Problem Area in Legal Ethics
Assignment (Feb. 2, 2016)
Jimenez vs Francisco (2014)
Facts:
Atty. Edgar Francisco was the legal counsel of Mark Jimenez.
What happened was Mark Jimenez filed a complaint for estafa
against Caroline Jimenez (complainant) and several others.
Jimenez alleged that he was the true and beneficial owner of
the shares of stock in Clarion Realty and Development
Corporation, which was incorporated specifically for the purpose
of purchasing a residential house located in Forbes Park, Makati.
In order to achieve its purpose of purchasing the Forbes
property, Clarion simulated a loan from the complainant in the
amount of P80,750,000.00. Thereafter, Clarion purchased the
Forbes property in the amount of P117,000,000.00 from
Gerardo Contreras. To effect the sale, Myla handed a check in
the said amount which was funded entirely by Jimenez. The
sale, however, was undervalued. In the deed of sale, it was
made to appear that the Forbes property was purchased for
P78,000,000.00 only. Further, the money used as the purchase
price was not reflected in the books of Clarion.
Caroline (complainant) was shocked with the complaint.
More so, she felt betrayed by Atty. Francisco who helped
Jimenez filed the estafa case. So, Caroline filed a complaint
against Atty. Francisco for multiple violations of the Code of
Professional responsibility before the Commission on Bar
Discipline (CBD). Caroline claimed that Atty. F represented
conflicting interests. According to her, she usually conferred with
Atty. Francisco regarding the legal implications of Clarion’s
transactions. More significantly, the principal documents relative
to the sale and transfer of Clarion’s property were all prepared
and drafted by Atty. Francisco or the members of his law office.
In his defense, Atty. F denied that he was ever the personal
lawyer of Caroline. He admitted that he acted as legal counsel
of Clarion, but then again, the corporation has a personality
separate from that of Caroline. He also said that he helped
Caroline under the impression that it was what Jimenez would
have wanted.
The CBD sided with Caroline and recommended that Atty. F
be suspended from the practice of law for one year. This was
upheld by the IBP.
Issue: Whether or not Atty. F was guilty of violations of the CPR.
Held: Canon 1 and Rule 1.0 was violated, but he was not guilty
of representing conflicting interests.
CANON 1 – A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION,
OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR
LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES. Rule 1.0 – A lawyer shall not
engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
In the facts obtaining in this case, Atty. Francisco clearly
violated the canons and his sworn duty. He is guilty of engaging
in dishonest and deceitful conduct when he admitted to having
allowed his corporate client, Clarion, to actively misrepresent to
the SEC, the significant matters regarding its corporate purpose
and subsequently, its corporate shareholdings. In the
documents submitted to the SEC, such as the deeds of
assignment and the GIS, Atty. Francisco, in his professional
capacity, feigned the validity of these transfers of shares,
making it appear that these were done for consideration when,
in fact, the said transactions were fictitious, albeit upon the
alleged orders of Jimenez. The Investigating Commissioner was
correct in pointing out that this ran counter to the deeds of
assignment which he executed as corporate counsel. In his long
practice as corporate counsel, it is indeed safe to assume that
Atty. Francisco is knowledgeable in the law on contracts,
corporation law and the rules enforced by the SEC. As corporate
secretary of Clarion, it was his duty and obligation to register
valid transfers of stocks. Nonetheless, he chose to advance the
interests of his clientele with patent disregard of his duties as a
lawyer. Worse, Atty. Francisco admitted to have simulated the
loan entered into by Clarion and to have undervalued the
consideration of the effected sale of the Forbes property. He
permitted this fraudulent ruse to cheat the government of taxes.
Unquestionably, therefore, Atty. Francisco participated in a
series of grave legal infractions and was content to have granted
the requests of the persons involved.
Time and again, the Court has reminded lawyers that their
support for the cause of their clients should never be attained
at the expense of truth and justice. While a lawyer owes
absolute fidelity to the cause of his client, full devotion to his
genuine interest, and warm zeal in the maintenance and defense
of his rights, as well as the exertion of his utmost learning and
ability, he must do so only within the bounds of the law.
The rule on conflict of interests presupposes a lawyer-client
relationship. But here, there was no proof of such lawyer-client
relationship.
Elements of lawyer-client privilege: (1) There exists an
attorney-client relationship, or a prospective attorney-client
relationship, and it is by reason of this relationship that the client
made the communication; (2) The client made the
communication in confidence. (3) The legal advice must be
sought from the attorney in his professional capacity.
Considering these factors in the case at bench, the Court
holds that the evidence on record fails to demonstrate the claims
of complainant. As discussed, the complainant failed to establish
the professional relationship between her and Atty. Francisco.
The records are further bereft of any indication that the "advice"
regarding the sale of the Forbes property was given to Atty.
Francisco in confidence. Neither was there a demonstration of
what she had communicated to Atty. Francisco nor a recital of
circumstances under which the confidential communication was
relayed. All that complaint alleged in her complainant was that
"she sought legal advice from respondent in various occasions."
Considering that complainant failed to attend the hearings at the
IBP, there was no testimony as to the specific confidential
information allegedly divulged by Atty. Francisco without her
consent. It is, therefore, difficult, if not impossible, to determine
if there was any violation of the rule on privileged
communication. As held in Mercado, such confidential
information is a crucial link in establishing a breach of the rule
on privileged communication between attorney and client. It is
not enough to merely assert the attorney-client privilege.30 It
cannot be gainsaid then that complainant, who has the burden
of proving that the privilege applies, failed in this regard.
 Problem Area in Legal Ethics
Assignment (Feb. 2, 2016)
Foster vs Agtang (2014)
Facts:
Complainant Erlinda Foster had a legal problem over a deed
of sale she entered with Tierra Realty. Atty. Jaime Agtang
agreed to represent her as her counsel for the filing of the
appropriate case in court, even though he was the one who
notarized the deed of sale.
In the course of being Foster’s lawyer, Agtang committed
the following acts: (1) Borrowed money from Foster in the
amount of P100,000 anp P220,000; (2) Misrepresented the
amount (P150,000) of filing fee; (3) Asked for P50,000
purportedly to be given to the judge as a bribe; and (4) Failed
to notify Foster that the case was dismissed in September 2010.
Foster found out when he checked it herself in December of that
same year. Also, it turned out that Agtang had legal
relationships with Tierrar Realty.
Hence, Foster filed a complaint against Agtang with the
Commission of Bar Discipline (CBD) which found Agtang guilty
of ethical impropriety and recommended his suspension from
the practice of law for one (1) year. The IBP-BOG reduced the
one-year suspension to three months.
Issue: Whether or not Agtang violated the CPR.
Held: Yes. Rule 1.0, Canon 1 of the CPR, provides that “[a]
lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct.” It is well-established that a lawyer’s conduct
is “not confined to the performance of his professional duties. A
lawyer may be disciplined for misconduct committed either in
his professional or private capacity. The test is whether his
conduct shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty,
probity, and good demeanor, or whether it renders him
unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.” In this case,
respondent is guilty of engaging in dishonest and deceitful
conduct, both in his professional and private capacity. As a
lawyer, he clearly misled complainant into believing that the
filing fees for her case were worth more than the prescribed
amount in the rules, due to feigned reasons such as the high
value of the land involved and the extra expenses to be incurred
by court employees. In other words, he resorted to overpricing,
an act customarily related to depravity and dishonesty. He
demanded the amount of P150,000.00 as filing fee, when in
truth, the same amounted only to P22,410.00. His defense that
it was complainant who suggested that amount deserves no iota
of credence. For one, it is highly improbable that complainant,
who was then plagued with the rigors of litigation, would
propose such amount that would further burden her financial
resources. Assuming that the complainant was more than willing
to shell out an exorbitant amount just to initiate her complaint
with the trial court, still, respondent should not have accepted
the excessive amount. As a lawyer, he is not only expected to
be knowledgeable in the matter of filing fees, but he is likewise
duty-bound to disclose to his client the actual amount due,
consistent with the values of honesty and good faith expected
of all members of the legal profession.
Respondent’s unbecoming conduct towards complainant did
not stop here. Records reveal that he likewise violated Rule
16.04, Canon 16 of the CPR, which states that “[a] lawyer shall
not borrow money from his client unless the client’s interests are
fully protected by the nature of the case or by independent
advice. Neither shall a lawyer lend money to a client except,
when in the interest of justice, he has to advance necessary
expenses in a legal matter he is handling for the client.” In his
private capacity, he requested from his client, not just one, but
two loans of considerable amounts. The first time, he visited his
client in her home and borrowed P100,000.00 for the repair of
his car; and the next time, he implored her to extend to him a
loan of P70,000.00 or P50,000.00 “in the moment of urgency or
emergency” but was only given P22,000.00 by complainant.
These transactions were evidenced by promissory notes and
receipts, the authenticity of which was never questioned by
respondent. These acts were committed by respondent in his
private capacity, seemingly unrelated to his relationship with
complainant, but were indubitably acquiesced to by complainant
because of the trust and confidence reposed in him as a lawyer.
The Court deviates from the findings of the IBP. There is
substantial evidence to hold respondent liable for representing
conflicting interests in handling the case of complainant against
Tierra Realty, a corporation to which he had rendered services
in the past. The Court cannot ignore the fact that respondent
admitted to having notarized the deed of sale, which was the
very document being questioned in complainant’s case. While
the Investigating Commissioner found that the complaint in Civil
Case No. 14791-65 did not question the validity of the said
contract, and that only the intentions of the parties as to some
provisions thereof were challenged, the Court still finds that the
purpose for which the proscription was made exists. The Court
cannot brush aside the dissatisfied observations of the
complainant as to the allegations lacking in the complaint
against Tierra Realty and the clear admission of respondent that
he was the one who notarized the assailed document.
Regardless of whether it was the validity of the entire document
or the intention of the parties as to some of its provisions raised,
respondent fell short of prudence in action when he accepted
complainant’s case, knowing fully that he was involved in the
execution of the very transaction under question. Neither his
unpaid notarial fees nor the participation of a collaborating
counsel would excuse him from such indiscretion. It is apparent
that respondent was retained by clients who had close dealings
with each other. More significantly, there is no record of any
written consent from any of the parties involved. The
representation of conflicting interests is prohibited “not only
because the relation of attorney and client is one of trust and
confidence of the highest degree, but also because of the
principles of public policy and good taste. An attorney has the
duty to deserve the fullest confidence of his client and represent
him with undivided loyalty. Once this confidence is abused or
violated the entire profession suffers.”
Agtang was disbarred by the Supreme Court.
Navarro vs Solidum Jr (2014)
FACTS
On 4 April 2006, respondent signed a retainer agreement with
Presbitero to follow up the release of the payment for the latter’s
2.7-hectare property located in Bacolod which was the subject
of a Voluntary Offer to Sell (VOS) to the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR). The agreement also included the payment of the
debts of Presbitero’s late husband to the Philippine National
Bank (PNB), the sale of the retained areas of the property, and
 Problem Area in Legal Ethics
Assignment (Feb. 2, 2016)
the collection of the rentals due for the retained areas from their
occupants. It appeared that the DAR was supposed to
payP700,000 for the property but it was mortgaged by
Presbitero and her late husband to PNB for P1,200,000.
Presbitero alleged that PNB’s claim had already prescribed, and
she engaged the services of respondent to represent her in the
matter. Respondent proposed the filing of a case for quieting of
title against PNB. Respondent and Presbitero agreed to an
attorney’s fee of 10% of the proceeds from the VOS or the sale
of the property, with the expenses to be advanced by Presbitero
but deductible from respondent’s fees. Respondent
received P50,000 from Presbitero, supposedly for the expenses
of the case, but nothing came out of it.
In May 2006, Presbitero’s daughter, Ma. Theresa P. Yulo (Yulo),
also engaged respondent’s services to handle the registration of
her 18.85-hectare lot located in Nasud-ong, Caradio-an,
Himamaylan, Negros. Yulo convinced her sister, Navarro, to
finance the expenses for the registration of the property.
Respondent undertook to register the property in consideration
of 30% of the value of the property once it is registered.
Respondent obtained P200,000 from Navarro for the
registration expenses. Navarro later learned that the registration
decree over the property was already issued in the name of one
Teodoro Yulo. Navarro alleged that she would not have spent
for the registration of the property if respondent only apprised
her of the real situation of the property.
On 25 May 2006, respondent obtained a loan of P1,000,000
from Navarro to finance his sugar trading business. Respondent
and Navarro executed a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) and
agreed that the loan (a) shall be for a period of one year; (b)
shall earn interest at the rate of 10% per month; and (c) shall
be secured by a real estate mortgage over a property located in
Barangay Alijis, Bacolod City, covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 304688. They also agreed that respondent shall issue
postdated checks to cover the principal amount of the loan as
well as the interest thereon. Respondent delivered the checks to
Navarro, drawn against an account in Metrobank, Bacolod City
Branch, and signed them in the presence of Navarro.
In June 2006, respondent obtained an additional loan
of P1,000,000 from Navarro, covered by a second MOA with the
same terms and conditions as the first MOA. Respondent sent
Navarro, through a messenger, postdated checks drawn against
an account in Bank of Commerce, Bacolod City Branch.
Respondent likewise discussed with Navarro about securing a
"Tolling Agreement" with Victorias Milling Company, Inc. but no
agreement was signed.
At the same time, respondent obtained a loan of P1,000,000
from Presbitero covered by a third MOA, except that the real
estate mortgage was over a 263-square-meter property located
in Barangay Taculing, Bacolod City. Respondent sent Presbitero
postdated checks drawn against an account in Metrobank,
Bacolod City Branch.
Presbitero was dissatisfied with the value of the 263-square-
meter property mortgaged under the third MOA, and respondent
promised to execute a real estate mortgage over a 1,000-
square-meter parcel of land adjacent to the 4,000-square-meter
property he mortgaged to Navarro.
However, respondent did not execute a deed for the additional
security.
Respondent paid the loan interest for the first few months. He
was able to pay complainants a total of P900,000. Thereafter,
he failed to pay either the principal amount or the interest
thereon. In September 2006, the checks issued by respondent
to complainants could no longer be negotiated because the
accounts against which they were drawn were already closed.
When complainants called respondent’s attention, he promised
to pay the agreed interest for September and October 2006 but
asked for a reduction of the interest to 7% for the succeeding
months.
In November 2006, respondent withdrew as counsel for Yulo.
On the other hand, Presbitero terminated the services of
respondent as counsel. Complainants then filed petitions for the
judicial foreclosure of the mortgages executed by respondent in
their favor. Respondent countered that the 10% monthly
interest on the loan was usurious and illegal. Complainants also
filed cases for estafa and violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22
against respondent.
Complainants alleged that respondent induced them to grant
him loans by offering very high interest rates. He also prepared
and signed the checks which turned out to be drawn against his
son’s accounts. Complainants further alleged that respondent
deceived them regarding the identity and value of the property
he mortgaged because he showed them a different property
from that which he owned. Presbitero further alleged that
respondent mortgaged his 263-square-meter property to her
for P1,000,000 but he later sold it for only P150,000.
ISSUE
Whether or not respondent violated the CPR?
RULING
The records show that respondent violated at least four
provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
Rule 1.01. - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct.
With respect to his client, Presbitero, it was established that
respondent agreed to pay a high interest rate on the loan he
obtained from her. He drafted the MOA. Yet, when he could no
longer pay his loan, he sought to nullify the same MOA he
drafted on the ground that the interest rate was unconscionable.
It was also established that respondent mortgaged a 263-
square-meter property to Presbitero for P1,000,000 but he later
sold the property for only P150,000, showing that he deceived
his client as to the real value of the mortgaged property.
Respondent’s allegation that the sale was eventually rescinded
did not distract from the fact that he did not apprise Presbitero
as to the real value of the property.
Respondent failed to refute that the checks he issued to his
client Presbitero and to Navarro belonged to his son, Ivan Garcia
Solidum III whose name is similar to his name. He only claimed
that complainants knew that he could no longer open a current
bank account, and that they even suggested that his wife or son
issue the checks for him. However, we are inclined to agree with
the IBP-CBD’s finding that he made complainants believe that
the account belonged to him. In fact, respondent signed in the
presence of Navarro the first batch of checks he issued to
Navarro. Respondent sent the second batch of checks to
 Problem Area in Legal Ethics
Assignment (Feb. 2, 2016)
Navarro and the third batch of checks to Presbitero through a
messenger, and complainants believed that the checks belonged
to accounts in respondent’s name.
It is clear that respondent violated Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. We have ruled that conduct, as used
in the Rule, is not confined to the performance of a lawyer’s
professional duties. A lawyer may be disciplined for misconduct
committed either in his professional or private capacity. The test
is whether his conduct shows him to be wanting in moral
character, honesty, probity, and good demeanor, or whether it
renders him unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.
In this case, the loan agreements with Navarro were done in
respondent’s private capacity. Although Navarro financed the
registration of Yulo’s lot, respondent and Navarro had no lawyer-
client relationship. However, respondent was Presbitero’s
counsel at the time she granted him a loan. It was established
that respondent misled Presbitero on the value of the property
he mortgaged as a collateral for his loan from her. To appease
Presbitero, respondent even made a Deed of Undertaking that
he would give her another 1,000-square-meter lot as additional
collateral but he failed to do so.
Clearly, respondent is guilty of engaging in dishonest and
deceitful conduct, both in his professional capacity with respect
to his client, Presbitero, and in his private capacity with respect
to complainant Navarro. Both Presbitero and Navarro allowed
respondent to draft the terms of the loan agreements.
Respondent drafted the MOAs knowing that the interest rates
were exorbitant. Later, using his knowledge of the law, he
assailed the validity of the same MOAs he prepared. He issued
checks that were drawn from his son’s account whose name was
similar to his without informing complainants. Further, there is
nothing in the records that will show that respondent paid or
undertook to pay the loans he obtained from complainants.
Canon 16 and Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility provide:
CANON 16. - A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS
AND PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT THAT MAY COME INTO HIS
POSSESSION.
Rule 16.01 – A lawyer shall account for all money or property
collected or received for or from the client.
The fiduciary nature of the relationship between the counsel and
his client imposes on the lawyer the duty to account for the
money or property collected or received for or from his
client. We agree with the IBP-CBD that respondent failed to
fulfill this duty. In this case, the IBP-CBD pointed out that
respondent received various amounts from complainants but he
could not account for all of them.
Navarro, who financed the registration of Yulo’s 18.85-hectare
lot, claimed that respondent received P265,000 from her.
Respondent countered that P105,000 was paid for real estate
taxes but he could not present any receipt to prove his claim.
Respondent also claimed that he paid P70,000 to the surveyor
but the receipt was only for P15,000. Respondent claimed that
he paid P50,000 for filing fee, publication fee, and other
expenses but again, he could not substantiate his claims with
any receipt. As pointed out by the IBP-CBD, respondent had
been less than diligent in accounting for the funds he received
from Navarro for the registration of Yulo’s property.
Unfortunately, the records are not clear whether respondent
rendered an accounting to Yulo who had since passed away.
As regards Presbitero, it was established during the clarificatory
hearing that respondent received P50,000 from Presbitero. As
the IBP-CBD pointed out, the records do not show how
respondent spent the funds because he was not transparent in
liquidating the money he received from Presbitero.
Clearly, respondent had been negligent in properly accounting
for the money he received from his client, Presbitero. Indeed,
his failure to return the excess money in his possession gives
rise to the presumption that he has misappropriated it for his
own use to the prejudice of, and in violation of the trust reposed
in him by, the client.
Rule 16.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
Rule 16.04. - A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client
unless the client’s interests are fully protected by the nature of
the case or by independent advice. Neither shall a lawyer lend
money to a client except, when in the interest of justice, he has
to advance necessary expenses in a legal matter he is handling
for the client.
Here, respondent does not deny that he borrowed P1,000,000
from his client Presbitero. At the time he secured the loan,
respondent was already the retained counsel of Presbitero.
While respondent’s loan from Presbitero was secured by a MOA,
postdated checks and real estate mortgage, it turned out that
respondent misrepresented the value of the property he
mortgaged and that the checks he issued were not drawn from
his account but from that of his son. Respondent eventually
questioned the terms of the MOA that he himself prepared on
the ground that the interest rate imposed on his loan was
unconscionable. Finally, the checks issued by respondent to
Presbitero were dishonored because the accounts were already
closed. The interest of his client, Presbitero, as lender in this
case, was not fully protected. Respondent violated Rule 16.04
of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which presumes that
the client is disadvantaged by the lawyer’s ability to use all the
legal maneuverings to renege on his obligation. In his dealings
with his client Presbitero, respondent took advantage of his
knowledge of the law as well as the trust and confidence
reposed in him by his client.
We modify the recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors
imposing on respondent the penalty of suspension from the
practice of law for two years. Given the facts of the case, we
see no reason to deviate from the recommendation of the IBP-
CBD imposing on respondent the penalty of disbarment.
Respondent failed to live up to the high standard of morality,
honesty, integrity, and fair dealing required of him as a member
of the legal profession. Instead, respondent employed his
knowledge and skill of the law and took advantage of his client
to secure undue gains for himself that warrants his removal
from the practice of law. Likewise, we cannot sustain the IBP
Board of Governors’ recommendation ordering respondent to
return his unpaid obligation to complainants, except for
advances for the expenses he received from his client,
Presbitero, that were not accounted at all. In disciplinary
proceedings against lawyers, the only issue is whether the
officer of the court is still fit to be allowed to continue as a
member of the Bar. Our only concern is the determination of
respondent’s administrative liability.
 Problem Area in Legal Ethics
Assignment (Feb. 2, 2016)
Our findings have no material bearing on other judicial action
which the parties may choose to file against each
other. Nevertheless, when a lawyer receives money from a
client for a particular purpose involving the client-attorney
relationship, he is bound to render an accounting to the client
showing that the money was spent for that particular purpose. If
the lawyer does not use the money for the intended purpose,
he must immediately return the money to his client. Respondent
was given an opportunity to render an accounting, and he failed.
He must return the full amount of the advances given him by
Presbitero, amounting to P50,000.
Tabang vs Gacott (2013)
Complainants alleged that sometime in 1984 and 1985,
complainant Lilia Tabang sought the advice of Judge Eustaquio
Gacott, respondent Atty. Glenn Gacott’s father. Lilia Tabang
intended to purchase a total of thirty (30) hectares of
agricultural land located in Barangay Bacungan, Puerto Princesa,
Palawan, which consisted of several parcels belonging to
different owners. Judge Gacott noted that under the
government’s agrarian reform program, Tabang was prohibited
from acquiring vast tracts of agricultural land as she already
owned other parcels. Thus, Judge Gacott advised her to put the
titles of the parcels under the names of fictitious persons.2
Eventually, Lilia Tabang was able to purchase seven parcels and
obtained the corresponding Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT)
under the names of fictitious persons.
Later, complainants Lilia and Concepcion Tabang decided to sell
the seven parcels as they were in need of funds for their
medication and other expenses. Claiming that he would help
complainants by offering the parcels to prospective buyers,
respondent Glenn Gacott borrowed from Lilia Tabang the TCTs
covering the parcels.4
About a year after respondent borrowed the titles and after he
failed to negotiate any sale, complainants confronted
respondent. Respondent then told the complainants that he had
lost all seven titles.5
On the pretext of offering a remedy to complainants, respondent
advised them to file petitions in court for re-issuance of titles.
Pretending to be the "authorized agent-representative" of the
fictitious owners of the seven parcels, Lilia Tabang filed petitions
for re-issuance of titles.6
In the course of the proceedings, the public prosecutor noticed
similarities in the signatures of the supposed owners that were
affixed on the Special Powers of Attorney (SPA) purportedly
executed in favor of Lilia Tabang. The public prosecutor, acting
on his observation, asked the court to have the supposed
owners summoned.7
Seeking to avoid embarrassment, Lilia Tabang had the petitions
voluntarily dismissed without prejudice to their being re-filed.8
Subsequently, Lilia Tabang filed a new set of petitions. This
time, she changed the fictitious owners’ signatures in the hope
of making them look more varied.9
Upon learning that Lilia Tabang had filed a new set of petitions,
respondent executed several documents that included
revocations of SPAs and various affidavits of recovery
purportedly signed by the parcels’ (fictitious) owners.
Respondent then caused the annotation of these documents on
the TCTs of the seven parcels.10
Also, respondent caused the publication of notices where he
represented himself as the owner of the parcels and announced
that these were for sale.11 Later, respondent succeeded in
selling the seven parcels.
Alleging that respondent committed gross misconduct,
dishonesty, and deceit, complainants filed their complaint
directly with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines on February
3, 2003.
In his defense, respondent alleged that the owners of the seven
parcels were not fictitious and that they had voluntarily sold the
seven parcels. He added that Lilia Tabang had been merely the
broker for the seven parcels and that she had unsuccessfully
demanded a "balato" of twenty percent (20%) from the
proceeds of the sale of the seven parcels. He alleged that after
she had been refused to be given a "balato," Lilia Tabang had
threatened to defame him and seek his disbarment.13
ISSUE
Whether or not respondent engaged in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct violating Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, thus warranting his disbarment?
RULING
After a careful examination of the records, the Court concurs
with and adopts the findings and recommendation of
Commissioner Limpingco and the IBP Board of Governors. It is
clear that respondent committed gross misconduct, dishonesty,
and deceit in violation of Rule 1.01 of the CPR when he executed
the revocations of SPAs and affidavits of recovery and in
arrogating for himself the ownership of the seven (7) subject
parcels.
While it may be true that complainant Lilia Tabang herself
engaged in illicit activities, the complainant’s own complicity
does not negate, or even mitigate, the repugnancy of
respondent’s offense. Quite the contrary, his offense is made
even graver. He is a lawyer who is held to the highest standards
of morality, honesty, integrity, and fair dealing. Perverting what
is expected of him, he deliberately and cunningly took
advantage of his knowledge and skill of the law to prejudice and
torment other individuals. Not only did he countenance illicit
action, he instigated it. Not only did he acquiesce to injustice,
he orchestrated it. Thus, We impose upon respondent the
supreme penalty of disbarment.
De Jesus vs Sanchez-Malit (2014)
FACTS
In the Affidavit-Complaint filed by complainant before the Office
of the Bar Confidant on 23 June 2004, she alleged that on 1
March 2002, respondent had drafted and notarized a Real Estate
Mortgage of a public market stall that falsely named the former
as its absolute and registered owner. As a result, the mortgagee
sued complainant for perjury and for collection of sum of money.
She claimed that respondent was a consultant of the local
government unit of Dinalupihan, Bataan, and was therefore
aware that the market stall was government-owned. Prior
 Problem Area in Legal Ethics
Assignment (Feb. 2, 2016)
thereto, respondent had also notarized two contracts that
caused complainant legal and financial problems. One contract
was a lease agreement notarized by respondent sometime in
September 1999 without the signature of the lessees. However,
complainant only found out that the agreement had not been
signed by the lessees when she lost her copy and she asked for
another copy from respondent. The other contract was a sale
agreement over a property covered by a Certificate of Land
Ownership Award (CLOA) which complainant entered into with
a certain Nicomedes Tala (Tala) on 17 February 1998.
Respondent drafted and notarized said agreement, but did not
advise complainant that the property was still covered by the
period within which it could not be alienated.
In addition to the documents attached to her complaint,
complainant subsequently submitted three Special Powers of
Attorney (SPAs) notarized by respondent and an Affidavit of
Irene Tolentino (Tolentino), complainant’s secretary/treasurer.
The SPAs were not signed by the principals named therein and
bore only the signature of the named attorney in-fact, Florina B.
Limpioso (Limpioso). Tolentino’s Affidavit corroborated
complainant’s allegations against respondent.
With respect to the lease agreement, respondent countered that
the document attached to the Affidavit-Complaint was actually
new. She gave the court’s copy of the agreement to complainant
to accommodate the latter’s request for an extra copy. Thus,
respondent prepared and notarized a new one, relying on
complainant’s assurance that the lessees would sign it and that
it would be returned in lieu of the original copy for the court.
Complainant, however, reneged on her promise.
ISSUE
Whether or not respondent is guilty of violating Canon 1 and
Rules 1.01, 1.02, and 10.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility
RULING
The important role a notary public performs cannot be
overemphasized. The Court has repeatedly stressed that
notarization is not an empty, meaningless routinary act, but one
invested with substantive public interest. Notarization converts
a private document into a public document, making it admissible
in evidence without further proof of its authenticity. Thus, a
notarized document is, by law, entitled to full faith and credit
upon its face. It is for this reason that a notary public must
observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the
performance of his notarial duties; otherwise, the public's
confidence in the integrity of a notarized document would be
undermined.
Where the notary public admittedly has personal knowledge of
a false statement or information contained in the instrument to
be notarized, yet proceeds to affix the notarial seal on it, the
Court must not hesitate to discipline the notary public
accordingly as the circumstances of the case may dictate.
Otherwise, the integrity and sanctity of the notarization process
may be undermined, and public confidence in notarial
documents diminished. In this case, respondent fully knew that
complainant was not the owner of the mortgaged market stall.
That complainant comprehended the provisions of the real
estate mortgage contract does not make respondent any less
guilty. If at all, it only heightens the latter’s liability for tolerating
a wrongful act. Clearly, respondent’s conduct amounted to a
breach of Canon 1 and Rules 1.01 and 1.02 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
Respondent’s explanation about the unsigned lease agreement
executed by complainant sometime in September 1999 is
incredulous. If, indeed, her file copy of the agreement bore the
lessees’ signatures, she could have given complainant a certified
photocopy thereof. It even appears that said lease agreement is
not a rarity in respondent’s practice as a notary public. Records
show that on various occasions from 2002 to 2004, respondent
has notarized 22 documents that were either unsigned or lacking
signatures of the parties. Technically, each document maybe a
ground for disciplinary action, for it is the duty of a notarial
officer to demand that a document be signed in his or her
presence.
A notary public should not notarize a document unless the
persons who signed it are the very same ones who executed it
and who personally appeared before the said notary public to
attest to the contents and truth of what are stated therein. Thus,
in acknowledging that the parties personally came and appeared
before her, respondent also violated Rule 10.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and her oath as a lawyer that she
shall do no falsehood. Certainly, respondent is unfit to continue
enjoying the solemn office of a notary public. In several
instances, the Court did not hesitate to disbar lawyers who were
found to be utterly oblivious to the solemnity of their oath as
notaries public. Even so, the rule is that disbarment is meted out
only in clear cases of misconduct that seriously affect the
standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the court
and the Court will not disbar a lawyer where a lesser penalty will
suffice to accomplish the desired end. The blatant disregard by
respondent of her basic duties as a notary public warrants the
less severe punishment of suspension from the practice of law
and perpetual disqualification to be commissioned as a notary
public.
Ecraela vs Pangalangan (2015)
FACTS
Complainant and respondent were best friends and both
graduated from the University of the Philippines (UP) College of
Law in 1990, where they were part of a peer group or barkada
with several of their classmates. After passing the bar
examinations and being admitted as members of the Bar in
1991, they were both registered with the IBP Quezon City.
Respondent was formerly married to Sheila P. Jardiolin
(Jardiolin) with whom he has three (3) children. Complainant
avers that while married to Jardiolin, respondent had a series of
adulterous and illicit relations with married and unmarried
women between the years 1990 to 2007.
These alleged illicit relations involved:
a. AAA, who is the spouse of a colleague in the UP College of
Law, from 1990 to 1992, which complainant had personal
knowledge of such illicit relations;
b. BBB, sometime during the period from 1992 to 1994 or from
1994 to 1996, despite being already married to Jardiolin;
c. CCC, despite being married to Jardiolin and while also being
romantically involved with DDD;
 Problem Area in Legal Ethics
Assignment (Feb. 2, 2016)
d. DDD, sometime during the period from 2000 to 2002, despite
still being married to Jardiolin and while still being romantically
.involved with CCC; '
e. EEE, who is related to complainant, sometime during the
period from May 2004 until the filing of the Petition, while still
being romantically involved with CCC.
Complainant claims that respondent, with malice and without
remorse, deceived CCC and DDD by representing himself to be
a bachelor, thereby convincing the two women to start a love
affair with him, when in. truth, he was then still married to
Jardiolin.
Aside from these illicit affairs, complainant avers that sometime
during the period of 1998 to 2000, respondent, as a lawyer of
the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC),
represented the interest of Manila International Airport Authority
(MIAA) in cancellation proceedings filed by MIAA against
Kendrick Development Corporation (KOC). However, despite
being a public officer and a government counsel, respondent
conspired with Atty. Abraham Espejo, legal counsel of KDC, and
assisted KDC in its case, thereby sabotaging MIAA's case, and,
m effect, that of the Philippine Government.
Complainant further claims that respondent even attempted to
bribe then Solicitor Rolando Martin of the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) in exchange for the latter's cooperation in the
dismissal of the cancellation proceedings in favor of KDC. In
return for his "earnest efforts" in assisting KDC in its case,
respondent was allegedly rewarded with a Toyota Corolla XL
with plate number ULS-835 by Atty. Espejo. The vehicle was
seen several times by respondent's classmates and officemates
being driven and parked by respondent in his own home and in
the OGCC premises itself.
Complainant also claims that respondent abused his authority
as an educator in Manuel L. Quezon University, San Sebastian
College, College of St. Benilde, and Maryknoll College, where
respondent induced his male students to engage in "nocturnal
preoccupations" and entertained the romantic gestures of his
female students in exchange for passing grades.
ISSUE
Whether or not the respondent committed gross immoral
conduct, which would warrant his disbarment?
RULING
After a thorough examination of the records, the Court agrees
with the Board of Governors' resolution finding that Atty.
Pangalangan's grossly immoral conduct was fully supported by
the evidences offered.
CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION,
OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR
LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct.
CANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE
INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND
SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.
Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely
reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in
public or private life. behave in a scandalous manner to the
discredit of the legal profession.
The practice of law is a privilege given to those who possess and
continue to possess the legal qualifications for the profession.
Good moral character is not only required for admission to the
Bar, but must also be retained in order to maintain one's good
standing in this exclusive and honored fraternity.
We are not unmindful of the serious consequences of
disbarment or suspension proceedings against a member of the
Bar. Thus, the Comi has consistently held that clearly
preponderant evidence is necessary to justify the imposition of
administrative penalties on a member of the Bar.
The IBP-CBD Report sufficiently showed by preponderant
evidence the grounds by which respondent has been found
committing gross immorality in the conduct of his personal
affairs.
In the present case, complainant alleged that respondent
carried on several adulterous and illicit relations with both
married and unmarried women between the years 1990 to 2007,
including complainant's own wife. Through documentary
evidences in the form of email messages, as well as the
corroborating testimonies of the witnesses presented,
complainant was able to establish respondent's illicit relations
with DOD and CCC by preponderant evidence.
Respondent's main defense against the alleged illicit relations
was that the same were not sufficiently established. In his
answer, respondent simply argued that complainant's petition
contains self-serving averments not supported by evidence.
Respondent did not specifically deny complainant's allegations
and, instead, questioned the admissibility of the/ suppoting
documents. Due to respondent's own failure to attend the
hearings and even submit his own position paper, the existence
of respondent's illicit relations with DDD and CCC remain
uncontroverted.
The IBP-CBD Report was correct when it found that respondent
violated Article XV, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution, to wit:
In engaging in such illicit relationships, Respondent disregarded
the sanctity of marriage and the marital vows protected by the
Constitution and affirmed by our laws, which as a lawyer he
swore under oath to protect. The 1987 Constitution, specifically
Article XV, Section 2 thereof clearly provides that marriage, an
inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and
shall be protected by the State.
Aside from respondent's illicit relations, We agree with
Commissioner Villadolid' s findings that respondent violated
Canon 1 0 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, as well as
Rule 10.01 and Rule 10.03 thereof.
CANON 10 - A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD
FAITH TO THE COURT.
Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to
the doing of any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the
Court to be misled by any artifice.
Rule 10.03 - A lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure and
shall not misuse them to defeat the ends of justice.
 Problem Area in Legal Ethics
Assignment (Feb. 2, 2016)
In the Petition, complainant alleged that respondent was the
subject of a Senate Inquiry and had a pending case for graft and
corruption against him with the Sandiganbayan.
Perez vs Catindig (2015)
In her complaint, Dr. Perez alleged that she and Atty. Catindig
had been friends since the mid-1960’s when they were both
students at the University of the Philippines, but they lost touch
after their graduation. Sometime in 1983, the paths of Atty.
Catindig and Dr. Perez again crossed. It was at that time that
Atty. Catindig started to court Dr. Perez.
Atty. Catindig admitted to Dr. Perez that he was already wed to
Lily Corazon Gomez (Gomez), having married the latter on May
18, 1968 at the Central Methodist Church in Ermita, Manila,
which was followed by a Catholic wedding at the Shrine of Our
Lady of Lourdes in Quezon City. Atty. Catindig however claimed
that he only married Gomez because he got her pregnant; that
he was afraid that Gomez would make a scandal out of her
pregnancy should he refuse to marry her, which could have
jeopardized his scholarship in the Harvard Law School.
Atty. Catindig told Dr. Perez that he was in the process of
obtaining a divorce in a foreign country to dissolve his marriage
to Gomez, and that he would eventually marry her once the
divorce had been decreed. Consequently, sometime in 1984,
Atty. Catindig and Gomez obtained a divorce decree from the
Dominican Republic. Dr. Perez claimed that Atty. Catindig
assured her that the said divorce decree was lawful and valid
and that there was no longer any impediment to their marriage.
Thus, on July 14, 1984, Atty. Catindig married Dr. Perez in the
State of Virginia in the United States of America (USA). Their
union was blessed with a child whom they named Tristan Jegar
Josef Frederic.
Years later, Dr. Perez came to know that her marriage to Atty.
Catindig is a nullity since the divorce decree that was obtained
from the Dominican Republic by the latter and Gomez is not
recognized by Philippine laws. When she confronted Atty.
Catindig about it, the latter allegedly assured Dr. Perez that he
would legalize their union once he obtains a declaration of nullity
of his marriage to Gomez under the laws of the Philippines. He
also promised to legally adopt their son.
Sometime in 1997, Dr. Perez reminded Atty. Catindig of his
promise to legalize their union by filing a petition to nullify his
marriage to Gomez. Atty. Catindig told her that he would still
have to get the consent of Gomez to the said petition.
Sometime in 2001, Dr. Perez alleged that she received an
anonymous letter9 in the mail informing her of Atty. Catindig’s
scandalous affair with Atty. Baydo, and that sometime later, she
came upon a love letter written and signed by Atty. Catindig for
Atty. Baydo dated April 25, 2001. In the said letter, Atty.
Catindig professed his love to Atty. Baydo, promising to marry
her once his “impediment is removed.” Apparently, five months
into their relationship, Atty. Baydo requested Atty. Catindig to
put a halt to their affair until such time that he is able to obtain
the annulment of his marriage. On August 13, 2001, Atty.
Catindig filed a petition to declare the nullity of his marriage to
Gomez.
On October 31, 2001, Atty. Catindig abandoned Dr. Perez and
their son; he moved to an upscale condominium in Salcedo
Village, Makati City where Atty. Baydo was frequently seen.
Atty. Catindig, in his Comment, admitted that he married Gomez
on May 18, 1968. He claimed, however, that immediately after
the wedding, Gomez showed signs that she was incapable of
complying with her marital obligations, as she had serious
intimacy problems; and that while their union was blessed with
four children, their relationship simply deteriorated.
Eventually, their irreconcilable differences led to their de
facto separation in 1984. They then consulted Atty. Wilhelmina
Joven (Atty. Joven), a mutual friend, on how the agreement to
separate and live apart could be implemented. Atty. Joven
suggested that the couple adopt a property regime of complete
separation of property. She likewise advised the couple to obtain
a divorce decree from the Dominican Republic for whatever
value it may have and comfort it may provide them.
Thus, on April 27, 1984, Atty. Catindig and Gomez each
executed a Special Power of Attorney addressed to a Judge of
the First Civil Court of San Cristobal, Dominican Republic,
appointing an attorney-in-fact to institute a divorce action under
its laws. Atty. Catindig likewise admitted that a divorce by
mutual consent was ratified by the Dominican Republic court on
June 12, 1984. Further, Atty. Catindig and Gomez filed a Joint
Petition for Dissolution of Conjugal Partnership before the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 133, which was
granted on June 23, 1984.
Atty. Catindig claimed that Dr. Perez knew of the foregoing,
including the fact that the divorce decreed by the Dominican
Republic court does not have any effect in the Philippines.
Notwithstanding that she knew that the marriage of Atty.
Catindig and Gomez still subsisted, Dr. Perez demanded that
Atty. Catindig marry her. Thus, Atty. Catindig married Dr. Perez
in July 1984 in the USA.
Atty. Catindig claimed that Dr. Perez knew that their marriage
was not valid since his previous marriage to Gomez was still
subsisting, and that he only married Dr. Perez because he loved
her and that he was afraid of losing her if he did not. He merely
desired to lend a modicum of legitimacy to their relationship.
Atty. Catindig claimed that his relationship with Dr. Perez turned
sour. Eventually, he left their home in October 2001 to prevent
any acrimony from developing.
He denied that Atty. Baydo was the reason that he left Dr. Perez,
claiming that his relationship with Dr. Perez started to fall apart
as early as 1997. He asserted that Atty. Baydo joined his law
firm only in September 1999; and that while he was attracted to
her, Atty. Baydo did not reciprocate and in fact rejected him. He
likewise pointed out that Atty. Baydo resigned from his firm in
January 2001.
For her part, Atty. Baydo denied that she had an affair with Atty.
Catindig. She claimed that Atty. Catindig began courting her
while she was employed in his firm. She however rejected Atty.
Catindig’s romantic overtures; she told him that she could not
reciprocate his feelings since he was married and that he was
too old for her. She said that despite being turned down, Atty.
 Problem Area in Legal Ethics
Assignment (Feb. 2, 2016)
Catindig still pursued her, which was the reason why she
resigned from his law firm.
ISSUE
Whether or not the respondents committed gross immorality,
which would warrant their disbarment?
RULING
After a thorough perusal of the respective allegations of the
parties and the circumstances of this case, the Court agrees with
the findings and recommendations of the Investigating
Commissioner and the IBP Board of Governors.
The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct.
Canon 7 – A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and
dignity of the legal profession and support the activities of the
Integrated Bar.
Rule 7.03 – A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely
reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in
public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the
discredit of the legal profession.
In Arnobit v. Atty. Arnobit, the Court held:
[T]he requirement of good moral character is of much greater
import, as far as the general public is concerned, than the
possession of legal learning. Good moral character is not only a
condition precedent for admission to the legal profession, but it
must also remain intact in order to maintain one’s good standing
in that exclusive and honored fraternity. Good moral character
is more than just the absence of bad character. Such character
expresses itself in the will to do the unpleasant thing if it is right
and the resolve not to do the pleasant thing if it is wrong. This
must be so because “vast interests are committed to his care;
he is the recipient of unbounded trust and confidence; he deals
with his client’s property, reputation, his life, his all.”
“A lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any misconduct
showing any fault or deficiency in his moral character, honesty,
probity or good demeanor.” Immoral conduct involves acts that
are willful, flagrant, or shameless, and that show a moral
indifference to the opinion of the upright and respectable
members of the community. Immoral conduct is gross when it
is so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act, or so unprincipled
as to be reprehensible to a high degree, or when committed
under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock
the community’s sense of decency. The Court makes these
distinctions, as the supreme penalty of disbarment arising from
conduct requires grossly immoral, not simply immoral, conduct.
Contracting a marriage during the subsistence of a
previous one amounts to a grossly immoral conduct.
The facts gathered from the evidence adduced by the parties
and, ironically, from Atty. Catindig’s own admission, indeed
establish a pattern of conduct that is grossly immoral; it is not
only corrupt and unprincipled, but reprehensible to a high
degree.
Atty. Catindig was validly married to Gomez twice – a wedding
in the Central Methodist Church in 1968, which was then
followed by a Catholic wedding. In 1983, Atty. Catindig started
pursuing Dr. Perez when their paths crossed again. Curiously,
15 years into his first marriage and four children after, Atty.
Catindig claimed that his first marriage was then already falling
apart due to Gomez’ serious intimacy problems.
A year after pursuing Dr. Perez, Atty. Catindig had a de
facto separation from Gomez, dissolved their conjugal
partnership of gains, obtained a divorce decree from a court in
the Dominican Republic, and married Dr. Perez in the USA all in
the same year. Atty. Catindig was so enchanted with Dr. Perez
at that time that he moved heaven and earth just so he could
marry her right away – a marriage that has at least a semblance
of legality.
From his own admission, Atty. Catindig knew that the divorce
decree he obtained from the court in the Dominican Republic
was not recognized in our jurisdiction as he and Gomez were
both Filipino citizens at that time. He knew that he was still
validly married to Gomez; that he cannot marry anew unless his
previous marriage be properly declared a nullity. Otherwise, his
subsequent marriage would be void. This notwithstanding, he
still married Dr. Perez. The foregoing circumstances seriously
taint Atty. Catindig’s sense of social propriety and moral values.
It is a blatant and purposeful disregard of our laws on marriage.
It has also not escaped the attention of the Court that Atty.
Catindig married Dr. Perez in the USA. Considering that Atty.
Catindig knew that his previous marriage remained valid, the
logical conclusion is that he wanted to marry Dr. Perez in the
USA for the added security of avoiding any charge of bigamy by
entering into the subsequent marriage outside Philippine
jurisdiction.
Moreover, assuming arguendo that Atty. Catindig’s claim is true,
it matters not that Dr. Perez knew that their marriage is a nullity.
The fact still remains that he resorted to various legal strategies
in order to render a façade of validity to his otherwise invalid
marriage to Dr. Perez. Such act is, at the very least, so
unprincipled that it is reprehensible to the highest degree.
Further, after 17 years of cohabiting with Dr. Perez, and despite
the various legal actions he resorted to in order to give their
union a semblance of validity, Atty. Catindig left her and their
son. It was only at that time that he finally decided to properly
seek the nullity of his first marriage to Gomez. Apparently, he
was then already entranced with the much younger Atty. Baydo,
an associate lawyer employed by his firm.
While the fact that Atty. Catindig decided to separate from Dr.
Perez to pursue Atty. Baydo, in itself, cannot be considered a
grossly immoral conduct, such fact forms part of the pattern
showing his propensity towards immoral conduct. Lest it be
misunderstood, the Court’s finding of gross immoral conduct is
hinged not on Atty. Catindig’s desertion of Dr. Perez, but on his
contracting of a subsequent marriage during the subsistence of
his previous marriage to Gomez.
“The moral delinquency that affects the fitness of a member of
the bar to continue as such includes conduct that outrages the
generally accepted moral standards of the community, conduct
for instance, which makes ‘a mockery of the inviolable social
institution of marriage.’” In various cases, the Court has held
that disbarment is warranted when a lawyer abandons his lawful
 Problem Area in Legal Ethics
Assignment (Feb. 2, 2016)
wife and maintains an illicit relationship with another woman
who has borne him a child.
Atty. Catindig’s subsequent marriage during the subsistence of
his previous one definitely manifests a deliberate disregard of
the sanctity of marriage and the marital vows protected by the
Constitution and affirmed by our laws. By his own admission,
Atty. Catindig made a mockery out of the institution of marriage,
taking advantage of his legal skills in the process. He exhibited
a deplorable lack of that degree of morality required of him as
a member of the bar, which thus warrant the penalty of
disbarment.

The Court is not unmindful of the rule that the power to disbar
must be exercised with great caution, and only in a clear case
of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and character
of the lawyer as an officer of the Court and as a member of the
bar. Where a lesser penalty, such as temporary suspension,
could accomplish the end desired, disbarment should never be
decreed. Nevertheless, in this case, the seriousness of the
offense compels the Court to wield its power to disbar, as it
appears to be the most appropriate penalty.
Atty. Catindig’s claim that Dr. Perez’s allegations against him are
not credible since they are uncorroborated and not supported
by affidavits contrary to Section 1, Rule 139-B of the Rules of
Court, deserves scant consideration. Verily, Atty. Catindig
himself admitted in his pleadings that he indeed married Dr.
Perez in 1984 while his previous marriage with Gomez still
subsisted. Indubitably, such admission provides ample basis for
the Court to render disciplinary sanction against him.
There is insufficient evidence to prove the affair
between the respondents.

The Court likewise agrees with the Investigating Commissioner

that there is a dearth of evidence to prove the claimed amorous
relationship between the respondents. As it is, the evidence that
was presented by Dr. Perez to prove her claim was mere
allegation, an anonymous letter informing her that the
respondents were indeed having an affair and the purported
love letter to Atty. Baydo that was signed by Atty. Catindig.
The Court has consistently held that in suspension or disbarment
proceedings against lawyers, the lawyer enjoys the presumption
of innocence, and the burden of proof rests upon the
complainant to prove the allegations in his complaint. The
evidence required in suspension or disbarment proceedings is
preponderance of evidence.
The presentation of the anonymous letter that was received by
Dr. Perez only proves that the latter indeed received a letter
informing her of the alleged relations between the respondents;
it does not prove the veracity of the allegations therein.
Similarly, the supposed love letter, if at all, only proves that Atty.
Catindig wrote Atty. Baydo a letter professing his love for her.
It does not prove that Atty. Baydo is indeed in a relationship
with Atty. Catindig.