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Caiet Seminar-2 PDF
Caiet Seminar-2 PDF
Caiet de istorie
contemporană universală
‐ suport de seminar -
Mihai Croitor
Manuela Marin
CLUJ‐NAPOCA
2007
Mihai Croitor , Manuela Marin – Caiet de istorie contemporană universală
Precizări generale
I Modul de evaluare:
SEMINAR NR. 1
- organizarea activităţilor de seminar ; prezentarea temelor şi
bibliografiei ; metodologia şi sursele istoriei contemporane ; definirea
diacronică, epistemologică şi structurală a problemelor ce urmează a
fi studiate.
SEMINAR NR. 2
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Mihai Croitor , Manuela Marin – Caiet de istorie contemporană universală
Bibliografie:
Ch. Zorgbibe, Histoire des relations internationales, Paris, 1994, vol. II (De la paix de
Versailles à la Grande Alliance contre Hitler 1918-1945), p. 4-94. (BIG 11554)
M. Iacobescu, România la Societatea Naţiunilor, Bucureşti, 1988, p. 16-56, 68-78. (F
3237 a/b)
Pierre Gerbert (coord.), Société des Nations et Organisation des Nations Unies, Paris,
Edition Richelieu, 1973, p. 5-30. (BIG 10209)
SEMINAR NR. 3
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Mihai Croitor , Manuela Marin – Caiet de istorie contemporană universală
Bibliografie:
Charles Zorgbibe, op. cit., p. 97-109, 177-184, 193-240.
Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, London, 1988, p. 296-353.
P. Milza, S. Berstein, Istoria secolului XX, Bucureşti, 1999, vol. I. (BIG 12215) (paginile
referitoare la problematică)
Jean- Baptiste Duroselle, Istoria relaţiilor internaţionale 1919-1947, vol.I, Editura
Ştiinţelor Sociale şi Poltice, Bucureşti, 2006 (paginile referitoare la problematică)
SEMINAR NR. 4 ŞI 5
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Mihai Croitor , Manuela Marin – Caiet de istorie contemporană universală
Jacques Droz, Istoria Germaniei, Corint, 2000, cap. V : Republica de la Weimar ; cap.
VI : Germania hitleristă. (BIG 12814)
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Mihai Croitor , Manuela Marin – Caiet de istorie contemporană universală
Claude David, Hitler şi nazismul, Corint, 2002, partea I-ascensiunea lui Hither şi a
nazismului, Germania 1919-1933 (p. 7-77); partea a II-a: Hitlerismul la putere (1934-
1945) : stuctura statului : puterea centrală, statele, partidul, poliţii şi organizaţii militare,
Lagăre de concentrare, Instituţii fundamentale ale statului (justiţia, propaganda, formarea
tineretului, organizarea muncii. Politica socială) (p. 79-91) ; Politica economică (p. 93-
102) ; Politica internă. Persecuţii şi crize (p. 103-130).
Max Gallo, Italia lui Mussolini, Bucureşti, 1969. (BIG 6292, 854487)
Giuliano Procacci, Istoria italienilor, Bucureşti, Editura politică, 1975, p. 431-438, 452-
468. (BIG 7194)
Martin Clark, Modern Italy: 1871-1982, London, New York: Longman, 1993 (BIG
11319) (paginile referitoare la tematică)
Michael Lynch, Stalin şi Huşciov URSS, 1924-1964, Bucureşti, BIC ALL, 1991.
(paginile referitoare la problematică)
N. Werth, Istoria Uniunii Sovietice de la Lenin la Stalin (1917-1953), Bucureşti, Corint,
2000. (paginile referitoare la problematică)
Facultativ :
Chantal Millon-Delsol, Ideile politice ale secolului XX, Iaşi, Polirom, 2002, p. 24-51; p.
53-91; p. 118-121.
Gh. Rădulescu, Spania, Bucureşti, 1997, p. 210-216, 225-254, 266-273. (761900)
A. H. de Oliveira Marques, Istoria Portugaliei, Bucureşti, 1996, p. 145-172. (725024)
J. Gernet, Lumea chineză, vol. II, Bucureşti, Editura Meridiane, 1985 (BIG 8176)
(paginile referitoare la problematică)
Hani Goro, Istoria poporului japonez, Bucureşti, Editura politică, 1964 (BIG 5543)
(paginile referitoare la problematică)
V. Cristian, Istoria Asiei, Corint, 2002. (paginile referitoare la problematică)
SEMINAR NR. 6
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Mihai Croitor , Manuela Marin – Caiet de istorie contemporană universală
Bibliografie:
Leonida Loghin, Mari conferinţe internaţionale 1939-1945, Bucureşti, Editura Politică,
1989 (paginile referitoare la problematică)
Ch. Zorgbibe, op. cit., vol. II, p. 273-295, vol. III (Du system de Ialta aux missiles de
Cuba 1945-1962), p. 7-39.
Marea conflagraţie a secolului XX, p. 188-197. (BIG 6611 a/b)
R. G. Feltham, Diplomatic Handbook, London and New York, 1982, p. 61-85. (BIG
9786)
Pierre Gerbert (coord.), op. cit., (BIG 10209) (paginile referitoare la problematică)
SEMINAR NR. 7
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Mihai Croitor , Manuela Marin – Caiet de istorie contemporană universală
Bibliografie:
Ch. Zorgbibe, op. cit., vol. III, p. 7-65.
H. Kissinger, Diplomaţia, Bucureşti, 1998, p. 385-429 (BIG12223)
André Fontaine, Istoria războiului rece : de la Revoluţia din Octombrie la războiul din
Coreea : 1917-1950, Bucureşti, Editura militară, 1991, vol. III (BIG 10175/723483)
(paginile referitoare la problematică)
SEMINAR NR. 8
Bibliografie:
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Mihai Croitor , Manuela Marin – Caiet de istorie contemporană universală
Hugh Seton-Watson, The East European Revolution, London, 1991. (BIG 5346) (paginile
referitoare la problematică)
Peter Calvocoressi, Politica mondială după 1945 , Editura ALLFA , Bucureşti , 2000
(paginile referitoare la problematică)
Joseph Rothschild, Întoarcerea la diversitate. Istoria politică a Europei Centrale şi de
Est după al Doilea Război Mondial, Oradea, Editura Antet, 1997, cap. 3 (Comuniştii
preiau puterea), cap. 4 (Dialectica stalinismului şi a titoismului)
SEMINAR NR. 9
Bibliografie:
André Fontaine, op. cit., vol. IV, De la Războiul din Coreea la criza alianţelor: 1950-
1967, Bucureşti, 1994. (BIG 10175/723483) (paginile referitoare la problematică)
Ch. Zorgbibe, op. cit., vol. III, p. 67-128, 166-187.
H. Kissinger, op. cit., p. 429-538, 586-589.
Jean-Louis Dufour, Crizele internaţionale. De la Beijing (1900) la Kosovo (1999),
Corint, 2002. [Blocada Berlinului (1948-1949) (p. 93-96) ; Insurecţia ungară (1956) (p.
96-98) ;
SEMINAR NR. 10
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Mihai Croitor , Manuela Marin – Caiet de istorie contemporană universală
Bibliografie:
André Fontaine, op. cit., vol. IV, De la Războiul din Coreea la criza alianţelor: 1950-
1967, Bucureşti, 1994. (BIG 10175/723483) (paginile referitoare la problematică)
Ch. Zorgbibe, op. cit., vol. III, p. 67-128, 166-187.
H. Kissinger, op. cit., p. 429-538, 586-589.
Jean-Louis Dufour, op. cit., [Naţionalizarea Companiei Universale a canalului Suez
(1956) (p. 98-101) ; Rachetele din Cuba (1962) (p. 115-117)
SEMINAR NR. 11
Bibliografie:
Henry Kissinger, op. cit., p. 538-689.
Ch. Zorgbibe, op. cit., vol. III, p. 307-326, vol. IV (Du schisme Moscou-Pékin à l’après
guerre froide : 1962 à nos jours), p. 7-11, 51-64, 142-144, 178-211.
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Mihai Croitor , Manuela Marin – Caiet de istorie contemporană universală
André Fontaine, op. cit., vol. IV. (BIG 10175/723483) (paginile referitoare la
problematică)
Jean-Louis Dufour, op. cit., [Războiul de şase zile şi reacţiile comunităţii internaţionale
(1967) (p. 120-122) ; Primăvara de la Praga şi intervenţia sovietică (1968) (p. 122-125) ;
Urmările internaţionale ale Războiului de Yom Kippur (1973) (p. 127-130)
SEMINAR NR. 12
Bibliografie:
Henry Kissinger, op. cit., p. 689-727.
Françoise Thom, Sfârşiturile comunismului, Polirom, Iaşi, p. 35-91.
Joseph Rothschild, op. cit., cap. 7 (Finaluri de partidă), cap. 8 (Epilog)
Peter Calvocoressi, op. cit. (paginile referitoare la problematică)
Ch. Zorgbibe, op. cit., vol. IV, p. 341-350.
Jean-Louis Dufour, op. cit., [Intervenţia sovietică în Afganistan (1979) (p. 154-156) ;
Stare de război în Polonia (1981) (p. 159-162)]
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Mihai Croitor , Manuela Marin – Caiet de istorie contemporană universală
Studii de caz : URSS după al doilea război mondial, China, Europa de Est, Europa
de Vest, , SUA,
Bibliografie generală:
Paul Johnson, op. cit., vol. II. (paginile referitoare la problematică)
Norman Davis, Europe A History, Oxford and New York Univ. Press, p. 1057-1137 (cap.
12) (BIG 12476)
Pierre Milza, S. Berstein, op. cit., vol. II, vol. III. (paginile referitoare la problematică)
Peter Calvocoressi, op. cit. (paginile referitoare la problematică)
René duc de Castris, Histoire de la France : des origines à 1981, p. 575-599. (BIG 9859)
J. Madaule, op. cit., vol. III. (paginile referitoare la tematică)
P. Courtier, La quatrième republique, Paris, 1989, 126 p. (BIG 9025)
H. Mendras, La séconde revolution française : 1965-1984, Paris, Gallimard, 1988 (BIG
9498)
Allan M. Winkler , Trecutul apropiat, eseuri si documente despre America dupa al doilea
razboi mondial,
Garson Robert, The Uncertain Power : A Political History of the USA since 1929, (BIG
9777)
G. Brown Tindall, E. David Shi, America: o istorie narativă, Bucureşti, Editura
Enciclopedică, 1996, vol. III (BIG 11392)
André Kaspi, Histoire des Etats Unis de l’Amerique, p. 383-547
Camil Mureşan, Al. Vianu, Preşedinte la Casa Albă, Bucureşti, Editura politică, 1974, p.
525-637. (BIG 7091)
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Mihai Croitor , Manuela Marin – Caiet de istorie contemporană universală
René Rémond, Istoria Statelor Unite ale Americii, Corint, 1999, p. 135-148.
Michael Lynch, Stalin şi Huşciov URSS, 1924-1964, Bucureşti, BIC ALL, 1991.
(paginile referitoare la problematică)
N. Werth, Istoria Uniunii Sovietice de la Lenin la Stalin (1917-1953), Corint, 2000.
(paginile referitoare la problematică)
Nicolas Werth, Istoria Uniunii Sovietice de la Hruşciov la Gorbaciov (1953-1985),
Bucureşti, Corint, 2000.
Pascal Lorot, Perestroika. URSS sub Gorbaciov (1985-1991), Bucureşti, Corint, 2002.
Jacques Droz, Istoria Germaniei, Corint, 2000, cap. VII: Germania divizată, cap. VIII:
Reunificarea
Martin Clark, op. cit. (paginile referitoare la tematică)
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Mihai Croitor , Manuela Marin – Caiet de istorie contemporană universală
Seminar nr. 2
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Mihai Croitor , Manuela Marin – Caiet de istorie contemporană universală
şi Pichon pentru Franţa, Wilson şi colonelul House pentru SUA, Lloyd George şi
Balfour pentru Anglia, Orlando şi Sonnino pentru Italia, Saionji şi Makino pentru
Japonia).
d. Fiecare delegaţie a fost însoţită de numeroşi experţi şi profesionişti, care aveau
misiunea de a prepara tehnic negocierea tratatelor.
e. Au funcţionat 52 de comisii pentru reglementarea problemelor specifice: Liga
Naţiunilor, Responsabilitatea pentru Război şi Garanţii, Reparaţii, pentru
minorităţi, Oraganizaţia Internaţională a Muncii, etc. Toate erau subordonate şi
coordinate de Consiliul celor zece
f. A doua fază a conferinţei: 14 martie- sfârşitul lunii aprilie 1919
g. Pregătirea şi adoptarea formei finale a Statutului (Conventului) Ligii Naţiunilor,
negocierea termenilor tratatului de la Versailles.
h. Coordonarea activităţilor a fost transferată Consiliului celor 4, apoi – după criza
din Fiume – celor 3, care a luat toate deciziile finale pentru cele cinic tratate de
pace.
i. Crize apărute în negociere între puterile aliate: statutul zonei Rhin-ului, a oraşului
Fiume sau asupra Shantungului.
j. Pregătirea tratatelor dificilă: multe comisii de specialitate implicate, lipsă de
coordonare între acestea: muncă laborioasă şi dificil de evaluat la nivelul ultim
decizional: exemplu, Tratatul cu Germania, 200 pagini, 440 articole organizate în
15 capitole, fiecare dependent de munca mai multor comisii. Ca urmare, Consiliul
celor 4 nu a văzut textul în întregime decât în 7 mai 1919 doar cu puţine ore
înainte de transmiterea acestuia către delegaţia germană.
k. Semnarea tratatului de la Versailles a încheiat misiunea principală a Conferinţei;
de acum preparativele pentru încheierea tratatelor cu Austria, Ungaria, Bulgaria a
fost lăsată în sarcina Consiliului Suprem organizat la Versailles; termenii
tratatului cu Turcia au fost precizaţi la Londra şi semnarea a avut loc la Sevres, 20
august 1920.
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Mihai Croitor , Manuela Marin – Caiet de istorie contemporană universală
c) planul francez Leon Bourgeois: crearea unei forţe militare internaţionale , având un
stat major permanent
- Comisia pentru Societatea Naţiunilor a acceptat proiectul comun anglo – american
Hurst – Miller, ca bază a discuţiilor
- 28 aprilie 1919 - acceptarea regulamentului Societăţii Naţiunilor prin adunarea
plenară a Conferinţei de pace de la Versailles
- 28 iunie 1919 – semnarea regulamentului alcătuit din 26 de articole de către statele
fondatoare, care sunt şi semnatare ale tratatului de pace. Regulamentul devine parte
integrantă a Tratatului de la Versailles
- ianuarie 1920 Societatea Naţiunilor îşi începe activitatea.
B) Structura:
1) Adunarea generală
- se întruneşte o dată pe an la Geneva
- în cadrul ei, fiecare stat are drept de vot
2) Consiliul:
- alcătuit iniţial din 5 membri permanenţi şi 4 membrii provizorii aleşi de Adunarea
generală
- Germania intră în Societatea Naţiunilor în 1926 şi tot atunci devine membru
permanent; după retragerea sa în 1933, locul său este preluat de Uniunea Sovietică
- creşte numărul membrilor provizorii de la 6 în 1922, la 9 în 1926 pentru ca în 1936,
numărul lor să ajungă la 11
- atribuţii: decide în caz de conflict care este agresorul şi preconizează eventualele
sancţiuni
3) Secretariatul general
- condus de un secretar general permanent
- pregăteşte documentele şi rapoartele pentru Adunarea generală şi Consiliu
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Mihai Croitor , Manuela Marin – Caiet de istorie contemporană universală
C ) Scopul:
- crearea şi garantarea securităţii colective prin mijloace specifice specificate în
statutul Societăţii (arbitraj, sancţiuni morale, economice, militare)
- dezvoltarea cooperării între state
- reducerea înarmărilor
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Mihai Croitor , Manuela Marin – Caiet de istorie contemporană universală
Dicţionar:
armistiţiu: suspendarea temporară a acţiunilor militare în urma unui acord încheiat
între părţile beligerante
clauză: dispoziţie prevăzută într-o convenţie sau tratat
demilitarizare: desfiinţarea, în urma unei convenţii sau a unui tratat, a oricărei
armate şi excluderea armamentului sau a instalaţiilor militare de pe un anumit
teritoriu
plebiscit / referendum: consultarea prealabilă a cetăţenilor, care urmează să se
pronunţe prin „da” sau „nu” asupra unui act de stat de importanţă deosebită
preambul: parte introductivă a unui act important, a unui tratat internaţional, care
lămureşte utilitatea sau necesitatea lui sau care prezintă sumar dispoziţiile lui
generale; expunere de motive (a unui proiect de lege)
reparaţii de război: despăgubiri plătite pentru compensarea pagubelor economice
datorate unui război
securitate colectivă: componentă a relaţiilor internaţionale, concretizată prin măsuri
comune, luate de către toate statele şi care vizează menţinerea păcii şi respectarea
angajamentelor
teritoriu sub mandat: teritoriu administrat de o ţară străină în baza hotărârii unui for
internaţional
tratat: înţelegere scrisă încheiată între două sau mai multe state, în vederea
determinării, într-un anumit domeniu, a drepturilor şi a obligaţiilor părţilor
contractante sau în scopul stabilirii unor norme juridice; acord internaţional,
convenţie internaţională
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Mihai Croitor , Manuela Marin – Caiet de istorie contemporană universală
V Suport documentar
1. Convenţii de pace publice, încheiate deschis, după care nu vor mai exista acorduri
internaţionale private de nici un fel, ci o diplomaţie care va acţiona întotdeauna cu
sinceritate în văzul tuturor.
2. Libertatea absolută de navigaţie pe mări în afara apelor teritoriale, atât pe timp de pace
cât şi în timp de război, în afară de mările care ar putea fi închise total sau în parte printr-
o acţiune internaţională în vederea executării acordurilor internaţionale.
3. Suprimarea, atât cât va fi posibil, a tuturor barierelor economice; stabilirea de condiţii
comerciale egale între toate naţiunile care sunt de acord cu pacea şi se asociază pentru a o
menţine.
4. Garanţii convenabile, date şi luate, că armamentele naţionale vor fi reduse până la
ultimul punct compatibil cu securitatea ţării.
5. Înţelegerea liberă, într-un spirit larg şi absolut a tuturor revendicărilor coloniale, bazată
pe respectarea şi pe principiul strict că, în fixarea tuturor chestiunilor de suveranitate,
interesele populaţiilor în cauză vor trebui să aibă o pondere egală cu aceea a cererilor
echitabile ale guvernului al cărui titlu trebuie să fie hotărât.
6. Evacuarea tuturor teritoriilor ruse şi reglementarea tuturor chestiunilor privitoare la
Rusia, care vor asigura cea mai buna şi mai liberă cooperare a celorlalte naţiuni, pentru a
da Rusiei prilejul să hotărască, fără să fie împiedicată sau stânjenită, pentru independenţa
propriei sale dezvoltări şi a politicii sale naţionale şi pentru a i se asigura o sinceră bună
primire în Societatea naţiunilor libere, sub instituţiile alese de ea singură şi, mai mult
decât o primire, întregul ajutor de care ea ar avea nevoie şi pe care l-ar dori.
Tratamentul acordat Rusiei de către naţiunile surori în lunile ce urmează va fi piatra de
încercare a bunăvoinţei lor şi a înţelegerii nevoilor ei, abstracţie făcând de propriile lor
interese şi de simpatia lor dezinteresată.
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Mihai Croitor , Manuela Marin – Caiet de istorie contemporană universală
14. O asociaţie generală de naţiuni va trebui să fie formată prin convenţii speciale, în
scopul de a da garanţii mutuale de independenţă politică şi integritate teritorială statelor
mari, ca şi celor mici.
SURSA: Alexandru Vianu, Zorin Zamfir, Constantin Buşe, Gheorghe
Bădescu, Relaţii internaţionale în acte şi documente, vol.I (1917-1939), Editura
Didactică şi Pedagogică, Bucureşti, 1974, pp.12- 14
Partea I
Pactul Societăţii Naţiunilor
Înaltele părţi contractante, considerând că, pentru a dezvolta cooperarea între naţiuni şi
pentru a le garanta pacea şi siguranţa, este necesar să se accepte anumite obligaţiuni, de a
nu recurge la război, să se întreţină la lumina zilei relaţiuni internaţionale bazate pe
justiţie şi onoare, să se observe riguros prescripţiunile dreptului internaţional, recunoscute
aici înainte ca regulă efectivă a guvernelor, să se facă să domnească dreptatea şi să se
respecte cu sfinţenie toate obligaţiile tratatelor, în raporturile mutuale dintre popoarele
organizate.
Adoptă prezentul pact, care instituie Societatea Naţiunilor.
Articolul 1
Sunt membri originari ai Societăţii Naţiunilor, acei dintre semnatari al căror nume
figurează în anexa prezentului Pact, precum şi statele, de asemenea numite în Anexă, care
vor fi aderat la prezentul Pact fără nici o rezervă, prin declaraţiune, depusă la Secretariat,
în cursul celor două luni de la intrarea în vigoare a Pactului şi despre care se va face
notificare celorlalţi membri ai societăţii.
Orice stat, dominion sau colonie care se guvernează liber şi care nu este menţionat în
anexă, poate deveni membru al Societăţii, dacă admiterea sa este pronunţată de cele două
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Mihai Croitor , Manuela Marin – Caiet de istorie contemporană universală
treimi ale adunării, cu condiţia să dea garanţii efective de intenţia sa sinceră de a observa
angajamentele sale internaţionale şi de a accepta regulamentul stabilit de Societate, în
ceea ce priveşte forţele şi armamentele sale militare, navale şi aeriene.
Orice membru al Societăţii poate, după o prealabilă înştiinţare făcută cu doi ani înainte,
să se retragă din Societate, cu condiţia de a fi îndeplinit, în acel moment, toate
obligaţiunile sale internaţionale, inclusiv cele prevăzute în prezentul Pact.
Articolul 2
Acţiunea Societăţii, astfel cum este definită în prezentul Pact, se exercită de o Adunare şi
de un Consiliu asistaţi de un secretariat permanent.
Articolul 3
Adunarea se compune din reprezentanţi ai membrilor Societăţii. Ea se întruneşte la epoci
fixate şi la orice moment, dacă împrejurările o cer, la sediul Societăţii sau în vreun alt loc
care ar putea fi desemnat.
Adunarea are căderea de a se pronunţa asupra oricărei chestiuni care intră în sfera de
activitate a Societăţii sau care atinge pacea lumii.
Fiecare membru al Societăţii nu poate avea mai mult de trei reprezentanţi în Adunare şi
nu dispune decât de un vot.
Articolul 4
Consiliul se compune din reprezentanţi ai principalelor Puteri aliate şi asociate, precum şi
din reprezentanţi ai altor patru membri ai Societăţii. Aceşti patru membrii sunt desemnaţi
în mod liber, de Adunare, şi la datele ce se va crede de cuviinţă. (...)
Cu aprobarea majorităţii Adunării, Consiliul poate desemna pe alţi membrii ai Societăţii a
căror reprezentare va fi de aici înainte permanentă.
El poate, cu aceeaşi aprobare, să sporească numărul membrilor Societăţii care vor fi aleşi
de adunare pentru a fi reprezentaţi în Consiliu.
Consiliul se întruneşte când o cer împrejurările şi cel puţin o dată pe an, la sediul
Societăţii, sau în orice alt loc care ar putea fi desemnat.
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Orice chestiune intrând în sfera de activitate a Societăţii sau privitoare la pacea lumii e de
căderea Consiliului.
Orice membru al Societăţii care nu este reprezentat în Consiliu este invitat să trimită un
reprezentant, spre a lua parte în Consiliu, atunci când o chestiune care îl interesează în
particular e adusă înaintea Consiliului.
Fiecare membru al Societăţii reprezentat în Consiliu nu dispune decât de un vot şi nu are
decât un singur reprezentant.
Articolul 5
Afară de vreo dispoziţiune hotărâtă contra acestui Pact, sau clauzelor prezentului tratat,
hotărârile Adunării sau ale Consiliului sunt date de unanimitatea membrilor Societăţii
reprezentanţi în Adunare. (...)
Articolul 6
Secretariatul permanent este stabilit la sediul societăţii. El se compune dintr-un Secretar
general, din secretari şi din personalul necesar. (...)
Articolul 7
Sediul Societăţii este stabilit la Geneva. (...)
Articolul 8
Membrii Societăţii recunosc că menţinerea păcii cere reducerea armamentului naţional la
minimul compatibil cu siguranţa naţională şi cu executarea obligaţiunilor internaţionale
impuse printr-o acţiune comună. (...)
După adoptarea lor de diversele guverne, limita armamentelor astfel fixate nu poate fi
depăşită fără consimţământul Consiliului. (...)
Articolul 10
Membrii Societăţii îşi iau îndatorirea să respecte şi să menţină în contra oricărei
agresiuni externe integritatea teritorială şi independenţa politică existentă a tuturor
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Mihai Croitor , Manuela Marin – Caiet de istorie contemporană universală
Articolul 11
Se declară în mod hotărât că orice război sau ameninţare de război, fie că ar atinge direct
sau indirect pe unul dintre membrii Societăţii, interesează întreaga Societate şi că aceasta
trebuie să ia măsurile proprii pentru a salva în mod eficace pacea Naţiunilor. În asemenea
caz, Secretariatul general convoacă imediat Consiliul, la cererea oricărui membru al
Societăţii.
În afară de aceasta se mai declară că orice membru al Societăţii are dreptul să atragă, în
mod amical, atenţiunea Adunări sau a Consiliului asupra oricărei împrejurări de natură să
atingă relaţiunile internaţionale şi care ameninţă în urmă să tulbure pacea, sau buna
înţelegere între naţiuni, de care depinde pacea.
Articolul 12
Toţi membrii societăţii convin că, dacă se iveşte între ei un diferend susceptibil să aducă
o ruptură, îl vor supune fie procedurii arbitrajului, fie examinării Consiliului. Ei mai
convin că, în nici un caz, nu trebuie să recurgă la război înainte de expirarea unui termen
de trei luni după darea sentinţei arbitrilor sau după raportul Consiliului. (...)
Articolul 13
Membrii Societăţii convin că dacă s-ar ivi între ei un diferend susceptibil, după părerea
lor, de o soluţie arbitrară şi dacă acestui diferend nu i se poate pune capăt în mod
satisfăcător, pe cale diplomatică, chestiunea va fi supusă în întregime arbitrajului.
Printre diferendele care sunt în general susceptibile de o soluţie arbitrară se declară: toate
diferendele privitoare la interpretarea unui tratat, la orice chestiune de drept internaţional,
al orice fapt care dacă s-ar realiza ar constitui ruptura unui angajament internaţional,
precum şi diferendele relative la întinderea sau la natura reparaţiilor datorate pentru o
asemenea ruptură.
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Articolul 14
Consiliul este însărcinat să prepare un proiect de Curtea permanentă de justiţie
internaţională şi să-l supună membrilor Societăţii. Această Curte va fi competentă de a
judeca toate diferendele cu caracter internaţional ce părţile i le vor supune. Ea va da, de
asemenea, avize consultative asupra oricărui diferend sau oricărui punct ce va fi adus
înaintea ei de către Consiliu sau de Adunare.
Articolul 15
Dacă se iveşte între membrii societăţii un diferend susceptibil a atrage după sine o ruptură
şi dacă acest diferend nu este supus arbitrajului prevăzut prin articolul 13, membrii
Societăţii convin să-l aducă în faţa Consiliului. În acest scop este de ajuns ca unul dintre
ei să aducă acest diferend la cunoştinţa Secretariatului general, care ia orice dispoziţiuni
în vederea unei anchete şi a unei examinări complete. (...)
Articolul 16
Dacă un membru al Societăţii recurge la război contra angajamentelor luate prin
articolele 12, 13 sau 15 este de ipso facto considerat că a comis un act de război în contra
tuturor celorlalţi membri ai Societăţii. Aceştia se îndatorează să rupă imediat cu el orice
relaţiuni comerciale sau financiare, să interzică orice raporturi între naţionali lor şi aceia
ai statului care a călcat Pactul, şi să facă să înceteze orice comunicaţiuni financiare,
comerciale sau personale între naţionalii acestui stat şi aceia a oricărui alt stat sau nu al
societăţii.
În acest caz, Consiliul are datoria de a recomanda diferitelor guverne interesate efectivele
militare, navale sau aeriene cu care membrii Societăţii vor contribui, fiecare în parte, la
forţele armate destinate respectării angajamentelor Societăţii.
Membrii Societăţii mai convin, în afară de aceasta, de a-şi da sprijin reciproc pentru
aplicarea măsurilor economice şi financiare ce urmează a se lua în virtutea prezentului
articol, pentru a reduce la minimum pierderile şi neajunsurile ce ar putea rezulta. Îşi dau,
de asemenea, sprijin reciproc pentru a rezista împotriva oricărei măsuri speciale
îndreptate în contra unuia dintre ei, de către statul care a călcat Pactul.
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Mihai Croitor , Manuela Marin – Caiet de istorie contemporană universală
Ei iau dispoziţiunile necesare pentru a înlesni trecerea prin teritoriul lor a forţelor oricărui
membru al Societăţii, care ia parte la o acţiune comună pentru a obţine respectarea
angajamentelor luate de Societate.
Poate fi exclus din Societate orice membru care s-a făcut vinovat de violarea vreunuia din
angajamentele ce rezultă din Pact. Excluderea este pronunţată prin votul tuturor celorlalţi
membrii ai Societăţii reprezentaţi în Consiliu.
Articolul 17
În caz de diferend între două state, dintre care numai unul singur este membru al
Societăţii sau între două state care nu fac parte din Societate, statul sau statele care nu
sunt membrii si Societăţii sunt invitate să se supună obligaţiunilor impuse membrilor ei,
pentru soluţionarea diferendului în condiţiile socotite drepte de Consiliu. Dacă această
invitaţie este primită, dispoziţiunile articolelor 12-16 se aplică sub rezerva modificărilor
considerate ca necesare de Consiliu.
Din momentul trimiterii acestei invitaţiuni, Consiliul deschide o anchetă asupra
împrejurărilor diferendului şi propune măsura care i se pare cea mai nimerită şi cea mai
eficace în acea împrejurare.
Dacă statul invitat refuză să primească obligaţiunile de membru al societăţii, în scopul
soluţionării diferendului şi recurge la război în contra vreunui membru al Societăţii, îi
sunt aplicabile dispoziţiunile articolului 16.
Dacă cele două părţi invitate refuză să primească obligaţiunile de membri ai societăţii, în
scopul soluţionării diferendului, Consiliul poate să ai toate măsurile şi să facă propuneri
de natură a preveni ostilităţile şi a pune capăt conflictului.
Articolul 18
Orice tratat sau angajament internaţional încheiat în viitor de un membru al Societăţii va
trebui imediat înregistrat de Secretariat şi publicat de el cât mai curând posibil. Nici unul
dintre aceste tratate sau angajamente nu va fi obligatoriu înainte de a fi fost înregistrat.
(...)
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Articolul 20
Membrii Societăţii recunosc, fiecare în ce-l priveşte, că prezentul Pact abrogă orice
obligaţiuni sau înţelegeri „inter se”, incompatibile cu dispoziţiunile sale şi se leagă în
mod solemn să nu mai contracteze în viitor altele de acest fel.
Dacă înainte de intrarea sa în Societate un membru a luat asupră-şi obligaţiuni
incompatibile cu dispoziţiunile Pactului, dânsul trebuie să ia măsuri imediate pentru a se
desface de aceste obligaţiuni.(...)
Articolul 21
Principiile următoare se aplică coloniilor şi teritoriilor care în urma războiului au încetat a
fi sub suveranitatea Statelor care le guvernau mai înainte şi care sunt locuite de popoare
încă incapabile de a se conduce ele însele, date fiind condiţiunile deosebit de grele ale
lumii moderne. Bunăstarea şi dezvoltarea acestor popoare formând o misiune sfântă a
civilizaţiei, este necesar să se încorporeze în prezentul Pact garanţii pentru îndeplinirea
acestei misiuni.
Cea mai bună metodă pentru realizarea în mod practic a acestui principiu este de a
încredinţa tutela acestor popoare naţiunilor mai înaintate care, prin resursele, experienţa
sau poziţiunea lor geografică sunt cele mai în măsură să-şi ia această răspundere şi care
consimt să o primească: ele ar exercita această tutelă în calitate de mandatare şi în numele
Societăţii.
Caracterul mandatului trebuie să difere, după gradul de dezvoltare al poporului, după
situaţia geografică a teritoriului, după orice alte circumstanţe asemănătoare (....)
Articolul 26
Modificările Pactului de faţă vor intra în vigoare din momentul ratificării lor de către
membrii Societăţii, ai cărei reprezentanţi compun Consiliul, şi de către majoritatea
acelora ai cărei reprezentanţi formează Adunarea.
Orice membru al societăţii este liber a nu primi amendamentele aduse Pactului, în care
caz el încetează a mai face parte din Societate.
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Partea a II-a
Tratatul de pace cu Germania
Partea a III-a
Clauze politice europene
Secţiunea I – Belgia
Articolul 32
Germania recunoaşte deplina suveranitate a Belgiei asupra ansamblului teritoriului
contestat Moresnet (zis Moresnet neutru) (...)
Articolul 33
Germania renunţă în favoarea Belgiei la orice drept şi titlu asupra teritoriilor ce cuprind
ansamblul ţinuturilor (Kreise) Eupen şi Malmedy. (...)
Articolul 40
Germania recunoaşte că Marele Ducat de Luxemburg a încetat a mai face parte din
Uniunea vamală germană, cu începere de la 1 ianuarie 1919; renunţă la orice drepturi
asupra căilor ferate; aderă la abrogarea regimului de neutralitate a Marelui Ducat şi
acceptă dinainte toate aranjamentele internaţionale încheiate de către Puterile aliate şi
asociate cu privire la Marele Ducat (...).
Articolul 42
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Articolul 43
Sunt de asemenea interzise, în zona definită de articolul 42, întreţinerea sau adunarea de
forţe armate, fie cu caracter permanent, fie cu caracter temporar, precum şi orice manevre
militare, de orice natură ar fi, şi menţinerea oricăror mijloace materiale de mobilizare.
Articolul 49
Germania renunţă în favoarea Societăţii Naţiunilor (...)la guvernarea teritoriului specificat
mai sus.
După expirarea unui termen de 15 ani, socotit de la data intrării în vigoare a prezentului
tratat, populaţia sus – zisului teritoriu va fi chemată să se pronunţe asupra suveranităţii
sub care ar dori să fie pusă.
Articolul 51
Teritoriile cedate Germaniei [ Alsacia şi Lorena ] în virtutea Preliminariilor de pace
semnate la Versailles la 26 februarie 1871 şi Tratatului de la Frankfurt de la 10 mai 1871,
se reintegrează în suveranitatea franceză, cu începere de la armistiţiul din 11 noiembrie
1918. (...)
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Articolul 80
Germania recunoaşte şi va respecta cu stricteţe independenţa Austriei, între frontierele
care se vor fixa printr-un tratat ce se va încheia între această ţară şi principalele Puteri
aliate şi asociate.
Articolul 8
Germania recunoaşte, după cum au făcut-o de acum Puterile aliate şi asociate, completa
independenţă a statului cehoslovac (...). Ea declară că este de acord cu frontierele acestui
stat, aşa cum vor fi ele determinate de către principalele Puteri aliate şi asociate, si
celelalte state interesate.
Articolul 83
Germania renunţă în favoarea statului cehoslovac la toate drepturile şi titlurile sale asupra
părţii din teritoriul silezian (...).
Articolul 87
Germania recunoaşte, după cum au făcut-o de acum Puterile aliate şi asociate, completa
independenţă a Poloniei şi renunţă în favoarea Poloniei la orice drepturi şi titluri asupra
teritoriilor delimitate de Marea Baltică, frontiera estică a Germaniei (...).
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Partea a IV-a
Drepturile şi interesele germane în afara Germaniei
Articolul 119
Germania renunţă în favoarea principalelor Puteri aliate şi asociate la toate drepturile şi
titlurile sale asupra posesiunilor sale de peste mare.(...)
Partea a V-a
Clauze militare, navale şi aeriene
Articolul 160
Cu începere de la 31 martie 1920 cel mai târziu, armata germană nu va trebui să cuprindă
mai mult de şapte divizii de infanterie şi trei divizii de cavalerie.
Începând din acest moment, totalul efectivelor armatei statelor care constituie Germania
nu va trebui să depăşească o sută de mii de oameni, inclusiv ofiţeri şi necombatanţi, şi va
fi destinată exclusiv la menţinerea ordinii pe teritoriu şi la poliţia frontierelor.
Efectivul total de ofiţeri, inclusiv personalul Statelor majore, oricare ar fi alcătuirea
acestora, nu va trebui să depăşească patru mii (...) Marele Stat major german şi alte
formaţiuni similare vor fi dizolvate şi nu vor putea fi reconstituite sub nici o formă (...).
Articolul 173
Orice fel de serviciu militar obligatoriu va fi desfiinţat în Germania. Armata germană nu
va putea fi construită şi recrutată decât prin angajări voluntare.(...)
Articolul 180
Toate fortificaţiile, fortăreţele şi locurile întărite, situate pe teritoriul german, la vestul
unei linii trasate de 50 km est de Rin, vor fi dezarmate şi dărmate (...)
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Articolul 181
După expirarea unui termen de două luni, socotit de la punerea în vigoare a Tratatului,
forţele flotei de război germane nu vor trebui să depăşească în nave înarmate:6 cuirasate,
6 crucişătoare uşoare, 12 distrugătoare, 12 torpilatoare sau un număr egal de vase de
înlocuire (...). Ele nu vor trebui să includă nici un vas submarin.(...)
Articolul 191
Construcţia şi achiziţia oricărui fel de vas submarin, chiar de comerţ, vor fi interzise în
Germania. (...)
Articolul 198
Forţele militare ale Germaniei nu vor trebui să cuprindă nici o aviaţie militară sau
marină.(...)
Articolul 203
Toate clauzele militare, navale şi aeronautice conţinute în prezentul Tratat şi pentru
executarea cărora s-a fixat o limită de timp vor fi executate de Germania sub controlul
unor Comisiuni interaliate, special numite în acest scop de către principalele Puteri aliate
şi asociate (...)
Partea a VIII-a
Reparaţii
Articolul 231
Guvernele aliate şi asociate declară, iar Germania recunoaşte, că Germania şi aliaţii săi
sunt răspunzători – pentru că le-au cauzat - de toate pierderile şi de toate daunele suferite
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Articolul 233
Valoarea pagubelor sus – menţionate, pentru care Germania datorează reparaţii, va fi
fixată de o Comisie interaliată, care va lua denumirea de Comisiunea reparaţiilor (...)
Comisiunea va stabili un stat de plată, prevăzând termenele şi modalităţile de achitare de
către Germania a întregii sale datorii, în decursul unei perioade de 30 de ani, cu începere
de la 1 mai 1921. (...)
Articolul 235
(...) în cursul anilor 1919 şi 1920, precum şi în primele patru luni ale anului 1921,
Germania va plăti echivalentul a 20 miliarde mărci aur, în vărsăminte şi în condiţiile pe
care le va fixa Comisiunea reparaţiilor (în aur, mărfuri, vapoare, hârtii de valoare saul
altfel) (...)
Articolul 249
Costul total al întreţinerii tuturor armatelor aliate şi asociate în teritoriile germane ocupate
va fi în sarcina Germaniei cu începere de la semnarea armistiţiului de la 11 noiembrie
1918 (...).
Partea a XII-a
Porturi, căi fluviale şi căi ferate
Articolul 331
Sunt declarate internaţionale: Elba (...), Oder (...), Niemen (...), Dunărea (...).
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Partea a XIV-a
Garanţii de executare
Articolul 428
Drept garanţie pentru executarea prezentului Tratat de către Germania, teritoriile germane
aflate la Vest de Rin, împreună cu capetele de pod, vor fi ocupate de trupele Puterilor
aliate şi asociate timp de 15 ani, socotiţi de la intrarea în vigoare a prezentului Tratat (...)
Articolul 430
În cazul în care, fie în timpul ocupaţiei, fie după expirarea celor 15 ani sus arătaţi,
Comisia reparaţiilor ar recunoaşte ca Germania refuză să respecte în totul sau în parte
obligaţiunile ce rezultă pentru ea din prezentul Tratat cu privire la reparaţii, întreaga sau o
parte din zona specificată (...) va fi imediat ocupată din nou de către forţele aliate şi
asociate.
Articolul 431
Dacă Germania îşi va îndeplini toate angajamentele pe care şi le-a luat prin prezentul
Tratat, înainte de expirarea perioadei de 15 ani, trupele de ocupaţie vor fi retrase imediat
(...).
Articolul 433
Drept garanţie pentru executarea dispoziţiunilor prezentului tratat, prin care Germania
recunoaşte în mod definitiv abrogarea Tratatului de la Brest – Litovsk şi a tuturor
tratatelor, convenţiilor şi aranjamentelor pe care le-a încheiat cu guvernul maximalist din
Rusia, precum şi în vederea asigurării restabilirii păcii şi a unui guvern bun în provinciile
baltice şi în Lituania, - toate trupele germane, care se află actualmente în menţionatele
teritorii, se vor înapoia între hotarele Germaniei de îndată ce guvernele principalelor
Puteri aliate şi asociate vor socoti că este momentul potrivit, faţă de situaţia internă din
aceste teritorii.
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SURSA: Al. Vianu, Zorin Zamfir, C-tin Buşe, Relaţii internaţionale în acte şi
documente, vol. I (1917-1939), Bucureşti, Editura Didactică şi Pedagogică, Bucureşti,
1974, pp. 27- 32.
(...)
Articolul 59
Austria renunţă, în ce-o priveşte, în favoarea României la orice drepturi şi titluri asupra
părţii din fostul ducat al Bucovinei aflată dincoace de frontierele României, aşa cum vor
fi fixate ulterior de către principalele Puteri aliate şi asociate.(...)
Articolul 87
Austria recunoaşte şi se angajează să respecte, ca permanentă şi inalienabilă,
independenţa tuturor teritoriilor ce făceau parte din fostul imperiu al Rusiei la 1 august
1914 (...)
Articolul 88
Independenţa Austriei este inalienabilă numai cu consimţământul Consiliului Societăţii
Naţiunilor. În consecinţă, Austria se angajează să se abţină – în afară de cazul când ar
avea consimţământul zisului Consiliu (...)
Austria declară de pe acum că recunoaşte şi acceptă frontierele Bulgariei, Greciei,
Ungariei, Poloniei, României, ale Statului Sârbo- Croato- Sloven şi ale Statului
cehoslovac, aşa cum aceste vor fi stabilite de către principalele Puteri aliate şi
asociate.(...)
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Articolul 120
Numărul total al forţelor militare în armata austriacă nu va trebui să depăşească 30.000 de
oameni, inclusiv ofiţeri şi trupe auxiliare.(...)
Armata austriacă va trebui să fie folosită în mod exclusiv la menţinerea ordinii pe
întinderea teritoriului Austriei şi la poliţia frontierelor sale (...)
Articolul 177
Guvernele aliate şi asociate declară, şi Austria recunoaşte, că Austria şi aliaţii săi sunt
răspunzători – pentru a le fi cauzat – de pierderile şi pagubele suferite de Guvernele aliate
şi asociate şi naţionalii lor, ca urmare a războiului ce le-a fost impus prin agresiunea
Austro – Ungariei şi a aliaţilor săi. (...)
SURSA: Alexandru Vianu, Zorin Zamfir, Constantin Buşe, Gheorghe Bădescu, Relaţii
internaţionale în acte şi documente, vol.I (1917-1939), Editura Didactică şi Pedagogică,
Bucureşti, 1974, pp.35-36.
(...)
Articolul 27
Frontierele Bulgariei vor fi stabilite după cum urmează: cu România: de la Marea Neagră
până la Dunăre – frontiera aşa cum era la 1 august 1914; de acolo până la confluenţa
Timocului cu Dunărea; partea principală de navigaţie a Dunării în amont (...).
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Articolul 36
Bulgaria recunoaşte, aşa cum au făcut-o deja Puterile aliate şi asociate, Statul Sârbo-
Croato- Sloven (...).
Articolul 48
(...) Puterile aliate şi asociate se angajează ca libertatea accesului economic al Bulgariei la
Marea Egee să fie garantată. (...)
[Ulterior Tracia a fost cedată Greciei, iar Bulgaria a pierdut ieşirea la Marea Egee ]
Articolul 66
(...) Numărul total al forţelor militare în armata bulgară nu va trebui să depăşească 20.000
de oameni, inclusiv ofiţeri şi trupele auxiliare (...).
Articolul 122
Bulgaria recunoaşte că, alăturându-se războiului de agresiune pe care Germania şi
Austro-Ungaria le-au pornit împotriva Puterilor aliate şi asociate, le-a cauzat acestora din
urmă pierderi şi sacrificii de tot felul (...).
În consecinţă, Bulgaria se angajează să plătească (...) suma de două miliarde două sute
cincizeci milioane franci aur, reprezentând reparaţiile(...). Plata acestei sume se va face
prin vărsăminte semestriale (...) fiecare cuprinzând (...)suma necesară amortizării în 37 de
ani (...) a sumei datorate de Bulgaria (...).
SURSA: Alexandru Vianu, Zorin Zamfir, Constantin Buşe, Gheorghe Bădescu, Relaţii
internaţionale în acte şi documente, vol.I (1917-1939), Editura Didactică şi Pedagogică,
Bucureşti, 1974, pp.37-38
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Mihai Croitor , Manuela Marin – Caiet de istorie contemporană universală
(...)
Articolul 45
Ungaria renunţă, în ce-o priveşte, în favoarea României, la orice drepturi şi titluri asupra
teritoriilor din fosta monarhie austro –ungară, situate dincolo de frontierele Ungariei (...).
Articolul 73
Ungaria declară de pe acum că recunoaşte şi primeşte fruntariile Austriei, Bulgariei,
Greciei, Poloniei, României, Statului Sârbo – Croato – Sloven şi ale Statului Cehoslovac,
astfel cum aceste fruntarii vor fi fixate de către Principalele puteri aliate şi asociate.
Articolul 104
(...) Numărul total al forţelor militare în armata ungară nu va trebui să depăşească 30.000
de oameni, inclusiv ofiţeri şi trupele auxiliare (...).
Articolul 161
Ungaria recunoaşte că ea şi aliaţii săi sunt răspunzători, pentru a le fi cauzat, de pierderile
şi pagubele suferite de Guvernele aliate şi asociate şi de către conaţionalii lor, ca urmare a
războiului care le-a fost impus, prin agresiunea Austro – Ungaria şi a aliaţilor săi (...).
SURSA: Alexandru Vianu, Zorin Zamfir, Constantin Buşe, Gheorghe Bădescu, Relaţii
internaţionale în acte şi documente, vol.I (1917-1939), Editura Didactică şi Pedagogică,
Bucureşti, 1974, pp.39-40
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Mihai Croitor , Manuela Marin – Caiet de istorie contemporană universală
Seminar nr. 3
I. Tratatul celor Patru Puteri (Anglia, Franţa, Japonia, SUA), 13 decembrie 1921,
valabil pe o perioadă de 6 ani
- părţile semnatare conveneau să-şi respecte reciproc posesiunile din Pacific şi să supună
consultărilor orice dispute sau ameninţări din exterior
* De ilustrat principalele prevederi, precum şi semnificaţia tratatului pentru evoluţia
ulterioară a evenimentelor
II. Tratatul naval al celor cinci puteri sau tratatul asupra limitării armamentului
naval (Anglia, Franţa, Japonia, SUA, Italia), 6 februarie 1922, valabil pe o perioadă de
15 ani
- stabilea un sistem de limitare a tonajelor flotelor
- părţile semnatare se angajau să menţină status-quo-ul în zona Pacificului
* De ilustrat principalele prevederi, precum şi semnificaţia tratatului pentru evoluţia
ulterioară a evenimentelor
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Mihai Croitor , Manuela Marin – Caiet de istorie contemporană universală
III. Tratatul celor nouă (Anglia, Franţa, Japonia, SUA, Italia, China, Belgia, Olanda,
Portugalia)
- garanta independenţa Chinei
- Japonia retroceda Chinei Shandong şi Kiaochou
- angajamentul formal al părţilor de a sprijini politica porţilor deschise
II Relaţiile sovieto-germane
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- conţinea un protocol adiţional secret prin care erau stabilite sferele de influenţă
* De ilustrat contextul în care s-a semnat tratatul, principalele prevederi, precum şi
semnificaţia sa pentru evoluţia ulterioară a evenimentelor
Geneva, 1924-1925
- Protocolul de la Geneva sau Protocolul pentru reglementarea paşnică a diferendelor
dintre state viza:
- realizarea securităţii colective prin dezarmare
- introducea un element nou: arbitrajul obligatoriu
- stabilea o legătură între cei trei termeni: arbitraj, securitate, dezarmare
° De ilustrat contextul în care s-a a fost elaborat documentul, principalele prevederi,
cauzele eşecului acestei iniţiative
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Mihai Croitor , Manuela Marin – Caiet de istorie contemporană universală
IV Problema reparaţiilor
- a revenit unei Comisii a reparaţiilor, care trebuia să urmărească modul în care Germania
îşi onorează obligaţiile asumate
- Germania intră în incapacitate de plată a datoriilor sale problema datoriilor germane
a fost discutată la Conferinţa de la Spaa din iulie 1920
Conferinţa de la Spaa
- a stabilit cotele ce trebuiau să revină fiecărui învingător
- distribuia cotele care cădeau în sarcina Austriei, Ungariei, Bulgariei şi Turciei
*De ilustrat principalele hotărâri ale conferinţei
- Comisia de reparaţii (Londra, aprilie – mai 1921) a fixat cuantumul reparaţiilor datorate
de Germania la suma de 132 miliarde mărci aur sub ameninţarea ocupării Ruhrului de
către trupele aliate, guvernul german este nevoit să accepte această decizie, fără a putea
achita tranşeele respective 11 ianuarie 1923 trupele franceze şi belgiene ocupă bazinul
carbonifer al Ruhrului
- rezolvarea crizei Ruhrului s-a realizat prin planul Dawes, 1924
Planul Dawes
- se preconiza:
1) o reeşalonare a datoriilor Germaniei pe 5 ani
2) depunerile germane erau garantate printr-o ipotecă asupra căilor ferate şi industriei
* De ilustrat principalele prevederi ale planului
- între 1 iulie – 17 august 1925 trupele belgine şi cele franceze au evacuat zona Ruhrului
- planul Dawes este înlocuit cu planul Young, 1930
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Mihai Croitor , Manuela Marin – Caiet de istorie contemporană universală
Planul Young
- se prevedea reducerea datoriilor Germaniei la 38 miliarde mărci aur, plătibile în 59 de
ani
* De ilustrat principalele prevederi ale planului
- moratoriu Hoover, 1931– prevedea suspendarea pe o durată de un an a plăţii tuturor
reparaţiilor de război
- Conferinţa de la Laussane, 16 iunie – 19 iulie 1932, care a marcat sfârşitul problemei
reparaţiilor pentru că Germaniei i s-a impus să plătească doar 3 miliarde mărci aur şi
numai în măsura în care situaţia ei economică îi permitea acest lucru
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- memorandumul Hossbach din 5 noiembrie 1937: în timpul unei şedinţe Hitler cu o serie
de consilieri, acesta ar fi vorbit despre planurile de cucerire a lumii, propunând mai întâi
cucerirea Cehoslovacia şi doar apoi a Austriei
- lipsa unei coeziuni interne a statului generată de nemulţumirile minorităţilor naţionale
- poziţia geografică nefavorabilă a ţării în contextul unui conflict
- existenţa unei mişcări a germanilor din regiunea sudetă
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Mihai Croitor , Manuela Marin – Caiet de istorie contemporană universală
-24 aprilie 1938, Programul de la Karlsbad lipsa de reacţie a Franţei şi, implicit a
URSS
- Marea Britanie trimite ca mediator pe lordul Runciman
- 1 septembrie 1938 Hitler îl primeşte pe Konrad Helein, liderul germanilor sudeţi şi îi
vorbeşte acestuia despre „armonia perfectă între opiniile lor”
- 4 septembrie 1938 are loc o întâlnire între Benes şi liderii germanilor sudeţi
- 12 septembrie 1938, discursul lui Hitler de la Nürnberg 13 septembrie, liderii
germani sudeţi au întrerupt convorbirile cu autorităţile cehoslovace şi au încercat o
revoltă, care a fost rapid reprimată de guvernul cehoslovac
- 15 septembrie 1938 Chamberlain şi Sir Horace Wilson s-au întâlnit cu Hitler la
Berchtesgaden
- pe 20 septembrie 1938, guvernul cehoslovac a respins memoriu franco – britanic
privind împărţirea ţării
- pe 21 septembrie 1938, guvernul cehoslovac acceptă condiţiile impuse, ca urmarea a
unui ultimatum franco – britanic
- 22 septembrie 1938, Chamberlain s-a întâlnit din nou cu Hitler, la Godesberg, liderul
german declarând că nu este de acord cu condiţiile primite, germanii sudeţi fiind
maltrataţi, regiunea trebuia anexată Germaniei
- 29 septembrie 1938 Conferinţa de la München şi împărţirea statului cehoslovac
apogeul conciliatorismului
- 30 septembrie 1938 Chamberlain şi Hitler au semnat o declaraţie de neagresiune
considerată de toată lumea ca menit să aducă pacea în Europa
- la 2 octombrie 1938 Polonia colonelului Beck a ocupat regiunea Teschen
-la 2 noiembrie 1938, în urma primul dictat de la Viena, Ungaria primeşte sudul Slovaciei
- martie 1939, preşedintele cehoslovac Hacha (succesorul lui Benes) se întâlneşte cu
Hitler şi sub presiune, acceptă protectoratul german asupra Boemiei şi Moraviei
- 15 martie 1939, Slovacia îşi declară independenţa, iar la 16 martie 1939 acceptă
protectoratul german
* De ilustrat pe larg conţinutul fiecărei etape a agresiunii Germaniei asupra
Cehoslovaciei, precum şi reacţia marilor puteri.
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- în contextul unei crize economice resimţite de Japonia, militarii niponi propun ca soluţie
la această situaţie o politică de cuceriri profitând de un incident minor la căile ferate
japoneze (18 septembrie 1931), trupele japoneze au ocupat principalele oraşe din
Manciuria, o bogată regiune minieră şi agricolă din nordul Chinei
- guvernul chinez refuză să negocieze, face apel la Societatea Naţiunilor, ordonă boicot
împotriva mărfurilor japoneze, dar nu declară război Japoniei, din cauza pregătirilor
militare insuficiente
- septembrie – decembrie 1931, Consiliul Societăţii Naţiunilor a examinat plângerea
chineză decembrie 1931 s-a creat comisia Laytton,
- între timp continuă agresiunea japoneză în China, ocupând noi provincii şi afectând, în
acest mod, interesele americane şi engleze doctrina Stimson, prin care făcea cunoscută
decizia SUA de a nu recunoaşte nici un fel de anexări teritoriale sau tratate ⁄acorduri care
ar consimţi aceste contropiri; de asemenea, în notă se protesta împotriva oricăror măsuri
care ar leza interesele americane în China sau ar veni în contradicţie cu principiul porţilor
deschise
- la 18 februarie 1832, japonezii au proclamat independenţa Manciuriei, sub numele de
Manciuko
- la 9 martie 1932, în fruntea statutului marionetă creat de japonezi era impus ca regent,
apoi încoronat ca împărat la 1 mai 1932, Pu I (cel care fusese forţat să abdice de pe tronul
Chinei în 1912)
- septembrie 1932, Comisia Laytton şi–a prezentat raportul, discutat în Adunarea
Generală a Societăţii Naţiunilor după dezbateri prelungite, la 24 februarie 1933 s-a
adoptat o rezoluţie în spiritul recomandărilor Comisiei Laytton:
- nu se aplicau nici un fel de sancţiuni Japoniei agresive
- se recunoşteau aşa – zisele drepturi şi interese speciale ale acesteia în nord –
estul Chinei
- se constata încălcarea de către Japonia a Tratatului celor nouă puteri
- nu se recunoştea existenţa statului Manciuko
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- Ahmed Zogu, protejat iugoslav, s-a alăturat italienilor, după ce l-a izgonit pe
predecesorul său
- ales preşedinte pe 7 ani, acesta l-a informat pe Mussolini, în ianuarie 1925, că intenţiona
să realizeze un guvern solid în Albania pentru a contribui la pacea din Balcani, iar liderul
fascist italian l-a recunoscut imediat
- 27 noiembrie 1926 s-a semnat primul tratat italo-albanez, în fapt „un pact de prietenie şi
securitate”
- Mussolini a perceput Acordul de la Paris dintre Iugoslavia şi Franţa (11 noiembrie
1927) ca fiind unul îndreptat împotriva Italiei 22 noiembrie 1927, Mussolini a ripostat,
semnând cu Albania un al doilea tratat la Tirana
- în septembrie 1928, Ahmed Zogu a fost încoronat regele al albanezilor, cu aprobarea
Italiei
- la 7 aprilie 1939, urmând exemplul lui Hitler, Mussolini a ordonat trupelor sale să
invadeze Albania
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- Etiopia era un stat independent african, membru al Societăţii Naţiunilor din 1923,
admiterea sa fiind susţinută de Franţa şi Italia un acord privind zonele de influenţă în
Etiopia, plecând mai degrabă de la o serie de considerente de ordin economic
- Franţa a protestat împotriva acestui acord în numele unui tratat din 1906, care prevedea
menţinerea drepturilor suverane ale împăratului Etiopiei
- în iunie 1926, Etiopia a protestat, la rândul ei, pe lângă Societatea Naţiunilor, declarând
că acordul este o ameninţare pentru suveranitatea etiopiană
- Italia reuşeşte să liniştească guvernul etiopian şi să semneze împreună pe 2 august 1928
un tratat de prietenie, de conciliere şi arbitraj
- ideea lui Mussolini de a cuceri Etiopia datează cel puţin din toamna anului 1933
- incidentul de care s-a servit Mussolini s-a desfăşurat la Ual-Ual, la 5 decembrie 1934, la
frontiera dintre Eritreea şi Etiopia
- guvernul etiopian a propus ca incidentul să fie supus arbitrajului, conform tratatului din
1928, însă Italia a refuzat (15 decembrie 1934)
- imediat guvernul etiopian a făcut la Societatea Naţiunilor; în aceste condiţii, guvernul
italian a revenit asupra deciziei sale şi a acceptat arbitrajul, da acesta a eşuat
- pentru că pregătirile militare ale Italiei în Eritreea au căpătat dimensiuni considerabile,
la 17 martie 1935, Etiopia a făcut din nou apel la Societatea Naţiunilor
- poziţia dificilă a guvernelor englez şi francez generată de reînarmarea Germaniei şi de
interesele lor specifice legate de această zonă
- negocierile stagnau
- încercările de compromis ale lui Eden, ale conferinţei tripartite franco – anglo- italiană,
ale Consiliul Societăţii Naţiunilor respinse de Mussolini
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XVI Alianţe
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Dicţionar:
conciliatorism: atitudine care duce spre împăcare, spre realizarea unui acord sau a unui
compromis
crah: fenomen economic manifestat prin lipsa acută a creditului pe piaţă, prin scăderea
bruscă a cursului acţiunilor la bursă şi prin devalorizarea monedei
credit: capital provenit prin împrumut, pe baza încrederii şi solvabilităţii
deficit bugetar: sumă cu care cheltuielile depăşesc veniturile
moratoriu: amânarea plăţii datoriilor unui debitor; amânarea legală a executării
obligaţiilor financiare internaţionale, determinate de o situaţie excepţională (criză
economică, război etc.)
pact de neagresiune: tratat prin care două sau mai multe state se obligă să nu întreprindă
acţiuni duşmănoase unul faţă de celălalt
securitate colectivă: componentă a relaţiilor internaţionale, concretizată prin măsuri
comune, luate de către toate statele şi care vizează menţinerea păcii şi respectarea
angajamentelor
reparaţii de război: despăgubiri plătite pentru compensarea pagubelor economice
datorate unui război
revizionism: curent politic care şi propune modificarea (revizuirea) unor tratate
internaţionale
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Mihai Croitor , Manuela Marin – Caiet de istorie contemporană universală
Eu nu aprob deloc, chiar în sensul cel mai larg, anularea datoriilor care ni se
cuvin. Încrederea internaţională nu ar spori prin aceasta. Nici una din naţiunile care ne
sunt debitoare nu a sugerat-o vreodată, dar acum baza reglementării acestor datorii constă
în capacitatea de plată a debitorilor în condiţii normale, noi acţionăm în deplină
concordanţă cu politica şi principiile noastre, luând în consideraţie situaţia anormală
existentă actualmente în lume.
Esenţa prezentei propuneri este de a da răgaz guvernelor debitoare, să-şi refacă
prosperitatea naţională. (...)
Articolul 1
Cele două guverne sunt de acord ca divergenţele dintre Germania şi Republica Sovietică
Rusă, în probleme ce au apărut în timpul când aceste state au fost în stare de război, să se
reglementeze pe următoarele baze:
a) Statul german şi RSFSR renunţă, în mod reciproc, la despăgubirea pentru cheltuielile
de război, precum şi la dezdăunarea pagubelor de război, adică a acelor pagube care le-a
fost cauzate, lor şi cetăţenilor respectivi, în regiunile operaţiunilor de război şi ca urmare
a măsurilor de război, inclusiv rechiziţiile făcute pe teritoriul Părţii potrivnice.
Ambele părţi renunţă, de asemenea, la dezdăunarea pagubelor cauzate cetăţenilor unei
din Părţi, nu de război, ci prin aşa-numitele legi excepţionale de război şi prin măsurile
forţate luate de organele de stat ale celeilalte Părţi.
b) Germania şi Rusia renunţă, în mod reciproc, la despăgubiri pentru cheltuielile ce le-au
avut cu prizonierii de război. Guvernul german renunţă, de asemenea, la despăgubiri,
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pentru cheltuielile făcute cu internarea în Germania a unei părţi din Armata Roşie.
Guvernul rus renunţă, la rândul său, la restituirea sumelor câştigate de Germania din
vânzarea bunurilor militare introduse de Germania de către unităţile internate.
Articolul 2
Germania renunţă la pretenţiile izvorând din faptul aplicării, până în prezent, a legilor şi
măsurilor RSFSR unor cetăţeni germani şi drepturilor lor private, precum şi drepturile
Germaniei şi ale statelor germane faţă de Rusia; de asemenea renunţă la pretenţiunile ce
izvorăsc, în general, din măsurile luate de RSFSR sau de organele ei faţă de cetăţenii
germani sau faţă de drepturile lor private, - sub condiţia că guvernul RSFSR nu va
satisface pretenţiuni analoge ale altor state.
Articolul 3
Relaţiile diplomatice şi consulare între Germania şi R.S.F.S.R. se reiau fără întârziere.
Articolul 4
Ambele guverne sunt de acord mai departe să aplice clauza naţiunii celei mai favorizate,
cu privire la situaţia juridică generală a cetăţenilor uneia din Părţi pe teritoriul celeilalte şi
în reglementarea generală a relaţiilor economice şi comerciale reciproce.
Articolul 5
Cele două guverne vor lua în considerare cu bunăvoinţă, în mod reciproc, nevoile
economice ale ambelor părţi.
Guvernul german se declară gata să sprijine, pe cât posibil, convenţiile proiectate de
unele firme particulare, - care i-au fost aduse la cunoştinţă în ultima vreme, şi să
înlesnească executarea lor (...).
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SURSA: Alexandru Vianu, Zorin Zamfir, Constantin Buşe, Gheorghe Bădescu, Relaţii
internaţionale în acte şi documente, vol.I (1917-1939), Editura Didactică şi Pedagogică,
Bucureşti, 1974, Vol.I, pp. 98-99.
Articolul 1
Ambele părţi contractante se obligă a se abţine de la orice violenţă, de la orice acţiune
agresivă şi orice atac una împotriva celeilalte, atât izolat, cât şi în comun cu alte puteri.
Articolul 2
În cazul când una din Părţile contractante devine obiect al acţiunilor militare din partea
unei terţe puteri, cealaltă parte contractantă nu va susţine sub nici o formă această putere.
Articolul 3
Guvernele ambelor Părţi contractante rămân să ţină contact între ele pe viitor pentru
consultaţii, ca să se informeze reciproc asupra chestiunilor ce privesc interesele lor
comune.
Articolul 4
Nici una din Părţile contractante nu va participa la orice grupare de puteri îndreptată,
direct sau indirect, împotriva altei părţi.
Articolul 5
În caz de izbucnire a litigiilor sau conflictelor între părţile contractante într-un fel sau
altul de chestiuni, ambele părţi vor rezolva aceste litigii şi conflicte exclusiv pe cale
paşnică, făcând schimb prietenesc de opinii sau, în cazuri necesare, pe calea creării unei
comisii pentru aplanarea conflictului.
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Articolul 6
Tratatul de faţă este încheiat pe un termen de zece ani. Dacă una din părţile contractante
nu-l va denunţa cu un an înainte de expirarea termenului, durata pactului să fie
considerată în mod automat pe următorii cinci ani.
Articolul 7
Tratatul de faţă urmează să fie ratificat într-un termen cât mai scurt posibil. Schimbul de
instrumente de ratificare trebuie să aibă loc la Berlin. Tratatul întră în vigoare imediat
după semnarea lui.
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Articolul 1
Guvernul URSS şi guvernul german stabilesc ca frontierele între cele două state
interesate, pe teritoriul fostului stat polonez, linia trasată pe harta alăturată, ce va fi
descrisă mai amănunţit în protocolul suplimentar (...).
Articolul 3
Reconstruirea de stat necesară pe teritoriul de vest de la linia arătată la articolul 1 o va
face guvernul german, pe teritoriul de la răsărit de această linie - guvernul URSS.
SURSA: Alexandru Vianu, Constantin Buşe, Zorin Zamfir, Gheorghe Bădescu, Relaţii
internaţionale în acte şi documente, Vol. II (1939-1945), Editura Didactică şi
Pedagogică, Bucureşti, 1976, p.19.
Articolul 1
Înaltele părţi contractante declară solemn în numele popoarelor lor respective că
condamnă recursul la război pentru regularea diferendelor internaţionale şi renunţă la el
ca instrument de politică naţională în relaţiunile lor mutuale
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Articolul 2
Înaltele părţi contractante recunosc că regularea sau rezolvarea tuturor diferendelor sau
conflictelor de orice natură sau de orice origine ar fi ele care se vor putea ivi între ele, nu
va trebui niciodată urmărită decât prin mijloace pacifiste.
(...)
SURSA: Alexandru Vianu, Zorin Zamfir, Constantin Buşe, Gheorghe Bădescu, Relaţii
internaţionale în acte şi documente, vol.I (1917-1939), Editura Didactică şi Pedagogică,
Bucureşti, 1974, p.134.
Articolul 2
Germania şi Belgia, precum şi Germania şi Franţa se obligă în mod reciproc ca, în
raporturile lor, să nu recurgă în nici un caz la agresiune şi cotropire şi să nu recurgă la
război una împotriva celeilalte (...).
Articolul 3
Faţă de obligaţiile reciproce pe care şi le-au asumat prin articolul 2, Germania şi Belgia,
precum şi Germania şi Franţa, se obligă să rezolve pe cale paşnică toate problemele, de
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Mihai Croitor , Manuela Marin – Caiet de istorie contemporană universală
orice natură ar fi, care le despart şi care ar putea fi soluţionate prin obişnuitele căi
diplomatice (...).
Articolul 4
În cazul unei încălcări a articolului 2 din prezentul tratat sau a nerespectării vădite a
articolelor 42 sau 43 din Tratatul de la Versailles, de către una din Înaltele părţi
contractante, fiecare din celelalte Puteri contractante se obligă de pe acum ca, de îndată
ce va afla că acea încălcare sau nerespectare constituie un act de agresiune neprovocat şi
că sunt necesare acţiuni imediate din cauza trecerii frontierei, sau a începerii acţiunilor de
război, sau a concentrării de forţe armate în zona demilitarizată, să acorde fără întârziere
sprijinul său acelei Părţi faţă de care s-a săvârşit o astfel de încălcare sau o astfel de
încălcare (...).
Articolul 5
Dispoziţia din articolul 3 al prezentului tratat se pune sub garanţia Înaltelor părţi
contractante, după cum urmează:
În cazul în care una din Puterile indicate în articolul 3 refuză să se conformeze regulilor
paşnice sau să execute o hotărâre arbitrală sau judecătorească, şi ar viola articolul 3 al
prezentului tratat, sau nu ar respecta articolele 42 sau 43 din Tratatul de la Versailles, ea
va fi supusă aplicării prevederilor din articolul 4 al prezentului tratat (...).
Articolul 6
Dispoziţiunile prezentului Tratat nu aduc nici o atingere drepturilor şi obligaţiunilor ce
decurg pentru Înaltele părţi contractante din Tratatul de pace de la Versailles, precum şi
din convenţiile complementare, inclusiv aceea din 30 august 1924 semnată la Londra (...).
Articolul 1
În cazul în care Polonia sau Franţa ar avea de suferit de pe urma nerespectării
angajamentelor, intervenite astăzi între ele şi Germania în vederea menţinerii păcii
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generale, Franţa, şi în mod reciproc Polonia, acţionând în aplicarea articolul 16 din Pactul
Societăţii Naţiunilor, se angajează să-şi dea imediat ajutor şi asistenţă, dacă o asemenea
nerespectare va fi însoţită de o folosire a armelor ce n-ar fi fost provocată (...).
SURSA: Alexandru Vianu, Constantin Buşe, Zorin Zamfir, Gheorghe Bădescu, Relaţii
internaţionale în acte şi documente, Vol. II (1939-1945), Editura Didactică şi
Pedagogică, Bucureşti, 1976, pp. p.113-115
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Seminarul nr. 6
1) 22 iunie 1941, discursul lui Winston Churchill la radio prin care făcea cunoscută
poporului englez, agresiunea Germaniei împotriva Uniunii Sovietice şi justifica, din
perspectiva necesităţii eliminării agresiunii militare fasciste, alianţa cu URSS, depăşind
astfel orice diferenţe ideologice
2) 12 iulie 1941, la Moscova era semnat acordul sovieto – englez, intitulat „Cu privire la
acţiunile comune de război împotriva Germaniei”
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scop, a acordat un credit iniţial de 1 miliard de dolari, iar în februarie 1942, un alt fond de
aceeaşi valoare
11) 1 ianuarie 1942 a fost semnată la Casa Albă, Declaraţia Naţiunilor Unite de către
reprezentanţii celor 26 de state care au participat la Conferinţa de la Washington (22
decembrie 1941 – 14 ianuarie 1942)
12) 26 mai 1942 s-a semnat la Londra, tratatul de alianţă anglo – sovietic, intitulat „Cu
privire la principiile ajutorului reciproc în războiul împotriva agresorului”
13) 11 iunie 1942 s-a semnat la Washington acordul sovieto – american care reglementa
relaţiile economice şi financiare pe baza legii lend and lease
٭De ilustrat, pe larg, conţinutul fiecărei etape, din formarea coaliţiei Naţiunilor Unite.
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٭De ilustrat, pe larg, conţinutul fiecărei etape, din formarea coaliţiei anglo-americane.
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- redactat un proiect comun de declaraţie a celor patru puteri (SUA, URSS, Marea
Britanie, China)
- s-a confirmat decizia de fixare a deschiderii celui de al doilea front în Franţa la 1
mai 1944
- s-a fixat o operaţiune de debarcare în sudul Franţei, aşa- numita operaţiune Anvil
- problema războiului din Pacific – s-a aprobat planul de operaţiuni americane
pentru perioada 1943-1944, care prevedea ocuparea arhipelagurilor Marshall,
Caroline, Mariane
- august 1943 – s-a semnat un acord anglo-american în domeniul cercetării atomice
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° desprinderea unor regiuni din sudul Germaniei pentru includerea lor, alături de alte
state din Europa Centrală în o Federaţie dunăreană guvernul sovietic s-a opus, iar
preşedintele american a propus ca problema să fie discutată în Comisia consultativă
europeană
- în ceea ce priveşte chestiunea poloneză, Churchill a acceptat soluţia „de a împinge
Polonia spre vest”, teritoriul polonez trebuind a fi delimitat de linia Curzon şi Oder,
inclusiv Prusia Orientală şi Oppeln URSS încorpora teritoriile atribuite prin
acordul germano – sovietic din 1939, iar Polonia primea în schimb, în compensaţie,
Prusia Orientală, Pomerania, Silezia
- Finlanda – Stalin a arătat că Finlanda
° trebuia să revină la frontierele din 1940
° să cedeze Uniunii Sovietice, Petsamo
° să alunge trupele germane de pe teritoriul său
° să plătească Uniunii Sovietice, reparaţii de război
- Oceanul Pacific – URSS a considerat că este posibil să înceapă operaţiunile
militare împotriva Japoniei, la 6 luni după terminarea conflictului din Europa
- organizarea securităţii colective:
a) Churchill a propus un sistem „regionalist” construit în jurul a trei organisme
continentale din Europa, Asia şi America
b) Stalin a imaginat o instituţie mondială cu trei nivele de operaţionalizare:
° o adunare, la care să participe toate statele suverane
° un comitet executiv care să administreze serviciile publice internaţionale
° un directoriat al celor patru mari puteri (SUA, URSS, Anglia, China)
care să menţină ordinea internaţională
- a fost adoptată: Declaraţia cu privire la Iran (1 decembrie 1943)
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B) problema poloneză
- problema constituirii unui guvern polonez
- stabilirea frontierelor statului polonez
C) problema iugoslavă
- problema constituirii unui guvern iugoslav
D) problema strâmtorilor
E) problema Japoniei
G) Organizaţia mondială
- s-a stabilit convocarea unei conferinţe a Naţiunilor Unite pentru constituirea unei
organizaţii mondiale la data de 25 aprilie 1945 în Statele Unite ale Americii
b) problema germană
- organizarea postbelică a Germaniei prin împărţirea ei în zone de ocupaţie
- transformarea Germaniei într-un stat democratic şi paşnic prin:
° denazificare
° democratizare
° demilitarizare
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c) problema Italiei
- preşedintele american Truman a propus încheierea cât mai repede posibil a păcii
cu Italia pentru a se putea începe cât mai repede procesul de refacere şi edificare a
vieţii statele democratice
- Churchill s-a opus acestei propuneri, amintind că Italia a fost multă vreme în
tabăra fascistă
d) problema poloneză
- problema tezaurului aflat al Londra: Churchill a afirmat că valoarea sa nu
acoperea cheltuielile făcute de Marea Britanie pentru organizarea şi întreţinerea
trupelor poloneze, pentru întreţinerea guvernului polonez aflat în exil şi a emigraţiei
- problema frontierelor:
° anglo – saxonii au promis să sprijine transferul către URSS a oraşului
Koenigsberg şi a unei părţi din Prusia orientală
° cealaltă parte a Prusiei Orientale şi oraşul Danzig trebuiau să revină Poloniei
° teritoriul de la est de linia Oder-Neisse să fie administrată provizoriu de Polonia
f) s-a adoptat o declaraţie comună anglo – americano – chineză prin care se cerea
Japoniei să capituleze necondiţionat, căreia i se va alătura, ulterior, şi partea sovietică
٭De ilustrat, pe baza documentelor incluse în acest caiet de seminar, deciziile luate în
cursul conferinţelor interaliate asupra problemelor identificate mai sus.
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Geneza:
- în ianuarie 1941, în mesajul său adresat Congresul SUA, preşedintele american
Roosevelt proclama cele patru drepturi:
° dreptul la expresie şi de opinie
° dreptul de liberă exercitare a credinţei
° dreptul de a fi ferit de sărăcie
° dreptul de a fi ferit de teroare
- 14 august 1941, Carta Atlanticului realizarea unui „sistem mai larg şi
permanent de securitate generală”
- 1 ianuarie 1942 a fost semnată la Casa Albă, Declaraţia Naţiunilor Unite de către
reprezentanţii celor 26 de state care au participat la Conferinţa de la Washington
(22 decembrie 1941 – 14 ianuarie 1942); Aliaţii îşi spun pentru prima oară
Naţiunile Unite
- 1943 Conferinţa miniştrilor de Externe de la Washington a hotărât crearea unui
organism internaţional pentru asigurarea păcii şi securităţii
- între 21 august -7 octombrie 1944 s-a desfăşurat Conferinţa de la Dumbarton
Oaks, în cadrul căreia s-au elaborat propunerile privind statutul O.N.U. şi s-au
stabilit principiile generale de organizare
- la Conferinţa de la Yalta din 4-11 februarie 1945 s-a stabilit, printre altele:
° că membrii permanenţi ai Consiliului de Securitate primesc drept de veto
° convocarea unei conferinţe a Naţiunilor Unite privind constituirea organizaţiei mondiale
la data de 25 aprilie 1945 în Statele Unite ale Americii
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- organizarea:
1) Adunarea Generală
2) Consiliul de Securitate
3) Secretarul General
5) Consiliul de Tutelă
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V Suport documentar
Nimeni mai mult decât mine nu a fost un adversar mai statornic al comunismului, în
cursul ultimilor 25 de ani. Nu voi retrage nici un cuvânt din cele ce am spus despre acest
subiect (...).
Nu avem decât un singur ţel, un singur scop irevocabil. Suntem hotărâţi să distrugem pe
Hitler şi orice urmă de a regimului nazist. Nimic nu ne va îndepărta de la această hotărâre
– nimic! (...) orice om şi orice stat care luptă împotriva nazismului va avea sprijinul
nostru. Orice om şi orice stat care merge cu Hitler este duşmanul nostru (...).
SURSA: Alexandru Vianu, Constantin Buşe, Zorin Zamfir, Gheorghe Bădescu, Relaţii
internaţionale în acte şi documente, Vol. II (1939-1945), Editura Didactică şi
Pedagogică, Bucureşti, 1976, pp.91-92.
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(...) Guvernul URSS şi guvernul Majestăţii Sale a Regatului Unit au încheiat prezentul
acord şi declară următoarele:
1. Ambele guverne se obligă reciproc să-şi acorde unul altuia ajutor şi sprijin de orice
natură în actualul război împotriva Germaniei hitleriste.
SURSA: Alexandru Vianu, Constantin Buşe, Zorin Zamfir, Gheorghe Bădescu, Relaţii
internaţionale în acte şi documente, Vol. II (1939-1945), Editura Didactică şi
Pedagogică, Bucureşti, 1976, p.96.
14 august 1941
Preşedintele Statelor Unite ale Americii şi Dl. Churchill, prim –ministru, reprezentând
guvernul Majestăţii Sale în Regatul Unit, întâlnindu-se pe mare, consideră că trebuie
făcute cunoscute unele dintre principiile pe care îşi bazează speranţele într-u viitor mai
bun pentru omenire şi care sunt comune politicii naţionale a ţărilor respective.
1. Ţările lor nu urmăresc nici o mărire teritorială sau de altă natură.
2. Ei nu doresc să vadă nici o modificare teritorială care să nu fie în acord cu voinţele
liber exprimate ale popoarelor interesate.
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3. Ei respectă dreptul ce are fiecare popor de a alege forma de guvernământ sub care vrea
să trăiască; ei doresc să fie redate drepturile suverane şi liberul exerciţiu de guvernare
celor care au fost privaţi de ele prin forţă.
4. Ei se străduiesc, ţinând seama de obligaţiile pe care şi le-au asumat deja, să deschidă
tuturor statelor, mari sau mici, învingători sau învinşi, accesul la materii prime ale lumii
şi tranzacţiilor comerciale care sunt necesare prosperităţii lor.
5. Ei doresc să realizeze între toate naţiunile colaborarea cea mai completă în domeniul
economic, cu scopul de a garanta tuturor ameliorarea condiţiei muncii, progresul
economic şi securitatea socială.
6. După distrugerea finală a tiraniei naziste, ei speră să vadă stabilindu-se o pace care va
permite tuturor naţiunilor să se afle în securitate în interiorul propriilor lor frontiere şi va
garanta tuturor oamenilor din toate ţările o existenţă eliberată de orice teamă şi de lipsuri.
7. O asemenea pace va permite tuturor oamenilor să navigheze fără frică pe mare.
8. Ei sunt convinşi că toate naţiunile lumii, atât din motive de ordin practic cât şi de ordin
spiritual, vor trebui să renunţe în cele din urmă la folosirea forţei. Şi din moment ce este
imposibil de a salva pacea viitoare atâta vreme cât unele naţiuni care o ameninţă – sau ar
putea să o ameninţe – posedă arme pe mare, pe uscat şi în aer, ei consideră că, aşteptând
să poate stabili un sistem larg şi permanent de securitate generală, dezarmarea acestor
naţiuni se impune. Totodată, ei vor ajuta şi încuraja toate celelalte măsuri susceptibile să
uşureze povara zdrobitoare a armamentelor care copleşeşte popoarele paşnice.
SURSA: Alexandru Vianu, Constantin Buşe, Zorin Zamfir, Gheorghe Bădescu, Relaţii
internaţionale în acte şi documente, Vol. II (1939-1945), Editura Didactică şi
Pedagogică, Bucureşti, 1976, p.111.
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Guvernele semnatare,
SURSA: Alexandru Vianu, Constantin Buşe, Zorin Zamfir, Gheorghe Bădescu, Relaţii
internaţionale în acte şi documente, Vol. II (1939-1945), Editura Didactică şi
Pedagogică, Bucureşti, 1976, pp.121-122.
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Mihai Croitor , Manuela Marin – Caiet de istorie contemporană universală
PART ONE
ARTICLE I
In virtue of the alliance established between the United Kingdom and the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics, the high contracting parties mutually undertake to afford one
another military and other assistance and support of all kinds in war against Germany and
all those States which are associated with her in acts of aggression in Europe.
ARTICLE II
The high contracting parties undertake not to enter into any negotiations with the
Hitlerite Government or any other government in Germany that does not clearly renounce
all aggression intentions, and not to negotiate or conclude, except by mutual consent, any
armistice or peace treaty with Germany or any other State associated with her in acts of
aggression in Europe.
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PART TWO
ARTICLE III
1. The high contracting parties declare their desire to unite with other like-minded
States in adopting proposals for common action to preserve peace and resist aggression in
the post-war period.
2. Pending adoption of such proposals, they will after termination of hostilities take all
measures in their power to render impossible the repetition of aggression and violation of
peace by Germany or any of the States associated with her in acts of aggression in
Europe.
ARTICLE IV
Should either of the high contracting parties during the postwar period become
involved in hostilities with Germany or any of the States mentioned in Article III, Section
2, in consequence of the attack by that State against that party, the other high contracting
party will at once give to the contracting party so involved in hostilities all military and
other support and assistance in his power. (…)
ARTICLE V
The high contracting parties, having regard to the interests of security of each of them,
agree to work together in close and friendly collaboration after re-establishment of peace
for the organization of security and economic prosperity in Europe.
They will take into account the interests of the United Nations in these objects and
they will act in accordance with the two principles of not seeking territorial
aggrandizement for themselves and of non-interference in the internal affairs of other
States.
ARTICLE VI
The high contracting parties agree to render one another all possible economic
assistance after the war.
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ARTICLE VII
Each contracting party undertakes not to conclude any alliance and not to take part in
any coalition directed against the other high contracting party.
Articolul 1
Guvernul SUA va continua să aprovizioneze guvernul URSS cu acele materiale de
apărare, de asistenţă medicală şi informaţii pe care preşedintele SUA a dispus să i le
transmită sau să i le pună la dispoziţie.
Articolul 2
Guvernul URSS va continua să contribuie la apărarea SUA şi la întărirea lor şi să le
furnizeze materiale, asistenţă, avantaje şi informaţii în măsura posibilităţilor sale (...).
SURSA: Alexandru Vianu, Constantin Buşe, Zorin Zamfir, Gheorghe Bădescu, Relaţii
internaţionale în acte şi documente, Vol. II (1939-1945), Editura Didactică şi
Pedagogică, Bucureşti, 1976, p.134.
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Se stabileşte prin prezenta, că această lege se va numi „Legea despre întărirea apărării
Statelor Unite” (...).
Secţiunea 3
a) Independent de prevederile cuprinse în orice altă lege, preşedintele poate, atunci când
socoate ca necesar, în interesele apărării naţionale, să împuternicească pe Secretarul de
război, Secretarul flotei maritime de război sau pe conducătorul oricărui alt minister sau
instituţie guvernamentală:
1) În limitele mijloacelor alocate pentru acest scop, sau contractelor aprobate din
timp de către Congres, să producă în arsenalele, fabricile şi şantierele aflate în subordinea
lor sau să procure pe orice altă cale orice materiale de apărare pentru guvernul fiecărei
ţări a cărui apărare preşedintele o consideră vital necesară pentru securitatea Statelor
Unite.
2) Să vândă, să transfere dreptul, să schimbe, să dea în arendă, să dea în folosinţă
sau să predea în orice alt mod unui astfel de guvern orice materiale de apărare care nu
sunt produse şi procurate în conformitate cu paragraful 1(...).
b) Termenele şi condiţiile în care oricare astfel de guvern străin va primi oricare din
ajutoarele autorizate conform cu subsecţiunea a) vor fi stabilite de către preşedinte;
pentru livrările efectuate, Statele Unite vor primi plata sau compensarea fie direct sub
forma de sume de bani, fie sub forma de orice fel de proprietate pe care le va stabili
preşedintele (...).
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SURSA: Alexandru Vianu, Constantin Buşe, Zorin Zamfir, Gheorghe Bădescu, Relaţii
internaţionale în acte şi documente, Vol. II (1939-1945), Editura Didactică şi
Pedagogică, Bucureşti, 1976, pp. 81-83 .
(…)
We have lately concluded a long, hard battle in the Southwest Pacific and we have
made notable gains. That battle started in the Solomons and New Guinea last summer. It
has demonstrated our superior power in planes and, most importantly, in the fighting
qualities of our individual soldiers and sailors.
American armed forces in the Southwest Pacific are receiving powerful aid from
Australia and New Zealand and also directly from the British themselves.
We do not expect to spend the time it would take to bring Japan to final defeat merely
by inching our way forward from island to island across the vast expanse of the Pacific.
Great and decisive actions against the Japanese will be taken to drive the invader from
the soil of China. Important actions will be taken in the skies over China-and over Japan
itself.
The discussions at Casablanca have been continued in Chungking with the
Generalissimo by General Arnold and have resulted in definite plans for offensive
operations.
There are many roads which lead right to Tokyo. We shall neglect none of them.
In an attempt to ward off the inevitable disaster, the Axis propagandists are trying all
of their old tricks in order to divide the United Nations. They seek to create the idea that
if we win this war, Russia, England, China, and the United States are going to get into a
cat-and-dog fight.
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This is their final effort to turn one nation against another, in the vain hope that they
may settle with one or two at a time-that any of us may be so gullible and so forgetful as
to be duped into making "deals" at the expense of our Allies.
To these panicky attempts to escape the consequences of their crimes we say-all the
United Nations say-that the only terms on which we shall deal with an Axis government
or any Axis factions are the terms proclaimed at Casablanca: "Unconditional Surrender."
In our uncompromising policy we mean no harm to the common people of the Axis
nations. But we do mean to impose punishment and retribution in full upon their guilty,
barbaric leaders...
In the years of the American and French revolutions the fundamental principle guiding
our democracies was established. The cornerstone of our whole democratic edifice was
the principle that from the people and the people alone flows the authority of
government.
It is one of our war aims, as expressed in the Atlantic Charter, that the conquered
populations of today be again the masters of their destiny. There must be no doubt
anywhere that it is the unalterable purpose of the United Nations to restore to conquered
peoples their sacred rights.
Joint Statement by Prime Minister Churchill and President Roosevelt, August At,
1943
The Anglo-American war conference, which opened at Quebec on August 11, under
the hospitable auspices of the Canadian Government, has now concluded its work.
The whole field of world operations has been surveyed in the light of the many
gratifying events which have taken place since the meeting of the President and the Prime
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Minister in Washington at the end of May, and the necessary decisions have been taken
to provide for the forward action of the fleets, armies, and air forces of the two nations.
Considering that these forces are intermingled in continuous action against the enemy
in several quarters of the globe, it is indispensable that entire unity of aim and method
should be maintained at the summit of the war direction.
Further conferences will be needed, probably at shorter intervals than before, as the
war effort of the United States and British Commonwealth and Empire against the enemy
spreads and deepens.
It would not be helpful to the fighting troops to make any announcement of the
decisions which have been reached. These can only emerge in action.
It may, however, be stated that the military discussions of the chiefs of staff turned
very largely upon the war against Japan and the bringing of effective aid to China. Dr. T.
V. Soong, representing the Generalissimo Kai-shek, was a party to the discussions. In this
field, as in the European, the President and the Prime Minister were able to receive and
approve the unanimous recommendation of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Agreements
were also reached upon the political issues underlying or arising out of the military
operations.
It was resolved to hold another conference before the end of the year between the
British and American authorities, in addition to any tri-partite meeting which it may be
possible to arrange with Soviet Russia. Full reports of the decisions so far as they affect
the war against Germany and Italy will be furnished to the Soviet Government.
Consideration has been given during the Conference to the question of relations with
the French Committee of Liberation, and it is understood that an announcement by a
number of governments will be made in the latter part of the week.
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The governments of the United States of America, United Kingdom, the Soviet Union,
and China;
United in their determination, in accordance with the declaration by the United
Nations of January, 1942, and subsequent declarations, to continue hostilities against
those Axis powers with which they respectively are at war until such powers have laid
down their arms on the basis of unconditional surrender;
Conscious of their responsibility to secure the liberation of themselves and the peoples
allied with them from the menace of aggression;
Recognizing the necessity of insuring a rapid and orderly transition from war to peace
and of establishing and maintaining international peace and security with the least
diversion of the world's human and economic resources for armaments;
Jointly declare:
1. That their united action, pledged for the prosecution of the war against their
respective enemies, will be continued for the organization and maintenance of peace and
security.
2. That those of them at war with a common enemy will act together in all matters
relating to the surrender and disarmament of that enemy.
3. That they will take all measures deemed by them to be necessary to provide against
any violation of the terms imposed upon the enemy.
4. That they recognize the necessity of establishing at the earliest practicable date a
general international organization, based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all
peace-loving states, and open to membership by all such states, large and small, for the
maintenance of international peace and security.
5. That for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security pending the re-
establishment of law and order and the inauguration of a system of general security they
will consult with one another and as occasion requires with other members of the United
Nations, with a view to joint action on behalf of the community of nations.
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6. That after the termination of hostilities they will not employ their military forces
within the territories of other states except for the purposes envisaged in this declaration
and after joint consultation.
7. That they will confer and cooperate with one another and with other members of the
United Nations to bring about a practicable general agreement with respect to the
regulation of armaments in the post-war period.
The Foreign Secretaries of the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet
Union have established that their three governments are in complete agreement that
Allied policy toward Italy must be based upon the fundamental principle that Fascism
and all its evil influence and configuration shall be completely destroyed and that the
Italian people shall be given every opportunity to establish governmental and other
institutions based on democratic principles. (…)
In furtherance of this policy in the future the Foreign Secretaries of the three
governments are agreed that the following measures are important and should be put into
effect:
1. It is essential that the Italian Government should be made more democratic by
inclusion of representatives of those sections of the Italian people who have always
opposed Fascism.
2. Freedom of speech, of religious worship, of political belief, of press and of public
meeting, shall be restored in full measure to the Italian people, who shall be entitled to
form anti-Fascist political groups.
3. All institutions and organizations created by the Fascist regime shall be suppressed.
4. All Fascist or pro-Fascist elements shall be removed from the administration and
from institutions and organizations of a public character.
5. All political prisoners of the Fascist regime shall be released and accorded full
amnesty.
6. Democratic organs of local government shall be created.
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7. Fascist chiefs and army generals known or suspected to be war criminals shall be
arrested and handed over to justice. (…)
DECLARATION ON AUSTRIA
The governments of the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and the United States of
America are agreed that Austria, the first free country to fall a victim to Hitlerite
aggression, shall be liberated from German domination.
They regard the annexation imposed on Austria by Germany on March 15, 1938, as
null and void. They consider themselves as in no way bound by any charges effected in
Austria since that date. They declare that they wish to see re-established a free and
independent Austria and thereby to open the way for the Austrian people themselves, as
well as those neighboring States which will be face with similar problems, to find that
political and economic security which is the only basis for lasting peace. Austria is
reminded, however that she has a responsibility, which she cannot evade, for
participation in the war at the side of Hitlerite Germany, and that in the final settlement
account will inevitably be taken of her own contribution to her liberation.
STATEMENT ON ATROCITIES
Signed by President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill and Premier Stalin.
The United Kingdom, the United States and the Soviet Union have received from
many quarters evidence of atrocities, massacres and cold-blooded mass executions which
are being perpetrated by Hitlerite forces in many of the countries they have overrun and
from which they are now being steadily expelled. (…)
Accordingly, the aforesaid three Allied powers, speaking in the interest of the thirty-
two United Nations, hereby solemnly declare and give full warning of their declaration as
follows:
At the time of granting of any armistice to any government which may be set up in
Germany, those German officers and men and members of the Nazi party who have been
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responsible for or have taken a consenting part in the above atrocities, massacres and
executions will be sent back to the countries in which their abominable deeds were done
in order that they may be judged and punished according to the laws of these liberated
countries and of free governments which will be erected therein. (…)
The several military missions have agreed upon future military operations against
Japan. The Three Great Allies expressed their resolve to bring unrelenting pressure
against their brutal enemies by sea, land, and air. This pressure is already mounting.
The Three Great Allies are fighting this war to restrain and punish the aggression of
Japan. They covet no gain for themselves and have no thought of territorial expansion.
It is their purpose that Japan shall be stripped of all the islands in the Pacific which
she has seized or occupied since the beginning of the first World War in 1914, and that
all the territories Japan has stolen form the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa, and the
Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China.
Japan will also be expelled from all other territories which she has taken by violence
and greed. The aforesaid three great powers, mindful of the enslavement of the people of
Korea, are determined that in due course Korea shall become free and independent.
With these objects in view the three Allies, in harmony with those of the United
Nations at war with Japan, will continue to persevere in the serious and prolonged
operations necessary to procure the unconditional surrender of Japan.
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We the President of the United States, the Prime Minister of Great Britain, and the
Premier of the Soviet Union, have met these four days past, in this, the Capital of our
Ally, Iran, and have shaped and confirmed our common policy.
We express our determination that our nations shall work together in war and in the
peace that will follow..
As to war-our military staffs have joined in our round table discussions, and we have
concerted our plans for the destruction of the German forces. We have reached complete
agreement as to the scope and timing of the operations to be undertaken from the east,
west and south. (…)
No power on earth can prevent our destroying the German armies by land, their U
Boats by sea, and their war plants from the air.
Our attack will be relentless and increasing.
Emerging from these cordial conferences we look with confidence to the day when all
peoples of the world may live free lives, untouched by tyranny, and according to their
varying desires and their own consciences.
We came here with hope and determination. We leave here, friends in fact, in spirit
and in purpose.
ROOSEVELT, CHHRCHILL and STALIN
Signed at Tehran, December 1, 1943
The President of the United States, the Premier of the U. S. S. R. and the Prime
Minister of the United Kingdom, having consulted with each other and with the Prime
Minister of Iran, desire to declare the mutual agreement of their three Governments
regarding their relations with Iran.
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The Governments of the United States, the U. S. S. R., and the United Kingdom
recognize the assistance which Iran has given in the prosecution of the war against the
common enemy, particularly by facilitating the transportation of supplies from overseas
to the Soviet Union.
The Three Governments realize that the war has caused special economic difficulties
for Iran, and they are agreed that they will continue to make available to the Government
of Iran such economic assistance as may be possible, having regard to the heavy demands
made upon them by their world-wide military operations, and to the world-wide shortage
of transport, raw materials, and supplies for civilian consumption.
With respect to the post-war period, the Governments of the United States, the U. S. S.
R., and the United Kingdom are in accord with the Government of Iran that any
economic problems confronting Iran at the close of hostilities should receive full
consideration, along with those of other members of the United Nations, by conferences
or international agencies held or created to deal with international economic matters.
The Governments of the United States, the U. S. S. R., and the United Kingdom are at
one with the Government of Iran in their desire for the maintenance of the independence,
sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iran They count upon the participation of Iran,
together with all other peace-loving nations, in the establishment of international peace,
security and prosperity after the war, in accordance with the principles of the Atlantic
Charter, to which all four Governments have subscribed.
WINSTON S.CHURCHILL
J. STALIN
FRANKLIN D ROOSEVELT
The Conference:-
(1) Agreed that the Partisans in Yugoslavia should be supported by supplies and
equipment to the greatest possible extent, and also by commando operations (…)
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(4) Took note that Operation OVERLORD would be launched during May 1944, in
conjunction with an operation against Southern France. (…)
FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT
JOSEPH V. STALIN
WINSTON S. CHURCHILL
TEHRAN, December 1, 1943.
Washington, March 24 - The text of the agreements reached at the Crimea (Yalta)
Conference between President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill and Generalissimo
Stalin, as released by the State Department today, follows:
I. WORLD ORGANIZATION
It was decided:
1. That a United Nations conference on the proposed world organization should be
summoned for Wednesday, 25 April, 1945, and should be held in the United States of
America.
2. The nations to be invited to this conference should be:
(a) the United Nations as they existed on 8 Feb., 1945; and
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(b) Such of the Associated Nations as have declared war on the common enemy by 1
March, 1945. (For this purpose, by the term "Associated Nations" was meant the eight
Associated Nations and Turkey.) When the conference on world organization is held, the
delegates of the United Kingdom and United State of America will support a proposal to
admit to original membership two Soviet Socialist Republics, i.e., the Ukraine and White
Russia.
3. That the United States Government, on behalf of the three powers, should consult
the Government of China and the French Provisional Government in regard to decisions
taken at the present conference concerning the proposed world organization.
4. That the text of the invitation to be issued to all the nations which would take part
in the United Nations conference should be as follows:
"The Government of the United States of America, on behalf of itself and of the
Governments of the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialistic Republics and the
Republic of China and of the Provisional Government of the French Republic invite the
Government of -------- to send representatives to a conference to be held on 25 April,
1945, or soon thereafter , at San Francisco, in the United States of America, to prepare a
charter for a general international organization for the maintenance of international peace
and security.
"The above-named Governments suggest that the conference consider as affording a
basis for such a Charter the proposals for the establishment of a general international
organization which were made public last October as a result of the Dumbarton Oaks
conference and which have now been supplemented by the following provisions for
Section C of Chapter VI:
C. Voting
"1. Each member of the Security Council should have one vote.
"2. Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters should be made by an
affirmative vote of seven members.
"3. Decisions of the Security Council on all matters should be made by an affirmative
vote of seven members, including the concurring votes of the permanent members;
provided that, in decisions under Chapter VIII, Section A and under the second sentence
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naziste şi popoarele fostelor state satelite ale Axei, să rezolve prin mijloace democratice
probleme lor politice şi economice cel mai urgente.
Stabilirea ordinii în Europa şi reconstrucţia economiei naţionale trebuie să fie realizată
prin mijloace care să permită popoarelor eliberate de a lichida ultimele vestigii ale
nazismului şi fascismului, de a stabili instituţii democratice alese de ele. Acestea
corespund principiilor Cartei Atlanticului – dreptul tuturor popoarelor de a-şi alege forma
de guvernământ în care doresc să trăiască – restaurarea drepturilor suverane şi de
autoguvernare în profitul popoarelor care au fost private de aceste drepturi prin acte de
agresiune.
În scopul de a crea condiţiile în care popoarele eliberate să poată să-şi exercite aceste
drepturi, cele trei guverne vor asiste împreună popoarele oricărui stat european, fost
satelit al Axei, de fiecare dată când ele vor crede că situaţia o impune:
a) crearea condiţiilor de pace internă;
b) să ia masurile de urgenţă pentru a ajuta popoarele aflate în pericol;
c) să constituie autorităţi guvernamentale provizorii în mod larg reprezentative ale tuturor
forţelor democratice ale acestor populaţii şi care se vor angaja să stabilească, cât mai
curând posibil, prin alegeri libere, guverne care să fie expresia voinţei popoarelor şi,
d) să faciliteze, oriunde va fi necesar, astfel de alegeri.
Cele trei guverne vor constata că situaţia dintr-un stat eliberat din europa sau într-un fost
satelit al axei, impune o asemenea acţiune necesară, ele se vor consulta asupra măsurilor
de luat pentru a-şi asuma răspunderea comună definită prin prezenta declaraţie.
SURSA: Alexandru Vianu, Constantin Buşe, Zorin Zamfir, Gheorghe Bădescu, Relaţii
internaţionale în acte şi documente, Vol. II (1939-1945), Editura Didactică şi
Pedagogică, Bucureşti, 1976, pp.185-186.
(…) "The United Kingdom, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics shall possess supreme authority with respect to Germany. In the
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exercise of such authority they will take such steps, including the complete
dismemberment of Germany as they deem requisite for future peace and security."
The study of the procedure of the dismemberment of Germany was referred to a
committee consisting of Mr. Anthony Eden, Mr. John Winant, and Mr. Fedor T. Gusev.
This body would consider the desirability of associating with it a French representative.
It was agreed that a zone in Germany, to be occupied by the French forces, should be
allocated France. This zone would be formed out of the British and American zones and
its extent would be settled by the British and Americans in consultation with the French
Provisional Government.
It was also agreed that the French Provisional Government should be invited to
become a member of the Allied Control Council for Germany.
V. REPARATION
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VII. POLAND
VIII. YUGOSLAVIA
It was agreed to recommend to Marshal Tito and to Dr. Ivan Subasitch: (…)
(b) That as soon as the new Government has been formed it should declare:
(I) That the Anti-Fascist Assembly of the National Liberation (AVNOJ) will be extended
to include members of the last Yugoslav Skupstina who have not compromised
themselves by collaboration with the enemy, thus forming a body to be known as a
temporary Parliament and
(II) That legislative acts passed by the Anti-Fascist Assembly of the National Liberation
(AVNOJ) will be subject to subsequent ratification by a Constituent Assembly; and that
this statement should be published in the communiqué of the conference.
(…)
The British delegation put in notes for the consideration of their colleagues on the
following subjects:
(a) The Control Commission in Bulgaria.
(b) Greek claims upon Bulgaria, more particularly with reference to
reparations.
(c) Oil equipment in Rumania.
(…..)
E. R. Stettinius Jr.
M. Molotov
Anthony Eden
The leaders of the three great powers – the Soviet Union, the United States of America
and Great Britain – have agreed that in two or three months after Germany has
surrendered and the war in Europe is terminated, the Soviet Union shall enter into war
against Japan on the side of the Allies on condition that:
1. The status quo in Outer Mongolia (the Mongolian People’s Republic) shall
be preserved.
Joseph Stalin
Franklin D. Roosevelt
Winston S. Churchill
(…)
I. ESTABLISHMENT OF A COUNCIL OF FOREIGN MINISTERS.
A. The Conference reached the following agreement for the establishment of a Council of
Foreign Ministers to do the necessary preparatory work for the peace settlements:
" (1) There shall be established a Council composed of the Foreign Ministers of the
United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, China, France, and the United
States.
"(2) (i) The Council shall normally meet in London which shall be the permanent seat
of the joint Secretariat which the Council will form. Each of the Foreign Ministers will be
accompanied by a high-ranking Deputy, duly authorized to carry on the work of the
Council in the absence of his Foreign Ministers, and by a small staff of technical
advisers.
" (ii) The first meeting of the Council shall be held in London not later than September
1st 1945. Meetings may be held by common agreement in other capitals as may be agreed
from time to time.
" (3) (i) As its immediate important task, the Council shall be authorized to draw up,
with a view to their submission to the United Nations, treaties of peace with Italy,
Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland, and to propose settlements of territorial
questions outstanding on the termination of the war in Europe. The Council shall be
utilized for the preparation of a peace settlement for Germany to be accepted by the
Government of Germany when a government adequate for the purpose is established.
(…)
A. POLITICAL PRINCIPLES.
1. In accordance with the Agreement on Control Machinery in Germany, supreme
authority in Germany is exercised, on instructions from their respective Governments, by
the Commanders-in-Chief of the armed forces of the United States of America, the
United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the French Republic, each
in his own zone of occupation, and also jointly, in matters affecting Germany as a whole,
in their capacity as members of the Control Council.
2. So far as is practicable, there shall be uniformity of treatment of the German
population throughout Germany.
3. The purposes of the occupation of Germany by which the Control Council shall be
guided are:
(i) The complete disarmament and demilitarization of Germany and the elimination or
control of all German industry that could be used for military production. To these ends:-
(a) All German land, naval and air forces, the SS., SA., SD., and Gestapo, with all
their organizations, staffs and institutions, including the General Staff, the Officers'
Corps, Reserve Corps, military schools, war veterans' organizations and all other military
and semi-military organizations, together with all clubs and associations which serve to
keep alive the military tradition in Germany, shall be completely and finally abolished in
such manner as permanently to prevent the revival or reorganization of German
militarism and Nazism;
(b) All arms, ammunition and implements of war and all specialized facilities for their
production shall be held at the disposal of the Allies or destroyed. The maintenance and
production of all aircraft and all arms. ammunition and implements of war shall be
prevented.
(ii) To convince the German people that they have suffered a total military defeat and
that they cannot escape responsibility for what they have brought upon themselves, since
their own ruthless warfare and the fanatical Nazi resistance have destroyed German
economy and made chaos and suffering inevitable.
(iii) To destroy the National Socialist Party and its affiliated and supervised
organizations, to dissolve all Nazi institutions, to ensure that they are not revived in any
form, and to prevent all Nazi and militarist activity or propaganda.
(iv) To prepare for the eventual reconstruction of German political life on a
democratic basis and for eventual peaceful cooperation in international life by Germany.
4. All Nazi laws which provided the basis of the Hitler regime or established
discriminations on grounds of race, creed, or political opinion shall be abolished. No such
discriminations, whether legal, administrative or otherwise, shall be tolerated.
5. War criminals and those who have participated in planning or carrying out Nazi
enterprises involving or resulting in atrocities or war crimes shall be arrested and brought
to judgment. Nazi leaders, influential Nazi supporters and high officials of Nazi
organizations and institutions and any other persons dangerous to the occupation or its
objectives shall be arrested and interned.
6. All members of the Nazi Party who have been more than nominal participants in its
activities and all other persons hostile to Allied purposes shall be removed from public
and semi-public office, and from positions of responsibility in important private
undertakings. Such persons shall be replaced by persons who, by their political and moral
qualities, are deemed capable of assisting in developing genuine democratic institutions
in Germany.
7. German education shall be so controlled as completely to eliminate Nazi and
militarist doctrines and to make possible the successful development of democratic ideas.
8. The judicial system will be reorganized in accordance with the principles of
democracy, of justice under law, and of equal rights for all citizens without distinction of
race, nationality or religion.
9. The administration in Germany should be directed towards the decentralization of
the political structure and the development of local responsibility. To this end:-
(i) local self-government shall be restored throughout Germany on democratic
principles and in particular through elective councils as rapidly as is consistent with
military security and the purposes of military occupation;
(ii) all democratic political parties with rights of assembly and of public discussion
shall be allowed and encouraged throughout Germany;
(iii) representative and elective principles shall be introduced into regional, provincial
and state (Land) administration as rapidly as may be justified by the successful
application of these principles in local self-government;
(iv) for the time being, no central German Government shall be established.
Notwithstanding this, however, certain essential central German administrative
departments, headed by State Secretaries, shall be established, particularly in the fields of
finance, transport, communications, foreign trade and industry. Such departments will act
under the direction of the Control Council.
10. Subject to the necessity for maintaining military security, freedom of speech, press
and religion shall be permitted, and religious institutions shall be respected. Subject
likewise to the maintenance of military security, the formation of free trade unions shall
be permitted.
B. ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES.
11. In order to eliminate Germany's war potential, the production of arms, ammunition
and implements of war as well as all types of aircraft and sea-going ships shall be
prohibited and prevented. Production of metals, chemicals, machinery and other items
that are directly necessary to a war economy shall be rigidly controlled and restricted to
Germany's approved post-war peacetime needs to meet the objectives stated in Paragraph
15. Productive capacity not needed for permitted production shall be removed in
accordance with the reparations plan recommended by the Allied Commission on
Reparations and approved by the Governments concerned or if not removed shall be
destroyed.
12. At the earliest practicable date, the German economy shall be decentralized for the
purpose of eliminating the present excessive concentration of economic power as
exemplified in particular by cartels, syndicates, trusts and other monopolistic
arrangements.
13. In organizing the German Economy, primary emphasis shall be given to the
development of agriculture and peaceful domestic industries. (…)
(a) 15 per cent of such usable and complete industrial capital equipment, in the first
place from the metallurgical, chemical and machine manufacturing industries as is
unnecessary for the German peace economy and should be removed from the Western
Zones of Germany, in exchange for an equivalent value of food, coal, potash, zinc,
timber, clay products, petroleum products, and such other commodities as may be agreed
upon.
(b) 10 per cent of such industrial capital equipment as is unnecessary for the German
peace economy and should be removed from the Western Zones, to be transferred to the
Soviet Government on reparations account without payment or exchange of any kind in
return.
Removals of equipment as provided in (a) and (b) above shall be made
simultaneously. (…)
8. The Soviet Government renounces all claims in respect of reparations to shares of
German enterprises which are located in the Western Zones of Germany as well as to
German foreign assets in all countries except those specified in paragraph 9 below.
9. The Governments of the U. K. and U. S. A. renounce all claims in respect of
reparations to shares of German enterprises which are located in the Eastern Zone of
occupation in Germany, as well as to German foreign assets in Bulgaria, Finland,
Hungary, Rumania and Eastern Austria.
10. The Soviet Government makes no claims to gold captured by the Allied troops in
Germany.
(4) All stocks of armament, ammunition and supplies of the German Navy
appertaining to the vessels transferred pursuant to paragraphs (1) and (3) hereof shall be
handed over to the respective powers receiving such ships. (…)
B. The following principles for the distribution of the German Merchant Marine were
agreed:-
(1) The German Merchant Marine, surrendered to the Three Powers and wherever
located, shall be divided equally among the U. S. S. R., the U. K., and the U. S. A. (…)
VII. AUSTRIA.
(…)The three Governments have also charged the Council of Foreign Ministers with
the task of preparing Peace Treaties for Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary and Rumania. The
conclusion of Peace Treaties with recognized democratic governments in these States
will also enable the three Governments to support applications from them for
membership of the United Nations. The three Governments agree to examine each
separately in the near future in the light of the conditions then prevailing, the
establishment of diplomatic relations with Finland, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary to
the extent possible prior to the conclusion of peace treaties with those countries.
The three Governments have no doubt that in view of the changed conditions resulting
from the termination of the war in Europe, representatives of the Allied press will enjoy
full freedom to report to the world upon developments in Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary
and Finland.
As regards the admission of other States into the United Nations Organization, Article
4 of the Charter of the United Nations declares that:
1. Membership in the United Nations is open to all other peace-loving States who
accept the obligations contained in the present Charter and, in the judgment of the
organization, are able and willing to carry out these obligations;
2. The admission of any such State to membership in the United Nations will be
effected by a decision of the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security
Council.
The three Governments, so far as they are concerned, will support applications for
membership from those States which have remained neutral during the war and which
fulfill the qualifications set out above. (…)
Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, will have to be undertaken. They agree that any
transfers that take place should be effected in an orderly and humane manner. (…)
XIV. IRAN.
It was agreed that Allied troops should be withdrawn immediately from Tehran, and
that further stages of the withdrawal of troops from Iran should be considered at the
meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers to be held in London in September, 1945.
Document 15: Charter of the United Nations; June 26, 1945 (excerpt)
CHAPTER I
PURPOSES AND PRINCIPLES
Article 1
The Purposes of the United Nations are:
1. To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective
collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the
suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by
peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law,
adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a
breach of the peace;
2. To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of
equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to
strengthen universal peace;
3. To achieve international co-operation in solving international problems of an
economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging
respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to
race, sex, language, or religion; and
4. To be a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of these
common ends.
Article 2
The Organization and its Members, in pursuit of the Purposes stated in Article 1,
shall act in accordance with the following Principles.
1. The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its
Members.
2. All Members, in order to ensure to all of them the rights and benefits resulting from
membership, shall fulfill in good faith the obligations assumed by them in accordance
with the present Charter.
3. All Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a
manner that international peace and security, and. justice, are not endangered.
4. All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of
force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other
manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.
5. All Members shall give the United Nations every assistance in any action it takes in
accordance with the present Charter, and shall refrain from giving assistance to any state
against which the United Nations is taking preventive or enforcement action.
6. The Organization shall ensure that states which are not Members of the United
Nations act in accordance with these Principles so far as may be necessary for the
maintenance of international peace and security.
7. Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to
intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or
shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter;
but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under
CHAPTER II
MEMBERSHIP
(…)
Article 4
1. Membership in the United Nations is open to a other peace-loving states which
accept the obligations contained in the present Charter and, in the judgment of the
Organization, are able and willing to carry out these obligations. (…)
CHAPTER III
ORGANS
Article 7
1. There are established as the principal organs of the United Nations: a General
Assembly, a Security Council, an Economic and Social Council, a Trusteeship Council,
an International Court of Justice, and a Secretariat.
2. Such subsidiary organs as may be found necessary may be established in
accordance with the present Charter. (…)
CHAPTER IV
THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Composition
Article 9
1. The General Assembly shall consist of all the Members of the United Nations.
2. Each Member shall have not more than five representatives in the General
Assembly.
(…)
Article 11
1. The General Assembly may consider the general principles of co-operation in the
maintenance of international peace and security, including the principles governing
disarmament and the regulation of armaments, and may make recommendations with
regard to such principles to the Members or to the Security Council or to both.
2. The General Assembly may discuss any questions relating to the maintenance of
inter- national peace and security brought before it by any Member of the United Nations,
or by the Security Council, or by a state which is not a Member of the United (…) may
make recommendations with regard to any such questions to the state or states concerned
or to the Security Council or to both. (…)
Voting
Article 18
1. Each member of the General Assembly shall have one vote.
2. Decisions of the General Assembly on important questions shall be made by a two-
thirds majority of the members present and voting. These questions shall include:
recommendations with respect to the maintenance of international peace and security, the
election of the non-permanent members of the Security Council, the election of the
members of the Economic and Social Council, (…) the admission of new Members to
the United Nations, the suspension of the rights and privileges of membership, the
expulsion of Members, questions relating to the operation of the trusteeship system, and
budgetary questions.
Procedure
Article 20
The General Assembly shall meet in regular annual sessions and in such special
sessions as occasion may require. Special sessions shall be convoked by the Secretary-
General at the request of the Security Council or of a majority of the Members of the
United Nations.
Article 21
The General Assembly shall adopt its own rules of procedure. It shall elect its
President for each session.
Article 22
The General Assembly may establish such subsidiary organs as it deems necessary for
the performance of its functions.
CHAPTER V
Composition
Article 23
1. The Security Council shall consist of fifteen Members of the United Nations. The
Republic of China, France, the Union of Soviet Socialist , the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America shall be permanent
members of the Security Council. The General Assembly shall elect ten other Members
of the United Nations to be non-permanent members of the Security Council (…).
2. The non-permanent members of the Security Council shall be elected for a term of
two years. In the first election of the non- permanent members after the increase of the
membership of the Security Council from eleven to fifteen, two of the four additional
members shall be chosen for a term of one year. A retiring member shall not be eligible
for immediate re-election.
3. Each member of the Security Council shall have one representative.
Voting
Article 27
1. Each member of the Security Council shall have one vote.
2. Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters shall be made by an
affirmative vote of nine members. (…)
Procedure
Article 28
1. The Security Council shall be so organized as to be able to function continuously.
Each member of the Security Council shall for this purpose be represented at times at the
seat of the Organization. (…)
CAPTER VI
Article 33
1. The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the
maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of a, seek a solution by
negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to
regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice.
2. The Security Council shall, when it deems necessary, call upon the parties to settle
their dispute by such means.
Article 34
The Security Council may investigate any dispute, or any situation which might lead
to international friction or give rise to a dispute, in order to determine whether the
continuance of the dispute or situation is likely to endanger the maintenance of
international peace and security.
Article 35
l. Any Member of the United Nations may bring any dispute, or any situation of the
nature referred to in Article 34, to the attention of the Security Council or of the General
Assembly.
2. A state which is not a Member of the United Nations may bring to the attention of
the Security Council or of the General Assembly any dispute to which it is a party if it
accepts in advance, for the purposes of the dispute, the obligations of pacific settlement
provided in the present Charter. (…)
CHAPTER VII
(…)
Article 44
When Security Council has decided to use force it shall, before calling upon a
Member not represented on it to provide armed forces in fulfilment of the obligations
assumed under Article 43, invite that Member, if the Member so desires, to participate in
the decisions of the Security Council concerning the employment of contingents of that
Member's armed forces.
Article 45
In order to enable the Nations to take urgent military measures, Members shall hold
immediately available national air-force contingents for combined international
enforcement action. (…)
Article 46
Plans for the application of armed force shall be made by the Security Council with
the assistance of the Military Staff Committee. (….)
Article 48
1. The action required to carry out the decisions of the Security Council for the
maintenance of international peace and security shall be taken by all the Members of the
United Nations or by some of them, as the Security Council may determine.
2. Such decisions shall be carried out by the Members of the United Nations directly
and through their action in the appropriate international agencies of which they are
members.
Article 49
The Members of the United Nations shall join in affording mutual assistance in
carrying out the measures decided upon by the Security Council. (…)
CHAPTER X
THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL
Composition
Article 61
1. The Economic and Social Council shall consist of fifty-four Members of the United
Nations elected by the General Assembly.
2. (…) eighteen members of the Economic and Social Council shall be elected each
year for a term of three years. A retiring member shall be eligible for immediate re-
election. (…)
4. Each member of the Economic and Social Council shall have one representative.
Article 62
1. The Economic and Social Council may make or initiate studies and reports with
respect to international economic, social, cultural, educational, health, and related matters
and may make recommendations with respect to any such matters to the General
Assembly, to the Members of the United Nations, and to the specialized agencies
concerned. (…)
Voting
Article 67
1. Each member of the Economic and Social Council shall have one vote.
2. Decisions of the Economic and Social Council shall be made by a majority of the
members present and voting. (…)
CHAPTER XIV
THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
Article 92
The International Court of Justice shall be the principal judicial organ of the United
Nations.(…)
Article 96
1. The General Assembly or the Security Council may request the International Court
of Justice to give an advisory opinion on any legal question.
2. Other organs of the United Nations and specialized agencies, which may at any
time be so authorized by the General Assembly, may also request advisory opinions of
the Court on legal questions arising within the scope of their activities.
CHAPTER XV
THE SECRETARIAT
Article 97
The Secretariat shall comprise a Secretary- General and such staff as the Organization
may require. The Secretary-General shall be appointed by the General Assembly upon
the recommendation of the Security Council. He shall be the chief administrative officer
of the Organization.
Article 98
The Secretary-General shall act in that capacity in all meetings of the General
Assembly, of the Security Council, of the Economic and Social Council, and of the
Trusteeship Council, and shall perform such other functions as are entrusted to him by
these organs. The Secretary-General shall make an annual report to the General
Assembly on the work of the Organization.
Article 99
The Secretary-General may bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter
which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security.
(…)
Seminar nr. 7
- un discurs electoral
- Stalin aducea elogii sistemului sovietic care a ieşit învingător din război, fapt
care demonstra, din perspectiva sa, că sistemul social sovietic era o formă de
organizare mai bună decât orice alt sistem social ne-sovietic
- descriind cauzele celui de al doilea război mondial, liderul sovietic invoca o
normă comunistă clasică, şi anume că războiul nu ar fi fost provocat de Hitler
D. Telegrama Novikov
- septembrie 1946 - ambasadorul sovietic la Washington , Nikolai Novikov
elaborează o telegramă în care atrăgea atenţia factorilor politici de la Moscova
asupra pericolului politicii americane de dominare economică şi militară a
lumii.
- 1943 – din ordinul lui Stalin Comintern-ul este desfiinţat , această măsură ,
aparent radicală , având menirea de a-i convinge pe aliaţii occidentali de
faptul că URSS a renunţat la ideea revoluţiei mondiale.
- 22 septembrie 1947 – este creat Cominformul . În discursul inaugural , Andrei
Jdanov , după ce prezintă Cominform-ul drept o reacţie directă la propunerea
de acceptare a Planului Marshall , proclamă împărţirea oficială a lumii în două
tabere:
° tabăra imperialistă şi antidemocratică al cărei
scop rezidă în sprijinirea regimurilor
reacţionare şi pro-faciste.
° tabăra antiimperialistă şi democratică , având
drept scop consolidarea democraţiei , eliminarea
ultimelor vestigii ale fascismului , rezistând
totodată expansiunii imperialiste.
- ulterior a avut menirea de a pregăti terenul extirpării abcesului titoist.
Comrades!
(…)
It would be wrong to believe that the Second War broke out accidentally or as a
result of the mistakes of some or other statesmen, through mistakes certainly were made.
In reality, the war broke out as an inevitable result of the development of the world
economic and political forces on the basis of modern monopoly capitalism.
Marxists have stated more than once that the capitalist system of world economy
conceals in itself the elements of general crisis and military clashes, that in view of this in
our time the development of world capitalism takes place not as a smooth and even
advance but through crises and war catastrophes.
The reason is that the unevenness of the development of capitalist countries
usually results, as time passes, in an abrupt disruption of the equilibrium within the world
system of capitalism, and that a group of capitalist countries which believes itself to be
less supplied with raw materials and markets usually attempts to alter the situation and
re-divide the “spheres of influence” in its own favour by means of armed forces.
This results in the splitting of the capitalist world in two hostile camps and in war
between them. (…)
Thus the first crisis of the capitalist system of the world economy resulted in the
First World War, and the second crisis resulted in the Second World War.
This does not mean, of course, that the Second World War was an exact replica of the
first. On the contrary, the Second World War substantially differs in its nature from the
first. (…)
The Second World War from the very outset assumed the nature of an anti –
Fascist war, a war of liberation, one of the tasks of which was also to reestablish
democratic liberties. The entry of the Soviet Union into the war against the Axis States
could only strengthen –and actually did strengthen – the anti – fascist and liberating
character of the Second World War.
It was on this basis that the anti-fascist coalition of the Soviet Union, the United
States of America, Great Britain and other freedom – loving States took shape, a collation
which later played a decisive part in routing the armed forces of the Axis States. This is
how matters stand with regard to the question of the origin and nature of the Second
World War. (…)
But the war was not only a curse. It was at the same time a great school in which
all the forces of the people were tried and tested. The war laid bare all the facts and
events in the rear and at the front, it mercilessly tore off the veils and covers which had
concealed the true faces of the States, governments, and parties, and placed them on the
stage without masks, without embellishments, with all their shortcomings and virtues.
The war set something in the nature of an examination for our Soviet system, our State,
our Government, our Communist Party, and summed up the results of their work as if
telling us: here they are, your people and organizations, their deeds and days – look at
them closely and reward them according to their deserts. This is one of the positive
aspects of the war. (…)
There is one main result which served as a basis for all other results. This result is
that at the end of the war the enemies suffered defeat and we, together with our Allies,
emerged as victors. We ended the war in complete victory over the enemy – this is the
principal result of the war. But this is too general as a result, and we cannot stop at that.
(…)
Our victory means, in the first place, that our Soviet social system has won, that
the Soviet social system successfully withstood the trial in the flames of war and proved
its perfect viability. (…) The war has shown that the Soviet social system is a truly
popular system, which has grown from the people and enjoys its powerful support, that
the Soviet social system is a perfectly viable and stable from of organization of society.
More that that, the point is now not whether the Soviet social system is viable or not,
since after the objective lessons of the war no single skeptic now ventures to come out
with doubts concerning the viability of the Soviet social system. The point is that the
Soviet social system has proved more viable and stable that a non-Soviet social system,
that the Soviet social system is a better form of organization of society than any non-
Soviet social system. (…)
Secondly, our victory means that our Soviet State System has won, that our multi-
national Soviet State withstood all the trials of war and proved its viability. (…)
Thirdly, or victory means that the Soviet armed forces have won, that our Red Army has
won, that the Red Army heroically withstood all the adversities of war, utterly routed the
armies of our enemies and emerged from the war as victor. (…)
These are the main results of the war.
( … ) A shadow has fallen upon the scenes so lately light by the Allied victory.
Nobody knows what Soviet Russia and its Communist international organization intends
to do in the immediate future, or what are the limits, if any, to their expansive and
proselytizing tendencies. I have a strong admiration and regard for the valiant Russian
people and for my wartime comrade, Marshall Stalin. There is deep sympathy and
goodwill in Britain -- and I doubt not here also -- towards the peoples of all the Russias
and a resolve to persevere through many differences and rebuffs in establishing lasting
friendships. We understand the Russian need to be secure on her western frontiers by the
removal of all possibility of German aggression. We welcome Russia to her rightful place
among the leading nations of the world. We welcome her flag upon the seas. Above all,
we welcome, or should welcome, constant, frequent and growing contacts between the
Russian people and our own people on both sides of the Atlantic. It is my duty however,
for I am sure you would wish me to state the facts as I see them to you. It is my duty to
place before you certain facts about the present position in Europe.
From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic an iron curtain has descended
across the Continent. Behind that line lie all the capitals of the ancient states of Central
and Eastern Europe. Warsaw, Berlin, Prague, Vienna, Budapest, Belgrade, Bucharest
and Sofia, all these famous cities and the populations around them lie in what I must call
the Soviet sphere, and all are subject in one form or another, not only to Soviet influence
but to a very high and, in some cases, increasing measure of control from Moscow.
Athens alone -- Greece with its immortal glories -- is free to decide its future at an
election under British, American and French observation. The Russian-dominated Polish
Government has been encouraged to make enormous and wrongful inroads upon
Germany, and mass expulsions of millions of Germans on a scale grievous and
undreamed-of are now taking place. The Communist parties, which were very small in all
these Eastern States of Europe, have been raised to pre-eminence and power far beyond
their numbers and are seeking everywhere to obtain totalitarian control. Police
governments are prevailing in nearly every case, and so far, except in Czechoslovakia,
there is no true democracy.
Turkey and Persia are both profoundly alarmed and disturbed at the claims which
are being made upon them and at the pressure being exerted by the Moscow Government.
An attempt is being made by the Russians in Berlin to build up a quasi-Communist party
in their zone of occupied Germany by showing special favors to groups of left-wing
German leaders. At the end of the fighting last June, the American and British Armies
withdrew westward, in accordance with an earlier agreement, to a depth at some points of
150 miles upon a front of nearly four hundred miles, in order to allow our Russian allies
to occupy this vast expanse of territory which the Western Democracies had conquered.
If no the Soviet Government tries, by separate action , to build up a pro-
Communist Germany in their areas, this will cause new serious difficulties in the
American and British zones, and will give the defeated Germans the power of putting
themselves up to auction between the Soviets and the Western Democracies. Whatever
conclusions may be drawn from these facts -- and facts they are -- this is certainly not the
Liberated Europe we fought to build up. Nor is it one which contains the essentials of
permanent peace. ( … )
also by racial theory , maintaining that only nations speaking the English language are
fully valuable nations , called upon to decide the destinies of the entire world.
( … ) As a result of the German invasion , the Soviet Union has irrevocably lost in
battles with the Germans , and also during the German ocupation and through the
expulsion of Soviet citizens to German slave labor camps , about 7 000 000 people. In
other words , the Soviet Union has lost in men several times more then Britain and the
United States together.
It may be that some quarters are trying to push into oblivion these sacrifices of the
Soviet people which insured the liberation of Europe frome the Hitlerite yoke.
But the Soviet Union cannot forget them. One can ask therefore , what can be
surprising in the fact that the Soviet Union , in a desire to ensure its security for the
future, tries to achieve that these countries should have governments whose relations to
the Soviet Union are loyal? How can one , without having lost one’s reason , qualify this
peaceful aspirations of the Soviet Union as “expansionist tendencies” of our
Government?
( … ) Mr. Churchill wanders around the truth when he speaks of the growth of the
influence of the Communist parties in Easter Europe ( … ) The growth of the influence of
the Communism cannot be considered accidental. It is a normal function. The influence
of the Comunists grew because during the hard years of the mastery of fascism in Europe
, Communists showed themselves to be reliable , daring and self-sacrificing fighters
against fascist regimes for the liberty of peoples.
SURSA: Jussi Hanhimaki , Odd Arne Westad , The Cold War , A History in
Documents and Eyewitness Accounts , Oxford University Press , 2004 , p.48-49
(3) Success of Soviet system, as form of internal power, is not yet finally proven.
It has yet to be demonstrated that it can survive supreme test of successive transfer of
power from one individual or group to another. Lenin's death was first such transfer, and
its effects wracked Soviet state for 15 years. After Stalin's death or retirement will be
second. But even this will not be final test. Soviet internal system will now be subjected,
by virtue of recent territorial expansions, to series of additional strains which once proved
severe tax on Tsardom. We here are convinced that never since termination of civil war
have mass of Russian people been emotionally farther removed from doctrines of
Communist Party than they are today. In Russia, party has now become a great and--for
the moment--highly successful apparatus of dictatorial administration, but it has ceased to
be a source of emotional inspiration. Thus, internal soundness and permanence of
movement need not yet be regarded as assured.
(4) All Soviet propaganda beyond Soviet security sphere is basically negative and
destructive. It should therefore be relatively easy to combat it by any intelligent and
really constructive program.
For those reasons I think we may approach calmly and with good heart problem
of how to deal with Russia. As to how this approach should be made, I only wish to
advance, by way of conclusion, following comments:
(1) Our first step must be to apprehend, and recognize for what it is, the nature of
the movement with which we are dealing. We must study it with same courage,
detachment, objectivity, and same determination not to be emotionally provoked or
unseated by it, with which doctor studies unruly and unreasonable individual.
(2) We must see that our public is educated to realities of Russian situation. I
cannot over-emphasize importance of this. Press cannot do this alone. It must be done
mainly by Government, which is necessarily more experienced and better informed on
practical problems involved. In this we need not be deterred by [ugliness?] of picture. I
am convinced that there would be far less hysterical anti-Sovietism in our country today
if realities of this situation were better understood by our people. There is nothing as
dangerous or as terrifying as the unknown. It may also be argued that to reveal more
information on our difficulties with Russia would reflect unfavorably on Russian-
American relations. I feel that if there is any real risk here involved, it is one which we
should have courage to face, and sooner the better. But I cannot see what we would be
risking. Our stake in this country, even coming on heels of tremendous demonstrations of
our friendship for Russian people, is remarkably small. We have here no investments to
guard, no actual trade to lose, virtually no citizens to protect, few cultural contacts to
preserve. Our only stake lies in what we hope rather than what we have; and I am
convinced we have better chance of realizing those hopes if our public is enlightened and
if our dealings with Russians are placed entirely on realistic and matter-of-fact basis.
(3) Much depends on health and vigor of our own society. World communism is
like malignant parasite which feeds only on diseased tissue. This is point at which
domestic and foreign policies meets Every courageous and incisive measure to solve
internal problems of our own society, to improve self-confidence, discipline, morale and
community spirit of our own people, is a diplomatic victory over Moscow worth a
thousand diplomatic notes and joint communiqués. If we cannot abandon fatalism and
indifference in face of deficiencies of our own society, Moscow will profit--Moscow
cannot help profiting by them in its foreign policies.
(4) We must formulate and put forward for other nations a much more positive
and constructive picture of sort of world we would like to see than we have put forward
in past. It is not enough to urge people to develop political processes similar to our own.
Many foreign peoples, in Europe at least, are tired and frightened by experiences of past,
and are less interested in abstract freedom than in security. They are seeking guidance
rather than responsibilities. We should be better able than Russians to give them this. And
unless we do, Russians certainly will.
(5) Finally we must have courage and self-confidence to cling to our own
methods and conceptions of human society. After Al, the greatest danger that can befall
us in coping with this problem of Soviet communism, is that we shall allow ourselves to
become like those with whom we are coping.
SURSA: The Charge in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State ,
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/coldwar/documents/episode-1/kennan.htm , 12.01.2007
( … ) In these circumstances it is clear that the main element of any United States
policy toward the Soviet Union must be that of long-term, patient but firm and vigilant
containment of Russian expansive tendencies. It is important to note, however, that such
a policy has nothing to do with outward histrionics: with threats or blustering or
superfluous gestures of outward "toughness." While the Kremlin is basically flexible in
its reaction to political realities, it is by no means unamenable to considerations of
prestige. Like almost any other government, it can be placed by tactless and threatening
gestures in a position where it cannot afford to yield even though this might be dictated
by its sense of realism. The Russian leaders are keen judges of human psychology, and as
such they are highly conscious that loss of temper and of self-control is never a source of
strength in political affairs. They are quick to exploit such evidences of weakness. For
these reasons it is a sine qua non of successful dealing with Russia that the foreign
government in question should remain at all times cool and collected and that its demands
on Russian policy should be put forward in such a manner as to leave the way open for a
compliance not too detrimental to Russian prestige.
In the light of the above, it will be clearly seen that the Soviet pressure against the
free institutions of the western world is something that can be contained by the adroit and
vigilant application of counter-force at a series of constantly shifting geographical and
political points, corresponding to the shifts and maneuvers of Soviet policy, but which
cannot be charmed or talked out of existence. The Russians look forward to a duel of
infinite duration, and they see that already they have scored great successes. It must be
borne in mind that there was a time when the Communist Party represented far more of a
minority in the sphere of Russian national life than Soviet power today represents in the
world community.
But if the ideology convinces the rulers of Russia that truth is on their side and
they they can therefore afford to wait, those of us on whom that ideology has no claim are
free to examine objectively the validity of that premise. The Soviet thesis not only
implies complete lack of control by the west over its own economic destiny, it likewise
assumes Russian unity, discipline and patience over an infinite period. Let us bring this
apocalyptic vision down to earth, and suppose that the western world finds the strength
and resourcefulness to contain Soviet power over a period of ten to fifteen years. What
does that spell for Russia itself?
The Soviet leaders, taking advantage of the contributions of modern techniques to
the arts of despotism, have solved the question of obedience within the confines of their
power. Few challenge their authority; and even those who do are unable to make that
challenge valid as against the organs of suppression of the state.
The Kremlin has also proved able to accomplish its purpose of building up
Russia, regardless of the interests of the inhabitants, and industrial foundation of heavy
metallurgy, which is, to be sure, not yet complete but which is nevertheless continuing to
grow and is approaching those of the other major industrial countries. All of this,
however, both the maintenance of internal political security and the building of heavy
industry, has been carried out at a terrible cost in human life and in human hopes and
energies. It has necessitated the use of forced labor on a scale unprecedented in modern
times under conditions of peace. It has involved the neglect or abuse of other phases of
Soviet economic life, particularly agriculture, consumers' goods production, housing and
transportation.
To all that, the war has added its tremendous toll of destruction, death and human
exhaustion. In consequence of this, we have in Russia today a population which is
physically and spiritually tired. The mass of the people are disillusioned, skeptical and no
longer as accessible as they once were to the magical attraction which Soviet power still
radiates to its followers abroad. The avidity with which people seized upon the slight
respite accorded to the Church for tactical reasons during the war was eloquent testimony
to the fact that their capacity for faith and devotion found little expression in the purposes
of the regime.
In these circumstances, there are limits to the physical and nervous strength of
people themselves. These limits are absolute ones, and are binding even for the cruelest
dictatorship, because beyond them people cannot be driven. The forced labor camps and
the other agencies of constraint provide temporary means of compelling people to work
longer hours than their own volition or mere economic pressure would dictate; but if
people survive them at all they become old before their time and must be considered as
human casualties to the demands of dictatorship. In either case their best powers are no
longer available to society and can no longer be enlisted in the service of the state.
………………………………………………………………………………………………
It is clear that the United States cannot expect in the foreseeable future to enjoy
political intimacy with the Soviet regime. It must continue to regard the Soviet Union as a
rival, not a partner, in the political arena. It must continue to expect that Soviet policies
will reflect no abstract love of peace and stability, no real faith in the possibility of a
permanent happy coexistence of the Socialist and capitalist worlds, but rather a cautious,
persistent pressure toward the disruption and, weakening of all rival influence and rival
power.
Balanced against this are the facts that Russia, as opposed to the western world in
general, is still by far the weaker party, that Soviet policy is highly flexible, and that
Soviet society may well contain deficiencies which will eventually weaken its own total
potential. This would of itself warrant the United States entering with reasonable
confidence upon a policy of firm containment, designed to confront the Russians with
unalterable counter-force at every point where they show signs of encroaching upon he
interests of a peaceful and stable world. (…)
The foreign policy of the United States, which reflects the imperialist tendencies
of American monopolistic capital, is characterized in the postwar period by a striving for
world supremacy. This is the real meaning of the many statements by President Truman
and other representatives of American ruling circles; that the United States has the right
to lead the world. All the forces of American diplomacy -- the army, the air force, the
navy, industry, and science -- are enlisted in the service of this foreign policy. For this
purpose broad plans for expansion have been developed and are being implemented
through diplomacy and the establishment of a system of naval and air bases stretching far
beyond the boundaries of the United States, through the arms race, and through the
creation of ever newer types of weapons.
1. a) The foreign policy of the United States is conducted now in a situation that
differs greatly from the one that existed in the prewar period. This situation does not fully
conform to the calculations of those reactionary circles which hoped that during the
Second World War they would succeed in avoiding, at least for a long time, the main
battles in Europe and Asia. They calculated that the United States of America, if it was
unsuccessful in completely avoiding direct participation in the war, would enter it only at
the last minute, when it could easily affect the outcome of the war, completely ensuring
its interests.
In this regard, it was thought that the main competitors of the United States would
be crushed or greatly weakened in the war, and the United States by virtue of this
circumstance would assume the role of the most powerful factor in resolving the
fundamental questions of the postwar world. These calculations were also based on the
assumption, which was very widespread in the United States in the initial stages of the
war, that the Soviet Union, which had been subjected to the attack of German Fascism in
June 1941, would also be exhausted or even completely destroyed as a result of the war.
Reality did not bear out the calculations of the American imperialists.
b) The two main aggressive powers, fascist Germany and militarist Japan, which
were at the same time the main competitors of the United States in both the economic and
foreign policy fields, were thoroughly defeated. The third great power, Great Britain,
which had taken heavy blows during the war, now faces enormous economic and political
difficulties. The political foundations of the British Empire were appreciably shaken, and
crises arose, for example, in India, Palestine, and Egypt.
Europe has come out of the war with a completely dislocated economy, and the
economic devastation that occurred in the course of the war cannot be overcome in a
short time. All of the countries of Europe and Asia are experiencing a colossal need for
consumer goods, industrial and transportation equipment, etc. Such a situation provides
American monopolistic capital with prospects for enormous shipments of goods and the
importation of capital into these countries -- a circumstance that would permit it to
infiltrate their national economies.
Such a development would mean a serious strengthening of the economic position
of the United States in the whole world and would be a stage on the road to world
domination by the United States.
…………………………………………………………………………………………
3. Obvious indications of the U.S. effort to establish world dominance are also to be
found in the increase in military potential in peacetime and in the establishment of a large
number of naval and air bases both in the United States and beyond its borders.
In the summer of 1946, for the first time in the history of the country, Congress
passed a law on the establishment of a peacetime army, not on a volunteer basis but on
the basis of universal military service. The size of the army, which is supposed to amount
to about one million persons as of July 1, 1947, was also increased significantly. The size
of the navy at the conclusion of the war decreased quite insignificantly in comparison
with wartime. At the present time, the American navy occupies first place in the world,
leaving England's navy far behind, to say nothing of those of other countries.
Expenditures on the army and navy have risen colossally, amounting to $13
billion according to the budget for 1946-47 (about 40 percent of the total budget of $36
billion). This is more than 10 times greater than corresponding expenditures in the budget
for 1938, which did not amount to even $1 billion.
…………………………………………………………………………………………...
In recent years American capital has penetrated very intensively into the economy
of the Near Eastern countries, in particular into the oil industry. At present there are
American oil concessions in all of the Near Eastern countries that have oil deposits (Iraq,
Bahrain, Kuwait, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia). American capital, which made its first
appearance in the oil industry of the Near East, only in 1927, now controls 42 percent of
all proven reserves in the Near East, excluding Iran. Of the total proven reserves of 26.8
billion barrels, over 11 billion barrels are owned by U.S. concessions. Striving to ensure
further development of their concessions in different countries (which are often very
large--Saudi Arabia, for example), the American oil companies plan to build a trans-
Arabian pipeline to transport oil from the American concession in Saudi Arabia and in
other countries on the southeastern shore of the Mediterranean Sea to ports in Palestine
and Egypt.
In expanding in the Near East, American capital has English capital as its greatest
and most stubborn competitor. The fierce competition between them is the chief factor
preventing England and the United States from reaching an understanding on the division
of spheres of influence in the Near East, a division of that can occur only at the expense
of direct British interests in this region. ( … )
The gravity of the situation which confronts the world today necessitates my
appearance before a joint session of the Congress. The foreign policy and the national
security of this country are involved.
One aspect of the present situation, which I wish to present to you at this time for your
consideration and decision, concerns Greece and Turkey.
The United States has received from the Greek Government an urgent appeal for
financial and economic assistance. Preliminary reports from the American Economic
Mission now in Greece and reports from the American Ambassador in Greece
corroborate the statement of the Greek Government that assistance is imperative if
Greece is to survive as a free nation.
I do not believe that the American people and the Congress wish to turn a deaf ear to
the appeal of the Greek Government.
Greece is not a rich country. Lack of sufficient natural resources has always forced the
Greek people to work hard to make both ends meet. Since 1940, this industrious and
peace loving country has suffered invasion, four years of cruel enemy occupation, and
bitter internal strife.
When forces of liberation entered Greece they found that the retreating Germans had
destroyed virtually all the railways, roads, port facilities, communications, and merchant
marine. More than a thousand villages had been burned. Eighty-five per cent of the
children were tubercular. Livestock, poultry, and draft animals had almost disappeared.
Inflation had wiped out practically all savings.
As a result of these tragic conditions, a militant minority, exploiting human want and
misery, was able to create political chaos which, until now, has made economic recovery
impossible.
Greece is today without funds to finance the importation of those goods which are
essential to bare subsistence. Under these circumstances the people of Greece cannot
make progress in solving their problems of reconstruction. Greece is in desperate need of
financial and economic assistance to enable it to resume purchases of food, clothing, fuel
and seeds. These are indispensable for the subsistence of its people and are obtainable
only from abroad. Greece must have help to import the goods necessary to restore
internal order and security, so essential for economic and political recovery.
The Greek Government has also asked for the assistance of experienced American
administrators, economists and technicians to insure that the financial and other aid given
to Greece shall be used effectively in creating a stable and self-sustaining economy and in
improving its public administration.
The very existence of the Greek state is today threatened by the terrorist activities of
several thousand armed men, led by Communists, who defy the government's authority at
a number of points, particularly along the northern boundaries. A Commission appointed
by the United Nations security Council is at present investigating disturbed conditions in
northern Greece and alleged border violations along the frontier between Greece on the
one hand and Albania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia on the other.
................................................................................................................................................
Greece's neighbor, Turkey, also deserves our attention.
Finally, I ask that the Congress provide authority which will permit the speediest and
most effective use, in terms of needed commodities, supplies, and equipment, of such
funds as may be authorized. ( … )
că au fost pur şi simplu distruse. În multe ţări, încrederea în moneda natională a fost grav
zdruncinată. Prăbuşirea structurii comerciale a Europei s-a produs în timpul războiului.
Reînvierea economică a fost serios întârziată datorită faptului că doi ani după
încetarea ostilităţilor acordul cu privire la tratatele de pace cu Germania şi Austria n-a
fost încă stabilit. Unul dintre aspectele acestei probleme este în acelaşi timp interesant şi
grav: fermierul a produs întotdeauna bunuri alimentare pe care le poate schimba cu
orăşenii contra altor lucruri necesare vietii. Această diviziune a muncii reprezintă baza
civilizatiei moderne. La ora actuală, ea e ameninţată de ruină. lndustriile oraşelor nu
produc suficiente mărfuri necesare schimbului cu fermierii producători de produse
alimentare. Lipsesc materiile prime şi combustibilul. Utilajul industrial lipseşte sau este
prea uzat. Fermierul şi ţăranul nu pot să găsească pe piaţă mărfurile pe care vor să le
cumpere, astfel încât vânzarea produselor lor în schimbul banilor pe care nu pot să-i
utilizeze le pare o tranzactie lipsită de interes. Deci, ei au încetat să mai cultive intensiv
câmpul pentru a obţine nutreţ în ciuda faptului că le lipseşte îmbrăcămintea şi alte
produse ale civilizaţiei. În acelaşi timp, locuitorilor oraşelor le lipsesc hrana şi
combustibilul. Guvernele sunt deci forţate să se servească de resursele în devize străine şi
de credite pentru a cumpăra din străinătate aceste produse indispensabile, epuizând astfel
fondurile de care au o nevoie urgentă pentru reconstrucţie. Deci, se creează rapid o
situaţie foarte gravă care este de rău augur pentru întreaga lume. Sistemul modern care se
bazează pe diviziunea muncii şi pe schimbul de produse este în pericol de a se prăbuşi.
Adevărul este că nevoile Europei de hrană şi de alte produse esenţiale importate
din străinătate - şi mai ales din America - pentru următorii trei sau patru ani sunt mult mai
mari decât capacitatea sa actuală de plată, încât ea va trebui să primească un ajutor
suplimentar foarte important sau să se expună unei dislocări economice, sociale şi
politice foarte grave.
Remediul acestei situaţii constă în sfărâmarea cercului vicios şi în restaurarea
încrederii locuitorilor întregii Europe. Fabricantul şi fermierul din multe regiuni trebuie
să poată şi să vrea să-şi schimbe produsele contra monede a căror valoare constantă să fie
fără dubiu.
În afară de efectul demoralizant pe care disperarea popoarelor în chestiune o are
asupra întregii lumi şi a tulburărilor pe care aceasta le poate provoca, ar trebui să fie
evidente pentru toţi şi consecinţele acestei situaţii pentru economia Statelor Unite. Este
logic că Statele Unite ar trebui să facă tot ceea ce pot pentru a sprijini restabilirea
sănătăţii economice a lumii, în lipsa căreia stabilitatea politică şi pacea sunt imposibile.
Politica noastră nu este dirijată împotriva nici unei ţări, împotriva nici unei doctrine ci
contra foametei, sărăciei, disperării şi haosului. Scopul său trebuie să fie renaşterea unei
economii active în lume pentru a crea condiţiile politice şi sociale în care să poată să
existe instituţii libere. Acest ajutor, sunt convins, nu trebuie acordat cu zgârcenie, de
fiecare dată când survin crize. Orice ajutor pe care acest guvern ar putea să-l dea în viitor
ar trebui să fie mai mult un remediu decât un simplu paleativ. Orice guvern care vrea să
sprijine relansarea economică se va bucura, sunt sigur de acest lucru, de întreaga
cooperare din partea guvernului Statelor Unite. Orice guvern care va încerca împiedicarea
relansării economice a altor ţări nu poate spera să primească ajutorul nostru. În plus,
guvernele, partidele şi grupările politice care caută să perpetueze mizeria umană pentru a
avea un profit pe plan politic sau pe alte planuri se vor ciocni de opoziţia Statelor Unite.
Este deja evident că înainte ca guvernul Statelor Unite să poată să continue
eforturile pentru remedierea situaţiei şi sprijinirea Europei pe calea însănătoşirii, ar trebui
să se realizeze un acord de către ţările Europei, asupra nevoilor lor actuale şi asupra ceea
ce aceste ţări ale Europei vor face ele însele pentru a eficientiza toate măsurile pe care
acest guvern ar putea să le ia. Nu ar fi nici bine, nici util ca guvernul Statelor Unite să
stabilească el însuşi un program destinat punerii pe picioare a economiei europene.
Aceasta este problema europenilor. După părerea mea, iniţiativa trebuie să vină din partea
Europei.
Rolul Americii trebuie să constea în oferirea unui ajutor prietenesc la stabilirea
unui program european şi să ajute apoi la aplicarea acestuia în măsura în care va fi posibil
să o facă. Acest program va trebui să fie unul general, stabilit în comun măcar de către un
mare număr de naţiuni europene, dacă nu de toate.
SURSA: Charles Zorgbibe, Construcţia europeană. Trecut, prezent, viitor, Ed. Trei,
Bucureşti, 1998 , p. 26-28.
The end of the Second World War confronted all the freedom-loving nations with
the cardinal task of securing a lasting democratic peace sealing victory over fascism. In
the accomplishment of this fundamental task of the postwar period the Soviet Union and
its foreign policy are playing a leading role. This follows from the very nature of the
Soviet socialist state, to which motives of aggression and exploitation are utterly alien,
and which is interested in creating the most favorable conditions for the building of a
communist society. One of these conditions is external peace. As embodiment of a new
and superior social system, the Soviet Union reflects in its foreign policy the aspirations
of progressive mankind, which desires lasting peace and has nothing to gain from a new
war hatched by capitalism. The Soviet Union is a staunch champion of liberty and
independence of all nations, and a foe of national and racial oppression and colonial
exploitation in any shape or form. The change in the general alignment of forces between
the capitalist world and the socialist world brought about by the war has still further
enhanced the significance of the foreign policy of the Soviet state and enlarged the scope
of its activity on the international arena.
The successes and the growing international prestige of the democratic camp were
not to the liking of the imperialists. Even while World War II was still on, reactionary
forces in Great Britain and the United States became increasingly active, striving to
prevent concerted action by the Allied powers, to protract the war, to bleed the U.S.S.R.,
and to save the fascist aggressors from utter defeat. The sabotage of the Second Front by
the Anglo-Saxon imperialists, headed by Churchill, was a clear reflection of this
tendency, which was in point of fact a continuation of the Munich policy in the new and
changed conditions. But while the war was still in progress British and American
reactionary circles did not venture to come out openly against the Soviet Union and the
democratic countries, realizing that they had the undivided sympathy of the masses all
over the world. But in the concluding months of the war the situation began to change.
The British and American imperialists already manifested their willingness to respect the
legitimate interests of the Soviet Union and the democratic countries at the Potsdam
tripartite conference in July 1945.
The foreign policy of the Soviet Union and the democratic countries in these two
past years has been a policy of consistently working for the observance of the democratic
principles in the postwar settlement. The countries of the anti-imperialist camp have
loyally and consistently striven for the implementation of these principles, without
deviating from them one iota. Consequently, the major objective of the postwar foreign
policy of the democratic states has been a democratic peace, the eradication of the
vestiges of fascism and the prevention of a resurgence of fascist imperialist aggression,
the recognition of the principle of the equality of nations and respect for their
sovereignty, and general reduction of all armaments and the outlawing of the most
destructive weapons, those designed for the mass slaughter of the civilian population. ...
Of immense importance are the joint efforts of the diplomacy of the U.S.S.R. and
that of the other democratic countries to secure a reduction of armaments and the
outlawing of the most destructive of them -- the atomic bomb.
Soviet foreign policy proceeds from the fact of the coexistence for a long period of
the two systems -- capitalism and socialism. From this it follows that cooperation
between the U.S.S.R. and countries with other systems is possible, provided that the
principle of reciprocity is observed and that obligations once assumed are honored.
Everyone knows that the U.S.S.R. has always honored the obligations it has assumed. The
Soviet Union has demonstrated its will and desire for cooperation.
Seminar nr. 8
A) satelizare:
- procesul prin care ţările din această regiune s-au subordonat intereselor politicii
externe sovietice
- a început odată cu intrarea Armatei Roşii în regiune în 1944 şi a continuat cu
a) semnarea tratatelor de pace şi colaborare dintre aceste ţări, devenite democraţii
populare, şi Uniunea Sovietică
b) prin închegarea tot mai coerentă a blocului, prin constituirea în septembrie 1947, a
Cominformului
B) sovietizare:
- a început în 1944 /1945
- a cunoscut o definire treptată în funcţie de evoluţiile internaţionale
- a constat în impunerea şi acceptarea transformării statelor după modelul sovietic
vizând regimul politic, valorile societăţii, economia, structurile sociale, instituţiile, omul
- impunerea modelului sovietic a fost legat de prezenţa Armatei Roşii, cu excepţia
Iugoslaviei şi Albaniei
A) satelizare:
- etape:
a) semnarea convenţiilor de armistiţiu
Armistiţiu cu Italia, septembrie 1943
Armistiţiu cu România, 12 septembrie 1944
Armistiţiu cu Bulgaria, 28 octombrie 1944
* De ilustrat structura acestor convenţii de armistiţiu şi rolul lor în mecanismul de
sovietizare
de a păstra armata în Okinawa, iar Japonia îşi lua obligaţia de a renunţa la forţă şi la
ameninţarea cu forţa
- 14 mai 1955, Viena s-a semnat tratatul de pace cu Austria
* De ilustrat structura cu date concrete conţinutul clauzelor tratatelor şi rolul lor în
mecanismul de sovietizare
B) sovietizare:
- transformarea internă a societăţilor din Europa de Centrală şi de Est s-a bazat pe tiparele
staliniste aplicate de în URSS, în anii 1930
-Zbigniev Brzezinski: Stalin căuta securitatea, în faţa unui posibil conflict cu Occidentul,
în aplicarea rigidă a experienţei sale trecute la fiecare nouă situaţie, crezând că
loialitatea va fi obţinută într-o măsură mai mare prin duplicarea structurii sovietice în
Europa Centrală şi de Est
a) viaţa politică:
- partidele socialiste au fost absorbite de către partidele comuniste
- opoziţia deschisă a fost dispersată, închisă sau lichidată
- partidele non – comuniste au fost dizolvate sau incluse în fronturile patriotice şi
naţionale
- creşterea numerică iniţială a partidelor comuniste a fost urmată de epurări în
masă a membrilor de partid, dar şi a unor lideri de partid, care făceau parte din diferite
fracţiuni ale aceluiaşi partid comunist
- impunerea regimului politic de democraţie populară
b) viaţa culturală:
- controlul comunist asupra sistemului de învăţământ epurarea corpului
profesoral, eliminarea unor discipline şi introducerea unora noi (de exemplu, cursurile de
marxism -leninism)
- realismul socialist a fost proclamat ca normă în artă, arhitectură etc.
c) viaţa economică:
- naţionalizarea principalelor mijloace de producţie
- colectivizarea forţată a agriculturii
- adoptarea unui model de industrializare rapidă, de inspiraţie sovietică bazat pe:
° impunerea unui model centralizat de planificare
° predominarea sectorului de stat
° accentul pus pe industria grea
° dezvoltarea sistemului comercial între statele blocului sovietic
d) viaţa socială:
- apariţia unui clase muncitoare antrenate în domeniul industriei, extrase în marea
sa majoritate din mediul rural
- modelul urbanizării comuniste: construirea de oraşe în jurul marilor centre
industriale, cu un aspect arhitectural specific generat de nevoia stringentă de locuinţe
- conflictul red (membrii de partid) versus expert (intelectualitatea tehnică)
- crearea unor organizaţii de masă specializate pentru fiecare categorie socială în
parte (femei, copii, tinere etc.)
- eforturi pentru crearea unui tip de om nou, socialist
II. OCDE
III. NATO
- etapele constituirii Organizaţiei Tratatului Atlanticului de Nord
1) tratatul de la Dunkerque, martie 1947: semnat între Marea Britanie şi Franţa
2) lărgirea pactului de alianţă din martie 1947 la 17 martie 1948, la Bruxelles s-a
semnat un nou tratat între Marea Britanie, Franţa, Belgia, Olanda, Luxemburg
3) 11 iunie 1948 – rezoluţia Vandenberg care permitea Statelor Unite să intre într-un
sistem de alianţă în afara continentului
V Suport documentar
Articolul 23
I. Italia renunţă la toate drepturile şi legitimităţile sale asupra posesiunilor teritoriale
italiene din Africa şi anume: Libia, Eritreea şi Somalia Italiană. (...)
Articolul 27
Italia recunoaşte şi se obligă să respecte suveranitatea şi independenţa statului albanez.
(...)
Articolul 33
Italia recunoaşte şi se obligă să respecte suveranitatea şi independenţa statului etiopian.
(...)
SURSA: Constantin Buşe, Zorin Zamfir, Alexandru Vianu, Gheorghe Bădescu, Relaţii
internaţionale în acte şi documente, vol. III (1945-1982), Editura Didactică şi
Pedagogică, Bucureşti, 1983, p.21.
Partea I
Graniţele Bulgariei
Articolul 1
Graniţele Bulgariei (...) vor fi aceleaşi care existau la 1 ianuarie 1941.(...)
Partea a IV-a
Retragerea trupelor aliate (...)
Articolul 2
Toate forţele Puterilor aliate şi Unite vor fi retrase din Bulgaria în cel mai scurt timp
posibil şi în orice caz la nu mai mult de 90 de zile din ziua intrării în vigoare a
prezentului Tratat (...).
SURSA: Constantin Buşe, Zorin Zamfir, Alexandru Vianu, Gheorghe Bădescu, Relaţii
internaţionale în acte şi documente, vol. III (1945-1982), Editura Didactică şi
Pedagogică, Bucureşti, 1983, p.23.
(...)
Articolul 2
a) Japonia, recunoscând independenţa Coreei, renunţă la toate drepturile, temeiurile
pentru drepturile şi pretenţiile asupra Coreei, incluzând insulele: Quelpart, portul
Hamilton şi Dagelet.
b) Japonia renunţă la toate drepturile, temeiurile pentru drepturi şi pretenţii asupra
Formozei şi insulelor Pescadores.
Articolul 6
a) Toate trupele de ocupaţie ale Puterilor Aliate vor fi retrase din Japonia în cel mai scurt
timp posibil după intrarea în vigoare a prezentului Tratat şi în orice caz la nu mai mult de
90 de zile din ziua intrării în vigoare a prezentului Tratat (...).
SURSA: Constantin Buşe, Zorin Zamfir, Alexandru Vianu, Gheorghe Bădescu, Relaţii
internaţionale în acte şi documente, vol. III (1945-1982), Editura Didactică şi
Pedagogică, Bucureşti, 1983, p.39.
(...)
Articolul 1
Restaurarea Austriei ca stat liber şi independent
Puterile Aliate şi Unite recunosc că Austria se reconstituie ca stat suveran, independent şi
democratic. (...)
Articolul 4
Puterile Aliate şi Unite declară că uniunea politică sau economică între Austria şi
Germania este interzisă. (...)
Articolul 8
Instituţii democratice
Austria va avea un guvern democratic, ales în baza dreptului de vot general, liber, egal şi
secret al cetăţenilor (...).
Articolul 9
1. Austria trebuie să desăvârşească măsurile începute prin introducerea legilor
corespunzătoare, aprobate de Comisia Aliată pentru Austria, privind lichidarea partidului
naţional – socialist şi a organizaţiilor afiliate lui, ori aflate sub controlul acestui partid
(...).
SURSA: Constantin Buşe, Zorin Zamfir, Alexandru Vianu, Gheorghe Bădescu, Relaţii
internaţionale în acte şi documente, vol. III (1945-1982), Editura Didactică şi
Pedagogică, Bucureşti, 1983, pp.24-25.
(...)
ARTICLE 1
The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any
international dispute in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner
that international peace and security and justice are not endangered, and to refrain in their
international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the
purposes of the United Nations.
ARTICLE 2
The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly
international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better
understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by
promoting conditions of stability and well-being. They will seek to eliminate conflict in
their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between
any or all of them.
ARTICLE 3
In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the Parties,
separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid,
will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.
ARTICLE 4
The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the
territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened.
ARTICLE 5
The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North
America shall be considered an attack against them all, and consequently they agree that,
if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or
collective selfdefence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will
assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually, and in concert
with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed
force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.
Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be
reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security
Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and
security.
ARTICLE 6
For the purpose of Article 5, an armed attack on one or more of the Parties is deemed
to include an armed attack:
- on the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North America, on the Algerian
Departments of France, on the territory of Turkey or on the islands under the jurisdiction
of any of the Parties in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer;
- on the forces, vessels, or aircraft of any of the Parties, when in or over these territories
or any area in Europe in which occupation forces of any of the Parties were stationed on
the date when the Treaty entered into force or the Mediterranean Sea or the North
Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer.
ARTICLE 7
The Treaty does not effect, and shall not be interpreted as affecting, in any way the
rights and obligations under the Charter of the Parties which are members of the United
Nations, or the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of
international peace and security.
ARTICLE 8
Each Party declares that none of the international engagements now in force between
it and any other of the Parties or any third State is in conflict with the provisions of this
Treaty, and undertakes not to enter into any international engagement in conflict with this
Treaty.
ARTICLE 9
The Parties hereby establish a Council, on which each of them shall be represented to
consider matters concerning the implementation of this Treaty. The Council shall be so
organized as to be able to meet promptly at any time. The Council shall set up such
subsidiary bodies as may be necessary; in particular it shall establish immediately a
defence committee which shall recommend measures for the implementation of Articles
3 and 5.
ARTICLE 10
The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European State in a
position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the
North Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty. Any State so invited may become a party to
the Treaty by depositing its instrument of accession with the Government of the United
States of America. The Government of the United States of America will inform each of
the Parties of the deposit of each such instrument of accession.
ARTICLE 11
This Treaty shall be ratified and its provisions carried out by the Parties in accordance
with their respective constitutional processes. The instruments of ratification shall be
deposited as soon as possible with the Government of the United States of America,
which will notify all the other signatories of each deposit. The Treaty shall enter into
force between the States which have ratified it as soon as the ratification of the majority
of the signatories, including the ratifications of Belgium, Canada, France, Luxembourg,
the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States, have been deposited and
shall come into effect with respect to other States on the date of the deposit of their
ratifications.
ARTICLE 12
After the Treaty has been in force for ten years, or at any time thereafter, the Parties
shall, if any of them so requests, consult together for the purpose of reviewing the Treaty,
having regard for the factors then affecting peace and security in the North Atlantic area
including the development of universal as well as regional arrangements under the
Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security.
ARTICLE 13
After the Treaty has been in force for twenty years, any Party may cease to be a Party
one year after its notice of denunciation has been given to the Government of the United
States of America, which will inform the Governments of the other Parties of the deposit
of each notice of denunciation.
ARTICLE 14
This Treaty, of which the English and French texts are equally authentic, shall be
deposited in the archives of the Government of the United States of America. Duly
certified copies will be transmitted by that government to the governments of the other
signatories.
(...)
Articolul 1
Părţile îşi iau obligaţia, în conformitate cu Carta ONU, să soluţioneze prin mijloace
paşnice orice litigiu internaţional în care ar fi implicate şi să se abţină în relaţiile lor
internaţionale de la folosirea forţei în orice mod care nu este compatibil cu ţelurile ONU.
Articolul 2
Pentru a îndeplini mai efectiv ţelul acestui tratat, Părţile separat sau împreună pe calea
unui neîntrerupt şi efectiv ajutor propriu şi a ajutorului reciproc, vor continua să
întărească capacitatea lor proprie şi colectivă de a se opune unei invazii armate. (...)
SURSA: Constantin Buşe, Zorin Zamfir, Alexandru Vianu, Gheorghe Bădescu, Relaţii
internaţionale în acte şi documente, vol. III (1945-1982), Editura Didactică şi
Pedagogică, Bucureşti, 1983, p.62.
Seminar nr. 9
A. Crizele Berlinului
D. Defecţiunea iugoslavă
- cauze:
° refuzul lui Iosip Broz Tito de a fi considerat vasal al Moscovei
° sprijinul pe care iugoslavii l-au acordat comuniştilor greci în timpul
războiului civil
° patronarea iugoslavă a proiectului unei mari federaţii balcanice , ce
urma să includă Ungaria , România , Iugoslavia , Bulgaria , Albania ,
posibil şi Grecia
- 10 februarie 1948 – Kremlin – întâlnirea delegaţiilor de partid sovietică ,
iugoslavă şi bulgară. Stalin ordonă crearea unei federaţii iugoslavo-
bulgare ( raţiunea unui atare ordin rezidă în docilitatea faţă de Moscova a
liderilor comunişti bulgari )
- 1 martie 1948 – Comitetul Central al Partidului Comunist Iugoslav
respinge propunerea sovietică
- 18 martie 1948 – Moscova îşi retrage consilierii militari şi civili din
Iugoslavia
- 27 martie 1948 – într-o scrisoare , Moscova îşi motiva retragerea
consilierilor:
° aceştia fuseseră trataţi de iugoslavi cu ostilitate şi
agresivitate
II Crearea CAER
Document 1: Raport sovietic cu privire la revolta berlinezilor din 16-19 iunie 1958
(excerpt)
( … ) During the day of 16 June, there was a marked increase in the activity of
small groups of provocateurs in various parts of East Berlin, carrying out anti-democratic
agitation amongst the populace. In a number of enterprises in East Berlin and in GDR a
slogan was sent forth from West Berlin calling for an immediate strike in solidarity with
the construction workers of Berlin, as well as a slogan calling for a general strike on 17
June. In the evening of 16 June an extra edition of the evening paper “Dernbend” was
published in West Berlin, with calls for a general strike in the Eastern zone of Germany.
Solidarity strikes started to spread throughout a number of enterprises towards the day’s
end on 16 June.
In the evening of 16 June the situation in Berlin became more difficult. At 20.00
an extraordinary session of the most active members of the Berlin SED organizations was
held, where, in the presence of the entire CC SED Politburo, Ulbricht and Grotewohl
gave speeches on the new political course of the party and government. The mood of the
active party members, according to members of the Politburo, was good. However, the
GDR leadership said not a word of the strikes that were taking place in the city, and gave
no indication as to what course the active party members ought to take in the near future.
During this time crowds of West Berliners, consisting mostly of youth, began to arrive on
city railcars and other means of transportation as well as on foot. A crowd of some 4-5
thousand people moved in the direction of the Friedrichstadtpalast where a session of the
active members of the party was taking place, thus creating a possible danger that the
members of the CC SED Politburo could become hostages. At the same time, in the
centre of the city at Stalinallee, a crowd of West Berliners numbering some 2 thousand
began throwing rocks at the monument of comr. Stalin, and calling for the overthrow of
the GDR government. The were also shouts by isolated provocateurs, calling for the
killing of Russians.
The GDR police, acting on their instructions, did not actively intervene in these
events. The measures that we undertook (the dispatch of police reserves to the
Friedrichstadtpalast), were
enough to disperse the crowd that was moving in the direction of Friedrichstadtpalast, as
well as the mob at Stalinallee. Following this, various groups of provocateurs and
bandits, principally from West Berlin, took to rioting in various places in the Soviet
sector of Berlin, overturning automobiles, looting shops and apartments of SED activists
on Stalinallee, stopping street traffic, trying to break into the [natural] gas plant and other
important city enterprises. These acts of outrage were carried out by groups that together
numbered approximately 1.5-2 thousand people.
Late in the evening of 16 June, we met with the leadership of CC SED
(Grotewohl, Ulbricht, [secret police chief Wilhelm] Zaisser, [SED Politburo member
Rudolf] Herrnstadt). We turned their attention to the seemingly serious nature of the
disorders that had taken place in the city, pointing out that the slogans thrown out by the
provocateurs at the end of the day calling for a general strike were finding a positive
response within the enterprises of East Berlin and in some other places in GDR, and also
pointing out that it is necessary to take the most decisive measures to maintain order in
the city on 17 June, since one could expect a massive influx into East Berlin of
provocateur bands from West Berlin. We informed our friends of our decision to send
Soviet forces into Berlin. Our friends announced that they did not believe the situation so
serious as to warrant such extraordinary measures, and that, in their opinion, one should
not expect serious unrest in the city on 17 June, though they did not rule out the
possibility of a slight increase in unrest as compared to 16 June. They evaluated the
situation in GDR rather optimistically. We pointed out to the GDR leadership that it is
necessary to be highly prepared and we proposed that detachments of German barracks-
based police from Potsdam and Oranienburg be called out, which they did by the
morning of 17 June. During the day of 16 June we sent a warning telegram to our
regional representatives informing them of the unrest in Berlin and recommending that
they take urgent preventive and preparatory steps to tackle unrest in the regions of
GDR.We advised the friends /Ulbricht/ to also warn the regions about this through CC
SED channels, but they could not think of anything better than to call first secretaries of
regional committees to Berlin on 17 June “for instruction,” and as a result, during the
unrest of 17 June the regions were left with practically no top party leaders.
At about 7 o’clock in the morning of 17 June, in East Berlin and in many cities in
the western and southern parts of GDR, there took place simultaneous mass strikes that
turned into demonstrations, which, in a number of cities /Berlin, Magdeburg, Herlitz, and
others/, in turn became riots.
The provocateurs were not able to call out a general strike in Berlin. However,
according to preliminary figures, on 17 June 80 thousand workers, out of a total number
of 200 thousand, did strike. In addition, the largest enterprises participated in the strike:
the Stalin electrical machinery factory, the “Bergman-Borzig” factory, the Soviet
enterprises of “Siemens-Planya,” cable factories, and others.
After stopping work, many workers proceeded in columns towards the city centre
to Straussbergerplatz, where, the day before, the provocateurs called a general city
meeting. At 7:30 about 10 thousand people gathered at this plaza, who proceeded in
separate columns towards the GDR Statehouse, carrying banners
“Down with the government,” “We demand a decrease of norms,” “We demand a
decrease of prices at KhO by 40%,” “We demand free elections.” At 9 in the morning a
crowd of 30 thousand people gathered outside the GDR Statehouse, a significant part of
which was made up of West Berlin residents, who were the main organizers of the
provocations.
The insurgents were able to break through the line of steadfast policemen, who
did not use weapons during this time, and after throwing rocks at them, they broke into
the Statehouse where a pogrom was committed. The police security force of the
Statehouse was reinforced, and at the time of the attack numbered 500 men.
The Statehouse was recaptured only upon the arrival of the Soviet forces, in
concert with which,
by the way, the German police, having been partially beaten by the crowd, actively
participated
in the reestablishment of order.
At the same time, in the region of Aleksandrplatz (the centre of Berlin) large
columns of demonstrators came together from the regions of Pankov, Vaisenzee, and
Köpenich (the Soviet sector of Berlin).The crowds of demonstrators, with the active
participation of provocateurs, besieged the CC SED building, the Berlin
Polizeipresidium, the main telegraph, the city trade-union administration and other
buildings. At the Aleksandrplatz and in the Pankow region, the demonstrators built
barricades and obstructions. Windows were smashed in a number of GDR government
buildings.
………………………………………………………………………………………………
Overall, approximately 66 thousand people, including some 10 thousand West
Berliners, took part in the street demonstrations in East Berlin on 17 June. In addition to
the workers, the demonstration included artisans, merchants, and other members of the
petit bourgeoisie.
During the course of the day on 17 June, there appeared over various parts of the
Soviet sector of Berlin American planes, from which were dropped leaflets containing
calls to the population to participate in the strikes and the unrest, and to work to
overthrow the Government of GDR. On the sector border mobile loudspeakers appeared
on several occasions over which the
insurgents were given orders. After the deployment of guards on the sector border,
several large groups of provocateurs and hooligans from West Berlin broke through to
the Soviet sector. In the
streets Braunekstrasse and Bernauerstrasse, these bands started an exchange of fire with
the German police, as a result of which there were casualties.
In the evening of 17 June, the American radio station RIAS in its transmissions
recommended that the insurgents submit to the orders of Soviet officials, and not clash
with Soviet forces.
On 18 June in Berlin, under the presence of the military situation, many factories
continued to strike. In a number of places there were attempts to resume the
demonstrations and to form picket lines of strikers, which were suppressed by the
decisive actions of the German police and, in part, by the Soviet forces, which secured all
points of importance in the eastern part of the city. In the relations between the populace
and the Soviet military there was [a] significant feeling of alienation; in fact, not until 22
June did the party organize any campaign to
reestablish friendly ties between the populace and our military.
By 19-20 June the strikes in Berlin began to decline sharply and normalcy was
established. (…)
SURSA: “ The course of events in the GDR on 17-19 June ” în Cold War International
History Project Bulletin , Nr. 5 , Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars ,
Washington DC, Spring 1995 , p.17-19
the legal government. Kardelj, on Tito’s instructions, requested the advice of the CPSU
and the Soviet government as to whether to continue further talks with Imre Nagy. Tito
also asked the Soviet government to convey to Kadar’s government the request that they
not repress those communists who did not immediately take the correct line during the
recent events in Hungary. Tito, in Kardelj’s words, also asked the Soviet government to
take measures to protect the Yugoslav embassy from possible attacks on it, especially if
reactionaries find out that Nagy, who is located in the embassy, is supporting Kadar’s
government.
4/XI-56 N. FIRIUBIN
(…)
Articolul I
Obiective şi principii
1. Consiliu de Ajutor Economic Recirpoc are ca scop să contribuie , prin unirea şi
coordonarea eforturilor ţărilor-membre ale Consiliului de dezvoltare planică a
economiei naţionale , la ridicarea nivelului industrializării ţărilor cu o industrie
mai puţin dezvoltată, la creşterea continuă a productivităţii muncii şi la ridicarea
neîncetată a bunăstării popoarelor ţărilor-membre ale Consiliului.
2. Consiliul de Ajutor Economic Reciproc este format pe baza egalităţii suverane a
tuturor ţărilor-membre ale consiliului.
Colaborarea economică şi tehnico-ştiinţifică a ţărilor-membre ale consiliului se
desfăşoară potrivit principiilor egalităţii depline în drepturi, respectării
suveranităţii şi intereselor naţionale , ale avantajului reciproc tovărăşesc.
Articolul II
Calitatea de membru
1. Membrii iniţiali ai Consiliului de Ajutor Economic Reciproc sunt ţările care au
semnatz prezentul statut.
2. Primirea în calitate de membru al Consiliului este deschisă pentru alte ţări
europene care împărtăşesc scopurile şi principiile Consiliului şi şi-au exprimat
acordul de a-şi asuma obligaţiile cuprinse în prezentul Statut
Primirea de noi membrii se face prin hotărârea Sesiunii Consiliului , pe baza
cererilor oficiale ale ţărilor de a fi primite ca membrii ai Consiliului.
3. Fiecare ţară-membră a Consiliului poate să iasă din Consiliu , înştiinţând despre
aceasta pe depozitarul prezentului Statut. Această înştiinţare intră în vigoare după
şase luni de la data primirii ei de către depozitar. După primirea unei asemenea
înştiinţări , depozitarul va încunoştinţa despre aceasta ţările-membre
4. Ţările-membre ale Consiliului convin:
a) să asigure îndeplinirea recomandărilor organelor Consiliului, adoptate de ele;
b) să acorde Consiliului şi funcţionarilor acestuia sprijinul necesar în îndeplinirea
de către aceştia a atribuţilor prevăzute în prezentul Statut;
c) să prezinte Consiliului materialele şi informaţiile necesare pentru realizarea
sarcinilor ce-i sunt încredinţate;
d) să informeze Consiliul asupra mersului îndeplinirii recomandărilor adoptate în
Consiliu.
(…)
Articolul V
Organe
1. Pentru îndeplinirea atribuţiilor şi împuternicirilor menţionate in articolul III al
prezentului Statut , Consiliul de Ajutor Economic Reciproc are următoarele
organe de bază:
Sesiunea Consiliului,
Consfătuirea Reprezentanţilor ţărilor în Consiliu,
Comisiile permanente,
Secretariatul
2. Alte organe , care se pot dovedi necesare , se instituie potrivit prezentului Statut
(…)
SURSA: Aurel Preda-Mătăsaru , Tratat de Relaţii internaţionale moderne şi
contemporane, vol. III , Ed. Lumina Lex , Bucureşti , 2005, p.137-139
Seminar nr. 10
II Criza Suezului
- iulie 1956 – secretarul de stat John Foster Dulles anunţă faptul că SUA îşi
retrag sprijinul financiar pe care-l promiseseră autorităţilor egiptene pentru
construirea barajului de la Assuan.
- 26 iulie 1956 – Abdel Gamal Nasser ( venit la putere în 1954 ) hotărăşte
naţionalizarea Companiei Universale a Canalului Suez ( companie cu
capital majoritar francez şi englez )
- naţionalizarea canalului provoacă la Paris şi Londra indignare. Britanicii
şi francezii , împreună cu israelienii , elaborează planul unei riposte:
armata israeliană urma să invadeze Egiptul, extinzându-şi controlul asupra
Peninsulei Sinai. Odată declanşat conflictul , Franţa şi Marea Britanie
urmau să trimită în zonă trupe de menţinere a păcii.
- 29 octombrie 1956 – armata israeliană atacă Egiptul
V Suport documentar
(1) We have decided to send a portion of our troops, under the name of [the
Chinese] Volunteers, to Korea, assisting the Korean comrades to fight the troops of the
United States and its running dog Syngman Rhee. We regarded the mission as necessary.
If Korea were completely occupied by the Americans and the Korean revolutionary force
were fundamentally destroyed, the American invaders would be more rampant, and such
a situation would be very unfavorable to the whole East.
(2) We realize that since we have decided to send Chinese troops to Korea to fight
the Americans, we must first be able to solve the problem, that is, we are prepared to
wipe out the invaders from the United States and from other countries, and [thus] drive
them out [of Korea]; second, since Chinese troops will fight American troops in Korea
(although we will use the name of the Chinese Volunteers), we must be prepared for an
American declaration of war on China. We must be prepared for the possible
bombardments by American air forces of many Chinese cities and industrial bases, and
for attacks by American naval forces on China's coastal areas.
(3) Of the two questions, the first one is whether the Chinese troops would be able
to wipe out American troops in Korea, thus effectively resolving the Korean problem. If
our troops could annihilate American troops in Korea, especially the Eighth Army (a
competent veteran U.S. army), the whole situation would become favorable to the
revolutionary front and China, even though the second question (that the United States
declares war on China) would still remain as a serious question. In other words, the
Korean problem will end in fact with the defeat of American troops (although the war
might not end in name, because the United States would not recognize the victory of
Korea for a long period). If so, even though the Untied States declared war on China, the
confrontation would not be a large-scale one, nor would it last very long. We consider
that the most unfavorable situation would be that the Chinese forces fail to destroy
American troops in large numbers in Korea, thus resulting in a stalemate, and that, at the
same time, the United States openly declares war on China, which would be detrimental
to China's economic reconstruction already under way and would cause dissatisfaction
among the national bourgeoisie and some other sectors of the people (who are absolutely
afraid of war).
(4) Under the current situation, we have decided, starting on October 15, to move
the twelve divisions, which have been earlier transferred to southern Manchuria, into
suitable areas in North Korea (not necessarily close to the 38th parallel); these troops will
only fight the enemy that venture to attack areas north of the 38th parallel; our troops will
maintain a defensive warfare, while fighting with small groups of enemies and learning
about the situation in every respect. Meanwhile, our troops will be awaiting the arrival of
Soviet weapons and to be equipped with those weapons. Only then will our troops, in
cooperation with the Korean comrades, launch a counter-offensive to destroy the
invading American forces.
(5) According to our information, every U.S. army (two infantry divisions and
one mechanized division) is armed with 1500 pieces of artillery of various calibers
ranging from 70mm to 240mm, including tank guns and anti-aircraft guns, while each of
our armies (three divisions) is equipped with only 36 pieces of such artillery. The enemy
would control the air while our air force, which has just started its training, will not be
able to enter the war with some 300 planes until February 1951. Therefore, at present, we
are not assured that our troops are able to wipe out an entire U. S. army once and for all.
But since we have decided to go into the war against the Americans, we should be
prepared so that, when the U.S. high command musters up one complete army to fight us
in one campaign, we should be able to concentrate our forces four times larger than the
enemy (that is, to use four of our armies to fight against one enemy army) and to use a
firing power one and a half to two times stronger than that of the enemy (that is, to use
2200 to 3000 pieces of artillery of 70mm caliber and upward to deal with the enemy's
1500 pieces of artillery of the same calibers), so that we can guarantee a complete and
thorough destruction of one enemy army.
(6) In addition to the above-mentioned twelve divisions, we are transferring
another twenty-four divisions, as the second and third echelons to assist Korea, from the
south of the Yangzi River and the Shannxi-Ganshu areas to the Long-hai, Tianjin-Pukou,
and Beijing-Southern Manchuria railways; we expect to gradually apply these divisions
next spring and summer in accordance with the situation of the time.
SURSA: Chen Jian , China’s Road to the Korean War , Columbia University Press, New
York , 1994 , http://www.ciaonet.org/book/chen/auth.html , 15.02.2005
capabilă, dacă e necesar să învingă trupele americane, privite ca fiind mai slabe decât cele
japoneze.
2. Guvernul chinez, poate trimite , fără îndoială , nu doar cinci-şase divizii ci chiar
mai multe. Şi aceasta fără a spune că trupele chineze au nevoie de echipament tehnic în
domeniile antitanc şi artilerie.
Motivele acestor schimbări de poziţie a chinezilor nu ne sunt clare. Putem
presupune că au fost influenţaţi de situaţia internaţională , de înrăutăţirea poziţiei Coreei
şi de intrigile blocului anglo-american prin intermediul ( prim-ministrului indian
Jawaharlal – n.a.) Nehru , care i-a îndrumat pe chinezi la răbdare ( în privinţa
intervenţiei) , pentru a evita o catastrofă.
ROSHCHIN
Nr. 2270 3.10
dificila lor luptă. Pentru a discuta această problemă, Zhou Enlai va trebui să se
întâlnească cu tovarăşul Filippov din nou.
ROSHCHIN
Nr. 2408
13.10.50
Dear Mr. President: I have received your letter of October 23,(1) have studied it, and
am answering you.
Just imagine, Mr. President, that we had presented you with the conditions of an
ultimatum which you have presented us by your action. How would you have reacted to
this? I think that you would have been indignant at such a step on our part. And this
would have been understandable to us.
In presenting us with these conditions, you, Mr. President, have flung a challenge at
us. Who asked you to do this? By what right did you do this? Our ties with the Republic
of Cuba, like our relations with other states, regardless of what kind of states they may
be, concern only the two countries between which these relations exist. And if we now
speak of the quarantine to which your letter refers, a quarantine may be established,
according to accepted international practice, only by agreement of states between
themselves, and not by some third party. Quarantines exist, for example, on agricultural
goods and products. But in this case the question is in no way one of quarantine, but
rather of far more serious things, and you yourself understand this.
You, Mr. President, are not declaring a quarantine, but rather are setting forth an
ultimatum and threatening that if we do not give in to your demands you will use force.
Consider what you are saying! And you want to persuade me to agree to this! What
would it mean to agree to these demands? It would mean guiding oneself in one's
relations with other countries not by reason, but by submitting to arbitrariness. You are
no longer appealing to reason, but wish to intimidate us.
No, Mr. President, I cannot agree to this, and I think that in your own heart you
recognize that I am correct. I am convinced that in my place you would act the same way.
Reference to the decision of the Organization of American States cannot in any way
substantiate the demands now advanced by the United States. This Organization has
absolutely no authority or basis for adopting decisions such as the one you speak of in
your letter. Therefore, we do not recognize these decisions. International law exists and
universally recognized norms of conduct exist. We firmly adhere to the principles of
international law and observe strictly the norms which regulate navigation on the high
seas, in international waters. We observe these norms and enjoy the rights recognized by
all states.
You wish to compel us to renounce the rights that every sovereign state enjoys, you
are trying to legislate in questions of international law, and you are violating the
universally accepted norms of that law. And you are doing all this not only out of hatred
for the Cuban people and its government, but also because of considerations of the
election campaign in the United States. What morality, what law can justify such an
approach by the American Government to international affairs? No such morality or law
can be found, because the actions of the United States with regard to Cuba constitute
outright banditry or, if you like, the folly of degenerate imperialism. Unfortunately, such
folly can bring grave suffering to the peoples of all countries, and to no lesser degree to
the American people themselves, since the United States has completely lost its former
isolation with the advent of modern types of armament.
Therefore, Mr. President, if you coolly weigh the situation which has developed, not
giving way to passions, you will understand that the Soviet Union cannot fail to reject the
arbitrary demands of the United States. When you confront us with such conditions, try to
put yourself in our place and consider how the United States would react to these
conditions. I do not doubt that if someone attempted to dictate similar conditions to you--
the United States--you would reject such an attempt. And we also say--no.
The Soviet Government considers that the violation of the freedom to use international
waters and international air space is an act of aggression which pushes mankind toward
the abyss of a world nuclear-missile war. Therefore, the Soviet Government cannot
instruct the captains of Soviet vessels bound for Cuba to observe the orders of American
naval forces blockading that Island. Our instructions to Soviet mariners are to observe
strictly the universally accepted norms of navigation in international waters and not to
retreat one step from them. And if the American side violates these rules, it must realize
what responsibility will rest upon it in that case. Naturally we will not simply be
bystanders with regard to piratical acts by American ships on the high seas. We will then
be forced on our part to take the measures we consider necessary and adequate in order to
protect our rights. We have everything necessary to do so.
Respectfully,
N. Khrushchev(2)
SURSA: Letter From Chairman Khrushchev to President Kennedy , Moscow, October
24, 1962, http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/diplomacy/forrel/cuba/cuba061.htm ,
12.01.2007
DEAR MR. PRESIDENT, I have studied with great satisfaction your reply to Mr.
Thant(1) concerning measures that should be taken to avoid contact between our vessels
and thereby avoid irreparable and fatal consequences. This reasonable step on your part
strengthens my belief that you are showing concern for the preservation of peace, which I
note with satisfaction.
Council of Ministers, are concerned solely with having our country develop and
occupy a worthy place among all peoples of the world in economic competition, in the
development of culture and the arts, and in raising the living standard of the people. This
is the most noble and necessary field for competition, and both the victor and the
vanquished will derive only benefit from it, because it means peace and an increase in the
means by which man lives and finds enjoyment.
In your statement you expressed the opinion that the main aim was not simply to come
to an agreement and take measures to prevent contact between our vessels and
consequently a deepening of the crisis which could, as a result of such contacts, spark a
military conflict, after which all negotiations would be superfluous because other forces
and other laws would then come into play--the laws of war. I agree with you that this is
only the first step. The main thing that must be done is to normalize and stabilize the state
of peace among states and among peoples.
I understand your concern for the security of the United States, Mr. President, because
this is the primary duty of a President. But we too are disturbed about these same
questions; I bear these same obligations as Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the
U.S.S.R. You have been alarmed by the fact that we have aided Cuba with weapons, in
order to strengthen its defense capability--precisely defense capability--because whatever
weapons it may possess, Cuba cannot be equated with you since the difference in
magnitude is so great, particularly in view of modern means of destruction. Our aim has
been and is to help Cuba, and no one can dispute the humanity of our motives, which are
oriented toward enabling Cuba to live peacefully and develop in the way its people
desire.
You wish to ensure the security of your country, and this is understandable. But Cuba,
too, wants the same thing; all countries want to maintain their security. But how are we,
the Soviet Union, our Government, to assess your actions which are expressed in the fact
that you have surrounded the Soviet Union with military bases; surrounded our allies
with military bases; placed military bases literally around our country; and stationed your
missile armaments there? This is no secret. Responsible American personages openly
declare that it is so. Your missiles are located in Britain, are located in Italy, and are
aimed against us. Your missiles are located in Turkey.
You are disturbed over Cuba. You say that this disturbs you because it is 90 miles by
sea from the coast of the United States of America. But Turkey adjoins us; our sentries
patrol back and forth and see each other. Do you consider, then, that you have the right to
demand security for your own country and the removal of the weapons you call
offensive, but do not accord the same right to us? You have placed destructive missile
weapons, which you call offensive, in Turkey, literally next to us. How then can
recognition of our equal military capacities be reconciled with such unequal relations
between our great states? This is irreconcilable.
It is good, Mr. President, that you have agreed to have our represent-atives meet and
begin talks, apparently through the mediation of U Thant, Acting Secretary General of
the United Nations. Consequently, he to some degree has assumed the role of a mediator
and we consider that he will be able to cope with this responsible mission, provided, of
course, that each party drawn into this controversy displays good will.
I think it would be possible to end the controversy quickly and normalize the situation,
and then the people could breathe more easily, considering that statesmen charged with
responsibility are of sober mind and have an awareness of their responsibility combined
with the ability to solve complex questions and not bring things to a military catastrophe.
I therefore make this proposal: We are willing to remove from Cuba the means which
you regard as offensive. We are willing to carry this out and to make this pledge in the
United Nations. Your representatives will make a declaration to the effect that the United
States, for its part, considering the uneasiness and anxiety of the Soviet State, will
remove its analogous means from Turkey. Let us reach agreement as to the period of time
needed by you and by us to bring this about. And, after that, persons entrusted by the
United Nations Security Council could inspect on the spot the fulfillment of the pledges
made. Of course, the permission of the Governments of Cuba and of Turkey is necessary
for the entry into those countries of these representatives and for the inspection of the
fulfillment of the pledge made by each side. Of course it would be best if these
representatives enjoyed the confidence of the Security Council, as well as yours and
mine--both the United States and the Soviet Union--and also that of Turkey and Cuba. I
do not think it would be difficult to select people who would enjoy the trust and respect
of all parties concerned.
We, in making this pledge, in order to give satisfaction and hope of the peoples of
Cuba and Turkey and to strengthen their confidence in their security, will make a
statement within the framework of the Security Council to the effect that the Soviet
Government gives a solemn promise to respect the inviolability of the borders and
sovereignty of Turkey, not to interfere in its internal affairs, not to invade Turkey, not to
make available our territory as a bridgehead for such an invasion, and that it would also
restrain those who contemplate committing aggression against Turkey, either from the
territory of the Soviet Union or from the territory of Turkey's other neighboring states.
The United States Government will make a similar statement within the framework of
the Security Council regarding Cuba. It will declare that the United States will respect the
inviolability of Cuba's borders and its sovereignty, will pledge not to interfere in its
internal affairs, not to invade Cuba itself or make its territory available as a bridgehead
for such an invasion, and will also restrain those who might contemplate committing
aggression against Cuba, either from the territory of the United States or from the
territory of Cuba's other neighboring states.
Of course, for this we would have to come to an agreement with you and specify a
certain time limit. Let us agree to some period of time, but without unnecessary delay--
say within two or three weeks, not longer than a month.
The means situated in Cuba, of which you speak and which disturb you, as you have
stated, are in the hands of Soviet officers. Therefore, any accidental use of them to the
detriment of the United States is excluded. These means are situated in Cuba at the
request of the Cuban Government and are only for defense purposes. Therefore, if there is
no invasion of Cuba, or attack on the Soviet Union or any of our other allies, then of
course these means are not and will not be a threat to anyone. For they are not for
purposes of attack.
If you are agreeable to my proposal, Mr. President, then we would send our
representatives to New York, to the United Nations, and would give them comprehensive
instructions in order that an agreement may be reached more quickly. If you also select
your people and give them the corresponding instructions, then this question can be
quickly resolved.
Why would I like to do this? Because the whole world is now apprehensive and
expects sensible actions of us. The greatest joy for all peoples would be the
announcement of our agreement and of the eradication of the controversy that has arisen.
I attach great importance to this agreement in so far as it could serve as a good beginning
and could in particular make it easier to reach agreement on banning nuclear weapons
tests. The question of the tests could be solved in parallel fashion, without connecting one
with the other, because these are different issues. However, it is important that agreement
be reached on both these issues so as to present humanity with a fine gift, and also to
gladden it with the news that agreement has been reached on the cessation of nuclear tests
and that consequently the atmosphere will no longer be poisoned. Our position and yours
on this issue are very close together.
All of this could possibly serve as a good impetus toward the finding of mutually
acceptable agreements on other controversial issues on which you and I have been
exchanging views. These views have so far not been resolved, but they are awaiting
urgent solution, which would clear up the international atmosphere. We are prepared for
this.
These are my proposals, Mr. President.
Respectfully yours,
N. Khrushchev(2)
SURSA: Message From Chairman Khrushchev to President Kennedy , Moscow, October
27, 1962, http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/diplomacy/forrel/cuba/cuba091.htm ,
12.01.2007
the United States is very much interested in reducing tensions and halting the arms race;
and if your letter signifies that you are prepared to discuss a detente affecting NATO and
the Warsaw Pact, we are quite prepared to consider with our allies any useful proposals.
But the first ingredient, let me emphasize, is the cessation of work on missile sites in
Cuba and measures to render such weapons inoperable, under effective international
guarantees. The continuation of this threat, or a prolonging of this discussion concerning
Cuba by linking these problems to the broader questions of European and world security,
would surely lead to an intensification of the Cuban crisis and a grave risk to the peace of
the world. For this reason I hope we can quickly agree along the lines outlined in this
letter and in your letter of October 26.
/s/ John F. Kennedy"
Rusk
SURSA: Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union ,
Washington, October 27, 1962,
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/diplomacy/forrel/cuba/cuba095.htm , 12.01.2007
DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I have received your message of October 27.(1) I express
my satisfaction and thank you for the sense of proportion you have displayed and for
realization of the responsibility which now devolves on you for the preservation of the
peace of the world.
I regard with great understanding your concern and the concern of the United States
people in connection with the fact that the weapons you describe as offensive are
formidable weapons indeed. Both you and we understand what kind of weapons these
are.
In order to eliminate as rapidly as possible the conflict which endangers the cause of
peace, to give an assurance to all people who crave peace, and to reassure the American
people, who, I am certain, also want peace, as do the people of the Soviet Union, the
Soviet Government, in addition to earlier instructions on the discontinuation of further
work on weapons construction sites, has given a new order to dismantle the arms which
you described as offensive, and to crate and return them to the Soviet Union.
Mr. President, I should like to repeat what I had already written to you in my earlier
messages--that the Soviet Government has given economic assistance to the Republic of
Cuba, as well as arms, because Cuba and the Cuban people were constantly under the
continuous threat of an invasion of Cuba.
A piratic vessel had shelled Havana. They say that this shelling was done by
irresponsible Cuban emigres. Perhaps so, however, the question is from where did they
shoot. It is a fact that these Cubans have no territory, they are fugitives from their
country, and they have no means to conduct military operations.
This means that someone put into their hands these weapons for shelling Havana and
for piracy in the Caribbean in Cuban territorial waters. It is impossible in our time not to
notice a piratic ship, considering the concentration in the Caribbean of American ships
from which everything can be seen and observed.
In these conditions, pirate ships freely roam around and shell Cuba and make piratic
attacks on peaceful cargo ships. It is known that they even shelled a British cargo ship. In
a word, Cuba was under the continuous threat of aggressive forces, which did not conceal
their intention to invade its territory.
The Cuban people want to build their life in their own interests without external
interference. This is their right, and they cannot be blamed for wanting to be masters of
their own country and disposing of the fruits of their own labor.
The threat of invasion of Cuba and all other schemes for creating tension over Cuba
are designed to strike the Cuban people with a sense of insecurity, intimidate them, and
prevent them from peacefully building their new life.
Mr. President, I should like to say clearly once more that we could not remain
indifferent to this. The Soviet Government decided to render assistance to Cuba with the
means of defense against aggression--only with means for defense purposes. We have
supplied the defense means which you describe as offensive means. We have supplied
them to prevent an attack on Cuba--to prevent rash acts.
I regard with respect and trust the statement you made in your message of October 27,
1962, that there would be no attack, no invasion of Cuba, and not only on the part of the
United States, but also on the part of other nations of the Western Hemisphere, as you
said in your same message. Then the motives which induced us to render assistance of
such a kind to Cuba disappear.
It is for this reason that we instructed our officers--these means as I had already
informed you earlier are in the hands of the Soviet officers--to take appropriate measures
to discontinue construction of the aforementioned facilities, to dismantle them, and to
return them to the Soviet Union. As I had informed you in the letter of October 27,(2) we
are prepared to reach agreement to enable United Nations Representatives to verify the
dismantling of these means.
Thus in view of the assurances you have given and our instructions on dismantling,
there is every condition for eliminating the present conflict.
I note with satisfaction that you have responded to the desire I expressed with regard
to elimination of the aforementioned dangerous situation, as well as with regard to
providing conditions for a more thoughtful appraisal of the international situation, fraught
as it is with great dangers in our age of thermonuclear weapons, rocketry, spaceships,
global rockets, and other deadly weapons. All people are interested in insuring peace.
Therefore, vested with trust and great responsibility, we must not allow the situation to
become aggravated and must stamp out the centers where a dangerous situation fraught
with grave consequences to the cause of peace has arisen. If we, together with you, and
with the assist-ance of other people of good will, succeed in eliminating this tense
atmosphere, we should also make certain that no other dangerous conflicts which could
lead to a world nuclear catastrophe would arise.
In conclusion, I should like to say something about a detente between NATO and the
Warsaw Treaty countries that you have mentioned. We have spoken about this long since
and are prepared to continue to exchange views on this question with you and to find a
reasonable solution.
We should like to continue the exchange of views on the prohibition of atomic and
thermonuclear weapons, general disarmament, and other problems relating to the
relaxation of international tension.
Although I trust your statement, Mr. President, there are irresponsible people who
would like to invade Cuba now and thus touch off a war. If we do take practical steps and
proclaim the dismantling and evacuation of the means in question from Cuba, in so doing
we, at the same time, want the Cuban people to be certain that we are with them and are
not absolving ourselves of responsibility for rendering assistance to the Cuban people.
We are confident that the people of all countries, like you, Mr. President, will
understand me correctly. We are not threatening. We want nothing but peace. Our
country is now on the upsurge.
Our people are enjoying the fruits of their peaceful labor. They have achieved
tremendous successes since the October Revolution, and created the greatest material,
spiritual, and cultural values. Our people are enjoying these values; they want to continue
developing their achievements and insure their further development on the way of peace
and social progress by their persistent labor.
I should like to remind you, Mr. President, that military reconnaissance planes have
violated the borders of the Soviet Union. In connection with this there have been conflicts
between us and notes exchanged. In 1960 we shot down your U-2 plane, whose
reconnaissance flight over the USSR wrecked the summit meeting in Paris. At that time,
you took a correct position and denounced that criminal act of the former U.S.
Administration.
But during your term of office as President another violation of our border has
occurred, by an American U-2 plane in the Sakhalin area. We wrote you about that
violation on 30 August. At that time you replied that that violation had occurred as a
result of poor weather, and gave assurances that this would not be repeated. We trusted
your assurances, because the weather was indeed poor in that area at that time.
But had not your planes been ordered to fly about our territory, even poor weather
could not have brought an American plane into our airspace. Hence, the conclusion that
this is being done with the knowledge of the Pentagon, which tramples on international
norms and violates the borders of other states.
A still more dangerous case occurred on 28 October, when one of your
reconnasissance planes intruded over Soviet borders in the Chukotka Peninsula area in
the north and flew over our territory. The question is, Mr. President: How should we
regard this? What is this: A provocation? One of your planes violates our frontier during
this anxious time we are both experiencing, when everything has been put into combat
readiness. Is it not a fact that an intruding American plane could be easily taken for a
nuclear bomber, which might push us to a fateful step? And all the more so since the U.S.
Government and Pentagon long ago declared that you are maintaining a continuous
nuclear bomber patrol.
Therefore, you can imagine the responsibility you are assuming, especially now, when
we are living through such anxious times.
I should like to express the following wish; it concerns the Cuban people. You do not
have diplomatic relations. But through my officers in Cuba, I have reports that American
planes are making flights over Cuba.
We are interested that there should be no war in the world, and that the Cuban people
should live in peace. And besides, Mr. President, it is no secret that we have our people in
Cuba. Under such a treaty with the Cuban Government we have sent there officers,
instructors, mostly plain people: specialists, agronomists, zoo technicians, irrigators, land
reclamation specialists, plain workers, tractor drivers, and others. We are concerned
about them.
I should like you to consider, Mr. President, that violation of Cuban airspace by
American planes could also lead to dangerous consequences. And if you do not want this
to happen, it would be better if no cause is given for a dangerous situation to arise.
We must be careful now and refrain from any steps which would not be useful to the
defense of the states involved in the conflict, which could only cause irritation and even
serve as a provocation for a fateful step. Therefore, we must display sanity, reason, and
refrain from such steps.
We value peace perhaps even more than other peoples because we went through a
terrible war with Hitler. But our people will not falter in the face of any test. Our people
trust their Government, and we assure our people and world public opinion that the
Soviet Government will not allow itself to be provoked. But if the provocateurs unleash a
war, they will not evade responsibility and the grave consequences a war would bring
upon them. But we are confident that reason will triumph, that war will not be unleashed
and peace and the security of the peoples will be insured.
In connection with the current negotiations between Acting Secretary General U Thant
and representatives of the Soviet Union, the United States, and the Republic of Cuba, the
Soviet Government has sent First Deputy Foreign Minister V.V. Kuznetsov to New York
to help U Thant in his noble efforts aimed at eliminating the present dangerous situation.
Respectfully yours,
N. Khrushchev(3)
SURSA: Message From Chairman Khrushchev to President Kennedy , Moscow, October
28, 1962 , http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/diplomacy/forrel/cuba/cuba102.htm ,
12.01.2007
(…) Within the past thirty-five years the world has experienced two global wars
of tremendous violence. It has witnessed two revolutions--the Russian and the Chinese--
of extreme scope and intensity. It has also seen the collapse of five empires--the Ottoman,
the Austro-Hungarian, German, Italian, and Japanese--and the drastic decline of two
major imperial systems, the British and the French. During the span of one generation,
the international distribution of power has been fundamentally altered. For several
centuries it had proved impossible for any one nation to gain such preponderant strength
that a coalition of other nations could not in time face it with greater strength. The
international scene was marked by recurring periods of violence and war, but a system of
sovereign and independent states was maintained, over which no state was able to
achieve hegemony.
Two complex sets of factors have now basically altered this historic distribution
of power. First, the defeat of Germany and Japan and the decline of the British and
French Empires have interacted with the development of the United States and the Soviet
Union in such a way that power increasingly gravitated to these two centers. Second, the
Soviet Union, unlike previous aspirants to hegemony, is animated by a new fanatic faith,
anti-thetical to our own, and seeks to impose its absolute authority over the rest of the
world. Conflict has, therefore, become endemic and is waged, on the part of the Soviet
The fundamental purpose of the United States is laid down in the Preamble to the
Constitution: ". . . to form a more perfect Union, establish justice, insure domestic
Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure
the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity." In essence, the fundamental
purpose is to assure the integrity and vitality of our free society, which is founded upon
the dignity and worth of the individual.
Three realities emerge as a consequence of this purpose: Our determination to
maintain the essential elements of individual freedom, as set forth in the Constitution and
Bill of Rights; our determination to create conditions under which our free and
democratic system can live and prosper; and our determination to fight if necessary to
defend our way of life, for which as in the Declaration of Independence, "with a firm
reliance on the protection of Divine Providence, we mutually pledge to each other our
lives, our Fortunes, and our sacred Honor."
The fundamental design of those who control the Soviet Union and the
international communist movement is to retain and solidify their absolute power, first in
the Soviet Union and second in the areas now under their control. In the minds of the
Soviet leaders, however, achievement of this design requires the dynamic extension of
their authority and the ultimate elimination of any effective opposition to their authority.
The design, therefore, calls for the complete subversion or forcible destruction of
the machinery of government and structure of society in the countries of the non-Soviet
world and their replacement by an apparatus and structure subservient to and controlled
from the Kremlin. To that end Soviet efforts are now directed toward the domination of
the Eurasian land mass. The United States, as the principal center of power in the non-
Soviet world and the bulwark of opposition to Soviet expansion, is the principal enemy
whose integrity and vitality must be subverted or destroyed by one means or another if
the Kremlin is to achieve its fundamental design.
IV. The Underlying Conflict in the Realm of ideas and Values between the U.S.
Purpose and the Kremlin Design
A. NATURE OF CONFLICT
The Kremlin regards the United States as the only major threat to the conflict
between idea of slavery under the grim oligarchy of the Kremlin, which has come to a
crisis with the polarization of power described in Section I, and the exclusive possession
of atomic weapons by the two protagonists. The idea of freedom, moreover, is peculiarly
and intolerably subversive of the idea of slavery. But the converse is not true. The
implacable purpose of the slave state to eliminate the challenge of freedom has placed the
two great powers at opposite poles. It is this fact which gives the present polarization of
power the quality of crisis.
The free society values the individual as an end in himself, requiring of him only
that measure of self-discipline and self-restraint which make the rights of each individual
compatible with the rights of every other individual. The freedom of the individual has as
its counterpart, therefore, the negative responsibility of the individual not to exercise his
freedom in ways inconsistent with the freedom of other individuals and the positive
responsibility to make constructive use of his freedom in the building of a just society.
From this idea of freedom with responsibility derives the marvelous diversity, the
deep tolerance, the lawfulness of the free society. This is the explanation of the strength
of free men. It constitutes the integrity and the vitality of a free and democratic system.
The free society attempts to create and maintain an environment in which every
individual has the opportunity to realize his creative powers. It also explains why the free
society tolerates those within it who would use their freedom to destroy it. By the same
token, in relations between nations, the prime reliance of the free society is on the
strength and appeal of its idea, and it feels no compulsion sooner or later to bring all
societies into conformity with it.
For the free society does not fear, it welcomes, diversity. It derives its strength
from its hospitality even to antipathetic ideas. It is a market for free trade in ideas, secure
in its faith that free men will take the best wares, and grow to a fuller and better
realization of their powers in exercising their choice.
The idea of freedom is the most contagious idea in history, more contagious than the idea
of submission to authority. For the breadth of freedom cannot be tolerated in a society
which has come under the domination of an individual or group of individuals with a will
to absolute power. Where the despot holds absolute power--the absolute power of the
absolutely powerful will--all other wills must be subjugated in an act of willing
submission, a degradation willed by the individual upon himself under the compulsion of
a perverted faith. It is the first article of this faith that he finds and can only find the
meaning of his existence in serving the ends of the system. The system becomes God,
and submission to the will of God becomes submission to the will of the system. It is not
enough to yield outwardly to the system--even Gandhian non-violence is not acceptable--
for the spirit of resistance and the devotion to a higher authority might then remain, and
the individual would not be wholly submissive.
The same compulsion which demands total power over all men within the Soviet
state without a single exception, demands total power over all Communist Parties and all
states under Soviet domination. Thus Stalin has said that the theory and tactics of
Leninism as expounded by the Bolshevik party are mandatory for the proletarian parties
of all countries. A true internationalist is defined as one who unhesitatingly upholds the
position of the Soviet Union and in the satellite states true patriotism is love of the Soviet
Union. By the same token the "peace policy" of the Soviet Union, described at a Party
Congress as "a more advantageous form of fighting capitalism," is a device to divide and
immobilize the non-Communist world, and the peace the Soviet Union seeks is the peace
of total conformity to Soviet policy.
The antipathy of slavery to freedom explains the iron curtain, the isolation, the
autarchy of the society whose end is absolute power. The existence and persistence of the
idea of freedom is a permanent and continuous threat to the foundation of the slave
society; and it therefore regards as intolerable the long continued existence of freedom in
the world. What is new, what makes the continuing crisis, is the polarization of power
which now inescapably confronts the slave society with the free.
The assault on free institutions is world-wide now, and in the context of the
present polarization of power a defeat of free institutions anywhere is a defeat
everywhere. The shock we sustained in the destruction of Czechoslovakia was not in the
measure of Czechoslovakia's material importance to us. In a material sense, her
capabilities were already at Soviet disposal. But when the integrity of Czechoslovak
institutions was destroyed, it was in the intangible scale of values that we registered a loss
more damaging than the material loss we had already suffered.
Thus unwillingly our free society finds itself mortally challenged by the Soviet
system. No other value system is so wholly irreconcilable with ours, so implacable in its
purpose to destroy ours, so capable of turning to its own uses the most dangerous and
divisive trends in our own society, no other so skillfully and powerfully evokes the
elements of irrationality in human nature everywhere, and no other has the support of a
great and growing center of military power.
B. OBJECTIVES
The objectives of a free society are determined by its fundamental values and by the
necessity for maintaining the material environment in which they flourish. Logically and
in fact, therefore, the Kremlin's challenge to the United States is directed not only to our
values but to our physical capacity to protect their environment. It is a challenge which
encompasses both peace and war and our objectives in peace and war must take account
of it.
1. Thus we must make ourselves strong, both in the way in which we affirm our
values in the conduct of our national life, and in the development of our military
and economic strength.
2. We must lead in building a successfully functioning political and economic
system in the free world. It is only by practical affirmation, abroad as well as at
home, of our essential values, that we can preserve our own integrity, in which
lies the real frustration of the Kremlin design.
3. But beyond thus affirming our values our policy and actions must be such as to
foster a fundamental change in the nature of the Soviet system, a change toward
which the frustration of the design is the first and perhaps the most important step.
Clearly it will not only be less costly but more effective if this change occurs to a
maximum extent as a result of internal forces in Soviet society.
In a shrinking world, which now faces the threat of atomic warfare, it is not an
adequate objective merely to seek to check the Kremlin design, for the absence of order
among nations is becoming less and less tolerable. This fact imposes on us, in our own
interests, the responsibility of world leadership. It demands that we make the attempt, and
accept the risks inherent in it, to bring about order and justice by means consistent with
the principles of freedom and democracy. We should limit our requirement of the Soviet
Union to its participation with other nations on the basis of equality and respect for the
rights of others. Subject to this requirement, we must with our allies and the former
subject peoples seek to create a world society based on the principle of consent. Its
framework cannot be inflexible. It will consist of many national communities of great and
varying abilities and resources, and hence of war potential. The seeds of conflicts will
inevitably exist or will come into being. To acknowledge this is only to acknowledge the
impossibility of a final solution. Not to acknowledge it can be fatally dangerous in a
world in which there are no final solutions.
All these objectives of a free society are equally valid and necessary in peace and
war. But every consideration of devotion to our fundamental values and to our national
security demands that we seek to achieve them by the strategy of the cold war. It is only
by developing the moral and material strength of the free world that the Soviet regime
will become convinced of the falsity of its assumptions and that the pre-conditions for
workable agreements can be created. By practically demonstrating the integrity and
vitality of our system the free world widens the area of possible agreement and thus can
hope gradually to bring about a Soviet acknowledgement of realities which in sum will
eventually constitute a frustration of the Soviet design. Short of this, however, it might be
possible to create a situation which will induce the Soviet Union to accommodate itself,
with or without the conscious abandonment of its design, to coexistence on tolerable
terms with the non-Soviet world. Such a development would be a triumph for the idea of
freedom and democracy. It must be an immediate objective of United States policy.
There is no reason, in the event of war, for us to alter our overall objectives. They do not
include unconditional surrender, the subjugation of the Russian peoples or a Russia shorn
of its economic potential. Such a course would irrevocably unite the Russian people
behind the regime which enslaves them. Rather these objectives contemplate Soviet
acceptance of the specific and limited conditions requisite to an international
environment in which free institutions can flourish, and in which the Russian peoples will
have a new chance to work out their own destiny. If we can make the Russian people our
allies in the enterprise we will obviously have made our task easier and victory more
certain.
The objectives outlined in NSC 20/4 (November 23, 1948) ... are fully consistent
with the objectives stated in this paper, and they remain valid. The growing intensity of
the conflict which has been imposed upon us, however, requires the changes of emphasis
and the additions that are apparent. Coupled with the probable fission bomb capability
and possible thermonuclear bomb capability of the Soviet Union, the intensifying
struggle requires us to face the fact that we can expect no lasting abatement of the crisis
unless and until a change occurs in the nature of the Soviet system. (…)
SURSA: NSC 68: United States Objectives and Programs for National Security, April 14,
1950,http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/nsc-68/nsc68-1.htm , 18.02.2007
Seminar nr. 11
1) Ruptura chino-sovietică :
° februarie 1956 – Congresul al XX-lea al PCUS şi
discursul secret al lui Nikita Hruşciov
° noiembrie 1957 – Consfătuirea partidelor comuniste de la
Moscova
° 31 iulie – 3 august 1958 – întâlnirile oficiale dintre Mao
Zedong şi Nikita Hruşciov (Beijing)
2) Apropierea chino-americană :
° martie 1971 – SUA ridică restricţia la paşapoarte
cetăţenilor americani care doresc să călătorească în China
° 6 aprilie 1971 - Diplomaţia ping-pong-ului
° 10 iunie 1971 – SUA ridică , după 22 de ani , embargoul
privind comerţul cu Republica Populară China
° 9-10 iulie 1971 – călătoria secretă în China efectuată de
Kissinger
° 25 noiembrie 1971 – discursul lui Huang Hua , discurs
petrecut după primirea Republicii Populare China în ONU
° 21-28 februarie 1972 – vizita preşedintelui Nixon în
Republica Populară China
٭De relevat poziţiile SUA şi URSS vis-a-vis de această criză precum şi principalele
prevederi ale acordului de la Camp David (17 septembrie 1978), dintre Anwar as Sadat şi
Menahem Begin
Administraţia Truman
- în timpul celui de al doilea război mondial, rezistenţa împotriva ocupaţiei
japoneze a fost condusă de Vietminh (Liga vietnameză pentru
independenţă ) care a căzut sub influenţa comuniştilor conduşi de Ho Şi
Min
- la sfârşitul războiului Vietminhul controla nordul Vietnamului, iar în
septembrie 1945 Ho Şi Min a proclamat înfiinţarea Republicii
Democratice Vietnam, cu capitala la Hanoi, recunoscută de Franţa în 1946
- la sfârşitul anului 1946, Ho Şi Min s-a opus eforturilor franceze de a pune
bazele unui alt regim în sud se declanşează războiul din Indochina
Administraţia Einsenhower
- în 1954 forţe masive franceze sunt trimise la Dien Bien Phu în nord-vestul
Vietnamului, lângă graniţa cu Laos, pentru a atrage gherila Vietminh în
câmp deschis şi a o distruge, însă lipsiţi de ajutorul american, francezii
sunt încercuiţi şi asediaţi, iar Dien Bien Phu cade
- în iulie 1954 se încheie acordurile de la Geneva, prin care se urmăreau
normalizarea situaţiei din Vietnam
- în 1956, guvernul Vietnamului de Sud refuză să respecte prevederile
Acordurile de la Geneva şi în acest context, forţele de gherilă ale
Vietcongului declanşează o serie de atacuri împotriva regimului
Administraţia Kennedy
- Vietcongul este aprovizionat de Nord, prin Laos, prin calea Ho Şi Min
- preşedintele Kennedy trimite doar consilieri militari
- în 1963, Diem, primul ministru sud – vietnamez este înlăturat printr-o
lovitură de stat, ceea ce a inaugurat o perioadă de instabilitate politică
Administraţia Jonhson
- la 7 august 1954 rezoluţia asupra Golfului Tonkin este votată de Congres
- în februarie 1965 Vietcong a ucis şi rănit cetăţeni americani » preşedintele
american Jonhson ordonă operaţiunea Rolling Thunder (bombardarea
asupra Vietnamului de Nord pentru a opri aprovizionarea Vietcong)
- în martie 1965 primele unităţi sunt trimise sub pretextul apărării
aerodromurilor americane
- 31 ianuarie 1968, nerespectând armistiţiul încheiat pentru sărbători, forţele
Vietcong şi Nordul declanşează un atac surpriză împotriva Sudului, aşa –
numita ofensiva Tet » contraatac american şi al forţelor Vietnamului de
Sud, încheiat fără un rezultat clar, de fapt o victorie psihologică pentru
Hanoi » încetarea bombardamentelor
Administraţia Nixon
- o nouă strategia care viza trei direcţii de acţiune:
a) convorbiri la Paris
- ajung într-un impas datorită poziţiilor ireconciliabile ale celor două părţi:
americanii doreau retragerea forţelor Vietnamului de Nord şi a
Vietcongului din Sud, menţinerea regimului sprijinit de ei, în timp ce nord
vietnamezii şi Vietcongul doreau menţinerea unei prezenţe militare şi
reunificarea Vietnamului sub conducerea unui guvern comunist
b) vietnamizarea conflictului: reducerea implicării directe americane prin
scăderea numărului de soldaţi americani şi transferarea operaţiunilor
militare către unităţile vietnameze, însoţită de un sprijin american pentru
instruirea şi echiparea acestora
c) extinderea războiului asupra Cambodgiei, aşa –numita operaţiune
Menu (bombardarea începând cu martie 1969 a bazelor comuniste din
Cambodgia)
- dificultăţi interne generate de o serie de scandalurile legate de operaţiunile
militare americane în Vietnam (masacrul de la My Lai , incursiunea din
Cambodgia din 1970, adevărul despre evenimentele din Portul Tokin )
A. cauze:
- eforturile reformiştilor de la Praga de a oferi un model de socialism
radical diferit de cel sovietic
- lipsa de legitimitate a elitelor conducătoare, asociate cu modelul
anacronic stalinist
- conflict între ramura slovacă şi cea cehă a partidului comunist
ascuţirea luptei politice de la vârful conducerii partidului ianuarie 1968,
Novotny este înlocuit de către Alexander Dubcek, în fruntea partidului
comunist, iar în martie 1968, demisionează din funcţia de preşedinte al
Republicii, lăsându-i locul generalului Ludvik Svoboda
B. desfăşurarea evenimentelor:
- Dubcek a încercat o modernizare a sistemului socialist aprilie 1968 este
adoptat de către Comitetul Central al partidului comunist documentul
intitulat „Programul de acţiune”
- au avut loc masive reabilitări politice şi ale victimelor represiunii staliniste
V Dicţionar
VI Suport Documentar
Mao Zedong: Fără a face prognoze pe termen îndelugat , putem afirma faptul că şi
cooperarea noastră este asigurată pentru 10 000 de ani.
Hruşciov: În acest caz ne putem întâlni din nou în 9 999 de ani pentru a pune la punct
cooperarea pentru următorii 10 000 de ani.
................................................................................................................................................
Mao Zedong: Am înţeles după cum urmează: dacă vrem să obţinem asistenţă sovietică
atunci trebuie să construim o flotă comună orientată în principal împotriva SUA. Am
înţeles că Hruşciov a vrut să rezolve chestiunea flotei comune împreună cu tovarăşii
chinezi , având în gând şi atragerea Vietnamului.
Hruşciov: Am spus că atunci când războiul începe, noi va trebui să folosim zonele de
coastă pe scară largă , inclusiv Vietnamul.
Mao Zedong: Am spus anterior că în caz de război Uniunea Sovietică va putea folosi
orice parte a (teritoriului – n.a.) Chinei , şi marinarii ruşi vor fi liberi să acţioneze în orice
port al Chinei.
Hruşciov: Nu aş vorbi despre “marinari ruşi”. Când războiul începe este nevoie de
eforturi comune. Poate marinarii chinezi vor acţiona, poate eforturi comune vor fi
necesare. Dar nu am ridicat problema niciunui teritoriu (chinez –n.a.) şi a unei baze
(militare sovietice – n.a.) acolo.
Mao Zedong: Spre exemplu dacă ar fi 100 de soldaţi în flotă ce parte aţi deţine
dumneavoastră şi ce parte noi?
Hruşciov: Flota nu se poate afla în proprietatea a două state. Flota trebuie comandată.
Când doi sunt la comandă e imposibil de dus un război.
Mao Zedong: Este adevărat.
Hruşciov: Puteţi să nu fiţi de acord cu noi. Analizând aceasta ( chestiunea flotei comune –
n.a.) putem spune că suntem împotrivă. Dacă ne-aţi fi sugerat dumneavoastră aceasta
( ideea flotei comune – n.a.) am fi fost deasemena împotrivă.
Mao Zedong: Dacă este aşa atunci toţi norii negrii sunt risipiţi.
................................................................................................................................................
Hruşciov: Acum aş vrea să vorbesc despre staţia radar. Nu a fost nici o decizie a CC în
acestă chestiune. Tovarăşii miliari spun că este necesară o staţie radar , pentru ca atunci
când e nevoie să putem comanda submarinele sovietice din Pacific. Cred că aceste
consideraţii sunt corecte. M-am gândit că pentru realizarea unei atare probleme, am putea
intra în contact cu tovarăşii chinezi pentru a construi o astfel de staţie. Ar fi mai bine dacă
tovarăşii chinezi ar accepta participarea noastră la construcţia staţiei fie prin intermediul
unui credit, fie în alt mod. Staţia este necesară. Noi avem nevoie de ea şi dumneavoastră
veţi avea nevoie de ea , atunci când veţi dobândi o flotă de submarine. Problema e
exploatarea ( staţiei radar – n.a.). Cred că nu pot exista doi proprietari asupra acestei
staţii. prin urmare , suntem de acord ca pe baze de egalitate ca dumneavoastră să puteţi
menţine prin intermediul acestei staţii legătura cu flota dumneavoastră de submarine. Nu
există nici o problemă în legătură cu proprietatea ( staţiei radar – n.a.). Aceasta trebuie să
SURSA: “ Document No. 1 First Conversation of N.S. Khrushchev with Mao Zedong
Hall of Huaizhentan [Beijing], 31 July 1958” , în Cold War International History Project
Bulletin ... nr.12-13 , 2001, p. 250-260
Mao Zedong: Aş vrea să clarificăm două mici, dar importante probleme. Prima-legată de
interzicerea experienţelor de arme atomice. Dumneavoastră aţi oprit testarea unilateral ,
dar în Vest continuă testarea (armelor nucleare – n.a.). Credeţi că este necesară reluarea
testelor?
Hruşciov: Ei ne-au eliberat de orice angajament luat prin faptul că nu au oprit testele lor.
Noi ne-am desfăşurat testele noastre. Acum continuăm să lucrăm la bombele atomice şi
cu hidrogen. Când va fi necesar , desigur vom relua testele, sub condiţia ca la acea vreme
să nu fie un angajament general cu privire la încetarea testelor.
Mao Zedong: Acum am înţeles. Aţi spus că rachetele intercontinentale se deplasează prin
spaţiu. Nu ard când reintră în atmosferă?
Hruşciov: Nu , această probleme e rezolvată.
................................................................................................................................................
Mao Zedong: Ne-am pus la curent în legătură cu mesajul lui Eisenhower către
Dumneavoastră , Tovarăşe Hruşciov , care ne-a fost pus la dispoziţie în această dimineaţă
Hruşciov: Bine. În afară de aceasta am dori să vă punem la curent cu unele fragmente
referitoare la China, din discuţia mea cu Preşedintele D. Eisenhower din 27 septembrie
1959 , şi apoi permiteţi-ne să schimbăm opinii în legătură cu vizita mea în SUA şi în
legătură cu relaţiile cu America. Recomandat ar fi ca fragmentele de conversaţie cu
Eisenhower , mai sus menţionate , să fi traduse aici oral de interpret.
Interpreţii Yang Ming Fu şi Li Yue Zhen traduc oral fragmentele de conversaţie
cu Eisenhower , mai sus menţionate.
Chinezii au acordat o mare importanţă chestiunii detenţiei a cinci americani în
China , ca şi remarcii lui Eisenhower în legătură cu motivul pentru care URSS nu a
adoptat aceiaşi poziţie în problema Taiwan-ului ca în cea a Germaniei.
................................................................................................................................................
Hruşciov: Nu ştiam că RPC deţine cinci americani în captivitate. E adevărat? În
conversaţia cu Eisenhower am spus că doar sub forma unui sfat prietenesc aş putea atige
această problemă la Beijing.
Zhou Enlai:La 1 august 1956 , americanii şi noi , am ajuns la un acord potrivit căruia
americanii care locuiesc de mult timp în RPC (imigranţii) se pot întoarce în SUA. Cu
toate acestea am stipulat faptul că dacă aceşti oameni comit orice infracţiune, ei pot fi
arestaţi. Dreptul chinez prevede faptul că dacă un deţinut se poartă bine în detenţie,
sentinţa lui poate fi redusă. A doua categorie , care potrivit acordului , le era permis să
părăsească RPC erau prizonierii de război.Un avion aparţinând SUA a fost doborât pe
teritoriul Chinei şi nu al Coreei.18 militari americani , care se aflau în acest avion au fost
luaţi prizonieri. ... Noi am luat iniţiativa şi am eliberat 13 prizonieri de război americani.
Prin urmare la Conferinţa de la Geneva , americanii nu au avut de ce să ne acuze. După
aceasta au mai fost capturaţi doi americani , Fekto şi Downey, care sunt acum în detenţie.
Ei sunt agenţi ai Agenţiei Centrale de Iformaţii şi au fost prinşi în flagrant. ... O instanţă
judecătorească chineză i-a condamnat la pedepse lungi: unul pe viaţă şi altul la 20 de ani
SURSA: „ Note: The Soviet Embassy in Beijing to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the
People’s Republic of China, 18 July 1960 ” în Cold War International History Project
Bulletin ... nr.8-9 , 1996-1997, p.249-250
SURSA: “ Document No.1: Soviet Report to GDR Leadership on 2 March 1969 Sino-
Soviet Border Clashes ” în Cold War International History Project Bulletin ... nr. 6-7,
1995-1996, p.189
We cannot ignore the assertions, held in some places, that the actions of the five
socialist countries run counter to the Marxist-Leninist principle of sovereignty and the
rights of nations to self determination. The groundlessness of such reasoning consists
primarily in that it is based on an abstract, nonclass approach to the question of
sovereignty and the rights of nations to self determination.
The peoples of the socialist countries and Communist parties certainly do have
and should have freedom for determining the ways of advance of their respective
countries.
However, none of their decisions should damage either socialism in their country
or the fundamental interests of other socialist countries, and the whole working class
movement, which is working for socialism.
This means that each Communist Party is responsible not only to its own people,
but also to all the socialist countries, to the entire Communist movement. Whoever forget
this, in stressing only the independence of the Communist Party, becomes one-sided. He
deviates from his international duty.
Marxist dialectics are opposed to one-sidedness. They demand that each
phenomenon be examined concretely, in general connection with other phenomena, with
other processes.
Just as, in Lenin's words, a man living in a society cannot be free from the society,
one or another socialist state, staying in a system of other states composing the socialist
community, cannot be free from the common interests of that community.
The sovereignty of each socialist country cannot be opposed to the interests of the
world of socialism, of the world revolutionary movement. Lenin demanded that all
Communists fight against small nation narrow-mindedness, seclusion and isolation,
consider the whole and the general, subordinate the particular to the general interest.
The socialist states respect the democratic norms of international law. They have
proved this more than once in practice, by coming out resolutely against the attempts of
imperialism to violate the sovereignty and independence of nations.
It is from these same positions that they reject the leftist, adventurist conception
of "exporting revolution," of "bringing happiness" to other peoples.
However, from a Marxist point of view, the norms of law, including the norms of
mutual relations of the socialist countries, cannot be interpreted narrowly, formally, and
in isolation from the general context of class struggle in the modern world. The socialist
countries resolutely come out against the exporting and importing of counterrevolution.
Each Communist Party is free to apply the basic principles of Marxism, Leninism and
of socialism in its country, but it cannot depart from these principles (assuming, naturally,
that it remains a Communist Party).
Concretely this means, first of all, that in its activity, each Communist Party
cannot but take into account such a decisive fact of our time as the struggle between two
opposing social systems -- capitalism and socialism.
This is an objective struggle, a fact not depending on the will of the people, and
stipulated by the world's being split into two opposite social systems. Lenin said: "Each
man must choose between joining our side or the other side. Any attempt to avoid taking
sides in this issue must end in fiasco."
It has got to be emphasized that when a socialist country seems to adopt a "non-
affiliated" stand, it retains its national independence, in effect, precisely because of the
might of the socialist community, and above all the Soviet Union as a central force,
which also includes the might of its armed forces. The weakening of any of the links in
the world system of socialism directly affects all the socialist countries, which cannot
look indifferently upon this.
The antisocialist elements in Czechoslovakia actually covered up the demand for
so-called neutrality and Czechoslovakia's withdrawal from the socialist community with
talking about the right of nations to self-determination.
However, the implementation of such "self-determination," in other words,
Czechoslovakia's detachment from the socialist community, would have come into
conflict with its own vital interests and would have been detrimental to the other socialist
states.
Such "self-determination," as a result of which NATO troops would have been
able to come up to the Soviet border, while the community of European socialist
countries would have been split, in effect encroaches upon the vital interests of the
peoples of these countries and conflicts, as the very root of it, with the right of these
people to socialist self-determination.
Discharging their internationalist duty toward the fraternal peoples of Czechoslovakia
and defending their own socialist gains, the U.S.S.R. and the other socialist states had to
act decisively and they did act against the antisocialist forces in Czechoslovakia.
(…)
The Leading Role of the Party: A Guarantee of Socialist Progress
At present it is more important that the party adopt a policy fully justifying its
leading role in society. We believe this is a condition for the socialist development of the
country. (…)
In the past, the leading role of the party was usually conceived of a monopolistic
concentration of power in the hands of party organs. This concept corresponded with the
false thesis that the party is the instrument of the dictatorship of the proletariat. That
harmful conception weakened the initiative and the responsibility of state, economic, and
social institutions, damaged the party authority, and prevented it from carrying out its real
functions. The party’s goal is not to become a universal “caretaker” of society, bind all
organizations, and watch every step taken in fulfillment of its directives. Its mission
instead is primarily to inspire socialist initiative, to demonstrate communist perspectives,
their modes, and to win over all workers by systematic persuasion and the personal
examples of communists. This determines the conceptual side of party activity. Party
organs should not deal with all problems: they should encourage others and suggest
solutions to the most important difficulties. But at the same time the party cannot turn
into an organization that influences society by its ideas and program alone. It must
develop through its members and bodies the practical organizational methods of political
force in society. (…)
As a representative of the most progressive section of the society – and therefore
the representative of the prospective aims of society – the party cannot represent the full
range of social interests. (…) The party does not want to and will not take the place of
social organizations; on the contrary, it must ensure that their initiative and political
responsibility for the unity of society are revived and can flourish. The role of the party is
to find a way of satisfying the various interests without jeopardizing the interests of
society as a whole, and promoting those interests and creating new progressive ones. The
party’s policy must not lead non-communists to feel that their rights and freedom are
limited by the role of the party. (…)
For the Development of Socialist Democracy and a New System of the Political
Management of Society
(…) We must reform the whole political system so that it will permit the dynamic
development of social relations appropriate for socialism, combine broad democracy with
scientific, highly qualified management, strengthen the social order, stabilize the social
order, and maintain social discipline. The basic structure of the political system must, at
the same time, provide firm guarantees against a return to the old methods of
subjectivism and highhandedness. (…)
The implementation of the constitutional reforms of assembly and association
must be ensured this year so that the possibility of setting up voluntary organizations,
special - interest associations, societies, and other bodies is guaranteed by law, and so
that the present interests and needs of various sections of our society are tended to
without bureaucratic interference and free from a monopoly by any individual
organization. (…)
Legal standards must also set forth a more explicit guarantee of the freedom of
speech for minority interests and opinions. (…) The constitutional freedom of movement
particularly that of travel abroad for our citizens must be explicitly guaranteed by law.
(…)
Our entire legal code must gradually come to grips with the problem of how to
protect, in a better and more consistent way, the personal rights and property of citizens,
and we must certainly remove statutes that effectively put individual citizens at a
disadvantage with the state and other institutions. In the future we must prevent various
institutions from disregarding personal rights and the interests of individual citizens as far
as personal ownership of family houses, gardens, and other items is concerned. (…)
It is troubling that up to now the rehabilitation of people, both communists and
non- communists, who were the victims of legal transgressions in previous years, has not
always been carried out in full, regarding the political and civic consequences. (…)
(…) We stand resolutely on the side of progress, democracy, and socialism in the
struggle by socialist and democratic forces against the aggressive attempts of world
imperialism. It is from this viewpoint that we determine our attitude toward the most
acute international problems of the present and our role in the worldwide struggle against
the forces of imperialist reaction.
Taking, as a point of departure, the existing relationship of international forces
and our awareness that Czechoslovakia is an active component of the revolutionary
process in the world, the ČSSR (Czechoslovak Socialist Republic ) will formulate its own
position toward the fundamental problems of world politics.
The basic orientation of Czechoslovak foreign policy took root at the time of the
struggle for national liberation and in the process of the social reconstruction of the
country. It revolves around the alliance and cooperation with the Soviet Union and the
other socialist states. (…)
We will actively pursue a policy of peaceful coexistence vis-a–vis the advanced
capitalist countries. (…)
Document 8 : The „Two Thousand Words” Manifesto, June 27, 1968 (excerpt)
Two Thousand Words that Belong to Workers, Farmers, Officials, Scientists, Artists, and
Everybody
The first threat to our national life was from the war. The came the evil days and
events that endangered the nation’s spiritual well-being and character. Most of the nation
welcomed the socialist program with high hopes. But it fell into the hands of the wrong
people. (…)
After enjoying great popular confidence after the war, the communist part by
degrees bartered this confidence away for office, until it had al the offices and nothing
else. (…) The leaders’ mistaken policies transformed a political party and an alliance
based on ideas into an organization for exerting power, one that proved highly attractive
to power-hungry individuals eager to wield authority, to cowards who took the safe and
easy route, and to people with bad conscience. The influx of members such as these
affected the character and behavior of the party (…).
We bear responsibility for the present state of affairs. But those among us who are
communists bear more than others, and those who acted as components or instruments of
unchecked power bear the greatest responsibility of all. The power they wield was that of
a self-willed group spreading out through the party apparatus into every district and
community. It was this apparatus that decided what might and might not be done: It ran
the cooperative farms for the cooperative farmers, the factories for the workers, and the
National Committees for the public. No organizations, not even communist ones, were
really controlled by their own members. The chief sin and deception of these rulers was
to have explained their own whims as the “will of workers.” (…)
While many workers imagined that they were the rulers, it was a specially trained stratum
of party and state who actually rules in their name. In effect it was these people who
stepped into the shoes of the deposed class and themselves came to constitute the new
authority. Let us say in fairness that some of them long ago realized the evil trick history
had played. (…) They share our opposition to the retrograde views held by certain party
members. But large proportions of officials have been resistant to change and are still
influential. They still wield the instruments of power, especially at district and
community level, where they can employ them in secret and without fear of prosecution.
(…)
For after twenty years the communists were the only ones able to conduct some
sort of political activity. It was only the opposition inside the communist party that had
the privilege to voice antagonistic views. The effort and the initiative now displayed by
democratically – minded communists are only a partial repayment of the debt owed by
the entire party to the non-communists whom it kept down in an unequal position. (…)
But in the days to come we must gird ourselves with our own initiative and make
our own decisions.
To begin with we will oppose the view, sometimes voiced, that a democratic
revival can be achieved without the communists, or even in opposition to them. This
would be unjust and foolish too. The communist already have their organizations in
place, and in these we must support the progressive wing. They have their experienced
officials, and they still have in their hands, after all, the crucial levers and buttons. On the
other hand they have presented an Action Program to the public. (…)We must demand
that they produce local Actions Programs in public in every district and community. (…)
Although at present one cannot expect more of the central political bodies, it is
vital to achieve more at district and community level. Let us demand the departure of
people who abused their power, damaged public property, and acted dishonorably or
brutally. Ways must be found to compel them to resign. To mention a few: public
criticism, resolutions, demonstrations, demonstrative work brigades, collections to buy
presents for their retirement, strikes, and picketing at their front doors. (…) Let us
demand public sessions of the national committees. For questions that no one else will
look into, let us set up our own civic committees and commissions (…).
There has been great alarm recently over the possibility that foreign forces will
intervene in our development. Whatever superior forces may face us, all we can do is
stick to our own positions, behave decently, and initiate nothing ourselves. We can show
our government that we stand by it, with weapons if need be, if it will do what we give it
a mandate to do. And we can assure our allies that we will observe out treaties of
alliance, friendship and trade. (…)
(…) a great opportunity was given to us once again, as it was after the end of the
war. Again we have the chance to take into our hands our common cause, which for
working purposes we call socialism, and give it a form more appropriate to our once-
good reputation and to the fairly good opinion we used to have of ourselves. The spring is
over and will never return. By winter we will know all. (…)
SURSA: “Dva tisíce slov,” Literání listy (Prague), 27 June 1968, p.1 apud. apud. Jaromír
Navrátil and others (ed.), The Prague Spring 1968. A National Security Archive
Documents Reader, CEU Press, 1998, pp.177-181
Dragi tovarăşi,
Cetăţeni ai ţării româneşti,
În aceste momente grele pentru poporul frate cehoslovac, pentru situaţia din
Europa, doresc ca, în numele Comitetului Central, al Consiliului de Stat şi al guvernului
să mă adresez dvs., exprimând încrederea noastră deplină în hotărârea poporului român
de a asigura construcţia paşnică a socialismului în patria noastră.
Pătrunderea trupelor celor cinci ţări socialiste în Cehoslovacia constituie o mare
greşeală şi o primejdie gravă pentru pacea în Europa, pentru soarta socialismului în lume.
Este de neconceput în lumea de astăzi, când popoarele se ridică la luptă pentru a-şi apăra
independenţa naţională, pentru egalitatea în drepturi, ca un stat socialist, ca state
socialiste să încalce libertatea şi independenţa altui stat. Nu există nici o justificare, nu
poate fi acceptat nici un motiv de a admite, pentru o clipă numai, ideea intervenţiei
militare în treburile unui stat socialist frăţesc. (...)
Problema alegerii căilor de construcţie socialistă este o problemă a fiecărui
partid, a fiecărui stat, a fiecărui popor. Nimeni nu se poate erija în sfătuitor, în îndrumător
cu privire la felul în care trebuie construit socialismul în altă ţară. Noi considerăm că
pentru a aşeza relaţiile dintre ţările socialiste, dintre partidele comuniste pe baze cu
adevărat marxist – leniniste trebuie, o dată pentru totdeauna, să se pună capăt amestecului
în treburile altor partide. (...)
Noi pornim în activitatea noastră de la răspunderea pe care o avem faţă de popor,
faţă de toţi oamenii muncii fără deosebire de naţionalitate. Noi cu toţii, români, maghiari,
germani, oameni de alte naţionalităţi, avem acelaşi destin, aceleaşi năzuinţe – făurirea
comunismului în patria noastră – şi suntem hotărâţi, într-o unitate deplină, să asigurăm
înfăptuirea acestui ideal. (...)
SURSA: Ion Pătroiu (coordonator), Îngheţ în plină vară. Praga – august 1968, Editura
Paideia, Bucureşti, 1998, pp.94-96.
(...)
Articolul 1
Republica Federală Germania şi URSS consideră cel mai important ţel al politicii lor să
sprijine pacea internaţională şi să obţină destinderea încordării.
Ele îşi exprimă năzuinţa de a stimula normalizarea situaţiei în Europa şi dezvoltarea
relaţiilor paşnice între toate statele europene, pornind în această năzuinţă de la situaţia
reală existentă în această regiune.
Articolul 2
Republica Federală Germania şi URSS se vor călăuzi în relaţiile lor reciproce, precum şi
în problemele asigurării securităţii europene şi internaţionale, după ţelurile şi principiile
expuse în Carta Naţiunilor Unite. Ca urmare, ele îşi vor soluţiona problemele litigioase
exclusiv prin mijloace paşnice şi îşi asumă obligaţia să se abţină (...) de la ameninţarea cu
forţa sau de la folosirea forţei în probleme care afectează securitatea din europa şi
securitatea internaţională, precum şi relaţiile lor reciproce.
Articolul 3
În concordanţă cu ţelurile şi principiile expuse mai sus, Republica Federală Germania şi
URSS sunt unanime în a recunoaşte că pacea în Europa poate fi menţinută numai dacă
nimeni nu va atenta la graniţele actuale.
Ele se obligă să respecte neabătut integritatea teritorială a tuturor statelor din Europa în
graniţele lor actuale.
Ele declară că nu au nici un fel de pretenţii teritoriale faţă de cineva şi nu vor ridica
asemenea pretenţii nici pe viitor.
Ele consideră, în prezent ca şi în viitor, graniţele tuturor statelor din Europa ca fiind
inviolabile, aşa cum există ele în ziua semnării acestui tratat, inclusiv linia Oder – Neisse,
care constituie graniţa vestică a Republicii Populare Polone şi inclusiv graniţa între
Republica Federală Germania şi Republica Democrată Germană. (....)
SURSA: Constantin Buşe, Zorin Zamfir, Alexandru Vianu, Gheorghe Bădescu, Relaţii
internaţionale în acte şi documente, vol. III (1945-1982), Editura Didactică şi
Pedagogică, Bucureşti, 1983, p.30.
Document 11: Tratatul R.F. Germania cu R.P. Polonă , Varşovia, 7 decembrie 1970
(excerpt)
(...)
Articolul 1
1. Republica Federală Germania şi Republica Populare Polonă constată în deplin acord că
graniţa actuală, care este trasată în capitolul IX al hotărârilor Conferinţei de la Postdam
din 2 august 1945, începând de la Marea Baltică, în imediata apropiere şi la vest de
Swinemunde, mergând de acolo de-a lungul Odrei până la confluenţa cu Neisse, iar apoi
de-a lungul râului Neisse până la graniţa cu Cehoslovacia, constituie graniţa de stat
vestică a Republicii Populare Polone.
2. Ele confirmă inviolabilitatea graniţelor lor actuale acum şi în viitor şi se angajează
reciproc să respecte cu stricteţe integritatea lor teritorială.
3. Ele declară că nu au nici un fel de pretenţii teritoriale una faţă de cealaltă şi nu vor
enunţa pretenţii nici pe viitor.
Articolul 2
1. Republica Federală Germania şi Republica Populare Polonă se vor conduce în relaţiile
lor reciproce, precum şi în problemele garantării suveranităţii în Europa şi în lume după
ţelurile şi principiile înscrise în Carta Naţiunilor Unite.
2. Ca urmare, corespunzător articolelor I şi II din Carta Naţiunilor Unite, ele vor rezolva
toate probleme litigioase exclusiv cu mijloace paşnice şi se vor abţine în problemele care
afectează securitatea europeană şi internaţională, precum şi în relaţiile lor reciproce de la
ameninţarea cu forţa sau de la utilizarea forţei.
Articolul 3
1. Republica Federală Germania şi Republica Populare Polonă vor întreprinde noi paşi în
direcţia deplinei normalizării şi dezvoltări a relaţiilor lor reciproce, a căror bază stabilă o
constituie acest tratat. (...)
SURSA: Constantin Buşe, Zorin zamfir, Alexandru Vianu, Gheorghe Bădescu, Relaţii
internaţionale în acte şi documente, vol. III (1945-1982), Editura Didactică şi
Pedagogică, Bucureşti, 1983, p.31.
Articolul 1
Republica Federală Germania şi Republica Democrată Germană dezvoltă între ele relaţii
normale de bună vecinătate pe baza egalităţii.
Articolul 2
Republica Federală Germania şi Republica Democrată Germană se vor conduce după
scopurile şi principiile înscrise în Carta Naţiunilor Unite, mai ales a egalităţii suverane a
tuturor statelor, a respectării independenţei, suveranităţii şi integrităţii teritoriale, a
dreptului la autodeterminare, a apărării drepturilor omului şi a nediscriminării.
Articolul 3
În conformitate cu Carta O.N.U., Republica Federală Germania şi Republica Democrată
Germană vor rezolva probleme lor litigioase în exclusivitate prin mijloace paşnice şi se
vor abţine de la ameninţarea cu forţa sau de la aplicarea forţei.
Articolul 4
Republica Federală Germania şi Republica Democrată Germană declară ca nici unul din
cele două state nu-l reprezintă pe celălalt pe plan internaţional şi nu vorbeşte în numele
lui.
Articolul 5
Republica Federală Germania şi Republica Democrată Germană vor promova relaţii de
prietenie cu statele europene şi vor contribui la securitatea şi colaborarea europeană. (...)
Articolul 6
Republica Federală Germania şi Republica Democrată Germană pornesc de la principiul
limitării forţelor în ambele state. Ele respectă independenţa şi suveranitatea celor două
state în treburile lor interne şi externe. (...)
Articolul 8
Republica Federală Germania şi Republica Democrată Germană vor efectua un schimb
de reprezentanţe permanente. (...)
SURSA: Constantin Buşe, Zorin Zamfir, Alexandru Vianu, Gheorghe Bădescu, Relaţii
internaţionale în acte şi documente, vol. III (1945-1982), Editura Didactică şi
Pedagogică, Bucureşti, 1983, pp.34-35.
(...)
Partea II
Dispoziţiuni referitoare la sectoarele occidentale ale Berlinului
SURSA: Constantin Buşe, Zorin Zamfir, Alexandru Vianu, Gheorghe Bădescu, Relaţii
internaţionale în acte şi documente, vol. III (1945-1982), Editura Didactică şi
Pedagogică, Bucureşti, 1983, p.36.
(...)
Declaraţia privind principiile care guvernează relaţiile reciproce dintre statele
participante
Declară hotărârea lor de a respecta şi pune în practică, fiecare dintre ele în relaţiile sale cu
toate celelalte state participante, indiferent de sistemul lor politic, economic sau social,
precum şi de mărimea lor, situaţia lor geografică sau nivelul lor de dezvoltare, principiile
următoare (...):
3. Inviolabilitatea frontierelor
Statele participante consideră, fiecare, toate frontierele celuilalt, precum şi frontierele
tuturor statelor din Europa, şi în consecinţă ele se vor abţine acum şi în viitor de la orice
atentat împotriva acestor frontiere.
În consecinţă, ele se vor abţine, de asemenea, de la orice cerere sau de la orice act de
acaparare şi uzurpare a întregului sau a unei părţi a teritoriului oricărui stat participant.
SURSA: Constantin Buşe, Zorin Zamfir, Alexandru Vianu, Gheorghe Bădescu, Relaţii
internaţionale în acte şi documente, vol. III (1945-1982), Editura Didactică şi
Pedagogică, Bucureşti, 1983, p.205-211.
Seminar nr. 12
A. URSS
- 10 noiembrie 1982 – Leonid Brejnev moare
- 12 noiembrie 1982 – CC al PCUS îl alege ca secretar general pe Iuri
Andropov , fost şef al KGB
- 9 februarie 1984 – Iuri Andropov moare
- 13 februarie 1984 – CC al PCUS îl alege ca secretar general pe Konstantin
Cernenko
- 11 aprilie 1984 – Sovietul Suprem îl alege pe Cernenko ca şef al statului
(preşedinte al Prezidiului)
- 10 martie 1985 – Konstantin Cernenko moare
- 11 martie – CC al PCUS îl alege în funcţia de secretar general pe Mihail
Gorbaciov
- perestroika (restructurare) şi glasnost (transparenţă)
B. SUA
- 2 noiembrie 1976 – Jimmy Carter ( fostul guvernator al Georgiei ) devine
al 39-lea preşedinte al SUA
- 17 septembrie 1978 – Acordurile de la Camp David dintre Anwar as Sadat
şi Menahem Begin ( întâlnire mediată de Carter)
- 4 noiembrie 1979 – debutul crizei ostatecilor din Iran
- 4 noiembrie 1980 – Ronald Reagan este ales al 40-lea preşedinte al SUA
C. Relaţii Est-Vest
1. Criza euro-rachetelor
2. Doctrina Reagan
- formulată la începutul preşedinţiei lui Reagan, stipula decizia SUA de a
recurge la forţa militară pentru a se opune influenţei sovietice în Lumea a
Treia.
3. Întâlniri la vârf
b) cauze politice
- schimbări în politica externă a blocului occidental: decizia NATO de înarmare şi decizia
statelor Comunităţii Europene de a forma o uniune politică
- „factorul CSCE” – drepturile fundamentale ale cetăţenilor incluse în cel „de al treilea
coş” al CSCE Helsinki, care deveniseră şi drepturi pe care cetăţenii statelor comuniste le
puteau cere, au contribuit la de-legitimarea conducerilor acestor state şi la formarea unor
grupuri sociale autohtone
- folosirea prevederilor Actului final de la Helsinki ca o modalitate de presiune
diplomatică asupra ţărilor est – europene
- „factorul Gorbaciov” – reformele impuse de acesta sistemului sovietic; impunerea
doctrinei Sinatra în relaţiile Uniunii Sovietice cu ţările blocului comunist
- „efectul Ioan Paul al II-lea” – folosirea mesajul creştin având la bază adevărul,
solidaritatea şi respectarea drepturilor omului ca o formă de slăbire din interior a
regimurilor comuniste
- o înţelegere între cele două mari puteri (Uniunea Sovietică şi Statele Unite ale Americii)
ca o modalitate de a se pune capăt războiului rece, divizării Europei şi a Germaniei
- existenţa unei fracţiuni reformatoare în cadrul partidelor comuniste care va forma
nucleul unei conduceri alternative
- apariţia primelor mişcări de contestare a regimurilor comuniste din partea societăţii
civile
- pierderea legitimităţii partidelor comuniste datorită prelungirii crizei existente
c) cauze morale
- erodarea ideologiei marxist – leniniste: scăderea încrederii marii mase a populaţiei în
capacitatea elitelor comuniste de a rezolva criza prin metode tipice sistemului;
demoralizarea elitelor comuniste, pierderea încrederii acestora în viabilitatea unui sistem
de tip socialist
IV Suport documentar
Dear Sirs!
On 19 November 1989, the Civic Forum, which feels itself responsible to act as
the mouthpiece of the Czechoslovak public, was established in Prague. In a
demonstration by the Prague populace, attended by hundreds of thousands of people on
Wenceslas Square, the Civic Forum gained a consensus of opinion and therefore is
turning to you also in the name of these people.
SURSA: “Document No. 3, Letter from the Civic Forum to US President George Bush
and USSR General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev, 21 November 1989” în Cold War
International History Project Bulletin , Nr. 12/13 , … , Fall/Winter, 2001, p. 210-211
movement, which, through its protest demonstration, gave us the impulse for dramatic
social movement. Within it work all the current independent initiatives, artistic unions
headed by the theater—the first to be in solidarity with the students—and the renewed
currents in the National Front, including many former and current members of the CPCz.
The Catholic Church supported the Civic Forum through the words of the
cardinal, and other churches in Czechoslovakia. Anyone who agrees with its demands is
joining, and may join, the Civic Forum.
The Civic Forum is prepared to secure a dialogue between the public and the
present leadership immediately and has at its disposal qualified forces [from] all areas of
society, capable of carrying out a free and objective dialogue about real paths toward a
change in the political
and economic conditions in our country. The situation is open now, there are many
opportunities before us, and we have only two certainties.
The first is the certainty that there is no return to the previous totalitarian system
of government, which led our country to the brink of an absolute spiritual, moral,
political, economic and ecological crisis.
Our second certainty is that we want to live in a free, democratic and prosperous
Czechoslovakia, which must return to Europe, and that we will never abandon this ideal,
no matter what transpires in these next few days.
The Civic Forum calls on all citizens of Czechoslovakia to support its
fundamental demands by the demonstration of a general strike declared for Monday, 27
November 1989, at noon. Whether our country sets out in a peaceful way on the road to a
democratic social order, or whether an isolated group of Stalinists, who want at any price
to preserve their power and their privileges disguised as empty phrases about
reconstruction will conquer, may depend upon the success of this strike.
We challenge the leadership of this country to grasp the gravity of this situation,
rid themselves of compromised individuals and prevent all eventual efforts for a violent
revolution.
We call on all the members of the ruling party to join the citizenry and respect its
will.
We challenge all the members of the People’s Militias to not come out violently
against their comrade workers and thus spit upon all the traditions of worker solidarity.
We challenge all the members of the Police to realize that they are first and
foremost human beings and citizens of this country and only second subordinate to their
superiors.
We challenge the Czechoslovak People’s Army to stand on the side of the people
and, if necessary, to come out in its defense for the first time.
We call on the public and the governments of all countries to realize that our
homeland is from time immemorial the place where European and world confrontations
have begun and ended, and that in our country it is not only its fate which is at stake, but
the future of all of
Europe. We therefore demand that they support in every way the people’s movement and
the Civic Forum.
We are opponents of violence; we do not want revenge; we want to live as
dignified and free people, who have the right to speak for the fate of their homeland and
who also think of future generations.
The Civic Forum
23 November 1989
(…)
G. Bush: I want to clarify one point. You expressed concern about Western values. It
would be understandable if our devotion to certain ideals provoked difficulties in the
USSR or Eastern Europe and interfered with the progressive processes developing there.
But we have never
pursued such goals. Any discussion of Western values in NATO or other Western
organizations are completely natural and do not have destructive intent. But what are
Western values? They are, if you will, glasnost., openness, and heated debates. At the
economic level.incentives to progress and a free market. These values are not something
new or expedient but long-shared by us and the West Europeans, and they unite the West.
We greet the changes in the Soviet Union or in Poland but do not at all set Western
values against them. Therefore I want to understand your point of view as much as
possible in order to avoid any misunderstandings.
M. S. Gorbachev: The main principle which we have adopted and which we follow in our
new thinking is the right of each country to free choice, including the right to reexamine
and change their original choice. This is very painful, but it is a fundamental right. The
right to choose without outside interference. The US is devoted to a certain social and
economic system which the American people have chosen. Let other people decide
themselves, figuratively speaking, what God to pray to. It is important to me that the
tendency toward renewal noted in Eastern and Western Europe is proceeding in the
direction of drawing closer. The result will not be a copy of the Swedish, British, or
Soviet model. No. Something will result which meets the needs of the present stage of
development of human and European civilization. It has been observed now that people
have no fear of choosing one system or the other. They are looking for their unique
version which provides them with the best living conditions. When this choice proceeds
freely thenone can say only one thing: go right ahead.
G. Bush: I do not think that we differ here. We approve of self-determination and the
attendant debates. I want you to understand our approach on a positive level: Western
values do not at all mean imposing our system on Romania, Czechoslovakia, or even the
GDR.
M. S. Gorbachev: This is very important for us. Fundamental changes are occurring and
peoples are drawing closer together. And this is the main thing. I see that several means
of solving problems used by another system are taking root in Eastern Europe.in the
fields of economics, technology, etc. This is natural. If we and you have such a common
understanding, then all practical actions in changing conditions will be adequate and will
begin to have a positive nature. (…)
J. Baker: I would like to clarify our approach to selfdetermination. We agree that each
country should have the right of choice. But all of this makes sense only when the people
in the country are actually in a position to choose freely. This is contained in the concept
of .Western values,. and is not at all the right to force their systems on
others.
M. S. Gorbachev: If someone lays claim to the truth. expect disaster.
G. Bush: Absolutely right.
J. Baker: I’ve been talking about something else. Let us say, the question of the
reunification of Germany, which is causing nervousness in both our countries, and even
among Europeans. What do we say here about this? So that reunification takes place
according the principles of openness, pluralism, and a free market. We do not at all want
the reunification of Germany done on the model of 1937-1945 which, obviously,
concerns you. The Germany of that time had nothing in common with Western values.
M. S. Gorbachev: This is what [longtime Gorbachev aide] A. N. Yakovlev asks: “why are
democracy, openness, and a [free] market .Western. values?”
G. Bush: It was not always so. You personally have laid the foundation for these changes,
the movement toward democracy and openness. It is actually considerably clearer today
that you and we share these values than, say, 20 years ago.
M. S. Gorbachev: We ought not be drawn into propaganda battles.
A. N. Yakovlev: When they insist on “ Western values,” then “Eastern” and “Southern”
values unavoidably appear. (…)
M. S. Gorbachev: That’s it. And you see that ideological confrontations flare up again.
G. Bush: I understand you and agree. Let us avoid careless words and talk more about the
substance of the values themselves. We welcome the changes which are occurring with
all our hearts.
M. S. Gorbachev: This is very important since, as I have said, the main thing is that the
changes lead to greater openness in our relations with one another. We are beginning to
be organically integrated and liberated from everything which divided us. What will this
be called in the final account? I think.a new level of relations. Therefore, for my part, I
support your suggestion.let us
not have a discussion on a theological level. Historically this has always led to religious
wars. (…)
SURSA: “At Historic Crossroads: Documents on the December 1989 Malta Summit ,2-3
December 1989” în Cold War International History Project Bulletin , Nr. 12/13 , … ,
Fall/Winter, 2001, p.240-241