Republic of the Philippines shelf.

shelf.8 Complying with these requirements, RA 9522 shortened one baseline, optimized the location of some
SUPREME COURT basepoints around the Philippine archipelago and classified adjacent territories, namely, the Kalayaan Island
Manila Group (KIG) and the Scarborough Shoal, as "regimes of islands" whose islands generate their own applicable
maritime zones.
EN BANC
Petitioners, professors of law, law students and a legislator, in their respective capacities as "citizens,
G.R No. 187167 August 16, 2011 taxpayers or x x x legislators,"9 as the case may be, assail the constitutionality of RA 9522 on two principal
grounds, namely: (1) RA 9522 reduces Philippine maritime territory, and logically, the reach of the Philippine
state’s sovereign power, in violation of Article 1 of the 1987 Constitution, 10 embodying the terms of the
PROF. MERLIN M. MAGALLONA, AKBAYAN PARTY-LIST REP. RISA HONTIVEROS, PROF. HARRY C. ROQUE, JR., Treaty of Paris11 and ancillary treaties,12 and (2) RA 9522 opens the country’s waters landward of the
AND UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW STUDENTS, ALITHEA BARBARA ACAS, VOLTAIRE baselines to maritime passage by all vessels and aircrafts, undermining Philippine sovereignty and national
ALFERES, CZARINA MAY ALTEZ, FRANCIS ALVIN ASILO, SHERYL BALOT, RUBY AMOR BARRACA, JOSE JAVIER security, contravening the country’s nuclear-free policy, and damaging marine resources, in violation of
BAUTISTA, ROMINA BERNARDO, VALERIE PAGASA BUENAVENTURA, EDAN MARRI CAÑETE, VANN ALLEN relevant constitutional provisions.13
DELA CRUZ, RENE DELORINO, PAULYN MAY DUMAN, SHARON ESCOTO, RODRIGO FAJARDO III, GIRLIE
FERRER, RAOULLE OSEN FERRER, CARLA REGINA GREPO, ANNA MARIE CECILIA GO, IRISH KAY KALAW, MARY
ANN JOY LEE, MARIA LUISA MANALAYSAY, MIGUEL RAFAEL MUSNGI, MICHAEL OCAMPO, JAKLYN HANNA In addition, petitioners contend that RA 9522’s treatment of the KIG as "regime of islands" not only results
PINEDA, WILLIAM RAGAMAT, MARICAR RAMOS, ENRIK FORT REVILLAS, JAMES MARK TERRY RIDON, in the loss of a large maritime area but also prejudices the livelihood of subsistence fishermen. 14 To buttress
JOHANN FRANTZ RIVERA IV, CHRISTIAN RIVERO, DIANNE MARIE ROA, NICHOLAS SANTIZO, MELISSA their argument of territorial diminution, petitioners facially attack RA 9522 for what it excluded and
CHRISTINA SANTOS, CRISTINE MAE TABING, VANESSA ANNE TORNO, MARIA ESTER VANGUARDIA, and included – its failure to reference either the Treaty of Paris or Sabah and its use of UNCLOS III’s framework
MARCELINO VELOSO III, Petitioners, of regime of islands to determine the maritime zones of the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal.
vs.
HON. EDUARDO ERMITA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, HON. ALBERTO ROMULO, IN HIS Commenting on the petition, respondent officials raised threshold issues questioning (1) the petition’s
CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, HON. ROLANDO ANDAYA, IN HIS compliance with the case or controversy requirement for judicial review grounded on petitioners’ alleged
CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, HON. DIONY VENTURA, IN lack of locus standi and (2) the propriety of the writs of certiorari and prohibition to assail the
HIS CAPACITY AS ADMINISTRATOR OF THE NATIONAL MAPPING & RESOURCE INFORMATION AUTHORITY, constitutionality of RA 9522. On the merits, respondents defended RA 9522 as the country’s compliance
and HON. HILARIO DAVIDE, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF THE with the terms of UNCLOS III, preserving Philippine territory over the KIG or Scarborough Shoal.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES TO THE UNITED NATIONS, Respondents. Respondents add that RA 9522 does not undermine the country’s security, environment and economic
interests or relinquish the Philippines’ claim over Sabah.
DECISION
Respondents also question the normative force, under international law, of petitioners’ assertion that what
CARPIO, J.: Spain ceded to the United States under the Treaty of Paris were the islands and all the waters found within
the boundaries of the rectangular area drawn under the Treaty of Paris.

The Case
We left unacted petitioners’ prayer for an injunctive writ.

This original action for the writs of certiorari and prohibition assails the constitutionality of Republic Act No.
95221 (RA 9522) adjusting the country’s archipelagic baselines and classifying the baseline regime of nearby The Issues
territories.
The petition raises the following issues:
The Antecedents
1. Preliminarily –
In 1961, Congress passed Republic Act No. 3046 (RA 3046)2 demarcating the maritime baselines of the
Philippines as an archipelagic State.3 This law followed the framing of the Convention on the Territorial Sea 1. Whether petitioners possess locus standi to bring this suit; and
and the Contiguous Zone in 1958 (UNCLOS I),4 codifying, among others, the sovereign right of States parties
over their "territorial sea," the breadth of which, however, was left undetermined. Attempts to fill this void 2. Whether the writs of certiorari and prohibition are the proper remedies to assail the constitutionality of
during the second round of negotiations in Geneva in 1960 (UNCLOS II) proved futile. Thus, domestically, RA RA 9522.
3046 remained unchanged for nearly five decades, save for legislation passed in 1968 (Republic Act No.
5446 [RA 5446]) correcting typographical errors and reserving the drawing of baselines around Sabah in
North Borneo. 2. On the merits, whether RA 9522 is unconstitutional.

In March 2009, Congress amended RA 3046 by enacting RA 9522, the statute now under scrutiny. The
change was prompted by the need to make RA 3046 compliant with the terms of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III),5 which the Philippines ratified on 27 February 1984.6 Among
others, UNCLOS III prescribes the water-land ratio, length, and contour of baselines of archipelagic States
like the Philippines7 and sets the deadline for the filing of application for the extended continental
The Ruling of the Court
On the threshold issues, we hold that (1) petitioners possess locus standi to bring this suit as citizens and (2)
the writs of certiorari and prohibition are proper remedies to test the constitutionality of RA 9522. On the
merits, we find no basis to declare RA 9522 unconstitutional.
On the Threshold Issues
Petitioners Possess Locus
Standi as Citizens
Petitioners themselves undermine their assertion of locus standi as legislators and taxpayers because the
petition alleges neither infringement of legislative prerogative15 nor misuse of public funds,16 occasioned by
the passage and implementation of RA 9522. Nonetheless, we recognize petitioners’ locus standi as citizens
with constitutionally sufficient interest in the resolution of the merits of the case which undoubtedly raises
issues of national significance necessitating urgent resolution. Indeed, owing to the peculiar nature of RA
9522, it is understandably difficult to find other litigants possessing "a more direct and specific interest" to
bring the suit, thus satisfying one of the requirements for granting citizenship standing. 17
The Writs of Certiorari and Prohibition
Are Proper Remedies to Test
the Constitutionality of Statutes
In praying for the dismissal of the petition on preliminary grounds, respondents seek a strict observance of
the offices of the writs of certiorari and prohibition, noting that the writs cannot issue absent any showing
of grave abuse of discretion in the exercise of judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial powers on the part of
respondents and resulting prejudice on the part of petitioners.18
conduct of States in the world’s oceans and submarine areas, recognizing coastal and archipelagic States’
graduated authority over a limited span of waters and submarine lands along their coasts.
On the other hand, baselines laws such as RA 9522 are enacted by UNCLOS III States parties to mark-out
specific basepoints along their coasts from which baselines are drawn, either straight or contoured, to serve
as geographic starting points to measure the breadth of the maritime zones and continental shelf. Article 48
of UNCLOS III on archipelagic States like ours could not be any clearer:
Article 48. Measurement of the breadth of the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the exclusive economic
zone and the continental shelf. – The breadth of the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the exclusive
economic zone and the continental shelf shall be measured from archipelagic baselines drawn in accordance
with article 47. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, baselines laws are nothing but statutory mechanisms for UNCLOS III States parties to delimit with
precision the extent of their maritime zones and continental shelves. In turn, this gives notice to the rest of
the international community of the scope of the maritime space and submarine areas within which States
parties exercise treaty-based rights, namely, the exercise of sovereignty over territorial waters (Article 2),
the jurisdiction to enforce customs, fiscal, immigration, and sanitation laws in the contiguous zone (Article
33), and the right to exploit the living and non-living resources in the exclusive economic zone (Article 56)
and continental shelf (Article 77).

Respondents’ submission holds true in ordinary civil proceedings. When this Court exercises its Even under petitioners’ theory that the Philippine territory embraces the islands and all the waters within
constitutional power of judicial review, however, we have, by tradition, viewed the writs of certiorari and the rectangular area delimited in the Treaty of Paris, the baselines of the Philippines would still have to be
prohibition as proper remedial vehicles to test the constitutionality of statutes,19 and indeed, of acts of drawn in accordance with RA 9522 because this is the only way to draw the baselines in conformity with
other branches of government.20 Issues of constitutional import are sometimes crafted out of statutes UNCLOS III. The baselines cannot be drawn from the boundaries or other portions of the rectangular area
which, while having no bearing on the personal interests of the petitioners, carry such relevance in the life delineated in the Treaty of Paris, but from the "outermost islands and drying reefs of the archipelago." 24
of this nation that the Court inevitably finds itself constrained to take cognizance of the case and pass upon
the issues raised, non-compliance with the letter of procedural rules notwithstanding. The statute sought to UNCLOS III and its ancillary baselines laws play no role in the acquisition, enlargement or, as petitioners
be reviewed here is one such law. claim, diminution of territory. Under traditional international law typology, States acquire (or conversely,
lose) territory through occupation, accretion, cession and prescription, 25 not by executing multilateral
RA 9522 is Not Unconstitutional treaties on the regulations of sea-use rights or enacting statutes to comply with the treaty’s terms to delimit
RA 9522 is a Statutory Tool maritime zones and continental shelves. Territorial claims to land features are outside UNCLOS III, and are
to Demarcate the Country’s instead governed by the rules on general international law.26
Maritime Zones and Continental
Shelf Under UNCLOS III, not to RA 9522’s Use of the Framework
Delineate Philippine Territory of Regime of Islands to Determine the
Maritime Zones of the KIG and the
Petitioners submit that RA 9522 "dismembers a large portion of the national territory"21 because it discards Scarborough Shoal, not Inconsistent
the pre-UNCLOS III demarcation of Philippine territory under the Treaty of Paris and related treaties, with the Philippines’ Claim of Sovereignty
successively encoded in the definition of national territory under the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions. Over these Areas
Petitioners theorize that this constitutional definition trumps any treaty or statutory provision denying the
Philippines sovereign control over waters, beyond the territorial sea recognized at the time of the Treaty of Petitioners next submit that RA 9522’s use of UNCLOS III’s regime of islands framework to draw the
Paris, that Spain supposedly ceded to the United States. Petitioners argue that from the Treaty of Paris’ baselines, and to measure the breadth of the applicable maritime zones of the KIG, "weakens our territorial
technical description, Philippine sovereignty over territorial waters extends hundreds of nautical miles claim" over that area.27 Petitioners add that the KIG’s (and Scarborough Shoal’s) exclusion from the
around the Philippine archipelago, embracing the rectangular area delineated in the Treaty of Paris.22 Philippine archipelagic baselines results in the loss of "about 15,000 square nautical miles of territorial
waters," prejudicing the livelihood of subsistence fishermen.28 A comparison of the configuration of the
Petitioners’ theory fails to persuade us. baselines drawn under RA 3046 and RA 9522 and the extent of maritime space encompassed by each law,
coupled with a reading of the text of RA 9522 and its congressional deliberations, vis-à-vis the Philippines’
UNCLOS III has nothing to do with the acquisition (or loss) of territory. It is a multilateral treaty regulating, obligations under UNCLOS III, belie this view.1avvphi1
among others, sea-use rights over maritime zones (i.e., the territorial waters [12 nautical miles from the
baselines], contiguous zone [24 nautical miles from the baselines], exclusive economic zone [200 nautical The configuration of the baselines drawn under RA 3046 and RA 9522 shows that RA 9522 merely followed
miles from the baselines]), and continental shelves that UNCLOS III delimits. 23 UNCLOS III was the the basepoints mapped by RA 3046, save for at least nine basepoints that RA 9522 skipped to optimize the
culmination of decades-long negotiations among United Nations members to codify norms regulating the location of basepoints and adjust the length of one baseline (and thus comply with UNCLOS III’s limitation
on the maximum length of baselines). Under RA 3046, as under RA 9522, the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal
lie outside of the baselines drawn around the Philippine archipelago. This undeniable cartographic fact takes The principal sponsor of RA 9522 in the Senate, Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago, took pains to emphasize
the wind out of petitioners’ argument branding RA 9522 as a statutory renunciation of the Philippines’ claim the foregoing during the Senate deliberations:
over the KIG, assuming that baselines are relevant for this purpose.
What we call the Kalayaan Island Group or what the rest of the world call[] the Spratlys and the Scarborough
Petitioners’ assertion of loss of "about 15,000 square nautical miles of territorial waters" under RA 9522 is Shoal are outside our archipelagic baseline because if we put them inside our baselines we might be accused
similarly unfounded both in fact and law. On the contrary, RA 9522, by optimizing the location of of violating the provision of international law which states: "The drawing of such baseline shall not depart to
basepoints, increased the Philippines’ total maritime space (covering its internal waters, territorial sea and any appreciable extent from the general configuration of the archipelago." So sa loob ng ating baseline,
exclusive economic zone) by 145,216 square nautical miles, as shown in the table below:29 dapat magkalapit ang mga islands. Dahil malayo ang Scarborough Shoal, hindi natin masasabing malapit
sila sa atin although we are still allowed by international law to claim them as our own.

Extent of maritime area

Extent of maritime area This is called contested islands outside our configuration. We see that our archipelago is defined by the
using RA 3046, as amended,
using RA 9522, taking into orange line which [we] call[] archipelagic baseline. Ngayon, tingnan ninyo ang maliit na circle doon sa itaas,
taking into account the
account UNCLOS III (in that is Scarborough Shoal, itong malaking circle sa ibaba, that is Kalayaan Group or the Spratlys. Malayo na
Treaty of Paris’ delimitation
square nautical miles) sila sa ating archipelago kaya kung ilihis pa natin ang dating archipelagic baselines para lamang masama
(in square nautical miles)
itong dalawang circles, hindi na sila magkalapit at baka hindi na tatanggapin ng United Nations because of
Internal or archipelagic the rule that it should follow the natural configuration of the archipelago.34 (Emphasis supplied)
waters 166,858 171,435
Similarly, the length of one baseline that RA 3046 drew exceeded UNCLOS III’s limits.1avvphi1 The need to
Territorial Sea 274,136 32,106
shorten this baseline, and in addition, to optimize the location of basepoints using current maps, became
Exclusive Economic imperative as discussed by respondents:
Zone 382,669
[T]he amendment of the baselines law was necessary to enable the Philippines to draw the outer limits of its
TOTAL 440,994 586,210
maritime zones including the extended continental shelf in the manner provided by Article 47 of [UNCLOS
III]. As defined by R.A. 3046, as amended by R.A. 5446, the baselines suffer from some technical
Thus, as the map below shows, the reach of the exclusive economic zone drawn under RA 9522 even deficiencies, to wit:
extends way beyond the waters covered by the rectangular demarcation under the Treaty of Paris. Of
course, where there are overlapping exclusive economic zones of opposite or adjacent States, there will 1. The length of the baseline across Moro Gulf (from Middle of 3 Rock Awash to Tongquil Point) is 140.06
have to be a delineation of maritime boundaries in accordance with UNCLOS III.30 nautical miles x x x. This exceeds the maximum length allowed under Article 47(2) of the [UNCLOS III], which
states that "The length of such baselines shall not exceed 100 nautical miles, except that up to 3 per cent of
Further, petitioners’ argument that the KIG now lies outside Philippine territory because the baselines that the total number of baselines enclosing any archipelago may exceed that length, up to a maximum length of
RA 9522 draws do not enclose the KIG is negated by RA 9522 itself. Section 2 of the law commits to text the 125 nautical miles."
Philippines’ continued claim of sovereignty and jurisdiction over the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal:
2. The selection of basepoints is not optimal. At least 9 basepoints can be skipped or deleted from the
SEC. 2. The baselines in the following areas over which the Philippines likewise exercises sovereignty and baselines system. This will enclose an additional 2,195 nautical miles of water.
jurisdiction shall be determined as "Regime of Islands" under the Republic of the Philippines consistent with
Article 121 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS): 3. Finally, the basepoints were drawn from maps existing in 1968, and not established by geodetic survey
methods. Accordingly, some of the points, particularly along the west coasts of Luzon down to Palawan
a) The Kalayaan Island Group as constituted under Presidential Decree No. 1596 and were later found to be located either inland or on water, not on low-water line and drying reefs as
prescribed by Article 47.35
b) Bajo de Masinloc, also known as Scarborough Shoal. (Emphasis supplied)
Hence, far from surrendering the Philippines’ claim over the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal, Congress’
decision to classify the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal as "‘Regime[s] of Islands’ under the Republic of the
Had Congress in RA 9522 enclosed the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal as part of the Philippine archipelago, Philippines consistent with Article 121"36 of UNCLOS III manifests the Philippine State’s responsible
adverse legal effects would have ensued. The Philippines would have committed a breach of two provisions observance of its pacta sunt servanda obligation under UNCLOS III. Under Article 121 of UNCLOS III, any
of UNCLOS III. First, Article 47 (3) of UNCLOS III requires that "[t]he drawing of such baselines shall not "naturally formed area of land, surrounded by water, which is above water at high tide," such as portions of
depart to any appreciable extent from the general configuration of the archipelago." Second, Article 47 (2) the KIG, qualifies under the category of "regime of islands," whose islands generate their own applicable
of UNCLOS III requires that "the length of the baselines shall not exceed 100 nautical miles," save for three maritime zones.37
per cent (3%) of the total number of baselines which can reach up to 125 nautical miles.31

Statutory Claim Over Sabah under

Although the Philippines has consistently claimed sovereignty over the KIG32 and the Scarborough Shoal for RA 5446 Retained
several decades, these outlying areas are located at an appreciable distance from the nearest shoreline of
the Philippine archipelago,33 such that any straight baseline loped around them from the nearest basepoint
will inevitably "depart to an appreciable extent from the general configuration of the archipelago."
Petitioners’ argument for the invalidity of RA 9522 for its failure to textualize the Philippines’ claim over validly invoke its sovereignty to absolutely forbid innocent passage that is exercised in accordance with
Sabah in North Borneo is also untenable. Section 2 of RA 5446, which RA 9522 did not repeal, keeps open customary international law without risking retaliatory measures from the international community.
the door for drawing the baselines of Sabah:
The fact that for archipelagic States, their archipelagic waters are subject to both the right of innocent
Section 2. The definition of the baselines of the territorial sea of the Philippine Archipelago as provided in passage and sea lanes passage45 does not place them in lesser footing vis-à-vis continental coastal States
this Act is without prejudice to the delineation of the baselines of the territorial sea around the territory of which are subject, in their territorial sea, to the right of innocent passage and the right of transit passage
Sabah, situated in North Borneo, over which the Republic of the Philippines has acquired dominion and through international straits. The imposition of these passage rights through archipelagic waters under
sovereignty. (Emphasis supplied) UNCLOS III was a concession by archipelagic States, in exchange for their right to claim all the waters
landward of their baselines, regardless of their depth or distance from the coast, as archipelagic waters
UNCLOS III and RA 9522 not subject to their territorial sovereignty. More importantly, the recognition of archipelagic States’ archipelago
Incompatible with the Constitution’s and the waters enclosed by their baselines as one cohesive entity prevents the treatment of their islands as
Delineation of Internal Waters separate islands under UNCLOS III.46 Separate islands generate their own maritime zones, placing the waters
between islands separated by more than 24 nautical miles beyond the States’ territorial sovereignty,
subjecting these waters to the rights of other States under UNCLOS III.47
As their final argument against the validity of RA 9522, petitioners contend that the law unconstitutionally
"converts" internal waters into archipelagic waters, hence subjecting these waters to the right of innocent
and sea lanes passage under UNCLOS III, including overflight. Petitioners extrapolate that these passage Petitioners’ invocation of non-executory constitutional provisions in Article II (Declaration of Principles and
rights indubitably expose Philippine internal waters to nuclear and maritime pollution hazards, in violation State Policies)48 must also fail. Our present state of jurisprudence considers the provisions in Article II as
of the Constitution.38 mere legislative guides, which, absent enabling legislation, "do not embody judicially enforceable
constitutional rights x x x."49 Article II provisions serve as guides in formulating and interpreting
implementing legislation, as well as in interpreting executory provisions of the Constitution. Although Oposa
Whether referred to as Philippine "internal waters" under Article I of the Constitution39 or as "archipelagic v. Factoran50 treated the right to a healthful and balanced ecology under Section 16 of Article II as an
waters" under UNCLOS III (Article 49 [1]), the Philippines exercises sovereignty over the body of water lying exception, the present petition lacks factual basis to substantiate the claimed constitutional violation. The
landward of the baselines, including the air space over it and the submarine areas underneath. UNCLOS III other provisions petitioners cite, relating to the protection of marine wealth (Article XII, Section 2,
affirms this: paragraph 251 ) and subsistence fishermen (Article XIII, Section 752 ), are not violated by RA 9522.

Article 49. Legal status of archipelagic waters, of the air space over archipelagic waters and of their bed and In fact, the demarcation of the baselines enables the Philippines to delimit its exclusive economic zone,
subsoil. – reserving solely to the Philippines the exploitation of all living and non-living resources within such zone.
Such a maritime delineation binds the international community since the delineation is in strict observance
1. The sovereignty of an archipelagic State extends to the waters enclosed by the archipelagic of UNCLOS III. If the maritime delineation is contrary to UNCLOS III, the international community will of
baselines drawn in accordance with article 47, described as archipelagic waters, regardless of their depth or course reject it and will refuse to be bound by it.
distance from the coast.
UNCLOS III favors States with a long coastline like the Philippines. UNCLOS III creates a sui generis maritime
2. This sovereignty extends to the air space over the archipelagic waters, as well as to their bed and subsoil, space – the exclusive economic zone – in waters previously part of the high seas. UNCLOS III grants new
and the resources contained therein. rights to coastal States to exclusively exploit the resources found within this zone up to 200 nautical
miles.53 UNCLOS III, however, preserves the traditional freedom of navigation of other States that attached
xxxx to this zone beyond the territorial sea before UNCLOS III.

4. The regime of archipelagic sea lanes passage established in this Part shall not in other respects affect the RA 9522 and the Philippines’ Maritime Zones
status of the archipelagic waters, including the sea lanes, or the exercise by the archipelagic State of its
sovereignty over such waters and their air space, bed and subsoil, and the resources contained therein. Petitioners hold the view that, based on the permissive text of UNCLOS III, Congress was not bound to pass
(Emphasis supplied) RA 9522.54 We have looked at the relevant provision of UNCLOS III55 and we find petitioners’ reading
plausible. Nevertheless, the prerogative of choosing this option belongs to Congress, not to this Court.
The fact of sovereignty, however, does not preclude the operation of municipal and international law norms Moreover, the luxury of choosing this option comes at a very steep price. Absent an UNCLOS III compliant
subjecting the territorial sea or archipelagic waters to necessary, if not marginal, burdens in the interest of baselines law, an archipelagic State like the Philippines will find itself devoid of internationally acceptable
maintaining unimpeded, expeditious international navigation, consistent with the international law principle baselines from where the breadth of its maritime zones and continental shelf is measured. This is recipe for
of freedom of navigation. Thus, domestically, the political branches of the Philippine government, in the a two-fronted disaster: first, it sends an open invitation to the seafaring powers to freely enter and exploit
competent discharge of their constitutional powers, may pass legislation designating routes within the the resources in the waters and submarine areas around our archipelago; and second, it weakens the
archipelagic waters to regulate innocent and sea lanes passage.40 Indeed, bills drawing nautical highways for country’s case in any international dispute over Philippine maritime space. These are consequences
sea lanes passage are now pending in Congress.41 Congress wisely avoided.

In the absence of municipal legislation, international law norms, now codified in UNCLOS III, operate to The enactment of UNCLOS III compliant baselines law for the Philippine archipelago and adjacent areas, as
grant innocent passage rights over the territorial sea or archipelagic waters, subject to the treaty’s embodied in RA 9522, allows an internationally-recognized delimitation of the breadth of the Philippines’
limitations and conditions for their exercise.42 Significantly, the right of innocent passage is a customary maritime zones and continental shelf. RA 9522 is therefore a most vital step on the part of the Philippines in
international law,43 thus automatically incorporated in the corpus of Philippine law.44 No modern State can safeguarding its maritime zones, consistent with the Constitution and our national interest.
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. Matutina, or their replacements in their official posts if they have already vacated the same, are ORDERED
to furnish this Court within five (5) days from notice of this decision, official or unofficial reports pertaining
SO ORDERED. to petitioner – covering but not limited to intelligence reports, operation reports and provost marshal
reports prior to, during and subsequent to September 6, 2009 – made by the 5th Infantry Division,
Philippine Army, its branches and subsidiaries, including the 17th Infantry Battalion, Philippine Army.

The above-named respondents are also DIRECTED to refrain from using the said reports in any transaction
or operation of the military. Necessarily, the afore-named respondents are ORDERED to expunge from the
records of the military all documents having any reference to petitioner.

Likewise, the afore-named respondents, as well as respondents Police Director General Jesus Ame Versoza,
Antonio Cruz, Aldwin Pasicolan and Vicente Callagan are DIRECTED to ensure that no further violation of
Republic of the Philippines petitioner’s rights to life, liberty and security is committed against the latter or any member of his family.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
The petition is DISMISSED with respect to President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo on account of her presidential
immunity from suit. Similarly, the petition is DISMISSED with respect to respondents Calog and George
EN BANC Palacpac or Harry for lack of merit.

G.R. No. 191805 November 15, 2011 Petitioner’s prayer for issuance of a temporary protection order and inspection order is DENIED.

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE WRIT OF AMPARO AND HABEAS DATA IN FAVOR OF NORIEL H. Noriel Rodriguez (Rodriguez) is petitioner in G.R. No. 191805 and respondent in G.R. No. 193160. He is a
RODRIGUEZ, NORIEL H. RODRIGUEZ, Petitioner, member of Alyansa Dagiti Mannalon Iti Cagayan (Kagimungan), a peasant organization affiliated with
vs. Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (KMP).
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, GEN. VICTOR S. IBRADO, PDG JESUS AME VERSOZA, LT. GEN. DELFIN BANGIT,
MAJ. GEN. NESTOR Z. OCHOA, P/CSUPT. AMETO G. TOLENTINO, P/SSUPT. JUDE W. SANTOS, COL. REMIGIO
M. DE VERA, an officer named MATUTINA, LT. COL. MINA, CALOG, GEORGE PALACPAC under the name On the other hand, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (former President Arroyo), Police Director General (PDG.) Jesus
"HARRY," ANTONIO CRUZ, ALDWIN "BONG" PASICOLAN and VINCENT CALLAGAN, Respondents. A. Verzosa, Police Senior Superintendent (P/SSupt.) Jude W. Santos, Brigadier General (Brig. Gen.) Remegio
M. De Vera, First Lieutenant (1st Lt.) Ryan S. Matutina, Lieutenant Colonel (Lt. Col.) Laurence E. Mina,
Antonio C. Cruz (Cruz), Aldwin C. Pasicolan (Pasicolan) and Vicente A. Callagan (Callagan) are respondents in
x------------------------x G.R. No. 191805 and petitioners in G.R. No. 193160. At the time the events relevant to the present Petitions
occurred, former President Arroyo was the President of the Philippines. PDG. Verzosa, P/SSupt. Santos, Brig.
G.R. No. 193160 Gen. De Vera, 1st Lt. Matutina and Lt. Col. Mina were officers of the Philippine National Police (PNP). Cruz,
Pasicolan and Callagan were Special Investigators of the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) in Region II.
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE WRIT OF AMPARO AND HABEAS DATA IN FAVOR OF NORIEL H.
RODRIGUEZ, POLICE DIR. GEN. JESUS A. VERSOZA, P/SSUPT. JUDE W. SANTOS, BGEN. REMEGIO M. DE VERA, Antecedent Facts
1st LT. RYAN S. MATUTINA, LT. COL. LAURENCE E. MINA, ANTONIO C. CRUZ, ALDWIN C. PASICOLAN and
VICENTE A. CALLAGAN, Petitioners, Rodriguez claims that the military tagged KMP as an enemy of the State under the Oplan Bantay Laya,
vs. making its members targets of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances.2
NORIEL H. RODRIGUEZ, Respondent.

On 6 September 2009, at 5:00 p.m., Rodriguez had just reached Barangay Tapel, Cagayan onboard a tricycle
DECISION driven by Hermie Antonio Carlos (Carlos), when four men forcibly took him and forced him into a car. Inside
the vehicle were several men in civilian clothes, one of whom was holding a .45 caliber pistol. Subsequently,
SERENO, J.: three more persons arrived, and one of them carried a gun at his side. Two men boarded the car, while the
others rode on the tricycle.3
Before this Court are two consolidated cases, namely, (1) Petition for Partial Review on Certiorari dated 20
April 2010 (G.R. No. 191805), and (2) Petition for Review on Certiorari dated 19 August 2010 (G.R. No. The men tied the hands of Rodriguez, ordered him to lie on his stomach, sat on his back and started
193160).1 Both Petitions assail the 12 April 2010 Decision of the Court of Appeals, the dispositive portion of punching him. The car travelled towards the direction of Sta. Teresita-Mission and moved around the area
which reads: until about 2:00 a.m. During the drive, the men forced Rodriguez to confess to being a member of the New
People’s Army (NPA), but he remained silent. The car then entered a place that appeared to be a military
WHEREFORE, the petition for writ of amparo and writ of habeas data is GRANTED. camp. There were soldiers all over the area, and there was a banner with the word "Bravo" written on it.
Rodriguez later on learned that the camp belonged to the 17th Infantry Battalion of the Philippine Army.4

Respondents Gen. Victor S. Ibrado, Lt. Gen. Delfin Bangit, Maj. Gen. Nestor Z. Ochoa, PCSupt. Ameto G.
Tolentino, PSSupt. Jude W. Santos, Col. Remigio M. De Vera, Lt. Col. Laurence E. Mina and 1Lt. Ryan S. Rodriguez was brought to a canteen, where six men confronted him, ordering him to confess to his
membership in the NPA. Due to his exhaustion, he unintentionally fell asleep. As a result, the men hit him
on the head to wake him up. After the interrogation, two of the men guarded him, but did not allow him to forced him down, held his hands, and sat on his feet. He did not only receive another beating, but was also
sleep.5 electrocuted. The torture lasted for about an hour.12

In the morning of 7 September 2009, the men tied the hands of Rodriguez, blindfolded him and made him At 11:00 p.m. on 15 September 2009, the soldiers brought Rodriguez to a military operation in the
board a vehicle. While they were in transit, the soldiers repeatedly hit him in the head and threatened to kill mountains, where he saw Matutina again. They all spent the night there.13
him. When the car stopped after about ten minutes, the soldiers brought him to a room, removed his
blindfold, and forced him to confess to being a member of the NPA. During the interrogation, the soldiers In the morning of 16 September 2009, the soldiers and Rodriguez started their descent. When they stopped,
repeatedly hit him on the head. Thereafter, he was detained inside the room for the entire day. The soldiersthe soldiers took his photograph and asked him to name the location of the NPA camp. Thereafter, they all
tied his stomach to a papag, and gave him rice and viand. Fearing that the food might be poisoned, he returned to the military camp. The soldiers asked him to take a bath and wear a white polo shirt handed to
refused to eat anything. He slept on the papag while being tied to it at the waist.6 him. He was then brought to the Enrile Medical Center, where Dr. Juliet Ramil (Dr. Ramil) examined
him.14 When the doctor asked him why he had bruises and contusions, he lied and told her that he
On 8 September 2009, the men forced Rodriguez into a vehicle, which brought them to Bugey and Mission. sustained them when he slipped, as he noticed a soldier observing him. Dr. Ramil’s medical certificate
While passing houses along the way, the men asked him if his contacts lived in those houses. When he failed indicated that he suffered from four hematomas in the epigastric area, chest and sternum. 15
to answer, a soldier pointed a gun to his head and threatened to kill him and his family. Because he
remained silent, the soldiers beat him and tied him up. The vehicle returned to the military camp at past Back at the camp, the soldiers let Rodriguez eat with several military officials and took pictures of him while
1:00 p.m., where he was again subjected to tactical interrogation about the location of an NPA camp and his he was eating with them. They also asked him to point to a map in front of him and again took his
alleged NPA comrades. He suffered incessant mauling every time he failed to answer. 7 photograph. Later, they told him that he would finally see his mother. 16

At dawn on 9 September 2009, soldiers armed with rifles took Rodriguez and made him their guide on their Rodriguez was brought to another military camp, where he was ordered to sign a piece of paper stating that
way to an NPA camp in Birao. Accompanying them was a man named Harry, who, according to the soldiers, he was a surrenderee and was never beaten up. Scared and desperate to end his ordeal, he signed the
was an NPA member who had surrendered to the military. Harry pointed to Rodriguez and called him a paper and was warned not to report anything to the media.17
member of the NPA. He also heard Harry tell the soldiers that the latter knew the area well and was
acquainted with a man named Elvis. The soldiers loaded Rodriguez into a military truck and drove to Tabbak,
Bugey. While he was walking with the soldiers, he noticed a soldier with the name tag "Matutina," who Around 6:00 a.m. on 17 September 2009, the soldiers instructed petitioner to take a bath. They gave him a
appeared to be an official because the other soldiers addressed him as "sir."8 pair of jeans and perfume. While he was having breakfast, the two soldiers guarding him repeatedly
reminded him not to disclose to the media his experience in the camp and to say instead that he had
surrendered to the military.18
Upon reaching Birao on foot, the soldiers looked for and was able to locate a certain Elvis and told him that
Rodriguez had identified his whereabouts location. The soldiers forced Rodriguez to convince Elvis to
disclose the location of the NPA camp. They brought the two to the mountains, where both were At 9:00 a.m. on the same day, the mother and the brother of Rodriguez arrived surrounded by several men.
threatened with death. When the soldiers punched Elvis, Rodriguez told them that he would reveal the His mother, Wilma Rodriguez (Wilma), talked to Lt. Col. Mina. Rodriguez heard one of the soldiers tell Wilma
location of the NPA camp if they let Elvis go home. They finally released Elvis around 3:00 p.m. that day. The that he had surrendered to the military and had long been its asset. His brother, Rodel Rodriguez (Rodel),
soldiers and Rodriguez spent the next three nights in the mountains.9 informed him that the men accompanying them were from the CHR, namely, Pasicolan, Cruz and Callagan.
Upon seeing Rodriguez, Cruz instructed him to lift up his shirt, and one of the CHR employees took
photographs of his bruises.19
On 12 September 2009, the soldiers again hit Rodriguez and forced him to identify the location of the NPA
camp. He was blindfolded and warned to get ready because they would beat him up again in the military
camp. Upon arrival therein, they brought him to the same room where he had first been detained, and two A soldier tried to convince Wilma to let Rodriguez stay in the camp for another two weeks to supposedly
soldiers mauled him again. They repeatedly punched and kicked him. In the afternoon, they let him rest and prevent the NPA from taking revenge on him. Respondent Calog also approached Rodriguez and Rodel and
gave him an Alaxan tablet. Thereafter, he fell asleep due to over-fatigue and extreme body pain. The asked them to become military assets. Rodel refused and insisted that they take Rodriguez home to Manila.
soldiers, however, hit him again. After giving him a pen and a piece of paper, they ordered him to write Again, the soldiers reminded them to refrain from facing the media. The soldiers also told them that the
down his request for rice from the people. When he refused, the soldiers maltreated him once more. 10 latter will be taken to the Tuguegarao Airport and guarded until they reached home.20

On 13 September 2009, the soldiers forced Rodriguez to sign documents declaring that he had surrendered Rodriguez and his family missed their flight. Subsequently, the soldiers accompanied them to the CHR office,
in an encounter in Cumao, and where Rodriguez was made to sign an affidavit stating that he was neither abducted nor tortured. Afraid
and desperate to return home, he was forced to sign the document. Cruz advised him not to file a case
against his abductors because they had already freed him. The CHR personnel then led him and his family to
that the soldiers did not shoot him because he became a military asset in May. When he refused to sign the the CHR Toyota Tamaraw FX service vehicle. He noticed that a vehicle with soldiers on board followed
document, he received another beating. Thus, he was compelled to sign, but did so using a different them.21
signature to show that he was merely coerced.11

The soldiers showed Rodriguez photographs of different persons and asked him if he knew the men
appearing therein. When he told them that he did not recognize the individuals on the photos, the soldiers
instructed him to write down the name of his school and organization, but he declined. The soldiers then
wrote something on the paper, making it appear that he was the one who had written it, and forced him to
sign the document. The soldiers took photographs of him while he was signing. Afterwards, the soldiers
The Tamaraw FX pulled over and respondent 1st Lt. Matutina boarded the vehicle. Upon reaching a mall in
Isabela, Rodriguez, his family, Callagan, 1st Lt. Matutina and two other soldiers transferred to an orange
Toyota Revo with plate number WTG 579. Upon reaching the boundary of Nueva Ecija and Nueva Viscaya,
1st Lt. Matutina alighted and called Rodriguez to a diner. A certain Alan approached Rodriguez and handed
him a cellphone with a SIM card. The latter and his family then left and resumed their journey back home.22
Rodriguez reached his house in Sta. Ana, Manila at 3:00 a.m. on 18 September 2010. Callagan and two B. Cabaccan and Cpl. Julius P. Navarro, Rodriguez was a former member of the NPA operating in Cagayan
soldiers went inside the house, and took photographs and a video footage thereof. The soldiers explained Valley.34 Wanting to bolt from the NPA, he told Cpl. Cabaccan and Cpl. Navarro that he would help the
that the photos and videos would serve as evidence of the fact that Rodriguez and his family were able to military in exchange for his protection.35
arrive home safely. Despite Rodriguez’s efforts to confront the soldiers about their acts, they still continued
and only left thirty minutes later.23 Upon his voluntary surrender on 28 May 2009, Rodriguez was made to sign an Oath of Loyalty and an
Agent’s Agreement/Contract, showing his willingness to return to society and become a military
On 19 September 2009, Dr. Reginaldo Pamugas, a physician trained by the International Committee on asset.36 Since then, he acted as a double agent, returning to the NPA to gather information.37 However, he
Torture and Rehabilitation, examined Rodriguez and issued a Medical Certificate stating that the latter had feared that his NPA comrades were beginning to suspect him of being an infiltrator.38 Thus, with his
been a victim of torture.24 knowledge and consent, the soldiers planned to stage a sham abduction to erase any suspicion about him
being a double agent.39 Hence, the abduction subject of the instant petition was conducted.40
Around 7:00 a.m. on 3 November 2010, Rodriguez and his girlfriend, Aileen Hazel Robles, noticed that
several suspicious-looking men followed them at the Metro Rail Transit (MRT), in the streets and on a Meanwhile, Cruz, Pasicolan and Callagan filed a Consolidated Return of the Writ dated 15 January
jeepney.25 2010,41 alleging that they had exercised extraordinary diligence in locating Rodriguez, facilitating his safe
turnover to his family and securing their journey back home to Manila. More specifically, they alleged that,
On 7 December 2009, Rodriguez filed before this Court a Petition for the Writ of Amparo and Petition for on 16 September 2009, after Wilma sought their assistance in ascertaining the whereabouts of her son, Cruz
the Writ of Habeas Data with Prayers for Protection Orders, Inspection of Place, and Production of made phone calls to the military and law enforcement agencies to determine his location. 42 Cruz was able to
Documents and Personal Properties dated 2 December 2009.26 The petition was filed against former speak with Lt. Col. Mina, who confirmed that Rodriguez was in their custody.43 This information was
President Arroyo, Gen. Ibrado, PDG. Versoza, Lt. Gen. Bangit, Major General (Maj. Gen.) Nestor Z. Ochoa, transmitted to CHR Regional Director Atty. Jimmy P. Baliga. He, in turn, ordered Cruz, Pasicolan and Callagan
44
P/CSupt. Tolentino, P/SSupt. Santos, Col. De Vera, 1st Lt. Matutina, Calog, George Palacpac (Palacpac), Cruz, to accompany Wilma to the 17th Infantry Division.
Pasicolan and Callagan. The petition prayed for the following reliefs:
When the CHR officers, along with Wilma and Rodel, arrived at the 17th Infantry Battalion at Masin, Alcala,
a. The issuance of the writ of amparo ordering respondents to desist from violating Rodriguez’s right to life, Cagayan, Brigade Commander Col. de Vera and Battalion Commander Lt. Col. Mina alleged that Rodriguez
liberty and security. had become one of their assets, as evidenced by the Summary on the Surrender of Noriel Rodriguez and the
latter’s Contract as Agent.45 The CHR officers observed his casual and cordial demeanor with the
soldiers.46 In any case, Cruz asked him to raise his shirt to see if he had been subjected to any maltreatment.
b. The issuance of an order to enjoin respondents from doing harm to or approaching Rodriguez, his family Cruz and Pasicolan did not see any traces of torture. Thereafter, Rodriguez was released to his family, and
and his witnesses. they were made to sign a certification to this effect. During the signing of the document, herein CHR officers
did not witness any threat, intimidation or force employed against Rodriguez or his family. 47
c. Allowing the inspection of the detention areas of the Headquarters of Bravo Co., 5th Infantry Division,
Maguing, Gonzaga, Cagayan and another place near where Rodriguez was brought. During their journey back to the home of Rodriguez, the CHR officers observed that he was very much at
ease with his military escorts, especially with 1st Lt. Matutina.48 Neither was there any force or intimidation
d. Ordering respondents to produce documents submitted to them regarding any report on Rodriguez, when the soldiers took pictures of his house, as the taking of photographs was performed with Wilma’s
including operation reports and provost marshall reports of the 5th Infantry Division, the Special Operations consent.49
Group of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), prior to, on and subsequent to 6 September
2009.1âwphi1 During the hearing on 27 January 2010, the parties agreed to file additional affidavits and position papers
and to have the case considered submitted for decision after the filing of these pleadings. 50
e. Ordering records pertinent or in any way connected to Rodriguez, which are in the custody of
respondents, to be expunged, disabused, and forever barred from being used. 27 On 12 April 2010, the Court of Appeals rendered its assailed Decision.51 Subsequently, on 28 April 2010,
respondents therein filed their Motion for Reconsideration.52 Before the Court of Appeals could resolve this
On 15 December 2009, we granted the respective writs after finding that the petition sufficiently alleged Motion for Reconsideration, Rodriguez filed the instant Petition for Partial Review on Certiorari (G.R. No.
that Rodriguez had been abducted, tortured and later released by members of the 17th Infantry Battalion of 191805), raising the following assignment of errors:
the Philippine Army.28 We likewise ordered respondents therein to file a verified return on the writs on or
before 22 December 2009 and to comment on the petition on or before 4 January 2010.29 Finally, we a. The Court of Appeals erred in not granting the Interim Relief for temporary protection order.
directed the Court of Appeals to hear the petition on 4 January 2010 and decide on the case within 10 days
after its submission for decision.30
b. The Court of Appeals erred in saying: "(H)owever, given the nature of the writ of amparo, which has the
effect of enjoining the commission by respondents of violation to petitioner’s right to life, liberty and
During the initial hearing on 4 January 2010, the Court of Appeals required the parties to submit affidavits security, the safety of petitioner is ensured with the issuance of the writ, even in the absence of an order
and other pieces of evidence at the next scheduled hearing on 27 January 2010.31 preventing respondent from approaching petitioner."

On 8 January 2010, respondents therein, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed their Return c. The Court of Appeals erred in not finding that respondent Gloria Macapagal Arroyo had command
of the Writ, which was likewise considered as their comment on the petition.32 In their Return, respondents responsibility.53
therein alleged that Rodriguez had surrendered to the military on 28 May 2009 after he had been put under
surveillance and identified as "Ka Pepito" by former rebels.33 According to his military handlers, Corporal
(Cpl.) Rodel On the other hand, respondents therein, in their Comment dated 30 July 2010, averred:
a. The Court of Appeals properly dropped then President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo as a party-respondent, as right to privacy – especially the right to informational privacy66 – the proceedings for the issuance of the writ
she may not be sued in any case during her tenure of office or actual incumbency. of habeas data does not entail any finding of criminal, civil or administrative culpability. If the allegations in
the petition are proven through substantial evidence, then the Court may (a) grant access to the database
b. Petitioner had not presented any adequate and competent evidence, much less substantial evidence, to or information; (b) enjoin the act complained of; or (c) in case the database or67information contains
establish his claim that public respondents had violated, were violating or threatening to violate his rights to erroneous data or information, order its deletion, destruction or rectification.
life, liberty and security, as well as his right to privacy. Hence, he was not entitled to the privilege of the
writs of amparo and habeas data or to the corresponding interim reliefs (i.e. inspection order, production First issue: Grant of interim reliefs
order and temporary protection order) provided under the rule on the writ of amparo and the rule on the
writ of habeas data.54 In the petition in G.R. No. 191805, Rodriguez prays for the issuance of a temporary protection order. It must
be underscored that this interim relief is only available before final judgment. Section 14 of the Rule on the
On 19 August 2010, PDG. Verzosa, P/SSupt. Santos, BGen. De Vera, 1st Lt. Matutina, Lt. Col. Mina, Cruz, Writ of Amparo clearly provides:
Pasicolan and Callagan filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari, seeking the reversal of the 12 April 2010
Decision of the Court of Appeals.55 They alleged that Rodriguez – Interim Reliefs. – Upon filing of the petition or at anytime before final judgment, the court, justice or judge
may grant any of the following reliefs:
Has not presented any adequate and competent evidence, must less substantial evidence, to establish his
claim that petitioners have violated, are violating or threatening with violation his rights to life, liberty and Temporary Protection Order. – The court, justice or judge, upon motion or motu proprio, may order that the
security, as well as his right to privacy; hence, he is not entitled to the privilege of the writs of amparo and petitioner or the aggrieved party and any member of the immediate family be protected in a government
habeas data and their corresponding interim reliefs (i.e., inspection order, production order and temporary agency or by an accredited person or private institution capable of keeping and securing their safety. If the
protection order) provided under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo and the Rule on the Writ of Habeas petitioner is an organization, association or institution referred to in Section 3(c) of this Rule, the protection
Data.56 may be extended to the officers involved.

In ascertaining whether the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in issuing its assailed Decision and The Supreme Court shall accredit the persons and private institutions that shall extend temporary
Resolution, the following issues must be resolved: protection to the petitioner or the aggrieved party and any member of the immediate family, in accordance
with guidelines which it shall issue.
I. Whether the interim reliefs prayed for by Rodriguez may be granted after the writs of amparo and habeas
data have already been issued in his favor. The accredited persons and private institutions shall comply with the rules and conditions that may be
imposed by the court, justice or judge.
II. Whether former President Arroyo should be dropped as a respondent on the basis of the presidential
immunity from suit. (a) Inspection Order. – The court, justice or judge, upon verified motion and after due hearing, may order
any person in possession or control of a designated land or other property, to permit entry for the purpose
III. Whether the doctrine of command responsibility can be used in amparo and habeas data cases. of inspecting, measuring, surveying, or photographing the property or any relevant object or operation
thereon.
IV. Whether the rights to life, liberty and property of Rodriguez were violated or threatened by respondents
in G.R. No. 191805. The motion shall state in detail the place or places to be inspected. It shall be supported by affidavits or
testimonies of witnesses having personal knowledge of the enforced disappearance or whereabouts of the
At the outset, it must be emphasized that the writs of amparo and habeas data were promulgated to ensure aggrieved party.
the protection of the people’s rights to life, liberty and security.57 The rules on these writs were issued in
light of the alarming prevalence of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. 58 The Rule on the Writ If the motion is opposed on the ground of national security or of the privileged nature of the information,
of Amparo took effect on 24 October 2007,59 and the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data on 2 February 2008.60 the court, justice or judge may conduct a hearing in chambers to determine the merit of the opposition.

The writ of amparo is an extraordinary and independent remedy that provides rapid judicial relief, as it
partakes of a summary proceeding that requires only substantial evidence to make the appropriate interim
and permanent reliefs available to the petitioner.61 It is not an action to determine criminal guilt requiring
proof beyond reasonable doubt, or liability for damages requiring preponderance of evidence, or
administrative responsibility requiring substantial evidence that will require full and exhaustive
proceedings.62 Rather, it serves both preventive and curative roles in addressing the problem of extrajudicial
killings and enforced disappearances.63 It is preventive in that it breaks the expectation of impunity in the
commission of these offenses, and it is curative in that it facilitates the subsequent punishment of
perpetrators by inevitably leading to subsequent investigation and action.64
Meanwhile, the writ of habeas data provides a judicial remedy to protect a person’s right to control
information regarding oneself, particularly in instances where such information is being collected through
unlawful means in order to achieve unlawful ends.65 As an independent and summary remedy to protect the
The movant must show that the inspection order is necessary to establish the right of the aggrieved party
alleged to be threatened or violated.
The inspection order shall specify the person or persons authorized to make the inspection and the date,
time, place and manner of making the inspection and may prescribe other conditions to protect the
constitutional rights of all parties. The order shall expire five (5) days after the date of its issuance, unless
extended for justifiable reasons.
(b) Production Order. – The court, justice, or judge, upon verified motion and after due hearing, may order
any person in possession, custody or control of any designated documents, papers, books, accounts, letters,
photographs, objects or tangible things, or objects in digitized or electronic form, which constitute or
contain evidence relevant to the petition or the return, to produce and permit their inspection, copying or
photographing by or on behalf of the movant.
The motion may be opposed on the ground of national security or of the privileged nature of the
information, in which case the court, justice or judge may conduct a hearing in chambers to determine the
merit of the opposition.
The court, justice or judge shall prescribe other conditions to protect the constitutional rights of all the
parties.
(c) Witness Protection Order. – The court, justice or judge, upon motion or motu proprio, may refer the
witnesses to the Department of Justice for admission to the Witness Protection, Security and Benefit
Program, pursuant to Republic Act No. 6981.
The court, justice or judge may also refer the witnesses to other government agencies, or to accredited
persons or private institutions capable of keeping and securing their safety. (Emphasis supplied)
We held in Yano v. Sanchez68 that "[t]hese provisional reliefs are intended to assist the court before it
arrives at a judicious determination of the amparo petition." Being interim reliefs, they can only be granted
before a final adjudication of the case is made. In any case, it must be underscored that the privilege of the
writ of amparo, once granted, necessarily entails the protection of the aggrieved party. Thus, since we grant
petitioner the privilege of the writ of amparo, there is no need to issue a temporary protection order
independently of the former. The order restricting respondents from going near Rodriguez is subsumed
under the privilege of the writ.
Second issue: Presidential immunity from suit
In Estrada v. Desierto,73 we clarified the doctrine that a non-sitting President does not enjoy immunity from
suit, even for acts committed during the latter’s tenure. We emphasize our ruling therein that courts should
look with disfavor upon the presidential privilege of immunity, especially when it impedes the search for
truth or impairs the vindication of a right, to wit:
We reject [Estrada’s] argument that he cannot be prosecuted for the reason that he must first be convicted
in the impeachment proceedings. The impeachment trial of petitioner Estrada was aborted by the walkout
of the prosecutors and by the events that led to his loss of the presidency. Indeed, on February 7, 2001, the
Senate passed Senate Resolution No. 83 "Recognizing that the Impeachment Court is Functus Officio." Since
the Impeachment Court is now functus officio, it is untenable for petitioner to demand that he should first
be impeached and then convicted before he can be prosecuted. The plea if granted, would put a perpetual
bar against his prosecution. Such a submission has nothing to commend itself for it will place him in a better
situation than a non-sitting President who has not been subjected to impeachment proceedings and yet can
be the object of a criminal prosecution. To be sure, the debates in the Constitutional Commission make it
clear that when impeachment proceedings have become moot due to the resignation of the President, the
proper criminal and civil cases may already be filed against him, viz:
"x x x xxx xxx
Mr. Aquino. On another point, if an impeachment proceeding has been filed against the President, for
example, and the President resigns before judgment of conviction has been rendered by the impeachment
court or by the body, how does it affect the impeachment proceeding? Will it be necessarily dropped?
Mr. Romulo. If we decide the purpose of impeachment to remove one from office, then his resignation
would render the case moot and academic. However, as the provision says, the criminal and civil aspects of
it may continue in the ordinary courts."

This is in accord with our ruling in In Re: Saturnino Bermudez that "incumbent Presidents are immune from
It bears stressing that since there is no determination of administrative, civil or criminal liability in amparo suit or from being brought to court during the period of their incumbency and tenure" but not beyond. xxx
and habeas data proceedings, courts can only go as far as ascertaining responsibility or accountability for
the enforced disappearance or extrajudicial killing. As we held in Razon v. Tagitis: 69
We now come to the scope of immunity that can be claimed by petitioner as a non-sitting President. The
cases filed against petitioner Estrada are criminal in character. They involve plunder, bribery and graft and
It does not determine guilt nor pinpoint criminal culpability for the disappearance; rather, it determines corruption. By no stretch of the imagination can these crimes, especially plunder which carries the death
responsibility, or at least accountability, for the enforced disappearance for purposes of imposing the penalty, be covered by the alleged mantle of immunity of a non-sitting president. Petitioner cannot cite any
appropriate remedies to address the disappearance. Responsibility refers to the extent the actors have been decision of this Court licensing the President to commit criminal acts and wrapping him with post-tenure
established by substantial evidence to have participated in whatever way, by action or omission, in an immunity from liability. It will be anomalous to hold that immunity is an inoculation from liability for
enforced disappearance, as a measure of the remedies this Court shall craft, among them, the directive to unlawful acts and omissions. The rule is that unlawful acts of public officials are not acts of the State and the
file the appropriate criminal and civil cases against the responsible parties in the proper courts. officer who acts illegally is not acting as such but stands in the same footing as any other trespasser.
Accountability, on the other hand, refers to the measure of remedies that should be addressed to those
who exhibited involvement in the enforced disappearance without bringing the level of their complicity to
the level of responsibility defined above; or who are imputed with knowledge relating to the enforced Indeed, a critical reading of current literature on executive immunity will reveal a judicial disinclination to
disappearance and who carry the burden of disclosure; or those who carry, but have failed to discharge, the expand the privilege especially when it impedes the search for truth or impairs the vindication of a right. In
burden of extraordinary diligence in the investigation of the enforced disappearance. In all these cases, the the 1974 case of US v. Nixon, US President Richard Nixon, a sitting President, was subpoenaed to produce
issuance of the Writ of Amparo is justified by our primary goal of addressing the disappearance, so that the certain recordings and documents relating to his conversations with aids and advisers. Seven advisers of
life of the victim is preserved and his liberty and security are restored.70 (Emphasis supplied.) President Nixon's associates were facing charges of conspiracy to obstruct justice and other offenses which
were committed in a burglary of the Democratic National Headquarters in Washington's Watergate Hotel
during the 1972 presidential campaign. President Nixon himself was named an unindicted co-conspirator.
71
Thus, in the case at bar, the Court of Appeals, in its Decision found respondents in G.R. No. 191805 – with President Nixon moved to quash the subpoena on the ground, among others, that the President was not
the exception of Calog, Palacpac or Harry – to be accountable for the violations of Rodriguez’s right to life, subject to judicial process and that he should first be impeached and removed from office before he could
liberty and security committed by the 17th Infantry Battalion, 5th Infantry Division of the Philippine be made amenable to judicial proceedings. The claim was rejected by the US Supreme Court. It concluded
Army. 72 The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition with respect to former President Arroyo on account of that "when the ground for asserting privilege as to subpoenaed materials sought for use in a criminal trial is
her presidential immunity from suit. Rodriguez contends, though, that she should remain a respondent in based only on the generalized interest in confidentiality, it cannot prevail over the fundamental demands of
this case to enable the courts to determine whether she is responsible or accountable therefor. In this due process of law in the fair administration of criminal justice." In the 1982 case of Nixon v. Fitzgerald, the
regard, it must be clarified that the Court of Appeals’ rationale for dropping her from the list of respondents US Supreme Court further held that the immunity of the President from civil damages covers only "official
no longer stands since her presidential immunity is limited only to her incumbency. acts." Recently, the US Supreme Court had the occasion to reiterate this doctrine in the case of Clinton v.
Jones where it held that the US President's immunity from suits for money damages arising out of their
official acts is inapplicable to unofficial conduct.74 (Emphasis supplied)
Further, in our Resolution in Estrada v. Desierto,75 we reiterated that the presidential immunity from suit
exists only in concurrence with the president’s incumbency:
Petitioner, however, fails to distinguish between term and tenure. The term means the time during which
the officer may claim to hold the office as of right, and fixes the interval after which the several incumbents
shall succeed one another. The tenure represents the term during which the incumbent actually holds
office. The tenure may be shorter than the term for reasons within or beyond the power of the incumbent.
From the deliberations, the intent of the framers is clear that the immunity of the president from suit is
concurrent only with his tenure and not his term.76 (Emphasis supplied)

Petitioner stubbornly clings to the contention that he is entitled to absolute immunity from suit. His
arguments are merely recycled and we need not prolong the longevity of the debate on the subject. In our Applying the foregoing rationale to the case at bar, it is clear that former President Arroyo cannot use the
Decision, we exhaustively traced the origin of executive immunity in our jurisdiction and its bends and turns presidential immunity from suit to shield herself from judicial scrutiny that would assess whether, within the
up to the present time. We held that given the intent of the 1987 Constitution to breathe life to the policy context of amparo proceedings, she was responsible or accountable for the abduction of Rodriguez.
that a public office is a public trust, the petitioner, as a non-sitting President, cannot claim executive
immunity for his alleged criminal acts committed while a sitting President. Petitioner's rehashed arguments Third issue: Command responsibility in amparo proceedings
including their thinly disguised new spins are based on the rejected contention that he is still President,
albeit, a President on leave. His stance that his immunity covers his entire term of office or until June 30,To attribute responsibility or accountability to former President Arroyo, Rodriguez contends that the
2004 disregards the reality that he has relinquished the presidency and there is now a new de jure doctrine of command responsibility may be applied. As we explained in Rubrico v. Arroyo, 77 command
President. responsibility pertains to the "responsibility of commanders for crimes committed by subordinate members
of the armed forces or other persons subject to their control in international wars or domestic
Petitioner goes a step further and avers that even a non-sitting President enjoys immunity from suit during conflict."78 Although originally used for ascertaining criminal complicity, the command responsibility
his term of office. He buttresses his position with the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, viz: doctrine has also found application in civil cases for human rights abuses.79 In the United States, for
example, command responsibility was used in Ford v. Garcia and Romagoza v. Garcia – civil actions filed
"Mr. Suarez. Thank you. under the Alien Tort Claims Act and the Torture Victim Protection Act.80 This development in the use of
command responsibility in civil proceedings shows that the application of this doctrine has been liberally
extended even to cases not criminal in nature. Thus, it is our view that command responsibility may likewise
The last question is with reference to the Committee's omitting in the draft proposal the immunity provision find application in proceedings seeking the privilege of the writ of amparo. As we held in Rubrico:
for the President. I agree with Commissioner Nolledo that the Committee did very well in striking out this
second sentence, at the very least, of the original provision on immunity from suit under the 1973
Constitution. But would the Committee members not agree to a restoration of at least the first sentence It may plausibly be contended that command responsibility, as legal basis to hold military/police
that the president shall be immune from suit during his tenure, considering that if we do not provide him commanders liable for extra-legal killings, enforced disappearances, or threats, may be made applicable to
that kind of an immunity, he might be spending all his time facing litigations, as the President-in-exile in this jurisdiction on the theory that the command responsibility doctrine now constitutes a principle of
Hawaii is now facing litigations almost daily? international law or customary international law in accordance with the incorporation clause of the
Constitution.

Fr. Bernas:
xxx xxx xxx

The reason for the omission is that we consider it understood in present jurisprudence that during his
tenure he is immune from suit. If command responsibility were to be invoked and applied to these proceedings, it should, at most, be only
to determine the author who, at the first instance, is accountable for, and has the duty to address, the
disappearance and harassments complained of, so as to enable the Court to devise remedial measures that
Mr. Suarez: may be appropriate under the premises to protect rights covered by the writ of amparo. As intimated
earlier, however, the determination should not be pursued to fix criminal liability on respondents
So there is no need to express it here. preparatory to criminal prosecution, or as a prelude to administrative disciplinary proceedings under
existing administrative issuances, if there be any.81 (Emphasis supplied.)
Fr. Bernas:
Precisely in the case at bar, the doctrine of command responsibility may be used to determine whether
There is no need. It was that way before. The only innovation made by the 1973 Constitution was to make respondents are accountable for and have the duty to address the abduction of Rodriguez in order to enable
that explicit and to add other things. the courts to devise remedial measures to protect his rights. Clearly, nothing precludes this Court from
applying the doctrine of command responsibility in amparo proceedings to ascertain responsibility and
accountability in extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. In this regard, the Separate Opinion of
Mr. Suarez: Justice Conchita Carpio-Morales in Rubrico is worth noting, thus:

On the understanding, I will not press for any more query, madam President. That proceedings under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo do not determine criminal, civil or administrative
liability should not abate the applicability of the doctrine of command responsibility. Taking Secretary of
I thank the Commissioner for the clarification." National Defense v. Manalo and Razon v. Tagitis in proper context, they do not preclude the application of
the doctrine of command responsibility to Amparo cases.
Manalo was actually emphatic on the importance of the right to security of person and its contemporary In other words, command responsibility may be loosely applied in amparo cases in order to identify those
signification as a guarantee of protection of one’s rights by the government. It further stated that protection accountable individuals that have the power to effectively implement whatever processes an amparo court
includes conducting effective investigations, organization of the government apparatus to extend protection would issue. In such application, the amparo court does not impute criminal responsibility but merely
to victims of extralegal killings or enforced disappearances, or threats thereof, and/or their families, and pinpoint the superiors it considers to be in the best position to protect the rights of the aggrieved party.
bringing offenders to the bar of justice.
Such identification of the responsible and accountable superiors may well be a preliminary determination of
Tagitis, on the other hand, cannot be more categorical on the application, at least in principle, of the criminal liability which, of course, is still subject to further investigation by the appropriate government
doctrine of command responsibility: agency. (Emphasis supplied.)

Given their mandates, the PNP and PNP-CIDG officials and members were the ones who were remiss in their As earlier pointed out, amparo proceedings determine (a) responsibility, or the extent the actors have been
duties when the government completely failed to exercise the extraordinary diligence that the Amparo Rule established by substantial evidence to have participated in whatever way, by action or omission, in an
requires. We hold these organizations accountable through their incumbent Chiefs who, under this enforced disappearance, and (b) accountability, or the measure of remedies that should be addressed to
Decision, shall carry the personal responsibility of seeing to it that extraordinary diligence, in the manner those (i) who exhibited involvement in the enforced disappearance without bringing the level of their
the Amparo Rule requires, is applied in addressing the enforced disappearance of Tagitis. complicity to the level of responsibility defined above; or (ii) who are imputed with knowledge relating to
the enforced disappearance and who carry the burden of disclosure; or (iii) those who carry, but have failed
Neither does Republic Act No. 9851 emasculate the applicability of the command responsibility doctrine to to discharge, the burden of extraordinary diligence in the investigation of the enforced disappearance. Thus,
Amparo cases. The short title of the law is the "Philippine Act on Crimes Against International Humanitarian although there is no determination of criminal, civil or administrative liabilities, the doctrine of command
Law, Genocide, and Other Crimes Against Humanity." Obviously, it should, as it did, only treat of superior responsibility may nevertheless be applied to ascertain responsibility and accountability within these
responsibility as a ground for criminal responsibility for the crimes foregoing definitions.
covered.http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/feb2010/gr_183871_2010.html - fnt20cm Such limited
treatment, however, is merely in keeping with the statute’s purpose and not intended to rule out the a. Command responsibility of the President
application of the doctrine of command responsibility to other appropriate cases.
Having established the applicability of the doctrine of command responsibility in amparo proceedings, it
Indeed, one can imagine the innumerable dangers of insulating high-ranking military and police officers must now be resolved whether the president, as commander-in-chief of the military, can be held
from the coverage of reliefs available under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo. The explicit adoption of the responsible or accountable for extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. We rule in the affirmative.
doctrine of command responsibility in the present case will only bring Manalo and Tagitis to their logical
conclusion. To hold someone liable under the doctrine of command responsibility, the following elements must obtain:

In fine, I submit that the Court should take this opportunity to state what the law ought to be if it truly a. the existence of a superior-subordinate relationship between the accused as superior and the perpetrator
wants to make the Writ of Amparo an effective remedy for victims of extralegal killings and enforced of the crime as his subordinate;
disappearances or threats thereof. While there is a genuine dearth of evidence to hold respondents Gen.
Hermogenes Esperon and P/Dir. Gen. Avelino Razon accountable under the command responsibility
doctrine, the ponencia’s hesitant application of the doctrine itself is replete with implications abhorrent to b. the superior knew or had reason to know that the crime was about to be or had been committed; and
the rationale behind the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.82 (Emphasis supplied.)
c. the superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent the criminal acts or punish
84
This Separate Opinion was reiterated in the recently decided case of Boac v. Cadapan,83 likewise penned by the perpetrators thereof.
Justice Carpio-Morales, wherein this Court ruled:
The president, being the commander-in-chief of all armed forces,85 necessarily possesses control over the
Rubrico categorically denies the application of command responsibility in amparo cases to determine military that qualifies him as a superior within the purview of the command responsibility doctrine. 86
criminal liability. The Court maintains its adherence to this pronouncement as far as amparo cases are
concerned. On the issue of knowledge, it must be pointed out that although international tribunals apply a strict
standard of knowledge, i.e., actual knowledge, such may nonetheless be established through circumstantial
Rubrico, however, recognizes a preliminary yet limited application of command responsibility in amparo evidence.87 In the Philippines, a more liberal view is adopted and superiors may be charged with
cases to instances of determining the responsible or accountable individuals or entities that are duty-bound constructive knowledge. This view is buttressed by the enactment of Executive Order No. 226, otherwise
to abate any transgression on the life, liberty or security of the aggrieved party. known as the Institutionalization of the Doctrine of ‘Command Responsibility’ in all Government Offices,
particularly at all Levels of Command in the Philippine National Police and other Law Enforcement Agencies
(E.O. 226).88 Under E.O. 226, a government official may be held liable for neglect of duty under the doctrine
If command responsibility were to be invoked and applied to these proceedings, it should, at most, be only of command responsibility if he has knowledge that a crime or offense shall be committed, is being
to determine the author who, at the first instance, is accountable for, and has the duty to address, the committed, or has been committed by his subordinates, or by others within his area of responsibility and,
disappearance and harassments complained of, so as to enable the Court to devise remedial measures that despite such knowledge, he did not take preventive or corrective action either before, during, or
may be appropriate under the premises to protect rights covered by the writ of amparo. As intimated immediately after its commission.89 Knowledge of the commission of irregularities, crimes or offenses is
earlier, however, the determination should not be pursued to fix criminal liability on respondents presumed when (a) the acts are widespread within the government official’s area of jurisdiction; (b) the acts
preparatory to criminal prosecution, or as a prelude to administrative disciplinary proceedings under have been repeatedly or regularly committed within his area of responsibility; or (c) members of his
existing administrative issuances, if there be any. immediate staff or office personnel are involved. 90
Meanwhile, as to the issue of failure to prevent or punish, it is important to note that as the commander-in- More particularly, the fact of Rodriguez’s abduction was corroborated by Carlos in his Sinumpaang Salaysay
chief of the armed forces, the president has the power to effectively command, control and discipline the dated 16 September 2009,99 wherein he recounted in detail the circumstances surrounding the victim’s
military.91 capture.

b. Responsibility or accountability of former President Arroyo As regards the allegation of torture, the respective Certifications of Dr. Ramil and Dr. Pamugas validate the
physical maltreatment Rodriguez suffered in the hands of the soldiers of the 17th Infantry Battalion, 5th
100
The next question that must be tackled is whether Rodriguez has proven through substantial evidence that Infantry Division. According to the Certification dated 12 October 2009 executed by Dr. Ramil, she
former President Arroyo is responsible or accountable for his abduction. We rule in the negative. examined Rodriguez in the Alfonso Ponce Enrile Memorial District Hospital on 16 September 2009 and
arrived at the following findings:

Rodriguez anchors his argument on a general allegation that on the basis of the "Melo Commission" and the
"Alston Report," respondents in G.R. No. 191805 already had knowledge of and information on, and should FACE
have known that a climate of enforced disappearances had been perpetrated on members of the
NPA.92 Without even attaching, or at the very least, quoting these reports, Rodriguez contends that the - 10cm healed scar face right side
Melo Report points to rogue military men as the perpetrators. While the Alston Report states that there is a
policy allowing enforced disappearances and pins the blame on the President, we do not automatically - 2cm healed scar right eyebrow (lateral area)
impute responsibility to former President Arroyo for each and every count of forcible disappearance. 93 Aside
from Rodriguez’s general averments, there is no piece of evidence that could establish her responsibility or
accountability for his abduction. Neither was there even a clear attempt to show that she should have - 2cm healed scar right eye brow (median area)
known about the violation of his right to life, liberty or security, or that she had failed to investigate, punish
or prevent it. - 4cm x 2cm hematoma anterior chest at the sternal area right side

Fourth issue: Responsibility or accountability of respondents in G.R. No. 191805 - 3cm x 2cm hematoma sternal area left side

The doctrine of totality of evidence in amparo cases was first laid down in this Court’s ruling in Razon, 94 to - 6cm x 1cm hematoma from epigastric area to ant. chest left side
wit:
- 6cm x 1cm hematoma from epigastric area to ant. chest right side
The fair and proper rule, to our mind, is to consider all the pieces of evidence adduced in their totality, and
to consider any evidence otherwise inadmissible under our usual rules to be admissible if it is consistent - Multiple healed rashes (brownish discoloration) both forearm
with the admissible evidence adduced. In other words, we reduce our rules to the most basic test of reason
– i.e., to the relevance of the evidence to the issue at hand and its consistency with all other pieces of
adduced evidence. Thus, even hearsay evidence can be admitted if it satisfies this basic minimum - Multiple healed rashes (brownish discoloration)
test.95 (Emphasis supplied.)
- both leg arm
In the case at bar, we find no reason to depart from the factual findings of the Court of Appeals, the same
being supported by substantial evidence. A careful examination of the records of this case reveals that the - hip area/lumbar area101
totality of the evidence adduced by Rodriguez indubitably prove the responsibility and accountability of
some respondents in G.R. No. 191805 for violating his right to life, liberty and security.
Dr. Pamugas performed a separate medical examination of Rodriguez on 19 September 2009, the results of
which confirmed that the injuries suffered by the latter were inflicted through torture. Dr. Pamugas thus
a. The totality of evidence proved by substantial evidence the responsibility or accountability of respondents issued a Medical Report dated 23 September 2009,102 explicitly stating that Rodriguez had been tortured
for the violation of or threat to Rodriguez’s right to life, liberty and security. during his detention by the military, to wit:

After a careful examination of the records of these cases, we are convinced that the Court of Appeals X. Interpretation of Findings
correctly found sufficient evidence proving that the soldiers of the 17th Infantry Battalion, 5th Infantry
Division of the military abducted Rodriguez on 6 September 2009, and detained and tortured him until 17
The above physical and psychological findings sustained by the subject are related to the torture and ill-
September 2009.
treatment done to him. The multiple circular brown to dark brown spots found on both legs and arms were
due to the insect bites that he sustained when he was forced to join twice in the military operations. The
Rodriguez’s Sinumpaang Salaysay dated 4 December 2009 was a meticulous and straightforward account of abrasions could also be due to the conditions related during military operations. The multiple pin-point
his horrific ordeal with the military, detailing the manner in which he was captured and maltreated on blood spots found on his left ear is a result of an unknown object placed inside his left ear. The areas of
account of his suspected membership in the NPA.96 His narration of his suffering included an exhaustive tenderness he felt during the physical examination were due to the overwhelming punching and kicking on
description of his physical surroundings, personal circumstances and perceived observations. He likewise his body. The occasional difficulty of sleeping is a symptom experience (sic) by the subject as a result of the
positively identified respondents 1st Lt. Matutina and Lt. Col. Mina to be present during his abduction, psychological trauma he encountered during his detention.
detention and torture,97 and respondents Cruz, Pasicolan and Callagan as the CHR representatives who
appeared during his release.98
XI. Conclusions and Recommendations 27. Na sinabihan kami ni Lt. Col. Mina na baka pwedeng maiwan pa ng dalwang linggo ang aking kapatid sa
kanila para raw ma-train sya.
The physical injuries and psychological trauma suffered by the subject are secondary to the torture and ill-
treatment done to him while in detention for about 11 days. The physical injuries sustained by the subject, 28. Na hindi kami pumayag ng aking nanay; xxx107
of which the age is compatible with the alleged date of infliction (sic).103 (Emphasis supplied.)
Moreover, the Court of Appeals likewise aptly pointed out the illogical, if not outrightly contradictory,
In assessing the weight of the Certifications, the Court of Appeals correctly relied on the medical finding that contention of respondents in G.R. No. 191805 that while Rodriguez had complained of his exhaustion from
the injuries suffered by Rodriguez matched his account of the maltreatment inflicted on him by the soldiers his activities as a member of the CPP-NPA, he nevertheless willingly volunteered to return to his life in the
of the 17th Infantry Battalion, 5th Infantry Division of the Philippine Army. Further, the kind of injuries he NPA to become a double-agent for the military. The lower court ruled in this manner:
sustained showed that he could not have sustained them from merely falling, thus making respondents’
claim highly implausible. In the Return of the Writ, respondent AFP members alleged that petitioner confided to his military handler,
Cpl. Navarro, that petitioner could no longer stand the hardships he experienced in the wilderness, and that
Despite these medical findings that overwhelmingly supported and lent credibility to the allegations of he wanted to become an ordinary citizen again because of the empty promises of the CPP-NPA. However, in
Rodriguez in his Sinumpaang Salaysay, respondents in G.R. No. 191805 still stubbornly clung to their the same Return, respondents state that petitioner agreed to become a double agent for the military and
argument that he was neither abducted nor detained. Rather, they claimed that he was a double agent, wanted to re-enter the CPP-NPA, so that he could get information regarding the movement directly from
whose relationship with the military was at all times congenial. This contention cannot be sustained, as it is the source. If petitioner was tired of life in the wilderness and desired to become an ordinary citizen again, it
far removed from ordinary human experience. defies logic that he would agree to become an undercover agent and work alongside soldiers in the
mountains – or the wilderness he dreads – to locate the hideout of his alleged NPA comrades.108 (Emphasis
If it were true that Rodriguez maintained amicable relations with the military, then he should have supplied.)
unhesitatingly assured his family on 17 September 2009 that he was among friends. Instead, he vigorously
pleaded with them to get him out of the military facility. In fact, in the Sinumpaang Salaysay dated 4 Furthermore, the appellate court also properly ruled that aside from the abduction, detention and torture
December 2009104 Wilma executed, she made the following averments: of Rodriguez, respondents, specifically 1st Lt. Matutina, had violated and threatened the former’s right to
security when they made a visual recording of his house, as well as the photos of his relatives, to wit:
18. Na nang Makita ko ang aking anak ay nakaramdam ako sa kanya ng awa dahil sa mukha syang pagod at
malaki ang kanyang ipinayat. In the videos taken by the soldiers – one of whom was respondent Matutina – in the house of petitioner on
September 18, 2009, the soldiers even went as far as taking videos of the photos of petitioner’s relatives
19. Na niyakap ko sya at sa aming pagkakayakap ay binulungan nya ako na wag ko syang iiwan sa lugar na hung on the wall of the house, as well as videos of the innermost part of the house. This Court notes that
iyon; 1Lt. Matutina, by taking the said videos, did not merely intend to make proofs of the safe arrival of
petitioner and his family in their home. 1Lt. Matutina also desired to instill fear in the minds of petitioner
and his family by showing them that the sanctity of their home, from then on, will not be free from the
xxx xxx xxx watchful eyes of the military, permanently captured through the medium of a seemingly innocuous
cellhpone video camera. The Court cannot – and will not – condone such act, as it intrudes into the very
23. Na sinabihan ako ng mga sundalo na kung pwede daw ay maiwan muna ng dalawang linggo sa kampo core of petitioner’s right to security guaranteed by the fundamental law.109 (Emphasis supplied.)
ako at si Noriel para daw matrain pa si Noriel sa loob ng kampo;
Taken in their totality, the pieces of evidence adduced by Rodriguez, as well as the contradictory defenses
24. Na hindi ako pumayag na maiwan ang aking anak; presented by respondents in G.R. No. 191805, give credence to his claim that he had been abducted,
detained and tortured by soldiers belonging to the 17th Infantry Battalion, 5th Infantry Division of the
xxx xxx xxx military.

33. Na sa kasalukuhan, hanggang ngayon ay nag-aalala pa ako sa paa (sic) sa kaligtasan ng aming buong
pamilya, lalo na kay Noriel; xxx105
Also, Rodel made the following supporting averments in his Sinumpaang Salaysay dated 3 December
2009:106
24. Na nang makita ko si Noriel, hindi sya makalakad ng diretso, hinang-hina sya, malaki ang ipinayat at
nanlalalim ang mga mata;
25. Na nang makita ko ang aking kapatid ay nakaramdam ako ng awa dahil nakilala ko syang masigla at
masayahin;
26. Na ilang minuto lang ay binulugan nya ako ng "Kuya, ilabas mo ako dito, papatayin nila ako."
It must be pointed out, however, that as to respondents Cruz, Pasicolan and Callagan, there was no
substantial evidence to show that they violated, or threatened with violation, Rodriguez’s right to life,
liberty and security. Despite the dearth of evidence to show the CHR officers’ responsibility or
accountability, this Court nonetheless emphasizes its criticism as regards their capacity to recognize torture
or any similar form of abuse. The CHR, being constitutionally mandated to protect human rights and
investigate violations thereof,110 should ensure that its officers are well-equipped to respond effectively to
and address human rights violations. The actuations of respondents unmistakably showed their insufficient
competence in facilitating and ensuring the safe release of Rodriguez after his ordeal.
b. The failure to conduct a fair and effect investigation amounted to a violation of or threat to Rodriguez’s
rights to life, liberty and security.
The Rule on the Writ of Amparo explicitly states that the violation of or threat to the right to life, liberty and
security may be caused by either an act or an omission of a public official.111 Moreover, in the context of
amparo proceedings, responsibility may refer to the participation of the respondents, by action or omission, In this case, respondents Ibrado, Verzosa, Bangit, Tolentino, Santos, De Vera, and Mina are accountable, for
in enforced disappearance.112 Accountability, on the other hand, may attach to respondents who are while they were charged with the investigation of the subject incident, the investigation they conducted
imputed with knowledge relating to the enforced disappearance and who carry the burden of disclosure; or and/or relied on is superficial and one-sided. The records disclose that the military, in investigating the
those who carry, but have failed to discharge, the burden of extraordinary diligence in the investigation of incident complained of, depended on the Comprehensive Report of Noriel Rodriguez @Pepito prepared by
the enforced disappearance.113 1Lt. Johnny Calub for the Commanding Officer of the 501st Infantry Brigade, 5th Infantry Division, Philippine
Army. Such report, however, is merely based on the narration of the military. No efforts were undertaken to
114
In this regard, we emphasize our ruling in Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo that the right to solicit petitioner’s version of the subject incident and no witnesses were questioned regarding the alleged
security of a person includes the positive obligation of the government to ensure the observance of the duty abduction of petitioner.
to investigate, viz:
Respondent PDG Verzosa, as Chief of the PNP, is accountable because Section 24 of Republic Act No. 6975,
Third, the right to security of person is a guarantee of protection of one's rights by the government. In the otherwise known as the "PNP Law," specifies the PNP as the governmental office with the mandate "to
context of the writ of Amparo, this right is built into the guarantees of the right to life and liberty under investigate and prevent crimes, effect the arrest of criminal offenders, bring offenders to justice and assist
Article III, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution and the right to security of person (as freedom from threat and in their prosecution." In this case, PDG Verzosa failed to order the police to conduct the necessary
guarantee of bodily and psychological integrity) under Article III, Section 2. The right to security of person in investigation to unmask the mystery surrounding petitioner’s abduction and disappearance. Instead, PDG
this third sense is a corollary of the policy that the State "guarantees full respect for human rights" under Verzosa disclaims accountability by merely stating that petitioner has no cause of action against him.
Article II, Section 11 of the 1987 Constitution. As the government is the chief guarantor of order and Palpable, however, is the lack of any effort on the part of PDG Verzosa to effectively and aggressively
security, the Constitutional guarantee of the rights to life, liberty and security of person is rendered investigate the violations of petitioner’s right to life, liberty and security by members of the 17th Infantry
116
ineffective if government does not afford protection to these rights especially when they are under threat. Battalion, 17th Infantry Division, Philippine Army. (Emphasis supplied.)
Protection includes conducting effective investigations, organization of the government apparatus to extend
protection to victims of extralegal killings or enforced disappearances (or threats thereof) and/or their Clearly, the absence of a fair and effective official investigation into the claims of Rodriguez violated his right
families, and bringing offenders to the bar of justice. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights stressed the to security, for which respondents in G.R. No. 191805 must be held responsible or accountable.
importance of investigation in the Velasquez Rodriguez Case, viz:
Nevertheless, it must be clarified that Rodriguez was unable to establish any responsibility or accountability
(The duty to investigate) must be undertaken in a serious manner and not as a mere formality preordained on the part of respondents P/CSupt. Tolentino, P/SSupt. Santos, Calog and Palacpac. Respondent P/CSupt.
to be ineffective. An investigation must have an objective and be assumed by the State as its own legal duty, Tolentino had already retired when the abduction and torture of Rodriguez was perpetrated, while P/SSupt.
not as a step taken by private interests that depends upon the initiative of the victim or his family or upon Santos had already been reassigned and transferred to the National Capital Regional Police Office six
their offer of proof, without an effective search for the truth by the government. months before the subject incident occurred. Meanwhile, no sufficient allegations were maintained against
respondents Calog and Palacpac.
xxx xxx xxx
From all the foregoing, we rule that Rodriguez was successful in proving through substantial evidence that
Similarly, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) has interpreted the "right to security" not only as respondents Gen. Ibrado, PDG. Verzosa, Lt. Gen. Bangit, Maj. Gen. Ochoa, Brig. Gen. De Vera, 1st Lt.
prohibiting the State from arbitrarily depriving liberty, but imposing a positive duty on the State to afford Matutina, and Lt. Col. Mina were responsible and accountable for the violation of Rodriguez’s rights to life,
protection of the right to liberty. The ECHR interpreted the "right to security of person" under Article 5(1) of liberty and security on the basis of (a) his abduction, detention and torture from 6 September to 17
the European Convention of Human Rights in the leading case on disappearance of persons, Kurt v. Turkey. September 2009, and (b) the lack of any fair and effective official investigation as to his allegations. Thus,
In this case, the claimant's son had been arrested by state authorities and had not been seen since. The the privilege of the writs of amparo and habeas data must be granted in his favor. As a result, there is no
family's requests for information and investigation regarding his whereabouts proved futile. The claimant longer any need to issue a temporary protection order, as the privilege of these writs already has the effect
suggested that this was a violation of her son's right to security of person. The ECHR ruled, viz: of enjoining respondents in G.R. No. 191805 from violating his rights to life, liberty and security.

... any deprivation of liberty must not only have been effected in conformity with the substantive and It is also clear from the above discussion that despite (a) maintaining former President Arroyo in the list of
procedural rules of national law but must equally be in keeping with the very purpose of Article 5, namely to respondents in G.R. No. 191805, and (b) allowing the application of the command responsibility doctrine to
protect the individual from arbitrariness... Having assumed control over that individual it is incumbent on amparo and habeas data proceedings, Rodriguez failed to prove through substantial evidence that former
the authorities to account for his or her whereabouts. For this reason, Article 5 must be seen as requiring President Arroyo was responsible or accountable for the violation of his rights to life, liberty and property.
the authorities to take effective measures to safeguard against the risk of disappearance and to conduct a He likewise failed to prove through substantial evidence the accountability or responsibility of respondents
prompt effective investigation into an arguable claim that a person has been taken into custody and has not Maj. Gen. Ochoa, Cruz, Pasicolan and Callagan.
been seen since.115 (Emphasis supplied)
WHEREFORE, we resolve to GRANT the Petition for Partial Review in G.R. No. 191805 and DENY the Petition
In the instant case, this Court rules that respondents in G.R. No. 191805 are responsible or accountable for for Review in G.R. No. 193160. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED WITH
the violation of Rodriguez’s right to life, liberty and security on account of their abject failure to conduct a MODIFICATION.
fair and effective official investigation of his ordeal in the hands of the military. Respondents Gen. Ibrado,
PDG. Verzosa, Lt. Gen. Bangit, Maj. Gen. Ochoa, Col. De Vera and Lt. Col. Mina only conducted a perfunctory The case is dismissed with respect to respondents former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, P/CSupt.
investigation, exerting no efforts to take Ramirez’s account of the events into consideration. Rather, these Ameto G. Tolentino, and P/SSupt. Jude W. Santos, Calog, George Palacpac, Antonio Cruz, Aldwin Pasicolan
respondents solely relied on the reports and narration of the military. The ruling of the appellate court must and Vicent Callagan for lack of merit.
be emphasized:
This Court directs the Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman) and the Department of Justice (DOJ) to take
the appropriate action with respect to any possible liability or liabilities, within their respective legal
competence, that may have been incurred by respondents Gen. Victor Ibrado, PDG. Jesus Verzosa, Lt. Gen.
Delfin Bangit, Maj. Gen. Nestor Ochoa, Brig. Gen. Remegio De Vera, 1st Lt. Ryan Matutina, and Lt. Col.
Laurence Mina. The Ombudsman and the DOJ are ordered to submit to this Court the results of their action
within a period of six months from receipt of this Decision.
Before this Court are two consolidated cases, namely, (1) Petition for Partial Review on Certiorari dated 20
April 2010 (G.R. No. 191805), and (2) Petition for Review on Certiorari dated 19 August 2010 (G.R. No.
193160).1 Both Petitions assail the 12 April 2010 Decision of the Court of Appeals, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition for writ of amparo and writ of habeas data is GRANTED.

In the event that herein respondents no longer occupy their respective posts, the directives mandated in
this Decision and in the Court of Appeals are enforceable against the incumbent officials holding the
relevant positions. Failure to comply with the foregoing shall constitute contempt of court.
SO ORDERED.
Respondents Gen. Victor S. Ibrado, Lt. Gen. Delfin Bangit, Maj. Gen. Nestor Z. Ochoa, PCSupt. Ameto G.
Tolentino, PSSupt. Jude W. Santos, Col. Remigio M. De Vera, Lt. Col. Laurence E. Mina and 1Lt. Ryan S.
Matutina, or their replacements in their official posts if they have already vacated the same, are ORDERED
to furnish this Court within five (5) days from notice of this decision, official or unofficial reports pertaining
to petitioner – covering but not limited to intelligence reports, operation reports and provost marshal
reports prior to, during and subsequent to September 6, 2009 – made by the 5th Infantry Division,
Philippine Army, its branches and subsidiaries, including the 17th Infantry Battalion, Philippine Army.

The above-named respondents are also DIRECTED to refrain from using the said reports in any transaction
or operation of the military. Necessarily, the afore-named respondents are ORDERED to expunge from the
records of the military all documents having any reference to petitioner.

Likewise, the afore-named respondents, as well as respondents Police Director General Jesus Ame Versoza,
Antonio Cruz, Aldwin Pasicolan and Vicente Callagan are DIRECTED to ensure that no further violation of
petitioner’s rights to life, liberty and security is committed against the latter or any member of his family.

The petition is DISMISSED with respect to President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo on account of her presidential
immunity from suit. Similarly, the petition is DISMISSED with respect to respondents Calog and George
Palacpac or Harry for lack of merit.
G.R. No. 191805 November 15, 2011
Petitioner’s prayer for issuance of a temporary protection order and inspection order is DENIED.
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE WRIT OF AMPARO AND HABEAS DATA IN FAVOR OF NORIEL H.
RODRIGUEZ, NORIEL H. RODRIGUEZ, Petitioner, Noriel Rodriguez (Rodriguez) is petitioner in G.R. No. 191805 and respondent in G.R. No. 193160. He is a
vs. member of Alyansa Dagiti Mannalon Iti Cagayan (Kagimungan), a peasant organization affiliated with
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, GEN. VICTOR S. IBRADO, PDG JESUS AME VERSOZA, LT. GEN. DELFIN BANGIT, Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (KMP).
MAJ. GEN. NESTOR Z. OCHOA, P/CSUPT. AMETO G. TOLENTINO, P/SSUPT. JUDE W. SANTOS, COL. REMIGIO
M. DE VERA, an officer named MATUTINA, LT. COL. MINA, CALOG, GEORGE PALACPAC under the name On the other hand, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (former President Arroyo), Police Director General (PDG.) Jesus
"HARRY," ANTONIO CRUZ, ALDWIN "BONG" PASICOLAN and VINCENT CALLAGAN, Respondents. A. Verzosa, Police Senior Superintendent (P/SSupt.) Jude W. Santos, Brigadier General (Brig. Gen.) Remegio
M. De Vera, First Lieutenant (1st Lt.) Ryan S. Matutina, Lieutenant Colonel (Lt. Col.) Laurence E. Mina,
x------------------------x Antonio C. Cruz (Cruz), Aldwin C. Pasicolan (Pasicolan) and Vicente A. Callagan (Callagan) are respondents in
G.R. No. 191805 and petitioners in G.R. No. 193160. At the time the events relevant to the present Petitions
G.R. No. 193160 occurred, former President Arroyo was the President of the Philippines. PDG. Verzosa, P/SSupt. Santos, Brig.
Gen. De Vera, 1st Lt. Matutina and Lt. Col. Mina were officers of the Philippine National Police (PNP). Cruz,
Pasicolan and Callagan were Special Investigators of the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) in Region II.
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE WRIT OF AMPARO AND HABEAS DATA IN FAVOR OF NORIEL H.
RODRIGUEZ, POLICE DIR. GEN. JESUS A. VERSOZA, P/SSUPT. JUDE W. SANTOS, BGEN. REMEGIO M. DE VERA,
1st LT. RYAN S. MATUTINA, LT. COL. LAURENCE E. MINA, ANTONIO C. CRUZ, ALDWIN C. PASICOLAN and Antecedent Facts
VICENTE A. CALLAGAN, Petitioners,
vs. Rodriguez claims that the military tagged KMP as an enemy of the State under the Oplan Bantay Laya,
NORIEL H. RODRIGUEZ, Respondent. making its members targets of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances.2

DECISION On 6 September 2009, at 5:00 p.m., Rodriguez had just reached Barangay Tapel, Cagayan onboard a tricycle
driven by Hermie Antonio Carlos (Carlos), when four men forcibly took him and forced him into a car. Inside
SERENO, J.: the vehicle were several men in civilian clothes, one of whom was holding a .45 caliber pistol. Subsequently,
three more persons arrived, and one of them carried a gun at his side. Two men boarded the car, while the
others rode on the tricycle.3
The men tied the hands of Rodriguez, ordered him to lie on his stomach, sat on his back and started that the soldiers did not shoot him because he became a military asset in May. When he refused to sign the
punching him. The car travelled towards the direction of Sta. Teresita-Mission and moved around the area document, he received another beating. Thus, he was compelled to sign, but did so using a different
until about 2:00 a.m. During the drive, the men forced Rodriguez to confess to being a member of the New signature to show that he was merely coerced.11
People’s Army (NPA), but he remained silent. The car then entered a place that appeared to be a military
camp. There were soldiers all over the area, and there was a banner with the word "Bravo" written on it. The soldiers showed Rodriguez photographs of different persons and asked him if he knew the men
Rodriguez later on learned that the camp belonged to the 17th Infantry Battalion of the Philippine Army.4 appearing therein. When he told them that he did not recognize the individuals on the photos, the soldiers
instructed him to write down the name of his school and organization, but he declined. The soldiers then
Rodriguez was brought to a canteen, where six men confronted him, ordering him to confess to his wrote something on the paper, making it appear that he was the one who had written it, and forced him to
membership in the NPA. Due to his exhaustion, he unintentionally fell asleep. As a result, the men hit him sign the document. The soldiers took photographs of him while he was signing. Afterwards, the soldiers
on the head to wake him up. After the interrogation, two of the men guarded him, but did not allow him to forced him down, held his hands, and sat on his feet. He did not only receive another beating, but was also
sleep.5 electrocuted. The torture lasted for about an hour.12

In the morning of 7 September 2009, the men tied the hands of Rodriguez, blindfolded him and made him At 11:00 p.m. on 15 September 2009, the soldiers brought Rodriguez to a military operation in the
board a vehicle. While they were in transit, the soldiers repeatedly hit him in the head and threatened to kill mountains, where he saw Matutina again. They all spent the night there.13
him. When the car stopped after about ten minutes, the soldiers brought him to a room, removed his
blindfold, and forced him to confess to being a member of the NPA. During the interrogation, the soldiers In the morning of 16 September 2009, the soldiers and Rodriguez started their descent. When they stopped,
repeatedly hit him on the head. Thereafter, he was detained inside the room for the entire day. The soldiersthe soldiers took his photograph and asked him to name the location of the NPA camp. Thereafter, they all
tied his stomach to a papag, and gave him rice and viand. Fearing that the food might be poisoned, he returned to the military camp. The soldiers asked him to take a bath and wear a white polo shirt handed to
refused to eat anything. He slept on the papag while being tied to it at the waist.6 him. He was then brought to the Enrile Medical Center, where Dr. Juliet Ramil (Dr. Ramil) examined
him.14 When the doctor asked him why he had bruises and contusions, he lied and told her that he
On 8 September 2009, the men forced Rodriguez into a vehicle, which brought them to Bugey and Mission. sustained them when he slipped, as he noticed a soldier observing him. Dr. Ramil’s medical certificate
While passing houses along the way, the men asked him if his contacts lived in those houses. When he failed indicated that he suffered from four hematomas in the epigastric area, chest and sternum. 15
to answer, a soldier pointed a gun to his head and threatened to kill him and his family. Because he
remained silent, the soldiers beat him and tied him up. The vehicle returned to the military camp at past Back at the camp, the soldiers let Rodriguez eat with several military officials and took pictures of him while
1:00 p.m., where he was again subjected to tactical interrogation about the location of an NPA camp and his he was eating with them. They also asked him to point to a map in front of him and again took his
alleged NPA comrades. He suffered incessant mauling every time he failed to answer. 7 photograph. Later, they told him that he would finally see his mother. 16

At dawn on 9 September 2009, soldiers armed with rifles took Rodriguez and made him their guide on their Rodriguez was brought to another military camp, where he was ordered to sign a piece of paper stating that
way to an NPA camp in Birao. Accompanying them was a man named Harry, who, according to the soldiers, he was a surrenderee and was never beaten up. Scared and desperate to end his ordeal, he signed the
was an NPA member who had surrendered to the military. Harry pointed to Rodriguez and called him a paper and was warned not to report anything to the media.17
member of the NPA. He also heard Harry tell the soldiers that the latter knew the area well and was
acquainted with a man named Elvis. The soldiers loaded Rodriguez into a military truck and drove to Tabbak,
Bugey. While he was walking with the soldiers, he noticed a soldier with the name tag "Matutina," who Around 6:00 a.m. on 17 September 2009, the soldiers instructed petitioner to take a bath. They gave him a
appeared to be an official because the other soldiers addressed him as "sir."8 pair of jeans and perfume. While he was having breakfast, the two soldiers guarding him repeatedly
reminded him not to disclose to the media his experience in the camp and to say instead that he had
surrendered to the military.18
Upon reaching Birao on foot, the soldiers looked for and was able to locate a certain Elvis and told him that
Rodriguez had identified his whereabouts location. The soldiers forced Rodriguez to convince Elvis to
disclose the location of the NPA camp. They brought the two to the mountains, where both were At 9:00 a.m. on the same day, the mother and the brother of Rodriguez arrived surrounded by several men.
threatened with death. When the soldiers punched Elvis, Rodriguez told them that he would reveal the His mother, Wilma Rodriguez (Wilma), talked to Lt. Col. Mina. Rodriguez heard one of the soldiers tell Wilma
location of the NPA camp if they let Elvis go home. They finally released Elvis around 3:00 p.m. that day. The that he had surrendered to the military and had long been its asset. His brother, Rodel Rodriguez (Rodel),
soldiers and Rodriguez spent the next three nights in the mountains.9 informed him that the men accompanying them were from the CHR, namely, Pasicolan, Cruz and Callagan.
Upon seeing Rodriguez, Cruz instructed him to lift up his shirt, and one of the CHR employees took
photographs of his bruises.19
On 12 September 2009, the soldiers again hit Rodriguez and forced him to identify the location of the NPA
camp. He was blindfolded and warned to get ready because they would beat him up again in the military
camp. Upon arrival therein, they brought him to the same room where he had first been detained, and two A soldier tried to convince Wilma to let Rodriguez stay in the camp for another two weeks to supposedly
soldiers mauled him again. They repeatedly punched and kicked him. In the afternoon, they let him rest and prevent the NPA from taking revenge on him. Respondent Calog also approached Rodriguez and Rodel and
gave him an Alaxan tablet. Thereafter, he fell asleep due to over-fatigue and extreme body pain. The asked them to become military assets. Rodel refused and insisted that they take Rodriguez home to Manila.
soldiers, however, hit him again. After giving him a pen and a piece of paper, they ordered him to write Again, the soldiers reminded them to refrain from facing the media. The soldiers also told them that the
down his request for rice from the people. When he refused, the soldiers maltreated him once more. 10 latter will be taken to the Tuguegarao Airport and guarded until they reached home.20

On 13 September 2009, the soldiers forced Rodriguez to sign documents declaring that he had surrendered Rodriguez and his family missed their flight. Subsequently, the soldiers accompanied them to the CHR office,
in an encounter in Cumao, and where Rodriguez was made to sign an affidavit stating that he was neither abducted nor tortured. Afraid
and desperate to return home, he was forced to sign the document. Cruz advised him not to file a case
against his abductors because they had already freed him. The CHR personnel then led him and his family to
the CHR Toyota Tamaraw FX service vehicle. He noticed that a vehicle with soldiers on board followed During the initial hearing on 4 January 2010, the Court of Appeals required the parties to submit affidavits
them.21 and other pieces of evidence at the next scheduled hearing on 27 January 2010.31

The Tamaraw FX pulled over and respondent 1st Lt. Matutina boarded the vehicle. Upon reaching a mall in
Isabela, Rodriguez, his family, Callagan, 1st Lt. Matutina and two other soldiers transferred to an orange
Toyota Revo with plate number WTG 579. Upon reaching the boundary of Nueva Ecija and Nueva Viscaya,
1st Lt. Matutina alighted and called Rodriguez to a diner. A certain Alan approached Rodriguez and handed
him a cellphone with a SIM card. The latter and his family then left and resumed their journey back home.22
On 8 January 2010, respondents therein, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed their Return
of the Writ, which was likewise considered as their comment on the petition.32 In their Return, respondents
therein alleged that Rodriguez had surrendered to the military on 28 May 2009 after he had been put under
surveillance and identified as "Ka Pepito" by former rebels.33 According to his military handlers, Corporal
(Cpl.) Rodel

Rodriguez reached his house in Sta. Ana, Manila at 3:00 a.m. on 18 September 2010. Callagan and two B. Cabaccan and Cpl. Julius P. Navarro, Rodriguez was a former member of the NPA operating in Cagayan
soldiers went inside the house, and took photographs and a video footage thereof. The soldiers explained Valley.34 Wanting to bolt from the NPA, he told Cpl. Cabaccan and Cpl. Navarro that he would help the
that the photos and videos would serve as evidence of the fact that Rodriguez and his family were able to military in exchange for his protection.35
arrive home safely. Despite Rodriguez’s efforts to confront the soldiers about their acts, they still continued
and only left thirty minutes later.23 Upon his voluntary surrender on 28 May 2009, Rodriguez was made to sign an Oath of Loyalty and an
Agent’s Agreement/Contract, showing his willingness to return to society and become a military
On 19 September 2009, Dr. Reginaldo Pamugas, a physician trained by the International Committee on asset.36 Since then, he acted as a double agent, returning to the NPA to gather information.37 However, he
Torture and Rehabilitation, examined Rodriguez and issued a Medical Certificate stating that the latter had feared that his NPA comrades were beginning to suspect him of being an infiltrator. 38 Thus, with his
been a victim of torture.24 knowledge and consent, the soldiers planned to stage a sham abduction to erase any suspicion about him
being a double agent.39 Hence, the abduction subject of the instant petition was conducted.40
Around 7:00 a.m. on 3 November 2010, Rodriguez and his girlfriend, Aileen Hazel Robles, noticed that
several suspicious-looking men followed them at the Metro Rail Transit (MRT), in the streets and on a Meanwhile, Cruz, Pasicolan and Callagan filed a Consolidated Return of the Writ dated 15 January
jeepney.25 2010,41 alleging that they had exercised extraordinary diligence in locating Rodriguez, facilitating his safe
turnover to his family and securing their journey back home to Manila. More specifically, they alleged that,
On 7 December 2009, Rodriguez filed before this Court a Petition for the Writ of Amparo and Petition for on 16 September 2009, after Wilma sought their assistance in ascertaining the whereabouts of her son, Cruz
the Writ of Habeas Data with Prayers for Protection Orders, Inspection of Place, and Production of made phone calls to the military and law enforcement agencies to determine his location.42 Cruz was able to
Documents and Personal Properties dated 2 December 2009.26 The petition was filed against former speak with Lt. Col. Mina, who confirmed that Rodriguez was in their custody.43 This information was
President Arroyo, Gen. Ibrado, PDG. Versoza, Lt. Gen. Bangit, Major General (Maj. Gen.) Nestor Z. Ochoa, transmitted to CHR Regional Director Atty. Jimmy P. Baliga. He, in turn, ordered Cruz, Pasicolan and Callagan
44
P/CSupt. Tolentino, P/SSupt. Santos, Col. De Vera, 1st Lt. Matutina, Calog, George Palacpac (Palacpac), Cruz, to accompany Wilma to the 17th Infantry Division.
Pasicolan and Callagan. The petition prayed for the following reliefs:
When the CHR officers, along with Wilma and Rodel, arrived at the 17th Infantry Battalion at Masin, Alcala,
a. The issuance of the writ of amparo ordering respondents to desist from violating Rodriguez’s right to life, Cagayan, Brigade Commander Col. de Vera and Battalion Commander Lt. Col. Mina alleged that Rodriguez
liberty and security. had become one of their assets, as evidenced by the Summary on the Surrender of Noriel Rodriguez and the
latter’s Contract as Agent.45 The CHR officers observed his casual and cordial demeanor with the
soldiers.46 In any case, Cruz asked him to raise his shirt to see if he had been subjected to any maltreatment.
b. The issuance of an order to enjoin respondents from doing harm to or approaching Rodriguez, his family Cruz and Pasicolan did not see any traces of torture. Thereafter, Rodriguez was released to his family, and
and his witnesses. they were made to sign a certification to this effect. During the signing of the document, herein CHR officers
did not witness any threat, intimidation or force employed against Rodriguez or his family. 47
c. Allowing the inspection of the detention areas of the Headquarters of Bravo Co., 5th Infantry Division,
Maguing, Gonzaga, Cagayan and another place near where Rodriguez was brought. During their journey back to the home of Rodriguez, the CHR officers observed that he was very much at
ease with his military escorts, especially with 1st Lt. Matutina.48 Neither was there any force or intimidation
d. Ordering respondents to produce documents submitted to them regarding any report on Rodriguez, when the soldiers took pictures of his house, as the taking of photographs was performed with Wilma’s
including operation reports and provost marshall reports of the 5th Infantry Division, the Special Operations consent.49
Group of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), prior to, on and subsequent to 6 September
2009.1âwphi1 During the hearing on 27 January 2010, the parties agreed to file additional affidavits and position papers
and to have the case considered submitted for decision after the filing of these pleadings. 50
e. Ordering records pertinent or in any way connected to Rodriguez, which are in the custody of
respondents, to be expunged, disabused, and forever barred from being used. 27 On 12 April 2010, the Court of Appeals rendered its assailed Decision.51 Subsequently, on 28 April 2010,
respondents therein filed their Motion for Reconsideration. 52 Before the Court of Appeals could resolve this
On 15 December 2009, we granted the respective writs after finding that the petition sufficiently alleged Motion for Reconsideration, Rodriguez filed the instant Petition for Partial Review on Certiorari (G.R. No.
that Rodriguez had been abducted, tortured and later released by members of the 17th Infantry Battalion of 191805), raising the following assignment of errors:
the Philippine Army.28 We likewise ordered respondents therein to file a verified return on the writs on or
before 22 December 2009 and to comment on the petition on or before 4 January 2010.29 Finally, we a. The Court of Appeals erred in not granting the Interim Relief for temporary protection order.
directed the Court of Appeals to hear the petition on 4 January 2010 and decide on the case within 10 days
after its submission for decision. 30
b. The Court of Appeals erred in saying: "(H)owever, given the nature of the writ of amparo, which has the
effect of enjoining the commission by respondents of violation to petitioner’s right to life, liberty and
security, the safety of petitioner is ensured with the issuance of the writ, even in the absence of an order
preventing respondent from approaching petitioner."
c. The Court of Appeals erred in not finding that respondent Gloria Macapagal Arroyo had command
responsibility.53
and permanent reliefs available to the petitioner.61 It is not an action to determine criminal guilt requiring
proof beyond reasonable doubt, or liability for damages requiring preponderance of evidence, or
administrative responsibility requiring substantial evidence that will require full and exhaustive
proceedings.62 Rather, it serves both preventive and curative roles in addressing the problem of extrajudicial
killings and enforced disappearances.63 It is preventive in that it breaks the expectation of impunity in the
commission of these offenses, and it is curative in that it facilitates the subsequent punishment of
perpetrators by inevitably leading to subsequent investigation and action.64

On the other hand, respondents therein, in their Comment dated 30 July 2010, averred: Meanwhile, the writ of habeas data provides a judicial remedy to protect a person’s right to control
information regarding oneself, particularly in instances where such information is being collected through
unlawful means in order to achieve unlawful ends.65 As an independent and summary remedy to protect the
a. The Court of Appeals properly dropped then President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo as a party-respondent, as right to privacy – especially the right to informational privacy66 – the proceedings for the issuance of the writ
she may not be sued in any case during her tenure of office or actual incumbency. of habeas data does not entail any finding of criminal, civil or administrative culpability. If the allegations in
the petition are proven through substantial evidence, then the Court may (a) grant access to the database
b. Petitioner had not presented any adequate and competent evidence, much less substantial evidence, to or information; (b) enjoin the act complained of; or (c) in case the database or information contains
establish his claim that public respondents had violated, were violating or threatening to violate his rights to erroneous data or information, order its deletion, destruction or rectification.67
life, liberty and security, as well as his right to privacy. Hence, he was not entitled to the privilege of the
writs of amparo and habeas data or to the corresponding interim reliefs (i.e. inspection order, production First issue: Grant of interim reliefs
order and temporary protection order) provided under the rule on the writ of amparo and the rule on the
writ of habeas data.54
In the petition in G.R. No. 191805, Rodriguez prays for the issuance of a temporary protection order. It must
be underscored that this interim relief is only available before final judgment. Section 14 of the Rule on the
On 19 August 2010, PDG. Verzosa, P/SSupt. Santos, BGen. De Vera, 1st Lt. Matutina, Lt. Col. Mina, Cruz, Writ of Amparo clearly provides:
Pasicolan and Callagan filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari, seeking the reversal of the 12 April 2010
Decision of the Court of Appeals.55 They alleged that Rodriguez –
Interim Reliefs. – Upon filing of the petition or at anytime before final judgment, the court, justice or judge
may grant any of the following reliefs:
Has not presented any adequate and competent evidence, must less substantial evidence, to establish his
claim that petitioners have violated, are violating or threatening with violation his rights to life, liberty and
security, as well as his right to privacy; hence, he is not entitled to the privilege of the writs of amparo and Temporary Protection Order. – The court, justice or judge, upon motion or motu proprio, may order that the
habeas data and their corresponding interim reliefs (i.e., inspection order, production order and temporary petitioner or the aggrieved party and any member of the immediate family be protected in a government
protection order) provided under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo and the Rule on the Writ of Habeas agency or by an accredited person or private institution capable of keeping and securing their safety. If the
Data. 56 petitioner is an organization, association or institution referred to in Section 3(c) of this Rule, the protection
may be extended to the officers involved.

In ascertaining whether the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in issuing its assailed Decision and
Resolution, the following issues must be resolved: The Supreme Court shall accredit the persons and private institutions that shall extend temporary
protection to the petitioner or the aggrieved party and any member of the immediate family, in accordance
with guidelines which it shall issue.
I. Whether the interim reliefs prayed for by Rodriguez may be granted after the writs of amparo and habeas
data have already been issued in his favor.
The accredited persons and private institutions shall comply with the rules and conditions that may be
imposed by the court, justice or judge.
II. Whether former President Arroyo should be dropped as a respondent on the basis of the presidential
immunity from suit.
(a) Inspection Order. – The court, justice or judge, upon verified motion and after due hearing, may order
any person in possession or control of a designated land or other property, to permit entry for the purpose
III. Whether the doctrine of command responsibility can be used in amparo and habeas data cases. of inspecting, measuring, surveying, or photographing the property or any relevant object or operation
thereon.
IV. Whether the rights to life, liberty and property of Rodriguez were violated or threatened by respondents
in G.R. No. 191805. The motion shall state in detail the place or places to be inspected. It shall be supported by affidavits or
testimonies of witnesses having personal knowledge of the enforced disappearance or whereabouts of the
At the outset, it must be emphasized that the writs of amparo and habeas data were promulgated to ensure aggrieved party.
the protection of the people’s rights to life, liberty and security.57 The rules on these writs were issued in
light of the alarming prevalence of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. 58 The Rule on the Writ If the motion is opposed on the ground of national security or of the privileged nature of the information,
of Amparo took effect on 24 October 2007,59 and the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data on 2 February 2008.60 the court, justice or judge may conduct a hearing in chambers to determine the merit of the opposition.

The writ of amparo is an extraordinary and independent remedy that provides rapid judicial relief, as it The movant must show that the inspection order is necessary to establish the right of the aggrieved party
partakes of a summary proceeding that requires only substantial evidence to make the appropriate interim alleged to be threatened or violated.
The inspection order shall specify the person or persons authorized to make the inspection and the date, Thus, in the case at bar, the Court of Appeals, in its Decision71 found respondents in G.R. No. 191805 – with
time, place and manner of making the inspection and may prescribe other conditions to protect the the exception of Calog, Palacpac or Harry – to be accountable for the violations of Rodriguez’s right to life,
constitutional rights of all parties. The order shall expire five (5) days after the date of its issuance, unless
liberty and security committed by the 17th Infantry Battalion, 5th Infantry Division of the Philippine
extended for justifiable reasons. Army. 72 The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition with respect to former President Arroyo on account of
her presidential immunity from suit. Rodriguez contends, though, that she should remain a respondent in
(b) Production Order. – The court, justice, or judge, upon verified motion and after due hearing, may order this case to enable the courts to determine whether she is responsible or accountable therefor. In this
any person in possession, custody or control of any designated documents, papers, books, accounts, letters, regard, it must be clarified that the Court of Appeals’ rationale for dropping her from the list of respondents
photographs, objects or tangible things, or objects in digitized or electronic form, which constitute or no longer stands since her presidential immunity is limited only to her incumbency.
contain evidence relevant to the petition or the return, to produce and permit their inspection, copying or
photographing by or on behalf of the movant. In Estrada v. Desierto,73 we clarified the doctrine that a non-sitting President does not enjoy immunity from
suit, even for acts committed during the latter’s tenure. We emphasize our ruling therein that courts should
The motion may be opposed on the ground of national security or of the privileged nature of the look with disfavor upon the presidential privilege of immunity, especially when it impedes the search for
information, in which case the court, justice or judge may conduct a hearing in chambers to determine the truth or impairs the vindication of a right, to wit:
merit of the opposition.
We reject [Estrada’s] argument that he cannot be prosecuted for the reason that he must first be convicted
The court, justice or judge shall prescribe other conditions to protect the constitutional rights of all the in the impeachment proceedings. The impeachment trial of petitioner Estrada was aborted by the walkout
parties. of the prosecutors and by the events that led to his loss of the presidency. Indeed, on February 7, 2001, the
Senate passed Senate Resolution No. 83 "Recognizing that the Impeachment Court is Functus Officio." Since
the Impeachment Court is now functus officio, it is untenable for petitioner to demand that he should first
(c) Witness Protection Order. – The court, justice or judge, upon motion or motu proprio, may refer the be impeached and then convicted before he can be prosecuted. The plea if granted, would put a perpetual
witnesses to the Department of Justice for admission to the Witness Protection, Security and Benefit bar against his prosecution. Such a submission has nothing to commend itself for it will place him in a better
Program, pursuant to Republic Act No. 6981. situation than a non-sitting President who has not been subjected to impeachment proceedings and yet can
be the object of a criminal prosecution. To be sure, the debates in the Constitutional Commission make it
The court, justice or judge may also refer the witnesses to other government agencies, or to accredited clear that when impeachment proceedings have become moot due to the resignation of the President, the
persons or private institutions capable of keeping and securing their safety. (Emphasis supplied) proper criminal and civil cases may already be filed against him, viz:

We held in Yano v. Sanchez68 that "[t]hese provisional reliefs are intended to assist the court before it "x x x xxx xxx
arrives at a judicious determination of the amparo petition." Being interim reliefs, they can only be granted
before a final adjudication of the case is made. In any case, it must be underscored that the privilege of the Mr. Aquino. On another point, if an impeachment proceeding has been filed against the President, for
writ of amparo, once granted, necessarily entails the protection of the aggrieved party. Thus, since we grant example, and the President resigns before judgment of conviction has been rendered by the impeachment
petitioner the privilege of the writ of amparo, there is no need to issue a temporary protection order court or by the body, how does it affect the impeachment proceeding? Will it be necessarily dropped?
independently of the former. The order restricting respondents from going near Rodriguez is subsumed
under the privilege of the writ.
Mr. Romulo. If we decide the purpose of impeachment to remove one from office, then his resignation
would render the case moot and academic. However, as the provision says, the criminal and civil aspects of
Second issue: Presidential immunity from suit it may continue in the ordinary courts."

It bears stressing that since there is no determination of administrative, civil or criminal liability in amparo This is in accord with our ruling in In Re: Saturnino Bermudez that "incumbent Presidents are immune from
and habeas data proceedings, courts can only go as far as ascertaining responsibility or accountability for suit or from being brought to court during the period of their incumbency and tenure" but not beyond. xxx
the enforced disappearance or extrajudicial killing. As we held in Razon v. Tagitis: 69

We now come to the scope of immunity that can be claimed by petitioner as a non-sitting President. The
It does not determine guilt nor pinpoint criminal culpability for the disappearance; rather, it determines cases filed against petitioner Estrada are criminal in character. They involve plunder, bribery and graft and
responsibility, or at least accountability, for the enforced disappearance for purposes of imposing the corruption. By no stretch of the imagination can these crimes, especially plunder which carries the death
appropriate remedies to address the disappearance. Responsibility refers to the extent the actors have been penalty, be covered by the alleged mantle of immunity of a non-sitting president. Petitioner cannot cite any
established by substantial evidence to have participated in whatever way, by action or omission, in an decision of this Court licensing the President to commit criminal acts and wrapping him with post-tenure
enforced disappearance, as a measure of the remedies this Court shall craft, among them, the directive to immunity from liability. It will be anomalous to hold that immunity is an inoculation from liability for
file the appropriate criminal and civil cases against the responsible parties in the proper courts. unlawful acts and omissions. The rule is that unlawful acts of public officials are not acts of the State and the
Accountability, on the other hand, refers to the measure of remedies that should be addressed to those officer who acts illegally is not acting as such but stands in the same footing as any other trespasser.
who exhibited involvement in the enforced disappearance without bringing the level of their complicity to
the level of responsibility defined above; or who are imputed with knowledge relating to the enforced
disappearance and who carry the burden of disclosure; or those who carry, but have failed to discharge, the Indeed, a critical reading of current literature on executive immunity will reveal a judicial disinclination to
burden of extraordinary diligence in the investigation of the enforced disappearance. In all these cases, the expand the privilege especially when it impedes the search for truth or impairs the vindication of a right. In
issuance of the Writ of Amparo is justified by our primary goal of addressing the disappearance, so that the the 1974 case of US v. Nixon, US President Richard Nixon, a sitting President, was subpoenaed to produce
life of the victim is preserved and his liberty and security are restored.70 (Emphasis supplied.) certain recordings and documents relating to his conversations with aids and advisers. Seven advisers of
President Nixon's associates were facing charges of conspiracy to obstruct justice and other offenses which
were committed in a burglary of the Democratic National Headquarters in Washington's Watergate Hotel
during the 1972 presidential campaign. President Nixon himself was named an unindicted co-conspirator. Mr. Suarez:
President Nixon moved to quash the subpoena on the ground, among others, that the President was not
subject to judicial process and that he should first be impeached and removed from office before he could On the understanding, I will not press for any more query, madam President.
be made amenable to judicial proceedings. The claim was rejected by the US Supreme Court. It concluded
that "when the ground for asserting privilege as to subpoenaed materials sought for use in a criminal trial is
based only on the generalized interest in confidentiality, it cannot prevail over the fundamental demands of I thank the Commissioner for the clarification."
due process of law in the fair administration of criminal justice." In the 1982 case of Nixon v. Fitzgerald, the
US Supreme Court further held that the immunity of the President from civil damages covers only "official Petitioner, however, fails to distinguish between term and tenure. The term means the time during which
acts." Recently, the US Supreme Court had the occasion to reiterate this doctrine in the case of Clinton v. the officer may claim to hold the office as of right, and fixes the interval after which the several incumbents
Jones where it held that the US President's immunity from suits for money damages arising out of their shall succeed one another. The tenure represents the term during which the incumbent actually holds
official acts is inapplicable to unofficial conduct.74 (Emphasis supplied) office. The tenure may be shorter than the term for reasons within or beyond the power of the incumbent.
From the deliberations, the intent of the framers is clear that the immunity of the president from suit is
Further, in our Resolution in Estrada v. Desierto,75 we reiterated that the presidential immunity from suit concurrent only with his tenure and not his term.76 (Emphasis supplied)
exists only in concurrence with the president’s incumbency:
Applying the foregoing rationale to the case at bar, it is clear that former President Arroyo cannot use the
Petitioner stubbornly clings to the contention that he is entitled to absolute immunity from suit. His presidential immunity from suit to shield herself from judicial scrutiny that would assess whether, within the
arguments are merely recycled and we need not prolong the longevity of the debate on the subject. In our context of amparo proceedings, she was responsible or accountable for the abduction of Rodriguez.
Decision, we exhaustively traced the origin of executive immunity in our jurisdiction and its bends and turns
up to the present time. We held that given the intent of the 1987 Constitution to breathe life to the policy Third issue: Command responsibility in amparo proceedings
that a public office is a public trust, the petitioner, as a non-sitting President, cannot claim executive
immunity for his alleged criminal acts committed while a sitting President. Petitioner's rehashed arguments To attribute responsibility or accountability to former President Arroyo, Rodriguez contends that the
including their thinly disguised new spins are based on the rejected contention that he is still President, doctrine of command responsibility may be applied. As we explained in Rubrico v. Arroyo,77 command
albeit, a President on leave. His stance that his immunity covers his entire term of office or until June 30,responsibility pertains to the "responsibility of commanders for crimes committed by subordinate members
2004 disregards the reality that he has relinquished the presidency and there is now a new de jure of the armed forces or other persons subject to their control in international wars or domestic
President. conflict."78 Although originally used for ascertaining criminal complicity, the command responsibility
doctrine has also found application in civil cases for human rights abuses.79 In the United States, for
Petitioner goes a step further and avers that even a non-sitting President enjoys immunity from suit during example, command responsibility was used in Ford v. Garcia and Romagoza v. Garcia – civil actions filed
his term of office. He buttresses his position with the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, viz: under the Alien Tort Claims Act and the Torture Victim Protection Act.80 This development in the use of
command responsibility in civil proceedings shows that the application of this doctrine has been liberally
"Mr. Suarez. Thank you. extended even to cases not criminal in nature. Thus, it is our view that command responsibility may likewise
find application in proceedings seeking the privilege of the writ of amparo. As we held in Rubrico:

The last question is with reference to the Committee's omitting in the draft proposal the immunity provision
for the President. I agree with Commissioner Nolledo that the Committee did very well in striking out this
second sentence, at the very least, of the original provision on immunity from suit under the 1973
Constitution. But would the Committee members not agree to a restoration of at least the first sentence
that the president shall be immune from suit during his tenure, considering that if we do not provide him
that kind of an immunity, he might be spending all his time facing litigations, as the President-in-exile in
Hawaii is now facing litigations almost daily?
Fr. Bernas:
The reason for the omission is that we consider it understood in present jurisprudence that during his
tenure he is immune from suit.
Mr. Suarez:
So there is no need to express it here.
Fr. Bernas:
There is no need. It was that way before. The only innovation made by the 1973 Constitution was to make
that explicit and to add other things.
It may plausibly be contended that command responsibility, as legal basis to hold military/police
commanders liable for extra-legal killings, enforced disappearances, or threats, may be made applicable to
this jurisdiction on the theory that the command responsibility doctrine now constitutes a principle of
international law or customary international law in accordance with the incorporation clause of the
Constitution.
xxx xxx xxx
If command responsibility were to be invoked and applied to these proceedings, it should, at most, be only
to determine the author who, at the first instance, is accountable for, and has the duty to address, the
disappearance and harassments complained of, so as to enable the Court to devise remedial measures that
may be appropriate under the premises to protect rights covered by the writ of amparo. As intimated
earlier, however, the determination should not be pursued to fix criminal liability on respondents
preparatory to criminal prosecution, or as a prelude to administrative disciplinary proceedings under
existing administrative issuances, if there be any.81 (Emphasis supplied.)
Precisely in the case at bar, the doctrine of command responsibility may be used to determine whether
respondents are accountable for and have the duty to address the abduction of Rodriguez in order to enable
the courts to devise remedial measures to protect his rights. Clearly, nothing precludes this Court from
applying the doctrine of command responsibility in amparo proceedings to ascertain responsibility and
accountability in extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. In this regard, the Separate Opinion of
Justice Conchita Carpio-Morales in Rubrico is worth noting, thus:
That proceedings under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo do not determine criminal, civil or administrative disappearance and harassments complained of, so as to enable the Court to devise remedial measures that
liability should not abate the applicability of the doctrine of command responsibility. Taking Secretary of may be appropriate under the premises to protect rights covered by the writ of amparo. As intimated
National Defense v. Manalo and Razon v. Tagitis in proper context, they do not preclude the application of earlier, however, the determination should not be pursued to fix criminal liability on respondents
the doctrine of command responsibility to Amparo cases. preparatory to criminal prosecution, or as a prelude to administrative disciplinary proceedings under
existing administrative issuances, if there be any.
Manalo was actually emphatic on the importance of the right to security of person and its contemporary
signification as a guarantee of protection of one’s rights by the government. It further stated that protection In other words, command responsibility may be loosely applied in amparo cases in order to identify those
includes conducting effective investigations, organization of the government apparatus to extend protection accountable individuals that have the power to effectively implement whatever processes an amparo court
to victims of extralegal killings or enforced disappearances, or threats thereof, and/or their families, and would issue. In such application, the amparo court does not impute criminal responsibility but merely
bringing offenders to the bar of justice. pinpoint the superiors it considers to be in the best position to protect the rights of the aggrieved party.

Tagitis, on the other hand, cannot be more categorical on the application, at least in principle, of the Such identification of the responsible and accountable superiors may well be a preliminary determination of
doctrine of command responsibility: criminal liability which, of course, is still subject to further investigation by the appropriate government
agency. (Emphasis supplied.)
Given their mandates, the PNP and PNP-CIDG officials and members were the ones who were remiss in their
duties when the government completely failed to exercise the extraordinary diligence that the Amparo Rule As earlier pointed out, amparo proceedings determine (a) responsibility, or the extent the actors have been
requires. We hold these organizations accountable through their incumbent Chiefs who, under this established by substantial evidence to have participated in whatever way, by action or omission, in an
Decision, shall carry the personal responsibility of seeing to it that extraordinary diligence, in the manner enforced disappearance, and (b) accountability, or the measure of remedies that should be addressed to
the Amparo Rule requires, is applied in addressing the enforced disappearance of Tagitis. those (i) who exhibited involvement in the enforced disappearance without bringing the level of their
complicity to the level of responsibility defined above; or (ii) who are imputed with knowledge relating to
Neither does Republic Act No. 9851 emasculate the applicability of the command responsibility doctrine to the enforced disappearance and who carry the burden of disclosure; or (iii) those who carry, but have failed
Amparo cases. The short title of the law is the "Philippine Act on Crimes Against International Humanitarian to discharge, the burden of extraordinary diligence in the investigation of the enforced disappearance. Thus,
Law, Genocide, and Other Crimes Against Humanity." Obviously, it should, as it did, only treat of superior although there is no determination of criminal, civil or administrative liabilities, the doctrine of command
responsibility as a ground for criminal responsibility for the crimes responsibility may nevertheless be applied to ascertain responsibility and accountability within these
covered.http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/feb2010/gr_183871_2010.html - fnt20cm Such limited foregoing definitions.
treatment, however, is merely in keeping with the statute’s purpose and not intended to rule out the
application of the doctrine of command responsibility to other appropriate cases. a. Command responsibility of the President

Indeed, one can imagine the innumerable dangers of insulating high-ranking military and police officers
from the coverage of reliefs available under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo. The explicit adoption of the
doctrine of command responsibility in the present case will only bring Manalo and Tagitis to their logical
conclusion.
In fine, I submit that the Court should take this opportunity to state what the law ought to be if it truly
wants to make the Writ of Amparo an effective remedy for victims of extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances or threats thereof. While there is a genuine dearth of evidence to hold respondents Gen.
Hermogenes Esperon and P/Dir. Gen. Avelino Razon accountable under the command responsibility
doctrine, the ponencia’s hesitant application of the doctrine itself is replete with implications abhorrent to
the rationale behind the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.82 (Emphasis supplied.)
Having established the applicability of the doctrine of command responsibility in amparo proceedings, it
must now be resolved whether the president, as commander-in-chief of the military, can be held
responsible or accountable for extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. We rule in the affirmative.
To hold someone liable under the doctrine of command responsibility, the following elements must obtain:
a. the existence of a superior-subordinate relationship between the accused as superior and the perpetrator
of the crime as his subordinate;
b. the superior knew or had reason to know that the crime was about to be or had been committed; and

This Separate Opinion was reiterated in the recently decided case of Boac v. Cadapan,83 likewise penned by c. the superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent the criminal acts or punish
Justice Carpio-Morales, wherein this Court ruled: the perpetrators thereof.84

Rubrico categorically denies the application of command responsibility in amparo cases to determine The president, being the commander-in-chief of all armed forces,85 necessarily possesses control over the
criminal liability. The Court maintains its adherence to this pronouncement as far as amparo cases are military that qualifies him as a superior within the purview of the command responsibility doctrine. 86
concerned.
On the issue of knowledge, it must be pointed out that although international tribunals apply a strict
Rubrico, however, recognizes a preliminary yet limited application of command responsibility in amparo standard of knowledge, i.e., actual knowledge, such may nonetheless be established through circumstantial
87
cases to instances of determining the responsible or accountable individuals or entities that are duty-bound evidence. In the Philippines, a more liberal view is adopted and superiors may be charged with
to abate any transgression on the life, liberty or security of the aggrieved party. constructive knowledge. This view is buttressed by the enactment of Executive Order No. 226, otherwise
known as the Institutionalization of the Doctrine of ‘Command Responsibility’ in all Government Offices,
particularly at all Levels of Command in the Philippine National Police and other Law Enforcement Agencies
If command responsibility were to be invoked and applied to these proceedings, it should, at most, be only (E.O. 226).88 Under E.O. 226, a government official may be held liable for neglect of duty under the doctrine
to determine the author who, at the first instance, is accountable for, and has the duty to address, the of command responsibility if he has knowledge that a crime or offense shall be committed, is being
committed, or has been committed by his subordinates, or by others within his area of responsibility and, Rodriguez’s Sinumpaang Salaysay dated 4 December 2009 was a meticulous and straightforward account of
despite such knowledge, he did not take preventive or corrective action either before, during, or his horrific ordeal with the military, detailing the manner in which he was captured and maltreated on
immediately after its commission.89 Knowledge of the commission of irregularities, crimes or offenses is account of his suspected membership in the NPA.96 His narration of his suffering included an exhaustive
presumed when (a) the acts are widespread within the government official’s area of jurisdiction; (b) the acts description of his physical surroundings, personal circumstances and perceived observations. He likewise
have been repeatedly or regularly committed within his area of responsibility; or (c) members of his positively identified respondents 1st Lt. Matutina and Lt. Col. Mina to be present during his abduction,
immediate staff or office personnel are involved. 90 detention and torture,97 and respondents Cruz, Pasicolan and Callagan as the CHR representatives who
appeared during his release.98
Meanwhile, as to the issue of failure to prevent or punish, it is important to note that as the commander-in-
chief of the armed forces, the president has the power to effectively command, control and discipline the More particularly, the fact of Rodriguez’s abduction was corroborated by Carlos in his Sinumpaang Salaysay
military.91 dated 16 September 2009,99 wherein he recounted in detail the circumstances surrounding the victim’s
capture.
b. Responsibility or accountability of former President Arroyo
As regards the allegation of torture, the respective Certifications of Dr. Ramil and Dr. Pamugas validate the
The next question that must be tackled is whether Rodriguez has proven through substantial evidence that physical maltreatment Rodriguez suffered in the hands of the soldiers of the 17th Infantry Battalion, 5th
former President Arroyo is responsible or accountable for his abduction. We rule in the negative. Infantry Division. According to the Certification dated 12 October 2009 executed by Dr. Ramil,100 she
examined Rodriguez in the Alfonso Ponce Enrile Memorial District Hospital on 16 September 2009 and
arrived at the following findings:
Rodriguez anchors his argument on a general allegation that on the basis of the "Melo Commission" and the
"Alston Report," respondents in G.R. No. 191805 already had knowledge of and information on, and should
have known that a climate of enforced disappearances had been perpetrated on members of the FACE
92
NPA. Without even attaching, or at the very least, quoting these reports, Rodriguez contends that the
Melo Report points to rogue military men as the perpetrators. While the Alston Report states that there is a - 10cm healed scar face right side
policy allowing enforced disappearances and pins the blame on the President, we do not automatically
impute responsibility to former President Arroyo for each and every count of forcible disappearance.93 Aside - 2cm healed scar right eyebrow (lateral area)
from Rodriguez’s general averments, there is no piece of evidence that could establish her responsibility or
accountability for his abduction. Neither was there even a clear attempt to show that she should have
known about the violation of his right to life, liberty or security, or that she had failed to investigate, punish - 2cm healed scar right eye brow (median area)
or prevent it.
- 4cm x 2cm hematoma anterior chest at the sternal area right side
Fourth issue: Responsibility or accountability of respondents in G.R. No. 191805
- 3cm x 2cm hematoma sternal area left side
The doctrine of totality of evidence in amparo cases was first laid down in this Court’s ruling in Razon, 94 to
wit: - 6cm x 1cm hematoma from epigastric area to ant. chest left side

The fair and proper rule, to our mind, is to consider all the pieces of evidence adduced in their totality, and - 6cm x 1cm hematoma from epigastric area to ant. chest right side
to consider any evidence otherwise inadmissible under our usual rules to be admissible if it is consistent
with the admissible evidence adduced. In other words, we reduce our rules to the most basic test of reason - Multiple healed rashes (brownish discoloration) both forearm
– i.e., to the relevance of the evidence to the issue at hand and its consistency with all other pieces of
adduced evidence. Thus, even hearsay evidence can be admitted if it satisfies this basic minimum
test.95 (Emphasis supplied.) - Multiple healed rashes (brownish discoloration)

In the case at bar, we find no reason to depart from the factual findings of the Court of Appeals, the same - both leg arm
being supported by substantial evidence. A careful examination of the records of this case reveals that the
totality of the evidence adduced by Rodriguez indubitably prove the responsibility and accountability of - hip area/lumbar area101
some respondents in G.R. No. 191805 for violating his right to life, liberty and security.
Dr. Pamugas performed a separate medical examination of Rodriguez on 19 September 2009, the results of
a. The totality of evidence proved by substantial evidence the responsibility or accountability of respondents which confirmed that the injuries suffered by the latter were inflicted through torture. Dr. Pamugas thus
for the violation of or threat to Rodriguez’s right to life, liberty and security. issued a Medical Report dated 23 September 2009,102 explicitly stating that Rodriguez had been tortured
during his detention by the military, to wit:
After a careful examination of the records of these cases, we are convinced that the Court of Appeals
correctly found sufficient evidence proving that the soldiers of the 17th Infantry Battalion, 5th Infantry X. Interpretation of Findings
Division of the military abducted Rodriguez on 6 September 2009, and detained and tortured him until 17
September 2009.
The above physical and psychological findings sustained by the subject are related to the torture and ill-
treatment done to him. The multiple circular brown to dark brown spots found on both legs and arms were
due to the insect bites that he sustained when he was forced to join twice in the military operations. The
abrasions could also be due to the conditions related during military operations. The multiple pin-point
blood spots found on his left ear is a result of an unknown object placed inside his left ear. The areas of
tenderness he felt during the physical examination were due to the overwhelming punching and kicking on
his body. The occasional difficulty of sleeping is a symptom experience (sic) by the subject as a result of the
psychological trauma he encountered during his detention.
24. Na nang makita ko si Noriel, hindi sya makalakad ng diretso, hinang-hina sya, malaki ang ipinayat at
nanlalalim ang mga mata;
25. Na nang makita ko ang aking kapatid ay nakaramdam ako ng awa dahil nakilala ko syang masigla at
masayahin;
26. Na ilang minuto lang ay binulugan nya ako ng "Kuya, ilabas mo ako dito, papatayin nila ako."

XI. Conclusions and Recommendations 27. Na sinabihan kami ni Lt. Col. Mina na baka pwedeng maiwan pa ng dalwang linggo ang aking kapatid sa
kanila para raw ma-train sya.

The physical injuries and psychological trauma suffered by the subject are secondary to the torture and ill-
treatment done to him while in detention for about 11 days. The physical injuries sustained by the subject, 28. Na hindi kami pumayag ng aking nanay; xxx107
of which the age is compatible with the alleged date of infliction (sic).103 (Emphasis supplied.)
Moreover, the Court of Appeals likewise aptly pointed out the illogical, if not outrightly contradictory,
In assessing the weight of the Certifications, the Court of Appeals correctly relied on the medical finding that contention of respondents in G.R. No. 191805 that while Rodriguez had complained of his exhaustion from
the injuries suffered by Rodriguez matched his account of the maltreatment inflicted on him by the soldiers his activities as a member of the CPP-NPA, he nevertheless willingly volunteered to return to his life in the
of the 17th Infantry Battalion, 5th Infantry Division of the Philippine Army. Further, the kind of injuries he NPA to become a double-agent for the military. The lower court ruled in this manner:
sustained showed that he could not have sustained them from merely falling, thus making respondents’
claim highly implausible. In the Return of the Writ, respondent AFP members alleged that petitioner confided to his military handler,
Cpl. Navarro, that petitioner could no longer stand the hardships he experienced in the wilderness, and that
Despite these medical findings that overwhelmingly supported and lent credibility to the allegations of he wanted to become an ordinary citizen again because of the empty promises of the CPP-NPA. However, in
Rodriguez in his Sinumpaang Salaysay, respondents in G.R. No. 191805 still stubbornly clung to their the same Return, respondents state that petitioner agreed to become a double agent for the military and
argument that he was neither abducted nor detained. Rather, they claimed that he was a double agent, wanted to re-enter the CPP-NPA, so that he could get information regarding the movement directly from
whose relationship with the military was at all times congenial. This contention cannot be sustained, as it is the source. If petitioner was tired of life in the wilderness and desired to become an ordinary citizen again, it
far removed from ordinary human experience. defies logic that he would agree to become an undercover agent and work alongside soldiers in the
mountains – or the wilderness he dreads – to locate the hideout of his alleged NPA comrades.108 (Emphasis
supplied.)
If it were true that Rodriguez maintained amicable relations with the military, then he should have
unhesitatingly assured his family on 17 September 2009 that he was among friends. Instead, he vigorously
pleaded with them to get him out of the military facility. In fact, in the Sinumpaang Salaysay dated 4 Furthermore, the appellate court also properly ruled that aside from the abduction, detention and torture
December 2009104 Wilma executed, she made the following averments: of Rodriguez, respondents, specifically 1st Lt. Matutina, had violated and threatened the former’s right to
security when they made a visual recording of his house, as well as the photos of his relatives, to wit:
18. Na nang Makita ko ang aking anak ay nakaramdam ako sa kanya ng awa dahil sa mukha syang pagod at
malaki ang kanyang ipinayat. In the videos taken by the soldiers – one of whom was respondent Matutina – in the house of petitioner on
September 18, 2009, the soldiers even went as far as taking videos of the photos of petitioner’s relatives
hung on the wall of the house, as well as videos of the innermost part of the house. This Court notes that
19. Na niyakap ko sya at sa aming pagkakayakap ay binulungan nya ako na wag ko syang iiwan sa lugar na 1Lt. Matutina, by taking the said videos, did not merely intend to make proofs of the safe arrival of
iyon; petitioner and his family in their home. 1Lt. Matutina also desired to instill fear in the minds of petitioner
and his family by showing them that the sanctity of their home, from then on, will not be free from the
xxx xxx xxx watchful eyes of the military, permanently captured through the medium of a seemingly innocuous
cellhpone video camera. The Court cannot – and will not – condone such act, as it intrudes into the very
23. Na sinabihan ako ng mga sundalo na kung pwede daw ay maiwan muna ng dalawang linggo sa kampo core of petitioner’s right to security guaranteed by the fundamental law.109 (Emphasis supplied.)
ako at si Noriel para daw matrain pa si Noriel sa loob ng kampo;
Taken in their totality, the pieces of evidence adduced by Rodriguez, as well as the contradictory defenses
24. Na hindi ako pumayag na maiwan ang aking anak; presented by respondents in G.R. No. 191805, give credence to his claim that he had been abducted,
detained and tortured by soldiers belonging to the 17th Infantry Battalion, 5th Infantry Division of the
military.
xxx xxx xxx
It must be pointed out, however, that as to respondents Cruz, Pasicolan and Callagan, there was no
33. Na sa kasalukuhan, hanggang ngayon ay nag-aalala pa ako sa paa (sic) sa kaligtasan ng aming buong substantial evidence to show that they violated, or threatened with violation, Rodriguez’s right to life,
pamilya, lalo na kay Noriel; xxx105 liberty and security. Despite the dearth of evidence to show the CHR officers’ responsibility or
accountability, this Court nonetheless emphasizes its criticism as regards their capacity to recognize torture
Also, Rodel made the following supporting averments in his Sinumpaang Salaysay dated 3 December or any similar form of abuse. The CHR, being constitutionally mandated to protect human rights and
2009:106 investigate violations thereof,110 should ensure that its officers are well-equipped to respond effectively to
and address human rights violations. The actuations of respondents unmistakably showed their insufficient In the instant case, this Court rules that respondents in G.R. No. 191805 are responsible or accountable for
competence in facilitating and ensuring the safe release of Rodriguez after his ordeal. the violation of Rodriguez’s right to life, liberty and security on account of their abject failure to conduct a
fair and effective official investigation of his ordeal in the hands of the military. Respondents Gen. Ibrado,
b. The failure to conduct a fair and effect investigation amounted to a violation of or threat to Rodriguez’s PDG. Verzosa, Lt. Gen. Bangit, Maj. Gen. Ochoa, Col. De Vera and Lt. Col. Mina only conducted a perfunctory
rights to life, liberty and security. investigation, exerting no efforts to take Ramirez’s account of the events into consideration. Rather, these
respondents solely relied on the reports and narration of the military. The ruling of the appellate court must
be emphasized:
The Rule on the Writ of Amparo explicitly states that the violation of or threat to the right to life, liberty and
111
security may be caused by either an act or an omission of a public official. Moreover, in the context of
amparo proceedings, responsibility may refer to the participation of the respondents, by action or omission, In this case, respondents Ibrado, Verzosa, Bangit, Tolentino, Santos, De Vera, and Mina are accountable, for
in enforced disappearance.112 Accountability, on the other hand, may attach to respondents who are while they were charged with the investigation of the subject incident, the investigation they conducted
imputed with knowledge relating to the enforced disappearance and who carry the burden of disclosure; or and/or relied on is superficial and one-sided. The records disclose that the military, in investigating the
those who carry, but have failed to discharge, the burden of extraordinary diligence in the investigation of incident complained of, depended on the Comprehensive Report of Noriel Rodriguez @Pepito prepared by
the enforced disappearance.113 1Lt. Johnny Calub for the Commanding Officer of the 501st Infantry Brigade, 5th Infantry Division, Philippine
Army. Such report, however, is merely based on the narration of the military. No efforts were undertaken to
solicit petitioner’s version of the subject incident and no witnesses were questioned regarding the alleged
114
In this regard, we emphasize our ruling in Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo that the right to abduction of petitioner.
security of a person includes the positive obligation of the government to ensure the observance of the duty
to investigate, viz:
Respondent PDG Verzosa, as Chief of the PNP, is accountable because Section 24 of Republic Act No. 6975,
otherwise known as the "PNP Law," specifies the PNP as the governmental office with the mandate "to
Third, the right to security of person is a guarantee of protection of one's rights by the government. In the investigate and prevent crimes, effect the arrest of criminal offenders, bring offenders to justice and assist
context of the writ of Amparo, this right is built into the guarantees of the right to life and liberty under in their prosecution." In this case, PDG Verzosa failed to order the police to conduct the necessary
Article III, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution and the right to security of person (as freedom from threat and investigation to unmask the mystery surrounding petitioner’s abduction and disappearance. Instead, PDG
guarantee of bodily and psychological integrity) under Article III, Section 2. The right to security of person in Verzosa disclaims accountability by merely stating that petitioner has no cause of action against him.
this third sense is a corollary of the policy that the State "guarantees full respect for human rights" under Palpable, however, is the lack of any effort on the part of PDG Verzosa to effectively and aggressively
Article II, Section 11 of the 1987 Constitution. As the government is the chief guarantor of order and investigate the violations of petitioner’s right to life, liberty and security by members of the 17th Infantry
security, the Constitutional guarantee of the rights to life, liberty and security of person is rendered Battalion, 17th Infantry Division, Philippine Army.116 (Emphasis supplied.)
ineffective if government does not afford protection to these rights especially when they are under threat.
Protection includes conducting effective investigations, organization of the government apparatus to extend
protection to victims of extralegal killings or enforced disappearances (or threats thereof) and/or their Clearly, the absence of a fair and effective official investigation into the claims of Rodriguez violated his right
families, and bringing offenders to the bar of justice. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights stressed the to security, for which respondents in G.R. No. 191805 must be held responsible or accountable.
importance of investigation in the Velasquez Rodriguez Case, viz:
Nevertheless, it must be clarified that Rodriguez was unable to establish any responsibility or accountability
(The duty to investigate) must be undertaken in a serious manner and not as a mere formality preordained on the part of respondents P/CSupt. Tolentino, P/SSupt. Santos, Calog and Palacpac. Respondent P/CSupt.
to be ineffective. An investigation must have an objective and be assumed by the State as its own legal duty, Tolentino had already retired when the abduction and torture of Rodriguez was perpetrated, while P/SSupt.
not as a step taken by private interests that depends upon the initiative of the victim or his family or upon Santos had already been reassigned and transferred to the National Capital Regional Police Office six
their offer of proof, without an effective search for the truth by the government. months before the subject incident occurred. Meanwhile, no sufficient allegations were maintained against
respondents Calog and Palacpac.

xxx xxx xxx

From all the foregoing, we rule that Rodriguez was successful in proving through substantial evidence that
respondents Gen. Ibrado, PDG. Verzosa, Lt. Gen. Bangit, Maj. Gen. Ochoa, Brig. Gen. De Vera, 1st Lt.
Similarly, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) has interpreted the "right to security" not only as Matutina, and Lt. Col. Mina were responsible and accountable for the violation of Rodriguez’s rights to life,
prohibiting the State from arbitrarily depriving liberty, but imposing a positive duty on the State to afford liberty and security on the basis of (a) his abduction, detention and torture from 6 September to 17
protection of the right to liberty. The ECHR interpreted the "right to security of person" under Article 5(1) of September 2009, and (b) the lack of any fair and effective official investigation as to his allegations. Thus,
the European Convention of Human Rights in the leading case on disappearance of persons, Kurt v. Turkey. the privilege of the writs of amparo and habeas data must be granted in his favor. As a result, there is no
In this case, the claimant's son had been arrested by state authorities and had not been seen since. The longer any need to issue a temporary protection order, as the privilege of these writs already has the effect
family's requests for information and investigation regarding his whereabouts proved futile. The claimant of enjoining respondents in G.R. No. 191805 from violating his rights to life, liberty and security.
suggested that this was a violation of her son's right to security of person. The ECHR ruled, viz:

... any deprivation of liberty must not only have been effected in conformity with the substantive and
procedural rules of national law but must equally be in keeping with the very purpose of Article 5, namely to
protect the individual from arbitrariness... Having assumed control over that individual it is incumbent on
the authorities to account for his or her whereabouts. For this reason, Article 5 must be seen as requiring
the authorities to take effective measures to safeguard against the risk of disappearance and to conduct a
prompt effective investigation into an arguable claim that a person has been taken into custody and has not
been seen since.115 (Emphasis supplied)
It is also clear from the above discussion that despite (a) maintaining former President Arroyo in the list of
respondents in G.R. No. 191805, and (b) allowing the application of the command responsibility doctrine to
amparo and habeas data proceedings, Rodriguez failed to prove through substantial evidence that former
President Arroyo was responsible or accountable for the violation of his rights to life, liberty and property.
He likewise failed to prove through substantial evidence the accountability or responsibility of respondents
Maj. Gen. Ochoa, Cruz, Pasicolan and Callagan.
WHEREFORE, we resolve to GRANT the Petition for Partial Review in G.R. No. 191805 and DENY the Petition
for Review in G.R. No. 193160. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED WITH
MODIFICATION.

The case is dismissed with respect to respondents former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, P/CSupt.
Ameto G. Tolentino, and P/SSupt. Jude W. Santos, Calog, George Palacpac, Antonio Cruz, Aldwin Pasicolan
and Vicent Callagan for lack of merit.

This Court directs the Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman) and the Department of Justice (DOJ) to take
the appropriate action with respect to any possible liability or liabilities, within their respective legal
competence, that may have been incurred by respondents Gen. Victor Ibrado, PDG. Jesus Verzosa, Lt. Gen.
Delfin Bangit, Maj. Gen. Nestor Ochoa, Brig. Gen. Remegio De Vera, 1st Lt. Ryan Matutina, and Lt. Col.
Laurence Mina. The Ombudsman and the DOJ are ordered to submit to this Court the results of their action
within a period of six months from receipt of this Decision.

In the event that herein respondents no longer occupy their respective posts, the directives mandated in
this Decision and in the Court of Appeals are enforceable against the incumbent officials holding the
relevant positions. Failure to comply with the foregoing shall constitute contempt of court.

SO ORDERED.