GALVEZ VS. CA RULE 110: PROSEC.

OF OFFENSE
G.R. No. 79094 June 22, 1988

FACTS: Petitioners Honorato Galvez, the incumbent Mayor of San Ildefonso, Bulacan, and one
Godofredo Diego were charged in three separate informations with homicide and two
counts of frustrated homicide for allegedly shooting to death Alvin Calma Vinculado
and seriously wounding Levi Calma Vinculado and Miguel Reyes Vinculado, Jr.
However, before arraignment, the prosecutor upon ex parte motion, withdrew the
first set of information filed before the court and thereafter filed new set of
information for murder, frustrated murder, and illegal possession of firearms.
Petitioner contends that the withdrawal of the original informations is null and void
arguing that the prosecution should have amended the original information to charge
the proper offense.

ISSUE: WoN the ex parte motion to withdraw the original informations is null and void

HELD: No. The rule is well settled that once a complaint or information is filed in court any
disposition of the case, whether as to its dismissal or the conviction or the acquittal
of the accused, rests in the sound discretion of the court. Although the prosecutor
retains the direction and control of the prosecution of criminal cases even when the
case is already in court, he cannot impose his opinion upon the tribunal.

Also, Section 14 of Rule 110, states that “The information or complaint may be
amended, in substance or form, without leave of court, at any time before the accused
pleads; and thereafter and during the trial as to all matters of form, by leave and at
the discretion of the court, when the same can be done without prejudice to the rights
of the accused. And if it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has been
made in charging the proper offense, the court shall dismiss the original complaint or
information upon the filing of a new one charging the proper offense in accordance
with Rule 119, Section 11, provided the accused would not be placed thereby in
double jeopardy, and may also require the Witnesses to give bail for their appearance
at the trial.”

In the given case, the ex parte motion for withdrawal are well within the law and was
done with leave of court. Furthermore, no substantial rights of the accused were in
any way prejudiced by the substitution of the new set of information.

It is a general rule that a nolle prosequi or dismissal entered before the accused is
placed on trial and before he is called on to plead is not equivalent to an acquittal,
and does not bar a subsequent prosecution for the same offense. It is not a final
disposition of the case. Rather, it partakes of the nature of a nonsuit or discontinuance
in a civil suit and leaves the matter in the same condition in which it was before the
commencement of the prosecution.
TANDOC v. HON. RESULTAN RULE 112: PRELIM. INVESTIGATION
G.R. No. 59241-44 July 5, 1989

FACTS: Petitioner Tandoc figured in an altercation with private respondent Payopay when the
latter went to the petitioner’s house to confront the same regarding the stoning of
the house and store of Tandoc. Petitioner filed a complaint against respondent before
the City Fiscal for trespass of dwelling, oral defamation, grave threats, and serious
physical injuries and a month or so thereafter, respondent also filed a similar
complaint against petitioner. For the petitioner’s complaint, the investigating fiscal
found probable cause and endorsed the same for the filing of the information. On the
other hand, it dismissed the complaint of respondent on the ground that they "were
found to be in a nature of a countercharge”, the same being filed a month or so from
the incident. Respondent filed again for a complaint against the petitioner, this time,
before the City Court which found for the respondent after conducting a preliminary
examination. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration as well as a motion for re-
investigation by the City Fiscal, but to no avail. Hence, this petition for certiorari on
the resolution by the City Court.

ISSUE: WoN the City Court can conduct anew a preliminary examination of charges previously
the subject of a preliminary investigation conducted by the Office of the City Fiscal and
thereafter dismissed by the latter.

HELD: YES. A preliminary investigation is intended to protect the accused from the
inconvenience, expense and burden of defending himself in a formal trial unless the
reasonable probability of his guilt shall have been first ascertained in a fairly summary
proceeding by a competent officer. It is also intended to protect the state from
having to conduct useless and expensive trials.

There are two (2) stages in a preliminary investigation; first, the preliminary
examination of the complainant and his witnesses prior to the arrest of the accused
to determine whether or not there is ground to issue a warrant of arrest; second,
preliminary investigation proper, wherein the accused, after his arrest, is informed of
the complaint filed against him and is given access to the testimonies and evidence
presented, and he is also permitted to introduce evidence in his favor. The purpose of
this stage of investigation is to determine whether or not the accused should be
released or held before trial.

The preliminary examination prior to the issuance of a warrant of arrest and the sworn
statements of the complainant and his witnesses are sufficient to establish whether
"there is a reasonable ground to believe that an offense has been committed and the
accused is probably guilty thereof', to prevent needless waste or duplication of time
and effort.

In the case at bar, the city court has the power and authority to conduct a preliminary
examination and proceed with the trial of the case properly within its jurisdiction.
FULE VS. CA RULE 118: PRE-TRIAL
G.R. No. 79094 June 22, 1988

FACTS: This is a Petition for Review on certiorari of the Decision of respondent Appellate
Court, which affirmed the judgment of the Trial Court, convicting petitioner Fule of
Violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (The Bouncing Checks Law) on the basis of the
Stipulation of Facts entered into between the prosecution and the defense during the
pre-trial conference in the Trial Court. Petitioner however contends that the
respondent Court of Appeals erred in affirming the decision of the Trial Court
convicting the petitioner of the offense charged, despite the fact that the basis of the
conviction was based solely on the stipulation of facts made during the pre-trial which
was not signed by the petitioner, nor by his counsel.

ISSUE: WoN the unsigned Stipulation of Facts is admissible

HELD: NO. The 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, which became effective on January 1,
1985, applicable to this case, provides:

SEC. 4. Pre-trial agreements must be signed. - No agreement or admission

made or entered during the pre-trial conference shall be used in evidence
against the accused unless reduced to writing and signed by him and his
counsel.

By its very language, the Rule is mandatory. Under the rule of statutory construction,
negative words and phrases are to be regarded as mandatory while those in the
affirmative are merely directory. The use of the term "shall" further emphasizes its
mandatory character and means that it is imperative, operating to impose a duty
which may be enforced.

Therefore, the omission of the signature of the accused and his counsel, as
mandatorily required by the Rules, renders the Stipulation of Facts inadmissible in
evidence.