TORTS and DAMAGES Case Guide

I. Quasi-Delict (2176 to 2194)

A. General Principles
1. Elements

G.R. No. L-10073 December 24, 1915

BUTARO YAMADA, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. THE MANILA RAILROAD CO., defendant, and BACHRACH
GARAGE & TAXICAB CO., Defendant-Appellant.

G.R. No. L-10074 December 24, 1915

KENJIRO KARABAYASHI, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. THE MANILA RAILROAD CO., defendant, and BACHRACH
GARAGE & TAXICAB CO., Defendant-Appellant.

G.R. No. L-10075 December 24, 1915

TAKUTARU UYEHARA, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. THE MANILA RAILROAD CO., defendant, and BACHRACH
GARAGE & TAXICAB CO., Defendant-Appellant.
D.R. Williams for appellant.
Rohde and Wright for appellees.

MORELAND, J.:
The three cases dealt with in this decision differ in their facts only with respect to the injury suffered by
the respective plaintiffs. The law applicable to them is the same and, at the request of counsel, they will
be decided at the same time. Plaintiffs claim damages against both the railroad and the garage company
because of injuries suffered by them in a collision between a train owned by and operated over tracks
belonging to the railroad company and an automobile the property of the Bachrach Garage & Taxicab
Co.chanrobles virtualawlibra ry chanr obles virtual law lib rary

On January 2, 1913, the plaintiffs, together with three companions, hired an automobile from the
defendant taxicab company for a trip to Cavite Viejo. The automobile was secured at a certain price
hour and was driven and controlled by a chauffeur supplied by the taxicab company. The journey to
Cavite Viejo was made without incident but, on the return trip, while crossing the tracks of defendant
railroad company in the barrio of San Juan, municipality of Cavite Viejo, the automobile was struck by a
train and the plaintiffs injured. chanrobles virtualawlib rary chan robles vir tual law library

The trial court dismissed the complaint on the merits as to the Manila Railroad Company and held the
defendant taxicab company liable for damages to the plaintiffs in various amounts. The taxicab company
appealed. chanrobles virtualawlibrary cha nrobles vir tual law libra ry

It appears from the record, and was found by the trial court, that the driver of the automobile drove his
machine upon the railroad tracks without observing the precautions which ordinary care and prudence
would require, without reducing speed and without taking any precaution looking to determining
whether there was danger from a train or locomotive. The trial court accordingly found that the driver
was guilty of gross negligence and that said negligence was the proximate cause of the accident. It also
found that the driver had been, in effect, instructed by the taxicab company to approach and pass over
railroad tracks in the manner and form followed and observed on the occasion in question, and that, for
that reason, the taxicab company was liable for the damages caused. chanrobles virtualawlibrary chanro bles virtual law libra ry

Several errors are assigned by the appellant. The first one relates to the finding of the trial court: "That
the driver of the automobile did not slacken speed, which was fast, upon approaching the railroad
crossing, which was clearly visible and had to be approached on an upward grade, or take any other
precaution to avert accident. ... and I can but conclude that the driver of the automobile was grossly
negligent and careless in not taking such precaution as would have notified him of the coming of the
train. On the contrary, he proceeded with reckless speed and regardless of possible or threatened
danger. If he had been driving the automobile at a proper rate of speed for going over railroad crossing
he could easily have stopped before going over the railroad crossing after seeing the train." chanrobles vir tual law libra ry
The argument of the appellant which is devoted to this finding seems to admit impliedly at least that the
driver of the automobile maintained his rate of speed as he approached and went upon the railroad
crossing; and that he took no precaution to ascertain the approach of a train. chanrobl es virtualawlibra ry chan robles virt ual law library

The appellant contended on the trial and offered evidence to prove that, on approaching the railroad
crossing from the direction in which the automobile was travelling at the time, the view of the railroad
tracks in both directions was obstructed by bushes and trees growing alongside thereof, and that it was
impossible for a person approaching the crossing even though on guard, to detect by sight the approach
of a train. If that were the case, it was clearly the duty of the driver to reduce the speed of his car and
the noise thereof to such an extent that he would be able to determine from the unrestricted and
uninterrupted use of all his faculties whether or not a train was near. It is the law that a person must use
ordinary care and prudence in passing over a railroad crossing. While we are not prepared to lay down
any absolute rule as to what precise acts of precaution are necessary to be done or left undone by a
person who may have need to pass over a railroad crossing, we may say that it is always incumbent on
him to use ordinary care and diligence. What acts are necessary to constitute such care and diligence
must depend on the circumstances of each particular case. The degree of care differs in different cases.
Greater care is necessary in crossing a road where the cars are running at a high rate of speed and close
together than where they are running at less speed and remote from one another. But in every case due
care should be exercised. It is very possible that where, on approaching a crossing, the view of the tracks
in both directions is unobstructed for such a distance as to render it perfectly safe to pass over without
the use of any other faculty than sight, such use alone is sufficient and it is not necessary to stop or even
to slacken speed or listen. On the other hand, where the view of the tracks is obstructed, them it is
driver's duty to slacken speed, to reduce the noise, if any, of the vehicle, to look and to listen, if
necessary, or do any other act necessary to determine that a train is not in dangerous proximity to the
crossing.chanrobles virtualawlibra ry chanr obles virtual law lib rary

In the case at bar the appellant's own showing is to the effect that the view of the track in the direction
from which the train was coming was obstructed in such manner that neither the track nor a train could
be seen as a traveler approached the crossing; and yet, in spite of that fact, the chauffeur drove upon
the tracks without investigation or precaution of any kind. The very fact that a train was approaching
and was so near as to collide with the automobile is strong evidence of the fact that no precautions
were taken to determine that fact. It is undoubted that if the driver had taken the simplest means of
permitting his own faculties to exercise themselves fairly, there would have been no accident, as the
presence of the train would have been discovered in an instant; but he chose, rather, to give his senses
no opportunity to protect him or his passengers and drove on the track at full speed with all the noise
which an automobile produces at such speed on an upgrade and the sense of hearing impaired by the
rush of the wind. Railroad trains rarely pass over tracks without noise and their presence, generally
speaking, is easily detected by persons who take ordinary precautions. chanrobles virtualawlib rary chanro bles virtual law libra ry

Under this assignment the appellant's main effort is being to the demonstration of the fact that there
was a custom established among automobile drivers of Manila by which they habitually drove their cars
over railroad crossings in the manner in which the automobile was driven by defendant's servant on the
occasion in controversy. To prove that custom counsel presents the evidence of the president of the
defendant company, Mr. Bachrach, who testified on the trial that all of his drivers, including the one in
charge of the car on the night of the accident, operated cars in that manner and that it was the custom
among automobile drivers generally. Counsel also cites the testimony of the witness Palido, living near
the scene of the accident, who testified that, as a general rule, automobiles passed over the railroad
crossing without changing speed. This testimony was corroborated by the defendant company's driver
who had the automobile in charge at the time of the occurrence. Basing himself on this alleged custom
counsel contends that "When a person does what is usual and customary, i. e., proceeds as he and
others engaged in a like occupation have been accustomed to proceed, the action cannot be
characterized as reckless, nor, strictly speaking as negligent." To this the obvious reply may be made, for
the moment admitting the existence of the custom, that a practice which is dangerous to human life
cannot ripen into a custom which will protect anyone who follows it. To go upon a railroad crossing
without making any effort to ascertain the approach of a train is so hazardous an act and one so
dangerous to life, that no one may be permitted to excuse himself who does it, provided injury result.
One who performs an act so inherently dangerous cannot, when an accident occurs, take refuge behind
the plea that others have performed the same act safely. chanrobles virtualawlibrary chanrobl es virtual law libra ry

Under the second error assigned, the appellant contends with much vigor that the plaintiffs cannot
recover for the reason that the negligence of the driver of the automobile, if any, was imputable to
them, they having permitted the driver to approach and pass over the railroad crossing without the use
of ordinary care and diligence to determine the proximity of a train or locomotive, and having made no
effort to caution or instruct him or compel him to take reasonable care in making the crossing. With this
contention we cannot agree. We think the better rule, and one more consonant with the weight of
authority, is that a person who hires a public automobile and gives the driver direction as to the place to
which he wishes to be conveyed, but exercise no other control over the conduct of the driver, is not
responsible for acts of negligence of the latter or prevented from recovering for injuries suffered from a
collision between the automobile and a train, caused by the negligence either of the locomotive
engineer or the automobile driver. (Little vs. Hackett, 116 U.S., 366.) The theory on which the negligence
of the driver has in some instances been imputed to the occupant of the vehicle is that, having trusted
the driver by selecting the particular conveyance, the plaintiff so far identified himself with the owner
and his servants that, in case of injury resulting from their negligence, he was considered a party
thereto. This was the theory upon which the case of Thorogood vs. Bryan (8 C.B., 115) was decided,
which is the leading case in favor of the principle contended for by appellant. The Supreme Court of the
United States, however, in Little vs. Hackett (116 U.S., 366), had this to say concerning the ground on
which the Thorogood case was decided: "The truth is, the decision in Thorogood vs. Bryan rests upon
indefensible ground. The identification of the passenger with the negligent driver or the owner, without
his personal cooperation or encouragement, is a gratuitous assumption. There is no such identity. The
parties are not in the same position. The owner of public conveyance is a carrier, and the driver or the
servant of the passenger, and his asserted identity with them is contradicted by the daily experience of
the world."chanrobles virtual law lib rary

Further discussing the same question the court said: "There is no distinction in principle whether the
passenger be on public conveyance like a railroad train or an omnibus, or be on a hack hired from a
public stand in the street for a drive. Those on a hack do not become responsible for the negligence of
the driver if they exercise no control over him further than to indicate the route they wish to travel or
the places to which they wish to go. If he is their agent so that his negligence can be imputed to them to
prevent their recovery against a third party, he must be their agent in all other respects, so far as the
management of the carriage is concerned, and responsibility to third parties would attach to them for
injuries caused by his negligence in the course of his employment. But, as we have already stated,
responsibility cannot, within any recognized rules of law, be fastened upon one who has in no way
interfered with and the with and controlled in the matter causing the injury. From the simple fact of
hiring the carriage or riding in it no such liability can arise. The party hiring or riding must in some way
have cooperated in producing the injury complained of before he incur any liability for it. 'If the law
were otherwise,' as said by Mr. Justice Depue in his elaborate opinion in the latest case in New Jersey,
'not only the hirer of the coach but also all the passengers in it would be under a constraint to mount
the box and superintend the conduct of the driver in the management and control of his team, or be put
for remedy exclusively to an action against the irresponsible driver or equally irresponsible owner of a
coach taken, it may be, from a coach stand, for the consequences of an injury which was the product of
the cooperating wrongful acts of the driver and of a third person, and that too, though the passengers
were ignorant of the character of the driver, and of the responsibility of the owner of the team, and
strangers to the route over which they were to be carried.' (New York, Lake Erie & Western Railroad vs.
Steinbrenner, 47 N.J.L. [18 Vroom], 161, 171.)" chan robles vir tual law libra ry

We are of the opinion, therefore, that the rule is as we have stated it. Ordinarily where one rides in
public vehicle with the driver thereof and is injured by the negligence of a third person, to which
negligence that of the driver contributes his contributory negligence is not imputable to the passenger
unless said passenger has or is in the position to have and exercise some control over the driver with
reference to the matter wherein he was negligent. Whether the person injured exercises any control
over the conduct of the driver further than to indicate the place to which he wishes to drive is a
question of fact to be determined by the trial court on all of the evidence in the case. (Duval vs. Railroad
Co., 134 N. C., 331; Hampel vs. Detroit etc. R. R. Co., 110 Am. St. Rep., 275; Cotton vs. Willmar etc. R. R.
Co., 99 Minn., 366; Shultz vs. Old Colony Street Ry. Co., 193 Mass., 309; Wilson vs. Puget Sound Elec. Ry.
Co., 52 Wash., 522; Johnson vs. Coey, 237 Ill., 88; Hindu vs. Steere, 209 Mass. 442.) chanrobles vir tual law libra ry
The appellant assigns as the third error the finding of the trial court "that the defendant Manila Railroad
Company was not guilty of negligence which contributed to the causing of the accident complained of."
virtual law libra ry
chanrobles

In this connection it appears that, prior to the beginning of the action now before us, two actions were
instituted, both growing out of the accident which forms the basis of the actions before us: (1) A
criminal action against the engineer of the train, in which the engineer was acquitted; and (2) a civil
action for damages by the garage and taxicab company, the appellant herein, against the defendant
railroad company, for damages to the automobile which was destroyed as a result of the accident, in
which judgment was for defendant. There is evidence in the record showing that the locomotive
engineer gave due and timely signals on approaching the crossing in question. The trial court found that
the employees of the railroad company fully performed their duty as the train approached the crossing
on the night in question and that, therefore, the railroad company in nowise contributed to the
accident. We do not believe that the record will justify us in a reversal of this finding. There is abundant
evidence to support it and we have nothing before us by which that evidence may be impeached. That
the bell was rung and the whistle was blown on nearing the crossing, giving due and timely warning to
all persons approaching, was testified to not only by servants of the corporation but by passengers on
the train. We find nothing in the record which materially impairs the credibility of these witnesses or to
show that their evidence is improbable or unreasonable; and we would be going far under such
circumstances in discarding it and reversing a judgment based thereon. chanro bles virtualawlib rary cha nrobles vir tual law libra ry

The appellant under this assignment of error presents other facts which he claims show necessarily that
the company was negligent. He asserts: "(1) That this accident occurred in the heart of the barrio of San
Juan (Cavite Viejo), within approximately one hundred meters of the railroad station, that is, in a
populous community; (2) that the railroad company did not maintain either a flagman or protecting
gates at the grade crossing where the accident occurred, while the sign "Railroad Crossing" was broken
on the side toward the road; (3) that trees and undergrowth had been permitted to grow on and
adjoining the right of way and houses were constructed thereon, in such manner as to obstruct the view
of persons approaching the railroad track until within a few meters thereof; and (4) that the approach to
the crossing is twisting, and on either side thereof are ditches about two meters deep." chanro bles virtual law libra ry

With respect to the existence of trees and undergrowth on the railroad company's right of way, the
evidence is conflicting, plaintiff maintaining and attempting to prove that such trees and undergrowth
existed, while defendant company contended and offered evidence to show that no such growth existed
at the time of the accident. On this conflict of evidence the trial court found: "Evidence on the part of
the defendant Bachrach Garage & Taxicab Co. is to the effect that the view from the crossing along the
track towards Manila was obstructed by bushes growing on the railroad right to way along the track,
while the preponderance of the evidence discloses that for a distance of twelve or fifteen meters from
the a view of the track for a considerable distance is wholly unobstructed, and I can but conclude that
the driver of the unobstructed, and I can but conclude that the driver of the automobile was grossly
negligent and careless in not taking such precaution as would have notified him of the coming of the
train. On the contrary, he proceeded with reckless speed and regardless of possible or threatened
danger." chanrobles virtual law libra ry

Here again we are met with a contradiction in the evidence of witnesses who, so far as appears, are
equally entitled to credit, which conflict has been resolved by the trial court in favor of the witnesses for
the defendant railroad company. Counsel for appellant has failed to give any reason why we should we
should accept the testimony of appellant's witnesses rather than those of the railroad company and he
has also neglected to point out any error committed by the trial court in making its finding in this regard.
A careful examination of the record discloses no reason why the judgment of the trial court on this point
should be disturbed, there appearing nothing on which we could base a judgment declaring that the trial
court erred in making its decision. chanrobles virtualawlibra ry chan robles virtual law lib rary

As to the other facts set forth on which appellant predicates negligence on the part of the railroad
company, we find them, even if admitted, to be insufficient to establish negligence. It is not negligence
on the part of the railroad company to maintain grade crossing, even in populous district; nor is it
negligence not to maintain a flagman at such crossing. It is true that a railroad company is held to
greater caution in the more thronged streets of the densely populated portions of the city than in the
less frequented streets in suburban parts or in towns; but this does not mean that it is negligence to
maintain grade crossing in such densely populated portions or that it is negligence not to maintain a
flagman at crossings located in such districts. It simply means that the company in operating its trains
over such crossings must exercise care commensurate with the use of crossings in any given locality.
virtual law libra ry
chanrobles virtualawlibrary chanro bles
The main contention of the appellant is based on the claim that, even admitting as proved all of the
facts alleged by the plaintiffs, the appellant is not liable. It is maintained that up to the time the accident
occurred the defendant taxicab company had fully performed its duty to the public, it being undisputed
in the record that the driver was competent and had a long and satisfactory record, having driven cars
for the defendant for 5 or 6 years without accident or misadventure, and that his negligence, if any, in
attempting to pass over the crossing on the occasion before us, cannot legally be imputed to the taxicab
company so as to make it liable for the damages resulting therefrom. In supporting of this argument the
case of Johnson vs. David (5 Phil., Rep., 663), is cited as determinative of the question under
consideration. The appellant, however, having denied the fact of negligence, we might, before entering
on a discussion of the applicability of the principles enunciated in Johnson vs. David to the facts before
us, repeat what we have already said, that it appears from the record, and was found by the trial court,
that the driver of the automobile drove his machine upon the railroad tracks without observing the
precautions which ordinary care and prudence would have required. He made substantially no effort
toward ascertaining whether there was danger from a train or locomotive. The trial court found, as was
quite necessary under the facts, that the driver was guilty of gross negligence and that such negligence
was the proximate cause of the accident. It also found that the taxicab company had permitted its
drivers to approach and pass over railroad tracks in the manner and form followed and observed on the
occasion in question until it had become a custom among its drivers, known and sanctioned by the
company; and that, for that reason, the taxicab company was liable for the damages caused. We are of
the opinion that the trial court is fully supported in the finding that the conduct of the officials of the
taxicab company, and notably the president thereof, amounted, in law, to a sanction of the custom
established among its automobile drivers in passing over railroad crossings. Counsel is met, therefore, at
the opening of his discussion on this branch of the case, with the question: Did the defendant taxicab
company fully discharge its duty when it furnished a suitable and proper car and selected driver who
had been with the company for 5 or 6 years and who had not had an accident or misadventure before?
We think not. It was the duty of the company not only to furnish a suitable and proper car and select a
competent operator, but also to supervise and, where necessary, instruct him properly. chanrobles virtualawlib rary chanrobl es virtual law libra ry

Returning now to the applicability of the case of Johnson vs. David to the facts before us: cha nrobles vir tual law libra ry

The Civil Code, in dealing with the liability of a master for the negligent acts of his servant, makes a
distinction between private individuals and public enterprises. (Art. 1903, Civil Code.) That article,
together with the preceding article, is as follows:

ART 1902. A person who by an act or omission causes damage to another when there is fault or
negligence shall be obliged to repair the damage so done. chanrobles virtualawlibra ry chan robles virt ual law library

ART. 1903. The obligation imposed by the preceding article is demandable, not only for personal acts
and omissions, but also for the persons for whom they should be responsible. chanrobles virtualawlibra ry chanr obles virtual law lib rary

The father, and on his death or incapacity the mother is liable for the damages caused by the minors
who live with them. chanrobles virtualawlib rary cha nrobles vir tual law libra ry

Guardians are liable for the damages caused by minors or incapacitated persons who are under their
authority and live with them. chanrobles virtualawlibra ry chan robles virt ual law library

Owners or directors of an establishment or enterprise are equally liable for the damages caused by their
employees in the service of the branches in which the latter may be employed or on account of their
duties.chanrobles virtualawlibra ry chan robles virtual law lib rary

The State is liable in this sense when it acts through a special agent, but not when the damage should
have been caused by the official to whom properly it pertained to do the act performed, in which case
the provisions of the proceeding article shall be applicable. chanrobles virtualawlibrary chanro bles virtual law libra ry

Finally, master or directors of arts and trades are liable for the damages caused by their pupils or
apprentices while they are under their custody. chanrobles vir tualawlibra ry chan robles virt ual law library

The liability referred to in this articles shall cease when the persons mentioned therein prove that they
employed all the diligence of a good father of a family to avoid the damage.

These two articles are found under chapter 2, title 16, of the Civil Code, dealing with "obligations which
arise from fault or negligence;" and set out the cases, generally speaking, in which the master is liable
for the acts of his servant. That chapter also contains articles providing for liability for negligent acts of
servants in special cases, among them 1905, which provides that "the possessor of an animal, or the one
who uses it, is liable for the damages it may cause even when said animal escapes from him or strays,"
but that this liability shall cease "in the case the damage should arise from force majeure or from the
fault of the person who may have suffered it;" 1906, which declares that "the owner of a game preserve
shall be liable for damages caused by the game to neighboring estates, should he not have done what
may have been necessary to avoid increase of the same or should he have hindered the efforts of the
owners of said estates to hunt;" 1907, which provides for the liability of the owner of a building "for
damages which may result from the collapse of the whole or a part thereof, if it should occur through
the absence of necessary repairs;" 1908, which states that "owners shall be liable for damages caused
by the explosion of machines which may not have been cared for with due diligence, and been placed in
a safe and proper place;" "by excessive smoke, which may be noxious to persons of property;" "by the
fall of trees, located in places of transit, when not caused by force majeure;" "by the emanations of
sewers or deposits of infectious matters, when constructed without precautions proper for the place
where they are located;" and "the head of a family who dwells in a house, or in a part of the same, is
liable for the damages by the things which may be thrown or which may fall therefrom." chanrobles virtual law libra ry

These are the only cases under the Civil Code in which damages may be recovered from the master for
the negligent of his servant. As is seen from a reading of article 1903, a person being driven about by his
servant's negligent acts except under certain circumstances. (Chapman vs. Underwood, 27 Phil., Rep.,
374; Johnson vs. David, supra.) On the other hand, the master is liable for the negligent acts of his
servant where he is the owner or director of a business or enterprise and the negligent acts are
committed while the servant is engaged in his master's employment as such owner. chanrobles virtualawlib rary chanro bles virtual law libra ry

The distinction made in the Code has been observed, as would naturally be expected, by the decisions of
this court. In the case of Johnson vs. David, supra, we held that the defendant was not liable for the acts
of his servant in negligently driving a horse and carriage against plaintiff, who was at the time riding a
bicycle in the streets of Manila, throwing him to the ground and injuring him and his bicycle. It appeared
in that case that the vehicle was owned by the defendant, that it was being driven by the defendant's
coachman on the private affairs of the owner, that it was not a public conveyance driven for hire or as a
part of a business or enterprise. In that case we said: "It would seem, from an examination of these
various provisions, that the obligation to respond for the negligent acts of another was limited to the
particular cases mentioned; in other words, we are of the opinion and so hold that it was the intention
of the legislature in enacting said chapter 2 to enumerate all the persons for whose negligent acts third
persons are responsible. Article 1902 provides when a person himself is liable for negligence. Articles
1903, 1904, 1905, 1906, 1907, 1908, and 1910 provide when a person shall be liable for injuries caused,
not by his own negligence but by the negligence of other persons or things.
xxx xxx xxx
These sections do not include a liability on the part of the plaintiff for injuries resulting from acts of
negligence such as are complained of in the present cause . . . ." chanrobles virtual law lib rary

These case of Chapman vs. Underwood, (27 Phil., Rep., 374) was similar in its facts and the principles
governing it, to that of Johnson vs. David. In that case the plaintiff, while about to board a street car,
was struck by an automobile which, at the time, was being driven on the wrong side of the street. The
automobile was in charge of the servant of the owner, who was present in the automobile at the time
the accident occurred. The automobile was not a part of defendant's business nor was it being used at
the time as a part or adjunct of any business or enterprise owned or conducted by him. Although the act
of the driver was negligent, and was so declared by this court, it was, nevertheless, held that the master
was not liable for the results of the act. We said:

The defendant, however, is not responsible for the negligence of his driver, under the facts and
circumstances of this case. As we have said in the case of Johnson vs. David (5 Phil., Rep., 663), the
driver does not fall within the list of person in article 1903 of the Civil Code for whose acts the
defendant would be responsible. chanrobles virtualawlibra ry chanr obles virtual law lib rary

Although in the David case the owner of the vehicle was not present at the time the alleged negligent
acts were committed by the driver, the same rule applies where the owner is present, unless the
negligent acts of the driver are continued for such a length of time as to give the owner a reasonable
opportunity to observe them and to direct his driver to desist therefrom. An owner who sits in his
automobile, or other vehicle, and permits his driver to continue in a violation of the law by the
performance of negligent acts, after he has had a reasonable opportunity to observe them and to direct
that the driver, becomes himself responsible for such acts. The owner of an automobile who permits his
chauffeur to drive up the Escolta, for example, at a speed of 60 miles an hour, without any effort to stop
him, although he has had a reasonable opportunity to do so, becomes himself responsible, both
criminally and civilly, for the results produced by the acts of his chauffeur. On the other hand, if the
driver, by a sudden act of negligence, and without the owner having a reasonable opportunity to
prevent the act or its continuance, injures a person or violates the criminal law, the owner of the
automobile, although present therein at the time the act was committed, is not responsible, either
civilly or criminally, therefor. The act complained of must be continued in the presence of the owner for
such a length of time that the owner, by his acquiescence, makes his driver's act his own. chanrobles vir tualawlibra ry chan robles virtual law lib rary

In the case before us it does not appear from the record that, from the time the automobile took the
wrong side of the road to the commission of the injury, sufficient time intervened to afford the
defendant an opportunity correct the act of his driver. Instead, it appears with fair clearness that the
interval between the turning out to meet and pass the street car and the happening of the accident was
so short as not to be sufficient to charge defendant with the negligence of the driver.
The case of Bahia vs. Litonjua and Leynes (30 Phil., Rep., 624), was a case of a different character. There
an automobile was being operated by the defendant as a public vehicle carrying passengers from
Balayan to Tuy (Province of Batangas) and return for hire. On one to the trips, the machine, by reason of
a defect in the steering gear, refused to respond to the guidance of the driver and, as a result a child was
run over and killed. That case, as is seem at a glance, is quite different from the case of Johnson vs.
David and that of Chapman vs. Underwood, in that the automobile was operated as a business or
enterprise on which the defendant had entered for gain; and this is the particular distinction which is
made in article 1903 of the Civil Code which holds the masters responsible for the negligent acts of the
servant when the master is the owner "of an establishment or enterprise," and the acts complained of
are committed within the scope of the servant's employment in such business. In the case under
discussion we held that, in addition to the requirement to furnish and use proper and safe machines, it
was the duty of a person or corporation operating automobiles for hire to exercise ordinary care and
diligence in the selection of the drivers of his or its automobiles and in supervision over them while in
his or its employ, including the promulgation of proper rules and regulations and the formulation and
due publication of proper instructions for their guidance in cases where such rules, regulations and the
formulation and due publication of proper instructions for their guidance in cases where such rules,
regulations and instruction are necessary. Discussion article 1903 of the Civil Code, which, as we have
seen, not only established liability in case of negligence but also provides when that liability ceases, the
court in that case said:
From this article two things are apparent: (1) That when an injury is caused by the negligence of a
servant or employee there instantly arises a presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of
the master or employer either in the selection of the selection of the servant or employee or in
supervision over him after the selection, or both; and (2) that that presumption is juris tantum and
not juris et de jure and consequently may be rebutted. It follows necessarily that if the employer shows
to the satisfaction of the court that in selection and supervision he has exercised the care and diligence
of a good father of a family, the presumption is overcome and he is relieved from liability. chanrobles virtualawlibra ry chanr obles virtual law lib rary

This theory bases the responsibility of the master ultimately on his own negligence and not on that of
his servant. This is the notable peculiarity of the Spanish law of negligence. It is, of course, in striking
contrast to the American doctrine that, in relations with strangers, the negligence of the servant is
conclusively the negligence of the master. chanrobles virtualawlibra ry chan robles virt ual law library

In the case before us the death of the child caused by a defect in the steering gear of the automobile
immediately raised the presumption that Leynes was negligent in selecting a defective automobile or in
his failure to maintain it in good condition after selection and the burden of proof was on him to show
that he had exercised the care of a good father of a family.

In that case we further said: "From the commencement of the use of the machine until the accident
occurred sufficient time had not elapsed to require an examination of the machine by the defendant as
a part of his duty of inspection and supervision. While it does not appear that the defendant formulated
rules and regulations for the guidance of the drivers and gave them proper instructions, designed for the
protection of the public and the passengers, the evidence shows, as we have seen, that the death of the
child was not caused by a failure to promulgate rules and regulations. It was caused by a defect in the
machine as to which the defendant has shown himself free from responsibility." chanrobles virtual law library

We, therefore, see that taxicab company did not perform its full duty when it furnished a safe and
proper car and a driver with a long and satisfactory record. It failed to comply with one of the essential
requirements of the law of negligence in this jurisdiction, that of supervision and instruction, including
the promulgation of proper rules and regulations and the formulation and publication of proper
instructions for their guidance in cases where such rules and regulations and instructions are necessary.
To repeat, it was found by the trial court, and that finding is fully sustained by the record, that it was the
custom of the driver who operated the machine on the night of the accident, to approach and pass over
railroad crossings without adequate precautions, and that such custom was known to and had been
sanctioned by the officials of the taxicab company, the president of the company testifying that none of
its drivers, especially the one who operated the car on the night of the accident, were accustomed to
stop or even reduce speed or take any other precaution in approaching and passing over railroad
crossings, no matter of what nature, unless they heard "the signal of a car." He testified that he himself
had ridden behind several of his drivers, among them the one who handled the automobile on the night
of the accident, and that it was settled practice, to which he made no objection and as to which he gave
no instructions, to approach and pass over railroad crossings without any effort to ascertain the
proximity of a train. These facts and circumstances bring the case within the doctrine enunciated in the
Litonjua case to which reference has already been made, and, at the same time, remove it from that
class of cases governed by Johnson vs. David. Not only has the defendant taxicab company failed to
rebut the presumption of negligence arising from the carelessness of its servant, but it has, in effect,
made those negligent acts its own by having observed and known the custom of its drivers without
disapproving it and without issuing instructions designed to supersede it. chanrobles vir tualawlibra ry chan robles virtual law lib rary

We are of the opinion that the trial court erred in fixing the amount of damages which the plaintiffs
suffered. Under the law, each of the plaintiffs, is entitled to recover the time, doctors' bills and hospital
bills and hospital bills and medicines, and any other item of expense which it was found necessary to
undergo by reason of the damages sustained. chanrobles virtualawlibra ry chanr obles virtual law lib rary

The plaintiff Butaro Yamada is entitled to be reimbursed for his hospital bill of P49, for the P50 which he
paid to Dr. Strahan, and for the loss of time which he suffered at the rate of P100 a month. The trial
court allowed him for certain alleged fees of doctors and expenses in hospitals and at hot springs in
Japan. He was also allowed P150 alleged by him to have been paid to a Japanese doctor in Manila. We
do not believe that the record warrants these allowances. As to the expenses in Japan, we may say that
the injury occurred to plaintiff on the 2nd of January and he remained in Manila for nearly 6 months
before going to Japan. According to the testimony of Dr. Strahan the plaintiff was in good physical
condition long before he left this country for Japan. His testimony is to the effect that the plaintiff
suffered no permanent injuries, the damage being limited to temporary shocks and bruises, and that he
would be ready for his usual occupation in about 3 months. According to plaintiff's own testimony he
went back to work 2 months after the injury, but, claiming he still felt pains, went to Japan. We do not
believe that we ought to accept the plaintiff's bare statement as to his physical condition after leaving
the Philippine Islands in defiance of the testimony of Dr. Strahan as to his physical condition 3 months
after the injury was received and particularly in view of the fact that he returned to work at the end of 2
months. As to the P150 alleged to have been paid to a Japanese doctor in Manila, we have grave doubts
whether he had sufficiently proved that item of expenditure. He does not give the name of the physician
to whom he paid the money and he presents no receipt or voucher from the person whom he paid. He
made no memorandum of the payment at the time or of the person to whom he paid it or of the date
on which it was paid. All of his testimony relating to the items which constitute his damage was based
on a memorandum made from memory on the morning of the trial. It seems to us that where the
sources of knowledge are to so large an extent within the knowledge and control of the person who
presents the evidence, he should be held rather strictly to presenting the best evidence that the
circumstances permit. If he had offered the Japanese doctor as a witness or if he had even produced
receipts from him, the matter would have borne quite a different aspect. chanrobles vir tualawlibra ry chan robles virtual law lib rary
We are accordingly of the opinion that the judgment in favor of this plaintiff should consist simply of the
loss of time, amounting to 2 months at P100 a month, his hospital bill of P49 and his doctor's bill of P50,
in all P299, with costs. chanr obles virtualawlib rary cha nrobles vir tual law libra ry

With respect to the plaintiff Takutaru Uyehara, the judgment in his favor must be also modified.
Concerning his condition we have substantially the same testimony by the same doctor that we had in
the case of Yamada. There were no permanent injuries. The plaintiff suffered merely from shock and
bruises. He was quite recovered in 3 months. It appears that he was earning P200 a month at the time of
his injury and that his hospital expense, including attendance of a physician, was P350. We are satisfied
from the record that he is entitled to P600 for 3 months' loss of wages and to P350 for hospital expenses
and medical attendance. As to the claim for P150 paid to a Japanese doctor, we have in substance the
same circumstances found in connection with the claim of the plaintiff Yamada, - no name, no date, no
memorandum, no receipt; nothing but the testimony of the plaintiff himself based upon date prepared
from memory. It is worthy of note also that both this plaintiff and plaintiff Yamada claim to have paid
exactly the same amount to Japanese doctors in Manila. chanrobles virtualawlib rary chan robles virt ual law library

Judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff Takutaru Uyehara for the sum of P950, and
costs. chanrobles vir tualawlibra ry chan robles virtual law lib rary

With respect to the judgment in favor of the plaintiff Kenjiro Karabayashi, we are clear that it must be
reduced in amount. This plaintiff was able, immediately after the accident occurred, to move about
readily an to assist his injured companions. He did not go to a hospital, or, so far as appeared, consult a
physician until some time after the accident. He alleges that he paid to Japanese doctors P310 and to
massage doctors P130, and that he paid P365 for medicines. The injury was received on the 2d of
January, 1913, and this caution was commenced in October of the same year. It seem to us incredible
that the plaintiff, who suffered and suffers from no physical injury testified to by any physician, should
have paid out during that time more than P800 for medicines and doctors. That sum exceeds the sums
claimed to have been paid out by the other plaintiffs, who were so badly injured that they were carried
in a semiconscious condition to the hospital and were unable to move without assistance for some
days.chanrobles virtualawlibra ry chan robles virtual law lib rary

This plaintiff complains of loss of memory as the only result of his injuries and claims that he is unable to
obtain a salary equivalent to that which he was receiving before the accident. He presents no evidence
of such loss of memory except his own statement, his physical condition at the time of the trial being
apparently perfect and there being at that time no evidence, as he himself admitted, of loss of memory.
He presented no doctor to testify as to services rendered, indeed, he does not even furnish the name of
the person to whom the money was paid, and he shows no receipts and produces no evidence except
his own statement with respect to the amount paid out for medicines. We believe that, under this
testimony, no damages should be allowed to this plaintiff except possibly salary for the short period
during which, by reason of shock, he may have been unable to render active service. He testified that he
lost two and one-half months' time, during which he did not work at all, and that his services were
worth P160 a month. chanro bles virtualawlib rary chan robles virt ual law library

The judgment of the Court of First Instance with respect to this plaintiff, Kenjiro Karabayashi, is modified
and judgment in his favor and against the Bachrach Garage & Taxicab Co. for P400 is hereby decreed,
with costs. chanrobles vir tualawlibra ry chan robles virtual law lib rary

It may be urged that the reductions in the amounts allowed the several plaintiffs by the trial court are
arbitrary, the evidence as to the damages sustained being uncontradicted and the trial court having
based its judgment thereon. It is clear, however, that we are in no way interfering with the rule so many
times laid down by this court that we will not interfere with the judgment of the trial court as to the
credibility of witnesses except where it appears that the court overlooked or misapplied facts or
circumstances of weight and influence appearing in the case. Here the trial court seems to have
overlooked those facts and circumstances top which we have adverted and which we have made the
basis of the modification. It nowhere appears in the decision of the trial court or elsewhere in the record
that it took any of those facts and circumstances into consideration. So ordered. chanrobles virtualawlib rary chan robles virt ual law library

Arellano, C.J., Torres, Carson and Araullo, JJ., concur.

Johnson, J., concurs in the result.
Trent, J., did not sit in the case.
G.R. No. 169891 November 2, 2006
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL RAILWAYS, Petitioner,
vs.
ETHEL BRUNTY and JUAN MANUEL M. GARCIA, Respondents.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CV No. 47567 and its Resolution2 denying the motion for reconsideration thereof. The assailed
decision affirmed with partial modification the ruling3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila,
Branch 20, directing petitioner Philippine National Railways (PNR) to indemnify respondents Ethel
Brunty and Juan Manuel M. Garcia for the death of Rhonda Brunty, and to pay actual and moral
damages, attorney’s fees and cost of suit.

Rhonda Brunty, daughter of respondent Ethel Brunty and an American citizen, came to the
Philippines for a visit sometime in January 1980. Prior to her departure, she, together with her
Filipino host Juan Manuel M. Garcia, traveled to Baguio City on board a Mercedes Benz sedan with
plate number FU 799, driven by Rodolfo L. Mercelita. It was about 12:00 midnight, January 25, 1980.
By then, PNR Train No. T-71, driven by Alfonso Reyes, was on its way to Tutuban, Metro Manila4 as
it had left the La Union station at 11:00 p.m., January 24, 1980.

By 2:00 a.m., Rhonda Brunty, Garcia and Mercelita were already approaching the railroad crossing
at Barangay Rizal, Moncada, Tarlac. Mercelita, driving at approximately 70 km/hr, drove past a
vehicle, unaware of the railroad track up ahead and that they were about to collide with PNR Train
No. T-71. Mercelita was instantly killed when the Mercedes Benz smashed into the train; the two
other passengers suffered serious physical injuries.5 A certain James Harrow 6 brought Rhonda
Brunty to the Central Luzon Doctor’s Hospital in Tarlac, where she was pronounced dead after ten
minutes from arrival. Garcia, who had suffered severe head injuries, was brought via ambulance to
the same hospital. He was transferred to the Manila Doctor’s Hospital, and later to the Makati
Medical Center for further treatment.7

On July 28, 1981, Ethel Brunty sent a demand letter 8 to the PNR demanding payment of actual,
compensatory, and moral damages, as a result of her daughter’s death. When PNR did not respond,
Ethel Brunty and Garcia, filed a complaint9 for damages against the PNR before the RTC of Manila.
The case was raffled to Branch 20 and was docketed as Civil Case No. 83-18645. They alleged that
the death of Mercelita and Rhonda Brunty, as well as the physical injuries suffered by Garcia, were
the direct and proximate result of the gross and reckless negligence of PNR in not providing the
necessary equipment at the railroad crossing in Barangay Rizal, Municipality of Moncada, Tarlac.
They pointed out that there was no flagbar or red light signal to warn motorists who were about to
cross the railroad track, and that the flagman or switchman was only equipped with a hand
flashlight.10 Plaintiffs likewise averred that PNR failed to supervise its employees in the performance
of their respective tasks and duties, more particularly the pilot and operator of the train. 11 They
prayed for the payment of the following damages:
1.) ₱200,000.00 as actual and compensatory damages to plaintiff Ethel Brunty;
2.) ₱2,800,000.00 for compensatory damages to plaintiff Ethel Brunty representing lost or unearned
income of Rhonda Brunty;
3.) Such amounts of moral and exemplary damages as may be warranted by the evidence adduced,
to plaintiff Ethel Brunty;
4.) At least ₱64,057.61 as actual damages representing medical expenses to plaintiff Juan Manuel
M. Garcia and at least ₱1,000,000.00 as unearned or lost income of said plaintiff;
5.) At least ₱72,760.00 as actual damages representing cost of the Mercedes Benz car to plaintiff
Juan Manuel M. Garcia;
6.) Such amounts of moral and exemplary damages as may be warranted by the evidence adduced,
to plaintiff Juan Manuel M. Garcia; and
7.) Attorney’s fees equivalent to at least 15% of the total award to plaintiffs herein. 12
In its Answer,13 PNR claimed that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family not only in the
selection but also in the supervision of its employees.14 By way of special and affirmative defense, it
stressed that it had the right of way on the railroad crossing in question, and that it has no legal duty
to put up a bar or red light signal in any such crossing. It insisted that there were adequate, visible,
and clear warning signs strategically posted on the sides of the road before the railroad crossing. It
countered that the immediate and proximate cause of the accident was Mercelita’s negligence, and
that he had the last clear chance to avoid the accident. The driver disregarded the warning signs, the
whistle blasts of the oncoming train and the flashlight signals to stop given by the guard.15 As
counterclaim, it prayed that it be awarded actual and compensatory damages, and litigation
expenses.16
Plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint17 dated July 28, 1986 to include, as party plaintiff, Chemical
Industries of the Philippines, Inc. (Chemphil), Garcia’s employer, who claimed to have paid for the
latter’s medical and hospitalization expenses, the services rendered by the funeral parlor of the
deceased, and the expenses in transferring the remains of Rhonda Brunty to the United States.18
After trial on the merits, the RTC rendered its Decision19 on May 21, 1990 in favor of plaintiffs. The
fallo reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs Ethel Brunty and Juan Manuel
M. Garcia and against the defendant Philippine National Railways directing the latter to pay the
former the sum of:
1. Thirty Thousand Pesos (₱30,000.00) Philippine Currency, for the death of Rhonda Brunty formerly
a resident of 1595 Ashland Avenue, Des Plaines, Illinois, U.S.A.;
2. One Million Pesos (₱1,000,000.00) Philippine Currency for moral and actual damages due the
heirs of Rhonda Brunty;
3. Seventy-Two Thousand Seven Hundred Sixty Pesos (₱72,760.00) Philippine Currency for
damages sustained by the Mercedes Benz;
4. Fifty Thousand Pesos (₱50,000.00) Philippine Currency as and for attorney's fees, and;
5. Costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.20

Aggrieved, the PNR appealed the case to the CA, raising the following errors:
I.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADJUDGING DEFENDANT-APPELLANT PNR LIABLE FOR THE
DEATH OF RHONDA BRUNTY AND THE CONSEQUENT AWARD OF DAMAGES DUE THE
HEIRS OF RHONDA BRUNTY.
II.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADJUDGING DEFENDANT-APPELLANT PNR LIABLE FOR THE
DAMAGES SUFFERED BY PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE’S MERCEDES BENZ IN THE AMOUNT OF
SEVENTY-TWO THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED AND SIXTY PESOS (₱72,760.00).
III.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN AWARDING ATTORNEY’S FEES TO THE PLAINTIFFS-
APPELLEES.21

In its Brief, PNR insisted that the sole and proximate cause of the accident was the negligence and
recklessness of Garcia and Mercelita.22 It insisted that it had provided adequate warning signals at
the railroad crossing23 and had exercised due care in the selection and supervision of its
employees.24 The RTC erred in awarding damages to Rhonda Brunty as she cannot be allowed to
receive what she is not in a position to give, having been a non-resident alien who did not own a
property in the Philippines.25 It likewise questioned the award of damages on the Mercedes Benz as
well as the grant of attorney’s fees.26 At the very least, Mercelita was guilty of contributory
negligence.27

For their part, appellees countered that appellant was grossly and recklessly negligent in not
properly providing the necessary equipment at the railroad crossing in Rizal, Moncada,
Tarlac;28 appellant was negligent in not exercising due diligence of a good father of a family in the
supervision of its employees, particularly the train operator Alfonso Reyes;29 the car was driven in a
careful and diligent manner, and at a moderate speed, with due regard to all traffic rules and
regulations at that particular time;30 the doctrine of "last clear chance" is not applicable;31 Ethel
Brunty is a non-resident alien who can rightfully file the instant case;32 and they are entitled to
recover damages from appellant.33

The CA rendered the assailed Decision34 on August 15, 2005. The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed decision is hereby AFFIRMED with PARTIAL
MODIFICATIONS, increasing the death indemnity award from ₱30,000.00 to ₱50,000.00, and
deleting the award for damages sustained by the Mercedes Benz.
SO ORDERED.35

The appellate court affirmed the findings of the RTC as to the negligence of the PNR. Considering
the circumstances prevailing at the time of the fatal accident, it ruled that the alleged safety
measures installed by the PNR at the railroad crossing were not merely inadequate – they did not
satisfy the well-settled safety standards in transportation.36 However, the CA did not agree with the
RTC’s findings on the contributory negligence of Mercelita, the driver of the Mercedes Benz. It held
that Mercelita could not have foreseen the harm that would befall him and the two other passengers
under the prevailing circumstances, thus, could not be considered guilty of contributory negligence. 37
The PNR, now petitioner, comes before this Court in this Petition for Review on Certiorari on the
following grounds:
I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN MANIFESTLY OVERLOOKING CERTAIN RELEVANT
FACTS NOT DISPUTED BY THE PARTIES AND WHICH, IF PROPERLY CONSIDERED, WOULD
JUSTIFY A DIFFERENT CONCLUSION SUCH AS:
THE RESPONDENTS’ DRIVER OVERTOOK ANOTHER VEHICLE BY ACCELERATING AT 70
KILOMETERS PER HOUR WITHIN JUST 50 YARDS AWAY FROM THE RAILROAD TRACKS.
II.
THE FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE COURT OF APPEALS ARE CONTRARY TO THOSE OF THE
TRIAL COURT REGARDING CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE OF THE RESPONDENTS’ DRIVER.
III.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT APPLYING THE DOCTRINE OF LAST CLEAR
CHANCE IN THE INSTANT CASE.38

Petitioner insists that the proximate cause of the mishap was Mercelita’s disregard of traffic rules
and regulations. Had the court considered the fact that Mercelita had overtaken another vehicle a
few yards before the railroad track, it would have reached a different conclusion. 39 Moreover,
petitioner asserts, considering that the decisions of the RTC and the CA vary as to whether or not
Mercelita was guilty of contributory negligence, the findings of the RTC should prevail. Thus,
Mercelita’s contributory negligence should not have been ignored. 40 Lastly, petitioner avers that
since there is freedom of control and greater maneuverability on the part of motor vehicles, it is
obvious that in railroad crossings, they have the last clear chance to prevent or avoid an unwanted
accident from taking place.41

In their Comment42 on the petition, respondents reiterate the findings of the RTC and the CA that the
breach by petitioner of its legal duty to provide adequate and necessary public safety device and
equipment within the area or scene of the accident was the proximate cause of the mishap. 43 While it
is true that as a general rule, the trial court is in the best position to evaluate and observe the
conduct and demeanor of the witnesses presented during the trial, the CA, in the exercise of its
appellate jurisdiction, has the vested right to modify, reject, or set aside the trial court’s evaluation
and findings.44 As to the application of the doctrine of last clear chance, respondents claim that said
issue is being raised for the first time in this petition.45 Lastly, respondents cite foreign jurisprudence
stating that if the violation is one which gives rise to liability per se for any resulting injury, the
defenses ordinarily available in actions for diligence are barred and the contributory negligence of
the person injured is no defense.46

The Court is thus tasked to answer the following factual questions: (1) As between petitioner and
Mercelita, whose negligence resulted in the unfortunate collision? (2) Is Mercelita (the driver of the
Mercedes Benz) guilty of contributory negligence? Finally, the application in this case of the doctrine
of last clear chance is likewise in question.

Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by those

considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing of
something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do. 47 In Corliss v. Manila Railroad
Company,48 this Court held that negligence is want of the care required by the circumstances. It is a
relative or comparative, not an absolute, term and its application depends upon the situation of the
parties and the degree of care and vigilance which the circumstances reasonably require. 49 In
determining whether or not there is negligence on the part of the parties in a given situation,
jurisprudence50 has laid down the following test: Did defendant, in doing the alleged negligent act,
use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the
same situation? If not, the person is guilty of negligence. The law, in effect, adopts the standard
supposed to be supplied by the imaginary conduct of the discreet pater familias of the Roman law.
The issue of who, between the parties, was negligent was thoroughly discussed by both the RTC
and the CA. In petitions for review under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, only questions of
law may be put into issue, and questions of fact as a general rule, cannot be entertained. The finding
of negligence by the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, is a question of fact which this Court cannot pass
upon as it would entail going into factual matters on which the finding of negligence was
based.51 The established rule is that factual findings of the CA affirming those of the trial court are
conclusive and binding on this Court.52

The records of the instant case show that both the RTC and the CA carefully examined the factual
circumstances surrounding the case, and we find no cogent reason to disturb the same. It is,
however, worthy to emphasize that petitioner was found negligent because of its failure to provide
the necessary safety device to ensure the safety of motorists in crossing the railroad track. As such,
it is liable for damages for violating the provisions of Article 2176 of the New Civil Code, viz:
Article 2176. Whoever, by act or omission, causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-
existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the
provisions of this Chapter.

In a long line of cases, the Court held that in order to sustain a claim based on quasi-delict, the
following requisites must concur: (1) damage to plaintiff; (2) negligence, by act or omission, of which
defendant, or some person for whose acts he must respond was guilty; and (3) connection of cause
and effect between such negligence and damage.53 Applying the foregoing requisites, the CA
correctly made the following conclusions:
It was clearly established that plaintiffs-appellees (respondents herein) sustained damage or injury
as a result of the collision. That there was negligence on the part of PNR is, likewise, beyond cavil.
Considering the circumstances prevailing at the time of the fatal accident, the alleged safety
measures installed by the PNR at the railroad crossing is not only inadequate but does not satisfy
well-settled safety standards in transportation. x x x
xxxx
x x x An examination of the photographs of the railroad crossing at Moncada, Tarlac presented as
evidence by PNR itself would yield the following: (1.) absence of flagbars or safety railroad bars; (2.)
inadequacy of the installed warning signals; and (3.) lack of proper lighting within the area. Thus,
even if there was a flagman stationed at the site as claimed by PNR (petitioner), it would still be
impossible to know or see that there is a railroad crossing/tracks ahead, or that there is an
approaching train from the Moncada side of the road since one’s view would be blocked by a cockpit
arena. x x x54

Moreover, the CA held that a vehicle coming from the Moncada side would have difficulty in knowing
that there is an approaching train because of the slight curve, more so, at an unholy hour as 2:00
a.m. Thus, it is imperative on the part of the PNR to provide adequate safety equipment in the area.55
It may broadly be stated that railroad companies owe to the public a duty of exercising a reasonable
degree of care to avoid injury to persons and property at railroad crossings, which duties pertain
both in the operation of trains and in the maintenance of the crossings. 56 Moreover, every
corporation constructing or operating a railway shall make and construct at all points where such
railway crosses any public road, good, sufficient, and safe crossings and erect at such points, at a
sufficient elevation from such road as to admit a free passage of vehicles of every kind, a sign with
large and distinct letters placed thereon, to give notice of the proximity of the railway, and warn
persons of the necessity of looking out for trains.57

This Court has previously determined the liability of the PNR for damages for its failure to put a cross
bar, or signal light, flagman or switchman, or semaphores. Such failure is evidence of negligence
and disregard of the safety of the public, even if there is no law or ordinance requiring it because
public safety demands that said device or equipment be installed. 58
In view of the foregoing, we affirm the factual findings of the CA as well as its conclusion on
petitioner’s negligence.

As to whether or not Mercelita was guilty of contributory negligence, we agree with petitioner.
Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the injured party, contributing as a legal cause to
the harm he has suffered, which falls below the standard to which he is required to conform for his
own protection.59 To hold a person as having contributed to his injuries, it must be shown that he
performed an act that brought about his injuries in disregard of warning or signs of an impending
danger to health and body.60 To prove contributory negligence, it is still necessary to establish a
causal link, although not proximate, between the negligence of the party and the succeeding injury.
In a legal sense, negligence is contributory only when it contributes proximately to the injury, and not
simply a condition for its occurrence.61

The court below found that there was a slight curve before approaching the tracks; the place was not
properly illuminated; one’s view was blocked by a cockpit arena; and Mercelita was not familiar with
the road. Yet, it was also established that Mercelita was then driving the Mercedes Benz at a speed
of 70 km/hr and, in fact, had overtaken a vehicle a few yards before reaching the railroad track.
Mercelita should not have driven the car the way he did. However, while his acts contributed to the
collision, they nevertheless do not negate petitioner’s liability. Pursuant to Article 217962 of the New
Civil Code, the only effect such contributory negligence could have is to mitigate liability, which,
however, is not applicable in this case, as will be discussed later.
1 âwphi 1

As to whether or not the doctrine of last clear chance is applicable, we rule in the negative. The
doctrine of last clear chance states that where both parties are negligent but the negligent act of one
is appreciably later than that of the other, or where it is impossible to determine whose fault or
negligence caused the loss, the one who had the last clear opportunity to avoid the loss but failed to
do so, is chargeable with the loss. Stated differently, the antecedent negligence of plaintiff does not
preclude him from recovering damages caused by the supervening negligence of defendant, who
had the last fair chance to prevent the impending harm by the exercise of due diligence. 63 The
proximate cause of the injury having been established to be the negligence of petitioner, we hold
that the above doctrine finds no application in the instant case.

We note that the damages awarded by the appellate court consist of (1) ₱50,000.00 as indemnity for
the death of Rhonda Brunty; (2) ₱1,000,000.00 as actual and moral damages due the heirs of
Rhonda Brunty; and (3) ₱50,000.00 as and by way of attorney’s fees. No damages, however, were
awarded for the injuries suffered by Garcia, yet, the latter never interposed an appeal before the CA
nor even before this Court. The record is, likewise, bereft of any allegation and proof as to the
relationship between Mercelita (the driver) and Rhonda Brunty. Hence, the earlier finding of
contributory negligence on the part of Mercelita, which generally has the effect of mitigation of
liability, does not apply.

As to the amount of damages awarded, a modification of the same is in order, specifically on the
award of actual and moral damages in the aggregate amount of ₱1,000,000.00.
Actual or compensatory damages are those awarded in order to compensate a party for an injury or
loss he suffered. They arise out of a sense of natural justice, aimed at repairing the wrong done. To
be recoverable, they must be duly proved with a reasonable degree of certainty. A court cannot rely
on speculation, conjecture, or guesswork as to the fact and amount of damages, but must depend
upon competent proof that they have suffered, and on evidence of the actual amount
thereof.64 Respondents, however, failed to present evidence for such damages; hence, the award of
actual damages cannot be sustained. However, as the heirs of Rhonda Brunty undeniably incurred
expenses for the wake and burial of the latter, we deem it proper to award temperate damages in the
amount of ₱25,000.00 pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence.65 This is in lieu of actual damages as it
would be unfair for the victim’s heirs to get nothing, despite the death of their kin, for the reason
alone that they cannot produce receipts.66

The relatives of the victim who incurred physical injuries in a quasi-delict are not proscribed from
recovering moral damages in meritorious cases.67 We, therefore, sustain the award of moral
damages in favor of the heirs of Rhonda Brunty.

Moral damages are not punitive in nature, but are designed to compensate and alleviate in some
way the physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded
feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury unjustly caused a person. Although
incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages must nevertheless be somehow proportional to
and in approximation of the suffering inflicted.68 In the instant case, the moral suffering of the heirs of
Rhonda Brunty was sufficiently established by Ethel Brunty in her deposition,69 viz:
Q: What have you felt as a result of the death of Rhonda?
A: I felt earnest anguish and mixed feelings of anger and extreme sorrow because she died so far
away and alone, and because her death could so easily be prevented if there had been adequate
and appropriate warning signals at the railroad crossing and it is just an unbearable and irreparable
loss. In so many ways, she was my life. It seemed to me that losing her was just like losing my own
life, or worst, and even now, there is no end to our bereavement. I am still on constant medication to
be able to sleep and to be able to perform my duties effectively in my job but it does not take away
the pain of loss.70

In People v. Teehankee, Jr.,71 and in Metro Manila Transit Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 72 we
awarded moral damages in the amount of ₱1,000,000.00 to the heirs of the deceased. In Victory
Liner, Inc. v. Heirs of Malecdan,73 the award of ₱100,000.00 as moral damages was held in keeping
with the purpose of the law, while in Macalinao v. Ong,74 the amount of ₱50,000.00 was held
sufficient.
1âwphi1

Considering the circumstances attendant in this case, we find that an award of ₱500,000.00 as
moral damages to the heirs of Rhonda Brunty is proper. In view of recent jurisprudence, indemnity of
₱50,000.00 for the death of Rhonda Brunty and attorney’s fees amounting to ₱50,000.00 is likewise
proper.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated August 15, 2005 is
AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATIONS. The award of actual damages is deleted, and in lieu thereof,
temperate damages of ₱25,000.00 is awarded to the heirs of Rhonda Brunty. The award of moral
damages is reduced to ₱500,000.00.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 168512 March 20, 2007
ORLANDO D. GARCIA, JR., doing business under the name and style COMMUNITY DIAGNOSTIC
CENTER and BU CASTRO,1 Petitioners,
vs.
RANIDA D. SALVADOR and RAMON SALVADOR, Respondents.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This is a petition for review 2 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the February 27, 2004
Decision3 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 58668 finding petitioner Orlando D. Garcia
liable for gross negligence; and its June 16, 2005 Resolution4 denying petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration.

On October 1, 1993, respondent Ranida D. Salvador started working as a trainee in the Accounting
Department of Limay Bulk Handling Terminal, Inc. (the Company). As a prerequisite for regular
employment, she underwent a medical examination at the Community Diagnostic Center (CDC).
Garcia who is a medical technologist, conducted the HBs Ag (Hepatitis B Surface Antigen) test and
on October 22, 1993, CDC issued the test result5 indicating that Ranida was "HBs Ag: Reactive."
The result bore the name and signature of Garcia as examiner and the rubber stamp signature of
Castro as pathologist.

When Ranida submitted the test result to Dr. Sto. Domingo, the Company physician, the latter
apprised her that the findings indicated that she is suffering from Hepatitis B, a liver disease. Thus,
based on the medical report6 submitted by Sto. Domingo, the Company terminated Ranida’s
employment for failing the physical examination.7

When Ranida informed her father, Ramon, about her ailment, the latter suffered a heart attack and
was confined at the Bataan Doctors Hospital. During Ramon’s confinement, Ranida underwent
another HBs Ag test at the said hospital and the result8 indicated that she is non-reactive. She
informed Sto. Domingo of this development but was told that the test conducted by CDC was more
reliable because it used the Micro-Elisa Method.

Thus, Ranida went back to CDC for confirmatory testing, and this time, the Anti-HBs test conducted
on her indicated a "Negative" result.9
Ranida also underwent another HBs Ag test at the Bataan Doctors Hospital using the Micro-Elisa
Method. The result indicated that she was non-reactive.10
Ranida submitted the test results from Bataan Doctors Hospital and CDC to the Executive Officer of
the Company who requested her to undergo another similar test before her re-employment would be
considered. Thus, CDC conducted another HBs Ag test on Ranida which indicated a "Negative"
result.11 Ma. Ruby G. Calderon, Med-Tech Officer-in-Charge of CDC, issued a Certification
correcting the initial result and explaining that the examining medical technologist (Garcia)
interpreted the delayed reaction as positive or reactive. 12
Thereafter, the Company rehired Ranida.

On July 25, 1994, Ranida and Ramon filed a complaint 13 for damages against petitioner Garcia and
a purportedly unknown pathologist of CDC, claiming that, by reason of the erroneous interpretation
of the results of Ranida’s examination, she lost her job and suffered serious mental anxiety, trauma
and sleepless nights, while Ramon was hospitalized and lost business opportunities.
On September 26, 1994, respondents amended their complaint14 by naming Castro as the "unknown
pathologist."

Garcia denied the allegations of gross negligence and incompetence and reiterated the scientific
explanation for the "false positive" result of the first HBs Ag test in his December 7, 1993 letter to the
respondents.15

For his part, Castro claimed that as pathologist, he rarely went to CDC and only when a case was
referred to him; that he did not examine Ranida; and that the test results bore only his rubber-stamp
signature.

On September 1, 1997,16 the trial court dismissed the complaint for failure of the respondents to
present sufficient evidence to prove the liability of Garcia and Castro. It held that respondents should
have presented Sto. Domingo because he was the one who interpreted the test result issued by
CDC. Likewise, respondents should have presented a medical expert to refute the testimonies of
Garcia and Castro regarding the medical explanation behind the conflicting test results on Ranida. 17
Respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed the trial court’s findings, the
dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and another one entered
ORDERING defendant-appellee Orlando D. Garcia, Jr. to pay plaintiff-appellant Ranida D. Salvador
moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00, exemplary damages in the amount of P50,000.00 and
attorney’s fees in the amount of P25,000.00.
SO ORDERED.18

The appellate court found Garcia liable for damages for negligently issuing an erroneous HBs Ag
result. On the other hand, it exonerated Castro for lack of participation in the issuance of the results.
After the denial of his motion for reconsideration, Garcia filed the instant petition.

The main issue for resolution is whether the Court of Appeals, in reversing the decision of the trial
court, correctly found petitioner liable for damages to the respondents for issuing an incorrect
HBsAG test result.

Garcia maintains he is not negligent, thus not liable for damages, because he followed the
appropriate laboratory measures and procedures as dictated by his training and experience; and that
he did everything within his professional competence to arrive at an objective, impartial and
impersonal result.

At the outset, we note that the issues raised are factual in nature. Whether a person is negligent or
not is a question of fact which we cannot pass upon in a petition for review on certiorari which is
limited to reviewing errors of law.19

Negligence is the failure to observe for the protection of the interest of another person that degree of
care, precaution and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, 20 whereby such other person
suffers injury. For health care providers, the test of the existence of negligence is: did the health care
provider either fail to do something which a reasonably prudent health care provider would have
done, or that he or she did something that a reasonably prudent health care provider would not have
done; and that failure or action caused injury to the patient;21 if yes, then he is guilty of negligence.
Thus, the elements of an actionable conduct are: 1) duty, 2) breach, 3) injury, and 4) proximate
causation.

All the elements are present in the case at bar.

Owners and operators of clinical laboratories have the duty to comply with statutes, as well as rules
and regulations, purposely promulgated to protect and promote the health of the people by
preventing the operation of substandard, improperly managed and inadequately supported clinical
laboratories and by improving the quality of performance of clinical laboratory examinations. 22 Their
business is impressed with public interest, as such, high standards of performance are expected
from them.

In F.F. Cruz and Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, we found the owner of a furniture shop liable for the
destruction of the plaintiff’s house in a fire which started in his establishment in view of his failure to
comply with an ordinance which required the construction of a firewall. In Teague v. Fernandez, we
stated that where the very injury which was intended to be prevented by the ordinance has
happened, non-compliance with the ordinance was not only an act of negligence, but also the
proximate cause of the death.23

In fine, violation of a statutory duty is negligence. Where the law imposes upon a person the duty to
do something, his omission or non-performance will render him liable to whoever may be injured
thereby.

Section 2 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 4688, otherwise known as The Clinical Laboratory Law,
provides:

Sec. 2. It shall be unlawful for any person to be professionally in-charge of a registered clinical
laboratory unless he is a licensed physician duly qualified in laboratory medicine and authorized by
the Secretary of Health, such authorization to be renewed annually.
No license shall be granted or renewed by the Secretary of Health for the operation and
maintenance of a clinical laboratory unless such laboratory is under the administration, direction and
supervision of an authorized physician, as provided for in the preceding paragraph.
Corollarily, Sections 9(9.1)(1), 11 and 25(25.1)(1) of the DOH Administrative Order No. 49-B Series
of 1988, otherwise known as the Revised Rules and Regulations Governing the Registration,
Operation and Maintenance of Clinical Laboratories in the Philippines, read:
Sec. 9. Management of the Clinical Laboratory:
9.1 Head of the Clinical Laboratory: The head is that person who assumes technical and
administrative supervision and control of the activities in the laboratory.
For all categories of clinical laboratories, the head shall be a licensed physician certified by the
Philippine Board of Pathology in either Anatomic or Clinical Pathology or both provided that:
(1) This shall be mandatory for all categories of free-standing clinical laboratories; all tertiary
category hospital laboratories and for all secondary category hospital laboratories located in areas
with sufficient available pathologist.
xxxx
Sec. 11. Reporting: All laboratory requests shall be considered as consultations between the
requesting physician and pathologist of the laboratory. As such all laboratory reports on various
examinations of human specimens shall be construed as consultation report and shall bear the
name of the pathologist or his associate. No person in clinical laboratory shall issue a report, orally
or in writing, whole portions thereof without a directive from the pathologist or his authorized
associate and only to the requesting physician or his authorized representative except in
emergencies when the results may be released as authorized by the pathologist.
xxxx
Sec. 25. Violations:
25.1 The license to operate a clinical laboratory may be suspended or revoked by the
Undersecretary of Health for Standards and Regulation upon violation of R.A. 4688 or the rules and
regulations issued in pursuance thereto or the commission of the following acts by the persons
owning or operating a clinical laboratory and the persons under their authority.
(1) Operation of a Clinical Laboratory without a certified pathologist or qualified licensed physician
authorized by the Undersecretary of Health or without employing a registered medical technologist
or a person not registered as a medical technologist in such a position.
And Section 29(b) of R.A. No. 5527, otherwise known as The Philippine Medical Technology Act of
1969, reads:
Section 29. Penal Provisions.- Without prejudice to the provision of the Medical Act of 1959, as
amended relating to illegal practice of Medicine, the following shall be punished by a fine of not less
than two thousand pesos nor more than five thousand pesos, or imprisonment for not less than six
months nor more than two years, or both, in the discretion of the court:
xxxx
(b) Any medical technologist, even if duly registered, who shall practice medical technology in the
Philippines without the necessary supervision of a qualified pathologist or physician authorized by
the Department of Health;
From the foregoing laws and rules, it is clear that a clinical laboratory must be administered, directed
and supervised by a licensed physician authorized by the Secretary of Health, like a pathologist who
is specially trained in methods of laboratory medicine; that the medical technologist must be under
the supervision of the pathologist or a licensed physician; and that the results of any examination
may be released only to the requesting physician or his authorized representative upon the direction
of the laboratory pathologist.

These rules are intended for the protection of the public by preventing performance of substandard
clinical examinations by laboratories whose personnel are not properly supervised. The public
demands no less than an effective and efficient performance of clinical laboratory examinations
through compliance with the quality standards set by laws and regulations.

We find that petitioner Garcia failed to comply with these standards.

First, CDC is not administered, directed and supervised by a licensed physician as required by law,
but by Ma. Ruby C. Calderon, a licensed Medical Technologist. 24 In the License to Open and
Operate a Clinical Laboratory for the years 1993 and 1996 issued by Dr. Juan R. Nañagas, M.D.,
Undersecretary for Health Facilities, Standards and Regulation, defendant-appellee Castro was
named as the head of CDC.25 However, in his Answer with Counterclaim, he stated:
3. By way of affirmative and special defenses, defendant pathologist further avers and plead as
follows:
Defendant pathologist is not the owner of the Community Diagnostic Center nor an employee of the
same nor the employer of its employees. Defendant pathologist comes to the Community Diagnostic
Center when and where a problem is referred to him. Its employees are licensed under the Medical
Technology Law (Republic Act No. 5527) and are certified by, and registered with, the Professional
Regulation Commission after having passed their Board Examinations. They are competent within
the sphere of their own profession in so far as conducting laboratory examinations and are allowed
to sign for and in behalf of the clinical laboratory. The defendant pathologist, and all pathologists in
general, are hired by laboratories for purposes of complying with the rules and regulations and
orders issued by the Department of Health through the Bureau of Research and Laboratories.
Defendant pathologist does not stay that long period of time at the Community Diagnostic Center but
only periodically or whenever a case is referred to him by the laboratory. Defendant pathologist does
not appoint or select the employees of the laboratory nor does he arrange or approve their
schedules of duty.26

Castro’s infrequent visit to the clinical laboratory barely qualifies as an effective administrative
supervision and control over the activities in the laboratory. "Supervision and control" means the
authority to act directly whenever a specific function is entrusted by law or regulation to a
subordinate; direct the performance of duty; restrain the commission of acts; review, approve, revise
or modify acts and decisions of subordinate officials or units. 27

Second, Garcia conducted the HBsAG test of respondent Ranida without the supervision of
defendant-appellee Castro, who admitted that:
[He] does not know, and has never known or met, the plaintiff-patient even up to this time nor has he
personally examined any specimen, blood, urine or any other tissue, from the plaintiff-patient
otherwise his own handwritten signature would have appeared in the result and not merely stamped
as shown in Annex "B" of the Amended Complaint.28

Last, the disputed HBsAG test result was released to respondent Ranida without the authorization of
defendant-appellee Castro.29
Garcia may not have intended to cause the consequences which followed after the release of the
HBsAG test result. However, his failure to comply with the laws and rules promulgated and issued
for the protection of public safety and interest is failure to observe that care which a reasonably
prudent health care provider would observe. Thus, his act or omission constitutes a breach of duty.
Indubitably, Ranida suffered injury as a direct consequence of Garcia’s failure to comply with the
mandate of the laws and rules aforequoted. She was terminated from the service for failing the
physical examination; suffered anxiety because of the diagnosis; and was compelled to undergo
several more tests. All these could have been avoided had the proper safeguards been scrupulously
followed in conducting the clinical examination and releasing the clinical report.

Article 20 of the New Civil Code provides:

Art. 20. Every person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall
indemnify the latter for the same.

The foregoing provision provides the legal basis for the award of damages to a party who suffers
damage whenever one commits an act in violation of some legal provision. 30 This was incorporated
by the Code Commission to provide relief to a person who suffers damage because another has
violated some legal provision.31

We find the Court of Appeals’ award of moral damages reasonable under the circumstances bearing
in mind the mental trauma suffered by respondent Ranida who thought she was afflicted by Hepatitis
B, making her "unfit or unsafe for any type of employment." 32 Having established her right to moral
damages, we see no reason to disturb the award of exemplary damages and attorney’s fees.
Exemplary damages are imposed, by way of example or correction for the public good, in addition to
moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages,33 and attorney’s fees may be recovered
when, as in the instant case, exemplary damages are awarded.34
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 58668 dated February 27,
2004 finding petitioner Orlando D. Garcia, Jr. guilty of gross negligence and liable to pay to
respondents ₱50,000.00 as moral damages, ₱50,000.00 as exemplary damages, and ₱25,000.00
as attorney’s fees, is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 158995 September 26, 2006
L.G. FOODS CORPORATION and VICTORINO GABOR, Vice-President and General
Manager, petitioners,
vs.
HON. PHILADELFA B. PAGAPONG-AGRAVIADOR, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of Regional
Trial Court, Branch 43, Bacolod City, and SPS. FLORENTINO and THERESA
VALLEJERA, respondents.
DECISION
GARCIA, J.:

Assailed and sought to be set aside in this petition for review on certiorari is the Decision1 dated April
25, 2003 of the Court of Appeals (CA), as reiterated in its Resolution of July 10, 2003, 2 in CA-G.R.
SP No. 67600, affirming an earlier Order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City, Branch
43, which denied the petitioners' motion to dismiss in Civil Case No. 99-10845, an action for
damages arising from a vehicular accident thereat instituted by the herein private respondents - the
spouses Florentino Vallejera and Theresa Vallejera - against the petitioners.

The antecedent facts may be briefly stated as follows:

On February 26, 1996, Charles Vallereja, a 7-year old son of the spouses Florentino Vallejera and
Theresa Vallejera, was hit by a Ford Fiera van owned by the petitioners and driven at the time by
their employee, Vincent Norman Yeneza y Ferrer. Charles died as a result of the accident.
In time, an Information for Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Homicide was filed against the driver
before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Bacolod City, docketed as Criminal Case No.
67787, entitled People of the Philippines v. Vincent Norman Yeneza.
Unfortunately, before the trial could be concluded, the accused driver committed suicide, evidently
bothered by conscience and remorse. On account thereof, the MTCC, in its order of September 30,
1998, dismissed the criminal case.

On June 23, 1999, in the RTC of Bacolod City, the spouses Vallejera filed a complaint 3 for damages
against the petitioners as employers of the deceased driver, basically alleging that as such
employers, they failed to exercise due diligence in the selection and supervision of their employees.
Thereat docketed as Civil Case No. 99-10845, the complaint was raffled to Branch 43 of the court.
In their Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim,4 the petitioners as defendants denied liability for the
death of the Vallejeras' 7-year old son, claiming that they had exercised the required due diligence in
the selection and supervision of their employees, including the deceased driver. They thus prayed in
their Answer for the dismissal of the complaint for lack of cause of action on the part of the Vallejera
couple.

During pre-trial, the defendant petitioners insisted that their dismissal prayer be resolved. Hence, the
trial court required them to file within ten days a memorandum of authorities supportive of their
position.

Instead, however, of the required memorandum of authorities, the defendant petitioners filed
a Motion to Dismiss, principally arguing that the complaint is basically a "claim for subsidiary liability
against an employer" under the provision of Article 1035 of the Revised Penal Code. Prescinding
therefrom, they contend that there must first be a judgment of conviction against their driver as a
condition sine qua non to hold them liable. Ergo, since the driver died during the pendency of the
criminal action, the sine qua non condition for their subsidiary liability was not fulfilled, hence the of
lack of cause of action on the part of the plaintiffs. They further argue that since the plaintiffs did not
make a reservation to institute a separate action for damages when the criminal case was filed, the
damage suit in question is thereby deemed instituted with the criminal action. which was already
dismissed.

In an Order dated September 4, 2001,6 the trial court denied the motion to dismiss for lack of merit
and set the case for pre-trial. With their motion for reconsideration having been denied by the same
court in its subsequent order7 of September 26, 2001, the petitioners then went on certiorari to
the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 67600, imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial judge in
refusing to dismiss the basic complaint for damages in Civil Case No. 99-10845.
In the herein assailed decision8 dated April 25, 2003, the CA denied the petition and upheld the trial
court. Partly says the CA in its challenged issuance:
xxx xxx xxx

It is clear that the complaint neither represents nor implies that the responsibility charged was the
petitioner's subsidiary liability under Art. 103, Revised Penal Code. As pointed out [by the trial court]
in the Order of September 4, 2001, the complaint does not even allege the basic elements for such a
liability, like the conviction of the accused employee and his insolvency. Truly enough, a civil action
to enforce subsidiary liability separate and distinct from the criminal action is even unnecessary.
xxx xxx xxx

Specifically, Civil Case No. 99-10845 exacts responsibility for fault or negligence under Art.
2176, Civil Code, which is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence
under the Revised Penal Code. Verily, therefore, the liability under Art. 2180, Civil Code, is direct
and immediate, and not conditioned upon prior recourse against the negligent employee or prior
showing of the latter's insolvency. (Underscoring in the original.)
In time, the petitioners moved for a reconsideration but their motion was denied by the CA in its
resolution9 of July 10, 2003. Hence, the petitioners' present recourse on their submission that the
appellate court committed reversible error in upholding the trial court's denial of their motion to
dismiss.

We DENY.

As the Court sees it, the sole issue for resolution is whether the spouses Vallejeras' cause of action
in Civil Case No. 99-10845 is founded on Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, as maintained by
the petitioners, or derived from Article 218010 of the Civil Code, as ruled by the two courts below.
It thus behooves us to examine the allegations of the complaint for damages in Civil Case No. 99-
10845. That complaint alleged, inter alia, as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
3. That defendant [LG Food Corporation] is the registered owner of a Ford Fiera Van with Plate No.
NMS 881 and employer sometime February of 1996 of one Vincent Norman Yeneza y Ferrer, a
salesman of said corporation;
4. That sometime February 26, 1996 at around 2:00 P.M. at Rosario St., Bacolod City, the minor son
of said plaintiffs [now respondents], Charles Vallejera, 7 years old, was hit and bumped by above-
described vehicle then driven by said employee, Vincent Norman Yeneza y Ferrer;
5. That the mishap was due to the gross fault and negligence of defendant's employee, who drove
said vehicle, recklessly, negligently and at a high speed without regard to traffic condition and safety
of other road users and likewise to the fault and negligence of the owner employer, herein
defendants LG Food Corporation who failed to exercise due diligence in the selection and
supervision of his employee, Vincent Norman Yeneza y Ferrer;
6. That as a result of said incident, plaintiffs' son suffered multiple body injuries which led to his
untimely demise on that very day;
7. That a criminal case was filed against the defendant's employee, docketed as Criminal Case No.
67787, (earlier filed as Crim. Case No. 96-17570 before RTC) before MTC-Branch III, entitled
"People v. Yeneza" for "Reckless Imprudence resulting to Homicide," but the same was dismissed
because pending litigation, then remorse-stricken [accused] committed suicide;
xxx xxx xxx
8. That the injuries and complications as well as the resultant death suffered by the late minor
Charles Vallejera were due to the negligence and imprudence of defendant's employee;
9. That defendant LG Foods Corporation is civilly liable for the negligence/imprudence of its
employee since it failed to exercise the necessary diligence required of a good father of the family in
the selection and supervision of his employee, Vincent Norman Yeneza y Ferrer which diligence if
exercised, would have prevented said incident. (Bracketed words and emphasis ours.)
Nothing in the foregoing allegations suggests, even remotely, that the herein petitioners are being
made to account for their subsidiary liability under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code. As
correctly pointed out by the trial court in its order of September 4, 2001 denying the
petitioners' Motion to Dismiss, the complaint did not even aver the basic elements for the subsidiary
liability of an employer under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, such as the prior conviction of
the driver in the criminal case filed against him nor his insolvency.

Admittedly, the complaint did not explicitly state that plaintiff Vallejeras were suing the defendant
petitioners for damages based on quasi-delict. Clear it is, however, from the allegations of the
complaint that quasi-delict was their choice of remedy against the petitioners. To stress, the plaintiff
spouses alleged in their complaint gross fault and negligence on the part of the driver and the failure
of the petitioners, as employers, to exercise due diligence in the selection and supervision of their
employees. The spouses further alleged that the petitioners are civilly liable for the
negligence/imprudence of their driver since they failed to exercise the necessary diligence required
of a good father of the family in the selection and supervision of their employees, which diligence, if
exercised, could have prevented the vehicular accident that resulted to the death of their 7-year old
son.
Section 2, Rule 2, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure defines cause of action as the "act or
omission by which a party violates the right of another." Such act or omission gives rise to an
obligation which may come from law, contracts, quasi contracts, delicts or quasi-delicts.11
Corollarily, an act or omission causing damage to another may give rise to two separate civil
liabilities on the part of the offender, i.e., 1) civil liability ex delicto;12 and 2) independent civil
liabilities, such as those (a) not arising from an act or omission complained of as felony (e.g., culpa
contractual or obligations arising from law;13 the intentional torts;14 and culpa aquiliana15); or (b)
where the injured party is granted a right to file an action independent and distinct from the criminal
action.16 Either of these two possible liabilities may be enforced against the offender. 17
Stated otherwise, victims of negligence or their heirs have a choice between an action to enforce the
civil liability arising from culpa criminal under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, and an action
for quasi-delict (culpa aquiliana) under Articles 2176 to 2194 of the Civil Code. If, as here, the action
chosen is for quasi-delict, the plaintiff may hold the employer liable for the negligent act of its
employee, subject to the employer's defense of exercise of the diligence of a good father of the
family. On the other hand, if the action chosen is for culpa criminal, the plaintiff can hold the
employer subsidiarily liable only upon proof of prior conviction of its employee. 18
Article 116119 of the Civil Code provides that civil obligation arising from criminal offenses shall be
governed by penal laws subject to the provision of Article 217720 and of the pertinent provision of
Chapter 2, Preliminary Title on Human Relation, and of Title XVIII of this Book, regulating damages.
Plainly, Article 2177 provides for the alternative remedies the plaintiff may choose from in case the
obligation has the possibility of arising indirectly from the delict/crime or directly from quasi-delict/tort.
The choice is with the plaintiff who makes known his cause of action in his initiatory pleading or
complaint,21 and not with the defendant who can not ask for the dismissal of the plaintiff's cause of
action or lack of it based on the defendant's perception that the plaintiff should have opted to file a
claim under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code.
Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, the liability of the employer is direct or immediate. It is not
conditioned upon prior recourse against the negligent employee and a prior showing of insolvency of
such employee.22

Here, the complaint sufficiently alleged that the death of the couple's minor son was caused by the
negligent act of the petitioners' driver; and that the petitioners themselves were civilly liable for the
negligence of their driver for failing "to exercise the necessary diligence required of a good father of
the family in the selection and supervision of [their] employee, the driver, which diligence, if
exercised, would have prevented said accident."

Had the respondent spouses elected to sue the petitioners based on Article 103 of the Revised
Penal Code, they would have alleged that the guilt of the driver had been proven beyond reasonable
doubt; that such accused driver is insolvent; that it is the subsidiary liability of the defendant
petitioners as employers to pay for the damage done by their employee (driver) based on the
principle that every person criminally liable is also civilly liable. 23 Since there was no conviction in the
criminal case against the driver, precisely because death intervened prior to the termination of the
criminal proceedings, the spouses' recourse was, therefore, to sue the petitioners for their direct and
primary liability based on quasi-delict.

Besides, it is worthy to note that the petitioners, in their Answer with Compulsory Counter-
Claim,24 repeatedly made mention of Article 2180 of the Civil Code and anchored their defense on
their allegation that "they had exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of [their]
employees." The Court views this defense as an admission that indeed the petitioners
acknowledged the private respondents' cause of action as one for quasi-delict under Article 2180 of
the Civil Code.

All told, Civil Case No. 99-10845 is a negligence suit brought under Article 2176 - Civil Code to
recover damages primarily from the petitioners as employers responsible for their negligent driver
pursuant to Article 2180 of the Civil Code. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not
only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
Thus, the employer is liable for damages caused by his employees and household helpers acting
within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former is not engaged in any business or
industry.

Citing Maniago v. CA,25 petitioner would argue that Civil Case No. 99-10845 should have been
dismissed for failure of the respondent spouses to make a reservation to institute a separate civil
action for damages when the criminal case against the driver was filed.
The argument is specious.
To start with, the petitioners' reliance on Maniago is obviously misplaced. There, the civil case was
filed while the criminal case against the employee was still pending. Here, the criminal case against
the employee driver was prematurely terminated due to his death. Precisely, Civil Case No. 99-
10845 was filed by the respondent spouses because no remedy can be obtained by them against
the petitioners with the dismissal of the criminal case against their driver during the pendency
thereof.

The circumstance that no reservation to institute a separate civil action for damages was made when
the criminal case was filed is of no moment for the simple reason that the criminal case was
dismissed without any pronouncement having been made therein. In reality, therefor, it is as if there
was no criminal case to speak of in the first place. And for the petitioners to insist for the conviction
of their driver as a condition sine qua non to hold them liable for damages is to ask for the
impossible.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit.

Costs against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
 2. Concept and Scope of Quasi-delict

G.R. No. L-48006 July 8, 1942

FAUSTO BARREDO, petitioner,
vs.
SEVERINO GARCIA and TIMOTEA ALMARIO, respondents.
Celedonio P. Gloria and Antonio Barredo for petitioner.
Jose G. Advincula for respondents.
BOCOBO, J.:

This case comes up from the Court of Appeals which held the petitioner herein, Fausto Barredo,
liable in damages for the death of Faustino Garcia caused by the negligence of Pedro Fontanilla, a
taxi driver employed by said Fausto Barredo.

At about half past one in the morning of May 3, 1936, on the road between Malabon and Navotas,
Province of Rizal, there was a head-on collision between a taxi of the Malate Taxicab driven by
Pedro Fontanilla and a carretela guided by Pedro Dimapalis. The carretela was overturned, and one
of its passengers, 16-year-old boy Faustino Garcia, suffered injuries from which he died two days
later. A criminal action was filed against Fontanilla in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, and he was
convicted and sentenced to an indeterminate sentence of one year and one day to two years
of prision correccional. The court in the criminal case granted the petition that the right to bring a
separate civil action be reserved. The Court of Appeals affirmed the sentence of the lower court in
the criminal case. Severino Garcia and Timotea Almario, parents of the deceased on March 7, 1939,
brought an action in the Court of First Instance of Manila against Fausto Barredo as the sole
proprietor of the Malate Taxicab and employer of Pedro Fontanilla. On July 8, 1939, the Court of
First Instance of Manila awarded damages in favor of the plaintiffs for P2,000 plus legal interest from
the date of the complaint. This decision was modified by the Court of Appeals by reducing the
damages to P1,000 with legal interest from the time the action was instituted. It is undisputed that
Fontanilla 's negligence was the cause of the mishap, as he was driving on the wrong side of the
road, and at high speed. As to Barredo's responsibility, the Court of Appeals found:
... It is admitted that defendant is Fontanilla's employer. There is proof that he exercised the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. (See p. 22, appellant's brief.) In fact it is
shown he was careless in employing Fontanilla who had been caught several times for violation of
the Automobile Law and speeding (Exhibit A) — violation which appeared in the records of the
Bureau of Public Works available to be public and to himself. Therefore, he must indemnify plaintiffs
under the provisions of article 1903 of the Civil Code.

The main theory of the defense is that the liability of Fausto Barredo is governed by the Revised
Penal Code; hence, his liability is only subsidiary, and as there has been no civil action against
Pedro Fontanilla, the person criminally liable, Barredo cannot be held responsible in the case. The
petitioner's brief states on page 10:
... The Court of Appeals holds that the petitioner is being sued for his failure to exercise all the
diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of Pedro Fontanilla to prevent
damages suffered by the respondents. In other words, The Court of Appeals insists on applying in
the case article 1903 of the Civil Code. Article 1903 of the Civil Code is found in Chapter II, Title 16,
Book IV of the Civil Code. This fact makes said article to a civil liability arising from a crime as in the
case at bar simply because Chapter II of Title 16 of Book IV of the Civil Code, in the precise words of
article 1903 of the Civil Code itself, is applicable only to "those (obligations) arising from wrongful or
negligent acts or commission not punishable by law.

The gist of the decision of the Court of Appeals is expressed thus:

... We cannot agree to the defendant's contention. The liability sought to be imposed upon him in this
action is not a civil obligation arising from a felony or a misdemeanor (the crime of Pedro
Fontanilla,), but an obligation imposed in article 1903 of the Civil Code by reason of his negligence in
the selection or supervision of his servant or employee.
The pivotal question in this case is whether the plaintiffs may bring this separate civil action against
Fausto Barredo, thus making him primarily and directly, responsible under article 1903 of the Civil
Code as an employer of Pedro Fontanilla. The defendant maintains that Fontanilla's negligence
being punishable by the Penal Code, his (defendant's) liability as an employer is only subsidiary,
according to said Penal code, but Fontanilla has not been sued in a civil action and his property has
not been exhausted. To decide the main issue, we must cut through the tangle that has, in the minds
of many confused and jumbled together delitos and cuasi delitos, or crimes under the Penal Code
and fault or negligence under articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code. This should be done, because
justice may be lost in a labyrinth, unless principles and remedies are distinctly envisaged.
Fortunately, we are aided in our inquiry by the luminous presentation of the perplexing subject by
renown jurists and we are likewise guided by the decisions of this Court in previous cases as well as
by the solemn clarity of the consideration in several sentences of the Supreme Tribunal of Spain.
Authorities support the proposition that a quasi-delict or "culpa aquiliana " is a separate legal
institution under the Civil Code with a substantivity all its own, and individuality that is entirely apart
and independent from delict or crime. Upon this principle and on the wording and spirit article 1903
of the Civil Code, the primary and direct responsibility of employers may be safely anchored.

The pertinent provisions of the Civil Code and Revised Penal Code are as follows:
CIVIL CODE
ART. 1089 Obligations arise from law, from contracts and quasi-contracts, and from acts and
omissions which are unlawful or in which any kind of fault or negligence intervenes.
xxx xxx xxx
ART. 1092. Civil obligations arising from felonies or misdemeanors shall be governed by the
provisions of the Penal Code.
ART. 1093. Those which are derived from acts or omissions in which fault or negligence, not
punishable by law, intervenes shall be subject to the provisions of Chapter II, Title XVI of this book.
xxx xxx xxx
ART 1902. Any person who by an act or omission causes damage to another by his fault or
negligence shall be liable for the damage so done.
ART. 1903. The obligation imposed by the next preceding article is enforcible, not only for personal
acts and omissions, but also for those of persons for whom another is responsible.

The father and in, case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are liable for any damages caused by
the minor children who live with them.
Guardians are liable for damages done by minors or incapacitated persons subject to their authority
and living with them.
Owners or directors of an establishment or business are equally liable for any damages caused by
their employees while engaged in the branch of the service in which employed, or on occasion of the
performance of their duties.
The State is subject to the same liability when it acts through a special agent, but not if the damage
shall have been caused by the official upon whom properly devolved the duty of doing the act
performed, in which case the provisions of the next preceding article shall be applicable.
Finally, teachers or directors of arts trades are liable for any damages caused by their pupils or
apprentices while they are under their custody.

The liability imposed by this article shall cease in case the persons mentioned therein prove that
they are exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage.
ART. 1904. Any person who pays for damage caused by his employees may recover from the latter
what he may have paid.

REVISED PENAL CODE

ART. 100. Civil liability of a person guilty of felony. — Every person criminally liable for a felony is
also civilly liable.
ART. 101. Rules regarding civil liability in certain cases. — The exemption from criminal liability
established in subdivisions 1, 2, 3, 5, and 6 of article 12 and in subdivision 4 of article 11 of this
Code does not include exemption from civil liability, which shall be enforced to the following rules:

First. In cases of subdivision, 1, 2 and 3 of article 12 the civil liability for acts committed by any
imbecile or insane person, and by a person under nine years of age, or by one over nine but under
fifteen years of age, who has acted without discernment shall devolve upon those having such
person under their legal authority or control, unless it appears that there was no fault or negligence
on their part.

Should there be no person having such insane, imbecile or minor under his authority, legal
guardianship, or control, or if such person be insolvent, said insane, imbecile, or minor shall respond
with their own property, excepting property exempt from execution, in accordance with the civil law.
Second. In cases falling within subdivision 4 of article 11, the person for whose benefit the harm has
been prevented shall be civilly liable in proportion to the benefit which they may have received.
The courts shall determine, in their sound discretion, the proportionate amount for which each one
shall be liable.

When the respective shares can not be equitably determined, even approximately, or when the
liability also attaches to the Government, or to the majority of the inhabitants of the town, and, in all
events, whenever the damage has been caused with the consent of the authorities or their agents,
indemnification shall be made in the manner prescribed by special laws or regulations.
Third. In cases falling within subdivisions 5 and 6 of article 12, the persons using violence or causing
the fear shall be primarily liable and secondarily, or, if there be no such persons, those doing the act
shall be liable, saving always to the latter that part of their property exempt from execution.
ART. 102. Subsidiary civil liability of innkeepers, tavern keepers and proprietors of establishment. —
In default of persons criminally liable, innkeepers, tavern keepers, and any other persons or
corporation shall be civilly liable for crimes committed in their establishments, in all cases where a
violation of municipal ordinances or some general or special police regulation shall have been
committed by them or their employees.

Innkeepers are also subsidiarily liable for the restitution of goods taken by robbery or theft within
their houses lodging therein, or the person, or for the payment of the value thereof, provided that
such guests shall have notified in advance the innkeeper himself, or the person representing him, of
the deposit of such goods within the inn; and shall furthermore have followed the directions which
such innkeeper or his representative may have given them with respect to the care of and vigilance
over such goods. No liability shall attach in case of robbery with violence against or intimidation
against or intimidation of persons unless committed by the innkeeper's employees.

ART. 103. Subsidiary civil liability of other persons. — The subsidiary liability established in the next
preceding article shall also apply to employers, teachers, persons, and corporations engaged in any
kind of industry for felonies committed by their servants, pupils, workmen, apprentices, or employees
in the discharge of their duties.
xxx xxx xxx
ART. 365. Imprudence and negligence. — Any person who, by reckless imprudence, shall commit
any act which, had it been intentional, would constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of
arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period; if it would have
constituted a less grave felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods
shall be imposed.

Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall commit an act which would otherwise
constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its medium and maximum
periods; if it would have constituted a less serious felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its
minimum period shall be imposed."

It will thus be seen that while the terms of articles 1902 of the Civil Code seem to be broad enough
to cover the driver's negligence in the instant case, nevertheless article 1093 limits cuasi-delitos to
acts or omissions "not punishable by law." But inasmuch as article 365 of the Revised Penal Code
punishes not only reckless but even simple imprudence or negligence, the fault or negligence under
article 1902 of the Civil Code has apparently been crowded out. It is this overlapping that makes the
"confusion worse confounded." However, a closer study shows that such a concurrence of scope in
regard to negligent acts does not destroy the distinction between the civil liability arising from a crime
and the responsibility for cuasi-delitos or culpa extra-contractual. The same negligent act causing
damages may produce civil liability arising from a crime under article 100 of the Revised Penal
Code, or create an action for cuasi-delito or culpa extra-contractual under articles 1902-1910 of the
Civil Code.

The individuality of cuasi-delito or culpa extra-contractual looms clear and unmistakable. This legal
institution is of ancient lineage, one of its early ancestors being the Lex Aquilia in the Roman Law. In
fact, in Spanish legal terminology, this responsibility is often referred to as culpa aquiliana. The
Partidas also contributed to the genealogy of the present fault or negligence under the Civil Code;
for instance, Law 6, Title 15, of Partida 7, says: "Tenudo es de fazer emienda, porque, como quier
que el non fizo a sabiendas en daño al otro, pero acaescio por su culpa."
The distinctive nature of cuasi-delitos survives in the Civil Code. According to article 1089, one of the
five sources of obligations is this legal institution of cuasi-delito or culpa extra-contractual: "los actos
. . . en que intervenga cualquier genero de culpa o negligencia." Then article 1093 provides that this
kind of obligation shall be governed by Chapter II of Title XVI of Book IV, meaning articles 1902-
0910. This portion of the Civil Code is exclusively devoted to the legal institution of culpa aquiliana.
Some of the differences between crimes under the Penal Code and the culpa aquiliana or cuasi-
delito under the Civil Code are:
1. That crimes affect the public interest, while cuasi-delitos are only of private concern.
2. That, consequently, the Penal Code punishes or corrects the criminal act, while the Civil Code, by
means of indemnification, merely repairs the damage.
3. That delicts are not as broad as quasi-delicts, because the former are punished only if there is a
penal law clearly covering them, while the latter, cuasi-delitos, include all acts in which "any king of
fault or negligence intervenes." However, it should be noted that not all violations of the penal law
produce civil responsibility, such as begging in contravention of ordinances, violation of the game
laws, infraction of the rules of traffic when nobody is hurt. (See Colin and Capitant, "Curso Elemental
de Derecho Civil," Vol. 3, p. 728.)

Let us now ascertain what some jurists say on the separate existence of quasi-delicts and the
employer's primary and direct liability under article 1903 of the Civil Code.
Dorado Montero in his essay on "Responsibilidad" in the "Enciclopedia Juridica Española" (Vol.
XXVII, p. 414) says:
El concepto juridico de la responsabilidad civil abarca diversos aspectos y comprende a diferentes
personas. Asi, existe una responsabilidad civil propiamente dicha, que en ningun casl lleva
aparejada responsabilidad criminal alguna, y otra que es consecuencia indeclinable de la penal que
nace de todo delito o falta."

The juridical concept of civil responsibility has various aspects and comprises different persons.
Thus, there is a civil responsibility, properly speaking, which in no case carries with it any criminal
responsibility, and another which is a necessary consequence of the penal liability as a result of
every felony or misdemeanor."

Maura, an outstanding authority, was consulted on the following case: There had been a collision
between two trains belonging respectively to the Ferrocarril Cantabrico and the Ferrocarril del Norte.
An employee of the latter had been prosecuted in a criminal case, in which the company had been
made a party as subsidiarily responsible in civil damages. The employee had been acquitted in the
criminal case, and the employer, the Ferrocarril del Norte, had also been exonerated. The question
asked was whether the Ferrocarril Cantabrico could still bring a civil action for damages against the
Ferrocarril del Norte. Maura's opinion was in the affirmative, stating in part (Maura, Dictamenes, Vol.
6, pp. 511-513):
Quedando las cosas asi, a proposito de la realidad pura y neta de los hechos, todavia menos
parece sostenible que exista cosa juzgada acerca de la obligacion civil de indemnizar los
quebrantos y menoscabos inferidos por el choque de los trenes. El titulo en que se funda la accion
para demandar el resarcimiento, no puede confundirse con las responsabilidades civiles nacidas de
delito, siquiera exista en este, sea el cual sea, una culpa rodeada de notas agravatorias que
motivan sanciones penales, mas o menos severas. La lesion causada por delito o falta en los
derechos civiles, requiere restituciones, reparaciones o indemnizaciones, que cual la pena misma
atañen al orden publico; por tal motivo vienen encomendadas, de ordinario, al Ministerio Fiscal; y
claro es que si por esta via se enmiendan los quebrantos y menoscabos, el agraviado excusa
procurar el ya conseguido desagravio; pero esta eventual coincidencia de los efectos, no borra la
diversidad originaria de las acciones civiles para pedir indemnizacion.
Estas, para el caso actual (prescindiendo de culpas contractuales, que no vendrian a cuento y que
tiene otro regimen), dimanan, segun el articulo 1902 del Codigo Civil, de toda accion u omision,
causante de daños o perjuicios, en que intervenga culpa o negligencia. Es trivial que acciones
semejantes son ejercitadas ante los Tribunales de lo civil cotidianamente, sin que la Justicia punitiva
tenga que mezclarse en los asuntos. Los articulos 18 al 21 y 121 al 128 del Codigo Penal, atentos al
espiritu y a los fines sociales y politicos del mismo, desenvuelven y ordenan la materia de
responsabilidades civiles nacidas de delito, en terminos separados del regimen por ley comun de la
culpa que se denomina aquiliana, por alusion a precedentes legislativos del Corpus Juris. Seria
intempestivo un paralelo entre aquellas ordenaciones, y la de la obligacion de indemnizar a titulo de
culpa civil; pero viene al caso y es necesaria una de las diferenciaciones que en el tal paralelo se
notarian.
Los articulos 20 y 21 del Codigo Penal, despues de distribuir a su modo las responsabilidades
civiles, entre los que sean por diversos conceptos culpables del delito o falta, las hacen extensivas a
las empresas y los establecimientos al servicio de los cuales estan los delincuentes; pero con
caracter subsidiario, o sea, segun el texto literal, en defecto de los que sean responsables
criminalmente. No coincide en ello el Codigo Civil, cuyo articulo 1903, dice; La obligacion que
impone el articulo anterior es exigible, no solo por los actos y omisiones propios, sino por los de
aquellas personas de quienes se debe responder; personas en la enumeracion de las cuales figuran
los dependientes y empleados de los establecimientos o empresas, sea por actos del servicio, sea
con ocasion de sus funciones. Por esto acontece, y se observa en la jurisprudencia, que las
empresas, despues de intervenir en las causas criminales con el caracter subsidiario de su
responsabilidad civil por razon del delito, son demandadas y condenadas directa y aisladamente,
cuando se trata de la obligacion, ante los tribunales civiles.
Siendo como se ve, diverso el titulo de esta obligacion, y formando verdadero postulado de nuestro
regimen judicial la separacion entre justicia punitiva y tribunales de lo civil, de suerte que tienen
unos y otros normas de fondo en distintos cuerpos legales, y diferentes modos de proceder,
habiendose, por añadidura, abstenido de asistir al juicio criminal la Compañia del Ferrocarril
Cantabrico, que se reservo ejercitar sus acciones, parece innegable que la de indemnizacion por los
daños y perjuicios que le irrogo el choque, no estuvo sub judice ante el Tribunal del Jurado, ni fue
sentenciada, sino que permanecio intacta, al pronunciarse el fallo de 21 de marzo. Aun cuando el
veredicto no hubiese sido de inculpabilidad, mostrose mas arriba, que tal accion quedaba
legitimamente reservada para despues del proceso; pero al declararse que no existio delito, ni
responsabilidad dimanada de delito, materia unica sobre que tenian jurisdiccion aquellos
juzgadores, se redobla el motivo para la obligacion civil ex lege, y se patentiza mas y mas que la
accion para pedir su cumplimiento permanece incolume, extraña a la cosa juzgada.

As things are, apropos of the reality pure and simple of the facts, it seems less tenable that there
should be res judicata with regard to the civil obligation for damages on account of the losses
caused by the collision of the trains. The title upon which the action for reparation is based cannot be
confused with the civil responsibilities born of a crime, because there exists in the latter, whatever
each nature, a culpa surrounded with aggravating aspects which give rise to penal measures that
are more or less severe. The injury caused by a felony or misdemeanor upon civil rights requires
restitutions, reparations, or indemnifications which, like the penalty itself, affect public order; for this
reason, they are ordinarily entrusted to the office of the prosecuting attorney; and it is clear that if by
this means the losses and damages are repaired, the injured party no longer desires to seek another
relief; but this coincidence of effects does not eliminate the peculiar nature of civil actions to ask for
indemnity.

Such civil actions in the present case (without referring to contractual faults which are not pertinent
and belong to another scope) are derived, according to article 1902 of the Civil Code, from every act
or omission causing losses and damages in which culpa or negligence intervenes. It is unimportant
that such actions are every day filed before the civil courts without the criminal courts interfering
therewith. Articles 18 to 21 and 121 to 128 of the Penal Code, bearing in mind the spirit and the
social and political purposes of that Code, develop and regulate the matter of civil
responsibilities arising from a crime, separately from the regime under common law, of culpa which
is known as aquiliana, in accordance with legislative precedent of the Corpus Juris. It would be
unwarranted to make a detailed comparison between the former provisions and that regarding the
obligation to indemnify on account of civil culpa; but it is pertinent and necessary to point out to one
of such differences.

Articles 20 and 21 of the Penal Code, after distriburing in their own way the civil responsibilities
among those who, for different reasons, are guilty of felony or misdemeanor, make such civil
responsibilities applicable to enterprises and establishments for which the guilty parties render
service, but with subsidiary character, that is to say, according to the wording of the Penal Code, in
default of those who are criminally responsible. In this regard, the Civil Code does not coincide
because article 1903 says: "The obligation imposed by the next preceding article is demandable, not
only for personal acts and omissions, but also for those of persons for whom another is responsible."
Among the persons enumerated are the subordinates and employees of establishments or
enterprises, either for acts during their service or on the occasion of their functions. It is for this
reason that it happens, and it is so observed in judicial decisions, that the companies or enterprises,
after taking part in the criminal cases because of their subsidiary civil responsibility by reason of the
crime, are sued and sentenced directly and separately with regard to the obligation, before the civil
courts.

Seeing that the title of this obligation is different, and the separation between punitive justice and the
civil courts being a true postulate of our judicial system, so that they have different fundamental
norms in different codes, as well as different modes of procedure, and inasmuch as the Compaña
del Ferrocarril Cantabrico has abstained from taking part in the criminal case and has reserved the
right to exercise its actions, it seems undeniable that the action for indemnification for the losses and
damages caused to it by the collision was not sub judice before the Tribunal del Jurado, nor was it
the subject of a sentence, but it remained intact when the decision of March 21 was rendered. Even
if the verdict had not been that of acquittal, it has already been shown that such action had been
legitimately reserved till after the criminal prosecution; but because of the declaration of the non-
existence of the felony and the non-existence of the responsibility arising from the crime, which was
the sole subject matter upon which the Tribunal del Jurado had jurisdiction, there is greater reason
for the civil obligation ex lege, and it becomes clearer that the action for its enforcement remain
intact and is not res judicata.

Laurent, a jurist who has written a monumental work on the French Civil Code, on which the Spanish
Civil Code is largely based and whose provisions on cuasi-delito or culpa extra-contractual are
similar to those of the Spanish Civil Code, says, referring to article 1384 of the French Civil Code
which corresponds to article 1903, Spanish Civil Code:
The action can be brought directly against the person responsible (for another), without including the
author of the act. The action against the principal is accessory in the sense that it implies the
existence of a prejudicial act committed by the employee, but it is not subsidiary in the sense that it
can not be instituted till after the judgment against the author of the act or at least, that it is
subsidiary to the principal action; the action for responsibility (of the employer) is in itself a principal
action. (Laurent, Principles of French Civil Law, Spanish translation, Vol. 20, pp. 734-735.)
Amandi, in his "Cuestionario del Codigo Civil Reformado" (Vol. 4, pp. 429, 430), declares that the
responsibility of the employer is principal and not subsidiary. He writes:
Cuestion 1. La responsabilidad declarada en el articulo 1903 por las acciones u omisiones de
aquellas personas por las que se debe responder, es subsidiaria? es principal? Para contestar a
esta pregunta es necesario saber, en primer lugar, en que se funda el precepto legal. Es que
realmente se impone una responsabilidad por una falta ajena? Asi parece a primera vista; pero
semejante afirmacion seria contraria a la justicia y a la maxima universal, segun la que las faltas son
personales, y cada uno responde de aquellas que le son imputables. La responsabilidad de que
tratamos se impone con ocasion de un delito o culpa, pero no por causa de ellos, sino por causa del
causi delito, esto es, de la imprudencia o de la negligencia del padre, del tutor, del dueño o director
del establecimiento, del maestro, etc. Cuando cualquiera de las personas que enumera el articulo
citado (menores de edad, incapacitados, dependientes, aprendices) causan un daño, la ley presume
que el padre, el tutor, el maestro, etc., han cometido una falta de negligencia para prevenir o evitar
el daño. Esta falta es la que la ley castiga. No hay, pues, responsabilidad por un hecho ajeno, sino
en la apariencia; en realidad la responsabilidad se exige por un hecho propio. La idea de que esa
responsabilidad sea subsidiaria es, por lo tanto, completamente inadmisible.
Question No. 1. Is the responsibility declared in article 1903 for the acts or omissions of those
persons for who one is responsible, subsidiary or principal? In order to answer this question it is
necessary to know, in the first place, on what the legal provision is based. Is it true that there is a
responsibility for the fault of another person? It seems so at first sight; but such assertion would be
contrary to justice and to the universal maxim that all faults are personal, and that everyone is liable
for those faults that can be imputed to him. The responsibility in question is imposed on the occasion
of a crime or fault, but not because of the same, but because of the cuasi-delito, that is to say, the
imprudence or negligence of the father, guardian, proprietor or manager of the establishment, of the
teacher, etc. Whenever anyone of the persons enumerated in the article referred to (minors,
incapacitated persons, employees, apprentices) causes any damage, the law presumes that the
father, guardian, teacher, etc. have committed an act of negligence in not preventing or avoiding the
damage. It is this fault that is condemned by the law. It is, therefore, only apparent that there is a
responsibility for the act of another; in reality the responsibility exacted is for one's own act. The idea
that such responsibility is subsidiary is, therefore, completely inadmissible.
Oyuelos, in his "Digesto: Principios, Doctrina y Jurisprudencia, Referentes al Codigo Civil Español,"
says in Vol. VII, p. 743:
Es decir, no responde de hechos ajenos, porque se responde solo de su propia culpa, doctrina del
articulo 1902; mas por excepcion, se responde de la ajena respecto de aquellas personas con las
que media algun nexo o vinculo, que motiva o razona la responsabilidad. Esta responsabilidad, es
directa o es subsidiaria? En el orden penal, el Codigo de esta clase distingue entre menores e
incapacitados y los demas, declarando directa la primera (articulo 19) y subsidiaria la segunda
(articulos 20 y 21); pero en el orden civil, en el caso del articulo 1903, ha de entenderse directa, por
el tenor del articulo que impone la responsabilidad precisamente "por los actos de aquellas
personas de quienes se deba responder."

That is to say, one is not responsible for the acts of others, because one is liable only for his own
faults, this being the doctrine of article 1902; but, by exception, one is liable for the acts of those
persons with whom there is a bond or tie which gives rise to the responsibility. Is this responsibility
direct or subsidiary? In the order of the penal law, the Penal Code distinguishes between minors and
incapacitated persons on the one hand, and other persons on the other, declaring that the
responsibility for the former is direct (article 19), and for the latter, subsidiary (articles 20 and 21); but
in the scheme of the civil law, in the case of article 1903, the responsibility should be understood as
direct, according to the tenor of that articles, for precisely it imposes responsibility "for the acts of
those persons for whom one should be responsible."

Coming now to the sentences of the Supreme Tribunal of Spain, that court has upheld the principles
above set forth: that a quasi-delict or culpa extra-contractual is a separate and distinct legal
institution, independent from the civil responsibility arising from criminal liability, and that an
employer is, under article 1903 of the Civil Code, primarily and directly responsible for the negligent
acts of his employee.

One of the most important of those Spanish decisions is that of October 21, 1910. In that case,
Ramon Lafuente died as the result of having been run over by a street car owned by the "compañia
Electric Madrileña de Traccion." The conductor was prosecuted in a criminal case but he was
acquitted. Thereupon, the widow filed a civil action against the street car company, paying for
damages in the amount of 15,000 pesetas. The lower court awarded damages; so the company
appealed to the Supreme Tribunal, alleging violation of articles 1902 and 1903 of the Civil Code
because by final judgment the non-existence of fault or negligence had been declared. The Supreme
Court of Spain dismissed the appeal, saying:
Considerando que el primer motivo del recurso se funda en el equivocado supuesto de que el
Tribunal a quo, al condonar a la compañia Electrica Madrileña al pago del daño causado con la
muerte de Ramon La fuente Izquierdo, desconoce el valor y efectos juridicos de la sentencia
absolutoria deictada en la causa criminal que se siguio por el mismo hecho, cuando es lo cierto que
de este han conocido las dos jurisdicciones bajo diferentes as pectos, y como la de lo criminal
declrao dentro de los limites de su competencia que el hecho de que se trata no era constitutivo de
delito por no haber mediado descuido o negligencia graves, lo que no excluye, siendo este el unico
fundamento del fallo absolutorio, el concurso de la culpa o negligencia no califacadas, fuente de
obligaciones civiles segun el articulo 1902 del Codigo, y que alcanzan, segun el 1903, netre otras
perosnas, a los Directores de establecimientos o empresas por los daños causados por sus
dependientes en determinadas condiciones, es manifesto que la de lo civil, al conocer del mismo
hehco baho este ultimo aspecto y al condenar a la compañia recurrente a la indemnizacion del daño
causado por uno de sus empleados, lejos de infringer los mencionados textos, en relacion con el
articulo 116 de la Ley de Enjuciamiento Criminal, se ha atenido estrictamente a ellos, sin invadir
atribuciones ajenas a su jurisdiccion propia, ni contrariar en lo mas minimo el fallo recaido en la
causa.

Considering that the first ground of the appeal is based on the mistaken supposition that the trial
court, in sentencing the Compañia Madrileña to the payment of the damage caused by the death of
Ramon Lafuente Izquierdo, disregards the value and juridical effects of the sentence of acquittal
rendered in the criminal case instituted on account of the same act, when it is a fact that the two
jurisdictions had taken cognizance of the same act in its different aspects, and as the criminal
jurisdiction declared within the limits of its authority that the act in question did not constitute a felony
because there was no grave carelessness or negligence, and this being the only basis of acquittal, it
does no exclude the co-existence of fault or negligence which is not qualified, and is a source of civil
obligations according to article 1902 of the Civil Code, affecting, in accordance with article 1903,
among other persons, the managers of establishments or enterprises by reason of the damages
caused by employees under certain conditions, it is manifest that the civil jurisdiccion in taking
cognizance of the same act in this latter aspect and in ordering the company, appellant herein, to
pay an indemnity for the damage caused by one of its employees, far from violating said legal
provisions, in relation with article 116 of the Law of Criminal Procedure, strictly followed the same,
without invading attributes which are beyond its own jurisdiction, and without in any way
contradicting the decision in that cause. (Emphasis supplied.)

It will be noted, as to the case just cited:

First. That the conductor was not sued in a civil case, either separately or with the street car
company. This is precisely what happens in the present case: the driver, Fontanilla, has not been
sued in a civil action, either alone or with his employer.
Second. That the conductor had been acquitted of grave criminal negligence, but the Supreme
Tribunal of Spain said that this did not exclude the co-existence of fault or negligence, which is not
qualified, on the part of the conductor, under article 1902 of the Civil Code. In the present case, the
taxi driver was found guilty of criminal negligence, so that if he had even sued for his civil
responsibility arising from the crime, he would have been held primarily liable for civil damages, and
Barredo would have been held subsidiarily liable for the same. But the plaintiffs are directly suing
Barredo, on his primary responsibility because of his own presumed negligence — which he did not
overcome — under article 1903. Thus, there were two liabilities of Barredo: first, the subsidiary one
because of the civil liability of the taxi driver arising from the latter's criminal negligence; and,
second, Barredo's primary liability as an employer under article 1903. The plaintiffs were free to
choose which course to take, and they preferred the second remedy. In so doing, they were acting
within their rights. It might be observed in passing, that the plaintiff choose the more expeditious and
effective method of relief, because Fontanilla was either in prison, or had just been released, and
besides, he was probably without property which might be seized in enforcing any judgment against
him for damages.
Third. That inasmuch as in the above sentence of October 21, 1910, the employer was held liable
civilly, notwithstanding the acquittal of the employee (the conductor) in a previous criminal case, with
greater reason should Barredo, the employer in the case at bar, be held liable for damages in a civil
suit filed against him because his taxi driver had been convicted. The degree of negligence of the
conductor in the Spanish case cited was less than that of the taxi driver, Fontanilla, because the
former was acquitted in the previous criminal case while the latter was found guilty of criminal
negligence and was sentenced to an indeterminate sentence of one year and one day to two years
of prision correccional.
(See also Sentence of February 19, 1902, which is similar to the one above quoted.)

In the Sentence of the Supreme Court of Spain, dated February 14, 1919, an action was brought
against a railroad company for damages because the station agent, employed by the company, had
unjustly and fraudulently, refused to deliver certain articles consigned to the plaintiff. The Supreme
Court of Spain held that this action was properly under article 1902 of the Civil Code, the court
saying:
Considerando que la sentencia discutida reconoce, en virtud de los hechos que consigna con
relacion a las pruebas del pleito: 1.º, que las expediciones facturadas por la compañia ferroviaria a
la consignacion del actor de las vasijas vacias que en su demanda relacionan tenian como fin el que
este las devolviera a sus remitentes con vinos y alcoholes; 2.º, que llegadas a su destino tales
mercanias no se quisieron entregar a dicho consignatario por el jefe de la estacion sin motivo
justificado y con intencion dolosa, y 3.º, que la falta de entrega de estas expediciones al tiempo de
reclamarlas el demandante le originaron daños y perjuicios en cantidad de bastante importancia
como expendedor al por mayor que era de vinos y alcoholes por las ganancias que dejo de obtener
al verse privado de servir los pedidos que se le habian hecho por los remitentes en los envases:
Considerando que sobre esta base hay necesidad de estimar los cuatro motivos que integran este
recurso, porque la demanda inicial del pleito a que se contrae no contiene accion que nazca del
incumplimiento del contrato de transporte, toda vez que no se funda en el retraso de la llegada de
las mercancias ni de ningun otro vinculo contractual entre las partes contendientes, careciendo, por
tanto, de aplicacion el articulo 371 del Codigo de Comercio, en que principalmente descansa el fallo
recurrido, sino que se limita a pedir la reparaction de los daños y perjuicios producidos en el
patrimonio del actor por la injustificada y dolosa negativa del porteador a la entrega de las
mercancias a su nombre consignadas, segun lo reconoce la sentencia, y cuya responsabilidad esta
claramente sancionada en el articulo 1902 del Codigo Civil, que obliga por el siguiente a la
Compañia demandada como ligada con el causante de aquellos por relaciones de caracter
economico y de jurarquia administrativa.

Considering that the sentence, in question recognizes, in virtue of the facts which it declares, in
relation to the evidence in the case: (1) that the invoice issued by the railroad company in favor of
the plaintiff contemplated that the empty receptacles referred to in the complaint should be returned
to the consignors with wines and liquors; (2) that when the said merchandise reached their
destination, their delivery to the consignee was refused by the station agent without justification and
with fraudulent intent, and (3) that the lack of delivery of these goods when they were demanded by
the plaintiff caused him losses and damages of considerable importance, as he was a wholesale
vendor of wines and liquors and he failed to realize the profits when he was unable to fill the orders
sent to him by the consignors of the receptacles:

Considering that upon this basis there is need of upholding the four assignments of error, as the
original complaint did not contain any cause of action arising from non-fulfillment of a contract of
transportation, because the action was not based on the delay of the goods nor on any contractual
relation between the parties litigant and, therefore, article 371 of the Code of Commerce, on which
the decision appealed from is based, is not applicable; but it limits to asking for reparation for losses
and damages produced on the patrimony of the plaintiff on account of the unjustified and fraudulent
refusal of the carrier to deliver the goods consigned to the plaintiff as stated by the sentence, and the
carrier's responsibility is clearly laid down in article 1902 of the Civil Code which binds, in virtue of
the next article, the defendant company, because the latter is connected with the person who
caused the damage by relations of economic character and by administrative hierarchy. (Emphasis
supplied.)

The above case is pertinent because it shows that the same act may come under both the Penal
Code and the Civil Code. In that case, the action of the agent was unjustified and fraudulent and
therefore could have been the subject of a criminal action. And yet, it was held to be also a proper
subject of a civil action under article 1902 of the Civil Code. It is also to be noted that it was the
employer and not the employee who was being sued.

Let us now examine the cases previously decided by this Court.

In the leading case of Rakes vs. Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Co. (7 Phil., 359, 362-365 [year 1907]), the
trial court awarded damages to the plaintiff, a laborer of the defendant, because the latter had
negligently failed to repair a tramway in consequence of which the rails slid off while iron was being
transported, and caught the plaintiff whose leg was broken. This Court held:
It is contended by the defendant, as its first defense to the action that the necessary conclusion from
these collated laws is that the remedy for injuries through negligence lies only in a criminal action in
which the official criminally responsible must be made primarily liable and his employer held only
subsidiarily to him. According to this theory the plaintiff should have procured the arrest of the
representative of the company accountable for not repairing the track, and on his prosecution a
suitable fine should have been imposed, payable primarily by him and secondarily by his employer.

This reasoning misconceived the plan of the Spanish codes upon this subject. Article 1093 of the
Civil Code makes obligations arising from faults or negligence not punished by the law, subject to
the provisions of Chapter II of Title XVI. Section 1902 of that chapter reads:
"A person who by an act or omission causes damage to another when there is fault or negligence
shall be obliged to repair the damage so done.
"SEC. 1903. The obligation imposed by the preceeding article is demandable, not only for personal
acts and omissions, but also for those of the persons for whom they should be responsible.
"The father, and on his death or incapacity, the mother, is liable for the damages caused by the
minors who live with them.
xxx xxx xxx
"Owners or directors of an establishment or enterprise are equally liable for the damages caused by
their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter may be employed or in the
performance of their duties.
xxx xxx xxx

"The liability referred to in this article shall cease when the persons mentioned therein prove that
they employed all the diligence of a good father of a family to avoid the damage."
As an answer to the argument urged in this particular action it may be sufficient to point out that
nowhere in our general statutes is the employer penalized for failure to provide or maintain safe
appliances for his workmen. His obligation therefore is one 'not punished by the laws' and falls under
civil rather than criminal jurisprudence. But the answer may be a broader one. We should be
reluctant, under any conditions, to adopt a forced construction of these scientific codes, such as is
proposed by the defendant, that would rob some of these articles of effect, would shut out litigants
against their will from the civil courts, would make the assertion of their rights dependent upon the
selection for prosecution of the proper criminal offender, and render recovery doubtful by reason of
the strict rules of proof prevailing in criminal actions. Even if these articles had always stood alone,
such a construction would be unnecessary, but clear light is thrown upon their meaning by the
provisions of the Law of Criminal Procedure of Spain (Ley de Enjuiciamiento Criminal), which,
though never in actual force in these Islands, was formerly given a suppletory or explanatory effect.
Under article 111 of this law, both classes of action, civil and criminal, might be prosecuted jointly or
separately, but while the penal action was pending the civil was suspended. According to article 112,
the penal action once started, the civil remedy should be sought therewith, unless it had been
waived by the party injured or been expressly reserved by him for civil proceedings for the future. If
the civil action alone was prosecuted, arising out of a crime that could be enforced only on private
complaint, the penal action thereunder should be extinguished. These provisions are in harmony
with those of articles 23 and 133 of our Penal Code on the same subject.

An examination of this topic might be carried much further, but the citation of these articles suffices
to show that the civil liability was not intended to be merged in the criminal nor even to be
suspended thereby, except as expressly provided in the law. Where an individual is civilly liable for a
negligent act or omission, it is not required that the injured party should seek out a third person
criminally liable whose prosecution must be a condition precedent to the enforcement of the civil
right.

Under article 20 of the Penal Code the responsibility of an employer may be regarded as subsidiary
in respect of criminal actions against his employees only while they are in process of prosecution, or
in so far as they determine the existence of the criminal act from which liability arises, and his
obligation under the civil law and its enforcement in the civil courts is not barred thereby unless by
the election of the injured person. Inasmuch as no criminal proceeding had been instituted, growing
our of the accident in question, the provisions of the Penal Code can not affect this action. This
construction renders it unnecessary to finally determine here whether this subsidiary civil liability in
penal actions has survived the laws that fully regulated it or has been abrogated by the American
civil and criminal procedure now in force in the Philippines.

The difficulty in construing the articles of the code above cited in this case appears from the briefs
before us to have arisen from the interpretation of the words of article 1093, "fault or negligence not
punished by law," as applied to the comprehensive definition of offenses in articles 568 and 590 of
the Penal Code. It has been shown that the liability of an employer arising out of his relation to his
employee who is the offender is not to be regarded as derived from negligence punished by the law,
within the meaning of articles 1902 and 1093. More than this, however, it cannot be said to fall within
the class of acts unpunished by the law, the consequence of which are regulated by articles 1902
and 1903 of the Civil Code. The acts to which these articles are applicable are understood to be
those not growing out of pre-existing duties of the parties to one another. But where relations already
formed give rise to duties, whether springing from contract or quasi contract, then breaches of those
duties are subject to articles 1101, 1103, and 1104 of the same code. A typical application of this
distinction may be found in the consequences of a railway accident due to defective machinery
supplied by the employer. His liability to his employee would arise out of the contract of employment,
that to the passengers out of the contract for passage, while that to the injured bystander would
originate in the negligent act itself.

In Manzanares vs. Moreta, 38 Phil., 821 (year 1918), the mother of the 8 of 9-year-old child Salvador
Bona brought a civil action against Moreta to recover damages resulting from the death of the child,
who had been run over by an automobile driven and managed by the defendant. The trial court
rendered judgment requiring the defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of P1,000 as indemnity: This
Court in affirming the judgment, said in part:
If it were true that the defendant, in coming from the southern part of Solana Street, had to stop his
auto before crossing Real Street, because he had met vehicles which were going along the latter
street or were coming from the opposite direction along Solana Street, it is to be believed that, when
he again started to run his auto across said Real Street and to continue its way along Solana Street
northward, he should have adjusted the speed of the auto which he was operating until he had fully
crossed Real Street and had completely reached a clear way on Solana Street. But, as the child was
run over by the auto precisely at the entrance of Solana Street, this accident could not have
occurred if the auto had been running at a slow speed, aside from the fact that the defendant, at the
moment of crossing Real Street and entering Solana Street, in a northward direction, could have
seen the child in the act of crossing the latter street from the sidewalk on the right to that on the left,
and if the accident had occurred in such a way that after the automobile had run over the body of the
child, and the child's body had already been stretched out on the ground, the automobile still moved
along a distance of about 2 meters, this circumstance shows the fact that the automobile entered
Solana Street from Real Street, at a high speed without the defendant having blown the horn. If
these precautions had been taken by the defendant, the deplorable accident which caused the death
of the child would not have occurred.

It will be noticed that the defendant in the above case could have been prosecuted in a criminal case
because his negligence causing the death of the child was punishable by the Penal Code. Here is
therefore a clear instance of the same act of negligence being a proper subject-matter either of a
criminal action with its consequent civil liability arising from a crime or of an entirely separate and
independent civil action for fault or negligence under article 1902 of the Civil Code. Thus, in this
jurisdiction, the separate individually of a cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana under the Civil Code has
been fully and clearly recognized, even with regard to a negligent act for which the wrongdoer could
have been prosecuted and convicted in a criminal case and for which, after such a conviction, he
could have been sued for this civil liability arising from his crime.

Years later (in 1930) this Court had another occasion to apply the same doctrine. In Bernal and
Enverso vs. House and Tacloban Electric & Ice Plant, Ltd., 54 Phil., 327, the parents of the five-year-
old child, Purificacion Bernal, brought a civil action to recover damages for the child's death as a
result of burns caused by the fault and negligence of the defendants. On the evening of April 10,
1925, the Good Friday procession was held in Tacloban, Leyte. Fortunata Enverso with her daughter
Purificacion Bernal had come from another municipality to attend the same. After the procession the
mother and the daughter with two others were passing along Gran Capitan Street in front of the
offices of the Tacloban Electric & Ice Plant, Ltd., owned by defendants J. V. House, when an
automobile appeared from the opposite direction. The little girl, who was slightly ahead of the rest,
was so frightened by the automobile that she turned to run, but unfortunately she fell into the street
gutter where hot water from the electric plant was flowing. The child died that same night from the
burns. The trial courts dismissed the action because of the contributory negligence of the plaintiffs.
But this Court held, on appeal, that there was no contributory negligence, and allowed the parents
P1,000 in damages from J. V. House who at the time of the tragic occurrence was the holder of the
franchise for the electric plant. This Court said in part:

Although the trial judge made the findings of fact hereinbefore outlined, he nevertheless was led to
order the dismissal of the action because of the contributory negligence of the plaintiffs. It is from this
point that a majority of the court depart from the stand taken by the trial judge. The mother and her
child had a perfect right to be on the principal street of Tacloban, Leyte, on the evening when the
religious procession was held. There was nothing abnormal in allowing the child to run along a few
paces in advance of the mother. No one could foresee the coincidence of an automobile appearing
and of a frightened child running and falling into a ditch filled with hot water. The doctrine announced
in the much debated case of Rakes vs. Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Co. ([1907]), 7 Phil., 359), still rule.
Article 1902 of the Civil Code must again be enforced. The contributory negligence of the child and
her mother, if any, does not operate as a bar to recovery, but in its strictest sense could only result in
reduction of the damages.

It is most significant that in the case just cited, this Court specifically applied article 1902 of the Civil
Code. It is thus that although J. V. House could have been criminally prosecuted for reckless or
simple negligence and not only punished but also made civilly liable because of his criminal
negligence, nevertheless this Court awarded damages in an independent civil action for fault or
negligence under article 1902 of the Civil Code.

In Bahia vs. Litonjua and Leynes (30 Phil., 624 [year 1915), the action was for damages for the
death of the plaintiff's daughter alleged to have been caused by the negligence of the servant in
driving an automobile over the child. It appeared that the cause of the mishap was a defect in the
steering gear. The defendant Leynes had rented the automobile from the International Garage of
Manila, to be used by him in carrying passengers during the fiesta of Tuy, Batangas. Leynes was
ordered by the lower court to pay P1,000 as damages to the plaintiff. On appeal this Court reversed
the judgment as to Leynes on the ground that he had shown that the exercised the care of a good
father of a family, thus overcoming the presumption of negligence under article 1903. This Court
said:

As to selection, the defendant has clearly shown that he exercised the care and diligence of a good
father of a family. He obtained the machine from a reputable garage and it was, so far as appeared,
in good condition. The workmen were likewise selected from a standard garage, were duly licensed
by the Government in their particular calling, and apparently thoroughly competent. The machine
had been used but a few hours when the accident occurred and it is clear from the evidence that the
defendant had no notice, either actual or constructive, of the defective condition of the steering gear.

The legal aspect of the case was discussed by this Court thus:
Article 1903 of the Civil Code not only establishes liability in cases of negligence, but also provides
when the liability shall cease. It says:
"The liability referred to in this article shall cease when the persons mentioned therein prove that
they employed all the diligence of a good father of a family to avoid the damage."
From this article two things are apparent: (1) That when an injury is caused by the negligence of a
servant or employee there instantly arises a presumption of law that there was negligence on the
part of the matter or employer either in the selection of the servant or employee, or in supervision
over him after the selection, or both; and (2) that presumption is juris tantum and not juris et de jure,
and consequently, may be rebutted. It follows necessarily that if the employer shows to the
satisfaction of the court that in selection and supervision he has exercised the care and diligence of
a good father of a family, the presumption is overcome and he is relieve from liability.
This theory bases the responsibility of the master ultimately on his own negligence and not on that of
his servant.

The doctrine of the case just cited was followed by this Court in Cerf vs. Medel (33 Phil., 37 [year
1915]). In the latter case, the complaint alleged that the defendant's servant had so negligently
driven an automobile, which was operated by defendant as a public vehicle, that said automobile
struck and damaged the plaintiff's motorcycle. This Court, applying article 1903 and following the
rule in Bahia vs. Litonjua and Leynes, said in part (p. 41) that:
The master is liable for the negligent acts of his servant where he is the owner or director of a
business or enterprise and the negligent acts are committed while the servant is engaged in his
master's employment as such owner.

Another case which followed the decision in Bahia vs. Litonjua and Leynes was Cuison vs. Norton &
Harrison Co., 55 Phil., 18 (year 1930). The latter case was an action for damages brought by Cuison
for the death of his seven-year-old son Moises. The little boy was on his way to school with his sister
Marciana. Some large pieces of lumber fell from a truck and pinned the boy underneath, instantly
killing him. Two youths, Telesforo Binoya and Francisco Bautista, who were working for Ora, an
employee of defendant Norton & Harrison Co., pleaded guilty to the crime of homicide through
reckless negligence and were sentenced accordingly. This Court, applying articles 1902 and 1903,
held:

The basis of civil law liability is not respondent superior but the relationship of pater familias. This
theory bases the liability of the master ultimately on his own negligence and not on that of his
servant. (Bahia vs. Litonjua and Leynes [1915], 30 Phil., 624; Cangco vs. Manila Railroad Co.
[1918], 38 Phil., 768.)
In Walter A. Smith & Co. vs. Cadwallader Gibson Lumber Co., 55 Phil., 517 (year 1930) the plaintiff
brought an action for damages for the demolition of its wharf, which had been struck by the steamer
Helen C belonging to the defendant. This Court held (p. 526):
The evidence shows that Captain Lasa at the time the plaintiff's wharf collapsed was a duly licensed
captain, authorized to navigate and direct a vessel of any tonnage, and that the appellee contracted
his services because of his reputation as a captain, according to F. C. Cadwallader. This being so,
we are of the opinion that the presumption of liability against the defendant has been overcome by
the exercise of the care and diligence of a good father of a family in selecting Captain Lasa, in
accordance with the doctrines laid down by this court in the cases cited above, and the defendant is
therefore absolved from all liability.

It is, therefore, seen that the defendant's theory about his secondary liability is negatived by the six
cases above set forth. He is, on the authority of these cases, primarily and directly responsible in
damages under article 1903, in relation to article 1902, of the Civil Code.
Let us now take up the Philippine decisions relied upon by the defendant. We study first, City of
Manila vs. Manila Electric Co., 52 Phil., 586 (year 1928). A collision between a truck of the City of
Manila and a street car of the Manila Electric Co. took place on June 8, 1925. The truck was
damaged in the amount of P1,788.27. Sixto Eustaquio, the motorman, was prosecuted for the crime
of damage to property and slight injuries through reckless imprudence. He was found guilty and
sentenced to pay a fine of P900, to indemnify the City of Manila for P1,788.27, with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency. Unable to collect the indemnity from Eustaquio, the City of
Manila filed an action against the Manila Electric Company to obtain payment, claiming that the
defendant was subsidiarily liable. The main defense was that the defendant had exercised the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage. The lower court rendered judgment in
favor of the plaintiff. This Court held, in part, that this case was governed by the Penal Code, saying:
With this preliminary point out of the way, there is no escaping the conclusion that the provisions of
the Penal Code govern. The Penal Code in easily understandable language authorizes the
determination of subsidiary liability. The Civil Code negatives its application by providing that civil
obligations arising from crimes or misdemeanors shall be governed by the provisions of the Penal
Code. The conviction of the motorman was a misdemeanor falling under article 604 of the Penal
Code. The act of the motorman was not a wrongful or negligent act or omission not punishable by
law. Accordingly, the civil obligation connected up with the Penal Code and not with article 1903 of
the Civil Code. In other words, the Penal Code affirms its jurisdiction while the Civil Code negatives
its jurisdiction. This is a case of criminal negligence out of which civil liability arises and not a case of
civil negligence.
xxx xxx xxx

Our deduction, therefore, is that the case relates to the Penal Code and not to the Civil Code.
Indeed, as pointed out by the trial judge, any different ruling would permit the master to escape scot-
free by simply alleging and proving that the master had exercised all diligence in the selection and
training of its servants to prevent the damage. That would be a good defense to a strictly civil action,
but might or might not be to a civil action either as a part of or predicated on conviction for a crime or
misdemeanor. (By way of parenthesis, it may be said further that the statements here made are
offered to meet the argument advanced during our deliberations to the effect that article 0902 of the
Civil Code should be disregarded and codal articles 1093 and 1903 applied.)

It is not clear how the above case could support the defendant's proposition, because the Court of
Appeals based its decision in the present case on the defendant's primary responsibility under article
1903 of the Civil Code and not on his subsidiary liability arising from Fontanilla's criminal negligence.
In other words, the case of City of Manila vs. Manila Electric Co., supra, is predicated on an entirely
different theory, which is the subsidiary liability of an employer arising from a criminal act of his
employee, whereas the foundation of the decision of the Court of Appeals in the present case is the
employer's primary liability under article 1903 of the Civil Code. We have already seen that this is a
proper and independent remedy.

Arambulo vs. Manila Electric Co. (55 Phil., 75), is another case invoked by the defendant. A
motorman in the employ of the Manila Electric Company had been convicted o homicide by simple
negligence and sentenced, among other things, to pay the heirs of the deceased the sum of P1,000.
An action was then brought to enforce the subsidiary liability of the defendant as employer under the
Penal Code. The defendant attempted to show that it had exercised the diligence of a good father of
a family in selecting the motorman, and therefore claimed exemption from civil liability. But this Court
held:
In view of the foregoing considerations, we are of opinion and so hold, (1) that the exemption from
civil liability established in article 1903 of the Civil Code for all who have acted with the diligence of a
good father of a family, is not applicable to the subsidiary civil liability provided in article 20 of the
Penal Code.

The above case is also extraneous to the theory of the defendant in the instant case, because the
action there had for its purpose the enforcement of the defendant's subsidiary liability under the
Penal Code, while in the case at bar, the plaintiff's cause of action is based on the defendant's
primary and direct responsibility under article 1903 of the Civil Code. In fact, the above case
destroys the defendant's contention because that decision illustrates the principle that the
employer's primary responsibility under article 1903 of the Civil Code is different in character from
his subsidiary liability under the Penal Code.

In trying to apply the two cases just referred to, counsel for the defendant has failed to recognize the
distinction between civil liability arising from a crime, which is governed by the Penal Code, and the
responsibility for cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana under the Civil Code, and has likewise failed to give
the importance to the latter type of civil action.

The defendant-petitioner also cites Francisco vs. Onrubia (46 Phil., 327). That case need not be set
forth. Suffice it to say that the question involved was also civil liability arising from a crime. Hence, it
is as inapplicable as the two cases above discussed.

The foregoing authorities clearly demonstrate the separate individuality of cuasi-delitos or culpa
aquiliana under the Civil Code. Specifically they show that there is a distinction between civil liability
arising from criminal negligence (governed by the Penal Code) and responsibility for fault or
negligence under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code, and that the same negligent act may
produce either a civil liability arising from a crime under the Penal Code, or a separate responsibility
for fault or negligence under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code. Still more concretely, the
authorities above cited render it inescapable to conclude that the employer — in this case the
defendant-petitioner — is primarily and directly liable under article 1903 of the Civil Code.
The legal provisions, authors, and cases already invoked should ordinarily be sufficient to dispose of
this case. But inasmuch as we are announcing doctrines that have been little understood in the past,
it might not be inappropriate to indicate their foundations.

Firstly, the Revised Penal Code in article 365 punishes not only reckless but also simple negligence.
If we were to hold that articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code refer only to fault or negligence not
punished by law, according to the literal import of article 1093 of the Civil Code, the legal institution
of culpa aquiliana would have very little scope and application in actual life. Death or injury to
persons and damage to property through any degree of negligence — even the slightest — would
have to be indemnified only through the principle of civil liability arising from a crime. In such a state
of affairs, what sphere would remain for cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana? We are loath to impute to
the lawmaker any intention to bring about a situation so absurd and anomalous. Nor are we, in the
interpretation of the laws, disposed to uphold the letter that killeth rather than the spirit that giveth
life. We will not use the literal meaning of the law to smother and render almost lifeless a principle of
such ancient origin and such full-grown development as culpa aquiliana or cuasi-delito, which is
conserved and made enduring in articles 1902 to 1910 of the Spanish Civil Code.

Secondly, to find the accused guilty in a criminal case, proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt is
required, while in a civil case, preponderance of evidence is sufficient to make the defendant pay in
damages. There are numerous cases of criminal negligence which can not be shown beyond
reasonable doubt, but can be proved by a preponderance of evidence. In such cases, the defendant
can and should be made responsible in a civil action under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code.
Otherwise, there would be many instances of unvindicated civil wrongs. Ubi jus ibi remedium.

Thirdly, to hold that there is only one way to make defendant's liability effective, and that is, to sue
the driver and exhaust his (the latter's) property first, would be tantamount to compelling the plaintiff
to follow a devious and cumbersome method of obtaining relief. True, there is such a remedy under
our laws, but there is also a more expeditious way, which is based on the primary and direct
responsibility of the defendant under article 1903 of the Civil Code. Our view of the law is more likely
to facilitate remedy for civil wrongs, because the procedure indicated by the defendant is wasteful
and productive of delay, it being a matter of common knowledge that professional drivers of taxis
and similar public conveyance usually do not have sufficient means with which to pay damages.
Why, then, should the plaintiff be required in all cases to go through this roundabout, unnecessary,
and probably useless procedure? In construing the laws, courts have endeavored to shorten and
facilitate the pathways of right and justice.
At this juncture, it should be said that the primary and direct responsibility of employers and their
presumed negligence are principles calculated to protect society. Workmen and employees should
be carefully chosen and supervised in order to avoid injury to the public. It is the masters or
employers who principally reap the profits resulting from the services of these servants and
employees. It is but right that they should guarantee the latter's careful conduct for the personnel
and patrimonial safety of others. As Theilhard has said, "they should reproach themselves, at least,
some for their weakness, others for their poor selection and all for their negligence." And according
to Manresa, "It is much more equitable and just that such responsibility should fall upon the principal
or director who could have chosen a careful and prudent employee, and not upon the injured person
who could not exercise such selection and who used such employee because of his confidence in
the principal or director." (Vol. 12, p. 622, 2nd Ed.) Many jurists also base this primary responsibility
of the employer on the principle of representation of the principal by the agent. Thus, Oyuelos says
in the work already cited (Vol. 7, p. 747) that before third persons the employer and employee
"vienen a ser como una sola personalidad, por refundicion de la del dependiente en la de quien le
emplea y utiliza." ("become as one personality by the merging of the person of the employee in that
of him who employs and utilizes him.") All these observations acquire a peculiar force and
significance when it comes to motor accidents, and there is need of stressing and accentuating the
responsibility of owners of motor vehicles.

Fourthly, because of the broad sweep of the provisions of both the Penal Code and the Civil Code
on this subject, which has given rise to the overlapping or concurrence of spheres already
discussed, and for lack of understanding of the character and efficacy of the action for culpa
aquiliana, there has grown up a common practice to seek damages only by virtue of the civil
responsibility arising from a crime, forgetting that there is another remedy, which is by invoking
articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code. Although this habitual method is allowed by our laws, it has
nevertheless rendered practically useless and nugatory the more expeditious and effective remedy
based on culpa aquiliana or culpa extra-contractual. In the present case, we are asked to help
perpetuate this usual course. But we believe it is high time we pointed out to the harm done by such
practice and to restore the principle of responsibility for fault or negligence under articles 1902 et
seq. of the Civil Code to its full rigor. It is high time we caused the stream of quasi-delict or culpa
aquiliana to flow on its own natural channel, so that its waters may no longer be diverted into that of
a crime under the Penal Code. This will, it is believed, make for the better safeguarding of private
rights because it re-establishes an ancient and additional remedy, and for the further reason that an
independent civil action, not depending on the issues, limitations and results of a criminal
prosecution, and entirely directed by the party wronged or his counsel, is more likely to secure
adequate and efficacious redress.
In view of the foregoing, the judgment of the Court of Appeals should be and is hereby affirmed, with
costs against the defendant-petitioner.
Yulo, C.J., Moran, Ozaeta and Paras, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-24803 May 26, 1977
PEDRO ELCANO and PATRICIA ELCANO, in their capacity as Ascendants of Agapito Elcano,
deceased, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
REGINALD HILL, minor, and MARVIN HILL, as father and Natural Guardian of said
minor, defendants-appellees.
Cruz & Avecilla for appellants.
Marvin R. Hill & Associates for appellees.

BARREDO, J.:

Appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City dated January 29, 1965 in Civil
Case No. Q-8102, Pedro Elcano et al. vs. Reginald Hill et al. dismissing, upon motion to dismiss of
defendants, the complaint of plaintiffs for recovery of damages from defendant Reginald Hill, a
minor, married at the time of the occurrence, and his father, the defendant Marvin Hill, with whom he
was living and getting subsistence, for the killing by Reginald of the son of the plaintiffs, named
Agapito Elcano, of which, when criminally prosecuted, the said accused was acquitted on the ground
that his act was not criminal, because of "lack of intent to kill, coupled with mistake."

Actually, the motion to dismiss based on the following grounds:

1. The present action is not only against but a violation of section 1, Rule 107, which is now Rule III,
of the Revised Rules of Court;
2. The action is barred by a prior judgment which is now final and or in res-adjudicata;
3. The complaint had no cause of action against defendant Marvin Hill, because he was relieved as
guardian of the other defendant through emancipation by marriage.
(P. 23, Record [p. 4, Record on Appeal.])
was first denied by the trial court. It was only upon motion for reconsideration of the defendants of
such denial, reiterating the above grounds that the following order was issued:
Considering the motion for reconsideration filed by the defendants on January 14, 1965 and after
thoroughly examining the arguments therein contained, the Court finds the same to be meritorious
and well-founded.
WHEREFORE, the Order of this Court on December 8, 1964 is hereby reconsidered by ordering the
dismissal of the above entitled case.
SO ORDERED.
Quezon City, Philippines, January 29, 1965. (p. 40, Record [p. 21, Record on Appeal.)

Hence, this appeal where plaintiffs-appellants, the spouses Elcano, are presenting for Our resolution
the following assignment of errors:
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE CASE BY UPHOLDING THE CLAIM OF
DEFENDANTS THAT -
I
THE PRESENT ACTION IS NOT ONLY AGAINST BUT ALSO A VIOLATION OF SECTION 1, RULE
107, NOW RULE 111, OF THE REVISED RULES OF COURT, AND THAT SECTION 3(c) OF RULE
111, RULES OF COURT IS APPLICABLE;
II
THE ACTION IS BARRED BY A PRIOR JUDGMENT WHICH IS NOW FINAL OR RES-
ADJUDICTA;
III
THE PRINCIPLES OF QUASI-DELICTS, ARTICLES 2176 TO 2194 OF THE CIVIL CODE, ARE
INAPPLICABLE IN THE INSTANT CASE; and
IV
THAT THE COMPLAINT STATES NO CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST DEFENDANT MARVIN HILL
BECAUSE HE WAS RELIEVED AS GUARDIAN OF THE OTHER DEFENDANT THROUGH
EMANCIPATION BY MARRIAGE. (page 4, Record.)

It appears that for the killing of the son, Agapito, of plaintiffs-appellants, defendant- appellee
Reginald Hill was prosecuted criminally in Criminal Case No. 5102 of the Court of First Instance of
Quezon City. After due trial, he was acquitted on the ground that his act was not criminal because of
"lack of intent to kill, coupled with mistake." Parenthetically, none of the parties has favored Us with a
copy of the decision of acquittal, presumably because appellants do not dispute that such indeed
was the basis stated in the court's decision. And so, when appellants filed their complaint against
appellees Reginald and his father, Atty. Marvin Hill, on account of the death of their son, the
appellees filed the motion to dismiss above-referred to.
As We view the foregoing background of this case, the two decisive issues presented for Our
resolution are:
1. Is the present civil action for damages barred by the acquittal of Reginald in the criminal case
wherein the action for civil liability, was not reversed?
2. May Article 2180 (2nd and last paragraphs) of the Civil Code he applied against Atty. Hill,
notwithstanding the undisputed fact that at the time of the occurrence complained of. Reginald,
though a minor, living with and getting subsistenee from his father, was already legally married?
The first issue presents no more problem than the need for a reiteration and further clarification of
the dual character, criminal and civil, of fault or negligence as a source of obligation which was firmly
established in this jurisdiction in Barredo vs. Garcia, 73 Phil. 607. In that case, this Court postulated,
on the basis of a scholarly dissertation by Justice Bocobo on the nature of culpa aquiliana in relation
to culpa criminal or delito and mere culpa or fault, with pertinent citation of decisions of the Supreme
Court of Spain, the works of recognized civilians, and earlier jurisprudence of our own, that the same
given act can result in civil liability not only under the Penal Code but also under the Civil Code.

Thus, the opinion holds:

The, above case is pertinent because it shows that the same act machinist. come under both the
Penal Code and the Civil Code. In that case, the action of the agent killeth unjustified and fraudulent
and therefore could have been the subject of a criminal action. And yet, it was held to be also a
proper subject of a civil action under article 1902 of the Civil Code. It is also to be noted that it was
the employer and not the employee who was being sued. (pp. 615-616, 73 Phil.). 1
It will be noticed that the defendant in the above case could have been prosecuted in a criminal case
because his negligence causing the death of the child was punishable by the Penal Code. Here is
therefore a clear instance of the same act of negligence being a proper subject matter either of a
criminal action with its consequent civil liability arising from a crime or of an entirely separate and
independent civil action for fault or negligence under article 1902 of the Civil Code. Thus, in this
jurisdiction, the separate individuality of a cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana, under the Civil Code has
been fully and clearly recognized, even with regard to a negligent act for which the wrongdoer could
have been prosecuted and convicted in a criminal case and for which, after such a conviction, he
could have been sued for this civil liability arising from his crime. (p. 617, 73 Phil.) 2

It is most significant that in the case just cited, this Court specifically applied article 1902 of the Civil
Code. It is thus that although J. V. House could have been criminally prosecuted for reckless or simple
negligence and not only punished but also made civilly liable because of his criminal negligence,
nevertheless this Court awarded damages in an independent civil action for fault or negligence under
article 1902 of the Civil Code. (p. 618, 73 Phil.) 3

The legal provisions, authors, and cases already invoked should ordinarily be sufficient to dispose of
this case. But inasmuch as we are announcing doctrines that have been little understood, in the
past, it might not he inappropriate to indicate their foundations.

Firstly, the Revised Penal Code in articles 365 punishes not only reckless but also simple
negligence. If we were to hold that articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code refer only to fault or
negligence not punished by law, accordingly to the literal import of article 1093 of the Civil Code, the
legal institution of culpa aquiliana would have very little scope and application in actual life. Death or
injury to persons and damage to property- through any degree of negligence - even the slightest -
would have to be Idemnified only through the principle of civil liability arising from a crime. In such a
state of affairs, what sphere would remain for cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana? We are loath to impute
to the lawmaker any intention to bring about a situation so absurd and anomalous. Nor are we, in the
interpretation of the laws, disposed to uphold the letter that killeth rather than the spirit that giveth
life. We will not use the literal meaning of the law to smother and render almost lifeless a principle of
such ancient origin and such full-grown development as culpa aquiliana or cuasi-delito, which is
conserved and made enduring in articles 1902 to 1910 of the Spanish Civil Code.

Secondary, to find the accused guilty in a criminal case, proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt is
required, while in a civil case, preponderance of evidence is sufficient to make the defendant pay in
damages. There are numerous cases of criminal negligence which can not be shown beyond
reasonable doubt, but can be proved by a preponderance of evidence. In such cases, the defendant
can and should be made responsible in a civil action under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code.
Otherwise. there would be many instances of unvindicated civil wrongs. "Ubi jus Idemnified
remedium." (p. 620,73 Phil.)

Fourthly, because of the broad sweep of the provisions of both the Penal Code and the Civil Code
on this subject, which has given rise to the overlapping or concurrence of spheres already
discussed, and for lack of understanding of the character and efficacy of the action for culpa
aquiliana, there has grown up a common practice to seek damages only by virtue of the civil
responsibility arising from a crime, forgetting that there is another remedy, which is by invoking
articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code. Although this habitual method is allowed by, our laws, it has
nevertheless rendered practically useless and nugatory the more expeditious and effective remedy
based on culpa aquiliana or culpa extra-contractual. In the present case, we are asked to help
perpetuate this usual course. But we believe it is high time we pointed out to the harms done by
such practice and to restore the principle of responsibility for fault or negligence under articles 1902
et seq. of the Civil Code to its full rigor. It is high time we caused the stream of quasi-delict or culpa
aquiliana to flow on its own natural channel, so that its waters may no longer be diverted into that of
a crime under the Penal Code. This will, it is believed, make for the better safeguarding or private
rights because it realtor, an ancient and additional remedy, and for the further reason that an
independent civil action, not depending on the issues, limitations and results of a criminal
prosecution, and entirely directed by the party wronged or his counsel, is more likely to secure
adequate and efficacious redress. (p. 621, 73 Phil.)

Contrary to an immediate impression one might get upon a reading of the foregoing excerpts from
the opinion in Garcia that the concurrence of the Penal Code and the Civil Code therein referred to
contemplate only acts of negligence and not intentional voluntary acts - deeper reflection would
reveal that the thrust of the pronouncements therein is not so limited, but that in fact it actually
extends to fault or culpa. This can be seen in the reference made therein to the Sentence of the
Supreme Court of Spain of February 14, 1919, supra, which involved a case of fraud or estafa, not a
negligent act. Indeed, Article 1093 of the Civil Code of Spain, in force here at the time of Garcia,
provided textually that obligations "which are derived from acts or omissions in which fault or
negligence, not punishable by law, intervene shall be the subject of Chapter II, Title XV of this book
(which refers to quasi-delicts.)" And it is precisely the underline qualification, "not punishable by law",
that Justice Bocobo emphasized could lead to an ultimo construction or interpretation of the letter of
the law that "killeth, rather than the spirit that giveth lift- hence, the ruling that "(W)e will not use the
literal meaning of the law to smother and render almost lifeless a principle of such ancient origin and
such full-grown development as culpa aquiliana or quasi-delito, which is conserved and made
enduring in articles 1902 to 1910 of the Spanish Civil Code." And so, because Justice Bacobo was
Chairman of the Code Commission that drafted the original text of the new Civil Code, it is to be
noted that the said Code, which was enacted after the Garcia doctrine, no longer uses the term, 11
not punishable by law," thereby making it clear that the concept of culpa aquiliana includes acts
which are criminal in character or in violation of the penal law, whether voluntary or matter. Thus, the
corresponding provisions to said Article 1093 in the new code, which is Article 1162, simply says,
"Obligations derived from quasi-delicto shall be governed by the provisions of Chapter 2, Title XVII of
this Book, (on quasi-delicts) and by special laws." More precisely, a new provision, Article 2177 of
the new code provides:

ART. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and
distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot
recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant.
According to the Code Commission: "The foregoing provision (Article 2177) through at first sight
startling, is not so novel or extraordinary when we consider the exact nature of criminal and civil
negligence. The former is a violation of the criminal law, while the latter is a "culpa aquiliana" or
quasi-delict, of ancient origin, having always had its own foundation and individuality, separate from
criminal negligence. Such distinction between criminal negligence and "culpa extracontractual" or
"cuasi-delito" has been sustained by decision of the Supreme Court of Spain and maintained as
clear, sound and perfectly tenable by Maura, an outstanding Spanish jurist. Therefore, under the
proposed Article 2177, acquittal from an accusation of criminal negligence, whether on reasonable
doubt or not, shall not be a bar to a subsequent civil action, not for civil liability arising from criminal
negligence, but for damages due to a quasi-delict or 'culpa aquiliana'. But said article forestalls a
double recovery.", (Report of the Code) Commission, p. 162.)

Although, again, this Article 2177 does seem to literally refer to only acts of negligence, the same
argument of Justice Bacobo about construction that upholds "the spirit that giveth lift- rather than that
which is literal that killeth the intent of the lawmaker should be observed in applying the same. And
considering that the preliminary chapter on human relations of the new Civil Code definitely
establishes the separability and independence of liability in a civil action for acts criminal in character
(under Articles 29 to 32) from the civil responsibility arising from crime fixed by Article 100 of the
Revised Penal Code, and, in a sense, the Rules of Court, under Sections 2 and 3 (c), Rule 111,
contemplate also the same separability, it is "more congruent with the spirit of law, equity and justice,
and more in harmony with modern progress"- to borrow the felicitous relevant language in Rakes vs.
Atlantic. Gulf and Pacific Co., 7 Phil. 359, to hold, as We do hold, that Article 2176, where it refers to
"fault or negligencia covers not only acts "not punishable by law" but also acts criminal in character,
whether intentional and voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a separate civil action lies against the
offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted,
provided that the offended party is not allowed, if he is actually charged also criminally, to recover
damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the
two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. In other words, the extinction of civil liability
referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100
of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as a quasi-
delict only and not as a crime is not estinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the
criminal act charged has not happened or has not been committed by the accused. Briefly stated,
We here hold, in reiteration of Garcia, that culpa aquiliana includes voluntary and negligent acts
which may be punishable by law.4

It results, therefore, that the acquittal of Reginal Hill in the criminal case has not extinguished his
liability for quasi-delict, hence that acquittal is not a bar to the instant action against him.
Coming now to the second issue about the effect of Reginald's emancipation by marriage on the
possible civil liability of Atty. Hill, his father, it is also Our considered opinion that the conclusion of
appellees that Atty. Hill is already free from responsibility cannot be upheld.
While it is true that parental authority is terminated upon emancipation of the child (Article 327, Civil
Code), and under Article 397, emancipation takes place "by the marriage of the minor (child)", it is,
however, also clear that pursuant to Article 399, emancipation by marriage of the minor is not really
full or absolute. Thus "(E)mancipation by marriage or by voluntary concession shall terminate
parental authority over the child's person. It shall enable the minor to administer his property as
though he were of age, but he cannot borrow money or alienate or encumber real property without
the consent of his father or mother, or guardian. He can sue and be sued in court only with the
assistance of his father, mother or guardian."
Now under Article 2180, "(T)he obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's
own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. The father and, in
case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible. The father and, in case of his death or
incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in
their company." In the instant case, it is not controverted that Reginald, although married, was living
with his father and getting subsistence from him at the time of the occurrence in question. Factually,
therefore, Reginald was still subservient to and dependent on his father, a situation which is not
unusual.

It must be borne in mind that, according to Manresa, the reason behind the joint and solidary liability
of presuncion with their offending child under Article 2180 is that is the obligation of the parent to
supervise their minor children in order to prevent them from causing damage to third persons. 5 On
the other hand, the clear implication of Article 399, in providing that a minor emancipated by marriage
may not, nevertheless, sue or be sued without the assistance of the parents, is that such emancipation
does not carry with it freedom to enter into transactions or do any act that can give rise to judicial
litigation. (See Manresa, Id., Vol. II, pp. 766-767, 776.) And surely, killing someone else invites judicial
action. Otherwise stated, the marriage of a minor child does not relieve the parents of the duty to see to it
that the child, while still a minor, does not give answerable for the borrowings of money and alienation or
encumbering of real property which cannot be done by their minor married child without their consent.
(Art. 399; Manresa, supra.)

Accordingly, in Our considered view, Article 2180 applies to Atty. Hill notwithstanding the
emancipation by marriage of Reginald. However, inasmuch as it is evident that Reginald is now of
age, as a matter of equity, the liability of Atty. Hill has become milling, subsidiary to that of his son.

WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is reversed and the trial court is ordered to proceed in
accordance with the foregoing opinion. Costs against appellees.
Fernando (Chairman), Antonio, and Martin, JJ., concur.
Concepcion Jr., J, is on leave.
Martin, J, was designated to sit in the Second Division.

Separate Opinions

AQUINO, J, concurring:
Article 2176 of the Civil Code comprehends any culpable act, which is blameworthy, when judged by
accepted legal standards. "The Idea thus expressed is undoubtedly board enough to include any
rational conception of liability for the tortious acts likely to be developed in any society." (Street, J. in
Daywalt vs. Corporacion de PP. Agustinos Recoletos, 39 Phil. 587, 600). See article 38, Civil Code
and the ruling that "the infant tortfeasor is liable in a civil action to the injured person in the same
manner and to the same extent as an adult" (27 Am. Jur. 812 cited by Bocobo, J., in Magtibay vs.
Tiangco, 74 Phil. 576, 579).

Separate Opinions
AQUINO, J, concurring:
Article 2176 of the Civil Code comprehends any culpable act, which is blameworthy, when judged by
accepted legal standards. "The Idea thus expressed is undoubtedly board enough to include any
rational conception of liability for the tortious acts likely to be developed in any society." (Street, J. in
Daywalt vs. Corporacion de PP. Agustinos Recoletos, 39 Phil. 587, 600). See article 38, Civil Code
and the ruling that "the infant tortfeasor is liable in a civil action to the injured person in the same
manner and to the same extent as an adult" (27 Am. Jur. 812 cited by Bocobo, J., in Magtibay vs.
Tiangco, 74 Phil. 576, 579).
G.R. No. L-35095 August 31, 1973
GERMAN C. GARCIA, LUMINOSA L. GARCIA, and ESTER FRANCISCO, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE MARIANO M. FLORIDO OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MISAMIS
OCCIDENTAL, MARCELINO INESIN, RICARDO VAYSON, MACTAN TRANSIT CO., INC., and
PEDRO TUMALA Y DIGAL, respondents.
Paulino A. Conol for petitioners.
Dominador M. Canastra and Wilfredo C. Martinez for private respondents.
Hon. Mariano M. Florido for and in his own behalf.

ANTONIO, J.:
Appeal by certiorari from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Misamis Occidental, Branch
III, in Civil Case No. 2850 (German C. Garcia, et al. vs. Marcelino Inesin et al.) dated October 21,
1971, dismissing petitioners' action for damages against respondents, Mactan Transit Co., Inc. and
Pedro Tumala "without prejudice to refiling the said civil action after conviction of the defendants in
the criminal case filed by the Chief of Police of Sindangan Zamboanga del Norte", and from the
order of said Court dated January 21, 1972, denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration.
On August 4, 1971, petitioners, German C. Garcia, Chief of the Misamis Occidental Hospital,
together with his wife, Luminosa L. Garcia, and Ester Francisco, bookkeeper of said hospital, hired
and boarded a PU car with plate No. 241-8 G Ozamis 71 owned and operated by respondent,
Marcelino Inesin, and driven by respondent, Ricardo Vayson, for a round-trip from Oroquieta City to
Zamboanga City, for the purpose of attending a conference of chiefs of government hospitals,
hospital administrative officers, and bookkeepers of Regional Health Office No. 7 at Zamboanga
City. At about 9:30 a.m., while the PU car was negotiating a slight curve on the national highway at
kilometer 21 in Barrio Guisukan, Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte, said car collided with an
oncoming passenger bus (No. 25) with plate No. 77-4 W Z.N. 71 owned and operated by the Mactan
Transit Co., Inc. and driven by defendant, Pedro Tumala. As a result of the aforesaid collision,
petitioners sustained various physical injuries which necessitated their medical treatment and
hospitalization.

Alleging that both drivers of the PU car and the passenger bus were at the time of the accident
driving their respective vehicles at a fast clip, in a reckless, grossly negligent and imprudent manner
in gross violation of traffic rules and without due regard to the safety of the passengers aboard the
PU car, petitioners, German C. Garcia, Luminosa L. Garcia, and Ester Francisco, filed on September
1, 1971 with respondent Court of First Instance of Misamis Occidental an action for damages (Civil
Case No. 2850) against the private respondents, owners and drivers, respectively, of the PU car and
the passenger bus that figured in the collision, with prayer for preliminary attachment.
On September 16, 1971, Marcelino Inesin and Ricardo Vayson filed their answer in the
aforementioned Civil Case No. 2850 admitting the contract of carriage with petitioners but alleged,
by way of defense, that the accident was due to the negligence and reckless imprudence of the bus
driver, as when Ricardo Vayson, driver of the PU car, saw the oncoming passenger bus No. 25
coming from the opposite direction ascending the incline at an excessive speed, chasing another
passenger bus, he had to stop the PU car in order to give way to the passenger bus, but, in spite of
such precaution, the passenger bus bumped the PU car, thus causing the accident in question, and,
therefore, said private respondents could not be held liable for the damages caused on petitioners.
On September 29, 1971, respondents, Mactan Transit Co., Inc. and Pedro Tumala, filed a motion to
dismiss on three (3) grounds, namely: 1) that the plaintiffs (petitioners) had no cause of action; 2)
that the complaint carries with it a prayer for attachment but without the requisite verification, hence
defective under the provision of Sec. 3, Rule 57 of the Rules of Court; and 3) that the defendants
(respondents), Mactan Transit Co., Inc. and its driver, accused Pedro Tumala, had operated said
passenger bus with maximum care and prudence.

The principal argument advanced in said motion to dismiss was that the petitioners had no cause of
action for on August 11, 1971, or 20 days before the filing of the present action for damages,
respondent Pedro Tumala was charged in Criminal Case No. 4960 of the Municipal Court of
Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte, in a complaint filed by the Chief of Police for "double serious and
less serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence", and that, with the filing of the aforesaid
criminal case, no civil action could be filed subsequent thereto unless the criminal case has been
finally adjudicated, pursuant to Sec. 3 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, and, therefore, the filing of
the instant civil action is premature, because the liability of the employer is merely subsidiary and
does not arise until after final judgment has been rendered finding the driver, Pedro Tumala guilty of
negligence; that Art. 33 of the New Civil Code, is not applicable because Art. 33 applied only to the
crimes of physical injuries or homicide, not to the negligent act or imprudence of the driver.
On October 14, 1971, petitioners filed an opposition to said motion to dismiss alleging that the
aforesaid action for damages was instituted not to enforce the civil liability of the respondents under
Art. 100 of the Revised Penal Code but for their civil liability on quasi-delicts pursuant to Articles
2176-2194, as the same negligent act causing damages may produce civil liability arising from a
crime under the Revised Penal Code or create an action for quasi-delict or culpa extra-contractual
under the Civil Code, and the party seeking recovery is free to choose which remedy to enforce.
In dismissing the complaint for damages in Civil Case No. 2850, the lower court sustained the
arguments of respondents, Mactan Transit Co., Inc. and Pedro Tumala, and declared that whether
or not "the action for damages is based on criminal negligence or civil negligence known as culpa
aquiliana in the Civil Code or tort under American law" there "should be a showing that the offended
party expressly waived the civil action or reserved his right to institute it separately" and that "the
allegations of the complaint in culpa aquiliana must not be tainted by any assertion of violation of law
or traffic rules or regulations" and because of the prayer in the complaint asking the Court to declare
the defendants jointly and severally liable for moral, compensatory and exemplary damages, the
Court is of the opinion that the action was not based on "culpa aquiliana or quasi-delict."
Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied by the trial court on January 21, 1972, hence this
appeal on certiorari.

There is no question that from a careful consideration of the allegations contained in the complaint in
Civil Case No. 2850, the essential averments for a quasi-delictual action under Articles 2176-2194 of
the New Civil Code are present, namely: a) act or omission of the private respondents; b) presence
of fault or negligence or the lack of due care in the operation of the passenger bus No. 25 by
respondent Pedro Tumala resulting in the collision of the bus with the passenger car; c) physical
injuries and other damages sustained by petitioners as a result of the collision; d) existence of direct
causal connection between the damage or prejudice and the fault or negligence of private
respondents; and e) the absence of pre-existing contractual relations between the parties. The
circumstance that the complaint alleged that respondents violated traffic rules in that the driver drove
the vehicle "at a fast clip in a reckless, grossly negligent and imprudent manner in violation of traffic
rules and without due regard to the safety of the passengers aboard the PU car" does not detract
from the nature and character of the action, as one based on culpa aquiliana. The violation of traffic
rules is merely descriptive of the failure of said driver to observe for the protection of the interests of
others, that degree of care, precaution and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, which
failure resulted in the injury on petitioners. Certainly excessive speed in violation of traffic rules is a
clear indication of negligence. Since the same negligent act resulted in the filing of the criminal
action by the Chief of Police with the Municipal Court (Criminal Case No. 4960) and the civil action
by petitioners, it is inevitable that the averments on the drivers' negligence in both complaints would
substantially be the same. It should be emphasized that the same negligent act causing damages
may produce a civil liability arising from a crime under Art. 100 of the Revised Penal Code or create
an action for quasi-delict or culpa extra-contractual under Arts. 2176-2194 of the New Civil Code.
This distinction has been amply explained in Barredo vs. Garcia, et al. (73 Phil. 607, 620-621).1
It is true that under Sec. 2 in relation to Sec. 1 of Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Court which
became effective on January 1, 1964, in the cases provided for by Articles 31, 33, 39 and 2177 of
the Civil Code, an independent civil action entirely separate and distinct from the civil action, may be
instituted by the injured party during the pendency of the criminal case, provided said party has
reserved his right to institute it separately, but it should be noted, however, that neither Section 1 nor
Section 2 of Rule 111 fixes a time limit when such reservation shall be made. In Tactaquin v.
Palileo,2 where the reservation was made after the tort-feasor had already pleaded guilty and after
the private prosecutor had entered his appearance jointly with the prosecuting attorney in the course
of the criminal proceedings, and the tort-feasor was convicted and sentenced to pay damages to the
offended party by final judgment in said criminal case, We ruled that such reservation is legally
ineffective because the offended party cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission
of the defendant. We explained in Meneses vs. Luat3 that when the criminal action for physical
injuries against the defendant did not proceed to trial as he pleaded guilty upon arraignment and the
Court made no pronouncement on the matter or damages suffered by the injured party, the mere
appearance of private counsel in representation of the offended party in said criminal case does not
constitute such active intervention as could impart an intention to press a claim for damages in the
same action, and, therefore, cannot bar a separate civil action for damages subsequently instituted
on the same ground under Article 33 of the New Civil Code.

In the case at bar, there is no question that petitioners never intervened in the criminal action
instituted by the Chief of Police against respondent Pedro Tumala, much less has the said criminal
action been terminated either by conviction or acquittal of said accused.
It is, therefore, evident that by the institution of the present civil action for damages, petitioners have
in effect abandoned their right to press recovery for damages in the criminal case, and have opted
instead to recover them in the present civil case.
As a result of this action of petitioners the civil liability of private respondents to the former has
ceased to be involved in the criminal action. Undoubtedly an offended party loses his right to
intervene in the prosecution of a criminal case, not only when he has waived the civil action or
expressly reserved his right to institute, but also when he has actually instituted the civil action. For
by either of such actions his interest in the criminal case has disappeared.
As we have stated at the outset, the same negligent act causing damages may produce a civil
liability arising from crime or create an action for quasi-delict or culpa extra-contractual. The former
is a violation of the criminal law, while the latter is a distinct and independent negligence, having
always had its own foundation and individuality. Some legal writers are of the view that in
accordance with Article 31, the civil action based upon quasi-delict may proceed independently of
the criminal proceeding for criminal negligence and regardless of the result of the latter. Hence, "the
proviso in Section 2 of Rule 111 with reference to ... Articles 32, 33 and 34 of the Civil Code is
contrary to the letter and spirit of the said articles, for these articles were drafted ... and are intended
to constitute as exceptions to the general rule stated in what is now Section 1 of Rule 111.
The proviso which is procedural, may also be regarded as an unauthorized amendment of
substantive law, Articles 32, 33 and 34 of the Civil Code, which do not provide for the reservation
required in the proviso."4 But in whatever way We view the institution of the civil action for recovery of
damages under quasi-delict by petitioners, whether as one that should be governed by the
provisions of Section 2 of Rule 111 of the Rules which require reservation by the injured party
considering that by the institution of the civil action even before the commencement of the trial of the
criminal case, petitioners have thereby foreclosed their right to intervene therein, or one where
reservation to file the civil action need not be made, for the reason that the law itself (Article 33 of the
Civil Code) already makes the reservation and the failure of the offended party to do so does not bar
him from bringing the action, under the peculiar circumstances of the case, We find no legal
justification for respondent court's order of dismissal.

WHEREFORE, the decision and order appealed from are hereby reversed and set aside, and the
court a quo is directed to proceed with the trial of the case. Costs against private respondents.
Zaldivar, Castro Fernando, Teehankee, Makasiar and Esguerra, JJ., concur.
Makalintal, Actg., C.J., concurs in the result.

Separate Opinions

BARREDO, J., concurring:

I would like to limit my concurrence.
I believe that the only substantive legal provision involved in this case are Articles 2176 and 2177 of
the Civil Code which read as follows:
ART 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence,
is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of
this Chapter.
ART 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and
distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot
recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant.
These provisions definitely create a civil liability distinct and different from the civil action arising from
the offense of negligence under the Revised Penal Code. Since Civil Case No. 2850 is predicated
on the above civil code articles and not on the civil liability imposed by the Revised Penal Code, I
cannot see why a reservation had to be made in the criminal case. As to the specific mention of
Article 2177 in Section 2 of the Rule 111, it is my considered view that the latter provision is
inoperative, it being substantive in character and is not within the power of the Supreme Court to
promulgate, and even if it were not substantive but adjective, it cannot stand because of its
inconsistency with Article 2177, an enactment of the legislature superseding the Rules of 1940.
Besides, the actual filing of Civil Case No. 2850 should be deemed as the reservation required, there
being no showing that prejudice could be caused by doing so.
Accordingly, I concur in the judgment reversing the order of dismissal of the trial court in order that
Civil Case No. 2850 may proceed, subject to the limitation mentioned in the last sentence of Article
2177 of the Civil Code, which means that of the two possible judgments, the injured party is entitled
exclusively to the bigger one.
G.R. No. L-32599 June 29, 1979
EDGARDO E. MENDOZA, petitioner
vs.
HON. ABUNDIO Z. ARRIETA, Presiding Judge of Branch VIII, Court of First Instance of Manila,
FELINO TIMBOL, and RODOLFO SALAZAR, respondents.
David G. Nitafan for petitioner.
Arsenio R. Reyes for respondent Timbol.
Armando M. Pulgado for respondent Salazar.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J:
Petitioner, Edgardo Mendoza, seeks a review on certiorari of the Orders of respondent Judge in Civil
Case No. 80803 dismissing his Complaint for Damages based on quasi-delict against respondents
Felino Timbol and Rodolfo Salazar.

The facts which spawned the present controversy may be summarized as follows:
On October 22, 1969, at about 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon, a three- way vehicular accident
occurred along Mac-Arthur Highway, Marilao, Bulacan, involving a Mercedes Benz owned and
driven by petitioner; a private jeep owned and driven by respondent Rodolfo Salazar; and a gravel
and sand truck owned by respondent Felipino Timbol and driven by Freddie Montoya. As a
consequence of said mishap, two separate Informations for Reckless Imprudence Causing Damage
to Property were filed against Rodolfo Salazar and Freddie Montoya with the Court of First Instance
of Bulacan. The race against truck-driver Montoya, docketed as Criminal Case No. SM-227, was for
causing damage to the jeep owned by Salazar, in the amount of Pl,604.00, by hitting it at the right
rear portion thereby causing said jeep to hit and bump an oncoming car, which happened to be
petitioner's Mercedes Benz. The case against jeep-owner-driver Salazar, docketed as Criminal Case
No. SM 228, was for causing damage to the Mercedes Benz of petitioner in the amount of P8,890.00
At the joint trial of the above cases, petitioner testified that jeep-owner- driver Salazar overtook the
truck driven by Montoya, swerved to the left going towards the poblacion of Marilao, and hit his car
which was bound for Manila. Petitioner further testified that before the impact, Salazar had jumped
from the jeep and that he was not aware that Salazar's jeep was bumped from behind by the truck
driven by Montoya. Petitioner's version of the accident was adopted by truck driver Montoya. Jeep-
owner-driver Salazar, on the other hand, tried to show that, after overtaking the truck driven by
Montoya, he flashed a signal indicating his intention to turn left towards the poblacion of Marilao but
was stopped at the intersection by a policeman who was directing traffic; that while he was at a stop
position, his jeep was bumped at the rear by the truck driven by Montova causing him to be thrown
out of the jeep, which then swerved to the left and hit petitioner's car, which was coming from the
opposite direction.

On July 31, 1970, the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Branch V, Sta. Maria, rendered judgment,
stating in its decretal portion:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, this Court finds the accused Freddie Montoya GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of damage to property thru reckless imprudence in Crime. Case No.
SM-227, and hereby sentences him to pay a fine of P972.50 and to indemnify Rodolfo Salazar in the
same amount of P972.50 as actual damages, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency,
both as to fine and indemnity, with costs.
Accused Rodolfo Salazar is hereby ACQUITTED from the offense charged in Crime. Case No. SM-
228, with costs de oficio, and his bond is ordered canceled
SO ORDERED. 1

Thus, the trial Court absolved jeep-owner-driver Salazar of any liability, civil and criminal, in view of
its findings that the collision between Salazar's jeep and petitioner's car was the result of the former
having been bumped from behind by the truck driven by Montoya. Neither was petitioner awarded
damages as he was not a complainant against truck-driver Montoya but only against jeep-owner-
driver Salazar.

On August 22, 1970, or after the termination of the criminal cases, petitioner filed Civil Case No.
80803 with the Court of First Instance of Manila against respondents jeep-owner-driver Salazar and
Felino Timbol, the latter being the owner of the gravel and sand truck driven by Montoya, for
indentification for the damages sustained by his car as a result of the collision involving their
vehicles. Jeep-owner-driver Salazar and truck-owner Timbol were joined as defendants, either in the
alternative or in solidum allegedly for the reason that petitioner was uncertain as to whether he was
entitled to relief against both on only one of them.
On September 9, 1970, truck-owner Timbol filed a Motion to Dismiss Civil Case No. 80803 on the
grounds that the Complaint is barred by a prior judgment in the criminal cases and that it fails to
state a cause of action. An Opposition thereto was filed by petitioner.
In an Order dated September 12, 1970, respondent Judge dismissed the Complaint against truck-
owner Timbol for reasons stated in the afore- mentioned Motion to Dismiss On September 30, 1970,
petitioner sought before this Court the review of that dismissal, to which petition we gave due
course.
On January 30, 1971, upon motion of jeep-owner-driver Salazar, respondent Judge also dismissed
the case as against the former. Respondent Judge reasoned out that "while it is true that an
independent civil action for liability under Article 2177 of the Civil Code could be prosecuted
independently of the criminal action for the offense from which it arose, the New Rules of Court,
which took effect on January 1, 1964, requires an express reservation of the civil action to be made
in the criminal action; otherwise, the same would be barred pursuant to Section 2, Rule 111
... 2 Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration thereof was denied in the order dated February 23, 1971,
with respondent Judge suggesting that the issue be raised to a higher Court "for a more decisive
interpretation of the rule. 3
On March 25, 1971, petitioner then filed a Supplemental Petition before us, also to review the last
two mentioned Orders, to which we required jeep-owner-driver Salazar to file an Answer.

The Complaint against

truck-owner Timbol
We shall first discuss the validity of the Order, dated September 12, 1970, dismissing petitioner's
Complaint against truck-owner Timbol.
In dismissing the Complaint against the truck-owner, respondent Judge sustained Timbol's
allegations that the civil suit is barred by the prior joint judgment in Criminal Cases Nos. SM-227 and
SM-228, wherein no reservation to file a separate civil case was made by petitioner and where the
latter actively participated in the trial and tried to prove damages against jeep-driver-Salazar only;
and that the Complaint does not state a cause of action against truck-owner Timbol inasmuch as
petitioner prosecuted jeep-owner-driver Salazar as the one solely responsible for the damage
suffered by his car.

Well-settled is the rule that for a prior judgment to constitute a bar to a subsequent case, the
following requisites must concur: (1) it must be a final judgment; (2) it must have been rendered by a
Court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the parties; (3) it must be a judgment on
the merits; and (4) there must be, between the first and second actions, Identity of parties, Identity of
subject matter and Identity of cause of action.

It is conceded that the first three requisites of res judicata are present. However, we agree with
petitioner that there is no Identity of cause of action between Criminal Case No. SM-227 and Civil
Case No. 80803. Obvious is the fact that in said criminal case truck-driver Montoya was not
prosecuted for damage to petitioner's car but for damage to the jeep. Neither was truck-owner
Timbol a party in said case. In fact as the trial Court had put it "the owner of the Mercedes Benz
cannot recover any damages from the accused Freddie Montoya, he (Mendoza) being a
complainant only against Rodolfo Salazar in Criminal Case No. SM-228. 4 And more importantly, in
the criminal cases, the cause of action was the enforcement of the civil liability arising from criminal
negligence under Article l of the Revised Penal Code, whereas Civil Case No. 80803 is based
on quasi-delict under Article 2180, in relation to Article 2176 of the Civil Code As held in Barredo vs.
Garcia, et al. 5

The foregoing authorities clearly demonstrate the separate in. individuality of cuasi-delitos or culpa
aquiliana under the Civil Code. Specifically they show that there is a distinction between civil liability
arising from criminal negligence (governed by the Penal Code) and responsibility for fault or
negligence under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code, and that the same negligent act may
produce either a civil liability arising from a crime under the Penal Code, or a separate responsibility
for fault or negligence under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code. Still more concretely, the
authorities above cited render it inescapable to conclude that the employer in this case the
defendant- petitioner is primarily and directly liable under article 1903 of the Civil Code.
That petitioner's cause of action against Timbol in the civil case is based on quasi-delict is evident
from the recitals in the complaint to wit: that while petitioner was driving his car along MacArthur
Highway at Marilao, Bulacan, a jeep owned and driven by Salazar suddenly swerved to his
(petitioner's) lane and collided with his car That the sudden swerving of Salazar's jeep was caused
either by the negligence and lack of skill of Freddie Montoya, Timbol's employee, who was then
driving a gravel and sand truck iii the same direction as Salazar's jeep; and that as a consequence of
the collision, petitioner's car suffered extensive damage amounting to P12,248.20 and that he
likewise incurred actual and moral damages, litigation expenses and attorney's fees. Clearly,
therefore, the two factors that a cause of action must consist of, namely: (1) plaintiff's primary right,
i.e., that he is the owner of a Mercedes Benz, and (2) defendant's delict or wrongful act or omission
which violated plaintiff's primary right, i.e., the negligence or lack of skill either of jeep-owner Salazar
or of Timbol's employee, Montoya, in driving the truck, causing Salazar's jeep to swerve and collide
with petitioner's car, were alleged in the Complaint. 6
Consequently, petitioner's cause of action being based on quasi-delict, respondent Judge committed
reversible error when he dismissed the civil suit against the truck-owner, as said case may proceed
independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter.

Art. 31. When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or omission
complained of as a felony, such civil action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings
and regardless of the result of the latter.
But it is truck-owner Timbol's submission (as well as that of jeep-owner-driver Salazar) that
petitioner's failure to make a reservation in the criminal action of his right to file an independent civil
action bars the institution of such separate civil action, invoking section 2, Rule 111, Rules of Court,
which says:
Section 2. — Independent civil action. — In the cases provided for in Articles 31, 32, 33, 34 and
2177 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, an independent civil action entirely separate and distinct
from the criminal action may be brought by the injured party during the pendency of the criminal
case, provided the right is reserved as required in the preceding section. Such civil action shau
proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of
evidence.
Interpreting the above provision, this Court, in Garcia vs. Florida 7 said:
As we have stated at the outset, the same negligent act causing damages may produce a civil
liability arising from crime or create an action for quasi-delict or culpa extra-contractual. The former
is a violation of the criminal law, while the latter is a distinct and independent negligence, having
always had its own foundation and individuality. Some legal writers are of the view that in
accordance with Article 31, the civil action based upon quasi-delict may proceed independently of
the criminal proceeding for criminal negligence and regardless of the result of the latter. Hence, 'the
proviso in Section 2 of Rule 111 with reference to ... Articles 32, 33 and 34 of the Civil Code is
contrary to the letter and spirit of the said articles, for these articles were drafted ... and are intended
to constitute as exceptions to the general rule stated in what is now Section 1 of Rule 111. The
proviso, which is procedural, may also be regarded as an unauthorized amendment of substantive
law, Articles 32, 33 and 34 of the Civil Code, which do not provide for the reservation required in the
proviso ... .

In his concurring opinion in the above case, Mr. Justice Antonio Barredo further observed that
inasmuch as Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code create a civil liability distinct and different from
the civil action arising from the offense of negligence under the Revised Penal Code, no reservation,
therefore, need be made in the criminal case; that Section 2 of Rule 111 is inoperative, "it being
substantive in character and is not within the power of the Supreme Court to promulgate; and even if
it were not substantive but adjective, it cannot stand because of its inconsistency with Article 2177,
an enactment of the legislature superseding the Rules of 1940."
We declare, therefore, that in so far as truck-owner Timbol is concerned, Civil Case No. 80803 is not
barred by the fact that petitioner failed to reserve, in the criminal action, his right to file an
independent civil action based on quasi-delict.

The suit against

jeep-owner-driver Salazar
The case as against jeep-owner-driver Salazar, who was acquitted in Criminal Case No. SM-228,
presents a different picture altogether.
At the outset it should be clarified that inasmuch as civil liability co-exists with criminal responsibility
in negligence cases, the offended party has the option between an action for enforcement of civil
liability based on culpa criminal under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, and an action for
recovery of damages based on culpa aquiliana under Article 2177 of the Civil Code. The action for
enforcement of civil liability based on culpa criminal under section 1 of Rule 111 of the Rules of
Court is deemed simultaneously instituted with the criminal action, unless expressly waived or
reserved for separate application by the offended party. 8
The circumstances attendant to the criminal case yields the conclusion that petitioner had opted to
base his cause of action against jeep-owner-driver Salazar on culpa criminal and not on culpa
aquiliana as evidenced by his active participation and intervention in the prosecution of the criminal
suit against said Salazar. The latter's civil liability continued to be involved in the criminal action until
its termination. Such being the case, there was no need for petitioner to have reserved his right to
file a separate civil action as his action for civil liability was deemed impliedly instituted in Criminal
Case No. SM-228.
Neither would an independent civil action he. Noteworthy is the basis of the acquittal of jeep-owner-
driver Salazar in the criminal case, expounded by the trial Court in this wise:
In view of what has been proven and established during the trial, accused Freddie Montoya would
be held able for having bumped and hit the rear portion of the jeep driven by the accused Rodolfo
Salazar,
Considering that the collision between the jeep driven by Rodolfo Salazar and the car owned and
driven by Edgardo Mendoza was the result of the hitting on the rear of the jeep by the truck driven by
Freddie Montoya, this Court behaves that accused Rodolfo Salazar cannot be held able for the
damages sustained by Edgardo Mendoza's car. 9
Crystal clear is the trial Court's pronouncement that under the facts of the case, jeep-owner-driver
Salazar cannot be held liable for the damages sustained by petitioner's car. In other words, "the fact
from which the civil might arise did not exist. " Accordingly, inasmuch as petitioner's cause of action
as against jeep-owner-driver Salazar is ex- delictu, founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal
Code, the civil action must be held to have been extinguished in consonance with Section 3(c), Rule
111 of the Rules of Court 10 which provides:
Sec. 3. Other civil actions arising from offenses. — In all cases not included in the preceding section
the following rules shall be observed:
xxx xxx xxx
c) Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the extinction
proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil night arise did not
exist. ...
And even if petitioner's cause of action as against jeep-owner-driver Salazar were not ex-delictu, the
end result would be the same, it being clear from the judgment in the criminal case that Salazar's
acquittal was not based upon reasonable doubt, consequently, a civil action for damages can no
longer be instituted. This is explicitly provided for in Article 29 of the Civil Code quoted here under:
Art. 29. When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not
been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or omission may
be instituted. Such action requires only a preponderance of evidence ...
If in a criminal case the judgment of acquittal is based upon reasonable doubt, the court shall so
declare. In the absence of any declaration to that effect, it may be inferred from the text of the
decision whether or not the acquittal is due to that ground.
In so far as the suit against jeep-owner-driver Salazar is concerned, therefore, we sustain
respondent Judge's Order dated January 30, 1971 dismissing the complaint, albeit on different
grounds.

WHEREFORE, 1) the Order dated September 12, 1970 dismissing Civil Case No. 80803 against
private respondent Felino Timbol is set aside, and respondent Judge, or his successor, hereby
ordered to proceed with the hearing on the merits; 2) but the Orders dated January 30, 1971 and
February 23, 1971 dismissing the Complaint in Civil Case No. 80803 against respondent Rodolfo
Salazar are hereby upheld.
No costs.

SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, (Chairman), Makasiar, Fernandez, Guerrero and De Castro, JJ., concur.
#Footnotes
1 p. 26, Rollo
2 pp. 147-149, Ibid.
3 pp. 138-139, Ibid.
4 Decision P. 26, Ibid
5 73 PhiL 607, 620 (1942)
6 Racoma vs. Fortich, 39S CRA 521(1971)
7 52 SCRA 420 (1973)
8 Padua vs. Robles, 66 SCRA 485 (1975)
9 pp. 25-26, Rollo
10 Eleano Hill, 77 SCRA 98 (1977)
 3. Prescription (1146)

G.R. No. L-83524 October 13, 1989

ERNESTO KRAMER, JR. and MARIA KRAMER, petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and TRANS-ASIA SHIPPING LINES, INC., respondents.
Rodolfo D. Mapile for petitioners.
Jose Al. Perez for private respondent.

GANCAYCO, J.:
The principal issue in this Petition for Review is whether or not a Complaint for damages instituted
by the petitioners against the private respondent arising from a marine collision is barred by the
statute of limitations.
The record of the case discloses that in the early morning of April 8, 1976, the F/B Marjolea, a
fishing boat owned by the petitioners Ernesto Kramer, Jr. and Marta Kramer, was navigating its way
from Marinduque to Manila. Somewhere near Maricabon Island and Cape Santiago, the boat figured
in a collision with an inter-island vessel, the M/V Asia Philippines owned by the private respondent
Trans-Asia Shipping Lines, Inc. As a consequence of the collision, the F/B Marjolea sank, taking with
it its fish catch.
After the mishap, the captains of both vessels filed their respective marine protests with the Board of
Marine Inquiry of the Philippine Coast Guard. The Board conducted an investigation for the purpose
of determining the proximate cause of the maritime collision.
On October 19, 1981, the Board concluded that the loss of the F/B Marjolea and its fish catch was
attributable to the negligence of the employees of the private respondent who were on board the
M/V Asia Philippines during the collision. The findings made by the Board served as the basis of a
subsequent Decision of the Commandant of the Philippine Coast Guard dated April 29, 1982
wherein the second mate of the M/V Asia Philippines was suspended from pursuing his profession
as a marine officer.1
On May 30, 1985, the petitioners instituted a Complaint for damages against the private respondent
before Branch 117 of the Regional Trial Court in Pasay City.2 The suit was docketed as Civil Case
No. 2907-P.
The private respondent filed a Motion seeking the dismissal of the Complaint on the ground of
prescription. He argued that under Article 1146 of the Civil Code, 3 the prescriptive period for
instituting a Complaint for damages arising from a quasi-delict like a maritime collision is four years.
He maintained that the petitioners should have filed their Complaint within four years from the date
when their cause of action accrued, i.e., from April 8, 1976 when the maritime collision took place,
and that accordingly, the Complaint filed on May 30, 1985 was instituted beyond the four-year
prescriptive period.
For their part, the petitioners contended that maritime collisions have peculiarities and characteristics
which only persons with special skill, training and experience like the members of the Board of
Marine Inquiry can properly analyze and resolve. The petitioners argued that the running of the
prescriptive period was tolled by the filing of the marine protest and that their cause of action
accrued only on April 29, 1982, the date when the Decision ascertaining the negligence of the crew
of the M/V Asia Philippines had become final, and that the four-year prescriptive period under Article
1146 of the Civil Code should be computed from the said date. The petitioners concluded that
inasmuch as the Complaint was filed on May 30, 1985, the same was seasonably filed.
In an Order dated September 25, 1986,4 the trial court denied the Motion filed by the private
respondent. The trial court observed that in ascertaining negligence relating to a maritime collision,
there is a need to rely on highly technical aspects attendant to such collision, and that the Board of
Marine Inquiry was constituted pursuant to the Philippine Merchant Marine Rules and Regulations,
which took effect on January 1, 1975 by virtue of Letter of Instruction No. 208 issued on August 12,
1974 by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos, precisely to answer the need. The trial court went on
to say that the four-year prescriptive period provided in Article 1146 of the Civil Code should begin to
run only from April 29, 1982, the date when the negligence of the crew of the M/V Asia Philippines
had been finally ascertained. The pertinent portions of the Order of the trial court are as follows —
Considering that the action concerns an incident involving a collision at sea of two vehicles and to
determine negligence for that incident there is an absolute need to rely on highly technical aspects
attendant to such collisions. It is obviously to answer such a need that the Marine Board of Inquiry
(Sic) was constituted pursuant to the Philippine Merchant Marine Rules and Regulations which
became effective January 1, 1975 under Letter of Instruction(s) No. 208 dated August 12, 1974. The
relevant section of that law (Art. XVI/b/ provided as follow(s):
1. Board of Marine Inquiry (BMI) — Shall have the jurisdiction to investigate marine accidents or
casualties relative to the liability of shipowners and officers, exclusive jurisdiction to investigate
cases/complaints against the marine officers; and to review all proceedings or investigation
conducted by the Special Boards of Marine Inquiry.
2. Special Board of Marine Inquiry. — Shall have original jurisdiction to investigate marine casualties
and disasters which occur or are committed within the limits of the Coast Guard District concerned or
those referred by the Commandant.
The Court finds reason in the argument of the plaintiff that marine incidents have those 'peculiarities
which only persons of special skill, training and exposure can rightfully decipher and resolve on the
matter of the negligence and liabilities of parties involved and inasmuch as the report of the Board of
Inquiry (sic) admittedly came out only on April 29, 1982, the prescriptive period provided x x x under
Art. 1146 of the Civil Code should begin to run only from that date. The complaint was filed with this
Court on May 10, 1985, hence the statute of limitations can not constitute a bar to the filing of this
case.5
The private respondent elevated the case to the Court of Appeals by way of a special civil action
for certiorari and prohibition, alleging therein that the trial court committed a grave abuse of
discretion in refusing to dismiss the Complaint filed by the petitioners. The case was assigned to the
Second Division of the appellate court and was docketed as Case No. CA-G.R. SP No. 12032.6
In a Decision dated November 27, 1987,7 and clarified in a Resolution dated January 12, 1988, 8 the
Court of Appeals granted the Petition filed by the private respondent and ordered the trial court to
dismiss the Complaint. The pertinent portions of the Decision of the appellate court are as follows —
It is clear that the cause of action of private respondent (the herein petitioners Ernesto Kramer, Jr.
and Marta Kramer) accrued from the occurrence of the mishap because that is the precise time
when damages were inflicted upon and sustained by the aggrieved party and from which relief from
the court is presently sought. Private respondents should have immediately instituted a complaint for
damages based on a quasi-delict within four years from the said marine incident because its cause
of action had already definitely ripened at the onset of the collision. For this reason, he (sic) could
cite the negligence on the part of the personnel of the petitioner to exercise due care and lack of
(sic) diligence to prevent the collision that resulted in the total loss of their x x x boat.
We can only extend scant consideration to respondent judge's reasoning that in view of the nature of
the marine collision that allegedly involves highly technical aspects, the running of the prescriptive
period should only commence from the finality of the investigation conducted by the Marine Board of
Inquiry (sic) and the decision of the Commandant, Philippine Coast Guard, who has original
jurisdiction over the mishap. For one, while it is true that the findings and recommendation of the
Board and the decision of the Commandant may be helpful to the court in ascertaining which of the
parties are at fault, still the former (court) is not bound by said findings and decision. Indeed, the
same findings and decision could be entirely or partially admitted, modified, amended, or
disregarded by the court according to its lights and judicial discretion. For another, if the accrual of a
cause of action will be made to depend on the action to be taken by certain government agencies,
then necessarily, the tolling of the prescriptive period would hinge upon the discretion of such
agencies. Said alternative it is easy to foresee would be fraught with hazards. Their investigations
might be delayed and lag and then witnesses in the meantime might not be available or disappear,
or certain documents may no longer be available or might be mislaid. ... 9
The petitioners filed a Motion for the reconsideration of the said Decision but the same was denied
by the Court of Appeals in a Resolution dated May 27, 1988. 10
Hence, the instant Petition wherein the arguments raised by the petitioner before the trial court are
reiterated.11 In addition thereto, the petitioner contends that the Decision of the Court of
Appeals 12 The private respondent filed its Comment on the Petition seeking therein the dismissal of
the same.13 It is also contended by the private respondent that the ruling of the Court in Vasquez is
not applicable to the case at bar because the said case involves a maritime collision attributable to a
fortuitous event. In a subsequent pleading, the private respondent argues that the Philippine
Merchant Marine Rules and Regulations cannot have the effect of repealing the provisions of the
Civil Code on prescription of actions.14
On September 19,1988, the Court resolved to give due course to the petition. 15 After the parties filed
their respective memoranda, the case was deemed submitted for decision.
The petition is devoid of merit. Under Article 1146 of the Civil Code, an action based upon a quasi-
delict must be instituted within four (4) years. The prescriptive period begins from the day the quasi-
delict is committed. In Paulan vs. Sarabia,16 this Court ruled that in an action for damages arising
from the collision of two (2) trucks, the action being based on a quasi-delict, the four (4) year
prescriptive period must be counted from the day of the collision.
In Espanol vs. Chairman, Philippine Veterans Administration, 17 this Court held as follows-
The right of action accrues when there exists a cause of action, which consists of 3 elements,
namely: a) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is
created; b) an obligation on the part of defendant to respect such right; and c) an act or omission on
the part of such defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff ... It is only when the last element
occurs or takes place that it can be said in law that a cause of action has arisen ... .
From the foregoing ruling, it is clear that the prescriptive period must be counted when the last
element occurs or takes place, that is, the time of the commission of an act or omission violative of
the right of the plaintiff, which is the time when the cause of action arises.
It is therefore clear that in this action for damages arising from the collision of two (2) vessels the
four (4) year prescriptive period must be counted from the day of the collision. The aggrieved party
need not wait for a determination by an administrative body like a Board of Marine Inquiry, that the
collision was caused by the fault or negligence of the other party before he can file an action for
damages. The ruling in Vasquez does not apply in this case. Immediately after the collision the
aggrieved party can seek relief from the courts by alleging such negligence or fault of the owners,
agents or personnel of the other vessel.
Thus, the respondent court correctly found that the action of petitioner has prescribed. The collision
occurred on April 8, 1976. The complaint for damages was filed iii court only on May 30, 1 985, was
beyond the four (4) year prescriptive period.
WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Cruz, Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-47926 August 13, 1990

ROMUALDO F. DUMUK, Petitioner, vs. HON. ANGEL A. DAQUIGAN, BERNARDO MIRANDA y

JUGAL and THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL RAILWAYS, Respondents.

Joaquin Ortega for petitioner.chanrobles virtual law library

Luis T. Mojica for private respondent.

GANCAYCO, J.:

The center of controversy in this case is whether or not a civil action that was filed arising from the acts or
omissions subject of a separate criminal action had already prescribed of is
premature.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

On March 2, 1962, private respondent was charged with the crime of serious physical injuries through
reckless imprudence in an information that was filed in the Municipal Court of Bacnotan, La Union. An
amended information was filed on October 17, 1969 charging private respondent Miranda with the higher
category of serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library

On November 20, 1969, pending trial of said respondent Miranda in the Municipal Court of Bacnotan, La
Union, the petitioner who is the offended party in the case filed an express reservation to file a separate
action as to the civil liability arising from the offense. In a decision rendered by the Municipal Court dated
October 12, 1971 the private respondent was convicted of the offense charged. He appealed his
conviction to the Court of First Instance.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Before any information could be filed by the provincial fiscal's office, the petitioner wrote the provincial
fiscal on February 3, 1972 informing him that on account of the felony committed by the private
respondent he suffered P100,000.00 damages and he requested the provincial fiscal to include the said
damages in the information. He stated that the reason why he reserved his right to file a separate civil
action for damages in the inferior court was because his claim was beyond the jurisdiction of said
court. 1 Hence, on February 14, 1972 an information was filed by the fiscal for the same offense alleging
therein the claim for actual, moral and exemplary damages in the amount of P100,000.00 of the
petitioner. 2chanrobles virtual law library

During the trial of said criminal case a private prosecutor appeared in behalf of petitioner who attempted
to prove the damages suffered by petitioner but the trial court refused to receive the evidence on the civil
aspect. Thus, in the decision of the trial court of October 14, 1977 private respondent was found guilty of
the offense charged and sentenced to three months of arresto mayor and to pay the costs. It was also
therein stated that the right to file a separate civil action for damages was reserved in favor of petitioner.
The said decision was appealed by private respondent to the Court of
Appeals.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Petitioner earlier filed a complaint for damages against private respondent and the Philippine National
Railways (PNR) in the Court of First Instance of La Union on August 17, 1977 arising from the criminal
acts of private respondent on January 2, 1962 apparently because of the refusal of the trial court to
receive evidence on the civil liability in the criminal case. An amended complaint was filed by petitioner
which added as allegation that the defendant corporation failed to exercise care in the selection and
supervision of its employees which was clearly manifest in this case. In the answer of the defendants in
said case the defense of prescription was interposed. The actual court, acting on the motions of
respondents for a hearing on the affirmative defenses and after receiving the memoranda of the parties,
issued an order on September 2, 1977 dismissing the complaint on the ground of prescription of action
and/or for lack of cause of action. 3chanrobles virtual law library

A motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner was denied in an order dated November 28, 1977. Hence,
the herein petition for review on certiorari of the said orders of the trial
court.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

The main thrust of the appeal is to the effect that the trial court erred when it held that the filing of the civil
action had prescribed and/or was otherwise premature.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library
In the questioned order it was ruled that if the civil liability is based on quasi-delict the period of
prescription arises from the date the alleged quasi-delict was committed on January 2, 1962 and it
prescribes in four (4) years in accordance with Article 1146 of the Civil Code, so the civil action has
prescribed. On the other hand it also held that if the civil action arises from the criminal act which is
impliedly instituted with the criminal action, the filing of the civil action is premature because the liability of
respondent PNR is subsidiary. Petitioner must await final judgment in the criminal action against
respondent Miranda before the civil action impleading respondent PNR may be
instituted.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

On the other hand petitioner contends that prescription has not set in that although he has made a
reservation to file a separate civil action in the Municipal Court on November 20, 1969, when the
information was filed in the Court of First Instance on February 14, 1972, it included the claim for civil
liability of petitioner, thus the filing of the information tolled the running of the period of prescription. As
such, only two years, four months and 25 days had expired.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual
law library

Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court then in force provide as follows-

SECTION 1. -Institution of criminal and civil actions. - When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action
for recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged is impliedly instituted with the criminal action,
unless the offended party expressly waives the civil action or reserves his right to institute it
separately.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

SECTION 2. -Independent civil action - In the cases provided for in Articles 31, 32, 33, 34 and 2177 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines, an independent civil action entirely separate and distinct from the criminal
action, may be brought by the injured party during the pendency of the criminal case, provided the right is
reserved as required in the preceding section. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the
criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.

From the foregoing rules it is clear that once a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery
of civil liability arising from the offense is impliedly instituted with the criminal action. However, for
damages arising under Articles 31, 32, 33, 34 and 2177 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, an
independent civil action entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the
injured party during the pendency of the criminal case, provided the right is reserved in the criminal
action.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

In the present case when an information for the crime of serious physical injuries through reckless
imprudence was filed on March 2, 1962 in the Municipal Court of Bacnotan, La Union, the civil action for
recovery of civil liability arising from the offense was deemed impliedly instituted with the filing of said
information and amended information thereafter. However, on November 20, 1969, the petitioner
informed the inferior court in writing that he was making an express reservation to file a separate civil
action as to the civil liability arising from the offense. Thus on October 12, 1971 when respondent Miranda
was convicted by the municipal court, no damages were awarded to the
petitioner.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

When respondent Miranda appealed to the CFI, petitioner then wrote the provincial fiscal on February 3,
1972 asking that the damages that he suffered in the amount of P100,000.00 be included in the
information explaining that he reserved his right to file a separate civil action in the municipal court
because his claim exceeded the jurisdiction of the municipal court. Forthwith the provincial fiscal on
February 14, 1972 filed an information which included the claim for damages of the
petitioner.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

The period of prescription within which to file a civil action as to the civil liability arising from the offense
started to run on November 20, 1969 when the petitioner informed the municipal court in writing that he
was reserving his right to file a separate civil action. It was interrupted upon the filing of the information in
the CFI on February 14, 1972 alleging the claim for damages. On said date a period of only two (2) years,
three (3) months and twenty-three (23) days more or less have lapsed
then.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Obviously, at the time the information was filed the four-year prescriptive period for the action had not yet
lapsed. Because of the refusal of the trial court to accept evidence of damages in the criminal case
(perhaps because the express reservation of petitioner was still in the records of the case), a separate
civil action was instituted by petitioner on August 17, 1976.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual
law library

Consequently, in the criminal case, the trial court rendered judgment affirming the conviction of private
respondent Miranda but recognizing the right of petitioner to file a separate civil action for
damages.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

From the foregoing set of facts, it is clear that the civil action instituted by the petitioner for damages
arising from the offense has not prescribed. It was filed well within the period of
prescription.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

However, the civil action based on quasi-delict had prescribed. Petitioner did not reserve the filing of an
independent civil action arising therefrom nor did he file the civil action within the four (4) year
reglementary period. The acts complained of occurred on February 2, 1962 while the separate civil action
for damages was fued by petitioner only on August 17, 1976 which was amended only on January 17,
1977 to include the claim for damages arising from quasi-delict. No doubt the civil action arising from
quasi-delict had prescribed.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The questioned orders of the trial court dated September 2,
1972 and November 20, 1979 are hereby modified in that the civil action arising from the offense has not
prescribed and must take its due course. However, the civil action based on quasi-delict had
prescribed.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa (Chairman), Cruz, Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-85868 October 13, 1989

ALLIED BANKING CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS AND JOSELITO Z. YUJUICO, respondents.

Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala & Cruz for petitioner.

Balgos & Perez Law Offices for respondents.

GANCAYCO, J.:

What started as a simple collection suit and which developed into an intricate question of procedure is the
focus of this petition for review on certiorari.

The present petition seeks the reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 14759
dated September 5, 1988 entitled "Joselito Z. Yujuico vs. Hon. Domingo D. Panis, RTC Judge of Manila
Branch LXI and Allied Banking Corp. 1 and the resolution dated November 9,1988 denying petitioner's
motion for reconsideration of the said decision.2

The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:

On April 1, 1976, private respondent Joselito Z. Yujuico obtained a loan from the General Bank and Trust
Company (GENBANK) in the amount of Five Hundred Thousand pesos (P500,000.00), payable on or
before April 1, 1977. As evidence thereof, private respondent issued a corresponding promissory note in
favor of GENBANK. At the time private respondent incurred the obligation, he was then a ranking officer
of GENBANK and a member of the family owning the controlling interest in the said bank.

On March 25,1977, the Monetary Board of the Central Bank issued Resolution No. 675 forbidding
GENBANK from doing business in the Philippines. This was followed by Resolution No. 677 issued by the
Monetary Board on March 29, 1977 ordering the liquidation of GENBANK.
It appears that in a Memorandum of Agreement dated May 9, 1977 executed by and between Allied
Banking Corporation (ALLIED) and Arnulfo Aurellano as Liquidator of GENBANK, ALLIED acquired all the
assets and assumed the liabilities of GENBANK, which includes the receivable due from private
respondent under the promissory note.

Upon failing to comply with the obligation under the promissory note, petitioner ALLIED, on February 7,
1979, filed a complaint against private respondent for the collection of a sum of money. This case was
docketed as Civil Case No. 121474 before the then Court of First Instance of Manila (now Regional Trial
Court).

Sometime in 1987 and in the course of the proceedings in the court below, private respondent, then
defendant in the court below, filed a Motion to Admit Amended/Supplemental Answer and Third-Party
Complaint. Private respondent sought to implead the Central Bank and Arnulfo Aurellano as third-party
defendants. It was alleged in the third-party complaint that by reason of the tortious interference by the
Central Bank with the affairs of GENBANK, private respondent was prevented from performing his
obligation under the loan such that he should not now be held liable thereon.

Acting on the motion and on the opposition filed thereto, the Regional Trial Court through the Hon. Judge
Felix B. Mintu issued an order dated August 13,1987 denying the admission of the third- party complaint
but admitting private respondent's amended/supplemental answer.

When the case was re-raffled to Branch 61 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, presiding Judge
Domingo D. Panis, on February 29, 1 988, reiterated the order denying the admission of private
respondent's third-party complaint and admitting the amended/supplemental answer. When both parties
filed their respective motions for partial reconsideration, the Hon. Judge Panis issued an order dated April
18, 1988 denying both motions.

Thereupon, private respondent filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari 3 on June 1, 1988
questioning the orders of Hon. Judge Panis dated February 29, 1988 denying private respondent's motion
to admit third-party complaint, and April 18, 1988 denying private respondent's motion for partial
reconsideration of the February 29,1988 order.

On September 5, 1988, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed decision, the dispositive portion of
which reads:

WHEREFORE, finding grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent Judge, the Order of
February 29, 1988 as well as that of April 18, 1988 insofar as it denies petitioner's motion to admit his
third party complaint, is hereby declared null and void. Respondent judge is hereby ordered to admit the
proposed third-party complaint. Cost de oficio.

SO ORDERED.4

A motion for reconsideration thereof filed by petitioner was denied in a resolution dated November 9,
1988. Petitioner assigns the following errors:

RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT HON. JUDGE PANIS
COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN DENYING ADMISSION TO PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS THIRD-PARTY COMPLAINT, CONSIDERING THAT:

A. PRIVATE RESPONDENT'S PROPOSED THIRD-PARTY COMPLAINT DOES NOT STATE A CAUSE

OF ACTION IN RESPECT OF PETITIONERS CLAIM.

B. THE ALLEGED CAUSE OF ACTION SET FORTH IN PRIVATE RESPONDENTS PROPOSED

THIRD-PARTY COMPLAINT HAS ALREADY PRESCRIBED.

C. THE ADMISSION OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT'S PROPOSED THIRD-PARTY COMPLAINT WILL

ONLY CAUSE FURTHER UNNECESSARY DELAY IN THE DISPOSITION OF THE CASE OF
PETITIONER AGAINST PRIVATE RESPONDENT.

II
CONTRARY TO THE RULING OF RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS, THE RULE PRESCRIBING
THAT DEFENSES NOT RAISED IN THE COURT BELOW CANNOT BE RAISED FOR THE FIRST TIME
ON APPEAL IS NOT APPLICABLE TO SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS OF CERTIORARI.5

From the foregoing assignment of errors, petitioner would like Us to resolve the following issues: (a) Is
there a proper ground to admit the third-party complaint?; and (b) assuming that there is, has the cause of
action under the third-party complaint prescribed?

A third-party complaint is a procedural device whereby a "third-party who is neither a party nor privy to the
act or deed complained of by the plaintiff, may be brought into the case with leave of court, by the
defendant, who acts as third-party plaintiff to enforce against such third-party defendant a right for
contribution, indemnity, subrogation or any other relief, in respect of the plaintiff s claim . 6 The third party
complaint is actually independent of, separate and distinct from the plaintiffs complaint. Such that, were it
not for this provision of the Rules of Court, it would have to be filed separately from the original complaint
by the defendant against the third-party.7

After going through the records of this case, this Court finds that the third-party plaintiffs claim is premised
not only on what was alleged as the tortious interference by the third-party defendants with the affairs of
GENBANK. More importantly, attention should have been focused on the fact that this allegation is
wedded to a decision rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 03642 which affirmed the
decision of the Regional Trial Court in Special Proceedings No. 107812.8 We quote the pertinent portion
of the affirmed decision, to wit:

Based on the foregoing facts, the Court finds the liquidation of GBTC as embodied in Annex "A" and
Annex "B" of the petition, which merely adopted the bid of the Lucio Tan group as the liquidation plan of
GBTC as plainly arbitrary and made in bad faith and therefore the same must be annulled and set aside.
... 9 (Italics supplied).

This decision, which declared as null and void the liquidation of GENBANK, prompted private respondent
herein to file a third-party complaint against the Central Bank and Arnulfo Aurellano on the theory that he
has a right to proceed against them in respect of ALLIED's claim. In the words of private respondent, he
"[s]eeks to transfer liability for the default imputed against him by the petitioner to the proposed third-party
defendants because of their tortious acts which prevented him from performing his obligations. 10 Thus, if
at the outset the issue appeared to be a simple maker's liability on a promissory note, it became complex
by the rendition of the aforestated decision.

As early as Capayas vs. Court of First Instance of Albay,11 this Court had already outlined the tests to
determine whether the claim for indemnity in a third-party claim is "in respect of plaintiff's claim." They
are: (a) whether it arises out of the same transaction on which the plaintiffs claim is based, or whether the
third-party's claim, although arising out of another or different contract or transaction, is connected with
the plaintiffs claim; (b) whether the third-party defendant would be liable to the plaintiff or to the defendant
for all or part of the plaintiffs claim against the original defendant, although the third-party defendant's
liability arises out of another transaction; or (c) whether the third-party defendant may assert any defense
which the third-party plaintiff has, or may have against plaintiff s claim.12

While the claim of third-party plaintiff, private respondent herein, does not fall under test (c), there is no
doubt that such claim can be accommodated under tests (a) and (b) above-mentioned. Whether or not
this Court agrees with the petitioner's assertion that the claim does not "arise out of the same transaction
on which the plaintiff s claim is based," it cannot be denied that the third-party's claim (although arising
out of another or different contract or transaction) is connected with plaintiffs claim. The judgement of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 03642 is the substantive basis of private respondent's proposed
third-party complaint. Put differently, there is merit in private respondent's position that if held liable on the
promissory note, they are seeking, by means of the third-party complaint, to transfer unto the third-party
defendants liability on the note by reason of the illegal liquidation of GENBANK which, in the first place,
was the basis for the assignment of the promissory note. If there was any confusion at all on the ground/s
alleged in the third-party complaint, it was the claim of third-party plaintiff for other damages in addition to
any amount which he may be called upon to pay under the original complaint.13 While these allegations in
the proposed third-party complaint may cause delay in the disposition of the main suit, it cannot, however,
be outrightly asserted that it would not serve any purpose.
It is one thing to say that a third-party defendant may be held liable to indemnify or reimburse the third-
party plaintiff "in respect of plaintiffs claim," but it is quite another to state that a third-party defendant may
be held liable to a third-party plaintiff. The second instance may not carry with it the necessary connection
to the main cause of action and, therefore, is not allowed by the Rules for it introduces a controversy that
is entirely foreign to and distinct from the main cause. The first instance is allowable and should be
allowed if it will help in clarifying in a single proceeding the multifarious issues involved arising from a
single transaction.

It is this Court's pronouncement that the first instance is applicable in the present situation.

As to the issue of prescription, it is the position of petitioner that the cause of action alleged in the third-
party complaint has already prescribed.14 Being founded on what was termed as tortious interference,"
petitioner asserts that under the applicable provisions of the Civil Code on quasi-delict 15 the action
against third-party defendants should have been filed within four (4) years from the date the cause of
action accrued. On the theory that the cause of action accrued on March 25, 1977, the date when the
Monetary Board ordered GENBANK to desist from doing business in the Philippines, petitioner maintains
that the claim should have been filed at the latest on March 25, 1981.16 On the other hand, private
respondent relies on the "Doctrine of Relations" or "Relations Back Doctrine"17 to support his claim that
the cause of action as against the proposed third-party defendant accrued only on December 12,1986
when the decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 03642 became final and executory. Thus, it is contended that while
the third party complaint was filed only on June 17,1987, it must be deemed to have been instituted on
February 7, 1979 when the complaint in the case was filed.

There can be no question in this case that the action for damages instituted by private respondent arising
from the quasi-delict or alleged tortious interference" should be filed within four (4) years from the day the
cause of action accrued.18

In the case of Español vs. Chairman, Philippine Veterans Administration,19 this Court ruled that it is from
the date of the act or omission violative of the right of a party when the cause of action arises and it is
from this date that the prescriptive period must be reckoned.

Thus, while technically the third party complaint in this case may be admitted as above discussed,
however, since the cause of action accrued on March 25, 1980 when the Monetary Board ordered the
General Bank to desist from doing business in the Philippines while the third party complaint was filed
only on June 17, 1987, consequently, the action has prescribed. The third party complaint should not be
admitted.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the respondent Court of Appeals dated
September 5, 1988 and its resolution dated November 9, 1988 denying the motion for reconsideration
filed by petitioner are hereby reversed and set aside and declared null and void, and another judgment is
hereby rendered sustaining the orders of the trial court of February 29,1988 and April 18,1988, denying
the admission of the third party complaint. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, Cruz, Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 Pages 42-49, Rollo; Justice Rodolfo A. Nocon was ponente, and Justices Alfredo Marigomen and
Fernando A. Santiago, concurring.

2 Pages 51-57, Rollo.

3 Docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 14759.

4 Page 48, Rollo.

5 Page 18, Rollo.

6 Section 12, Rule 6, Rules of Court; see also Annotations, 25 SCRA, 651 (1968).
7 Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 1979 ed., page 278.

8 Page 43, Rollo.

9 Page 55, Rollo.

10 Page 66, Rollo.

11 77 Phil. 181 (1946).

12 Ibid, page 183.

13 Page 48, Records in CA-G.R. SP No. 14759.

14 Pages 23-29, Rollo.

15 Articles 1146 and 2176, Civil Code.

16 Page 23, Rollo.

17 That principle of law by which an act done at one time is considered by a fiction of law to have been
done at some antecedent period. It is a doctrine which, although of equitable origin, has a well recognized
application to proceedings at law; a legal fiction invented to promote the ends of justice or to prevent
injustice and the occurrence of injuries where otherwise there would be no remedy.

18 The doctrine, when invoked, must have connection with actual fact, must be based on some
antecedent lawful lights. It has also been referred to as "the doctrine of relation back." (2 CJS 1310).

19 Article 1146, Civil Code; Paulan, et al. vs. Sarabia, et al., G.R. L-10542, July 31, 1952.

20 137 SCRA 314 (1985).