THE RADICAL MUSLIM DISCOURSE ON JIHAD AND THE HATRED OF

CHRISTIANS1

Noorhaidi Hasan
(International Institute for Asian Studies, Leiden, the Netherlands)

Following the collapse of the New Order authoritarian regime Indonesia has witnessed the rise of
various radical Muslim movements that believe that they have a mandate from God to save Islam
considered being threatened with destruction. Notable among them were Muslim militia groups
with the names like the Laskar Pembela Islam (the Defenders of Islam’s Force), the Laskar Jihad
(Holy War Force) and the Laskar Mujahidin Indonesia (Indonesian Holy Warriors’ Force), which
were not hesitant to use violence as a means to strive for their political ends. The rise of these
groups undoubtedly caught worldwide attention since they not only signaled the spread of
militancy and violence but also the expansion of Islamic radicalism into the public sphere of
Indonesia, known as the largest Muslim country in the world. Although remained quantitatively
small and peripheral their expansion in one way or another destructed Indonesia’s reputation for
practicing a tolerant and inclusive form of Islam.

The Laskar Pembela Islam is a Muslim militia group set up in August 1998 by
Muhammad Rizieq Shihab. This group was often associated with a number of military and
civilian personalities who were not ashamed to mobilize preman and other violence-prone groups
in order to maintain their political interests. The success of this group to reinforce its existence
was followed by the rise of the Laskar Jihad, whose birth was proclaimed by Ja’far Umar Thalib,
the leader of this group, in April 2000. This group incorporated young men calling themselves
Salafists who were active under the umbrella of the Forum Komunikasi Ahl Sunnah wal-Jama’ah
(The Forum for Followers of the Sunna and the Community of the Prophet) (Hasan, 2002). The
existence of both groups was subsequently completed in August 2000 by the birth of the Laskar
Mujahidin, which is a loose alliance of a dozen of the Darul Islam-inspired Muslim clandestine
groups, into which hundreds of Afghan war veterans reportedly joined themselves. Under the
leadership of Abu Bakar Baasyir, this group appeared to be the most radical one associated with
al-Qaeda-linked Jama’ah Islamiyyah network (Abuza 2003).

Within the atmosphere of freedom brought about by the collapse of the New Order
regime these vigilante groups actively mobilized rallies and demonstrations to voice certain
political demands. They forced the government, for instance, to abrogate the policy of Azaz
Tunggal requiring all political and social organizations to base on the Pancasila, the ideology of
the state. They also demanded the implementation of the Jakarta Charter, which they believed as
an initial step toward the reinforcement of the Islamic Shari’a as a whole. Further they sparked
violent street riots by conducting razzias on cafés, discotheques, casinos, brothels and other
venues they accused of being dens of iniquity. More importantly, they openly called for jihad to
the Moluccas and other trouble spots in Indonesia. Following the U.S-led air strikes on
Afghanistan, which were the responses to the terrorist’s attacks on the World Trade Center and
part of the Pentagon on 11 September 2001, they came to the foremost line to express their

1
This paper is presented at the “International Symposium on Christianity in Indonesia, Perspectives of
Power”, held in the University of Frankfurt, Germany, from 12 to 14 December 2003.
enmity to Washington. Although remained as rhetoric, thousands of their fighters stated a
determination and readiness to wage jihad in Afghanistan.

Alongside the expansion of these militia groups the discourse on the hatred of Christians
increasingly enjoyed wide currency in the Indonesian public sphere. In this discourse Christians
were blamed as part of the Zionist-cum-West global conspiracy responsible for all recent
problems afflicting Muslims in Indonesia. The eruption of economic crisis which brought out the
fall of Soeharto, the widespread of vice in big cities, and the explosion of communal conflicts in
several regions, such as the Moluccas and Poso, were taken as the examples of how such an evil
conspiracy was at work to undermine Islam and the Muslim umma. The radical Muslim groups
claimed to have been bringing a holy duty to save Islam and the Muslim umma from the ferocity
of Christian enemies while other Muslim organizations looked indifferent and impotent in
countering the threats.

Even though this sort of discourse is not entirely new in Indonesia since it has deep
historical roots within the dynamics of the relation between religion and state, its resonance in the
aftermaths of the New Order regime certainly demonstrated new emphases and nuances. The
main question to be addressed here is how this discourse took its forms and became
contextualized in the Indonesian politics following the collapse of the New Order regime and its
ensuing transitional processes.

Transition to Democracy

The collapse of the New Order regime has led Indonesia into the era of transition. The coming of
this era paved the way for an open contestation for the public sphere among different elements of
the Indonesian society. Not only that “the newly liberated society” suddenly found a free space to
express themselves and their interests, but also that they did not want to let certain actors
dominate the dynamics of change taking place during the transition process at that time. The
emergence of the newly liberated civil society that entailed the openness indeed enabled all
members of the society to discuss and develop opinions on issues that affect their lives.
Paradoxically, in this openness lies a site where the remaining power of the New Order could run
maneuverings and orchestrate a game that might destruct the cohesiveness of the emerging civil
society and this, in turn, would recover their lost power. The key to reach this end is to
manipulate the public sphere, which has served as the main arena of the civil society.

Habermas (1989: 231-235) has long been aware that the genuinely growing bourgeois
public sphere that had operated as a site for the critical discussion of state policy has potentially
degenerated into something more like publicity. Habermas describes this phenomenon as a
process of refeudalization that occurred precisely when the public sphere became dominated by a
smaller number of large and powerful organizations associated with commercial and party
political interest groups. Through capital and political strengths, they sought to penetrate the
private realm of the society through the manipulation of public opinions. Instead of giving a space
for meaningful participation of people on public life, the public sphere turned to be an arena for
advertising the interests of the commercial and party political interest groups. As a result, critical
debates become replaced by a more passive culture of consumption and an apolitical sociability
(Calhoun 1993: 26).

The intervention of the capital and political strengths in making the public opinions as
such indicates that the ideal-typically concept of civil society preserves its own paradoxes. At
theoretical level, civil society is most often defined in contrast to the state and is defended as a

2
realm that ought to be insulated in certain ways from the state (Hall 1995: 1). It is “a complex and
dynamic ensemble of legally protected non-governmental institutions that tend to be non-violent,
self-organizing, self-reflective, and permanently in tension with each other and with the state
institutions that frame, constrict and enable their activities” (Keane 1998: 67). In this complex
ensemble the public sphere serves as an arena through which ideas, interests, values, and
ideologies formed within the relations of civil society are voiced and made politically efficacious
(Chamber 2003: 96). What becomes the main feature of this civil society is that it serves as a site
of complexity, choice and dynamism, and therefore, a necessary condition of liberty (Gellner
1994: 3).

Within the context of Indonesia, the freedom arising from the collapse of the New Order
authoritarian regime has turned to be a two-sides sword. On the one hand, pro-democracy groups
persistently spoke of the needs for reform and democracy through the reduction of the state power
and empowerment of the civil society. To voice their critical opinions these groups actively
staged demonstrations, held seminars, talk shows, workshops, and discussions. Through the
expansion of the new media their voices could reach broader audience and be made politically
efficacious. This, in turn, resulted in an increasingly articulated discourse of democracy. On the
other hand, the status quo did not let the public sphere be dominated by the pro-democracy
oppositions. They sought to manipulate, or politicize, in Habermas’s own term, the public sphere
through the dissemination of various issues that touched the interests of the people (Habermas
1996: 424). What we have witnessed then is the fact that the more the discourse of democracy
was disseminated, the more the discourse of hostility along the lines of ethnic, race, gender and
religion was spread.

Historically speaking, the strategy of manipulating primordial sentiments as such had

been rooted in the political practice of the New Order regime in facing the expansion of civil
society. By manipulating these sentiments, the New Order sought to cause a rift on the seeds of
the civil society and at the same time maintain its hegemony. As a result, citizens’ energies and
interests were deflected into private associational activities, which where generally organized
within rather than across group boundaries (Hikam 1999: 70). In fact, toward the fall of Soeharto,
the period that saw dramatic increase of anti-Christian violence (Sidel 2001), the New Order still
sought to expand its basis of support vis-à-vis the opposition by exploiting the primordial
sentiments. Through the hand of Prabowo Subianto, Soeharto’s own son-in-law, this regime
spread anti-Zionist-cum-Christian sentiments with the supports from the Indonesian Committee
for the Solidarity of the Muslim World (Kisdi) and other elements of hard-line Muslim
organizations associated with the Indonesian Council for Islamic Propagation (DDII). In a
meeting with proponents of the hard-line Muslim organizations Prabowo distributed a booklet
explaining that the economic crisis afflicting Indonesia and the ensuing problems were the results
of a conspiracy run by secular nationalists and extremist Jesuits under the collaborations of the
CIA, the Mossad, the Vatican, and Indonesian Chinese. This conspiracy story was composed by
Prabowo-backed Institute for Policy Studies (IPS), into which the Islamist figures such as Amir
Santoso, M. Fadli Zon and M. Dien Syamsuddin were associated (Hefner 2000: 202-203).

This discourse continued to embellish the political struggle taking place during B.J.
Habibie’s presidency, particularly when Megawati Soekarnoputri, known for her nearness with
secular-nationalist and Christian politicians, appeared to be a potential candidate for presidential
seat. A Christian retired army general, Theo Syafei, one of the influential advisors of Megawati,
provided a catalyst for a further proliferation of the anti-Zionist-cum-Christian sentiments when
he made a speech, a tape of which had circulated, about a plot by members of political elite to
transform Indonesia into an Islamic republic by the year 2010. Giving a comment on this, he
stated that, rather than Islam, Christian notions had inspired and based Indonesian’s penal code

3
and the ideals of human rights, so that the role of Christians in the historical course of Indonesian
nation-state should not be neglected. Harsh protests from a variety of Islamist organizations and
individuals (see van Dijk, 2001: 380-381).

Communal Conflicts

In the atmosphere of the contestation for power following the collapse of the New Order regime
bloody communal conflicts which cost thousands of lives and in one way or another drove
Indonesia to the brink of civil war flared up in different areas of Indonesia, such as West
Kalimantan, Central Kalimantan, West Nusa Tenggara, East Nusa Tenggara, Central Sulawesi,
and the Moluccas.2 The eruption of these conflicts undoubtedly provided a hidden arena for the
New Order to prolong its existence. Through the conflicts chaos was created to give a lesson for
the opposition to reconsider their attempts to realize democracy. Here, the remaining forces of the
New Order apparently let the conflicts continue to happen.

The bloody communal conflict between Muslims and Christians that erupted in the
Moluccas on 19 January 1999, only seven months after Soeharto had resigned from his
presidency, provided the main arena of this game. The trigger of this conflict was a fighting
between two youths in the Batumerah terminal in the heart of Ambon town, the province capital
of the Moluccas (ICG 2000: 4-5; van Klinken 2001: 2; Trijono 2001: 39). This fighting quickly
evolved into turmoil, involving each peer group, identified as Mardika and Batumerah gangs of
youths respectively. Although the fighting between the Mardika and Batumerah gangs of youths
was not unusual to happen,3 but this time it quickly destructed several houses, shops, and public
facilities in the area around the terminal, and more importantly created an atmosphere of conflict
throughout Ambon. 4 These riots soon evolved into a communal violence juxtaposing Muslims
and Christians and transformed itself into Moluccan conflict as a whole.

It must be noted that before the conflict flared up, Muslims and Christians in the
Moluccas had relatively lived in a harmony. They interacted in the light of tolerant, friendly pela-
gandong tradition, a traditional system in the Moluccas that enables ties between one or more
clans, tribes or religions (Bartels 1978: 56). Although there were some latent tensions brought
about by “long-term primordial social patterns and a short-term instrumentalization of those
patterns in the context of intra-elite competition at the local level” (van Klinken 2001: 2), the real
tension was only smelt when hundreds of originally-Ambonese premans, who had been involved
in some Soeharto’s crony-sponsored violence businesses in Jakarta, were forced to flee to
Ambon. They were Christian premans led by Milton Matuanakotta, who have reportedly had
access to Bambang Trihatmojo, Soeharto’s second son, via Yoris Raweyai, the head’s deputy of
the Pemuda Pancasila. Their return to Ambon was a direct impact of the Ketapang riots in
November 1998, which juxtaposed them with Ongen Sangaji-led preman group who served as the
patron-client of Siti Hardiyanti Rukmana, the first Soeharto’s daughter, via Abdul Gafur, former
minister of youths and sports in the 1980s. Some analysts believed that the arrival of the premans

2
There are several volumes published about these conflicts, including Wessel and Wimhofer (eds.), 2001;
Colombijn and Lindblad (eds.), 2002; and Bamualim et. al. (eds.), 2002.
3
According to Farhan dan Mukhtar, two Ambonese youths I met in Batumerah, fighting between
Batumerah and Mardika youthsters had actually repeatedly flared up. If within three or four months such a
fighting does not happen, people would question what wrong with this situation (Interview with Farhan dan
Mukhtar, Batumerah Ambon, 23 April 2003).
4
Interview with Sahjuan Pahasuan, a civil servant who directly witnessed the fighting, Batumerah Ambon,
20 April 2003.

4
who brought with them their own revenge significantly contributed to the eruption of the
Moluccan conflict as they were directly involved in spreading false rumors and inflaming the
early stages of the Moluccan conflict, using handy-talkies and hand-phones (Aditjondro 2001:
112; ICG 2001: 5). These Jakarta premans operated hand-in-hand with two local Ambonese
preman groups led by Agus Wattimena and Berty Loupatty respectively. Since even April 1998
Wattimena had moulded his members into the Laskar Kristus (Christ Militia Force) while
Loupatty organized his members into the Coker (Cowok-cowok Kristen/cowok-cowok keren
meaning Christian boys or handsome boys) (Sholeh 2003: 35).

Apparently the coming of the Jakarta premans cannot be disassociated from several
important events that had even occurred before 19 January 1999, which were unfortunately
overlooked by most researchers (see, for instance, van Klinken 2001; Trijono 2001). From 16 to
18 November 1998, thousands of students from the State University of Pattimura (Unpatti) and
Indonesian Christian University of Moluccas (UKIM) held a series of demonstrations decrying
the dual-function of the military in front of the District Military Command (Korem) of Pattimura.
These rallies culminated with the repressive action from the military personnel which cost 3
casualties and caused 70 people injured. On 20 November Governor M. Saleh Latuconsina
sponsored a meeting between the commander of the Korem and some religious leaders from
Christian and Muslim communities, in which the commander was strongly condemned for acting
brutally toward students. In relation to these events, it is apparently not accidental that on 13
December a soldier from the Battalion Infantry 733 Ambon inflamed a small riot in a wedding
party in Wailete, a village populated mostly by Bugisnese, Butonese and Makassarese (BBM). As
an effect of this riot, hundreds of masses from a Christian village, Hative Besar, attacked Wailete.
They burned the village and expelled its Muslim population. In a similar case, on 27 December,
hundreds of people from Bak Air, a Christian village, attacked Tawiri, a Muslim village because
the Tawiri people killed a pig that belonged to Bak Air people. Since then, a rumor flew about the
possibility of the eruption of riots in the Moluccas.

Zionist-cum-Christian Conspiracy

The conflict that had erupted in the Moluccas on 19 January 1999 soon gained its political
contents when the rumors of the Republic of Southern Moluccas (RMS) rebellious movement and
the Islamization of the Moluccas as the driving force behind the conflict were widely spread
within the circles of Muslims and Christians respectively. The rumor of the RMS accounts that
the remaining forces of this rebellious movement, supported by their Netherlands-based
international sponsor, deliberately instigated the Moluccan conflict, under the collaboration of the
Moluccan Protestant Church (GPM) and the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P), in
an effort to set up Moluccan state based on Christianity. This speculation was challenged by
another rumor which was mainly voiced by Churches about the attempt of Muslim forces in the
Moluccas to Islamize the islands by expelling Christians.

The conspiracy theory which mentions the involvement of the RMS in the Moluccan
conflict first appeared at the national level on 28 January 1999 in a press conference organized by
two hard-line Muslim groups, the Indonesian Committee for the Solidarity of the Muslim World
(KISDI) and the Indonesian Muslim Workers Union (PPMI), led by Ahmad Sumargono and Eggy
Sudjana respectively. A.M. Hendropriyono, the Minister of Transmigration during B.J. Habibie’s
presidency, made it clear in a public meeting in Ambon on 9 March 1999 that it was the RMS
which is responsible for the eruption of the conflict. Faisal Tanjung, the then Coordinating
Minister for Political and Security Affairs, clarified Hendropriyono’s statement by pointing some
evidences of the RMS’s involvement in the Moluccan conflict (Aditjondtro 2001: 115).

5
 The story of the RMS was given resonance in line with the articulation of the discourse of
an on-going Zionist-cum-West/Christian conspiracy seeking to destroy Islam and the Muslim
umma in Indonesia, particularly in relation to the quarrel for power during Habibie’s presidency
which continued to the period of Abdurrahman Wahid. Several Islamist medias, such as the
Sabili, the Media Dakwah, and the Suara Hidayatullah, rigorously responded the story by
publishing articles portraying the Moluccan conflict as part of the Zionist-cum-Christian
conspiracy to Christianize Muslims in the Moluccas, through the hands of the RMS. Since the
first months of the conflict, the Sabili have appeared with provoking headlines. In its March 1999
issue, this magazine underscored the role of Jews and Christians planning to clean Muslims from
the Moluccas behind the conflict, under the headline “Moslem Cleansing: Ambon is not alone”
(Sabili, 24 March 1999: 25-26). Further, it associated the conflict more clearly with
Christianization issue and claimed it in a headline as “Christianization: Volume 2” (Sabili 3, 28
July 1999: 14-18). The official mouthpiece of the DDII, the Media Dakwah, even not only
mentioned the Zionist-cum-Christian conspiracy as the party behind the Moluccan conflict but
directly called for jihad as a necessity to respond to what it refers to as a crusade waged by
Christians with a headline “Jihad War is continuing in Ambon” (Media Dakwah December 1999:
42-44). The Suara Hidayatullah equally sought to popularize this Zionist-cum-Christian
conspiracy theory by making headlines such as “Uncover the Practice of the GGG: Gold-Glory-
Gospel: The Moslem Cleansing in Ambon” (Suara Hidayatullah, October 1999). The attention of
Indonesian Muslims to the Moluccan conflict became larger and larger in line with the spreading
of the discourse.

It is of interest to note how the anti-Zionist-cum-Christian discourse has been

contextualized in the Indonesian public sphere. This discourse was derived from an-anti-Zionist
sentiment which has actually a long history in the context of the relation between state and Islam
in Indonesia. It came to Indonesia in the 1970s from a number of Arabic texts produced in the
Middle East, which are frequently referred to as Al-Maka’id al-Yahudiyyah (the Protocol of the
Elders of Zion). In the course of time, it repeatedly appeared in reference to Muslim’s anxiety of
any conspiracy to undermine Islam (van Bruinessen 1994; Liddle 1996, and Siegel 2000). Due to
insignificant presence, not to say absence, of Jews in Indonesia Christians have become the
targets of the hostility so that the anti-Zionist discourse is directly interlocked with anti-Christian
discourse. As a form of political escape from former Masyumi leaders, the DDII stood behind the
spreading of this discourse. As a strategy to criticize the New Order regime that rigorously
marginalized Islam from the political arena of the state and at the same time, demonstrate its
concern with the fate of the Muslim umma, the DDII explored anti-Christian sentiments by
highlighting the expansion of Christian missionary projects.

When the Moluccan conflict flared up the DDII lost no time to demonstrate its concerns
with the fate of Muslims in the islands. Through its philanthropic organization, the Committee for
Overcoming Crises (Kompak), this organization conducted humanitarian activities utilizing the
support from two international philanthropic organizations, London-based Muslim Aid and Saudi
Arabia-based Haramayn Foundation (DDII, 1999: 47). It came there as early as February 1999,
particularly through its provincial branch established in the 1970s. Al-Bunyan published by
Yogyakarta and Central Java branches of the DDII appeared to be the first bulletin that
specifically covered the Moluccan conflict. The role of the Kompak was complemented by the
Justice Party Command Posts and Community Development (Posko Keadilan Peduli Umat),
which mobilized humanitarian aids and explored the Moluccan conflict into the public sphere of
Indonesia even since the first weeks of its eruption.

6
 In line with the escalation of the conflicts, marked among other things by the Tobelo
massacre killing more than 500 Muslims in December 1999, the Islamist media became more
rigorous in sensationalizing the Moluccan conflict and linking it with Christians. The Sabili, for
instance, several times displayed the on-going conflict in the Moluccas with provoking images
telling, for instance, “Thousands of Muslims Slaughtered by Infidel Christians” (Sabili, 16, 26
January 2000: xvi). The Media Dakwah similarly was active in observing the Moluccan conflict
under the headlines such as “Take Care of Ambon/Maluku”, displaying heartrending suffering of
Muslims due to the attacks of Christians working to Christianize the islands:

The population of transmigration villages Suka Maju and Kusuri were forced to
convert to Christianity. They were provided with Bible, and red head-banner
writing “Christ is God”. Those who do not want to do so preferred to flee and
many of them died. Those converts were given pork meat and soup. Extremely
barbaric! (Media Dakwah, February 2000).

In the Moluccas itself, since the early days of the conflict a retired army general, Rustam
Kastor, has tried hard to convince Moluccan Muslims about the existence of the RMS
collaborated by the Moluccan Protestant Church and the PDI-P, publishing a dozen of articles
analyzing events related to the conflict in a local media. His analyses about the events were lately
documented well into a book (2000) entitled “Facts, Data, and Analysis of RMS-Christian
Conspiracy in Destroying Muslims in Ambon the Moluccas”,5 in which he sarcastically
mentioned the RMS as the abbreviation of the Republik Maluku Serani (Republic of Christian
Moluccas). His efforts to popularize the RMS issue gained enthusiastic supports from local
Muslim organizations in the Moluccas. A militant organization, the Moluccan Front of the
Defenders of Islam (FPIM), facilitated a further proliferation of the discourse among Moluccan
Muslims by publishing pamphlets and booklets. This organization was set up at the beginning of
2000 by M. Husain Toisuta, an influential local leader from Ahuru, and M. Husni Putuhena,
former teacher at the Pesantren Persis, Bangil, who now served as a civil servant at the
Department of Religious Affairs of Ambon Town.6 One of its leaders tried hard to demonstrate
that the Moluccan conflict was deliberately designed by the RMS collaborated by the Moluccan
Protestan Church by publishing a book entitled “The Renaissance of History: Moluccan Turmoil:
Conspiracy of the RMS and Protestant Church for Gospel-Gold-Glory Towards the Century of
Ecumenism” (Putuhena 2000).7

The image that the Moluccan conflict was set in motion by the Zionist-cum-Christian
conspiracy urged many hard-line Muslim leaders to mobilize rallies and demonstrations. The
masses from the Justice Party-linked United Actions of Indonesian Muslim Students (Kammi),
the Kisdi-linked Inter-Universities Muslim Student Association (Hammas), the United and
Development Party (PPP)-linked Muslim Youth Movement (GPI), the Crescent and Star Party-
linked God’s Army Front, the Hizbut Tahrir, the Laskar Pembela Islam, and the embryo of the
Laskar Mujahidin, to mention but a few, repeatedly flooded the main streets in Jakarta and other
big cities to decry the on-going violent conflict. They competed to show their concerns with the
conflict. They did not stop there, but went further by organizing campaigns and demonstrations
calling for jihad. These campaigns culminated at a tabligh akbar sejuta umat, a million Muslim
religious gathering, in January 2000 around the National Monument in Jakarta, which was

5
It appeared in Bahasa Indonesia as Fakta, Data dan Analisa, Konspirasi Politik RMS dan Kristen
Menghancurkan Ummat Islam di Ambon-Maluku.
6
Interview with M. Husni Putuhena, Ambon, 23 April 2003.
7
Its original title sounds Pencerahan Sejarah Kerusuhan di Maluku: Konspirasi RMS dan Gereja Kristen
Untuk Rencana Gospel-Gold-Glory Menyongsong Abad Oikumene.

7
organized by Al Chaidar, an activist of the Laskar Mujahidin-linked NII movement. In this
tabligh akbar, a number of political and Muslim leaders, including Amin Rais, Hamzah Haz,
Ahmad Sumargono, Eggy Sujana, Husein Umar, and Daud Rasyid gave speeches, criticizing
Abdurrahman Wahid for his indifference with the Moluccan conflict. They even served a
deadline of two weeks on Wahid to solve the crisis (see Awwas 2000).

The Drama of Jihad

In a climate of growing “anxiety” against the expansion of Zionist-cum-Christian powers to

undermine Islam and the Muslim umma in Indonesia, particularly in relation to the escalation of
the Moluccan conflict, the Laskar Jihad came to the arena. They found a sort of momentum to
demonstrate themselves as the most committed defenders of Islam, stating their determination
and readiness to conduct a physical jihad. For this purpose, the Laskar Jihad proclaimed a
resolution, called “Resolusi Jihad” in a tabligh akbar on 30 January 2000 in Kridosono,
Yogyakarta. In this resolution there are five points in which the stress on the necessity to wage
jihad in the Moluccan islands is laid down to protect the dignity of Muslims and their religion
from the attacks of Christian enemies. The Laskar Jihad believed that the Moluccan conflict was
arising from a separatist movement run by the RMS collaborated by the Moluccan Protestant
Church, whose aim was to dismiss all Muslims from the Moluccan islands and to Christianize
these islands by making them separated from the Republic of Indonesia (Thalib 2000a: 6-9).

For the Laskar Jihad, the Moluccan islands were simply a “pilot project” of the efforts to
Christianize the whole Indonesia in the framework of the “Proyek Kristenisasi Salib”,
Christianization crusade project run by the Zionist-cum-Christian international powers. They
believed that the success of the Moluccan project” would determine their subsequent agendas
(Thalib 2000b: 33). In this situation they were convinced that the neglected duty of jihad must be
fulfilled to resist against what they referred to as the evil conspiracy of international Zionist-cum-
Crusaders seeking to anchor their hegemony in Indonesia, as appeared in the book written by
Ja’far Umar Thalib himself, “Laskar Jihad Ahlus Sunnah wal-Jama’ah, Pioneering the Resistance
against the Evil Hegemony of International Crusaders-Zionists in Indonesia” (see Thalib 2001a).8

The Laskar Jihad embarked upon their jihad drama on 6 April 2000, when public’s eyes
were shocked by a vast crowd wearing jalabiyya, Arab-style-white-long-flowing robs, and turban
who assembled in the Senayan main stadium in Jakarta. Their presence in the biggest stadium of
Indonesia, which is usually overwhelmed by the yells of football supporters, presented a totally
different atmosphere. They waved banners and posters hoisted with the slogans such as “wage
jihad fi sabil Allah” and “defend Muslims in the Moluccas”. While wielding swords they chanted
“Allah Akbar” and decried what they referred to as a genocidal attack of Christians against
Muslims. This tabligh akbar served as a prologue of this drama as the Laskar Jihad continued
their action by marching to the parliament building and then to the presidential palace, stating
their determination to wage jihad in the Moluccas. Subsequently, the Laskar Jihad marched to
Kampung Munjul-Tanah Sareal, Bogor, in the south to Jakarta, to undertake a paramilitary
training. On 26 April 2000, thousands of the Laskar Jihad fighters left for the Moluccan islands.
Later, they sought to extend the domain of their jihad operation by sending hundreds of its
fighters to Poso, Central Sulawesi. Although failed, they even tried to land in West Papua and
Aceh.

8
The original title of this book is Laskar Jihad Ahlus Sunnah wal-Jama’ah, Mempelopori Perlawanan
Kedurjanaan Hegemoni Salibis-Zionis Internasional di Indonesia.

8
 I deliberately refer to this event as a drama, borrowing Turner’s term, since it constituted
a unit of aharmonic or disharmonic process, arising in conflict situation. According to Turner, the
conflict situation takes place mainly when “the interests and attitudes of groups and individuals
stood in obvious opposition” (Turner 1974: 33). For the Laskar Jihad, to show their image as the
defenders of God is much more important than the jihad itself. This is obviously different from
the Laskar Mujahidin led by Abu Bakar Baasyir, which preferred to operate secretly with small
well-armed trained groups called “Laskar Khos” (Special Force) which could effectively
perpetrate attacks against Christian forces. If the concern with publicity was a priority for the
Laskar Jihad, the success in defeating their Christian enemies was much more important for the
Laskar Mujahidin.9 To guarantee the success of their operations in the Moluccas, the Laskar
Mujahidin reportedly received sophisticated weapons from various militia groups outside
Indonesia, such as Abu Sayyaf group in the southern Philippines.

To reinforce the image that their calls for jihad to the Moluccas were not beyond the
framework of defending Islam as religion, the Laskar Jihad spread the translations of fatwas they
had received from the prominent sources of authority in Saudi Arabia and Yemen. They were
‘Abd al-Razzaq ibn `Abd al-Muhsin al-`Abbad, Muqbil ibn Hadi al-Wadi`i, Rabi`ibn Hadi al-
Madkhali, Salih al-Suhaymi, Ahmad Yahya ibn Muhammad al-Najm, Wahid al-Jabiri, and Zaid
ibn Muhammad ibn Hadi al-Madkhali. In these fatwas the hatred of Christians are visible since
the requestor had clarified to the muftis that the Moluccan conflict has turned to be a massacre by
Christians of Muslims. It is not surprising that al-Wadi’i obliged all Muslims in Indonesia in
particular to "to arise and conduct jihad in the name of God and overthrow Christians who
occupy Muslim territory". Similarly, Rabi`al-Madkhali required all Muslims to “help Muslims
attacked by Christian enemies" (Hasan 2002).

On the basis of these fatwas, Ja’far Umar Thalib declared that going to the Moluccas is a
holy jihad against Christian enemies attacking Muslims. He emphasized that engagement in what
he called this Moluccan war was a duty that should be fulfilled by Muslims in order to honour
Allah’s message. Quoting Ibn Taymiyyah, Ja’far Umar Thalib said, “Should our enemy attack
Muslims, to confront the attack would be an obligation incumbent on the Muslims who are being
attacked and it would be compulsory for other Muslims to help them”. According to him, this was
obligatory because succumbing to the pressure from a Zionist-cum-Christian international
conspiracy, the government did not have any ability or the power to put the war to an end (Thalib
2000c: 7).

Although the Laskar Jihad knew that nowhere does the Quran sanction permanent
violence or violence unstructured by a designated end as appeared in their conservative doctrines
of jihad, through the fatwas they clarified the possible benefits that violence sometimes brings in
certain context. Believing that they were God’s army fighting a jihad against the forces of evil,
they considered that the end justified the means. Violence jihad is not only legitimate but also
obligatory in the battle against the “Zionist-cum-Christian forces seeking to undermine Islam and
the Muslim umma.” What Keane (1996: 98) refers to as the transition-to-democracy dilemma
found its context with the spreading of these fatwas, when civil society forces are tempted to
demonstrate its strength through religiously-sanctioned violence.

It is worth mentioning here that, the term jihad can actually be loosely translated as ‘to
struggle’ or ‘to expend effort’ towards a particular cause. The term was originally used to refer to
one’s personal struggle against one’s own mortal failings and weaknesses, which would include
battling against one’s pride, fears, anxieties, and prejudices. This personal existential struggle is

9
Interview with Irfan S. Awwas, Yogyakarta, 2 October 2001.

9
described as the jihad akbar (greater jihad); alongside this notion is the concept of jihad asghar
(lesser jihad), associated with armed war for self-preservation and self-defense. In the context of
the struggle for self-preservation and self-defense, jihad has always been regulated by a host of
ethical sanctions and prerogatives (Khadduri 1955: 55-73). The concept of violent jihad began to
gain resonance within the context of the confrontation between Muslims and Christians, which
embarked upon the history of colonization upon Muslim countries. This atmosphere of
confrontation at that time implanted the rhetoric of crusade glorified by Western powers into the
minds of Muslims (Akbar 2002: xiv). In the late twentieth and twenty-first centuries the violent
jihad has gained remarkable currency and appeared to be a common word used “by resistance,
liberation and terrorist movements alike to legitimate their cause and motivate their followers”
(Esposito, 2002: 26).

The Rhetoric of Hostility

As soon as the Laskar Jihad deployed its fighters at the beginning of May 2000, the atmosphere
of jihad was quickly felt in Ambon. The arrival of these fighters brought with them not only the
spirit of jihad but also symbols that transformed the Moluccan conflict in a clearer manner into a
religious war. No less important, the Commander-in-Chief of the Laskar Jihad, Ja’far Umar
Thalib, was highly enthusiastic in glorifying the spirit of jihad in this town by delivering sermons
in various tabligh akbars. In such occasions, he fuelled the spirit of his jihad fighters as well as
local Muslims, echoing the rhetoric of jihad. In one of his sermons entitled “Menyatukan Barisan
Kaum Muslim” (Uniting Muslim Steps) delivered in the tabligh akbar held in front of al-Fatah
Mosque just a few days after the arrival of the first contingent of the Laskar Jihad, Ja’far Umar
Thalib said:

“We are attacked by Christian enemies who have desire to remove us from the
surface of the earth. Thus, we have to answer this challenge with jihad fi sabil
Allah. Don’t think of any other alternatives. We do not want to be colonized.
When we wage a war against them, we will obtain our dignity. That is the only
choice. This not only takes place in the Moluccas, but also in Poso, Luwu, and
Gorontalo. They will continue to wage crusade against us. Muslims in Java and
other islands are preparing themselves to wage a war against belligerent
unbelievers and their collaborators” (Thalib 2000d, translation mine).

As a matter of facts, since the coming of the Laskar Jihad in Ambon, the ferocity of
Muslim side increased significantly as if they wanted to make revenge upon the losses they
suffered during the first year.10 Only in mid May 2000, Muslim forces attacked and took over
Ahuru and subsequently seized upon Galala. With the spirit of jihad, they even dared attack the
Brimob headquarters in Tantui, and at the same time, seized upon Efrata Church and Otto Kwick
Hospital located in the same area. Particularly as the result of the attack on the Brimob
headquarters, Muslims obtained various kinds of weaponry, including Pistol Colt 28, Jungle
Karabein, SKS rifle, MK III, LMG and even Mortar-5, equal with the weapons Christians used,
such as SKS rifles and AK-47s (Kastor 2000: 34 and 67). With this new weaponry, they attacked
and seized upon the Indonesian Christian University of the Moluccas in Talake and University of
Pattimura in Poka. In the North Moluccas, Muslims equally intensified their attacks on Christians.
Under the leadership of Abu Bakar Wahid al-Banjari, North Moluccan Muslim militias

10
According to the witness of a humanitarian activist which arrived in Ambon in March 1999, in the first
year of the conflict Christians looked so aggressive in attacking Muslim targets. Interview with Frederic
R.R. Capelle, Field Coordinator of the Medecins Sans Frontiers, Jl. Mutiara Ambon, 23 April 2003.

10
perpetrated attacks against Christian villages, taking revenge upon the attacks of Christians in
December 1999 which killed more that 500 Muslims in Tobelo (ICG 2000: 8)

The rhetoric of religious war between Muslims and Christians glorified by Ja’far Umar
Thalib gained supports from Abu Bakar Baasyir. In another tabligh akbar held in the same venue,
Abu Bakar Baasyir appeared to deliver a key-note speech in which he decried Christians deemed
to be responsible for the massacre of thousands of Muslims in the Moluccas and other trouble
spots of Indonesia. He stimulated Muslims in this islands to wage jihad till the last drop of blood
and for him, the Moluccas would be a locus of jihad training toward a real jihad, resisting against
taghuts, tyrannies oppressing Muslims.11 In an interview he emphasized the responsibility of
Christians in instigating the conflict:

The troublemaker of all problems afflicting our country is not other but
Christians, who continuously sought to hamper Muslims from actualizing their
Shari’a. That is the cause. Otherwise, our country would be secured. Look at the
Moluccas and Poso. Who instigated the wars? No doubt it was Christians who
instigated the wars. In Ambon, when Muslims were going to perform ‘id al-fitri
prayer Christians came to attack them. It is natural then if we resist against them.
Islam teaches us to resist and defend ourselves from attacks of any enemies.12

This sort of discourse resonated loudly in the printed and online media of the Laskar
Jihad and other radical Islamist groups. The Maluku Hari Ini (Moluccas Today) which appeared
since March 2000 actively sensationalized the casualties among Muslims, and the ferocity of
Christian militias against Muslims, displaying the headlines such as “Christian-RMS Force
Attacked the Laskar Jihad” (5-6 June 2000). Further, the Laskar Jihad set up the Laskar Jihad
Online, a sort of the Laskar Jihad daily providing day-to-day information related to the activities
of the Laskar Jihad and the developments of the Moluccan conflict, as intended to counterbalance
the domination of Christian medias in cyberspace.13 Indeed we have to note that the effort of
Christian side to attract worldwide attention through the spreading of hostile discourses against
Islam was no less significant. They set up, among other things, “Ambon Berdarah Online”,
“Masariku Network”, and “Crisis Center of the Diocese Ambon (see Brauchler 2002).

The Laskar Jihad Online glorified a slogan, “Berjihad di Dunia Maya” (Jihad in
Cyberspace), complete with a banner “Victory or Martyrdom: Jihad in Ambon”. This slogan
highlighted the quotations of selected Quranic verses which appeared in this website to support
the image of the Moluccan conflict as a religious war, including two Quranic verses, which are
often quoted by militant Muslims to legitimize their hostility against Christians, stating that “Jews
and Christians never allow Muslims to exist until the Muslims follow their religions” (QS 2: 120)
and “Muslims are obliged to fight against those who fight them” (QS 2: 190). Through these
quotations the hostile discourses spread in this website found its legitimacy and justifications, and
bolstered the identity of the people behind it.

11
The content of this sermon was highlighted by M. Ali Fauzy, in my interview in Ambon on 22 April
2003.
12
Interview with Abu Bakar Baasyir, Solo, 2 October 2002.
13
Interview with Adib Susanto, Jakarta, 27 October 2002.

11
The gallery of pictures displaying the massacre by Christians of Muslims and the destruction of
mosques made the stories deployed more real and supported the making of the image of the
Moluccan conflict as the slaughter field of Muslims by Christians and Jews.

Realizing the limited access of the majority of the Laskar Jihad members in particular and
Indonesian Muslims in general to internet, the Laskar Jihad subsequently published the Buletin
Laskar Jihad Ahlus Sunnah wal Jama’ah, with the logo of “two crossed sabers with the Quran
and the Muslim creed in Arabic letters in between”. The photos of Muslim victims and destructed
mosques appeared more real in this printed bulletin complete with the story about the ferocity of
Christians attacking Muslims. More phenomenally, this bulletin was offered “free of charge”
by the Laskar Jihad members standing in intersections, traffic lights, mosques, and public
venues

Amidst the growth of this rhetoric of hostility in the Indonesian public sphere a series of
bombings occurred on Christmas Eve 2000. This tragedy cost hundreds of lives and destructed a
dozen of churches in Jakarta, Bandung, Batam, Medan, Mojokerto and Mataram. Certainly we
cannot establish evidence about the correlation between the growth of anti-Christian rhetoric and
the bombings. But we can feel that the anti-Christian rhetoric provided a sort of justification to
that barbaric action.

12
Anti-Americanism

Alongside the spread of anti-American sentiments following the 11 September 2001 tragedy,
which resulted in US-led air strikes on Afghanistan, anti-Christian discourse became larger and
more widespread. The rhetoric used by George W. Bush, proclaiming a “global crusade” against
“terrorism”, triggered hostility and anger among the members of the Muslim militia groups,
exploiting the rhetoric of global jihad against the so-called ‘West-cum-Zionist conspiracy’ to the
extent that it enjoyed wide currency in popular political discourse. They rigorously spoke of the
West’s coalition led by the US waging war against Islam, pointing to the US-led air strikes on
Afghanistan as the example that the war has began. Fore them, through the attacks on
Afghanistan the West explicitly professed their enmity towards Islam and therefore is in a
dangerous position now.

Ja’far Umar Thalib responded the 11 September tragedy by writing an article entitled
“Die America”, in which he stated sarcastically a sorrow:

“We wish you to mourn well, United States of America. Hopefully you
learned something from your stupid arrogance. To Muslims we say, “Be happy
about the revenge that was taken for all the humiliations and terrors committed
by the highest terrorist country in the world against all Muslim countries”
(Buletin Laskar Jihad 10: 9, translation mine).

In this rhetoric, the word “America” was clearly associated with Christians as Ja’far Umar Thalib
quickly connected his analysis to Jews and Christians,

“The Almighty Allah demonstrates the falsity of the triumph of Jews and
Christians glorified by Western media, claiming the United States as the
world’s super power…. We don’t need to be worried about the issue of the
United States that would intervene in the Moluccan and Papuan conflicts. That
is only issue spread to intimidate Muslims so that they succumbed to the will
of Christians supported by the US and other Western countries” (Buletin
Laskar Jihad 10: 9, translation mine).

Together with the leaders of the other radical groups Ja’far Umar Thalib came to the
foremost line to voice anti-Americanism, through demonstrations, rallies, sabotages on US
hegemonic symbols and calls for boycott. The anger of the militant Muslim groups to the US
continued to explode as this country accelerated its campaign against terrorism, which gradually
brought them to corner. As a country that received special attention from the US, Indonesia was
not able to refrain from repressing the proliferation of the radical Muslim groups. Megawati
Sukarnoputri, who before Bush promised to support fully the US campaign against terrorism,
implemented the policies that forced the militant groups to retreat from the political arena. In one
of his reactions to this fact, Ja’far Umar Thalib gave a sermon aired by the radio station Suara
Perjuangan Muslim Maluku (The Mouthpiece of Moluccan Muslim Struggle) in April 2002 in
which he stated:

“Listen, you accomplices of the United States. Listen, you accomplices of the
World Church Council. Listen, you accomplices of Zionist evangelists. Listen,
you Jews and Christians: We Muslims are inviting the US military to prove its
power in the Moluccas. Let us fight to the finish. Let us prove for the
umpteenth time that the Muslim faithful cannot be conquered by over-
exaggerated-physical power” (Thalib 2002: quoted in www.angelfire.com).

13
Subsequently, one by one the radical groups disbanded itself and its actors retreated from the
political arena of the state. Some of them indeed became the targets of arrests by the police.

Thirteen months after the 11 September tragedy, bombs exploded at Paddy’s Cafe and
Sari Club at Legian, Bali, which cost around 200 casualties, injured hundreds of people, and
destructed a dozen of buildings. This tragedy can apparently be seen not only as a culmination of
the hostile discourses against the United States, but also as an indication of the decline of the
Muslim militant groups. As an impact of this bombing, we saw the episode of arrests of Amrozi,
Ali Ghufron, Ali Imron, Imam Samudera, Abdul Rauf, and a dozen of other suspects involved in
the Bali bombing. Majority of them have taken part in jihad actions in Afghanistan, and have
studied in Madrasah Lukmanul Hakiem, Johor Malaysia, a religious school established by Abu
Bakar Baasyir and his colleague Abdullah Sungkar. They were divided into two groups:
Kelompok Tenggulun (Tenggulung Group) and Kelompok Serang (Serang Group). The nexus
between both groups was Abu Bakar Baasyir, who had been arrested only one week after the
bombing.

From his small cell in the Jakarta’s Police Prison, Abu Bakar Baasyir delivered a written
sermon entitled “Defending Islam, Resisting against US, Jews and Other Enemies of Islam”,
reinforcing his anger against the US and its allies:

“The United States and its allies, collaborated by Jews and Christians, have
proclaimed a crusade against Islam and the Muslim umma. They have attacked
Afghanistan and killed innocent Muslims. They have even attacked mujahidin
who strove to defend Islam. With their arrogance, they have alleged Muslims as
terrorists that must be destroyed and removed from the surface of earth”… To
obtain the help from Allah so that we can get the victory in resisting the enemies
of Islam like the US and its allies, we have to resist against all evil plans against
Islam and the Muslim umma. Herewith I declared a war against the US, which
has oppressed Islam and the Muslim umma” (Baasyir in Awwas 2003: 113-119,
translation mine).

Conclusion

The rise of the militant Muslim groups calling for jihad and voicing anti-Christian discourses in
the Indonesian public sphere cannot be disassociated from political changes taking place during
the process of transition following the collapse of the New Order regime. This phenomenon must
be seen at the first instance within the framework of power struggle which particularly occurred
when the elements of the status-quo are trying to maintain their power. In this context all “civil
society forces” became the target of the expansion of the supports for the status quo, which was
carried out mainly through the manipulation of ethnic, racial, gender, and religious sentiments. As
a result, the contest for the public sphere heightened to the extent that it exacerbated some tension
and conflict in the society.

Communal conflicts that flared up in different provinces of Indonesia provided an

additional arena of this contestation. It served as a sort of the hidden arena through which power
was being negotiated. In relation to these conflicts, there emerged the discourse of Zionist-cum-
Christian conspiracy thought to be the party responsible for the eruption of the conflicts. Being
interconnected with this theory of conspiracy, the militant Muslim groups portrayed the conflicts
as religious wars plotted by Zionist-cum-Christian international powers. On this reason, they had

14
a legitimacy to fight a jihad, considered to be the only solution to get out from the trap of the
enemies of Islam, and interestingly, save the integrity of the Indonesian nation-state.

The anti-Christian discourse strikingly appeared in the Islamist medias, which rigorously
reported their observations on the conflicts. They framed the reports within the story about Gold-
Gospel-Glory for which Indonesia or particularly trouble spots had become the target of
worldwide Christianization projects, somehow legitimating the anti-Christianization discourse
which had been developed so far by hard-line Muslim organizations centered around the DDII.
The spread of this discourse was part of their efforts to resist against the hegemony of the New
Order regime trying to marginalize Islam. Being legitimized by this discourse, the radical Muslim
groups launched jihad to several trouble sports, especially the Moluccas and Poso.

The global campaign launched by the United States marked by air-strikes on Afghanistan
which was response to the 11 September attacks of the WTC and part of on 11 September
Pentagon bolstered the militant Muslim groups’ claim about the real threat of the enemies of
Islam. Again, Christians are interconnected with the anti-American discourse, which emerged as
a reaction against the campaign. The political changes after the September 11 tragedy both at the
international level and national level forced the radical Muslim groups to retreat themselves from
the political arena and this undoubtedly provoked their sporadic reactions which apparently
entailed the Bali bombings on 12 October 2002. There is little doubt that this tragedy marked
more a weakness rather than strength of the expansion of the radical Muslim groups in the
Indonesian public sphere.

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