CASE DIGEST: CALTEX V PALOMAR

Caltex vs Palomar

G.R. No. L-19650

29 September 1966

Facts:
In the year 1960, Caltex conceived a promotional scheme and called it "Caltex Hooded Pump Contest".
It calls for participants to estimate the actual number of liters a hooded gas pump at each Caltex Station
will dispense during a specified period. For the priviledge to participate, no fees or consideration, nor
purchase of Caltex products were required.

Forseeing the extensive use of mails relative to the contest, representations were made by Caltex with
the postal authorities for the contest to be cleared in advanced for mailing. The acting Postmaster General
opined that the scheme falls within the purview of sections 1954, 1982 and 1983 of the Revised
Administrative Code and declined to grant the requested clearance.

Issues:
W/N construction should be employed in this case and W/N the contest violates the provisions of the
Postal Law

Held:
Yes. Construction of a law is in order if what is in issue is an inquiry into the intended meaning of the
words used in a certain law. As defined in Black's Law Dictionary:Construction is the art or process of
discovering and expounding the meaning and intention of the author's of the law with respect to a given
case, where that intention is rendered doubtful, amongst others, by reason of the fact that the given case is
not explicitly provided for in the law. In the present case, the prohibitive provisions of the Postal Law
inescapably require an inquiry into the intended meaning of the words therein. This is as much as question
of construction or interpretation as any other. The Court is tasked to look beyond the fair exterior, to the
substance, in order to unmask the real element and pernicious tendencies that the law is seeking to
prevent.

Lottery extends to all schemes for the distribution of prize by chance. The three essential elements of
a lottery are: (1) consideration, (2) prize, and (3) chance. Gift enterprise is commonly applied to a sporting
artifice under which goods are sold for their market value but by way of inducement, each purchaser is
given a chance to win a prize. Gratuitous distribution of property by lot or chance does not constitute
lottery. In the present case, the element of consideration is not observed. No payment or purchase of a
merchandise was required for the priviledge to participate.
SOCORRO D. RAMIREZ v. CA, GR No. 93833, 1995-09-28
Facts:
civil case for damages was filed by petitioner Socorro D. Ramirez in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City alleging that the private respondent, Ester S. Garcia, in a confrontation in the latter's office, allegedly
vexed, insulted and humiliated her in a
"hostile and furious mood" and in a manner offensive to petitioner's dignity and personality," contrary to
morals, good customs and public policy... filed by pe... respondent filed a criminal case before the
Regional Trial Court of Pasay City for violation of Republic Act 4200, entitled "An Act to... prohibit and
penalize wire tapping and other related violations of private communication, and other purposes."...
petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the Information on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute
an offense, particularly a violation of R.A. 4200.
Issues:
applicable provision of Republic Act 4200 does not apply to the taping of a private conversation by one of
the parties to the conversation. She contends that the provision... merely refers to the unauthorized
taping of a private conversation by a party other than those involved in the communication.[... petitioner
argues that R.A. 4200 penalizes the taping of a "private communication,... not a "private conversation" a
"private communication" in Section 1 of R.A. 4200 does not include "private conversations" narrows the
ordinary meaning of the word "communication" to a point of absurdity.
Ruling:

1. the facts charged do not constitute an offense under R.A. 4200; and that 2) the violation
punished by R.A. 4200 refers to a the taping of a communication by a person other than a
participant to the communication.

d... eclaring the trial court's order of May 3, 1989 null and void, and holding that:
"[T]he allegations sufficiently constitute an offense punishable under Section 1 of R.A. 4200. In thus
quashing the information based on the ground that the facts alleged do not constitute an offense, the
respondent judge acted in grave abuse of discretion... correctible by certiorari."[5]... provision clearly and
unequivocally makes it illegal for any person, not authorized by all the parties to any private
communication to secretly record such communication by means of a tape recorder.
The law makes no distinction as to whether... the party sought to be penalized by the statute ought to be
a party other than or different from those involved in the private communication.
intent to penalize all persons unauthorized to make such recording is underscored by the use of the
qualifier "any".
This is a complete ban on tape recorded conversations taken without the authorization of all the parties.
he provision seeks to penalize even those privy to the private... communications. Where the law makes
no distinctions, one does not distinguish.
he nature of the conversation is immaterial to a violation of the statute
Nowhere (in the said law) is it required that before one can be regarded as a violator, the nature of the
conversation, as well as its communication to a third person should be professed."
In its ordinary signification, communication connotes the act of sharing or imparting, as in a
conversation,[15] or signifies the "process by which meanings or thoughts are shared between
individuals... through a common system of symbols... applicable facts and circumstances pointing to a
violation of R.A. 4200 suffer from no ambiguity, and the statute itself explicitly mentions the unauthorized
"recording" of private communications with the use of tape-recorders as among the acts punishable.
Principles:
legislative intent is determined principally from the language of a statute.
Where the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the law is applied according to its express
terms, and interpretation would be resorted to only where a literal interpretation... would be either
impossible[11] or absurd or would lead to an injustice[
Section I. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private
communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or arrangement, to
secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or... spoken word by using a device
commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or
however otherwise described.
enacting R.A. 4200 our lawmakers indeed contemplated to make illegal, unauthorized tape recording of
private conversations or communications taken either by the parties... themselves or by third persons.
The right to the privacy... of communication, among others, has expressly been assured by our
Constitution.

CESARIO URSUA, petitioner v. COURT OF APPEALS AND

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents
G.R. No. 112170. April 10,1996.

Facts:

On May 9,1989, provincial governor of Cotabato requested the Office of the Ombudsman to conduct an
investigation regarding bribery, dishonesty, abuse of authority and giving of unwarranted benefits and it
was found out that the petitioner Cesario Ursua, a Community Environment and Natural Resources officer
was involved in the illegal cutting of mahogany trees and illegally-cut logs in the area. So, a complaint was
filed against him which was initiated by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan.

On August 1 1989, Atty. Francis Palmones, counsel for petitioner, wrote to the Office of the Ombudsman
to furnished him a copy of the complaint and asked petitioner to bring that letter to the Office of the
Ombudsman since his messenger had to attend to some personal matters which the latter complied. Before
proceeding to the office of the Ombudsman, he talked to Oscar Perez and the latter advised him that he
could sign his name if ever he would be required to acknowledge receipt of the complaint. When he arrived
at the Office of the Ombudsman in Davao City, he was asked to sign his name on a log book and instead of
writing his own name, he wrote “Oscar Perez”, afterwhich he proceeded to the Administrative Division and
hand in the letter to Loida Kahulugan, Chief of the Administrative Division in order to get a furnished copy
of the complaint. Before petitioner left, he was greeted by an acquaintance and from there Loida learned
that the one who introduced his name as Oscar Perez is actually the petitioner himself so the latter reported
the matter immediately to the Deputy Ombudsman who ordered that petitioner be accordingly charged.

On December 18,1990 petitioner without leave of court filed a demurrer to evidence alleging that the
failure of the prosecution to prove that his supposed alias was different from his registered name was fatal
to its cause. Petitioner contends that no document from the civil registry was presented to show the
registered name of the accused which according to him was a condition sine qua non for the validity of
his conviction.The RTC rejected his contentions and found him guilty of violating Sec.1 of Commonwealth
Act No.142 as amended by R.A. No.6085. On May 31,1993, The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction of
the said petitioner. Petitioner appealed to the C.A. contending that he has not violated C.A. No.142
as amended by R.A. No.6085 as he never used any alias name, he only used such name on one occasion
with an express consent of Oscar Perez himself.

Issue:

Whether or not petitioner has violated Sec.1 of Commonwealth Act No.142 as amendedby R.A.6085 or
otherwise known as An Act to Regulate the Use of Aliases.

Ruling:

No, the petitioner did not violateSec.1 of C.A No.142 as amended by R.A. 6085. The court ruled that there
is no evidence showing that he had used or was intending to used that name in addition to his real name.
That name was used in an isolated transaction where he was not even legally required to expose his real
identity. While the act may be covered by other provisions of law, it does not constitute an offense within
the concept of C.A. No.142

Section 1 of Commonwealth ActNo.142 provides that except as a pseudonym solely for literary, cinema,
television, radio or other entertainment purposes and in athletic events where the use of a pseudonym is
a normally accepted practice, no person shall use any name different from the one which he was registered
at birth in the office of the civil registry or with which he was baptized for the first time, or in case of
an alien, with which he was registered in the Bureau of Immigration upon entry, or such substitute name
as may have been authorized by a competent court provided, that persons whose birthshave not been
registered in any local civil registry and who have not been baptized, have one one year from the approval
of this act within which to register their names in the civil registry of their residence. The name shall
comprise the patronymic name and one or two surnames.

The decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner CESARIO URSUA is acquitted of
the crime charged.
People v. Concepcion Case Digest

People v. Concepcion

G.R. No. 19190 (November 29, 1922)

FACTS:

Defendant authorized an extension of credit in favor of Concepcion, a co-

partnership. Defendant’s wife was a director of this co-partnership. Defendant was found guilty of
violating Sec. 35 of Act No. 2747 which says that “The National Bank shall not, directly or indirectly, grant
loans to any of the members of the Board of Directors of the bank nor to agents of the branch banks.” This
Section was in effect in 1919 but was repealed in Act No. 2938 approved on January 30, 1921.

ISSUE:

W/N Defendant can be convicted of violating Sections of Act No. 2747, which were repealed by Act
No. 2938.

HELD:

In the interpretation and construction, the primary rule is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of
the Legislature. Section 49 in relation to Sec. 25 of Act No. 2747 provides a punishment for any person who
shall violate any provisions of the Act. Defendant contends that the repeal of these Sections by Act No.
2938 has served to take away basis for criminal prosecution. The Court holds that where an act of
the Legislature which penalizes an offense repeals a former act which penalized the same offense, such
repeal does not have the effect of thereafter depriving the Courts of jurisdiction to try, convict and
sentence offenders charged with violations of the old law.
ORTEGA VS. PEOPLE- G. R. NO. 151085

Category: Book 1- General Provisions

Ortega vs. People

G. R. No. 151085, August 20, 2008

Facts:

At the time of commission of rape, the accused was 13 years old while the victim was 6. The case was
pending when the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006 (R.A. 9344) was enacted amending among
others the age of criminal irresponsibility being raised from 9 to 15 years old. At the time of the
promulgation of judgment, the accused already reached the age of majority.

Issue:

Whether or not the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006 (R.A. 9344) should be applied, in the
resolution of the case.

Held:

The Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006 (R.A. 9344) should be applied. By virtue of R.A. No. 9344,
the age of criminal irresponsibility has been raised from 9 to 15 years old, this law is evidently favorable
to the accused. Petitioner was only 13 years old at the time of the commission of the alleged rape. This
was duly proven by the certificate of live birth, by petitioner's own testimony, and by the testimony of
his mother. Furthermore, petitioner’s age was never assailed in any of the proceedings before the RTC
and the CA. Indubitably, petitioner, at the time of the commission of the crime, was below 15 years of
age. Under R.A. No. 9344, he is exempted from criminal liability.