Spousal homicide in Russia: Gender inequality in a multifactor model

Violence against Women; Thousand Oaks; Oct 1997; Edward W Gondolf; Dmitri Shestakov;
Volume: 3
Issue: 5
Start Page: 533-546
ISSN: 10778012
Subject Terms: Social research
Murders & murder attempts
Marriage
Domestic violence
Sexes
Geographic Names: Russia
Abstract:
Information from secondary sources, interviews with officials and international conferences are used to describe the role of social
disorganization, normative violence and gender inequality in the high rate of spousal homicide and disproportionate female murders in
Russia.
Full Text:
Copyright Sage Publications, Inc. Oct
1997
[Headnote]
Recent sociological research on spousal violence implies a multifactor model of social variables to explain rates and sex ratios of spousal
homicide across societies. Information from secondary sources, interviews with officials, and international conferences are used to
describe the role of social disorganization, normative violence, and gender inequality in the high rate of spousal homicide and
disproportionate female murders in Russia. The Russian situation illustrates the prominent role of social disorganization in the level of
spousal homicide. However, the contradictory status of women in Russia appears to contribute to the high ratio of female murders in that
country. In sum, gender inequality surfaces as a paradoxical but essential factor in explaining spousal homicides.
Russia has recently been besieged by dramatic economic and political change. Headlines have noted drastic increases in violent crime and
organized crime. There has been little attention, however, to the nature and level of spousal violence behind these headlines. For years, the
ideal Soviet man and woman dominated the state's portrayal of family life and limited discussion of family problems. Since Perestroika,
attention to family problems has increased, and with this increased attention has come an awareness of violence in the home-and
particularly the high level of spousal homicide.'
Improved East-West relations have opened the doors to social science exchanges and new information on Russia. With these
developments come the opportunity to explore spousal violence in that country: What accounts for the high levels of violence in Russia as
opposed to the United States? Russia offers a useful contrast to the West for the study of social problems, such as spousal violence.
Although it shares many social and organizational aspects with modernized industrial countries of the West, its Soviet legacy and recent
political changes provide a convenient test for Western social theories.
Spousal violence research in the West implies a multifactor model with a complexity of influences and a variety of intervention points
(Carlson, 1984; Dutton, 1985; Edleson & Tolman, 1992; Kurz, 1989; Straus, 1983). The model suggests that spousal violence is related to
a framework of social disorganization, normative violence, and gender inequality. Spousal violence, for instance, may be related to the
breakdown of society in general, another aspect of the so-called culture of violence (i.e., normative violence), or a manifestation of the
subjugation of women (i.e., gender inequality)-or some combination of these.
Additionally, community factors, represented by indicators for spousal violence legislation and services, appear to mediate the influence of
other societal factors (Browne & Williams, 1989; Counts, Brown, & Campbell, 1992; Stout, 1989; Yllo & Straus, 1990). The social
factors, furthermore, may reinforce and contribute to one another. For instance, normative violence may serve to disrupt and threaten
social institutions in a way that contributes to social disorganization. Gender inequality may allow for the male power struggles and
conflicts that contribute to social disorganization and normative violence.
Cross-national comparisons have been used to further define and elaborate the model, contrasting spousal homicide rates, spousal
homicide sex ratios, and the circumstances of spousal homicide (Browne & Williams,1989; Counts et al.,1992; Wilson & Daly, 1993).
Spousal homicide has been used as an indicator of spousal violence because it offers a concrete and documented form of spousal violence
and is obviously the violence of greatest concern to the individual and society. The role of gender inequality in this macromodel building
is a fundamental and complex one. Women's taking nontraditional roles appears to decrease women's risk for homicide in developed
countries, but if they achieve higher economic status, their risk may increase (Gartner, Baker, & Pampel, 1990; Levinson, 1989).
We attempt here to apply the emerging multifactor model to spousal homicide in Russia. The model serves as a framework to help
organize information on secondary sources, interviews, and collaborative surveys on Russian families. Whereas such a review admittedly
lacks a systematic scientific assessment, it provides a descriptive summary of the factors and related issues that might be tested in future
research. The descriptive information suggests that social factors different from those that explain spousal homicide in the United States
predominate in explaining spousal homicide in Russia. Gender inequality, in particular, appears to play a central but complex role in
accounting for the high likelihood that women will become homicide victims in Russia.
ASSESSING SOCIAL FACTORS IN RUSSIA
Indicators for the four primary social factors of the multifactor model are used to focus and organize our consideration of spousal
homicide in Russia: social disorganization, normative violence, gender inequality, and community resources.
Social disorganization refers to the Durkheimian notions of normlessness and anomie when conventional social controls, roles, and
expectations are suspended, contradicted, or ambiguous. One of the primary indicators for social disorganization is political instability in
terms of abrupt or frequent changes in government, political leaders, and social policy (e.g., Parker & Toth, 1990; Smith & Brewer, 1992).
Other indicators are economic recession and increased class differences. Indicators for the social pathology associated with social
disorganization are drug and alcohol abuse and suicide.
Normative violence refers to tolerance for interpersonal assaults in what has been referred to as a culture of violence (Ember & Ember,
1993; Straus, 1983). Some of the primary indicators for normative violence are pervasive military presence and expenditure, high rates of
violent crime, widespread broadcast of violent action films and television shows, and the popularity of combative sports, such as football
and boxing.
Gender inequality refers to disparities in social, political, and economic status of women versus men (e.g., Gartner et al., 1990; Levinson,
1989; Yllo & Straus, 1990). Common indicators have been lack of legal support for women's rights and well-being; underrepresentation of
women in political and governmental positions; lower levels of employment, occupational status, and income levels for women; and less
household mobility in terms of few child care options, restrictive divorce laws, and traditional gender roles for women.
Finally, community resources refers to the availability of "sanctions and sanctuaries" at the local level (Counts et al., 1992). These
resources are generally in the form of social services and shelters for victims of spousal violence, and police action and criminal penalties
for perpetrators (e.g., Browne & Williams, 1989; Counts et al., 1992).
Our information on these social factors is drawn primarily from the literature reviews of survey research on Russian families (Maddock,
Hogan, Antonov, & Matskovsky, 1994) and interviews with Russian officials on spousal violence and homicide.2 Descriptive material and
data on social disorganization, general violence, and crime are drawn from a conference of U.S. and Russian researchers, practitioners, and
policy makers titled International Perspectives on Crime, Justice, and Public Order, held in St. Petersburg, Russia, in June 1992.
Economic, social, and crime statistics were corroborated with data from the Russian embassy in the United States (Kuznestsov, 1994). Our
assessment of spousal homicide is based on 1991 official homicide statistics adjusted for considerations derived from case review studies
(for elaboration, see Gondolf & Shestakov, in press).
The information examining contributing social factors is admittedly tentative and problematic. A Russian-U.S comparison is made
particularly difficult because of the limited social science research in Russia prior to Perestroika, the rapid social and political changes that
accompanied Perestroika, and the lack of resources for systematic data collection. Additionally, national descriptive statistics are
confounded by an ethnic and cultural diversity that far surpasses that of the United States.
SOCIAL FACTORS
SPOUSAL HOMICIDE
As reported elsewhere, the spousal homicide rate in Russia appears to be substantially higher than in the United States (Gondolf &
Shestakov, in press). There may be as many as 1.7 times more spousal homicides in Russia than in the United States. Most striking is that
the ratio of female victims in Russia far surpasses that of the United States and Europe. The likelihood of murder of a woman as opposed
to a man by an intimate partner is nearly 3 times greater in Russia than in the United States (1:6 vs. 1:2.3). These findings indicate that
Russian women are 2.5 times as likely to be murdered by their spouses or lovers than their American counterparts. (This likelihood is
based on the spousal homicide rate adjusted for sex ratio.) Importantly, women in the United States are twice as likely as women in
comparable Westernized countries to be victims of spousal homicide (Wilson & Daly, 1992), making Russian women the most vulnerable
in industrialized countries. How do we explain the level and nature of spousal homicide in Russia?
SOCIAL DISORGANIZATION
Spousal homicide in Russia must, of course, be considered in a broad social context that includes a society in the midst of dramatic change
and upheaval. Dramatic political, economic, and social changes may promote social anomie, individual stressors, and general despair that
contribute to violence in general (Beliaev, 1992; Gilinsky, 1993). Most prominent of these changes is the revolutionary political
transformation accelerated in the past 3 years by privatization of government-owned businesses (Kuznetsov, 1994). Politically, the
government has moved from the liberalization of government policies under Perestroika to the breakup of the Soviet Union and the
disbanding of the Communist party. A new constitution has been formulated, but two coup attempts and contentious factionalism have
slowed its implementation. Russia has fallen into an economic depression similar to the 1930s depression in the United States.
Unemployment has soared from nearly zero to over 20%, if the "hidden" unemployment of factory layoffs and cutbacks is included.
Inflation has reached 100% the past 3 years, wiping out individual savings and wealth (Kuznetsov,1994). The government has issued
vouchers to private citizens to claim ownership of previously government-owned industries. However, abuse and misunderstanding of the
voucher system have brought a wave of confusion and uncertainty. Overall, a sense of betrayal, distrust, and humiliation has beset much of
the population, according to journalistic accounts and our personal observations (Fedarko, 1994).
The black market and the Russian Mafia are increasingly controlling sectors of the economy, and emerging entrepreneurs are creating a
nouveau riche class (an estimated 300,000 in Moscow) that simultaneously draws scorn and envy from the struggling mass of Russians,
whose average income is U.S. $100 per month (Babkov, 1992; Kuznetsov, 1994). The elderly, in particular, are suffering under inflation
that depletes their savings and from the reduction of government supports; they increasingly contribute to the estimated 40,000 homeless
in Moscow alone. Even while economic hardships intensify, many Russians boast to journalists and researchers that they will endure
(Fedarko, 1994; Kuznetsov, 1994). Russian character has endured the hardships of modern history that range from 20 million dead in the
Great War (World War II), to the repression of a totalitarian regime, to dissolution of its superpower status.
Russia continues to have the highest rate of alcoholism in the industrialized world, despite Gorbachev's launching under Perestroika of a
publicity campaign against excessive drinking (Gilinsky, 1992). Drug use is said to be on the rise among successful entrepreneurs and is
being promoted by black market profiteers. A great deal of confusion surrounds private values, which in the past were reinforced by state
ideology. Even though Russians exhibit a new enthusiasm for religion and the reopening of churches, they also tolerate open prostitution
in international hotels and thefts from companies and the black market, as the coauthors and journalists have directly observed (Fedarko,
1994; Rope, 1994).
In sum, the social disorganization from the dramatic political and economic changes in Russia has brought disillusionment and anomie that
appear to be reflected in the social pathology of alcohol abuse, crime, and homicide in general. Viewed in this light, the high rate of
spousal homicide may be an extension of general social disorganization.
NORMATIVE VIOLENCE
The high level of spousal homicide may also reflect the level of violence throughout the society in the form of militarism, crime, and
combative sports. In the early 1980s, Russia and the Soviet Union had the largest and most extensive military force in the world; 70% of
the economy was related to the defense industry (Kuznetsov,1994). Sovietologists often critiqued Soviet militarism as a means of
legitimating an autocratic and repressive government. At the same time, the militarism of the former Soviet Union has been rationalized as
a largely defensive measure, due to a history of invasions, devastating wars, and vulnerable borders. Nearly every existing family lost at
least one relative during World War II, and 50% of Russian young men have served in the modern Soviet military (Boss & Gurko, 1994).
This deep-seated militarism, apparently promulgated by the state and embraced by much of the population, has recently met with
resistance. The previous decade saw the end of the controversial Afghanistan war, which was openly broadcast on Russian television and
which deeply affected the current generation, much as Vietnam did an earlier generation in the United States. Moreover, the militarism has
been checked by the breakup of the Soviet Union and the loss of superpower status. Ethnic conflict and political strife within and among
the republics have brought a new kind of military tension closer to home (Gilinsky,1993; Kuznetsov, 1994). The army's 1993 attack on the
Russian parliament building, for instance, raised the level of fear, anger, and discontent among average citizens and reestablished the role
of the military in the new Russia.
Russia has experienced dramatic increases in violent crime and civil violence in the past 5 years (Beliaev, 1992; Gilinsky, 1992;
Stepashin, 1992). Violent crime, according to state statistics, has more than doubled to a rate of 325 incidents per 100,000 people
(Gilinsky, 1993; Stepashin, 1992). The crime rate in urban areas is rapidly approaching that of the United States. These statistics reflect an
increase in Mafia-related killings, predatory street violence, and spousal violence, as well as the ethnic conflicts already mentioned
(Kostoev, 1992). The collapse of the Soviet Union, furthermore, brought thousands of troops home from the European front. They
returned to high unemployment, already crowded housing, and general discontent-all of which contribute to crime (Beliaev, 1992).
For years, legal regulation of guns amounted to gun control, so the number of weapons in households was therefore very low. The number
of available guns has substantially increased, however, due to two situations: First, many of the returning military men have brought guns
back with them from the front; second, ethnic conflicts have increased the underground flow of armaments, making guns more available to
the private citizen (Shestakov, 1992).
Media violence has been considerably more regulated in Russia than in the United States and has not been a primary issue of debate
(Beliaev, 1992). The state-owned-and-managed media have, until Perestroika, offered very few details of political, civil, or spousal
violence. Film and televised entertainment have conventionally displayed only mild levels of violence in comparison with entertainment in
the United States. Recently, however, satellite television has brought in Western action films, and less restricted news media have
graphically portrayed the escalating violence across the country. The extent and level of combative sports, which might reinforce or
promote aggression, are minimal in Russia compared with the United States, especially with the demise of state-funded national teams of
elite athletes and the disrepair of major sport facilities.
In sum, reinforcements for violence are currently more pervasive in the Russian society that was once highly contained by totalitarianism.
A tradition of military prowess underlies responses to ethnic strife and economic shifts, and media violence from the West offers
reinforcement for the now unbridled tensions and fears. From this perspective, the level of spousal homicide may be an extension of the
violence on the streets into the homes.
GENDER INEQUALITY
The status of women may especially contribute to the sex ratio of spousal homicide; so many more women are being killed by their male
partners than the reverse. As mentioned previously, the political and economic status of women, as well as household and relationship
status, is associated with the level of spousal violence in a country or culture (e.g., Levinson, 1989; Yllo & Straus, 1990).
Reforms under the Russian czars in the mid-1800s and early 1900s initially decreed the specific civil rights of Russian women. Legal
equality for Russian women was explicitly reaffirmed in the Soviet constitution of 1918 and championed by Communist ideology (Boss &
Gurko, 1994). The image of the hearty Soviet woman is reflected today in monuments and murals in Moscow and other major cities,
which replace the billboards of sexy female models common to the West. But the everyday reality for Russian women does not necessarily
meet this image, as academic surveys, journalistic reports, and observation confirm (Boss & Gurko, 1994; Rope, 1994; Sloane, 1994).
Few women have had positions in diplomatic and international relations or in the upper echelons of the Russian government. Women
composed about one third of the Supreme Soviet and 50% of local Soviet government, in part as a result of a de facto quota system of
representation (Boss & Gurko, 1994). However, in the more recent 1989 First Congress of People's Deputies, only 15% of the members
were women (Zimmerman, Antonov, Johnson, & Borisov, 1994). In 1989, the Committee on the Family, Children, and Women was
established to help promote women's participation in politics as well as to attend to other gender and family issues.
Until recently, the percentage of women in the Russian workforce was the highest in the industrialized world. Nearly 90% of Soviet
women from 25 to 55 years of age worked outside the home, a figure that has fallen to about 75% in the current Russian depression (Boss
& Gurko, 1994). Many women simply wanted to return to the home and not have to "work so hard," but low family incomes have made
outside employment a necessity. Nearly 40% of scientists and 36% of engineers are women. But the majority of Russian women labor in
monotonous factory jobs and receive lower wages than their male counterparts (Zimmerman et al., 1994). As in the United States,
employed women still do most of the housework as well.
As a result of the extensive casualties in World War II, many households of the previous generation were headed by widowed women, and
today's husbands were raised primarily by women. The status of Russian women, therefore, involves a conflict between fulfilling
established household roles and at the same time performing in the workplace (Olson & Matskovsky,1994). Women are, furthermore,
faced with limited child care, alcoholic family members, weak rape laws, and spousal violence (Sloane, 1994). Ethnic and political
struggles have overshadowed women's issues and immobilized a groundswell of women's dissatisfaction.
The divorce rate in Russia has been increasing over the past 25 years and has stabilized at about 40%; about 10% of Russian families are
single-parent families (Oslon & Matskovsky 1994). However, mobility and independence of divorcees are substantially curtailed by the
tremendous housing shortage that frequently forces even divorced or separated couples to share their small state-owned apartments
(Fedarko, 1994; Shestakov, 1992).
Russian women, in sum, face increased contradictions as their social and economic status ensured by the state is challenged by loss of
jobs, lack of mobility, and entrapped relationships. It is difficult for them to confront or escape abusive relationships aggravated by social
and political tensions of the times.
COMMUNITY RESOURCES
According to research on spousal homicide, community resources devoted to spousal homicide appear to mitigate the influence of social
factors and contribute to a lower level of spousal violence and spousal homicide. Such resources are relatively few in Russia, possibly
allowing spousal violence to escalate unchecked. There are organizations in the two largest cities offering services for sexually assaulted
women, but they are not generally known and do not provide substantial service as yet (Sloane, 1994). Some apartment buildings have
rooms reserved for emergencies, but these rooms are not readily available because they may be used for situations other than spousal
violence; they are increasingly difficult to maintain amid the pressing housing shortage (Shestakov, 1992). Consequently, women, in
particular, have little mobility or opportunity to escape from escalating violence.
Psychological treatment for troubled families is increasing, but most of the couples who participate in this treatment are selfreferred
(Shestakov, 1992). The state campaign to reduce alcoholism is indirectly related to the reduction of spousal violence because spousal
violence is very highly associated with high levels of alcohol abuse in Russia (Gilinsky, 1992). Intervention into spousal violence is left
primarily to the police, yet police have no explicit arrest policy or protocol for spousal homicide. In fact, the overtaxed police departments
are currently consumed by street and Mafia violence. Although the crime rate has dramatically increased, most urban police departments
have faced reductions in staff and equipment because of the state's economic crisis (Stepashin, 1992).
CONCLUSION
MULTIFACTOR MODEL
The high level of male-perpetrated spousal homicide in Russia appears to be associated with high levels of social disorganization and
normative violence (especially in terms of continuing militarism and high crime rates). These factors, in turn, appear to be interrelated in
some fashion. The normative violence in Russia coincides with the sudden increase in social disorganization, particularly political
instability and economic collapse. The relatively high status of women in the economy and politics may be neutralized in part by the social
and economic crisis and lack of support services for assaulted women. Russian social commentary suggests that unemployed and
politically emasculated men may project their own loss of status and increased frustrations on women, especially if they feel weakened
relative to women's secure family and community roles. The Russian situation appears to illustrate the prominent role of social
disorganization in the level of male-perpetrated spousal homicide. This is especially the case when there is a lack of mediating intervention
in the form of spousal violence services.
The role of gender inequality initially appears less clear. Women in Russia by some measures would appear to have the political and
economic status that might help to counter the high level of female homicides. Communist rhetoric supporting women in the workplace
and the central role of women in the post-World War II home have bolstered women's status in Russia. However, the low level of work
and the lack of mobility to move out of an abusive relationship entrap many Russian women. Furthermore, the workload of women and
their lack of resources have precluded involvement in social services that might help abate abuse and the prospects of spousal homicide.
Whereas the increase in social disorganization in Russia appears to contribute to the very high level of spousal homicide in that country,
the contradictory status of women may be the crucial factor in the high ratio of female murders. Russian women have had relatively high
social status, but this status has been more to advance the state rather than to protect the individual. The apparent lack of personal rights
for women in Russia may account for the lack of spousal violence services and legal actions that might otherwise check the high rate of
male-perpetrated homicides. A surge of individual women's rights in Russia may, inversely, serve to offset the consequences of the sudden
social disorganization and normative violence, as it appears to have done in the United States.
[Footnote]
NOTES

[Footnote]
1. The term spousal here refers to a more inclusive category of intimate heterosexual partners, including separated and divorced couples,
boyfriends and girlfriends in intimate relationships, and cohabiting male-female couples. Spousal violence and spousal homicide have
previously been viewed as distinct from other forms of homicide and interpersonal violence in terms of both societal and individual factors
(e.g., Parker & Toth, 1990).

[Footnote]
2. The coauthors conducted joint informational interviews with the following persons: chief, Murder Investigation Department, Ministry
for Internal Affairs; chief, Institute of Sociology, Russian Academy of Sciences; director, Russia Advanced Training Institute for Criminal
Investigators; vice chairman, Council of Science, Office of the Mayor, St. Petersburg; deputy chairwoman, Committee for Social Affairs,
Office of the Mayor, St. Petersburg; administrative committee, Office of the Mayor, St. Petersburg; editor, Radio Russia; director, Crisis
Network, St. Petersburg; chief, Family Program, St. Petersburg Psychiatric Clinic; chief, St. Petersburg State Penitentiary for Women. The
lead author visited Russia for 2 weeks in the summers of 1992 and 1994, and the coauthor visited the United States for additional
collaboration in the fall of 1991.

[Reference]
REFERENCES
[Reference]
Babkov. V. (1992, June). Plenary address by the director, Department of Customs, Northwest Region, Russia. Conference on International
Perspectives on Crime, Justice, and Public Order, St. Petersburg, Russia.
Beliaev, N. A. (1992, June). Crime causation in CIS. Paper presented at International Perspectives on Crime, Justice, and Public Order, St.
Petersburg, Russia.

[Reference]
Boss, P, & Gurko, T. (1994). The relationships of men and women in marriage. In J. Maddock, M. J. Hogan, A. Antonov, & M.
Matskovsky (Eds.), Families b and after Perestroika: Russian and LI.S. perspectives (pp. 36-75). New York Guilford. Browne, A., lGc
Williams, K (1989). Exploring the effect of resource availability and the likelihood of female-perpetrated homicides. Law and Society
Review, 23, 75-94. Carlson, B. (1984). Causes and maintenance of domestic violence: An ecological analysis.
Social Service Review, 58, 569-587.
Counts, D., Brown, j., & Campbell, J. (Eds.) (1992). Sanctions and sanctuary: Cultural perspectives on the beating of wives. Boulder, CO:
Westview Dutton, D. (1985). An ecologically nested theory of male violence toward intimates. International Journal of Women's Studies,
8, 404-413.
Edleson, J., & Tolman, R (1992). Intervention for men who butter: An ecological approach. Newbury Park, CA Sage.
Ember, C., Ik Ember, M. (1993). Issues in cross-cultural studies of interpersonal violence. Violence and Victims, 8, 217-234.
Fedarko, K (1994, July 4). City on edge: Moscow struggles to find a sense of itself. ru, pp. 51-53.

[Reference]
Gartner, R, Baker, K, & Pampel, E (1990). Gender stratification and the gender gap in homicide victimization. Social Problems, 37, 593-
612,.
Gilinsky, Y. (1992). Alcohol, social problems, and deviant behavior in St. Petersburg. Social Problems Around the Baltic Sea, 21, 68-84.
Gilinsky, Y (1993). Social situation and deviant behavior in St. Petersburg, Russia. Unpublished manuscript, Institute of Sociology, St.
Petersburg, Russia. Gondolf, E. W., & Shestakov, D. (in press). Spousal homicide in Russia versus the United States: Preliminary findings
and implications. Journal of Family Violence. Kostoev, I. (1992, June). Murders in Russia. Paper presented at International Perspectives
on Crime, Justice, and Public Order, St. Petersburg, Russia. Kurz, D. (1989). Social science perspectives on wife abuse: Current debates
and future
directions. Gender & Society, 3, 489-505.
Kuznetsov, S. (1994, June). Political and economic change in Russia and its implication for international relations. Presentation by the first
secretary of the Russian Embassy, Washington, DC, 34th Annual Raymond L. Lee Public Affairs Forum, Indiana University of
Pennsylvania, Indiana, PA.

[Reference]
Levinson, D. (1989). Family violence in cross-cultural perspective. Newbury Park, CA: Sage. Maddock, J., Hogan, M., Antonov, A., lGc
Matskovsky, M. (Eds.). (1994). Families before and
after Perestroika. New York: Guilford.
Olson, D., dz Matskovsky, M. (1994). Soviet and American families: A comparative overview. In J. Maddock, M. J. Hogan, A. Antonov,
dc M. Matskovsky (Eds.), Families bcfore and after Perestroika: Russian and U.S. perspectives (pp. 9-36). New York: Guilford. Parker, R,
dc Toth, A. (1990). Family, intimacy, and homicide: A macm-soal approach. Ifr/nce and Viti/ns, 5,195-207.
Rope, V (1994, March 28). To be young and pretty in Moscow. US. News & World Report, pp. 28, 56.
Shestakov, D. (1992). Conjugal homicide as a social problem. St. Petersburg, Russia: St. Petersburg University Press.
Sloane, W. (1994, July 22). Domestic abuse is high, attention is low in Russia. The Christian Science Monitor, p. 8.
Smith, D., & Brewer, V (1992). Asex-specific analysis of correlates of homicide victimization in United States cities. Voence and Vwtims,
7, 279-286. Stepashin, S. V (1992, June). Plenary address by the deputy minister, Ministry of Security of Russia. Conference on
International Perspectives on Crime, Justice, and Public Order, St. Petersburg, Russia.

[Reference]
Stout, IC (1989) Intimate femicide: Effect of legislation and social services. Affilia, 4, 21-30. Straus, M. (1983). Societal morphogenesis
and intrafamily violence in cross-cultural perspective. In R Gelles dk C. Cornell (Eds.), International perspectives on family violence (pp.
27-44). Lexington, MA: Lexington Books.
Wilson, M., lr Daly, M. (1992). Who kills whom in spouse killings? On the exceptional
sex-ratio of spousal homicides in the United States. Criminology, 30,189-215. Wilson, M., & Daly, M. (1993). Spousal homicide risk and
estrangement. Violence and Wctims, 8, 3-16.

[Reference]
Yllo, K, &Straus, M. (1990). Patriarchy and violence against wives: The impact of structural and normative factors. In M. Straus & R.
Gelles (Eds.), Physical violence in American families: Risk factors and adaptations to violence in 8,145 families (pp. 383-399). New
Brunswick, NJ: Transaction.
Zimmerman, S., Antonov, A., Johnson, M., & Borisov, V. (1994). Social policy and families. In J. Maddock, M. J. Hogan, A. Antonov, dr
M. Matskovsky (Eds.), Families before and after Perestroika: Russian and U.S. perspectives (pp. 186-219). New York: Guilford.
[Author note]
EDWARD W. GONDOLF Indiana University of Pennsyluania DMITRI SHESTAKOV
St. Petersburg State University, Russia

[Author note]
AUTHORS' NOTE: The authors wish to thank Sonya Shestakov for her translation and research assistance during their collaboration. The
Mid-Atlantic Addiction Training Institute, Indiana University of Pennsylvania; Office of International Services, Indiana University of
Pennsylvania; and Department of Law and Criminology, St. Petersburg State University, Russia, offered funding and support for the
research.

[Author note]
Edward W. Gondolf, Ed.D, M.PH., is associate director of research for the Mid-Atlantic Addiction Training Institute (MAATI) and
professor of sociology at Indiana University of Pennsylvania. He is author of several books and articles on domestic violence, including
Battered Women as Survivors and Psychiatric Response to Family Violence.

[Author note]
Dmitri Shestakov, Ph.D, is a criminology professor at St. Petersburg State University, Russia. He also conducts training for criminal
investigators and is author of the text Family Criminology as well as monographs and articles on spousal homicide in Russia.