QUA CHEE GAN,JAMES UY,DANIEL DY alias DEE PAC, CHAN TIONG YU,CUA CHU TIAN,CHUA LIM PAO alias

JOSE CHUA and BASILIO KING,

petitionersappellants, vs. THE DEPORTATION BOARD, respondentappellee.

No. L-10280. September 30, 1963.

The Deportation board issued a warrant of arrest against Qua Chee Gan et al for ilegaly remmtting US dollars to Hongkong and for alleged bribery
charges.

Petitioners challenged such issuance on the ground that the Board has no power to issue same.

Respondents, in their answer, claim that the Deportation Board, as agent of the President, has jurisidiction over the case and the authority to order
their arrest.

Important provisions of law:

Section 69 of Act No. 2711 (Revised Administrative Code)

“Sec. 69. Deportation of subject of foreign power.—A subject of a foreign power residing in the Philippines shall not be deported, expelled,
or excluded from said Islands or repatriated to his own country by the President of the Philippines except upon prior investigation,
conducted by said Executive or his authorized agent, xxx”

This gives rise to the question regarding the extent of the power of the President to conduct investigation, i.e., whether such authority carries with
it the power to order the arrest of the alien complained of, since the Administrative Code is silent on the matter, and if it does, whether the same
may be delegated to the respondent Deportation Board.

As has been pointed out elsewhere, Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code, upon whose authority the President’s power to deport is
predicated, does not provide for the exercise of the power to arrest. But the Solicitor General argues that the law could not have denied to the Chief
Executive acts which are absolutely necessary to carry into effect the power of deportation granted him, such as the authority to order the arrest of
the foreigner charged as undesirable.

Issues:

1. whether or not the President himself can order the arrest of a foreigner for purposes of investigation only, and before a definitive order of
deportation has been issued
2. whether the same may be delegated to the respondent Deportation Board.

Held:

1. The court did not rule on the first issue. It held: We are merely called upon to resolve herein whether, conceding without deciding that the
President can personally order the arrest of the alien complained of, such power can be delegated by him to the Deportation Board
2. No. The discretion of whether a warrant of arrest shall issue or not is personal to the one upon whom the authority devolves. And authorities
are to the effect that while ministerial duties may be delegated, official functions requiring the exercise of discretion and judgment, may
not be so delegated

Under the express terms of our Constitution, it is, therefore, even doubtful whether the arrest of an individual may be ordered by any authority other
than the judge if the purpose is merely to determine the existence of a probable cause, leading to an administrative investigation.

The contention of the Solicitor General that the arrest of a foreigner is necessary to carry into effect the power of deportation is valid only when, as
already stated, there is already an order of deportation. To carry out the order of deportation, the President obviously has the power to order the
arrest of the deportee. But, certainly, during the investigation, it is not indispensable that the alien be arrested

MARTINIANO P. Vivo, as Acting Commissioner of Immigation, BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS, Bureau of Immigration and DEPORTATION OFFICER,
Bureau of Immigration, petitioners, vs. HON. AGUSTIN P. MONTESA, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XIX, JOSE CALACDAY,
ET AL., respondents.

No. L-24576. July 29, 1968.

Commissioner of Immigration Martiniano Vivo issued warrants of arrest against the herein private respondents (7) all surnamed as "Calacdays" in
line with th confession made by Isaac Calacday (PR's supposed father) that they were not his sons hence the identification certificate issued to them
by the BOI upon their arrival from Hongkong was invalid.

The warrants directed any immigration office or officer of the law to bring the respondents before the Commissioner, for them to show cause, if any
there be, why they should not be deported. Only Manuel Calacday was arrested. The others remained at large.

Commissioners challenged the jurisdiction of the trial court.

Trial Court, maintaining that it has jurisdiction ruled in favor the "Calacdays"

issue:

whether or no the lower court has jurisdiction over the case - NO

whether or not the warrant of arrrest issued by the Commissioners of Immigration is valid - NO.

Held:

1. no. These proceedings are within the jurisdiction of the Immigration authorities under Sections 28 and 37 of the Philippine Immigration
Act (C.A. No. 613).
 The Calacdays have alluded in this Court to certain documents in support of their claim to Philipphi'e citizenship. The proper procedure is
for said respondents to appear before the Immigration officials and there submit these documents as evidence on their part to show cause
why they should not be deported

The respondents Calacdays, therefore, are not being deported. Before the Board reaches a decision, it has to conduct a hearing where the
main issue will be the citizenship or alienage of the respondents. Therefore, there is nothing so far for the courts to review.

2. the issuance of warrants of arrest by the Commissioners of Immigration solely for purposes of investigation and before a final order of
deportation is issued, conflicts with paragraph 3, Section 1, of Article III (Bill of Rights) of our Constitution.

It will be noted that the power to determine probable cause for warrants of arrest is limited by the Philippine Constitution to judges
exclusively.

The Court cited Morano vs. Vivo where it distinguished between administrative arrest in the execution of a final deportation order and
arrest as preliminary to further administrative proceedings

The constitutional limitation contemplates an order of arrest in the exercise of judicial power as a step preliminary or incidental to
prosecution or proceedings for a given offense or administrative action, not as a measure indispensable to carry out a valid decision by a
competent official, such as a legal order o£ deportation, issued by the Commissioner of Immigration, in pursuance of a valid legislation

Therefore, as long as the illegal entry or offense of the respondents Calacdays has not yet been established and their expulsion finally
decided upon, their arrest upon administrative warrant violates the provisions of our Bill of Rights. The constitutional guarantees of
individual liberty must be liberally construed and applied if we are to enjoy the blessings of a regime of justice, liberty and democracy that
the Philippine Constitution sought to secure and consolidate

Santos vs. Commissioner, Bureau of Immigration

Facts:

Commissioner of Immigration issued a warrant of arrest against petitioner on the ground of him being a Chinese citizen who entered the country
illegally.

Petitoner was detained by virtue of such warrant. Subsequently, an application for habeas corpus was filed by petitioner before lower court.

After hearing, the lower court, without passing on the question of citizenship ordered the release of petitioner.

Issue: w/n the issuance of the warrant of arrest valid.

Held: No.

The Supreme Court cited The Que Chee Gan ruling that while the Constitution does not distinguish between warrants in a criminal case and
administrative warrants in administrative proceedings which are both entitled to a determination of probable cause against him, by a judge, the rule
is different if the order of arrest is issued to carry out a final finding of violation either by an executive or legislative officer or agency duly
authorized for the purpose.

It appears clear that at the time of the challenged order, the deportation proceeding was still pending. Moreover, the release was provisional.

To carry out the order of deportation, the President obviously has the power to order the arrest of the deportee. But, certainly, during the
investigation, it is not indispensable that the alien be arrested.

It should not escape attention that under the present Constitution, a warrant of arrest may issue on a showing of “probable cause to be determined
by the judge, or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law.

This case, however, is governed by the former Constitution. The conclusion reached by the lower court, therefore, finds support in Qua Chee Gan.
We cannot set it aside

Harvey vs. Defensor-Santiago No. L-82544. June 28, 1988.*

Facts:

 On February 27, 1988 petitioners herein who are foreigners were apprehended by agents of the Commission on Immigration and
Deportation by virtue of Missions Orders issued by CID Commissioner MDS in line with the petioner being among the 22 suspected alien
pedophiles under close surveillance of the CID

 On 4 March 1988, deportation proceedings were instituted against petitioners for being undesirable aliens under Section 69 of the Revised
Administrative Code

 On 7 March 1988, Warrants of Arrest were issued by respondent against petitioners for violation of Sections 37, 45 and 46 of the
Immigration Act and Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code. On the same date, the Board of Special Inquiry III commenced trial
against petitioners 1)

 On 4 April 1988, petitioners filed Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus claiming that the Commissioner does not have authority to arrest
and detain petitioners pending determination of the existence of a probable cause leading to an administrative investigation

Issue: w/n the issuance of warrant of arrest valid

Held:
the records show that formal deportation charges have been filed against them, as undesirable aliens, on 4 March 1988. Warrants of arrest were
issued against them on 7 March 1988 “for violation of Section 37, 45 and 46 of the Immigration Act and Section 69 of the Administrative Code.” A
hearing is presently being conducted by a Board of Special Inquiry. The restraint against their persons, therefore, has become legal. The Writ has
served its purpose. The process of the law is being followed.

“It is a fundamental rule that a writ of habeas corpus will not be granted when the confinement is or has become legal, although such confinement
was illegal at the beginning”

At any rate, the filing by petitioners of a petition to be released on bail should be considered as a waiver of any irregularity attending their arrest and
estops them from questioning its validity.

The deportation charges instituted by respondent Commissioner are in accordance with Section 37(a) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, in
relation to Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code. Section 37(a) provides in part:

“(a) The following aliens shall be arrested upon the warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation or any other officer
designated by him for the purpose and deported upon the warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation after a
determination by the Board of Commissioners of the existence of the ground for deportation as charged against the alien

The specific constraints in both the 19351 and 19872 specific constraints in both the 193 and 198 Constitutions, which are substantially identical,
contemplate prosecutions essentially criminal in nature

Deportation proceedings, on the other hand, are administrative in character. An order of deportation is never construed as a punishment. It is
preventive, not a penal process. It need not be conducted strictly in accordance with ordinary Court proceedings.

The ruling in Vivo vs. Montesa (G. R. No. 24576, July 29, 1968, 24 SCRA 155) that “the issuance of warrants of arrest by the Commissioner of
Immigration, solely for purposes of investigation and before a final order of deportation is issued, conflicts with paragraph 3, Section 1 of Article III
of the Constitution” (referring to the 1935 of the Constitution” (referring to the 1935 Constitution)3 Constitution is not invocable herein.

Respondent Commissioner’s Warrant of Arrest issued on 7 March 1988 did not order petitioners to appear and show cause why they should not be
deported. They were issued specifically “for violation of Sections 37, 45 and 46 of the Immigration Act and Section 69 of the Revised Administrative
Code.

Before that, deportation proceedings had been commenced against them as undesirable aliens on 4 March 1988 and the arrest was a step preliminary
to their possible deportation.

“The requirement of probable cause, to be determined by a Judge, does not extend to deportation proceedings.” (Morano vs. Vivo)

The foregoing does not deviate from the ruling in Qua Chee Gan. probable cause had already been shown to exist before the warrants of arrest were
issued

Habeas Corpus is hereby denied.

Lucien Tran Van Nghia vs. Liwag

G.R. No. 78596. July 13, 1989.*

Facts:

This is a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus filed by Lucien Tran Van Nghia alleging that he was arrested without warrant and deprived
of his liberty by respondent Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation and his agents.

Respondent, acting on sworn complaint accusing the petitioner of being a undesirable alien, isueed a mission order to CID agents for them to locate
and bring petitioner to CID. "invite"

Petitioner resisted prompting the CID agents to seek help from the Police. Because of the continued struggle, the petitioner and some officers were
injured. Eventually, petitioner was taken to the CID Intelligence Office.

A warrant of arrest was issued by respondent Commissioner on June 2, 1987 but there is nothing in the records to convince this Court that said
warrant was served on petitioner prior to his apprehension.

Subsequently, petitioner was transferred from his cell to the Philippine General Hospital. Thereafter, petitioner’s counsel filed the instant petition
for habeas corpus to avert the “threatened removal” of petitioner from PGH and to question the validity of his detention by respondent
Commissioner.

Petitioner insists that respondent official has no power, authority or jurisdiction to cause his arrest because under the 1987 Constitution, it is provided
that “no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge.

Issue: w/n the arrest was legal

Held: Yes.

The Supreme Court, citing Morano vs. Vivo, held that ‘The requirement of probable cause to be determined by a Judge, does not extend to
deportation proceedings. What is essential is that there should be a specific charge against the alien intended to be arrested and deported and that
a fair hearing be conducted.

Harvey vs. Defensor will not apply because herein petitioner was “invited” by a combined team of CID agents and police officers at his apartment
unit on the strength of a mission order issued by the Commissioner on Immigration based on a sworn complaint of a single individual. The essential
requisite of probable cause was conspicuously absent.
HOWEVER, even assuming that the arrest of petitioner was not legal at the beginning, certain events have supervened to render his petition moot
and academic or to otherwise cure whatever defect there was at the inception of his arrest.

Firstly, petitioner is no longer under confinement. Secondly, records show that formal deportation proceedings have been initiated against petitioner
before the Board of Special Inquiry of the CID.10 The restraint (if any) against petitioner’s person has therefore become legal.

The general rule in a number of cases is that the release, whether permanent or temporary, of a detained person renders the petition for habeas
corpus moot and academic, unless there are restraints attached to his release which precludes freedom of action, in which case the Court can still
inquire into the nature of his involuntary restraint under the Villavicencio vs. Lukban rule.

HORTENCIA SALAZAR, petitioner, vs. HON. TOMAS D. ACHACOSO, in his capacity as Administrator of the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration, and FERDIE MARQUEZ, respondents.

G.R. No. 81510. March 14, 1990.*

Facts:

A search warrant was issued by respondent Achacoso against Hortencia Salazar over documents and paraphernalia used or intended to be used as
means of committing illegal recruitment. Thereafter, a team was tasked to implement the closure and seizure order which resulted to the seizure of
several costumes.

Petitioners claim that respondent violated Sec. 2, Art. III of the Philippine Constitution which guarantees right of the people “to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose.

Respondent hinges his position on Presidential Decree No. 1920 when Pres. Marcos amended the same which gave the Minister of Labor arrest and
closure powers

Issue: w/nPhilippine Overseas Employment Administration (or the Secretary of Labor) validly issue warrants of search and seizure (or arrest) under
Article 38 of the Labor Code

Held:

The decrees in question, it is well to note, stand as the dying vestiges of authoritarian rule in its twilight moments.

We reiterate that the Secretary of Labor, not being a judge, may no longer issue search or arrest warrants. Hence, the authorities must go through
the judicial process. To that extent, we declare Article 38, paragraph (c), of the Labor Code, unconstitutional and of no force and effect.

Moreover, Morano v. Vivo will not apply. Vivo involved a deportation case. In deportation cases, an arrest (of an undesirable alien) ordered by the
President or his duly authorized representatives, in order to carry out a final decision of deportation is valid. It is valid, however, because of the
recognized supremacy of the Executive in matters involving foreign affairs

The power of the President to order the arrest of aliens for deportation is, obviously, exceptional. It (the power to order arrests) can not be made to
extend to other cases, like the one at bar. Under the Constitution, it is the sole domain of the courts.

assuming, ex gratia argumenti, that it was validly issued, is clearly in the nature of a general warrant. We have held that a warrant must identify
clearly the things to be seized, otherwise, it is null and void.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Article 38, paragraph (c) of the Labor Code is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL and null and void. The respondents
are ORDERED to return all materials seized as a result of the implementation of Search and Seizure Order No. 1205.

CID vs. Dela Rosa

Then Secretary of Justice issued a memorandum directing the Board of COmmissioners to review all cases where the entry was allowed on the ground
that the entrant was a Philippine citizen, including that of respodents Gatchalian. Petitioner Board reveresed the decision of the Board of Special
Inquiry admitting respondents Gatchalian as Filipino citizens. Petitioner issued a mission order commanding the arrest of respondent William
Gatchalian.

Issue: W/n the warrant of arrest issued by petitioner was valid

Held:

No. The Commissioner of Immigration may issue warrants of arrest only after a determination by the Board of Commissioners of the existence of the
ground for deportation as charged against the alien.

A warrant of arrest issued by the Commissioner of Immigration, to be valid, must be for the sole purpose of executing a final order of deportation. A
warrant of arrest issued by the Commissioner of Immigration for purposes of investigation only, as in the case at bar, is null and void for being
unconstitutional.

CAMARA v. MUNICIPAL COURT(1967)

No. 92 Argued: February 15, 1967Decided: June 5, 1967

An inspector from the Department of Public Health of San Francisco asked Roland Camara to be allowed to search his residence. The inspector
claimed that the occupancy permit for the property did not allow residential use of the first floor. The search was a routine annual inspection. Camara
refused to let the inspector enter the building without a warrant. The inspector returned two more times without a warrant, and Camara turned him
away. About a month after the first visit, Camara was arrested and charged with violation of the San Francisco Housing Code (SFHC) for refusing to
allow the inspection. Camara sought a writ of prohibition, arguing that the section of the SFHC that authorized the inspection violated Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments. The Superior Court of California denied the writ, the District Court of Appeals affirmed and the Supreme Court of California
denied a petition for hearing.

CA: Relying on Frank v. Maryland, Eaton v. Price, and decisions in other States, 3 the District [387 U.S. 523, 528] Court of Appeal held that 503 does
not violate Fourth Amendment rights because it "is part of a regulatory scheme which is essentially civil rather than criminal in nature, inasmuch as
that section creates a right of inspection which is limited in scope and may not be exercised under unreasonable conditions." Having concluded that
Frank v. Maryland, to the extent that it sanctioned such warrantless inspections, must be overruled, we reverse.

Issue: w/n §503 of the SFHC, which authorizes inspection of private dwellings without a warrant, and §507, which makes it a crime to refuse such an
inspection, violate the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments

In assessing whether the public interest demands creation of a general exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement, the question is
not whether the public interest justifies the type of search in question, but whether the authority to search should be evidenced by a warrant, which
in turn depends in part upon whether the burden of obtaining a warrant is likely to frustrate the governmental purpose behind the search.

In this case, appellant has been charged with a crime for his refusal to permit housing inspectors to enter his leasehold without a warrant. There was
no emergency demanding immediate access; in fact, the inspectors made three trips to the building in an attempt to obtain appellant's consent to
search. Yet no warrant was obtained and thus appellant was unable to verify either the need for or the appropriate limits of the inspection. No doubt,
the inspectors entered the public portion of the building with the consent of the landlord, through the building's manager, but appellee does not
contend that such consent was sufficient to authorize inspection of appellant's premises

United States Supreme Court SEE v. CITY OF SEATTLE(1967)

No. 180 Argued: February 15, 1967Decided: June 5, 1967

Appellant seeks reversal of his conviction for refusing to permit a representative of the City of Seattle Fire Department to enter and inspect appellant's
locked commercial warehouse without a warrant and without probable cause to believe that a violation of any municipal ordinance existed therein.
The inspection was conducted as part of a routine, periodic city-wide canvass to obtain compliance with Seattle's Fire Code. After he refused the
inspector access, appellant was arrested and charged with violating 8.01.050 of the Code.

Issue: w/n warrantless inspection of his warehouse, violated petitioner’s rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.

Held:

Yes. As we explained in Camara, a search of private houses is presumptively unreasonable if conducted without a warrant. The businessman, like the
occupant of a residence, has a constitutional right to go about his business free from unreasonable official entries upon his private commercial
property. The businessman, too, has that right placed in jeopardy if the decision to enter and inspect for violation of regulatory laws can be made
and enforced by the inspector in the field without official authority evidenced by a warrant.

We therefore conclude that administrative entry, without consent, upon the portions of commercial premises which are not open to the public may
only be compelled through prosecution or physical force within the framework of a warrant procedure.