MADERPAKING CASE DIGEST

OFFICE OF THE COURT OF ADMINISTRATOR V. JUDGE YU

A.M. No. MTJ-121813 November 22, 2016

NATURE:
Eliza B. Yu's Motion for Reconsideration with Explanation for the Show Cause Order decision
promulgated on November 22, 2016 disposing against her.

FACTS
The Court finds and pronounces respondent Judge Elizabeth Yu
1. Guilty of gross insubordination;
2. Gross ignorance of the law;
3. Gross misconduct;
4. Grave abuse of authority;
5. Oppression; and
6. Conduct unbecoming of a judicial official;
And, dismisses her from the service effective immediately, with forfeiture of all her benefits, except
accrued leave credits, and further disqualifies her from reinstatement or appointment to any public
office or employment.

In her motion, the respondent repeatedly denies committing all the administrative offenses for which
she was held guilty, and insists on the absence of proof to support the findings against her. She pleads
that the Court reconsiders based on the following:
1. Noncompliance with A.O. No. 19-2011
2. Refusal to honor the appointments of court personnel
3. Issuance of a show-cause order against fellow Judges and court personnel
4. Disrespectful attitude towards SC officers and offices,
5. Order of presentation of ex parte evidence before the OCA who was not a member of the Bar
6. Refusal to sign the application for leave of absence,
7. Inappropriate messages to her fellow Judge
8. Authorization to allow criminal proceedings without the actual participation of the public
prosecutor
9. Her manner of disposing cases, and
10. Other allegations of oppressions resulted to the several complaints filed against her.

1. Noncompliance with A.O. No. 19-2011 the complaint against her was premature because of the pendency of her protest
against night court duty. A.O. No. 19-2011 did not carry a penal provision, and was only directory because of the use of the
permissive word may. In addition to A.O. No. 19-2011 being non-compliant with the requirements of a valid administrative
order, the requirement of night court duty violated Section 5, Rule XVII which limited the working hours for government
officials and employees. There was no law prohibiting her from writing the protest letters. At any rate, she had the right to do
so under the Freedom of Speech Clause. She did not refuse to obey A.O. No. 19-2011
2. Refusal to honor the appointments of Ms. Mariejoy P. Lagman and Ms. Leilani Tejero-Lopez The respondent claims that she
did not refuse to honor the appointment. She merely exercised her statutory right as a judge to question the appointment of
the branch clerk of court assigned to her sala. Under Canon 2, Section 3 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine
Judiciary, she was mandated to bring to the proper authorities the irregularities surrounding the appointments.. She did not
also commit any act of cruelty against Ms. Tejera-Lopez; on the contrary, it was Ms. Tejero-Lopez who went beyond the norms
of decency by her persistent application in my court harassment. Her opposition against the appointment of Ms. Lagman was
meritorious. There was no proof of the alleged verbal threats, abuse, misconduct or oppression committed against Ms. Tejero-
Lopez. It was not proper to penalize a judge based on a "letter with few words that other people find objectionable."6
3. Show-cause order respondent issued against fellow judges
It was premature to rule that she thereby abused and committed misconduct because she did not issue any ruling on the
explanation by the other judges. She did not violate Section 5, Canon 3 and Section 8, Canon 4 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.
4. Refusal to sign the leave of absence of Mr. Noel Labid The refusal to sign the application for leave of absence had factual and
legal bases. Moreover, she should be presumed to have acted in good faith if she misconstrued the rules on approval of
application of leave.
5. Allowing on-the-job trainees The respondent claims that she did not order the trainees to perform judicial tasks. She had no
personal knowledge that the trainees were made to serve as assistant court stenographers. Based on what she heard, the
trainees were only in the premises of her court for a few hours. She reminds that she allowed the trainees to merely observe
proceedings.
6. Designation of an officer-in-charge and ordering reception of evidence by a non-lawyer The respondent denies having
violated CSC Memorandum Circular No. 06-05 when she designated an officer-in-charge. There was no proof showing that she
willfully and deliberately intended to cause public damage. In fact, the OCA recognized Mr. Ferdinand Santos as the OIC of her
branch in several letters. There was no proof that she violated Section 9, Rule 30 of the Rules of Court. The ex parte reception
of evidence by a non-lawyer clerk of court was allowed under the Rules of Court, as well as by Section 2l(e), Administrative
Circular No. 35-2004, and Administrative Circular No. 37-93.
7. Allowing criminal proceedings to continue despite the absence of counsel The respondent merely followed the Rules of
Criminal Procedure in allowing criminal proceedings despite absence of counsel.
8. Sending of inappropriate email messages The respondent maintains that the e-mail messages were hearsay because the
certification by the SC-MISO was not presented to her, depriving her of the opportunity to object. Her granting access by the
MISO to her private e-mails was conditional to prove tampering. Her Lycos e-mail account was hacked. She did not completely
waive her right to privacy. Considering that she did not authenticate said e-mail messages, the same were inadmissible for
being hearsay. The e-mail messages with her full name written in capital letters as the sender did not emanate from her
because her Yahoo! and MSN accounts carried her name with only the first letters being capitalized. The e-mails reproduced in
the decision were not the same messages that she had requested Judge San Gaspar-Gito to delete. There were words that she
did not write on the e-mail messages pertaining to her demand for reimbursement of $10.00. Her writing style was different
from what appeared in the e-mail messages. She denies having opened the "Rudela San Gaspar" account. It was wrong to
penalize her based on assumptions and speculations. She did not commit electronic libel. Her funny and innocent comments
were not actionable documents. The certification by the SC MISO was not an authentication as to the truthfulness of the
contents of the e-mail messages and as to the identification of the sender or author of the messages. It was wrong and unjust to
impute wrongdoing to her when there was no proof that she had sent the inappropriate messages. The disclaimer in the e-
mails were not printed in the decision; hence, the messages were inadmissible. The presentation of the messages without her
consent as the sender was covered by the exclusionary rule. Letters and communications in writing were guaranteed and
protected by Sections.

ISSUE:
WON disbarment should be imposed on the respondent. - YAH

RULING:
The foregoing findings may already warrant Judge Yu's disbarment.

The Court still hold and declare that the respondent flagrantly and blatantly violated the Lawyer's
Oath, and several canons and rules of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the Canon of Judicial
Ethics and the New Judicial Code of Conduct. We propose to expound on some points for greater
enlightenment on the issues and grounds taken into consideration in removing the respondent from
the Judiciary, and for purposes of providing the requisite predicate to the ruling on the directive for
her to show sufficient cause in writing why she should not also be disbarred from the Roll of
Attorneys. The respondent insists that there was no proof to support the adverse findings of the
Court.

Accordingly, gross misconduct, violation of the Lawyer's Oath, and willful disobedience of any lawful
order by the Court constitute grounds to disbar an attorney. In the respondent's case, she was herein
found to have committed all of these grounds for disbarment, warranting her immediate disbarment
as a consequence. The Court deems it worthwhile to remind that the penalty of disbarment being
hereby imposed does not equate to stripping the respondent of the source of her livelihood.
Disbarment is intended to protect the administration of justice by ensuring that those taking part in
it as attorneys should be competent, honorable and reliable to enable the courts and the clients they
serve to rightly repose their confidence in them.

Furthermore, the Court emphatically observed and pointed out in the decision of November 22, 2016
the following: In all, Judge Yu exhibited an unbecoming arrogance m committing insubordination and
gross misconduct. By her refusal to adhere to and abide by A.O. No. 19-2011, she deliberately
disregarded her duty to serve as the embodiment of the law at all times. She thus held herself above
the law by refusing to be bound by the issuance of the Court as the duly constituted authority on
court procedures and the supervision of the lower courts. To tolerate her insubordination and gross
misconduct is to abet lawlessness on her part. She deserved to be removed from the service because
she thereby revealed her unworthiness of being part of the Judiciary.

WHEREFORE, the Court FINDS and PRONOUNCES respondent JUDGE ELIZA B. YU GUILTY of GROSS
INSUBORDINATION; GROSS IGNORANCE OF THE LAW; GROSS MISCONDUCT; GRAVE ABUSE OF
AUTHORITY; OPPRESSION; and CONDUCT UNBECOMING OF A JUDICIAL OFFICIAL; and,
ACCORDINGLY, DISMISSES her from the service EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY, with FORFEITURE OF
ALL HER BENEFITS, except accrued leave credits, and further DISQUALIFIES her from reinstatement
or appointment to any public office or employment, including to one in any government-owned or
government-controlled corporations.
Respondent JUDGE ELIZA B. YU is directed to show cause in writing within ten (10) days from notice
why she should not be disbarred for violation of the Lawyer's Oath, the Code of Professional
Responsibility, and the Canons of Professional Ethics as outlined herein.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R No. 118882 September 26, 1996

FACTS:
The case is a petition for review with an urgent prayer for injunction and/or restraining order which
seeks to: (a) Annul and set aside the decision of the case People of the Philippines vs. Hon Pedro
Espina et al. insofar as it denied the Peoples prayer to inhibit respondent Judge Pedro Espina of the
RTC of Tacloban from hearing the criminal case entitled People of the Philippines vs. Cristela Reyes.
And (b) enjoin the said judge from conducting further proceedings in the aforesaid criminal case
The court required the respondents to comment on the sad prayer of the petitioners within 10 days
from notice. The respondents however failed to do so.
Until now, the respondents have not yet submitted their comments on the because the delays of the
proceedings may benefit the respondents and sanctions against them would not be that much since
most of the respondents are detained. The
The court then proceeded to dispense the comments and proceed with the disposition of the petition.

ISSUE:
WON Judge Espino should be inhibited from presiding on the Criminal Case, People vs. Cristela Reyes.
- YAH

RULING:
Judge Espina, as correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, cannot be considered to adequately
possess such cold neutrality of an impartial judge as to fairly assess the both the evidence to be
presented by the prosecution and defense in view of his previous decision wherein he enjoined the
preliminary investigation at the Regional State Prosecutor’s office level against herein respondent
Jane Go, the principal accused in the killing of her husband Dominador Go.
Espina’s decision in favor of respondent Jane Go, serves as sufficient and reasonable basis for the
prosecution to seriously doubt his impartiality in handing the cases.
One of the essential requirements of procedural due process in a judicial proceeding is that there
must be an impartial court or tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear and determine the matter
before it. The court consistently demands the cold neutrality of an impartial judge.
The litigants should be sure that when their rights are violated they can go to a judge who shall give
them justice.

IN THE MATTER OF THE CHARGES OF PLAGIARISM, ETC., AGAINST ASSOCIATE JUSTICE

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC, October 12, 2010

FACTS:
On April 28, 2010, the Supreme Court issued a decision which dismissed a petition filed by the
Malaya Lolas Organization in the case of Vinuya vs Romulo. Atty. Herminio Harry Roque Jr., counsel
for Vinuya et al, questioned the said decision. He raised, among others, that the ponente in said case,
Justice Mariano del Castillo, plagiarized three books when the honorable Justice “twisted the true
intents” of these books to support the assailed decision. These books were: a. A Fiduciary Theory of
Jus Cogens by Evan J. Criddle and Evan Fox-Descent, Yale Journal of International Law (2009); b.
Breaking the Silence: Rape as an International Crime by Mark Ellis, Case Western Reserve Journal of
International Law (2006); and c. Enforcing Erga Omnes Obligations by Christian J. Tams, Cambridge
University Press (2005).

As such, Justice del Castillo is guilty of plagiarism, misconduct, and at least inexcusable negligence.
Interestingly, even the three foreign authors mentioned above, stated that their works were used
inappropriately by Justice Del Castillo and that the assailed decision is different from what their
works advocated.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there is plagiarism in the case at bar. - NAH

RULING:
There is no plagiarism. Even if there is (as emphasized by the Supreme Court in its ruling on the
Motion for Reconsideration filed by Vinuya et al in 2011), the rule on plagiarism cannot be applied to
judicial bodies.

No Plagiarism
At its most basic, plagiarism means the theft of another person’s language, thoughts, or ideas. To
plagiarize, as it is commonly understood according to Webster, is to take (ideas, writings, etc.) from
(another) and pass them off as ones own. The passing off of the work of another as ones own is thus
an indispensable element of plagiarism.

According to Black’s Law Dictionary: Plagiarism is the “deliberate and knowing presentation of
another person’s original ideas or creative expressions as one’s own.”

This cannot be the case here because as proved by evidence, in the original drafts of the assailed
decision, there was attribution to the three authors but due to errors made by Justice del Castillo’s
researcher, the attributions were inadvertently deleted. There is therefore no intent by Justice del
Castillo to take these foreign works as his own.

But in plagiarism, intent is immaterial.

On this note, the Supreme Court stated that in its past decisions, (i.e. U.P Board of Regents vs CA, 313
SCRA 404), the Supreme Court never indicated that intent is not material in plagiarism. To adopt a
strict rule in applying plagiarism in all cases leaves no room for errors. This would be very
disadvantageous in cases, like this, where there are reasonable and logical explanations.

On the foreign authors’ claim that their works were used inappropriately
According to the Supreme Court, the passages lifted from their works were merely used as
background facts in establishing the state on international law at various stages of its development.
The Supreme Court went on to state that the foreign authors’ works can support conflicting theories.
The Supreme Court also stated that since the attributions to said authors were accidentally deleted, it
is impossible to conclude that Justice del Castillo twisted the advocacies that the works espouse.

No Misconduct
Justice del Castillo is not guilty of misconduct. The error here is in good faith. There was no malice,
fraud or corruption.

No Inexcusable Negligence (explanation of Justice Del Castillo)

The error of Justice del Castillo’s researcher is not reflective of his gross negligence. The researcher is
a highly competent one. The researcher earned scholarly degrees here and abroad from reputable
educational institutions. The researcher finished third in her class and 4th in the bar examinations.
Her error was merely due to the fact that the software she used, Microsoft Word, lacked features to
apprise her that certain important portions of her drafts are being deleted inadvertently. Such error
on her part cannot be said to be constitutive of gross negligence nor can it be said that Justice del
Castillo was grossly negligent when he assigned the case to her. Further, assigning cases to
researchers has been a long standing practice to assist justices in drafting decisions. It must be
emphasized though that prior to assignment, the justice has already spelled out his position to the
researcher and in every sense, the justice is in control in the writing of the draft.

With the advent of computers, however, as Justice Del Castillos researcher also explained, most legal
references, including the collection of decisions of the Court, are found in electronic diskettes or in
internet websites that offer virtual libraries of books and articles. Here, as the researcher found items
that were relevant to her assignment, she downloaded or copied them into her main manuscript, a
smorgasbord plate of materials that she thought she might need.

She electronically cut relevant materials from books and journals in the Westlaw website and pasted
these to a main manuscript in her computer that contained the issues for discussion in her proposed
report to the Justice. She used the Microsoft Word program. Later, after she decided on the general
shape that her report would take, she began pruning from that manuscript those materials that did
not fit, changing the positions in the general scheme of those that remained, and adding and deleting
paragraphs, sentences, and words as her continuing discussions with Justice Del Castillo, her chief
editor, demanded. Parenthetically, this is the standard scheme that computer-literate court
researchers use everyday in their work.