Republic of the Philippines rehearsed testimony.
The test is whether the testimonies agree
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. Nos. 94994-95 May 14, 1993
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
LILIBETH CACO y PALMARIO and TEODORO CACO y
LAPADA, accused.
LILIBETH CACO y PALMARIO, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Mariano L. Ordoñez III for accused-appellant.
Remedial Law; Evidence; Credibility of Witnesses; Minor
discrepancies or inconsistencies in the testimonies of
prosecution witnesses do not impair the essential integrity of the
prosecution’s evidence, the same even tend to strengthen
rather than weaken the credibility thereof by erasing any
suspicion of rehearsed testimony.—The claimed
inconsistencies in the testimonies of Quillan and Tamayo
concern minor, if not trivial matters. It is doctrinally settled that
minor discrepancies or inconsistencies do not impair the
essential integrity of the prosecution’s evidence as a whole or
reflect on the witnesses’ honesty. Such inconsistencies, which
may be caused by the natural fickleness of memory, even tend
to strengthen rather than weaken the credibility of the
prosecution’s witnesses because they erase any suspicion of
on the essential facts and whether the respective versions
corroborate and substantially coincide with each other to make
a consistent and coherent whole.
Criminal Procedure; Arrest; Search and Seizure; There is a
lawful arrest, even without a warrant, of an accused caught in
flagrante delicto and the evidence obtained in a search
incidental thereto is admissible in evidence.—Appellant was
caught in flagrante selling marijuana to the poseur-buyer. Under
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Court, she could
be, as in fact she was, lawfully arrested without a warrant
because she was then committing or has just committed a crime
in the presence of the policemen. xxx As an incident to the
lawful arrest, the appellant could be, pursuant to Section 12,
Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court, “searched for
dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of
the commission of an offense, without a search warrant.” xxx
Being the product of a lawful search, the eighty-nine (89) sticks
of marijuana are, therefore, admissible in evidence.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Criminal Law; Dangerous
Drugs Act; A “Buy-bust” operation is a recognized means of
entrapment, an operation sanctioned by the Revised Penal
Code, of drug pushers.—In Our jurisdiction, a buy-bust
operation is a recognized means of entrapping drug pushers.
Entrapment is an operation sanctioned by the Revised Penal
Code.
Page 1 of 6
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
of the decision reads:
Accused spouses Teodoro and Lilibeth Caco were charged with the
violation of Section 4, Article II of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (R.A.
No. 6425), as amended, in an Information filed on 27 February 1990 with
Branch 172 of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila. The
accusatory portion thereof reads:
That on or about the 23rd day of February 1990, in the
municipality of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction oof this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused conspiring, confederating and
mutually helping each other, without authority of law, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell,
deliver, dispatch in transit and transport ten (10) sticks
of marijuana cigarettes, which is a prohibited
drug.1
The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 10108-V-90.
On the same date, another information for the violation of Section 27,
Article IV of the said Act was filed with the same court against Mercia
Bayonito, Rosemarie Reyes, Corazon de la Cruz, Annabelle Castillo and
Linda Caco. The said persons allegedly smoked marijuana while gathered
as a group in the house of the spouses Teodoro and Lilibeth Caco. The
case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 10106-V-90.2
Both cases were consolidated and jointly tried.
After all of the accused had entered a plea of not guilty during their
arraignment, trial on the merits ensued. The witnesses presented by the
prosecution were Pat. Wilfredo Quillan, Pat. Rafael Tamayo and
Constancia Franco. The witnesses for the defense were the accused
Mercia Bayonito and Corazon de la Cruz in Criminal Case No. 10106-V-
90, accused Lilibeth Caco in Criminal Case No. 10108-V-90, and
Barangay Captain Ruperto Sabile, Jr.
On 13 August 1990, the trial court promulgated a joint decision 3 in the
above cases acquitting all the accused in Criminal Case No. 10106-V-90
and the accused Teodoro Caco in Criminal Case No. 10108-V-90 but
convicting the accused Lilibeth Caco in the latter. The dispositive portion
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court in
Criminal Case No. 10106-V-90 finds all the accused
namely Mercia Bayonito y Biazon, Rosemarie Reyes y
Sabayan, Corazon de la Cruz y Cruz, Annabelle Castillo
y Cruz and Linda Caco y Lapada not guilty of the crime
charged on ground of reasonable doubt. In Criminal
Case No. 10108-V-90, the Court finds Teodoro Caco not
guilty of the crime charged because of reasonable doubt.
The Court finds Lilibeth Caco y Palmario guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged and is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment, and
a fine of Twenty Thousand without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of inslovency, and to pay the
costs. The bail bonds posted by all the accused in Civil
(sic) Case No. 10106-V-90 are hereby ordered
cancelled. The Jail Warden of Valenzuela is hereby
ordered to release Teodoro Caco from confinement
unless held for any lawful cause. All the sticks of
marijuana are hereby ordered forfeited in favor of the
government.
SO ORDERED.4
Said conviction is based on the following findings and conclusion
of the trial court:
Anent Criminal Case No. 10108-V-90 the Court has
found the following facts and arrived at the following
conclusions:
The Court heard the testimonies of both police officers
and saw their demeanor, and read the contents of their
joint affidavit that Lilibeth Caco received from Pat.
Wilfredo Quillan the P20.00, went inside the house and
when she came out she gave to Pat. Wilfredo Quillan 10
sticks of marijuana, which were proven by the
prosecution to be marijuana. The testimony and written
allegations of Pat. Rafael Tamayo that he peeped
Page 2 of 6
 through the hole and saw Lilibeth hand to Teodoro Caco
the money and the latter "may kinuha sa kaning kuarto"
cannot be taken against Teodoro Caco because as
stated above said hole was not proven to exist and it is
not categorically proven as to what Teodoro Caco hand
(sic) to Lilibeth inside the house. It was Lilibeth who was
proven to have received the money and who was proven
to have handed to poseur buyer Pat. Quillan the 10
sticks. Teodoro Caco was not proven successfully by the
prosecution to have participated in the sale.
The Court noted the recent jailbreak of prisoners of the
Valenzuela Jail. The accused Teodoro Caco was one of
them (sic) who bolted but he surrendered thereafter
before the authorities gave chase, he, alleging that he
was threatened to be killed if he declined to join the
jailbreak. The Court takes this gesture of his in
surrendering to the authority and returning to jail while
this case pends, as an indication of an innocent person.
Since Lilibeth Caco was apprehended during the illegal
act of selling marijuana the confiscation from her house
of the 89 sticks of marijuana even without search warrant
is legal, and said evidence cannot be taken against him
(sic), as pursuant to a legal arrest.
It has been held in our jurisprudence that possession of
a large quantity of such prohibited drug without evidence
showing that the accused is a user, bolsters the charge
that he/she is a pusher.
Overwhelming evidence that prove (sic) the guilt of the
accused Lilibeth Caco but innocense (sic) of Teodoro
Caco in Criminal Case No. 10108-V-90 has been
presented by the accused (sic). The weak defense of
Lilibeth Caco cannot really prevail over said prosecution
evidence. 5
The pertinent facts as established by the prosecution are succinctly and
more lucidly stated by the People in the Brief for the Appellee6 as follows:
On February 23, 1990, at about 2:30 o'clock in the
afternoon, Patrolman Wilfredo Quillan received
information from a civilian informant that appellant and
her husband were selling marijuana in their house at
Tanke Street, Malinta, Valenzuela, Metro Manila (pp. 2-
3, tsn, March 23, 1990).
Patrolman Quillan relayed the information to Sergeant
Loreto Rodriguez, head of the Anti-Narcotics Unit. Sgt.
Rodriguez formed a team to conduct a "buy-bust"
operation. He designated Patrolman Quillan to act as
"poseur buyer," giving him a marked P20.00 bill forthe
purpose (p. 3, ibid.).
The group composed of Patrolman Quillan, Federico
Patag, Jose Villaseñor, Rafael Tamayo and Crisanto
Zuriaga proceeded to Tanke Street, Valenzuela, Metro
Manila. The civilian informant showed them the house of
appellant (p. 4, ibid.).
Patrolman Quillan and Tamayo went to the house of
appellant and called for her. When appellant came out,
they asked if her husband, Boy Andeng, was there. They
then told her that they wanted to buy marijuana worth
P20.00 (ibid.).
Appellant got the money and went inside. When she
returned, she handed to them ten sticks of marijuana.
Thereupon, Patrolman Quillan and Tamayo introduced
themselves as police officers and signaled their
companions to approach (p. 5, ibid.).
The police went inside the house and found two rouches
(sic) of marijuana on the floor. Appellant's husband,
Teodoro Caco, surrendered eighty nine (89) more sticks
of marijuana (p. 6, ibid.).
Patrolman Quillan identified the ten sticks of marijuana
appellant sold to him (Exhibits I-1 to E-10) through his
initials (p. 2, tsn, May 23, 1990). He likewise identified
the 89 sticks of marijuana (Exhibit I-11 to I-99) found
Page 3 of 6
 inside the house of appellant through his initials on the
plastic bag (ibid.).
Exhibits I-1 to I-99 were confirmed to be marijuana
through chemical tests conducted by Constancia
Salonga, Supervising Forensic Chemist of the National
Bureau of Investigation (pp. 2-4, tsn, May 4,
1990).7
Accused Lilibeth Caco, hereinafter referred to as the Appellant,
seasonably appealed from the decision and in the Resolution of 29 April
1991, this Court accepted the appeal. 8
On 28 August 1991, the appellant filed through her new lawyer, Atty.
Mariano Ordoñez II, a seven-page Appeal Brief for Accused 9 wherein she
presents and discusses the following assignment of errors:
I.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE
ACCUSED WITHOUT GIVING MORE WEIGHT TO
THE TESTIMONIES OF THE PROSECUTION
WITNESSES, ESPECIALLY INCONSISTENCIES
EVIDENT.
II.
THE LOWER COURT HAS NOT PROVEN THE GUILT
OF THE ACCUSED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
The formulation of the assigned errors leaves much to be desired and it
is obvious that it was done with undue haste. As worded, the first suffers
from ambiguity with a shade of self-contradiction while the second
proposes a novel rule of evidence by shifting to the trial court the burden
of proving the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. This Court,
however, will resolve the issues not on the basis of the formulation of the
assignment of errors but on the merits of the arguments proferred in
support thereof.
In seeking the reversal of the decision, the appellant points out in the first
assigned errors what she perceives to be inconsistencies between the
testimonies of prosecution witnesses Quillan and Tamayo which the trial
court allegedly failed to notice. According to her, although Tamayo
testified that he and Quillan introduced themselves to the appellant when
the latter went inside the house, and that the five (5) women (accused in
Criminal Case No. 10106-V-90) were just sitting down, Quillan declared
that the introduction was made before he went inside the house after the
sale was made and that the five (5) women were dancing. She then
concludes that these disparities, taken in the light of the further declaration
of Tamayo that he was only one (1) meter away from Quillan, show that
Tamayo was not within the area of the appellant's house, but somewhere
else. Appellant further claims that the trial court erred in not verifying
whether there was a legitimate buy-bust operation and whether the
apprehending policemen entered the house of the appellant with a search
warrant in compliance with the mandate of the Constitution.10
Appellant opens her discussion of the second assigned error with a
reiteration of her quaint theory that "the court was not able to prove
accused's guilt beyond reasonable doubt," hence, it committed an error in
convincing her. She submits that there are doubts on the "reasonableness
of the search made on accused's house," and on the "existence of the
buy-bust operation for the lower court failed to prove that the front door of
the accused's house was either open or close."11 As to the latter, she
observes that the prosecution's evidence tends to establish that the door
was closed because the policeman had to knock while the defense was
able to prove that it was wide open.12Finally, she raises "a question of
admissibility in evidence" of the eighty- nine (89) sticks of marijuana
allegedly voluntarily surrendered by Teodoro Caco because there was no
search warrant issued therefor, and describes the alleged surrender
thereof as beyond comprehension because she and her husband had
questioned the authority of the policemen to search their house and had
demanded for a search warrant.13
In its Brief,14 the Appellee refutes in detail the assigned errors by showing
that: (1) the buy-bust operation was fully established in evidence, (2) the
testimonies of Quillan and Tamayo regarding it are consistent on major
points, (3) the inconsistencies pointed out refer to non-crucial details
which do not detract from their overall credibility,15 and (4) the search and
seizure in this case were made as an incident to a lawful arrest; hence,
pursuant to Section 12, Rule 126 in relation to Section 5(1), Rule 113 of
the Rules of Court, no warrant was required.16
Page 4 of 6
A thorough examination and evaluation of the records and the evidence
adduced by the prosecution does not sustain the appellant's position. Her
appeal is clearly unmeritorious.
The claimed inconsistencies in the testimonies of Quillan and Tamayo
concern minor, if not trivial, matters. It is doctrinally settled that minor
discrepancies or inconsistencies do not impair the essential integrity of
the prosecution's evidence as a whole or reflect on the witnesses'
honesty.17 Such inconsistencies, which may be caused by the natural
fickleness of memory, even tend to strengthen rather than weaken the
credibility of the prosecution's witnesses because they erase any
suspicion of rehearsed testimony.18 The test is whether the testimonies
agree on the essential facts and whether the respective versions
corroborate and substantially coincide with each other to make a
consistent and coherent whole.19 Appellant does not even attempt to
dispute the factual infrastructure of the successful buy-bust operation as
established by the evidence for the prosecution, viz., that she received the
P20.00 buy-bust money in consideration of which she delivered to the
poseur-buyer, Pat. Quillan, ten (10) sticks of marijuana. By no stretch of
the imagination can it be said that these facts were whittled down or
depreciated by the alleged inconsistencies. The "reasonable doubt" she
raised regarding the buy-bust operation is wholly unacceptable for it is
based on the paradoxical statement that "the lower court failed to prove
that the front door of the accused's house was either open or close.20 It is
not, of course, the duty of the trial court to prove the guilt of the accused.
That is the burden of the prosecution. The court's duty is to weigh the
evidence and determine if the quantum of proof required for conviction —
proof beyond reasonable doubt — is met.21 Besides, the condition of the
door in the instantcase is entirely irrelevant to the issue of whether there
was in fact a buy-bust operation.
With respect to the legality and validity of the search and seizure
conducted by the policemen, this Court notes that no specific assignment
of error is devoted to it and that the appellant merely makes a passing
reference to it in her second assigned error. Such a paramount issue
involving a sacred constitutional right certainly deserves more than just a
fleeting mention or a passing interest if indeed the appellant had a valid
grievance. The records of this case yield nothing to support such a plaint.
On the contrary, the legality and validity of the search and seizure is
beyond dispute. Appellant was caught in flagrante selling marijuana to the
poseur-buyer. Under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Court,
she could be, as in fact she was, lawfully arrested without a warrant
because she was then committing or has just committed a crime in the
presence of the policemen. Said section provides:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace
officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest
a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed,
and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that
the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has
escaped from a penal establishment or place where he
is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while
his case is pending, or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another. . . . 22
As an incident to the lawful arrest, the appellant could be,
pursuant to Section 12, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court,
"searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be
used as proof of the commission of an offense, without a search
warrant."
In People vs.Paco,23 this Court ruled:
Having caught the appellant in flagrante as a result of a
buy-bust operation, the policemen were not only
authorized but were also under obligation to apprehend
the drug pusher even without a warrant of arrest. And
since appellant's arrest was lawful, it follows that the
search made incidental to the arrest was also valid.
[Rule 126, Sec. 12, Alvero vs. Dizon, 76 Phil. 637 (1946);
People vs. Claudio, G.R. No. 72564, April 15, 1988].
Page 5 of 6
 Being the product of a lawful search, the eighty-nine (89) sticks
of marijuana are, therefore, admissible in evidence.

In Our jurisdiction, a buy-bust operation is a recognized means of

entrapping drug pushers.24 Entrapment is an operation sanctioned by the
Revised Penal Code.25

The decision appealed from must perforce be affirmed as it is fully

supported by the facts and the applicable law and jurisprudence.

We end, however, with a note that We are not exactly happy at seeing a
married woman suffer the penalty of life imprisonment for drug pushing
while her husband was acquitted of the same charge. She would, thus,
leave a family deprived of maternal love and a husband divested of
consortium. However, she committed an offense whose consequences go
beyond her immediate victims and in open defiance of the continuing and
relentless campaign of the Government to rid society of the drug menace
and its disastrously harmful social, economic, and even spiritual effects.
It has broken the lives, shattered the hopes and destroyed the future of
thousands of our young citizens.26Let her and others of her ilk know that
purveyors of drugs are agents of destruction; they deserve no less than
the maximum penalty.27

WHEREFORE, the challenged Decision of Branch 172 of the Regional

Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila in Criminal Case No. 10108-V-90
is hereby AFFIRMED in toto, with costs against accused-appellant
LILIBETH CACO y PALMARIO.

Page 6 of 6