Appeals adopted the trial court’s discussion that the marriage between Benjamin and Sally is not bigamous. The trial
court stated:
On whether or not the parties’ marriage is bigamous under the concept of Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code,
the marriage is not bigamous. It is required that the first or former marriage shall not be null and void. The
marriage of the petitioner to Azucena shall be assumed as the one that is valid, there being no evidence to the
contrary and there is no trace of invalidity or irregularity on the face of their marriage contract. However, if the
second marriage was void not because of the existence of the first marriage but for other causes such as lack of
license, the crime of bigamy was not committed. In People v. De Lara [CA, 51 O.G., 4079], it was held that what was
committed was contracting marriage against the provisions of laws not under Article 349 but Article 350 of the
Revised Penal Code. Concluding, the marriage of the parties is therefore not bigamous because there was no
marriage license. The daring and repeated stand of respondent that she is legally married to petitioner cannot, in
any instance, be sustained. Assuming that her marriage to petitioner has the marriage license, yet the same would
be bigamous, civilly or criminally as it would be invalidated by a prior existing valid marriage of petitioner and
Azucena.23
For bigamy to exist, the second or subsequent marriage must have all the essential requisites for validity except for the
existence of a prior marriage.24 In this case, there was really no subsequent marriage. Benjamin and Sally just signed a
purported marriage contract without a marriage license. The supposed marriage was not recorded with the local civil
registrar and the National Statistics Office. In short, the marriage between Benjamin and Sally did not exist. They lived
together and represented themselves as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage.
ON THE PROPERTY RELATIONS: The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the property relations of Benjamin and Sally is
governed by Article 148 of the Family Code which states:
Art. 148. In cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding Article, only the properties acquired by both of the parties
through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to
their respective contributions. In the absence of proof to the contrary, their contributions and corresponding shares are
presumed to be equal. The same rule and presumption shall apply to joint deposits of money and evidences of credit.
If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the co-ownership shall accrue to the absolute
community of conjugal partnership existing in such valid marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith is not validly
married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the manner provided in the last paragraph of the preceding
Article.
The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both parties are in bad faith.
Benjamin and Sally cohabitated without the benefit of marriage. Thus, only the properties acquired by them through their
actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their
respective contributions. Thus, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals correctly excluded the 37 properties being
claimed by Sally which were given by Benjamin’s father to his children as advance inheritance.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the 17 August 2011 Decision and the 14 March 2012 Resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 94226.

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Case Title: Date: February 10, 1968

GLORIA G. JOCSON, plaintiff-appellee, G.R. No.: G.R. No. L-23433

vs. RICARDO R. ROBLES, defendant-appellant. Ponente: REYES, J.B.L., J, EN BANC
Nature of Action:
Topic: Procedure in action for Declaration of Nullity; No Confession of
Judgment
Facts:
 On February 4, 1963, Gloria G. Jocson commenced in the Juvenile & Domestic Relations Court an action for the
annulment of her marriage to Ricardo R. Robles, on the ground that it was bigamous.
 It was alleged in the amended complaint that previous to his marriage to plaintiff on May 27, 1958, defendant Robles
had contracted a first marriage with Josefina Fausto, who had instituted a criminal action for Bigamy against the same
defendant.
 Plaintiff also demanded from the defendant moral and exemplary damages, attorneys' fees, and costs, claiming that
during their cohabitation, she was subjected to physical maltreatment by her husband, resulting in the premature birth
of their first child, who died three days later.

 In his answer, defendant also assailed the validity of the marriage. But he charged plaintiffs' parents with having
compelled him by force, threat and intimidation, to contract that marriage with her, notwithstanding their knowledge
that he is a married man; and that said threat and intimidation allegedly persisted until January, 1963 when he was
finally able to get away and live apart from the plaintiff.

 On December 23, 1963, defendant's motion for summary judgment was denied, the court ruling that before it can pass
upon plaintiff's prayer for the declaration of nullity of her marriage to defendant, there is necessity for proof that when
he contracted marriage with plaintiff, defendant Robles had a previous and subsisting valid marriage.
 The evidentiary requirement to establish these facts, according to the court, was not met in the motion for summary
judgment. Defendant's plea to have his marriage declared as having been brought about by force and intimidation, was
also denied, the court finding indications of collusion between the parties in their attempt to secure the nullification of
said marriage.
 Reconsideration of this order, sought by defendant, was denied on January 18, 1964. And, when both parties failed to
appear at the scheduled hearing on March 9, 1964, the court directed the dismissal of the action.
 On April 17, 1964, defendant notified the court below of his intention to appeal. The appeal bond and amended record
on appeal, dated April 15, 1964, were thereafter approved.
Issue: W/N a decree of declaration of nullity of marriage of Jocson and Robles may be made based on a confession
of judgment by Robles

Ruling: No. (Dismissed)

Ratio:
It is noted that, as specified in the notice of appeal, defendant is taking exception from the lower court's orders; however,
there is no indication or certification or proof that the filing of the appeal notice, bond and record on appeal on April 17,
1964 were made within the reglementary period, as required by the provisions of Section 6, Revised Rule 41 of the Rules of
Court.

There is here no showing that the present appeal was perfected within the reglementary period, which datum should have
appeared in the record on appeal.

On the merits, we are satisfied that the Court of Domestic Relations correctly denied the motion for summary judgment in
view of the first paragraph of Article 88 and 101 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, that expressly prohibit the rendition of
a decree of annulment of a marriage upon a stipulation of facts or a confession of judgment. The affidavits annexed to the
petition for summary judgment practically amount to these methods not countenanced by the Civil Code.

This proceeding is hereby dismissed, conformable to Section (a) of Revised Rule 50 of the Rules of Court.

48
Case Title: Date: March 15, 1974
ROMULO TOLENTINO, petitioner,
vs. G.R. No.: L-23264
HELEN VILLANUEVA and HONORABLE CORAZON Nature of Action: Suit for annulment of marriage (trial court)
JULIANO AGRAVA, Judge of the Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court, respondents. Ponente: MAKASIAR, J
Topic: Procedure in action for declaration of Nullity – No confession of
judgment
Facts:
Petitioner Romulo Tolentino filed a suit for annulment of his marriage to private respondent Helen Villanueva, alleging that
his consent was obtained through fraud because immediately after the marriage celebration, he discovered that private
respondent was pregnant despite the fact that he had no sexual relations with her prior to the marriage ceremony. Petitioner
also alleges that they did not live as husband and wife as immediately after the marriage celebration, Helen Villanueva left his
house and her whereabouts remained unknown to him until he discovered that she is residing in San Francisco, Cebu. Said
marriage was solemnized by Quezon City Judge Mariano R. Virtucio on September 28, 1959.

Despite the fact that she was served with summons and copy of the complaint, Helen failed to file a responsive pleading, for
which reason petitioner filed on June 13, 1962 a motion to declare her in default and to set the date for the presentation of his
evidence.

In an order dated June 28, 1962, respondent Judge declared private respondent in default, but, pursuant to the provision of
Articles 88 and 101 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, referred the case to the City Fiscal of Manila for investigation to
determine whether collusion exists between the parties, directing the City Fiscal to submit his report within sixty (60) days
from receipt thereof, and, in the event of a negative finding, to represent the State at the trial of the case to prevent fabrication
of evidence; and likewise directed herein petitioner to furnish the City Fiscal with copies of the complaint and such other
documents necessary for the City Fiscal's information and guidance.

On July 3, 1962, Petitioner submitted to the City Fiscal only a copy of his complaint. Thus, the Assistant City Fiscal assigned to
the case, issued a subpoena to petitioner's counsel requiring him to bring petitioner with him as well as copies of other
documents in connection with the annulment case. Plaintiff's counsel, in a letter, informed Assistant City Fiscal Jose that he
could not comply with the subpoena for it will unnecessarily expose his evidence.

In a motion dated and filed on October 29, 1962, petitioner, thru counsel, prayed the respondent Judge to set the date for the
reception of his evidence on the ground that the City Fiscal had not submitted a report of his findings despite the lapse of sixty
(60) days from July 10, 1962 when he submitted to the City Fiscal a copy of the complaint.

Respondent Judge denied the aforesaid motion of petitioner unless he submits himself for interrogation by the City Fiscal to
enable the latter to report whether or not there is collusion between the parties. Ultimately, Respondent Judge dismissed the
complaint in view of the fact that petitioner is not willing to submit himself for interrogation by the City Fiscal pursuant to the
provisions of the second paragraph of Article 101 of the New Civil Code.

Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner filed with the Supreme Court a prayer for nullity of
judgment and for the Court to order Respondent Judge to receive his evidence.

Issue: W/N an annulment of marriage may be decided based upon a stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment

Ruling: (Direct Answer to Issue)

No, Articles 88 and 101 of the Civil Code of the Philippines expressly prohibit the rendition of a decision in suits for annulment
of marriage and legal separation based on a stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment and direct that in case of non-
appearance of defendant, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to inquire whether or not collusion between the
parties exists, and if none, said prosecuting attorney shall intervene for the State to prevent fabrication of evidence for the
plaintiff.
Ratio:

ART. 88. No judgment annulling a marriage shall be promulgated upon a stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment.

In case of non-appearance of the defendant, the provisions of article 101, paragraph 2, shall be observed.

ART. 101. No decree of legal separation shall be promulgated upon a stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment.

In case of non-appearance of the defendant, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to inquire whether or not a
collusion between the parties exists. If there is no collusion, the prosecuting attorney shall intervene for the State in order to
49
take care that the evidence for the plaintiff is not fabricated.

The prohibition expressed in the aforesaid laws and rules is predicated on the fact that the institutions of marriage and of the
family are sacred and therefore are as much the concern of the State as of the spouses; because the State and the public have
vital interest in the maintenance and preservation of these social institutions against desecration by collusion between the
parties or by fabricated evidence. The prohibition against annulling a marriage based on the stipulation of facts or by
confession of judgment or by non-appearance of the defendant stresses the fact that marriage is more than a mere contract
between the parties; and for this reason, when the defendant fails to appear, the law enjoins the court to direct the prosecuting
officer to intervene for the State in order to preserve the integrity and sanctity of the marital bonds

Hence, the inevitable conclusion is that the petition is without merit.

WHEREFORE, THE ORDER DATED JULY 29, 1963 IS HEREBY AFFIRMED AND THE PETITION IS HEREBY DISMISSED. WITH
COSTS AGAINST PETITIONER.
Relevant Dissent-Concurring Opinion/Notes:

50
Case Title: Date: April 25, 1941

GODOFREDO BUCCAT, demandante-apelante, G.R. No. 47101

vs.
Nature of Action: Appeal from Decision of Court of First
LUIDA MANGONON DE BUCCAT, demandada-
Instance, Baguio
apelada.
Ponente: HORRILLENO, J.

Topic: Grounds for Annulment

Facts:
Godofredo Buccat and Luida Mangonon de Buccat met in March 1938; became engaged in September 19, 1938, and got
married in Nov 26, 1938. Godofredo claims that he agreed to the marriage because of the promise based on Luida’s
assurance that she was a virgin.

On Feb 23, 1939, (89 days after marriage) Luida gave birth to a son. After knowing this, Godofredo left Luida and never
returned to married life with her.

On March 23, 1939, he filed for an annulment of their marriage on the grounds that there had been fraud.

Issue: W/N Luida’s concealment of her pregnancy constituted a ground for annulment of marriage which is fraud.

Ruling: (Direct Answer to Issue)

No. There is no fraud. It is unlikely that the plaintiff Godofredo had not suspected anything about Luida’s condition
considering that she was in an advanced stage of pregnancy. As she gave birth less than 3 months after they got married,
she must have looked very pregnant even before they were married. Since Godofredo must have known that she was not a
virgin, the marriage cannot be annulled.

Ratio:
Marriage is a most sacred institution. It is the foundation upon which society rests. To nullify it would need clear and
authentic proof. In this case no such proof exists.

51
FERNANDO AQUINO, petitioner, July 27, 1960
vs.
CONCHITA DELIZO, respondent. G.R. No.: L-15853

Petition for Certiorari to review decision of the CA

Ponente: Gutierrez David, J.
Topic: Fraud
Facts:

This is a petition for certiorari to review a decision of the Court of Appeals affirming that of the Court of First Instance of
Rizal which dismissed petitioner's complaint for annulment of his marriage with respondent Conchita Delizo.

The dismissed complaint was based on the ground of fraud against Conchita Delizo that at the date of her marriage with the
former on December 1954, concealed the fact that she was pregnant by another man and sometime in April 1955 or about
4 months after their marriage, gave birth to a child. During the trial, Provincial Fiscal Jose Goco represent the state in the
proceedings to prevent collusion. Only Aquino testified and the only documentary evidence presented was the marriage
contract between the parties. Delizo did not appear nor presented any evidence.

CFI-Rizal dismissed petitioner’s complaint for annulment of marriage, which was affirmed by CA thus a petition for
certiorari to review the decisions.
Issue: Whether or not concealment of pregnancy as alleged by Aquino does not constitute such fraud as would annul a
marriage.

Ruling: Concealment constitutes fraud. (relate with Art. 46(2) of FC)

Ratio:

The concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of the marriage, she was pregnant by a man other than her husband
constitutes fraud and is a ground for annulment of marriage. Delizo was allegedly to be only more than four months
pregnant at the time of her marriage. At this stage, it is hard to say that her pregnancy was readily apparent especially
since she was “naturally plump”. It is only on the 6th month of pregnancy that the enlargement of the woman’s abdomen
reaches a height above the umbilicus, making the roundness of the abdomen more general and apparent.
The court remanded the case for new trial and decision complained is set aside.

52