PENALTY

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff and appellee vs. QUE Po LAY, defendant and appellant.

[No. 6791. March 29, 1954]

Que Po Lay was found guilty of violating Central Bank Circular No 20 which requires holders of foreign money orders (7k dollars in this
case) to sell the same to the Central Bank or its agents within one day.

Que Po Lay claimed that said circular was not published in the Official Gazette hence it had no force and effect.

The Solicitor General answering this contention says that Commonwealth Act No. 638 and 2930 do not require the publication in the
Official Gazette of said circular issued for the implementation of a law in order to have force and effect.

Issue: w/n the circulars are required to be published in order to have force and effect.

Held:

Yes. While CA No. 638 and 2930 do not require the publication of the circulars, regulations or notices therein mentioned in order to
become binding and effective, section 11 of the Revised Administrative Code provides that statutes passed by Congress shall, in the
absence of special provision, take effect at the beginning of the fifteenth day after the completion of the publication of the statute in the
Official Gazette. Article 2 of the new Civil Code (Republic Act 386) equally provides that laws shall take effect after fifteen days following
the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided.

It is true that Circular No. 20 of the Central Bank is not a statute or law but being issued for the implementation of the law authorizing its
issuance, it has the force and effect of law and according to settled jurisprudence as a rule, circulars and regulations especially like the
Circular No. 20 of the Central Bank in question which prescribes a penalty for its violation should be published before becoming effective,
this, on the general principle and theory that before the public is bound by its contents, especially its penal provisions, a law, regulation
or circular must first be published and the people officially and specifically informed of said contents and its penalties.

People v. Maceren (1977)

LAW: Fisheries Law only punishes the use of toxic or obnoxious substances in fishing.

RULE: Fisheries Admin Order 84-01 was issued by the Secretary of the DENR which also penalized electro fishing.

HELD: INVALID rule. Defining a crime is essentially legislative, admin agencies are not allowed to punish an act as a crime if not defined
by law.

A penal statute is strictly construed. While an administrative agency has the right to make rules and regulations to carry into effect a law
already enacted, that power should not be confused with the power to enact a criminal statute. An administrative agency can have only
the administrative or policing powers expressly or by necessary implication conferred upon it.

In a prosecution for a violation of an administrative order, it must clearly appear that the order is one which falls within the scope of the
authority conferred upon the administrative body, and the order will be scrutinized with special care.
Interpretation
Hilado vs. Coll. of Internal Rev. and Ct. of Tax Appeals

No. L-9408. October 31, 1956

Facts:

Emilio Hilado filed his income tax return for 1951 with the treasurer of Bacolod City, claiming a deductible item of P12,837.65 from his
gross income pursuant to General Circular V-123 issued by the Collector of Internal Revenue. The Secretary of Finance, through the
Collector, issued General Circular V-139 which revoked and declared void Circular V-123; and laid down the rule[s] that losses of property
which occurred in World War II from fires, storms, shipwreck or other casualty, or from robbery, theft, or embezzlement are deductible in
the year of actual loss or destruction of said property. The deductions were disallowed.

Petitioner argues that General Circular No. V- 139 cannot be given retroactive effect because that would affect and obliterate the vested
right acquired by petitioner under the previous circular

Issue: w/n Circular V-123 conferred a vested right to petitioner

Held: No. a vested right cannot spring from a wrong interpretation.

A regulation that is merely an interpretation of the statute when once determined to have been erroneous becomes nullity. An erroneous
construction of the law by the Treasury Department or the collector of internal revenue does not preclude or estop the government from
collecting a tax which is legally due.

Victorias Milling Company, Inc. vs. Social Security Commission

No. L-16704. March 17, 1962.

On October 15, 1958, the Social Security Commission issued its Circular No. 22 of the following tenor:

Effective November 1, 1958, all Employers in computing the premiums due the System, will take into consideration and include in the
Employee's remuneration all bonuses and overtime pay, as well as the cash value of other media of remuneration.

Upon receipt of a copy thereof, petitioner protesting against the circular as contradictory to a previous Circular No. 7, dated October 7,
1957 expressly excluding overtime pay and bonus in the computation of the employers' and employees' respective monthly premium
contributions.

Circular No. 22 in question was issued by the Social Security Commission, in view of the amendment of the provisions of the Social Security
Law defining the term "compensation" contained in Section 8 (f) of Repub Act No. 1161 which, before its amendment, reads as follows:

"(f) Compensation—A ll remunerat ion for employment include the cash value of any remuneration paid in any medium other
than cash except (1) that part of the remuneration in excess of P500 received during the month; (2) bonuses, allowances or
overtime pay; and (3) dismissal and all other payments which the employer may make, although not legally required to do so."

Republic Act No. 1792 changed the definition of "compensation" to:

"(f) Compensation—All remuneration for employment include the cash value of any remuneration paid in any medium other
than cash except that part of the remuneration in excess or P500.00 received during the month."

Held:

A rule is binding on the courts so long as the procedure fixed for its promulgation is followed and its scope is within the statutory authority
granted by the legislature, even if the courts are not in agreement with the policy stated therein or its innate wisdom (Davis, op. cit.. 195-
197). On the other hand, administrative interpretation of the law is at best merely advisory, for it is the courts that finally determine what
the law means.

The express elimination among the exemptions excluded in the old law, of all bonuses, allowances and overtime pay in the determination
of the "compensation" paid to employees makes it imperative that such bonuses and overtime pay must now be included in the
employee's remuneration in pursuance of the amendatory law.

Circular No. 22 purports merely to advise employers-members of the System of what, in the light of the amendment of the law, they
should include in determining the monthly compensation of their employees upon which the social security contributions should be
based, and that such circular did not require presidential approval and publication in the Official Gazette for its effectivity.

It will thus be seen that whereas prior to the amendment, bonuses, allowances, and overtime pay given in addition to the regular or base
pay were -expressly excluded, or exempted from the definition of the term "compensation", such exemption or exclusion was deleted by
the amendatory law. It thus became necessary for the Social Security Commission to interpret the effect of such deletion or elimination.

Circular No. 22 was, therefore, issued to apprise those concerned of the interpretation or understanding of the Commission, of the law as
amended, which it was its duty to enforce. It did not add any duty or detail that was not already in the law as amended. It merely stated
and circularized the opinion of the Commission as to how the law should be construed.
While it is true that terms or words are to be interpreted in accordance with their well-accepted meaning in law, nevertheless, when such
term or word is specifically defined in a particular law, such interpretation must be adopted in enforcing that particular law, for it can not
be gainsaid that a particular phrase or term may have one meaning for one purpose and another meaning for some other purpose.

Such is the case that is now before us. Republic Act 1161 specifically defined what "compensation" should mean "For the purposes of this
Act". Republic Act 1792 amended such definition by deleting same exemptions authorized in the original Act. By virtue of this express
substantial change in the phraseology of the law, whatever prior executive or judicial construction may have been given to the phrase in
question should give way to the clear mandate of the new law.

MAYNARD R. PERALTA, petitioner, vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, respondent.

G.R. No. 95832. August 10, 1992.*

Petitioner challenges the interpretation of the CSC that an employee who has no leave credits in his favor is not entitled to the payment
of salary on Saturdays, Sundays or Holidays unless such non-working days occur within the period of service actually rendered.

The Civil Service Commission in its here questioned Resolution No. 90-797 construed R.A. 2625 as referring only to government employees
who have earned leave credits against which their absences may be charged with pay, as its letters speak only of leaves of absence with
full pay. The respondent Commission ruled that a reading of R.A. 2625 does not show that a government employee who is on leave of
absence without pay on a day before or immediately preceding a Saturday, Sunday or legal holiday is entitled to payment of his salary
for said days.

Basically:

How is leave of an employee who has no more leave credits computed if: he is absent on a Friday and the following Monday. He is
considered on leave without pay for 4 days covering Friday to Monday;

Held:

The construction by the respondent Commission of R.A. 2625 is not in accordance with the legislative intent. R.A. 2625 specifically provides
that government employees are entitled to fifteen (15) days vacation leave of absence with full pay and fifteen (15) days sick leave with
full pay, exclusive of Saturdays, Sundays and Holidays in both cases. Thus, the law speaks of the granting of a right and the law does not
provide for a distinction between those who have accumulated leave credits and those who have exhausted their leave credits in order to
enjoy such right. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemus.

Government employees, whether or not they have accumulated leave credits, are not required by law to work on Saturdays, Sundays and
Holidays and thus they cannot be declared absent on such nonworking days. They cannot be or are not considered absent on non-
working days; they cannot and should not be deprived of their salary corresponding to said non-working days just because they were
absent without pay on the day immediately prior to, or after said non-working days. A different rule would constitute a deprivation of
property without due process.

When an administrative or executive agency renders an opinion or issues a statement of policy, it merely interprets a pre-existing law;
and the administrative interpretation of the law is at best advisory, for it is the courts that finally determine what the law means.8 It has
also been held that interpretative regulations need not be published.

Administrative construction, if we may repeat, is not necessarily binding upon the courts. Action of an administrative agency may be
disturbed or set aside by the judicial department if there is an error of law, or abuse of power or lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of
discretion clearly conflicting with either the letter or the spirit of a legislative enactment.

Note: “The purpose of the present bill is to exclude from the computation of the leave those days, Saturdays and Sundays, as
well as holidays, because actually the employee is entitled not to go to office during those days. And it is unfair and unjust to
him that those days should be counted in the computation of leaves.” – Sen Tolentino.
Examples of rule-making in various agencies
Director of Forestry vs. Muñoz

No. L-24796. June 28, 1068

Facts:

Piadeco claims to be the owner of Some 72,000 hectares of land 3 located in the municipalities of Angat, Norzagaray and San Jose del
Monte, province of Bulacan, and in Antipolo and Montalban, province of Rizal. Piadeco's evidence of ownership consists of Titulo de
Propiedad and a deed of absolute sale.

Director of Forestry denied the registration of contested land in viw of AO 12-12.

7. Titles that may be registered. — Only the following titles covering lands containing timber, firewood and other minor
forest products may be registered under and pursuant to Section 1829 of the Revised Administrative Code:

(a) Administrative titles granted by the present Government, such as homestead patent, free patent, and sales
patent; and

(b) Judicial titles, such as Torrens Title obtained under the Land Registration Act (Act 496, as amended) or under
the Cadastral Act (Act No. 2259, as amended).

Piadeco’s position is that such amendment contravenes said Section 1829, which does not specify the titles that are
registrable thereunder; and that it is diametrically opposed to the Opinion of the Attorney General of October 15, 1919,
which ruled that a royal title “issued in September, 1896, and inscribed in the Registry of Property within a year after its
issuance is valid, and therefore its owner is entitled to the benefits” of Section 1829 aforesaid
Held:

Forestry Administrative Order 12–2 was recommended by the Director of Forestry. and approved by the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources. It is no less a valid law. It is an administrative regulation germane to the objects and purposes of the law.

True it is that the law, Section 1829, does not describe with particularity titles that may be registered with the Bureau of Forestry.
Concededly, too, administrative authorities in the past considered as registrable, titles issued during the Spanish regime. In fact, as late as
1962, Forestry Administrative Order 12–1 was still in force, authorizing registration of such Spanish titles. But when Forestry Administrative
Order 12–2 came into effect on January 1, 1963, that order should be deemed to have repealed all such previous administrative
determinations.

There should be no question now that Forestry Administrative Order 12–2 has the force and effect of law. It was promulgated pursuant
to law. Section 1817, Revised Administrative Code, empowers the Bureau of Forestry, with the approval of the department head, to issue
regulations “deemed expedient or necessary to secure the protection and conservation of the public forests.

A rule shaped out by jurisprudence is that when Congress authorizes the promulgation of administrative rules and regulations to
implement a given legislation, “[a]ll that is required is that the regulation should be germane to the objects and purposes of the law; that
the regulation be not in contradiction with it, but conform to the standards that the law prescribes.”

In this case, it is undisputed that Piadeco’s title which it sought to register was issued by the Spanish sovereignty— Titulo de Propiedad
No. 4136, dated April 25 or 29, 1894. It is unmistakably not one of those enumerated in Section 7 aforesaid. It should not have been
allowed registration in the first place. Obviously, registration thereof can never be renewed.

Sand vs. Abad Santos Educational Institution

No. L-30918. July 18, 1974.*

Abad Santos School of Nursing filed petition against herein petitioners seeking a declaration that “Article VIII, Rule 69, section 5 of the
rules and regulations [of petitioner board] adopted on July 27, 1967 (is) void, illegal and ineffective and without force of law and that. Said
rule provides for periodic inspection of nursing schools and bars graduates of such schools that do not comply “with the minimum
requirements and standards” from admission to the nurses’ examination or registration as a registered nurse.

The lower court after hearing rendered its decision of June 24, 1969 holding that while petitioner board has “the full authority under
section 9, Republic Act No. 877, as amended to promulgate said rules and regulations,” particularly the cited regulation providing for
periodic inspection of nursing schools, the board “may apply only the same to new schools or colleges established or opened after the
promulgation of said rules and regulations” and “conversely” may not be given “retroactive effect” and “cannot be enforced on schools
and colleges already duly accredited by the Bureau of Private Schools” prior to the promulgation by the board of the 1967 rules and
regulations.

Lower court declared such rule as void, illegal and of no effect against herein petitioner and its graduates.
Hence, the present petition seeking a reversal of respondent court’s judgment and for a declaration of validity of the disputed rule.

Held:

The Philippine Nursing Act,2 Republic Act No. 877 as amended by Republic Act No. 4704 (approved June 18, 1966 expressly empowers in
section 9 thereof the petitioner board “subject to the approval of the President of the Philippines [to] promulgate such rules and
regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this Act.

Section 3 of the cited Act specifically empowers petitioner board to inspect nursing colleges and schools and p vests it with authority4
“to issue, suspend, revoke, or reissue certificates of registration for practice of nursing.

It further provides that "(T)he Board shall have the power to investigate violations of this Act xxx xxx xx The Board shall from time to time
look into the conditions affecting the practice of nursing in the Philippines and whenever necessary, recommend or adopt such measures
as may be deemed proper for the advancement of the profession and for the vigorous enforcement of this Act”

where the board finds in the course of its periodic inspection that a nursing school does not meet the standing minimum requirements
and standards then it is the board’s duty, as provided in the rule, to require the deficient school to make the required improvements as
would enable it to meet the minimum standards which must be carried out within one year and meanwhile to bar the would-be graduates
of such deficient school from the nurses’ examination until its deficiency and that of its would-be graduates shall have been removed.

Respondent’s argument that “to contend that the Board of Examiners for Nurses has the same visitorial power over already existing
schools of nursing as that conferred by law on the Bureau of Private Education might result in the highly anomalous situation that said
Board and the Bureau of Private Education might have different and conflicting findings on the conditions and standards of these schools,
and a resultant power struggle between these two agencies of the governments, to the prejudice of the schools concerned and their
students and graduates,” manifestly addresses itself to the wisdom of the provisions of the Act granting similar visitorial powers to the
petitioner board as a specialized board composed of highly competent technical persons, viz, “registered nurses of recognized standing
in the Philippines” whom the Congress deemed could be relied upon to maintain high standards for nursing education and the nursing
profession.

However, It is well settled that it is beyond the domain of the courts to inquire into the wisdom of the Act vesting the petitioner board
with similar powers to that likewise entrusted to the Bureau of Private Education.

American Tobacco Co. vs. Director of Patents

No. L-26803. October 14, 1975

petitioners challenge the validity of Rule 168 of the “Revised Rules of Practice before the Philippine Patent Office in Trademark Cases” as
amended, authorizing the Director of Patents to designate any ranking official of said office to hear “ inter partes” proceedings.

Under the Trade-mark Law (Republic Act No. 166), the Director of Patents is vested with jurisdiction over the above-mentioned cases.

In accordance with Rule, the Director of Patents delegated the hearing of petitioners’ cases to hearing officers.

Petitioners filed their objections to the authority of the hearing officers to hear their cases, alleging that the amendment of the Rule is
illegal and void because under the law the Director must personally hear and decide inter partes cases.

Issue: w/n the Director of Patents has the authority to delegate petitioners case to hearing officers

Held: Yes.

RA 165 empowers “the Director, subject to the approval of the Department Head,” to “promulgate the necessary rules and regulations,
not inconsistent with law, for the conduct of all business in the Patent Office.” The aforecited statutory authority undoubtedly also applies
to the administration and enforcement of the Trade-mark Law (Republic Act No. 166).

has been held that power-conferred upon an administrative agency to which the administration of a statute is entrusted to issue such
regulations and orders as may be deemed necessary or proper in order to carry out its purposes and provisions may be an adequate
source of authority to delegate a particular function, unless by express provisions of the Act or by implication it has been withheld.4 There
is no provision either in Republic Act No. 165 or 166 negativing the existence of such authority, so far as the designation of hearing
examiners is concerned. Nor can the absence of such authority be fairly inferred from contemporaneous and consistent Executive
interpretation of the Act

The nature of the power and authority entrusted to the Director of Patents suggests that the aforecited laws (Republic Act No. 166, in
relation to Republic Act No. 165) should be construed so as to give the aforesaid official the administrative flexibility necessary for the
prompt and expeditious discharge of his duties in the administration of said laws.

The rule that requires an administrative officer to exercise his own judgment and discretion does not preclude him from utilizing, as a
matter of practical administrative procedure, the aid of subordinates to investigate and report to him the facts, on the basis of which the
officer makes his e facts, on the basis of which the officer makes his decisions.14 decisions.14 It is sufficient that the judgment and
discretion finally exercised are those of the officer authorized by law.

Moreover, In the case at bar, while the hearing officer may make preliminary rulings on the myriad of questions raised at the hearings of
these cases, the ultimate decision on the merits of all the issues and questions involved is left to the Director of Patent
The Conference of Maritime Manning Agencies, Inc. vs. Philippine Overseas Employment Administration

G.R. No. 114714. April 21, 1995.*

Petitioner Conference of Maritime Manning Agencies, Inc., an incorporated association of licensed Filipino manning agencies, and its co-
petitioners, all licensed manning agencies which hire and recruit Filipino seamen for and in behalf of their respective foreign shipowner-
principals, urge us to annul Resolution No. 01, series of 1994, of the Governing Board of the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration (POEA) and POEA Memorandum Circular No. 05, series of 1994, on the grounds that: The POEA does not have the power
and authority to fix and promulgate rates affecting death and workmen’s compensation of Filipino seamen working in ocean-going
vessels; only Congress can.

Petitioners claim discrimination against foreign shipowners and principals employing Filipino seamen and in favor of foreign employers
employing overseas Filipinos who are not seamen.

Issues: w/n the POEA has authority to fix and promulgate rates and compensation of Filipino seamen

Assuming that POEA has the authority, w/n the Memorandum Circular is violative of equal protection clause and/or non-impairment of
contracts

Held:

The authority to issue the said regulation is clearly provided in Section 4(a) of Executive Order No. 797, reading as follows: “x x x The
governing Board of the Administration (POEA), as hereunder provided, shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to govern
the exercise of the adjudicatory functions of the Administration (POEA).”

while the making of laws is a non-delegable power that pertains exclusively to Congress, nevertheless, the latter may constitutionally
delegate the authority to promulgate rules and regulations to implement a given legislation and effectuate its policies, for the reason that
the legislature finds it impracticable, if not impossible, to anticipate situations that may be met in carrying the law into effect. All that is
required is that the regulation should be germane to the objects and purposes of the law; that the regulation be not in contradiction to
but in conformity with the standards prescribed by the law.9 This is the principle of subordinate legislation

It is an established principle of constitutional law that the guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not violated by legislation based on
reasonable classification. And for the classification to be reasonable, it (1) must rest on substantial distinctions; (2) must be germane to
the purpose of the law; (3) must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) must apply equally to all members of the same class.14
There can be no dispute about the dissimilarities between land-based and sea-based Filipino overseas workers in terms of, among other
things, work environment, safety, dangers and risks to life and limb, and accessibility to social, civic, and spiritual activities.

The constitutional prohibition against impairing contractual obligations is not absolute and is not to be read with literal exactness. It is
restricted to contracts with respect to property or some object of value and which confer rights that may be asserted in a court of justice;
it has no application to statutes relating to public subjects within the domain of the general legislative powers of the State and involving
the public rights and public welfare of the entire community affected by it. It does not prevent a proper exercise by the State of its police
power by enacting regulations reasonably necessary to secure the health, safety, morals, comfort, or general welfare of the community,
even though contracts may thereby be affected, for such matters cannot be placed by contract beyond the power of the State to regulate
and control them.

The challenged resolution and memorandum circular being valid implementations of E.O. No. 797, which was enacted under the police
power of the State, they cannot be struck down on the ground that they violate the contract clause. To hold otherwise is to alter long-
established constitutional doctrine and to subordinate the police power to the contract clause.
Government Service Insurance System vs. Board of Commissioners (Second Devision), HLURB

G.R. No. 180062. May 5, 2010.*

Private respondent Lucina Sendino filed a complaint for specific performance against petitioner REVI with the Office of Appeals
Adjudication and Legal Affairs of the HLURB (HLURB-OAALA).

Said agency ruled in favor of Sendino. REVI exhausted all avaible remedies until he reached the Officeo the President but still failed to
attain favorable judgement. Hence this case.

Petitioners claim that the HLURB under its charter is not vested with adjudicatory powers and even if they can excercise such power, the
agency judgement is invalid as it was not decided enbanc

Issue: w/n the HLURB has quasi-judicial functions nothwithstanding the absence of express grant by EO no 90 which created it

Assuming that it can excercise such function, w/n the board of commissioner is allowed to sit as a division rather than enbanc in deciding
a case

Held:

Yes. Jurisprudence provide tht the adjudicatory function of the HLURB was due to transfer of all powers including adjudicatory function
from National Housing Authority (NHA) to the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission (HSRC).

HSRC was only renamed HLURB by virtue of EO No. 90. The SC fails to see how the HSRC—which possessed jurisdiction over the actions
for specific performance for contractual and statutory obligations filed by buyers of subdivision lots against developers—had suddenly
lost its adjudicatory powers by the mere fiat of a change in name through E.O. 90.

Going to petitioners’ contention that the decision of the OAALA should have been rendered by the Board of Commissioners sitting en
banc, we find ample authority— both in the statutes and in jurisprudence—justifying the Board’s act of dividing itself into divisions of
three. Under Section 5 of E.O. 648 which defines the powers and duties of the Commission, the Board is specifically mandated to “(a)dopt
rules of procedure for the conduct of its business” and perform such functions necessary for the effective accomplishment of (its) above
mentioned functions.” Since nothing in the provisions of either E.O. 90 or E.O. 648 denies or withholds the power or authority to delegate
adjudicatory functions to a division, we cannot see how the Board, for the purpose of effectively carrying out its administrative
responsibilities and quasi-judicial powers as a regulatory body should be denied the power, as a matter of practical administrative
procedure, to constitute its adjudicatory boards into various divisions. After all, the power conferred upon an administrative agency to
issue rules and regulations necessary to carry out its functions has been held “to be an adequate source of authority to delegate a
particular function, unless by express provision of the Act or by implication it has been withheld.”

Government Service Insurance System vs. Board of Commissioners (Second Devision), HLURB | G.R. No. 180062. May 5, 2010.*

New San Jose Builders, Inc. (NSJBI) mortgaged on December 10, 1997 three parcels of land together with the existing improvements, to
the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) to secure the payment of a loan. The mortgaged properties were later sold by NSJBI to
spouses De los Reyes. NSJBI defaulted in its loan obligation, hence, the GSIS foreclosed the mortgage and purchased the subject
properties.

Upon learning the mortgage and eventual sale, the spouses filed a complaint against NSJBI with the HLURB. Eventually, the HLURB Second
Division issued a Cease and Desist Order (CDO) restraining GSIS from consolidating ownership of the properties.

GSIS filed a motion for reconsideration before the Board EN BANC, however, it was denied by the SECOND DIVISION by resolution. Hence
GSIS appealed to the CA.

GSIS alleged that the HLURB acted without jurisdiction, for only three members, instead of the nine man Board of Commissioners,
entertained the appeal, contrary to the mandate of Sections 5 and 6(a) of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 648 (1981), as amended.

CA held that the HLURB Second Division did not abuse its discretion in taking jurisdiction over GSIS’s motion for reconsideration-appeal,
for 2004, the HLURB Revised Rules of Procedure provides that appeals shall be decided by the Board of Commissioners sitting en banc or
by division in accordance with the internal rules of the Board.

Issue: w/n the the second division of the HLURB has the authority to rule on motion for reconsideration filed with the HLURB En Banc.

Held: Yes.

Section 5 of E.O. No. 648 specifically mandates the HLURB Board of Commissioners to adopt rules of procedure for the conduct of its
business and perform such functions necessary for the effective discharge thereof. Such grant of power necessary to carry out its functions
has been held to be an adequate source of authority to delegate a particular function, unless, by express provision of the Act or by
implication, it has been withheld.

The present composition of the Board of Commissioners, 12 wherein five out of its nine members sit in ex officio capacity while the
remaining four serve as full time commissioners, practicality necessitates the establishment of a procedure whereby a case on appeal may
be decided by members of a division. Since the 2004 HLURB Rules of Procedure provides that a motion for reconsideration shall be
assigned to the Division from which the decision, order or ruling originated ,13 the questioned cognizance by the HLURB Second Division
of GSIS’s motion for reconsideration is in order.