Patriarchal struggles and state practices: A feminist, political-economic view

Gender & Society; Thousand Oaks; Oct 1998; Anna M Zajicek; Toni M Calasanti;
Volume: 12
Issue: 5
Start Page: 505-527
ISSN: 08912432
Subject Feminism
Terms: Political power
Sexes
Abstract:
Feminist scholars challenge ahistorical conceptions of the patriachal state and emphasize the importance of power struggles across class,
race, and gender lines in tranforming state gender policies. They also unintentionally downplay the ideological power struggles among
race- and class-homogeneous patriarchal institutions, especially in relatively monolithic political contexts with little or no independent
feminist movement.
Full Text:
Copyright Sage Publications, Inc. Oct
1998
[Headnote]
Feminist scholars challenge ahistorical conceptions of the patriarchal state and emphasize the importance of power struggles across class,
race and gender lines in transforming state gender policies. They also unintentionally downplay the ideological power struggles among
race- and class-homogeneous patriarchal institutions, especially in relatively monolithic political contexts with little orno independent
feminist movement. Our historical (1945-89) case study of the transformations of Polish abortion laws and selected economic policies
geared toward women explores how these changing policies geared toward women explores how these changing policies were used in, and
shaped by the ideological power struggles between two homogeneous, powerful, maledominated institutions: the Communist Party and the
Catholic Church We argue that one cannot understand patriarchal state practices without considering the ideological power struggles
between patriarchal institutions in homogeneous social contexts as well as in those of a more heterogeneous nature.
As they revision theories of the state, western feminist scholars have focused on the influence of gender, class, and racial conflicts and
alliances on state policies. Feminists have challenged both genderless conceptions of the liberal state and monolithic conceptions of the
patriarchal state (e.g., Franzway, Court, and Connell 1989; Power 1984; Pyle 1990; Quadagno 1990, 1994). Recent attention has turned to
examining how state policies are shaped by the "matrix of domination" (Hill Collins 1990) and to the relations between the state and
marginalized actors, including working-class women and women of color. However, western feminists have not studied the experiences of
Third World and socialist countries. This exclusion creates a twofold problem.
First, in most western liberal states, women's movements have fostered change in patriarchal state policies. Also, the interactions of
gender, race, and class have influenced the conflicts over gender-related issues occurring in many western nations. Thus, while gender
inequality has structured many political and economic divisions, on numerous occasions, race and class interests have appeared to be more
salient and resulted in unexpected alliances between women and men (Goldberg 1991, chap. 9; Quadagno 1990). However, the political
and economic conditions characteristic of most western nations are not necessarily present in other societies, many of which lack a
democratic political system-indicated by freedom of association and choice between parties-and labor market competition. Feminist state
theories based only on the experiences of western liberal states will remain partial, and our knowledge of other political arrangements and
their effects on gender inequality will remain limited.
Second, to address the problems created by an exclusive focus on gender, recent feminist theorizing has emphasized the importance of
multiple structural inequalities in shaping western state policies (Eisenstein 1994; Quadagno 1990). However, while this theoretical shift
has helped us understand social struggles within and between class- and race-structured institutions, analyses of gender politics and
struggles in more homogeneous institutions may require a different framework. Scholars have drawn such a framework from socialist
feminism, which emphasizes the importance of economic conditions in shaping the gender politics of otherwise homogeneous actors; that
is, white male power elites (e.g., McIntosh 1978; Pyle 1990). Yet, this theory can be overly abstract (Connell 1994); a focus on economic
factors, while necessary, does not allow for a complete understanding of state gender politics.
We address these concerns by focusing on the experiences of a nonliberal and noncapitalist state and by studying the ideological
differences and struggles among patriarchal institutions that shape the politics of otherwise homogeneous social actors and produce
historically variable state practices toward women. Specifically, we examine some state policies concerning women in pre-1990 Poland, a
socialist country with a political system dominated by one party and a less diversified social structure than found in many Western
societies.
THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS: SHIFTING THE ANALYTIC LENS
Although the diversity of feminist approaches to the state makes it difficult to draw clear-cut boundaries between them, we distinguish
three strands. The first, represented by liberal feminism, views the state not as an inherently patriarchal structure but rather as representing
the interests of a dominant group. Since men happen to be the powerful group, the state acts as the agent for their interests (Peterson and
Runyan 1993). The second, represented by radical feminism, presents a stronger version of the patriarchal state and depicts the state as the
oppressor itself: a patriarchal power structure (Connell 1994). From this position, the state, as a social structure and institution, not only
serves men's interests but is itself inherently gendered. While these two strands perceive men as a homogeneous category, the multipower
state literature, which includes multiracial feminism (see Baca Zinn and Dill 1997) and socialist feminism, views the state as shaped by the
interactions of race, class, and gender, and acknowledges the possibility of divisions among men. Specifically, multiracial and socialist-
feminist perspectives recognize the importance of contextual factors, such as changing economic conditions, on people's actions. However,
they are not identical with regard to how much weight they give to the importance of race-, gender-, and class-based inequalities for actors'
actions. Whereas multiracial feminism emphasizes the role racial inequalities play in shaping actors' politics in racially differentiated
social contexts, the socialistfeminist perspective focuses on the importance of economic factors in shaping the politics of male-dominated
power elites. Thus, the multiple-power feminist theorizing both sensitizes us to the existence of the "matrix of domination" and, depending
on which aspect of power relations is salient in a given context, allows us to adjust our theoretical perspective to the historical context of
actors' actions. Because of our interest in factors affecting actors' politics in a racially homogenous social context, we focus on socialist-
feminist theory.
Socialist feminists assume that limited economic opportunities reproduce patriarchal domination, and they focus on the ways in which
state policies affect women's status (e.g., Burton 1985; McIntosh 1978; Pyle 1990; Wilson 1977). This occurs mainly through state
regulation of the relationship between paid employment and household labor or, in a more general sense, between production and
reproduction; state's regulation is driven mainly by economic considerations, including the level of unemployment and economic growth,
which, in turn, are related to the continuation of patriarchy and capitalist accumulation (Walby 1986). Thus, depending on political-
economic conditions, the male-dominated state may pursue economic interests primarily and gender interests only indirectly (McIntosh
1978), or it may pursue gender interests more aggressively: "The objectives of state personnel can involve maintenance of traditional
gender relations (male-domination) as well as the stimulation of economic development and growth" (Pyle 1990, xvii).
By challenging genderless conceptions of the state and emphasizing the importance of economic conditions in shaping the interests of
male-dominated elites, socialist-feminist theory furthers our understanding of state policies. This perspective, however, has three
important shortcomings. First, similar to other feminist theories of the state, it can provide an overly abstract, "strategy-driven rather than
data driven" (Connell 1994, 146) view of the relationships between gender, political economy, and state policies. Second, while it
recognizes that male elite's interests may vary because of changes in the economic conditions, it glosses over the possibility that two
powerful, male-dominated institutions may have sometimes different and sometimes converging interests (Connell 1994, 148). Third, and
relatedly, it tends to assume that economic conditions can provide a sufficient explanation for policy formation. As a result, socialist
feminism underplays the complexity of men's interests, which also limits its ability to adequately understand historical variations in state
policies.
Connell stresses the need for more "data driven" theorizing of the state and suggests that we attend more closely to "the changing
circumstances in which state instrumentalities act, the strategic problems of state directorates, and the scope and limits of the state's
embroilment in gender relations" (1994, 148). In this context, Connell argues that the state is "not essentially patriarchal" but "is
historically patriarchal" (1994, 163). Connell's notion of a "historically patriarchal state" is important in that it "denaturalizes" and
"problematizes" gender interests by depicting them as historically contingent outcomes of social struggles rather than as a natural reality.
At the same time, he recognizes that "state elites typically face shifting situations and contradictory pressures which their strategies can
only partially resolve" (1994, 160-61). These pressures result from uncertainty surrounding the gendered accumulation and exchange
processes, legitimation crises in patriarchal institutions brought about by the "rise of the liberal state [which] gave weight to generalizable
claims of equality," and the emergence of the feminist movement (1994,161). And, although Connell does not specifically examine
Communist states, he suggests that his theoretical framework should be useful because "their sexual politics will differ from liberal states
in the way interests in sexual politics are articulated, but in other ways will be similar" (1994, 139).
Former socialist states lack both the liberal state and an independent feminist movement. Thus, further theoretical development depends on
moving beyond the experiences of Western nations to contexts in which state practices are shaped by struggles between male-dominated
institutions rather than conflicts between a feminist movement and the liberal state.
METHODOLOGY AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS
We focus on only one aspect of these broader interests and explore the role of ideological differences and power struggles between
patriarchal institutions in shaping specific state practices toward women. We undertake a historical case study of selected women-oriented
state practices in Poland. Poland provides a theoretically interesting case because it has a relatively racially and ethnically homogeneous
population, it has neither a liberal state nor an independent feminist movement, and it features an opposition between two institutions: a
one-party political system and the Catholic Church. The coexistence of Communist and oppositional patriarchal forces presents an
excellent opportunity to examine state practices in relation to power struggles between male-dominated institutions.
Specifically, since the end of World War II, Polish history has been characterized by the existence of a male-dominated Communist Party
(PUWP) that controlled state politics for more than 40 years, as well as a relatively strong, male-dominated opposition to the Communist
regime (Jancar 1978; Penn 1994). Since 1947, the party and the Roman Catholic Church have been the main, antagonistic political players
whose actions and strategies have shaped Polish internal politics. From 1947 to 1980, the relationships between the PUWP and the church
were characterized by open political confrontation (1947-55), hidden ideological conflict (1956-59), amelioration (1960-70), and
accommodation (1971-80) (Monticone 1986).' In 1980, the male-dominated trade union Solidarity, which has always had strong ties to the
Catholic Church, emerged as an important actor in the political arena. In the context of ensuing confrontation between Solidarity and the
PUWP, the church assumed a role of a mediator between the party and political opposition. In 1983, after Solidarity was delegalized and
the economic situation worsened considerably, the PUWP and the church engaged in a mutual effort "to normalize their relationship"
(Monticone 1986, 8). As a result, between 1980 and 1989, state-church relations were characterized by a dialogue and cooperation which,
similar to the previous periods, resulted in some important changes in state practices toward women. Over the period of about 40 years,
and against the backdrop of changing economic and political conditions, Polish state politics, including its gender practices, have been
constructed by the struggle between the Communist Party, which has always been interested in reproducing its domination and
undermining the influence of the church, and the Catholic Church, which has always been at the forefront of opposition to Communist
rule.
We define state practices toward women as those laws, regulations, policies, and ideological pronouncements whose goal is to encourage
the development of certain behaviors and roles on the part of women. Our selection of particular state practices for the present analysis
rests on the socialist-feminist assumption that women's and men's relative economic status is one of the main factors reproducing
domination, and that people's economic situation is shaped by their position in the productionreproduction nexus (Tong 1989). Thus, in
this article, we focus on women's access to public employment and reproductive rights. Because of the centrality of the Communist Party's
ideological conflict with the Catholic Church to Polish internal politics, we focus on these two institutional actors in our analysis of the
formation of state practices toward women.
Finally, we apply a political-economic approach, which focuses on collective actors whose power rests in the control of economic,
institutional, and ideological resources, "and who vie with each other for scarce resources in the pursuit of conflicting goals"
(Rueshemeyer, Huber Stephens, and Stephens 1992, 5). Following this view, state practices, including pronouncements about women,
men, and their rights and appropriate gender roles, are pursued by purposive social actors, typically men, located in positions of power
who have an interest in reproducing their power in the context of political struggles between different interest groups. These groups may
be formed either from within the dominant parties or political elites or from without, by groups opposed to the politics of the dominant
party. More important, to maintain political and ideological advantage over their opponents, power elites must concern themselves with
economic prosperity. This translates into a mandate to successfully deal with a variety of economic instabilities brought about by changes
in labor supply and demand, and cycles of economic growth and decline. Thus, political legitimacy, which includes the popular acceptance
of the ethical and intellectual leadership, and economic prosperity are the two main goals of power elites.
An adequate inquiry into the patriarchal struggles that shape state practices considers how opposing political actors will adjust their
strategies and practices to the changing historical political-economic context without necessarily transforming their ideologies. The
context facilitates or limits the development of particular practices, strategies, and struggles. Specifically, the strategies of patriarchal
institutions and socialist state practices toward women have been influenced by the degree of economic legitimacy of the planned
economy, including its capacity to produce increases in the standard of living and to maintain balance between labor supply and demand;
the degree of ethical legitimacy of the political system, including its capacity to generate popular consent; and the balance of power
between competing actors. In examining how the struggles between the party and the church produced state practices toward women, we
will consider the fact that these opposing political actors adjust their strategies to the changing politicaleconomic situations in which they
operate.2
Data for this analysis come from government sources, including Communist Party publications, existing analyses of state-church relations,
research on the history of gender ideologies, newspapers, and popular magazines. We examine five different periods in the relationships
between the PUWP and the church, including an open political confrontation (1947-55), hidden ideological conflict (1956-59),
amelioration (1960-69), accommodation (1970-79), and dialogue (1980-89), and their impact on the formation of state practices toward
women. In discussing each period we will attend to the degree of political and economic legitimacy of the PUWP, including its ability to
avoid political repression and regulate economic growth and employment relations. We will conclude by discussing the implications of
our analysis for feminist theories of the state.
We begin by exploring the period between 1947 and 1955. In this postwar political-economic context we focus on how ideological power
struggles between the Communist Party and the church shaped the state's practices regarding women's position in the production-
reproduction nexus.
CONSOLIDATION OF STATIST PATRIARCHY AND OPEN POLITICAL CONFLICT WITH THE CHURCH, 1947-55
After World War II, the Soviet Union imposed its Communist political-economic regime on Poland, a nation proud of its strong Catholic
tradition and the political independence it regained in 1918. The emergence of this new Polish statehood transformed state practices
toward women. Under communism, the state assumed the roles of employer, economic manager, and welfare agent, thereby monopolizing
the regulation of various aspects of the production-reproduction nexus, including wages, financial and institutional help to families,
provision of child care services, and gender representation in institutions of higher education. We refer to this highly centralized
organization of social life, including gender relations, as a statist patriarchy.3
The first years of the statist patriarchy in Poland were characterized by the Communist Party's effort to undermine the strong religious
influence of the Catholic Church, on one hand, and to institutionalize a Marxist ideological rhetoric that emphasized the importance of
economic equality among people, on the other hand. But while "[t]he aim of all Marxist-Leninist states is the eradication of religious
thought, since religion has no place in the type of society they seek to attain" (Monticone 1986, 7), in Poland, the politics of the PUWP
toward the Catholic Church were mediated by the strength of religious convictions among the population and the attitudes of the church's
hierarchy toward the regime.
More important, the issue of gender equality played a crucial role in state propaganda in two ways. First, in terms of garnering greater
power, promoting gender equality could undermine the religious teachings of the Catholic Church, which emphasized the social
importance of the family and women's reproductive role. Second, at an economic level, encouraging such equity could mobilize women to
participate in the reconstruction of the devastated economy. In this context, the Communist Party envisioned that gender equality involved
removing women from the household and giving them some economic freedom to escape from reliance on men. Bringing women into
production would then erase the divisions between the sexes and put working women in the same plight as working men: under socialism,
they would then both be free. (Robinson 1995, 207)
Significantly, the leaders of the party connected women's emancipation to their participation in the public sphere, but they did not consider
the division of reproductive labor an important dimension of gender equality. As a result, by encouraging women's participation in the paid
labor force, the party defied, at least to some extent, the religious teaching of the church but ultimately penalized women by creating their
double burden and reinforcing the notion that they were responsible for reproductive labor.4
Specifically, after the male-dominated Communist Party took over the political system in 1947, it faced several economic and political
problems. The most pressing economic issue was to increase production of goods and foster rapid economic growth. This was not an easy
task considering that about 22 percent of the population died in the war and between 70 percent and 80 percent of the economic
infrastructure was destroyed (Goodwyn 1991, 46-47). The most important political challenge was to overcome the continued resistance of
large segments of the population to Communist rule. This resistance was fueled by the church's insistence on trying to maintain an
influence on Polish politics (Raciborski 1994) and its role in the parliamentary elections in 1947, during which its dignitaries urged
Catholics to "vote only for those persons, electoral lists and programs that are not in opposition to Catholic teachings and morality" (Polish
bishops' letter, quoted in Monticone 1986,14). One measure that the party leaders could use to diminish the influence of the church was to
juxtapose the PUWP's rhetoric of gender equality and women's liberation with the church's discourse stressing women's subordinate role
and family-centered responsibilities. And, in the context of a war-related shortage of male workers, one way in which the party leaders
could simultaneously achieve their political and economic goals was by encouraging women's labor force participation.5 Toward these
ends, the party used two strategies.
First, a new vision of "appropriate womanhood" was disseminated by different party-controlled organizations, such as the Women's
League (Robinson 1995, 210), and through the state-owned mass media. Central to this new notion was the image of a strong, young, and
healthy woman driving a tractor or working in the construction industry. This ascendant gender discourse broke from the prewar (1918-39)
image of a more passive and domestic-oriented Polish woman. At the same time, the new gender ideologies tapped into, and continued,
the image of the civic-minded and publicly active Polish matriarch that was dominant when Poland was partitioned between 1773 and
1918. The renewed postwar emphasis on the heroic and inherently patriotic aspect of Polish womanhood also defined a woman's body in
terms of physical strength and stamina, suggesting that, when necessary, she could be like a man. The focus on the fluidity of biological
differences between women and men that emerged in this new image of womanhood thus signified a certain rift with the prewar image.
The Communist government's newly constructed gender ideology was meant to help regulate women's place in the productionreproduction
nexus by downplaying the existence of socially consequential biological differences between women and men, differences that were
emphasized by the Catholic religion. More important, the dominant ideology did not challenge the normative symbolism of productivist
masculinity but instead constructed a parallel image of productivist femininity. At least in part, the image of a productionoriented,
physically robust masculinity remained because it corresponded to the needs of labor-intensive economic growth.
The second strategy the government employed was to enact several new laws and policies that encouraged women's labor force
participation and institutionalized the Communist ideology of gender equality. For example, in 1952, gender equality was codified in the
new Polish constitution, which stated that "omen in the Polish People's Republic have equal rights with men in all spheres of state,
political, economic and social and cultural life" (quoted in Reading 1992, 30). The pressing need for labor was reflected in new regulations
that, for instance, temporarily allowed women to work in the underground coal mines. And to assist women's incorporation into the paid
workforce, in 1952, the Polish government established gendered employment quotas for different enterprises, provided for vocational
training for women, and strove to increase their numbers in vocational schools (Holzer and Wasilawska-Trenker 1985, 163, endnote 1).
These new policies remained in line with the dominant ideology as they did not deconstruct the normative structure of patriarchal
masculinity. Yet, they were the first significant, albeit contradictory, attempts to formally challenge the notions of femininity embedded in
the religious Catholic discourse. Thus, the concept of women's rights, as inscribed in Polish constitution, still posited men as the norm, but
it also assumed that women can be just like men. At the same time, however, the concept of equal rights referred only to the public-men's-
sphere, leaving largely intact the patriarchal normative structure rendering women responsible for reproductive labor and unequal gender
relations in the private sphere. The emphasis on productive activities and the public sphere implied that women's reproductive work, which
was elevated by the church, was not important, unless it was performed in the productive sphere. Finally, despite the legislative changes
undertaken by the government, a restrictive abortion law, a vestige of the church's earlier influence, was still in place.
This contradictory and piecemeal package of economic policies was due largely to the continued influence religion had on significant
segments of society. Despite the strong official pressures to be employed, a push sometimes compounded by forceful public criticism of
women who remained in the domestic sphere only, women's entry into the paid labor force was not widely accepted among the general
population, especially among rural men and women who comprised the majority of the surplus labor force. Resistance stemmed from
"traditional social attitudes [which] saw the woman as mother and housewife, active only in her own household" (Holzer and Wasilawska-
Trenker 1985, 130). Such traditional attitudes were supported by the church, which continued to play a crucial role in Polish society
despite the censure it experienced at the beginning of the 1950s, including the imprisonment of two bishops, censorship of the church's
printing materials, and restrictions on the legal status of the church (Monticone 1986, 21-23).
In sum, during the first period of statist patriarchy, the Polish state practices were dictated not only by the Communist Party's ideology of
gender equality and time-specific economic conditions but also by the existence of an oppositional political player-the Catholic Church. In
this context, state gender practices became an important tool in the ideological struggle between the party and the church.
HIDDEN IDEOLOGICAL STRUGGLE: THE ABORTION ISSUE, 1956-59
Three notable trends emerged in the 1950s. First, between 1955 and 1960, the Polish economy continued to grow, although not at the same
spectacular pace as during the previous years. Labor shortages remained one of the most important obstacles for the economy based on its
extensive growth. Second, the total fertility rate continued its slow but steady decline, from 3.66 in 1950 to 3.61 in 1955 (Anker 1985, 12;
Glowny Urzad Statystyczny 1968, xvi). Third, after Stalin's death in 1953, which marked an end to political purges in most Communist
countries, and the Polish workers' uprising against the Communist regime in 1956, the ruling party experienced a brief legitimacy crisis,
which was temporarily resolved by replacing the old guard with very popular leaders. The new party leadership liberalized some areas of
political life by making limited political concessions to diverse social groups and institutions, including workers, the intelligentsia, and
even the Catholic Church. These concessions were related to the growing recognition that political repression was actually increasing
people's discontent with the Communist rule, and that open warfare with the church "had caused many Catholics in their turn to oppose the
building of socialism" (Monticone 1986, 28). In this context, concessions were meant to garner "the support of the dissident elements
within the nation" (Monticone 1986, 26). But while liberalization of political life ended a period of an open public confrontation between
the state and the church, the importance of the ideological struggle with the church increased, as evidenced in new abortion legislation.
Specifically, despite fierce opposition by the Catholic Church, in 1956 the Communist government legalized abortions, followed in 1959
by executive provisions that broadened the accessibility of abortions. As a result, first-trimester abortions were available for women who
faced a difficult economic or social situation, and the medical procedure was subsidized by the government. A three-day leave from work
was also guaranteed. Given the declining fertility rate and the renewed need for the biological reproduction of society, the Communist
government's legalization and liberalization of abortions can be understood only in the context of an ideological "campaign against the
Church [which] involved undermining doctrine as well as undercutting the financial foundations of the Church" (Monticone 1986, 34).
That is, the state acted on women's behalf, and in a manner contradictory to its own long-term economic goals, to further reduce the
influence of the church (Plakwicz 1992).6 And although the law was continually attacked, especially in the wake of the Solidarity
movement in 1980-81, it remained largely unchanged until 1992.
The legalization of abortion is just one critical piece of evidence that indicates that even during a time of "outward cooperation between
the church and the state," a hidden ideological power struggle was being waged, with the state seeking to "destroy the bases upon which
religion had developed and thrived" (Monticone 1986, 34). Moreover, it appears that, under the statist patriarchy, the state was not an
agent that merely expressed men's general interests or the economic interest of the Communist elites. On the basis of Communist ideology
and pressing politicaleconomic issues, many state practices were aimed at improving women's public situation and social status; at the
same time, the practices on women's behalf were an important aspect of its effort to undermine the politics of the church. From this
vantage, one can argue that state practices served the historically specific ideological interests of some men, especially the Communist
elites, who sought to counter the interests of other men, represented by the patriarchal Catholic Church. In this context, the general
assumption of policy makers was that the legitimacy of communism and, at times, economic stability, were reinforced by supporting
women's rights, which, in turn, also helped to ideologically undermine the tenets of the Catholic doctrine.
IMPROVED STATE-CHURCH RELATIONS, 1960-69
Beginning in the 1960s, new economic conditions, characterized by economic stabilization, influenced employment policy by lowering the
demand for women workers (Holzer and Wasilawska-Trenker 1985, 131). This change in policy was also possible because of a slight
increase in the ratio of women to men, from 110 women per 100 men in 1950, to 106 women per 100 men in 1965 (Glowny Urzad
Statystyczny 1991, xxiv). In this context, the continued decline in the total fertility rate, from 3.66 in 1950 to 2.52 in 1965 (Anker 1985,
12) was not perceived to be a problem. At the same time, the new Communist leaders enjoyed a relatively high level of social support due,
to some extent, to their improved relationship with the Catholic Church. Given this situation, mobilization behind the party, especially of
women, declined in importance, as did the related emphasis on gender equality. In fact, the practical realization of gender equality through
women's labor force participation became costly as it required more government subsidies for free child care.
The abortion issue became the state's last significant attempt to use policies for women to oppose the church. The change in state practices
was at least partly due to the transformation of the church's attitude toward Communist rule. Namely, in an effort to gain more political
influence, church dignitaries began retracting their oppositional stance toward the Communist regime and tried to create a working
relationship with the government. Given the change in church politics, the importance of the Communist government's ideological struggle
against organized religion declined somewhat but did not disappear. For example, in 1966, Gomulka, the first secretary of the PUWP,
stated that the party should "[I]et the Church continue its activities. Let it perform the function which is its duty. We demand, however,
that it conduct a policy loyal to the state" (quoted in Monticone 1986, 42). Similarly, Trybuna Ludu, an official party newspaper, stated
that "the government did not wish to interfere with religious teaching" (Monticone 1986, 45). This shift in state-church relations opened up
a new discursive space and gave the Communist Party more flexibility in conducting its gender politics. The propaganda apparatus did not
have to emphasize the differences between its ideology and the church's teachings to the same extent as it had previously.
As a result, the disseminated gender discourse began emphasizing biological differences between women and men. From the 1960s
onward, the government's position with regard to women's labor force participation began slowly converging with the traditional discourse
of the church. This does not mean that the former ideology and policies supporting women's paid employment immediately disappeared;
they were altered as the dominant discourse quit "glorifying women miners and women masons" (Heinen 1990, 86). Instead, the
Communist propaganda began forging a pro-family campaign, "insisting on the role of women as wife and mother" (Heinen 1990, 86).
Yet, while the period of amelioration in state-church relations became conducive to the emergence of pro-family ideology, this stance, as
we discuss below, did not become an official one until the mid- 970s. Similarly, it did not dominate the political discourse until the early
1980s when, in the context of another serious economic and legitimation crisis, the Communist Party made significant efforts to gain
political support from the Catholic Church.
A PERIOD OF ACCOMMODATION: TOWARD A PATRIARCHAL ALLIANCE,1970-79
In 1970, Poland experienced another serious political-economic crisis that resulted in the accession to power of a new group of
Communist leaders. To overcome growing economic difficulties, the new government tried to fuel economic growth by increasing
investments, especially in heavy industries, and foreign debt. As a result, during the first half of the 1970s, the national economy
experienced a temporary economic boom. The increased investments in heavy industries contributed to the creation of new employment
opportunities and labor demand continued to exceed labor supply (Glowny Urzad Statystyczny 1987, 236-37). More important, the new
employment opportunities were concentrated in financially attractive sectors of the economy, a factor that could increase the influx of
women workers into heavy industry. However, this picture changed in the second half of the decade as new investments were halted and
economic stagnation ensued. Given the policy of full employment, the Communist government could not revert to laying off workers in
these high-paying industries. At the same time, as a result of the institutionalization of some pro-natalist policies, including increased
family allowances and extended unpaid maternity leave (Holzer and Wasilawska-Trenker 1985,132), total fertility began increasing slowly
from 2.20 in 1970 to 2.27 in 1975 (Anker 1985, 12).
Politically, Gierek, the new first secretary of the PUWP, tried to introduce changes into state-church relations. His new approach could be
partly attributed to his having been raised by "very devout Catholic parents," making him aware "of the strength of religious belief and
practice among the Polish people" (Monticone 1986, 52). Regardless, when Gierek became the first secretary, he was committed to
normalizing the relations between state and church and expected that the church would enthusiastically welcome his efforts. The church,
however, was increasingly aware of its political strength and influence, and also realized that the recent crisis had weakened the popularity
of the party, even with new leadership. To capitalize on this new configuration of power, the church presented a set of political demands,
including the incorporation of a clause about freedom of the church, into the new constitution. The state, "[kJnowing its lack of support
among the . . . people. . began to pursue a policy of detente with the Polish Church" (Monticone 1986, 53).
As already noted, the amelioration of state-church relations in the 1960s decreased the necessity for direct ideological confrontation
between the two institutions even further. This, in turn, opened up a discursive space wherein the state propaganda could safely exploit
some ideological tenets of Catholic discourse, especially the notion of gender difference, for its own ends. Of course, the ideological
struggle between Marxism and Christianity did not end (Monticone 1986, 54), but the Communist Party and its propaganda apparatus had
to make important strategic choices regarding the arenas in which concessions to the church could and could not be made. In this context,
the party opted to continue, and even increase, the ideological struggle with the church in the economic and educational arenas.
In the economic arena, the Polish state focused on socializing agriculture and including private farmers in the pension system if they
contracted the products with the government or sold their land to the state (Monticone 1986, 60). A successful program of socialization in
agriculture would draw "private peasants closer to socialized economy" and foster migration to the cities, thus undermining "the pillars of
traditional life" and the church's influence (Heneghen cited in Monticone 1986, 61). With regard to educational reform, school curricula
were modified to include more Marxist-Leninist ideas in course content, late afternoon classes were introduced to hinder "children from
attending religious instruction," and new school superintendents sympathetic to the party were appointed (Monticone 1986, 61). Thus,
socializing agriculture and school reform became the two critical arenas of confrontation between the state and the church (Monticone
1986, 60-62). Since the issue of gender equality was important, but not very critical, to Marxist-Leninist ideology, it could be easily
sacrificed as part of concessions to the church and its followers. Furthermore, de-emphasizing gender equality had an economic
component as well. As the economic situation continued to worsen, the change in the dominant gender ideology and policies toward
women was a rational measure that could help accomplish three important goals: show that the party was ready to make ideological
concessions to the church, help employment stabilization while controlling women's influx into the heavy industries, and ameliorate the
party's image as an alien force trying to eradicate "natural differences between the sexes."'
The change in gender ideology began in the 1960s when government propaganda started disseminating gender discourse, which
emphasized biological differences between women and men. The political-economic climate of the 1970s helped to institutionalize these
differences in social policies and in legal discourse. In the first half of that decade, the government passed several pro-natalist social
policies that sought to stabilize the economy by encouraging .gainfully employed women to return to the home. They included increased
family allowances and childbirth benefits, the extension of fully paid leave to care for sick children and for maternity, the introduction of a
reward for every child born, and material aid to young couples (Holzer and Wasilawska-Trenker 1985).
The publication of the first postwar Labor Code in 1974 presents yet another example of government's efforts to strengthen families and to
institutionalize gender differences in public life. For example, the code stated that women could not perform tasks considered dangerous to
their health (Kodeks Pracy 1974, art. 176). This new law served to exclude women from almost 90 occupations in 18 industrial branches
and to limit women's access to jobs that required carrying, lifting, or transporting materials beyond established norms (Uscinska and
Pracka 1990). In this case, the state's legal discourse constructed and deployed gender differences to weaken women's position in
production relative to men. Indeed, in 1975, Florczak-Bywalec noted that
despite the fact that men and women have equal rights guaranteed by the Constitution and although the demand for labour concerns all
employees, regardless of their sex, male labour force is preferred.... It is far easier for a man than for a woman to find a job. (quoted in
Malinowska 1995, 37)
Thus, in the 1960s and 1970s, the dictum concerning women's emancipation through their participation in the public sphere was slowly
disappearing from ideological discourse. Instead, the government began promoting pro-natalist policies and women's return to the home.8
THE DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE STATE AND THE CHURCH: THE CONSOLIDATION OF PATRIARCHAL ALLIANCE, 1980-
89
The importance of the 1980s in Polish political-economic history is not limited to the emergence and subsequent delegalization of the
oppositional social movement organized around the trade union Solidarity and the beginning of a serious political-economic crisis that led
to the collapse of communism. It also marks a critical turning point in the history of state-church relations.
With regard to the political-economic crisis, in August 1980 Poland experienced a wave of strikes in several strategically positioned
industries, including shipyards, coal mining, and construction, which lasted until the imposition of the martial law in December 1981.
These strikes deepened the crisis that had been haunting the Polish economy since the beginning of the 1970s. Thus, in 1981, the gross
national product fell 5.3 percent, the gross investment declined 22 percent, and the foreign debt increased from 20.7 billion dollars in 1979
to 25.5 billion dollars in 1981 (Glowny Urzad Statystyczny 1988, 8; 1991, xxiv-v). In this context, the state budget experienced serious
difficulties, the standard of living declined even further, and the gap between consumer needs and the supply of goods grew larger
(Robinson 1995). At the same time, the pro-natalist policies introduced in the 1970s led to an increased fertility rate from 76.1 to 79.1 live
births per 1,000 women (Glowny Urzad Statystyczny 1985, 6).
This crisis was shaped by the struggle between the party and the Solidarity trade union, a movement that had close ties to the church and
an ideology shaped by Christian ethics (Monticone 1986, 112-33; see also Tygodnik Solidarnosc 1981). Solidarity not only played an
important role in destabilizing the Communist regime but also shaped pro-family gender discourses and policies throughout the decade.
For example, one of the union's "Twenty-one Demands," and the only demand dealing with gender issues, was a three-year maternity
leave for women workers. Also, the First National Congress of Solidarity declared that "the Union defends the rights of the family" and
resolved that one of the union's tasks was to lobby against women's nighttime work and for the introduction of part-time work
opportunities for mothers and pregnant women (Dokumenty 11 Tury Zjazdu 1981, 74). Interestingly, when Solidarity was delegalized in
1981 and its political and economic agreements with the government were annulled, maternity leave and the ban on women's work at night
remained intact.
In terms of state-church relations, discussion concerning the need for a dialogue between the state and the church surfaced in 1978, but it
was not until 1983 that this conversation began. The first sign of change in state-church relations was a 1983 article published in a
semiofficial party weekly, Polityka, which stated that "the struggle against religion should be halted since religion is indestructible"
(Monticone 1986,184). At the same time, and despite the church's political interest in strengthening antigovernment opposition, the new
Polish Cardinal Glemp asked priests to stay away from politics, denounced the leaders of the banned Solidarity movement for continuing
underground oppositional activities, and defined the role of the church in terms of uniting "those who are disunited" (Monticone, 1986,
814-15). This conciliatory attitude of the church's hierarchy toward the PUWPwhich delegalized Solidarity in 1981, arrested its members,
and kept the country under the grip of the martial law for nearly two years-severed the relationship between the church's moderate
hierarchy and the political opposition, including some Catholic priests who were involved in political activism (Monticone 1986, 184-86).
Also, the church's public withdrawal of support for the delegalized Solidarity and continued emphasis on women's social role as the
biological reproducers of the nation, guardians of morality and family, and agents of moderation and unification could be seen as going
against the grain of the long-established politics of opposition to the regime. In fact, given the widespread participation of women in
strikes and other resistance activities at the beginning of the 1980s (Nowakowska 1988; Penn 1994), the emphasis on domesticity and the
push to exclude women from political life could have decreased the strength of the resistance movement. In this context, the question
becomes, Why did the church encourage actions that could have resulted in weakening the opposition?
Two factors seem to underlie the church's emphasis on gender differences and women's reproductive roles. First, in 1983, the Vatican
published the Card of Family Rights, which among other things stated that governments should guarantee a family wage to the male
breadwinner (Janicki 1992,10). Since the Polish Catholic Church established a very close relationship with the Vatican after a Polish
national became the Pope, the publication of the Card of Family Rights had a strong impact on the church's pronouncements regarding
women. Second, after martial law was imposed and many male leaders were detained, Solidarity was transformed into a clandestine
organization in which women members became the main pillars (Penn 1994). In this context, the church's ideological push toward
women's domestication did not really threaten and may have strengthened oppositional activities. After the military crackdown occurred,
the private sphere remained the only sphere where antigovernment activities could continue.
From the party's point of view, the church's conciliatory approach made it easier for the government to implement social policies that were
in line with the church's earlier demands, including the demand that the government should "respect the rights of the Family and [give
prominence] to the priority of the Family over the professions and over other social and political groups" (Raina 1978, 226). It is in this
context that the official policy and the ideas promoted by the church converged; as a result, a family-oriented gender ideology officially
became the dominant gender discourse. Communist Party leaders began insisting that "the social policy of our Party and of the state is to
strengthen the family and procreative and educational functions" (quoted in Reading 1992,40). Images supportive of a "good and
responsible mother" abounded. The family was depicted as the nucleus of Polish society, and Polish mothers'-not women's-contributions to
society and the economy were increasingly stressed. Biological gender differences were emphasized repeatedly, even by members of the
League of Polish Women, a Communist Party-affiliated organization concerned with women's rights (see, e.g., Kobiety w zyciu 1987, 58-
69). And, in 1989, Nowe Drogi, a Communist Party magazine, suggested that women's emancipation promotes family crisis and the
neglect of elderly people (Jankowska 1989, 5). Indeed, the notion of women's political activism, so touted in the 1940s and 1950s,
disappeared from public discourse, and women's representation in political and administrative bodies dropped from an already paltry 15
percent to 10 percent (Reading 1992, 65).
Several factors account for the state promotion of this new family-oriented discourse and for the convergence of otherwise antagonistic
social forces on the issue of "women's place." First, the government sought to ease the financial burden that it had accrued because of
strikes, and to forestall the threat of unemployment in the context of weakening economy. Preserving maternity leave allowed the
government to shift some of the costly reproductive responsibilities it had assumed by providing free preschool, day care, and kindergarten
back to women (Robinson 1995, 215-16), while simultaneously stabilizing the labor market by encouraging them to stay at home. Second,
as we have already noted, women played a central role in developing the Solidarity movement, in subsequent strikes, in the so-called
hunger marches, and in maintaining opposition after the men were detained. In this context, the ideological push toward women's
domestication was meant to counter women's political activism; in reality, however, it politicized the private realm even further. The
Communist Party misjudged the nature and role of women's oppositional activities at the time (Penn 1994).
Thus, during the final years before the collapse of communism and statist patriarchy, the historical developments in state-church relations
in the 1980s created a situation wherein the state could and did exploit the themes underlying patriarchal religious discourse for its own
ends. While the notion of gender difference and the focus on women's role in biological reproduction surfaced in the 1960s, it was not
until the 1970s that the ideology of "radical gender differences" (Watson 1993) was used as a vehicle for women's economic
marginalization, and it was not until the 1980s that the notion of radical gender difference was reinforced by the ideology of domesticity
that was used to legitimize women's exclusion from economic activities and neutralize women's role in political opposition. More
important, this historical shift in state practices might not have occurred to the same extent if state-church relations had remained as
antagonistic as they were in the 1940s and 1950s.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Poland does not necessarily typify state-church relations in Communist countries. Some of the conflicts between the Communist Party and
the Catholic Church could have been exaggerated for ideological reasons. As a result, we cannot determine which of the conflicts
discussed were consequential struggles and which were merely symbolic. Still, despite these possible shortcomings, the postwar history of
gender politics in Poland can provide several important insights for feminist, especially socialist-feminist, theories of the state. In this final
section, we summarize the results of our study and discuss their theoretical importance.
First, official state discourse and policies toward women, especially concerning the production-reproduction nexus, have changed over
time in Poland as a result of ideological conflicts between the Communist Party and the Catholic Church and in relation to political-
economic pressures. When the party sought to consolidate its political power in the context of fast economic growth, a shortage of
manpower, and a heightened ideological struggle with the church, its discourse and policies emphasized gender similarities and strongly
encouraged gender equality through women's labor force participation. As a result, the previous patriarchal strategy of gender
differentiation through the imposition of gender dichotomies gave way to a different strategy embedded in a productivist gender discourse.
By creating this alternative discourse and enacting policies stimulating women's paid employment, the Polish government sought to
regulate women's place in the production-reproduction nexus, on one hand, and transform the traditional gender belief system embedded in
Catholic doctrine, on the other. In so doing, the party hoped to undermine the church's influence while also mobilizing women to help the
economy and to gain their political support in exchange for policies that benefited them.
When state-church relations improved, the sex ratio and hence worker availability stabilized, and the party faced political or economic
legitimation crises, its gender politics tended to cross over the boundaries of the gender discourse disseminated by the church. That is,
beginning in 1960, the Polish state slowly withdrew from the Marxist principles of gender equality and started developing a new gender
strategy embedded in a reproductivist gender discourse. This new discourse consisted of messages and policies intended to limit women's
access to employment and to reinforce traditional stereotypes, such as the value of motherhood. Until 1970, both productivist and
reproductivist gender discourses coexisted, but by the early 1970s, the institutionalization of gender differences brought the latter
discourse to the fore where it has since prevailed.
This convergence in official and unofficial gender discourses did not signal the end of the ideological conflict between the Polish state and
the church. Rather, it indicated the Communist Party leaders' choices regarding arenas in which they would struggle with the church.
Given women's relative lack of power and the declining need for their paid labor, turning to more conservative gender politics did not pose
a great threat to the legitimacy of Communist rule. Instead, other issuessuch as maintaining full employment, reversing the expansion of
the private sector in agriculture, or increasing Communist and decreasing religious indoctrination through education-appeared to be more
important arenas of political struggle. Furthermore, creating the appearance of a good relationship with the church, especially during the
1970s and 1980s, boosted the party's legitimacy. Consequently, changing gender politics seemed a relatively safe gesture for the
government to make to enter a dialogue with the church. In effect, then, these two otherwise antagonistic institutions converged in the
1980s over women's issues as their leaders seemed to agree that women's "intrusion" into the public sphere had gone too far.
Second, the political and economic interests that drive state practices can contradict each other, even for the same group of men. Indeed,
political-economic context alone cannot explain how state policies are formed. For example, the legalization of abortion in 1956
contradicted the existing economic context but fit with party efforts to continue the ideological struggle with the church and create a
secular society. Similarly, although the church played both a direct political and indirect ideological role in the Solidarity movement, the
church's politics after Solidarity was outlawed in 1981 were rather conciliatory toward the regime and continued to define the role of
women in terms of their moral and biological, not political, responsibilities. Yet, this ran counter to the church's political interest in
strengthening the antigovernment opposition. By insisting on cooperation with the party and by maintaining its conservatism even after
most of the male Solidarity leaders were arrested in 1981, the church seemed to be more willing to risk weakening of oppositional forces
than to act in ways that might challenge its political position and patriarchal ideology. This political stance resembles that of the party with
regard to political opportunism and contrasts with that of the PUWP with regard to gender ideology. As we have seen, the party would
easily change its position regarding gender equality to secure its political or economic ends. Thus, while we can at least attribute these
changes to the party's effort to deal with changing economic conditions, the historically specific power struggles with the church also
played an important role in shaping state practices. Overall, our exploration of state-church relations in forming gender practices suggests
that state policies can simultaneously serve and undermine the interests of different groups of men, and that men can be fragmented
political actors who, depending on the configuration of power relations among them, legitimacy of their politics, and economic pressures,
may either struggle against or create alliances across ideological antagonisms.
Our analysis of the changes in the Polish state's gender politics indicates the existence of contextual bases for a more or less monolithic
assertion of patriarchal power, and for the changing emphasis on gender similarities or differences. Perhaps periods of consolidation of
political power, heightened ideological confrontation between leftist and Christian politics, and economic growth aid the emergence of an
emphasis on gender similarities. In contrast, the declining legitimacy of leftist politics, the realization that cooperation with the church or
another conservative organization with popular support helps maintain power, and economic stabilization or crisis, as was the case in the
1970s and 1980s, create a political-economic climate conducive to creating patriarchal alliances and political discourses stressing gender
differences.
This analysis has important implications for socialist-feminist theories of the state. First, such theories should examine the experiences of
non-Western societies and nonliberal political systems because the relations peculiar to them highlight gender politics that are not easily
visible under other, oftentimes more heterogeneous, arrangements. Second, the experience of Poland, a statist patriarchy, suggests that the
socialist-feminist perspective should attend to ideological divisions and alliances among groups of men and their impact on state practices
that are context specific and issue specific; a specific issue, an economic policy, or political rhetoric can be fashioned in a way that seems
to contradict some men's economic interests but supports their ideological fight against other patriarchal institutions.
The recognition of different patriarchal players with conflicting interests aids inquiries into the politics of states dominated by one political
party or socially homogeneous political elites. In such cases, we can too easily conclude that the state's gender practices are ahistorical and
result from only one factor: men's attempts to control women. Furthermore, in many Communist countries ideological and policy
developments can occur at the same time, and people may attribute them to the economic pressures of a centrally planned economy, such
as full employment or shortages of consumer goods. Taken at face value, this observation may appear to support the socialist-feminist
reliance on economic explanations. However, if we compare what we have learned from our analysis of gender practices in Poland with
the dynamics of gender politics in, for example, the German Democratic Republic (GDR), we might conclude that although the shift in
policies toward women occurred in both countries at approximately the same time-in the 1970sthese changes occurred for different
reasons. In Poland, the institutionalization of reproductivist gender discourse, which was meant to encourage women to stay at home,
cannot be separated from the changes in state-church relations. By contrast, in the GDR "mommy politics" were meant "to facilitate
women's combining paid employment with motherhood" (Ferree 1993, 93) and were not linked to a struggle between the state and the
Catholic Church. Thus, even in such relatively "simple" and homogeneous political contexts, at various historical moments the
maledominated parties could introduce similar gender practices for very different reasons.
Finally, feminist scholars have begun to analyze the changes in gender relations in Eastern Europe brought about by the shift to a free-
market economy. Although insightful, some of these analyses appear to take the existence of "traditional definitions of gender" in
Communist countries for granted (Moghadam 1995a, b; Watson 1993). For example, Watson argues that "the absence of civil society
fostered the neo-traditional organization of society, one aspect of which was the valorization and entrenchment of traditional definitions of
gender" (1993, 71). More important, these "[r]adical claims of gender difference are the sole basis for the legitimacy of the rule of men,
and constitute an explicit justification of the exclusion of women from power in Eastern Europe" (Watson 1993, 72-73). Yet, as our study
has revealed, the Communist government can construct and reproduce a variety of gender meanings that change even within the same
political-economic era. The emergence of the "radical ideology of gender difference" as the dominant discourse did not depend on the lack
of a civil society in Poland or on the fact that the Communist Party was male dominated. In fact, the Catholic Church and the Solidarity
movement, both of which could be seen as representing civil society in an embryonic form, may have actually contributed to the
construction of gender differences through official Polish state discourse. We suggest that the emergence and entrenchment of the radical
ideology of gender difference in the official ideology of Communist states was a historical contingency and that, given a different
combination of gendered political and economic pressures, the transition to free-market economies could have occurred in the context of a
productivist, not reproductivist, discourse. The existence or absence of a civil society does not determine the gender ideology.
Thus, both feminist theories of the state in general, and inquiries into the gender relations in transitory societies such as Eastern European
countries specifically, should attend to when and how the state constructs different meanings of gender. Even though government practices
may tend to benefit men more than women overall, their content is not a given and can change rapidly. In fact, as the Polish case suggests,
gender politics depend not only on the country's economic situation, as many socialist-feminist scholars have acknowledged, but also on
the degree of political legitimacy enjoyed by the ruling elites, and on the power of oppositional patriarchal organizations such as the
Catholic Church. Recognizing the influence of ideological differences in shaping the gender politics of actors who are homogeneous with
regard to their class, race, and gender helps theorists move beyond identity politics; that is, interpretations "stuck in the realm of the body,
not the realm of belief and action" (Senna 1995, 20).
[Footnote]
AUTHORS' NOTE: An earlier version of this article was presented as a paper at the annual meeting of the American Sociological
Association, Washington DC, August l9-23, 1995. We would like to thank Beth Schneider. Judy Root Aulette, Rachel Parker-Gwin, Neal
King, Thelma McCormack, Brigitte Young, and an anonymous reviewer for their helpful comments on earlier versions of this article.

[Footnote]
NOTES

[Footnote]
1. This periodization is based on Monticone's (1986, ?-8) work on state-church relations in Poland. However, since he does not include
state gender politics in constructing this periodization, we adjusted it so that it better reflects the gender dimension of the power struggle
between the state and the church.
2. We do recognize that the state is not a single, monolithic entity acting in a rational manner (see, e.g., Connell 1994; Evans,
Rueschemeyer, and Skocpol 1985). However, since our interest is in the changing relationships between patriarchal institutions and
resultant state policies, for our present purposes we gloss over the internal dynamics in these institutions. Moreover, Polish state practices
toward women were controlled by the PUWP (Communist Party), which dominated the Parliament and the government, the two
institutions responsible for formulating and executing state actions. Thus, in this article, we will also assume that state practices
represented the position of the Communist Party with regard to women and gender roles.
3. We are not suggesting that the ensuing changes in state policies and gender discourses were influenced only by the new political-
economic situation. Rather, the political-economic system itself was built on, and in the context of, preexisting patriarchal structures
characterized by women's relatively low labor force participation, political involvement, and limited reproductive rights. Before World
War II, these patriarchal structures were reinforced by a gender ideology that elevated women's role in the private sphere and their
contributions to the Polish culture through their reproductive labor, broadly understood.

[Footnote]
4. Although the Communist state tried to mediate the contradictions experienced by gainfully employed women by providing free child
came facilities; subsidizing food services in the workplace; and by passing legislation protecting mothers, pregnant women, and children,
these actions were too limited in scope. In fact, between 1950 and 1955 the number of places in day care centers per 1,000 children
decreased from 165 to 143. Many married women experienced a double shift consisting of four types of jobs-paid work, housework, child
rearing, and work as a wife. It is estimated that in the 1950s, an average Polish woman spent a minimum of 50 hours per week on domestic
labor (Sokolowska 1963, 146).
5. At the end of World War II the ratio of women to men stood at 114; by 1955 it diminished to 108, and it has been 105 since 1977
(Ciechocinska 1993, 305).
6. In fact between 1955 and 1965 the total fertility rate declined from lI.Olive births per 100 women to 7.0 live births per 100 women aged
IS-49.
7. The policy of full employment was one of the most important tenets of Marxism-Leninism. That in practice this tenet implicitly referred
to men only was another issue. 8. While these new developments held sway over some types of women's employment opportunities, they
did not visibly discourage women from combining paid employment, family responsibilities, and motherhood. When the economy picked
up in the 1970s, women's movement into the paid labor force increased. Thus, the share of women in the total paid labor force, and
women's economic role, continued to rise from 33.7 percent in 1960 to 39.6 percent in 1970 and 44.2 percent in 1980 (Holzer and
Wasilawska-Trenker 1985, 31).

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[Author note]
REPRINT REQUESTS: Anna M. Zajicek, Department of Sociology, University of Arkansas, 216 Old Main, Fayetteville, AR 72701; e-
mail: azajicek@comp.uark.cdu

[Author note]
Anna M. Zajicek is an assistant professor of sociology and gender studies at the University of Arkansas. She is currently the principal
investigator of the oral history project examining the interactions of race, class, and sexual orientation in the local women's movement.
Toni M. Calasanti is an associate professor of sociology and women's studies at Virginia Tech, where she is also a faculty affliate of the
Center for Gerontology. Her research centers on gender, class, race, and age as these conditions are shaped by work/retirement.