Right
In an abstract sense, justice, ethical correctness, or harmony with the
rules of law or the principles of morals. In a concrete legal sense, a
power, privilege, demand, or claim possessed by a particular person
by virtue of law.
In Constitutional Law, rights are classified as natural, civil, and
political. Natural rights are those that are believed to grow out of the
nature of the individual human being and depend on her personality,
such as the rights to life, liberty, privacy, and the pursuit of happiness.
Civil Rights are those that belong to every citizen of the state, and are
not connected with the organization or administration of
government. They include the rights of property, marriage, protection
by law, freedom to contract, trial by jury, and the like. These rights
are capable of being enforced or redressed in a civil action in a court.
Political rights entail the power to participate directly or indirectly in
the establishment or administration of government, such as the right
of citizenship, the right to vote, and the right to hold public office.
Private act
a statute exclusively for the settlement of private and personal
interests, of which courts do not take judicial notice; - opposed to a
general law, which operates on the whole community.
The essence of procedural due process is embodied in the basic
requirement of notice and a real opportunity to be heard. In
administrative proceedings, such as in the case at bar, procedural due
process simply means the opportunity to explain one’s side or the
opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of. "To be heard" does not mean only verbal arguments
in court; one may be heard also thru pleadings. Where opportunity to
be heard, either through oral arguments or pleadings, is accorded,
there is no denial of procedural due process.
In administrative proceedings, procedural due process has been
recognized to include the following: (1) the right to actual or
constructive notice of the institution of proceedings which may affect
a respondent’s legal rights; (2) a real opportunity to be heard
personally or with the assistance of counsel, to present witnesses and
evidence in one’s favor, and to defend one’s rights; (3) a tribunal
vested with competent jurisdiction and so constituted as to afford a
person charged administratively a reasonable guarantee of honesty
as well as impartiality; and (4) a finding by said tribunal which is
supported by substantial evidence submitted for consideration during
the hearing or contained in the records or made known to the parties
affected.
Void-for-Vagueness
An act to constitute a crime, the law must expressly and clearly
declare such act a crime. A related doctrine is that penal statutes are
construed strictly against the state and liberally in favor of the
accused.
The void-for-vagueness doctrine holds that a law is facially invalid if
men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning
and differ as to its application. However, this Court has imposed
certain limitations by which a criminal statute, as in the challenged
law at bar, may be scrutinized. This Court has declared that facial
invalidation or an "on-its-face" invalidation of criminal statutes is not
appropriate. We have so enunciated in no uncertain terms in
Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan, thus:
In sum, the doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and vagueness
are analytical tools developed for testing "on their faces" statutes in
free speech cases or, as they are called in American law, First
Amendment cases. They cannot be made to do service when what is
involved is a criminal statute. With respect to such statute, the
established rule is that 'one to whom application of a statute is
constitutional will not be heard to attack the statute on the ground
that impliedly it might also be taken as applying to other persons or
other situations in which its application might be unconstitutional.' As
has been pointed out, 'vagueness challenges in the First Amendment
context, like overbreadth challenges typically produce facial
invalidation, while statutes found vague as a matter of due process
typically are invalidated [only] 'as applied' to a particular defendant.'"
a. The police power. —
There is no question that the Act was approved in the exercise of the
police power, but petitioner claims that its exercise in this instance is
attended by a violation of the constitutional requirements of due
process and equal protection of the laws. But before proceeding to
the consideration and resolution of the ultimate issue involved, it
would be well to bear in mind certain basic and fundamental, albeit
preliminary, considerations in the determination of the ever
recurrent conflict between police power and the guarantees of due
process and equal protection of the laws. What is the scope of police
power, and how are the due process and equal protection clauses
related to it? What is the province and power of the legislature, and
what is the function and duty of the courts? These consideration must
be clearly and correctly understood that their application to the facts
of the case may be brought forth with clarity and the issue accordingly
resolved.
It has been said the police power is so far - reaching in scope, that it
has become almost impossible to limit its sweep. As it derives its
existence from the very existence of the State itself, it does not need
to be expressed or defined in its scope; it is said to be co-extensive
with self-protection and survival, and as such it is the most positive
and active of all governmental processes, the most essential, insistent
and illimitable. Especially is it so under a modern democratic
framework where the demands of society and of nations have
multiplied to almost unimaginable proportions; the field and scope of
police power has become almost boundless, just as the fields of public
interest and public welfare have become almost all-embracing and
have transcended human foresight. Otherwise stated, as we cannot
foresee the needs and demands of public interest and welfare in this
constantly changing and progressive world, so we cannot delimit
beforehand the extent or scope of police power by which and through
which the State seeks to attain or achieve interest or welfare. So it is
that Constitutions do not define the scope or extent of the police
power of the State; what they do is to set forth the limitations
thereof. The most important of these are the due process clause and
the equal protection clause.
b. Limitations on police power. —
The basic limitations of due process and equal protection are found
in the following provisions of our Constitution:
SECTION 1.(1) No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property
without due process of law, nor any person be denied the equal
protection of the laws. (Article III, Phil. Constitution)
These constitutional guarantees which embody the essence of
individual liberty and freedom in democracies, are not limited to
citizens alone but are admittedly universal in their application,
without regard to any differences of race, of color, or of nationality.
(Yick Wo vs. Hopkins, 30, L. ed. 220, 226.)
The fundamental right of equal protection of the laws is not
absolute, but is subject to reasonable classification. If the groupings
are characterized by substantial distinctions that make real
differences, one class may be treated and regulated differently from
another. Classification, to be valid, must (1) rest on substantial
distinctions, (2) be germane to the purpose of the law, (3) not be
limited to existing conditions only, and (4) apply equally to all
members of the same class.
Levels of Scrutiny Under the Three-Tiered Approach to Equal
Protection Analysis
1. STRICT SCRUTINY (The government must show that the challenged
classification serves a compelling state interest and that the
classification is necessary to serve that interest.):
A. Suspect Classifications:
1. Race
2. National Origin
3. Religion (either under EP or Establishment Clause analysis)
4. Alienage (unless the classification falls within a recognized "political
community" exception, in which case only rational basis scrutiny will
be applied).
B. Classifications Burdening Fundamental Rights
1. Denial or Dilution of the Vote
2. Interstate Migration
3. Access to the Courts
4. Other Rights Recognized as Fundamental
2. MIDDLE-TIER SCRUTINY (The government must show that the
challenged classification serves an important state interest and that
the classification is at least substantially related to serving that
interest.):
Quasi-Suspect Classifications:
1. Gender
2. Illegitimacy
3. MINIMUM (OR RATIONAL BASIS) SCRUTINY (The govenment need
only show that the challenged classification is rationally related to
serving a legitimate state interest.)
Minimum scrutiny applies to all classifications other than those listed
above, although some Supreme Court cases suggest a slightly closer
scrutiny ("a second-order rational basis test") involving some
weighing of the state's interest may be applied in cases, for example,
involving classifications that disadvantage mentally retarded people,
homosexuals, or innocent children of illegal aliens
d. The due process clause. —
The due process clause has to do with the reasonableness of
legislation enacted in pursuance of the police power. Is there public
interest, a public purpose; is public welfare involved? Is the Act
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the legislature's
purpose; is it not unreasonable, arbitrary or oppressive? Is there
sufficient foundation or reason in connection with the matter
involved; or has there not been a capricious use of the legislative
power? Can the aims conceived be achieved by the means used, or is
it not merely an unjustified interference with private interest? These
are the questions that we ask when the due process test is applied.
The conflict, therefore, between police power and the guarantees of
due process and equal protection of the laws is more apparent than
real. Properly related, the power and the guarantees are supposed to
coexist. The balancing is the essence or, shall it be said, the
indispensable means for the attainment of legitimate aspirations of
any democratic society. There can be no absolute power, whoever
exercise it, for that would be tyranny. Yet there can neither be
absolute liberty, for that would mean license and anarchy. So the
State can deprive persons of life, liberty and property, provided there
is due process of law; and persons may be classified into classes and
groups, provided everyone is given the equal protection of the law.
The test or standard, as always, is reason. The police power legislation
must be firmly grounded on public interest and welfare, and a
reasonable relation must exist between purposes and means. And if
distinction and classification has been made, there must be a
reasonable basis for said distinction.
e. Legislative discretion not subject to judicial review. —
Now, in this matter of equitable balancing, what is the proper place
and role of the courts? It must not be overlooked, in the first place,
that the legislature, which is the constitutional repository of police
power and exercises the prerogative of determining the policy of the
State, is by force of circumstances primarily the judge of necessity,
adequacy or reasonableness and wisdom, of any law promulgated in
the exercise of the police power, or of the measures adopted to
implement the public policy or to achieve public interest. On the other
hand, courts, although zealous guardians of individual liberty and
right, have nevertheless evinced a reluctance to interfere with the
exercise of the legislative prerogative. They have done so early where
there has been a clear, patent or palpable arbitrary and unreasonable
abuse of the legislative prerogative. Moreover, courts are not
supposed to override legitimate policy, and courts never inquire into
the wisdom of the law.
The concept of relative constitutionality
The constitutionality of a statute cannot, in every instance, be
determined by a mere comparison of its provisions with applicable
provisions of the Constitution, since the statute may be
constitutionally valid as applied to one set of facts and invalid in its
application to another.
Under the plain view doctrine, a law enforcement officer can seize
evidence of a crime (otherwise known as 'contraband') without a
warrant, if the officer observes the contraband in plain view.
Under the knock and announce rule, police need to knock on the
door, announce their authority to search the premises and wait a
reasonable period of time before they enter. Only if a person fails to
allow a search after the police identify themselves can the police
forcibly come in.
three strands of the right to privacy, viz: (1) locational or situational
privacy - Refers to the privacy that is felt in physical space, such as
that which may be violated by trespass and unwarranted search and
seizure (2) informational privacy - right of individuals to control
information about themselves and (3) decisional privacy - right of
individuals to make certain kinds of fundamental choices with respect
to their personal and reproductive autonomy.
right to be forgotten is recognized in the form of “right of erasure or
blocking” under the DPA in that the data subject may ‘suspend,
withdraw or order the blocking, removal or destruction of his or her
personal information from the personal information controller’s filing
system upon discovery and substantial proof that the personal
information are incomplete, outdated, false, unlawfully obtained,
used for unauthorized purposes or are no longer necessary for the
purposes for which they were collected
Prior restraint refers to official governmental restrictions on the
press or other forms of expression in advance of actual publication or
dissemination.56 Freedom from prior restraint is largely freedom from
government censorship of publications, whatever the form of
censorship, and regardless of whether it is wielded by the executive,
legislative or judicial branch of the government. Thus, it precludes
governmental acts that required approval of a proposal to publish;
licensing or permits as prerequisites to publication including the
payment of license taxes for the privilege to publish; and even
injunctions against publication. Even the closure of the business and
printing offices of certain newspapers, resulting in the
discontinuation of their printing and publication, are deemed as
previous restraint or censorship. 57 Any law or official that requires
some form of permission to be had before publication can be made,
commits an infringement of the constitutional right, and remedy can
be had at the courts.
Given that deeply ensconced in our fundamental law is the hostility
against all prior restraints on speech, and any act that restrains
speech is presumed invalid,58 and “any act that restrains speech is
hobbled by the presumption of invalidity and should be greeted with
furrowed brows,” 59 it is important to stress not all prior restraints on
speech are invalid. Certain previous restraints may be permitted by
the Constitution, but determined only upon a careful evaluation of
the challenged act as against the appropriate test by which it should
be measured against.
Hence, it is not enough to determine whether the challenged act
constitutes some form of restraint on freedom of speech. A
distinction has to be made whether the restraint is (1) a content-
neutral regulation, i.e., merely concerned with the incidents of the
speech, or one that merely controls the time, place or manner, and
under well defined standards;60 or (2) a content-based restraint or
censorship, i.e., the restriction is based on the subject matter of the
utterance or speech. 61 The cast of the restriction determines the test
by which the challenged act is assayed with.
When the speech restraints take the form of a content-neutral
regulation, only a substantial governmental interest is required for its
validity.62 Because regulations of this type are not designed to
suppress any particular message, they are not subject to the strictest
form of judicial scrutiny but an intermediate approach—somewhere
between the mere rationality that is required of any other law and
the compelling interest standard applied to content-based
restrictions.63 The test is called intermediate because the Court will
not merely rubberstamp the validity of a law but also require that the
restrictions be narrowly-tailored to promote an important or
significant governmental interest that is unrelated to the suppression
of expression. The intermediate approach has been formulated in this
manner:
A governmental regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the
constitutional power of the Government, if it furthers an important
or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is
unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incident
restriction on alleged [freedom of speech & expression] is no greater
than is essential to the furtherance of that interest. 64
On the other hand, a governmental action that restricts freedom of
speech or of the press based on content is given the strictest
scrutiny in light of its inherent and invasive impact. Only when the
challenged act has overcome the clear and present danger rule will it
pass constitutional muster,65 with the government having the burden
of overcoming the presumed unconstitutionality.
Unless the government can overthrow this presumption, the content-
based restraint will be struck down.66
With respect to content-based restrictions, the government must
also show the type of harm the speech sought to be restrained would
bring about—especially the gravity and the imminence of the
threatened harm—otherwise the prior restraint will be invalid. Prior
restraint on speech based on its content cannot be justified by
hypothetical fears, “but only by showing a substantive and imminent
evil that has taken the life of a reality already on ground.”67 As
formulated, “the question in every case is whether the words used
are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create
a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive
evils that Congress has a right to prevent. It is a question of proximity
and degree.”68
The regulation which restricts the speech content must also serve an
important or substantial government interest, which is unrelated to
the suppression of free expression. 69
Also, the incidental restriction on speech must be no greater than
what is essential to the furtherance of that interest. 70 A restriction
that is so broad that it encompasses more than what is required to
satisfy the governmental interest will be invalidated. 71 The
regulation, therefore, must be reasonable and narrowly drawn to fit
the regulatory purpose, with the least restrictive means
undertaken. 72
Thus, when the prior restraint partakes of a content-neutral
regulation, it is subjected to an intermediate review. A content-based
regulation,73 however, bears a heavy presumption of invalidity and is
measured against the clear and present danger rule. The latter will
pass constitutional muster only if justified by a compelling reason,
and the restrictions imposed are neither overbroad nor vague.
overbreadth doctrine, a proper governmental purpose,
constitutionally subject to state regulation, may not be achieved by
means that unnecessarily sweep its subject broadly, thereby invading
the area of protected freedoms.
A heckler's veto occurs when an acting party's right to freedom of
speech is curtailed or restricted by the government in order to
prevent a reacting party's behavior. The common example is that of
demonstrators (reacting party) causing a speech (given by the acting
party) to be terminated in order to preserve the peace. A form of
curtailment of one's freedom of expression. It occurs when the
government restricts the right to speak or to express one’s opinion or
reaction. It is commonly resorted to avoid expression of negativity.
Privileged communication is an interaction between two parties in
which the law recognizes a private, protected relationship. Whatever
is communicated between the parties remains confidential, and the
law cannot force their disclosure.
The presumption of malice does not arise in the two cases of
privileged communications mentioned in paragraphs 1 and 2 of Art.
354 of the Revised Penal Code, i.e.:
a. A private communication made by any person to another in the
performance of any legal, moral or social duty;
b. A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments
or remarks, of any judicial, legislative, or other official proceedings
which are not of confidential nature, or of any statement, report, or
speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any other act performed
by public officers in the exercise of their functions.
Where the communication is privileged, malice is not presumed from
the defamatory words. The plaintiff or the prosecution must prove
malice in fact, whenever the defamatory imputation appears in a
privileged communication.

Freedom of assembly and association
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to
freedom of association with others, including the right to form and to
join trade unions for the protection of his interests.
2. No restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of these rights other
than such as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic
society in the interests of national security or public safety, for the
prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals
or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. This article
shall not prevent the imposition of lawful restrictions on the exercise
of these rights by members of the armed forces, of the police or of
the administration of the state.
The strict neutrality approach which examines only whether
government action is for a secular purpose and does not consider
inadvertent burden on religious exercise protects such a rigid barrier.
The name “conscientious objector” is of military origin. It refers to
people who refuse to go to war for religious reasons: three basic
tests. 1. He must show that he is conscientiously opposed to war in
any form. 2. He must show that this opposition is based upon religious
training and belief, as the term has been construed in our decisions.
3. he must show that this objection is sincere.
Reasonable Doubt
A standard of proof that must be surpassed to convict an accused in
a criminal proceeding. Reasonable doubt is a standard of proof used
in criminal trials. When a criminal defendant is prosecuted, the
prosecutor must prove the defendant's guilt Beyond a Reasonable
Doubt.
Proof beyond reasonable doubt charges the prosecution with the
immense responsibility of establishing moral certainty. The
prosecution's case must rise on its own merits, not merely on relative
strength as against that of the defense. Should the prosecution fail to
discharge its burden, acquittal must follow as a matter of course.
Rule 133, Section 2 of the Revised Rules on Evidence specifies the
requisite quantum of evidence in criminal cases:
Section 2. Proof beyond reasonable doubt. — In a criminal case, the
accused is entitled to an acquittal, unless his guilt is shown beyond
reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean
such a degree of proof, excluding possibility of error, produces
absolute certainly. Moral certainly only is required, or that degree of
proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind.
This rule places upon the prosecution the task of establishing the guilt
of an accused, relying on the strength of its own evidence, and not
banking on the weakness of the defense of an accused. Requiring
proof beyond reasonable doubt finds basis not only in the due process
clause35 of the Constitution, but similarly, in the right of an accused
to be "presumed innocent until the contrary is proved."36
"Undoubtedly, it is the constitutional presumption of innocence that
lays such burden upon the prosecution."37 Should the prosecution
fail to discharge its burden, it follows, as a matter of course, that an
accused must be acquitted. As explained in Basilio v. People of the
Philippines:38
We ruled in People v. Ganguso:
An accused has in his favor the presumption of innocence which the
Bill of Rights guarantees. Unless his guilt is shown beyond reasonable
doubt, he must be acquitted. This reasonable doubt standard is
demanded by the due process clause of the Constitution which
protects the accused from conviction except upon proof beyond
reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with
which he is charged. The burden of proof is on the prosecution, and
unless it discharges that burden the accused need not even offer
evidence in his behalf, and he would be entitled to an acquittal. Proof
beyond reasonable doubt does not, of course, mean such degree of
proof as, excluding the possibility of error, produce absolute
certainty. Moral certainty only is required, or that degree of proof
which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind. The conscience
must be satisfied that the accused is responsible for the offense
charged.
Well-entrenched in jurisprudence is the rule that the conviction of the
accused must rest, not on the weakness of the defense, but on the
strength of the prosecution. The burden is on the prosecution to
prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt, not on the accused to prove his
innocence.39 (Citations omitted)
The determination of the guilt of an accused hinges on how a court
appreciates evidentiary matters in relation to the requisites of an
offense. Determination of guilt is, thus, a fundamentally factual issue.
This court, however, is not a trier of facts. Consistent with Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court, "[a]s a rule, only questions of law, not questions
of fact, may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45."40 More specifically, "in a criminal case, factual findings of the
trial court are generally accorded great weight and respect on appeal,
especially when such findings are supported by substantial evidence
on record."41
Nevertheless, there are exceptions allowing this court to overturn the
factual findings with which it is confronted. Speaking specifically of
criminal cases, this court stated in People of the Philippines v.
Esteban42 that "in exceptional circumstances, such as when the trial
court overlooked material and relevant matters . . . this Court will re-
calibrate and evaluate the factual findings of the [lower courts]."43
Below are the recognized exceptions to the general rule binding this
court to the factual findings of lower courts:
(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation,
surmises, and conjectures;
(2) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or
impossible;
(3) Where there is a grave abuse of discretion;
(4) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;
(5) When the findings of fact are conflicting;
(6) When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond
the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of
both appellant and appellee;
(7) When the findings are contrary to those of the trial court;
(8) When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of
specific evidence on which they are based;
(9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners'
main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and
(10) When the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised
on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the
evidence on record.
In international human rights law, an enforced disappearance occurs
when a person is secretly abducted by a state, political organization,
or by a third party.
An extrajudicial killing (also known as extrajudicial execution) is the
killing of a person by governmental authorities or individuals without
the sanction of any judicial proceeding or legal process.
Extrajudicial killings and forced disappearances in the Philippines are
illegal liquidations, unlawful or felonious killings and forced
disappearances in the Philippines. These are forms of extrajudicial
punishment, and include extrajudicial executions, summary
executions, arbitrary arrest and detentions, and failed prosecutions
due to political activities.
b. The presumption of regularity in the performance of duty cannot
prevail in these cases.
Even the presumption as to regularity in the performance by police
officers of their official duties easily disappeared before it could find
significance in these cases. Continuing accretions of case law reiterate
that a high premium is accorded the presumption of innocence over
the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty, viz:
We have usually presumed the regularity of performance of their
official duties in favor of the members of buy-bust teams enforcing
our laws against the illegal sale of dangerous drugs. Such presumption
is based on three fundamental reasons, namely: first, innocence, and
not wrongdoing, is to be presumed; second, an official oath will not
be violated; and, third, a republican form of government cannot
survive long unless a limit is placed upon controversies and certain
trust and confidence reposed in each governmental department or
agent by every other such department or agent, at least to the extent
of such presumption. But the presumption is rebuttable by
affirmative evidence of irregularity or of any failure to perform a duty.
Judicial reliance on the presumption despite any hint of irregularity in
the procedures undertaken by the agents of the law will thus be
fundamentally unsound because such hint is itself affirmative proof
of irregularity.
The presumption of regularity of performance of official duty stands
only when no reason exists in the records by which to doubt the
regularity of the performance of official duty. And even in that
instance the presumption of regularity will not be stronger than the
presumption of innocence in favor of the accused. Otherwise, a mere
rule of evidence will defeat the constitutionally enshrined right to be
presumed innocent. Trial courts are instructed to apply this
differentiation, and to always bear in mind the following reminder
issued in People v. Catalan:
x x x We remind the lower courts that the presumption of regularity
in the performance of duty could not prevail over the stronger
presumption of innocence favoring the accused. Otherwise, the
constitutional guarantee of the accused being presumed innocent
would be held subordinate to a mere rule of evidence allocating the
burden of evidence. Where, like here, the proof adduced against the
accused has not even overcome the presumption of innocence, the
presumption of regularity in the performance of duty could not be a
factor to adjudge the accused guilty of the crime charged.
Moreover, the regularity of the performance of their duty could not
be properly presumed in favor of the policemen because the records
were replete with indicia of their serious lapses. As a rule, a presumed
fact like the regularity of performance by a police officer must be
inferred only from an established basic fact, not plucked out from thin
air. To say it differently, it is the established basic fact that triggers the
presumed fact of regular performance. Where there is any hint of
irregularity committed by the police officers in arresting the accused
and thereafter, several of which we have earlier noted, there can be
no presumption of regularity of performance in their favor.
According to the doctrine of command responsibility, a superior may
be held criminally responsible for a crime committed by his
subordinates if it is proven that despite his awareness of the crimes
of subordinates, he fails to fulfil his duties to prevent and punish these
crimes.
The Trial Chamber identified three elements for liability pursuant to
Article 7(3): (i) the existence of a superior-subordinate relationship;
(ii) that the superior knew or had reason to know that the criminal act
was about to be or had been committed; and (iii) that the superior
failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent the
criminal act or punish the perpetrator.
Self-incrimination, in law, the giving of evidence that might tend to
expose the witness to punishment for crime. The term is generally
used in relation to the privilege of refusing to give such evidence.
WHAT IS THE SCOPE OF THE RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION?
> The right against self-incrimination covers testimonial compulsion
only and the compulsion to produce real or physical evidence
using the body of the accused
> Physical or moral compulsion to extort communication
WITH WHAT KIND OF TESTIMONY OR INSTANCES CAN THE RIGHT BE
INVOKED?
> It applies to commutative testimony and not mechanical testimony
> Commutative testimony involves the use of intelligence on the
part of the accused or witness. Corrorarily, on cases on self-
incrimination, the following are permissible—substance from the
body, morphine from mouth, put on pants, physical exam, wallet,
picture taking, etc. The following on the other hand are not
permissible—handwriting, signature, and similar incidents which
involve the use of intelligence.
SUPPOSE THAT THERE IS A HOLE IN A DOOR TO WHICH IF IT
IS FOUND OUT THAT THE HAND OF THE ACCUSED FITS THE HOLE, HE
IS MOST PROBABLE GUILTY OF THE ACCUSATION. CAN HE INVOKE
THE RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION?
> No, what is being asked of him is mechanical in nature. The
inserting of his hand into the hole will not involve intelligence on his
part to fulfill the task.
IS THERE AN EXCEPTION TO THE RIGHT AGAINST SELF-
INCRIMINATION?
> The right cannot be invoked when the State has the rights to
inspect documents under its police power, such as documents of
corporations.
ON WHAT KIND OF PROCEEDINGS CAN THE RIGHT AGAINST SELF-
INCRIMINATION BE INVOKED?
> The right against self-incrimination can be invoked in all proceedings
instituted by the government
SUPPOSE THAT X WAS A WITNESS IN A JUDICIAL PROCEEDING.
THE COUNSEL ASKED HIM ABOUT HIS WHEREABOUTS DURING
A CERTAIN DATE. X WAS ACTUALLY TOGETHER WITH A WOMAN IN
A MOTEL DURING THAT DATE. REVEALING HIS WHEREABOUTS
WOULD RESULT TO A DOMESTIC TURBULENCE. CAN X RIGHTFULLY
INVOKE HIS RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION?
> X cannot invoke the right. He can only invoke the right if there is
only a possibility of criminal prosecution but not in cases of
possible embarrassment.
WHO MAY INVOKE THE RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION AND
WHEN CAN SUCH PERSON INVOKE THE RIGHT?
> An ordinary witness may invoke the right but he may only do so as
each incriminating question is asked
> The accused himself may invoke the right, but unlike the ordinary
witness, he may altogether refuse to take the witness stand and
refuse to answer any and all questions.
> But once the accused waives his right and chooses to testify
on his own behalf, he may be cross-examined on matters covered in
his direct examination. He cannot refuse to answer questions
during cross-examination by claiming that the answer that he will give
could incriminate him for the crime he is being charged.
> However, if the question during cross-examination relates to a
crime different from that which he was charged, he can still invoke
the right and refuse to answer.
CAN AN ACCUSED OR WITNESS INVOKE THE RIGHT AGAINST SELF-
INCRIMINATION IF HE IS ASKED ABOUT PAST CRIMINALITY?
> It depends
> If he can still be prosecuted for it, questions about the past criminal
liability are still covered by the protection against self-incrimination
> But if he cannot anymore be prosecuted for it anymore, he cannot
invoke the right
SUPPOSE X WAS A WITNESS ASKED ABOUT BEING CHARGED WITH
PERJURY TWO YEARS AGO. HE INVOKES HIS RIGHT AGAINST
SELF-INCRIMINATION. CAN THIS BE TAKEN AGAINST HIM?
> It depends. If in the prior charge of perjury against him, the case
has already been terminated through his acquittal, conviction, or
dismissal of the complaint, he couldn't invoke the right anymore.
But if it is the case that he could still be charged with this past
criminality, then he could invoke said right.
SUPPOSE X WAS A WITNESS ASKED ABOUT BEING A PAID
WITNESS IN THE PAST. X REFUSED TO ANSWER INVOKING THE
RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION. CAN THIS BE TAKEN
AGAINST X?
> Again, it depends. If he could still be charged for rendering false
testimony, then he could invoke the right. If he cannot anymore be
charged for past criminality, then it could not invoke the right.
X ACCUSED WAS ASKED TO BE A HOSTILE WITNESS. HE REFUSED TO
DO SO. CAN THIS BE TAKEN AGAINST X?
> No, X cannot be prejudiced whatsoever as a result of his refusal to
be a hostile witness. To prejudice X as a result of his refusal
would render his right against self-incrimination useless and
nugatory.
Weight of Evidence: - The balance of evidence and in whose favor it
tilts. This refers to the indication of the greater evidence between the
parties . This depends on the judicial evaluation within the guidelines
provided by the rules and by jurisprudence.
Sufficiency of Evidence- refers to the adequacy of evidence. Such
evidence in character, weight, or amount, as will legally justify the
judicial action demanded or prayed by the parties.
This refers to the question as to whether the evidence amounts or
meets the required quantum needed to arrive at a decision in a civil,
criminal, or administrative case; or to prove matters of defense or
mitigation or to overcome a prima facie case or a presumption
II. HIERARCHY OF EVIDENTIARY VALUES
a). Proof beyond reasonable doubt
b). Clear and convincing proof
c). Preponderance of Evidence
d). Substantial evidence
2. a). Conclusive- overwhelming or incontrovertible
b). Prima Facie- that which suffices until rebutted
c). Probable Cause- as that required for filing of an Information
in Court or for the issuance of a warrant of arrest
III. QUANTUM OF EVIDENCE REQUIRED
A. Criminal cases: Proof of Guilt Must be Beyond reasonable doubt.
1. That degree of proof, which, excluding the possibility of error,
produces moral certainty. If the inculpatory facts are capable of two
or more explanations, one of which is consistent with the innocence
of the accused and the other consistent with his guilt, then the
evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty and is not
sufficient to support a conviction.
B. Civil Cases: Preponderance of Evidence. This means that he weight,
credit and value of the aggregate evidenced of one is superior to the
other
IV. RULES IN THE EVALUATION OF EVIDENCE
1. Courts shall consider and take into consideration : (a) all facts
which were presented during the trial whether testimonial, object, or
documentary (b) all facts which were stipulated or judicially admitted
(c) those judicially noticed and (d) all facts which are presumed
2. No extraneous matters shall be considered even if the Court knows
them as existing in his personal capacity
3. In determining the weight and sufficiency of a party’s evidence, the
court shall consider :
A.) All the facts and circumstances of the case.
B). The testimonial characteristics of a witness such as:
i). The manner of testifying by a witness which
includes his conduct and behavior on the witness stand, the
emphasis, gestures, and inflection of his voice in answering
questions. This is the reason why the rules require the
witness to personally testify in open court.
ii). The intelligence of the witness. This refers o
this position to perceive by the sue of his organs of sense,
his opportunity for accurate observation and faithful
recollection of the facts to which he is testifying. This
intelligence must be coupled with integrity, a general
reputation for truth, honesty and integrity. This is because
a witness to be believed must be truthful in his narration of
correct facts.
iii). The means and opportunity of knowing the
facts which includes his presence and observation of the
facts.
iv). The nature of the facts to which the witness is
testifying such as: whether he did the act as a participant,
whether he saw the occurrence of an accident as he was a
passenger; the identity of a person who is an old
acquaintance; thus as to the circumstances of the birth a
person, the mother would be the best witness on this point
mother.
v). The absence or presence of interest or basis
for bias or prejudice.
vi). Personal Credibility of the witness, referring
to his general reputation for truth, honesty or integrity as
for example: (i) the case of an young girl who makes a
complaint for rape ; as for instance the accused claiming self
defense who is well built, broad shouldered a boxer and
expert in martial arts claiming the victim of assault by an
ordinary person
viii). The probability or improbability of the
testimony
C. The number of witnesses. However witnesses are to been
weighed not numbered because quantitative superiority does not
necessarily mean legal preponderance. Thus an accused may be
convicted based solely on the testimony of one witness. But where
the evidence for both parties is principally testimonial where the
version of each exhibit equal tendency to be true and accurate, and A.) That it be credible in itself i.e. such as the common
the witnesses have not betrayed themselves by major contradictions experience and observation of mankind can approve as probable
or other indications of falsehood, there exists every reason to under the circumstances. Testimony must be natural, reasonable and
measure preponderance by numerical advantage. probable as to make it easy to believe
B). Must come from a credible source- a credible witness is
4. The Court has the power to stop the further presentation of one who testifies in a categorical, straightforward spontaneous and
evidence on the same point as when the additional evidence is only frank manner and remains consistent on cross examination
corroborative or the point has already been established, or when it
results to unnecessary delay V. APPRECIATION OF EVIDENCE BY TRIAL COURT by trial court
5. As to the testimony of a witness: generally accorded respect by appellate courts as the former have
A). the court must consider everything stated by the first hand contact with the evidence and were able to observe the
witness during the direct, cross, re-direct and re-cross examinations witness as they testified.
B). the testimony of a witness maybe believed in part and
disbelieved in other parts, depending on the corroborative evidence In matters concerning the credibility of witnesses, appellate courts
and the probabilities and improbabilities of the case. It is accepted as will generally not disturb the findings of trial courts unless they
a matter of common sense that if certain parts of the testimony are neglected, ignored or misappreciated material and substantial facts,
true, his testimony can not be disregarded entirely. Contrast this with which could materially affect the results of the case.
the so called “Falsus in unos, falsus in omnibus” - is a Latin phrase
meaning "false in one thing, false in everything." At common law, it is VI. EVIDENCE ON MOTION –When a motion is based on facts not
the legal principle that a witness who testifies falsely about one appearing of record the court may hear the matter on affidavits or
matter is not credible to testify about any matter depositions presented by the respective parties, but the court may
6. The Preference of Evidence must be observed in case of conflict: direct that the matter be wholly or partially on oral testimony or
A). Physical or Object evidence is evidence of the highest depositions.
order and prevails over contrary testimonial evidence
B). Documentary over testimonial evidence A. This refers to collateral issues or motions based on facts
C). Positive over negative evidence. E.G. positive not appearing on record such as (i) proof of service by publication (ii)
identification over alibi; an assertion of the occurrence of a thing over relief from order of default (iii) Taking of depositions (iv) motion for
a plain denial. “Denials, if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing new trial (v) relief from judgment (vi) issuance of writ of preliminary
evidence, are deemed negative and self-serving evidence unworthy injunction
of credence.” (Wa-acon vs. People, 510 SCRA 429)
D). Direct over circumstantial
E). Testimony in open court over sworn statements or
affidavits
F). The “Admitted Facts Rule”- evidence of whatever
description must yield to the extent that it conflicts with admitted or
clearly established facts”. Thus courts give superior credit to
witnesses whose testimonies on material points are in accord with
facts already established ( Frondarina vs. Malazarte 510 SCRA 223)
7. Rule in criminal cases
A. For conviction
i). For conviction: the prosecution must adduce
proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt i.e. moral
certainty not absolute certainty
ii). Every doubt is to be resolved in favor of the
accused
iii) Accusation is not synonymous with guilt
iv) Accused need not present evidence if the
evidence against him is weak because conviction
must be on the strength of the evidence of the
prosecution and not on the weakness of the
evidence of the accused
B. Affirmative Defenses be shown by clear, positive and
convincing evidence
C. Two Witness Rule in Treason
D. If conviction is based on circumstantial evidence. The
requirements under section 4 must be present
i). There must be more than one circumstance
ii). The facts from which the inferences are
derived are proven
iii). The combination of all such circumstances
produces conviction beyond reasonable doubt
E. If based on Extra Judicial Confession, same must be
corroborated by evidence of corpus delicti

IV. CREDIBLE EVIDENCE: Evidence to be believed requires: