Union Bank of the Philippines v. Maunlad Homes, Inc. | G.R. No. 190071 | Brion, J.
|  RTC explained that the parties’ venue stipulation cannot be
(2012)
FACTS:
 Petitioner Union Bank is the owner of Maunlad Shopping Mall, a commercial
complex in Malolos, Bulacan. It entered into a Contract to Sell with
Respondent Maunlad Homes as buyer over said property for ₱151M, with
₱2.4M as down payment. The contract authorized Maunlad to possess the
property and build improvements thereon. Should Maunlad violate any of
the contractual terms, all payments made will be applied as rentals while the
improvements will accrue in Union Bank’s favor.
o The contract further stated that in the event of rescission due to
failure to pay or to comply with the terms, Maunlad will be required
to immediately vacate and return possession of the property to
Union Bank.
o Note: the contract contained a venue stipulation that “all actions in
connection with the Contract to Sell shall be filed in Makati.”
 When Maunlad failed to pay the monthly amortization, Union Bank sent a
Notice of Rescission of Contract, demanding payment; otherwise, the latter
shall consider the contract automatically rescinded. Maunlad failed to
comply, prompting Union Bank to send another letter demanding rentals due
and requiring that the property be vacated and its possession turned over to
the bank.
 Because Maunlad did not heed the demand, Union Bank instituted an
ejectment suit before MeTC Branch 64 of Makati. Maunlad resisted the suit
by claiming it is the owner of the property as Union Bank did not reserve
ownership thereof under the contract. Consequently, Maunlad had the right
to possess.
o MeTC dismissed Union Bank’s complaint, finding that the latter’s
cause of action was based on a breach of contract and both parties
were claiming a better right to possess based on their respective
claims of ownership. Thus, the appropriate action was accion
reivindicatoria, over which MeTC had no jurisdiction.
 On appeal, the RTC affirmed the MeTC, stating that determination of the
rights of the parties under the contract extends beyond issues commonly
involved in an unlawful detainer suit.
o Additionally, since the property was located in Bulacan, Makati was
an improper venue, pursuant to the 2nd par. of Rule 4, Sec. 1 which
stated, “Forcible entry and detainer actions shall be commenced
and tried in the municipal trial court of the municipality or city
wherein the real property involved, or a portion thereof, is
situated.”
relied on since ejectment is not an action arising out of or
connected with the contract.
 Union Bank appealed to the CA via petition for review under Rule 42.
o CA affirmed the RTC, stating that the bank’s claim of possession is
based on its claim of ownership which in turn is based on its
interpretation of the contractual terms (particularly on the
consequences of Maunlad's breach of contract.) Such cause of
action is premised on the interpretation and enforcement of the
contract and the determination of the validity of the rescission, both
of which are matters beyond the MeTC’s jurisdiction.
 The CA made no further ruling on the issue of venue.
 Union Bank appealed the case to SC via petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45. Union Bank argued that it was not claiming ownership over the
property through ejectment because, in fact, it never lost ownership; only
the right to possess was conceded to Maunlad. Maunlad’s failure to comply
with the terms gave the bank the right to rescind the contract, which
rescission consequently terminated Maunlad’s right to possess.
o SC initially denied the petition but on motion for reconsideration set
aside its former ruling and required Maunlad to comment.
 Maunlad countered that the bank’s action was based on the propriety of the
rescission, an issue within the RTC’s (not MeTC’s) jurisdiction.
o Maunlad also contended that its failure to make payments did not
terminate its right to possess because it already acquired ownership
when Union Bank failed to reserve ownership of the property under
the contract.
o Maunlad reiterated that the proper venue was Malolos, Bulacan.
o Finally, Maunlad contended that suspension of payment did not
affect its right to possess because the contract was one of sale, not
one to sell; hence, ownership has been transferred to it.
ISSUES:
a) [MAIN] Did the MeTC have jurisdiction over Union Bank’s ejectment
complaint? – YES.
b) Was Makati the proper venue for the complaint? – YES.
c) Was the contract one of sale (as opposed to one to sell), such that Maunlad’s
suspension of payment did not affect its right to possess? – NO.
RATIO:
On the MeTC’s authority to interpret contracts in an unlawful detainer action
 In any case involving the question of jurisdiction, it is a settled doctrine that
jurisdiction of a court is determined by the nature of the action pleaded by the
litigant through the allegations in his complaint.
 Unlawful detainer is an action to recover possession of real property from
one who unlawfully withholds possession after the expiration or termination
of his right to hold possession under any contract, express or implied. Under
Rule 70, Sec. 1, such action must be filed within 1 year after the unlawful
deprivation or withholding of possession. To fall within the jurisdiction of the
MeTC, the complaint must allege:
1. The defendant originally had lawful possession of the property,
either by virtue of a contract or by tolerance of the plaintiff;
2. Eventually, the defendant's possession of the property became
illegal or unlawful upon notice by the plaintiff to defendant of the
expiration or the termination of the defendant's right of possession;
3. Thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property
and deprived the plaintiff the enjoyment thereof; and
4. Within one year from the unlawful deprivation or withholding of
possession, the plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment.
 Here, all four requirements were alleged in Union Bank's Complaint:
o Union Bank alleged that Maunlad "maintained possession of the
subject properties" under the Contract to Sell.
o Maunlad Homes, however, "failed to faithfully comply with the
terms of payment," prompting Union Bank to "rescind the Contract
to Sell in a Notice of Rescission.
o When Maunlad "refused to turn over and vacate the subject
premises," Union Bank sent another Demand Letter on November
19, 2003 to Maunlad Homes requiring it to pay rentals and to vacate
the property.
o As the demand went unheeded, Union Bank instituted an action for
unlawful detainer before the MeTC within one year from the date
of the last demand.
 These allegations clearly demonstrate a cause of action for
unlawful detainer and vested the MeTC jurisdiction.
 A defendant may not divest the MeTC of its jurisdiction by merely claiming
ownership of the property. Under Rule 70, Sec. 16, when the defendant
raises the defense of ownership in his pleadings and the question of
possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the
issue of ownership shall be resolved only to determine the issue of
possession.
o Rule 70, Sec. 18 adds that such judgment shall be conclusive with
respect to the possession only and shall in no wise affect the
ownership of the land or building.
o Thus, despite Maunlad’s claim of ownership, the MeTC retained
jurisdiction.
 This authority granted to the MeTC to preliminarily resolve the issue of
ownership to determine the issue of possession ultimately allows it to
interpret and enforce the contract. To deny the MeTC jurisdiction over a
complaint merely because the issue of possession requires the interpretation
of a contract will effectively rule out unlawful detainer as a remedy.
o In an action for unlawful detainer, the defendant's right to possess
may be by virtue of contract; corollarily, termination of such right
would be governed by the terms of the same contract.
Interpretation is inevitable because it is the contract that initially
grants the defendant the right to possess the property; it is the same
contract that the plaintiff subsequently claims was violated or
extinguished, terminating the defendant's right to possess.
o At any rate, the MeTC’s ruling on the parties’ rights is merely
provisional and is binding only with respect to the issue of
possession.
On the propriety of venue
 Despite the 2nd par. of Rule 4, Sec. 1, SC noted that Sec. 4 of the same Rule
provides that the rule shall not apply “where the parties have validly agreed
in writing before the filing of the action on the exclusive venue thereof."
o Here, the parties precisely provided for a different venue. And since
the unlawful detainer action is connected with the contract, Union
Bank correctly filed the complaint with MeTC Makati.
On the issue of contract of sale v. to sell and effect on right to possess
 SC noted that the contract stated in part, “Upon payment in full of the
Purchase Price, SELLER shall execute and deliver a Deed of Absolute Sale
conveying the Property to the BUYER [.]”
o In jurisprudence, where the seller promises to execute a deed of
absolute sale upon the completion by the buyer of the payment of
the price, the contract is only a contract to sell.
o In a contract to sell, non-payment of the price renders the contract
to sell ineffective. Thus, Maunlad’s act of withholding the
installments rendered the contract ineffective, ultimately depriving
itself of the right to continue possessing the property.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, we hereby GRANT the petition and SET ASIDE the
decision dated October 28, 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 107772.
Respondent Maunlad Homes, Inc. is ORDERED TO VACATE the Maunlad Shopping
Mall, the property subject of the case, immediately upon the finality of this Decision.
Respondent Maunlad Homes, Inc. is further ORDERED TO PAY the rentals-in-arrears,
as well as rentals accruing in the interim until it vacates the property.
The case is REMANDED to the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati City, Branch
64, to determine the amount of rentals due. In addition to the amount determined as
unpaid rent, respondent Maunlad Homes, Inc. is ORDERED TO PAY legal interest of six
percent (6%) per annum, from November 19, 2003, when the demand to pay and to
vacate was made, up to the finality of this Decision. Thereafter, an interest of twelve
percent (12%) per annum shall be imposed on the total amount due until full payment
is made.

Michael Sebastian vs. Annabel Lagmay Ng, represented by her Attorney-in-fact, Angelita
Lagmay | G.R. No. 164594 | April 22, 2015 | Brion, J.:
Facts:
1. In 1997, Angelita Lagmay (Angelita), acting as representative and attorney-in-fact
of her daµghter Annabel Lagmay Ng (Annabel), filed a complaint before the
Barangay Justice of Siclong, Laur, Nueva Ecija against petitioner Michael
Sebastian.
2. Angelita sought to collect from Michael ₱350,000.00 that Annabel sent to
Michael.
3. She claimed that Annabel and Michael were once sweethearts. They agreed to
jointly invest their financial resources to buy a truck.
4. While Annabel was working in Hongkong, Annabel sent Michael the amount of
₱350,000.00 to purchase the truck. However after their relationship ended,
Michael allegedly refused to return the money to Annabel hence the complaint
before the Barangay Justice.
5. On July 9, 1997, the parties entered into an amicable settlement, evidenced by a
document denominated as "kasunduan." Michael agreed to pay Annabel
₱250,000.00 on specific dates. The kasunduan was signed by Angelita (on behalf
of Annabel), Michael, and the members of the pangkat ng tagapagkasundo.1
6. Angelita alleged that the kasunduan was not repudiated within a period of 10 days
from the settlement, in accordance with the Katarungang Pambarangay Law
embodied in the Local Government Code of 1991 (RA 7160) and Section 14 of its
Implementing Rules.
7. When Michael failed to honor the kasunduan, Angelita brought the matter back
to the Barangay.
8. The Barangay Captain failed to enforce the kasunduan, and instead, issued a
Certification to File Action.
1
“Nagkasundo ang dalawang panig napagkayari ng labing apat na buwan (14 months)
simula ngayong July 9, 1997 hanggang September 1998 ay kailangan ng maibigay ni
Mr. Sebastian ang pera ni Ms. Anabelle Lagmay.At napagkasunduan ay dalawang
hulog ang halagang ₱250,000.00 na pera ni Ms.Lagmay at simula ng pagbibigay ni Mr.
Sebastian ay sa buwan ng September 1998.At upang may katunayan ang lahat ng
napag usapan ay lumagda sa ibaba nito at sa harap ng mga saksi ngayong ika-9 ng
9. After about 1 ½ years from date of execution of kasunduan (Jan. 15, 1999),
Angelita filed with MCTC of Laur and Gabaldon, Nueva Ecija, a Motion for
Execution of the kasunduan.
10. Michael moved for the dismissal of the Motion for Execution on the ground that
Angelita allegedly violated Rule 13, Sec. 15 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
11. MCTC ruled in favor of Annabel. It granted the Motion for Execution filed by
Annabel based on Rule 7, Sec. 2 of the IRR of R.A. 7160. It ordered Michael to pay
Annabel ₱250,000.00 with legal interests from July 9, 1997 until said obligation is
fully paid, attorney’s fees of and to pay the cost of the suit within 15 days from
receipt of decision.
12. Michael filed an appeal with the RTC. He argued that the MCTC committed grave
abuse of discretion in prematurely deciding the case. He also pointed out that a
hearing was necessary for Angelita to establish the genuineness and due
execution of the kasunduan.
13. RTC upheld the MCTC Decision. It held that Michael failed to assail the validity of
the kasunduan, or to adduce any evidence to dispute Annabel’s claims or the
applicability of the IRR of R.A. No. 7160.
14. Michael filed an MRarguing that:
a. an amicable settlement or arbitration award can be enforced by the
Lupon within 6 months from date of settlement or after the lapse of 6
months, by ordinary civil action in the appropriate City or Municipal Trial
Court and not by a mere Motion for execution; and
b. MCTC does not have jurisdiction over the case since the amount of
₱250,000.00 (as the subject matter of the kasunduan) is in excess of
MCTC’s jurisdictional amount of ₱200,000.00.
15. RTC in an Order granted Michael’s MR and ruled that there is merit in
jurisdictional issue raised. It dismissed Angelita’s Motion for Execution and set
aside MCTC Decision.
16. Angelita filed an MR to the RTC’s Order, but was subsequently denied.
17. She filed a petition for Review with the CA.
Hulyo, 1997.” (signed by Mrs. Angelita Lagmay, Mr. Michael Sebastian and the
witnesses: Kagawad Rolando Mendizabal, Hepe Quirino Sapon, Benjamin Sebastian
and Jun Roxas)
18. CA initially dismissed the petition for review on a mere technical ground of failure
to attach the Affidavit of Service. Angelita moved for reconsideration, attaching
in her motion the Affidavit of Service. The CA granted the motion.
19. CA granted the petition and reversed RTC’s decision. It declared that the
"appropriate local trial court" stated in Rule VII, Sec. 2 of the Implementing Rules
of R.A. No. 7160 refers to the municipal trial courts. Thus, the MCTC has
jurisdiction to enforce any settlement or arbitration award, regardless of the
amount involved.
20. CA also ruled that Michael’s failure to repudiate the kasunduan in accordance
with the procedure prescribed under the Implementing Rules of R.A. No. 7160,
rendered the kasunduan final. Hence, Michael can no longer assail the kasunduan
on the ground of forgery.
21. Michael filed an MR. CA denied MR. Hence this petition for review on certiorari.
22. Michael alleges that the kasunduan cannot be given the force and effect of a final
judgment because it did not conform to the provisions of the Katarungang
Pambarangay law embodied in Book III, Title One, Chapter 7 of R.A. No. 7160. He
points out the following irregularities in the kasunduan’s execution, and claims
that the agreement forged between him and Angelita was fictitious and
simulated:
a. there was no record of the complaint in the Barangay;
b. there was no notice of mediation sent to him;
c. there was no constitution of the Pangkat Ng Tagapagasundo;
d. the parties were never called upon to choose the three (3) members
from among the Lupon members;
e. he had no participation in the execution of the kasunduan;
f. his signature in the kasunduan was forged;
g. he did not personally appear before the Barangay;
h. there was no attestation clause;
i. the kasunduan was neither reported nor filed before the MCTC; and
j. Annabel, the real party in interest, did not personally appear before the
Barangay as required by the law.
23. Michael also claims that the kasunduan is merely in the nature of a private
document. He also reiterates that since the amount of ₱250,000.00 – the subject
matter of the kasunduan – is in excess of MCTC’s jurisdictional amount of
₱200,000.00, the kasunduan is beyond the MCTC’s jurisdiction to hear and to
resolve. Accordingly, the proceedings in the Barangay are all nullity.
Issues:
1. Whether Angelita filed the proper remedy? YES.
2. Whether the kasunduan could be given the force and effect of a final judgment?
YES.
3. Whether MCTC has the authority and jurisdiction to execute the kasunduan
regardless of the amount involved? YES.
Ratio:
1. A perusal of the body of the motion for execution shows that it is actually in the
nature of an action for execution; hence, it was a proper remedy.
At the outset that Michael raised – in his brief before the CA – the issue of wrong
remedy. He alleged that Angelita’s recourse should have been to file a civil action,
not a mere motion for execution, in a regular court. However, the CA failed to
address this issue and only ruled on the issues of the kasunduan’s irregularities
and the MCTC’s jurisdiction.
A simple reading of Section 417 of the Local Government Code readily discloses
the two-tiered mode of enforcement of an amicable settlement. The provision
reads:
Section 417. Execution.- The amicable settlement or arbitration award
may be enforced by execution by the lupon within six (6) months from
the date of the settlement. After the lapse of such time, the settlement
may be enforced by action in the appropriate city or municipal court.
Under this provision, an amicable settlement or arbitration award that is not
repudiated within a period of 10 days from the settlement may be enforced by:
a. FIRST, execution by the Lupon within 6 months from the date of the
settlement; or
b. SECOND, by an action in the appropriate city or municipal trial court
if more than 6 months from the date of settlement has already
elapsed.
Under the FIRST mode of enforcement, the execution of an amicable settlement
could be done on mere motion of the party entitled thereto before the Punong
Barangay. The proceedings in this case are summary in nature and are governed
by the Local Government Code and the Katarungang Pambarangay Implementing
Rules and Regulations.
The SECOND mode of enforcement, on the other hand, is judicial in nature and
could only be resorted to through the institution of an action in a regular form
before the proper City/Municipal Trial Court. The proceedings shall be governed
by the provisions of the Rules of Court.
In this case, Angelita chose to enforce the kasunduan under the second mode and
filed a motion for execution, which was docketed as Special Proceedings No. 45-
99.
It is undisputed that what Angelita filed before the MCTC was captioned "motion
for execution," rather than a petition/complaint for execution. A perusal of the
motion for execution, however, shows that it contains the material requirements
of an initiatory action.
a. First, the motion is sufficient in form and substance. It is complete with
allegations of the ultimate facts constituting the cause of action; the
names and residences of the plaintiff and the defendant; it contains the
prayer for the MCTC to order the execution of the kasunduan; and there
was also a verification and certification against forum shopping.
b. Furthermore, attached to the motion are:
i. the authenticated special power of attorney of Annabel,
authorizing Angelita to file the present action on her behalf; and
ii. the copy of the kasunduan whose contents were quoted in the
body of the motion for execution.
It is well-settled that what are controlling in determining the nature of the
pleading are the allegations in the body and not the caption.
Thus, the motion for execution that Angelita filed was intended to be an initiatory
pleading or an original action that is compliant with the requirement under Rule 6,
Sec. 3 of the Rules of Court that the complaint should allege the plaintiff’s cause of
action and the names and residences of the plaintiff and the defendant.
Angelita’s motion could therefore be treated as an original action, and not merely
as a motion/special proceeding. For this reason, Annabel has filed the proper
remedy prescribed under Section 417 of the Local Government Code.
However, Angelita should pay the proper docket fees corresponding to the filing
of an action for execution. The docket fees shall be computed by the Clerk of
Court of the MCTC, with due consideration, of course, of what Angelita had
already paid when her motion for execution was docketed as a special
proceeding.
2. The kasunduan has the force and effect of a final judgment.
Under Section 416 of the Local Government Code, the amicable settlement and
arbitration award shall have the force and effect of a final judgment of a court
upon the expiration of 10 days from the date of its execution, unless the
settlement or award has been repudiated or a petition to nullify the award has
been filed before the proper city or municipal court.
Moreover, Rule VI, Sec. 14 of the Katarungang Pambarangay Implementing Rules
states that the party’s failure to repudiate the settlement within the period of 10
days shall be deemed a waiver of the right to challenge the settlement on the
ground that his/her consent was vitiated by fraud, violence or intimidation.
In this case, the records reveal that Michael never repudiated the kasunduan
within the period prescribed by the law.1âwphi1 Hence, the CA correctly ruled
that the kasunduan has the force and effect of a final judgment that is ripe for
execution.
Furthermore, the irregularities in the kasunduan’s execution, and the claim of
forgery are deemed waived since Michael never raised these defenses in
accordance with the procedure prescribed under the Local Government Code.
Thus, we see no reason to discuss these issues in the present case.
3. The MCTC has the authority and jurisdiction to enforce the kasunduan regardless
of the amount involved.
CA correctly upheld the MCTC’s jurisdiction to enforce any settlement or
arbitration award issued by the Lupon.
Section 417 of the Local Government Code states that after the lapse of the 6
month period from the date of the settlement, the agreement may be enforced
by action in the appropriate city or municipal court.
 The law, as written, unequivocally speaks of the "appropriate city or municipal
court" as the forum for the execution of the settlement or arbitration award
issued by the Lupon. Notably, in expressly conferring authority over these courts,
Section 417 made no distinction with respect to the amount involved or the
nature of the issue involved.

Thus, there can be no question that the law’s intendment was to grant jurisdiction
over the enforcement of settlement/arbitration awards to the city or municipal
courts the regardless of the amount. A basic principle of interpretation is that
words must be given their literal meaning and applied without attempted
interpretation where the words of a statute are clear, plain and free from
ambiguity.

PETITION DENIED.
G.R. No. 204448 December 13, 2017
JOSEPH O. REGALADO v EMMA DE LA RAMA VDA. DELA PEÑA ET. AL
Remedial Law; Jurisdiction; Recovery of possession of real property; In our jurisdiction,
there are three kinds of action for recovery of possession of real property: 1) ejectment
(either for un]awful detainer or forcible entry) in case the dispossession has lasted for
not more than a year; 2) accion publiciana or a plenary action for recovery of real right
of possession when dispossession has lasted for more than one year; and, 3) accion
reinvindicatoria or an action for recovery of ownership. Pursuant to Republic Act No.
7691 (RA 7691),the proper Metropolitan Trial Court (Me TC), MTC, or Municipal Circuit
Trial Court (MCTC) has exclusive original jurisdiction over ejectment cases. Moreover,
jurisdiction of the MeTC, MTC, and MCTC shall include civil actions involving title to or
possession of real property, or any interest therein where the assessed value of the
property does not exceed P20, 000.00 (or P50,000.00 in Metro Manila). On the other
hand, the RTC has exclusive original jurisdiction over civil actions involving title to or
possession of real property, or any interest therein in case the assessed value of the
property exceeds P.20, 000.00 (or P50, 000.00 in Metro Manila).
DEL CASTILLO J.:
FACTS:
 Respondents (the dela Penas)2 herein are registered owners of two parcels
of land with an area of 44 hectares located in Murcia, Negros Occidental.
Allegedly, in 1974, petitioners (Joseph Regalado), without consent, entered
the property and took possession of the sugar canes.
 Upon failure of the verbal demand and the barangay conciliation,
respondents filed for the recovery of possession and damages against the
petitioner before the RTC of Bacolod on March 9, 1998.
 Petitioner contends that respondents waived their interest to Jaime (one of
the respondents) who in turn, waived all his rights to him. Petitioner then
filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that RTC has no jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the case positing that the complaint being a recovery of
physical possession; it should be the MTC who has cognizance of there being
no allegation of the amount of the property in the complaint.
 RTC denied the motion to dismiss and granted the petition of the
respondents.
 The Court of Appeals affirmed.
ISSUE/S: WoN RTC has jurisdiction over the case? NO.
RULING:
NEGATIVE. In our jurisdiction, there are three kinds of action for recovery of possession
of real property: 1) ejectment (either for un]awful detainer or forcible entry) in case
2
Emma, Jesusa, Johnny, Johanna, Jose, Jessica, and Jaime
the dispossession has lasted for not more than a year; 2) accion publiciana or a plenary
action for recovery of real right of possession when dispossession has lasted for more
than one year; and, 3) accion reinvindicatoria or an action for recovery of ownership.
Pursuant to Republic Act No. 7691 (RA 7691),the proper Metropolitan Trial Court (Me
TC), MTC, or Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) has exclusive original jurisdiction
over ejectment cases. Moreover, jurisdiction of the MeTC, MTC, and MCTC shall
include civil actions involving title to or possession of real property, or any interest
therein where the assessed value of the property does not exceed P20, 000.00 (or
P50,000.00 in Metro Manila). On the other hand, the RTC has exclusive original
jurisdiction over civil actions involving title to or possession of real property, or any
interest therein in case the assessed value of the property exceeds P.20, 000.00 (or
P50, 000.00 in Metro Manila).
Jurisdiction is thus determined not only by the type of action filed but also by the
assessed value of the property. It follows that in accion publiciana and reinvindicatoria,
the assessed value of the real property is a jurisdictional element to determine the
court that can take cognizance of the action. As such, to ascertain the proper court
that has jurisdiction, reference must be made to the averments in the complaint, and
the law in force at the commencement of the action. This is because only the facts
alleged in the complaint can be the basis for determining the nature of the action, and
the court that can take cognizance of the case.
The agrees with petitioner that while this case is an accion publiciana. However, it also
ruled that there was no clear showing that the RTC has jurisdiction over it. Well-settled
is the rule that jurisdiction is conferred only by law. It cannot be presumed or implied,
and must distinctly appear from the law. It cannot also be vested upon a court by the
agreement of the parties; or by the court's erroneous belief that it had jurisdiction
over a case. The complaint by the respondents failed to specify the assessed value of
the subject properties. Thus, it is unclear if the RTC properly acquired jurisdiction, or
the MTC has jurisdiction, over respondents' action. In the absence of any allegation in
the Complaint of the assessed value of the subject properties, it cannot be determined
which court has exclusive original jurisdiction over respondents' Complaint. Courts
cannot simply take judicial notice of the assessed value, or even market value of the
land. Resultantly, for lack of jurisdiction, all proceedings .before the RTC, including its
decision, are void. Petition GRANTED.
 Radio Communications of the Philippines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals and Manuel
Dulawon
G.R. No. 136109 | Aug. 1, 2002 | Ynares-Santiago, J.:
Facts:
1. On June 18, 1997, private respondent Manuel Dulawon filed with the RTC Tabuk,
Kalinga, Branch 25, a complaint for breach of contract of lease with damages
against petitioner Radio Communications of the Philippines, Inc. (RCPI).
2. RCPI filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. RCPI contends
that the Municipal Trial Court has jurisdiction over the complaint because it is one
for collection of unpaid rentals amounting to PHP 84,000. It does not exceed the
jurisdictional amount of Php 100,000 for RTCs.
3. RTC denied motion to dismiss and MR.
4. Hence, petitioner went to the CA on a petition for certiorari.
5. CA dismissed the petition (“petition is hereby DENIED DUE COURSE and is
DISMISSED”).
6. MR also denied. Hence, this petition for review of the CA decision and its
resolution denying the MR.
Issue: Whether the RTC has jurisdiction over the complaint? YES. This action for
specific performance case is incapable of pecuniary estimation which is cognizable
exclusively by the RTC.
Ratio:
BP 129, as amended by R.A. 7691, provides:
SEC. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. – Regional Trial Courts shall exercise
exclusive original jurisdiction:
(1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of
pecuniary estimation;
xxx xxx xxx
(8) In all other cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest, damages of
whatever kind, attorney’s fees, litigation expenses, and costs or the value of
3
Pertinent portions of the complaint:
2. That sometime during the end of the year 1995, defendant through its appropriate
officials negotiated with plaintiff the lease of a portion of the latter’s building x x x
3. That the lease contract was effective for a period of three (3) years of from January
1, 1996 to January 1, 1998 with advance payment for the year 1996. The advance was
the property in controversy exceeds One hundred thousand pesos
(P100,000.00) or, in such other cases in Metro Manila, where the demand,
exclusive of the abovementioned items exceeds Two hundred thousand
pesos (P200,000.00).
Corollary thereto, Administrative Circular No. 09-94, states:
2. The exclusion of the term "damages of whatever kind" in determining the
jurisdictional amount under Section 19 (8) and Section 33 (1) of B.P. 129, as
amended by R.A. No. 7691, applies to cases where the damages are merely
incidental to or a consequence of the main cause of action. HOWEVER, in cases
where the claim for damages is the main cause of action, or one of the causes
of action, the amount of such claim shall be considered in determining the
jurisdiction of the court.
In Russell, et al., v. Vestil, et al, the Court held that in determining whether an action
is one the subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary estimation, the nature
of the principal action or remedy sought must first be ascertained.
a. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered
CAPABLE of pecuniary estimation, and jurisdiction over the action will depend on
the amount of the claim.
b. However, if the basic issue is something OTHER THAN the right to recover a sum
of money, where the money claim IS PURELY INCIDENTAL to, or a CONSEQUENCE
OF, the principal relief sought, the action is one where the subject of the litigation
may NOT be estimated in terms of money, which is cognizable exclusively by
Regional Trial Courts (NOT CAPABLE of pecuniary estimation).
Jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and is determined by
the allegations in the complaint and the character of the relief sought, irrespective of
whether the plaintiff is entitled to all or some of the claims asserted.
In this case, the allegations in the complaint plainly show that Manuel Dulawon’s cause
of action is breach of contract.3 It is settled that a breach of contract is a cause of action
not however given in lump sum but on installment. One check that was given in
payment of one month’s rental for 1996 was even stale and had to be changed only
after demand;
4. That as per contract the monthly rental for 1997 was P3,300.00 while for 1998, it
is P3,700.00;
EITHER for specific performance or rescission of contracts. Note that in,
Manufacturer’s Distributors, Inc. v. Siu Liong, the Court held that actions for specific
performance are INCAPABLE of pecuniary estimation and therefore fall under the
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court.
The averments in the complaint reveal that the suit filed by private respondent
Manuel Dulawon was primarily for specific performance.
a. It aimed to enforce a 3-year lease contract which would INCIDENTALLY entitle him
to monetary awards if the court should find that the contract was breached.
b. RCPI’s failure to pay rentals due for the period from Jan - March 1997, constituted
a violation of their contract which had the effect of accelerating the payment of
monthly rentals for the years 1997 and 1998.
c. The complaint also implied a premature and unilateral termination of the term of
the lease with the closure of and removal all communication equipment in the
leased premises.
Under the circumstances, the court has to scrutinize the facts and the applicable laws
in order to determine whether there was indeed a violation of their lease agreement
that would justify the award of rentals and damages. The prayer, therefore, for the
payment of unpaid rentals in the amount of P84,000.00 plus damages consequent to
the breach is MERELY INCIDENTAL to the main action for specific performance.
Similarly, in Manufacturer’s Distributor’s Inc., the Court held that, the payment sought
would be but an incident or consequence of defendant's liability for specific
performance. If no such liability is judicially declared, the payment can not be awarded.
5. That the defendant surreptitiously removed its equipments and other personalities
from the leased premises and failed to pay rentals due for the months of January to
March 1997 to the damage and prejudice of plaintiff; that this failure and refusal on
the part of plaintiff accelerated the payment of all rentals for each month for the
years 1997 and 1998;
6. That the acts of defendant amounts to a breach of contract which is unlawful and
malicious, as in fact, it caused plaintiff serious anxiety, emotional stress, and sleepless
nights for which he is entitled to moral damages;
7. That plaintiff conveyed his feelings to Mr. Ronald C. Manalastas as evidenced by a
letter dated January 7, 1997 a copy of which is hereto attached to form part hereof
as Annex "B". This was later followed by a letter of plaintiff’s counsel a machine copy
Hence, the amounts sought do not represent the value of the subject of litigation. It
held:
"Subject matter over which jurisdiction cannot be conferred by consent, has
reference, not to the res or property involved in the litigation nor to a
particular case, but to the class of cases, the purported subject of litigation,
the nature of the action and of the relief sought (Appeal of Maclain, 176 NW.
817)."
"The Court has no jurisdiction of a suit for specific performance of a contract,
although the damages alleged for its breach, if permitted, are within the
amount of which that court has jurisdiction." (Mebane Cotton Breeding
Station. vs. Sides, 257 SW. 302; 21 C.J.S. 59, note).
Clearly, this action for specific performance case, irrespective of the amount of rentals
and damages sought to be recovered, is incapable of pecuniary estimation, hence
cognizable exclusively by the Regional Trial Court. The trial court, therefore, did not
err in denying petitioner’s motion to dismiss.
PETITION DENIED. CA Decision AFFIRMED.
of which is hereto attached to form part hereof and marked as Annex "C". Both these
letters landed on deaf ears thereby aggravating the worries/anxieties of plaintiff;
8. That the period agreed is for the benefit of both parties and any unilateral
termination constitutes breach of contract;
9. That defendant actually used the leased premises during the year 1996; that had
it not been for the contract, plaintiff could have leased the premises to other persons
for business purposes; that this unlawful and malicious breach of contract cannot be
lawfully countenanced hence defendant must be taught a lesson by being ordered to
pay exemplary damages; xxx
 Racpan v. Barroga-Haigh G.R. No. 234499 June 6, 2018
Facts: Rudy Racpan filed a Complaint “for Declaration for Nullity of ‘Deed of Sale with
Right to Repurchase’ and Attorney’s Fees” before RTC Davao. He alleged in his
Complaint that after his wife died (November 2011), their daughter discovered a Deed
of Sale with Right to Repurchase dated March 2011. The said document was
purportedly signed by him and his late wife and appeared to convey to Sharon
Barroga-Haigh a real property registered under Rudy’s name located in Bo. Tuganay,
Carmen, Davao del Norte. He maintained that he never signed any contract nor even
a SPA for the sale or conveyance of the property which is still in his possession.
In her Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim, Barroga contends that the venue of the
Complaint was improperly laid and that the filing of the case lacks the mandatory
requirement of Barangay Clearance.
The Regional Trial Court dismissed the case on the basis of the contention raised by
the respondents. Racpan moved for reconsideration but the same was denied.
He appealed to Court of Appeals. CA affirmed the dismissal of the Complaint. It
explained that the Complaint is a real action as it wants the court to abrogate and
nullify whatever right or claim the respondent might have on the property. Hence, the
Complaint should have been filed with RTC Davao del Norte and not RTC-Davao. CA
further ruled that the prayer for the issuance of a writ of injunction is a mere ploy to
avoid the requirement of a barangay conciliation. Racpan moved for reconsideration
but the same was also denied.
Thus, Petitioner filed Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 assailing the
Decision of the CA. He contends that the Complaint filed before RTC-Davao is a
personal action because his complaint is not concerned with title to or possession of
real property, in fact, no transfer of possession or title has occurred. He maintains that
the venue is properly laid in Davao City where both he and respondent reside. He also
reiterated that since his Complaint is coupled with a prayer for the issuance of a writ
of preliminary injunction, it is exempt from barangay conciliation proceedings.
Issue:
 (Main issue) Whether the Complaint for Declaration for Nullity of ‘Deed of
Sale with Right to Repurchase’ filed before RTC Davao is properly laid?
 (Syllabus topic) Whether the Complaint is exempted from Barangay
Conciliation Proceedings?
Ruling:
The venue was properly laid as the complaint was a personal action.
The nature of an action is determined by the allegations in the complaint. In turn, the
nature of the action determines its proper venue.
The determinants of whether an action is of a real or a personal nature have been
fixed by the Rules of Court and relevant jurisprudence. According to Section 1, Rule 4
of the Rules of Court, a real action is one that affects title to or possession of real
property, or an interest therein. Such action is to be commenced and tried in the
proper court having jurisdiction over the area wherein the real property involved, or
a portion thereof, is situated, which explains why the action is also referred to as a
local action. In contrast, the Rules of Court declares all other actions as personal
actions. Such actions may include those brought for the recovery of personal property,
or for the enforcement of some contract or recovery of damages for its breach, or for
the recovery of damages for the commission of an injury to the person or property.
The venue of a personal action is the place where the plaintiff or any of the principal
plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides,
or in the case of a non-resident defendant where he may be found, at the election of
the plaintiff, for which reason the action is considered a transitory one.
What determines the venue of a case is the primary objective for the filing of the case.
On one hand, if the plaintiff seeks the recovery of personal property, the enforcement
of a contract or the recovery of damages, his complaint is a personal action that may
be filed in the place of residence of either party. On the other hand, if the plaintiff
seeks the recovery of real property, or if the action affects title to real property or for
the recovery of possession, or for partition or condemnation of, or foreclosure of
mortgage on, real property, then the complaint is a real action that must be brought
before the court where the real property is located.
In Chua v. Total Office Products and Services, Inc., this Court ruled that where the
action is not intended for the recovery of real property but solely for the annulment
of a contract, it is a personal action that may be filed in the court where the plaintiff
or the respondent resides.
Considering that there was no allegation that the possession and title to the property
have been transferred to respondent, nowhere in the Complaint did petitioner allege
or pray for the recovery or reconveyance of the real property. Thus, the complaint is
a personal action filed in the proper venue where the plaintiff or respondent reside.
The Complaint was exempted from Barangay Conciliation Proceedings
Section 412 of the Local Government Code (LGC) provides that parties may go directly
to court where the action is coupled with provisional remedies:
 SEC. 412. Conciliation. - (a) Pre-condition to filing of complaint in
court. - No complaint, petition, action, or proceeding involving any
matter within the authority of the lupon shall be filed or instituted
directly in court or any other government office for adjudication,
unless there has been a confrontation between the parties before
the lupon chairman or the pangkat, and that no conciliation or
settlement has been reached as certified by the lupon secretary or
pangkat secretary as attested to by the lupon chairman or pangkat
chairman or unless the settlement has been repudiated by the
parties thereto.

(b) Where parties may go directly to court. - The parties may go

directly to court in the following instances:

(1) Where the accused is under detention;

(2) Where a person has otherwise been deprived of personal liberty

calling for habeas corpus proceedings;

(3) Where actions are coupled with provisional remedies such as

preliminary injunction, attachment, delivery of personal property,
and support pendente lite; and

(4) Where the action may otherwise be barred by the statute of

limitations.

(c) Conciliation among members of indigenous cultural

communities. - The customs and traditions of indigenous cultural
communities shall be applied in settling disputes between members
of the cultural communities.

While there is no dispute herein that the present case was never referred to the
Barangay Lupon for conciliation before petitioner instituted the case, there is likewise
no question that his Complaint was coupled with a prayer for the issuance of a
preliminary injunction. Hence, it falls among the exceptions to the rule requiring the
referral to baranggay conciliation.

As good faith is always presumed, in the absence of proof of improper motive on the
part of the petitioner, the Court cannot countenance the appellate court's assumption
that petitioner was solely intent on evading the requirements of the LGC in applying
for a preliminary injunction. This Court cannot sustain a dismissal of an action on
account of an unproven assertion of bad faith.
Pajares v Remarkable Laundry
G.R. No. 212690 February 20, 2017
DOCTRINES:
 Breach of contract may give rise to an action for specific performance or
rescission of contract. It may also be the cause of action in a complaint for
damages filed pursuant to Art. 1170 of the Civil Code.
 In the specific performance and rescission of contract cases, the subject
matter is incapable of pecuniary estimation, hence jurisdiction belongs to the
RTC.
 In the case for damages, the court that has jurisdiction depends upon the
total amount of the damages claimed.
FACTS:
1. Remarkable Laundry (Respondents) filed a Complaint denominated as
"Breach of Contract and Damages" against spouses Romeo and Ida Pajares
(petitioners) before the RTC of Cebu City.
2. Respondent alleged that it entered into a Remarkable Dealer Outlet Contract
with petitioners whereby the Petitioners, acting as a dealer outlet, shall
accept and receive items or materials for laundry which are then picked up
and processed by the Respondents in its main plant or laundry outlet; that
petitioners violated Article IV (Standard Required Quota & Penalties) of said
contract, which required them to produce at least 200 kilos of laundry items
each week. Respondents made written demands upon petitioners for the
payment of penalties imposed and provided for in the contract, but the latter
failed to pay; and, that petitioners' violation constitutes breach of contract.
3. RTC dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. RTC held that the action
is not an action incapable of pecuniary estimation. The amount of damages
prayed for is only P280,000 which is below the P300,000 jurisdiction of the
RTC. Hence, the action should be filed wtih the MTC.
4. CA reversed the RTC, and remanded the case to the RTC. CA held that since
the cause of action is a breach of contract, it is an action incapable of
pecuniary estimation. The totality of damages principle finds no application
in the instant case since the same applies only when damages is principally
and primarily demanded.
5. Upon appeal to the SC, petitioner argues that since the respondent merely
prayed for the payment of damages in its complaint, and not a judgment on
the claim of breach of contract, then jurisdiction should be determined based
solely on the total amount of the claim or demand as alleged in the prayer.
6. Respindent argues that the action is primarily a breach of contract case, and
that the damages prayed for are merely incidental to the principal action. The
Complaint itself made reference to the Remarkable Dealer Outlet Contract
and the breach committed by petitioners.
ISSUE: Whether the complaint filed in the RTC is an action incapable of pecuniary
estimation. NO. It is a complaint for damages. Hence, RTC has no jurisdiction to take
cognizance of the case.
RATIONALE:
1. Respondent’s complaint is neither an action for specific performance, nor a
complaint for rescission contract. The Complaint shows that there is nothing
therein which would support a conclusion that respondent's Complaint is one
for specific performance or rescission of contract.
2. The principal obligation of petitioners under the Remarkable Laundry
Dealership Contract is to act as respondent's dealer outlet. Respondent,
however, neither asked the RTC to compel petitioners to perform such
obligation as contemplated in said contract nor sought the rescission thereof.
The Complaint's body, heading, and relief are bereft of such allegation. In
fact, neither phrase appeared on or was used in the Complaint when, for
purposes of clarity, respondent's counsels, who are presumed to be learned
in law, could and should have used any of those phrases to indicate the
proper designation of the Complaint.
3. There is no such thing as an "action for breach of contract." Rather, "breach
of contract is a cause of action, but not the action or relief itself." Breach of
contract may be the cause of action in a complaint for specific performance
or rescission of contract, both of which are incapable of pecuniary estimation
and, therefore, cognizable by the RTC. However, as will be discussed below,
breach of contract may also be the cause of action in a complaint for
damages.
4. A complaint primarily seeking to enforce the accessory obligation contained
in the penal clause is actually an action for damages capable of pecuniary
estimation. Petitioners' responsibility under the above penal clause involves
the payment of liquidated damages because under Article 2226 of the Civil
Code the amount the parties stipulated to pay in case of breach are liquidated
damages. "It is attached to an obligation in order to ensure performance and
has a double function: (1) to provide for liquidated damages, and (2) to
strengthen the coercive force of the obligation by the threat of greater
responsibility in the event of breach.
5. It is not correct to immediately conclude, as the CA erroneously did, that
since the cause of action is breach of contract, the case would only either be
specific performance or rescission of contract because it may happen, as in
this case, that the complaint is one for damages.
6. In an action for damages, the court which has jurisdiction is determined by
the total amount of damages claimed. Since the total amount of the damages
claimed by the respondent in its Complaint filed with the amounted only to
P280,000.00, said court was correct in refusing to take cognizance of the
case.
First United Constructors Corporation (FUCC) v. Poro Point Management Corporation
(PPMC)
January 19, 2009
Nachura, J:
FACTS:
 FUCC filed this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition with prayer
for the issuance of a temporary restraining order.
o It seeks to annul (1) the re-bidding of the contract for the Upgrading
of the San Fernando Airport Project, Phase I, held on May 8, 2007
(2) the Notice of Award dated May 23, 2007 to Satrap Construction
Company, Inc. (SCCI); and (3) Notice to Proceed dated May 29, 2007
also to SCCI.
o It also seeks to permanently enjoin the Special Bids and Awards
Committee (SBAC) and Poro Point Management Corporation
(PPMC) from implementing the Contract in favor of SCCI.
o Additionally, it seeks to direct respondent SBAC and/or respondent
PPMC and/or respondent Atty. Recadio (PPMC Head) to reconsider
the "Failed" rating of the bid of FUCC, open the Financial Proposal
Envelope submitted by FUCC during the original bidding, declare
FUCC as the winning bidder, and forthwith award the contract to
FUCC, as the winning bidder and being the only qualified contractor
for the project.
 PPMC approved the Contract for the Upgrading of the San Fernando Airport
Phase I. The SBAC then issued invitations to reputable contractors to pre-
qualify for the project.
 FUCC and two other contractors — C.M. Pancho Construction, Inc. (C.M.
Pancho) and EEI-New Kanlaon Construction, Inc. Joint Venture (EEI-New
Kanlaon JV) responded to the invitation and were pre-qualified to bid for the
project.
 However, upon evaluation, none of the pre-qualified bidders was chosen.
C.M. Pancho was disqualified because it did not possess the required
minimum years of experience in airport projects, while EEI New Kanlaon JV
was disqualified because it did not submit a special license to bid as joint
venture.
 FUCC's technical proposal, on the other hand, obtained a failing mark
because it failed to submit the automated weather observation system
(AWOS) and its authorized representative did not sign some pages of the
narrative construction method and the tax returns. FUCC sought
reconsideration of the SBAC decision, but it was denied.
 FUCC filed a protest with the PPMC but on March 26, 2007, the PPMC Head
ruled that there is no reversible error finding and that there exists a
presumption of regularity of official action of a public officer.
 SBAC then scheduled a re-bidding and issued new invitations to bid for the
project. To enjoin the re-bidding set on May 8, 2007, FUCC filed a petition
for injunction with prayer for the issuance of a preliminary injunction or
temporary restraining order (TRO) with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of La
Union, docketed as Civil Case No. 7274.
 RTC: issued a TRO which was lifted because under Section 3 of Republic Act
No. 8975, no court, except the Supreme Court, shall issue a TRO or injunction
or prohibit the bidding or award of a government infrastructure project.
SBAC thus proceeded with the re-bidding of the project on May 8, 2007 and
awarded the project to SCCI as the lowest qualified bidder.
o FUCC filed an amended petition with the RTC to enjoin the
implementation of the project. The Office of the Government
Corporate Counsel (OGCC) moved to dismiss the petition for lack of
jurisdiction.
o Pending resolution of OGCC's motion to dismiss, FUCC moved for
the dismissal of its amended petition, which was granted by the
RTC.
 Claiming that there is no appeal, or any speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law, FUCC comes to the SC via this petition. It also asks
for the issuance of a TRO to enjoin the implementation of the project,
asserting that SCCI is not qualified to undertake the project and the award
clearly poses a real threat to the public welfare and safety.
o In its November 12, 2007 Resolution, this Court denied FUCC's
application for the issuance of a TRO for lack of merit.
ISSUE: Whether or not the SC has original jurisdiction over special civil action for
certiorari and prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order
with regard to a bid award of a procuring entity.
HELD: NO. Dismiss the petition.
RATIO:
 According to Section 58 of the Government Procurement Reform Act, Court
action may be resorted only after the protest contemplated in this Article
shall have been completed. Cases that are filed in violation of the process
specified in this Article shall be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The regional
trial court shall have jurisdiction over final decisions of the head of the
procuring entity. Court actions shall be governed by Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure.
 FUCC challenged the decision of SBAC in a protest filed with Atty. Racadio of while courts below are prohibited by RA No. 8795 from issuing TROs or
the PPMC who affirmed the SBAC decision. Instead of filing a petition for preliminary restraining orders pending the adjudication of the case, said
certiorari, as provided in Section 58, FUCC filed a petition for injunction with statute, however, does not explicitly proscribe the issuance of a permanent
prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction granted by a court of law arising from an adjudication of a case on
injunction with the RTC. the merits.
 FUCC, however, later moved for its dismissal theorizing that the RTC had no  Clearly, except for the prayer for the issuance of a TRO or preliminary
jurisdiction over petitions for injunction. Thereafter, it filed this petition for injunction, the issues raised by FUCC and the relief it sought are within the
certiorari with this Court. jurisdiction of the RTC. It is a procedural faux pas for FUCC to invoke the
 Section 4, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a special original jurisdiction of this Court over the issuance of a writ of certiorari and
civil action for certiorari shall be filed not later than sixty (60) days from the permanent injunction.
notice of the judgment, order or resolution.
 FUCC admitted that it received the PPMC decision on March 27, 2007.
Additional Notes:
However, it filed this petition assailing the said decision only on July 30, 2007.
 The invitation to bid contains a reservation for PPMC to reject any bid. The
It is, therefore, too late in the day for FUCC, via this petition, to assail the
discretion to accept or reject bid and award contracts is vested in the
PPMC decision which rated its bid as failed. government agencies entrusted with that function. Thus, where PPMC as
 Besides, FUCC violated the doctrine of judicial hierarchy in filing this petition advertiser, availing itself of that right, opts to reject any or all bids, the losing
for certiorari directly with this Court. Section 58 is clear that petitions for the bidder has no cause to complain or right to dispute that choice, unless
issuance of a writ of certiorari against the decision of the head of the fraudulent acts, injustice, unfairness or grave abuse of discretion is shown.
procuring agency, like PPMC, should be filed with the Regional Trial Court.
 Indeed, the jurisdiction of the RTC over petitions for certiorari is concurrent
with this Court. However, such concurrence does not allow unrestricted
freedom of choice of the court forum. A direct invocation of the Supreme
Court's original jurisdiction to issue this writ should be allowed only when
there are special and important reasons, clearly and specifically set out in the
petition.
 In the present case, FUCC adduced no special and important reason why
direct recourse to this Court should be allowed. The Court reaffirms the
judicial policy that this Court will not entertain a direct invocation of its
jurisdiction unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate
lower courts, and exceptional and compelling circumstances justify the resort
to the extraordinary remedy of a writ of certiorari.
 Similarly, the RTC is the proper venue to hear FUCC's prayer for permanent
injunction. Unquestionably, RA No. 8975 enjoins all courts, except the
Supreme Court, from issuing any temporary restraining order, preliminary
injunction, or preliminary mandatory injunction against the government, or
any of its subdivisions, officials or any person or entity to restrain, prohibit or
compel the bidding or awarding of a contract or project of the national
government.
 The proscription, however, covers only temporary restraining orders or writs
but not decisions on the merits granting permanent injunction. Therefore,
G.R. No. 184466. December 5, 2016.
LUZ ANATOLIA E. CRISPINO, CARIDAD C. n ECHAVES REESE and ZENAIDA ECHAVES
represented by their Attorney-in-Fact, REUBEN CAPILI ECHAVES, petitioners, vs.
ANATOLIA TANSAY as substituted by LILIAN YAP, respondent.
FACTS:
1. This was a civil case for Revocation of Trust, Declaration of Nullity of Transfer
and Cancellation of Titles filed before the RTC of Cebu City
2. Respondent Anatolia Tansay, deceased, was twice widowed. In 1947,
Anatolia established her residence in Oroquieta, Misamis Occidental. There,
she met 20-year-old Zenaida Capili who was then single. Anatolia took in
Zenaida and treated her as her own child.
3. Anatolia and Zenaida moved to Cebu where Anatolia acquired a 3,107 sq. m.
parcel of land known as the Tansay Compound. The compound was
subdivided into 3 lots. Anatolia constructed her abode over a portion of Lot
No. 1048-A-3
4. Zenaida eventually got married to Ben Ricaredo Echaves and had several
children, among whom are petitioners Luz Anatolia E. Crispino and Caridad
C. Echaves.
5. Anatolia allegedly sold Lot No. 1048-A-1 in favor of Zenaida on July 6, 1981
and Lot No. 1048-A-3 in favor of Luz Anatolia and Caridad on July 11, 1989 by
virtue of two deeds of sale.
6. 1991 - Zenaida returned from abroad and discovered that the titles of the
lots were missing from her room where she had left them.
7. Hence, she filed a petition before the RTC of Cebu City for reconstitution of
the certificates of title, which was granted.
8. Anatolia filed Civil Case No. CEB-14547 entitled Revocation of Trust,
Declaration of Nullity of Transfer, and Cancellation of Title before the
Regional Trial Court of Cebu City
9. Zenaida alleged that Anatolia sold Lot No. 1048-A-1 in her favor for
P6,170.00.
a. One of Zenaida's daughters, Lourdes, testified that since 1975, her
sisters, Luz Anatolia and Caridad, deposited sums of money in
Anatolia's bank account for the purchase of Lot No. 1048-A-3.
b. However, Anatolia merely turned over the sums she received to
Zenaida since she was not in need of money.
10. TRIAL COURT: deeds of sale not valid.
a. Zenaida, Luz Anatolia, and Caridad did not pay any monetary or
other valuable consideration for the transfer of the properties in
their names
b. Anatolia never intended to sell the lots despite executing the deeds
of sale. Rather, she merely constituted Zenaida, Luz Anatolia, and
Caridad as trustees of the properties.
c. Dispositive portion:
i. plaintiff Anatolia Tansay as the lawful and rightful owner of
Lot No. 1048-A-1 covered by TCT No. 81406, and Lot No.
1048-A-3 covered by TCT No. 101693
ii. cancel said TCT No. 1048-A-1 issued to defendant Zenaida
and TCT No. 10963 issued to the defendants Luz Anatolia
Crispino and Caridad Echaves, and to reinstate plaintiff
Anatolia Tansay's title to said lots.
11. Zenaida, Luz Anatolia, and Caridad appealed the Decision before the Court of
Appeals.
12. During the pendency of the appeal, Anatolia died on August 11, 2001 and was
substituted by her only known legal heir, Lilian Tan Yap.
13. Aug 16, 2001: Zenaida, Luz Anatolia, and Caridad filed an Urgent Motion to
Remand Records of the Case for the Re-Opening of Trial. They anchored their
motion on an Affidavit allegedly executed by Anatolia after the RTC had
rendered its Decision
14. Affidavit
a. Confirmation of previous sales, recognizing its validity
b. Realized that the filing of the case was a mistake
15. CA DENIED.
a. CA denied the Urgent Motion to Remand Records of the Case for
the Re-Opening of Trial. The appellate court considered the same as
a motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence under
Rule 53 of the Rules of Court and ruled that the Confirmation of
Previous Sales was "not the kind of newly discovered evidence
contemplated by the Rules that would warrant a new trial."
16. CA DECISION: affirmed the RTC Decision in toto. MR was also denied.
17. Petitioners filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari seeking a ruling on the
power of the Court of Appeals to receive evidence under Section 9 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by Republic Act No. 7902.
18. Petitioner’s argument:
 a.The CA should have considered their Urgent Motion to Remand
Records of the Case for Re-Opening of Trial as a motion to receive
further evidence under Section 9 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as
amended by Republic Act No. 7902.
b. Court of Appeals has the authority and power to "receive all kinds
of evidence to resolve factual issues within its original and appellate
jurisdiction.
c. The appellate court inadvertently treated their motion to remand as
a motion for new trial under Rule 53 of the Rules of Court.
d. Assuming that the Court of Appeals was correct, petitioners contend
that the Court of Appeals' power to conduct new trials is not limited
to new trials based on newly discovered evidence.
19. Respondents’ argument:
a. it was unlikely for Anatolia to execute the affidavit because she
requested the early resolution of the appeal through two letters
addressed to the appellate court.
b. Respondent suspects the timing of petitioner's motion to remand
since it was filed just a few days after Anatolia's death.
c. Respondent argues that the Petition for Review is not the proper
remedy considering that petitioners are not disputing the factual
findings or the ratio decidendi of the CA Decision
d. Petitioners' arguments are directed against CA Resolution which
denied the motion to remand, which was an interlocutory order.
Since the Resolution was not challenged through an appeal or a
motion for reconsideration, the same had already become final and
could no longer be assailed on appeal.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the CA erred in treating petitioners' motion to remand as a motion
for new trial under Rule 53 of the Rules of Court; NO
2. Whether an interlocutory order may be assailed in an appeal of the appellate
court's Decision. YES
HELD:
ISSUE 1: Court of Appeals correctly treated petitioners' motion to remand as a motion
for new trial under Rule 53 of the Rules of Court. YES.
1. Petitioners sought the introduction of evidence pursuant to the Court of
Appeals' expanded power under Section 9 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129
a. The Court of Appeals shall have the power to try cases and conduct
hearings, receive evidence and perform any and all acts necessary
to resolve factual issues raised in cases falling within its original and
appellate jurisdiction, including the power to grant and conduct new
trials or further proceedings. Trials or hearings in the Court of
Appeals must be continuous and must be completed within three
(3) months, unless extended by the Chief Justice.
2. Clearly, the Court of Appeals, pursuant to its expanded jurisdiction under
Section 9 or Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended, is empowered to receive
evidence to resolve factual issues raised in cases falling within its original and
appellate jurisdiction.
3. However, Section 9 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended, should be read
and construed together with the Court of Appeals' internal rules.
a. Under Section 3, Rule 6 of the Internal Rules of the CA, the CA may
receive evidence in the following cases:
b. (b) In appeals in civil cases where the Court grants a new trial on the
ground of newly discovered evidence, pursuant to Sec. 12, Rule 53
of the Rules of Court;
4. in actions falling within the original jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals, such
as a special civil action for certiorari, the Court of Appeals' power to receive
evidence is unqualified. This does not hold true with respect to appeals in
civil cases, criminal cases, as well as appeals involving claims for damages.
5. In this case, petitioners filed an ordinary appeal from the RTC Decision dated
February 16, 1996. At the time the CA ruled on petitioners' motion to
remand, the 2002 Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals 83 was in effect
a. SECTION 3. Power of the Court to Receive Evidence. —
b. In appeals in civil cases where the court grants a new trial on the
ground of newly discovered evidence pursuant to Sec. 3, Rule 53 of
the Rules of Court;
6. The Court of Appeals cannot simply accept additional evidence from the
parties. If the interpretation were otherwise, then there would be no end to
litigation.
7. Hence, in appeals in civil cases, the Court of Appeals may only receive
evidence when it grants a new trial based on newly discovered evidence.
8. This notwithstanding, the Court of Appeals cannot accept any kind of
evidence in a motion for new trial. A motion for new trial under Rule 53 is
limited to newly discovered evidence
 a. SECTION 1. Period for filing; ground. — At any time after the appeal
from the lower court has been perfected and before the Court of
Appeals loses jurisdiction over the case, a party may file a motion for
new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence which could
not have been discovered prior to the trial in the court below by the
exercise of due diligence and which is of such character as would
probably change the result. The motion shall be accompanied by
affidavits showing the facts constituting the grounds therefor and
the newly discovered evidence
9. The document petitioners seek to present before the appellate court does
not fall under the concept of newly discovered evidence.
10. Under Rule 53 of the Rules of Court, the following criteria must be satisfied
for evidence to be considered newly discovered:
a. (a) the evidence could not have been discovered prior to the trial in
the court below by exercise of due diligence; and (b) it is of such
character as would probably change the result.
11. The document denominated as Confirmation of Previous Sales was allegedly
executed on January 15, 1998, three years after the RTC rendered its
decision. Hence, it could not have been discovered by petitioners prior to trial
by the exercise of due diligence.
12. The document is not of such character that would probably change the lower
court's judgment. The nature of the deeds of sale executed would not have
been affected even if the Confirmation of Previous Sales was admitted in
evidence.
13. The validity of a contract is determined by law and not by the stipulation of
the parties.
14. The CA can determine whether the deeds of sale were valid independent of
said document. Thus, the Court of Appeals correctly denied petitioners'
motion to have the Confirmation of Previous Sales admitted in evidence.
prohibition is to prevent multiple appeals in a single action that would
unnecessarily cause delay during trial.
3. Aggrieved parties would have to prove that the order was issued without or
in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction and that there is neither appeal nor any plain, speedy,
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
4. This notwithstanding, a special civil action for certiorari is not the only
remedy that aggrieved parties may take against an interlocutory order, since
an interlocutory order may be appealed in an appeal of the judgment itself.
5. Jurisprudence: “an "interlocutory" order may not be questioned on appeal
except only as part of an appeal that may eventually be taken from the final
judgment rendered in the case.”
6. The Court of Appeals' Resolution which denied petitioners' motion to
remand, was an interlocutory order. Rather than availing of the extraordinary
remedy of certiorari under Rule 65, petitioners opted to wait for the CA to
render its decision before challenging the Resolution.
7. Petitioners did not commit any procedural infirmity in assailing the
interlocutory order in an appeal of the Court of Appeals' decision.
8. Though petitioners could have filed a petition for certiorari, they would have
been burdened to prove that the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in
denying their motion to remand. Moreover, petitioners still had the option
to assail the Resolution in an appeal of CA’s final decision.

ISSUE: Whether an interlocutory order may be assailed in an appeal? YES.

1. A final judgment or order, from which an appeal may be taken, is one that
finally disposes of the case and leaves nothing more to be done by the court
(e.g., an adjudication on the merits of the case on the basis of the evidence).
In contrast, an interlocutory order is one that merely resolves incidental
matters and does not finally dispose of the case.
2. The remedy against an interlocutory order is not appeal but a special civil
action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The reason for the
Ampong v. Civil Service Commission
G.R. No. 167916
August 26, 2008
Facts:
 On November 10, 1991, Evelyn Junio-Decir applied for and took the
Professional Board Examination for Teacher (PBET). She passed with a rating
of 74.27%
 At the time of the examination, Sarah Ampong and Decir were public school
teachers under the supervision of Department of Education Culture and
Sports. Later, Ampong was transferred to RTC in Alabel, Sarangani Province
and appointed as Court Interpreter III.
 On 1994, a woman representing herself as Evelyn Decir went to the Civil
Service Regional Officer to claim a copy of her PBET Certificate of Eligibility.
The CSRO personnel noticed that the woman did not resemble the picture of
the examinee in the Picture Seat Plan (PSP). Upon further probing, it was
confirmed that the person claiming the eligibility was different from the one
who took the examinations. It was petitioner Ampong who took and passed
the examinations under the name Evelyn Decir.
 The CSRO conducted a preliminary investigation and determined the
existence of a prima facie case against Decir and Ampong for Dishonesty,
Grave Misconduct and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service.
On August 23, 1994, they were formally charged and required to file answers
under oath.
 Decir denied the charges against her. She argues that it was the examination
proctor who pasted the wrong picture on the PSP and that her signatures
were different because she was still signing her maiden name at the time of
the examination.
 Even before filing an Answer, petitioner Ampong voluntarily appeared at the
CSRO on February 2, 1995 and admitted to the wrongdoing. When reminded
4
Moreover, it must be pointed out that administrative supervision is distinct from administrative
jurisdiction. While it is true that this Commission does not have administrative supervision over
employees in the judiciary, it definitely has concurrent jurisdiction over them. Such jurisdiction was
conferred upon the Civil Service Commission pursuant to existing law specifically Section 12(11),
Chapter 3, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive Order No. 292) which provides as
follows:
that she may avail herself of the services of counsel, petitioner voluntarily
waived said right.
 On March 21, 1996, the CSC found petitioner Ampong and Decir guilty of
dishonesty, dismissing them from the service. Petitioner Ampong moved for
reconsideration, raising for the first time the issue of jurisdiction.
o She argued that the exclusive authority to discipline employees of
the judiciary lies with the Supreme Court; that the CSC acted with
abuse of discretion when it continued to exercise jurisdiction
despite her assumption of duty as a judicial employee. She
contended that at the time the case was instituted on August 23,
1994, the CSC already lost jurisdiction over her. She was appointed
as Court Interpreter III of the RTC, Branch 38, Alabel, Sarangani
Province
 The CSC denied the motion for reconsideration. According to the
Commission, to allow petitioner to evade administrative liability would be a
mockery of the country’s administrative disciplinary system. In upholding its
jurisdiction over petitioner, the CSC differentiated between administrative
supervision exercised by the Supreme Court and administrative jurisdiction
granted to the Commission over all civil service employees.4
 Via petition for review under Rule 43, petitioner elevated the matter to the
CA. She insisted that as a judicial employee, it is the Supreme Court and not
the CSC that has disciplinary jurisdiction over her. CA denied the petition for
lack of merit.
o The appellate court opined that while lack of jurisdiction may be
assailed at any stage, a party’s active participation in the
proceedings before a court, tribunal or body will estop such party
from assailing its jurisdiction.
Issue: Whether the CSC has administrative jurisdiction over an employee of the
Judiciary for acts committed while said employee was still with the Executive or
Education Department.
Held: The answer to the question at the outset is in the negative but We rule against
the petition on the ground of estoppel.
"(11) Hear and decide administrative cases instituted by or through it directly or on appeal, including
contested appointment, and review decisions and actions of its offices and of the agencies attached to it x
x x."
The fact that court personnel are under the administrative supervision of the Supreme Court does not
totally isolate them from the operations of the Civil Service Law. Appointments of all officials and
employees in the judiciary is governed by the Civil Service Law (Section 5(6), Article VIII, 1987
Constitution). (Emphasis supplied)

1. Administrative jurisdiction over court employees belongs to the Supreme
Court, regardless of whether the offense was committed BEFORE or AFTER
employment in the judiciary.
 The CSC has administrative jurisdiction over the civil service. As
defined under the Constitution and the Administrative Code, the
civil service embraces every branch, agency, subdivision, and
instrumentality of the government, and government-owned or
controlled corporations. Pursuant to its administrative authority,
the CSC is granted the power to "control, supervise, and coordinate
the Civil Service examinations." This authority grants to the CSC the
right to take cognizance of any irregularity or anomaly connected
with the examinations.
 However, the Constitution provides that the Supreme Court is given
exclusive administrative supervision over all courts and judicial
personnel. By virtue of this power, it is only the Supreme Court that
can oversee the judges’ and court personnel’s compliance with all
laws, rules and regulations. It may take the proper administrative
action against them if they commit any violation. No other branch
of government may intrude into this power, without running afoul
of the doctrine of separation of powers. Otherwise, it violates the
specific mandate of the Constitution granting to the Supreme Court
supervisory powers over all courts and their personnel; it
undermines the independence of the judiciary.
 In Civil Service Commission v. Sta. Ana, and Bartolata v. Julaton, this
Court held that impersonating an examinee of a civil service
examination is an act of dishonesty. But because the offender
involved a judicial employee under the administrative supervision of
the Supreme Court, the CSC filed the necessary charges before the
Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), a procedure which this
Court validated.
 Compared to Sta. Ana and Bartolata, the present case involves a
similar violation of the Civil Service Law by a judicial employee. But
this case is slightly different in that petitioner committed the
offense before her appointment to the judicial branch. At the time
of commission, petitioner was a public school teacher under the
administrative supervision of the DECS and, in taking the civil service
examinations, under the CSC. Petitioner surreptitiously took the
CSC-supervised PBET exam in place of another person. When she
did that, she became a party to cheating or dishonesty in a civil
service-supervised examination.
 That she committed the dishonest act before she joined the RTC
does not take her case out of the administrative reach of the
Supreme Court.
 The bottom line is administrative jurisdiction over a court employee
belongs to the Supreme Court, regardless of whether the offense was
committed before or after employment in the judiciary.
2. The Court, however, is constrained to uphold the ruling of the CSC based on
the principle of Estoppel
 The previous actions of petitioner have estopped her from attacking
the jurisdiction of the CSC. A party who has affirmed and invoked the
jurisdiction of a court or tribunal exercising quasi-judicial functions to
secure an affirmative relief may not afterwards deny that same
jurisdiction to escape a penalty.
 Under the principle of estoppel, a party may not be permitted to
adopt a different theory on appeal to impugn the court’s
jurisdiction. In Emin v. De Leon, the Court held that a party who fully
participated in the proceedings before the CSC and was accorded due
process is estopped from subsequently attacking its jurisdiction.
 Petitioner was given ample opportunity to present her side and
adduce evidence in her defense before the CSC. She filed with it her
answer to the charges leveled against her. When the CSC found her
guilty, she moved for a reconsideration of the ruling. These
circumstances all too clearly show that due process was accorded to
petitioner.
 Petitioner’s admission of guilt stands. Apart from her full participation
in the proceedings before the CSC, petitioner admitted to the offense
charged – that she impersonated Decir and took the PBET exam in
the latter’s place. We note that even before petitioner filed a written
answer, she voluntarily went to the CSC Regional Office and admitted
to the charges against her. In the same breath, she waived her right
to the assistance of counsel. Her admission, among others, led the
CSC to find her guilty of dishonesty, meting out to her the penalty of
dismissal.
  Now, she assails said confession, arguing that it was given without aid
of counsel. In police custodial investigations, the assistance of
counsel is necessary in order for an extra-judicial confession to be
made admissible in evidence against the accused in a criminal
complaint. If assistance was waived, the waiver should have been
made with the assistance of counsel.

 But while a party’s right to the assistance of counsel is sacred in

proceedings criminal in nature, there is no such requirement in
administrative proceedings. In Lumiqued v. Exevea,31 this Court ruled
that a party in an administrative inquiry may or may not be assisted
by counsel. Moreover, the administrative body is under no duty to
provide the person with counsel because assistance of counsel is not
an absolute requirement.32

 Petitioner’s admission was given freely. There was no compulsion,

threat or intimidation. As found by the CSC, petitioner’s admission
was substantial enough to support a finding of guilt.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.

Notes:
 The CSC categorizes dishonesty as "an act which includes the procurement
and/or use of fake/spurious civil service eligibility, the giving of assistance to
ensure the commission or procurement of the same, cheating, collusion,
impersonation, or any other anomalous act which amounts to any violation
of the Civil Service examination." Petitioner impersonated Decir in the PBET
exam, to ensure that the latter would obtain a passing mark. By intentionally
practicing a deception to secure a passing mark, their acts undeniably involve
dishonesty.

 This Court has defined dishonesty as the "(d)isposition to lie, cheat, deceive,
or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of honesty, probity or
integrity in principle; lack of fairness and straightforwardness; disposition to
defraud, deceive or betray." Petitioner’s dishonest act as a civil servant
renders her unfit to be a judicial employee. Indeed, We take note that
petitioner should not have been appointed as a judicial employee had this
Court been made aware of the cheating that she committed in the civil
service examinations. Be that as it may, petitioner’s present status as a
judicial employee is not a hindrance to her getting the penalty she deserves.
 Salvador v. Patricia, Inc. | G.R. No. 195834 | Nov. 9, 2016 | Bersamin, J.
Petitioners: Guillermo Salvador, Remedios Castro, Represented By Paz "Chit" Castro,
Leonila Guevarra, Felipe Mariano, Ricardo De Guzman, Virgilio Jimenez, Represented
By Josie Jimenez, Asuncion Juamiz, Rolando Batang, Carmencita Samson, Augusto
Tortosa, Represented By Fernando Tortosa, Susana Morante, Luzviminda Bularan, Luz
Orozco, Jose Sapico, Leonardo Palad, Abel Baking, Represented By Abelina Baking,
Graciano Arnaldo, Represented By Ludy Arnaldo, Judith Hidalgo, And Igmidio
Justiniano, Ciriaco Mijares, Represented By Fredezwinda Mijares, Jennifer Morante,
Teresita Diala, And Anita P. Salar
Respondent: Patricia, Inc.
Intervenors: City of Manila and Ciriaco C. Mijares
GIST: This case concerns an action for quieting of title and injunction. As a real action
(quieting of title), jurisdiction over such an action depends on the assessed value of the
property as alleged in the complaint (less than 20k/50k [if Metro Manila] action to be
tried by first level court [based on BP 129 as amended]). The complaint did not allege
the amount of the assessed value, hence RTC had no jurisdiction. (Lengthy discussion
on jurisdiction included, please read since this case is under general principles)
Facts
1. Plaintiffs (Petitioners herein) filed an action for injunction and quieting of title
with RTC Manila Branch 32 to determine who owns the property occupied by
them and by intervenor Mijares. Petitioners also applied for a preliminary
injunction to prevent Respondent from evicting them from the improvements
made on the land, pending resolution of the case.
2. City of Manila filed a complaint-in-intervention as owner of the land occupied by
Petitioners. Intervenor Mijares filed a similar complaint claiming that he was
similarly situated with the Petitioners.
3. All parties agreed and admitted in evidence by stipulation as to the authenticity of
the ff. documents: TCT No. 44247 in the name of City of Manila, TCT No. 35727 in
the name of Patricia, Inc., Approved Plan PSD 38540 and Approved Subdivision
Pan PCS 3290 for Ricardo Manotok. By virtue of such agreement and stipulation,
the issue as to whether Patricia Inc.’s TCT should be cancelled as prayed for by the
Petitioners was no longer resolved.
4. RTC then proceeded to resolve the question of where the boundaries are located
based on the description in the respective titles. RTC appointed 3 geodetic
5
SECTION 5. Amendment to Conform to or Authorize Presentation of Evidence. — When issues not raised
by the pleadings are tried with the express or implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all
respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings. Such amendment of the pleadings as may be necessary
to cause them to conform to the evidence and to raise these issues may be made upon motion of any party
at any time, even after judgment; but failure to amend does not affect the result of the trial of these issues.
engineers as commissioners, with the concurrence of the parties. 2 of these
commissioners found that the portion of the land in dispute belonged to the City
of Manila. RTC decided in favor of Petitioners and permanently enjoined
Respondent from evicting and collecting rentals from them.
5. On appeal, CA reversed and set aside the RTC’s judgment and dismissed the
complaint. CA ruled that Petitioners did not have legal or equitable title to
maintain the suit for quieting of title, stated that RTC should have conducted
hearings on the reports of the commissioners, and ruled that it was highly
improper for the RTC to have adjudicated a boundary dispute in an action for
quieting of title.
6. Petitioners argue that CA erred in dismissing the complaint – since the boundary
issue was raised with and litigated with the RTC, this amended the complaint to
conform to the evidence pursuant to Sec. 5 Rule 105 of the ROC. Petitioners argue
that they had sufficient interest to bring the action for quieting of title because
they built improvements on the property. City of Manila urged the SC to reinstate
RTC’s ruling as the issue on boundaries was litigated and reiterated the argument
relying on Sec. 5 Rule 10.
Issues
WON CA erred in dismissing the Petitioners’ complaint? NO.
WON RTC has jurisdiction over the action for injunction? YES but there are other
reasons for dismissing the complaint as a whole.
WON RTC had jurisdiction over the action for quieting of title? NO.
Ratio
1. The allegations in the complaint should support both causes of action for
injunction and for quieting of title. One of the important allegations would be
those vesting jurisdiction in the trial court.
2. The power of a court to hear and decide a controversy is called its jurisdiction,
which includes the power to determine whether or not it has the authority to hear
and determine the controversy presented, and the right to decide whether or not
the statement of facts that confer jurisdiction exists, as well as all other matters
that arise in the case legitimately before the court. Jurisdiction imports the power
and authority to declare the law, to expound or to apply the laws exclusive of the
idea of the power to make the laws, to hear and determine issues of law and of
fact, the power to hear, determine, and pronounce judgment on the issues before
the court, and the power to inquire into the facts, to apply the law, and to
pronounce the judgment.
If evidence is objected to at the trial on the ground that it is not within the issues made by the pleadings, the
court may allow the pleadings to be amended and shall do so with liberality if the presentation of the merits
of the action and the ends of substantial justice will be subserved thereby. The court may grant a continuance
to enable the amendment to be made. (5a)
3. But judicial power is to be distinguished from jurisdiction in that the former cannot
exist without the latter and must of necessity be exercised within the scope of the
latter, not beyond it.
4. Jurisdiction is a matter of substantive law because it is conferred only by law, as
distinguished from venue, which is a purely procedural matter. The conferring law
may be the Constitution, or the statute organizing the court or tribunal, or the
special or general statute defining the jurisdiction of an existing court or tribunal,
but it must be in force at the time of the commencement of the action.
Jurisdiction cannot be presumed or implied, but must appear clearly from the law
or it will not be held to exist, but it may be conferred on a court or tribunal by
necessary implication as well as by express terms. It cannot be conferred by the
agreement of the parties; or by the court's acquiescence; or by the erroneous
belief of the court that it had jurisdiction; or by the waiver of objections; or by the
silence of the parties.
5. The three essential elements of jurisdiction are: (1) that the court must have
cognizance of the class of cases to which the one to be adjudged belongs; (2) that
the proper parties must be present; and, (3) that the point decided must be, in
substance and effect, within the issue. The test for determining jurisdiction is
ordinarily the nature of the case as made by the complaint and the relief sought;
and the primary and essential nature of the suit, not its incidental character,
determines the jurisdiction of the court relative to it.
6. Jurisdiction may be classified into original and appellate, the former being the
power to take judicial cognizance of a case instituted for judicial action for the
first time under conditions provided by law, and the latter being the authority of
a court higher in rank to re-examine the final order or judgment of a lower court
that tried the case elevated for judicial review. Considering that the two classes
of jurisdiction are exclusive of each other, one must be expressly conferred by
law. One does not flow, nor is inferred, from the other.
7. Jurisdiction v. exercise of jurisdiction – When there is jurisdiction over the person
and subject matter, the decision of all other questions arising in the case is but an
exercise of that jurisdiction. The test of jurisdiction is whether or not the court or
tribunal had the power to enter on the inquiry, not whether or not its conclusions
were correct for the power to decide necessarily carries with it the power to
decide wrongly or rightly. The lack of the power to act results in a void judgment;
while the lack of the power to render an erroneous decision results in a judgment
6
Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. — Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:
(1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation;
(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein,
except actions for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over
which is conferred upon Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts;
(3) In all actions in admiralty and maritime jurisdiction where the demand or claim exceeds twenty thousand
pesos (P20,000.00);
(4) In all matters of probate, both testate and intestate, where the gross value of the estate exceeds twenty
thousand pesos (P20,000.00);
that is valid until set aside. The fact that a decision is erroneous does not divest
the court or tribunal of its jurisdiction conferred by law to try the case. Any error
made by the court or tribunal with jurisdiction in a civil action may be attributed
to it as an error of judgment, not of jurisdiction; appeal, not certiorari, lies to
correct the error.
8. The exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC is conferred by Sec. 19 of BP 129.6 To
determine its jurisdiction, the trial court must interpret and apply the law on
jurisdiction in relation to the allegations of ultimate facts made in the complaint,
regardless of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some
of the claims asserted therein.
9. In this case, the RTC has jurisdiction over the action for injunction because it was
one in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation. BUT
it has no jurisdiction over the action for quieting of title which had the nature of a
real action or one that involves the issue of ownership or possession of real
property or any interest therein.
10. This is because BP 129 was amended by RA 7691 effective on Apr. 15, 1994, which
provides that first level courts such as MeTCs, MTCs, or MCTCs shall exercise:
Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, possession of,
real property, or any interest therein where the assessed value of the property or
interest therein does not exceed Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil
actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not exceeds (sic) Fifty
thousand pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind,
attorneys fees, litigation expenses and cost…
11. As such, the determination of which trial court has the exclusive original jurisdiction
over the real action is dependent on the assessed value of the property in dispute.
An action to quiet title is a special civil action under Rule 63. While Sec. 1 of Rule
63 specifies the forum to be “the appropriate Regional Trial Court” such
specification does not override the statutory provision on jurisdiction. As the court
ruled in Malana v. Tappa, Rule 63 must be read together with BP 129, as
amended. Rule 63 does not require that the action be filed with the RTC as it uses
the word “may” which denotes that it is merely permissive and indicates a mere
possibility or option. In contrast, BP 129 uses the word shall and explicitly requires
the MTC to exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all civil actions which involve
title to or possession of real property where the assessed value does not exceed
20k.
(5) In all actions involving the contract of marriage and marital relations;
(6) In all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person or body exercising judicial
or quasi-judicial functions;
(7) In all civil actions and special proceedings falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of a Juvenile
and Domestic Relations Court and of the Courts of Agrarian Relations as now provided by law; and
(8) In all other cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest and costs or the value of the property in
controversy, amounts to more than twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00).
12. The complaint of the Petitioners did not contain any allegation of the assessed real owners of the land: Patricia, Inc. and the City of Manila. Any violation by
value of the property – hence, the RTC did not have any basis to determine which Patricia, Inc. would have given a rise to a right of action in favor of the City of
court could validly take cognizance of the cause of action for quieting of title. The Manila only.
RTC could not proceed with the case and render judgment for lack of jurisdiction. 4. The invocation of Sec. 5 Rule 10 was unwarranted. A boundary dispute should not
Although the issue of lack of jurisdiction was not raised during the proceedings be litigated in an action for quieting of title due to the limited scope of the action.
with the trial court, the SC may, motu proprio consider and resolve it since A boundary dispute would essentially alter or modify the TCTs of City of Manila
jurisdiction is a matter conferred by law and could not be vested by any act or and Patricia, Inc., and any attacks on Torrens titles must be brought through a
omission of any party. direct attack. Bringing up a boundary dispute in an action to quiet title is
prohibited for being a collateral attack.
Other reasons for dismissal of the complaint:
1. Erroneous joinder of action for injunction and action to quiet title. The latter is a
special civil action while the former is an ordinary action. Sec. 5(b) Rule 2 disallows
such joinder: The joinder shall not include special civil actions or actions governed
by special rules. The RTC should have, upon motion or motu proprio, severed
these causes of action and tried them separately assuming it has jurisdiction over
both. Severance is proper since according to Sec. 6 of Rule 2, misjoinder of causes
of action is not a ground for dismissal of an action. Dismissal is proper only if
Petitioners refused to accept the severance pursuant to Sec. 3 Rule 17. 7
2. The Petitioners did not show that they were real parties in interest to demand
either injunction or quieting of title. For an action to quiet title to prosper, 2
indispensable requisites must concur: (1) plaintiff should have legal or equitable
title to or interest in the real property subject of the action, and (2) the deed,
claim, encumbrance claimed to be casting cloud on his title must be shown to be
in fact invalid despite its prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy. In the
complaint, Petitioners did not claim ownership of the land itself or authority or
other legal basis for their alleged lawful occupation. They only claimed that they
had been in continuous possession of the property for more than 30 years, that
their houses were built in good faith, and that the area had been declared as an
Area for Priority Development (APD) – but none of these reasons validly clothed
them with the necessary interest to maintain the action for quieting of title.
Because they had admitted the authenticity of the title of the City of Manila and of
Patricia, Inc., they could not have established any right other than as occupants.
They also failed to deny that they were lessees of Patricia, Inc. Even if the area
was declared as an APD under PD 1967, the only benefit they would have received
was the grant of the right of first refusal in the event that the land owner decides
to sell the land.
3. Petitioners did not have a cause of action for injunction which requires: (1) there
must be a right to be protected, and (2) acts against which the injunction is to be
directed are violative of said right. Petitioners had no right to be protected
because they only established the existence of a boundary dispute between the

7
Section 3. Dismissal due to fault of plaintiff. — If, for no justifiable cause, the plaintiff fails to appear on the defendant to prosecute his counterclaim in the same or in a separate action. This dismissal shall have the
the date of the presentation of his evidence in chief on the complaint, or to prosecute his action for an effect of an adjudication upon the merits, unless otherwise declared by the court. (3a)
unreasonable length of time, or to comply with these Rules or any order of the court, the complaint may be
dismissed upon motion of the defendant or upon the court's own motion, without prejudice to the right of