CANON 2. INTEGRITY
The firearm that became the
1. A.M. No. MTJ-13-1823
P/SR. INSP. TEDDY M. ROSQUETA, Complainant,
vs. JUDGE JONATHAN A. ASUNCION, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT IN
CITIES, BRANCH 2, LAOAG CITY, Respondent.
BERSAMIN, J.:
The members of the Bench are one of the pillars of our justice
system. They must strive to observe the highest standards of
integrity and probity in their professional and personal lives. The
public has the right to expect an unimpeachable bearing from
them. This expectation is not limited to their judgments, but
extends to their public demeanor, and should stand to the
closest of scrutiny. They deserve to be condignly sanctioned
otherwise.
Antecedents
On July 2, 2008, complainant Police Sr. Insp. Teddy M. Rosqueta,
then Deputy Chief of Police of Bacarra, Ilocos Norte, filed an
affidavit- complaint charging respondent Presiding Judge
Jonathan A. Asuncion of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities
(MTCC), Branch 2, in Laoag City, Ilocos Norte with grave
misconduct and violation of the New Code of Judicial Conduct,
specifically Canon 2, Rule 2.01.1
The antecedents of the charge follow.
At about 4:30 pm of April 25, 2008, Chief Insp. Jericho Baldeo, the
Chief of Police of Bacarra, received a report about persons
armed with firearms in the house of one Alex Asuncion. Chief Insp.
Baldeo dispatched Sr. Insp. Rosqueta and other members of the
Bacarra Municipal Police Station to verify the report. Sr. Insp.
Rosqueta and his team proceeded to the area, where they
found two shirtless males with guns tucked on their waists and
immediately apprehended them for illegally possessing firearms,
magazines and ammunitions. The arrestees were identified as
Fidel Refuerzo and Rex Dalere.
subject of this administrative charge – identified as a DAEWOO
9mm pistol bearing serial number BA 005280 – was seized from
Refuerzo.2
Based on Sr. Insp. Rosqueta’s investigation, Refuerzo, a resident
of Barangay 15, Bacarra, Ilocos Norte, worked as an
associate/bodyguard of Judge Asuncion.3 Upon verification at
the Ilocos Norte Police Provincial Office of the Office of the
Firearms and Explosives, Security Agencies and Guards
Supervision (FESAGS), Refuerzo was found to be not listed as a
registered or licensed holder of any kind and caliber of firearm.4
The investigation revealed that the firearm in question had been
previously seized from the possession of one Joseph Canlas
during an illegal drugs buy-bust operation conducted on August
23, 2005 in Darayday, Laoag City, Ilocos Norte; and that Sr. Insp.
Rosqueta had led the buy-bust operation and had seen to the
filing on August 24, 2005 of criminal cases charging Canlas with
illegal possession of dangerous drugs in violation of Republic Act
No 9165 (Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act), and with the
illegal possession of a firearm and ammunition in violation of
Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended by Republic Act No.
8294.
The criminal case for illegal possession of firearms, docketed as
Criminal Case No. 34412, was assigned to Branch 2 where Judge
Asuncion presided.5 However, Canlas moved to quash the
information in Criminal Case No. 34412 on the ground that under
Republic Act No. 8294, the illegal possession of firearms and
ammunitions could not be prosecuted as a separate offense if
the firearm and ammunitions had been seized during the
commission of the other crime of illegal possession of dangerous
drugs.6
On September 12, 2005, pending the resolution of Canlas’ motion
to quash, Sr. Insp. Rosqueta formally moved for the release of the
DAEWOO 9mm pistol bearing serial number BA 005280 "for
ballistic and cross matching examination with some other crimes
committed wherein a caliber 9mm pistol was used."7 In his order
dated September 13, 2005,8 Judge Asuncion denied Sr. Insp.
Rosqueta’s motion on the ground that it lacked the conformity of
the public prosecutor.
On October 5, 2005, Judge Asuncion granted the motion to
quash and dismissed Criminal Case No. 34412.9
On January 16, 2006, then Assistant City Prosecutor Myra Sheila
Nalupta-Barba filed a motion seeking the turnover of the
DAEWOO 9mm pistol bearing serial number BA 005280 to the
Laoag City Prosecutor’s Office to enable said office to act upon
the request of the PNP Provincial Office to include the firearm in
the list of PNP properties for the use of PNP personnel.10 In his order
dated April 11, 2006, however, Judge Asuncion denied the
motion for lack of merit.11
Upon the recovery of the firearm some two years after the
dismissal of Criminal Case No. 34412, Sr. Insp. Rosqueta insisted
that Judge Asuncion should have turned over the firearm to the
PNP to accord with Supreme Court (SC) Circular No. 47-98, to wit:
7. Firearms being used as evidence in courts will only be turned-
in to FEO (now Firearms and Explosives Division) upon the
termination of the cases or when it is no longer needed as
evidence.
Strict compliance herewith is enjoined.
Sr. Insp. Rosqueta also contended that Judge Asuncion
committed serious misconduct because he had shown malicious
interest in the firearm by allowing his bodyguard to take
possession of the firearm.
In his comment dated October 24, 2008,12 Judge Asuncion
maintained that he did not commit any indiscretion in denying
the motions to withdraw the exhibits in Criminal Case No. 34412;
that SC Circular No. 47-98 did not apply because the information
in Criminal Case No. 34412 had been quashed, leaving the
firearm as unoffered evidence; that the reasons proffered by Sr.
Insp. Rosqueta and the Office of the City Prosecutor were
unavailing, because the firearm could neither be forfeited in
favor of the Government nor released to the Firearms and
Explosives Division if the information, being void, did not validly
charge Canlas with the alleged crime; that the firearm still
impliedly belonged to Canlas; and that Sr. Insp. Rosqueta had
usurped the authority of his superior officer and the City
Prosecutor by taking it upon himself to file the motion to withdraw
the firearm without the consent of either official.
Judge Asuncion recalled that two years after the quashal of the
information against Canlas in Criminal Case No. 34412, the clerk
of court presented the firearm to him and inquired about what
should be done to dispose it; that he then contemplated
transferring the custody of the firearm to the PNP Provincial
Office, and accordingly instructed the clerk of court to put the
firearm in the trunk of his car;13 that he planned to discuss the
transfer with the PNP Provincial Director on April 21, 2008 before
issuing the order corresponding thereto; that he meanwhile fell ill
with acute bronchitis and underwent medical treatment in the
period of April 21-30, 2008; that when he accompanied his
daughter to enroll in Baguio City on April 25, 2008, he asked his
brother-in-law, Randy Esperanza, to bring the car to a mechanic,
but overlooked that the firearm was inside the trunk of the car;
that he tried to call and tell Esperanza about the firearm but he
could not reach the latter; that he called Refuerzo to have him
look for Esperanza in the motor shop in order to instruct him to
give the firearm to his sister for safekeeping; that unable to locate
Esperanza, Refuerzo himself took the firearm from the car with the
intention of delivering it to the sister of Esperanza; and that on his
way home from the motor shop, Refuerzo dropped by his (Judge
Asuncion) house, and it was there where the policemen frisked
him allegedly for no reason at all and seized the firearm.14
In the Resolution promulgated on August 4, 2010,15 the Court
referred the administrative complaint to Executive Judge
Conrado A. Ragucos of the Regional Trial Court in Laoag City for
investigation, report, and recommendation.
Executive Judge Ragucos submitted his Investigation Report
dated January 11, 2011, wherein he rendered his findings and
observations, as follows:
1.Criminal Case No. 34412, People of the Philippines vs. Joseph
Canlas was dismissed on technicality. The firearm subject of the
Information was not yet offered as evidence, hence, the
prosecution was deemed to be still in custody of the firearm. It
was with the Court allegedly for safe keeping. By denying the
Motion of the Prosecution to Withdraw the Exhibit, the
respondent judge appears to have shown undue interest.
2.When the respondent Judge and the Clerk of Court discussed
about what to do with the firearm, it was clear that the court
does not need it anymore. There was no need to discuss it with
the PNP Provincial Director. All that the respondent judge should
have done was to instruct the Clerk of Court to forward it to the
Firearms and Explosives unit of the PNP through the Provincial
Director in accordance with SC Circular No. 47-98. The
respondent judge did not do this. Was it because the firearm was
no longer in the custody of the court?
3.There was no need for the respondent judge to bring home the
firearm. It had been safe in the locker of the court for two (2)
years. It was the bringing home of the firearm by the respondent
Judge which was the mainspring of confiscation of the firearm
that seriously tainted the integrity of the judiciary.
4.In fairness to the respondent judge, there is no substantial
evidence that he delivered the firearm to Fidel Refuerzo and that
the latter was his bodyguard.16
Executive Judge Ragucos recommended that Judge Asuncion
be held liable for simple misconduct and simple neglect of duty;
and that a fine be imposed upon him at the Court’s discretion.17
The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) adopted the findings
of Executive Judge Ragucos. It noted the two opportunities in
which Judge Asuncion could have turned over the firearm long
after Criminal Case No. 34412 had been dismissed; that by
denying the motions to withdraw the firearm as an exhibit, "it
cannot be gainsaid that he took a special interest in the subject
firearm;"18 and that it was incomprehensible that Judge Asuncion
supposedly brought the firearm home seven days prior to its
seizure although it had lain undisturbed in the custody of the
court for nearly two years.
The OCA recommended the following:
1.This case be TREATED as a regular administrative matter;
2.Judge Jonathan A. Asuncion, Branch 2, Municipal Trial Court in
Cities, Laoag City, Ilocos Norte, be ADJUDGED GUILTY of gross
misconduct constituting a violation of the Code of Judicial
Conduct, and a FINE of Twenty-One Thousand Pesos
(Php21,000.00) be IMPOSED upon him with a stern warning that a
repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more
severely; and
3.Judge Asuncion be DIRECTED to turn-over within fifteen (15)
days from notice the handgun (cal. 9mm pistol with serial number
BA 005280) subject matter of this case to the Philippine National
Police in accordance with Circular No. 47-98, unless the same
had already been previously done.19
Issues
Did Judge Asuncion take the firearm and give it to Refuerzo? If
so, did he violate the New Code of Judicial Conduct as to make
him guilty of gross misconduct?
Ruling
After due consideration of the findings and evaluation of
Executive Judge Ragucos, which the OCA adopted, we find that
Judge Asuncion took the firearm and gave it to Refuerzo in
violation of the New Code of Judicial Conduct. Accordingly, we
pronounce him guilty of gross misconduct.
1.
Explanations of Judge Asuncion were not entitled to credence
The firearm, then in the custody of Branch 2 of the MTCC, would
have been evidence in Criminal Case No. 34412 to prove the
charge of illegal possession of a firearm and its ammunitions, but
its being offered as evidence did not ultimately come to pass
because of the intervening quashal of the information on
October 5, 2005 upon the motion of Canlas. Being unoffered
evidence, the firearm had to be properly disposed of thereafter
either by the Office of the City Prosecutor of Laoag City, whose
evidence the firearm was supposed to be offered in court, or by
the PNP, the agency expressly authorized by law to take custody
of the firearm. Under SC Circular 47-98, supra, which was a
substantial reiteration of SC Circular 2 dated May 13, 1983,20
Judge Asuncion and his clerk of court in Branch 2 had the
ministerial duty and the primary responsibility to turn over the
firearm to the proper office of the PNP (i.e., FESAGS) because it
would no longer be needed as evidence upon the dismissal of
Criminal Case No. 34412. A ministerial duty or function is one that
an officer or tribunal performs in the context of a given set of
facts, in a prescribed manner and without regard to the exercise
of judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act to be
done.21 However, on April 11, 2006, Judge Asuncion denied the
motion filed on January 16, 2006 by the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Laoag City seeking the turnover of the firearm to
the PNP.
The actuations of Judge Asuncion in relation to the firearm
conceded that the dismissal of Criminal Case No. 34412 did not
invest the rightful custody of the firearm either in him or his court.
Yet, the established facts and circumstances show that he still
appropriated the firearm and given it to Refuerzo, his bodyguard.
His appropriation of the firearm would have gone undiscovered
had not the team led by Sr. Insp. Rosqueta seized it from
Refuerzo, who had nothing to do with its proper custody. It then
became incumbent upon Judge Asuncion to explain how the
firearm landed in the possession of Refuerzo.
In his comment, Judge Asuncion sought to explain by narrating
that he had instructed the clerk of court to put the firearm in the
trunk of his car because he would take up the turnover of the
firearm personally with the PNP Provincial Director on April 21,
2008. Such explanation would justify why the firearm had been
taken out of the court’s custody. The explanation cannot
command credence, however, because it was blatantly
implausible. For one, even assuming that Judge Asuncion would
be directly taking up the turnover of the firearm with the PNP
Provincial Director, we cannot understand why he had to have
the physical possession of the firearm to do so. Also, why Judge
Asuncion would himself take the matter up with the PNP
Provincial Director was puzzling considering that all he needed to
do as the judge was to direct the clerk of court to deliver the
firearm to the custody of the PNP Provincial Office, or simply to
require a representative of the PNP Provincial Office to collect
the firearm from the clerk of court. Either alternative would have
substantially complied with the directive of SC Circular 47-98
regarding the firearm.
Judge Asuncion would further explain how the firearm landed in
the possession of Refuerzo. He affirmed that when he requested
his brother-in- law to bring the car to the mechanic he had
overlooked that the firearm was still inside the trunk of his car after
April 21, 2008; and that he remembered about the firearm being
in the trunk only after the car was already in the mechanic’s
shop. Thus, according to him, after having tried but failed to
reach his brother-in-law by phone, he had requested Refuerzo to
find his brother-in-law in the shop and have him take the firearm
from the trunk of the car. However, Refuerzo, who was unable to
find the brother-in-law, opted to get the firearm himself from the
trunk of the car.
The foregoing story of how the firearm came into the hands of
Refuerzo was incredible. To start with, carelessly or forgetfully
leaving the firearm in the trunk of the car after April 21, 2008 was
very unlikely for a judge like Judge Asuncion who had already
irregularly taken the firearm from the effective custody of his
court. Equally highly unlikely was for him to carelessly dispatch the
car to the mechanic with the firearm still inside the trunk.
Common experience would have him take the greatest care of
the firearm as if it was his very own, instead, given the dire
consequences to him if it were to be lost. And, thirdly, that
Refuerzo should himself retrieve the firearm from the trunk, and
then be caught red-handed by the PNP team under Sr. Insp.
Rosqueta with the firearm in his possession was just too much of a
coincidence. If the story of Refuerzo’s part was true, his possession
could easily and credibly be explained. But it seems to be far
from the truth, with the records showing that the firearm was
seized from Refuerzo when he was then shirtless and displaying
the firearm along with another equally armed person.
Judge Asuncion did not clarify why there had been a delay of
two years since the dismissal of the criminal case before he and
the clerk of court would think of turning the firearm over to the
PNP Provincial Office for the first time. Although SC Circular 47-98
did not so specify, the prompt and immediate compliance with
its directive of turning the firearm over by either Judge Asuncion
or the clerk of court was reasonably expected. The unexplained
long delay could only mean that he had already taken personal
interest in the firearm.
Judge Asuncion took the position that the firearm, unoffered in
evidence because of the quashal of the information, still
"impliedly belonged to Joseph Canlas;"22 hence, the directive of
SC Circular 47-98 for the turnover of the firearm to the PNP did not
apply to the firearm involved here. His position is clearly
untenable. Firstly, he had no discretion to withhold the firearm
from the PNP and to return it instead to Canlas, who held no
license or authority to possess it. Indeed, the turnover to the PNP
was based on the clear and straightforward text and tenor of SC
Circular 47- 98 – Firearms being used as evidence in courts will
only be turned-in to FEO (now Firearms and Explosives Division)
upon the termination of the cases or when it is no longer needed
as evidence. And, secondly, he did not sincerely believe in his
own position, because he did he not order the return of the
firearm to Canlas upon the dismissal of Criminal Case No. 34412.
The foregoing incongruities contained in Judge Asuncion’s
explanation inevitably lead us to conclude that he took a
personal interest in the firearm and appropriated it.1awp++i1
Accountability for his actuations is inescapable for him. He was
guilty of misusing evidence entrusted to his court. He thereby did
not live up to the exacting standards prescribed by the New
Code of Judicial Conduct, specifically its Canon 2 and Canon 4,
viz:
CANON 2
INTEGRITY
Integrity is essential not only to the proper discharge of the
judicial office but also to the personal demeanor of judges.
Section 1. Judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct
above reproach, but that it is perceived to be so in the view of a
reasonable observer.
Sec. 2. The behavior and conduct of judges must reaffirm the
people’s faith in the integrity of the judiciary. Justice must not
merely be done but must also be seen to be done.
CANON 4
PROPRIETY
Propriety and the appearance of propriety are essential to the
performance of all the activities of a judge.
Section 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of
impropriety in all of their activities.
The admonition that judges must avoid not only impropriety but
also the appearance of impropriety is more sternly applied to
lower court judges.23 Indeed, judges are reminded that after xxxx
having accepted their exalted position in the Judiciary, they owe
Considering that this is the first time that Judge Asuncion
to the public to uphold the exacting standards of conduct
committed an serious administrative offense, we adopt the
demanded of them. The circumstances obtaining here seriously
recommendation of the OCA to impose upon him a fine of
tainted the good image and reputation of the Judiciary, even as
P21,000.00, but have to issue to him a stern warning that a
it reflected badly on Judge Asuncion’s personal and official
repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more
reputation. As this Court held in Re: Josefina V. Palon,24 the
severely.28 He should likewise be directed to turn over the firearm
conduct required of court personnel, from the Presiding Judge to
to the PNP in accordance with SC Circular No. 47-98 within 10
the lowliest clerk, must always be beyond reproach and
days from notice, unless the firearm had already been turned
circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility as to let
over.
them be free from any suspicion that could taint the judiciary.
The objective of disciplining an officer or employee is not the
Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court classifies violations of the
punishment of the officer or employee but the improvement of
Code of Judicial Conduct under the category of gross
the public service and the preservation of the public’s faith and
misconduct. We have defined gross misconduct as a
confidence in the Government.29 Judge Asuncion is reminded,
"transgression of some established and definite rule of action,
therefore, that "the Constitution stresses that a public office is a
more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by the
public trust and public officers must at all times be accountable
public officer."25 Gross misconduct involves corruption, or an act
to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity,
that is inspired by the intention to violate the law, or that is a
loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead
persistent disregard of well-known rules.26 Needless to state, any
modest lives. These constitutionally-enshrined principles, oft-
gross misconduct seriously undermines the faith and confidence
repeated in our case law, are not mere rhetorical flourishes or
of the people in the Judiciary.27 A further reading of the rule
idealistic sentiments. They should be taken as working standards
provides the penalties therefor, to wit:
by all in the public service."30
Section 11. Sanctions.– A. If the respondent is guilty of a serious
WHEREFORE, the Court PRONOUNCES Judge JONATHAN A.
charge, any of the following sanctions may be imposed:
ASUNCION, Presiding Judge of Branch 2, Municipal Trial Court in
1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits Cities, in Laoag City ADMINISTRATIVELY LIABLE for GROSS
as the Court may determine, and disqualification from MISCONDUCT for violating Section 1 and Section 2 of Canon 2,
reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including and Section 1 of Canon 4, of the New Code of Judicial Conduct;
government- owned or controlled corporations. Provided, FINES him in the amount of P21,000.00 to be paid within fifteen·
however, that the forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include (15) days from the finality hereof, with a stern warning that a
accrued leave credits; repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with more
severely; and DIRECTS him to turn over the firearm known as
2. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for
DAEWOO 9mm pistol with serial number BA 005280 to the
more than three (3) but not exceeding six (6) months; or
Philippine National Police in accordance with SC Circular No. 47-
3. A fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00 98 within 10 days from notice, unless the firearm had already
been turned over.
SO ORDERED. the necessary building permit in spite of the fact that she secured
one.

The OCA referred the matter to Judge Balloguing of the RTC of

2. BERNARDITA F. ANTIPORDA, Complainant, -versus- FRANCISCO
Vigan City for investigation, report, and recommendation.
A. ANTE, JR., Presiding Judge, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Vigan
City, Ilocos Sur, Respondent. A.M. No. MTJ-18-1908, EN BANC, In her Report, Judge Balloguing found that complainant had
January 16, 2018, PER CURIAM. indeed sustained physical injuries inflicted by respondent.
However, she believed that it was complainant who held the
A judge should always conduct himself in a manner that would
steel chain, which she used to defend herself when respondent
preserve the dignity, independence and respect for
approached her. Judge Balloguing also found that respondent
himself/herself, the Court, and the Judiciary as a whole. In other
had a grudge against complainant because he reported the
words, a judge should possess the virtue of gravitas. Judges are
illegal renovation of her house, opining that he could have
required to always be temperate, patient, and courteous, both
instead advised her to secure the necessary building permit.
in conduct and in language.
Judge Balloguing recommended that respondent be found
Respondent's demeanor and actuations, which resulted in guilty of acts unbecoming of a judge and be sanctioned with
physical injuries to complainant, are in direct contravention of either a fine or suspension.
the virtues of patience, sobriety, and self-restraint so espoused by
The OCA, while concurring with Judge Balloguing's conclusions
the Court and highly expected of a member of the judiciary.
of fact, disagreed with respect to the recommended penalty.
Regardless of the reason for the incident, respondent, being a
magistrate, should have observed judicial temperament which ISSUE:
requires him to be always temperate, patient, and courteous,
DEAN’S CRICLE 2019 – UST FCL
both in conduct and in language.
135
FACTS:
Whether respondent should be held administratively liable. (YES)
Complainant alleged that in the morning of March 2, 2014, she
was in the backyard of a house located at Rizal St., Barangay III, RULING:
Vigan City, Ilocos Sur, when respondent, who was in the adjacent
lot, suddenly confronted her by saying, “Why are you Canon 2 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct states that
glaring/pouting at me?" Then, he slapped her face several times, "integrity is essential not only to the proper discharge of the
and whipped her with a dog chain. He also pointed a .45 caliber judicial office but also to the personal demeanor of judges."
pistol at complainant, as well as her boarders and workers, who
witnessed the incident.
A judge should always conduct himself in a manner that would
Although complainant admitted having glared at respondent at preserve the dignity, independence and respect for
the time, she explained that it was because she discovered that himself/herself, the Court, and the Judiciary as a whole. In other
respondent had maliciously reported to the Office of the City words, a judge should possess the virtue of gravitas. Judges are
Engineer of Vigan that her house was being renovated without
required to always be temperate, patient, and courteous, both omission that would violate the norm of public accountability
in conduct and in language. and diminish the faith of the people in the judiciary.

DEAN’S CRICLE 2019 – UST FCL

Apart from being a display of arrogance, respondent's

demeanor and actuations, which resulted in physical injuries to
152
complainant, are in direct contravention of the virtues of
patience, sobriety, and self-restraint so espoused by the Court
and highly expected of a member of the judiciary. Regardless of
the reason for the incident, respondent, being a magistrate, Judge Buyucan's continued illegal settlement erodes the
should have observed judicial temperament which requires him public's confidence in its agents of justice because such act was
to be always temperate, patient, and courteous, both in an arbitrary deprivation of the DA's ownership rights over the
conduct and in language. Subject Property. Worse, his continued refusal to vacate
instigated the continued illegal occupation of other informal
settlers. He is also faulted for acquiring a portion of the Subject
Property from a respondent in a case pending before his sala. His
Respondent's acts, therefore, constitute grave misconduct,
act is further aggravated by the fact that the respondent therein
which the Court defines as "a transgression of some established
received a favorable judgment just a few months before the
and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior
purported sale. FACTS: Under Proclamation No. 573, the
or gross negligence by a public officer." Since respondent has,
Department of Agriculture (DA) acquired a 193-hectare parcel
however, retired on November 7, 2017 and hence, could not
of land located in Bagabag, Nueva Vizcaya for research
anymore be dismissed from service, the Court, instead, found it
purposes. As there was a need to clear the subject property of
proper to order the forfeiture of all of his retirement benefits
informal settlers residing therein, the DA filed several cases before
(except accrued leave credits), and further, disqualify him from
the MTCC, presided over by Judge Buyucan. Said cases were
reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including
dismissed by Judge Buyucan. A few months later, Judge
government-owned or controlled corporations.
Buyucan acquired from a respondent in his previously dismissed
cases a parcel of land within the subject property. He denied
knowledge of the DA’s ownership over the subject property and
3. ANONYMOUS, complainant -versus- JUDGE BILL D. BUYUCAN,
instead claimed that the land he occupied was within the road-
MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURT, BAGABAG-DIADI, NUEVA
right-of wat of the DPWH. The Office of the Court Administrator
VIZCAYA, respondent. AM No. MTJ-16-1879 (Formerly OCA IPI No.
found Judge Buyucan liable for gross misconduct for his illegal
14-2719-MTJ), EN BANC, 24 July 2018, PER CURIAM. Persons
occupation and refusal to vacate the land despite repeated
involved in the administration of justice are expected to uphold
demands from the DA. ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Buyucan is
the strictest standards of honesty and integrity in the public
liable for gross misconduct. (YES) RULING: Persons involved in the
service; their conduct must always be beyond reproach and
administration of justice are expected to uphold the strictest
circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility. In this
standards of honesty and integrity in the public service; their
regard, the Court has consistently admonished any act or
conduct must always be beyond reproach and circumscribed
with the heavy burden of responsibility. In this regard, the Court
has consistently admonished any act or omission that would
violate the norm of public accountability and diminish the faith
of the people in the judiciary. Canon 2 of the New Code of
Judicial Conduct requires that the conduct of judges must
reaffirm the people's faith in the integrity of the judiciary and that
their conduct must, at the least, be perceived to be above
reproach in the view of a reasonable observer. In this case,
Judge Buyucan's continued illegal settlement erodes the public's
confidence in its agents of justice because such act was an
arbitrary deprivation of the DA's ownership rights over the Subject
Property. Worse, his continued refusal to vacate instigated the
continued illegal occupation of other informal settlers. Section 2
of Canon 3 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that
a judge shall ensure that his conduct, both in and out of court,
maintains and enhances the confidence of the public and
litigants in his impartiality and that of the judiciary. Here, Judge
Buyucan is faulted for acquiring a portion of the Subject Property
from a respondent in a case pending before his sala. His act is
further aggravated by the fact that the respondent therein
received a favorable judgment just a few months before the
purported sale.

CANON 3 INTEGRITY
4. AM no. RTJ-14-2399
 EDITHA E. BAGSIC, COURT INTERPRETER III, AND MR. DAVID
CAGUIMBAL, PROCESS SERVER, ALL OF REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,
BRANCH 87, ROSARIO, BATANGAS, RESPONDENTS.

[A.M. No. 12-7-130-RTC]

RE: UNDATED ANONYMOUS LETTER-COMPLAINT AGAINST THE

PRESIDING JUDGE, CLERK OF COURT AND COURT STENOGRAPHER
OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 87, ROSARIO,
BATANGAS.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

This administrative matter arose from the judicial audit

conducted in the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 87, Rosario,
Batangas on March 2 to 4, 2009 in view of the then pending
compulsory retirement of Judge Pablo R. Chavez (Judge
Chavez) on August 17, 2009 and pursuant to Travel Order No. 09-
A-2009.

Respondent Judge Chavez previously presided over Branch 87

of the RTC of Rosario, Batangas. In a Memorandum[1] dated
October 30, 2009, the judicial audit team reported that as of
audit date, Branch 87 had a total caseload of 602 active cases
consisting of 409 criminal cases and 193 civil cases. The report
5. EN BANC was based on the records actually presented to and examined
by the team which are classified according to the status/stages
[ A.M. No. RTJ-10-2219, March 07, 2017 ]
of the proceedings:
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, COMPLAINANT, VS.
STATUS/STAGES OF
RETIRED JUDGE PABLO R. CHAVEZ, FORMER PRESIDING JUDGE, CRIMINAL CIVIL TOTAL
PROCEEDINGS
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 87, ROSARIO, BATANGAS,
ATTY. TEOFILO A. DIMACULANGAN, JR., CLERK OF COURT VI, MR. Warrants/Summons 18 1 19
ARMANDO ERMELITO M. MARQUEZ, COURT INTERPRETER III, MS.
Arraignment 23 0 23 records and the amounts of legal fees allegedly paid are merely
enumerated on the pleadings while there were cases without
Preliminary Conference, even the breakdown of the fees paid; (3) there was no
22 24 46
Pre-Trial, Mediation information as to whether the amount of sheriffs fees for the
Trial 278 87 365 service of summons were cash advanced or subject to
reimbursement as there were no documents available to support
For Compliance 4 13 17 them; (4) the civil and criminal docket books were not updated
and the civil docket book contained erasures as to the status of
No action Taken 0 2 2
cases for nullity of marriage; (5) the court's semestral docket
No Further Action/Setting 21 21 42 inventory for June to December 2008 was not accurate; (6)
records in some criminal cases had no certificates of
Submitted for Resolution 11 10 21 arraignment; (7) a cash count disclosed that the court had in its
Submitted for Decision 27 24 51 possession the amount of P29,240 as of March 4, 2009; (8) during
the audit, a certain Ms. Rene Frane Arillano from Biga, Labo,
Suspended proceedings 4 7 11 Batangas, approached the team inquiring about correction of
entry in the birth certificate as her name was misspelled and that
Newly Filed 1 4 5
her gender was typed "male" instead of "female." Asked why she
TOTAL 409 193 602[2] was waiting outside, she said that she was waiting for Mr.
Armando Ermelito M. Marquez (Marquez)[5] who prepared for her
The audit team highlighted the items in the court's caseload and the necessary documents needed for their filing. Asked to
identified the case number, parties, nature of the case and latest comment, Mr. Marquez stated that he merely referred Ms.
court action. There were 17 criminal cases without further action Arillano to Atty. Jose Calingasan; (9) archiving of cases was
or setting for a considerable length of time, four criminal cases resorted to even if the inaction was attributable to the non-
where the accused had not been arraigned despite the lapse of compliance of government officers, bureaus and agencies to
a considerable length of time from the date the cases were filed, the directives of the court and the court's failure to set the cases
11 criminal cases with pending incidents submitted for resolution for hearing; and (10) the court staff does not observe the
and 27 criminal cases submitted for decision.[3] Meanwhile, there mandatory flag ceremonies under Republic Act No. 8491[6] and
were two civil cases where the court failed to take action from reiterated in Supreme Court (SC) Circular No. 37-98[7] dated June
the time of their filing, 21 civil cases without further action or 22, 1998 and SC Circular No. 62-2001[8] dated September 27,
setting for a considerable length of time, 10 civil cases with 2001.[9]
unresolved motion or incident submitted for resolution and 24 civil
cases submitted for decision.[4] On the court's active cases, Judge Chavez was found to have
failed to: (1) take any action on Civil Cases Nos. LRC 09-006, CC
The following are the audit team's general adverse findings: (1) 09-013 from the time of their filing; (2) take further action on
case records are not well kept as they are not chronologically identified criminal and civil cases; (3) resolve the pending
arranged and not paginated; there were typographical errors in incidents and motions submitted for resolution on identified
several issued orders; (2) legal fees form are not attached to the criminal and civil cases; (4) decide identified criminal and civil
cases which were submitted for decision as early as 2007 and
2008; (5) resolve on time identified criminal cases; and (6) present
to the audit team the records of a criminal case. He was also
reported to have irregularly issued an order of inhibition dated
August 28, 2008 after the case had been submitted for decision
on September 12, 2007. The audit team noted that except for
three cases, in all the cases it identified, Judge Chavez failed to
seek an extension to resolve or decide them. Even in the three
cases where Judge Chavez sought an extension, he still incurred
delay in deciding them.[10]
The audit team further observed the following in the sampling of
85 decided and 27 archived annulment of marriage cases for the
period 2004 to 2008: (1) the mandatory requirements to effect a
valid substituted service of summons pursuant to Manotoc v.
Court of Appeals[11] were not strictly observed. Most of the
summons issued and served by Process Server David Caguimbal
were not personally served on the respondent. There was
improper resort to substituted service of summons as the Return
of Service does not indicate if there were several attempts made
to personally serve summons within a reasonable period to
respondent; (2) there were no liquidation reports on the amount
withdrawn from the sheriffs' fees by the branch's process server
for the service of summons; (3) in all cases, no order was issued
by the court for the petitioner to furnish the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) a copy of the petition and its annexes; (4) several
cases proceeded even without the investigation report of the
public prosecutor; (5) no notice of appearance was filed by the
OSG in several cases and in some cases, the notices of
appearance of the OSG appear to be mere photocopies; (6) in
a considerable number of cases, the parties, counsel/s, the
public prosecutor and the OSG were not duly furnished with
copies of the notice of pre-trial conference and court orders. The
records also show that no pre-trial briefs were filed in court; (7)
petitions, affidavits, and the special power of attorney attached
to the records of some cases were not duly notarized; (8) a
motion in the records of a particular case was signed only by the
petitioner; (9) there were dubious blank documents attached to
the records of particular cases which contain the signatures of
the psychologist and the petitioner; (10) the exhibits allegedly
marked as mentioned in some decisions show that the
documents were not actually marked and at times bear different
or erroneous markings; (11) there were case records containing
only three court orders; (12) most of the records have no minutes
and/or transcript of stenographic notes (TSN) of the proceedings
conducted; (13) most of the records show that the OSG and the
respondent were not duly furnished copies of the decisions
rendered; (14) a case was decided on January 24, 2009, a
Saturday; (15) several pre-trial briefs in the records were undated
and unsigned; (16) several psychological reports attached to the
records were undated, unsigned and mere photocopies—the
original copies were never presented in court; (17) on March 4,
2009, a Friday, Atty. Teofilo A. Dimaculangan (Atty.
Dimaculangan), Branch Clerk of Court, conducted the marking
of exhibits in Civil Case No. 08-020 entitled Singson v. Singson for
annulment of marriage with Atty. Pamela P. Mercado, counsel
for petitioner, without the presence of the prosecutor and
without asking the assistance of any other staff of the court; (18)
the ex parte motion for leave of court to allow service of
summons by publication in SP No. 04-078 was notarized by Atty.
Dimaculangan; (19) cases were archived even if the inaction
was due to the failure of the process server to make a return of
service of summons, failure of the prosecutor to submit the report
on collusion and the court's failure to set the cases for hearing;
(20) in several cases, the counsel who prepared the petition was
not the one who handled the pre-trial and trial of the case; and
(21) decisions were rendered despite the absence of a formal
offer of exhibits for the petitioner or in some cases, no action was
taken by the court relative to the formal offer of exhibits
submitted.[12]
The Court in a Resolution[13] dated February 1, 2010 resolved to:
1. RE-DOCKET the Judicial Audit report as an administrative
complaint against:
a. Retired Judge Pablo R. Chavez, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial
Court, Br. 87, Rosario, Batangas, for gross dereliction of duty, gross
inefficiency, gross incompetence, serious misconduct, corruption
and deliberate violation of the law on marriage;
b. Atty. Teofilo A. Dimaculangan, Jr., Clerk of Court VI, same
court, for gross dereliction of duty, gross inefficiency, gross
incompetence, serious misconduct, corruption, deliberate
violation of the law on marriage and violation of Administrative
Circular No. 3-2000 dated June 15, 2000 as amended by
Administrative Circular No. 35-2004 dated August 20, 2004 which
requires that daily collections shall be deposited every day with
the nearest branch of the Land Bank of the Philippines and for
violation of Supreme Court Circular No. 1-90;
c. Mr. Armando Ermelito M. Marquez, Court Interpreter III, same
court, for gross inefficiency in his failure to make the minutes of
the proceedings and for violation of Section 5, Canon IV of the
Code of Conduct for Court Personnel for acting as a broker or
agent for Atty. Jose Calingasan as declared by Ms. Rene Frane
Arillano from Biga, Lobo, Batangas;
d. Ms. Editha E. Bagsic, Court Stenographer III, same court, for
gross inefficiency and incompetence in the performance of
official duties for violation of Administrative Circular No. 24-90 and
corruption in connection with annulment of marriages cases; and
e. Mr. David Caguimbal, Process Server, this court, for gross
irregularity in the service of summons on annulment of marriages
cases.
2. WITHHOLD the RELEASE of the retirement benefits, except the
Terminal Leave, of Judge Pablo R. Chavez pending the resolution
of this administrative matter;
3. DIRECT the Fiscal Monitoring Division of the Office of the Court
Management Office, Office of the Court Administrator, to
conduct a detailed financial audit and to submit report thereon
to determine whether the exact amount of legal fees was
collected in all civil cases filed from 2002 to the present and if
properly remitted to their appropriate accounts;
4. DIRECT all the judicial employees of the Hall of Justice, Rosario,
Batangas to regularly observe the mandatory Flag ceremonies
under RA 8491 and reiterated in Circular No. 37-98 dated June
22, 1998 and Circular No. 62-2001 dated September 27, 2001; and
5. DIRECT Acting Presiding Judge Noel M. Lindog, Regional Trial
Court, Br. 87, Rosario, Batangas to:
a. Take appropriate action in Crim. Case Nos. x x x which
remained without action from the time of their filing or without
further action for a considerable length of time and in Crim. Case
Nos. x x x wherein accused had not been arraigned despite the
lapse of a considerable length of time from the date the cases
were filed;
b. RESOLVE with dispatch the pending incidents in the following
cases and submit copy of each resolution to this Court, through
this Office, within ten (10) days from their resolution:
xx
c. DECIDE with dispatch the following criminal and civil cases
submitted for decision and submit a copy of each decision to this
Court, through this Office, within ten (10) days from its rendition:[14]
x x x (Emphasis in the original.)
In a Resolution[15] dated April 12, 2010, the Court required
respondents to file their respective comments. After the
respondents filed their comments, the Court, in a Resolution[16]
dated December 15, 2010, referred the case to the Office of the
Court Administrator (OCA) for evaluation, report and
recommendation.
II

In its June 3, 2011 Report,[17] the OCA submitted the following
recommendations:
1. The retirement benefits of Judge Pablo R. Chavez, Presiding
Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 87, Rosario, Batangas, be
FORFEITED, except his accrued leave credits, for corruption, gross
dereliction of duty, gross inefficiency, gross incompetence,
serious misconduct and deliberate violation of the law on
marriage;
[2.] Atty. Teofilo A. Dimaculangan, Jr., Clerk of Court VI, of the
same court, be DISMISSED from office with forfeiture of all
retirement benefits, except his accrued leave credits, and with
perpetual and absolute disqualification from re-employment in
any branch or instrumentality of government, including
government-owned or controlled corporations for gross
dereliction of duty, gross inefficiency, gross incompetence,
serious misconduct, corruption, deliberate violation of the law on
marriage, Section 17, paragraph 1, Rule 136 of the Rules of Court,
and violations of Administrative Circular No. 3-2000 dated June
15, 2000 as amended and Supreme Court Circular No. 1-90;
[3.] Ms. Editha E. Bagsic, Court Stenographer III, of the same court,
be DISMISSED from office with forfeiture of all retirement benefits,
except [her] accrued leave credits, and with perpetual and
absolute disqualification from re-employment in any branch or
instrumentality of government, including government-owned or
controlled corporations for gross dereliction of duty, gross
inefficiency, gross incompetence, serious misconduct,
corruption, deliberate violation of the law on marriage and
violations of Section 17, paragraph 1, Rule 136 of the Rules of
Court, Administrative Circular No. 24-90 dated July 12, 1990,
Administrative Circular No. 3-2000 dated June 15, 2000 as
amended and Supreme Court Circular No. 1-90;
[4.] Mr. Amando Ermelito M. Marquez, Court Interpreter III, in lieu
of suspension from office for three (3) months without pay and
other benefits, be FINED the amount of TWENTY THOUSAND
([P]20,000.00) for gross inefficiency in his failure to prepare the
minutes of the proceedings in annulment and nullity of marriage
cases and for violation of Section 5, Canon IV of the Code of
Conduct for Court Personnel; and
[5.] Mr. David Caguimbal, Process Server, in lieu of suspension
from office for three (3) months without pay and other benefits,
be FINED the amount of TWENTY THOUSAND ([P]20,000.00) for
gross inefficiency, gross irregularity in the service of summons on
annulment of marriages cases.[18]
Meanwhile, on August 4, 2009, the OCA received an undated
anonymous letter against the presiding judge, clerk of court, and
stenographer of Branch 87. The letter did not identify Judge
Chavez as the presiding judge while the clerk of court and
stenographer were identified as respondents Atty.
Dimaculangan and Editha E. Bagsic (Bagsic), respectively. The
letter alleged that: (1) decisions in annulment cases are virtually
for sale in Branch 87; (2) parties in annulment cases are not
required to attend hearings; (3) notices supposedly sent to the
OSG are not reflected in the records; (4) respondent Atty.
Dimaculangan is reportedly living a lavish lifestyle out of the
money he is making from such illegal activities; (5) respondent
Atty. Dimaculangan is engaged in an illicit relationship with
respondent Bagsic; (6) respondent Atty. Dimaculangan does not
observe office hours, spends court funds without authority, and
signs orders without the permission of the court.[19]
In a Memorandum[20] dated June 25, 2012, the OCA
recommended the consolidation of the undated anonymous
letter with Administrative Matter No. RTJ-10-2219 since the June 3,
2011 Report included matters raised in the anonymous letter.
III
1. Judge Pablo R. Chavez

a.On delay in rendering judgement, Section 15(1) and (2), Article
VIII of the Constitution provides that all cases and matters must
be decided or resolved by the lower courts within three months
from the date of submission of the last pleading. Section 5, Canon
6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine
Judiciary[21] mandates judges to "perform all judicial duties,
including the delivery of reserved decisions, efficiently, fairly and
with reasonable promptness." Also, Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of the
Code of Judicial Conduct exhorts judges to dispose of the court's
business promptly and to decide cases within the required
periods.
Judge Chavez' unexplained and unreasonable delay in
deciding cases and resolving incidents and motions, and his
failure to decide the remaining cases before his compulsory
retirement constitute gross inefficiency which cannot be
tolerated. Inexcusable failure to decide cases within the
reglementary period constitutes gross inefficiency, warranting
the imposition of an administrative sanction on the defaulting
judge.[22]
In his Comment, Judge Chavez admits incurring delay in
resolving pending incidents and deciding cases. He attributes his
delays to his court being a single-sala court. He likewise blames
the clerk of court and legal researcher for their failure to remind
him of the due dates and assist him in drafting decisions and
orders.[23]
Judge Chavez' excuses are not sufficient to absolve him of
disciplinary action. Judges and clerks of court should personally
conduct a physical inventory of the pending cases in their courts
and personally examine the records of each case at the time of
their assumption to office, and every semester thereafter. Judges
should know which cases are submitted for decision and are
expected to keep their own record of cases so that they may act
on them promptly.[24] We thus find him guilty of undue delay in
rendering a decision.
Undue delay in rendering a decision or order is classified as a less
serious charge under Section 9, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court. It
is punishable by (1) suspension from office without salary and
other benefits for not less than 1 month nor more than 3 months,
or (2) a fine of more than P10,000 but not exceeding P20,000.[25]
b.On the anomalies found in Judge Chavez' court, the Code of
Judicial Conduct provides:
Rule 3.08. - A judge should diligently discharge administrative
responsibilities, maintain professional competence in court
management, and facilitate the performance of the
administrative functions of other judges and court personnel.
Rule 3.09. - A judge should organize and supervise the court
personnel to ensure the prompt and efficient dispatch of
business, and require at all times the observance of high
standards of public service and fidelity.
Rule 3.10. - A judge should take or initiate appropriate disciplinary
measures against lawyers or court personnel for unprofessional
conduct of which the judge may have become aware.
Judge Chavez failed to adhere to these standards. He was
inefficient in managing his caseload and grossly negligent in
running the affairs of his court. This is evidenced by the following
anomalies discovered by the judicial audit team: (1) case
records were not well kept since they were not chronologically
arranged and had no pagination; (2) legal fees forms were not
attached to the records although the amount allegedly paid
were enumerated in the pleadings while there were cases
without the breakdown of the fees paid; (3) no documents
supporting the amount of sheriff s fees for the service of summons
were available; (4) the civil and criminal docket books were not
updated and the civil docket book contained erasures as to the
status of cases for nullity of marriage; (5) the court's semestral
docket inventory for June to December 2008 was not accurate;
(6) records in some criminal cases had no certificates of
arraignment; (7) archiving of cases were resorted to even if the
inaction were attributable to the non-compliance of
government officers, bureaus and agencies to the directives of
the court, and the court's failure to set the cases for hearing; and
(8) the court staff in the RTC do not observe the mandatory flag
ceremonies under Republic Act No. 8491 and reiterated in
Circular No. 37-98 dated June 22, 1998 and Circular No. 62-2001
dated September 27, 2001.[26]
Judges are charged with exercising extra care in ensuring that
the records of the cases and official documents in their custody
are intact. They must adopt a system of record management
and organize their dockets to bolster the prompt and efficient
dispatch of business. Further, as administrative officers of the
court, judges should organize and supervise court personnel to
ensure the prompt and efficient dispatch of business, as well as
the observance of high standards of public service and fidelity at
all times.[27]
Acting on the findings of the judicial audit team, we hold that
Judge Chavez is liable for gross neglect of duty. Gross neglect of
duty refers to negligence that is characterized by a glaring want
of care; by acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is
a duty to act, not inadvertently, but willfully and intentionally; or
by acting with a conscious indifference to consequences with
respect to other persons who may be affected. It is the omission
of that care that even inattentive and thoughtless men never fail
to take on their own property. In cases involving public officials,
there is gross negligence when a breach of duty is flagrant and
palpable.[28]
In this case, the totality of the findings of the judicial audit team
proves Judge Chavez' reckless and irresponsible attitude towards
his duties. He utterly and glaringly lacked the necessary care and
organization in handling and managing his court and personnel.
He was completely remiss in his duties to ensure that there is order
and inefficiency in his court, to maintain a well-organized system
of record-keeping and docket management, and to supervise
his personnel and make sure that they are aware of and comply
with the exacting standards imposed on all public servants.
Judge Chavez himself admits that he has been overly lenient and
lax and that, as Presiding Judge for 11 years, "he overly relied on
the representations of his [c]ourt staff, particularly his Clerk of
Court that the case records and disposition of cases are proper
and in order." He laments that he is a victim of his court staffs
betrayal and perfidy.[29]
Unfortunately for Judge Chavez, his defense does not exonerate
him from the penalties under the law. Judges cannot be excused
by the acts of their subordinates because court employees are
not the guardians of a judge's responsibility. Judges should not
merely rely on their court staff for the proper management of the
court's business.[30] Being in legal contemplation the head of his
branch, he was the master of his own domain who should be
ready and willing to take the responsibility for the mistakes of his
subjects, as well as to be ultimately responsible for order and
efficiency in his court. He could not hide behind the inefficiency
or the incompetence of any of his subordinates.[31]
Gross neglect of duty is a grave offense punishable by
dismissal.[32] The penalty of dismissal carries with it "cancellation of
eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits, perpetual
disqualification from holding public office and bar from taking
civil service examinations."[33]
c.
Section 17, Rule XIV of the Civil Service Commission Rules
Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292 and Other
Pertinent Civil Service Laws[34] provides that when the respondent
is guilty of two or more charges, the penalty for the most serious
charge should be imposed and the other charges may be
considered as aggravating circumstances. In this case, Judge
Chavez is guilty of the grave offense of gross neglect of duty, and
the less serious charge of undue delay in rendering decisions.
Since Judge Chavez is already retired, the Court imposes a
penalty of forfeiture of Judge Chavez' retirement benefits.
2. Atty. Teofilo A. Dimaculangan, Jr.
The undated anonymous letter alleged that: (1) respondent
Dimaculangan led the sale of decisions in annulment cases in
Branch 87; (2) parties in annulment cases were not required to
attend hearings; (3) notices supposedly sent to the OSG were not
reflected in the records; (4) in one case, the court issued an order
of dismissal without notifying the private complainant; (5) some
decisions or orders of the court were signed by respondent
Dimaculangan instead of the presiding judge; (6) respondent
Dimaculangan would ask the court's process server to sign returns
of summons in annulment cases even if no pleading was actually
served; and (7) respondent Dimaculangan used court funds for
personal expenses and only returned the money at a later
date.[35]
Some of the allegations in the undated anonymous letter are
consistent with the judicial audit's findings, to wit: (1) Judge
Chavez himself admitted in his Comment that a number of the
decisions and orders in the annulment cases were not decided
by him since the signatures appearing on them were not his;[36]
(2) return of summons or registry receipts were signed by the
process server, as instructed by his "superior" though no summons
or pleadings were served;[37] (3) a number of cases did not have
TSNs or minutes in the records; (4) forms for legal fees were not
attached to the records of the cases; (5) summons were
improperly served or not served at all to the OSG or the
respondent; (6) there was no notice of appearance of the OSG
in a number of cases; (7) there were no pre-trial briefs in a number
of cases; (8) some psychological reports were undated, unsigned
or mere photocopies; and (9) there was no proof that a copy of
the decision was furnished the OSG and/or respondent in a
number of cases.[38]
In his Comment,[39] respondent Dimaculangan blames the clerks-
in-charge having physical custody of the court's folders for the
failure to: (1) chronologically arrange and paginate the case
records; (2) update the court's docket books; and (3) attach the
forms for legal fees in civil case folders. Meanwhile, he blames
respondent Marquez for the failure to attach the certificates of
arraignment in cases where the accused had entered their plea.
He also makes a sweeping statement that erasures in the general
docket books were for the purpose of correcting erroneous
entries.
We stress that clerks of court are the chief administrative officers
of their respective courts. Their administrative functions are vital
to the prompt and proper administration of justice, to wit:
They must show competence, honesty and probity since they are
charged with safeguarding the integrity of the court and its
proceedings x x x.
xxxx
x x x They are charged with the efficient recording, filing and
management of court records, besides having administrative
supervision over court personnel. They play a key role in the
complement of the court and cannot be permitted to slacken
on their jobs under one pretext or another. They must be
assiduous in performing their official duties and in supervising and
managing court dockets and records. x x x[40] (Citations omitted.)
We find that the following circumstances raise the suspicion that
respondent Dimaculangan was indeed involved in the
anomalies related to annulment cases: (1) the allegations in the
anonymous letter; (2) the admission of Judge Chavez that his
signatures in some of the decisions in the annulment cases were
forged and that he mostly relied on his clerk of court; and (3) the
admission of the process server that he merely signed some of
the returns of summons and registry receipts as instructed by his
"superior."
Supreme Court may prescribe in compliance with Section 1, Rule
V of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, shall be for the account
of the Judiciary; and (ii) they certify in the notarized documents
that there are no notaries public within the territorial jurisdiction
of the Regional Trial Court[.]

a. There was no evidence that respondent Dimaculangan

complied with these requirements.

Regarding the pre-marking of exhibits without the presence of c.

the prosecutor in Singson v. Singson for annulment of marriage,
respondent Dimaculangan alleged that he obtained the
The Financial Audit Team also found the following: (1) there was
consent of the prosecutor. There was, however, no evidence
a cash shortage of P18,000 in the Fiduciary Fund; (2) respondent
proving this claim. As branch clerk of court, respondent
Dimaculangan did not deposit his collections within the
Dimaculangan is the administrative assistant of the presiding
prescribed period; (3) no legal fees were paid in the petition for
judge. The presiding judge may, before the start of the pre-trial
annulment of marriage filed by Bagsic against Edilberto L. Rivera;
conference, refer the case to the branch clerk of court for a
(3) no collection of the amount to defray travel expenses
preliminary conference to assist the parties in reaching a
needed for service of summons, subpoena and other court
settlement, to mark documents or exhibits to be presented by the
processes were made in 54 petitions for declaration of nullity of
parties and copies thereof to be attached to the records after
marriage/annulment of marriage cases.[43]
comparison and to consider such other matters as may aid in the
prompt disposition of the case.[41] The rules require the presence
SC Administrative Circular No. 3-2000[44] dated June 15, 2000
of both parties to the case. Thus, it was highly irregular for
requires that the collections for the Judiciary Development Fund
respondent Dimaculangan to conduct the pre-marking in the
(JDF) be deposited daily with the nearest Land Bank branch
prosecutor's absence.
through a designated account number. If a daily deposit is not
b. possible, it should be made at the end of every month, provided
that if the JDF collection reaches F500, the money shall be
deposited immediately.
As to respondent Dimaculangan's act of notarizing the ex parte
motion for leave of court to serve summons by publication in SP
These guidelines emphasize the importance and seriousness of
No. 04-078, he asserts that it was an exercise of his official
the duty imposed upon clerks of courts who manage and secure
functions as an ex-officio notary public. OCA Circular No. 156-
the funds of the Court. Mere delay in remitting the funds
2006[42] authorized clerks of court of the RTCs to notarize
collected has, in fact, been considered gross neglect of duty or
documents subject to the following conditions:
grave misconduct.[45]
(i) all notarial fees charged in accordance with Section 7(o) of
Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, and, with respect to private Clerks of court are the custodians of the courts' funds and
documents, in accordance with the notarial fee that the revenues, records, properties, and premises. They are liable for
any loss, shortage, destruction or impairment of those entrusted
to them. Any shortages in the amounts to be remitted and the
delay in the actual remittance constitute gross neglect of duty
for which the clerk of court shall be held administratively liable.[46]
The OCA's findings show that respondent Dimaculangan
incurred a cash shortage of P18,000 in the Fiduciary Fund and
failed to deposit the court's collections as required under SC
Administrative Circular No. 3-2000. Thus, we find that respondent
Dimaculangan has been remiss in his duty to promptly remit cash
collections and account for the shortages of court funds under
his care.
d.
Given respondent Dimaculangan's numerous and grave
infractions, we find that he was not only remiss in his duties; he
took advantage of his position as clerk of court to circumvent
and disregard the rules. His acts do not only point to gross neglect
of duty but also grave misconduct. Misconduct is grave if
corruption, clear intent to violate the law or flagrant disregard of
an established rule is present; otherwise, the misconduct is only
simple.[47]
In this case, the facts show that respondent Dimaculangan
disregarded established rules of the Court. Gross neglect of duty
and grave misconduct incur the penalty of dismissal. As
respondent Dimaculangan has already resigned,[48] all the
benefits to which he may have been entitled, except earned
leave credits, are forfeited. He is also disqualified from holding
public office in the future, including in government-owned and
controlled corporations.
3. David Caguimbal
Respondent Caguimbal, in his Comment[49] dated June 28, 2010,
denies the charges against him and states that he performed his
duties with utmost good faith and honesty. Further, he alleges
that in cases where summons were served to persons other than
the respondent or defendant, he made sure that the summons
were received by persons of suitable age and discretion.
Respondent Caguimbal claims that he is unsure whether he
issued and signed some of the returns of summons concerning
annulment of marriages. In his Supplemental Comment[50] dated
September 30, 2010, he admits that, in some annulment cases,
he never served the summons yet he signed the process server
returns upon his superior's instructions.
We have said that the duty of a process server is vital to the
administration of justice. A process server's primary duty is to serve
court notices which precisely requires utmost care on his part to
ensure that all notices assigned to him are duly served on the
parties.[51] It is through the process server that defendants learn of
the action brought against them by the complainant.
Significantly, it is also through the service of summons by the
process server that the trial court acquires jurisdiction over the
defendant. It is therefore important that summonses, other writs
and court processes be served expeditiously.[52]
Respondent Caguimbal committed grave misconduct and
serious dishonesty when he signed process server returns without
actually serving any such summons or court process. Misconduct
is an unacceptable behavior that transgresses the established
rules of conduct for public officers. To be considered as grave
and to warrant dismissal from the service, the misconduct must
be serious, important, weighty, momentous and not trifling. It
must imply wrongful intention and not a mere error of judgment
and it must have a direct relation to, and be connected with, the
performance of his official duties amounting either to
maladministration, willful, intentional neglect or failure to
discharge the duties of the office. On the other hand, dishonesty
is the disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud; unworthiness;
lack of honesty, probity or integrity in principle; lack of fairness
and straightforwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive or clerk, duly initialed on each page thereof, to be attached to the
betray.[53] record of the case.

Further, SC Administrative Circular No. 24-90[56] requires all

Here, there is evidence to show that respondent Caguimbal
stenographers to transcribe all stenographic notes and attach
intentionally neglected the discharge of his duty and, as a
the transcripts to the record of the case not later than 20 days
consequence, deceived both the court and the litigants.
from the time the notes were taken. Stenographers shall also
Assuming that he was merely instructed by his superior to falsify
accomplish a verified monthly certification to monitor their
the return, he knew or ought to have known that such instruction
compliance with this directive. The stenographer's salary shall be
is illegal. Respondent Caguimbal should not have tolerated such
withheld in case of failure or refusal to submit the required
illegal act. Instead, he should have taken measures to stop it.
certification.
Both grave misconduct and dishonesty are grave offenses which
Respondent Bagsic explained that it is their practice to keep TSNs
are punishable by dismissal even for the first offense.[54]
in their cabinets. If there were stenographic notes that were not
Considering respondent Caguimbal's retirement from service in
transcribed, she claims that this was due to lack of time. These
2013, all the benefits to which he may have been entitled, except
excuses, however, are not acceptable. Clearly, respondent
earned leave credits, will be forfeited.[55]
Bagsic was remiss in her duties as stenographer and should be
4. Editha E. Bagsic held liable for simple neglect of duty.

Simple neglect of duty is the failure to give attention to a task, or

The main charge against respondent Bagsic involves her failure
the disregard of a duty due to carelessness or indifference.[57]
to transcribe TSNs in nullity and annulment of marriage cases. The
Under Rule 10, Section 46(D)(1) of the Revised Rules on
OCA also found that the TSNs were not attached to their proper
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, simple neglect of duty,
case records.
classified as a less grave offense, is punishable by suspension of 1
month and 1 day to 6 months for the first offense. Under Section
Stenographers should comply faithfully with paragraph 1, Section
19, Rule XIV of the Civil Service Commission Rules Implementing
17, Rule 136, of the Rules of Court:
Book V of Executive Order No. 292 and Other Pertinent Civil
Sec. 17. Stenographer. - It shall be the duty of the stenographer Service Laws, a fine may be imposed in the alternative.
who has attended a session of a court either in the morning or in
the afternoon, to deliver to the clerk of court, immediately at the Since respondent Bagsic resigned from the RTC in December
close of such morning or afternoon session, all the notes he has 2009, we find the penalty of a fine in the amount of P5,000
taken, to be attached to the record of the case; and it shall reasonable in line with the Court's rulings in similar cases.[58]
likewise be the duty of the clerk to demand that the
5. Armando Ermelito M. Marquez
stenographer comply with said duty. The clerk of court shall
stamp the date on which such notes are received by him. When
a.
such notes are transcribed, the transcript shall be delivered to the

In his Comment[59] dated September 17, 2010, respondent
Marquez claims that his failure to prepare the minutes of the
proceedings was due to lack of sufficient time. He further claims
that he prioritized criminal cases over civil cases. His excuses,
however, do not persuade.
As court interpreter, respondent Marquez is duty-bound to
prepare and sign the minutes of court sessions. In Reyes v.
Pabilane,[60] we discussed the importance of the minutes:
[F]or it gives a brief summary of the events that take place
thereat including a statement of the date and time of the session;
the name of the judge, clerk of court, court stenographer, and
court interpreter who are present; the names of the counsel for
the parties who appear; the parties presenting evidence; the
names of the witnesses who testified; the documentary evidence
marked; and the date of the next hearing.[61] (Citation and
underscoring omitted.)
Respondent Marquez' failure to prepare and sign the minutes of
the court proceedings constitutes simple neglect of duty.[62]
b.
Respondent Marquez also denies that he acted as an agent for
Atty. Jose Calingasan when he referred said counsel to Ms. Rene
Frane Arillano for possible lawyer-client relationship. He claims
that he merely provided the names of counsels within the vicinity
of the Hall of Justice.
Section 5, Canon IV of the Code of Conduct for Court
Personnel[63] enjoins all court personnel from recommending
private attorneys to litigants, prospective litigants or anyone
dealing with the judiciary. As an employee of the judiciary,
respondent Marquez must maintain a neutral attitude in dealing
with party-litigants. All court personnel should be reminded that
they have no business getting personally involved in matters
directly emanating from court proceedings, unless expressly so
provided by law. Since the image of the courts of justice is
reflected in the conduct, official or otherwise, of even its minor
employees, it is the imperative duty of everyone involved in the
dispensation of justice to maintain the courts' integrity and
standing as true temples of justice and avoid any impression or
impropriety, misdeed or negligence. While court employees are
not totally prohibited from rendering aid to others, they should
see to it that the assistance, albeit involving acts unrelated to
their official functions, does not in any way compromise the
public's trust in the justice system.[64]
In this case, respondent Marquez transgressed the strict norm of
conduct required from court employees by referring a
prospective litigant to a private lawyer. His act gave the
impression that the court is indorsing a particular lawyer, thereby
undermining the public's faith in the impartiality of the courts.
We thus hold that respondent Marquez is guilty of simple
misconduct. Simple misconduct has been defined as an
unacceptable behavior which transgresses the established rules
of conduct for public officers, work-related or not.[65]
Consistent with the rulings involving simple neglect of duty[66] and
simple misconduct committed by court employees,[67] we
impose the fine of P5,000 on respondent Marquez.
IV
In Leave Division, Office of Administrative Services, Office of the
Court Administrator v. De Lemos,[68] we reminded court
employees:
[A]ll court employees must exercise at all times a high degree of
professionalism and responsibility, as service in the Judiciary is not
only a duty but also a mission. The Court has repeatedly
emphasized that everyone in the judiciary, from the presiding will be dealt with more severely.
judge to the clerk, must always be beyond reproach, free of any
suspicion that may taint the judiciary. Public service requires SO ORDERED.
utmost integrity and discipline. A public servant must exhibit at all
times the highest sense of honesty and integrity, for no less than
the Constitution mandates the principle that "a public office is a CANON 4
public trust and all public officers and employees must at all times
be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost PROPRIETY
responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency." As the
administration of justice is a sacred task, the persons involved in
it ought to live up to the strictest standards of honesty and 6.
integrity. Their conduct, at all times, must not only be
characterized by propriety and decorum, but must also be
above suspicion. Thus, every employee of the judiciary should be THIRD DIVISION
an example of integrity, uprightness, and honesty.[69]
[ A.M. No. RTJ-14-2376 [Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 11-3625-RTJ],
WHEREFORE, Judge Pablo R. Chavez is found GUILTY of gross March 05, 2014 ]
neglect of duty and undue delay of rendering decisions. Atty.
MA. LIZA M. JORDA, CITY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE, TACLOBAN CITY,
Teofilo A. Dimaculangan, Jr. is found GUILTY of gross neglect of
COMPLAINANT, VS. JUDGE CRISOLOGO S. BITAS, REGIONAL TRIAL
duty and grave misconduct. David Caguimbal is found GUILTY of
COURT, BRANCH 7, TACLOBAN CITY, RESPONDENT.
grave misconduct and serious dishonesty. In lieu of dismissal from
service which may no longer be imposed due to their respective
retirements and resignation, as a penalty for their offense, all their
[A.M. NO. RTJ-14-2377 [FORMERLY OCA I.P.I. NO. 11-3645-RTJ]]
benefits, except accrued leave credits, are hereby FORFEITED.
They are further disqualified from any reemployment in any
branch or instrumentality of the government, including
PROSECUTOR LEO C. TABAO, COMPLAINANT, VS. JUDGE
government-owned or controlled corporations and financial
CRISOLOGO S. BITAS, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 7,
institutions.
TACLOBAN CITY RESPONDENT.
Editha E. Bagsic is found GUILTY of simple neglect of duty and is
FINED in the amount of P5,000. This amount may be deducted
from whatever benefits respondent Bagsic may still be entitled to DECISION
after her voluntary resignation. PERALTA, J.:

Armando Ermelito M. Marquez is found GUILTY of simple neglect

of duty and simple misconduct and FINED in the amount of Before this Court are Consolidated Complaints dated March 29,
P5,000. He is warned that a repetition of the same or similar acts 2011[1] and March 25, 2011[2] filed by Prosecutor Leo C. Tabao,
Office of the City Prosecutor, Tacloban City and Ma. Liza M.
Jorda, Associate City Prosecutor, Tacloban City, respectively,
against respondent Judge Crisologo S. Bitas (respondent judge),
Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 7, Tacloban
City, for Grave Abuse of Authority, Irregularity in the Performance
of Official Duties, Bias and Partiality, relative to Criminal Case Nos.
2009-11-537,[3] 2009-11-538, 2009-11-539 entitled People v. Danilo
Miralles, et al.
The antecedent facts of the case, as culled from the records, are
as follows:
A.M. OCA I.P.I. No. 11-3645-RTJ
City Prosecutor Leo C. Tabao, Tacloban
City v. Judge Crisologo S. Bitas, RTC,
Branch 7, Tacloban City
The complaint stemmed from Criminal Case Nos. 2009-11-537;
2009-11-538 and 2009-11-539[4] for Qualified Trafficking and
Violation of Article VI, Section 10 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7610,
which were filed against Danilo Miralles (Miralles), et al. before
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 7, Tacloban City where
respondent Judge Bitas presides.
Complainant alleged that on January 15, 2010, accused Miralles,
through counsel, filed a Motion for Judicial Determination of
Probable Cause with Motion to Hold in Abeyance the Issuance
of a Warrant of Arrest. On the same day, respondent Judge
issued an order taking cognizance of the same and directed
Prosecutor Anthea G. Macalalag to file her comment on the
motion. The prosecution then filed its comment/opposition and
moved for the issuance of the required warrant for the arrest of
Miralles. No warrant of arrest was issued against Miralles.
On February 2, 2011, respondent judge issued an Order which
states:
After the prosecution presented their witnesses, the Court finds
that there is probable cause to hold the accused for trial for
Violation of 4 (a & e) of R.A. 9208 and, therefore, the court orders
Lynna Brito y Obligar to file a bail bond of Forty Thousand Pesos
(PhpP40,000.00) for her temporary liberty. Danilo Miralles is,
likewise, ordered to put up a bail bond of Forty Thousand Pesos
(P40,000.00) for each of the three (3) cases.
Subsequently, on February 4, 2011, Sheriff Jose Cabcabin of the
Office of the RTC Clerk of Court issued a certification that Miralles
surrendered to him to avail of his right to bail. The cash bail bond
in the amount of P120,000.00 was approved by respondent judge
on the same day.
Complainant lamented that respondent judge disregarded his
duties and violated mandatory provisions of the Rules of Court
when he did not issue a warrant of arrest against the accused
Miralles, who was charged with two (2) non-bailable criminal
offenses. As early as November 19, 2009, criminal complaints
against Miralles for Qualified Trafficking were already filed, yet
respondent judge never issued a warrant of arrest for Miralles
despite accused's presence during the court hearings.
Moreover, respondent judge granted a reduced bail of
P40,000.00 for accused Miralles even without any petition for the
fixing of bail. In fact, complainant reiterated that even after
respondent judge found probable cause to hold accused
Miralles for trial, he did not order the arrest of the accused.
Instead, respondent judge summarily granted a reduced bail in
the absence of a motion to fix bail and the prosecution was not
given the opportunity to interpose its objections. Complainant
claimed that such acts of respondent judge were evident of his
bias towards accused Miralles.
In his Answer, respondent judge reasoned that it was wrong to
arrest Miralles, because the court was still in the process of
determining whether there is sufficient evidence to hold the
accused for trial. He explained that Miralles had always made
himself available during the hearings for the determination of
probable cause; thus, the court already acquired jurisdiction
over the person of the accused.
After the hearing for the determination of probable cause, the
court ruled that there is no strong evidence presented by the
prosecution. On February 4, 2011, accused Danilo Miralles
surrendered to Sheriff Jose Cabcabin and posted P40,000.00 bail
for each of the three (3) cases, or a total of P120,000.00.
Respondent judge claimed that there was no more need for a
petition for bail, because in the judicial determination of
probable cause the court found that the evidence against
accused was weak.[5]
Respondent judge further averred that complainant did not
know the facts of the case and whether the evidence for the
prosecution is strong, yet he was faulted for granting bail and for
not issuing a warrant of arrest. He stressed that when the court
has acquired jurisdiction over the person of the accused, there is
no more need to issue a warrant of arrest. Respondent judge
pointed out that Miralles always made himself available, hence,
he believed that the ends of justice had not been frustrated. He
insisted that there is no anomaly in the procedure because a
warrant of arrest will be issued only upon the finding of probable
cause. In this case, however, he was able to post his bail bond
before a warrant of arrest can be issued against him. Thus, the
warrant of arrest had become fait accompli.
A.M. OCA IPI No. 11-3625-RTJ
Ma. Liza M. Jorda, Associate City
Prosecutor, Tacloban City v. Judge
Crisologo S. Bitas, RTC, Branch 7,
Tacloban City
This complaint, borne from the same criminal cases, has
substantially the same facts involving accused Danilo Miralles
referred to in A.M. OCA I.P.I. No. 11-3645-RTJ.
Complainant, Prosecutor Liza M. Jorda, Associate City
Prosecutor, alleged that during the hearing on the Petition for
Involuntary Commitment of the minor victim Margie Baldoza, to
the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD),
respondent judge propounded a series of questions which
appeared to mitigate Miralles' role in the crime charged. The
pertinent portion of which is quoted as follows:
Q. Did you see Danny shouting at you and get angry as what you
have stated in the record of the court?
A. No. Complainant pointed out that respondent judge's line of
questions went beyond judicial authority and discretion. Upon
investigation, complainant claimed to have discovered that the
xxxx family members of respondent judge are close associates of
Miralles.

Q. In other words, you are only for a presumption that it is Danny

who is getting angry where in fact you have seen him at
anytime?
A. It was Lynna whom he was [scolding] because the women
under her are stubborn.
Q. You have seen him scolding to (sic) your nanay Lynna?
Prompted by said events, complainant filed a motion for
inhibition on December 14, 2009 against respondent judge.
Respondent judge denied the motion. During the hearing on
December 15, 2009, complainant alleged that respondent judge
publicly humiliated her and exhibited his anger and animosity
towards her for filing the motion for inhibition.[7] Respondent
judge was quoted saying, among others things, that:

A. She would be called to the room in the Office and there she
would be scolded. “I don’t want to see your face! Why did you file the motion for
inhibition when it should have been Attorney Sionne Gaspay who
should have filed the same[?]”
Q. You have not seen nanay Lynna and Danny Miralles in the
office, you have not seen them?
“You better transfer to another court! You are being influenced
A. No. by politicians. I am not a close family friend of the Miralles(es), it
is my sister who is now in the United States who was close to the
Miralles(es).”
Q. Never have you (sic) seen them?

A. No.
“So you are questioning the integrity of this court, you better
transfer to another court.”
Q. So did you come to the conclusion that she [was] being
scolded by Danny Miralles?
“I don’t want to see your face.”[8]
A. Yes.[6]

Complainant added that when she was supposed to conduct

the cross-examination, respondent judge stated off-the-record:
“I don’t want you to participate anymore,” and refused to allow
her to do the cross-examination.
In support of her allegation, complainant presented the Joint
Affidavit[9] of Carmela D. Bastes and Marilou S. Nacilla, social
workers who were present during the December 15, 2009 hearing
of the subject case, and corroborated that indeed respondent
judge uttered the abovementioned statements to complainant
in open court in the presence of court personnel and the lawyers
of the parties.
Due to the continued hostility of respondent judge towards
complainant during the subsequent hearings of the case,
complainant opted to transfer to another court, pursuant to an
office order issued by City Prosecutor Ruperto Golong.
In a Supplemental Complaint-Affidavit[10] dated April 8, 2011,
complainant raised the possibility of “misrepresentation.” She
alleged that it was made to appear that a hearing on the
subject case was conducted on February 2, 2011, when in fact
there was none. She claimed that the Order dated February 2,
2011 appeared to have been inserted in the records of the case,
when in fact no hearing transpired that day.
On April 7, 2011, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA)
directed respondent judge to comment on the complaint
against him.[11]
In his Answer and Comment[12] dated May 10, 2011, respondent
judge denied the allegations in the complaint and contended
that complainant was piqued when he blamed her for making
baseless assumptions. He claimed that complainant was
incompetent as showed by the lack of evidence against Miralles.
Respondent judge further averred that, contrary to
complainant's allegation that it was her option to transfer to
another court, it was he who caused her transfer. He accused
complainant of lacking in knowledge of the law and that she
appeared for politicians and not for the Republic of the
Philippines.
Regarding complainant's accusation that he was close to the
Miralleses, respondent judge explained that it was his sister who
was a classmate of one Nora Miralles. He claimed that he is
unaware of any personal relation between Nora Miralles and the
accused Danilo Miralles. He insisted that complainant merely
assumed things even if she has no evidence that he knew Danilo
Miralles.
Respondent judge also admitted that he indeed stopped
complainant from conducting a cross-examination on the
witness during the hearing for involuntary commitment, because
the lawyer for petitioner DSWD should be the one actively
participating in the case, and not the prosecutors. He, however,
added that the court had already ordered that minor Margie
Baldoza be committed to the DSWD Home for Girls pending
resolution of the criminal cases.
As to the other allegations in the Complaint, respondent judge
commented that these were mere rehash of the complaint filed
in A.M. OCA I.P.I. No. 11-3645-RTJ and reiterated that the
evidence found against accused Miralles during the judicial
determination of the existence of probable cause in the
trafficking case was weak. Therefore, he ordered the posting of
P40,000.00 bail by the accused. Respondent judge claimed that
he merely acted upon the evidence presented and made a
resolution on what was right for the case.
In her Reply[13] dated May 21, 2011, complainant refuted
respondent judge's allegation of incompetence against her and
insisted on respondent's apparent bias in favor of Miralles. She
argued that respondent judge granted bail to the accused even
when there was no motion to fix bail and no hearing was
conducted thereon. Despite the finding of probable cause,
respondent judge did not issue a warrant of arrest against the
accused. Complainant also reiterated the controversy
surrounding the appearance of an Order dated February 2, 2011,
when in fact no hearing transpired that day.
In his 2nd Indorsement[14] dated June 14, 2011, respondent
judge denied that he falsified any document. He explained that
his stenographer made a mistake in placing the date as February
2, 2011 instead of February 3, 2011, the date when the hearing
was conducted. He attached the affidavits[15] of his court
stenographer and court interpreter in support of his explanation.
On May 11, 2001, the OCA directed Judge Bitas to file his
Comment on the instant complaint.
In a Resolution[16] dated September 12, 2011, upon the
recommendation of the OCA, the Court referred A.M. OCA I.P.I.
No. 11-3625-RTJ to an Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals,
Cebu City, for investigation, report and recommendation.
On October 12, 2011, the Court, in a Resolution,[17] resolved to
consolidate A.M. OCA I.P.I. No. 11-3645-RTJ (Prosecutor Leo C.
Tabao v. Judge Crisologo S. Bitas, RTC, Branch 7, Tacloban City)
with A.M. OCA I.P.I. No. 11-3625-RTJ (Ma. Liza M. Jorda v. Judge
Crisologo S. Bitas, Regional Trial Court, Branch 7, Tacloban City).
In its Report and Recommendation[18] dated February 14, 2013,
Associate Justice Carmelita Salandanan-Manahan, Court of
Appeals, Cebu City, found respondent judge guilty of grave
abuse of authority and gross ignorance of the law, and
recommended that respondent judge be fined in the amount of
P20,000.00 for A.M. OCA I.P.I. No. 11-3645-RTJ and fined anew in
the amount of P20,000.00 for A.M. OCA I.P.I. No. 11-3625-RTJ.
RULING
We adopt the findings of the Investigating Justice, except as to
the recommended penalty.
As a matter of public policy, not every error or mistake of a judge
in the performance of his official duties renders him liable. In the
absence of fraud, dishonesty or corruption, the acts of a judge in
his official capacity do not always constitute misconduct
although the same acts may be erroneous. True, a judge may
not be disciplined for error of judgment, absent proof that such
error was made with a conscious and deliberate intent to cause
an injustice. This does not mean, however, that a judge need not
observe propriety, discreetness and due care in the performance
of his official functions.
In the instant case, Miralles was charged with Qualified
Trafficking, which under Section 10 (C) of R.A. No. 9208 is
punishable by life imprisonment and a fine of not less than Two
Million Pesos (P2,000,000.00) but not more than Five Million Pesos
(P5,000,000.00). Thus, by reason of the penalty prescribed by law,
the grant of bail is a matter of discretion which can be exercised
only by respondent judge after the evidence is submitted in a
hearing. The hearing of the application for bail in capital offenses
is absolutely indispensable before a judge can properly
determine whether the prosecution’s evidence is weak or
strong.[19]
As correctly found by the Investigating Justice, with life
imprisonment as one of the penalties prescribed for the offense
charged against Miralles, he cannot be admitted to bail when
evidence of guilt is strong, in accordance with Section 7, Rule 114
of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.[20]
Here, what is appalling is not only did respondent judge deviate
from the requirement of a hearing where there is an application
for bail, respondent judge granted bail to Miralles without neither
conducting a hearing nor a motion for application for bail.
Respondent judge's justification that he granted bail, because he
found the evidence of the prosecution weak, cannot be
sustained because the records show that no such hearing for that
purpose transpired. What the records show is a hearing to
determine the existence of probable cause, not a hearing for a
petition for bail. The hearing for bail is different from the
determination of the existence of probable cause. The latter
takes place prior to all proceedings, so that if the court is not
satisfied with the existence of a probable cause, it may either
dismiss the case or deny the issuance of the warrant of arrest or
conduct a hearing to satisfy itself of the existence of probable
cause. If the court finds the existence of probable cause, the
court is mandated to issue a warrant of arrest or commitment
order if the accused is already under custody, as when he was
validly arrested without a warrant. It is only after this proceeding
that the court can entertain a petition for bail where a
subsequent hearing is conducted to determine if the evidence
of guilt is weak or not. Hence, in granting bail and fixing it at
P20,000.00 motu proprio, without allowing the prosecution to
present its evidence, respondent judge denied the prosecution
of due process. This Court had said so in many cases and had
imposed sanctions on judges who granted applications for bail
in capital offenses and in offenses punishable by reclusion
perpetua, or life imprisonment, without giving the prosecution the
opportunity to prove that the evidence of guilt is strong.[21]
Clearly, in the instant case, respondent judge's act of fixing the
accused's bail and reducing the same motu proprio is not mere
deficiency in prudence, discretion and judgment on the part of
respondent judge, but a patent disregard of well-known rules.
When an error is so gross and patent, such error produces an
inference of bad faith, making the judge liable for gross
ignorance of the law.[22]
Likewise, we are convinced that respondent judge’s actuations
in the court premises during the hearing of the petition for
commitment to the DSWD constitute abuse of authority and
manifest partiality to the accused. Indeed, respondent judge’s
utterance of: “I don’t want to see your face!”; “You better
transfer to another court!; You are being influenced by
politicians” was improper and does not speak well his stature as
an officer of the Court. We note the improper language of
respondent judge directed towards complainants in his Answers
and Comments where he criticized them for their incompetence
in handling the subject case. Respondent Bitas' use of abusive
and insulting words, tending to project complainant’s ignorance
of the laws and procedure, prompted by his belief that the latter
mishandled the cause of his client is obviously and clearly
insensitive, distasteful, and inexcusable. Complainants, likewise,
cannot be blamed for being suspicious of respondent’s bias to
the accused considering that the former can be associated with
the accused following his admission that his sister was a
classmate of one Nora Miralles. Considering the apprehension
and reservation of the complainants, prudence dictates that
respondent should have inhibited himself from hearing the case.
Such abuse of power and authority could only invite disrespect
from counsels and from the public.[23]
In pending or prospective litigations before them, judges should
be scrupulously careful to avoid anything that may tend to
awaken the suspicion that their personal, social or sundry
relations could influence their objectivity. Not only must judges
possess proficiency in law, they must also act and behave in such
manner that would assure litigants and their counsel of the
judges’ competence, integrity and independence.[24] Even on
the face of boorish behavior from those he deals with, he ought
to conduct himself in a manner befitting a gentleman and a high
officer of the court.[25]
The use of intemperate language is included in the proscription
provided by Section 1, Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct, thus: “Judges shall avoid impropriety and the
appearance of impropriety in all the activities of a judge.” It
bears stressing that as a dispenser of justice, respondent should
exercise judicial temperament at all times, avoiding vulgar and
insulting language. He must maintain composure and
equanimity.
This Court has long held that court officials and employees are
placed with a heavy burden and responsibility of keeping the
faith of the public. Any impression of impropriety, misdeed or
negligence in the performance of official functions must be
avoided. This Court shall not countenance any conduct, act or
omission on the part of all those involved in the administration of
justice which would violate the norm of public accountability
and diminish the faith of the people in the Judiciary.
We come to the imposable penalty.
Under Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended by
A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC, gross ignorance of the law or procedure is
classified as a serious charge. Under Section 11 (A) of the same
Rule, as amended, if respondent judge is found guilty of a serious
charge, any of the following sanctions may be imposed:
1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits
as the Court may determine, and disqualification from
reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including
government-owned or controlled corporations; Provided,
however, that the forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include
accrued leave credits;
2. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for
more than three (3) but not exceeding six (6) months; or
3. A fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00.
This is not the first time that respondent judge was found guilty of
the offense charged. In the case of Valmores-Salinas v. Judge
Crisologo Bitas,[26] the Court had previously imposed a fine of
P10,000.00 on respondent judge for disregarding the basic
procedural requirements in instituting an indirect contempt
charge, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or
similar act shall be dealt with more severely.
The provisions of the Revised Penal Code in bail are so clear and
unmistakable that there can be no room for doubt or even
interpretation. There can, therefore, be no excuse for
respondent judge's error of law. It hardly speaks well of the legal
background of respondent judge, considering his length of
service when he failed to observe procedural requirements
before granting bail. To top it all, the actuations of respondent
judge towards the complainants, as shown by his use of abusive
and insulting words against complainants in open court, and his
correspondence with the Court, are evident of his partiality to the
accused. All these taken into consideration, respondent judge
deserves a penalty of suspension of three (3) months and one (1)
day for the two (2) cases, instead of P20,000.00 fine for each of
the cases, as recommended by the Investigating Justice.
WHEREFORE, respondent JUDGE CRISOLOGO BITAS, Presiding
Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 7, Tacloban City, is
hereby SUSPENDED from service for a period of THREE (3) MONTHS
and ONE (1) DAY without pay, and WARNED that a repetition of
the same or similar offense will warrant the imposition of a more
severe penalty.
SO ORDERED.
7. A.M. No. MTJ-13-1837 [formerly OCA IPI No. 12-2463-MTJ],
September 24, 2014
CONRADO ABE LOPEZ, REPRESENTED BY ATTY. ROMUALDO JUBAY,
Complainant, v. JUDGE ROGELIO S. LUCMAYON, MUNICIPAL
TRIAL COURT IN CITIES, BRANCH 1, MANDAUE CITY, CEBU,
Respondent.
BRION, J.:
We resolve the administrative complaint1 filed by Conrado Abe
Lopez (complainant) charging Judge Rogelio S. Lucmayon
(respondent), Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 1, Mandaue
City, Cebu, with Dishonesty, Corruption and Malpractice relative
to a land dispute involving their families.
The Antecedent Facts
In a verified complaint-affidavit dated December 12, 2011, the
complainant, through his counsel Arty. Romualdo M. Jubay,
alleged that when he was eight years old, he inherited from his
adoptive father Restituto Lopez one-half (1/2) of Lot No. 1718 with
an area of 355 square meters located in Balamban, Cebu,
evidenced by a document entitled "Katapusan Panugon"
(Testamente). He claimed that while the document mentioned
Lot No. 1718, he ended up receiving a portion of Lot No. 1696
with a total land area of 49,817 square meters, that became the
object of an extrajudicial settlement involving him, his adoptive
mother Honorata Lopez, and the relatives of the respondent in
December 1978. Half of Lot No. 1696 was cultivated by his
adoptive mother until the latter's death in 1982. He took over the
cultivation of the land after he retired as a seafarer in 1988.
The complainant alleged that sometime in October 2004, he and
the respondent met in a waiting shed located in front of the
house of the latter's grandmother in Buanoy, Balamban, Cebu.
At that meeting, the respondent allegedly deceived him into
signing a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) to process the sale of
Lot No. 1696 to the prospective buyer, Aboitiz Group of
Company. Unknown to the complainant, the said SPA contained
at the bottom portion, a so-called "Waiver of Rights" that the
respondent had deceptively inserted in order to strip him of his
ownership of Lot No. 1696. After signing the document (notarized
by a certain Atty. Arturo C. Mata (Atty. Mata) without the
complainant's presence), the respondent allegedly told the
complainant that he no longer had any right over the property.
In March 2005, the father of the respondent, Pedro Lucmayon
(Pedro), ordered him to cease cultivating the land because of
the Waiver of Rights in the SPA he signed.
The complainant also asserted that the respondent had caused
Pedro and his siblings to execute a document entitled
"Supplemental Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of Moises
Legaspino and Victoria Lopez" to the damage and prejudice of
the complainant and his adoptive mother. He alleged that in the
extrajudicial settlement, his name and the name of his adoptive
mother were excluded. They claimed that as legal heirs of the
late Restituto Lopez (Restituto) who, in turn, had inherited the
property from his late mother Victoria Lopez (the co-owner of the
property), their exclusion from the extrajudicial settlement was an
act of dishonesty to which the respondent should be held
administratively liable.
In his comment2 dated March 8, 2012, the respondent
vehemently denied that he convinced the complainant to sell
his shares in the property; he claimed that it was the complainant
who was interested in selling his shares after he got tired of
cultivating the land. He also denied that he deceived the
complainant into signing the Waiver of Rights. He contended that
the filing of the administrative case against him was intended to
embarrass and harass him.
The respondent further stated that the signing of the Waiver of
Rights was done after he discovered that the complainant was
not legally adopted. He added that since there had been no
legal adoption, the complainant could not be considered as a
legal heir and was not entitled to any portion of the land. He
stated, too, that his participation in the sale transaction was
limited to informing his parents and relatives that the
complainant is not a legal heir of Resitituto.
The Report and Recommendation of the OCA
In its evaluation report3 dated October 23, 2012, the Office of the
Court Administrator (OCA) noted that the allegations in the
administrative complaint are basically the same allegations the
complainant raised in the criminal complaint for falsification of
public documents he filed against the respondent, which
complaint the Office of the City Prosecutor of Cebu City
dismissed. The City Prosecutor found that the complainant's
allegations lacked merit and evidentiary proof. It also found that
the complainant failed to discharge the burden of proving the
respondents' administrative liability and recommended the
dismissal of the administrative complaint for lack of merit. The
recommendation reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
"RECOMMENDATION: It is therefore respectfully recommended
for the consideration of the Honorable Court that the
administrative complaint against Judge Rogelio S. Lucmayon,
Branch 1, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Mandaue City, Cebu, be
DISMISSED for lack of merit."
On December 5, 2012, the Court issued a Resolution4 adopting
and approving the OCA's findings of fact, conclusions of law and
recommendation, and dismissed the complaint against the
respondent.
The complainant sought reconsideration5 contending that the
OCA's findings of fact were clearly erroneous. He pointed out the
OCA failed to appreciate and consider the other circumstances
that clearly showed the respondent's dishonesty, corruption and
malpractice. He reiterated that the respondent made him sign
three (3) SPAs and deceived him into signing the Waiver of Rights
at the bottom portion of the third SPA, which SPA was allegedly
notarized by Atty. Mata without his presence. He also stated that
the respondent's allegation that he was not a legally adopted
son of Restituto is baseless; since as shown in Restituto's
Testamente, he had been adopted and considered as Restituto's
true child.
The Court referred back the complainant's Motion for
Reconsideration to the OCA for evaluation, report and
recommendation.
In its Memorandum6 dated July 23, 2013, addressed to Associate
Justice Antonio T. Carpio, the OCA recommended that the
administrative case be re-docketed as a regular administrative
matter and that the respondent be held administratively liable
for acts of impropriety. The OCA held that while the respondent's
act of asking the complainant to sign the SPAs may not constitute
dishonesty, corruption or misconduct, his other actions
(specifically requiring the complainant to sign the SPAs and
allowing Atty. Mata to notarize the Waiver of Rights without each
other's presence) as well as his appointment as the complainant's
attorney-in-fact, violate Rule 5.06 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct7 and amount to impropriety.
Asked to comment, the respondent insisted that the complainant
still failed to adduce substantial evidence establishing his
administrative liability. He pointed out that contrary to the
complainant's contention, Atty. Mata never admitted that he
notarized the Waiver of Rights outside the complainant's
presence. He also alleged that the mere fact that the
complainant appointed him as attorney-in-fact does not ipso
facto taint his actions with impropriety.
The Court's Ruling
Based on the allegations of the complaint, the respondent's
comment, and the findings of the OCA, we find that the
respondent is liable for violation of Rule 5.06 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct ("Code") and Impropriety.
Respondent Violated Rule 5. 06 of the Code
As a general rule, a judge is prohibited from serving as executor,
administrator, trustee, guardian or other fiduciary. The intent of
the rule is to limit a judge's involvement in the affairs and interests
of private individuals to minimize the risk of conflict with his judicial
duties and to allow him to devote his undivided attention to the
performance of his official functions. When a member of the
bench serves as administrator of the properties of private
individuals, he runs the risk of losing his neutrality and impartiality,
especially when the interests of his principal conflicts with those
of the litigant who comes before his court.8cralawlawlibrary
The only exception to this rule as set forth in Rule 5.06 is when the
estate or trust belongs to, or the ward is a member of his
immediate family, and only if his service as executor,
administrator, trustee, guardian or fiduciary will not interfere with
the proper performance of his judicial duties. The Code defines
"immediate family" as being limited to the spouse and relatives
within the second degree of consanguinity.9cralawlawlibrary
In this case, since complainant clearly does not fall under
respondent's "immediate family" as herein defined, the latter's
appointment as the former's attorney-in-fact is not a valid
exception to the rule.
Furthermore, by serving as attorney-in-fact, the respondent not
only allowed himself to be distracted from the performance of his
judicial duties; he also undertook to perform all acts necessary to
protect the complainant's interest. In effect, the respondent
acted as the complainant's fiduciary, in direct and patent
violation of the prohibition against judges.
As held in Ramos v. Barot:10cralawlawlibrary
Being and serving as an attorney-in-fact is within the purview of
"other fiduciary" as used in Rule 5.06. As a noun, "fiduciary" means
"a person holding the character of a trustee, or a character
analogous to that of a trustee, in respect to the trust and
confidence involved in it and the scrupulous good faith and
candor which it requires." A fiduciary primarily acts for another's
benefit, pursuant to his undertaking as such fiduciary, in matters
connected with said undertaking x x x. (Emphasis Supplied)
As a judge who is expected to observe the ethical rules that
govern judicial conduct both in public and private affairs, the
respondent should have been more circumspect in accepting a public official is also judged by his private morals. The Code
the appointment as an attorney-in-fact of the complainant. He dictates that a judge, in order to promote public confidence in
should be reminded that the Code of Judicial Conduct — which, the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, must behave with
among others, prohibits members of the bench from engaging in propriety at all times. As we have recently explained, a judge's
extra-judicial activities that tends to create a conflict with their official life can not simply be detached or separated from his
judicial duties - must be strictly complied with.11 We conclude personal existence. Thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
that for violation of the rules, the respondent should be
sanctioned. Being the subject of constant public scrutiny, a judge should
freely and willingly accept restrictions on conduct that might be
Respondent is Guilty of Impropriety viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen.

On the charge of impropriety, we have repeatedly reminded A judge should personify judicial integrity and exemplify honest
members of the Judiciary to keep their conduct beyond public service. The personal behavior of a judge, both in the
reproach and suspicion, and to be free from any appearance of performance of official duties and in private life should be above
impropriety in their personal behavior, both in the discharge of suspicion. (Emphasis Supplied).
their official duties and in their everyday lives.12cralawlawlibrary
In the present administrative complaint, we agree with the OCA
Canon II of the Code of Judicial Conduct that the respondent's acts of: (1) making the complainant sign at
provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary least two (2) documents - consisting of SPA and Waiver of Rights
- without the presence of a counsel; and (2) allowing the
Rule 2.00: A judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance
notarization of the documents outside the presence of the
of impropriety in all activities.
executor, amount to impropriety. While no evidence directly
shows that the respondent had deceived the complainant into
Rule 2.01: A judge should so behave at all times as to promote
signing these documents, this Court cannot ignore the fact that
public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.
the documents the respondent himself prepared greatly
prejudiced the complainant. We also note that the Waiver of
By the very nature of their work, judges should observe an Rights benefitted the respondent and his family. As a judge who
exacting standard of morality and decency. For no position is more learned in the law than the complainant, the respondent,
exacts a greater demand on the moral righteousness and at the very least should have taken the appropriate steps (e.g.
uprightness of an individual than a seat in the advise the former to engage the services of a lawyer who could
Judiciary.13cralawlawlibrary lend him unbiased legal advice regarding the legal effects of the
waiver) to avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety
In Vedana v. Valencia,14 this Court pointedly stated in his dealings. This step, the respondent failed to take. In these
that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary lights, the Court finds the respondent guilty of impropriety.

The Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of a judge The Applicable Penalty
must be free of a whiff of impropriety not only with respect to his
performance of his judicial duties, but also to his behavior outside Under Section 11(B), in relation to Section 9(4) of Rule 140, as
his sala as a private individual. There is no dichotomy of morality: amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC,15 violation of Supreme Court
rules constitutes a less serious charge punishable by any of the
following sanctions:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
1. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits
for not less than one (1) nor more than three (3) months; or
2. A fine of more than PI 0,000.00 but not exceeding
P20,000.00.
On the other hand, Impropriety which constitutes as a light
charge is punishable by:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
1. A fine of not less than P1,000.00 but not exceeding
P10,000.00 and/or;
2. Censure;
3. Reprimand;
4. Admonition with warning.
Considering the nature and extent of the respondent's
transgressions, we find it proper to impose on him the following
penalties: (1) a fine of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) for
violation of Rule 5.06 of the Code; and (2) a fine of Ten Thousand
Pesos (PI 0,000.00) for impropriety.
WHEREFORE, the respondent Judge Rogelio S. Lucmayon,
Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Mandaue City, Cebu is found
GUILTY of (1) violating Rule 5.06 of the Code of Judicial Conduct;
and (2) impropriety. We hereby impose the total fine of THIRTY
THOUSAND PESOS (P30,000.00) for these offenses, with a STERN
WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be
dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.cralawred
8. A.M. No. MTJ-13-1837 September 24, 2014
[formerly OCA IPI No. 12-2463-MTJ]
CONRADO ABE LOPEZ, represented by ATTY. ROMUALDO JUBAY,
Complainant, vs.JUDGE ROGELIO S. LUCMAYON, Municipal Trial
Court in Cities, Branch 1, Mandaue City, Cebu, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We resolve the administrative complaint1 filed by Conrado Abe
Lopez (complainant) charging Judge Rogelio S. Lucmayon
(respondent), Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 1, Mandaue
City, Cebu, with Dishonesty, Corruption and Malpractice relative
to a land dispute involving their families.
The Antecedent Facts
In a verified complaint-affidavit dated December 12, 2011, the
complainant, through his counsel Atty. Romualdo M. Jubay,
alleged that when he was eight years old, he inherited from his
adoptive father Restituto Lopez one-half (1/2) of Lot No. 1718 with
an area of 355 square meters located in Balamban, Cebu,
evidenced by a document entitled "Katapusan Panugon"
(Testamente). He claimed that while the document mentioned
Lot No. 1718, he ended up receiving a portion of Lot No. 1696
with a total land area of 49,817 square meters, that became the
object of an extrajudicial settlement involving him, his adoptive
mother Honorata Lopez, and the relatives of the respondent in
December 1978. Half of Lot No. 1696 was cultivated by his
adoptive mother until the latter’s death in 1982. He took over the
cultivation of the land after he retired as a seafarer in 1988.
The complainant alleged that sometime in October 2004, he and
the respondent met in a waiting shed located in front of the
house of the latter’s grandmother in Buanoy, Balamban, Cebu.
At that meeting, the respondent allegedly deceived him into
signinga Special Power of Attorney (SPA) to process the sale of
Lot No. 1696 to the prospective buyer, Aboitiz Group of
Company. Unknown to the complainant, the said SPA contained
at the bottom portion, a so-called "Waiver of Rights" that the
respondent had deceptively inserted in order to strip him of his
ownership of Lot No. 1696. After signing the document
(notarizedby a certain Atty. Arturo C. Mata (Atty. Mata) without
the complainant’s presence), the respondent allegedly told the
complainant that he no longer had any right over the property.
In March 2005, the father of the respondent, Pedro Lucmayon
(Pedro), ordered him to cease cultivating the land because of
the Waiver of Rights in the SPA he signed.
The complainant also asserted that the respondent had caused
Pedro and his siblings to execute a document entitled
"Supplemental Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of Moises
Legaspino and Victoria Lopez" to the damage and prejudice of
the complainant and his adoptive mother. He alleged that in the
extrajudicial settlement, his name and the name of his adoptive
mother were excluded. They claimed that as legal heirs of the
late Restituto Lopez (Restituto) who, in turn, had inherited the
property from his late mother Victoria Lopez (the co-owner of the
property), their exclusion from the extrajudicial settlement was
anact of dishonesty to which the respondent should be held
administratively liable.
In his comment2 dated March 8, 2012, the respondent
vehemently denied that he convinced the complainant to sell
his shares in the property; he claimed that it was the complainant
who was interested in selling his shares after he got tired of
cultivating the land. He also denied that he deceived the
complainant into signing the Waiver of Rights. He contended that
the filing of the administrative case against him was intended to
embarrass and harass him.
The respondent further stated that the signing of the Waiver of
Rights was done after he discovered that the complainant was
not legally adopted. He added that since there had been no
legal adoption, the complainant could not be considered as a
legal heir and was not entitled to any portion of the land. He
stated, too, that his participation in the sale transaction was
limited to informing his parents and relatives that the
complainant is not a legal heir of Resitituto.
The Report and Recommendation of the OCA
In its evaluation report3 dated October 23, 2012,the Office of the
Court Administrator (OCA) noted that the allegations in the
administrative complaint are basically the same allegations the
complainant raised in the criminal complaint for falsification of
public documents he filed against the respondent, which
complaint the Office ofthe City Prosecutor of Cebu City
dismissed. The City Prosecutor found that the complainant’s
allegations lacked merit and evidentiary proof. It also found that
the complainant failed to discharge the burden of proving the
respondents’ administrative liability and recommended the
dismissal of the administrative complaint for lack of merit. The
recommendation reads:
"RECOMMENDATION: It is therefore respectfully recommended
for the consideration of the Honorable Court that the
administrative complaint against Judge Rogelio S. Lucmayon,
Branch 1, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Mandaue City, Cebu, be
DISMISSED for lack of merit."
On December 5, 2012, the Court issued a Resolution4 adopting
and approving the OCA’s findings of fact, conclusions of law and
recommendation, and dismissed the complaint against the
respondent.
The complainant sought reconsideration5 contending that the
OCA’s findings of fact were clearly erroneous. He pointed out the
OCA failed to appreciate and consider the other circumstances
that clearly showed the respondent’s dishonesty, corruption and
malpractice. He reiterated that the respondent made him sign
three (3) SPAs and deceived him into signing the Waiver of Rights
at the bottom portion of the third SPA, which SPA was allegedly
notarized by Atty. Mata withouthis presence. He also stated that
the respondent’s allegation that he was not a legally adopted
son of Restituto is baseless; since as shown in Restituto’s
Testamente, he had been adopted and considered as
Restituto’s true child.
The Court referred back the complainant’s Motion for
Reconsideration to the OCA for evaluation, report and
recommendation.
In its Memorandum6 dated July 23, 2013, addressed to Associate
Justice Antonio T. Carpio, the OCA recommended that the
administrative case be re-docketed as a regular administrative
matter and that the respondent be held administratively liable
for acts of impropriety. The OCA held that while the respondent’s
act of asking the complainant to sign the SPAs may not constitute
dishonesty, corruption or misconduct, his other actions
(specifically requiring the complainant to sign the SPAs and
allowing Atty. Matato notarize the Waiver of Rights without each
other’s presence) as well as his appointment as the
complainant’s attorney-in-fact, violate Rule 5.06 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct7 and amount to impropriety.
Asked to comment, the respondent insisted that the complainant
still failed to adduce substantial evidence establishing his
administrative liability. He pointed out that contrary to the
complainant’s contention, Atty. Mata never admitted that he
notarized the Waiver of Rights outside the complainant’s
presence. He also alleged that the mere fact that the
complainant appointed him asattorney-in-fact does not ipso
factotaint his actions with impropriety.
The Court’s Ruling
Based on the allegations of the complaint, the respondent’s
comment, and the findings of the OCA, we find that the
respondent is liable for violation of Rule 5.06 of the Codeof
Judicial Conduct ("Code") and Impropriety.
Respondent Violated Rule 5. 06 of the Code
As a general rule, a judge is prohibited from serving as executor,
administrator, trustee, guardian or other fiduciary. The intent of
the rule is to limit a judge's involvement in the affairs and interests
of private individuals to minimize the risk of conflict with his judicial
duties and to allow him to devote his undivided attention to the
performance of his official functions. When a member of the
bench serves as administrator of the properties of private
individuals, he runsthe risk of losing his neutrality and impartiality,
especially when the interests of his principal conflicts with those
of the litigant who comes before his court.8
The only exception to this rule as set forth in Rule 5.06 is when the
estate or trust belongs to, or the ward is a member of his
immediate family, and only if his service as executor,
administrator, trustee, guardian or fiduciary will not interfere with
the proper performance of his judicial duties. The Code defines
"immediate family" as being limited to the spouse and relatives
within the second degree of consanguinity.9
In this case, since complainant clearly does not fall under
respondent’s "immediate family" as herein defined, the latter’s
appointment as the former’s attorney-in-fact isnot a valid
exception to the rule.
Furthermore, by serving as attorney-in-fact, the respondent not
only allowed himself to be distracted from the performance of his
judicial duties; he also undertook to perform all acts necessary to
protect the complainant’s interest. In effect, the respondent
acted as the complainant’s fiduciary, in direct and patent
violation of the prohibition against judges.
As held in Ramos v. Barot:10
Being and serving as an attorney-in-fact is within the purview of
"other fiduciary" as used in Rule 5.06. As a noun, "fiduciary" means
"a person holding the character of a trustee, or a character
analogous to that of a trustee, in respect to the trust and
confidenceinvolved in it and the scrupulous good faith and
candor which it requires." A fiduciary primarily acts for another's
benefit, pursuant to his undertaking as such fiduciary, in matters
connected withsaid undertaking x x x. (Emphasis Supplied)
As a judge who is expected to observe the ethical rules that
govern judicial conduct both in public and private affairs, the
respondent should have been more circumspect in accepting
the appointment as an attorney-infact of the complainant. He
should be reminded that the Code of Judicial Conduct – which,
among others, prohibits members of the bench from engaging in
extra-judicial activities that tends to create a conflict with their
judicial duties– must be strictly complied with.11 We conclude
that for violation of the rules, the respondent should be
sanctioned.
Respondent is Guilty of Impropriety
On the charge of impropriety, wehave repeatedly reminded
members of the Judiciary to keep their conduct beyond
reproach and suspicion, and to be free from any appearance of
impropriety in their personal behavior, both in the discharge of
their official duties and in their everyday lives.12
Canon II of the Code of Judicial Conduct provides:
Rule 2.00: A judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance
of impropriety in all activities. Rule 2.01: A judge should so behave
at all times as to promote public confidence in the integrity and
impartiality of the judiciary.
By the very nature of their work, judges should observe an
exacting standard of morality and decency. For no position
exacts a greater demand on the moral righteousness and
uprightness of an individual than a seat in the Judiciary.13
In Vedana v. Valencia,14 this Court pointedly stated that:
The Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of a
judge must be free of a whiff of impropriety not only with respect
to his performance of his judicial duties,but also to his behavior
outside his sala as a private individual. There is no dichotomy of
morality: a public official is also judged by his private morals. The
Code dictates that a judge, in order to promote public
confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, must
behave with propriety at all times. As we have recently
explained, a judge’s official life can not simply be detached or
separated from his personal existence. Thus:
Being the subject of constant public scrutiny, a judge should
freely and willingly accept restrictions on conduct that might be
viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen.
A judge should personify judicial integrity and exemplify honest
public service.1âwphi1 The personal behavior of a judge, both
inthe performance of official duties and in private life should be
above suspicion. (Emphasis Supplied).
In the present administrative complaint, we agree with the OCA
that the respondent’s acts of: (1) making the complainant sign
at least two (2) documents – consisting of SPA and Waiver of
Rights – without the presence of a counsel; and (2) allowing the
notarization of the documents outside the presence of the
executor, amount to impropriety. While no evidence directly
shows that the respondent had deceived the complainant into
signing these documents, this Court cannot ignore the fact that
the documents the respondent himself prepared greatly
prejudiced the complainant. We also note that the Waiver of
Rights benefitted the respondent and his family. As a judge who
is more learned in the law than the complainant, the respondent,
at the very least should have taken the appropriate steps (e.g.
advise the former to engage the services of a lawyer who could
lend him unbiased legal advice regarding the legal effects of the
waiver) to avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety
in his dealings. This step, the respondent failed to take. In these
lights, the Court finds the respondent guilty of impropriety.
The Applicable Penalty
Under Section 11(B), in relation toSection 9(4) of Rule 140, as
amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC,15 violation of Supreme Court
rules constitutes a less serious charge punishable by any of the
following sanctions:
1. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not
less than one (1) nor more than three (3) months; or
2. A fine of more than ₱10,000.00 but not exceeding ₱20,000.00.
On the other hand, Impropriety which constitutes as a light
charge is punishable by:
1. A fine of not less than ₱1,000.00 but not exceeding ₱10,000.00
and/or;
2. Censure;
3. Reprimand;
4. Admonition with warning.
Considering the nature and extent of the respondent's
transgressions, we find it proper to impose on him the following
penalties: (1) a fine of Twenty Thousand Pesos (₱20,000.00) for
violation of Rule 5.06 of the Code; and (2) a fine of Ten Thousand
Pesos (₱10,000.00) for impropriety. WHEREFORE, the respondent
Judge Rogelio S. Lucmayon, Municipal Trial Court in Cities,
Mandaue City, Cebu is found GUILTY of (1) violating Rule 5.06 of
the Code of Judicial Conduct; and (2) impropriety. We hereby
impose the total fine of THIRTY THOUSAND PESOS (₱30,000.00) for
these offenses, with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the
same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
9. FIRST DIVISION
[ A.M. No. MTJ-17-1905 (Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 13-2582-MTJ),
August 30, 2017 ]
ATTY. PABLO B. MAGNO,[*] COMPLAINANT, V. JUDGE JORGE
EMMANUEL M. LORREDO, METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT, BRANCH
26, MANILA, RESPONDENT.
RESOLUTION
TIJAM, J.:
In a verified Complaint[1] dated March 6, 2013, complainant Atty.
Pablo B. Magno (Atty. Magno) charges respondent Judge Jorge
Emmanuel M. Lorredo (Judge Lorredo), Metropolitan Trial Court
of Manila (MeTC), Branch 26, with bias and partiality, arrogance
and oppression, and violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct
(CJC).
ANTECEDENT FACTS
On March 3, 2010, Que Fi Luan (Luan), as represented by his
attorney-in-fact and legal counsel, Atty. Magno, filed a
complaint for forcible entry against Rodolfo Dimarucut (Rodolfo)
docketed as Civil Case No. 186797-CV.[2]
Due to Rodolfo's death, Atty. Magno filed an Amended
Complaint, seeking, among others, that the complaint for
forcible entry be treated as an unlawful detainer case
impleading Teresa Alcober (Teresa) and Teresita Dimarucut,
daughter and widow of Rodolfo, respectively.[3]
In an Order dated September 8, 2010, however, the MeTC,
through respondent Judge Lorredo, dismissed the complaint for
failure of Luan to appear for mediation.[4]
On appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) reversed the Order of
the MeTC in a Decision[5] dated June 29, 2011. It held that the
MeTC hastily ordered the dismissal of the case for failure of the
parties to appear for a mediation conference without proper
notification to the parties. Accordingly, the RTC remanded the
case to the MeTC for further proceedings.
After the finality of the RTC Decision, the MeTC set the case for
preliminary conference. For failure, however, of defendants'
counsel therein to appear, the same was cancelled.
Nonetheless, in the course thereof, Judge Lorredo asked Atty.
Magno: "What did you do to convince those up there [RTC], that COURT: Sino yong abogado mo sa appeal?
you were able to secure that kind of decision". In reply, Atty.
Magno answered: "I never follow up on my cases, Your Honor.''[6]

Thereafter, Judge Lorredo vented his anger on Teresa's husband MR. Atty. Montera, your honor.
and asked him where their lawyer was. Immediately, he informed ALCOBER:
Judge Lorredo that their lawyer will not be able to attend the
hearing due to ailment.[7]
COURT: Nandito ba non... Atty. kanino pirma 'to? Ipakita mo
Also, during the preliminary conference, Judge Lorredo told
nga Alie, kung kaninong pirma to.
Teresa's husband that their lawyer is "mahina" or “hihina-hina". He
further stated that "[g]inawa ko na nga ang desisyon dito sa
kasong ito, at panalo kayo, ngayon talo pa kayo sa RTC."[8]
ATTY. Akin, your honor.
Consequently, Atty. Magno filed the instant case and claimed MAGNO:
that Judge Lorredo violated the Rules of Court and the CJC in
connection with his remarks during the preliminary conference
which insinuated that the former was able to get a favorable
decision from the RTC by committing unethical practice.[9] COURT: Ang argument mo sa RTC hindi mo sinabi na
mediation kayo?
In its 1st Indorsement,[10] the Office of the Court Administrator
(OCA) required Judge Lorredo to file his Comment within 10 days
from receipt thereof.
ATTY. Sinabi ninyo pero there was no setting, your honor.
In his Comment,[11] Judge Lorredo denied the charges against MAGNO: Atty. Montera was not here, also the defendant.
him. He alleged that the questions thrown against Atty. Magno
during the preliminary conference were made out of curiosity
considering that the latter's representation before the RTC was COURT: Hindi nong August 2010 ....... pumirma ka nga eh.
allegedly based on a lie.

According to Judge Lorredo, Atty. Magno lied to the RTC when

he claimed that he was not notified of the scheduled mediation ATTY. I don't know if it is in the afternoon or it was in the
conference.[12] As proof, Judge Lorredo submitted a copy of the MAGNO: morning, your honor.
Minutes[13] during the July 23, 2010 hearing stating that the case
is referred to mediation on "August 4, 2010" at 2:00 p.m.

To put his questions in proper context, Judge Lorredo, likewise, COURT: Pirma mo 'to?
submitted a copy of the Minutes of the preliminary conference
to prove that he did not show any bias or partiality in his line of
questioning. The relevant portion of the Minutes reads:
ATTY. Yes, your honor.
MAGNO:
xxx

COURT: Pero paano mo napaniwala yong court sa taas na

hindi ko sinet eh klaro na pumirma ka pa. Ano bang COURT: Pero klaro tayo na sinet ko yung mediation pumirma
nangyari? ka eh.

ATTY. I did not follow it up. Hindi ako nag follow I'm not the ATTY. Pirma ko yan ho.
MAGNO: lawyer who follow[ed] it up, your honor. MAGNO:

COURT: Di ba yon ang theory mo sa RTC? COURT: Nagtataka lang ako. How could you tell the RTC na
walang mediation. Sinet ko nga eh.

ATTY. Yes, your honor.

MAGNO: ATTY. I have pleadings your honor.
MAGNO:

COURT: Na hindi ko sinet ang mediation.

COURT: Bat mo ba sinabi na

ATTY. There was no specific setting on that very day.

MAGNO: ATTY. The RTC reversed the order because the parties
MAGNO: should be given another chance because the
mediator set it for the first time. The mediator did not
issue any order.
COURT: Eto o[,]2 P.M. pumirma ka. Nagtataka lang ako kung
paano mo napaniwala ang RTC.

COURT: Anyway, mahina ang abogado ayan mo (sic) sinet ko

na eh. Nanalo pa ang kalaban mo don. Kasalanan
ATTY. I’am (sic) a lawyer who does not follow up cases, your ng abogado mo yan. Hindi pinag-aaralan yung
MAGNO: honor. record. Sinasabihan kita. Nanalo pa sila kahit may
setting ako. Anyway, since nandito ka. I'm setting this
 case for mediation. Both of you, you appear in
mediation. Set this case for mediation. Mandatory let
him sign for mediation. You choose a date.[14]
On August 14, 2013, Atty. Magno filed a Supplemental
Complaint[15] wherein he further charged Judge Lorredo for the
following: (i) falsification of the Minutes during the July 23, 2010
hearing by adding the date "4" to indicate that he set the
mediation conference on August 4, 2010; (ii) not calling his cases
promptly at 8:30 a.m.; (iii) prays his usual prayer instead of the
centennial prayer required by the Court before the start of the
hearing; (iv) failure to require the parties to hand-carry the order
setting mediation to the mediation center to ensure that the
parties are notified personally of mediation setting; and (v)
knowingly and maliciously rendered an unjust and illegal decision
in Civil Case No. 186797-CV.
In its 1st Indorsement[16] dated August 28, 2013, the OCA required
Judge Lorredo to file his Comment to the Supplemental
Complaint within 10 days from receipt thereof.
In his Comment to the Supplemental Complaint,[17] Judge
Lorredo denied all the charges against him. Also, he referred Atty.
Magno as "petty, dull and slow thinking" and asseverated that
the latter's allegations were "amusing" but "incredibly, super silly".
THE RECOMMENDATION OF OCA
In a Memorandum[18] dated March 3, 2016, the OCA
recommended that Judge Lorredo be found guilty of conduct
unbecoming a judge and be fined in the amount of P5,000 with
a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar act shall
be dealt with more severely.
The OCA held that it is improper for a member of the bench to
humiliate a lawyer, litigant, or witness. Instead, he must carefully
choose his words, written or spoken, with utmost care and
sufficient control.
THE RULING OF THE COURT
After a careful review of the records of the case, the Court finds
that the recommendation of the OCA is proper under the
circumstances.
Respondent Judge Lorredo
should be more circumspect in
his language in the discharge of
his duties
A member of the bench "is the visible representation of the
law".[19] Thus, the law frowns upon even any manifestation of
impropriety in a magistrate's activities. In fact, it has often been
ruled that a judge must be like Ceasar's wife - above suspicion
and beyond reproach.[20]
Indeed, the CJC mandates all members of the bench to be
models of propriety at all times. Canon 4 thereof provides:
CANON 4
PROPRIETY
Propriety and the appearance of propriety are essential to the
performance of all the activities of a judge.
SECTION 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance
of impropriety in all of their activities.
xxx
SEC. 6. Judges, like any other citizen, are entitled to freedom of
expression, belief, association and assembly, but in exercising
such rights, they shall always conduct themselves in such a
manner as to preserve the dignity of the judicial office and the
impartiality and independence of the judiciary.
In the present case, Judge Lorredo's insulting statements during
the preliminary conference and in his pleadings before the Court
are obviously offensive, distasteful, and inexcusable. Certainly,
while Judge Lorredo's concern on the misrepresentation
committed by Atty. Magno before the RTC is understandable, he
should not have disregarded the rules on proper decorum at the
expense of the integrity of the court.
As correctly observed by the OCA in its Memorandum, Judge
Lorredo failed to exercise caution in his speech, keeping in mind
that his conduct in and outside the courtroom is always under
constant observation. The Memorandum in part states:
[Judge Lorredo] acted inappropriately when he repeatedly
badgered [Atty. Magno] about how the latter was able to
"convince" the RTC, Manila and secure a reversal of his decision.
[Judge Lorredo] did not even attempt to hide his sarcasm and
hold back his irritation towards [Atty. Magno] when he
indiscriminately and unashamedly used the word "stupid" in his
Supplemental Rejoinder and referred to [Atty. Magno] as "petty,
dull and slow thinking" and "pathological or compulsive liar" in his
Comment on the Supplemental Complaint.[21]
Atty. Magno failed to present
sufficient evidence to prove his
allegations in his Supplemental
Complaint
In Magsucang v. Judge Balgos,[22] the Court elucidated that:
A judge enjoys the presumption of regularity in the performance
of his function no less than any other public officer. The
presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by
affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty.
The presumption, however, prevails until it is overcome by no less
than clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. Thus, unless
the presumption is rebutted, it becomes conclusive. Every
reasonable intendment will be made in support of the
presumption and in case of doubt as to an officers act being
lawful or unlawful, construction should be in favor of its
lawfulness.[23]
Moreover, it is well settled that in administrative proceedings, the
burden of proof that respondent committed the acts
complained of rests on the complainant.[24] Mere allegations,
however, in the complaint must be supported by evidence to
establish that a judge has overstepped the parameters of his
official prerogative.[25] Here, the Court finds that Atty. Magno
failed to submit any evidence that will corroborate his assertion
of irregularities against Judge Lorredo, as alleged in the
Supplemental Complaint.
Penalty to be imposed against
Judge Lorredo for conduct
unbecoming of a judge
Conduct unbecoming of a judge is classified as a light offense
under Section 10, Rule 140. The same is penalized under Section
11 (c) thereof by any of the following: (i) fine of not less than
P1,000 but not exceeding P10,000; (ii) censure; (iii) reprimand;
and (iv) admonition with warning.
In Correa v. Judge Belen,[26] the Court, taking into consideration
that the complaint is not Judge Belen's first infraction, fined him
in the amount of P10,000 for his use of intemperate language and
inappropriate actions in dealing with counsels, such as the
complainant therein, appearing in his courtroom.
Here, considering that this is the first offense of Judge Lorreda, the
Court finds that the recommendation of the OCA for the
imposition of fine in the amount of P5,000 is commensurate.
As a final note, the Court reiterates that members of the bench,
as dispensers of justice, should always observe judicial
temperament and to avoid offensive or intemperate
language.[27] This is the price that judges have to pay for their
exalted positions in the administration of justice.[28] Improper
conduct on their part erodes public confidence in the
judiciary.[29] Consequently, they are called upon to avoid any
impression of impropriety in order to protect the image and
integrity of the judiciary.[30]
WHEREFORE, the Court finds Judge Jorge Emmanuel M. Lorredo,
Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, Branch
26, GUILTY of Conduct Unbecoming of a Judge and FINE him in
the amount of P5,000 with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of
the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
CANON 5
EQUALITY
On November 6, 2012, he accompanied Flores and introduced
her to the owner of Carolina Marketing. In order for Carolina
Marketing to accept a post-dated check as payment, Mendoza
agreed to guarantee the transaction. After, they proceeded to
Makati City Hall to see Judge Diasen, who gave them a check
for P70,000.00 to pay for the 50 sacks of rice. He also asked to
increase his order to 70 sacks, replacing his first check with a post-
dated check for P112,000.00 dated November 16, 2012.
Mendoza averred that the check was signed in his presence and
was dated November 16, 2012.3

Mendoza alleged that when the check was presented for

10. A.M. No. MTJ-17-1900 [Formerly OCA IPI No. 13-2585-MTJ], payment to Carolina Marketing, it was dishonored due to
August 09, 2017 insufficiency of funds. Carolina Marketing then sought payment
for the sacks of rice from Mendoza. Mendoza tried to inform
ARNEL MENDOZA, Complainant, v. HON. MARCOS C. DIASEN, JR., Flores and Judge Diasen about the matter but Judge Diasen was
ACTING PRESIDING JUDGE, METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT, BR. 62, never in his office and Flores was never at her residence. Thus, he
MAKATI CITY, Respondent. was constrained to file this Complaint.4
RESOLUTION
In his Comment,5 Judge Diasen denies that he personally knew
LEONEN, J.: Mendoza. As for Flores, he alleged that she was introduced to
him sometime in 2010 by a common friend and she would often
This is an administrative case charging Acting Presiding Judge
visit him at his office after work hours, sometimes accompanied
Marcos C. Diasen, Jr. (Judge Diasen), Metropolitan Trial Court,
by her relatives. He admitted knowing that Flores was single and
Branch 62, Makati City with violation of the Code of Judicial
unemployed.6
Conduct.
Judge Diasen alleged that sometime in 2012, Flores told him that
Arnel G. Mendoza (Mendoza) was a driver of a public utility
she needed extra income and wanted to sell rice to employees
vehicle, whose services were engaged several times by Cristy
of the Makati City Hall. Since she lacked the required capital, he
Flores (Flores). Mendoza alleged that he met Judge Diasen
agreed to lend her money out of pity. He claimed that the loan
through Flores and that Judge Diasen hired his services to go to
was on the condition that she would show him the rice she was
San Pedro and Sta. Rosa, Laguna.1
planning to buy and she would pay the loan from the proceeds
of the sale.7
Mendoza alleged that on November 5, 2012, Judge Diasen
called and asked him to assist Flores in looking for a rice retailer
On November 6, 2012, he issued and delivered a post-dated
where he could purchase 50 sacks of rice.2
check to Flores in the amount of P112,000.00. Flores assured him
that she would present the sacks of rice at the Makati City Hall on
November 16, 2012.8
He alleged that a few days after he issued the check, he came
across an envelope given by Flores sometime in 2010. Inside the
envelope were documents showing that Flores had been
previously convicted of numerous charges of estafa.9
On November 16, 2012, he waited for Flores at the back of Makati
City Hall but she did not show up with the sacks of rice. He
surmised that Flores connived with Mendoza to encash the
check at a discounted amount but he was able to prevent being
defrauded by notifying the bank to stop payment on the
check.10
In a Report11 dated December 22, 2016, Makati City Executive
Judge Elmo M. Alameda (Judge Alameda) recommended the
dismissal of the Complaint. In the investigation conducted,
Judge Alameda found that the submission of the photocopies of
the sales invoice, check, and check return advice was
insufficient to prove that Judge Diasen ordered 70 sacks of rice
and refused to pay for them.12 Judge Alameda noted that
Carolina Anaya, the proprietor of Carolina Marketing, failed to
appear in the investigation despite notice; thus, due execution
of the sales invoice and the check was not proven.13 He also
noted that Mendoza did not file the appropriate civil or criminal
case despite being allegedly issued a bouncing check.14
However, in a Memorandum15 dated April 10, 2017, the Office of
the Court Administrator recommended that Judge Diasen be
found guilty of conduct unbecoming a judge.16 The Office of the
Court Administrator disagreed with the findings of Judge
Alameda and noted that he arrived at his conclusion based only
on the records since the parties failed to attend the scheduled
hearing on November 28, 2016.17
The Office of the Court Administrator found that despite the
unsubstantiated allegation that Judge Diasen issued a bouncing
check, Judge Diasen had admitted that he would have profited
from the sales of rice had it been delivered. Judge Diasen also
admitted that he "took an active role in the prospective sale by
notifying employees of the Makati City Hall, and he even had 'to
advise would be buyers to come back the following day, which
[was] Saturday,' when Flores failed to arrive with the rice on the
agreed date."18
The Office of the Court Administrator found that Judge Diasen's
actions "disclose a deficiency in prudence and discretion that a
member of the Judiciary must exercise in the performance of his
official functions and of his activities as a private individual."19
Thus, the Office of the Court Administrator recommended that:
1. Hon. Marcos C. Diasen, Jr., former Acting Presiding Judge,
Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 62, Makati City, be found
GUILTY of conduct unbecoming a judge; and
2. Respondent Judge Diasen be REPRIMANDED to refrain
from further acts of impropriety with a STERN WARNING
that a repetition of the same or any similar act will be dealt
with severely.20
This Court adopts the findings of fact and conclusions of law of
the Office of the Court Administrator. The Code of Judicial
Conduct instructs that judges "should avoid impropriety and the
appearance of impropriety in all activities."21 Judges must at all
times conduct themselves in a manner beyond reproach to
ensure the public's continued confidence in the judiciary.22
Under Canon 5, Rule 5.02:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Rule 5.02. - A judge shall refrain from financial and business
dealings that tend to reflect adversely on the court's impartiality,
interfere with the proper performance of judicial activities or
increase involvement with lawyers or persons likely to come
before the court. A judge should so manage investments and
other financial interests as to minimize the number of cases giving C. If the respondent is guilty of a light charge, any of the following
grounds for disqualification. sanctions shall be imposed:

As this Court explained in Dionisio v. Hon. Escano:23

1. A fine of not less than P1,000.00 but not exceeding P10,000.00
The restriction enshrined under Rules 5.02 and 5.03 of the Code and/or
of Judicial Ethics on judges with regard to their own business 2. Censure;
interests is based on the possible interference which may be 3. Reprimand;
created by these business involvements in the exercise of their 4. Admonition with warning. 27

judicial duties which may tend to corrode the respect and dignity
For violation of Rule 5.02, this Court has imposed a range of
of the courts as the bastion of justice. Judges must not allow
penalties from reprimand,28 a fine of P2,000.00,29 a fine of
themselves to be distracted from the performance of their
P5,000.00,30 a fine of P8,000.0031 to a suspension for six (6)
judicial tasks by other lawful enterprises. It has been a time-
months.32
honored rule that judges and all court employees should
endeavor to maintain at all times the confidence and high
This appears to be Judge Diasen's first offense. He has also retired
respect accorded to those who wield the gavel of justice.24
from the judiciary as of January 17, 2017;33 thus, a reprimand with
Judge Diasen's act of attempting to sell rice to his employees and warning would not serve its purpose. This Court hereby finds a fine
to employees of other branches was highly improper. As a judge, of P5,000.00 to be sufficient penalty for his acts.
he exercised moral ascendancy and supervision over these
employees. If the sale had pushed through, he would have WHEREFORE, respondent Hon. Marcos C. Diasen, Jr., former
profited from his position. As the Office of the Court Administrator Acting Presiding Judge, Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 62,
observed:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary Makati City is found GUILTY of conduct unbecoming a judge and
is hereby FINED the amount of P5,000.00.
[Judge Diasen] cannot also deny that his position did not
influence the "would-be buyers" to actually partake in the sale of The 1st Indorsement dated July 4, 2017 of Deputy Court
rice. If employees of the other court branches and offices of the Administrator Thelma C. Bahia and letter dated May 18, 2017 of
Makati City Hall could be persuaded to buy the subject rice Hon. Marcos C. Diasen, Jr. are NOTED.
because a judge asked them to, what more with the employees
of his own branch[?]25 SO ORDERED.
For his improper acts, Judge Diasen is found guilty of conduct
unbecoming a judge.
CANON 6
This Court, however, finds that a modification of the
COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE
recommended penalty of reprimand is in order. Under Rule 140
of the Rules of Court, conduct unbecoming a judge is considered
a light charge,26 punishable by the following
11. G.R. No. 196894 March 3, 2014
sanctions:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
JESUS G. CRISOLOGO and NANETTE B. CRISOLOGO, Petitioners,
vs.
JEWM AGRO-INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION, Respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court challenging the May 6, 2011 Decision1 of the Court of
Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. SP No. 03896-MIN, which affirmed the
September 27, 2010,2 October 7, 20103 and November 9, 20104
Orders of the Regional Trial Court, Davao City, Branch 14 (RTC-Br.
14), in Civil Case No. 33,551-2010, an action for Cancellation of
Lien. It is entitled "JEWM Agro-Industrial Corporation v. The
Registry of Deeds for the City of Davao. Sheriff Robert Medialdea.
John & Jane Does. and all persons acting under their directions.
This controversy stemmed from various cases of collection for sum
of money filed against So Keng Kok, the owner of various
properties including two (2) parcels of land covered by TCT Nos.
292597 and 292600 (subject properties), which were attached by
various creditors including the petitioners in this case. As a result,
the levies were annotated on the back of the said titles.
Petitioners Jesus G. Crisologo and Nannette B. Crisologo (Spouses
Crisologo) were the plaintiffs in two (2) collection cases before
RTC, Branch 15, Davao City (RTC-Br. 15), docketed as Civil Case
Nos. 26,810-98 and 26,811-98, against Robert Limso, So Keng Koc,
et al. Respondent JEWM Agro-Industrial Corporation (JEWM) was
the successor-in-interest of one Sy Sen Ben, the plaintiff in another
collection case before RTC, Branch 8, Davao City (RTC-Br. 8),
docketed as Civil Case No. 26,513-98, against the same
defendants.
On October 19, 1998, RTC-Br. 8 rendered its decision based on a
compromise agreement, dated October 15, 1998, between the
parties wherein the defendants in said case were directed to
transfer the subject properties in favor of Sy Sen Ben. The latter
subsequently sold the subject properties to one Nilda Lam who,
in turn, sold the same to JEWM on June 1, 2000. Thereafter, TCT
Nos. 325675 and 325676 were eventually issued in the name of
JEWM, both of which still bearing the same annotations as well as
the notice of lis pendens in connection with the other pending
cases filed against So Keng Kok.
A year thereafter, Spouses Crisologo prevailed in the separate
collection case filed before RTC-Br. 15 against Robert Lim So and
So Keng Koc (defendants). Thus, on July 1, 1999, the said
defendants were ordered to solidarily pay the Spouses Crisologo.
When this decision attained finality, they moved for execution.
On June 15, 2010, a writ was eventually issued.
Acting on the same, the Branch Sheriff issued a notice of sale
scheduling an auction on August 26, 2010. The notice of sale
included, among others, the subject properties covered by TCT
Nos. 325675 and 325676, now, in the name of JEWM.
In the same proceedings, JEWM immediately filed its Affidavit of
Third Party Claim and the Urgent Motion Ad Cautelam. It prayed
for the exclusion of the subject properties from the notice of sale.
In an order, dated August 26, 2010, however, the motion was
denied. In turn, the Spouses Crisologo posted a bond in order to
proceed with the execution.
To protect its interest, JEWM filed a separate action for
cancellation of lien with prayer for the issuance of a preliminary
injunction before RTC-Br. 14, docketed as Civil Case No. 33,551-
2010. It prayed for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
to prevent the public sale of the subject properties covered in
the writ of execution issued pursuant to the ruling of RTC-Br. 15;
the cancellation of all the annotations on the back of the
pertinent TCTs; and the issuance of a permanent injunction order
after trial on the merits. "The Register of Deeds of Davao City,
Sheriff Robert Medialdea, John and Jane Does and all persons
acting under their direction" were impleaded as defendants.
At the scheduled hearing before RTC-Br. 14 on September 22,
2010, Spouses Crisologo’s counsel appeared and filed in open
court their Very Urgent Manifestation questioning the authority of
the said court to restrain the execution proceedings in RTC-Br. 15.
JEWM opposed it on the ground that Spouses Crisologo were not
parties in the case.
On September 24, 2010, Spouses Crisologo filed an Omnibus
Motion praying for the denial of the application for writ or
preliminary injuction filed by JEWM and asking for their
recognition as parties. No motion to intervene was, however, filed
as the Spouses Crisologo believed that it was unnecessary since
they were already the John and Jane Does named in the
complaint.
In the Order, dated September 27, 2010, RTC-Br. 14 denied
Spouses Crisologo’s Omnibus Motion and granted JEWM’s
application for a writ of preliminary injunction.
On October 1, 2010, Spouses Crisologo filed a Very Urgent
Omnibus Motion before RTC-Br. 14 praying for reconsideration
and the setting aside of its September 27, 2010 Order. This was
denied in the RTC Br.-14’s October 7, 2010 Order for lack of legal
standing in court considering that their counsel failed to make
the written formal notice of appearance. The copy of this order
was received by Spouses Crisologo on October 22, 2010. It must
be noted, however, that on October 27, 2010, they received
another order, likewise dated October 7, 2010, giving JEWM time
to comment on their Very Urgent Omnibus Motion filed on
October 1, 2010. In its Order, dated November 9, 2010, however,
RTC-Br. 14 again denied the Very Urgent Motion previously filed
by Spouses Crisologo.
On November 12, 2010, JEWM moved to declare the
"defendants" in default which was granted in an order given in
open court on November 19, 2010.
Spouses Crisologo then filed their Very Urgent Manifestation,
dated November 30, 2010, arguing that they could not be
deemed as defaulting parties because they were not referred to
in the pertinent motion and order of default.
On November 19, 2010, Spouses Crisologo filed with the CA a
petition for certiorari5 under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assailing
the RTC-Br. 14 orders, dated September 27, 2010, October 7, 2010
and November 9, 2010, all of which denied their motion to be
recognized as parties. They also prayed for the issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction.
In its Resolution, dated January 6, 2011, the CA denied the
application for a TRO, but directed Spouses Crisologo to amend
their petition. On January 19, 2011, the Spouses Crisologo filed
their Amended Petition6 with prayers for the issuance of a TRO
and/or writ of preliminary injunction, the annulment of the
aforementioned orders of RTC Br. 14, and the issuance of an
order dissolving the writ of preliminary injunction issued in favor of
JEWM.
Pending disposition of the Amended Petition by the CA, JEWM
filed a motion on December 6, 2010 before RTC-Br. 14 asking for
the resolution of the case on the merits.
On January 10, 2011, RTC-Br. 14 ruled in favor of JEWM, with the
dispositive portion of its Decision7 stating as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby
rendered in favor of the plaintiff as follows:
1. the preliminary writ of injunction issued on October 5, 2010 is
hereby made permanent;
2. directing herein defendant Registry of Deeds of Davao City
where the subject lands are located, to cancel all existing liens
and encumbrances on TCT No. T-325675 and T-325676 registered
in the name of the plaintiff, and pay the
3. cost of suit.
SO ORDERED.8
Spouses Crisologo then filed their Omnibus Motion Ex Abudanti
ad Cautelam, asking RTC- Br. 14 to reconsider the above
decision. Because no motion for intervention was filed prior to the
rendition of the judgment, a certificate, dated March 17, 2011,
was issued declaring the January 10, 2011 decision final and
executory.
On May 6, 2011, the CA eventually denied the Amended Petition
filed by Spouses Crisologo for lack of merit. It ruled that the writ of
preliminary injunction subject of the petition was already fait
accompli and, as such, the issue of grave abuse of discretion
attributed to RTC-Br. 14 in granting the relief had become moot
and academic. It further held that the failure of Spouses
Crisologo to file their motion to intervene under Rule 19 rendered
Rule 65 inapplicable as a vehicle to ventilate their supposed right
in the case.9
Hence, this petition.
ISSUES
I. The Court of Appeals erred in holding that the action for
Cancellation of Annotations may proceed even without notice
to and impleading the party/ies who caused the annotations, in
clear contravention of the rule on joinder of parties and basic
due process.
II. The Court of Appeals erred in applying a very constrictive
interpretation of the rules in holding that a motion to intervene is
the only way an otherwise real party in interest could participate.
III. The Court of Appeals erred in denying our application for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or a writ of
preliminary injunction.
IV. The Court of Appeals erred in holding that the issues raised by
petitioners before it [had] been mooted by the January 10, 2011
decision of RTC Branch 14.10
Spouses Crisologo submit as error the CA affirmation of the RTC-
Br. 14 ruling that the action for cancellation may proceed without
them being impleaded. They allege deprivation of their right to
due process when they were not impleaded in the case before
RTC-Br. 14 despite the claim that they stand, as indispensable
parties, to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the action
for the cancellation of annotations covering the subject
properties. They cite Gonzales v. Judge Bersamin,11 among
others, as authority. In that case, the Court ruled that pursuant to
Section 108 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529, notice must be
given to all parties in interest before the court may hear and
determine the petition for the cancellation of annotations on the
certificates of title.
The Spouses Crisologo also question the statement of the CA that
their failure to file the motion to intervene under Rule 19 before
RTC-Br. 14 barred their participation in the cancellation
proceedings. They put emphasis on the court’s duty to, at the
very least, suspend the proceedings before it and have such
indispensable parties impleaded.
As to the ruling on the denial of their application for the issuance
of a TRO or writ of preliminary injunction, Spouses Crisologo claim
that their adverse interest, evinced by the annotations at the
back of the certificates of title, warranted the issuance of a TRO
or writ of preliminary injunction against JEWM’s attempt to cancel
the said annotations in violation of their fundamental right to due
process.
Lastly, Spouses Crisologo cast doubt on the CA ruling that the
issues presented in their petition were mooted by the RTC-Br. 14
Decision, dated January 10, 2011. Having been rendered without
impleading indispensable parties, the said decision was void and
could not have mooted their petition.
In their Comment,12 JEWM asserts that Spouses Crisologo’s failure
to file a motion to intervene, pleadings-in-intervention, appeal or
annulment of judgment, which were plain, speedy and
adequate remedies then available to them, rendered recourse
to Rule 65 as improper; that Spouses Crisologo lacked the legal
standing to file a Rule 65 petition since they were not impleaded
in the proceedings before RTC-Br. 14; and that Spouses Crisologo
were not indispensable parties since their rights over the
properties had been rendered ineffective by the final and
executory October 19, 1998 Decision of RTC-Br. 8 which disposed
unconditionally and absolutely the subject properties in favor of
its predecessor-in-interest.
JEWM further argues that, on the assumption that Section 108 of
P.D. No. 1529 applies, no notice to Spouses Crisologo was
required because they were not real parties-in-interest in the
case before RTC-Br. 14, or even if they were, their non-
participation in the proceedings was because of their failure to
properly intervene pursuant to Rule 19; and, lastly, that the case
before RTC-Br. 14 became final and executory because Spouses
Crisologos did not perfect an appeal therefrom, thus, rendering
the issues in the CA petition moot and academic.
In their Reply,13 Spouses Crisologo restate the applicability of
Section 108 of P.D. No. 1529 to the effect that any cancellation
of annotation of certificates of title must be carried out by giving
notice to all parties-in-interest. This they forward despite their
recognition of the mootness of their assertion over the subject
properties, to wit:
Again, we respect JAIC’s position that "the claims of subsequent
attaching creditors (including petitioners’) have been rendered
moot and academic, and hence the entries in favor of said
creditors have no more legal basis and therefore must be
cancelled." But we likewise at least ask a modicum of respect by
at least being notified and heard.14
The Ruling of the Court
The crux of this controversy is whether the CA correctly ruled that
RTC-Br. 14 acted without grave abuse of discretion in failing to
recognize Spouses Crisologo as indispensable parties in the case
for cancellation of lien.
In this respect, the Court agrees with Spouses Crisologo.
In an action for the cancellation of memorandum annotated at
the back of a certificate of title, the persons considered as
indispensable include those whose liens appear as annotations
pursuant to Section 108 of P.D. No. 1529,15 to wit:
Section 108. Amendment and alteration of certificates. -No
erasure, alteration or amendment shall be made upon the
registration book after the entry of a certificate of title or of a
memorandum thereon and the attestation of the same by the
Register of Deeds, except by order of the proper Court of First
Instance. A registered owner or other person having an interest
in registered property, or, in proper cases, the Register of Deeds
with the approval of the Commissioner of Land Registration, may
apply by petition to the court upon the ground that the
registered interests of any description, whether vested,
contingent, expectant inchoate appearing on the certificate,
have terminated and ceased; or that new interest not appearing
upon the certificates have arisen or been created; or that an
omission or error was made in entering a certificate or
memorandum thereon, or on any duplicate certificate; x x x or
upon any other reasonable ground; and the court may hear and
determine the petition after notice to all parties in interest, and
may order the entry or cancellation of a new certificate, the
entry or cancellation of a memorandum upon a certificate, or
grant any other relief upon such terms and conditions, requiring
security or bond if necessary, as it may consider proper.
In Southwestern University v. Laurente,16 the Court held that the
cancellation of the annotation of an encumbrance cannot be
ordered without giving notice to the parties annotated in the
certificate of title itself. It would, thus, be an error for a judge to
contend that no notice is required to be given to all the persons
whose liens were annotated at the back of a certificate of title.
Here, undisputed is the fact that Spouses Crisologo’s liens were
indeed annotated at the back of TCT Nos. 325675 and 325676.
Thus, as persons with their liens annotated, they stand to be
benefited or injured by any order relative to the cancellation of
annotations in the pertinent TCTs. In other words, they are as
indispensable as JEWM itself in the final disposition of the case for
cancellation, being one of the many lien holders.
As indispensable parties, Spouses Crisologo should have been
joined as defendants in the case pursuant to Section 7, Rule 3 of
the Rules of Court, to wit:
SEC. 7. Compulsory joinder of indispensable parties. – Parties in
interest without whom no final determination can be had of an
action shall be joined either as plaintiffs or defendants.17
The reason behind this compulsory joinder of indispensable
parties is the complete determination of all possible issues, not
only between the parties themselves but also as regards other
persons who may be affected by the judgment.18
In this case, RTC-Br. 14, despite repeated pleas by Spouses
Crisologo to be recognized as indispensable parties, failed to
implement the mandatory import of the aforecited rule.
In fact, in Sps. Crisologo v. Judge George E. Omelio,19 a related
administrative case, the Court found the trial judge guilty of gross
ignorance of the law when it disregarded the claims of Spouses
Crisologo to participate. In part, the Court stated:
This is not the first time Judge Omelio has rendered a decision
affecting third parties’ interests, without even notifying the
indispensable parties. In the first disputed case, JEWM Agro-
Industrial Corporation v. Register of Deeds, Sheriff Medialdea,
John & Jane Does and all persons acting under their directions,
Judge Omelio failed to cause the service of proper summons
upon the John and Jane Does impleaded in the complaint. Even
when Sps. Crisologo voluntarily appeared in court to be
recognized as the John and Jane Does, Judge Omelio refused
to acknowledge their appearance and ordered the striking out
of Sps. Crisologos' pleadings. For this reason, the Investigating
Justice recommended admonishing Judge Omelio for failing to
recognize the Sps.Crisologo as indispensable parties in that case.
xxx xxx xxx
Clearly, the cancellation of the annotation of the sale without
notifying the buyers, Sps. Crisologo, is a violation of the latter’s
right to due process. Since this is the second time that Judge
Omelio has issued an order which fails to notify or summon the
indispensable parties, we find Judge Omelio guilty of gross
ignorance of the law, with a warning that repetition of the same
or similar act will merit a stiffer penalty in the future.
xxx
WHEREFORE, … We find Judge George E. Omelio GUILTY of four
counts of the serious charge of gross ignorance of the law for the
following acts: (a) refusing to recognize Spouses Jesus G.
Crisologo and Nannette B. Crisologo as indispensable parties; …
in violation of the latter's right to due process. Accordingly, we
impose upon Judge George E. Omelio the penalty of fine of Forty
Thousand Pesos (₱40,000.00), with a warning that repetition of the
same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.20
The trial court should have exercised prudence in denying
Spouses Crisologo’s pleas to be recognized as indispensable
parties. In the words of the Court, "Judge Omelio should be
penalized for failing to recognize Sps. Crisologo as indispensable
parties and for requiring them to file a motion to intervene,
considering that a simple perusal of the certificates of title would
show Sps. Crisologo’s adverse rights because their liens are
annotated at the back of the titles."21
This manifest disregard of the basic rules and procedures
constitutes a grave abuse of discretion.
In State Prosecutors II Comilang and Lagman v. Judge Medel
Belen,22 the Court held as inexcusable abuse of authority the trial
judge’s "obstinate disregard of basic and established rule of law
or procedure." Such level of ignorance is not a mere error of
judgment. It amounts to "evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual
refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in
contemplation of law,"23 or in essence, grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
Needless to say, judges are expected to exhibit more than just a
cursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural laws. They
must know the laws and apply them properly in good faith as
judicial competence requires no less.24
Despite the clear existence of grave abuse of discretion on the
part of RTC-Br. 14, JEWM asserts technical grounds on why the CA
did not err in dismissing the petition via Rule 65. It states that:
a) The Crisologos could have used other available remedies such
as intervention under Rule 19, an appeal of the judgment, or
even an annulment of judgment, which are, by all means, plain,
speedy and adequate remedies in the ordinary course of law;
b) The Crisologos lack legal standing to file the Rule 65 petition
since they were not impleaded in the Branch 14 case.
The rule is that a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is proper only
if there is no appeal, or any plain speedy, and adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of law.
In this case, no adequate recourse, at that time, was available
to Spouses Crisologo, except resorting to Rule 65.
Although Intervention under Rule 19 could have been availed of,
failing to use this remedy should not prejudice Spouses Crisologo.
It is the duty of RTC-Br. 14, following the rule on joinder of
indispensable parties, to simply recognize them, with or without
any motion to intervene. Through a cursory reading of the titles,
the Court would have noticed the adverse rights of Spouses
Crisologo over the cancellation of any annotations in the subject
TCTs.
Neither will appeal prove adequate as a remedy since only the
original parties to an action can appeal.25 Here, Spouses
Crisologo were never impleaded. Hence, they could not have
utilized appeal as they never possessed the required legal
standing in the first place.
And even if the Court assumes the existence of the legal standing
to appeal, it must be remembered that the questioned orders
were interlocutory in character and, as such, Spouses Crisologo
would have to wait, for the review by appeal, until the rendition
of the judgment on the merits, which at that time may not be
coming as speedy as practicable. While waiting, Spouses
Crisologo would have to endure the denial of their right, as
indispensable parties, to participate in a proceeding in which
their indispensability was obvious. Indeed, appeal cannot
constitute an adequate, speedy and plain remedy.
The same is also true if recourse to Annulment of Judgment under
Rule 47 is made since this remedy presupposes a final judgment
already rendered by a trial court.
At any rate, the remedy against an interlocutory order, not
subject of an appeal, is an appropriate special civil action under
Rule 65, provided that the interlocutory order is rendered without
or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. Only
then is certiorari under Rule 65 allowed to be resorted to.26
This takes particular relevance in this case where, as previously
discussed, RTC-Br. 14 acted with grave abuse of discretion in not
recognizing Spouses Crisologo as indispensable parties to the
pertinent action.
Based on the above, recourse to the CA via Rule 65 would have
already been proper, except for one last issue, that is, Spouses
Crisologo’s legal standing to file the same. JEWM cites DBP v.
COA27 where the Court held:
The petition for certiorari under Rule 65, however, is not available
to any person who feels injured by the decision of a tribunal,
board or officer exercising judicial or quasi judicial functions. The
‘person aggrieved’ under Section 1 of Rule 65 who can avail of
the special civil action of certiorari pertains only to one who was
a party in the proceedings before the court a quo, or in this case
before the COA. To hold otherwise would open the courts to
numerous and endless litigations.
Under normal circumstances, JEWM would be correct in their
averment that the lack of legal standing on the part of Spouses
Crisologo in the case before RTC-Br. 14 prevents the latter’s
recourse via Rule 65.
This case, however, is an exception. In many instances, the Court
has ruled that technical rules of procedures should be used to
promote, not frustrate the cause of justice. Rules of procedure
are tools designed not to thwart but to facilitate the attainment
of justice; thus, their strict and rigid application may, for good and
deserving reasons, have to give way to, and be subordinated by,
the need to aptly dispense substantial justice in the normal
cause.28
Be it noted that the effect of their non-participation as
indispensable parties is to preclude the judgment, orders and the
proceedings from attaining finality. Time and again, the Court
has ruled that the absence of an indispensable party renders all
subsequent actions of the court null and void for want of
authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even to
those present. Consequently, the proceedings before RTC-Br. 14
were null and void including the assailed orders, which may be
"ignored wherever and whenever it exhibits its head."29
To turn a blind eye to the said nullity and, in turn, rule as improper
the recourse to Rule 65 by the lack of legal standing is to prolong
the denial of due process to the persons whose interests are
indispensible to the final disposition of the case. It will only result
in a protracted litigation as Spouses Crisologo will be forced to
rely on a petition for the annulment of judgment before the CA
(as the last remaining remedy), which may again reach this
Court.1âwphi1 To prevent multiplicity of suits and to expedite the
swift administration of justice, the CA should have applied
liberality by striking down the assailed orders despite the lack of
legal standing on the part of Spouses Crisologo to file the Rule 65
petition before it. Besides, this lacking requirement, of which
Spouses Crisologo were not even at fault, is precisely the reason
why this controversy arose.
All told, the CA erred in dismissing the amended petition filed
before it and in not finding grave abuse of discretion on the part
of RTC-Br. 14.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The May 6, 2011 Decision
of the Court of Appeals is NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. The
September 27, 2010, October 7, 2010 and November 9, 2010
Orders of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14, Davao City, are
likewise NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. Civil Case No. 33,551-2010 is
hereby REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings. The
respondent is ordered to implead all parties whose annotations
appear at the back of Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 325675 and
325676.
SO ORDERED.
12. A.M. No. MTJ-13-1838 March 12, 2014
[Formerly A.M. OCA IPI NO. 10-2260-MTJ]
SPOUSES RICARDO and EVELYN MARCELO, Complainants,
vs.
JUDGE RAMSEY DOMINGO G. PICHAY, METROPOLITAN TRIAL
COURT, BRANCH 78, PARANAQUE CITY, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Before the Court is an administrative complaint1 filed against
respondent Judge Ramsey Domingo G. Pichay (Judge Pichay)
for delay in the disposition of the pending incidents relative to
Civil Case No. 2004-286 entitled "Spouses Ricardo S. Marcelo and
Evelyn Beato-Marcelo ([Sps. Marcelo]) v. Spouses Vilma
Magopoy and Florentino Magopoy ([Sps. Magopoy]).
The Facts
Complainants Sps. Marcelo were the plaintiffs in Civil Case No.
2004-286 for unlawful detainer before the Metropolitan Trial Court
of Parañaque City, Branch 78 (MeTC). By virtue of a Joint
Decision2 dated September 5, 2005 (subject decision), the
defendants therein, Sps. Magopoy, were ordered by the MeTC
to vacate and surrender the possession of the property located
at Marcelo Compound, Philip Street Extension, Barangay
Moonwalk, Parañaque City (subject property) to Sps. Marcelo.3
On April 14, 2006, a writ of execution4 was issued, and later
implemented by Branch Sheriff Hildo D. Epres (Sheriff Epres) on
July 27, 2006.5 Thus, Sps. Marcelo obtained the possession of the
subject property on the said date, as shown in the Certificate of
Turn-over of Possession. However, at around 6 o’clock in the
evening of the same day, Sps. Magopoy successfully re-entered
the subject property and regained its possession.6
On August 3, 2007, Sps. Marcelo moved7 to cite Sps. Magopoy in
contempt for disobedience/resistance to lawful court processes.
While finding the act of re-entry by Sps. Magopoy as a clear
defiance of a lawful writ, (i.e., the April 14, 2006 writ of execution)
which is a form of indirect contempt punishable under Rule 71 of
the Rules of Court, the MeTC, in an Order8 dated February 25,
2009, did not cite them in contempt but, instead, ordered them
to surrender the subject property to Sps. Marcelo within ten (10)
days from receipt of the order.9
On June 5, 2009, Sps. Marcelo filed an Ex-Parte Constancia in
view of the continued refusal of Sps. Magopoy to surrender the
subject property.10 This prompted Judge Pichay to issue an
Order11 dated August 7, 2009, giving Sheriff Epres12 three (3) days
within which to effect Sps. Magopoy’s eviction from the subject
property. Consequently, Sps. Magopoy filed a motion for
reconsideration13 on August 26, 2009, which was opposed14 by
Sps. Marcelo on September 8, 2009.15
The hearing on the aforesaid motion was conducted on
September 11, 2009, wherein Sps. Magopoy were directed to file
their reply. In compliance, Sps. Magopoy filed their Supplemental
Motion and Reply on September 24, 2009 (supplemental
motion),16 alleging that the miscellaneous sales application of
Sps. Marcelo over the subject property had been denied by the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources.17 The
following day, Sps. Marcelo filed a motion submitting all incidents
for resolution.18
Instead of resolving the pending incidents, Judge Pichay, in an
Order19 dated October 1, 2009 (October 1, 2009 Order), directed
Sps. Marcelo to file their comment and/or opposition to Sps.
Magopoy’s supplemental motion within five (5) days from receipt
of the order, with a warning that upon the expiration of said
period, the court will resolve the pending incidents. The pertinent
portions of the October 1, 2009 Order read as follows:
With respect to the Supplemental Motion and Reply, and in the
interest of justice, the Court directs [Sps. Marcelo] to file their
Comment and/or Opposition to said Supplemental Motion and
Reply within five (5) days from receipt of this Order with copy
furnished the [Sps. Magopoy]. The latter is given three (3) days
from the Comment and/or Opposition within which to file their
Reply if necessary.
Considering the Ex-Parte Constancia, the Court makes it clear to
the parties that the only pleading left to be received by this Court
is the Comment and/or Opposition of [Sps. Marcelo] on the
Supplemental Motion and Reply of [Sps. Magopoy] and the
Reply of [Sps. Magopoy] to said [Sps. Marcelo’s] Comment
and/or Opposition.
The Court will no longer conduct a hearing on the pending
incidents.
Hence, upon the expiration of the periods given above, the
Court will resolve the pending incidents.20 (Emphases supplied)
Despite the directive of the court a quo, Sps. Marcelo failed to
file their comment and/or opposition. Nonetheless, Judge
Pichay, set Sps. Magopoy’s previous motion for reconsideration
as well as their supplemental motion for hearing on February 12,
2010,21 March 16, 201022 and June 15, 2010.23
Disconcerted with Judge Pichay’s continuous inaction, Sps.
Marcelo filed an administrative complaint24 on March 10, 2010
before the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), charging him
and Sheriff Epres with inordinate delay in the disposition of the
pending incidents in Civil Case No. 2004-286 relating to the
implementation of the writ of execution of the subject decision.
In his Comment dated September 8, 2010,25 Judge Pichay
attributed the delay to the new arguments raised in Sps.
Magopoy’s supplemental motion. In particular, he considered
the denial of the sales application of Sps. Marcelo over the
subject property, as brought to his attention by Sps. Magopoy, as
a supervening event that may materially change the situation of
the parties26 and, thus, render the execution of the subject
decision inequitable.27 Therefore, in the interest of justice and
equity, he scheduled the supplemental motion for hearing in
order to be better apprised of the situation of the parties.
Unfortunately, the hearing dates therefor were further reset due
to the requests of Sps. Marcelo,28 and because he went on sick
leave from June 8 to 29, 2010.29
The Action and Recommendation of the OCA
In a Memorandum30 dated July 22, 2013, the OCA
recommended31 that Judge Pichay be held administratively
liable for undue delay in the resolution of the pending incidents
relative to the execution of the subject decision in Civil Case No.
2004-286, and that a fine in the amount of ₱10,000.00 be imposed
for the infraction.32 The OCA found that Judge Pichay
entertained dilatory machinations that resulted in the delay in the
implementation of the writ of execution issued as early as in 2006
for the eviction of Sps. Magopoy from the subject property.33
Separately, however, the OCA did not recommend that Sheriff
Epres be held administratively liable, considering the dearth of
evidence showing that the delay in the implementation of the
subject writ of execution was attributable to him or that he acted
with bad faith or any corrupt motive.34
Thereafter, the Court, in its Resolution dated November 13, 2013,
dismissed the administrative complaint against Sheriff Epres.35
The Issue Before the Court
The essential issue in this case is whether or not Judge Pichay
should be held administratively liable for undue delay in the
resolution of the pending incidents in Civil Case No. 2004-286.
The Court’s Ruling
The Court concurs with the OCA’s recommendations, subject to
the modification of the recommended penalty to be imposed
against Judge Pichay.
The Constitution requires our courts to conscientiously observe
the time periods in deciding cases and resolving matters brought
to their adjudication, which, for lower courts, is three (3) months
from the date they are deemed submitted for decision or
resolution. Section 15, Article VIII of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution (1987 Constitution) states this rule, viz.:
Section 15. (1) All cases or matters filed after the effectivity of this
Constitution must be decided or resolved within twenty-four
months from date of submission for the Supreme Court, and,
unless reduced by the Supreme Court, twelve months for all lower
collegiate courts, and three months for all other lower courts.
In consonance with the foregoing, Section 5, Canon 6 of the New
Code of Judicial Conduct For the Philippine Judiciary36 states
that:
Sec. 5. Judges shall perform all judicial duties, including the
delivery of reserved decisions, efficiently fairly and with
reasonable promptness. (Emphasis supplied)
In furtherance of the foregoing mandate, the Court issued
Administrative Circular No. 13-8737 [dated July 1, 1987], which
states:
The reorganized judiciary is tasked with the tremendous
responsibility of assisting parties litigants in obtaining just, speedy
and inexpensive determination of their cases and proceedings
as directed in Rule 1, Section 2 of the Rules of Court.38 Delay is a
recurring complaint of every litigant. The main objective of every
judge, particularly trial judges, should be to avoid delays, or if it
cannot be totally avoided, to hold them to the minimum and to
repudiate manifestly dilatory tactics.
GENERAL GUIDELINES
For all members of the judiciary, the following guidelines are
hereby issued:
xxxx
3. Judges shall observe scrupulously the periods prescribed by
Article VIII, Section 15 of the Constitution for the adjudication and
resolution of all cases or matters submitted in their courts. Thus, all
cases or matters must be decided or resolved within twelve
months from date of submission by all lower collegiate courts
while all other lower courts are given a period of three months to
do so. x x x x
Also, [the] Court's Administrative Circular No. 1-8839 [dated
January 28, 1988] states that:
Pursuant to Sec. 12, Art. XVIII of the 1987 Constitution mandating
the adoption of a systematic plan to expedite the decision or
resolution of cases or matters pending in the Supreme Court and
the lower courts prior to the effectivity of the Constitution on
February 2, 1987, the following directives must be complied with
strictly by all concerned.
x x x x40
In Re: Cases Submitted for Decision before Hon. Teofilo D.
Baluma, Former Judge, Branch 1, Tagbilaran City Bohol,41 the
Court held that non-compliance with the periods prescribed
under Section 15, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution constitutes
gross inefficiency, and, perforce, warrants the imposition of
administrative sanctions against the defaulting judge, viz.:
The Court has consistently impressed upon judges the need to
decide cases promptly and expeditiously under the time-
honored precept that justice delayed is justice denied. Every
judge should decide cases with dispatch and should be careful,
punctual, and observant in the performance of his functions for
delay in the disposition of cases erodes the faith and confidence
of our people in the judiciary, lowers its standards and brings it
into disrepute. Failure to decide a case within the reglementary
period is not excusable and constitutes gross inefficiency
warranting the imposition of administrative sanctions on the
defaulting judge. (Emphasis supplied)
While trial court judges are often burdened with heavy case
loads which, in turn, preclude the expeditious resolution of
disputes, they are given the option to, for good reasons, ask for
an extension of the period within which to resolve a particular
case or any pending incident therein. In Re: Report on the
Judicial Audit conducted in the Regional Trial Court, Branches 72
And 22, Narvacan, Ilocos Sur,42 citing the case of Office of the
Court Administrator v. Judge Javellana, the Court thus
remarked:43
x x x [A] judge cannot choose his deadline for deciding cases
pending before him. Without an extension granted by the Court,
the failure to decide even a single case within the required
period constitutes gross inefficiency that merits administrative
sanction. If a judge is unable to comply with the period for
deciding cases or matters, he can, for good reasons, ask for an
extension.
An inexcusable failure to decide a case within the prescribed 90-
day period constitutes gross inefficiency, warranting the
imposition of administrative sanctions such as suspension from
office without pay or fine on the defaulting judge. The fines
imposed vary in each case, depending chiefly on the number of
cases not decided within the reglementary period and other
factors, such as the presence of aggravating or mitigating
circumstances, the damage suffered by the parties as a result of
the delay, the health and age of the judge, and other analogous
circumstances. (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted)
As correctly observed by the OCA in this case, Judge Pichay
failed to resolve the subject motions, namely the motion for
reconsideration and supplemental motion, within the three (3)
month-period prescribed therefor. Records show that Sps.
Marcelo’s period to file their comment/opposition to the
supplemental motion and/ or rejoinder to the reply lapsed on
October 18, 2009,44 at which time, the pending incidents were,
as stated in the Order dated October 1, 2009, already deemed
submitted for resolution. This is concordant with Section 15(2),
Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution which states that "[a] case or
matter shall be deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon
the filing of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum required by
the Rules of Court or by the court itself."
Notwithstanding that the matter had already been submitted for
resolution, Judge Pichay continued with the proceedings by
setting the motions for hearing to the effect of unreasonably
delaying the execution of the subject decision. Indeed, while it
has been held that a presiding judge shall at all times remain in
firm control of the proceedings, he is nevertheless mandated to
adopt a policy against unwarranted delays.45 In this case, Judge
Pichay did not sufficiently explain the reasons as to why he failed
to resolve the pending incidents on time, as well as to why he still
had to set the same for hearing and repeatedly grant
postponements therefor, either motu proprio or by motion,
despite the summary nature of ejectment proceedings and the
ministerial nature of the subsequent issuance of a writ of
execution. These considerations he should have been fully aware
of. As case law instructs, "[e]jectment cases are summary
proceedings intended to provide an expeditious means of
protecting actual possession or right of possession of property,"46
and that "it becomes mandatory or ministerial duty of the court
to issue a writ of execution to enforce the judgment which has
become executory,"47 as in Civil Case No. 2004-286. To add, the
fact that Judge Pichay required medical attention on June 7,
2010 is no excuse for his default, considering that on such date,
the subject motions were already due for resolution.48 Thus,
without having duly applied for any extension before the Court,
Judge Pichay was bound to resolve the pending incidents in the
said case within the three (3) month-period prescribed by the
Constitution. This, he, however, failed to do, and, as such, the
imposition of administrative sanctions against him remains in
order.
Pursuant to Section 9, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, undue delay
in rendering a decision or order is considered as a less serious
offense which is punishable49 by either: (a) suspension from office
without salary and other benefits for not less than one (1) nor
more than three (3) months; or (b) a fine of more than ₱10,000.00
but not exceeding ₱20,000.00. Considering, however, that Judge
Pichay was held administratively liable for the same offense in
A.M. No. MTJ-10-1763 (formerly OCA IPI No. 09-2209-MTJ),50 and
hitherto warned that a repetition of a similar infraction would
warrant a more severe penalty, the Court deems it apt to
increase the fine recommended by the OCA from ₱10,000.00 to
₱12,000.00.
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Ramsey Domingo G. Pichay is
found GUILTY of violating Section 9, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court
for undue delay in resolving the pending incidents relative to Civil
Case No. 2004-286 and is thus FINED in the amount of ₱12,000.00.
He is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar
offense will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
13.
14. A.M. No. RTJ-15-2408 (Formerly OCA IPI No. 13-4134-RTJ),
March 02, 2016
FLORANTE A. MIANO, Complainant, v. MA. ELLEN M. AGUILAR,
Respondent.
The instant administrative case arose from a Verified Complaint1
dated September 10, 2013 filed by complainant Atty. Florante A.
Miano (complainant) before the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) charging respondent Ma. Ellen M. Aguilar
(respondent), Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Burgos, Pangasinan, Branch 70 (RTC-Burgos), with ignorance of
the rules on inhibition and gross inefficiency relative to several
pending cases in her sala.
The Facts
Complainant alleged that he filed motions for inhibition in several
cases raffled to the sala of respondent, specifically Civil Case No.
173-B,2 entitled "Florante A. Miano and Bernadette Atienza v.
Romeo Migano" (Migano case), and Criminal Case No. B-685,3
entitled "People of the Philippines v. Nelson Mores y Madarang"
(Madarang case), which respondent granted.4 In the Migano
case, complainant alleged5 as grounds for respondent's
inhibition his being a "personal friend" of the latter, as in fact
complainant - whom respondent called "Florams," a nickname
only used by close and intimate friends - would often have
dinners and/or lunches together with a common friend at
respondent's house in Quezon City. Moreover, prior to
respondent's appointment to the judiciary, one of her colleagues
at the City Legal Office of Olongapo City, a certain Leonardo M.
Miano, is a first cousin of complainant.6 The OCA was furnished a
copy of the Order of Inhibition dated September 11, 2007.7
Subsequently, however, respondent issued an Order8 dated
October 11, 2007 (October 11, 2007 Order) in the Migano case
directing that the proceedings therein be held in abeyance "until
such time that a new Presiding Judge will be appointed by the
Court Administrator to hear and decide this case."9 Complainant
asserted that this constitutes ignorance of the rules on inhibition
on the part of respondent because according to Administrative
Matter (A.M.) No. 03-8-02-SC,10 where the judge in a single-
branch RTC, such as RTC-Burgos where respondent presides, is
disqualified or voluntarily inhibits from hearing a case, the Order
of Inhibition shall be transmitted to the pairing judge who shall
then hear and decide the case.11 Likewise, complainant
contended that due to the issuance of the October 11, 2007
Order, the proceedings in the Migano case did not move from
the time respondent inhibited therefrom in 2007 up to the filing of
the present administrative complaint.12
Further, complainant accused respondent of gross inefficiency,
citing various instances where the latter failed to resolve motions
for inhibition within the 90-day period prescribed by law. Finally,
he averred that respondent - surprisingly - denied his motions for
inhibition in cases where the opposing counsel is a certain Atty.
Sancho Abasta, Jr. (Atty. Abasta), who hails from the same
province as her. In this regard, complainant claimed that
respondent showed bias as she would usually grant motions for
inhibition that he files before her court, except for the said cases
handled by Atty. Abasta.13
In her comment,14 respondent countered that: (a) she is aware
of the rules on inhibition set forth in A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC and that
the October 11, 2007 Order in the Migano case was only
intended to inform the OCA of her inhibition therefrom; (b) her
Branch Clerk of Court failed to transmit the records of the said
case to the Executive Judge of the multi-sala court of RTC-
Alaminos City, Pangasinan (RTC-Alaminos City), resulting in the
delay in the proceedings therein; (c) her failure to resolve the
motions filed by complainant within the 90-day period was due
to heavy workload, especially considering that, aside from being
the presiding judge of RTC-Burgos, she was also serving as acting
presiding judge in RTC-Alaminos City, Branch 54 in behalf of
Judge Benjamin Abella who already retired from service; and (d)
complainant's motions for inhibition in cases where the opposing
counsel is Atty. Abasta were pro forma, for which reason she
denied the same, and the mere fact that she and Atty. Abasta
hail from the same province is not enough justification for her
inhibition.15
The OCA's Report and Recommendation
In a Report and Recommendation16 dated August 20, 2014, the
OCA found respondent guilty of Gross Ignorance of the
Law/Procedure, Undue Delay in Issuing Orders in Several Cases,
and Undue Delay in Transmitting the Records of a Case.
Accordingly, the OCA recommended that she be meted the
penalty of dismissal from service with forfeiture of all benefits and
privileges, except accrued leave credits, if any, with prejudice to
re-employment in any branch or instrumentality of the
government, including government-owned or controlled
corporations.17
The OCA found that respondent was indeed ignorant of the rules
on inhibition, especially Section 8, Chapter V of A.M. No. 03-8-02-
SC which provides that the Order of Inhibition should be
transmitted to the pairing judge who shall be the one to hear and
decide the case. Her ignorance of such rules was highlighted
when she violated the same by issuing the October 11, 2007
Order in the Migano case which was not solely intended to inform
the OCA of her inhibition therefrom, but also "to hold the case in
abeyance until such time that a new Presiding Judge will be
appointed by the Court Administrator."18 Worse, she caused
undue delay in transmitting the records of the said case to the
appropriate pairing court as such transmittal was effected only
six (6) years after her inhibition therefrom.19
Anent the issue of respondent's failure to resolve motions for
inhibition within the prescribed period, the OCA found that while
her caseload was indeed heavy during the time she failed to
resolve said motions, she made no effort to seek for an extension
of time to resolve them. In this relation, the OCA pointed out that
in such instances, all that respondent needed to do was to
request and justify an extension of time to decide the cases and
the Court would have granted such request, but she failed to do
so.20
The Issue Before the Court
The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not grounds exist
to dismiss respondent from service, as recommended by the
OCA.
The Court's Ruling
The Court concurs with the OCA in finding respondent guilty of
Undue Delay in Issuing Orders in Several Cases and Undue Delay
in Transmitting the Records of a Case, but differs from its finding
that respondent should likewise be held guilty of Gross Ignorance
of the Law/Procedure.
To be able to render substantial justice and maintain public
confidence in the legal system, judges should be embodiments
of competence, integrity and independence. Judges are also
expected to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with
statutes and procedural rules and to apply them properly in all
good faith. They are likewise expected to demonstrate mastery
of the principles of law, keep abreast of prevailing jurisprudence,
and discharge their duties in accordance therewith.21
Corollary thereto, the Court has ruled that when a judge displays
an utter lack of familiarity with the rules, he erodes the public's
confidence in the competence of our courts. Such is gross
ignorance of the law. However, gross ignorance of the law is
more than an erroneous application of legal provisions.22 Not
every error or mistake that a judge commits in the performance
of his duties renders him liable, unless he is shown to have acted
in bad faith or with deliberate intent to do an injustice.23 To
constitute gross ignorance of the law and for administrative
liability to attach, it is not enough that the decision, order or
actuation of the judge in the performance of his official duties is
contrary to existing law and jurisprudence. It must also be proven
that he was moved by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty, or corruption
or had committed an error so egregious that it amounted to bad
faith.24
Section 8, Chapter V of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC states in part:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Section 8. Raffle and re-assignment of cases in ordinary courts
where judge is disqualified or voluntarily inhibits himself/herself
from hearing case. - x x x.
x x x x
(c) Where the judge in a single-branch RTC is disqualified or
voluntarily inhibits himself/herself, the Order of Inhibition shall be
transmitted to the pairing judge who shall then hear and decide
the case. The determination of the pairing judge shall be in
accordance with Annex "A" hereof.
xxxx
In this case, respondent maintains that she is aware of the
foregoing rules on inhibition. Nonetheless, she still issued the
October 11, 2007 Order and directed that the proceedings in the
Migano case be held in abeyance until such time that a new
judge shall have been appointed by the Court Administrator,
and failed to directly and immediately transmit the records of the
case to the pairing judge in RTC-Alaminos City for further
proceedings. Unfortunately, the transmittal was made only on
July 25, 2013, and the case did not progress during the six-year
interim period. As a result, the Migano case was left pending in
her court for a long period of time.
Under the foregoing circumstances, therefore, respondent was
clearly remiss in her duty of familiarizing herself with the rules on
inhibition set forth in A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC. However, the Court
finds that such error cannot be categorized as gross ignorance
of the law and/or procedure as records are devoid of evidence
to show that respondent was motivated by bad faith, fraud,
corruption, dishonesty, or egregious error in issuing the October
11, 2007 Order.
Respondent had already clarified that she issued the said Order
merely to inform the OCA of her inhibition from the subject case,
and while it is true that there was no necessity therefor,
respondent's act in itself is not indicative of bad faith. Moreover,
she explained that she had instructed her Branch Clerk to
transmit the records of the Migano case to the pairing judge in
RTC-Alaminos City, only to discover later on that the transmittal
letter was not properly attached to the records, resulting in the
delay in its transmittal. Hence, while it may be inferred under the
circumstances that respondent was careless and did not
exercise diligence in ensuring that the records of the Migano
case were immediately transmitted to the pairing judge of RTC-
Alaminos City for proper disposition, records are bereft of
evidence to show that the resulting delay was deliberately or
maliciously caused as to amount to bad faith. Instead, what is
evident in this case is that the delay was caused by inadvertence
and negligence.
As such, while it may be considered an unfortunate error on
respondent's part to hold in abeyance the proceedings in the
Migano case and to fail to promptly transmit the records thereof
to the pairing judge in RTC-Alaminos City, such error does not
appear to have been tainted with or impelled by bad faith. Bad
faith cannot be presumed25 and the Court cannot conclude that
bad faith attended respondent's acts when none has been
shown in this case. Consequently, respondent need not be
subjected to administrative sanction in this respect.26
With regard, however, to the delay in the resolution of pending
motions for inhibition within the prescribed period, records are
bereft of evidence to show that respondent filed any request for
an extension of time within which to resolve them, which the
Court could have granted. As such, even if the Court were to
accept her excuse that her combined caseload in RTC-Alaminos
City, as well as in RTC-Burgos, the courts where she was
concurrently presiding, was indeed heavy, she could have
requested an extension of time within which to decide and
dispose of pending cases and justified the same. The Court is not
unmindful of the circumstances that may delay the speedy
disposition of cases assigned to judges, thus, the Court allows
extensions of time within which pending cases may be disposed
of, upon a seasonable filing of a request therefor and sufficient
justification.27 For failing to do so, respondent cannot evade
administrative liability.
The rules and jurisprudence are clear on the matter of delay.
Failure to decide cases and other matters within the
reglementary period constitutes gross inefficiency and warrants
the imposition of administrative sanction against the erring
magistrate.28 Judges must decide cases and resolve matters with
dispatch because any delay in the administration of justice
deprives litigants of their right to a speedy disposition of their case
and undermines the people's faith in the judiciary. Indeed, justice
delayed is justice denied.29
In light of all the foregoing, the Court finds that respondent is
administratively liable for Undue Delay in Issuing Orders in Several
Cases and Undue Delay in Transmitting the Records of a Case,
which are classified as less serious charges under Section 9,30 Rule
140 of the Rules of Court that merit the penalty of (a) suspension
from office without salary and other benefits for not less than one
(1) nor more than three (3) months; or (b) a fine of more than
P10,000.00 but not exceeding P20,000.00.31 Considering the
circumstances of this case and the fact that this is not the first
time that respondent has been held administratively liable,32 the
Court finds it appropriate to impose the penalty of suspension for
a period of three (3) months against respondent.chanrobleslaw
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Ma. Ellen M. Aguilar,
Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Burgos, Pangasinan,
Branch 70, GUILTY of Undue Delay in Issuing Orders in Several
Cases and Undue Delay in Transmitting the Records of a Case,
and is hereby SUSPENDED from office without salary and other
benefits for a period of three (3) months, with a warning that a
repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with more
severely.
SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary
15. G.R. No. 179914 June 16, 2014
SPOUSES REYNALDO AND HILLY G. SOMBILON, Petitioners,vs.
 ATTY. REY FERDINAND GARAY AND PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK,
Respondents.
x-----------------------x
A.M. No. RTJ-06-2000
ATTY. REY FERDINAND T. GARAY, Petitioner,
vs.
JUDGE ROLANDO S. VENADAS, SR., Respondent.
A judge owes the public and the court the duty to know the law
by heart and to have the basic rules of procedure at the palm of
his hands.1
Before us are two consolidated cases: (1) a Petition for Review on
Certiorari2 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the June
13, 2007 Decision3 and the August 8, 2007 Resolution4 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 00477-MIN; and (2) an
Administrative Complaint5 against Judge Rolando S. Venadas,
Sr. (Judge Venadas, Sr.) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Malaybalay, Bukidnon, Branch 8, for Grave Abuse of Authority
and Grave Misconduct.
Factual Antecedents
Spouses Reynaldo and Hilly G. Sombilon (spouses Sombilon) were
the previous owners of a 601-square meter property, with two
buildings constructed on it, in South Poblacion, Maramag,
Bukidnon.6 The said property, which they mortgaged to the
Philippine National Bank (PNB) as security for their loan, was
foreclosed and sold at public auction on July 15, 1998, where PNB
emerged as the winning bidder in the amount of ₱2,355,000.00.7
Consequently, on August 20, 1998, a Certificate of Sale was
issued in PNB’s name, which was duly registered with the Registry
of Deeds for Bukidnon on August 25, 1999.8 The one-year
redemption period lapsed but spouses Sombilon failed to
redeem the property.9
In 2005, spouses Sombilon sought the help of Atty. Rey Ferdinand
T. Garay (Atty. Garay), a Public Attorney’s Office (PAO) lawyer,
who was once appointed by the court as counsel de officio for
Hilly Sombilon in a criminal case and who happens to be the
owner of a lot adjacent to the property.10 Spouses Sombilon told
Atty. Garay that they wanted to reacquire11 the property from
PNB, but had no money to repurchase it.12 Thus, they were
hoping that he would agree to advance the money and, in
exchange, they promised to sell him the 331-square meter
portion of the property, where one of the buildings is located, for
₱5 million.13
On February 9, 2005, Atty. Garay together with spouses Sombilon
went to PNB to inquire about the status of the property.14 They
were informed by the bank that the property could be
purchased at the fair market value of ₱2,938,000.00.15 The
following day, Atty. Garay went to the bank alone and offered
to buy the property by making a down payment of ₱587,600.0016
or 20% of the purchase price.17
On February 14, 2005, upon learning that Atty. Garay intended to
purchase the entire property for himself, spouses Sombilon
offered to buy back the property from PNB.18 The bank advised
them to make a 10% down payment of the bank’s total claim19
to formalize their offer.20
On February 15, 2005, a Final Deed of Conveyance was issued in
favor of PNB.21
On April 14, 2005, Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 94384 was
issued in the name of PNB.22
On the same date, PNB decided to approve the purchase offer
of Atty. Garay23 since spouses Sombilon failed to make the
required down payment.24
G.R. No. 179914
On May 9, 2005, PNB filed an Ex-Parte Petition for Issuance of a
Writ of Possession25 before the RTC of Malaybalay City, Bukidnon.
The case was docketed as Special Civil Case No. 375-05 and
raffled to Branch 8, presided over by Judge Venadas, Sr.
On June 10, 2005, Judge Venadas, Sr. issued an Order26 granting
the Petition and, on June27, 2005, he issued a Writ of Possession27
in favor of PNB.28
On June 22, 2005, PNB informed spouses Sombilon that Atty.
Garay’s offer to purchase the property had been approved due
to their failure to pay the full down payment.29
On July 10, 2005, spouses Sombilon moved for a
reconsideration30 of the issuance of the Writ of Possession
arguing that Atty. Garay,31 who was the former counsel of Hilly,
was barred from purchasing the property pursuant to paragraph
5,32 Article 1491 of the Civil Code.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On July 14, 2005, Judge Venadas, Sr. issued an Order33 holding
in abeyance the implementation of the Writ of Possession, a
portion of which reads:
Although, ordinarily a writ of possession is issued by the court
because it is a mandatory and ministerial duty under Act 3135, x
x x there is x x x an exception to this rule that if the implementation
and enforcement of the writ of possession would work [great]
injustice to the registered owner because the petitioner PNB or in
this case Atty. Garay counsel for the Sombilon[s] is not entitled
thereto. There is much to be said about the conduct of Atty.
Garay in manipulating that the property in question was finally
bought by him from the PNB not to mention the possible violation
of the [canon] of legal and judicial ethics. However, the court
cannot ignore the version of Mrs. Sombilon. The court will give
Atty. Garay [the opportunity] to rebut the evidence presented
by spouses Sombilon and he is directed to appear on August 2,
2005, at 8:30 in the morning. And if this case cannot be
accommodated in the morning[,] it will proceed in the
afternoon.
Send proper notice to Atty. Rey Ferdinand Garay for him to
appear on said date.
In the meantime, the full implementation x x x of the Writ of
Possession is hereby held in abeyance. Sheriff Claudio C.
Bugahod is hereby directed to return all items to the house of
Spouses Sombilon and to restore them in full possession of the
property, if already implemented and enforced.
SO ORDERED.34
Aggrieved, Atty. Garay and PNB elevated the case to the CA via
a Petition for Certiorari with prayer for issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Injunction35 under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court.
Initially, on August 2, 2005, the CA dismissed36 the Petition for
Certiorari for several procedural defects.37 However, on
reconsideration,38 the CA reinstated the Petition.39
On July 25, 2006, the CA issued a Resolution40 granting the PNB
and Atty. Garay’s application for a TRO. Thus:
Accordingly, let a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) be issued
upon the posting of a Five Thousand Peso (₱5,000.00) bond within
five (5) days from receipt hereof ordering, [petitioners] to:
1. Cease and desist from doing any act which is destructive of, or
involves danger to, or alters the nature and condition of the
property;
2. Cease and desist from collecting rent or income [for the use
of] the said property;
3. To deposit any rent or income arising from the said property
which they may have already received to the Clerk of Court of
the Regional Trial Court of the Tenth Judicial Region, Malaybalay
City; and
Furthermore, all tenants are hereby ordered to deposit any
rentals arising from the disputed property to the said Clerk of
Court.
SO ORDERED.41
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On June 13, 2007, the CA rendered a Decision42 granting the
Petition for Certiorari. The CA found grave abuse of discretion on
the part of Judge Venadas, Sr. in holding in abeyance the
implementation of the Writ of Possession.43 The dispositive portion
of the Decision reads:
ACCORDINGLY, the petition for certiorari is hereby GRANTED and
the assailed July 14, 2005 Order of the court a quo is hereby SET
ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.44
Spouses Sombilon moved for reconsideration45 but the CA
denied the same in its August 8, 2007 Resolution.46
Hence, spouses Sombilon filed the instant Petition for Review on
Certiorari contending that:
THE [CA] COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR AND GRAVELY ERRED
IN GRANTING THE PETITIONFOR CERTIORARI OF [ATTY. GARAY AND
PNB] AND IN DECLARING THAT THERE WAS GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNT[ING] TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION
COMMITTED BYTHE [RTC], BRANCH [8], MALAYBALAY CITY, WHICH
IS CONTRARY [TO] LAW AND APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE
HONORABLE SUPREME COURT.47
Spouses Sombilon’s Arguments
Spouses Sombilon insist that the CA should have dismissed the
Petition for Certioraridue to the failure of PNB and Atty. Garay to
file a Motion for Reconsideration of the assailed Order.48
They also allege that PNB and Atty. Garay engaged in forum-
shopping when they filed a Motion to Recall Order with the RTC,
in addition to the Petition for Certiorari they earlier filed with the
CA.49
As to the assailed Order, they contend that Judge Venadas, Sr.
did not commit grave abuse of discretion in holding in abeyance
the implementation of the Writ of Possession because PNB no
longer has the legal personality to apply for a Writ of Possession
considering that the subject property had already been sold to
Atty. Garay,50 who they claim is also not entitled to the Writ of
Possession as he is disqualified from purchasing the subject
property pursuant to paragraph 5,
Article 1491 of the Civil Code.51
Atty. Garay’s and PNB’s Arguments
Atty. Garay, on the other hand, argues that the CA did not err in
granting the Petition for Certiorari as Judge Venadas, Sr. acted
with grave abuse of discretion when he recalled the Writ of
Possession without notice to him and PNB.52 He also emphasizes
that it is a ministerial duty of the court to issue a writ of possession
after the redemption period has lapsed.53
PNB, for its part, asserts that as the registered owner of the subject
property, it is entitled to the Writ of Possession.54 Thus, it was grave
abuse of discretion on the part of Judge Venadas, Sr. in holding
in abeyance the implementation of the Writ of Possession, which
he had earlier issued.55
PNB further avers that it is not privy to the arrangement or
relationship between Atty. Garay and spouses Sombilon.56 In
any case, the prohibition in paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the Civil
Code does not apply to the instant case as Atty. Garay
purchased the subject property from PNB and not from spouses
Sombilon.57
Anent its failure to file a Motion for Reconsideration prior to filing
a Petition for Certiorari, PNB explains that in this case the filing of
a Motion for Reconsideration may be dispensed with as the issue
involved is purely one of law, which is an exception under
prevailing jurisprudence.58
Besides, there was no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy
available at the time considering that Judge Venadas, Sr. issued
the assailed Order, holding in abeyance the implementation of
the Writ of Possession, without affording PNB the opportunity to
be heard.59
Lastly, PNB denies that it committed forum-shopping claiming
that it did not institute another action simultaneously with the
Petition for Certiorari it filed with the CA.60
A.M. No. RTJ-06-2000
Meanwhile, on November15, 2005, Atty. Garay filed a Verified
Complaint61 against Judge Venadas, Sr., charging him with
Grave Abuse of Authority and Grave Misconduct when he
proceeded with the hearing of spouses Sombilon’s motion for
reconsideration of the Order granting the issuance of the Writ of
Possession despite lack of notice to PNB and for holding in
abeyance the Writ of Possession he issued in Special Civil Case
No. 375-05.
Atty. Garay’s Arguments
Atty. Garay claims that Judge Venadas, Sr. should be
administratively sanctioned for holding in abeyance the Writ of
Possession he earlier issued62 and for ignoring Sections 4,63 5,64
and 665 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court as he proceeded to hear
the motion despite lack of notice to PNB.66
Judge Venadas, Sr.’s Arguments
In his defense, Judge Venadas, Sr. denies the charges against
him arguing that he did not annul the Writ of Possession but
merely stayed its execution and implementation to prevent any
injustice.67 He insists there was no violation of due process
because he immediately scheduled a hearing for PNB to present
its evidence.68
Report and Recommendation of the
Office of the Court Administrator (OCA)
The OCA, in its Report,69 found Judge Venadas, Sr.
administratively liable for grave abuse of authority bordering on
gross ignorance of procedure.70 Although the OCA did not
touch on the issue of whether Judge Venadas, Sr. should be
administratively sanctioned for holding in abeyance the
implementation of the Writ of Possession as it was still pending
with the CA at that time, it nevertheless found Judge Venadas,
Sr. guilty of blatantly disregarding Sections 4, 5, and 6 of Rule 15
of the Rules of Court when he acted on the defective motion
filed by spouses Sombilon.71 It also pointed out that PNB and
Atty. Garay were deprived of their rights to due process as no
proper notice was sent to them.72 Thus, the OCA recommended
that:
a) the instant administrative complaint be DOCKETED as a
regular administrative complaint;
b) respondent Judge Rolando S. Venadas,Sr. be found guilty of
gross ignorance of procedure; and
c) respondent Judge Rolando S. Venadas, Sr. be ordered to pay
a FINE of TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (₱20,000.00) with a WARNING
that a similar transgression x x x will be dealt with more severely.73
On November 26, 2007, the Court resolved to consolidate A.M.
No. RTJ-06-2000 with G.R. No. 179914.74
Issues
Stripped of the non-essentials, the issues boil down to: (1) whether
Judge Venadas, Sr. committed grave abuse of discretion in
holding in abeyance the implementation of the Writ of
Possession; and (2) whether he should be administratively
sanctioned for holding in abeyance the implementation of the
Writ of Possession and for disregarding Sections 4, 5, and 6, Rule
15 of the Rules of Court.
Our Ruling
G.R. No. 179914
The issuance of a writ of possession is
ministerial upon the court.
A debtor has one year from the date the Certificate of Sale is
registered with the Register of Deeds within which to redeem his
property.75 During the one-year redemption period, the
purchaser may possess the property by filing a petition for the
issuance of a writ of possession before the court, upon the
posting of a bond.76 But after the one-year period, the purchaser
has a right to consolidate the title and to possess the property,
without need of a bond.77 And once title is consolidated under
the name of the purchaser, the issuance of the writ of possession
becomes ministerial on the part of the court; thus, no discretion is
left to the court.78 Questions regarding the regularity and validity
of the mortgage or the foreclosure sale may not be raised as a
ground to oppose or hold in abeyance the issuance of the writ
of possession as these must be raised in a separate action for the
annulment of the mortgage or the foreclosure sale.79 The
pendency of such action is also not a ground to stay the issuance
of a writ of possession.80
In this case, the redemption period had long lapsed when PNB
applied for the issuance of the Writ of Possession.1âwphi1 In fact,
the title over the subject property had already been
consolidated in PNB’s name. Thus, it was ministerial upon Judge
Venadas, Sr. to issue the Writ of Possession in favor of PNB, the
registered owner of the subject property.
Though there are instances when the issuance of the Writ of
Possession may be deferred,81 we find none of these recognized
exceptions present in the instant case. Spouses Sombilon claim
that the sale between PNB and Atty. Garay was invalid as it was
done in violation of paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the Civil Code.
However, the alleged invalidity of the sale is not a ground to
oppose or defer the issuance of the Writ of Possession as this does
not affect PNB’s right to possess the subject property. Thus, there
was no reason for Judge Venadas, Sr. to hold in abeyance the
implementation of the Writ of Possession. Clearly, he committed
grave abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed Order holding in
abeyance the implementation of the Writ of Possession because
PNB, as the registered owner, is entitled to the possession of the
subject property as a matter of right.
Regarding the failure of PNB and Atty. Garay to move for a
reconsideration of the assailed Order prior to the availment of a
special civil action for certiorari, we agree with PNB that the filing
of a motion for reconsideration may be dispensed with where the
decision is a patent nullity or where there is violation of due
process,82 such as in the instant case.
All told, we find no error on the part of the CA in granting the
Petition for Certiorari.
A.M. No. RTJ-06-2000
As to the Administrative Complaint filed against Judge Venadas,
Sr., we agree with the findings and recommendations of the
OCA.
Records show that spouses Sombilon failed to comply with the
three-day notice rule and the required proof of service
embodied in Sections 4, 5, and 6 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court,
thereby rendering the motion fatally defective. Despite this,
Judge Venadas, Sr. still took cognizance of the motion filed by
spouses Sombilon, depriving PNB and Atty. Garay of their right to
due process.
To exculpate himself from the charges against him, Judge
Venadas, Sr. claims that the motion was personally served on PNB
and its counsel on July 12, 2005 but they refused to receive the
same. However, as aptly pointed out by the OCA, no affidavit
was submitted to substantiate such allegation. Thus, we agree
with the Court Administrator that Judge Venadas, Sr. is guilty of
grave abuse of authority bordering on gross ignorance of
procedure for blatantly disregarding Sections 4, 5, and 6, Rule 15
16. SECOND DIVISION
of the Rules of Court.
[ G.R. No. 179914, June 16, 2014 ]
Blatant disregard of basic, elementary, and well-known rules of
procedure and law is gross ignorance of the law,83 which is SPOUSES REYNALDO AND HILLY G. SOMBILON, PETITIONERS, VS.
classified as a serious charge under Rule 140, Section 8 of the ATTY. REY FERDINAND GARAY AND PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK,
Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC, punishable RESPONDENTS.
by either dismissal from service, suspension for more than three
months but not exceeding six months, or a fine of more than [A.M. No. RTJ-06-2000]
₱20,000.00 but not exceeding ₱40,000.00.84
ATTY. REY FERDINAND T. GARAY, PETITIONER, VS. JUDGE ROLANDO
Thus, in view of his blatant disregard of the rules and his grave
S. VENADAS, SR., RESPONDENT.
abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed Order, and considering
that this is his first offense, we find Judge Venadas, Sr. guilty of
DECISION
grave abuse of authority bordering on gross ignorance of the law
and is hereby fined the amount of ₱20,000.00. Incidentally, in the DEL CASTILLO, J.:
April 18, 2007 Resolution in A.M. No. 12600-Ret.,85 the Court
approved the application of Judge Venadas, Sr. for disability A judge owes the public and the court the duty to know the law
retirement but withheld the amount of ₱100,000.00 pending the by heart and to have the basic rules of procedure at the palm of
final resolution of this case. In view thereof, the fine of ₱20,000.00 his hands.[1]
herein imposed on Judge Venadas, Sr. is to be deducted from
the withheld amount of ₱100,000.00. Before us are two consolidated cases: (1) a Petition for Review on
Certiorari[2] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the June
WHEREFORE, in G.R. No. 179914, the Petition is hereby DENIED. The 13, 2007 Decision[3] and the August 8, 2007 Resolution[4] of the
June 13, 2007 Decision and the August 8, 2007 Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 00477-MIN; and (2) an
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 00477-MIN are hereby Administrative Complaint[5] against Judge Rolando S. Venadas,
AFFIRMED. Sr. (Judge Venadas, Sr.) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Malaybalay, Bukidnon, Branch 8, for Grave Abuse of Authority
In Administrative Matter No. RTJ-06-2000, Judge Rolando S.
and Grave Misconduct.
Venadas, Sr. of the Regional Trial Court of Malaybalay City,
Bukidnon, Branch 8, is hereby found guilty of grave abuse of
Factual Antecedents
authority bordering on gross ignorance of the law and is ordered
to pay a FINE of TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (₱20,000.00) to be
Spouses Reynaldo and Hilly G. Sombilon (spouses Sombilon) were
deducted from the withheld amount of ₱100,000.00 from his
the previous owners of a 601-square meter property, with two
retirement benefits pursuant to the April 18, 2007 Resolution in
buildings constructed on it, in South Poblacion, Maramag,
A.M. No. 12600-Ret.
Bukidnon.[6] The said property, which they mortgaged to the
SO ORDERED. Philippine National Bank (PNB) as security for their loan, was
foreclosed and sold at public auction on July 15, 1998, where PNB On April 14, 2005, Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 94384 was
emerged as the winning bidder in the amount of P2,355,000.00.[7] issued in the name of PNB.[22]
Consequently, on August 20, 1998, a Certificate of Sale was
issued in PNB’s name, which was duly registered with the Registry On the same date, PNB decided to approve the purchase offer
of Deeds for Bukidnon on August 25, 1999.[8] The one-year of Atty. Garay[23] since spouses Sombilon failed to make the
redemption period lapsed but spouses Sombilon failed to required down payment.[24]
redeem the property.[9]
G.R. No. 179914
In 2005, spouses Sombilon sought the help of Atty. Rey Ferdinand
T. Garay (Atty. Garay), a Public Attorney’s Office (PAO) lawyer, On May 9, 2005, PNB filed an Ex-Parte Petition for Issuance of a
who was once appointed by the court as counsel de officio for Writ of Possession[25] before the RTC of Malaybalay City, Bukidnon.
Hilly Sombilon in a criminal case and who happens to be the The case was docketed as Special Civil Case No. 375-05 and
owner of a lot adjacent to the property.[10] Spouses Sombilon told raffled to Branch 8, presided over by Judge Venadas, Sr.
Atty. Garay that they wanted to reacquire[11] the property from
PNB, but had no money to repurchase it.[12] Thus, they were On June 10, 2005, Judge Venadas, Sr. issued an Order[26] granting
hoping that he would agree to advance the money and, in the Petition and, on June 27, 2005, he issued a Writ of
exchange, they promised to sell him the 331-square meter Possession[27] in favor of PNB.[28]
portion of the property, where one of the buildings is located, for
P5 million.[13] On June 22, 2005, PNB informed spouses Sombilon that Atty.
Garay’s offer to purchase the property had been approved due
On February 9, 2005, Atty. Garay together with spouses Sombilon to their failure to pay the full down payment.[29]
went to PNB to inquire about the status of the property.[14] They
were informed by the bank that the property could be On July 10, 2005, spouses Sombilon moved for a
purchased at the fair market value of P2,938,000.00.[15] The reconsideration[30] of the issuance of the Writ of Possession
following day, Atty. Garay went to the bank alone and offered arguing that Atty. Garay,[31] who was the former counsel of Hilly,
to buy the property by making a down payment of P587,600.00[16] was barred from purchasing the property pursuant to paragraph
or 20% of the purchase price.[17] 5,[32] Article 1491 of the Civil Code.

On February 14, 2005, upon learning that Atty. Garay intended to Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
purchase the entire property for himself, spouses Sombilon
offered to buy back the property from PNB.[18] The bank advised On July 14, 2005, Judge Venadas, Sr. issued an Order[33] holding
them to make a 10% down payment of the bank’s total claim[19] in abeyance the implementation of the Writ of Possession, a
to formalize their offer.[20] portion of which reads:

Although, ordinarily a writ of possession is issued by the court

On February 15, 2005, a Final Deed of Conveyance was issued in
because it is a mandatory and ministerial duty under Act 3135, x
favor of PNB.[21]
x x there is x x x an exception to this rule that if the implementation
and enforcement of the writ of possession would work [great] Accordingly, let a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) be issued
injustice to the registered owner because the petitioner PNB or in upon the posting of a Five Thousand Peso (P5,000.00) bond within
this case Atty. Garay counsel for the Sombilon[s] is not entitled five (5) days from receipt hereof ordering, [petitioners] to:
thereto. There is much to be said about the conduct of Atty.
Garay in manipulating that the property in question was finally 1. Cease and desist from doing any act which is destructive of, or
bought by him from the PNB not to mention the possible violation involves danger to, or alters the nature and condition of the
of the [canon] of legal and judicial ethics. However, the court property;
cannot ignore the version of Mrs. Sombilon. The court will give
Atty. Garay [the opportunity] to rebut the evidence presented 2. Cease and desist from collecting rent or income [for the use
by spouses Sombilon and he is directed to appear on August 2, of] the said property;
2005, at 8:30 in the morning. And if this case cannot be
accommodated in the morning[,] it will proceed in the 3. To deposit any rent or income arising from the said property
afternoon. which they may have already received to the Clerk of Court of
the Regional Trial Court of the Tenth Judicial Region, Malaybalay
Send proper notice to Atty. Rey Ferdinand Garay for him to City; and
appear on said date.
Furthermore, all tenants are hereby ordered to deposit any
In the meantime, the full implementation x x x of the Writ of rentals arising from the disputed property to the said Clerk of
Possession is hereby held in abeyance. Sheriff Claudio C. Court.
Bugahod is hereby directed to return all items to the house of
Spouses Sombilon and to restore them in full possession of the SO ORDERED.[41]
property, if already implemented and enforced.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
SO ORDERED.[34]
On June 13, 2007, the CA rendered a Decision[42] granting the
Aggrieved, Atty. Garay and PNB elevated the case to the CA via Petition for Certiorari. The CA found grave abuse of discretion on
a Petition for Certiorari with prayer for issuance of a Temporary the part of Judge Venadas, Sr. in holding in abeyance the
Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Injunction[35] under Rule 65 of the implementation of the Writ of Possession.[43] The dispositive portion
Rules of Court. of the Decision reads:

ACCORDINGLY, the petition for certiorari is hereby GRANTED and

Initially, on August 2, 2005, the CA dismissed[36] the Petition for
the assailed July 14, 2005 Order of the court a quo is hereby SET
Certiorari for several procedural defects.[37] However, on
ASIDE.
reconsideration,[38] the CA reinstated the Petition.[39]

SO ORDERED.[44]
On July 25, 2006, the CA issued a Resolution[40] granting the PNB
and Atty. Garay’s application for a TRO. Thus: Spouses Sombilon moved for reconsideration[45] but the CA
denied the same in its August 8, 2007 Resolution.[46]
 after the redemption period has lapsed.[53]
Hence, spouses Sombilon filed the instant Petition for Review on
Certiorari contending that: PNB, for its part, asserts that as the registered owner of the subject
property, it is entitled to the Writ of Possession.[54] Thus, it was grave
THE [CA] COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR AND GRAVELY ERRED
abuse of discretion on the part of Judge Venadas, Sr. in holding
IN GRANTING THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI OF [ATTY. GARAY
in abeyance the implementation of the Writ of Possession, which
AND PNB] AND IN DECLARING THAT THERE WAS GRAVE ABUSE OF
he had earlier issued.[55]
DISCRETION AMOUNT[ING] TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION
COMMITTED BY THE [RTC], BRANCH [8], MALAYBALAY CITY,
PNB further avers that it is not privy to the arrangement or
WHICH IS CONTRARY [TO] LAW AND APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF
relationship between Atty. Garay and spouses Sombilon.[56] In
THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT.[47]
any case, the prohibition in paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the Civil
Spouses Sombilon’s Arguments Code does not apply to the instant case as Atty. Garay
purchased the subject property from PNB and not from spouses
Spouses Sombilon insist that the CA should have dismissed the Sombilon.[57]
Petition for Certiorari due to the failure of PNB and Atty. Garay to
file a Motion for Reconsideration of the assailed Order.[48] They Anent its failure to file a Motion for Reconsideration prior to filing
also allege that PNB and Atty. Garay engaged in forum-shopping a Petition for Certiorari, PNB explains that in this case the filing of
when they filed a Motion to Recall Order with the RTC, in addition a Motion for Reconsideration may be dispensed with as the issue
to the Petition for Certiorari they earlier filed with the CA.[49] involved is purely one of law, which is an exception under
prevailing jurisprudence.[58] Besides, there was no plain, speedy,
As to the assailed Order, they contend that Judge Venadas, Sr. and adequate remedy available at the time considering that
did not commit grave abuse of discretion in holding in abeyance Judge Venadas, Sr. issued the assailed Order, holding in
the implementation of the Writ of Possession because PNB no abeyance the implementation of the Writ of Possession, without
longer has the legal personality to apply for a Writ of Possession affording PNB the opportunity to be heard.[59]
considering that the subject property had already been sold to
Atty. Garay,[50] who they claim is also not entitled to the Writ of Lastly, PNB denies that it committed forum-shopping claiming
Possession as he is disqualified from purchasing the subject that it did not institute another action simultaneously with the
property pursuant to paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the Civil Petition for Certiorari it filed with the CA.[60]
Code.[51]
A.M. No. RTJ-06-2000
Atty. Garay’s and PNB’s Arguments
Meanwhile, on November 15, 2005, Atty. Garay filed a Verified
Atty. Garay, on the other hand, argues that the CA did not err in Complaint[61] against Judge Venadas, Sr., charging him with
granting the Petition for Certiorari as Judge Venadas, Sr. acted Grave Abuse of Authority and Grave Misconduct when he
with grave abuse of discretion when he recalled the Writ of proceeded with the hearing of spouses Sombilon’s motion for
Possession without notice to him and PNB.[52] He also emphasizes reconsideration of the Order granting the issuance of the Writ of
that it is a ministerial duty of the court to issue a writ of possession Possession despite lack of notice to PNB and for holding in
abeyance the Writ of Possession he issued in Special Civil Case
No. 375-05.
Atty. Garay’s Arguments
Atty. Garay claims that Judge Venadas, Sr. should be
administratively sanctioned for holding in abeyance the Writ of
Possession he earlier issued[62] and for ignoring Sections 4,[63] 5,[64]
and 6[65] of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court as he proceeded to hear
the motion despite lack of notice to PNB.[66]
Judge Venadas, Sr.’s Arguments
In his defense, Judge Venadas, Sr. denies the charges against
him arguing that he did not annul the Writ of Possession but
merely stayed its execution and implementation to prevent any
injustice.[67] He insists there was no violation of due process
because he immediately scheduled a hearing for PNB to present
its evidence.[68]
Report and Recommendation of the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA)
The OCA, in its Report,[69] found Judge Venadas, Sr.
administratively liable for grave abuse of authority bordering on
gross ignorance of procedure.[70] Although the OCA did not
touch on the issue of whether Judge Venadas, Sr. should be
administratively sanctioned for holding in abeyance the
implementation of the Writ of Possession as it was still pending
with the CA at that time, it nevertheless found Judge Venadas,
Sr. guilty of blatantly disregarding Sections 4, 5, and 6 of Rule 15
of the Rules of Court when he acted on the defective motion
filed by spouses Sombilon.[71] It also pointed out that PNB and
Atty. Garay were deprived of their rights to due process as no
proper notice was sent to them.[72] Thus, the OCA recommended
that:
a) the instant administrative complaint be DOCKETED as a
regular administrative complaint;
b) respondent Judge Rolando S. Venadas, Sr. be found guilty of
gross ignorance of procedure; and
c) respondent Judge Rolando S. Venadas, Sr. be ordered to pay
a FINE of TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (P20,000.00) with a WARNING
that a similar transgression x x x will be dealt with more severely.[73]
On November 26, 2007, the Court resolved to consolidate A.M.
No. RTJ-06-2000 with G.R. No. 179914.[74]
Issues
Stripped of the non-essentials, the issues boil down to: (1) whether
Judge Venadas, Sr. committed grave abuse of discretion in
holding in abeyance the implementation of the Writ of
Possession; and (2) whether he should be administratively
sanctioned for holding in abeyance the implementation of the
Writ of Possession and for disregarding Sections 4, 5, and 6, Rule
15 of the Rules of Court.
Our Ruling
G.R. No. 179914
The issuance of a writ of possession is ministerial upon the court.
A debtor has one year from the date the Certificate of Sale is
registered with the Register of Deeds within which to redeem his
property.[75] During the one-year redemption period, the
purchaser may possess the property by filing a petition for the
issuance of a writ of possession before the court, upon the
posting of a bond.[76] But after the one-year period, the purchaser
has a right to consolidate the title and to possess the property,
without need of a bond.[77] And once title is consolidated under decision is a patent nullity or where there is violation of due
the name of the purchaser, the issuance of the writ of possession process,[82] such as in the instant case.
becomes ministerial on the part of the court; thus, no discretion is
left to the court.[78] Questions regarding the regularity and validity All told, we find no error on the part of the CA in granting the
of the mortgage or the foreclosure sale may not be raised as a Petition for Certiorari.
ground to oppose or hold in abeyance the issuance of the writ
of possession as these must be raised in a separate action for the A.M. No. RTJ-06-2000
annulment of the mortgage or the foreclosure sale.[79] The
pendency of such action is also not a ground to stay the issuance As to the Administrative Complaint filed against Judge Venadas,
of a writ of possession.[80] Sr., we agree with the findings and recommendations of the
OCA.
In this case, the redemption period had long lapsed when PNB
applied for the issuance of the Writ of Possession. In fact, the title Records show that spouses Sombilon failed to comply with the
over the subject property had already been consolidated in three-day notice rule and the required proof of service
PNB’s name. Thus, it was ministerial upon Judge Venadas, Sr. to embodied in Sections 4, 5, and 6 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court,
issue the Writ of Possession in favor of PNB, the registered owner thereby rendering the motion fatally defective. Despite this,
of the subject property. Judge Venadas, Sr. still took cognizance of the motion filed by
spouses Sombilon, depriving PNB and Atty. Garay of their right to
Though there are instances when the issuance of the Writ of due process.
Possession may be deferred,[81] we find none of these recognized
exceptions present in the instant case. Spouses Sombilon claim To exculpate himself from the charges against him, Judge
that the sale between PNB and Atty. Garay was invalid as it was Venadas, Sr. claims that the motion was personally served on PNB
done in violation of paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the Civil Code. and its counsel on July 12, 2005 but they refused to receive the
However, the alleged invalidity of the sale is not a ground to same. However, as aptly pointed out by the OCA, no affidavit
oppose or defer the issuance of the Writ of Possession as this does was submitted to substantiate such allegation. Thus, we agree
not affect PNB’s right to possess the subject property. Thus, there with the Court Administrator that Judge Venadas, Sr. is guilty of
was no reason for Judge Venadas, Sr. to hold in abeyance the grave abuse of authority bordering on gross ignorance of
implementation of the Writ of Possession. Clearly, he committed procedure for blatantly disregarding Sections 4, 5, and 6, Rule 15
grave abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed Order holding in of the Rules of Court.
abeyance the implementation of the Writ of Possession because
PNB, as the registered owner, is entitled to the possession of the Blatant disregard of basic, elementary, and well-known rules of
subject property as a matter of right. procedure and law is gross ignorance of the law,[83] which is
classified as a serious charge under Rule 140, Section 8 of the
Regarding the failure of PNB and Atty. Garay to move for a Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC, punishable
reconsideration of the assailed Order prior to the availment of a by either dismissal from service, suspension for more than three
special civil action for certiorari, we agree with PNB that the filing months but not exceeding six months, or a fine of more than
of a motion for reconsideration may be dispensed with where the P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00.[84]
Thus, in view of his blatant disregard of the rules and his grave
abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed Order, and considering
that this is his first offense, we find Judge Venadas, Sr. guilty of
grave abuse of authority bordering on gross ignorance of the law
and is hereby fined the amount of P20,000.00. Incidentally, in the
April 18, 2007 Resolution in A.M. No. 12600-Ret.,[85] the Court
approved the application of Judge Venadas, Sr. for disability
retirement but withheld the amount of P100,000.00 pending the
final resolution of this case. In view thereof, the fine of P20,000.00
herein imposed on Judge Venadas, Sr. is to be deducted from
the withheld amount of P100,000.00.
WHEREFORE, in G.R. No. 179914, the Petition is hereby DENIED. The
June 13, 2007 Decision and the August 8, 2007 Resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 00477-MIN are hereby
AFFIRMED.
In Administrative Matter No. RTJ-06-2000, Judge Rolando S.
Venadas, Sr. of the Regional Trial Court of Malaybalay City,
Bukidnon, Branch 8, is hereby found guilty of grave abuse of
authority bordering on gross ignorance of the law and is ordered
to pay a FINE of TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (P20,000.00) to be
deducted from the withheld amount of P100,000.00 from his
retirement benefits pursuant to the April 18, 2007 Resolution in
A.M. No. 12600-Ret.
SO ORDERED.
17. SECOND DIVISION
[ A.M. No. MTJ-15-1851, February 11, 2015 ]
CHUA KENG SIN, PETITIONER, VS. JUDGE JOB M. MANGENTE,
METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 54, NAVOTAS CITY,
RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
This is a Complaint[1] filed by Chua Keng Sin against Metropolitan
Trial Court Judge Job M. Mangente for gross ignorance of the law
and gross inefficiency relative to a criminal case for slight physical
injuries docketed as Criminal Case No. 10-13570, entitled “People
of the Philippines v. Chua Keng Sin.”[2]
On April 9, 2013, complainant Chua Keng Sin executed a
Complaint-Affidavit stating that respondent Judge Job M.
Mangente’s violation of the Local Government Code’s provisions
on Katarungang Pambarangay, Section 18 of the 1991 Revised
Rules on Summary Procedure,[3] and Rule 37, Section 4 of the
Revised Rules of Court[4] denied him of his right to the speedy
disposition of his case.[5] Complainant asserts that the laws and
rules that respondent failed to apply are so basic and
elementary, their violation constituted gross ignorance of the law
and gross inefficiency.[6]
Complainant alleged that he and his brother, Victorio Chua
(Victorio), “separately filed their complaints for slight physical
injuries against each other before the Lupon of Barangay
Bangkulasi, Navotas City.”[7] Complainant filed his Complaint
earlier than Victorio.[8] When Victorio learned that his Complaint
would be considered as a counterclaim, he decided not to
attend the scheduled hearings set by the Lupon.[9] Instead,
Victorio filed “a [C]omplaint for attempted murder against
complainant before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Navotas
City.”[10]
“Due to Victorio’s failure to appear, the Lupon issued (1) a
Certification to File Action dated March 3, 2009 in favor of
complainant allowing him to file his [C]omplaint [for slight
physical injuries] before the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Navotas City; and (2) a Certification to Bar Action/Counterclaim
. . . against Victorio due to his failure or refusal to appear in the
hearing.”[11]
The respective Complaints for slight physical injuries and
attempted murder were jointly heard by Navotas Assistant City
Prosecutor Lemuel R. Nobleza.[12] It was “recommended that
both brothers be charged with slight physical injuries.”[13]
Informations for the Complaints were filed and docketed as
Criminal Case No. 10-13569 (People v. Victorio Chua) and
Criminal Case No. 10-13570 (People v. Chua Keng Sin).[14]
Criminal Case No. 10-13570 was raffled to Branch 54 of the
Metropolitan Trial Court, Navotas City presided by respondent.
Complainant filed a Motion to Dismiss Case No. 10-13570 on the
ground that “Victorio’s [C]omplaint was filed in court without the
required certification to file action.”[15] Furthermore, the Lupon
had issued a certification to bar action/counterclaim against
Victorio.[16] Respondent denied complainant’s Motion to
Dismiss in the Order dated September 15, 2010[17] “on the
ground that it was a prohibited pleading . . . under the Rule on
Summary Procedure.”[18]
Complainant sought the reconsideration of the Order.[19] After
almost two (2) years, respondent denied the Motion for
Reconsideration in the Order dated October 16, 2012 on the
ground that the Lupon had issued a certificate to file action.[20]
During the intervening period, “complainant filed a [M]otion for
determination of probable cause assailing the [R]esolution of the
reviewing prosecutor[,] upgrading the offense of slight physical
injuries complainant was charged with to attempted
homicide[.]”[21]
On November 3, 2010, the Motion for determination of probable
cause was heard, “giving Victorio fifteen (15) days . . . to file his
comment/opposition to the [M]otion[,] while complainant was
given ten (10) days from receipt of the [C]omment to file his
[R]eply.”[22] Victorio’s Comment was filed on November 17,
2010.[23] Respondent declared complainant’s Motion for
determination “submitted for resolution on 22 November 2010[,]
without waiting for the expiration of complainant’s period to file
[R]eply[.]”[24]
On November 23, 2010, respondent denied complainant’s
Motion for determination of probable cause for lack of merit.[25]
Complainant argued that respondent’s refusal to grant his
Motion to Dismiss was “violative of Section 412 of the Local
Government Code of 1991[,] which prohibits the filing or
institution of a complaint, petition, action or proceeding involving
any matter within the authority of the Lupon directly in court of
any other government office for adjudication unless there has
been a confrontation between the parties before the Lupon,
and that no conciliation or settlement has been reached as
certified by the Lupon.”[26] Contrary to respondent’s
interpretation, the certification to file action issued by the Lupon
was in favor of complainant, not his brother Victorio. The
certification did not authorize Victorio to pursue his own
action.[27]
He further argued that respondent’s denial was also violative of
“Section 18 of the 1991 Revised Rules on Summary Procedure[,]
[which] provides for the dismissal of cases requiring referral to the
Lupon for conciliation where there is no showing of compliance
with such requirement.”[28] Complainant also averred that the
delay in resolving the Motion was in violation of Rule 37, Section
4 of the Revised Rules of Court. It was decided two (2) years after
the prosecution filed its Comment, instead of resolving it within 30
days from the time it was submitted for resolution.[29]
As to the denial of his Motion to determine probable cause,
complainant averred that respondent violated his right to due
process when the Motion was resolved “before the expiration of
the period given to him to file his [R]eply[.]”[30]
In his Comment dated June 25, 2013, respondent admitted and
apologized for his mistake, “attributing it to pure oversight and
inadvertence.”[31] He said that “[h]e had no intention to
disregard the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure or apply his
own interpretation of the rule.”[32] He explained that the
inadvertence “was mainly because of the bulk of work that he
had to attend to, as [the case was brought to him] barely a year
since he was appointed [as] judge[.]”[33] He admitted that “he
erroneously thought that the certification to file action was for
Criminal Case No. 10-13570 [and not Criminal Case 10-
13569].”[34]
Respondent argued, however, that “when the information
[against complainant] was amended from slight physical injuries
to attempted homicide, prior referral to the Lupon was no longer
necessary since [the latter] is an offense punishable by
imprisonment exceeding one (1) year[,] and the Barangay Lupon
has no jurisdiction for offenses punishable by imprisonment
exceeding one (1) year.”[35]
As for the hurried Resolution of the Motion to determine probable
cause, he explained that he had done so “on the honest belief
that the Motion was already due for resolution.”[36] However, he
argued that “[h]e did not violate complainant’s right to due
process because [complainant’s] motion was set for hearing and
was duly heard.”[37]
Respondent further claimed that “complainant cannot . . . put
the blame on him for the delay in resolving the [M]otions.”[38] He
was of the opinion that complainant and his counsel had the
responsibility of following up the status of his case.[39]
Findings of the Office of the Court Administrator
In the Report[40] dated July 23, 2014, the Office of the Court
Administrator recommended that respondent be held
administratively liable for gross ignorance of the law and delay in
resolving the Motion for Reconsideration dated September 30,
2010 and Motion to Admit Amended Information dated October
7, 2010.[41]
The Office of the Court Administrator found “[respondent’s]
handling of Criminal Case No. 10-13570 injudicious.”[42] While his
inadvertence was mainly due to the bulk of his work and his being
a newly appointed judge, it cannot be used as an excuse,
“considering the extent of his experience as public attorney for
nine (9) years and as prosecutor for twelve (12) years.”[43] The
rules he failed to observe were basic and elementary that he
should have been aware of their well-settled doctrines.[44]
As for the delay, respondent should have made a formal request
to this court for extension. This court almost always grants
requests of such nature in consideration of the numerous
difficulties faced by judges in the timely disposition of cases.[45]
“Under Section 8(9), Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, gross
ignorance of the law or procedure is a serious charge[.]”[46]
However, the Office of the Court Administrator gave due
consideration of the fact that it is respondent’s first administrative
offense, and that “he has expressed remorse and conveyed his
apology, promising to be more mindful of his duties in the future,
not to mention his court’s heavy caseload of over one thousand
(1,000) cases.”[47] In view of these circumstances, the Office of
the Court Administrator recommended that:
(1) the instant administrative complaint be RE-DOCKETED as a
regular administrative matter against [respondent Judge
Mangente]; and
(2) respondent Judge be FINED . . . FIVE THOUSAND PESOS
(P5,000.00) for gross ignorance of the law or procedure and
undue delay in rendering his orders, and STERNLY WARNED that a
commission of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more
severely.[48] (Emphasis in the original)
This court’s ruling
Respondent is guilty of gross ignorance of the law.
We agree with the Office of the Court Administrator’s finding that
the Complaint against respondent is meritorious. Upon thorough
evaluation of the parties’ respective arguments, the Office of the
Court Administrator found that respondent should be held
administratively liable for gross ignorance of the law and delay.
Due to the procedural carelessness exhibited by respondent in
Criminal Case No. 10-13570, the penalty imposed should be
increased to suspension of six (6) months.
In Re: Anonymous letter dated August 12, 2010, complaining
against Judge Ofelia T. Pinto:[49]
“To be able to render substantial justice and maintain public
confidence in the legal system, judges should be embodiments
of competence, integrity and independence.” Judges are also
“expected to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with
statutes and procedural rules and to apply them properly in all
good faith.” Judges are “likewise expected to demonstrate
mastery of the principles of law, keep abreast of prevailing
jurisprudence, and discharge their duties in accordance
therewith.” . . .
....
We have previously held that when a law or a rule is basic, judges
owe it to their office to simply apply the law. “Anything less is
gross ignorance of the law.” There is gross ignorance of the law
when an error committed by the judge was “gross or patent,
deliberate or malicious.” It may also be committed when a judge
ignores, contradicts or fails to apply settled law and jurisprudence
because of bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or corruption. Gross
ignorance of the law or incompetence cannot be excused by a
claim of good faith.[50] (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted).
Respondent was careless in disposing the Motions filed by
complainant, in a criminal case no less. The Office of the Court
Administrator correctly underscores that his experience as a
public attorney and prosecutor should have ingrained in him
well-settled doctrines and basic tenets of law. He cannot be
relieved from the consequences of his actions simply because he
was newly appointed and his case load was heavy. These
circumstances are not unique to him. His careless disposition of
the motions is a reflection of his competency as a judge in
discharging his official duties.
Judges are to be reminded that it is the height of incompetence
to dispense cases callously and in utter disregard of procedural
rules. Whether the resort to shortcuts is borne out of ignorance or
convenience is immaterial. Judges took an oath to dispense
their duties with competence and integrity; to fall short would be
a disservice not only to the entire judicial system, but more
importantly, to the public. Respondent’s failure must not be
brushed aside. We find the imposition of suspension for six (6)
months to be justified.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, Judge Job M. Mangente,
Presiding Judge of Branch 54 of the Metropolitan Trial Court,
Navotas City, is guilty of gross ignorance of the law and is hereby
SUSPENDED FROM SERVICE FOR SIX (6) MONTHS, with a warning
that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with
more severely.
SO ORDERED.
18. A.M. No. rtj-17-2507
Re: Anonymous Complaints against Hon. Dinah Evangeline B.
Bandong, former Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 59,
Lucena City, Quezon Province.,
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
On April 16, 2013, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA)
received two letters-complaints, one from an anonymous
sender1 (first letter-complaint) and the other under the
pseudonym "Shirley Gomez"2 (second letter-complaint), both
narrating the difficulties encountered by the employees of, and
litigants appearing before, the Regional Trial Court (HTC) of
Lucena City, Branch 59 concerning then Presiding Judge Dinah
Evangeline B. Bandong (Judge Bandong).
legal researcher to resolve the cases; (2) she would not acquaint
herself with the case status and would instead ask counsels about
the same; (3) she would admit in open court that she could not
resolve the case for failing to understand it; she would instead
force her staff to n1ediaie cases; (4) she would spend most of her
time watching television inside her chambers; in fact, she would
call for a recess in order to watch her favorite telenovelas; and,
(5) Judge Bandong would unreasonably demand that all checks
covering her salaries and allowances be immediately delivered
to her upon release.
Further, Judge Bandong would 1mduly favor Criminal Case Clerk-
inCharge Eduardo Febrer (Febrer) thereby affecting the office
dynamics negatively. Febrer, for his part, would always stay out
of the office and delegate his tasks to his co-workers, on top of
their respective assignments. Febrer would also look for records
or process bail bonds only when given money by bonding
companies or litigants. While obvious to all, Judge Bandong
seemed not to mind Febrer's ways.
The second letter-complaint was of similar import. It claimed that
Judge Bandong was not keen on studying cases, and would
instead direct her staff, except the utility worker, to talk to the
parties to settle the case at the outset. If the parties disagreed,
Judge Bandong would repeatedly postpone the hearing until
such time that the parties would just opt to settle. In one instance,
Judge Bandong even pursued the settlement of a rape case
notwithstanding that it was already submitted for decision prior
to her assumption as Presiding Judge of the branch. She ordered
the accused to plead guilty to a lesser offense, and when the
Public Attorney's Office lawyer refused to assist the accused,
Judge Bandong appointed another lawyer to the prejudice of
the private complainant whose efforts to obtain justice was put
to naught.
Also, Judge Bandong would refrain from reading voluminous
case records and would instead order her staff: usually the
stenographers and clerks, to make a digest or orally narrate to
her the circumstances of the case. Because of this, the
stenographers could not attend to the transcription of
stenographic notes, causing them to pile up.
In addition, the second letter-complaint mentioned that Judge
Bandong was especially fond of Febrer, whose wite would also
frequent the office and bring food for Judge Bandong. Because
of these, Judge Bandong tolerated Febrer's act of receiving
money from litigants.
On April 18, 2013, the OCA received another anonymous
lettercomplaint,3 this time against Febrer and the Court
Interpreter of the same branch, Francisco Mendioro (Mendioro).
It similarly alleged that Judge Bandong would assign Febrer's
duties to other staffrnembers, leaving the latter with nothing to
do. It also mentioned Febrer's scheme of demanding money
from litigants before attending to follow-ups of cases. The letter-
complaint likewise pointed to Mendioro as the person responsible
for the missing records that would re-surface a few days later, a
scheme on the part of Mendioro to make money.
Acting thereon, the OCA indorsed the two letters-complaints
against Judge Bandong and the letter-complaint against Febrer
and Mendioro to the Executive Judge of RTC Lucena City for
discreet investigation and report.4
Meanwhile, on November 20, 2013, the Court in A.M. No. 14889-
Ret. approved the application of Judge Bandong for optional
retirement effective at the close of office hours of September 30,
2013.5 However, her retirement benefits, except for the money
value of her accrued leave credits, were ordered withheld
pending resolution of the two aforementioned letters-complaints
against her and of two other administrative complaints, to wit: (1)
OCA IPI No. 12-3944-RTJ entitled "Liberty R. Beltran v. Presiding
Judge Dinah Evangeline B. Bandong';6and (2) OCA IPI No. 12-
3963-RTJ entitled "Yolanda G. Maniwang v. Presiding Judge
Dinah Evangeline B. Bandong."7
On February 26, 2014, the OCA received the separate reports8 of
then RTC Lucena City Executive Judge Eloida R. De Leon-Diaz (EJ
De Leon-Diaz) on the discreet investigations she conducted.
While EJ De Leon-Diaz recommended the dismissal of the
charges against Febrer and Mendioro for want of concrete
evidence, she opined otherwise with respect to Judge Bandong.
EJ De Leon-Diaz revealed that even before the discreet
investigation was made, the staff members of Judge Bandong
already requested detail to other branches on account of the
difficulties they experienced in dealing with the latter. Instead of
acceding, EJ De Leon-Diaz advised Judge Bandong to settle the
issues between her and her staff. Judge Bandong refused to
heed EJ De Leon-Diaz' advice and even scolded her staff for
discussing their problems with the Executive Judge. She allegedly
told her staff not to listen to EJ De Leon-Diaz since it was her
(Judge Bandong), as the Presiding Judge of Branch 59, who has
the final say on matters concerning the branch. Because of the
above-mentioned incident, EJ De Leon-Diaz claimed that she
continued to monitor the activities in Branch 59.
EJ De Leon-Diaz further stated that when Judge Bandong
assumed office as Presiding Judge of Branch 59, there were
complaints from prosecutors, lawyers, and litigants regarding her
failure to conduct formal hearings in her court; compelling parties
to conciliate even in criminal cases; and admitting that she does
not know how to conduct hearings and write decisions and
resolutions. Because of these, Judge Bandong had become the
laughing stock of lawyers appearing before the RTC Lucena City.
EJ De Leon-Diaz also confirmed the allegation that Judge
Bandong pursued the settlement of a rape case even if the same
was already submitted for decision. The said incident, according
to the Executive Judge, even caused the prosecutor assigned at
Judge Bandong's sala to request detail to another station due to
her disappointment with the latter's actuation.
Moreover, EJ De Leon-Diaz recounted that while conducting an
observation of the courts in RTC Lucena City, she noticed that
nO' hearing was being conducted in the sala of Judge Bandong.
When she went inside, she found Judge Bandong in her
chambers watching television with feet on the table. Judge
Bandong even invited EJ De Leon-Diaz to join her in watching but
the latter declined and advised her to just tum off the television
and attend to her cases instead. Later, the staff of Judge
Bandong told EJ De Leon-Diaz that they were scolded by their
boss for their failure to warn her of the Executive Judge's arrival.
They also told her that the money used to buy the television set
of Judge Bandong came from their own contributions.
EJ De Leon-Diaz likewise confirmed the following charges: (1)
Judge Bandong would assign duties not commensurate to the
plantilla positions of her staff, i.e., the Process Server was assigned
duties of a Clerk; the Utility Worker was assigned duties of a
Process Server; and the Stenographers were required to
summarize cases; (2) it was the Legal Researcher who would
resolve cases; (3) Judge Bandong would unreasonably demand
priority in the delivery of money and checks no matter how small
the amount; and, (4) Judge Bandong would exhibit eccentricities
and attitude problems. She disallowed her staff from talking to
other court personnel and instructed them to prevent the entry
of other persons inside their office; she also at one time
padlocked their office and brought the keys with her to Infanta,
Quezon, forcing her staff to engage a locksmith so they could
enter their office.
In view of the above, EJ De Leon-Diaz recommended that
administrative charges for gross ignorance of the law,
incompetence, and conduct unbecoming of a member of the
bench be filed against Judge Bandong.
In the Resolution9 dated October 15, 2014, the Court, per
recommendation of the OCA,10 resolved as follows:
1. CONSIDER the two (2) anonymous complaints filed on
1April2013 and 16 April 2013 against Presiding Judge Dinah
Evangeline B. Bandong, RTC, Br. 59, Lucena City, Quezon
Province, and the Reports both dated 15 August 2013 of
Executive Judge Eloida R De Leon-Diaz on her discreet
investigation on the anonymous complaints as an ADMINISTRA
TNE COMPLAINT against former Presiding Judge Dinah
Evangeline B. Bandong;
2. DIRECT the Division Clerk of Court to FURNISH former Judge
Bandong with copies of the two (2) anonymous complaints and
the Reports both dated 15 August 2013 of Executive Judge Eloida
R De Leon-Diaz;
3. REQUIRE Judge Bandong to COMMENT on the charges against
her within a period often (10) days from notice;
4. DISMISS the charges against Clerk III Eduardo Febrer and Court
Interpreter Francisco Mendioro, both of the RTC, Br. 59, Lucena
City, Quezon Province for lack of merit; and
5. DIRECT the Office of the Court Administrator to CONDUCT a
JUDICIAL AUDIT in the RTC, Br. 59, Lucena City, Quezon Province.
xxxx11
In her Compliance12 dated February 18, 2015, Judge Bandong
vehemently denied the charges against her.1âwphi1 She instead
imputed "sinister delight and malevolent glee" upon EJ De Leon-
Diaz in drafting the investigation report and even insinuated that
EJ De Leon-Diaz could be responsible for the two anonymous
letter-complaints.13
Relevant portions of Judge Bandong's comment to the charges
against her are as follows:
That 'the entire staff of Branch 59 has come to her (EJ. De Leon-
Diaz) personally to communicate their grievances against Judge
Bandong and request that they be detailed to the other
branches or offices of the court, leaving no support staff in
Branch 59' is too absurd and far-fetched to be worthy of belief.
First, while there may be at least a couple of 'bad eggs' in the
staff of Branch 59, the rest are practical and sensible enough to
recognize the irrationality of leaving the branch without a single
member of its staff. Second, it is no secret that EJ De Leon-Diaz is
generally known, at least within the courthouse in Lucena City
and local legal circles, to be unapproachable to most, to the
point of being fearsome.
xxxx
As to EJ. De Leon-Diaz' claim that she received complaints that
respondent 'does not conduct any formal hearings in her court',
the records will show otherwise. Information, though
unconfirmed, has reached [the] respondent that EJ. De Leon-
Diaz has been spreading rumors to that effect, all the way up to
the Supreme Court. And because EJ. De Leon-Diaz is an
absentee judge, being always out of the courthouse, she has
never seen how respondent has been working, sometimes
staying in court up to 8:00 o'clock at night, to meet her self-
imposed deadlines for court work.
There is simply no truth to EJ. De Leon-Diaz' finding that
respondent's 'former prosecutor asked to be detailed in Laguna
because she refused to conciliate criminal cases.' The truth is that
former Prosecutor Alelie B. Garcia was already detailed in
Laguna as early as April 2011 x x x concurrently serving as
prosecutor for Branch 59, and acted in both capacities until her
appointment as Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court at
Polillo Island on 09 September 2013.
EJ. De Leon-Diaz' story about finding respondent 'inside her
chamber x x x, feet raised and very relaxed in watching her
favorite telenovela' is a complete fabrication, a deliberate
falsehood and a vicious lie. It must be stressed here that
respondent previously underwent surgery on account of a
complete fracture of her leg bone, and can neither walk long
distances nor prop up her legs without experiencing disabling
pain. Consequently[,] respondent would never raise her feet on
a table, particularly one as high as that in her chambers at
Branch 59, unless it was absolutely necessary. EJ. De Leon-Diaz
seems to have forgotten that respondent walks with a limp, or it
may have entirely escaped her notice. At any rate, it runs against
respondent's moral fiber to watch a television show in lieu of
hearing cases during the business hours of the court.
xxxx
About the television set: while other courts/branches have
refrigerators, water dispensers and other electrical appliances,
Branch 59 procured only a television set for use during lunch
break which almost all members of the staff spent in court, to
keep abreast of goings-on in the country and elsewhere as well
as for entertainment. Worth some Php 6,000.00, respondent paid
the Phpl,500.00 down payment while the balance was paid via
contributions from the court employees. Respondent also
shouldered the expenses for the installation of a cable TV service
and the monthly subscription fees therefor while she was still
presiding over Branch 59. The TV set is, as far as respondent
knows, still in [the] court.
xxxx
It is not 'the Legal Researcher who resolves whatever is pending
for the (respondent's) consideration'. That is the duty of
respondent, which duty she discharges and fulfills by writing the
drafts of her own decisions, orders and other issuances, then
affixing her signature to the finalized form thereof The Legal
Researcher, Shiela Amandy, is asked to check the citations of law
and precedent, if any, that these drafts may contain, and
proceed with the reduction of the drafts into typewritten or
printed form for respondent's signature. Every decision or
resolution respondent made and signed was the product of her
study of the facts alleged, the evidence adduced, and the law
and jurisprudence applicable to the case. Aware that such
decisions/resolutions are subject to challenge by the parties,
respondent takes care to carefully apply the law and precedent
to the facts as shown by the evidence.
xxxx
Respondent did not and does not play favorites. An examination
of her work in all the courts she served will show that she is a fair,
just and humane judge and leader, who does not tolerate
idleness and wrongdoing. She adheres to the principle that every
member of the court staff represents a spoke in the wheel of
justice. For the wheel to keep turning, each spoke must give its
best and contribute its strength to the whole.
Branch 59's caseload consists of approximately eighty percent
(80%) criminal cases and twenty percent (20%) civil and other
cases. In view of the number of cases, the workload relative to
criminal cases could not be accomplished singlehandedly by
Criminal Docket Clerk Eduardo Febrer so that he was assisted by
a provincial employee who was, however, appointed Process
Server of the Municipal Trial Court at Lucban, Quezon, in March
2013. Process Server Eric Atienza was assigned to perform duties
related to his position and functions, specifically the service of
notices, orders, subpoenae, etc. by registered mail. Prior to
March 2013 Atienza' s workload was very light - he had much time
on his hands that he could afford to attend to his bar/restaurant
and construction contracting businesses as well as his functions
as President of the Process Servers Association of the Philippines
during office hours. When Atienza was given his new assignment
of mailing notices, he became scarce, frequently absenting
himself and when present refusing to work at the office, forcing
his co-employees Sheriff Grace Armarnento, Clerk III Madeleine
Gaviola and OIC Branch Clerk of Court Teodora Parfan to fill in
for him. On hindsight, respondent should have filed a case or
cases against Atienza.
xxxx
There is no truth whatsoever to EJ. De Leon-Diaz' report that
respondent 'closed the entire office because she wanted her
staff in San Pablo City as she was sick.' Respondent prefers to rest
in private when she is under the weather or otherwise feels unwell,
which preference is known to her staff in Branch 59 and the other
courts she had served, to friends and relations.
The story laying responsibility, nay, culpability, upon respondent
for the keys that went missing sometime in June 2013 while she
was on official travel to Infanta, Quezon, is only for the gullible.
Even EJ. De Leon-Diaz[, is] or should be aware that respondent is
not the custodian of the keys to the offices of Branch 59, so that
blaming respondent for their loss stretches logic and reason, and
is certainly unjustified and unreasonable.
On Demands for Priority in the Delivery of Checks and Moneys
There is a payroll for the eight (8) judges presiding over the
different branches of the Regional Trial Court in Lucena City,
which is prepared ahead of and apart from the payroll for the
other court employees. As a natural consequence, respondent
received her paychecks ahead of her staff, but she never
demanded that the same be given ahead of the other judges.
EJ De Leon-Diaz' confirmation of the claim that respondent wants
to be prioritized in the delivery of her checks appears to be a ploy
on her part to cover or camouflage her own shortcomings
regarding her pay. Unconfirmed reports have it that the EJ has a
lot of loans. But it is a fact that there is a pending matter between
Nedy Taringan and Lorelei Caranto, both employees of Branch
54. It is also a fact that the EJ has not investigated this matter until
the present. Then there is talk that the EJ could not proceed with
the investigation because she is in deep monetary debt to both
employees.
At any rate, whether or not the reports are true, the issue on
priority in check delivery is too petty to deserve any
consideration. x x x14
In its Memorandum15 dated August 19, 2015, the OCA informed
the Court that in compliance with the Resolution dated October
15, 2014, it dispatched a team to RTC-Lucena City, Branch 59 to
conduct a judicial audit. In the course thereof, the OCA likewise
conducted a parallel investigation in connection with the
complaints against Judge Bandong which yielded the following:
x x x Four (4) of the court personnel, namely, OIC-Legal
Researcher Shiela May Amandy, Court Interpreter Francisco
Mendioro, Clerk III Eduardo Febrer, and Process Server Eric
Atienza gave their respective sworn statements. OIC-Legal
Researcher Amandy narrated her initial non-designation by
respondent Judge Bandong as OIC. Moreover, she confirmed
the allegation that respondent Judge Bandong belatedly
conducted court hearings due to her habit of watching Korean
telenovelas and how she instructed her staff to give her a
detailed update on the scenes she missed whenever she was
constrained to conduct hearings. OIC Legal Researcher Amandy
stressed that respondent Judge Bandong practically delegated
to her the duty of preparing court decisions without any
significant output from the latter.
Court Interpreter Mendioro confirmed respondent Judge
Bandong's obsession to watch Korean telenovelas and revealed
the latter's peculiar manner of dressing up [in] public by wearing
dusters, slippers, and other household clothes. He expressed
incredulity over respondent Judge Bandong's propensity to
delegate cases (including appealed ones) for mediation even to
the lowerranked employees such as the process server. On the
other hand, Clerk III Febrer denied being the pet employee of
respondent Judge Bandong as he also received some dressing-
down from the latter. He also denied loafing around or looking
for records only when there was money involved. He, however,
validated respondent Judge Bandong's declaration that Process
Server Atienza's frequent loitering prompted the magistrate to
delegate to the latter the duty of releasing orders and notices.
For his part, Process Server Atienza confirmed all the allegations
against respondent Judge Bandong and Clerk III Febrer,
withoutc,J howevef[,J giving specifics. He asserted that he was
overloaded with tasks which are not part of his job description,
including the mediation of cases, to the detriment of his own
workload.x x x16
Interestingly, Process Server Atienza (Atienza) also stated that
there were allegations that their former OIC, Stenographer
Teodora Parfan (Parfan), was asking money in exchange of
favorable orders or decisions. In fact, Atienza, for several times,
saw litigants giving money to Parfan in their branch session hall.
Later, the OCA investigating team came across a piece of paper
which appeared to be a handwritten receipt issued and signed
by Parfan on November 27, 2014 indicating as follows: "Received
the amount of ₱ 5,000.00 from Rowel Abella as partial settlement
of case." Apparently, the said receipt pertained to Criminal Case
No. 2005-1127, a case for: frustrated homicide. The investigating
team then tracked down the accused therein, Rowell Abella
(Abella), and private complainant's father, Ruben de Ocampo
(de Ocampo). They both confirmed that after a scheduled
hearing, Judge Bandong referred the parties to Parfan for
mediation.17
Considering the foregoing, the OCA evaluated the complaints
as follows:
In the instant matter, respondent Judge Bandong is confronted
with a considerable number of charges. After a careful
evaluation of the charges, this Office is convinced that most of
them failed to surpass and transcend the required substantial
evidence to prove her culpability on said allegations, either
because the charges against her were uncorroborated and
inadequate, or because they were merely derived from second-
hand information, or because they were just too inconsequential
to merit the Court's attention, viz.:
a. Her alleged predisposition to keep favorite employees;
b. Her alleged public admission of ineptitude when
conducting trials and hearings and/or propensity to
compel litigants and lawyers to conciliate;
c. Her alleged failure to conduct trials and hearings;
d. Her alleged undue insistence for an immediate
dispatch of her checks;
e. Her alleged proclivity to delegate her decision-making
duty to her court personnel; and,
f. Her alleged eccentricities and/or peculiar directives to
her personnel.
Some of the above allegations might have been considered as
serious enough to have merited a deeper scrutiny had they been
supported by additional evidence. Unfortunately, mere
allegation without any proof of the supposed improprieties
committed by respondent Judge Bandong in the anonymous
letters and the report submitted by Executive Judge De Leon-
Diaz is evidently not sufficient to make her accountable for such
misfeasance.
Still, this Office believes that substantial evidence exists against
respondent Judge Bandong on the following charges:
a. Her habit of watching TV programs during court trials
and hearings;
b. Her predeliction to delegate mediation of cases to
court personnel; and,
c. Her designation of Process Server Atienza to perform the
functions and duties appertaining to Clerk III Febrer.18
As to Judge Bandong's habit of watching telenovelas during
office hours, the OCA noted that (1) EJ De Leon-Diaz had a first-
hand information on this as she herself witnessed it; and (2) the
same was confirmed by Judge Bandong's staff, namely, Atienza,
Amandy, Febrer and Mendioro in their respective sworn
statements. For this, the OCA found Judge Bandong to have
exhibited conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service
and violated Sections 1 and 2, Canon 6 of the New Code of
Judicial Conduct which mandate a judge's strict devotion to
judicial duties.
With respect to Judge Bandong's practice of delegating to her
court staff the mediation of cases, this was confirmed by the
sworn statements of Abella and de Ocampo which revealed
that per instruction of Judge Bandong, Stenographer Parfan
caused the parties in Criminal Case No. 2005-1127 to enter into
monetary settlement in order to terminate the case. Per A.M. No.
01-10-5-SC-PHILJA dated October 16, 2001, cases where
amicable settlement is possible should be referred to the
Philippine Mediation Center (PMC) which shall assist the parties in
selecting a duly accredited mediator. Judge Bandong therefore
erred in not referring mediatable cases to the PMC and in letting
her staff, who were not accredited mediators, handle the
mediation of cases. This, according to the OCA, constituted
grave misconduct.
Anent Judge Bandong's designation of (Process Server) Atienza
to perform the duties and functions pertaining to (Clerk III) Febrer,
the OCA stressed that under Section 7, Canon IV of the Code of
Conduct for Court Personnel, court personnel shall not be
required to perform any work or duty outside the scope of their
assigned job description. Here, the OCA noted the significant
difference between the duties of a Clerk III, which are basically
clerical in nature and require one to be always in the office, and
the duties of a Process Server, which require the latter in the field
to personally serve and/or mail court processes. The OCA opined
that it is incongruent to assign a Process Server with duties
pertaining to a Clerk since the same would tie down the former
to the office to the detriment of his own work, which as
mentioned, requires him to be out of the office most of the time.
While Judge Bandong might have had the best intention in
wanting to lighten the workload of Febrer, her assignment to
Atienza of the duties pertaining to Febrer, however, adversely
affected another important aspect of court management, that
is, the prompt service of court processes. This, according to OCA,
was counter-productive and did not serve the ends of justice.
Hence, it found Judge Bandong to have violated Supreme Court
circulars, rules and directives.
The OCA summed up its report as follows:
Recapitulating the three (3) charges discussed above, this Office
believes that respondent Judge Bandong is liable for (1) conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service (for watching TV
during court trials and hearings), (2) gross misconduct (for
erroneously referring cases for mediation), and (3) violation of
Supreme Court rules, directives, and circulars (for wrongful
delegation of duties to court personnel). Under Section 50, Rule
10 of the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
(RRACCS), if the respondent is found guilty of two (2) or more
charges or counts, the penalty to be imposed should be that
corresponding to the most serious charge and the rest shall be
considered as aggravating circumstances. In the instant case,
the charge of gross misconduct is the most serious charge,
making the charges of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of
the service and violation of Supreme Court rules, directives and
circulars as aggravating circumstances. Under Section 11, Rule
140 of the Rules of Court, gross misconduct is punishable by
dismissal from the service.
Considering, however, that respondent Judge Bandong has
already retired from the service, this Office finds wisdom in
applying the principle laid down in Santiago B. Burgos vs. Clerk of
Court II Vicky A. Baes. In lieu of dismissal that the offense carries
but which can no longer be effectively imposed because of
respondent Judge Bandong's retirement, this Office
recommends the forfeiture of whatever benefits still due her from
the government, except for the accrued leave credits, if any,
that she had earned. It is also recommended that she be barred
from reemployment in any branch or instrumentality of the
government, including government-owned and controlled
corporations.
xxxx
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, this Office respectfully recommends
that:
(a) the instant complaint be RE-DOCKETED as a regular
administrative matter;
(b) retired Judge Dinah Evangeline B. Bandong, formerly
of Branch 59, Regional Trial Court, Lucena City, Quezon be
found LIABLE for Gross Misconduct;
(c) considering that dismissal from the service can no
longer be effectively imposed on respondent Judge
Bandong in view of her optional retirement effective 30
September 2013, that whatever benefits still due her from
the government, except for accrued leave credits, if any,
be FORFEITED and that she be BARRED from re-
employment in any branch or instrumentality of the
government, including government-owned and
controlled corporations.
xxxx19
The Court's Ruling
The Court partly adopts the findings and recommendations of
the OCA.
Among the many charges against Judge Bandong, the OCA
aptly found that only the following were supported by substantial
evidence: (1) Judge Bandong's habit of watching television
during office hours; (2) her predeliction to delegate mediation of
cases to court personnel; and (3) her delegation to Process
Server Atienza the performance of the functions and duties
pertaining to Clerk III Febrer. "In administrative cases, the
quantum of evidence required is that of substantial evidence."20
"Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind may accept as adequate to support a conclusion. The
requirement is satisfied where there is reasonable ground to
believe that the [respondent] is guilty of the act or omission
complained of, even if the evidence might not be
overwhelming."21 Here, the other charges against Judge
Bandong remain to be mere allegations and therefore did not
meet the mandated quantum of evidence. Rightly so, Judge
Bandong "should not be held responsible for. allegations which
were not proven."22 However and as stated, it is otherwise with
respect to the three charges specifically mentioned as will be
discussed below.
Judge Bandong's habit of watching television programs during
office hours
As noted by the OCA, Judge Bandong's habit of watching
telenovelas during office hours was personally witnessed by EJ De
Leon-Diaz. Aside from this, the staff of Branch 59 in their respective
sworn statements23 uniformly attested that Judge Bandong
would watch Korean telenovelas during office hours thereby
causing delay in the conduct of hearings. Lawyers and litigants
were made to wait until she had finished watching. Indeed, the
report of EJ De LeonDiaz regarding this matter and the consistent
statements of the staff of Branch 59 already constituted
substantial evidence. On the other hand, Judge Bandong did
not categorically deny the charge and merely stated that "it runs
against [her] moral fiber to watch a television show in lieu of
hearing cases during the business hours of the court."24
Thus, the Court agrees with the OCA that Judge Bandong
violated Sections 1 and 2, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary which provide, viz.:
CANON 6
COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE
Competence and diligence are prerequisites to the due
performance of judicial office.
SECTION 1. The judicial duties of a judge take precedence over
all other activities.
SECTION 2. Judges shall devote their professional activity to
judicial duties, which include not only the performance of judicial
functions and responsibilities in court and the making of
decisions, but also other tasks relevant to the judicial office or the
court's operations.
The Court has stressed time and again that "decision-making is
the primordial x x x duty of a member of the [bench]."25 ''No other
[task] can be more important than decision-making x x x."26 In the
case of trial courts, the conduct of hearings is unquestionably an
important component of their decision-making process and,
conversely, all other official tasks must give way thereto.27 Hence,
for a judge to allow an activity, and an unofficial one at that, to
take precedence over the conduct of hearings is totally
unacceptable. It is a patent derogation of Sections 1 and 2 of
Canon 6 and a blatant disregard of the professional yardstick
that "all judicial [officials and] employees must devote their
official time to government service.28
Additionally, Judge Bandong's habit of watching television
during office hours violates Section 7 of the same Canon 6 which
requires Judges "not to engage in conduct incompatible with the
diligent discharge of judicial duties." Watching telenovelas surely
dissipates away Judge Bandong's precious time in the office,
which, needless to say, has an adverse effect on the prompt
administration of justice.29 Such activity is by all means counter-
productive to the due performance of judicial duties.
For the afore-stated violations, the Court finds Judge Bandong
guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
"Conduct prejudicial to the best interest of [the] service x x x
pertains to any conduct that is detrimental or derogatory or
naturally or probably bringing about a wrong result; it refers to
acts or omissions that violate the norm of public accountability
and diminish - or tend to diminish - the people's faith in the
Judiciary."30 As correctly stated by OCA, Judge Bandong's
"audacity to delay - and even interrupt - court trials and hearings
just to satisfy her obsession for soap operas [is w ]ithout a doubt
[a] reprehensible conduct [which] lowers the people's respect for
the judiciary."31
Judge Bandong's predeliction to delegate mediation of cases to
court personnel
Both the affidavits of De Ocampo and Abella confirmed that it
was (Stenographer) Parfan who mediated between them in
Criminal Case No. 2005- 1127. This was supported by the
handwritten receipt signed by Parfan (which the OCA
investigating team came across in the course of its investigation)
purportedly showing partial payment of the settlement amount
in the said criminal case. Abella also categorically stated that it
was Judge Bandong who referred them to Parfan. To the Court,
these are substantial evidence to support the subject charge
against Judge Bandong. Notably, Judge Bandong was silent
about the matter. She totally failed to deny or proffer any
explanation for the same.
To decongest court dockets and enhance access to justice, the
Court through A.M. No. 01-10-05-SC-PHILJA approved the
institutionalization of mediation in the Philippines through court-
annexed mediation. Along with this, structures and guidelines for
the implementation of court-annexed mediation were put in
place. Trial courts, therefore, cannot just indiscriminately refer for
mediation any case to just anybody. For one, there are cases
which shall32 and shall not33 be referred to court-annexed
mediation. For another, mediatable cases where amicable
settlement is possible must be referred by the trial courts to the
PMC, who in turn, shall assist the parties in selecting a mutually
acceptable mediator from its list of duly accredited mediators.
Here, Criminal Case No. 2005-1127 involving frustrated homicide
is apparently not a mediatable case. Clearly on this score alone,
Judge Bandong had already violated A.M. No. 01-10-05-
SCPHILJA. Worse, Judge Bandong entrusted the settlement of the
case to Parfan, a Court Stenographer, who obviously was not a
qualified, trained, or an accredited mediator. It must be
emphasized that while courts and their personnel are enjoined to
assist in the successful implementation of mediation, A.M. No. 01-
10- 05-SC-PHILJA does not authorize them to conduct the
mediation themselves. Mediation of cases can only be done by
individuals who possess the basic qualifications for the position,
have undergone relevant trainings, seminars-workshops, and
internship programs and were duly accredited by the court as
mediators. These are to ensure that the mediators have the ability
to discharge their responsibility of seeing to it that the parties to a
case consider and understand the terms of a settlement
agreement. Unlike therefore when the mediation is facilitated by
an accredited mediator, there is great danger that legal rights or
obligations of parties may be adversely affected by an improper
settlement if mediation is handled by an ordinary court
employee.
The above important points could not have been unwittingly
missed out by Judge Bandong. As opined by the OCA, Judge
Bandong could not feign ignorance of A.M. No. 01-10-05-SC-
PHILJA since the Philippine Judicial Academy frequently
conducts "conventions and seminars for judges and clerks of
court nationwide regarding the implementation of court-
annexed mediations and judicial dispute resolutions."34 To the
mind of the Court, Judge Bandong knowingly made the wrongful
referral because her indolence got the better of her. Indeed, this
wanton disregard and mockery of the proper procedure in
mediation of cases, as correctly held by the OCA, was
tantamount to misconduct.
Misconduct is defined as a transgression of some established and
definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty,
unlawful behavior, willful in character, improper or wrong
behavior. The misconduct is grave if it involves any of the
additional elements of corruption, willful intent to violate the law,
or to disregard established rules, which must be established by
substantial evidence. As distinguished from simple misconduct,
the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law, or
flagrant disregard of established rule, must be manifest in a
charge of grave misconduct.35
Here, the misconduct committed by Judge Bandong was grave
since the circumstances obtaining established her flagrant
disregard of the rules on referral of cases for mediation. Judge
Bandong committed a patent deviation from the rules when she
wrongfully referred a non-mediatable case to her staff, a court
stenographer, who was not an accredited mediator. This was
despite the expectation that as a member of the bench, she not
only knows the rules and regulations promulgated by this Court
but also faithfully complies with it. Indeed, Judge Bandong is
guilty of grave misconduct.
Judge Bandong's delegation of the functions and duties of Clerk
III Fehrer to Process Server Atienza
The separate sworn statements36 of Atienza and Febrer
confirmed the fact that the former was assigned the duties and
functions of the latter as Clerk III. Judge Bandong, on the other
hand, did not directly confront the subject charge and simply
stated that: (1) the number of workload relative to criminal cases
could not be accomplished singlehandedly by Febrer as the
Clerk-in-Charge of criminal cases; and, (2) that prior to March
2013, Atienza's workload was very light, allowing him to attend to
his other businesses as well as to his functions as President of the
Process Servers Association of the Philippines during office hours.37
The consistent statements of the two personnel involved in this
charge vis-a-vis Judge Bandong's ambivalent explanation on the
matter lead this Court to sustain the charge.
In Executive Judge Apita v. Estanislao, 38 the Court had the
occasion to explain that:
While the [2002 Revised Manual for Clerks of Court which defines
the general functions of all court personnel in the judiciary]
provides that court personnel may perform other duties the
presiding judge may assign from time to time, said additional
duties must be directly related to, and must not significantly vary
from, the court personnel's job description. x x x
Section 7, Canon IV of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel
expressly states that court personnel shall not be required to
perform any work outside the scope of their job description, thus:
Sec. 7. Court personnel shall not be required to perform any work
or duty outside the scope of their assigned job description.39
The rationale for this is as follows:
This rule is rooted in the time-honored constitutional principle that
public office is a public trust. Hence, all public officers and
employees, including court personnel in the judiciary, must serve
the public with utmost responsibility and efficiency. Exhorting
court personnel to exhibit the highest sense of dedication to their
assigned duty necessarily precludes requiring them to perform
any work outside the scope of their assigned job description,
save for duties that are identical with or are subsumed under their
present functions.40
Clearly here, Judge Bandong violated Supreme Court circulars,
rules and directives when she delegated to Atienza the duties of
Febrer as Clerk III. As explained by the OCA, the duties of a Clerk
III are not directly related to and significantly vary from those of a
Process Server, viz.:
The duties of a Clerk III differ significantly from those of a Process
Server. A Clerk Ill's job is basically clerical in nature and requires
him to be always in the office to assist the clerk of court in
maintaining the integrity of the docket books of the court. A
Process Server, on the other hand, has the primary duty of serving
court processes such as subpoenas, summons, court orders and
notices, thus, necessitating him to be mostly out of the office and
in the field personally serving and/or mailing court processes.
Hence, it would be incongruent to assign a Process Server with
duties pertaining to that of a Clerk III since it would tie him down
in the office to the detriment of his own work accomplishment.
Evidently, a Clerk III's duties are not directly related to, and
significantly vary from, the functions of a Process Server. Such
arrangement diminishes the court personnel's professional
responsibility and peak efficacy in the performance of their
respective roles in the administration of justice.41
Penalty
Under Sec. 46(B), Rule 10 of the Revised Rules on Administrative
Cases in the Civil Service (RRACCS), the offense of conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service is punishable by
suspension of six (6) months and one (1) day to one (1) year for
the first offense and dismissal from the service for the second
offense.
The penalty for grave or gross misconduct under Sec. 11 in
relation to Sec. 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court is any of the
following: "(1)dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of
the benefits as the Court may determine, and disqualification
from reinstatement or appointment to any public office,
including government-owned or controlled corporations;
Provided, however, that the forfeiture of benefits shall in no case
include accrued leave credits; (2) suspension from office without
salary and other benefits for more than three (3) but not
exceeding (6) months; or (3) a fine of more than ₱20,000.00 but
not exceeding ₱40,000.00."
With respect to violation of Supreme Court rules, directives, and
circulars, the same is sanctioned by any of the following under
Sec. 11 in relation to Sec. 9 of the same Rule 140: "(1) suspension
from office without salary and other benefits for not less than one
(1) nor more than three (3) months; or (2) a fine of more than
₱l0,000.00 but not exceeding ₱20,000.00."
Under Sec. 50, Rule 10 of the RRACCS, if the respondent is found
guilty of two or more charges or counts, the penalty to be
imposed should be that corresponding the most serious charge
and the rest shall be considered as aggravating circumstances.
Here, the most serious charge against Judge Bandong is grave
or gross misconduct. As mentioned above, any of the three
sanctions therefor provided under Sec. 11, Rule 140 of the Rules
of Court may be imposed for the said charge. Considering Judge
Bandong's service to the government spanning 46 years42 and
also the fact that she has not yet been previously penalized for
an administrative offense, the Court deems it proper to impose
upon her the penalty of fine in the amount of ₱40,000.00 to be
deducted from her retirement benefits. It may be recalled,
however, that the Court, in its Resolution of November 20, 2013,
ordered the withholding of Judge Bandong's retirement benefits
pending the outcome of this case and of the then two other
pending administrative cases against her, to wit OCA IPI No. 12-
3944-RTJ and OCA IPI No. 12-3963-RTJ. In view of this decision and
also of the January 29, 2014 Resolution in OCA IPI No. 12-3944-RTJ
(dismissing the complaint against Judge Bandong for involving
issues that are judicial in nature and for lack of merit) and the July
6, 2015 Resolution in OCA IPI No. 12-3963-RTJ (merely
admonishing Judge Bandong and directing her to refrain from
further acts of impropriety), it is proper that Judge Bandong's
retirement pay and other benefits be now ordered released after
deducting the fine herein imposed, subject to the usual
clearance requirements, unless withheld for some other lawful
cause.
As a final note, it bears to emphasize that a judge's "high and
exalted position in the Judiciary requires [her] to observe
exacting standards of x x x decency and competence. As the
visible representation of the law and given [her] task of
dispensing justice, a judge should conduct [herself] at all times in
a manner that would merit the respect and confidence of the
people."43
WHEREFORE, the instant complaints are RE-DOCKETED as a regular
administrative matter. Retired Judge Dinah Evangeline B.
Bandong, formerly of Branch 59, Regional Trial Court, Lucena
City, Quezon is hereby found GUILTY of Gross Misconduct,
Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service, and
Violation of Supreme Court Rules, Directives and Circulars for
which she is imposed a FINE of ₱40,000.00 to be deducted from
whatever retirement pay and other benefits which may be due
her. The Financial Management Office of the Office of the Court
Administrator is directed to release Judge Bandong's retirement
pay and other benefits after deducting the fine herein imposed,
unless withheld for some other lawful purpose.
SO ORDERED.
(MTC)/Municipal Circuit Trial Courts (MCTC) under the said RTC's
jurisdiction. The results thereof,[1] particularly with respect to the
MTC, Pitogo, Quezon presided by Judge Walter Inocencio V.
Arreza (Judge Arreza), showed, that out of the 35 pending cases,
there were numerous undecided cases which had been
overdue for several years.[2]
In view of this, Deputy Court Administrator Raul B. Villanueva
(DCA Villanueva) issued a Memorandum[3] dated October 28,
2016 to Judge Arreza which stated in part, viz.:
xxxx
MTC Pitogo, Quezon, has six (6) court personnel headed by the
Clerk of Court II, Ms. Mederlyn F. Orfanel. We note that the
positions of Court Stenographer I and Clerk II are vacant. The
court's latest monthly reports of cases for the last six (6) months
show the clearance and disposition rates and average inflow
and outflow of cases as follows:

19. APRIL 16, 2018 Pendin Clearance

Pendi Disposition Rate
g Inflo Outfl Rate
ng [Outflow÷(Beg+I
Beginni w ow (Outflow÷Inf
Cases nflow)]
ng low)

Mar-
FIRST DIVISION 45 1 4 42
16
[ A.M. No. MTJ-18-1911 (formerly A.M. No. 17-08-98-MTC), April
16, 2018 ] Apr-16 42 0 1 41

OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, COMPLAINANT, V. May-

41 0 2 39
WALTER INOCENCIO V. ARREZA, JUDGE, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT, 16
PITOGO, QUEZON, RESPONDENT.
Jun-16 39 4 2 41
RESOLUTION
Jul-16 41 0 0 41
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
From September 19, 2016 to October 1, 2016, a judicial audit was Aug-
conducted in Branches 61 and 62, Regional Trial Court (RTC), 41 1 2 40
16 183.33% 21.57%
Gumaca, Quezon, and all the Municipal Trial Courts
 Avera
1 2
ge
While the clearance rate may appear high at 183.33%, the
disposition rate is quite low at 21.57%. The data also shows that
the high clearance rate is only due to the fact that very few cases
are being filed in court, or an average of 1 case per month. The
disposal of the court leaves much to be desired. It was able to
dispose of only 2 cases per month, on the average.
The audit team examined a total of 35 pending cases (cutoff is
31 August 2016). Of these cases, 23 were already submitted for
decision; all are already overdue for several months and even
years, with the exception of 1 case. Thus, if we remove the 23
cases submitted for decision from the 35 pending cases, [Judge
Arreza was] left with only 12 cases in active trial. With only 12
cases to handle, Judge Arreza clearly had more than enough
time to render decisions. Further, we see no reason why there
could still be any protracted proceedings. But surprisingly, there
were 7 cases that have been pending trial for over 3 years. In
fact, the oldest case has been pending trial for almost 9 years x
x x.
In view of the above observations, Judge Arreza should be made
to explain why no administrative sanction should be imposed
against him for gross inefficiency and undue delay in deciding
cases.[4]
Thus, Judge Arreza was ordered to:
xxxx
a. IMMEDIATELY DECIDE the [twenty-three (23), cases submitted
for decision x x x which are overdue;
b. TAKE APPROPRIATE ACTION on the one (1) case with no further
action/setting for a considerable length of time x x x;[5]
c. EXPEDITE the disposition of the seven (7) cases aged three (3)
years and above and SUBMIT a status report thereon as of 30
June 2017 on or before 5 July 2017;[6] and
d. SUBMIT copies of the pertinent decisions and orders, as proof
of the action taken on Item Nos. 1(a) and 1(b) above, on or
before 30 December 2016, together with a written explanation
why no administrative sanction should be imposed against
[Judge Arreza for] gross inefficiency and undue delay in
deciding cases.
xxxx
For strict compliance.[7]
In the Compliance[8] dated December 27, 2016, a table was
presented indicating that: (1) all of the 23 cases submitted for
decision had already been resolved/decided; (2) the one case
with no further action/setting for a considerable length of time
had already been acted upon;[9] and (3) two of the seven
pending cases aged three years and above had already been
resolved while the remaining five were undergoing hearings.
Judge Arreza likewise submitted his written explanation[10] dated
December 29, 2016 wherein he admitted his inefficiency. He,
however, begged for understanding and narrated the
circumstances which he claimed led to his failure to act on and
decide cases. According to him, he and his wife were having
marital problems in 2008 or just a year after his appointment as
Judge. Things became worse in March 2010 when his wife finally
left him and their children. In December 2012, he suffered a
stroke, was hospitalized for two weeks, and almost became
paralyzed. He has since then started taking maintenance
medicine and was lucky enough to have now recovered. All
these, according to Judge Arreza, took a toll in his performance
as a judge. Be that as it may, he now undertakes to perform all
his tasks, duties and responsibilities in line with the Court's mission
and vision.
In the latest update[11] dated July 3, 2017, Judge Arreza reported
the status/specific actions taken on the remaining five cases
aged over three years and beyond which as of the said date
were still in active trial.
Recommendation of the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA)
In its Memorandum[12] of July 20, 2017, the OCA made the
following observations:
Judge Arreza's explanation that he experienced marital
problems and suffered a stroke in 2012 cannot justify the delay.
While we commiserate with him for having been abandoned by
his wife and having to take care of their children on his own, such
is not a valid ground to excuse his failure to discharge his duties.
We note that his stroke happened years ago in 2012. How he
allowed his court to incur the 23 overdue cases for too long a
time despite only around 12 active cases to hear at a once a
month hearing schedule, is abhorrent. More than half of said
cases were in fact submitted for decision even prior to his stroke.
We note further that after said cases were discovered during the
audit, he was able to dispose of all of them within a three (3)
month period without a hitch. This only shows that he had the
capability but chose not to act on said cases.
This Court has consistently impressed upon the members of the
Bench the need to decide cases promptly and expeditiously, on
the time-honored principle that justice delayed is justice denied.
As frontline officials of the Judiciary, trial court judges should at all
times act with dedication, efficiency, and a high sense of duty
and responsibility as the delay in the disposition of cases is a major
culprit in the erosion of public faith and confidence in the judicial
system.
This is embodied in Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct which states that a judge shall dispose of the court's
business promptly and decide cases within the required periods;
and in Section 5, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct
for the Philippine Judiciary which provides that judges shall
perform all judicial duties, including the delivery of reserved
decisions, efficiently, fairly, and with reasonable promptness.
No less that the Constitution requires that cases at the trial court
level be resolved within three (3) months from the date they are
submitted for decision, that is, upon the filing of the last pleading,
brief, or memorandum required by the Rules of Court or by the
court itself. This three (3)-month or ninety (90)-day period is
mandatory and failure to comply can subject the judge to
disciplinary action.[13] Accordingly, the OCA recommended that
Judge Arreza be held liable for gross inefficiency and undue
delay in deciding cases and fined in the amount of P40,000.00,
with stern warning, it being his first offense.
The Court's Ruling
The Court adopts the findings of the OCA with modification as
regards the recommended penalty.
The Court's policy on prompt resolution of disputes cannot be
overemphasized.[14] In Guerrero v. Judge Deray,[15] it stated:
As has been often said, delay in the disposition of cases
undermines the people's faith in the judiciary. Hence, judges are
enjoined to decide cases with dispatch. Their failure to do so
constitutes gross inefficiency and warrants the imposition of
administrative sanctions on them. Appellate magistrates and
judges alike, being paradigms of justice, have been exhorted
time and again to dispose of the court's business promptly and to
decide cases within the required periods. Delay not only results in
undermining the people's faith in the judiciary from whom the
prompt hearing of their supplications is anticipated and
expected; it also reinforces in the mind of the litigants the
impression that the wheels of justice grind ever so slowly.
Here, Judge Arreza himself admitted his inefficiency. While he
attributed this to domestic and health issues, suffice it to say that
said reasons, even if found acceptable, cannot excuse him but,
at most, can only mitigate his liability. Unfortunately for him, the
Court shares the OCA's observation that the problems alluded to
by Judge Arreza happened years before the judicial audit was
conducted in 2016. If he was really inclined to dispose of the
backlog caused by his domestic and health problems, he should
have immediately done so. Note that his separation from his wife
happened way back in 2010 and his stroke in 2012. To the mind
of the Court, Judge Arreza had more than enough time to catch
up before the conduct of the judicial audit in 2016 especially
considering that his sala has a manageable case load due to the
low average of case inflow which was only one case a month.
Moreover, the Court notes that, with respect to the cases already
submitted for decision but not decided within the prescribed
period, Judge Arreza failed to ask for extension to decide the
same. It has been previously held that "[i]n case of poor health,
the Judge concerned needs only to ask this Court for an
extension of time to decide cases, as soon as it becomes clear
to him that there would be delay in the disposition of his cases."[16]
To stress, Judge Arreza never bothered to ask the Court for an
extension after he suffered a stroke. In fact, even before his
stroke, there were already cases which were overdue for
decision for which no motions for extension were made. Anent
the cases with protracted proceedings, the Court shares the
observation of the OCA that there was no reason for them to
undergo a long-drawn-out trial considering that there were only
12 cases supposedly in active trial.
Given the foregoing, it is not difficult to see that the delay in
Judge Arreza's disposition of cases was the product of his apathy.
This becomes even more apparent in light of the fact that Judge
Arreza was able to dispose of all the 23 cases overdue for
decision within three (3) months and act on the other cases after
his attention was called by the OCA. Indeed, and as correctly
observed by the OCA, Judge Arreza has the capability but simply
chose not to act on the subject cases.[17]
Again, it bears to stress that "[a] judge's foremost consideration is
the administration of justice."[18] Judges must "decide cases
promptly and expeditiously under the time-honored precept that
justice delayed is justice denied. Every judge should decide
cases with dispatch and should be careful, punctual, and
observant in the performance of his functions for delay in the
disposition of cases erodes the faith and confidence of our
people in the judiciary, lowers its standards and brings it into
disrepute."[19]
As "delay in the disposition of cases is tantamount to gross
inefficiency on the part of a judge",[20] the OCA correctly found
Judge Arreza guilty of gross inefficiency for his undue delay in
rendering decisions and failure to act on cases with dispatch.
Under Section 11, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, the same is
punishable by (1) suspension from office without salary and other
benefits for not less than one (1) nor more than three (3) months;
or (2) a fine of more than P10,000.00 but not exceeding
P20,000.00. Considering that this is Judge Arreza's first offense, the
imposition of fine in the amount of P15,000.00 is in order.
WHEREFORE, Judge Walter Inocencio V. Arreza is hereby found
GUILTY of Gross Inefficiency for his undue delay in rendering
decisions and failure to act on cases with dispatch. He is ordered
to pay a FINE of P15,000.00 and STERNLY WARNED that a
repetition of the same or similar act or omission will be dealt with
more severely.
SO ORDERED.
20. April 3, 2018
A.M. No. MTJ-15-1860
ROSILANDA M. KEUPPERS, Complainant
vs
JUDGE VIRGILIO G. MURCIA, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT IN CITIES,
BRANCH 2. ISLAND GARDEN CITY OF SAMAL, Respondent
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
A municipal trial judge who solemnizes a marriage outside of his
territorial jurisdiction violates Article 7 of the Family Code, and is
guilty of grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service. He should be properly sanctioned.
The Case
This administrative matter commenced from the 1st Indorsement
dated November 4, 2009,1 whereby the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman for Mindanao endorsed to the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) for appropriate action the complete
records of the case initiated by affidavit-complaint by
complainant Rosilanda Maningo Keuppers against respondent
Judge Virgilio G. Murcia, the Presiding Judge of the Municipal
Trial Court in Cities, Branch 2, in the Island Garden City of Samal,
Davao del Norte. She thereby charged respondent Judge with
estafa; violation of Republic Act No. 6713; and grave misconduct
and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.2
The complainant averred in her affidavit-complaint executed on
June 6, 20083 that on May 12, 2008, she and her husband, Peter
Keuppers, went to the Local Civil Registrar's Office (LCRO) of
Davao City to apply for marriage license because they wanted
to get married before Peter's departure on May 22, 2008 so that
he could bring the marriage certificates with him back to
Germany; that Julie Gasatan, an employee of the LCRO,
explained the process for securing the license, and apprised
them it would be virtually impossible to solemnize their marriage
before May 22, 2008 because of the requirement for the
mandatory 10-day posting of the application for the marriage
license; that Gasatan then handled a note with the advise for the
couple to proceed to the office of DLS Travel and Tours
Corporation (DLS Travel and Tours) in Sandawa, Matina, Davao
City to look for a person who might be able to help the couple;
that in the office of DLS Travel Tours, Lorna Siega, the owner, told
the couple that the marriage processing fees charged by her
office would be higher than the ₱600.00 fee collected in the City
Hall in Davao City; that Siega assured that the couple would
immediately get the original as well as the National Statistics
Office (NSO) copies of the marriage certificate; that Siega then
required the couple to fill up forms but instructed the couple to
leave the spaces provided for the address and other information
blank; that the couple paid ₱15,750.00 to Siega purportedly to
cover the fees of the solemnizing Judge, the certification fee, the
security fee, the City Hall fee, the service fee and the passport
fee, and that Siega later on confirmed to the couple the date ,
time and place of the solemnization of the marriage.
Accordingly to the complainant, respondent Judge solemnized
the marriage on May 19, 2008 in the premises of the DLS Travel
and Tours in Davao City; that the staff of the DLS Travel and Tours
later on handed to the couple the copy of the marriage
certificate for their signatures; that on the following day, May 20,
2008, the couple returned to the DLS Travel and Tours to pick up
the documents as promised by Siega; that the couple was
surprised to find erroneous entries in the marriage certficate as
well as on the application for marriage license, specifically" (a)
the certificate stating "Office if the MTCC Judge, Island Garden
City of Samal" as the place of the solemnization of the marriage
although the marriage had been solemnized in th office of the
DLS Travel and Tours in Davao City; (b) the statement in the
application for marriage license that she and her husband had
applied for the marriage license in Sta. Cruz, Davao City on May
8, 2008 although then had accomplished their application on
May 12, 2008 in the office of the DLS Travel and Tours; and (c) the
statement in their application for marriage license on having
appeared before Mario Tizon, the Civil Registrar of Sta. Cruz,
Davao del Sur, which was untrue.
In his comment dated February 2, 2010,4 the respondent
professed no knowledge of how the complainant had processed
and secure the documents pertinent to her marriage; denied
personally knowing her and the persons she had supposedly
approached to help her fast-track the marriage; insisted that he
had met her only at the time of the solemnization of the marriage,
and that the solemnization of the marriage had been assigned
to him; asserted that the documents necessary for a valid
marriage were already duly prepared; and claimed that he was
entitled to the presumption of regularity in the performance of his
duties considering that the documents submitted by her had
been issued by the appropriate government agencies. He
contended that he should not be blamed for the erroneous
entries in her certificate of marriage license and from the other
documents submitted to him, with the real parties involved
having personally signed the certificate of marriage before him.
The respondent also denied receiving any amount for
solemnizing the marriage of the complainant and her husband;
and pointed out that he had not been aware as the solemnizing
officer if any of the documents submitted by her was spurious. He
recalled that she had freely and voluntarily signed the certificate
of marriage; and that it was the same document that had been
filed in the Local City Civil Registrar's Office of Davao City. He
declared that the marriage certificate itself stated the place of
the solemnization of the marriage; and that he did not alter,
modify or amend the entries therein.
Report & Recommendation
of the Investigating Justice
Upon the recommendation of the OCA,5 the Court referred the
complaint to the Court referred the complaint to the Court of
Appealsin Cagayan de Oro City for investigation, report and
recommendation. The complaint, originally assigned to
Associate Justice Pamela Ann Abella Maximo for such purposes,
was re-assigned to Associate Justice Maria Elisa Sempio Diy in
view of the transfer of Associate Justice Maximo to the Cebu
Station of the Court of Appeals.
On August 10, 2012, Investigating Justice Sempio Diy submitted
her report and recommendation as the Investigating Justice,6
whereby she concluded and recommended as follows:
The undersigned Investigating Office, in the course of the
investigation, has been hurled with overwhelming evidence that
the marriage between complainant and Peter Keuppers was
held only in the premises of DLS Travel and Tours Corporation,
Sandawa Road, Matina, Davao City, and was solemnized by
respondent. Several witnesses for complainant affirmed the
same. More importantly, this Office has conducted an ocular
inspection of the premises of DLS Travel and Tours. During said
inspection, it was confirmed that the premises shown in Exhibits
"G", "G-1", "G-2", "G-3", "G-4", and "G-5"where respondent is seen
solemnizing a wedding, is the same place subject of the ocular
inspection. Hence, the DLS Travel and Tours building is, in fact, the
actual venue of complainant's wedding.
It is also of equal importance to note that the respondent
admitted that he indeed solemnized the subject marriage
outside of his jurisdiction. In fact, in his testimony, respondent
stated:
A: Rosilanda Maningo was really begging that the marriage be
performed since that was really begging that the marriage as the
German fiance will be leaving soon. Because of pity, I
accommodated the parties. I risked your honor because I didn't
want that the marriage be postponed as it was for the best
interest of the couple because according to Rosilanda Maningo
that was the only day, the German fiance was leaving for
Germany. Sol, I decided to solemnize the marriage in the office
of the DLS Travel and Tours.
(Emphasis supplied)
The fact that respondent solemnized a marriage outside of his
jurisdiction is further bolstered by his own admission that he
solemnized the marriage of complainant and Peter Keuppers at
DLS Travel and Tours and not in his territorial jurisdiction in the
Island Garden City of Samal.
Indeed, respondent knows the possible consequence of the
aforementioned act when he said:
A: I was thinking your honor that there was a sanction but
because of my honest intention to help the parties because they
were already begging that the solemnization be performed [sic].
I was honest with my Intention and my conscience was clear.
However, this Office is also duty bound to specify that respondent
had no hand in the preparation and processing of the
documents pertaining to the subject wedding. The witness for
complainant, Lorna Siega, stated:
Q: Madam, you mentioned a while ago that your establishment
was the one who processed the documents for Rosilanda
Maningo Kuppers and Peter Keuppers to get married, you
confirm that?
A: Yes, ma'am.
Q: Who prepared the certificate of marriage?
A: Orlan.
Q: How about the marriage contract?
A: My employee.
-xxx- -xxx- -xxx-
Q: Who supplied the entries in the marriage contract?
A; Based on the marriage license.
-xxx- -xxx- -xxx-
Q: So, in relation to this case the once [sic] involving Peter
Keuppers, I have here the copy of the marriage contract, have
you seen this document, if any?
A: Yes, ma'am.
Q: You would confirm that the place of marriage typed there is
the office of the MTCC Judge, Branch 2, Island Garden City of
Samal?
A: Yes, ma'am.
Q: And your office supplied the information in the upper portion
in the certificate of marriage which is Davao del Norte, Island
Garden City of Samal?
A: Yes ma'am.
Be that as it may this Office is of the opinion that notwithstanding
that respondent had no hand in the preparation and processing
of the subject marriage, he indeed solemnized a marriage
outside of his territorial jurisdiction, subject to sanctions that the
Office of the Court Administrator nay impose.
The above-quoted Article * of the Family Code clearly states that
a marriage can be held outside the judge's chambers or
courtroom only in the following instances: 1.] at the point of
death; 2.] in remote places in accordance with Article 29; or 3.]
upon the request of both parties in writing in a sworn statement
to this effect.
Inasmuch as respondent's jurisdiction covers only the Island
Garden City of Samal, he was not clothed with authority to
solemnize a marriage in Davao City.
In this case, there is no pretense that either complainant or her
fiance Peter Keuppers was at the point of death or in a remote
place.1awp++i1 Neither was there a sworn written request made
by the contracting parties to respondent that the marriage be
solemnized outside his chambers or a place other than his sala.
What in fact appears on record that respondent took pity on the
couple and risked sanctions to attend to the urgency of
solemnizing the marriage of complainant and Peter Keuppers.
In Beso vs. Daguman, the Supreme Court held:
A person presiding over a court of law must not only apply the
law but must also live and abide by it and render justice at all
times without resorting to shortcuts clearly uncalled for. A judge
is not only bound by oath to apply the law; he must also be
conscientious and thorough in doing so. Certainly, judges by the
very delicate nature of their office[,] should be more circumspect
in the performance of their duties.
The undersigned Investigating Officer believes that taking pity on
the Keuppers couple is not enough reason for respondent to risk
possible sanctions that may be imposed upon him for not
observing the applicable laws under the circumstances. It is his
sworn duty to conscientiously uphold the law at all times despite
the inconvenience that it may cause to others.
Significantly, Cannon 6, Section 7 of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary mandates:
-xxx- Judges shall not engage in conduct incompatible with the
diligent discharge of judicial duties.1âwphi1
It is likewise worth mentioning that respondent cannot be
charged with ignorance of the law considering that he knew the
consequences of his actions and he also cannot be seen as
judge that demonstrates a lack of understanding of the basic
principles of civil law. Lastly, it also does not appear from the
records that he has been previously charged with anu offense or
that there is/are any pending administrative case/s against him.
RECOMMENDATION:
The undersigned Investigating Justice finds that indeed
respondent is guilty of solemnizing a marriage outside of his
territorial jurisdiction under circumstances not falling under any of
the exceptions as provided for in Article 8 of the Family Code.
Considering, however, the factual milieu of the instant case and
the peculiar circumstances attendant thereto, it is respectfully
recommended that respondent be meted a fine of ₱5,000.00
with STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or a similar
offense in the future will be dealt with severely.
Issue
Was respondent Judge liable for grave misconduct and conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service?
Ruling of the Court
We hold and find respondent Judge guilty of grave misconduct
and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service for
solemnizing the marriage of the complainant and her husband
outside his territorial jurisdiction, and in the office presmises of the
DLS Tour and Travel in Davao City.
Such place of solemnization was a blatant violation of Article 7
of the Family Code, which pertinently provides:
Art. 7. Marriage may be solemnized by:
(1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's
jurisdiction;
xxxx
Furthermore, in solemnizing the marriage of the complainant and
her husband in the office premises of the DLS Tour and Travel in
Davao City despite the foregoing provision of the Family Code
disallows solemnizingthe marriage in a venue other than the
judge's courtroom or chambers, viz.:
Article 8. The marriage shall be solemnized publicly in the
chamber of the judge or in open court, in the church, chapel or
temple or in the office of the consul-general, consul or vice-
consul, as the case may be, and not elsewhere, except in cases
of marriages contracted on the point of death or in remote
places in accordance with Article 29 of this Code, or where both
of the parties request the solemnizing officer in writing in by which
case the marriage may be solemnized at a house or placed
designated by them in a sworn statement to that effect. (57a)
Respondent Judge's explanation of having done so only out of
pity for the complainant after she has supposedly claimed that
her German fiance was soon returning to Germany and wanted
to bring with him the certified copy of the marriage certificate
din not diminish his liability, but instead highlighted his dismissive
and cavalier attitude towards express statutory requirements
instituted to secure the solemnization of marriages from abuse.
By agreeing to solemnize the marriage outside of his territorial
jurisdiction and at a place that had nothing to do with the
performance of his duties as a Municipal Trial Judge, he
demeaned and cheapened the inviolable social institution of
marriage. Article 8 of the Family Code contains the limiting
phrase and not elsewhere, which emphasizes that the place of
the solemnization of a marriage by a judge like him should only
be in his office or courtroom. Indeed, the limiting phrase
highlighted the nature and status of the marriage of the
complainant and her husband as "a special contract of
permanent union between a man and a woman," and as "the
foundation of the family and an inviolable social institution whose
nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law and
not subject to stipulation."7 The only exceptions to the limitation
are when the marriage was to be contracted on the point of
death of one or both of the complainant and her husband, or in prejudicial to the best interest of the service seriously undermined
remote place in accordance with Article 29 of the Family Code.8 the faith and confidence of the people in the Judiciary.
or where both of the complainant and her husband had
The Investigating Justice recommended the imposition on
requested him as the solemnizing officer in writing to solemnize
respondent Judge of the measly fine of ₱5,000.00 with a stern
the marriage at a house or place designated by them in their
warning that a repetition of the same or similar offense in the
sworn statement to that effect.
future would be dealt with severely. The recommendation did
Respondent Judge's offense was not his first act of gross not take into account that the present charge was the second
misconduct concerning the discharge of the office of offense respondent Judge committed in relation to his office of
solemnizing marriages.1âwphi1 He had been charged on solemnizing marriages. Given that the charge was committed
February 28, 2008 in A.M. No. RTJ-10-2223 entitled Palma v. Judge with a willful intent to violate the letter and the spirit of Article 7
George E. Omelio, Regional Trial Court, Br. 14, Davao City (then and Article 8 of the Family Code, and to flagrantly disregard the
of Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Br. 4, Davao City), Judge Virgilio relevant rules for the solemnization of marriages set by the Family
G. Murcia, Municipality Trial Court Judge in Cities, Br. 2 et al. with Code, the proper penalty was dismissal from the service.
having affixed his signature ads the solemnizing officer on the
Yet, dismissal from the service can no longer be imposed in view
marriage contract without having actually solemnized the
of the intervening retirement from the service of respondent
marriage. The charge was in violation of Administrative OrderNo
Judge. Instead, the Court forfeits all his retirement benefits except
125-2007 dated August 8, 2007 (Guidelines on the Solemnization
his accrued leaves.
of Marriage by the members of the Judiciary). The Court
declared him guilty of gross misconduct, and fined him in the WHEREFORE, the Court FINDS and HOLDS respondent JUDGE
amount of ₱40,000.00.9 The present offense was committed on VIRGILIO G. MURCIA, the former Presiding Judge of the Municipal
May 19, 2008. Trial Court in Cities, Branch 2, in the Island Garden City Samal,
Davao del Norte GUILTY of GRAVE MISCONDUCT and CONDUCT
Misconduct consists in the transgression of some established and
PREJUDICIAL TO THE BEST INTEREST OF THE SERVICE; and
definite rule of action, or, more particularly, in an unlawful
ACCORDINGLY, DECLARES as forfeited all his retirement benefits,
behavior or gross negligence by the public officer. It implies
except his accrued leaves, with prejudice to his appointment in
wrongful intention, and must not be a mere error of judgment.
government service.
Respondent Judge was guilty of grave, not simple, misconduct
because he had at the very least the wilful intent to violate the SO ORDERED.
Family Code on the venue of a marriage solemnized by a judge,
and to flagrantly disregard the relevant rules for such
solemnization set forth in the law. The office of solemnizing GROUNDS
marriages should not be treated as a casual or trivial matter, or
as business activity. For sure, his act, although not criminal,
constituted grave misconduct considering that crimes involving 21. A.M. No. RTJ-13-2360 November 19, 2014
moral turpitude are treated as separate grounds fpr dismissal (Formerly A.M. OCA IPI No. 08-3010-RTJ)
under the Adminstrative Code.10 It is relevant to observe,
moreover, that his acts of grave misconduct and conduct
DOROTHY FE MAH-AREVALO, Complainant,
vs.
JUDGE CELSO L. MANTUA, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF PALOMPON,
LEYTE, BRANCH 17, Respondent.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
The instant administrative case stems from an Amended
Administrative Complaint1 dated October 6, 2008 filed by
Dorothy Fe MahArevalo (complainant), Court Stenographer of
the Regional Trial Court of Palompon, Leyte, Branch 17 (RTC),
before the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), against
Judge Celso L. Mantua (respondent) of the same court, accusing
him of Disgraceful/Immoral Conduct, Gross Neglect of Duty,
Grave Misconduct, Dishonesty, Violation of Republic Act No.
3019,2 Gross Violation of the Judicial Code of Conduct, Abuse of
Authority, and Gross Ignorance of the Law.
The Facts
In the said complaint, it was alleged that respondent: (a) used
the Hall of Justice, particularly his chamber, as his residence; (b)
openly brought his mistress in court as observed by all of his staff,
especially by a former Utility Worker of the Metropolitan Trial
Court of the same station, Dyndee Nuñez (Nuñez); (c) used the
court process server, Benjamin Pepito (Pepito), as his personal
driver; (d) delegated his work load tohis legal researcher, Atty.
Elmer Mape (Atty. Mape), because he could no longer attend to
the same due to his many vices; (e) committed gross ignorance
of the law when, in one criminal case that he handled, he
proceeded to trial and allowed the private complainant to testify
in open court even if the accused was not assisted by counsel,
and furthermore, extorted money from the accused in the
amount of ₱200,000.00; (f) asked for gasoline, personal
allowance, and other benefits from the local government; and
(g) failed to decide cases within the prescribed 90-day period
because he was waiting for litigants to offer him monetary
consideration.3
In response to the OCA’s 1st Indorsement4 dated February 13,
2009 directing him to comment on the complaint, respondent
submitted an undated comment5 denying all accusations
against him. In particular, respondent maintained that he: (a)
could not be residing at the Hall of Justice as he was already
renting a vacant house near the same during his tenure as judge
of the RTC; (b) had no mistress, explaining that the woman that
often goes inside his office was his caterer who brought him food;
(c) merely requested to hitchhike with Pepito from Palompon to
Ormoc City and viceversa on Mondays and Fridays since the
latter synchronized his process serving to litigants and lawyers of
Ormoc City on such days; (d) personally prepared his decisions
as Atty. Mape only assisted him with legal research; (e) indeed
allowed trial to proceed without the accused being assisted by
counsel in that criminal case pointed out by the complainant,
but only because the accused violated the three (3)-day rule of
filing postponements and failed to inform the adverse party of
such intention, and that he never extorted money from the
accused; and (f) never asked for gasoline allowance, but
nevertheless affirmed that he, like all other local officials,
received allowances from the local government. Further,
respondent averred that as of January 9, 2009, he had already
been separated from service due to compulsory retirement.6
The OCA and CA Proceedings
Pursuant to the OCA’s Memorandum7 dated September 8, 2009,
the administrative case was referred to an Associate Justice of
the Court of Appeals (CA) for investigation, report, and
recommendation.8
In an undated Report9 received by the OCA on July 6, 2010, the
Investigating Justice found respondent guilty of violating Canon
2 and Rule 2.0110 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, and
accordingly, recommended that he be fined in the amount of
25,000.00. Giving credence to complainant’s consistent and
spontaneous answers as well as her demeanor in the witness
stand during her testimony, the Investigating Justice concluded
that respondent indeed made his chamber in the Hall of Justice
as his residence,11 a prohibited act under SC Administrative
Circular No. 3-9212 and A.M. No. 01-9-09-SC.13 Similarly, the
Investigating Justice also believed Nuñez’s testimony that
respondent indeed brought his mistress and slept with her inside
his chamber, finding no reason for Nuñez to fabricate a story.14
The Investigating Justice, however, exonerated respondent from
the other charges for failure of the complainant to substantiate
the same.15
In view of the foregoing, the Investigating Justice noted that
respondent’s acts would have warranted the latter’s suspension
and even dismissal from service, if not for his compulsory
retirement on January 9, 2009. In lieu thereof, respondent was
instead meted a fine in the aforesaid amount.16
Pursuant to such report, the OCA issued a Memorandum17 dated
August 5, 2013 finding respondent guilty of Immorality and
violation of SC Administrative Circular No. 3-92,and accordingly
increased the recommended fine to 40,000.00, which amount
shall be deducted from the retirement benefits due him. Similar
tothe Investigating Justice, the OCA found respondent to have
violated Administrative Circular No. 3-92 and A.M. No. 01-9-09-SC
when heused his chambers in the Hall of Justice as his
residence.18 The OCA likewise found respondent guilty of
Immorality for bringing his mistress to his chambers and using the
same as their "love nest."19
The Issue Before the Court
The essential issue in this case is whether or not respondent should
be held administratively liable for Immorality and violation of SC
Administrative Circular No. 3-92 inrelation to A.M. No. 01-9-09-SC.
The Court’s Ruling
The Court concurs with the findings of the Investigating Justice
and the OCA.
SC Administrative Circular No. 3-92 explicitly states that the Halls
of Justice may only be used for functions related to the
administration of justice and for no other purpose: SC
ADMINISTRATIVE CIRCULAR NO. 3-92, AUGUST 31, 1992
TO: ALL JUDGES AND COURT PERSONNEL
SUBJECT: PROHIBITION AGAINST USE OF HALLS OF JUSTICE FOR
RESIDENTIAL AND COMMERCIAL PURPOSES
All judges and court personnel are hereby reminded that the
Halls of Justice may be used only for purposes directly related to
the functioning and operation of the courts of justice, and may
not be devoted to any other use, least of all as residential
quarters of the judges or court personnel, or for carrying on
therein any trade or profession.
Attention is drawn to A.M. No. RTJ-89-327 (Nelly Kelly Austria v.
Judge Singuat Guerra), a case involving unauthorized and
improper use of the court’s premises for dwelling purposes by
respondent and his family, in which the Court, by Resolution
dated October 17, 1991, found respondent Judge guilty of
irresponsible and improper conduct prejudicial to the efficient
administration of justice and best interest of the service and
imposed on him the penalty of SEVERE CENSURE, the Court
declaring that such use of the court’s premises inevitably
degrades the honor and dignity of the court in addition to
exposing judicial records to danger of loss or damage.
FOR STRICT COMPLIANCE. (Emphases and underscoring
supplied)
xxxx
Similar thereto, Section 3, PartI of A.M. No. 01-9-09-SC also
provides for similar restrictions regarding the use of the Halls of
Justice, to wit:
PART I
GENERAL PROVISIONS
xxxx
Sec. 3. USE OF [Halls of Justice] HOJ.
Sec. 3.1. The HOJ shall be for the exclusive use of Judges,
Prosecutors, Public Attorneys, Probation and ParoleOfficers and,
in the proper cases, the Registries of Deeds, including their
support personnel.
Sec. 3.2. The HOJ shall be used only for court and office purposes
and shall not be used for residential, i.e., dwelling or sleeping, or
commercial purposes.
Sec. 3.3. Cooking, except for boiling water for coffee or similar
beverage, shall not be allowed in the HOJ.20 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
In this case, complainant’s evidence had sufficiently established
that respondent used his chambers in the Hall of Justice as his
residential and dwelling place. As correctly pointed out by both
the Investigating Justice and the OCA, respondent’s defense
that he rented a house did not negate the possibility that he used
the Hall of Justice as his residence, since it is possible that a person
could be renting one place while actually and physically residing
in another.
Further, the Investigating Justice and the OCA correctly found
respondent guilty of Immorality.1âwphi1 Immorality has been
defined "to include not only sexual matters but also ‘conduct
inconsistent with rectitude, or indicative of corruption,
indecency, depravity, and dissoluteness; or is willful, flagrant, or
shameless conduct showing moral indifference to opinions of
respectable members of the community, and an inconsiderate
attitude toward good order and public welfare.’"21 It is a serious
charge which may be punishable by any of the following: (a)
dismissal from service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the
Court may determine except accrued leave credits, and
disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public
office, including government-owned or controlled corporations;
(b) suspension from office withoutsalary and other benefits for
more than three (3) but not exceeding six (6) months; or (c) a fine
of more than ₱20,000.00 but not exceeding ₱40,000.00.22
In the case at bar, it was adequatelyproven that respondent
engaged in an extramarital affair with his mistress. The respective
testimonies of complainant and Nuñez clearly demonstrated
how respondent paraded his mistress in full view of his colleagues,
court personnel, and even the general public by bringing her to
fiestas and other public places, without any regard to
consequences that may arise as a result thereof.Worse,
respondent even had the audacity to use his chambers as a
haven for their morally depraved acts. In doing so, respondent
failed to adhere to the exacting standards of morality and
decency which every memberof the judiciary is expected to
observe.23 There is no doubt that engaging in an extra marital
affair is not only a violation of the moral standards expected of
the members and employees of the judiciary but is alsoa
desecration of the sanctity of the institution of marriage which
the Court abhors and is, thus, punishable.24
Finally, the Court agrees with the recommendation of both the
Investigating Justice and the OCA that since respondent can no
longer be dismissed or suspended from office on account of his
compulsory retirement on January 9, 2009, he should be fined
instead.25 In this light, the Court deems that given the
circumstances herein discussed, it is proper to impose upon
respondent the penalty of finein the amount of ₱40,000.00.
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Celso L. Mantua of the Regional
Trial Court of Palompon, Leyte, Branch 17 is found GUILTY of
Immorality and violation of Administrative Circular No. 3-92 in
relation to A.M. No. 01-9-09-SC. Accordingly, he is hereby meted
the penalty of a FINE in the amount of ₱40,000.00, which amount
shall be deducted from the retirement benefits due him.
SO ORDERED.
22. FIRST DIVISION
A.M. No. RTJ-15-2405 January 12, 2015
[Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 12-3919-RTJ]
ANTONIO S. ASCAÑO, JR., CONSOLACION D. DANTES, BASILISA A.
OBALO, JULIETA D. TOLEDO, JOSEPH Z. MAAC, EMILIANO E.
LUMBOY, TITA F. BERNARDO, IGMEDIO L. NOGUERA, FIDEL S.
SARMIENTO, SR., DAN T. TAUNAN, AMALIA G. SANTOS, AVELINA M.
COLONIA, ERIC S. PASTRANA, and MARIVEL B. ISON
Complainants,
vs.
PRESIDING JUDGE JOSE S. JACINTO, JR., Branch 45, Regional Trial
Court, San Jose Occidental Mindoro, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
SERENO, CJ:
This is an administrative Complaint1 for gross and serious violations
of the Canons of the Code of Judicial Conduct & Judicial Ethics
and Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. (R.A.) 3019, otherwise
known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, against
Judge Jose S. Jacinto Jr. (respondent) of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 45, San Jose, Occidental Mindoro. Complainants
Antonio Ascafio, Jr., Consolacion D. Dantes, Basilisa A. Obalo,
Julieta D. Toledo, Joseph Z. Maac, Fidel S. Sarmiento, Sr., Dan T.
Taunan, Amalia G. Santos, Emiliano E. Lumboy, Tita F. Bernardo,
Igmedio L. Noguera, Avelina Colonia, Eric S. Pastrana, and
Marivel B. Ison (collectively, complainants) were allegedly
section leaders of the lessees of market stalls in the public market
ofOccidental Mindoro. The Mayor of the Municipality of San Jose,
Occidental Mindoro (the Municipality), Jose T. Villarosa (Mayor
Villarosa or the Mayor) allegedly wanted to demolish the public
market, so that the Municipality can use the space to erect the
new "San Jose Commercial Complex."2 Thus, on 26 June 2012,
complainants filed a Petition for Prohibition With Urgent
Application for the Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order
(TRO) and Writ of Preliminary Injunction (WPI) against the
Municipality and Mayor Villarosa. The case was docketed as
Special Civil Action No. R-1731 and was raffled to respondent’s
sala.
Respondent issued a TRO, which had a 72-hour validity, on 27
June 2012. Hearings for the determination of the propriety of
extending the TRO or issuing the WPI against the Municipality
were scheduled on 2 and 3 July 2012. Mayor Villarosa waived his
right to present his evidence and submitted the case for
resolution.3
While the entire entourage of Mayor Villarosa, none of whom
were parties to the case, were all allowed inside the courtroom
during the 2 July 2012 hearing,4 only 12 out of the more than 500
members accompanying complainants on that day were
allowed to enter.5 Worse, upon the motion of the Mayor, all the
complainants were escorted out of the courtroom except for
Julieta D. Toledo, who was scheduled to giveher testimony that
day.6
Complainants claimed that the questions propounded by
respondent to their witnesses "were all geared towards
establishing" that they should have no right to oppose the
Mayor’s plan, as "this will be good for all and the progress and
development of the municipality."7
After the hearing, respondent issuedan open-court Order stating
that "the Court is not inclined to extend for seventeen (17) days
the said TRO."8
At the next hearing held on 3 July2012, Mayor Villarosa stepped
out of the courtroom to take a call. He exited through the door
used by the judge and the employees of the court.9 According
to complainants, the Mayor did not speak to anyone, not even
his lawyer, before leaving the courtroom. Thus, it came as a
surprise to everyone when respondent suddenly explained that
the Mayor had to excuse himself for an important appointment.10
Respondent eventually issued an Order lifting the TRO.11
Petitioners claimed that during the hearings held on 2 and 3 July
2012, respondent "argued, berated, accused, scolded, confused
and admonished petitioners without basis or justification."12 They
further claimed that respondent judge asked complainants
"confusing and misleading questions all geared and intended to
elicit answers damaging to the cause of petitioners and
favorable to the cause of their adversary."13
Complainants alleged that it is common knowledge to the entire
community of San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, that respondent is
beholden to Mayor Villarosa and is identified with the causes,
friends, and allies of the latter.14 They also alleged that all cases
in the RTC before respondent involving Mayor Villarosa or his
relatives, political allies, supporters, and close friends were
decided in favor of the Mayor or his relatives and supporters.15
Thus, complainants filed the instant complaint charging
respondent with serious violations of the canons of the Codes of
Judicial Conduct and Judicial Ethics and for Violation of Section
3(e) of R.A. 3019.
Respondent denied the foregoing accusations and cited several
cases in which he issued an order/ruling against Mayor
Villarosaand the latter’s supposed supporters.16
In a Resolution17 dated 25 November 2013, this Court referred the
Complaint to the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals,
Manila (CA) "for raffle among the Justices thereat, for
investigation, report and recommendation." The case was raffled
to CA Justice Pedro B. Corales on 24 February 2014. This Court
received his Report and Recommendation (Report)18 on 9 June
2014.
We adopt the findings and recommendation of Justice Corales.
Petitioners failed to substantiate their allegation that respondent
acted with bias and partiality. Mere suspicion that a judge is
partial is not enough.19 Clear and convincing evidence is
necessary to prove a charge of bias and partiality.20 The
circumstances detailed by petitioners failed to prove that
respondent exhibited "manifest partiality, evident bad faith or
gross inexcusable negligence" in the discharge of his judicial
functions, as required by Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019, when he issued
the Order lifting the TRO.
This Court cannot accept the contention that respondent’s bias
and partiality can be gleaned from the mere fact that he did not
allow the "more than 500 members" who accompanied
petitioners during the hearing to enter the courtroom. As
indicated in the report, due to the standard sizes of our
courtrooms, it is highly improbable that this huge group could
have been accommodated inside.21 With respect to the
exclusion of the other witnesses while Julieta Toledo was giving
her testimony, this is sanctioned by Section 15, Rule 132 of the
Rules of Court.22
We now go to the claim of petitioners that respondent berated,
scolded, confused and admonished their witnesses without basis
or justification. According to the investigating justice, respondent
failed to submit the transcript of notes for the 3 July 2012 hearing
without plausible reason.23 As regards what transpired in the 2
July 2012 hearing, the investigating justice found that apart from
raising his voice when addressing Toledo and making "abrasive
and unnecessary statements to her,"24 respondent also made the
following"insulting, sometimes needlessly lengthy statements"25 in
open court:
1. Respondent declared that he no longer wanted to go to the
market, because he might be mistreated by petitioners.26
2. He told petitioners: "Mga taga-palengke na nagkakaso sa akin
xxx pero ‘di naman nila alam ang kanilang ginagawa."27
3. He told Toledo while the latter was testifying: "[B]asta na lang
kayo pirma pirma na gawa naman ng abogado niyo."28
4. He asked Toledo: "You mentioned about that ‘walang pwesto
na nakikipwesto sa inyo,’ is that not a violation to your lease
contract that you are allowing somebody to occupy your portion
so that they can also engage in business? Is this not an additional
earning on your part and you are violating your lease contract?
Is that not depriving the coffer of the Municipal Government?"29
The investigating justice found that the foregoing statements
"definitely imperiled the respect and deference"30 rightly due to
respondent’s position.
We agree.
As stated in the report, respondent raised his voice and uttered
abrasive and unnecessary remarks to petitioners’ witness.31
Respondent failed to conduct himself in accordance with the
mandate of Section 6, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary,32 which reads:
SECTION 6. Judges shall maintain order and decorum in all
proceedings before the court and be patient, dignified and
courteous in relation to litigants, witnesses, lawyers and others
with whom the judge deals in an official capacity. Judges shall
require similar conduct of legal representatives, court staff and
others subject to their influence, direction or control.
A Judge should be considerate, courteous and civil to all persons
who come to his court,33 viz:
It is reprehensible for a judge to humiliate a lawyer, litigant or
witness. The act betrays lack of patience, prudence and
restraint. Thus, a judge must at all times be temperate in his
language. He must choose his words, written or spoken, with
utmost care and sufficient control. The wise and just man is
esteemed for his discernment. Pleasing speech increases his
persuasiveness.34
This Court likewise finds that respondent violated Section 1 of
Canon 2 and Section 1 of Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, which read:
CANON 2
INTEGRITY
SEC. 1. Judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct above
reproach, but that it isperceived to be so inview of a reasonable
observer.
CANON 4
PROPRIETY
SEC. 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of
impropriety in all of their activities.1âwphi1 The above provisions
clearly enjoin judges not only from committing acts of
impropriety, but even acts that have the appearance of
impropriety.35 This is because appearance is as important as
reality in the performance of judicial functions. A judge — like
Ceasar's wife — must not only be pure and faithful, but must also
be above suspicion.36
In this case, instead of reprimanding Mayor Villarosa for not
asking for the court’s permission to leave while the trial was
ongoing, respondent appeared to serve as the former’s
advocate. He did so by declaring in open court that the abrupt
exit of the Mayor should be excused, as the latter had an
important appointment to attend. Respondent does not deny
this in his Comment.37 It was the Mayor’s lawyer, and not
respondent judge, who had the duty of explaining why the
mayor left the courtroom without asking for the court’s
permission.
The New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary
mandates that judges must not only maintain their
independence, integrity and impartiality; they must also avoid
any appearance of impropriety or partiality, which may erode
the people's faith in the Judiciary.38 Members of the Judiciary
should be beyond reproach and suspicion in their conduct, and
should be free from any appearance of impropriety in the
discharge of their official duties, as well as in their personal
behavior and everyday life.39
The actions of respondent no doubt diminished public
confidence and public trust in him as a judge.1âwphi1 He gave
petitioners reason to doubt his integrity and impartiality.
Petitioners cannot be blamed for thinking that respondent must
have directly communicated with Mayor Villarosa. Otherwise, he
would not have been able to explain that the Mayor could no
longer return to attend the hearing after leaving, when not even
the latter’s own lawyers knew that. Thus, respondent is also guilty
of violating Section 2 of Canon 3, which reads:
CANON 3
IMPARTIALITY
SECTION 2. Judges shall ensure that his or her conduct, both in
and out of court, maintains and enhances the confidence of the
public, the legal p rofession and litigants in the impartiality of the
judge and of the judiciary.
It is clear from all the foregoing that respondent is guilty of
conduct unbecoming a judge.
We note that in a previous case, Taran v. Jacinto, Jr.,40 this Court
has already found Respondent Judge Jacinto liable for his failure
to supervise his personnel closely and for issuing orders relayed
over the phone. Judge Jacinto was found guilty of violating
Supreme Court Circular No. 26-97 by failing to compel his Clerk of
Court to issue official receipts for all monies received by the latter.
In the foregoing case, respondent judge was fined in the sum of
₱11,000 and was warned that a repetition of the same or similar
act will be dealt with more severely. Under Section 10 in relation
to Section 11(C), paragraph 1 of Rule 14041 of the Rules of Court,
as amended, "unbecoming conduct" is classified as a light
charge, punishable by any of the following sanctions: (1) a fine
of not less than ₱1,000, but not exceeding ₱10,000; and/or (2)
censure; (3) reprimand; (4) admonition with warning.42
Considering that this is respondent judge's second infraction
already, the Court finds that the penalties of a fine in the amount
of Pl 0,000 and admonition with warning, as recommended by
the investigating justice, are proper under the circumstances.
WHEREFORE, this Court finds respondent Judge Jose S. Jacinto,
Jr. guilty of unbecoming conduct and is hereby FINED in the
amount of TEN THOUSAND PESOS (₱10,000) and REPRIMANDED
with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or a similar
act shall be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
23. A.M. No. RTJ-13-2366 [Formerly OCA IPI No. 11-3740-RTJ],
February 04, 2015
JILL M. TORMIS, Complainant, v. JUDGE MEINRADO P. PAREDES,
Respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
For consideration is the Report and Recommendation1 of Justice
Maria Elisa Sempio Diy (Justice Diy), Court of Appeals, Cebu City,
submitted to this Court pursuant to its January 14, 2013
Resolution,2 referring the complaint filed by Jill M. Tormis (Jill)
against respondent Judge Meinrado P. Paredes (Judge
Paredes), Presiding Judge, Branch 13, Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Cebu City, for investigation, report and recommendation.
The Facts
In her Affidavit/Complaint,3 dated September 5, 2011, Jill
charged Judge Paredes with grave misconduct. Jill was a
student of Judge Paredes in Political Law Review during the first
semester of school year 2010-2011 at the Southwestern University,
Cebu City. She averred that sometime in August 2010, in his class
discussions, Judge Paredes named her mother, Judge Rosabella
Tormis (Judge Tormis), then Presiding Judge of Branch 4,
Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Cebu City, as one of the
judges involved in the marriage scams in Cebu City. Judge
Paredes also mentioned in his class that Judge Tormis was
abusive of her position as a judge, corrupt, and ignorant of the
law.
Jill added that Judge Paredes included Judge Tormis in his
discussions not only once but several times. In one session, Judge
Paredes was even said to have included in his discussion Francis
Mondragon Tormis (Francis), son of Judge Tormis, stating that he
was a “court-noted addict.”4 She was absent from class at that
time, but one of her classmates who was present, Rhoda L. Litang
(Rhoda), informed her about the inclusion of her brother. To
avoid humiliation in school, Jill decided to drop the class under
Judge Paredes and transfer to another law school in Tacloban
City.
Jill also disclosed that in the case entitled “Trinidad O. Lachica v.
Judge Tormis”5(Lachica v. Tormis), her mother was suspended
from the service for six (6) months for allegedly receiving payment
of a cash bail bond for the temporary release of an accused for
the warrant she had issued in a case then pending before her
sala. Judge Paredes was the one who reviewed the findings
conducted therein and he recommended that the penalty be
reduced to severe reprimand.
Jill, however, claimed that Judge Paredes committed an offense
worse than that committed by her mother. She averred that on
March 13, 2011, Judge Paredes accepted a cash bail bond in
the amount of Six Thousand Pesos (P6,000.00) for the temporary
release of one Lita Guioguio in a case entitled, “People of the
Philippines v. Lita Guioguio,” docketed as Criminal Case No.
148434-R,6 then pending before Branch 8, MTCC, Cebu City
(Guioguio case).
Thus, she prayed that Judge Paredes be administratively
sanctioned for his actuations.
Comment of Judge Paredes
In his Comment,7 dated October 28, 2011, Judge Paredes
denied the accusations of Jill. He stated that Judge Tormis had
several administrative cases, some of which he had investigated;
that as a result of the investigations, he recommended sanctions
against Judge Tormis; that Judge Tormis used Jill, her daughter,
to get back at him; that he discussed in his class the case of
Lachica v. Tormis, but never Judge Tormis’ involvement in the
marriage scams nor her sanctions as a result of the investigation
conducted by the Court; that he never personally attacked
Judge Tormis’ dignity and credibility; that the marriage scams in
Cebu City constituted a negative experience for all the judges
and should be discussed so that other judges, court employees
and aspiring lawyers would not emulate such misdeeds; that the
marriage scams were also discussed during meetings of RTC
judges and in schools where remedial law and legal ethics were
taught; that he talked about past and resolved cases, but not
the negative tendencies of Judge Tormis; that there was nothing
wrong in discussing the administrative cases involving Judge
Tormis because these cases were known to the legal community
and some were even published in the Supreme Court Reports
Annotated (SCRA) and other legal publications; and that when
he was the executive judge tasked to investigate Judge Tormis,
he told her to mend her ways, but she resented his advice.
Judge Paredes further stated that when Jill was still his student,
she did not complain about or dispute his discussions in class
regarding the administrative liabilities of her mother; that the
matter was not also brought to the attention of the Dean of
Southwestern University or of the local authorities; that he
admitted saying that Judge Tormis had a son named Francis who
was a drug addict and that drug dependents had no place in
the judiciary; and that he suggested that Francis should be
removed from the judiciary.
He denied, however, having stated that Francis was appointed
as court employee as a result of the influence of Judge Tormis.
She is not an influential person and it is the Supreme Court who
determines the persons to be appointed as court employees.
Judge Tormis, however, allowed her drug dependent son to
apply for a position in the judiciary.
Regarding the specific act being complained of, Judge Paredes
admitted that he personally accepted a cash bail bond of
P6,000.00 for the temporary release of Lita Guioguio on March 13,
2011. He claimed though that the approval of the bail bond was
in accordance with Section 14, Chapter 5 of A.M. No. 03-8-62-SC
which allowed executive judges to act on petitions for bail and
other urgent matters on weekends, official holidays and special
days. Judge Paredes explained that he merely followed the
procedure. As Executive Judge, he issued a temporary receipt
and on the following business day, a Monday, he instructed the
Branch Clerk of Court to remit the cash bond to the Clerk of
Court. The Clerk of Court acknowledged the receipt of the cash
bond and issued an official receipt. It was not his fault that the
Clerk of Court acknowledged the receipt of the cash bond only
in the afternoon of March 21, 2011.
Lastly, Judge Paredes averred that the discussions relative to the
administrative cases of Judge Tormis could not be the subject of
an administrative complaint because it was not done in the
performance of his judicial duties.
Reply of the Complainant
In her Verified-Reply,8 dated November 23, 2011, Jill countered
that her mother had nothing to do with the filing of the present
complaint; that she was forced to leave her family in Cebu City
to continue her law studies elsewhere because she could no
longer bear the discriminating and judgmental eyes of her
classmates brought about by Judge Paredes’ frequent
discussions in class of her mother’s administrative cases; that her
mother was indeed one of the judges implicated in the marriage
scams, but when Judge Paredes discussed the matter in his
classes, the case of her mother was not yet resolved by the Court
and, thus, in 2010, it was still premature; and that Judge Paredes
was aware that administrative cases were confidential in nature.
Jill claimed that the intention to humiliate her family was evident
when Judge Paredes branded her brother, Francis, as a “drug
addict.”
Rejoinder of Judge Paredes
In his Rejoinder,9 dated December 2, 2011, Judge Paredes
asserted that it was not premature to discuss the marriage scams
in class because the scandal was already disclosed by Atty.
Rullyn Garcia and was also written in many legal publications,
and that the drug addiction of Francis was known in the Palace
of Justice of Cebu City.
In its Report,10 dated September 12, 2012, the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) stated that the conflicting allegations by the
parties presented factual issues that could not be resolved based
on the evidence on record then. Considering the gravity and
the sensitive nature of the charges, a full-blown investigation
should be conducted by the CA.
On January 14, 2013, pursuant to the recommendation of the
OCA, the Court referred the administrative complaint to the
Executive Justice of the CA, Cebu Station, for investigation,
report and recommendation within sixty (60) days from receipt of
the records.11chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
On March 26, 2013, the case was raffled to, and the records were
received by, Justice Diy. Thereafter, the appropriate notices
were issued and the confidential hearings were conducted.
Afterwards, Justice Diy received the respective memoranda of
the parties.
In her memorandum,12 Jill contended that Judge Paredes’ act
of discussing Judge Tormis’ cases in class where she was present
was an open display of insensitivity, impropriety and lack of
delicadeza bordering on oppressive and abusive conduct,
which fell short of the exacting standards of behavior demanded
of magistrates. She asserted that the defense of Judge Paredes
that he could not be made administratively liable as the act was
not made in the performance of his official duties did not hold
water because a judge should be the embodiment of what was
just and fair not only in the performance of his official duties but
also in his everyday life.
Jill also averred that Judge Paredes violated the subjudice rule
when he discussed the marriage scam involving Judge Tormis in
2010 because at that time, the case was still being investigated;
that the administrative case relative to the marriage scam was
decided only on April 2, 2013; that Judge Paredes was not the
Executive Judge of the MTCC when he received the cash bail
bond in the Guiguio case; that he could not prove that the
executive judge of the MTCC was unavailable before accepting
the cash bail bond; and that the assertion of Judge Paredes of
his being an anti-corruption judge and a lone nominee of the IBP
Cebu City Chapter to the Foundation of Judicial Excellence did
not exculpate him from committing the acts complained of.
In his Reply-Memorandum,13 Judge Paredes reiterated the
allegations contained in his previous pleadings. He added that
the marriage scams scandalized the Judiciary and became
public knowledge when Atty. Rullyn Garcia of the OCA held a
press conference on the matter; that, hence, every citizen,
including him, may comment thereon; that in the hierarchy of
rights, freedom of speech and expression ranked high; that
Judge Tormis never intervened in the present case; that if he
indeed made derogatory remarks against Judge Tormis, she
should have filed a criminal action for oral defamation; and that
calling for the ouster of drug addicts could not be considered an
abuse, but was meant for the protection of the
Judiciary.14chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
In her Report and Recommendation, Justice Diy found Judge
Paredes guilty of conduct unbecoming of a judge. She opined
that his use of intemperate language during class discussions was
inappropriate. His statements in class, tending to project Judge
Tormis as corrupt and ignorant of the laws and procedure, were
obviously and clearly insensitive and inexcusable.
Justice Diy disregarded the defense of Judge Paredes that his
discussions of the administrative case of Judge Tormis in class was
an exercise of his right to freedom of expression. She cited the
New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary15
which urged members of the Judiciary to be models of propriety
at all times. She quoted with emphasis Section 6 which stated
that “Judges, like any other citizen, are entitled to freedom of
expression, belief, association and assembly, but in exercising
such rights, they shall always conduct themselves in such a
manner as to preserve the dignity of the judicial office and the
impartiality and independence of the
judiciary.”16chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Justice Diy likewise rejected Judge Paredes’ position that he
could not be held administratively liable for his comments against
Judge Tormis and Francis as these were uttered while he was not
in the exercise of his judicial functions. Jurisprudence,17 as well
as the New Code of Judicial Conduct, required that he conduct
himself beyond reproach, not only in the discharge of his judicial
functions, but also in his other professional endeavors and
everyday activities.
Justice Diy found merit in Jill’s allegation that Judge Paredes
violated the subjudice rule when the latter discussed the
marriage scams involving Judge Tormis in 2010 when the said
issue was still being investigated. She cited, as basis for Judge
Paredes’ liability, Section 4, Canon 3 of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct.
As regards Judge Paredes’ receipt of the cash bail bond in
relation to the Guioguio case, Justice Diy absolved him of any
liability as the charge of grave misconduct was not supported by
sufficient evidence. She accepted Judge Paredes’ explanation
that he merely followed the procedure laid down in Section 14,
Chapter 5 of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC when he approved the bail
bond.
 to violate the law, or flagrant disregard of established rule, must
be manifest in a charge of grave misconduct. Corruption, as an
Based on these findings, Justice Diy came up with the following
element of grave misconduct, consists in the act of an official or
recommendations, thus:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
fiduciary person who unlawfully and wrongfully uses his station or
character to procure some benefit for himself or for another
person, contrary to duty and the rights of
The undersigned Investigating Justice finds that indeed Judge others.19chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Paredes is guilty of conduct unbecoming of a judge. Conduct
unbecoming of a judge is classified as a light offense under
Section 10, Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Court, penalized
under Section 11 (c) thereof by any of the following: (1) a Fine of
not less than P1,000.00 but not exceeding P10,000.00; (2)
Censure; (3) Reprimand; and (4) Admonition with warning.
To constitute misconduct, the act or acts must have a direct
relation to and be connected with the performance of his official
duties.20 Considering that the acts complained of, the remarks
Inasmuch as this is Judge Paredes’ first offense and considering
against Judge Tormis and Francis, were made by Judge Paredes
the factual milieu and the peculiar circumstances attendant
in his class discussions, they cannot be considered as
thereto, it is respectfully recommended that Judge Paredes be
“misconduct.” They are simply not related to the discharge of his
meted out with the penalty of REPRIMAND with a warning that a
official functions as a judge. Thus, Judge Paredes cannot be held
repetition of the same or a similar offense will be dealt with more
liable for misconduct, much less for grave misconduct.
severely.18

Discussion of a subjudice matter, however, is another thing.

The Court’s Ruling

On subjudice matters, Section 4, Canon 3 of the New Code of

The Court adopts the findings and recommendations of Justice
Judicial Conduct provides:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Diy except as to the penalty.

CANON 3
Misconduct is defined as a transgression of some established and
definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or
gross negligence by a public officer. The misconduct is grave if
IMPARTIALITY
it involves any of the additional elements of corruption, willful
intent to violate the law, or to disregard established rules, which
must be established by substantial evidence. As distinguished
from simple misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent
SEC. 4. Judges shall not knowingly, while a proceeding is before
or could come before them, make any comment that might
reasonably be expected to affect the outcome of such
proceeding or impair the manifest fairness of the process. Nor
shall judges make any comment in public or otherwise that might
affect the fair trial of any person or issue. (Emphasis supplied)
The subjudice rule restricts comments and disclosures pertaining
to the judicial proceedings in order to avoid prejudging the issue,
influencing the court, or obstructing the administration of
justice.21 The rationale for the rule was spelled out in Nestle
Philippines, Inc. v. Sanchez,22 where it was stated that it is a
traditional conviction of civilized society everywhere that courts
and juries, in the decision of issues of fact and law should be
immune from every extraneous influence; that facts should be
decided upon evidence produced in court; and that the
determination of such facts should be uninfluenced by bias,
prejudice or sympathies.23chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Notably, when Judge Paredes discussed the marriage scams
involving Judge Tormis in 2010, the investigation relative to the
said case had not yet been concluded. In fact, the decision on
the case was promulgated by the Court only on April 2, 2013.24
In 2010, he still could not make comments on the administrative
case to prevent any undue influence in its resolution.
Commenting on the marriage scams, where Judge Tormis was
one of the judges involved, was in contravention of the subjudice
rule. Justice Diy was, therefore, correct in finding that Judge
Paredes violated Section 4, Canon 3 of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct.
The Court shares the view of Justice Diy that although the reasons
of Judge Paredes for discussing the marriage scams in his classes
seemed noble, his objectives were carried out insensitively and in
bad taste. The pendency of the administrative case of Judge
Tormis and the publicity of the marriage scams did not give
Judge Paredes unrestrained license to criticize Judge Tormis in his
class discussions. The publicity given to the investigation of the
said scams and the fact that it was widely discussed in legal
circles let people expressed critical opinions on the issue. There
was no need for Judge Paredes to “rub salt to the wound,”25 as
Justice Diy put it.
Judge Paredes in using intemperate language and unnecessary
comments tending to project Judge Tormis as a corrupt and
ignorant judge in his class discussions, was correctly found guilty
of conduct unbecoming of a judge by Justice Dy.
Indeed, the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine
Judiciary requires judges to exemplify propriety at all times.
Canon 4 instructs:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
CANON 4
PROPRIETY
SEC. 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of
impropriety in all of their activities.
xxx
SEC. 2. As a subject of constant public scrutiny, judges must
accept personal restrictions that might be viewed as
burdensome by the ordinary citizen and should do so freely and
willingly. In particular, judges shall conduct themselves in a way
that is consistent with the dignity of the judicial office.
A judge should always conduct himself in a manner that would
preserve the dignity, independence and respect for himself, the
Court and the Judiciary as a whole. He must exhibit the hallmark
judicial temperament of utmost sobriety and self-restraint. He
should choose his words and exercise more caution and control
in expressing himself. In other words, a judge should possess the
virtue of gravitas. Furthermore, a magistrate should not descend
to the level of a sharp-tongued, ill-mannered petty tyrant by
uttering harsh words, snide remarks and sarcastic comments. He
is required to always be temperate, patient and courteous, both
in conduct and in language.26chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
In this case, records show that Judge Paredes failed to observe
the propriety required by the Code and to use temperate and
courteous language befitting a magistrate. Indeed, Judge
Paredes demonstrated conduct unbecoming of a judge.
When Judge Paredes failed to restrain himself and included
Francis, whose condition and personal circumstances, as
properly observed by Justice Diy, had no relevance to the topic
that was then being discussed in class, it strongly indicated his
intention to taint their reputations.
The inclusion of Judge Tormis and Francis in his class discussions
was never denied by Judge Paredes who merely justified his
action by invoking his right to freedom of expression. Section 6,
Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct recognizes that
judges, like any other citizen, are entitled to freedom of
expression. Such right, however, is not without limitation. Section
6, Canon 4 of the Code also imposes a correlative restriction on
judges: in the exercise of their freedom of expression, they should
always conduct themselves in a manner that preserves the
dignity of the judicial office and the impartiality and
independence of the Judiciary. In the exercise of his right to
freedom of expression, Judge Paredes should uphold the good
image of the Judiciary of which he is a part. He should have
avoided unnecessary and uncalled for remarks in his discussions
and should have been more circumspect in his language. Being
a judge, he is expected to act with greater circumspection and
to speak with self-restraint. Verily, Judge Paredes fell short of this
standard.
The Court cannot sustain the assertion of Judge Paredes that he
cannot be held administratively liable for his negative portrayal
of Judge Tormis and Francis in his class discussions. Judge
Paredes should be reminded of the ethical conduct expected of
him as a judge not only in the performance of his judicial duties,
but in his professional and private activities as well. Sections 1
and 2, Canon 2 of the Code
mandates:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
CANON 2
INTEGRITY
Integrity is essential not only to the proper discharge of the
judicial office but also to the personal demeanor of judges.
SECTION 1. Judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct
above reproach, but that it is perceived to be so in the view of a
reasonable observer.
SECTION 2. The behavior and conduct of judges must reaffirm
the people’s faith in the integrity of the judiciary. Justice must not
merely be done but must also be seen to be done.
(Emphases supplied)
Any impropriety on the part of Judge Paredes, whether
committed in or out of the court, should not be tolerated for he
is not a judge only occasionally. It should be emphasized that
the Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of a
judge must be free of a whiff of impropriety not only with respect
to his performance of his judicial duties, but also to his behavior
outside his sala and as a private individual. There is no dichotomy
of morality, a public official is also judged by his private morals.
The Code dictates that a judge, in order to promote public
confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, must
behave with propriety at all times. A judge’s official life cannot
simply be detached or separated from his personal existence.
Thus, being a subject of constant public scrutiny, a judge should
freely and willingly accept restrictions on conduct that might be
viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen. He should
personify judicial integrity and exemplify honest public service.
The personal behavior of a judge, both in the performance of
official duties and in private life should be above
suspicion.27chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Regarding the act of receiving the cash bail bond in the
Guioguio case, Justice Diy correctly found that it cannot be
regarded as grave misconduct. The Court finds merit in the
position of Judge Paredes that the approval, as well as the
receipt, of the cash bail bond, was in accordance with the rules.
Thus:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Finally, the Investigating Officer disagrees with Jill’s allegation
that Judge Paredes committed grave misconduct when he
personally received cash bail bond in relation to the Guioguio
case. Judge Paredes justified his action by stating that he was
merely following the procedure set forth in Section 14, Chapter 5
of A.M. No. 03-02-SC, which authorizes executive judges to act
on petitions for bail on Saturdays after 1:00 o’clock in the
afternoon, Sundays, official holidays, and special days. Said rule
also provides that should the accused deposit cash bail, the
executive judge shall acknowledge receipt of the cash bail bond
in writing and issue a temporary receipt therefor. Considering
that Judge Paredes merely followed said procedure, he cannot
be held administratively liable for his act of receiving the cash
bail bond in the Guioguio case.
Moreover, respondent judge is authorized to receive the cash
bail bond under Section 17 (a), Rule 114 of the Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure. Under said provision, the bail bond may be
filed either with the court where the case is pending, or with any
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of the place of arrest, or with any judge
of the Metropolitan Trial Court or the Municipal Trial Court of the
place of arrest.
Lastly, Section 1 (h), Chapter 4 of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC provides
that executive judges are authorized to exercise other powers
and prerogatives which are necessary or incidental to the
performance of their functions in relation to court administration.
In the instant case, Judge Paredes was merely exercising powers
incidental to his functions as an Executive Judge since he was
the only judge available when Lita Guioguio posted bail.
Notably, Lita Guioguio’s payment for cash bail bond was made
on a Sunday. In addition, the judge assigned to the court where
the Guioguio case was then pending and the executive judge
of the MTCC, Cebu City were not available to receive the bail
bond. Judge Paredes was the only judge available since the
practice was for one judge to be present on Saturdays.
However, there was no judge assigned for duty during Sundays.
Relative to the matter above-discussed, the insinuation made by
complainant Jill of any irregularity reflected in the issuance of the
two (2) orders of release of different dates is not backed up by
sufficient evidence.28
Conduct unbecoming of a judge is classified as a light offense
under Section 10, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court and penalized
under Section 11(C) thereof by any of the following: (1) A fine of
not less than P1,000.00 but not exceeding P10,000.00; (2)
Censure; (3) Reprimand; and (4) Admonition with warning.
Considering that this is the first offense of Judge Paredes, the
appropriate penalty under the circumstances is
admonition.chanrobleslaw
WHEREFORE, the Court finds Judge Meinrado P. Paredes,
Presiding Judge of Branch 13 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu
City, administratively liable for conduct unbecoming of a judge
and ADMONISHES him therefor.
24. EN BANC
June 6, 2017
A.M. No. mtj-16-1870
RE: ANONYMOUS LETTER COMPLAINT, Complainant
vs.
JUDGE DIVINA T. SAMSON, Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Mabini-
Pantukan, Compostela Valley, and UTILITY WORKER FRANCISCO
M. ROQUE, JR., Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Mabini-Pantukan,
Compostela Valley, Respondents
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This is an administrative complaint against respondent Judge
Divina T. Samson of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of
Mabini-Pantukan, Compostela Valley for misconduct and
against respondent Francisco M. Roque, Jr., a utility worker in the
court of respondent Judge Samson, for dishonesty and
falsification.
The facts are as follows:
On July 11, 2013, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA)
received an anonymous letter-complaint1 charging respondent
Judge Divina T. Samson with misconduct for hiring co-respondent
Francisco M. Roque, Jr. as Utility Worker I in her court despite
knowing that respondent Roque was convicted in Criminal Case
No. 133882 for illegal possession of explosives, as she was the
public prosecutor who handled the case, and for knowingly
abetting the concealment of such fact, which led to Roque's
appointment in the Judiciary. The complaint also charged
respondent Roque with dishonesty and falsification for the
untruthful entries he made in his Personal Data Sheet, particularly
that he had not been formally charged and convicted of an
offense.
Respondent Roque was convicted of the crime of illegal
possession of explosives3 in Criminal Case No. 13388 by the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) ofTagum City, Branch 1, Davao del
Norte in an Order issued on June 1, 2005. Respondent Roque was
sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of six months of
arresto mayor, as minimum, to three years, six months and twenty
days of prision correccional, as maximum, including all the
accessory penalties provided by law. Respondent Roque
immediately applied for probation, which was granted by the
RTC of Tagum City, Branch 1 in an Order dated July 25, 2005.
Upon the motion of Lily Anne B. Cabonce, Probation and Parole
Officer II of Davao City, respondent Roque was discharged from
his probation by Executive Judge Isaac G. Robillo, Jr. of the RTC
of Davao on July 18, 2008.
Respondent Roque applied for the position of Utility Worker I in
the court of respondent Judge Samson. Despite having been
convicted of the crime of illegal possession of explosives, in his
Personal Data Sheet dated June 12, 2008, Roque answered "No"
to these questions:
37.a. Have you ever been formally charged?
38. Have you ever been convicted of any crime or violation of
any law, decree, ordinance or regulation by any court or
tribunal?
Respondent Judge Samson, who knew of respondent Roque's
conviction of the crime of illegal possession of explosives, as she
was the public prosecutor who handled his case, favorably
recommended respondent Roque for the position of Utility
Worker I in her court even if she knew that he was not yet
discharged from probation at that time. Respondent Roque was
appointed to the position on October 17, 2008 and started
working as Utility Worker on the said date.
The complainant alleged that the position of Clerk II in the trial
court remains vacant despite the availability of several qualified
applicants for the reason that respondent Judge Samson is
reserving it for someone else, presumably respondent Roque.
Moreover, an employee named Janet G. dela Cruz allegedly
continues to hold the position of Court Stenographer I despite her
incompetence and lack of knowledge about the job.
Further, the complainant alleged that respondent Judge Samson
has been tolerating the daily presence in her sala of her 62-year-
old sister Rachel Tabanyag-Verzola, who wears the court uniform
although she is not a court employee. Complainant said that
Verzola is like a fixer/swindler and she entertains litigants,
including those who wish to be wed by respondent Judge
Samson.
In her Comment,4 respondent Judge Samson admitted that she
knew that respondent Roque was convicted of the crime of
illegal possession of explosives. However, she countered that the
hiring of respondent Roque as Utility Worker I was not irregular,
but proper, because he was already discharged after having
served his probation. She inquired from Edgar Perez and Florida
Ayaso, both from the Probation and Parole Office of Davao del
Norte, as to the propriety of respondent Roque's application and,
likewise, sought the recommendation of then Executive Judge
Hilarion Clapiz, Jr. on the matter. They all assured her that a final
discharge of a probation restores all civil rights lost or suspended
as a result of the conviction.
Respondent Judge Samson dismissed as preposterous the
insinuation that she was reserving the position of Clerk II for
respondent Roque, since he is only a high school graduate and
not qualified for the position requiring civil service eligibility and
two years of college education.
Respondent Judge Samson did not address the allegation that
she had been tolerating the presence in her sala of her older
sister Rachel Verzola, who allegedly wears the official uniform
even if she is not a court employee. However, she dismissed the
charge that Verzola was a fixer/swindler as malicious. She
challenged the complainant to come up with evidence of fixing
or swindling and file the charge in court, and she will step down
from her position if the charge is proved. She suspected that the
anonymous complainant was Nelda Britanico, a court
stenographer in her sala, who allegedly has a penchant for filing
anonymous complaints to conceal her inefficiency and
incompetency at work.
Respondent Judge Samson prayed that the complaint be
dismissed for lack of cause of action.
In his Affidavit5 dated October 23, 2013, respondent Roque
admitted that he was convicted in Criminal Case No. 13388. He
said that he was a probationer from June 2005 to July 2008. He
was discharged from probation on July 18, 2008 by virtue of an
Order issued on the same date by then Executive Judge Isaac G.
Robillo, Jr. of the RTC of Davao City.
Respondent Roque stated that during his probation, he attended
several seminars and open forum where he asked Probation
Officer Lily Anne Cabonce if probationers could be employed or
travel abroad after having been discharged by the court.
Cabonce replied in the affirmative and assured him that his
discharge from probation would restore his civil rights and his
probation record would be considered confidential and would
not be opened to the public except upon court order.
Respondent Roque said that he learned about the vacant
position of Utility Worker I at the MCTC of Mabini-Pantukan,
Compostela Valley, so he applied for the said position in order to
support himself and his son. When he applied for the position,
respondent Judge Samson told him that she would refer his case
first to the Provincial Probation Officer Edgar Perez. Respondent
Roque averred that his application was made in good faith and
based on the assurance of his probation officer and the
favorable result of the referral of his application by respondent
Judge Samson to the Probation Office. Further, respondent
Roque said that when he applied for clearance from the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), his conviction and
probation were not indicated in his NBI clearance.
This administrative case raises these issues:
(1) Whether or not respondent Roque is liable for dishonesty and
falsification for failing to disclose in his Personal Data Sheet that
he was charged of a criminal offense and convicted of the crime
charged.
(2) Whether or not respondent Judge Samson is liable for violation
of the Code of Judicial Conduct for her complicity in the
appointment of respondent Roque to the judiciary despite
knowing that he was not yet discharged from probation when he
applied for the position of Utility Worker I in her court.
On February 15, 2016, the OCA submitted a Report6 and
recommended that this complaint be re-docketed as a regular
administrative matter. It found respondent Roque guilty of
dishonesty and falsification of his Personal Data Sheet and
recommended his dismissal from the government service, while it
found respondent Judge Samson guilty of misconduct and
recommended that she be fined in the amount of ₱20,000.00.
Moreover, the OCA found that the other allegations against
respondent Judge Samson on appointing an underqualified
employee, Janet de la Cruz, and allowing her sister Rachel
Versola to be a fixer in her court to be unsubstantiated with
substantial evidence.
The Court agrees with the findings of the OCA, but modifies the
recommended penalties to be imposed.
In regard to respondent Roque, Executive Judge Isaac G. Robillo,
Jr. of the RTC of Davao City issued an Order discharging him from
probation on July 18, 2008. However, the records show that
respondent Roque applied for the position of Utility Worker I in
June and accomplished his Personal Data Sheet on June 12, 2008
before he was discharged from probation. It is clear that when
respondent Roque applied for the position of Utility Worker I, he
was still a probationer.
However, the fact that respondent Roque was still a probationer
when he applied for the position of Utility Worker and
accomplished his Personal Data Sheet did not disqualify him from
applying for the position. In Moreno v. Commission on Elections, 7
the Court clarified that the grant of probation suspends the
imposition of the principal penalty of imprisonment as well as the
accessory penalties of suspension from public office and from the
right to follow a profession or calling, and that of perpetual
special disqualification from the right of suffrage. It held:
In Baclayon v. Mutia, the Court declared that an order placing
defendant on probation is not a sentence but is rather, in effect,
a .suspension of the imposition of sentence. We held that the
grant of probation to petitioner suspended the imposition of the
principal penalty of imprisonment, as well as the accessory
penalties of suspension from public office and from the right to
follow a profession or calling, and that of perpetual special
disqualification from the right of suffrage. We thus deleted from
the order granting probation the paragraph which required that
petitioner refrain from continuing with her teaching profession.
Applying this doctrine to the instant case, the accessory penalties
of suspension from public office, from the right to follow a
profession or calling, and that of perpetual special
disqualification from the right of suffrage, attendant to the
penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision
correccional in its minimum period imposed upon Moreno were
similarly suspended upon the grant of probation.
It appears then that during the period of probation, the
probationer is not even disqualified from running for a public
office because the accessory penalty of suspension from public
office is put on hold for the duration of the probation.
Clearly, the period within which a person is under probation
cannot be equated with service of the sentence adjudged. Sec.
4 of the Probation Law specifically provides that the grant of
probation suspends the execution of the sentence. During the
period of probation, the probationer does not serve the penalty
imposed upon him by the court but is merely required to comply
with all the conditions prescribed in the probation order.8
From the foregoing jurisprudence, it is clear that when
respondent Roque was granted probation, not only was the
imposition of the principal penalty of imprisonment suspended,
but the accessory penalty of suspension from the right to follow
a profession or calling was also suspended. Hence, respondent
Roque retained the right to seek employment and was,
therefore, not disqualified to apply for the position of utility worker
in the court when he was still a probationer. However, respondent
Roque had the obligation to disclose the fact that he had been
formally charged and convicted of an offense in his Personal
Data Sheet and cannot justify his non-disclosure of such fact by
invoking the confidentiality of his records under the Probation
Law.
Under Section 179 of the Probation Law, the confidentiality of
records of a probationer refers to the investigation report and
supervision history of a probationer taken under the said law,
which records shall not be disclosed to anyone other than the
Probation Administration or the court concerned. However, the
Probation Administration and the court concerned have the
discretion to allow disclosure of the confidential records to
specific persons and the government office/agency stated in
the Probation Law. The confidentiality of the said records is
different from respondent Roque's obligation to answer truthfully
the questions in his Personal Data Sheet, as the accomplishment
of the Personal Data Sheet is a requirement under the Civil
Service Rules and Regulations in connection with employment in
the government.10 The Personal Data Sheet is the repository of all
information about any government employee and official
regarding his personal background, qualification, and eligibility.
11 Respondent Roque, therefore, had the obligation to reveal the
fact that he had been formally charged and convicted of a
criminal offense to enable the Selection and Promotion Board for
Lower Courts to correctly determine his qualification for the
position applied for. The Office of the Court Administrator aptly
stated that by respondent Roque's false statement in his Personal
Data Sheet making it appear that he had a spotless record, he
gained unwarranted advantage over other qualified individuals,
especially that he was also recommended by respondent Judge
Samson for the position.
The falsification in respondent Roque's Personal Data Sheet is a
dishonest act related to his employment. Dishonesty is the
concealment or distortion of truth, which shows lack of integrity
or a disposition to defraud, cheat, deceive or betray and an
intention to violate the truth. 12
CSC Resolution No. 06-0538 provides the rules on classifying the
offense of Dishonesty and the proper penalty to be imposed
based on the factual circumstances of the case. The pertinent
provisions of Resolution No. 060538 are as follows:
Section 2. Classification of Dishonesty-The classification of the
offense of Dishonesty and their correspondent penalties are as
follows:
a. Serious Dishonesty punishable by dismissal from the service.
b. Less Serious Dishonesty punishable by suspension from six (6)
months and one (1) day to one (1) year for the first offense and
dismissal from the service for the second offense.
c. Simple Dishonesty punishable by suspension of one (1) month
and one (1) day to six (6) months for the first offense; six (6) months
and one (1) day to one (1) year suspension for the second
offense; and dismissal from the ser1ice for the third offense.
Section 3. Serious Dishonesty -- The presence of any one of the
following attendant circumstances in the commission of the
dishonest act would constitute the offense of Serious Dishonesty:
a. The dishonest act caused serious damage and grave
prejudice to the Government;
b. The respondent gravely abused his authority in order to
commit the dishonest act;
c. Where the respondent is an accountable officer, the dishonest
act directly involves property, accountable forms or money for
which he is directly accountable and the respondent shows an
intent to commit material gain, graft and corruption;
d. The dishonest act exhibits moral depravity on the part of the
respondent;
e. The respondent employed fraud and/or falsification of official
documents in the commission of the dishonest act related to
his/her employment;
f. The dishonest act was committed several times or in various
occasions;
g. The dishonest act involves a Civil Service examination
irregularity or fake Civil Service eligibility such as, but not limited
to impersonation, cheating and use of crib sheets;
h. Other analogous circumstances.
The falsification in respondent Roque's Personal Data Sheet is a
dishonest act related to his employment. Dishonesty is the
concealment or distortion of truth, which shows lack of integrity
or a disposition to defraud, cheat, deceive or betray and an
intention to violate the truth.
As the Court has stated in the recent case of Alfornon v. Delos
Santos, 13 we do not automatically dismiss dishonest government
employees; rather, their penalty would depend on the gravity of
their dishonesty. Rule IV, Section 53 of the Civil Service Rules
provides mitigating circumstances, among others, that may be
allowed to modify the penalty, such as length of service in the
government, good faith, and other analogous circumstances.14
Jurisprudence is replete with cases where we lowered the
penalty of dismissal to suspension taking into account the
presence of mitigating circumstances.15 Office of the Court
Administrator v. Aguilar16 enumerated cases 17 wherein the Court
reduced the administrative penalties imposed for equitable and
humanitarian reasons.
In Alfornon v. Delos Santos, 18 the petitioner therein, when she
became a permanent employee as Administrative Aide IV in the
Municipality of Argao, Cebu, answered "No" to the question in
her PDS about whether she had ever been formally charged
despite the fact that she was previously charged with the crime
of estafa in the RTC ofLapu-Lapu City, Cebu before she was
employed in the government. The Court held that while the
falsification in Alfomon's PDS can be considered as a dishonest
act related to her employment, it found that suspension was the
more proportionate penalty for her dishonesty. The Court
considered Alfomon's continued service to the Municipality of
Argao, Cebu since 2003, among others, in holding that she only
deserved to be suspended for six 6 months, as her outright
dismissal from the service would be too harsh.
In In the Matter of: Anonymous Complaint for Dishonesty, Grave
Misconduct and Perjury Committed by Judge Jaime E. Contreras
(Jn His Capacity as then 4th Provincial Prosecutor of Libmanan,
Ca-marines Sur), 19 respondent judge, in his application for a
position in the Judiciary, failed to disclose in his Personal Data
Sheet that a previous administrative case was filed against him
when he was the 4th Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Libmanan,
Camarines Sur. The Court found him guilty of dishonesty and
penalized him with suspension from the service for one year
without pay, taking into account that he had been in the
government service for more than 30 years and it was his first
offense as a member of the bench.
In Office of the Court Administrator v. Flores,20 the respondent
therein, who was a Court Legal Researcher II in the RTC of
Quezon City, was charged with dishonesty for failure to disclose
in her Personal Data Sheet her suspension and dismissal from her
previous employment. The Court imposed the penalty of
suspension for six months without pay, considering that
respondent had been in the government service for 14 years and
it was her first offense during her employment in the Judiciary.
In Advincula v. Dicen, 21 the petitioner therein, who was the
Provincial Agriculturist in Samar, declared in his Personal Data
Sheet that there were no pending administrative and criminal
cases against him and that he had not been convicted of any
administrative offense, although there were pending criminal
and administrative cases against him, and he had already been
convicted of the administrative offense of simple misconduct.
The Court affirmed the Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals affirming the Decision of the Office of the Ombudsman-
Visayas that petitioner was guilty of misconduct and penalized
with suspension from office for six months without pay.
In Yalung v. Pascua,22 respondent judge, in his application for
promotion, misrepresented in his PDS that he had never been
charged with violating any law, decree, ordinance or regulation
despite the fact that two administrative cases and one criminal
case had been filed against him, although these cases were later
dismissed. The Court penalized him with suspension ·for six
months, taking into consideration that he had been in the
government service for 26 years and that he had no prior
administrative record as the cases against him were eventually
dismissed.
In the instant case of respondent Roque, the penalty of
suspension for six months without pay is proper, considering that
he was already discharged from probation on July 18, 2008 when
he was appointed to the position of Utility Worker I on October
17, 2008, or he was appointed to the position almost three months
after his discharge from probation, and he has been in the
government service for almost nine years as a reformed member
of society. We take the benevolent stance to give him a chance
to serve in the government, as this is his first offense as an
employee in the Judiciary.
As regards respondent Judge Samson, she contends that
respondent Roque applied for the position of Utility Worker in her
court after his discharge from probation, but the records show
that respondent Roque accomplished his Personal Data Sheet
on June 12, 2008 or more than a month before he was from office without salary and other benefits for more than three
discharged from probation on July 18, 2008. When respondent (3) but not exceeding six (6) months; or (3) a fine of more than
Roque applied for the position of Utility Worker I in her court, ₱20,000.00 but not exceeding ₱40,000.00.
respondent Judge Samson knew that he was not yet discharged
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Judge Divina T. Samson
from probation and yet she recommended respondent Roque
guilty of gross misconduct and imposes on her a fine in the
for the position in a recommendation letter dated June 3, 2008,
amount of Twentyfive Thousand Pesos (₱25,000.00), while the
which forms part of the employment record of respondent Roque
Court finds respondent Francisco M. Roque, Jr. guilty of Serious
in the Court. As the Presiding Judge of the Court, respondent
Dishonesty and imposes on him the penalty of suspension for six
Judge Samson should have been circumspect and waited for
(6) months without pay, with a stem warning that the commission
the final discharge of respondent Roque before she entertained
of a similar offense shall be dealt with more severely.
his application and gave him her favorable recommendation, as
it is only upon the final discharge of respondent Roque from SO ORDERED
probation that his case is deemed terminated and all his civil
rights lost or suspended are restored. 23 Her act violates Canon 2
of the Code of Judicial Conduct, thus: 25. September 5, 2017
CANON 2 - A JUDGE SHOULD A VOID IMPROPRIETY AND
APPEARANCE OF IMPROPRIETY IN ALL ACTIVITIES

Rule 2.01 --A judge should so behave at all times as to promote

public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. EN BANC

xxxx [ A.M. No. 16-05-142-RTC, September 05, 2017 ]

Rule 2.03 - A judge shall not allow family, social, or other RE: REPORT ON THE PRELIMINARY RESULTS OF THE SPOT AUDIT IN
relationships to influence judicial conduct or judgment. The THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 170, MALABON CITY.
prestige of judicial office shall not be used or lent to advance the
private interests of others, nor convey or permit others to convey
the impression that they are in a special position to influence the DECISION
judge.
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Under Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, gross misconduct
constituting violations of the Code of Conduct is a serious charge
which may be sanctioned by: (1) Dismissal from the service, This administrative matter refers to the report on the preliminary
forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may determine, results of the spot audit conducted by the Office of the Court
and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any Administrator (OCA) in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 170,
public office, including government-owned or controlled Malabon City.
corporations; Provided, however, that the forfeiture of benefits
shall in no case include accrued leave credits; (2) suspension
The Factual Antecedents The data provided by the Statistical Reports Division of the Court
Management Office show the number of search warrants issued
by selected RTCs in the National Capital Judicial Region from
On April 26, 2016, the OCA sent a team to conduct a spot audit January 2015 up to March 2016:[4]
of search warrant applications raffled to Branch 170, due to
ISSUING COURT
persistent reports pertaining to the alleged irregular issuance of
search warrants by Presiding Judge Zaldy B. Docena (Judge NUMBER OF SEARCH WARRANTS ISSUED
Docena).
RTC of Malabon City

763
The Report on the Preliminary Results of the Spot Audit
RTC of Manila

675
On May 26, 2016, the OCA submitted to the Court its Report[1]
RTC of Makati City
dated May 23, 2016 on the preliminary results of the spot audit. In
the Report, the OCA made the following observations: 75

RTC of Quezon City

First, a total of 938 applications for search warrants were filed 68
before the RTC of Malabon City from January 2015 up to April 13,
2016. These applications were distributed among the following RTC of Pasig City
judges: Judge Docena, Branch 170, with 761 applications; then 9
Executive Judge Celso Raymundo L. Magsino, Jr. (Judge
Magsino), Branch 74, with 175 applications; and Judge Jimmy Third, out of the 761 applications assigned to Branch 170, Judge
Edmund G. Batara (Judge Batara), Branch 172, with two Docena issued 113 search warrants which are enforceable
applications.[2] outside the territorial jurisdiction of the RTC of Malabon City,
viz.:[5]

PLACE WHERE SEARCH WARRANTS WERE ENFORCED

Second, the RTC of Malabon City exceeded the number of
search warrants issued by the RTC of Manila (with 56 branches) JUDICIAL REGION
and the RTC of Quezon City (with 48 branches), notwithstanding SEARCH WARRANTS ISSUED
the fact that the latter courts are allowed to issue search warrants
which are enforceable nationwide.[3] Manila

National Capital Judicial Region

46
Makati City Paranaque City

National Capital Judicial Region National Capital Judicial Region

19 2

Pasig City Muntinlupa City

National Capital Judicial Region National Capital Judicial Region

14 1

Quezon City Laguna

National Capital Judicial Region 4th Judicial Region

8 1

Taguig City TOTAL

National Capital Judicial Region

Mandaluyong City 113

National Capital Judicial Region The OCA found this to be in violation of Section 2(a) of Rule 126
of the Rules of Court which provides that an application for a
6
search warrant shall be filed with "[a]ny court within whose
Pasay City territorial jurisdiction a crime was committed."[6]

National Capital Judicial Region

4 Fourth, Judge Docena issued 418 search warrants which are also
enforceable outside the territorial jurisdiction of the RTC of
Caloocan City Malabon City, but this time the applicants specifically invoked
National Capital Judicial Region Section 2(b) of Rule 126 which allows, for compelling reasons, the
filing of the application with any court within the judicial region
3 where the crime was committed or where the warrant shall be
Valenzuela City enforced.[7]

National Capital Judicial Region

2
The OCA, however, pointed out that said search warrant
applications merely cited the bare allegations of possible
leakage of information and/or that the person subject of the
application is influential in the area, or has friends working in the
local government offices and the courts.[8]
Fifth, Branch 170 has admitted returns on search warrants where
the seizing officer did not proceed with the operation because
of new developments and/or information that the subject has
already moved out, when the proper procedure is for the
applicant to file a motion to set aside the search warrant.[9]
There are also several cases where the returns have yet to be
submitted to the court despite the lapse of the 10-day period
within which to do so. The OCA considered this to be a failure on
the part of Branch 170 "to ascertain if the return has been made,
and if none, [to] summon the person to whom the warrant was
issued and require him to explain why no return was made."[10]
And sixth, the OCA noted that Branch 170:
a)
xxx issues search warrants even [though] the application is not
accompanied with pertinent papers to establish that the
applicant [had] conducted a surveillance prior to the filing of
said application xxx;
b)
xxx issues search wan-ants even when the authority of the head
of the agency to file the application is a mere photocopy;
c)
[admits] mere photocopies of the inventory of the seized items
and inventories that are not under oath; and,
d)
xxx always grants custody of the seized items to the applicant
and/or his agency for forensic examination or due to lack of
space in the court premises.[11]
Upon the OCA's recommendation, the Court issued a
Resolution[12] dated May 31, 2016 placing Judge Docena under
immediate preventive suspension for a period of six months. Thus:
xxx The Court resolved, upon the recommendation of the Office
of the Court Administrator (OCA), to:
(a) PREVENTIVELY SUSPEND, effective immediately, Judge Zaldy
B. Docena, Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 170, Malabon City,
for six (6) months pending the completion of a more
comprehensive and detailed investigation on the issuance of
search warrants;
 On the Distribution/Raffle of Search Warrant Applications

(b) RELIEVE Judge Celso Raymundo L. Magsino, Jr., Branch 74,

same court, from his duties as Executive Judge of RTC, Malabon
The Audit Team noted that only two out of the five branches[15]
City, and INCLUDE him IN THE INVESTIGATION in view of the
in the RTC of Malabon City, specifically, Branches 74 and 170,
apparent irregularity in the raffle of applications for search
took cognizance of search warrant applications, as Branches 72
warrants;
(Drugs Court), 73 (Family Court), and 169 (Family Court and
Agrarian Court) which exclusively handle drugs and family court
cases, respectively, are not included in the raffle of said
(c) DESIGNATE Judge Jimmy Edmund G. Batara, Branch 72, same
applications.[16]
court, and Judge Emmanuel D. Laurea, Branch 169, same court,
as Executive Judge and Vice-Executive Judge, respectively, of
RTC, Malabon City; and
The distribution of applications for search warrants in the RTC of
Malabon City from January 2015 up to May 10, 2016 is as
follows:[17]
(d) DIRECT the OCA to IMMEDIATELY SEAL/SECURE all
records/folders pertaining to applications for search warrant BRANCH/JUDGE
received by Judge Docena.
APPLICATIONS RECEIVED

Branch 170 (Judge Docena)

Let this resolution be personally and immediately served on the
795
parties concerned. xxx[13]
Branch 74 (Judge Magsino)
In compliance with the May 31, 2016 Resolution of the Court, the
OCA's Audit Team conducted an investigation on the raffle of - Involving ordinary criminal cases (received by raffle)
applications for and issuance of search warrants in the RTC of
Malabon City. The investigation was thereafter concluded on - Involving special criminal cases (received in his capacity as
June 17, 2016. Executive Judge)

185

The Result of the Investigation (152)

(33)

In a Memorandum[14] dated August 4, 2016, the Audit Team Branch 72 (Judge Batara)
submitted the result of the investigation to Court Administrator - Involving special criminal cases (received in his capacity as the
Jose Midas P. Marquez. Vice Executive Judge)
4 only the ordinary courts (170 and 74) are eligible for raffle unless
TOTAL
984
According to Atty. Esmeralda G. Dizon (Atty. Dizon), Clerk of
Court VI, Office of the Clerk of Court (OCC), this distribution
system is in accordance with their internal policies on the raffle of
cases.[18] The pertinent portions of said internal policies are
quoted as follows:
INTERNAL OFFICE MEMO
TO: CLERK IN CHARGE OF RAFFLE (Millet/Pam, Mark, Paul)
RE: SW/TRO/TPO
DATE: MAY 2014
______________________________________________________________
Per executive session with the Executive Judge, the following are
the innovations with respect to raffling:
xxx
3. Raffle of TRO/TPO/SW shall be special and shall require
notices/Returns/complete documentation and presence of
witness/applicant in case of SW;
4. Due to its confidentiality, only the Clerk of Court and the Clerk
In Charge shall receive any application for SW. Raffle of this
nature shall be held at the chambers/office of the EJ/Vice EJ and
the nature subject of application falls exclusively under the
powers of EJ or in his absence, the Vice EJ;
5. Ratio of cases between the EJ and Branch 170 shall be in
accordance with the Guidelines on the Selection and
Designation of EJs (A.M. 03-8-02-SC) which is 2:3;
6. SW shall be raffled on 1:2 daily basis and counted per
applicant.
Since Br. 74 is also the EJ, then, SW shall be raffled exclusively to
the remaining ordinary court when the EJ is on official leave,
official business, official meeting.
xxx
(Sgd.)
ATTY. ESMERALDA G. DIZON
Clerk of Court VI[19]
After a thorough examination of the records of the OCC, the
Audit Team concluded that the RTC of Malabon City failed to
observe the existing rules in the distribution of search warrant
applications involving ordinary criminal cases as provided in
Chapter V of the Guidelines on the Selection and Designation of
Executive Judges.[20]
The Audit Team cited three instances where the raffle of search
warrant applications was clearly inequitable:
a) in January 2016, Branch 170 received all 16 search warrant
applications filed in the RTC of Malabon City;[21]
b) in February 2016, 44 search warrant applications were
assigned to Branch 170, while only five ordinary criminal cases
were given to Branch 74;[22] and,
c) in March 2016, 87 search warrant applications went to Branch
170, while only three ordinary criminal cases were raffled to
Branch 74.[23]
In addition, the Audit Team also made the following observations:
First, the application docketed as SW 16-183 was raffled to
Branch 170, when it should have been directly assigned to the
Executive Judge as it involved violations of Republic Act No.
9165, or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, and
Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended, or the law on the
illegal possession of firearms.[24]
Second, it could not be ascertained whether a special raffle for
applications for search warrant was actually conducted in the
RTC of Malabon City because the OCC did not prepare the
minutes of the raffle.[25]
Third, there are discrepancies between the date of receipt of
some search warrant applications appearing in the OCC's
logbook and the date stamped on the face of said applications
as received by Branch 170.[26]
For instance, SW 15-120-MN appears to have been received by
the OCC on May 6, 2015 at 9:00 a.m. and thereafter raffled to
Branch 170 on the same day, based on the date stamped on the
face of the application.[27] However, the case was recorded in
the OCC's logbook only on May 7, 2015.[28] The corresponding
search warrant was also issued on May 7, 2015.[29]
The same observation is true for the following applications: SW 15-
427 to SW 15-432 - logged as filed with the OCC on September 9,
2015,[30] but the applications were all stamped received on
September 8, 2015 at 10:30 a.m.;[31] and SW 15-592 to SW 15-596
- logged as filed with the OCC on November 27, 2015,[32] but the
applications were stamped received on November 26, 2015, at
1:00 p.m.[33]
And fourth, there are cases where the caption of search warrant
applications already indicates that it is being filed with Branch
170, and typewritten at the bottom of the applications is the
name of Judge Docena to whom the application would be
subscribed and sworn to.[34]
On the Issuance of Search Warrants by Branch 170
The Audit Team noted that Judge Docena granted all 790 search
warrant applications raffled to Branch 170 from January 2015 up
to May 10, 2016, and 192[35] of which are John/Jane Doe search
warrants. Out of the 790 search warrants issued, 442 or 55.95%
thereof have yielded negative results, remained unserved, or
were otherwise never returned to the court.[36]
The Audit Team also found that Judge Docena granted 758 Mandaluyong City
search warrant applications even though the places of
6
commission of the crimes involved therein were outside the
territorial jurisdiction of the RTC of Malabon City. Out of 758 13
applications,[37] 130 had completely failed to cite compelling
reasons to warrant their filing in the RTC of Malabon City.[38] Thus: 19

PLACES WHERE SEARCH WARRANTS ENFORCEABLE Manila

NO COMPELLING REASON 54

WITH COMPELLING REASON 116

TOTAL 170

Laguna Muntinlupa City

1 1

- 15

1 16

Caloocan City Parañaque City

7 2

8 65

15 67

Las Piñas City Pasay City

- 6

6 75

6 81

Makati City Pasig City

18 15

170 68

188 83
Quezon City a) There are search warrants that were issued ahead of the date
of filing of the application.[41]
11

50
b) Judge Docena is the signatory of the jurat of all the
61
applications for search warrants before Branch 170. In some
Taguig City cases, the signature appearing thereon is not his customary
signature.[42]
7

33
c) There are some applications that are not under oath although
40 the affidavits were signed by Judge Docena.[43]
Valenzuela City

2 d) Page 3 of the application in SW 15-588 is missing, but Judge

9 Docena signed on another page containing the sketch of the
place to be searched.[44]
11

TOTAL
e) Judge Docena signed the jurat of some affidavits of witnesses,
130 despite the lack of signature of the affiant.[45]
628[39]

758 f) Some affidavits of witnesses are replicated, where only the

The Audit Team likewise observed that there are instances where
the compelling reasons cited by the applicant appear to be
without merit, and Judge Docena failed to ask the required
probing and exhaustive inquiry on the veracity of the compelling
reason invoked.[40]
In addition to its preliminary findings, the Audit Team pointed out
the following irregularities pertaining to Judge Docena's issuance
of search warrants:
dates and the addresses relating to the supposed surveillance
are changed.[46]
g) Judge Docena has admitted as proof of surveillance the
attachment of a map and pictures of the door of the unit to be
searched, as well as the screen of a computer.[47]
The Audit Team also noted several lapses in the management of
case records in Branch 170:
 i) Branch 170 does not maintain a logbook where entries shall be
made within 24 hours after the issuance of the search
a) Case records have no minutes of the proceedings.[48]
warrant.[56]

b) There were two sets of stenographic notes found in 16 search

Issuance of Search Warrants by Branch 74
warrant applications.[49]

The Audit Team noted that Judge Magsino also granted a

c) In most applications, there are no searching questions and
considerable number of search warrant applications from
answers in writing and under oath, in violation of Section 5, Rule
January 2015 up to May 10, 2016, where the offenses involved
126 of the Rules of Court.[50]
were committed outside the territorial jurisdiction of the RTC of
Malabon City.[57] Thus:[58]

d) The search warrant case folders of Branch 170 are not PLACES WHERE SEARCH WARRANTS ENFORCEABLE
paginated.[51]
NO COMPELLING REASON

WITH COMPELLING REASON

e) In cases where an applicant filed several search warrant
TOTAL
applications, some of the documents attached are not original
copies.[52] Rizal

f) Case folders are not properly stitched, and some folders have -
loose pages. Other folders, too, are merely attached using
1
fasteners.[53]
Caloocan City

1
g) Stenographic notes are not attached to the records.[54]
1

2
h) Transcripts of stenographic notes are similarly not attached to
the records.[55] Makati City

35
35 16

Mandaluyong City Pasig City

13 4

2 10

15 14

Manila Quezon City

1 3

18 3

19 6

Marikina City Taguig City

- 3

2 7

2 10

Muntinlupa City TOTAL

- 33

2 106

2 139

Parañaque City Nevertheless, the Audit Team found no patent irregularities in

Judge Magsino's issuance of search warrants assigned to Branch
7
74,[59] considering that:
10

17
1. There is no instance where the date of receipt by the OCC and
Pasay City the date of raffle of the search warrant application to Branch 74,
as stamped on the face of the application, are ahead of the
- date recorded in the logbook of the OCC.[60]
16
2. There is also no instance where the date of the search warrant
issued is ahead of the date of filing of the application in court.[61]
3. The minutes of the proceedings are attached to the case
records, but the contents are not complete.[62]
4. Aside from the issuance of search warrants, Judge Magsino
also issues an order stating, among others, that the court
conducted a hearing and examined the applicant and his
witness/informant.[63]
5. The stenographic notes are all attached to the records,
although some have yet to be transcribed.[64]
6. Branch 74 observes the guidelines on the custody of computer
data under Sections 15 and 16, Chapter IV of Republic Act No.
10175, or the Cybercrime Prevention Act.[65]
For these reasons, the Audit Team no longer discussed the details
of the rest of the acts and omissions of Branch 74.
In its 1st Indorsement[66] dated September 27, 2016, the OCA
directed Judge Docena and Judge Magsino, as well as the
concerned court personnel, to submit their comments on the
final report of the Audit Team.
Judge Docena's Comment
In his Comment[67] dated October 28, 2016, Judge Docena
submits that he granted the search warrant applications before
him "in the good faith belief that there was probable cause for
their issuance and in compliance with law and procedure."[68]
Judge Docena clarifies that he had no control over which search
warrant applications will be filed in the RTC of Malabon City,
much less those that will be raffled to Branch 170.[69] Neither
does he or the court personnel under him have any hand in the
implementation of the search warrants issued by him or the
outcome or results thereof.[70]
Judge Docena likewise contends that there is nothing irregular in
his issuance of 192 John/Jane Doe search warrants, considering
that the crimes involved therein are mostly violations of the
Cybercrime Prevention Act and the E-Commerce Act, where
there is indeed difficulty in obtaining the identities of the alleged
perpetrators.[71]
As for his issuance of search warrants involving crimes committed
outside the territorial jurisdiction of the RTC of Malabon City,
Judge Docena denies having violated Section 2(a) of Rule 126
of the Rules of Court and Section 12, Chapter V of A.M. No. 03-8-
02, given that the issuance of search warrants is inherent in all
courts and venue in search warrant applications is merely
procedural and not jurisdictional.[72]
Judge Docena further argues that he "cannot consider the issues
of absence of compelling reasons in the [search warrant]
application[s], and improper venue motu proprio to deny [said]
applications outright," as "these have to be raised by the
respondent/accused in a motion to quash."[73] And as for those
respondents in the search warrants who did not question the
venue of the pertinent search warrant applications, they should
be deemed to have waived said defense and considered to
have acquiesced to the venue of said applications.[74]
In addition, Judge Docena maintains that "he granted the
search warrant applications in the good faith belief that there is
merit to the compelling reasons provided by the applicants." He
insists that "this determination should be respected unless it is
shown that [he] is guilty of grave abuse of discretion amounting
to excess or lack of jurisdiction."[75]
Judge Docena also explains that "the rule requiring judges to
conduct a probing and exhaustive inquiry is applicable only to
the determination of probable cause" and not to the compelling
reasons cited by an applicant in a search warrant
application,[76] as the existence of compelling reasons does not
relate to the existence of probable cause which is the basis for
the issuance of the search warrant.[77]
While Judge Docena admits that there are search warrants that
appear to have been issued ahead of the date of filing of their
respective applications, he argues that the incorrect dates on
said warrants are typographical errors which are attributable to
honest mistake and inadvertence.[78] He claims that Branch 170
uses previous documents as templates in order to save time and
effort,[79] and he surmises that the dates in the orders pertaining
to some search warrant applications were unfortunately not
properly edited to reflect the correct date.[80]
Finally, Judge Docena begs the Court for understanding and
leniency for his failure to properly monitor the submission of
returns of the search warrants he issued and to summon those
applicants who have yet to file their respective returns, given the
extraordinarily high number of search warrants raffled to Branch
170.[81]
Recommendations of the OCA
In a Memorandum[82] dated February 20, 2017, the OCA made
the following recommendations:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, it is respectfully recommended
for the consideration of the Honorable Court that:
1. Hon. CELSO R. L. MAGSINO, JR., Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch
74, Malabon City, and then Executive Judge, RTC, Malabon City,
be found GUILTY of (a) violation of Supreme Court rules and
circulars concerning the raffle of search warrant applications,
and Section 2, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court and Section 12,
Chapter V of the Guidelines in the Selection and Designation of
Executive Judges and. Defining their Powers, Prerogatives and
Duties on the issuance of search warrants, and Section 12(b),
Rule 126, Rules of Court on, among others, the filing of the returns;
and (b) inefficiency in the performance of his duties as Presiding
Judge of Branch 74, same court, and FINED in the amount of
P20,000.00;
2. Atty. ESMERALDA G. DIZON, Clerk of Court, Office of the Clerk
of Court, RTC, Malabon City, be found GUILTY of simple neglect
of duty and SUSPENDED from the service for six (6) months,
effective immediately;
3. Hon. ZALDY B. DOCENA, Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 170,
Malabon City, be found GUILTY of gross ignorance of the law,
gross negligence, and gross misconduct and DISMISSED FROM
THE SERVICE with forfeiture of retirement benefits, except
accrued leave credits, and disqualification from re-employment
in any government institution;
4. Atty. JESUS S. HERNANDEZ, Branch Clerk of Court, RTC, Branch
170, Malabon City, be found GUILTY of simple neglect of duty
and SUSPENDED from the service for six (6) months, effective
immediately;
5. MS. OLIVIA M. LABAGNAO, MS. DEBHEM E. FARDO, MS.
ROSARIO [M. SAN PEDRO], and MS. GIGI M. MENDOZA, Court
Stenographers, and MS. ZENAIDA Z. SALONGA, Clerk-in-Charge,
all of RTC, Branch 170, Malabon City, be found GUILTY of simple
neglect of duty and ADMONISHED to be more diligent and
circumspect in the performance of their duties; and
6. Atty. EVELYN M. LOZANO-AGUILAR, Branch Clerk of Court, MA.
ALICIA C. MALUBAY, Court Interpreter, and DALISAY C. CASUGA,
MYRA D. SANTOS, SHERREE ANN R. RUZGAL, MA. THERESA P. REYES,
Court Stenographers, all of RTC, Branch 74, Malabon City, be
REMINDED to henceforth strictly comply with existing court
issuances on search warrants without necessarily giving up their
endeavor to preserve the confidentiality of the information in the
records.
Considering the herein recommendation of the OCA that Judge
Docena be dismissed from the service, and considering further
that the preventive suspension of Judge Docena will in the
meantime expire on 1 March 2017, it is likewise hereby
recommended that the PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION of Judge
Docena expiring on 1 March 2017 BE INDEFINITELY EXTENDED until
such time the Court has resolved this administrative matter.
In a Resolution[83] dated February 28, 2017, the Court extended
the preventive suspension of Judge Docena for another three (3)
months reckoned from March 1, 2017. Finally, on June 20, 2017,
the Court resolved to extend Judge Docena's suspension until
such time that this administrative matter would have been
resolved.[84]
The Court's Ruling
Section 2, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court provides for the proper
venue where applications for search warrant should be filed:
SEC. 2. Court where applications for search warrant shall be filed.
- An application for search warrant shall be filed with the
following:
(a) Any court within whose jurisdiction a crime was committed.
(b) For compelling reasons stated in the application, any court
within the judicial region where the crime was committed if the
place of the commission of the crime is known, or any court within
the judicial region where the warrant shall be enforced.
However, if the criminal action has already been filed, the
application shall only be made in the court where the criminal
action is pending.[85]
It is settled that the inclusion of a statement of compelling reasons
in a search warrant application that is filed in a court which does
not have territorial jurisdiction over the place of commission of
the alleged crime is a mandatory requirement, and the absence
of such statement renders the application defective.[86]
The absence of a statement of compelling reasons, however, is
not a ground for the outright denial of a search warrant
application, since it is not one of the requisites for the issuance of
a search warrant. Section 4 of Rule 126 is clear on this point:
SEC. 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. - A search warrant
shall not issue except upon probable cause in connection with
one specific offense to be determined personally by the judge
after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant
and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing
the place to be searched and the things to be seized which may
be anywhere in the Philippines.[87]
In other words, the statement of compelling reasons is only a
mandatory requirement in so far as the proper venue for the filing
of a search warrant application is concerned. It cannot be
viewed as an additional requisite for the issuance of a search
warrant.
It is also important to stress that an application for a search
warrant merely constitutes a criminal process and is not in itself a
criminal action.[88] The rule, therefore, that venue is jurisdictional
in criminal cases does not apply thereto.[89] Simply stated, venue
is only procedural, and not jurisdictional, in applications for the
issuance of a search warrant.
In Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation v. Romars International
Gases Corporation,[90] the Court ruled that the issue on the
absence of a statement of compelling reasons in an application
for a search warrant does not involve a question of jurisdiction
over the subject matter, as the power to issue search warrants is
inherent in all courts.[91] Thus, the trial court may only take
cognizance of such issue if it is raised in a timely motion to quash
the search warrant. Otherwise, the objection shall be deemed
waived, pursuant to the Omnibus Motion Rule.[92]
Consequently, the Court in Pilipinas Shell upheld the validity of
the questioned search warrants despite the lack of a statement
of compelling reasons in their respective applications,[93] as the
objection was not properly raised in a motion to quash.[94]
Note, too, that the determination of the existence of compelling
reasons under Section 2(b) of Rule 126 is a matter squarely
addressed to the sound discretion of the court where such
application is filed, subject to review by an appellate court in
case of grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of
jurisdiction.[95]
Clearly, this administrative proceeding is not the proper forum to
review the search warrants issued by Judge Docena and Judge
Magsino in order to determine whether the compelling reasons
cited in their respective applications are indeed meritorious.
Given these circumstances, we cannot agree with the OCA's
findings that Judge Docena and Judge Magsino violated
Section 2 of Rule 126 by simply issuing search warrants involving
crimes committed outside the territorial jurisdiction of the RTC of
Malabon City where: a) there is no compelling reason to take
cognizance of the applications; and b) the compelling reasons
alleged in the applications appear to be unmeritorious.[96]
It is obvious that Judge Docena and Judge Magsino simply
exercised the trial court's ancillary jurisdiction over a special
Third, four search warrants issued by Judge Docena, i.e. Search
criminal process[97] when they took cognizance of the
Warrant Nos. 13-160-MN, 13-161-MN, MN-13-162, and MN-13-163,
applications and issued said search warrants. And as previously
have been nullified by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP
discussed, the propriety of the issuance of these warrants is a
No. 132860 for insufficiency of the compelling reasons alleged in
matter that should have been raised in a motion to quash or in a
the search warrant applications;[103]
certiorari petition, if there are allegations of grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the issuing judge.

And fourth, there were search warrants that appear to have

been issued ahead of the dates of filing of their respective
The Administrative Liabilities
applications; search warrants that were released to the witness
instead of the applicant; and search warrants which were issued
on the date of filing of the application, but appear to have been
To hold a judge administratively liable for gross misconduct,
received by the applicant a day in advance.[104]
ignorance of the law or incompetence of official acts in the
exercise of judicial functions and duties, it must be shown that his
acts were committed with fraud, dishonesty, corruption, malice
We are not convinced. These circumstances alone are clearly
or ill-will, bad faith, or deliberate intent to do an injustice.[98]
insufficient to overturn the presumption that Judge Docena
Absent such proof, the judge is presumed to have acted in good
acted in good faith in issuing the subject search warrants.
faith in exercising his judicial functions.[99]

For one thing, it is unfair to hold the low rate of success of search
In this case, the OCA found Judge Docena's issuance of the
warrant operations against Judge Docena, given that the courts
subject search warrants to have been motivated by bad
have absolutely no participation in the implementation of the
faith,[100] as evidenced by the following attendant
search warrants that they issue.
circumstances:

For another, it is a grave error to consider the CA's nullification of

First, the high incidence of search warrant operations that
four search warrants issued by Judge Docena as an indication
yielded negative results, remained unserved, or otherwise were
that all warrants issued by him suffer from the same infirmity. After
never returned to the court;[101]
all, not every mistake or error of judgment of a judge in the
performance of his official duties makes him liable therefor.[105]

Second, Judge Docena appears to have thrown leading

questions during the examination of the applicant and the
witness in SW 16-257 and SW 14-134;[102]
Nevertheless, we find sufficient evidence to hold Judge Docena
administratively liable for gross neglect of duty for the serious
350 returns[109] were filed by applicants well beyond the 10-day
mismanagement of search warrant applications in Branch 170.
period to do so, with the delay ranging from 11 days up to six
months and five days(in SW 15-477).[110]

Section 12. Rule 126 of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 12. Delivery of property and inventory thereof to court; return 43 returns[111] were not immediately acted upon, with the delay
and proceedings thereon. - ranging from one month and 22 days up to five months and 12
days (in SW 15-435).[112]

a) The officer must forthwith deliver the property seized to the

judge who issued the warrant, together with a true inventory 29 returns[113] have yet to be acted upon.
thereof duly verified under oath.
Judge Docena likewise committed several lapses in ascertaining
whether Section 12(a) of Rule 126 was complied with by the
applicants in: a) SW 15-503-IVIN, where mere photocopies of the
b) Ten (10) days after issuance of the search warrant, the issuing
inventory of the seized items were submitted;[114] b) in SW 16-
judge shall ascertain if the return has been made, and if none,
286-MN, where the inventories are not under oath and the
shall summon the person to whom the warrant was issued and
signatures of the witnesses are unidentifiable because their
require him to explain why no return was made. If the return has
printed names are not indicated in the inventory;[115] and c) in
been made, the judge shall ascertain whether Section 11 of this
SW 16-273-MN, where only one witness signed the inventory
Rule has been complied with and shall require that the property
sheet.[116]
seized be delivered to him. The judge shall see to it that
subsection (a) hereof has been complied with.

We also find that Judge Docena failed to comply with his

administrative responsibilities under Rules 3.08 and 3.09 of the
c) The return on the search warrant shall be filed and kept by the
Code of Judicial Conduct which provide:
custodian of the log book on search warrants who shall enter
therein the date of the return, the result, and other actions of the RULE 3.08 - A judge should diligently discharge administrative
judge.[106] responsibilities, maintain professional competence in court
management, and facilitate the performance of the
The records show that Judge Docena has failed to properly
administrative functions of other judges and court personnel.
monitor the submission of returns as required under Section 12(b)
and (c) of Rule 126, considering that:

the returns on 172 search warrants[107] have yet to be submitted, RULE 3.09 - A judge should organize and supervise the court
and Judge Docena failed to summon each of the 39 applicants personnel to ensure the prompt and efficient dispatch of
thereof to court to explain why no return was made.[108]
business, and require at all times the observance of high f. In several applications, some documents attached thereto are
standards of public service and fidelity.[117] not original copies.[123]

as it appears that the concerned court personnel in Branch 170,

namely Atty. Jesus S. Hernandez (Atty. Hernandez), the Branch
g. Case folders are not property stitched, and some folders have
Clerk of Court, Ms. Zenaida Z. Salonga, the Clerk-in-Charge,
loose pages. Other folders, too, are merely attached using
together with Ms. Olivia M. Labagnao, Ms. Rosario M. San Pedro,
fasteners.[124]
Ms. Debhem N. Fajardo, and Ms. Gigi M. Mendoza, all court
stenographers, too, are all guilty of simple neglect of duty for
failure to diligently perform their respective administrative duties.
The court stenographers were likewise remiss in the performance
of their duties under Section 17, Rule 136 of the Rules of Court,
given that they failed to produce a total of 34 stenographic notes
Atty. Hernandez, as the administrative officer in Branch 170, fell
or seven sets of consolidated notes, and to properly label their
short of the diligence and care required of him in the following
stenographic notes.[125] It also appears that they only prepared
instances:
transcripts of stenographic notes upon request of the
applicants.[126]

a. Case records have no minutes of the proceedings.[118]

As for the Clerk-in-Charge, she clearly violated Section 12(c) of

Rule 126,[127] when she unjustifiably failed to maintain the
b. Some search warrants are incorrectly dated, thus making it
required log book for search warrant applications in Branch 170.
appear that they were issued ahead of the date of filing of their
respective applications.[119]

It is settled that "[a] judge presiding over a branch of a court is, in

c. Some search warrants were handed over to the witnesses
instead of the applicants.[120]
d. There is no date and time of receipt of the case folder by
Branch 170 on the face of the search warrant applications.[121]
e. The search warrant case folders in Branch 170 are not
paginated.[122]
legal contemplation, the head thereof having effective control
and authority to discipline all employees within the branch."[128]
Consequently, Judge Docena shares accountability for the
administrative lapses of his staff that contributed to the clearly
disorganized and inefficient dispatch of business in Branch 170.
Finally, we hold Judge Magsino and Atty. Dizon administratively
liable for simple misconduct, in their capacities as the Executive
Judge and the Clerk of Court of the RTC of Malabon,
respectively, for imposing their own internal policies and
practices[129] in lieu of the existing rules in the raffle of
applications involving ordinary cases covered by Chapter V of
the Guidelines on the Selection and Designation of Executive
Judges and Defining their Powers, Prerogatives and Duties
(Guidelines).
To be specific, Judge Magsino and Atty. Dizon failed to observe
the pertinent portion of Section 6 of the Guidelines which requires
the search warrant applications assigned to a branch during the
special raffle to be deducted from the number of cases allotted
to on the next scheduled regular raffle. This, however, was not
implemented in the RTC of Malabon City.[130]
Judge Magsino and Atty. Dizon also failed to observe the proper
ratio of the raffling of cases prescribed under par. 1, Chapter V
of Administrative Order No. 6 dated June 30, 1975,[131] which
states:
V. CASELOAD AND HONORARIUM
1. The caseload of the Executive Judge shall be as follows:
xxxx
c. In case of multiple branches (salas) of more than five (5), the
distribution of cases shall be in the proportion of one (1) case for
the Executive Judge and two (2) for each of the other
judges.[132]
Their use of an improvised system of counting the applicants
(instead of the applications)[133] in the special raffle is simply
unacceptable, as the Executive Judge, much less the Clerk of
Court, has absolutely no discretion to deviate from the
prescribed ratio for the raffling of cases without prior approval
from this Court.
This resulted in an inequitable distribution of search warrant
applications between Branches 170 and 74 at a ratio of almost
6:1, or a six out of seven chance that an application will be raffled
to Branch 170, thereby removing the unpredictability of the
raffling process, so much so that some applicants already
indicate that their applications are being filed with Branch
170.[134]
The Penalties
On the one hand, gross neglect of duty or gross negligence
"refers to negligence characterized by the want of even slight
care, or by acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is
a duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully and intentionally, with
a conscious indifference to the consequences, in so far as other
persons may be affected. xxx In cases involving public officials,
[there is gross negligence] when a breach of duty is flagrant and
palpable."[135]
It is important to stress, however, that the term "gross neglect of
duty" does not necessarily include willful neglect or intentional
wrongdoing. It can also arise from situations where "such neglect
which, from the gravity of the case or the frequency of instances,
becomes so serious in its character" that it ends up endangering
or threatening the public welfare.[136]
In contrast, simple neglect of duty means the failure of an
employee to give proper attention to a required task or to
discharge a duty due to carelessness or indifference.[137]
Under Section 46(A), Rule 10 of the Revised Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (RRACCS), gross neglect
of duty is classified as a grave offense punishable by dismissal
from the service (even for the first offense), while simple neglect
of duty is a less grave offense, punishable by suspension without
pay for one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6) months for the
first offense.
In this case, we find the gravity of Judge Docena's neglect in the
performance of his duties to be so serious in character that the
Court may unquestionably impose against him the penalty of
dismissal from the service.
Nevertheless, we take into consideration his length of service of
thirty (30) years in various sectors of the government, with eight
(8) years spent rendering service in the Judiciary as a Technical
Assistant in the Supreme Court from 1985 to 1987 and as an RTC
Judge from 2010 up to present,[138] his candid admission of his
lapses and his commitment to undertake stringent steps to
address the matters brought to his attention by the OCA[139] as
mitigating factors that serve to temper the penalty to be
imposed upon him.[140] We also note that this is Judge Docena's
first time to be administratively sanctioned by this Court. Thus,
instead of imposing the penalty of dismissal, we deem it proper
to impose against Judge Docena the penalty of suspension for
two (2) years without pay.
As for Atty. Hernandez, we agree with the OCA's conclusion that
he undoubtedly failed to meet the standards required of him as
an effective and competent clerk of court.[141] The OCA
recommended that Atty. Hernandez be suspended without pay
for six (6) months.[142] We, however, modify this
recommendation and reduce the penalty to suspension without
pay for one (1) month and (1) day, considering the fact that this
is his first offense,[143] and the errors he committed are purely
administrative in nature and are not gross or patent.
We likewise agree with the OCA's finding that Ms. Salonga (the
Clerk-in-Charge) and Ms. Labagnao, Ms. Fardo, Ms. San Pedro,
and Ms. Mendoza (the court stenographers) also failed to
diligently perform their respective duties.[144] Since this, too, is
their first offense, we adopt the OCA's recommendation[145]
and impose the penalty of admonition that they be more
circumspect in the performance of their respective duties.
On the other hand, "[m]isconduct is a transgression of some
established and definite rule of action, more particularly,
unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a public officer. The
misconduct is grave if it involves any of the additional elements
of corruption, willful intent to violate the law or to disregard
established rules, which must be proved by substantial evidence.
Otherwise, the misconduct is only simple."[146]
In this case, there is no substantial evidence to show that Judge
Magsino and Atty. Dizon's actions involved the elements of
corruption, willful intent to violate the law or to disregard
established rules to qualify their misconduct as grave. Absent
such malicious intent or bad faith on their part, they may only be
held administratively liable for simple misconduct.
Although the penalty for simple misconduct is suspension without
pay of one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6) months,[147] the
RRACCS allows the payment of a fine in place of suspension if the
offense is committed without abusing the powers of one's
position or office.[148] Considering that this is also the first offense
for both Judge Magsino and Atty. Dizon, we find the imposition
of a fine of P20,000.00 to be proper and commensurate for their
transgressions.
Four of the Justices voted for the dismissal of Judge Docena from
the service.
WHEREFORE, the Court:
1. FINDS Hon. Celso R. L. Magsino, Jr., Presiding Judge, Regional
Trial Court, Branch 74, Malabon City, and then Executive Judge,
Regional Trial Court, Malabon City, GUILTY of simple misconduct,
and hereby orders him to pay a FINE in the amount of Twenty
Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00), with a STERN WARNING that a
repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more
severely;
2. FINDS Atty. Esmeralda G. Dizon, Clerk of Court, Office of the
Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court, Malabon City, GUILTY of
simple misconduct, and hereby orders her to pay a FINE in the
amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00), with a STERN
WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be
dealt with more severely;
3. FINDS Hon. Zaldy B. Docena, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial
Court, Branch 170, Malabon City, GUILTY of gross neglect of duty,
and hereby SUSPENDS him from office for a period of two (2)
years without pay, with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the
same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely;
4. FINDS Atty. Jesus S. Hernandez, Branch Clerk of Court, Regional
Trial Court, Branch 170, Malabon City, GUILTY of simple neglect of
duty, and hereby SUSPENDS him from office for a period of one
(1) month without pay, with a STERN WARNING that a repetition
of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely;
5. FINDS Ms. Zenaida Z. Salonga, Clerk-in-Charge, and Ms. Olivia
M. Labagnao, Ms. Debhem E. Fardo, Ms. Rosario M. San Pedro,
and Ms. Gigi M. Mendoza, Court Stenographers, Regional Trial
Court, Branch 170, Malabon City, GUILTY of simple neglect of
duty, and are ADMONISHED to be more diligent and circumspect
in the performance of their duties.
SO ORDERED.
26. December 5, 2017
A.M. No. 14-11-350-RTC
RE: JUDICIAL AUDIT CONDUCTED IN THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,
BRANCH 20, CAGAY AN DE ORO CITY, MISAMIS ORIENTAL
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
The present administrative matter arose from the judicial audit
conducted on March 12 and 13, 2013, of Branch 20 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cagayan de Oro City, Misamis
Oriental, then presided by Judge Bonifacio M. Macabaya
(Judge Macabaya).
In a Memorandum1 dated April 17, 2013, the audit team found
that out of the 573 cases examined by it, (1) 69 cases were
submitted for decision but have yet to be decided despite the
lapse of the 90-day period [as mandated by par. 1, Section 15,
Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution];2 (2) 33 cases with pending
incidents were not yet resolved despite the lapse of the
reglementary period to resolve them; and (3) 155 cases were
dormant and unacted upon for a considerable length of time.
The audit team noted the following irregularities:
1. In Criminal Case No. 2001-888 entitled People [v.] Jabinao, the
[RTC] issued an Order dated 22 November 2011 directing the
accused to secure another bond within five (5) days from notice,
'it appearing that the bond put up by the accused had already
expired' The Order [goes against] Sec. 2(a) of Rule 114 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which provides that '(t)he
undertaking shall be effective upon approval, and unless
cancelled, shall remain in force at all stages of the case until
promulgation of the judgment of the Regional Trial Court,
irrespective of whether the case was originally filed in or
appealed to it. '3
2. In Crinlinal Case Nos. 2000-260 and 2000-316, both entitled
People [v.] Alba, et al. as well as Criminal Case Nos. 2002-098 and
2002-100, [also] both entitled People [v.] Alba, the [RTC] issued
twin Orders, both dated 26 September 2006, directing the
issuance of a Warrant of Arrest against the accused for his failure
to appearr,J and directing the Branch Clerk of Court 'to receive
evidence of the prosecution through ex-parte hearing' - [in
violation of] the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure [and by]
existing jurisprudence x x x.4
Moreover, the audit team noted inaccuracies in the RTC's
February 2013 report. It failed to include 43 cases already
submitted for decision and 13 cases with unresolved motions,
while it prematurely reported six cases5 as submitted for decision,
although the records did not show that the appellees received
the appellants' briefs or memoranda, against which the
prescribed period within which to submit the formers' briefs or
memoranda should be reckoned.6 These omissions and
inaccuracies in the report violated paragraph 8 of the Guidelines
and Instructions in Administrative Circular No. 61-2001 dated
December 10, 2001, which state that "(i)nfilling up Item No. VI x x
x where all the data needed must be indicated, include all cases
with unresolved motions which may determine the disposition of
the cases, e.g., Motion to Dismiss on Demurrer to Evidence.
Patent non-indication of undecided cases or unresolved motions
is tantamount to falsification of official document"
In addition, the audit team discovered that the docket books for
civil cases were not updated regularly; the docket inventory for
the period July-December 2012 suffered from a number of
defects in form; and, there was no judgment book, no book of
entries of judgment, nor an execution book.7
The audit team furthermore noted the constant presence and
active participation of Judge Macabaya's wife during the entire
judicial audit although she was not a court employee. She was
observed to be handing over case records to, and talking with,
the court staff. When this matter was brought to the attention of
Judge Macabaya, the latter assured the audit team that he was
in full control of the actions of his wife, and even acknowledged
''that she has been a big help x x x [in] overseeing the
administrative functions of his office, [thus allowing] him to focus
his attention on his judicial functions."8
In a Letter9 dated April 4, 2013, Judge Macabaya's Clerk of Court
V Atty. Taumaturgo U. Macabinlar (Atty. Macabinlar) submitted
a copy of an Action Plan10 for the Period April 2013 to April 2014,
bearing the signature of Judge Macabaya himself The Action
Plan was "formulated as a result of (their) discussions with the
Supreme Court Audit Team and (their) brainstorming session with
all the Branch 20 staff," and "is intended to make a more lasting
plan of action to prevent recurring audit exceptions."11
The audit team noted that the action plan provided for a single
strategy only and an inflexible time frame for the disposition of
three kinds of cases.12 Hence, the audit team recommended
that the Action Plan be revised to make it more specific and
more results-oriented for easier measurement of output.
Taking a holistic approach, the audit team made the following
recommendations to Judge Macabaya to:
xxxx
1.1 SUBMIT x x x within fifteen (15) days x x x a revised action plan,
incorporating therein the strategies, specific courses of action
and the corresponding time frame[ s ], to be measured by
specific number of calendar days, for: (a) the disposition of the
cases xxx; (b) the resolution of the incidents or motions x x x; and
(c) all the other judicial audit findings above x x x;
1.2 Immediately TAKE APPROPRIATE ACTION on the untranscribed
stenographic notes taken down by then court stenographer
Oscar P. Rabanes, x x x in Civil Case No. 3672, x x x and SUBMIT to
this Office within fifteen (15) days from receipt hereof a written
report thereon;
1.3 SUBMIT x x x within fifteen (15) days x x x a written status report
on the untranscribed stenographic notes x x x in Civil Case No.
6776 and in Criminal Case Nos. 1863 and 3418;
1.4 ENSURE that a request for extension of time to decide a case
is filed with the Office of the Court Administrator before the
expiration of the mandated period for decision, x x x;
1.5 TAKE APPROPRIATE ACTION immediately in the cases referred
to in Item No. I (7) above, and SUBMIT to this Office within thirty
(30) days from receipt hereof a written report thereon, attaching
thereto copies of the orders or decisions, if any, issued in
connection therewith;
1.6 CONDUCT PERSONALLY [a] physical inventory of cases at the
end of every semester, and CONSIDER the results of the exercise
in the evaluation and assessment of the performance of the
court against its existing action plan, and use the same as a basis
for drawing up a new action plan to ensure the sustainability of
the remedial measures earlier adopted;
1.7 ADOPT a firm policy against improvident postponements and
ENSURE that cases are heard and disposed of with deliberate
dispatch, x x x;
1.8 COMMENT in writing on the observations raised in Item No. II,
Sub item Nos. 1 and 2 above, and SUBMIT the same to this Office
within fifteen (15) days from receipt hereof;
1.9 DISCOURAGE and MINIMIZE his wife's presence in his court,
and PREVENT her from interfering with the business of the court
with a WARNING that any violation thereof will warrant an
administrative action against him; and
1.10 SUBMIT to this Office within fifteen (15) days from receipt
hereof a written report on the action/s taken on the immediately
preceding directive;
xxxx13
But in a letter14 dated July 22, 2013, Judge Macabaya and his
Branch Clerk of Court, Atty. Macabinlar, merely submitted copies
of the Decisions and Orders in some of the cases enumerated in
the April 17, 2013 Memorandum; and this was done despite the
passage of almost 10 months. Thus, in a letter-directive15 to
Judge Macabaya dated March 14, 2014, Deputy Court
Administrator (DCA) Jenny Lind R. Aldecoa-Delorino (DCA
Aldecoa-Delorino) reiterated the recommendations above.
In reply thereto, on May 12, 2014, Judge Macabaya attached
another set of copies of orders, resolutions, and decisions, without
any other explanation other than the inadvertent attachment of
the letter-directive to the RTC's October 2013 monthly report.16
Via a Letter17 dated May 19, 2014, one month after the deadline
set in the action plan, DCA Aldecoa-Delorino gave an updated
summary on the number of cases that had not yet been decided
or resolved, and acted upon. This letter likewise reiterated the
directive for Judge Macabaya to comply with the audit team's
Memorandum, particularly item nos. 2, 3, 8 and 9, with a reminder
that "all directives coming from the Court Administrator and his
deputies are issued in the exercise of the Court's administrative
supef1lision of trial courts and their personnel, hence, should be
respected These directives are not mere requests but should be
complied with promptly and completely. "18 Thus, DCA
AldecoaDelorino directed Judge Macabaya to:
1. EXPLAIN x x x the delay in: (a) deciding the remaining thirty [30]
cases x x x; (b) resolving the incidents in the remaining fifteen (15)
cases listed x x x; and (c) taking appropriate actions [on] the
remaining fifty-seven [57] dormant cases x x x; and SUBMIT the
same to this Office within fifteen (15) days from receipt hereof;
2. SUBMIT x x x within fifteen (15) from receipt hereof a copy of
each of the decisions, orders[,] or resolutions, if any, rendered or
issued in the cases referred to above; and
3. SUBMIT x x x within fifteen (15) days from receipt hereof a written
report on the actions x x x taken on x x x the directives contained
in our Memorandum dated 19 April 2013 .19 In a letter-
compliance20 dated June 30, 2014, Judge Macabaya attached
copies of the decisions, resolutions and orders rendered or issued
by his court. He then asked for a 90-day extension to decide or
resolve the remaining cases, giving as reason therefor the court's
heavy caseload and claiming that the remaining cases
submitted for decision comprised "mainly of those referred to the
Branch Clerk of Court, Atty. Taumaturgo U. Macabinlar[,] for ex-
parte hearing xxx."21
Owing to Judge Macabaya's repeated failure to fully comply
with the directives of the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA)
for more than one year,22 this Court on December 1, 2014
resolved to:
1. DIRECT Judge x x x Macabaya, xxx to:
a. SHOW CAUSE x x x why no disciplinary action should be taken
against him for his failure to: (a) decide the remaining twenty-
eight [28] cases due for decision; (b) resolve the incidents in the
remaining eleven [11] cases with incidents for resolution; (c) take
appropriate actions [on] the remaining thirty-eight [38] cases
found to be donnant at the time of the judicial audit, all despite
the lapse of more than one year since the said judicial audit was
conducted; and (d) comply with the other directives contained
in the 19 April 2013 Memorandum of the OCA, x x x;
b. DECIDE with dispatch the remaining twenty-eight (28) cases
submitted for decision x x x and SUBMIT x x x copies of the
Decisions within thirty (30) days from notice;
c. RESOLVE with dispatch the incidents in the remaining eleven
(11) cases x x x referred to above, and SUBMIT x x x copies of the
corresponding Orders or Resolutions within thirty (30) days from
notice;
d. TAKE APPROPRIATE ACTIONS immediately in the thirty-eight
(38) remaining dormant cases referred to above, and SUBMIT x x
x copies of the Orders or Decisions, if any, issued in connection
therewith; and
e. SUBMIT x x x within fifteen (15) days from notice his compliance
with directive Nos. 2, 3, 8, 9[,J and 10 contained in the 19 April
2013 Memorandum of the OCA, with a STERN WARNING that
failure to do so will be dealt with more severely;
2. RELIEVE Judge Macabaya of his judicial and administrative
functions, effective immediately and to continue until further
orders from the Court, EXCEPT to: (a) DECIDE the remaining
twenty-eight (28) cases submitted for decision; (b) RESOLVE the
remaining eleven (11) cases with incidents for resolution; and (c)
TAKE APPROPRIATE ACTIONS [on] the remaining thirty-eight (38)
dormant cases;
3. WITHHOLD the salaries and other benefits accruing to Judge
Macabaya, effective immediately until such time that the Court
shall have ordered the restoration of his judicial
administrative functions;
4. DESIGN A TE Judge Gil G. Bollozos, RTC, Br. 21, Cagayan de Oro
City, Misamis Oriental, Acting Presiding Judge of RTC, Br. 20,
Cagayan de Oro City, Misamis Oriental, effective immediately
and to continue until further orders from the Court, x x x and
5. ENTITLE Judge Bollozos to x x x traveling expenses with per
diems (if applicable), as well as an additional expense allowance
and judicial incentive allowance, x x x23 On February 18, 2015,
Judge Macabaya filed a Motion for
Reconsideration/Explanation24 claiming that the penalties
imposed upon him were unjust because they were solely based
on the Memorandum dated April 17, 2013; that no formal charge
had been filed against him, nor had any investigation been
conducted relative to any administrative case filed against him.
Simply put, Judge Macabaya insisted that he was not given his
day in court, as he ''was not apprised of any administrative
complaint about him."25
Judge Macabaya then filed a Supplemental Explanation to the
Motion for Reconsideration26 reiterating the arguments he put
forward in his MR, and further claiming that some unresolved
cases, those filed between 1971 to 2009, had long been
submitted for decision, and were well within the extension of time
he had requested in his compliance.27 Judge Macabaya
claimed that the judicial audit mistakenly and inaccurately
found that there were only 26 inherited cases when in fact he
inherited no more than 361 unresolved cases.28 Judge
Macabaya also argued that the audit team's recommendation
that he be made to resolve one case per day was "preposterous
if not downright impossible."29 Nevertheless, Judge Macabaya
hastened to add that he was ready to dispose of the remaining
inherited cases.30
On March 5, 2015, Judge Macabaya filed a Recapitulative
Statement with Urgent Reiterative Motion to Lift the Suspension of
and Administrative and Judicial Functions and the Release of Salaries,
Benefits[,] and Emoluments,31 to enable him to "issue orders and
help in the restoration and reconstitution of the records of cases
scorched by fire."32
On March 16, 2015, this Court referred Judge Macabaya's (1)
motion for reconsideration/explanation dated February 16, 2015;
(2) supplemental explanation to the motion for reconsideration
dated February 27, 2015, and(3) recapitulative statement with
urgent reiterative motion to lift the suspension of administrative
and judicial function and the release of salaries, benefits and
emoluments dated March 4, 2015, to the OCA for evaluation,
report, and recommendation.33
In a Memorandum34 dated May 7, 2015, the OCA
recommended that the matter be re-docketed as a regular
administrative complaint; that Judge Macabaya be adjudged
guilty of gross misconduct (due to his failure to comply with the
OCA and this Court's directives) and also of gross ignorance of
the law or procedure;35 and that Judge Macabaya be
dismissed "from the service, with forfeiture of his retirement
benefits, except his accrued leave credits, and with prejudice to
reinstatement in any branch of government, including
government owned and controlled corporations."36
The OCA explained that Judge Macabaya and his court staff
never questioned the findings and observations of the audit
team; and that Judge Macabaya even undertook to decide all
the cases/incidents listed in the audit findings within one year
from April 2013. The OCA noted that in all five of his letters-
compliance with the April 19, 2013 Memorandum of the OCA,
Judge Macabaya never took issue with such findings, but instead
merely submitted copies of his Decisions and Orders on the cases
submitted for decision in his sala.37 Needless to say, the
derelictions imputed against Judge Macabaya constituted
insubordination, disrespect, and disdain against the authority of
this Court, as these acts stemmed from his deliberate failure to
comply with the directives of the OCA - which directives
contained the command to "be complied with promptly and
completely."38 The OCA likewise noted the officious interference
of Judge Macabaya's wife in the court's functions - an
observation that was never refuted by Judge Macabaya; this, in
turn, further tarnished Judge Macabaya's already compromised
integrity.39
Lastly, the OCA affirmed the findings of the audit team that
Judge Macabaya's Order dated November 22, 2011 in Criminal
Case No. 2001-888,40 and his twin Orders dated September 26,
2006 in Criminal Case Nos. 2000-260,41 2000-31642 and 2000-
098,43 were clearly violative of the Constitution and the law thus
rendering Judge Macabaya guilty of ignorance of the law and
procedure.
Issue
Whether Judge Macabaya is guilty of gross misconduct and of
gross ignorance of the law, warranting his dismissal from the
service and the forfeiture of his retirement benefits (except
accrued leave credits), with prejudice to reinstatement in any
branch of government, including government-owned and
controlled corporations.
Our Ruling
We adopt and agree with the OCA' s findings but with
modification as regards the recommended penalty.
Judge Macabaya claimed that the audit team made vague
and sweeping accusations that were allegedly meant to mislead
and misinform the Court about the status of cases pending
before his sala.44 He also insisted that the administrative charges
against him were made without notice and hearing, hence
violative of his right to due process. Judge Macabaya moreover
assailed the Report/Memorandum dated April 17, 2013, saying
that the 264-working day period requiring him to decide or
resolve 168 cases was unrealistic due to (1) the cases' voluminous
records, (2) his sala's receipt of 761 new cases upon his
assumption into office, (3) his appointment as acting presiding
judge of the RTC Branch 9 in Malaybalay City, Bukidnon, (4) the
assignment to his court of other cases from other courts caused
by the inhibition of other judges, and (5) his busy schedule of
hearings.45 Lastly, Judge Macabaya maintained that as much
as he was willing to decide the 12 remaining cases that he had
inherited, he was unable to do so because of the conflagration
that gutted the records in the Hall of Justice ofCagayan de
Oro.46
Judge Macabaya' s arguments lack basis.
We find it surprising that throughout the breadth and length of
the space and time that were accorded to him as shown in the
OCA's (1) Memorandum dated April 19, 2013, (2) the letter dated
March 14, 2014, and (3) the letter dated May 19, 2014, Judge
Macabaya never protested against the validity or correctness of
the judicial audit's findings. Interestingly, it was only after this
Court resolved on December 1, 2014 to withhold his salaries and
benefits that he started to question the audit findings. However,
his assertion that the audit findings were incorrect or baseless, is
self-serving and lacked credence vis-à-vis the clear-cut and well-
supported findings of the audit team.
Judge Macabaya' s woeful lamentation that his right to due
process had been violated fails to persuade. It is axiomatic that
due process requires nothing else but the opportunity to be
heard - by no means does it require a formal, trial-type hearing.
Thus we held in FIO Ledesma v. Court of Appeals:47
Due process, as a constitutional precept, does not always and in
all situations require a trial-type proceeding. Due process is
satisfied when a person is notified of the charge against him and
given an opportunity to explain or defend himself. In
administrative proceedings, the filing of charges and giving
reasonable opportunity for the person so charged to answer the
accusations against him constitute the minimum requirements of
due process. The essence of due process is simply to be heard,
or as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to
explain one's side, or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of
the action or ruling complained of.
Here, Judge Macabaya was given ample opportunities to be
heard. Indeed, as early as April 19, 2013, Judge Macabaya was
asked to submit a written explanation to answer the directives
issued in the Memorandum dated April 17, 201348 and to
comment (in writing) on the observations raised in the judicial
audit.49 In a letter50 dated March 14, 2014, the OCA
acknowledged receipt of Judge Macabaya's and his clerk of
court's compliance letter dated July 22, 2013, but noted the lack
of explanation/full compliance to its directives, as mandated in
the OCA's earlier letters. In the May 19, 2014 OCA letter51 and
December 1, 2014 Court Resolution,52 Judge Macabaya was
directed anew to explain the delay in (1) deciding cases, (2)
resolving incidents, and (3) taking appropriate action in dormant
cases. Yet, despite such repeated behests and warnings,
punctuated by the caveat that "all directives from the Court
Administrator and his deputies are issued in the exercise of the
Court's administrative supervision of trial courts and their
personnel, hence, said directives should be respected [and
should not be construed] as mere requests [and] should be
complied with promptly and completely,"53 Judge Macabaya
only submitted decisions and resolutions on a piecemeal basis
sans explanation for his failure to comply in full. Judge Macabaya
ought to be reminded that:
A resolution of the Supreme Court should not be construed as a
mere request, and should be complied with promptly and
completely. Such failure to comply accordingly betrays not only
a recalcitrant streak in character, but also disrespect for the
Court's lawful order and directive. This contumacious conduct of
refusing to abide by the lawful directives issued by the Court has
likewise been considered as an utter lack of in1erest to remain
with, if not contempt of, the system. x x x54
The records disclose that Judge Macabaya utterly failed to
decide the cases submitted for decision or resolve pending
incidents within the reglementary period as well as within the time
frame that he himself fixed in the initial Action Plan. As noted
during the audit, these cases were already deemed submitted
for decision much further beyond the period55 allowed by the
Constitution and by statute. In Re: Judicial Audit of the RTC, Br.
14, Zamboanga City,56 we cited Rule 3.05 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct which underscores the need to speedily resolve cases,
thus:
The Supreme Court has consistently impressed upon judges the
need to decide cases promptly and expeditiously on the
principle that justice delayed is justice denied. Failure to resolve
cases submitted for decision within the period fixed by law
constitutes a serious violation of the constitutional right of the
parties to a speedy disposition of their cases.
The office of the judge exacts nothing less than faithful
observance of the Constitution and the law in the discharge of
official duties. Section 15 (1), Article VIII of the Constitution
mandates that cases or matters filed with the lower courts must
be decided or resolved within three months from the date they
are submitted for decision or resolution. Moreover, Rule 3.05,
Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct directs judges to
'dispose of the court's business promptly and decide cases within
the required periods.' Judges must closely adhere to the Code of
Judicial Conduct in order to preserve the integrity, competence,
and independence of the judiciary and make the administration
of justice more efficient. Time and again, we have stressed the
need to strictly observe this duty so as not to negate our efforts to
minimize, if not totally eradicate, the twin problems of congestion
and delay that have long plagued our courts. Finally, Canons 6
and 7 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics [exhort] judges to be
prompt and punctual in the disposition and resolution of cases
and matters pending before their courts, to wit:
6. PROMPTNESS
He should be prompt in disposing of all matters submitted to him,
remembering that justice delayed is often justice denied.
7. PUNCTUALITY
He should be punctual in the performance of his judicial duties,
recognizing that the time of litigants, witnesses, and attorneys is
of value and that if the judge is unpunctual in his habits, he sets
a bad example to the bar and tends to create dissatisfaction
with the administration of justice.
Parenthetically, Administrative Circular No. 1 dated 28 January
1988, requires all magistrates to observe scrupulously the periods
prescribed in Article VIII, Section 15 of the Constitution and to act
promptly on all motions and interlocutory matters pending
before their courts.
We cannot overstress this policy on prompt disposition or
resolution of cases. Delay in case disposition is a major culprit in
the erosion of public faith and confidence in the judiciary and
the lowering of its standards.
Failure to decide cases within the reglementary period, without
strong and justifiable reason, constitutes gross inefficiency
warranting the imposition of administrative sanction on the
defaulting judge.
Nor is there merit in Judge Macabaya's claim that at the time his
motion for reconsideration was filed, there were only 11 to 12
cases left undecided or unresolved, and that the period to
decide or resolve these cases were within the time extension he
prayed for.57 Judge Macabaya ought to know that requests for
extension of time are not always granted as a matter of course
and, even if they were, such requests for extension of time in no
wise operate to absolve him from administrative liability. Here, the
records showed that Judge Macabaya asked for additional time
to resolve the cases submitted for decision only on June 30,
201458 and on November 24, 201459 - or 61 and 208 days
respectively, past the deadline that Judge Macabaya himself set
in the action plan. The audit team even reminded him to submit
the request for extension of time before the mandated period to
decide would expire.60 This, he failed to do.
Even so, our independent examination disclosed the following
discrepancies between the status of the cases and the
allegations of Judge Macabaya:
1. In Civil Case Nos. 1971-3672 and 1971-3673, Judge Macabaya
insisted that the above-mentioned inherited cases were
disposed of on June 24, 2014.61 However, the alleged decision
or order disposing of the case has not been attached on record;
the only relevant document related to the instant case being an
Order dated March 25, 2014 ordering the parties to appear for a
preliminary conference on May 2, 2014.62
2. There was no decision, resolution or order attached in the
records in the following cases:
a. Civil Case No. 1990-258 entitled Integrated Rural Bank v.
Acenas;63
b. Civil Case No. 1995-403 entitled Minda Development Bank v.
Sps. Rabaya;64
c. Civil Case No. 1996-514 entitled PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc.
v. Sps. Lee;65
d. Civil Case No. 1996-521 entitled BA Savings Bank v. Sps. Yap, et
al.;66
e. Civil Case No. 1998-176 entitled Minda Development Bank v.
Agcopra;67
f. Civil Case No. 2004-214 entitled Veluz v. Morados;68
g. Civil Case No. 2011-220 entitled Tomarongv. P/Supt.
Pimentel;69
h. LRC No. 1999-085, LRC No. 2000-039, and LRC No. 2006-020 all
concerning Phividec Industrial Authority as the applicant;70
i. Criminal Case No. 2004-100 entitled People v. Manlunas; 71
j. Civil Case No. 1992-503 entitled Republic of the Philippines v.Y
anez, et al . ,72
k. Civil Case No. 1996-167 entitled Dumdum v. Dumdum;73
l. Civil Case No. 2002-195 entitled Shoreline Environment
Association, Inc. v. Reyes, et al.;74
m. Civil Case No. 2002-290 entitled Asset Pool, et al. v. Sps.
Forster;75
n. Civil Case No. 2006-123 entitled Sps. Nera v. Tobias;76
o. Civil Case 2011-062 entitled Pepsi Cola Products Phils., Inc. v.
Escauso;77
p. Civil Case No. 2011-191 entitled Sps. Encinareal v. Hult, et al.;
78
q. Spec. Proc. Case No. 2010-135 with Santiago C. Sabal as
petitioner;79
r. Criminal Case No. 4804 entitled People v. Roque, et al. ;80
s. Criminal Case Nos. 2005-103 to 107 and 2005-156 to 157 all
entitled People v. Autor;81
t. Criminal Case Nos. 2005-462 to 463 both entitled People v.
Roios;82
u. Criminal Case No. 2010-925 entitled People v. Velez; 83 and,
v. Criminal Case No. 2011-323 entitled People v. Gelam.84
In some of the above-mentioned cases,85 Judge Macabaya
claimed that he submitted a decision/order/resolution
concerning the same through an alleged Compliance dated
November 24, 2014. However, a perusal of the records shows that
this alleged Compliance was never submitted to this Court.
3. Judge Macabaya claimed that he already resolved Civil Case
No. 1998-04 last December 19, 2014 but failed to attach the same
at the earliest possible time. Judge Macabaya submitted a mere
photocopy thereof in his Supplemental to the Reiterative Motion
to Release of Salaries, Benefits and Other Emoluments Dated 27
October 2015,86 without any explanation for the belated
submission thereof notwithstanding his previous submission of a
Motion for Reconsideration/Explanation87 dated February 16,
2015; Supplemental Explanation to the Motion for
Reconsideration88 dated February 27, 2015; Recapitulative
Statement with Urgent Reiterative Motion to Lift the Suspension of
Administrative and Judicial Function[ s] and the Release of
Salaries, Benefits and Emoluments89 dated March 4, 2015,
Compliance/Report90 dated September 18, 2015, and
Reiterative Motion to Release of Salaries, Benefits and
Emoluments91 dated October 27, 2015.
4. Similar to Civil Case No. 1998-04, Judge Macabaya claimed to
have issued a Consolidated Order92 dated November 20, 2015
dismissing Civil Case No. 2010-103 entitled Sandigan v. Cagayan
De Oro Holy Infant School and Spec. Proc. Case No. 2010-116 in
Re: Petition to Approve the Will of Gregoria Veloso but only
attached the same to its Letter of Transmittal of Decided Cases
Subject to A.M. No. 14-11-350-RTC in the RTC of Cagayan De Oro
City, Misamis Oriental, Br. 20 with Reiterative Request for
Certification (Letter of Transmittal).93 Although Judge
Macabaya alleged that "he has already submitted them with the
Honorable Supreme Court, Second Division as part of his
pleadings and compliance with copies furnished to this
Honorable Office,"94 a thorough review of the records reveals
that the said cases were not submitted to this Court prior to said
Letter of Transmittal.
5. In Criminal Case No. 2002-394, Judge Macabaya issued an
Order95 dated June 28, 2013 recalling the previous order
declaring the case submitted for decision on the ground that the
records showed "that the prosecution has not yet presented their
evidence."96 However, the audit team noted that "this case may
be considered as inherited since the hearing in this cases [sic]
was entirely heard by the former judge, although the motion for
reconsideration of the Order dated 15 [Sept]. 2003 denying the
Formal Offer of Exhibits of the accused was only resolved on 15
Nov. 2011."97 The audit team's observation runs counter to Judge
Macabaya's findings that the prosecution has not yet presented
its evidence. To date, no other order has been submitted to this
Court regarding the status of the instant case.
6. In Criminal Case Nos. 2011-772, 2011-909 and 2012-732 Judge
Macabaya issued Orders dated June 19, 201398 and July 3,
201399 which deemed the criminal cases submitted for
judgment. However, to date, Judge Macabaya has not
submitted to this Court a copy of the said judgment (despite the
numerous pleadings he has filed in the instant administrative
case). Judge Macabaya is reminded of this Court's Resolution
dated December 1, 2014 ''to take appropriate action on the
remaining dormant cases" such as Criminal Case Nos. 2011-772,
2011-909, and 2012-732.
Also, despite this Court's directive for Judge Macabaya to
decide or resolve the remaining cases/incidents that were
included in the judicial audit, Judge Macabaya failed to comply
with the same. Even with Judge Macabaya's own acquiescence
that the remaining cases have to be resolved/acted upon by
him,100 he merely attached orders101 issued by Acting Presiding
Judge Gil G. Bollozos, concerning cases under the former's
responsibility in clear defiance of this Court's mandate, to wit:
1. Civil Case No. 1998-325-R entitled Heirs of Yacapin v. Buhay;102
2. Civil Case No. 2010-022-R entitled Emata, Jr. v. Emano; 103
3. Civil Case No. 2010-282 entitled Maybank Philippines, Inc. v.
Naval and John Doe; 104
4. Civil Case Nos. 1984-9853 entitled Padilla v. Development Bank
of the Philippines and 1985-10009-R entitled Development Bank
of the Philippines v. Padilla; 105
5. Civil Case No. 1996-766 entitled Nabo v. Lim; 106
6. Civil Case No. 2011-055-R entitled First Standard Finance Corp
v. Sps. Pacatan;107
7. Civil Case No. 2011-241-R entitled Soriano v. Onari; 108
8. Civil Case No. 2012-253 entitled Heirs of Longos v. Kahayag
Home Settlers Association, Inc.; 109
9. LRC Case No. N-2006-005 with Phividec Industrial Authority as
applicant;110
Judge Macabaya's negligence does not end here.
For, aside from the delay/sin rendering a Decision or Resolution
on cases submitted for decision, the judicial audit team also
found errors or irregularities in several orders issued by Judge
Macabaya.
In Criminal Case No. 2001-888, entitled People v. Jabinao, Judge
Macabaya issued an Order dated November 22, 2011 directing
the accused to secure another bail bond within five days from
notice, "it appearing that the bond put up by the accused had
already expired,"111 in clear violation of Section 2(a) Rule 114 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which provides:
SECTION 2. Conditions of the Bail; Requirements. -All kinds of bail
are subject to the following conditions:
(a) The undertaking shall be effective upon approval, and unless
cancelled, shall remain in force at all stages of the case until
promulgation of the judgment of the Regional Trial Court,
irrespective of whether the case was originally filed in or
appealed to it;
This Court, in its Resolution112 of July 20, 2004, had already
clarified that "[ u ]nless and until the Supreme Court directs
otherwise, the lifetime or duration of the effectivity of any bond
issued in criminal and civil action/special proceedings, or in any
proceeding or incident therein shall be from its approval by the
court until the action or proceeding is finally decided, resolved
or terminated."113
Then again, in Criminal Case Nos. 2000-260 and 2000-316, both
entitled People v. Alba, and in Criminal Case Nos. 2002-098 and
2002-100, also entitled People v. Alba, Judge Macabaya issued
twin Orders directing his Branch Clerk of Court ''to receive
evidence of the prosecution through ex-parte hearing."114
Nowhere in the Rules of Criminal Procedure are Clerks of Court
allowed to receive evidence ex-parte in criminal proceedings -
unlike in ordinary civil actions and in special proceedings where
the judge may delegate such act to his Clerk of Court.115 These
orders clearly showed gross ignorance of the rules of procedure.
Thus, we held in Spouses Lago v. Judge Abul, Jr.: 116
Though not every judicial error bespeaks ignorance of the law or
of the rules, and that, when committed in good faith, does not
warrant administrative sanction, the rule applies only in cases
within the parameters of tolerable misjudgment. When the law or
the rule is so elementary, not to be aware of it or to act as if one
does not know it constitutes gross ignorance of the law. One who
accepts the exalted position of a judge owes the public and the
court proficiency in the law, and the duty to maintain
professional competence at all times. When a judge displays an
utter lack of familiarity with the rules, he erodes the confidence
of the public in the courts. A judge is expected to keep abreast
of the developments and amendments thereto, as well as of
prevailing jurisprudence. Ignorance of the law by a judge can
easily be the mainspring of Injustice. (Underscoring supplied)
The audit team also noted that Judge Macabaya's wife
meddled or interfered with the court's business.1âwphi1 Judge
Macabaya, however, saw nothing wrong with that, and even
claimed that her presence helped him focus more on his judicial
functions. Apparently, Judge Macabaya seems to have missed
the point of his being the presiding Judge of his court; he seems
to be unaware that this unwholesome atmosphere can only
further aggravate the court's already fractured integrity and
efficiency. It is not too much to say that the court's official
business is none of Mrs. Macabaya's officious business. In Gordon
v. Judge Lilagan, 117 we said:
As pointed out by the Investigating Justice in his factual findings,
there is enough evidence on record to show that respondent
[judge] permitted [his wife] to have access to court records in
order to monitor the dates when cases are submitted for
decision. There is impropriety in this. Records of cases are
necessarily confidential, and to preserve their integrity and
confidentiality, access thereto ought to be limited only to the
judge, the parties or their counsel and the appropriate court
personnel in charge of the custody thereof Since [the judge's
wife] is not a court employee, much less the employee
specifically in charge of the custody of said records, it was
improper for respondent to allow her to have access thereto.
In this regard, the Code of Judicial Conduct states in no
uncertain terms that- Rule 3.08. A judge should diligently
discharge administrative responsibilities, maintain professional
competence in court management and facilitate the
performance of the administrative functions of other judges and
court personnel.
Rule 3.09. A judge should organize and supervise the court
personnel to ensure the prompt and efficient dispatch of business
and require at all times the observance of high standards of
public service and fidelity.
The foregoing rules should be observed by respondent judge with
the help of his staff and without the intervention of his wife who is
not a court employee. It needs be stressed in this regard that
respondent judge is not wanting in help from his staff to warrant
the assistance of one who, while closely related by affinity to
respondent judge, is actually an outsider in his sala insofar as
official business and court functions are concerned.
In sum, Judge Macabaya must be held to account for acts
constitutive of serious misconduct and gross ignorance of the law
and/or procedure.
Although this Court has meted out the penalty of dismissal or
forfeiture of retirement benefits to judges who were found guilty
of several infractions118 such as in this case, we have
nevertheless imposed lighter penalties towards members of the
bench when mitigating circumstances merit the same.
Judge Macabaya has continuously rendered almost 31 years of
government service - starting as Trial Attorney II of the Citizen's
Legal Assistance Office on December 2, 1986, as Public Attorney
II of the Public Attorney's Office from January 1, 1990 to March
31, 1997, as a prosecutor on April 1, 1997 up to his appointment
to the Judiciary on March 5, 2010.119 In the three decades he
has been in public service, this Court has not adjudged him guilty
of any infraction - with four of the six administrative cases filed
against him dismissed.120
Also, this Court notes that in the four years Judge Macabaya was
sitting as Presiding Judge of Branch 20, 761 new cases were
raffled to his sala.121 At the same time, he was appointed as
Acting Presiding Judge of Branch 9 of the RTC of Malaybalay
City, Bukidnon - some 93 kilometers away from his sala - to hear,
resolve and dispose of cases in that branch.122 This is
notwithstanding the assignment of other cases from other courts
where judges had inhibited and his continuous hearings in his
sala.123
Lastly, this Court notes the fire that engulfed the Cagayan de Oro
Hall of Justice last January 30, 2015.124 Albeit beyond the
prescribed period for Judge Macabaya to act on the cases
mentioned in the audit, this may have contributed to the
difficulty in disposing of or resolving the remaining cases under his
responsibility.
In light of the above-mentioned circumstances, we believe that
a fine equivalent to two (2) months' salary, with a stem warning
that a repetition of the same or similar offenses shall be dealt with
severely, is more commensurate.
WHEREFORE, Judge Bonifacio M. Macabaya, Presiding Judge of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 20, Cagayan de Oro City,
Misamis Oriental, is hereby found GUILTY of: (1) gross misconduct
for his repeated failure to comply with the directives of the Office
of the Court Administrator and this Court; and (2) gross ignorance
of the law and procedure. Nevertheless and in view of the
mitigating circumstances mentioned above, the Court hereby
imposes upon him a FINE equivalent to two (2) months' salary,
with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar
acts shall be dealt with more severely.
Judge Macabaya is also ORDERED to:
1. SUBMIT a copy of his Judgment on the following cases within
30 days from receipt of this Decision:
a. Criminal Case No. 2002-394 entitled People v. Baylon;
b. Criminal Case No. 2011-772 entitled People v. Valledor;
c. Criminal Case No. 2011-909 entitled People v. Tan;
d. Criminal Case No. 2012-732 entitled People v. Mendoza; and
e. Civil Case No. 2009-003 entitled Heirs of Ramos v. Heirs of
Abejuela, et al.
2. FURNISH a copy of the Decision/Resolution/Order in the
following cases:
a. Civil Case No. 1971-3672 entitledPabito v. Nicolas;
b. Civil Case No. 1971-3673 entitled Rustia v. Pabito;
c. Civil Case No. 1990-258 entitled Integrated Rural Bank v.
Acenas;
d. Civil Case No. 1995-403 entitled Minda Development Bank v.
Sps. Rabaya;
e. Civil Case No. 1996-514 entitled PC! Leasing and Finance, Inc.
v. Sps. Lee;
f. Civil Case No. 1996-521 entitled BA Savings Bankv. Sps. Yap;
g. Civil Case No. 1998-176 entitled Minda Development Bank v.
Agcopra;
h. Civil Case No. 2004-214 entitled Veluz v. Morados;
i. Civil Case No. 2011-220 entitled Tomarong v. P/Supt. Pimentel;
j. LRC No. 1999-085, LRC No. 2000-039, and LRC No. 2006-020 all
concerning Phividec Industrial Authority as the applicant;
k. Criminal Case No. 2004-100 entitled People v. Manlunas;
1. Civil Case No. 1992-503 entitled Republic of the Philippines v.
Yanez;
m. Civil Case No. 1996-167 entitled Dumdum v. Dumdum;
n. Civil Case No. 2002-195 entitled Shoreline Environment
Association, Inc. v. Reyes;
o. Civil Case No. 2002-290 entitled Asset Pool v. Sps. Forster
p. Civil Case No. 2006-123 entitled Sps. Nera v. Tobias;
q. Civil Case No. 2011-062 entitled Pepsi Cola Products Phils., Inc.
v. Escauso;
r. Civil Case No. 2011-191 entitled Sps. Encinareal v. Hult;
s. Spec. Proc. Case No. 2010-135 with Santiago C. Sabal as
petitioner;
t. Criminal case No. 4804 entitled People v. Roque;
u. Criminal Case Nos. 2005-103 to 107 and 2005-156 to 157 all
entitled People v. Autor;
v. Criminal Case Nos. 2005-462 to 463 both entitled People v.
Rosios;
w. Criminal Case No. 2010-925 entitled People v. Velez; and
x. Criminal Case No. 2011-323 entitled People v. Gelam.
3. CREATE, MAINTAIN and REGULARLY UPDATE the following
books in accordance with Sections 9 and 10 of Rule 136 of the
Rules of Court:
a. Judgment Book;
b. Book of Entries; and
c. Execution Book.
4. UPDATE his court's docket books;
5. UPDATE and make the necessary CORRECTIONS in his court's
Docket Inventory Report, particularly:
a. COMPLY with the prescribed form of the Docket Inventory
Report;
b. INCLUDE a column for the following details:
i. "Last Trial/Action Taken and Date thereof;"
ii. Names of the judges to whom cases are assigned;
iii. Pre-trial dates for criminal cases;
c. REMOVE the following columns for being unnecessary:
i. "Bonded or Detained;"
ii. "Place of Detention;" and
iii. "Date of Detention."
6. ENSURE the accuracy of monthly reports, in accordance with
Paragraph 8 of the Guidelines and Instructions in Administrative
Circular No. 61-2001 dated December 10, 2001;
7. DISALLOW his wife to have access to court records and
MINIMIZE her presence in his court to prevent the impression of
interference in the discharge of his judicial and administrative
functions.
Failure to comply with any of the directives set herein shall
constitute open defiance of this Court's orders and shall be dealt
with accordingly.
Judge Macabaya is DIRECTED to report to this Court the actual
date of his receipt of this Decision to enable this Court to
determine when his suspension shall have taken effect.
The current Acting Presiding Judge of Branch 20 of the Regional
Trial Court of Cagayan De Oro City is mandated to CONTINUE
TRIAL on the following cases WITH DISPATCH while Judge
Macabaya is serving his two year period of suspension:
1. Criminal Case Nos. 2000-260 and 2000-316 both entitled People
v. Alba, et al.; and
2. Criminal Case Nos. 2002-098 and 2002-100 both entitled People
v. Alba.
The current Acting Presiding Judge of Branch 20 of the Regional
Trial Court of Cagayan De Oro City is ordered to RECALL Judge
Macabaya's previous Order dated November 22, 2011 in
Criminal Case No. 2001-888 entitled People v. Jabinao as the bail
bond put up by the accused in the said case remains valid during
the pendency of the case.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to the personal records
of Judge Macabaya and furnished to Branch 20 of the Regional
Trial Court of Cagayan De Oro for its proper compliance.
SO ORDERED.
27. November 8, 2017
A.M. No. RTJ-16-2478
DOMINADOR I. FERRER, JR., Complainant
vs.
JUDGE ARNIEL A. DATING, Regional Trial Court, Bra.ncb 41, Daet,
Camarines Norte, Respondent
DECISION
CAGUIOA, J.:
For resolution is the Administrative Complaint1 dated April 18,
2011 filed by Atty. Dominador I. Ferrer, Jr. against Judge Arniel A.
Dating, Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 41, Daet, Camarines
Norte, for "abuse of authority, judicial oppression and
unreasonable/malicious acts to delay raffle of cases," relative to
Special Civil Action (SCA) No. 77882 (subject case), entitled,
"Cesar E. Barcelona and Jose Vargas vs. Atty. Freddie A. Venida
and Atty. Dominador Ferrer, Jr." for Quo Warranto with prayer for
temporary restraining order and/or injunction.3
The subject case, where complainant Atty. Ferrer, Jr. is one of the
respondents, was first raffled to respondent Judge Dating's sala,
RTC, Branch 41, Daet, Camarines Norte.4 In an Order5 dated
January 14, 2011, Judge Dating granted petitioners Barcelona
and Vargas' prayer for a temporary restraining order (TRO) and
set the hearing of the application for a writ of preliminary
injunction on January 24, 2011.6
Aggrieved by the said Order, Atty. Venida and Atty. Ferrer, Jr.
filed the following: (a) Motion for Inhibition/Disqualification dated
January 14, 2011; (b) Joint Omnibus Motion dated January 17,
2011; and (c) Second Amended Joint Omnibus Motion dated
January 20, 2011.7
In an Order8 dated January 25, 2011, Judge Dating denied the
Motion for Inhibition/Disqualification due to absence of valid or
just cause.9 Moreover, in an Order10 dated January 26, 2011,
Judge Dating cited Atty. Ferrer, Jr., Atty. Venida, and two (2)
other lawyers for direct contempt of court, and imposed a fine of
Two Thousand Pesos (₱2,000.00) upon each of them, and then
voluntarily inhibited himself from hearing the subject case.11
The subject case was re-raffled to the sala of Judge Winston S.
Racoma, RTC, Branch 39, Daet, Camarines Norte.12 The
respondents in the subject case, through their counsel, filed
motions for inhibition which Judge Racoma granted in an Order13
dated March 9, 2011.14 The case records were then transmitted
to the Office of the Executive Judge on March 15, 2011 for re-
raffle.15
As mentioned above, Atty. Ferrer, Jr., filed an Administrative
Complaint dated April 18, 2011 against Judge Dating, then the
Executive Judge, alleging that the latter deliberately caused the
delay of the re-raffle of the subject case for more than a month
because he was always unavailable, either on a leave of
absence or in a seminar.16 Atty. Ferrer, Jr. alleged that while
Judge Dating has the right to attend seminars or take a leave of
absence, the same should not cause unreasonable delay in the
re-raffle of the subject case.17
Atty. Ferrer, Jr. also alleged that Judge Dating favored the
petitioners in the subject case since the latter immediately
conducted hearings thereon and issued the TRO after only four
(4) days from the filing of the subject case.18 Hence, Atty. Ferrer,
Jr. prayed that the appropriate sanction be imposed upon
Judge Dating.19
In the 1st Indorsement20 dated May 9, 2011, signed by then
Deputy Court Administrator (DCA) and Officer-In-Charge of the
Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) Nimfa C. Vilches, and
OCA Chief of Legal Office, Wilhelmina D. Geronga, the said
Administrative Complaint was referred to Judge Dating for his
comment.
Meanwhile, in a Manifestation on the Continuing Delay and Non-
Raffle of the Case of Respondent Honorable Judge Arniel A.
Dating21 dated May 10, 2011, Atty. Ferrer, Jr., reiterated the
allegations in the Administrative Complaint, and added that, as
of that date, the subject case had not yet been re-raffled.22
Upon receipt of the above Manifestation, Judge Dating
submitted a letter23 dated May 19, 2011 to DCA Vilches stating
that the subject case was included in the raffle on April 28, 2011,
but that the Raffle Committee unanimously decided to return the
subject case to Branch 39 since the petitioners (i.e., Barcelona
and Vargas) in the subject case had filed a motion for
reconsideration of the order of inhibition issued by Judge
Racoma.24
Moreover, in compliance with the above 1st Indorsement, Judge
Dating submitted his Comment25 dated June 3, 2011 stating that
the case raffle is conducted every Thursday.26 Judge Dating also
stated therein that, while the records of the subject case were
received by the Office of the Executive Judge on March 15, 2011
(Tuesday), no raffle was done on March 17, 2011 (Thursday), since
there was no urgent case and the number of cases was not
sufficient for a raffle.27
Judge Dating also alleged that the judges of RTC, Daet,
Camarines Norte were scheduled to travel to Manila on that day,
March 17, 2011 to attend the 1st General Assembly of Judges the
following day.28 Judge Dating also stated that, in the morning of
March 17, 2011, he even heard cases in Branch 40 (a Family
Court), where he was a concurrent assisting judge, before he left
for Manila in the afternoon of that day.29
Judge Dating also explained that he used his forfeitable leave
credits on March 21-31, 2011.30 On April 7-9, 2011, he attended
the IBP National Convention in Subic, Zambales and, on April 14-
15, 2011, he attended the Land Valuation and Just
Compensation Seminar sponsored by the Philippine Judicial
Academy in Tagaytay City.31 He also denied that the delay was
deliberate.32
In a Report33 dated March 4, 2016, the OCA recommended that
the Administrative Complaint against Judge Dating be re-
docketed as a regular administrative matter, and that he be
found guilty of simple neglect of duty and fined in the amount of
Ten Thousand Pesos (₱10,000.00) with a stem warning that a
repetition of the same or any similar infraction would be dealt
with more severely.34
After considering the allegations in the Administrative Complaint
and Judge Dating's explanation, the OCA found as follows:
This Office finds such explanation to be unacceptable. A careful
perusal of Chapter V of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC,35 specifically the
provisions on the conduct of raffle of cases, would reveal that it
was never intended as an indispensable requirement that a
substantial number of cases must have been filed in court before
raffle of cases could be conducted. On the contrary, Section 2
thereof explicitly mandates that "[r]affling of cases shall be
regularly conducted at two o'clock in the afternoon every
Monday and/or Thursday as warranted by the number of cases
to be raffled." Clearly, as can be easily inferred from the use of
the words "shall" and "regularly," the raffle of cases should be
mandatorily done on a regular basis and, much more, not only
once but even twice a week depending on the number of cases
to be raffled. Clearly, if the supposed substantial number of cases
to be raffled affects the conduct of raffle as what respondent
Judge Dating is trying to impress upon us, it is more of the fact
that the conduct of raffle of cases in a week could be done
twice if necessary, but never to altogether dispense with the
raffle.
Respondent Judge Dating averred that there was no urgency to
conduct a raffle (as there was no case [presumably including the
Special Civil Action No. 7788] which applied for a TRO, a special
raffle, and the like). Again, respondent Judge Dating missed a
substantial point on the matter. Assuming that, save for Special
Civil Action No. 7788, there were no cases scheduled to be
raffled on 17 March 2011, respondent Judge Dating was still
obligated to cause the re-raffle of the quo warranto petition for
that particular day. As provided under Section 8 of the same
guidelines, "[w]here a judge in a multiple-branch court is
disqualified or voluntarily inhibits himself/herself [as what Judge
Racoma did], the records shall be returned to the Executive
Judge and the latter shall cause the inclusion of the said case in
the next regular raffle for re-assignment." The rule is so worded in
a mandatory tenor for Executive Judges to require the inclusion
of cases [inhibited by judges] in the next regular raffle for a re-
assignment. Unfortunately, respondent Judge Dating apparently
failed to grasp the true intent of that particular guideline.
Respondent Judge Dating rationalized the failure to immediately
raffle the quo warranto petition on 17 March 2011 by pointing out
that on that day, the judges would be travelling to attend the 1st
General Assembly of Judges in Manila on 18 March 2011.
Curiously though, he also averred that he conducted trial in the
morning of 17 March 2011 for cases pending before Branch 40 (a
Family Court) where he also serves as the Acting/ Assisting Judge,
and left his station for Manila in the afternoon. While it is
commendable for respondent Judge Dating to still perform his
duties as a Presiding Judge by holding trial in the morning, his
exemplary action was virtually negated by the fact that he failed
to perform his duties as an Executive Judge. This Office
understands that respondent Judge Dating, together with the
other judges of the RTC, Daet, Camarines Norte, would have to
leave much earlier than the others due to the considerable
distance of their stations from Manila. Still, this Office believes that
respondent Judge Dating [and the other members of the Raffle
Committee as well] could still have set aside even a few minutes
of their precious time to conduct a raffle before leaving their
station. Truth be told, the raffling of cases (minus the usual chats
and exchange of pleasantries) could be accomplished in less
than an hour, unlike court trials that invariably consume much of
the time of the judges. As Executive Judge, it is the personal duty
and responsibility of respondent Judge Dating to exercise
supervision over the raffling of cases. Hence, he should have
been prudent enough to find ways to minimize, if not totally
avoid, delays in the raffle of cases.
This ideal condition of avoiding or minimizing delays in the raffle
of cases all the more applies to respondent Judge Dating's
situation in light of his admission that it is his "custom" to avail of his
forfeitable leaves during the month of March. While attending
seminars and conventions sanctioned by the Court may excuse
the non-raffle of cases in courts on specific dates, the same could
not be said when the non-raffle of cases was occasioned by the
trial judges' forfeitable leave of absences. Unlike seminars and
conventions which are sponsored and evidently scheduled by
the Court [usually through the PHILJA], availing of forfeitable
leaves is a personal act on the part of judges especially on
choosing the dates which they usually prefer. While they are
indeed entitled to such leaves, judges should so schedule the
same in the most careful manner so as to prevent a hiatus in court
proceedings. Speedy administration of justice should never play
second fiddle to the personal comfort and caprice of those
working in the judiciary, judges and/or personnel alike. In the
case at bar, respondent Judge Dating scheduled his forfeitable
leaves from 21 March 2011 to 31 March 2011. Knowing fully well
that he would not be able to attend to his functions as
chairperson of the Raffle Committee for the raffle dates of 24
March 2011 and 31 March 2011, and aware of the fact of the
incoming seminar and convention that would coincide with the
succeeding raffle dates (7 April 2011 and 14 April 2011) as well as
of the observance by the nation of the Holy Week (21 April 2011
being a Maundy Thursday), respondent Judge Dating should
have endeavored to wrap up all his pending work before going
on a sabbatical. Unfortunately, instead of allotting just a few
minutes in the afternoon of 17 March 2011 to re-raffle Special Civil
Action No. 7788, he opted to forthwith leave his post to attend
the General Assembly of Judges, then proceeded with his
"customary" forfeitable leave of absences during the month of
March, then attended the IBP National Convention in Subic,
Zambales (7 to 9 of April 2011) and the Just Compensation
Seminar sponsored by PHILJA in Tagaytay City, Cavite (14 to 15
April 2011 ), and then took a break during the Holy Week, before
including on 28 April 2011 the quo warranto petition in the list of
cases to be raffled, only to have it referred back to the court of
origin in view of the pending motion for reconsideration of the
inhibition order. What could have been done by respondent
Judge Dating in less than an hour was apathetically delayed for
six (6) long weeks.
Apropos his letter dated 17 March 2011 to then DCA Jesus Edwin
Villasor and another letter addressed to then DCA Vilches
expressing his supposed dilemma in the conduct of raffle of cases
during his forfeitable leaves of absence and asking if the Vice-
Executive Judge could conduct the same during such time,
respondent Judge Dating seemed to flip-flop and contradict
himself when he subsequently explained [in the instant matter]
that during his absence, the Clerk of Court and the Vice-
Executive Judge are fully knowledgeable of what to do pursuant
to existing circulars and directives. These vacillations do not
augur well for respondent Judge Dating for they only serve to
highlight either his inconsistency in making a sound justification
for his inefficiency to supervise the conduct of raffle of cases, or
his tendency to put the blame on the other members of the Raffle
Committee.
xxxx
For his failure to strictly adhere to the provisions of A.M. No. 03- 8-
02-SC, specifically the provisions on the raffle of cases, this Office
finds respondent Judge Dating guilty of simple neglect of duty.
Simple neglect of duty signifies a disregard of a duty resulting
from carelessness or indifference.1âwphi1 The Court has
consistently held that mere delay in the performance of one's
functions is considered as simple neglect of duty. Under Rule IV,
Section 52 (B) of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the
Civil Service, it is a less grave offense punishable by suspension
without pay for one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6) months.
In order, however, not to disrupt the conduct of court
proceedings, the imposition of a fine against respondent Judge
Dating is appropriate under the circumstances.36
The Court hereby adopts the above well-reasoned OCA
recommendation.
For failure to observe the procedure on the raffle of cases
pursuant to A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC, Judge Dating is guilty of simple
neglect of duty which is defined as the "failure to give attention
to a task, or the disregard of a duty due to carelessness or
indifference."37 Simple neglect of duty is listed as one of the less
grave offenses punishable by suspension of one (1) month and
one (1) day to six (6) months for the first offense, and dismissal
from the service for the second offense under Rule IV, Section
52(B)(l) of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service.38 In lieu of suspension, the Court agrees with the OCA
recommendation for the imposition of a fine of Ten Thousand
Pesos (₱l0,000.00).
WHEREFORE, the Court finds Judge Ami el A. Dating GUILTY of
simple neglect of duty and imposes upon him a FINE in the
amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (₱l0,000.00), with a STERN
WARNING that a repetition of the same or any similar infraction
shall be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
28. A.M. No. RTJ-17-2508 [Formerly OCA IPI No. 06-2416-RTJ],
November 07, 2017 - MARIE ROXANNE G. RECTO, Complainant,
v. HON. HENRY J. TROCINO, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 62,
BAGO CITY, NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, Respondent.
EN BANC
A.M. No. RTJ-17-2508 [Formerly OCA IPI No. 06-2416-RTJ],
November 07, 2017
MARIE ROXANNE G. RECTO, Complainant, v. HON. HENRY J.
TROCINO, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 62, BAGO CITY,
NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Before the Court is an administrative complaint1 against Judge
Henry J. Trocino (Judge Trocino), former Executive Judge and
Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 62, Bago City (RTC),
filed by Marie Roxanne G. Recto (Complainant) for bias and
partiality, ignorance of the law, grave oppression, and violation
of the Code of Judicial Conduct for issuing an ex parte
Temporary Protection Order (TPO) in relation to Civil Case No.
1409, a case for Child Custody under the Family Code.
Antecedents:
The controversy stemmed from a petition2 for Child Custody with
Prayer for Protection Order under A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC3 in
relation to A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC4 and damages filed by
Magdaleno Peña (Peña) on December 20, 2005 against
complainant, entitled Magdaleno M. Peña, for himself and in
behalf of his minor son, Julian Henri "Harry" R. Peña v. Marie
Roxanne G. Recto. The petition was raffled to the RTC-Branch 62.
On December 23, 2005, the RTC issued, ex parte, a Temporary
Protection Order (TPO),5 granting, among others, the temporary
custody of their fifteen (15) month-old child, Julian Henri "Harry" R.
Peña (Henri), to her former live-in partner, Magdaleno Peña
(Peña). Specifically, the December 23, 2005 Order reads:
WHEREFORE, finding the petition to be sufficient in form and
substance, the court hereby directs the Clerk of Court to issue
Summons which shall be served, together with copy of the
petition and its annexes thereto, personally to the respondent.
TEMPORARY CUSTODY OVER JULIAN HENRI "HARRY" R. PEÑA IS
HEREBY VESTED UPON THE PETITIONER MAGDALENO M. PEÑA;
AND FOR THIS PURPOSE, THE PNP-CIDG (NCR) IS ORDERED TO
ASSIST THE SHERIFF OF THIS COURT IN [TAKING CUSTODY] OF
JULIAN HENRI "HARRY" R. PEÑA WHEREVER HE MIGHT BE FOUND
WHO SHALL THEREAFTER BE IMMEDIATELY TURNED OVER TO HIS
FATHER, THE HEREIN PETITIONER.
A protection order, which shall be effective for thirty (30) days
from service upon respondent Marie Roxanne G. Recto, is hereby
issued as follows:
1. prohibiting the respondent from threatening to commit or
committing, personally or through another, acts of
violence against the offended party;
2. prohibiting the respondent from harassing, annoying,
contacting or otherwise communicating in any form with
the offended party, either directly or indirectly;
3. removing and excluding the offended party from the
residence of the respondent or from any other place
where said offended party may be found;
4. requiring the respondent to stay away from the offended
party and any designated family or household member at
a distance of two hundred (200) meters;
5. requiring the respondent to stay away from the residence,
or any specified place frequented regularly by the
offended party and any designated family or household
member;
6. prohibiting the respondent from carrying or possessing any
firearms or deadly weapon, and ordering her to
immediately surrender the same to the court for proper
disposition; and
7. directing the respondent to put up a bond of ONE MILLION
PESOS (P1,000,000.00) to keep the peace and to present
two sufficient sureties who shall undertake that respondent
shall not commit any of the acts of violence on the
offended party and/ or the petitioner or violate the
protection order.
Lastly, pursuant to Section 16 of A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC (Rule on
Custody of Minors) a HOLD DEPARTURE ORDER is hereby issued for
the purpose of preventing the minor child from being brought out
of the country without prior order from the court, during the
pendency of the petition.
Accordingly, the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation is
directed NOT to allow the departure of the minor child from the
Philippines without the court's permission. Likewise, the
Department of Foreign Affairs is ordered NOT to issue any
passport to said minor without the prior authority of this court.
For the guidance of said government entities, hereunder are the
pertinent information about the subject of the Hold Departure
Order:
x x x
Furnish copies of this order the Department of Foreign Affairs, the
Bureau of Immigration and Deportation within twenty four (24)
hours hereof and through the most expeditious means of
transmittal.
Likewise furnish copies hereof the petitioner and counsel.
SO ORDERED.6
The Complaint
In vehement protest, complainant filed this administrative
complaint against Judge Trocino alleging that he (1) exhibited
bias and gross ignorance of the law; (2) acted with grave
oppression; and (3) violated the Code of Judicial Conduct when
he issued the TPO, ex parte, vesting immediate custody of Henri Peña who is a respondent in a Petition for Temporary and
to Peña based on hypothetical assumptions. Specifically, the Permanent Protection Order in the RTC of Mandaluyong City, yet
complainant alleged as follows: he issued the so called "TPO" by deliberately mis-applying the
provisions of R.A. 9262. The so called "TPO" of respondent judge
9. Respondent judge is biased, ignorant of the law, and acted
was not a product of innocent error in judgment. x x x
with grave oppression when he issued the TPO based on a
complaint for child custody. Respondent judge, in full disregard
13. Likewise, it is gross ignorance of the law on the part of
of the law and rule of the Supreme Court on Custody (A.M. No.
respondent judge in awarding temporary custody of minor Harry
03-04-04-SC), issued ex-parte the so called "TPO" without giving
to Magdaleno Peña based on hypothetical assumptions.
herein complainant Recto opportunity to file her answer, enter
Respondent judge in justifying his unfounded order said, and we
into Pre-trial, and without social worker's case study report. This
quote:
conduct of the respondent judge manifests patent bias in favor
of Peña, who is a resident of Negros Occidental. Moreover, Peña
x x x x
is not the natural guardian of Julian Harry, being an illegitimate
child.
14. Under Section 15 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, the Court may issue
an ex-parte TPO where there is reasonable ground to believe
10. Respondent judge deliberately did not apply the Rule on
that an imminent danger of violence against women and their
Custody but instead erroneously used R.A. 9262 to support his
children exists or is about to recur. There is complete absence of
order giving temporary custody of minor Harry Peña to
allegation to this effect in the petition. Clearly, the basis of the so
Magdaleno Peña, to the prejudice of herein complainant;
called "TPO" is hypothetical and not factual. Thus, respondent
issued the so called "TPO" without legal basis;
11. Respondent Judge inappropriately issued the so called "TPO"
considering that the case filed by Magdaleno Peña is for Child
15. There is no legal basis to award custody of minor Harry (an
Custody. The Rule on custody should have been observed by the
illegitimate child) to Magdaleno Peña, based on the Preamble
respondent judge and not the Rule on Anti-Violence against
of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child in the
Women and their Children. A TPO cannot be issued in favor of a
light of Article 213 of the Philippine Family Code that clearly state:
man because only women and their children are protected by
"No child under seven years of age shall be separated from the
R.A. 9262. Moreso, respondent's Order giving temporary child
mother, unless the court finds compelling reasons to order
custody to Magdaleno Peña has no legal leg to stand on
otherwise." Moreover, illegitimate children shall be under the sole
because in custody cases, only provisional orders for custody is
parental authority of the mother (Briones vs. Miguel, 440 SCRA
issued after an Answer is filed and after Pre-trial is conducted and
455);
a DSWD Social Worker Case Study Report is filed. Thus, the
Temporary Protection Order used by respondent Judge is not
16. The averments in the Petition for Child Custody are not
proper and patently illegal and void;
compelling reasons to immediately award custody of the minor
child to Magdaleno Peña to overcome Article 213 of the Family
12. Respondent's obvious bias is further shown by the fact that he
Code and the ruling in the case of Briones vs. Miguel. Not to be
was aware that a TPO was previously issued against Magdaleno
ignored is Article 213 of the Family Code is the caveat that,
generally, no child under seven years of age shall be separated
from the mother, except when the court finds cause to order
otherwise. Only the most compelling reasons, such as the
mother's unfitness to exercise sole parental authority, shall justify
her deprivation of parental authority and the award of custody
to someone else (Briones vs. Miguel, Ibid). It is elementary that
basic Philippine Law has greater weight than any international
law;
17. Likewise, Respondent Judge committed grave, whimsical
and capricious abuse of discretion in the exercise of his judicial
function in taking cognizance over the petition despite apparent
lack of jurisdiction and in issuing the so called "Temporary
Protection Order" against complainant;
18. Magdaleno M. Peña has no standing to institute an action in
behalf of complainant's 15 month old child because being
illegitimate, only complainant has parental authority on Julian
Henri "Harry" being the natural guardian, and yet with such
knowledge, the respondent judge abused his power with full
disregard for the law and the right of complainant in order to
favor Magdaleno Peña;
19. The respondent judge could not have innocently missed the
fact that the court had no jurisdiction because Magdaleno M.
Peña in filing for himself has no cause of action against herein
complainant (Marie Roxanne G. Recto), and avail of TPO [under]
RA 9262 because the remedies of the law could not be availed
of by a man;
20. Likewise clearly alleged in the petition is that Peña is bringing
the action for and in behalf of the offended party JULIAN HENRI
(HARRY R. PEÑA) - his minor illegitimate son [with complainant].
As such, it is manifest that the real petitioner is minor Harry Peña
who is a resident of Mandaluyong City. Under Sec. 9 of A.M. No.
04-10-11-SC, the verified petition for Temporary Protection Order
may be filed with the Family Court of the place where the
offended party resides. Accordingly, the petition must be filed
before the Family Court of Mandaluyong City;
21. Respondent Judge is fully aware of this defect of jurisdiction
in the petition considering that the alleged offended party Julian
Henri "Harry" R. Peña is not within his territorial jurisdiction. His
awareness of wrong venue is manifested in his order stating in
page 9 paragraph a) that "Harry" lives in Mandaluyong City and
not in Negros. We quote the following:
x x x x
22. Respondent judge blindly issued the so called "TPO" without
serious and judicious assessment of the contents of and
averments in the petition filed by Peña. This is an obvious fact
because the hypothetical approach in the petition for custody
was based on psychological incapacity for annulment of
marriage and not incapacity to rear a child. The documents
speak for themselves;
23. Apparently, respondent has no jurisdiction to take
cognizance of the petition before him and to issue the so called
"Temporary Protection Order" yet, he did so. In so doing,
respondent judge committed grave abuse of jurisdiction.
Accordingly, the so called "TPO" issued is null and void;
24. Respondent blindly assumed jurisdiction because respondent
Judge Trocino and petitioner Peña were in connivance.
Complainant has personal knowledge that respondent judge
was working under the dictates of Peña. On several occasions,
while complainant and Peña were still live-in partners, she has full
personal and direct knowledge that respondent judge was
dictated upon by Peña to decide on cases at the desire of Peña
in her presence. Aside from the personal knowledge of
complainant, the close relationship of Judge Trocino and Peña is
evident in the case entitled Eric L. Lee vs. Hon. Henry J. Trocino,
et al., under G.R. No. 164648 x x x before the Supreme Court,
where respondent and Judge Trocino and Magdaleno Peña are child. And even assuming that the TPO was
co-respondents;7 [Emphases supplied] erroneously/improperly issued, the proper remedy lies with the
proper court as the matter was judicial in nature, and not with
Respondent's Position
Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) by means of an
administrative complaint.
In his Comment,8 Judge Trocino denied the allegations and
pointed out that the TPO was sanctioned by Sections 119 and 1510
On the issue of jurisdiction, Judge Trocino asserted that the
of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC in relation to Section 3211 thereof as an
petition for child custody and damages was within the
ancillary remedy incident to the petition for custody filed by Peña
competence and jurisdiction of the RTC pursuant to Section 19 of
for himself and in behalf of his minor son. Judge Trocino asserted
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 otherwise known as the Judiciary
that the ex parte TPO was issued after a careful evaluation not
Reorganization Act of 1980 and A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC. Judge
only of the material allegations in the petition but all other
Trocino argued that the petition substantially complied with the
circumstances relevant to the welfare and best interest of the
requirements on non-forum shopping and that there was nothing
minor offended party, and that it was issued judiciously in
in the Verification and Certification against Non Forum Shopping
complete good faith, devoid of any grave, whimsical and
that would indicate that the parties raised a similar issue or cause
capricious abuse of discretion.
of action in another court, tribunal or agency.

Judge Trocino explained that the December 23, 2005 TPO was a
temporary order in contemplation of A.M. No. 04-1 0-11-SC and
not an order of temporary custody pursuant to A.M. 03-04-04-SC
which requires the prior filing of an answer, pre-trial, and a social
worker's study report. Judge Trocino insisted that the TPO was
properly issued considering that Civil Case No. 1409 was a case
for child custody with ancillary prayer for the issuance of a
protection order under Section 32 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC and
that said provision of the law authorizes an application for
protection order as an incident in criminal or civil actions.
As to the allegation that he worked under the dictates of Peña,
Judge Trocino vehemently denied the same and asserted that
he never allowed anyone to either influence or dictate on him in
the discharge of his official functions; and the fact that he and
Peña were co-respondents in a particular case filed before the
Court was not an indication that he worked under Peña's whims.
Meanwhile, on January 27, 2006, Judge Trocino voluntarily
inhibited himself from hearing the petition.12

Complainant likewise questioned the December 23, 2005 TPO

Judge Trocino contended that the issuance of the TPO was not
before the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 01394.13
based on hypothetical assumptions but was made after a
thorough evaluation of the allegations set forth in the petition Report and Recommendation of the OCA
and its supporting documents, and after assessment, he believed
in good faith that the TPO was legal and necessary for the
In a Resolution,14 dated July 17, 2017, the OCA found no basis to
protection of the minor offended party. Judge Trocino insisted
hold Judge Trocino liable for bias and partiality and grave
that his act was a bonafide exercise of judicial discretion, the
oppression. It, however, found him liable for gross ignorance of
paramount consideration of which was the interest of the minor
the law for issuing an ex parte TPO pursuant to A.M. No. 04-10-11-
SC in relation to R.A. No. 9262 and recommended that he be
fined in the amount of Sixty Thousand Pesos (P60,000.00)
considering that Judge Trocino compulsorily retired from the
service on July 15, 2006 and was previously found administratively
liable of undue delay in rendering a decision in A.M. No. RTJ-05-
193615 and A.M. No. RTJ-07-2057.16
such as the mother's unfitness to exercise sole parental authority,
shall justify her deprivation of parental authority and the award
of custody to someone else.21 The mother's fitness is a question of
fact to be properly entertained in the special proceedings
before the trial court.22
On Provisional Custody

The Ruling of the Court

A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC is instructive. Specifically, Section 13 thereof
provides:
Upon review of the records, the Court agrees with the findings
Section 13. Provisional order awarding custody. - After an answer
and recommendation of the OCA that Judge Trocino acted with
has been filed or after expiration of the period to file it, the court
gross ignorance of the law when he issued, ex parte, the
may issue a provisional order awarding custody of the minor. As
December 23, 2005 TPO pursuant to A.M. No. 04-1 0-11-SC in
far as practicable, the following order of preference shall be
relation to R.A. No. 9262, which granted, among others, the
observed in the award of custody:
temporary custody of the minor child to Peña and issued a
protection order against complainant effective for thirty (30)
(a) Both parents jointly;
days. He deliberately ignored the provisions of the Family Code,
A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC otherwise known as the Rule on Custody of
(b) Either parent, taking into account all relevant considerations,
Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus in relation to Custody of Minors
especially the choice of the minor over seven years of age and
and A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC or the Rule on Violence against
of sufficient discernment, unless the parent chosen is unfit;
Women and their Children.

(c) The grandparent, or if there are several grandparents, the

Gross ignorance of the law is the disregard of the basic rules and
grandparent chosen by the minor over seven years of age and
settled jurisprudence.17 A judge owes it to his office to simply
of sufficient discernment, unless the grandparent chosen is unfit
apply the law when the law or a rule is basic18 and the facts are
or disqualified;
evident.19 Not to know it or to act as if one does not know it
constitutes gross ignorance of the law.20

On Child Custody
(d) The eldest brother or sister over twenty-one years of age,
unless he or she is unfit or disqualified;
Article 176 of the Family Code explicitly confers the sole parental (e) The actual custodian of the minor over twenty-one years of
authority of an illegitimate child to the mother. This preference age, unless the former is unfit or disqualified; or
favoring the mother is reiterated in Article 213 of the Family Code
which provides that no child under seven years of age shall be (f) Any other person or institution the court may deem suitable to
separated from the mother. Only the most compelling of reasons,
provide proper care and guidance for the minor. [Emphasis (a) names and addresses of petitioner and respondent;
supplied]
(b) description of relationships between petitioner and
Clearly, a court is not authorized to issue a provisional order
respondent;
awarding custody of a minor child until after an answer to the
petition has been filed or when the period to file the same have
expired and no such answer was filed in court.
(c) a statement of the circumstances of the abuse;
Temporary Protection Order
(d) description of the reliefs requested by petitioner as specified
Judge Trocino's contention that the TPO was a temporary in Section 8 herein;
protection order pursuant to A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, and not an
order of temporary custody as contemplated in A.M. No. 03-04- (e) request for counsel and reasons for such;
04-SC, is not tenable.
(f) request for waiver of application fees until hearing; and
Section 15 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC provides:
(g) an attestation that there is no pending application for a
SEC. 15. Ex parte issuance of temporary protection order. - (a) If protection order in another court.
the court is satisfied from the verified allegations of the petition
that there is reasonable ground to believe that an imminent If the applicant is not the victim, the application must be
danger of violence against women and their children exists or is accompanied by an affidavit of the applicant attesting to (a) the
about to recur, the court may issue ex parte a temporary circumstances of the abuse suffered by the victim and (b) the
protection order which shall be effective for thirty days from circumstances of consent given by the victim for the filing of the
service on the party or person sought to be enjoined. application. When disclosure of the address of the victim will pose
danger to her life, it shall be so stated in the application. In such
x x x. [Emphasis supplied] a case, the applicant shall attest that the victim is residing in the
municipality or city over which court has territorial jurisdiction,
Section 11 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262 further provides: and shall provide a mailing address for purposes of service
SEC. 11. How to Apply for a Protection Order. - The application for processmg.
a protection order must be in writing, signed and verified under
oath by the applicant. It may be filed as an independent action An application for protection order filed with a court shall be
or as an incidental relief in any civil or criminal case the subject considered an application for both a TPO and PPO. Barangay
matter or issues thereof partakes of a violence as described in this officials and. court personnel shall assist applicants in the
Act. A standard protection order application form, written in preparation of the application. Law enforcement agents shall
English with translation to the major local languages, shall be also extend assistance in the application for protection orders in
made available to facilitate applications for protection orders, cases brought to their attention.[Emphasis supplied]
and shall contain, among others, the following information:
A protection order is issued to prevent further acts of violence
against women and their children, their family or household
members, and to grant other necessary reliefs.23 It is issued for the
purpose of safeguarding the offended party from further harm,
minimizing any disruption in the victim's daily life, and facilitating
the opportunity and ability of the victim to independently regain
control over her life.24 A protection order may be issued ex parte
if the court finds that there is danger of domestic violence to the
offended party. This provisionary protection order, however, may
be issued only if the court finds that the life, limb or property of
the offended party is in jeopardy and there is reasonable ground
to believe that the order is necessary to protect the victim from
the immediate and imminent danger of violence or to prevent
such violence, which is about to recur.25 If after examining the
verified petition and its accompanying affidavits the court is
satisfied that there is, indeed, a reasonable ground to believe
that an imminent danger of violence against the offended party
exists or is about to recur, it may issue a TPO ex parte.26
In the case at bar, a reading of the petition for child custody filed
by Peña would show that no specific allegation of violence or
abuse, whether physical, emotional or psychological was
committed or was about to be committed against Henri. Not
even the affidavits of witnesses attached to the petition
supported his positions. The averments in the petition that
complainant was suffering from personality disorder, that she
subjected Henri to psychological violence as she would always
shout at the helpers, and that complainant always leave Henri to
the yaya, to name a few, are not sufficient bases to issue the TPO.
Moreover, a perusal of the Verification with Certification of Non
forum Shopping27 attached to the petition for child custody
would reveal that a similar case for protection order and child
custody, docketed as Civil Case No. MC05-2779, was filed by
complainant against Peña before the RTC Mandaluyong City.
Considering that there was such a declaration, it behooves upon
Judge Trocino to inquire first about the nature and the status of
the said pending case before taking cognizance of the case and
eventually issue the TPO.
In fact, the December 23, 2005 TPO was eventually annulled and
set aside by the CA in its Decision28 dated September 15, 2006. In
the same decision, Civil Case No. 1409 was likewise dismissed for
lack of jurisdiction over the petition for protection order and child
custody. The CA held that Judge Trocino gravely abused his
discretion when he issued the December 23, 2005 TPO awarding
the custody of parties' common child to Peña. It ruled that since
the RTC-Mandaluyong City had already taken cognizance of the
petition for protection order and child custody, it exercises
jurisdiction thereon to the exclusion of all other courts. Hence, the
RTC-Mandaluyong City has exclusive jurisdiction over said
petition and no other petition involving the same subject matter
may be filed before any other court. The CA decision was
affirmed by the Court in a Resolution,29 dated June 20, 2007.
The Court has always reminded judges to be extra prudent and
circumspect in the performance of their duties. This exalted
position entails a lot of responsibilities, foremost of which is
proficiency in the law.30 Though not every judicial error bespeaks
ignorance of the law and that, if committed in good faith, does
not warrant administrative sanction, the same, nonetheless,
applies only in cases within the parameters of tolerable
misjudgment.31 Where the procedure is so simple and the facts
so evident as to be beyond permissible margins of error, to still err
thereon amounts to ignorance of the law.32 In the case of
Bautista v. Causapin Jr.,33 the Court explained thus:
Where the law involved is simple and elementary, lack of
conversance therewith constitutes gross ignorance of the law.
Judges are expected to exhibit more than just cursory
acquaintance with statutes and procedural laws. They must
know the laws and apply them properly in all good faith. Judicial
competence requires no less. The mistake committed by
respondent Judge is not a mere error of judgment that can be
brushed aside for being minor. The disregard of established rule
of law which amounts to gross ignorance of the law makes a
judge subject to disciplinary action.34
Given the foregoing, Judge Trocino's actions cannot be
considered a mere error in judgment that can be easily ignored.
His act of issuing the questioned TPO is not a simple lapse of
judgment but a blatant disregard of the basic rules on child
custody and the rule on the issuance of a protection order. As
held by the Court in a number of cases, a patent disregard of the
basic legal commands embodied in the law and the rules
constitutes gross ignorance of the law from which no one may
be excused, not even a judge.35
Verily, the Code of Judicial Conduct requires a judge to be the
embodiment of competence, integrity and independence.36 A
judge owes it to himself and his office to know by heart the basic
legal principles and relevant doctrines.37 It is highly imperative
that he be conversant with them because when a judge displays
an utter lack of familiarity with the laws and rules, he erodes the
confidence of the public in the courts.38
Previous Record; Penalty
Under Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended by
A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC, gross ignorance of the law is a serious
charge, punishable by dismissal from service, suspension from
office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3)
but not exceeding six (6) months, or a fine of more than
P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00.39 In the consolidated
cases of Department of Justice v. Judge Mislang40 and Home
Development Mutual Fund v. Judge Mislang,41 the respondent
judge was found guilty of gross ignorance of the law and was
dismissed from the service considering that he was previously
found administratively liable in two cases. The Court held that
despite previous warnings that a repetition of the same or similar
acts shall be dealt with more severely, he still continued to
transgress the norm of judicial conduct.
Similarly, the records show that Judge Trocino was previously
found administratively liable on two (2) cases for undue delay in
rendering judgments. In A.M. No. RTJ-05-1936,42 Judge Trocino
was suspended for three (3) months; while in A.M. No. RTJ-07-
2057,43 he was fined in the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos
(P20,000.00).
Doubtless, Judge Trocino's infraction on this instance would have
warranted the ultimate penalty of dismissal had he not
compulsory retired from the service effective July 15, 2006.
Consequently, considering the past infractions of Judge Trocino,
the Court finds that the OCA's recommended penalty of fine in
the amount of Sixty Thousand Pesos (P60,000.00) is
disproportionate to the present charge which he was found
guilty of.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Ret. Judge Henry J.
Trocino, Regional Trial Court, Branch 62, Bago City, Negros
Occidental, GUILTY of Gross Ignorance of the Law. In lieu of
dismissal from the service, the Court imposes the penalty of
FORFEITURE of all his retirement benefits except accrued leave
credits.
SO ORDERED.
29. June 6, 2017
A.M. No. p-06-2279
MAURA JUDAYA and ANA AREVALO, Complainants
vs.
RAMIRO F. BALBONA, Utility Worker I, Office of the Clerk of Court,
Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Respondents
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
For the Court's resolution is an Amended Affidavit1 dated May 29,
2006 filed by complainants Maura Judaya and Ana Arevalo
(complainants) against respondent Ramiro F. Balbona
(respondent), Utility Worker I, Office of the Clerk of Court,
Regional Trial Court of Cebu City (R TC), for Grave Misconduct.
The Facts
In the Amended Affidavit, complainants alleged that they are
the mother and live-in partner, respectively, of one Arturo Judaya
(Arturo), who was arrested purportedly for the use of illegal drugs.
Complainants were then told that respondent could facilitate
Arturo's release in exchange for ₱30,000.00. Thus, at 9:30 in the
morning of February 24, 2005, complainants went to the Palace
of Justice, Capitol, Cebu City to deliver the said amount to
respondent, who then assured them that he would help secure
Arturo's release. Respondent, however, failed to perform his
undertaking; thus the demand to return the money. Out of the
₱30,000.00, respondent only returned ₱2,500.00 to complainants;
hence, the instant complaint.2
In his defense, respondent essentially denied the accusations
against him, maintaining that as a mere utility worker, he could
not in any way facilitate the release of a detention prisoner. He
likewise denied personally knowing complainants and receiving
money from them. In this relation, respondent pointed out that
he is stationed at the Cebu City Palace of Justice, while the case
of Arturo was pending at Branch 55 of the RTC, which was
located in Mandaue City. Finally, respondent asserted that it is
contrary to human experience for complainants to simply hand
over a large amount of money to a complete stranger; that
complainants' act of doing so for the release of a prisoner was
illegal and showed their lack of moral fitness; and that
complainants have no one to blame but themselves for the
consequences of their act.3
In light of the seriousness of the accusations against respondent,
the Court, as recommended by the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA), redocketed the case as a regular
administrative matter and referred the same to the Executive
Judge of the RTC for investigation, report, and
recommendation. 4
In a Report 5 dated December 21, 2015, the Executive Judge
recommended respondent's dismissal on the ground of Grave
Misconduct and Conduct Unbecoming of a Government
Employee. It was disclosed that pending the instant proceedings,
respondent stopped reporting for work, had been declared
absent without official leave (AWOL), had resigned since
September 20, 2007,6 and eventually, his position was occupied
by another person. 7 Despite the foregoing, the Executive Judge
opined that the foregoing did not render the instant case moot
and academic.8 Subsequently, it was found that respondent's
act of receiving money from complainants on the pretext that
the latter will obtain a favorable ruling constitutes Grave
Misconduct for which he should be held administratively liable.9
The OCA's Report and Recommendation
In a Memorandum 10 dated October 19, 2016, the OCA
recommended that respondent be found guilty of Grave
Misconduct, an offense punishable by dismissal from service
under Section 2 (e ), Canon III, of the Code of Conduct for Court
Personnel. 11 It found substantial evidence showing that
respondent indeed solicited and received money from
complainants. However, since such penalty could no longer be
imposed on respondent due to his separation from service during
the pendency of the investigation against him, the OCA
recommended that he be, instead, meted the accessory
penalties appurtenant to the same, namely: cancellation of civil
service eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits; and perpetual
disqualification from holding public office and from taking civil
service examinations. 12
The Issue Before the Court
The primordial issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not
respondent should be held administratively liable for Grave
Misconduct.
The Court's Ruling
The Court adopts the findings and recommendations of the
OCA. Preliminarily, it is worthy to emphasize that the precipitate
resignation of a government employee charged with an offense
punishable by dismissal from service does not render moot the
administrative case against him. The Court's pronouncement in
Pagano v. Nazarro, Jr. 13 is instructive on this matter, to wit:
In [OCA] v. Juan [(478 Phil:" 823, 828-829 [2004])], this Court
categorically ruled that the precipitate resignation of a
government employee charged with an offense punishable by
dismissal from the service does not render moot the
administrative case against him. Resignation is not a way out to
evade administrative liability when facing administrative
sanction. The resignation of a public servant does not preclude
the finding of any administrative liability to which he or she shall
still be answerable.
A case becomes moot and academic only when there is no
more actual controversy between the parties or no useful
purpose can be served in passing upon the merits of the case.
The instant case is not moot and academic, despite the
petitioner's separation from government service. Even if the most
severe of administrative sanctions - that of separation from
service - may no longer be imposed on the petitioner, there are
other penalties which may be imposed on her if she is later found
guilty of administrative offenses charged against her, namely, the
disqualification to hold any government office and the forfeiture
of benefits.
Moreover, this Court views with suspicion the precipitate act of a
government employee in effecting his or her separation from
service, soon after an administrative case has been initiated
against him or her. An employee's act of tendering his or her
resignation immediately after the discovery of the anomalous
transaction is indicative of his or her guilt as flight in criminal cases.
14 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
Here, the Executive Judge of the RTC and the OCA correctly
pointed out that respondent's failure to report for work, which
eventually caused him to be declared in AWOL, and his
resignation during the pendency of the investigation against him
did not render this administrative case moot and academic,
especially so that he is being charged with an offense punishable
by dismissal from service.
In this light, the Court shall now delve into respondent's
administrative liability.
"Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite
rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross
negligence by the public officer.1âwphi1 To warrant dismissal
from service, the misconduct must be grave, serious, important,
weighty, momentous, and not trifling. The misconduct must imply
wrongful intention and not a mere error of judgment and must
also have a direct relation to and be connected with the
performance of the public officer's official duties amounting
either to maladministration or willful, intentional neglect, or failure
to discharge the duties of the office. In order to differentiate
[grave] misconduct from simple misconduct, the elements of
corruption, clear intent to violate the law, or flagrant disregard of
established rule, must be manifest in the former." 15
In order to sustain a finding of administrative culpability for such
offense, only substantial evidence is required, or that amount of
relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion. 16
A judicious review of the records of this case reveals substantial
evidence showing that respondent indeed solicited and
received the amount of ₱30,000.00 from complainants, on the
pretext that he will facilitate the release of the latter's relative who
is a detention prisoner. This is a direct violation of Section 2,
Canon I and Section 2 (e), Canon III of the Code of Conduct for
Court Personnel, 17 which respectively read:
CANON
FIDELITY TO DUTY
xxxx
Section 2. Court personnel shall not solicit or accept any gift,
favor or benefit based on any or explicit or implicit understanding
that such gift, favor or benefit shall influence their official actions.
CANON
CONFLICT OF INTEREST
xxxx
Section 2. Court personnel shall not:
xxxx
(e) Solicit or accept any gift, loan, gratuity, discount, favor,
hospitality or service under circumstances from which it could
reasonably be inferred that a major purpose of the donor is to
influence the court personnel in performing official duties.
In a catena of cases, the Court has consistently held that the acts
of soliciting and receiving money from litigants for personal gain
constitute Grave Misconduct, for which the court employee
guilty thereof should be held administratively liable, 18 as in this
case.
Anent the proper penalty to be" imposed on respondent, the
Court notes that Grave Misconduct is classified as a grave
offense punishable by dismissal from service for the first offense.
19 "Corollary thereto, the penalty of dismissal from service carries
with it the following administrative disabilities: (a) cancellation of
civil service eligibility; (b) forfeiture of retirement and other
benefits, except accrued leave credits, if any; and (c) perpetual
disqualification from re-employment in any government agency
or instrumentality, including any government-owned and
controlled corporation or government financial institution." 20 In
this instance, since respondent had earlier resigned, the penalty
of dismissal from service could no longer be imposed.
I Nevertheless, such penalty should be enforced in its full course by
imposing the aforesaid administrative disabilities upon him.21
As a final note, "[i]t must be emphasized that those in the
Judiciary serve as sentinels of justice, and any act of impropriety
on their part immeasurably affects the honor and dignity of the
Judiciary and the people's confidence in it. The Institution
demands the best possible individuals in the service and it had
III never and will never tolerate nor condone any conduct which
would violate the norms of public accountability, and diminish,
or even tend to diminish, the faith of the people in the justice
system. As such, the Court will not hesitate to rid its ranks of
undesirables who undermine its efforts towards an effective and
efficient administration of justice, thus tainting its image in the
eyes of the public."22
WHEREFORE, respondent Ramiro F. Balbona, former Utility Worker
I, Office of the Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, is
found GUILTY of Grave Misconduct and would have been
DISMISSED from service, had he not earlier resigned. Accordingly,
his civil service eligibility is hereby CANCELLED, his retirement and
other benefits, except accrued leave credits, are FORFEITED, and
he is PERPETUALLY DISQUALIFIED from re-employment in any
government agency or instrumentality, including any
government-owned and controlled corporation or government
financial institution.
SO ORDERED.
30. June 19, 2017
A.M. No. P-17-3709
JUDGE CELSO O. BAGUIO, Complainant
vs.
JOCELYN P. LACUNA, COURT STENOGRAPHER III, REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT, BRANCH 34, GAPAN CITY, NUEVA ECIJA, Respondent
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
This administrative matter stemmed from a letter-complaint 1 filed
by Judge Celso O. Baguio (Judge Baguio), Presiding Judge of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 34, Gapan City, Nueva Ecija
(RTC), charging respondent Jocelyn P. Lacuna (respondent),
Stenographer III of the same court, with gross incompetence.
In his letter-complaint, Judge Baguio alleged that on January 25,
2013, the RTC had to reset the scheduled initial trial of Criminal
Case No. 14405-10, entitled People of the Philippines v. Jason
Ondrade, for failure of respondent to transcribe and submit the
stenographic notes of the pre-trial proceedings held on
November 16, 2012. As a result, she was directed to immediately
transcribe the same in an Order 2 dated January 25, 2013, and
ordered to submit a written explanation why she should not be
held administratively liable for her failure to perform her job in
accordance with the rules. 3 While respondent apologized for her
incompetence in a letter 4 dated January 28, 2013, she
nonetheless claimed that the resetting of the case was not solely
due to her failure to perform her task but also in view of the
absence of the witness for the prosecution. Judge Baguio further
claimed that despite having been previously suspended for a
similar offense in A.M. No. P-11-2933 (formerly OCA IPI No. 07-
2674-P), 5 respondent did not improve, and that her proficiency
as stenographer was doubtful given that she relied solely on tape
recordings for the past fifteen (15) years. He pointed out that the
incident complained of was just one of the many similar incidents
involving respondent's dismal failure to perform her tasks, which
resulted in the cancellation of hearings and caused
embarrassment to the court. Nevertheless, Judge Baguio
remarked that respondent has an almost perfect attendance
and that she behaved well in court although she mostly tended
to keep to herself and was always very quiet. 6
In the 1st Indorsement 7 dated March 4, 2013 issued by the Office
of the Court Administrator (OCA), respondent was directed to
comment on the letter-complaint dated January 28, 2013.
In her Comment 8 dated April 15, 2013, respondent admitted
having failed to transcribe the stenographic notes of the pre-trial
held on November 16, 2012. However, she contended that her
omission was not due to her gross inefficiency but rather, due to
simple oversight or inadvertence on her part. She explicated that
the court regularly scheduled hearings three (3) times a week,
with the bulk of the criminal cases heard every Tuesday and
Friday, and that the date complained of was a Friday, during
which there were many criminal cases scheduled for hearing at
that time. She added that there were only three (3)
stenographers in Branch 34 and each of them took turns in their
duty at least once a week, transcribing not only stenographic
notes of pre-trial and trials, but also encoded orders of the court.
She clarified that her apology should not be viewed as an
admission of her incompetence, and further denied that she
solely relied on tape recordings. Likewise, she contended that her
regular attendance was a manifestation of her enthusiasm to not
only cope with her work load but also her willingness to improve
in the performance of her official functions. Accordingly, she
prayed that the complaint be dismissed or if found guilty, that her
penalty be mitigated. 9
On September 11, 2015, the OCA recommended that the
administrative complaint be referred to the Executive Judge of
the RTC of Cabanatuan City, Nueva Ecija for investigation, report
and recommendation.10
In a Report and Recommendation 11 dated March 2, 2017,
Executive Judge Ana Marie C. Joson-Viterbo recommended
that respondent be meted the penalty of six (6) months
suspension without pay, having been found guilty only of simple
neglect of duty. 12 The Executive Judge noted that respondent
admittedly failed to timely transcribe half of her stenographic
notes within the period prescribed prior to January 25, 2013 (the
date of the incident complained of) but nonetheless completed
the same before the next scheduled hearing of the cases, and
that the primary cause for the delay was her slow performance
despite her noticeable hard work. Since the investigation showed
that respondent has significantly improved, and in fact, exerted
efforts to fulfill her duties within the prescribed time, the Executive
Judge found respondent not to have acted in bad faith and
therefore guilty of simple neglect of duty only. Accordingly, the
Executive Judge recommended the penalty of six (6) months
suspension without pay after considering her previous infraction
for a similar offense, 13 the twenty-one (21) years of public
service, and complainant's admission that her working habits had
greatly improved. 14
The Issue Before the Court
The sole issue in this case is whether or not respondent should be
held administratively liable for simple neglect of duty.
The Court's Ruling
The Court finds the Executive Judge's recommendation to be in
accord with the law and the facts of the case and thus, adopts
and approves the same except as to the imposable penalty.
The duties of a Stenographer are clearly embodied under
Section 17, Rule 136 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
SEC. 17. Stenographer. - It shall be the duty of the stenographer
who has attended a session of a court either in the morning or in
the afternoon, to deliver to the clerk of court, immediately at the
close of such morning or afternoon session, all the notes he has
taken, to be attached to the record of the case; and it shall
likewise be the duty of the clerk to demand that the
stenographer comply with said duty. The clerk of court shall
stamp the date on which such notes are received by him. When
such notes are transcribed the transcript shall be delivered to the
clerk, duly initialed on each page thereof, to be attached to the
record of the case. (Emphasis supplied)
xxxx
Under the afore-cited provision, stenographers are enjoined to
immediately deliver to the clerk of court all the notes taken
during the session of the court, which are to be attached to the
record of the case. In this regard, Supreme Court Administrative
Circular No. 24-9015 requires stenographers to transcribe their
notes and attach the transcripts to the record of the case within
a period of twenty (20) days from the time they were taken, thus:
2. (a) All stenographers are required to transcribe all
stenographic notes and to attach the transcripts to the record of
the case not later than twenty (20) days from the time the notes
are taken.
In the case at bar, it is undisputed that respondent failed to
comply with the twenty (20) day period in the transcription of the
stenographic notes for the Pre-Trial in Criminal Case No. 14405-10,
and hence, guilty of violating Supreme Court Administrative
Circular No. 24-90. 15 The heavy work load proffered by
respondent in her attempt to be exonerated from liability is not
an adequate excuse for her to be remiss in the performance of
her duties. To allow otherwise would permit every government
employee charged with negligence and dereliction of duty to
resort to the same convenient excuse to evade punishment. 16
It bears stressing that a court stenographer performs a function
essential to the prompt and fair administration of justice. The
conduct of every person connected with the administration of
justice, from the presiding judge to the lowliest clerk, is
circumscribed with a heavy burden of responsibility. All public
officers are accountable to the people at all time and must
perform their duties and responsibilities with utmost efficiency
and competence. 17 As administration of justice is a sacred task,
the Court condemns any omission or act which would erode
public faith in the judiciary. 18 A public office is a public trust, and
a court stenographer, without doubt, violates this trust by failing
to fulfill his duties. 19
While respondent admitted to incurring delay in the performance
of her duties, records show that she nonetheless completed the
same in time for the calendar of cases. Under the circumstances,
her failure to timely transcribe the stenographic notes was
correctly found by the Executive Judge to constitute simple
neglect of duty, which is defined as a disregard of, or a failure to
give proper attention to a task expected of an employee, simple
neglect of duty signifies carelessness or indifference. 20
Section 46 (D) of Rule 10 of the Revised Rules on Administrative
Cases in the Civil Service 21 provides that simple neglect of duty
is categorized as a less grave offense punishable by suspension
of one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6) months for the first
offense, and dismissal from the service for the second offense.
While the Court is duty bound to sternly wield a corrective hand
to discipline its errant employees and to weed out those who are
undesirable, the Court also has the discretion to temper the
harshness of its judgment with mercy. 22 Thus, in several
administrative cases, the Court has restrained from imposing the
actual penalties in the presence of mitigating facts, such as,
length of service in the judiciary, the acknowledgment of
infractions and feelings of remorse, and family circumstances,
among others. 23 In this case, apart from respondent's long
service in the government, it has been observed during the
administrative investigation, and as admitted by complainant,
that the latter's working habits had greatly improved and had
since complied with her duties. 24
Accordingly, the Court finds the imposable penalty of three (3)
months suspension without pay, instead of the six (6) months
penalty recommended by the Executive Judge, to be more fair
and reasonable under the circumstances. It is noteworthy to
point out that where a penalty less punitive would suffice,
whatever missteps may be committed by the employee ought
not to be visited with a consequence so severe. 25
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Jocelyn P. Lacuna
GUILTY of simple neglect of duty. She is hereby SUSPENDED for a
period of three (3) months without pay and STERNLY WARNED to
be more circumspect in the performance of her duties, as a
repetition of the same or similar offense shall be dealt with more
severely. Let a copy of this Decision be entered in the 201 file of
respondent Jocelyn P. Lacuna.
SO ORDERED.
31. A.M. No. RTJ-16-2470 (Formerly OCA IPI No. 12-3987-RTJ),
January 10, 2018 - PROSECUTOR LEO T. CAHANAP, Complainant,
v. JUDGE LEONOR S. QUIÑONES, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,
BRANCH 6, ILIGAN CITY, LANAO DEL NORTE, Respondent.
EN BANC
A.M. No. RTJ-16-2470 (Formerly OCA IPI No. 12-3987-RTJ),
January 10, 2018
PROSECUTOR LEO T. CAHANAP, Complainant, v. JUDGE LEONOR
S. QUIÑONES, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 6, ILIGAN CITY,
LANAO DEL NORTE, Respondent.
DECISION
CAGUIOA, J.:
Complainant Prosecutor Leo T. Cahanap (Complainant) filed the
instant administrative complaint on October 30, 2012, charging
respondent Judge Leonor S. Quinones (respondent Judge) with
Gross Ignorance of the Law, Gross Misconduct and violation of
the Code of Judicial Conduct for the following alleged acts of
respondent Judge:
First, Complainant alleged that in his last two (2) years as a
prosecutor in Branch 6, he suffered unbearable and intolerable
oppression in the hands of respondent Judge.1
In the case of People v. Inot, docketed as Criminal Case No. 6-
15566, respondent Judge got angry and objected to the leading
questions asked during complainant's re-direct examination,
notwithstanding the fact that no objections were raised by the
defense counsel.2
In the case of People v. Badelles, docketed as Criminal Case No.
06- 15405, respondent Judge issued an order blaming
complainant for the failure of the forensic chemist to bring the
chemistry reports for the other accused in the case because
complainant did not sufficiently specify the chemistry reports due
to the court.3 In the same case, respondent Judge gave
complainant a lecture on the proper demeanor and conduct in
court while he was making a formal offer of a testimony, causing
extreme embarrassment to complainant.4
Complainant asserted that the prosecutors, who previously
appeared before respondent Judge, opted to be assigned to
other courts as they too experienced humiliation and harsh
treatment from her. Further, respondent Judge's staff themselves
were subjected to respondent Judge's insolent behavior.5
Second, Complainant further accused respondent Judge of
habitual tardiness which delayed the start of court sessions,
usually at 9:30 or 10:00 in the morning, earning for her sala the
monicker "Branch 10."6
Third, in the proceedings for the case of People v. Heck (Heck
Case), docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 15144, 15149, 15151 and
15153 for Estafa, pending before respondent Judge's sala,
respondent Judge, in open court and heard by the public, asked
private complainant, Hanna Mamad, to go to her house
because she was interested in buying jewelry items from her.7
Respondent Judge ordered her staff to provide Mamad with
directions to her house.8 Complainant averred that when he
called Mamad on September 13, 2012, Mamad confirmed that
respondent Judge bought jewelry from her. Court personnel
have also testified that respondent Judge showed off the jewelry
she bought from Mamad.9
Fourth, in proceedings in the case of People v. Macapato
(Macapato Case), docketed as Criminal Case No. 16089 for
Attempted Murder, respondent Judge issued an Order dated
June 18, 2012, directing the release of accused Dimaampao's
vehicle despite the prosecution's written opposition on the
ground that the vehicle has yet to be presented as evidence in
court and has yet to be formally offered before the court could
acquire jurisdiction.10
Respondent Judge immediately set accused's subject motion for
the release of accused Dimaampao's vehicle for hearing a day
after it was filed, in violation of the three-day notice rule.11 The
Transcript of Stenographic Notes (TSN) of the hearing revealed
that respondent Judge showed her bias and practically acted
as defense counsel, prompting the prosecution to move for the
inhibition of respondent Judge.12
Fifth, in the case of People v. Tingcang (Tingcang Case),
docketed as Criminal Case No. 6-6115 for Murder, respondent
Judge dismissed the case provisionally without prejudice to its
refiling upon the availability of the prosecution's witnesses on the
ground of speedy trial.13 The prosecution lamented that the
delay in the proceedings was due to the absence of the
accused who has been in hiding since 1996.14
Sixth, in the case of People v. Casido (Casido Case), docketed
as Criminal Case No. 6-16034, respondent Judge dismissed a
complaint for Attempted Murder due to the absence of a fatal
wound on the victim, which the prosecution believed to be
misplaced in an information for Attempted Murder.15
Seventh and lastly, complainant averred that respondent Judge
also mistreated her court staff. On July 29, 2011, respondent
Judge allegedly shouted at a court stenographer, and called her
"bogo" which meant dumb.16
Respondent Judge berated another stenographer and shouted
at the latter ''punyeta ka"17 and "buwisit ka"18.
Comment dated January 12, 2013 of respondent Judge
Respondent Judge, in her Comment dated January 12, 2013,
denied that she maltreated the prosecutors assigned to her sala.
In support thereof, she submitted the following documents:
1) Certification19 dated January 3, 2013 issued by OIC-
Provincial Prosecutor Diosdado D. Cabrera, stating that
Prosecutor Macacuna B. Macadatu requested for transfer
for security reasons, not due to respondent Judge's
maltreatment;
2) Letter20 dated March 22, 2011 to former Secretary Leila M.
De Lima by Prosecutor Macacuna B. Macadato,
requesting for transfer of assignment from Iligan City to the
Prosecutor's Office in Marawi City, due to a threat to his
life;
3) Affidavit21 dated December 18, 2012 executed by
Prosecutor Mangontawar M. Gubat, proving that he
declined to be the trial prosecutor in respondent Judge's
sala for health reasons, not due to the insolent behavior of
respondent Judge; and
4) Joint Affidavit22 dated January 3, 2013 by Public Attorneys
Nur Jaypha R. Bacaraman and Rashid A. Macarimbang,
attesting that their re-assignment or subsequent transfer to
other branches of the RTC in Iligan City is a matter of policy
in their office, with due consideration to the caseloads of
individual lawyers in the district or the balancing of work
assignment, not due to the reported misbehavior of
respondent Judge.
Relative to the Heck Case, respondent Judge denied having
asked jewelry from Mamad, the private complainant in the
subject case.23
Respondent Judge reasoned that she immediately acted on the
motion of the defense in the Macapato Case because an urgent
motion is exempted from the three-day notice rule. She
maintained that the motion was granted and was issued in good
faith in the performance of judicial functions.24
Respondent Judge also insisted that her order of dismissal in the
Tingcang Case was issued in good faith in the performance of
her judicial functions.25
Respondent Judge admitted her mistake in the Casido Case,
averring that the finding of lack of probable cause on the basis
of absence of a 'fatal injury' was an error but an error of judgment
made in good faith.26
In response to the allegation that she unduly interfered in the
court proceedings, respondent Judge explained that she merely
reminded lawyers of the purpose of enforcing the rules and to
elicit evidence with sufficient probative value to help in the
search for truth. She maintained that she was just helping the
prosecution and/or lawyers to propound questions to the
witnesses whenever she found it necessary to clarify matters.27
On her alleged offensive and disrespectful attitude towards her
staff, respondent Judge denied being oppressive to her staff. She
claimed that she merely rebuked or admonished them in the
exercise of her supervisory authority.28
Respondent Judge also admitted arriving late to court but
denied that her tardiness was often or habitual. Assuming
arguendo that she was habitually late, she countered that her
sixty percent (60%) disposal rate of cases assigned to her from
June 2010 to November 2012 would refute the issue of punctuality
hurled against her.29
OCA Resolution dated October 9, 2014
The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) recommended that
the charges against respondent Judge relative to the issuance
of the (1) Order dated June 18, 2012 in the Macapato Case, (2)
Order dated June 18, 2012 in the Tingcang Case for the dismissal
of the case on the ground of violation of the accused's right to
speedy trial, and (3) Order relative to the Casido Case, dismissing
the same for lack of probable cause, be dismissed for involving
issues judicial in nature which are beyond the purview of an
administrative proceeding.30
The OCA reasoned that a party's remedy, if prejudiced by the
orders of a judge given in the course of a trial, lies with the proper
reviewing court, not with OCA by means of an administrative
complaint.31 It must be understood that the statutory mandate of
the OCA extends only to the administrative supervision over court
officials and personnel and does not include the authority to
interfere with the judicial prerogatives of a judge to try and
resolve a case and its pending incidents. For the OCA to review
the merits underlying each decision and order issued by
respondent Judge would result in a re-evaluation of his exercise
of his judicial discretion which is definitely beyond the OCA's
authority. These are clearly matters for judicial adjudication.32 It
has been stressed that questions judicial in nature ought to be
threshed out in a judicial proceeding and definitely not in an
administrative one.33
With respect however to the other charges, pertaining largely to
the demeanor of respondent Judge, the OCA found that the
same appear to be serious.34 However, because of the
conflicting versions presented by the parties, there exist factual
issues that cannot be resolved merely on the basis of the records
at hand, and can be ventilated only in a formal investigation
where the parties can adduce their respective evidence.35
The OCA thus recommended that the remaining charges filed
against respondent Judge be referred to the Executive Justice of
the Court of Appeals, Cagayan de Oro City, for raffle among the
Justices thereat for investigation, report and recommendation
within sixty (60) days from receipt of the records.36
In a Resolution37 dated February 11, 2015, the Third Division of the
Court adopted the recommendations of the OCA.
Complainant filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the OCA's
Report dated October 9, 2014, which was denied by the Court in
a Resolution38 dated July 1, 2015.
Report dated July 13, 2015 of Investigating Justice Maria
Filomena D. Singh
Investigating Justice Maria Filomena D. Singh (Investigating
Justice) recommended that respondent Judge be held
administratively liable for Oppression with a fine of P40,000.00 and
Habitual Tardiness with a fine of P20,000.00.39
The Investigating Justice also recommended that respondent
Judge be transferred to a different court considering the
irremediably strained relations between respondent Judge and
the court staff;40 and that the names of certain witnesses be
blocked from the decision that the Court will render in this case.41
The testimonies of the court staff witnesses and the Branch Clerk
of Court uniformly pointed to the habitual tardiness of respondent
Judge in coming to work and holding court hearings, which they
consistently testified to as generally starting between 9:00 and
9:30 in the morning.42 In the judicial affidavit of complainant, he
attested that during his time as the public prosecutor in
respondent Judge's sala, respondent Judge started court
hearings at 9:30 a.m., instead of 8:30 a.m.43 The successor of
complainant, Assistant City Prosecutor Diaz, also confirmed that
respondent Judge commenced court sessions between 9:30
a.m. and 10:00 a.m.44
The testimonies of court staff witnesses also revealed that
respondent Judge does not want to indicate in the Minutes of
the Proceedings the actual time court sessions start. A court staff
testified that one of the court's casual employee was once
reprimanded by respondent Judge when she wrote in the
Minutes of the Proceedings that the actual time of arrival of
respondent Judge was 9:30 a.m..45 The Branch Clerk of Court
even admitted under oath that the Minutes of the Hearings and
Notices indicate that court hearings start at 8:30a.m. instead of
the actual time the hearings commenced.46
Although the Minutes of the Proceedings in her court reflect that
respondent Judge start court sessions regularly at 8:30 a.m., the
uniform testimonies of the witnesses regarding respondent
Judge's habitual tardiness, despite the risk of being held
administratively and criminally liable, constitute substantial
evidence to hold respondent Judge liable.47
On the charge of Oppression, the Investigating Justice found that
respondent Judge failed to show compassion, patience,
courtesy and civility to lawyers who appear before her in
contravention of the mandates of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct which sets the high standards of demeanor before all
judges must observe.
Respondent Judge displayed antagonistic behavior towards
Atty. Basher Macapado, who appeared as defense counsel in
Criminal Case Nos. 15539, 15540 and 15541, during the hearing
on May 14, 2012:
COURT:
Atty. Macapado, during the last hearing, it was Atty. Plando who
appeared. These were already testified by this witness. Next time,
if you intend to do your cross-examination you better appear so
you will not be wasting the court's time and these were already
testified to by the witness. Where is Atty. Plando?
ATTY. MACAPADO:
He is out of town Your Honor. As far as this is concerned Your
Honor, this was not testified to by this witness. COURT: It is your
question (Presiding Judge banging the gavel). What is your
question before this?
ATTY. MACAPADO:
I am asking about the confirmatory test.
COURT:
That was testified already. Listen! (banging the gavel again and
raising her voice).
ATTY. MACAPADO:
That was testified (interrupted)
COURT:
You listen! (banging the gavel again)
ATTY. MACAPADO:
Yes Your Honor, I am listening.
COURT:
I will contempt you. That was already taken during the last Yes Your Honor because she mention it now.
hearing when Atty. Plando appeared and this time you were
COURT:
asking the same question.
Proceed now.48
ATTY. MACAPADO:
Through the filing of a Manifestation, Atty. Macapado
Yes Your Honor because what this witness have testified is about
apologized to the court for the incident which happened during
confirmation and this object was not presented to the court Your
the hearing on May 14, 2012 but prayed for respondent Judge to
Honor.
extend a little respect to all lawyers who appear before her court
COURT: in the presence of their respective clients and other litigants.49

You are out of order Atty. Macapado. Next time before you As evidenced by the TSN taken on January 25, 2011, respondent
appear you ask Atty. Plando a copy of the previous transcript so Judge also engaged in an argument in open court with a certain
that there will be no redundancy. Have you read or are you Atty. Gerardo Padilla who appeared as defendants' counsel in
aware? Civil Case No. 06-7010.50 Atty. Padilla found the behavior of
respondent Judge antagonistic51 which led to the exchange of
ATTY. MACAPADO:
words between respondent Judge and Atty. Padilla who was
Yes Your Honor because the two of us appeared. prompted to utter the words "xxx you can do your worst and I will
do my best"52 to respondent Judge, maintaining civility towards
COURT: the court despite the exchange.
Are you sure of that? Complainant and Assistant City Prosecutor Diaz also
ATTY. MACAPADO: experienced the same antagonistic and hostile behavior from
respondent Judge which caused them embarrassment in open
Yes Your Honor. court as shown in the TSNs submitted by complainant.
COURT: Complainant was scolded by respondent Judge in open court
on September 10, 2012 for his failure to properly address the
But that was already taken during the last hearing. court.53 On November 4, 2014, ACP Diaz felt humiliated when
respondent Judge admonished her also in open court because
ATTY. MACAPADO:
respondent Judge felt displeased with ACP Diaz's reaction and
I am only asking the witness about this object Your Honor and this alleged disrespectful behavior which led ACP Diaz to cry and
was not presented during the last hearing. made her unable to continue with the presentation of her
witness.54
COURT:
The Investigating Justice reasoned that if respondent Judge felt
But you were asking, what IS confirmatory test and that was
that complainant or any other lawyer must be admonished for
already taken.
his/her behavior or unpreparedness in court, respondent Judge
ATTY. MACAPADO: could have called them privately to approach the bench or
even in chambers to scold him/her, but certainly not to
embarrass them in front of their clients and other litigants as the
same may also cause shame to the court, if an argument ensues,
and will directly affect the professional and personal lives of all
involved. These incidents highlighted respondent Judge's lack of
temperance and self-restraint which taints her impartiality in
making decisions in the eyes of the public.55
To make matters worse, respondent Judge also exhibited
conduct unbecoming of a judge when she shouted at a court
staff in her chambers while correcting the court staffs draft orders
which she dictated in open court and called the court staff,
"bogo ba nimo" (you are dumb or stupid).56 Although respondent
Judge and the court staff were alone in the chambers, the court
staff felt humiliated as she was berated for fifteen (15) minutes
and she cried when she went to the staff room.57
Another court staff also experienced being berated and
humiliated by respondent Judge. In correcting the court staffs
eleven (11) draft orders, respondent Judge humiliated her by
repeatedly pointing at her mistakes in an elevated voice in the
presence of a friend of respondent Judge, who happened to be
a party in a civil case pending before their court.58 Nearly in tears,
the court staff went out of the chambers and told her co-workers
that she would no longer help in drafting orders in bail bond
applications so she could concentrate on her drafts.59
Respondent Judge found court staffs reaction to be improper, so
respondent Judge followed her to the staff room and continued
to scold her in front of the other staff members, and even called
for an emergency staff meeting60 where respondent Judge even
called the court staff "punyeta ka, buwisit ka" in front of the other
staff.61
The Investigating Justice emphasized in her Report that judges
are expected to observe courtesy and civility at all times in
addressing lawyers, litigants and witnesses appearing in his/her
sala62 considering that judges must act beyond reproach to
maintain the court's integrity and public confidence in the
judicial system.63
The Investigating Justice also said that respondent judge's
belligerent, oppressive and tyrannical behavior towards her
court staff and lack of courtesy, civility and self-restraint towards
lawyers and litigants during court hearings cannot be treated
with leniency. The Investigating Justice added that public
confidence in the judiciary must be maintained and the tenets
on the first duty of judges to conduct themselves beyond
reproach must be safeguarded.64
OCA Report dated October 26, 2015
The OCA, in their Report dated October 26, 2015, agreed and
adopted the findings of the Investigating Justice.
Apart from Complainant, three (3) court staff testified to the
habitual tardiness of respondent Judge who began the court
hearings between 9:00 a.m. and 9:30 a.m.65 A former assistant
City Prosecutor also confirmed that she commenced court
sessions at the said time.66 The testimonies of her staff also
revealed that she did not want to indicate in the Minutes of the
Proceedings the actual time when court sessions started.67 It was
also revealed that a casual employee was once reprimanded
by respondent Judge when the employee wrote in the Minutes
that the actual time of arrival of respondent Judge was 9:30a.m.,
as corroborated by the testimony of another court staff.68
Respondent Judge unquestionably failed to observe the
prescribed official hours as repeatedly enjoined by the Court.69
She admitted being late "sometimes" in arriving to the court and
beginning the court hearings as rebuffed by contrary evidence.70
Facing the risk of being administratively and criminally held liable,
respondent Judge's own branch clerk of court even bravely
testified that court sessions commenced between 9:00a.m. and
10:00 a.m. although the Minutes of the Proceedings reflected the
time at 8:30 a.m..71
The OCA also found that respondent Judge failed to show
compassion, patience, courtesy and civility to lawyers who
appear before her in contravention of the mandates of the
Code of Judicial Ethics, which sets the high standards of
demeanor all judges must observe.72
The OCA pointed out that one significant aspect that became
apparent during the investigation is respondent Judge's
competence in the performance of her duties.73 True, she was
exonerated in the instant complaint because the issues raised
were judicial in nature and in another case for grave abuse of
discretion, dishonesty and partiality for lack of merit.74 But, as
testified to by witnesses, respondent Judge did not personally
prepare the court's orders, resolutions and decisions; she did not
know the details of some cases before her; and she does not
possess proficiency in English.75 Yet, respondent Judge remained
intractable and would not own up to her mistakes and
shortcomings.76
The OCA held that respondent Judge violated the Code of
Judicial Conduct for her repeated acts of oppression against
lawyers and court staff (gross misconduct) which constitute
serious charge pursuant to Rule 140, Section 8 of the Revised
Rules of Court punishable by dismissal, suspension from office for
more than three (3) to six (6) months or a fine of more than
P20,000.00 to P40,000.00.77
The OCA also held that respondent Judge is also guilty of
habitual tardiness which is a less serious charge sanctioned by
either suspension from office for not less than one (1) nor more
than three (3) months or a fine of more than P10,000.00 but not
exceeding P20,000.00.78
The OCA noted that the penalties that may be imposed on
respondent Judge may be mitigated by her being a first offender
as she has never been previously sanctioned.79 She has also
offered her apology.80 One staff member said that she would
sometimes show motherly care and compassion towards her
staff.81 Further, her "temper explosions" are no longer as frequent
as before.82
Anent Justice Singh's recommendation that respondent Judge
be transferred to a different court considering the strained
relations between respondent Judge and the court staff, the
OCA recommended that respondent Judge be given a fair
chance to change her unpleasant attitude and behavior.83 The
OCA averred that, with this present administrative case, her court
staff have now become emboldened and are no longer afraid
to speak up.84 They can easily initiate another complaint against
respondent Judge if circumstances warrant.85 As a deterrent
against future abuses, the OCA proposed that a periodic report
be submitted to the OCA to apprise the OCA of any untoward
incident involving respondent Judge in her dealings with her
court staff and the public.86
The Court's Ruling
The Court agrees with the findings of the OCA.
The Court has time and again reminded the members of the
bench to faithfully observe the prescribed official hours to inspire
public respect for the justice system. It has issued Supervisory
Circular No. 14 dated October 22, 1985, Circular No. 13 dated
July 1, 1987, and Administrative Circular No. 3-99 dated January
15, 1999 to reiterate the trial judges' mandate to exercise
punctuality in the performance of their duties.
Section 5 of Supervisory Circular No. 14 issued by the Court on
October 22, 1985 states:
5. Session Hours. - Regional Trial Courts, Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall hold
daily sessions from Monday to Friday, from 8:30 to 12:00 noon and
from 2:00 to 4:30 p.m. assisted by a skeletal force, also on rotation,
primarily to act on petitions for bail and other urgent matters.
(Emphasis supplied)
Circular No. 13 dated July 1, 1987 entitled, "Guidelines m the
Administration of Justice" provides that:

Guidelines for Trial Courts xxxx

xxxx

1. Punctuality and strict observance of office hours. -

Punctuality in the holding of scheduled hearings is an
imperative. Trial judges should strictly observe the II. Judges must be punctual at all times.
requirement of at least eight hours of service a day, five
hours of which should be devoted to trial, specifically from
8:30 a.m. to 12:00 noon and from 2:00 to 4:30 as required
by par. 5 of the Interim Rules issued by Supreme Court on xxxx
January 11, 1983, pursuant to Sec. 16 of BP 129.
(Underscoring in the original)

Administrative Circular No. 3-99 dated January 15, 1999 entitled,

"Strict Observance of Session Hours of Trial Courts and Effective
IV. There should be strict adherence to the policy on
Management of Cases To Ensure Their Speedy Disposition,"
avoiding postponements and needless delay.
reiterates the mandate for trial judges to exercise punctuality in
the performance of their duties, thus:

To insure speedy disposition of cases, the following guidelines

must be faithfully observed:
xxxx

I. The session hours of all Regional Trial Courts, Metropolitan

Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, Municipal Trial
Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall be from
8:30A.M. to noon and from 2:00 P.M. to 4:30 P.M., from
Monday to Friday. The hours in the morning shall be
devoted to the conduct of trial, while the hours in the
afternoon shall be utilized for (1) the conduct of pre-trial
conferences; (2) writing of decisions, resolutions or orders,
or (3) the continuation of trial on the merits, whenever
rendered necessary, as may be required by the Rules of
Court, statutes, or circular in specified cases.
VI. All trial judges must strictly comply with Circular No. 38-98,
entitled "Implementing the Provisions of Republic Act No.
8493" ("An Act to Ensure a Speedy Trial of All Cases Before
the Sandiganbayan, Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan
Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Municipal Trial
Court and Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Appropriating
Funds Therefor, and for Other Purposes") issued by the
Honorable Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa on 11 August

1998 and which took effect on 15 September 1998.87
(Italics supplied)
The aforesaid circulars are restatements of the Canons of Judicial
Ethics which enjoin judges to be punctual in the performance of
their judicial duties, recognizing that the time of litigants,
witnesses, and attorneys is of value, and that if the judge is not
punctual in his habits, he sets a bad example to the bar and
tends to create dissatisfaction in the administration of justice.88
The OCA aptly found that the testimonies of the prosecutors and
the court staff unquestionably proved that respondent Judge
failed to observe the prescribed official hours as repeatedly
enjoined by the Court. Respondent Judge's own branch clerk of
court even testified that court sessions commenced between
9:00 a.m. and 10:00 a.m. although the Minutes of the
Proceedings reflected the time at 8:30 a.m.89
The OCA also correctly observed that respondent Judge failed
to show compassion, patience, courtesy and civility to lawyers
who appear before her in contravention of the mandates of the
Code of Judicial Ethics, which sets the high standards of
demeanor all judges must observe.90
Section 3, Canon 5 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct clearly
provides:
Section 3. Judges shall carry out judicial duties with appropriate
consideration for all persons, such as the parties, witnesses,
lawyers, court staff and judicial colleagues, without
differentiation on any irrelevant ground, immaterial to the proper
performance of such duties.
In relation to Rule 3.04, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct,
provides that judges must always be courteous and patient with
lawyers, litigants and witnesses appearing in his/her court, thus:
Rule 3.04- A judge should be patient, attentive, and courteous to
lawyers, especially the inexperienced, to litigants, witnesses and
others appearing before the court. A judge should avoid
unconsciously falling into the attitude of mind that the litigants
are made for the courts, instead of the courts to the litigants.
Section 6, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct likewise
states:
Section 6. Judges shall maintain order and decorum in all
proceedings before the court and be patient, dignified and
courteous in relation to litigants, witnesses, lawyers and others
with whom the judge deals in an official capacity. Judges shall
require similar conduct of legal representatives, court staff and
others subject to their influence, direction or control.
The Court is convinced that respondent Judge is guilty of
Oppression as shown in several incidents of misbehavior by
respondent Judge, some of which are stated below:
1) Respondent Judge displayed antagonistic behavior
towards Atty. Macapado who appeared as defense
counsel in three (3) criminal cases and who might have
increased the tone of his voice in their verbal tussle. He
filed with the court apologizing for the incident but prayed
for respondent Judge to extend a little respect to all
lawyers who appear before her court in the presence of
their clients and other litigants.91
2) Respondent Judge engaged in an argument in open
court with a certain Atty. Gerardo Padilla who appeared
as defendants' counsel in Civil Case No. 06-7010.92 Atty.
Padilla found the behavior of respondent Judge
antagonistic which led to the exchange of words
between respondent Judge and Atty. Padilla who was
prompted to utter the words "xxx you can do you worst
 and I will do my best"93 to respondent Judge, maintaining
civility towards the court despite the exchange.
3) Assistant City Prosecutor Diaz was humiliated by
respondent Judge who admonished her also in open
court because respondent Judge felt displeased with ACP
Diaz's reaction and alleged disrespectful behavior which
led ACP Diaz to cry and made her unable to continue with
the presentation of her witness.94
4) Respondent Judge exhibited conduct unbecoming of a
judge when she shouted at a court staff in her chambers
while correcting the court staffs draft orders which she
dictated in open court and called the court staff, "bogo
ba nimo" (you are dumb or stupid).95 Although respondent
Judge and the court staff were alone in the chambers, the
court staff felt humiliated as she was berated for fifteen
(15) minutes and she cried when she went to the staff
room.96
5) Another court staff also experienced being berated and
humiliated by respondent Judge. In correcting the court
staffs eleven (11) draft orders, respondent Judge
humiliated her by repeatedly pointing at her mistakes in
an elevated voice in the presence of a friend of
respondent Judge, who happened to be a party in a civil
case pending before their court.97 Nearly in tears, the
court staff went out of the chambers and told her co-
workers that she would no longer help in drafting orders in
bail bond applications so she could concentrate on her
drafts.98 Respondent Judge found court staff's reaction to
be improper, so respondent Judge followed her to the
staff room and continued to scold her in front of the other
staff members, and even called for an emergency staff
meeting99 where respondent Judge even called the court
staff "punyeta ka, buwisit ka" in front of the other staff.100
The Court has previously ruled that "[a] display of petulance and
impatience in the conduct of trial is a norm of behavior
incompatible with the needful attitude and sobriety of a good
judge.''101
Thus, the Court finds the imposition of fines amounting to Forty
Thousand Pesos (P40,000.00) and Twenty Thousand Pesos
(P20,000.00), appropriate given the prevailing facts of the
present case vis-a-vis respondent Judge's record for habitual
malfeasance in office.
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court hereby finds
respondent Presiding Judge Leonor S. Quiñones, Branch 6,
Regional Trial Court, Iligan City GUILTY of (1) Oppression (gross
misconduct constituting violations of the Code of Judicial
Conduct) and FINED in the amount of Forty Thousand Pesos
(P40,000.00); and (2) Habitual Tardiness and FINED in the amount
of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00), with WARNING that a
repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more
severely.
The Branch Clerk of Court of Branch 6, Regional Trial Court, Iligan
City) is hereby DIRECTED to SUBMIT a status report on the working
relationship in the court within fifteen (15) days from the end of
each semester for two (2) years.
SO ORDERED.

DISCIPLINE OF MEMBERS OF JUDICIARY
32. A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC February 8, 2011
IN THE MATTER OF THE CHARGES OF PLAGIARISM, ETC., AGAINST
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
Petitioners Isabelita C. Vinuya, et al., all members of the Malaya
Lolas Organization, seek reconsideration of the decision of the
Court dated October 12, 2010 that dismissed their charges of
plagiarism, twisting of cited materials, and gross neglect against
Justice Mariano Del Castillo in connection with the decision he
wrote for the Court in G.R. No. 162230, entitled Vinuya v.
Romulo.1
Mainly, petitioners claim that the Court has by its decision
legalized or approved of the commission of plagiarism in the
Philippines. This claim is absurd. The Court, like everyone else,
condemns plagiarism as the world in general understands and
uses the term.
Plagiarism, a term not defined by statute, has a popular or
common definition. To plagiarize, says Webster, is "to steal and
pass off as one’s own" the ideas or words of another. Stealing
implies malicious taking. Black’s Law Dictionary, the world’s
leading English law dictionary quoted by the Court in its
decision, defines plagiarism as the "deliberate and knowing
presentation of another person's original ideas or creative
expressions as one’s own."2 The presentation of another
person’s ideas as one’s own must be deliberate or
premeditated—a taking with ill intent.
There is no commonly-used dictionary in the world that
embraces in the meaning of plagiarism errors in attribution by
mere accident or in good faith.
Certain educational institutions of course assume different
norms in its application. For instance, the Loyola Schools Code
of Academic Integrity ordains that "plagiarism is identified not
through intent but through the act itself. The objective act of
falsely attributing to one’s self what is not one’s work, whether
intentional or out of neglect, is sufficient to conclude that
plagiarism has occurred. Students who plead ignorance or
appeal to lack of malice are not excused."3
But the Court’s decision in the present case does not set aside
such norm. The decision makes this clear, thus:
To paraphrase Bast and Samuels, while the academic
publishing model is based on the originality of the writer’s thesis,
the judicial system is based on the doctrine of stare decisis,
which encourages courts to cite historical legal data,
precedents, and related studies in their decisions. The judge is
not expected to produce original scholarship in every respect.
The strength of a decision lies in the soundness and general
acceptance of the precedents and long held legal opinions it
draws from.4
Original scholarship is highly valued in the academe and rightly
so. A college thesis, for instance, should contain dissertations
embodying results of original research, substantiating a specific
view.5 This must be so since the writing is intended to earn for
the student an academic degree, honor, or distinction. He
earns no credit nor deserves it who takes the research of others,
copies their dissertations, and proclaims these as his own. There
should be no question that a cheat deserves neither reward nor
sympathy.
But the policy adopted by schools of disregarding the element
of malicious intent found in dictionaries is evidently more in the
nature of establishing what evidence is sufficient to prove the
commission of such dishonest conduct than in rewriting the
meaning of plagiarism. Since it would be easy enough for a
student to plead ignorance or lack of malice even as he has
copied the work of others, certain schools have adopted the
policy of treating the mere presence of such copied work in his
paper sufficient objective evidence of plagiarism. Surely,
however, if on its face the student’s work shows as a whole that
he has but committed an obvious mistake or a clerical error in
one of hundreds of citations in his thesis, the school will not be so
unreasonable as to cancel his diploma.
In contrast, decisions of courts are not written to earn merit,
accolade, or prize as an original piece of work or art. Deciding
disputes is a service rendered by the government for the public
good. Judges issue decisions to resolve everyday conflicts
involving people of flesh and blood who ache for speedy justice
or juridical beings which have rights and obligations in law that
need to be protected. The interest of society in written decisions
is not that they are originally crafted but that they are fair and
correct in the context of the particular disputes involved.
Justice, not originality, form, and style, is the object of every
decision of a court of law.
There is a basic reason for individual judges of whatever level of
courts, including the Supreme Court, not to use original or
unique language when reinstating the laws involved in the
cases they decide. Their duty is to apply the laws as these are
written. But laws include, under the doctrine of stare decisis,
judicial interpretations of such laws as are applied to specific
situations. Under this doctrine, Courts are "to stand by
precedent and not to disturb settled point." Once the Court has
"laid down a principle of law as applicable to a certain state of
facts, it will adhere to that principle, and apply it to all future
cases, where facts are substantially the same; regardless of
whether the parties or property are the same."6
And because judicial precedents are not always clearly
delineated, they are quite often entangled in apparent
inconsistencies or even in contradictions, prompting experts in
the law to build up regarding such matters a large body of
commentaries or annotations that, in themselves, often
become part of legal writings upon which lawyers and judges
draw materials for their theories or solutions in particular cases.
And, because of the need to be precise and correct, judges
and practitioners alike, by practice and tradition, usually lift
passages from such precedents and writings, at times omitting,
without malicious intent, attributions to the originators.
Is this dishonest? No. Duncan Webb, writing for the International
Bar Association puts it succinctly. When practicing lawyers
(which include judges) write about the law, they effectively
place their ideas, their language, and their work in the public
domain, to be affirmed, adopted, criticized, or rejected. Being
in the public domain, other lawyers can thus freely use these
without fear of committing some wrong or incurring some
liability. Thus:
The tendency to copy in law is readily explicable. In law
accuracy of words is everything. Legal disputes often centre
round the way in which obligations have been expressed in
legal documents and how the facts of the real world fit the
meaning of the words in which the obligation is contained. This,
in conjunction with the risk-aversion of lawyers means that
refuge will often be sought in articulations that have been tried
and tested. In a sense therefore the community of lawyers have
together contributed to this body of knowledge, language, and
expression which is common property and may be utilized,
developed and bettered by anyone.7
The implicit right of judges to use legal materials regarded as
belonging to the public domain is not unique to the Philippines.
As Joyce C. George, whom Justice Maria Lourdes Sereno cites
in her dissenting opinion, observed in her Judicial Opinion
Writing Handbook:
A judge writing to resolve a dispute, whether trial or appellate, is
exempted from a charge of plagiarism even if ideas, words or
phrases from a law review article, novel thoughts published in a
legal periodical or language from a party’s brief are used
without giving attribution. Thus judges are free to use whatever
sources they deem appropriate to resolve the matter before
them, without fear of reprisal. This exemption applies to judicial
writings intended to decide cases for two reasons: the judge is
not writing a literary work and, more importantly, the purpose of
the writing is to resolve a dispute. As a result, judges
adjudicating cases are not subject to a claim of legal
plagiarism.8
If the Court were to inquire into the issue of plagiarism
respecting its past decisions from the time of Chief Justice
Cayetano S. Arellano to the present, it is likely to discover that it
has not on occasion acknowledged the originators of passages
and views found in its decisions. These omissions are true for
many of the decisions that have been penned and are being
penned daily by magistrates from the Court of Appeals, the
Sandiganbayan, the Court of Tax Appeals, the Regional Trial
Courts nationwide and with them, the municipal trial courts and
other first level courts. Never in the judiciary’s more than 100
years of history has the lack of attribution been regarded and
demeaned as plagiarism.
This is not to say that the magistrates of our courts are mere
copycats. They are not. Their decisions analyze the often
conflicting facts of each case and sort out the relevant from the
irrelevant. They identify and formulate the issue or issues that
need to be resolved and evaluate each of the laws, rulings,
principles, or authorities that the parties to the case invoke. The
decisions then draw their apt conclusions regarding whether or
not such laws, rulings, principles, or authorities apply to the
particular cases before the Court. These efforts, reduced in
writing, are the product of the judges’ creativity. It is here—
actually the substance of their decisions—that their genius,
originality, and honest labor can be found, of which they should
be proud.
In Vinuya, Justice Del Castillo examined and summarized the
facts as seen by the opposing sides in a way that no one has
ever done. He identified and formulated the core of the issues
that the parties raised. And when he had done this, he
discussed the state of the law relevant to their resolution. It was
here that he drew materials from various sources, including the
three foreign authors cited in the charges against him. He
compared the divergent views these present as they
developed in history. He then explained why the Court must
reject some views in light of the peculiar facts of the case and
applied those that suit such facts. Finally, he drew from his
discussions of the facts and the law the right solution to the
dispute in the case. On the whole, his work was original. He had
but done an honest work.
The Court will not, therefore, consistent with established practice
in the Philippines and elsewhere, dare permit the filing of actions
to annul the decisions promulgated by its judges or expose
them to charges of plagiarism for honest work done.
This rule should apply to practicing lawyers as well. Counsels for
the petitioners, like all lawyers handling cases before courts and
administrative tribunals, cannot object to this. Although as a rule
they receive compensation for every pleading or paper they
file in court or for every opinion they render to clients, lawyers
also need to strive for technical accuracy in their writings. They
should not be exposed to charges of plagiarism in what they
write so long as they do not depart, as officers of the court, from
the objective of assisting the Court in the administration of
justice.
As Duncan Webb said:
In presenting legal argument most lawyers will have recourse to
either previous decisions of the courts, frequently lifting whole
sections of a judge’s words to lend weight to a particular point
either with or without attribution. The words of scholars are also
sometimes given weight, depending on reputation. Some
encyclopaedic works are given particular authority. In England
this place is given to Halsbury’s Laws of England which is widely
considered authoritative. A lawyer can do little better than to concerned, like the dozens of other sources she cited in her
frame an argument or claim to fit with the articulation of the law research, had high reputations in international law.1awphi1
in Halsbury’s. While in many cases the very purpose of the
Notably, those foreign authors expressly attributed the
citation is to claim the authority of the author, this is not always
controversial passages found in their works to earlier writings by
the case. Frequently commentary or dicta of lesser standing will
others. The authors concerned were not themselves the
be adopted by legal authors, largely without attribution.
originators. As it happened, although the ponencia of Justice
xxxx Del Castillo accidentally deleted the attribution to them, there
remained in the final draft of the decision attributions of the
The converse point is that originality in the law is viewed with
same passages to the earlier writings from which those authors
skepticism. It is only the arrogant fool or the truly gifted who will
borrowed their ideas in the first place. In short, with the
depart entirely from the established template and reformulate
remaining attributions after the erroneous clean-up, the
an existing idea in the belief that in doing so they will improve it.
passages as it finally appeared in the Vinuya decision still
While over time incremental changes occur, the wholesale
showed on their face that the lifted ideas did not belong to
abandonment of established expression is generally considered
Justice Del Castillo but to others. He did not pass them off as his
foolhardy.9
own.
The Court probably should not have entertained at all the
With our ruling, the Court need not dwell long on petitioners’
charges of plagiarism against Justice Del Castillo, coming from
allegations that Justice Del Castillo had also committed
the losing party. But it is a case of first impression and petitioners,
plagiarism in writing for the Court his decision in another case,
joined by some faculty members of the University of the
Ang Ladlad v. Commission on Elections.10 Petitioners are nit-
Philippines school of law, have unfairly maligned him with the
picking. Upon close examination and as Justice Del Castillo
charges of plagiarism, twisting of cited materials, and gross
amply demonstrated in his comment to the motion for
neglect for failing to attribute lifted passages from three foreign
reconsideration, he in fact made attributions to passages in
authors. These charges as already stated are false, applying the
such decision that he borrowed from his sources although they
meaning of plagiarism as the world in general knows it.
at times suffered in formatting lapses.
True, Justice Del Castillo failed to attribute to the foreign authors
Considering its above ruling, the Court sees no point in further
materials that he lifted from their works and used in writing the
passing upon the motion of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
decision for the Court in the Vinuya case. But, as the Court said,
for leave to file and admit motion for reconsideration-in-
the evidence as found by its Ethics Committee shows that the
intervention dated January 5, 2011 and Dr. Peter Payoyo’s claim
attribution to these authors appeared in the beginning drafts of
of other instances of alleged plagiarism in the Vinuya decision.
the decision. Unfortunately, as testified to by a highly qualified
and experienced court-employed researcher, she accidentally ACCORDINGLY, the Court DENIES petitioners’ motion for
deleted the same at the time she was cleaning up the final reconsideration for lack of merit.
draft. The Court believed her since, among other reasons, she
SO ORDERED.
had no motive for omitting the attribution. The foreign authors
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
Associate Justice
ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate Justice
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
Associate Justice
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
Associate Justice
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Associate Justice
Footnotes
1 April 28, 2010.
2 Black’s Law Dictionary (8th Edition, 2004).
3 Available at
http://www.admu.edu.ph/index.php?p=120&type=2&sec=25&
aid=9149.
4 In the Matter of the Charges of Plagiarism, etc., Against
Associate Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo, A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC,
October 12, 2010.
5 Webster’s Third New International Dictionary, p. 2374.
6 Black’s Law Dictionary (6th Edition, 1990), p. 1406.
7 Duncan Webb, Plagiarism: A Threat to Lawyers’ Integrity?
Published by the International Bar Association, available online
at
http://www.ibanet.org/Article/Detail.aspx?ArticleUid=bc2ef7cd-
3207-43d6-9e87-16c3bc2be595.
8 Joyce C. George, Judicial Opinion Writing Handbook (2007),
p. 725, cited by Justice Maria Lourdes Sereno in her dissenting
opinion.
9 Supra note 7.
10 G.R. No. 190582, April 8, 2010.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation
DISSENTING OPINION
CARPIO, J.:
I dissent on two grounds. First, this Court has no jurisdiction to
decide in an administrative case whether a sitting Justice of this
Court has committed misconduct in office as this power
belongs exclusively to Congress. Second, in writing judicial
decisions a judge must comply with the Law on Copyright1 as
the judge has no power to exempt himself from the mandatory
requirements of the law.
I. Disciplining Authority of Impeachable Officers
Under the Constitution, the sole disciplining authority of all
impeachable officers, including Justices of this Court, is
Congress. Section 3(1), Article XI of the Constitution provides
that, "The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive
power to initiate all cases of impeachment." Likewise, Section
3(6) of the same Article provides that, "The Senate shall have
the sole power to try and decide cases of impeachment." These
provisions constitute Congress as the exclusive authority to
discipline all impeachable officers for any impeachable
offense, including "betrayal of public trust," a "catchall phrase"2
to cover any misconduct involving breach of public trust by an
impeachable officer.
While impeachment is often described as a political process, it
also functions as the equivalent of administrative disciplinary
proceedings against impeachable officers. Impeachable
officers are not subject to administrative disciplinary
proceedings either by the Executive or Judicial branch, in the
same manner that non-impeachable officers are subject. Thus,
impeachment by Congress takes the place of administrative
disciplinary proceedings against impeachable officers as there
is no other authority that can administratively discipline
impeachable officers.3 Removal from office and
disqualification to hold public office,4 which is the penalty for
an impeachable offense,5 is also the most severe penalty that
can be imposed in administrative disciplinary proceedings.
Impeachment is not a criminal proceeding because conviction
in an impeachment complaint is not a bar to criminal
prosecution for the same act.6 An impeachable offense, like
betrayal of public trust, may not even constitute a criminal act.
Like in an administrative proceeding, proof beyond reasonable
doubt is not required for conviction in impeachment. If an
impeachable officer is charged of a crime, as distinguished
from an administrative charge, the proper court has jurisdiction
to try such impeachable officer because the proceeding is
criminal, not administrative. However, neither the conviction nor
acquittal of such impeachable officer in the criminal case
constitutes a bar to his subsequent impeachment by Congress.
There is no double jeopardy because impeachment is not a
criminal proceeding.7
Only Congress, as the exclusive disciplining authority of all
impeachable officers, can decide in a non-criminal, non-civil
proceeding8 whether a sitting Justice of this Court has
committed plagiarism. Plagiarism is a betrayal of public trust
because, as the majority puts it, to plagiarize is "‘to steal and
pass off as one’s own’ the ideas of another."9 However, in
writing judicial decisions a judge is liable for plagiarism only if the
copying violates the moral rights of the author under the Law on
Copyright.
This Court may conduct an investigation of an administrative
complaint against a sitting Justice to determine if there is basis
in recommending to the House of Representatives the initiation
of an impeachment complaint against the sitting Justice. This
Court may also conduct an investigation of an administrative
complaint against a sitting Justice to determine if the complaint
constitutes contempt of this Court. However, this Court has no
power to decide on the guilt or innocence of a sitting Justice in
the administrative complaint because such act is a usurpation
of the exclusive disciplinary power of Congress over
impeachable officers under the Constitution. Any decision by
this Court in an administrative case clearing a sitting Justice of
an impeachable offense is void for want of jurisdiction and for
violation of an express provision of the Constitution.
Such a decision will put this Court on a collision course with
Congress if subsequently an impeachment complaint for
plagiarism is filed with Congress against the sitting Justice.
Incidentally, an impeachment complaint has already been filed
in the House of Representatives involving the same complaint
subject of this administrative case. If the House of
Representatives decides to take cognizance of the complaint
and initiates an impeachment based on the same
administrative complaint that this Court had already dismissed
as baseless, then this Court would have created a constitutional
crisis that could only weaken the public’s faith in the primacy of
the Constitution.
The Supreme Court cannot assume jurisdiction over an
administrative complaint against a sitting Justice of this Court by
invoking Section 6, Article VIII of the Constitution. This provision
states that the "Supreme Court shall have administrative
supervision over all courts and the personnel thereof." This
provision refers to the administrative supervision that the
Department of Justice used to exercise over the courts and their
personnel, as shown by the folowing exchange during the
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission:
MR. GUINGONA: xxx.
The second question has reference to Section 9, about the
administrative supervision over all courts to be retained in the
Supreme Court. I was wondering if the Committee had taken
into consideration the proposed resolution for the transfer of the
administrative supervision from the Supreme Court to the
Ministry of Justice. But as far as I know, none of the proponents
had been invited to explain or defend the proposed resolution.
Also, I wonder if the Committee also took into consideration the
fact that the UP Law Constitution Project in its Volume I, entitled:
Annotated Provision had, in fact, made this an alternative
proposal, the transfer of administrative supervision from the
Supreme Court to the Ministry of Justice.
Thank you.
MR. CONCEPCION: May I refer the question to Commissioner
Regalado?
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Sarmiento): Commissioner
Regalado is recognized.
MR. REGALADO: Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer.
We did invite Minister Neptali Gonzales, who was the proponent
for the transfer of supervision of the lower courts to the Ministry
of Justice. I even personally called up and sent a letter or a
short note inviting him, but the good Minister unfortunately was
enmeshed in a lot of official commitments. We wanted to hear
him because the Solicitor General of his office, Sedfrey
Ordoñez, appeared before us, and asked for the maintenance
of the present arrangement wherein the supervision over lower
courts is with the Supreme Court. But aside from that, although
there were no resource persons, we did further studies on the
feasibility of transferring the supervision over the lower courts to
the Ministry of Justice. All those things were taken into
consideration motu proprio.10
For sure, the disciplinary authority of the Supreme Court over
judges is expressly govened by another provision, that is, Section
11, Article VIII of the Constitution. Section 11 provides:
Section 11. xxx The Supreme Court en banc shall have the
power to discipline judges of lower courts, or order their dismissal
by a vote of a majority of the Members who actually took part
in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon.
(Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, the disciplinary authority of the Supreme Court over
judges is found in Section 11 of Article VIII. However, this
disciplinary authority is expressly limited to lower court judges,
and does not incude Supreme Court Justices, precisely
because the Constitution expressly vests exclusively on Congress
the power to discipline Supreme Court Justices. By excluding
Supreme Court Justices, Section 11 withholds from the Supreme
Court en banc the power to discipline its own members.
The Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980 of the United
States, which gives judicial councils composed of federal judges
the power to discipline federal judges short of removal from
office, does not apply to Justices of the United States Supreme
Court who are subject to discipline only by the United States
Congress. Morever, a similar law cannot be enacted in the
Philippines bacause all lower court judges are subject to
discipline by the Supreme Court en banc under Section 11,
Article VIII of the Constitution. Thus, reference to the Judicial
Conduct and Disability Act of 1980 is inappropriate in this
jurisdiction.
I submit that this Court recall the Resolution of 12 October 2010
subject of the present motion for reconsideration for lack of
jurisdiction to decide the administrative complaint against
Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo.
II. The Judge Must Follow the Law on Copyright
a. Copying from Works of the Government
In writing judicial decisions, a judge should make the proper
attribution in copying passages from any judicial decision,
statute, regulation, or other Works of the Government. The
Manual of Judicial Writing adopted11 by this Court provides
how such attribution should be made.
However, the failure to make such attribution does not violate
the Law on Copyright.12 The law expressly provides that Works
of the Government are not subject to copyright.13 This means
that there is neither a legal right by anyone to demand
attribution, nor any legal obligation from anyone to make an
attribution, when Works of the Government are copied. The
failure to make the proper attribution of a Work of the
Government is not actionable but is merely a case of sloppy
writing. Clearly, there is no legal obligation, by a judge or by
any person, to make an attribution when copying Works of the
Government.
However, misquoting or twisting, with or without attribution, any
judicial decision, statute, regulation or other Works of the
Government in judicial writing, if done to mislead the parties or
the public, is actionable. Under Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct, a judge "should perform official duties honestly."14
Rule 3.01]15 and Rule 3.0216 of the Code provide that a judge
must be faithful to the law, maintain professional competence,
and strive diligently to ascertain the facts and the applicable
law.
The foregoing applies to any non-copyrightable work, and any
work in the public domain, whether local or foreign.
b. Copying from Pleadings of Parties
In writing judicial decisions, the judge may copy passages from
the pleadings of the parties with proper attribution to the author
of the pleading. However, the failure to make the proper
attribution is not actionable.
Pleadings are submitted to the court precisely so that the pleas,
or the arguments written on the pleadings, are accepted by
the judge. There is an implied offer by the pleader that the
judge may make any use of the pleadings in resolving the case.
If the judge accepts the pleader’s arguments, he may copy
such arguments to expedite the resolution of the case. In writing
his decision, the judge does not claim as his own the arguments
he adopts from the pleadings of the parties. Besides, the legal
arguments in the pleadings are in most cases merely reiterations
of judicial precedents, which are Works of the Government.
However, misquoting or twisting, with or without attribution, any
passage from the pleadings of the parties, if done to mislead
the parties or the public, is actionable. Under Canon 3 of the
Code of Judicial Conduct, a judge "should perform official
duties honestly." Rule 3.01 and Rule 3.02 of the Code provide
that a judge must be faithful to the law, maintain professional
competence, and strive diligently to ascertain the facts and the
applicable law.
c. Copying from Textbooks, Journals and other Non-
Government Works
In writing judicial decisions, the judge may copy passages from
textbooks, journals and other non-government works with
proper attribution. However, whether the failure to make the
proper attribution is actionable or not depends on the nature of
the passages copied.
If the work copied without proper attribution is copyrighted, the
failure to make such attribution violates Section 193 of the
Intellectual Property Code, which provides:
Section 193. Scope of Moral Rights. The author of a work shall,
independently of the economic rights in Section 177 or the
grant of an assignment or license with respect to such right,
have the right:
193.1. To require that the authorship of the works be attributed
to him, in particular, the right that his name, as far as
practicable, be indicated in a prominent way on the copies,
and in connection with the public use of his work;
xxxx
193.3 To object to any distortion, mutilation or other
modification of, or other derogatory action in relation to his
work which would be prejudicial to his honor or reputation;
x x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 184(k) of the Intellectual Property Code expressly allows,
as a limitation on the copyright or economic rights of the
author, "any use made of a work for the purpose of any judicial
proceedings x x x."17 Section 184(k) clearly authorizes a judge to
copy copyrighted works for "any use" in judicial proceedings,
which means the judge, in writing his decision, can copy
passages beyond the quantitative limitations of "fair-use" under
Section 184(b). This is the significance of Section 184(k), allowing
the judge to copy lengthy passages of copyrighted work even
beyond what is required by fair-use. Section 184(k) is silent on
the obligation of the judge to make the proper attribution,
unlike Section 184(b) on fair-use by the public which expressly
requires a proper attribution.
However, Section 193 nevertheless requires anyone, including a
judge writing a judicial decision, to make the proper attribution
to show respect for the moral rights of the author. Thus, while the
author has no right to demand economic compensation from
the judge or the government for the unlimited and public use of
his work in a judicial decision, the law requires that "the
authorship of the works be attributed to him x x x in connection
with the public use of his work." In short, the judge is legally
obligated to make the proper attribution because Section 193
protects the moral rights of the author.
The moral rights under Section 193 of the Intellectual Property
Code arise only if the work of an author is copyrighted. If the
work is not copyrighted, then there are no moral rights to the
work. If the passages in a textbook, journal article, or other non-
work of the government are merely quotations from Works of
the Government, like sentences or paragraphs taken from
judicial decisions, then such passages if copied by a judge do
not require attribution because such passages, by themselves,
are Works of the Government. The same is true for works in the
public domain.
However, the arrangement or presentation of passages copied
from Works of the Government may be subject to copyright,18
and a judge copying such arrangement or presentation,
together with the passages, may have to make the proper
attribution. If the passages are those of the author himself, and
not copied from Works of the Government or from works in the
public domain, then clearly there is a legal obligation on the
part of the judge to make the proper attribution. Failure by the
judge to make such attribution violates not only Section 193 of
the Intellectual Property Code, but also Canon 3 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct.
The moral rights of an author are independent of the author’s
economic rights to his work in the sense that even if the author
assigns his work, the moral rights to the work remain with him,
being inalienable.19 Any violation of an author’s moral rights
entitles him to the same remedies as a violation of the
economic rights to the work,20 whether such economic rights
are still with him or have been assigned to another party. Thus,
while called "moral rights," these rights are legally enforceable.
Two essential elements of an author’s moral rights are the right
to attribution and the right to integrity. The right to attribution or
paternity21 is the right of the author to be recognized as the
originator or father of his work, a right expressly recognized in
Section 193.1 of the Intellectual Property Code. The right to
integrity is the right of the author to prevent any distortion or
misrepresentation of his work, a right expressly recognized in
Section 193.3 of the Code. The Legislature incorporated the
moral rights of an author in the Intellectual Property Code in
compliance with the treaty obligations of the Philippines under
the Berne Convention, which requires treaty states to enact
legislation protecting the moral rights of authors.22
The rationale behind moral rights is explained in a local
intellectual property textbook, citing American jurisprudence:
The term moral rights has its origins in the civil law and is a
translation of the French le droit moral, which is meant to
capture those rights of a spiritual, non-economic and personal
nature. The rights spring from a belief that an artist in the process
of creation injects his spirit into the work and that the artist’s
personality, as well as the integrity of the work, should therefore
be protected and preserved. Because they are personal to the
artist, moral rights exist independently of an artist’s copyright in
his or her work. While the rubric of moral rights encompasses
many varieties of rights, two are protected in nearly every
jurisdiction recognizing their existence: attribution and integrity.
The right of attribution generally consists of the right of an artist
to be recognized by name as the author of his work or to
publish anonymously or pseudonymously, the right to prevent
the author’s work from being attributed to someone else, and to
prevent the use of the author’s name on works created by
others, including distorted editions of the author’s original work.
The right of integrity allows the author to prevent any deforming
or mutilating changes to his work, even after title of the work has
been transferred. In some jurisdictions, the integrity right also
protects artwork from destruction. Whether or not a work of art is
protected from destruction represents a fundamentally different
perception of the purpose of moral rights. If integrity is meant to
stress the public interest in preserving a nation’s culture,
destruction is prohibited; if the right is meant to emphasize the
author’s personality, destruction is seen as less harmful than the
continued display of deformed or mutilated work that
misrepresents the artist and destruction may proceed.23
(Emphasis supplied)
When a judge respects the right to attribution and integrity of
an author, then the judge observes intellectual honesty in
writing his decisions. Writing decisions is the most important
official duty of a judge, more so of appellate court judges.
Conversely, if a judge fails to respect an author’s right to
attribution and integrity, then the judge fails to observe
intellectual honesty in the performance of his official duties, a
violation of Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.
The duty of a judge to respect the moral rights of an author is
certainly not burdensome on the performance of his official
duties. All the reference materials that a judge needs in writing
judicial decisions are either Works of the Government or works in
the public domain. A judge must base his decision on the facts
and the law,24 and the facts and the law are all in the public
domain. There is no need for a judge to refer to copyrighted
works. When a judge ventures to refer to copyrighted works by
copying passages from such works, he immediately knows he is
treading on protected works, and should readily respect the
rights of the authors of those works. The judge, whose most
important function is to write judicial decisions, must be the first
to respect the rights of writers whose lives and passions are
dedicated to writing for the education of humankind.
Besides, Section 184(k) of the Intellectual Property Code already
generously allows the judge unlimited copying of copyrighted
works in writing his judicial decisions. The Code, however, does
not exempt the judge from recognizing the moral rights of the
author. The basic rule of human relations, as embodied in Article
19 of the Civil Code, requires that the judge should give to the
author of the copyrighted work what is due him. Thus, Article 19
states: "Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his
due, and observe honesty and good faith."
d. Difference from the Academe
Academic writing, such as writing dissertations or articles in
academic journals, is governed by standards different from
judicial decision writing. The failure to make the proper
attribution for passages copied from Works of the Government
is not actionable against a judge when writing a judicial
decision. However, the same failure by a student or a faculty
member may be deemed plagiarism in the academe, meriting
a severe administrative penalty. Nevertheless, the Judiciary and
the academe should have the same rule when it comes to
copyrighted works. In every case, there is a legal duty to make
the proper attribution when copying passages from
copyrighted works because the law expressly requires such
attribution without exception.
The academe requires that passages copied from Works of the
Government, works in the public domain, and non-copyrighted
works should be properly attributed in the same way as
copyrighted works. The rationale is to separate the original work
of the writer from the works of other authors in order to
determine the original contribution of the writer to the
development of a particular art or science. This rationale does
not apply to the Judiciary, where adherence to jurisprudential
precedence is the rule. However, if a judge writes an article for
a law journal, he is bound by the same rules governing
academic writing.25
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to RECALL the Resolution of 12 October
2010 subject of the present motion for reconsideration as this
Court’s jurisdiction extends only to a determination whether the
administrative complaint against Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo
constitutes contempt of this Court.
33. A.M. No. RTJ-08-2140 October 7, 2014
(Formerly A.M. No. 00-2-86-RTC)
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, Complainant,
vs.
EXECUTIVE JUDGE OWEN B. AMOR, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,
DAET, CAMARINES NORTE, Respondent.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Before the Court is a Memorandum1 dated November 23, 1999
filed by Acting Presiding Judge Manuel E. Contreras (Judge
Contreras) of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Paracale,
Camarines Norte for the Office of the Court Administrator
(OCA) against respondent Executive Judge Owen B. Amor
(respondent) of the Regional Trial Court of Daet, Camarines
Norte (RTC), accusing him of Grave Abuse of Authority, Grave
Misconduct, and Acts Inimical to Judicial Service.
The Facts
In the Memorandum which he submitted pursuant to the verbal
instruction of then Court Administrator Alfredo L. Benipayo, 2
Judge Contreras reported on the alleged acts of respondent,
as follows:
First, on October 1, 1999, respondent impounded the tricycle of
a certain Gervin Ojeda at the Hall of Justice of Daet, Camarines
Norte, when the latter bumped the former’s vehicle and was
unable to pay the amount demanded for the incurred
damages. As such impounding was entered in the Guard’s
Logbook, Judge Contreras was able to secure a certification
regarding the same from Security Guard Virginia Morico (SG
Morico). However, SG Morico inadvertently dated the
certification October 11, 1999, instead of November 11, 1999.
When Judge Contreras called the attention of SG Morico of the
wrong date, the latter took the certification and went straight to
respondent’s chambers. After leaving the chambers, SG Morico
became "belligerent and discourteous" and refused to return
the certification to Judge Contreras. Thus, Judge Contreras
sought the assistance of Judge Sancho Dames and 2nd
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Leo Intia in order to retrieve the
aforesaid certification from SG Morico, but to no avail.
Thereafter, Judge Contreras learned that respondent had
berated the guards of the Hall of Justice, including SG Morico,
for issuing the certification, and that SG Morico and Head
Guard Quintin Fernandez tried to conceal the alleged acts of
grave abuse of authority by respondent.3
Second, during the latter part of October 1999, Acting Presiding
Judge Rosita Lalwani (Judge Lalwani) of the MTC of Mercedes,
Camarines Norte called respondent to seek reconsideration of
her detail to another station. Respondent then berated Judge
Lalwani and accused her of being lazy and abusive like the
other judges of Camarines Sur who were also detailed at
Camarines Norte. Further, respondent instructed Judge Lalwani
to go slow with the trial of a BP 224 case as the accused therein
was his friend.5
Third, on October 27, 1999 and under the pretext of a judicial
visit, respondent visited Judge Contreras at the latter’s
chambers and personally intervened for one Atty. Freddie
Venida (Atty. Venida), who was previously arrested and
charged with indirect contempt for his failure to appear in three
(3) criminal cases for which he stood as an accused.
Respondent then told Judge Contreras that he does not mind
Atty. Verida’s abusive practice as he gives him gold which was
abundant in Paracale, Camarines Norte. Respondent further
sneered at Judge Contreras for "not exploiting the situation" and
intimated to the latter that Atty. Venida would give him gold.
Judge Contreras rejected respondent’s indecent overtures,
resulting in the latter publicly announcing in open court that he
is an abusive judge for persecuting Atty. Venida.6
Fourth, lawyers, prosecutors, and litigants complained about the
habitual absenteeism of respondent, especially during Mondays
and Fridays, resulting in delays in the disposition of cases in
violation of existing laws and circulars on speedy trial.7
Lastly, upon assumption as Executive Judge, respondent
ordered Clerk of Court Atty. Perfecto Loria (Atty. Loria) to submit
all petitions for extra-judicial foreclosures to him for scrutiny,
especially those requiring publication upon filing, resulting in the
delay in the proceedings. Respondent also ordered Atty. Loria
to ask for "grease money" from the newspaper publishers under
the pain of being blacklisted. Atty. Loria, however, never
obeyed respondent regarding this matter.8
Pursuant to the OCA’s Report9 dated February 3, 2000, the
Court issued a Resolution10 dated February 28, 2000 treating
Judge Contreras’s Memorandum as an administrative
complaint to which respondent was required to comment, but
to no avail. Thus, the Court issued a Resolution11 dated July 2,
2001, ordering respondent to show cause why he should not be
disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt for such failure, and
to submit his comment on Judge Contreras’s Memorandum. As
respondent continued to ignore the said directives, the Court
issued a Resolution12 dated January 30, 2008 referring the
matter to the OCA for evaluation, report, and
recommendation.
Meanwhile, respondent filed his certificate of candidacy (COC)
for the 2002 Barangay Elections, resulting in his automatic
resignation from the service effective June 7, 2002.13
The OCA’s Report and Recommendation
In a Memorandum14 dated July 25, 2008, the OCA found
respondent administratively liable as charged, and accordingly
recommended that: (a) the case be re-docketed as a regular
administrative matter; (b) respondent’s retirement benefits be
ordered forfeited; and (c) respondent be disqualified from
reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including
government-owned and controlled corporations.15
The OCA found that respondent’s failure to comment on the
administrative complaint despite being given an opportunity to
do so is tantamount to an admission of the truth of the
allegations against him. Thus, the OCA found respondent to
have gravely abused his authority, committed grave
misconduct, and performed acts inimical to judicial service.16
The OCA also found respondent guilty of gross misconduct and
insubordination for unduly refusing to obey the Court’s repeated
orders for him to file his comment on the instant administrative
case against him.17
Further, the OCA considered respondent’s filing of a COC for
the 2002 Barangay Elections that resulted in his automatic
resignation "as a mere convenient ploy for a ‘graceful exit’ from
the judiciary and to evade liability on his part."18 In this relation,
the OCA opined that respondent’s automatic resignation
during the pendency of the case did not divest the Court of its
jurisdiction to pronounce whether or not respondent was guilty
or innocent of the charges against him.19
Finally, the OCA held that respondent’s acts would have
warranted the imposition of the penalty of dismissal but due to
his automatic resignation, it recommended, instead, that he be
meted the aforesaid penalties.20
The Issue Before the Court
The essential issue in this case is whether or not respondent
should be held administratively liable for Grave Abuse of
Authority, Grave Misconduct, Gross Insubordination, and Acts
Inimical to Judicial Service.
The Court’s Ruling
The Court concurs with the OCA’s findings and
recommendation.
Grave abuse of authority is defined as a misdemeanor
committed by a public officer, who, under color of his office,
wrongfully inflicts upon a person any bodily harm, imprisonment,
or other injury; it is an act characterized with cruelty, severity, or
excessive use of authority.21
Misconduct, on the other hand, is a transgression of some
established and definite rule of action, more particularly,
unlawful behavior or gross negligence by the public officer. To
warrant dismissal from service, the misconduct must be grave,
serious, important, weighty, momentous, and not trifling. The
misconduct must imply wrongful intention and not a mere error
of judgment and must also have a direct relation to and be
connected with the performance of the public officer’s official
duties amounting either to maladministration or willful,
intentional neglect, or failure to discharge the duties of the
office. In order to differentiate grave misconduct from simple
misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate
the law, or flagrant disregard of established rule, must be
manifest in the former.22
Needless to say, these acts are inimical to judicial service, and
thus, constitute conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service as they violate the norm of public accountability and
diminish – or tend to diminish – the people’s faith in the
Judiciary.23
In the instant case, the OCA correctly found respondent guilty
of the charges against him. As aptly pointed out, respondent’s
failure to file a comment despite all the opportunities afforded
him constituted a waiver of his right to defend himself. In the
natural order of things, a man would resist an unfounded claim
or imputation against him. It is generally contrary to human
nature to remain silent and say nothing in the face of false
accusations. As such, respondent’s silence may thus be
construed as an implied admission and acknowledgement of
the veracity of the allegations against him.24 Hence, the Court
upholds the OCA’s findings that respondent: (a) abused his
authority in impounding the tricycle and exerted undue
influence on the security guards of the Hall of Justice in his
attempt to obstruct the investigation of Judge Contreras; (b)
was discourteous in dealing with a fellow judge when the latter
was merely asking for reconsideration of her detail to another
station; (c) used his office and position to intervene in behalf of
Atty. Venida and tolerated the latter’s abusive practice as a
lawyer in exchange for gold; (d) was habitually absent; and (e)
gave orders to Atty. Loria to submit all petitions for extra-judicial
foreclosures to him which resulted in delays in the proceedings
and asked the latter to demand "grease money" from
newspaper publishers in order not to be blacklisted.25
Further, the OCA properly found respondent guilty of Gross
Misconduct and Insubordination for refusing to comply with the
numerous directives of the Court to file a comment on the
administrative complaint against him. Verily, a judge who
deliberately and continuously fails and refuses to comply with
the resolution of the Court is guilty of the same. 26 Such willful
disobedience and disregard of the directives of the Court
constitute grave and serious misconduct affecting his fitness
and worthiness of the honor and integrity attached to his office.
27 In this case, it is noteworthy that respondent was afforded
several opportunities, not to mention a generous amount of
time to comply with the Court’s lawful orders, but he has failed
and continuously refused to heed the same. This continued
refusal to abide by the lawful directives issued by the Court is
glaring proof that he has become disinterested to remain with
the judicial system to which he purports to belong.28
Finally, the OCA correctly noted that respondent’s automatic
resignation due to his filing of a COC for the 2002 Barangay
Elections did not divest the Court of its jurisdiction in determining
his administrative liability. It is well-settled that resignation should
not be used either as an escape or an easy way out to evade
an administrative liability or administrative sanction.29 In this
light, respondent’s administrative liability for his acts stands.
The totality of respondent’s acts warrant the imposition of the
penalty of dismissal from service.1âwphi1 Corollary thereto, such
penalty carries with it the following administrative disabilities: (a)
cancellation of civil service eligibility; (b) forfeiture of retirement
and other benefits, except accrued leave credits, if any; (c)
perpetual disqualification from re-employment in any
government agency or instrumentality, including any
governmentowned and controlled corporation or government
financial institution; and (d) bar from taking the civil service
examinations.30
In this instance, since respondent had been deemed to have
automatically resigned from his position due to his filing of a
COC in the 2002 Barangay Elections, only the aforesaid
administrative disabilities can be imposed upon him.

It must be emphasized that those in the Judiciary serve as

sentinels of justice, and any act of impropriety on their part
immeasurably affects the honor and dignity of the Judiciary THIRD DIVISION
and the people’s confidence in it. The Institution demands the
best possible individuals in the service and it had never and will A.M. No. RTJ-13-2363 (Formerly OCA IPI No. 13-4149-RTJ),
never tolerate nor condone any conduct which would violate February 25, 2015
the norms of public accountability, and diminish, or even tend
SAMAHAN NG MGA BABAE SA HUDIKATURA (SAMABAHU),
to diminish, the faith of the people in the justice system. As such,
Complainant, v. JUDGE CESAR O. UNTALAN, REGIONAL TRIAL
the Court will not hesitate to rid its ranks of undesirables who
COURT, BRANCH 149, MAKATI CITY, Respondent.
undermine its efforts towards an effective and efficient
administration of justice, thus tainting its image in the eyes of the DECISION
public.31
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
WHEREFORE, respondent Executive Judge Owen B. Amor of the
The present administrative case stemmed from an unsigned
Regional Trial Court of Daet, Camarines Norte, is found GUILTY
letter received by the Office of the Chief Justice (OCJ) on April
of Grave Abuse of Authority, Grave Misconduct, Acts Inimical to
18, 2013, purportedly written by a group of female court
Judicial Service, and Insubordination and would have been
employees styled as “Samahan ng mga Babae sa Hudikatura”
DISMISSED from service, had he not been deemed
(SAMABAHU).
automatically resigned effective June 7, 2002. Accordingly, his
civil service eligibility is CANCELLED, his retirement and other
The aforesaid letter charging respondent with sexual
benefits, except accrued leave credits which he had already
harassment reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
claimed, are hereby FORFEITED. Further, he is PERPETUALLY
DISQUALIFIED from re-employment in any government agency April 5, 2013
or instrumentality, including any government-owned and
controlled corporation or government financial institution.
Hon. Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno
SO ORDERED. Chief Justice
Supreme Court of the Philippines
P. Faura St., Manila
34. A.M. No. RTJ-13-2363 (Formerly OCA IPI No. 13-4149-RTJ),
February 25, 2015 - SAMAHAN NG MGA BABAE SA HUDIKATURA Ma’am,
(SAMABAHU), Complainant, v. JUDGE CESAR O. UNTALAN,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 149, MAKATI CITY, Tulong po, marami po kaming kasamahang babae dito sa RTC,
Respondent. Makati na binabastos at hinihipuan sa SUSO, PUWET at
harapang bahagi ng katawan ni Judge Cezar Untalan, [J]udge
ng RTC, 149, at naging Acting Judge ng RTC Br. 145.
Isa siyang MANYAKIS na nagtatago sa Bible pero kurap at
salbahe sa empleyado. Kawawa po ang mga kasama kong
sina:
1) Sarah - court aide ng Br. 149, tuwing pinapapasok siya ni
Judge Untalan sa kuwarto niya ay hinihipuan ito umiiyak na
lang.
2) Tess Rol - Stenographer ng Br. 65 at kamag-anak ni Sarah,
pinuntahan niya si Sarah sa Br. 149 para tanungin sa tsismis, pero
siya rin ay hinipuan sa PUWET ni Judge Untalan kaya minura niya
ito.
3) Weng - Clerk III, RTC 145 mas madalas siyang hipuan sa
puwet kahit galit na galit siya noong Acting Judge sa Br. 145 si
Judge Manyakis.
4) Marissa - Stenographer, Br. 145 hinipuan din sa suso.
5) Ana San Pedro - Process Server, Br. 145 HINALIKAN sa nguso
habang hinihimas ang SUSO.
6) Sarah - Interpreter, Br. 145. Hinalikan din at hinimas ang suso.
May nakakita po sa kanila. Ang 2 nasa huli (Ana & Sarah) ay
pumayag na pagsamantalahan dahil lahat sila ay takot sa
banta ni Judge na ibabagsak ang performance rating noon.
7) Aurora - Legal Researcher, Br. 149. Dinukot din ni Judge
Untalan ang gilid ng suso.
NATATAKOT PO SILA para daw pong BALIW si Judge,
ipapsychological test po siya.
SAKLOLO ipatawag po niyo sila upang malaman ang totoo.
SUSPENDEHIN MUNA si manyakis habang iniimb[e]stigahan o
ilipat sa ibang Br. sa Metro Manila ‘wag sa Makati.
Alam po ito ng Judge ng 145 na si Judge Calpatura, at marami
pang Huwes. Pati ba sila ay takot kay Judge Untalan?
Mayabang siya at bastos, pag binati mo siya ng “Good
morning Judge” ang isasagot parati sa iyo ay “What is good in
the morning?.
Corrupt siya at yumaman nang maging Judge ng “Commercial
Court.” We challenge you your Honor, gawin niyong “Drugs
Court” siya para di siya kumita. Tingnan niyo ang Administrative
cases niya NAPAKARAMI. Malakas daw siya sa inyo at kay DCA
Delorino at Vice-President Binay. (Bakit matagal idecide mga
administrative case niya?)
Noong isang Linggo sinigawan niya at hiniya si Atty. Jamora Br.
Clerk of Court at Process Server ng RTC Br. 56 dahil sa agawan
ng parking ng kotse niya at Judge Pascua ng Br. 56. Nilamukos
at ibinato sa mukha ng Process Server ang papel na katunayan
na kay Judge Pascua ang parking space sabay mura kay Atty.
Jamora at Process Server. BALIW NA PO SI JUDGE UNTALAN,
SAKLOLO. Babae ka rin po.
SAMAHAN NG MGA BABAE SA HUDIKATURA1
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The anonymous letter was referred to the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) which dispatched a team of four (4)
lawyers tasked to conduct a “discreet investigation” and submit
a report. The team verified the identities of the alleged victims
named in the letter thru telephone calls. They eventually met
with two female employees of Makati City RTC, namely Mrs.
Rowena “Weng” P. Ripdos (Ripdos), Clerk III at Branch 145, and
Ms. Marissa Fe B. Herradura (Herradura).

On June 17, 2013, Ripdos and Herradura executed their
respective affidavit-complaints2 before the City Prosecutor of
Makati.
In her Affidavit-Complaint,3 Ripdos alleged that on April 22,
2011, she and Herradura remained at Branch 145 while their
office mates went out for lunch. Respondent suddenly arrived
and shouted for her to come inside the chambers. She was
made to sit infront of respondent’s table while respondent
looked angrily at her. She then asked “Bakit po, Judge?” and
respondent inquired if her husband was around. When she
replied that her husband, who is an employee of the Makati
City Hall detailed at Branch 145, was not there, respondent
quickly stood up saying “pahalik” while holding her cheeks. She
hurriedly rose from her seat and told respondent she was going
out but he also stood up, saying “sandali! pahalik ulit.”
Respondent embraced her and kissed her on the neck and
chest while rubbing his body against hers. She tried to push him
away but respondent knelt down with one hand clasping her
waist while the other was on her breast. Respondent’s face was
slumped on her womb while her hand was on her breast; his
body seemed to be “nanggigigil.” When respondent stopped
and released her, she quickly went out of the chambers and
ran towards Herradura. She narrated to Herradura what
respondent did to her and Herradura exclaimed “Putang-inang
Judge, iyan pati ako pinisil ang aking suso” at the same time
demonstrating how respondent pinched her breast.
After the alleged incident, Ripdos claimed that respondent
threatened her with a low performance rating and transfer to
the Office of the Clerk of Court (OCC). Since then, she tried to
avoid the respondent but when the time for accomplishing the
employees’ performance ratings came, respondent summoned
her and her husband. Respondent declared that he intended
to write this Court to request for her removal and attach her
performance rating with “Satisfactory” grade. When she
retorted that she will just respond to such charge, he got mad
and told her she is hard-headed and that he will talk to the
judge who will replace him at Branch 145 to give her a low
rating. At this point, she told respondent that he knows what he
did to her. Upon hearing this, respondent changed his mood
and calmly told them that he actually went to church where St.
Andrew pleaded to him because if she is dismissed from her job,
she and her husband would be pitiful and they would have no
means to send their children to school, and respondent would
see them living on the streets while his car passes by them.
Respondent then warned her not to complain to the
administration because no one will believe her, she is just an
employee and her enemy is a Judge and he can have her
removed.
Herradura corroborated the statement of Ripdos that she
divulged to her what respondent did to her. She narrated her
own experience with respondent whom she claimed pinched
her breast twice while she was working infront of the computer
and respondent was standing behind her. When she asked
respondent why, the latter did not answer and just left. She felt
shaken and later told everybody in Branch 146 and her office,
and also Atty. Danilo Lacson, what happened to her. Sometime
thereafter, respondent called her to his chambers and told him
that her office mates have many stories about her. She
repeatedly denied it but respondent kept on saying she was
lying. Respondent also asked her to report to him what Anna,
Sarah and “Tatang” (retired clerk) have been saying about him,
which confused her because these were his loyal employees
and thus she refused. Respondent then said the reason he
called for her was to tell her he will give her a low performance
rating if she will not apologize right away, but she told him she
does not know what she has to apologize for. After this,
respondent said her office mates dislike her because she does
not talk to them. She dared him to call all her office mates to
confront them but respondent said “Never mind, no need.”
Respondent then reiterated he was going to give her a low
performance rating, and when she asked why respondent said
“I don’t have to tell you, you know.” He even made her read
each criterion in the performance rating sheet, saying she
would fail. Again, he insinuated at another employee
(“Tatang”) who supposedly complained that she does not talk
to him, and she denied having dealt negatively with said
employee. She told respondent that she and her office mates
have been together for 20 years already and have not
quarreled until now, which respondent did not take well as it
alluded to him as the reason for the rift. When respondent
insisted he will still give her a low rating, she replied that she will
just fight it and told him he was being unfair and unjust. Realizing
that she will not apologize to him, he asked how the matter was
going to end and she told him it was him who is more broad-
minded.4cralawlawlibrary
In their Report5 dated October 1, 2013, the investigating team
submitted the foregoing affidavits and stated that they have
gathered information that the following staff members serve
as the “eyes and ears”
of respondent: Myrna Dizon and Roberto Guilang (locally
funded employees) and Eugyne del Rosario (Clerk III, Branch
149, RTC Makati City). The team said it is necessary to place
respondent under suspension “to literally clear the air and
ensure an unhampered investigation”6 as they believed once
respondent is suspended, “more victims will come out or it will
be easier for the Team to reach out and solicit more
information/evidence.”7 It was further recommended that Dizon
and Guilang be recalled to their mother unit while del Rosario in
the meantime should be detailed to the OCC-RTC Makati City.
After evaluation, the OCA concluded that the allegations in the
anonymous complaint are far from being figments of the
imagination as the complainants described in detail their
experience with respondent. It thus recommended that the
case be docketed as a regular administrative matter and
referred to the Court of Appeals (CA) Presiding Justice to be
raffled off among their Justices for investigation, report and
recommendation. Respondent was placed under preventive
suspension and directed to file his comment to be submitted to
the CA Investigating Justice. Further, the OCA ordered that del
Rosario be detailed to the OCC-RTC Makati City, and that Dizon
and Guilang return to the City Government of Makati.
In his Comment,8 respondent denied all the allegations of
improper conduct imputed to him and submitted the
supporting affidavits of his three female employees (Atty. Grace
C. Tang-Togado, Branch Clerk of Branch 149; Shara Joy Brillo,
Branch 149 Court Aide; and Aurora T. Usero-Jackson, Legal
Researcher II at Branch 149). He argued that the standard of
substantial evidence is not met in this case considering that the
alleged date mentioned by Ripdos in her affidavit, April 22,
2011, was in fact an official holiday as it was Good Friday. The
manner in which the “discreet investigation” was conducted
was likewise assailed by respondent, pointing out that the OCA
team’s findings were apparently based on hearsay from
unnamed sources. Respondent also lamented the fate of Dizon,
Guilang and del Rosario who were unjustly labeled as “moles”
by anonymous, unevaluated sources. He stressed that the team
itself admitted the flaws in their investigation, as they had to
resort to measures in order for them to reach out and “solicit
more information/evidence.” As to the charge of corruption,
respondent asserted there was no evidence on record except
for the allegation in the anonymous letter. Accordingly, he
prayed for the dismissal of the complaint.

The case was assigned to CA Justice Danton Q. Bueser who
conducted hearings where the following witnesses testified:
Atty. Analiza T. Parra (OCA), Ripdos, Herradura, Herman
Manigbas, respondent Judge Untalan, Shara Joy Brillo, Rosanna
San Pedro and Ma. Aurora Usero-Jackson.
In his Final Report and Recommendation, Justice Bueser found
respondent guilty beyond reasonable doubt of sexual
harassment as he exercised moral ascendancy over the
complaining female court employees. He found the testimonies
given by Ripdos and Herradura credible and that their silence
for two years before filing the present complaint can be
explained by their fear of losing their jobs. On respondent’s
denial, Justice Bueser declared that it cannot prevail over the
witnesses’ credible testimony. He thus recommended that
respondent be meted the penalty of dismissal from the service
with forfeiture of retirement benefits except accrued leave
credits.
After thorough evaluation of the records, we are unable to
concur with the findings and conclusions of the Investigating
Justice.
In administrative proceedings, the complainant has the burden
of proving the allegations in his complaint with substantial
evidence, i.e., that amount of relevant evidence which a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a
conclusion.9 Further, it is settled that the assessment of the
credibility of witnesses is a function primarily lodged in the
Investigating Justice.10 The findings of investigating magistrates
are generally given great weight by the Court by reason of the
unmatched opportunity to see the deportment of the witnesses
as they testified.11 The rule which concedes due respect, and
even finality, to the assessment of credibility of witnesses by trial
judges in civil and criminal cases applies a fortiori to
administrative cases.12 However, there are some exceptions to
the rule according finality to the trial judge’s assessment of a
witness’ testimony, such as when his evaluation was reached
arbitrarily or when the trial court overlooked, misunderstood or
misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and
substance which would affect the result of the
case.13cralawlawlibrary
In this case, the OCA and the Investigating Justice found
credible the allegation of Ripdos that respondent made sexual
advances on her despite respondent’s assertion that such
incident could not have happened considering that the date
stated in her Affidavit (dated June 17, 2013) - April 22, 2011- was
Good Friday, a regular holiday and hence all government
offices including courts are closed. Notably, it was only during
the investigation proper at the CA that Ripdos corrected herself
in her Judicial Affidavit14 dated June 2, 2014, after respondent
had raised the issue in his Comment,
thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
88. QUESTION: Sinasabi ni Judge Untalan sa kanyang Motion for
Reconsideration at Comment na ang date na April 22, 2011,
kung kelan nangyari umano ang pangmo-molestiya sa iyo, ay
Biyernes Santo o Good Friday. Nabasa mo ba ito?
ANSWER: Opo.
89. QUESTION: So kung Good Friday ang April 22, 2011, bakit mo
nasabi na ikaw at si Marissa Herradura ay nasa opisina nuong
araw na ito?
ANSWER: Maari po na ako ay nagkamali sa pagsabing April 22,
2011, pero sigurado po ako na naganap sa araw ng Biyernes sa
petsang April 2011 yung pangmo-molestiya sa akin ni Judge
Untalan.
90. QUESTION: Paano ka nakaka-siguro na araw ng Biyernes,
April 2011, nangyari ang insidente?
ANSWER: Kasi po wash day po kami kapag Biyernes, hindi po
kami required mag[-]uniform.
91. QUESTION: Sabi mo wash day kayo nuong Biyernes na iyon,
natatandaan mo ba kung ano ang suot mo nuong araw na
iyon?
ANSWER: Opo, sir.
92. QUESTION: Ano ang suot mo nuong araw na iyon?
ANSWER: Ako po ay naka-jacket na maong, pulang blouse at
maong na pantalon.
93. QUESTION: Bakit mo naa-alala ang suot mo nuong araw na
iyon samantalang 3 taon na ang nakakalipas?
ANSWER: Hindi ko po makakalimutan ang aking suot nuong
Biyernes na iyon dahil may ginawa sa akin si Judge Untalan na
hindi maganda at hindi mawala sa aking memorya.15 (Italics
supplied)
It may be recalled that as early as June 13, 2013, the OCA team
gave Ripdos a copy of her Affidavit so she can read and review
the same. When the team returned on June 17, 2013, Ripdos
when queried on the contents of her affidavit said that she was
satisfied with it and did not make any correction on the date of
the alleged incident stated therein.16 Her claim that it was pure
oversight on her part is thus difficult to believe, and so with her
silence for two years when, except for Herradura, she had not
complained to the proper authorities about respondent’s
improper act.
Respondent vehemently denied the charge of sexual
harassment. On Ripdos’ claim, he presented the following
documentary evidence to prove that on all Fridays of April 2011,
except April 22, he conducted hearings on his own court
(Branch 149)17:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
1. Certification dated July 9, 2014 issued by Branch Clerk
Atty. Danilo C. Lacson stating that hearings of cases
presided by Judge Cesar O. Untalan at Branch 145 were
regularly scheduled at 2:00 p.m. on Mondays, Tuesdays
and Wednesdays, except for some instances when
Judicial Dispute Resolutions were at times held on
Thursdays in the afternoon, and that for the month of
April 2011, these were held at 2:00 p.m.;
2. Court Calendar, Journal entries of scheduled hearings
and Minutes of hearings, as well as Orders issued by
Judge Cesar O. Untalan at Branch 149 on the Fridays of
April 2011, except April 22, the court sessions starting at
8:30 a.m., and hearing of motions at 2:00 p.m.
The OCA contends that these pieces of evidence are irrelevant
because as narrated by Ripdos, the incident took place during
lunch break and it lasted for only a few minutes. It points out
that while Atty. Tang-Togado testified that she normally sees
respondent taking his lunch at the canteen, she admitted that
she does not know his whereabouts after that. However, the
OCA failed to consider the fact that since respondent had no
scheduled hearing at Branch 145, where he was merely a
Pairing Judge, and with his hands full of hearings morning and
afternoon at Branch 149, it was unlikely that on one Friday of
April, respondent would momentarily escape to Branch 145 at
lunch break to commit the act of sexual harassment imputed to
him by Ripdos. Meanwhile, Atty. Tang-Togado clarified that
while she leaves the canteen after buying her lunch, with
respondent there still eating, the latter usually returns to their
office (Branch 149) after eating his lunch, then takes a nap,
comes out at 1:00 to 1:30 p.m. to ask about his scheduled
hearings for the day, and conducts hearing again at 2:00 p.m.
Under Section 3 of A.M. No. 03-03-13-SC (Re: Rule on
Administrative Procedure in Sexual Harassment Cases and
Guidelines on Proper Work Decorum in the Judiciary), work-
related sexual harassment is committed by an official or
employee in the Judiciary who, having authority, influence or
moral ascendancy over another in a work environment,
demands, requests or otherwise requires any sexual favor from
the other, regardless of whether the demand, request or
requirement for submission is accepted by the latter. It is
committed when “the sexual favor is made as a condition in the
hiring or in the employment, re-employment or continued
employment of said individual, or in granting said individual
favorable compensation, terms, conditions, promotions, or
privileges; or the refusal to grant the sexual favor results in
limiting, segregating or classifying the employee which in any
way would discriminate, deprive or diminish employment
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect said
employee.”18cralawlawlibrary
In this case, while respondent exercised moral ascendancy over
Ripdos and Herradura, his subordinates at Branch 145 where he
had temporarily presided as Pairing Judge at the time, the
alleged sexual advances by respondent were not proven with
moral certainty. We find that the totality of evidence failed to
convince that respondent committed the acts imputed against
him.
For one, SAMABAHU appears to be a non-existent group as
Ripdos and Herradura, and the other female court employees
who testified for respondent, all declared they had not known
nor heard about such organization. This Court has stressed that
an anonymous complaint is always received with great caution,
originating as it does from an unknown author. But such nature
of the complaint does not always justify its outright dismissal for
being baseless or unfounded, as it may easily be verified and
may, without much difficulty, be substantiated by other
competent evidence.19 While the herein letter-complaint may
be treated as an anonymous complaint, the Court must still
prudently examine it in the light of all evidence presented.
The letter-complaint not only raised serious allegations of
improper conduct against respondent, it also listed no less than
seven female employees in Makati City RTC who were allegedly
victims of sexual harassment perpetrated by respondent. The
OCA team’s “discreet investigation” resulted in the affidavits of
Ripdos and Herradura procured through coordination with
Makati RTC Clerk of Court, Atty. Engracio M. Escasinas, Jr..
Accusing some staff members of Branch 149 as “moles”, the
OCA team had them transferred and respondent placed under
preventive suspension because supposedly such measure will
pave the way for more victims to come out or it will be easier for
the team “to reach out and solicit more information/evidence”.
But on the contrary, even with the suspension of respondent
and removal of his purported “eyes and ears” in his court, the
team never got to obtain any information/evidence, other than
those claims of Ripdos and Herradura, to support the charges
against him, and the team also did not investigate further in the
Office of the Executive Judge. In defense of respondent, his
Branch Clerk together with three of his female subordinates and
another employee assigned at Branch 145, who were listed in
the letter-complaint as “victims” of respondent, submitted their
respective affidavits and testified on his good character,
categorically denying having been sexually harassed at any
time by respondent.
Atty. Grace C. Tang-Togado, Branch Clerk at Branch 149,
affirmed the contents of her affidavit and identified the
documents relative to the hearings for the month of April 2011.
She worked for respondent for almost ten years and attested to
his dedication to his duties and responsibilities and his
adherence to the laws and rule in performing their functions; his
being a devout Catholic who starts his day with reading the
Bible; he would leave often during lunch break, telling her he
was going to attend Mass. Upon learning that respondent was
charged with sexual harassment, she was shocked because she
had known him as a person of morals and integrity.20 On the
work habits of respondent, she recounted that before and after
a hearing, respondent is usually at his chambers reading the
cases to be heard, reviewing the pleadings filed each day and
signing/annotating Orders he issued. On Fridays, she sees
respondent eating his lunch at the canteen, then proceed to
his chambers to take a nap, after which he comes out asking
for the cases scheduled to be heard, and thereafter conduct
hearings again in the afternoon at 2:00 p.m. Respondent usually
reports for work at 8:00 a.m. and leaves the court at 5:00 p.m.,
and he is not fond of going out of his sala as he seldom
socializes with other people. She normally sees respondent
eating his lunch at the canteen and usually goes back to their
office after having his lunch.21cralawlawlibrary
Ma. Aurora Usero-Jackson, Legal Researcher at Branch 149, was
the “Aurora” mentioned in the letter-complaint. She testified
that she felt bad upon being shown said letter because it
contains false allegations. Despite her inclusion in the list of
alleged victims, she was never contacted by anyone to verify
such allegation.22 She confirmed her statements in her Affidavit
where she described respondent as a diligent, dedicated and
hardworking Judge who imparted to his staff his high standards
of work ethics, as well as his moral and religious principles,
always showing concern for the welfare of his staff, and inspires
them to become better individuals. She vehemently denied
that respondent committed any sexual misconduct on her
person and neither has she experienced anything offensive in
the workplace, and likewise not heard of the existence of
SAMABAHU nor have knowledge of the alleged sexual
complaints against the respondent.23cralawlawlibrary
Shara Joy Brillo, Court Aide at Branch 149, testified she was the
“Sarah” mentioned (No. 1) in the letter-complaint, and learned
about the case filed against respondent sometime in October
2013. She told respondent that she had nothing to do with the
complaint as no association or person even approached her.
She voluntarily executed her affidavit as she could not believe
respondent can do such things. She knows another Sarah, court
interpreter at Branch 145 whom she asked if respondent had
done anything bad to her but she replied in the negative. The
latter also confided to her that there was some
misunderstanding among her office mates at the time and
Sarah feared that the other staff of Branch 145 were against her
because she had wanted to testify for
respondent.24cralawlawlibrary
Rosanna San Pedro, former Process Server of Branch 145 and
now Barangay Captain of Napindan, affirmed that she was the
“Ana San Pedro” mentioned in the letter-complaint. She
testified that the alleged lewd act of respondent against her
never happened. As to SAMABAHU, it was only at the hearing of
the case that she heard about such group. She denied the
claim of Herradura that she was also present when Herradura
was being molested by respondent.25cralawlawlibrary
Sarah Cuares, Court Interpreter of Branch 145 testified that she is
the “Sarah” mentioned (No. 6) in the letter-complaint and
denied that respondent sexually harassed her, nor that anyone
else had witnessed that respondent was molesting her and
another female staff. While she admitted that Ripdos is her
office mate, she had no idea that Ripdos has executed an
affidavit against respondent. As to Herradura, she recalled that
she had been telling stories that she (Herradura) was pinched
by respondent at her back. Since she was busy working at the
time, she did not pay attention to such story.26cralawlawlibrary
The foregoing testimonies of witnesses who have worked more
closely with respondent on a daily basis, testifying as they did in
a candid, spontaneous and straightforward manner, and there
being no reason to believe they had any other motive in
testifying except to tell the truth, put serious doubts on the
veracity of the allegations of Ripdos and Herradura.
To refute the declarations of respondent’s witnesses, counsel for
complainants (Atty. James Navarrete) presented their rebuttal
witness, Herman L. Manigbas, an employee of the City
Government of Makati who is detailed at the office of Atty.
Escasinas (OCC) as Court Aide at Branch 149, and had been
office mates with Shara Brillo from 1988 to 2007. Manigbas
made a sketch showing their respective desks at the office. On
the alleged sexual advances committed by respondent against
Brillo, he had seen this many times from 2005 to 2006. About ten
times, he saw respondent holding Brillo at the side of her breast.
On Brillo’s denial that these happened, he said that Brillo was
just afraid to tell the truth because she might lose her job.
Although they always talked, he never asked her about it
especially since respondent did it jokingly. As to Aurora Usero-
Jackson, he claimed that he also witnessed about three times
respondent holding the side of her breast but did not complain
and simply goes to Atty. Tang-Togado. He worked at Branch
149 only until 2007 when respondent had him transferred and it
was Atty. Escasinas who accepted him at the OCC as casual
employee.27cralawlawlibrary
We are not persuaded by this bare claim of Manigbas who
could not even state the date, time and factual circumstances
when he allegedly witnessed respondent’s improper behavior.
Moreover, giving weight to his testimony aimed at disproving
the alleged victims’ categorical declarations in court, is an
affront to the dignity and reputation of these women who have
categorically and publicly denied they were sexually molested
by respondent.
In sum, the Court finds that Ripdos and Herradura failed to
substantiate their charges against respondent by the required
quantum of proof. While it is true that their affidavits were
replete with details describing the alleged sexual advances,
such detailed narration by itself will not suffice and will not
automatically result in a guilty verdict. Ripdos never reported
the alleged lascivious acts by respondent to the proper
authorities until two years later when the OCA team went to
their branch. This seeming lack of urgency on her part in taking
concrete administrative action against a wayward judge bears
heavily on her case.
The same thing can be said of Herradura, who appeared to
have told everybody at Branch 149 and Branch 145 her story
about respondent pinching the side of her breast, and yet
failing to complain before the proper authorities considering
that the alleged infraction took place within the court premises.
Rosanna San Pedro even denied Herradura’s claim that she
was also present when the aforesaid incident allegedly took
place. In contrast, respondent presented credible testimonial
and documentary evidence leading to a reasonable
conclusion that he could not have committed the alleged
sexual advances.
Based on the foregoing findings, there is no sufficient evidence
to create a moral certainty that Judge Cesar O. Untalan
committed the acts complained of.
Administrative complaints against members of the judiciary are
viewed by this Court with utmost care, for proceedings of this
nature affect not only the reputation of the respondents
concerned, but the integrity of the entire judiciary as well.28
Considering that the complainants failed to present substantial
evidence to prove the alleged sexual advances committed
against them by respondent, elementary justice dictates that
he be exonerated from the said charge.

WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Cesar O. Untalan is hereby
EXONERATED of the charges against him. The present
administrative complaint is accordingly DISMISSED for lack of
sufficient factual basis.
SO ORDERED.chan
35. A.M. No. RTJ-14-2367 January 13, 2014
(formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 12-3879-RTJ)
SR. REMY ANGELA JUNIO, SPC and JOSEPHINE D. LORICA,
Complainants,
vs.
JUDGE MARIVIC A. CACATIAN-BELTRAN, BRANCH 3, REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT TUGUEGARAO CITY, CAGAYAN, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
BRION, J.:
For our resolution is the Report and Recommendation1 dated
August 13, 2013 of the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA)
in OCA LP.I. No. 12-3879-RTJ.
The Antecedents
Claire Ann Campos, a 17-year old student, filed an affidavit-
complaint for violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7610 (the Child
Abuse Law) and R.A. No. 7277 (the Magna Carta for the
Disabled) before the Tuguegarao City Prosecution Office
against Sr. Remy Angela Junio and Dr. Josephine D. Lorica, the
President and the Dean of the School of Health Services,
respectively, of St. Paul University of the Philippines (SPUP).
In her complaint, Claire alleged that she was refused enrolment
by SPUP for the B.S. Nursing course in her sophomore year
because of her cleft palate; she alleged that the refusal was
made despite her completion of SPUP’s College Freshmen
Program Curriculum.
In its resolution dated August 22, 2008, the prosecutor’s office
found probable cause to indict Junio and Lorica of the crimes
charged, and recommended the filing of the corresponding
informations against them.
On September 8, 2008, Junio and Lorica appealed the August
22, 2008 resolution of the prosecutor’s office, but Undersecretary
Jose Vicente Salazar of the Department of Justice (DOJ) denied
their petition for review in his resolution of February 24, 2011.
On March 31, 2011, the prosecutor’s office filed two
informations against Junio and Lorica for violations of Section
10(a), Article VI, in relation with Article 3(a) and (b) of R.A. No.
7610, and Section 12 of R.A. No. 7277 before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 4, Tuguegarao City, presided by Judge
Lyliha Aquino.
On April 27, 2011, the cases were assigned to Judge Marivic A.
Cacatian-Beltran of the RTC, Branch 3, Tuguegarao City, due to
the inhibition of Judge Aquino.
On April 4, 2011, Junio and Lorica sought a reconsideration of
the DOJ’s February 24, 2011 resolution.
On May 5, 2011, the RTC found probable cause to issue
warrants of arrest against Junio and Lorica. Accordingly, it
issued the warrants of arrest against them.
On May 24, 2011, Lorica posted bail for her provisional liberty.
On May 25, 2011, Junio and Lorica filed an urgent motion to
hold in abeyance further proceedings and to recall warrants of
arrest. Junio posted bail on the same day.
In its order dated June 14, 2011, the RTC denied Junio and
Lorica’s urgent motion to hold in abeyance further proceedings
and to recall warrants of arrest.
Meanwhile, DOJ Secretary Leila de Lima granted Junio and
Lorica’s motion for reconsideration and set aside the February
24, 2011 resolution of Undersecretary Salazar. Accordingly, in her
resolution dated August 8, 2011, she directed the Cagayan
Provincial Prosecutor to immediately cause the withdrawal of
the informations for violations of R.A. Nos. 7610 and 7277 against
Junio and Lorica for lack of probable cause.
On August 12, 2011, Junio and Lorica filed a manifestation and
motion before the RTC, praying for the cancellation of their
scheduled arraignment, and for the dismissal of the cases
against them.
On September 5, 2011, the City Prosecutor, Junio and Lorica
filed a joint motion to withdraw informations in view of Secretary
De Lima’s August 8, 2011 resolution.
On September 14, 2011, Judge Cacatian-Beltran issued an
order stating that "the motion relative to the resolution of the
Department of Justice is deemed submitted for resolution."2
On December 20, 2011, Junio, Lorica and the City Prosecutor
filed a joint motion for resolution.
In its order of January 6, 2012, the RTC denied the joint motion to
withdraw informations for lack of merit.
The City Prosecutor, Junio and Lorica moved to reconsider this
order, but the RTC denied their motion in its order dated April
10, 2012.
The Administrative Complaint
Junio and Lorica filed an affidavit-complaint against Judge
Cacatian-Beltran for violation of Rules 1.02, 3.01, 3.02, and 3.05
of the Code of Judicial Conduct. They alleged that Judge
Cacatian-Beltran only resolved the joint motion to withdraw
informations after almost four months from the time it was
submitted for resolution. They claimed that four months was
beyond the period prescribed by existing rules for the resolution
of simple motions.
Junio and Lorica further alleged that Judge Cacatian-Beltran
"arrogated unto herself the role of a prosecutor and a judge"3
when she insisted that they stand for trial although she did not
find any grave abuse of discretion on the part of Justice
Secretary De Lima.
In her comment, Judge Cacatian-Beltran explained that Junio
and Lorica might have conducted a follow-up of the motions to
dismiss at Branch 4 where the records of the criminal cases had
been retained, and that the staff of Branch 4 failed to inform
her of any follow-up by Junio and Lorica and/or by their
counsel. She maintained that she "lost no time in finishing the
draft"4 of her January 6, 2012 order when the joint motion for
resolution was brought to her attention.
Judge Cacatian-Beltran maintained that the RTC was not
bound by the findings of the Secretary of Justice since her court
had already acquired jurisdiction over the case. She added
that she made an independent assessment of the evidence
before denying the motion. She further stated that she acted
promptly on all other incidents in the case.
The OCA’s Report and Recommendation
In its Report and Recommendation dated August 13, 2013, the
OCA recommended that: (1) the administrative complaint
against Judge Cacatian-Beltran be dismissed for being judicial
in nature; and (2) Judge Cacatian-Beltran be admonished to
strictly comply with the reglementary periods to act on pending
motions and other incidents in her court.
The OCA held that errors committed by a judge in the exercise
of his adjudicative functions cannot be corrected through
administrative proceedings. It explained that the aberrant acts
allegedly committed by Judge Cacatian-Beltran relate to the
exercise of her judicial functions, and added that only judicial
errors tainted with fraud, dishonesty, gross ignorance, bad faith
or deliberate intent to do an injustice should be administratively
sanctioned.
The OCA, nonetheless, ruled that Judge Cacatian-Beltran
should be admonished to be more mindful of the reglementary
periods to resolve pending motions.
Our Ruling
After due consideration, we approve and adopt the OCA’s
recommendations as our own ruling.
Delay in resolving a motion
Section 15(1), Article VIII of the Constitution requires lower court
judges to decide a case within the period of ninety (90) days.
Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct likewise
holds that judges should administer justice without delay and
directs every judge to dispose of the courts’ business promptly
within the period prescribed by law. Rules prescribing the time
within which certain acts must be done are indispensable to
prevent needless delays in the orderly and speedy disposition of
cases. Thus, the ninety (90) day period is mandatory. This
mandate applies even to motions or interlocutory matters or
incidents pending before a magistrate.5
In the present case, the City Prosecutor’s joint motion to
withdraw informations was deemed submitted for resolution on
September 14, 2011. Judge Cacatian-Beltran, however, did not
act on the motion within the prescribed three (3) month period
(or up to December 13, 2011), and instead ruled on it only on
January 6, 2012.
In her defense, Judge Cacatian-Beltran explained that Junio
and Lorica might have conducted a follow-up of the motions to
dismiss at Branch 4 where the records of the criminal cases were
retained, and that the staff of Branch 4 failed to inform her of
any follow-up by Junio and Lorica and/or their counsel. We
note, however, that Branch 4 is paired with Judge Cacatian-
Beltran’s Branch 3 per Circular No. 7-74, as amended by SC
Circular No. 19-98. Since Criminal Case Nos. 14053-54 had been
assigned to Judge Cacatian-Beltran, it was incumbent upon her
to update herself on the developments in these consolidated
cases; she should have kept her own record of cases and noted
therein the status of each case to ensure prompt and effective
action. To do this, Judge Cacatian-Beltran should have
adopted a record management system and organized her
docket – an approach that she appears not to have done.
Sections 9 and 11, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended
by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC, classifies undue delay in rendering a
decision or order as a less serious charge, with the following
administrative sanctions: (a) suspension from office without
salary and other benefits for not less than one (1) nor more than
three (3) months; or (b) a fine of more than ₱10,000.00 but not
exceeding ₱20,000.00.
However, the records are bereft of any evidence showing that
there had been undue delay (as shown by the records), any
attendant bad faith, any intent to prejudice a party to the case,
or some other ulterior ends. The OCA, in fact, pointedly ruled
that the inaction was not attended with malice: Judge
Cacatian-Beltran resolved the joint motion to withdraw
informations two (2) days after she learned of its existence on
January 4, 2012.
To our mind, these circumstances are sufficient to mitigate the
liability of Judge Cacatian-Beltran and keep us from imposing a
fine or suspension from office. Accordingly, we find sufficient
and warranted the OCA’s recommended penalty of
admonition.
Denial of the joint motion to withdraw informations
The trial court is not bound to adopt the resolution of the
Secretary of Justice since it is mandated to independently
evaluate or assess the merits of the case; in the exercise of its
discretion, it may agree or disagree with the recommendation
of the Secretary of Justice. Reliance on the resolution of the
Secretary of Justice alone would be an abdication of the trial
court's duty and jurisdiction to determine a prima facie case.6
We stress that once a criminal complaint or information is filed in
court, any disposition of the case (whether it be a dismissal, an
acquittal or a conviction of the accused) rests within the
exclusive jurisdiction, competence, and discretion of the trial
court; it is the best and sole judge of what to do with the case
before it.7
In resolving a motion to dismiss a case or to withdraw the
information filed by the public prosecutor (on his own initiative
or pursuant to the directive of the Secretary of Justice), either
for insufficiency of evidence in the possession of the prosecutor
or for lack of probable cause, the trial court should not merely
rely on the findings of the public prosecutor or of the Secretary
of Justice that no crime had been committed or that the
evidence in the possession of the public prosecutor is insufficient
to support a judgment of conviction of the accused.8 To do so is
to surrender a power constitutionally vested in the Judiciary to
the Executive.
In the present case, Judge Cacatian-Beltran does not appear
to have arbitrarily denied the joint motion to withdraw
informations. The records show that she evaluated and assessed
the informations, the resolution of the City Prosecutor, the
affidavit and reply-affidavit of the complainants, the counter-
affidavit and rejoinder and the appeal memorandum of Junio
and Lorica, and the supporting documents attached to them.
In her January 6, 2012 order, Judge Cacatian-Beltran notably
explained the basis for her denial. No proof whatsoever exists in
all these, showing that bad faith, malice or any corrupt purpose
attended the issuance of her order. It is also important to note in
this regard that the issue of whether Judge Cacatian-Beltran
correctly denied the joint motion to withdraw informations,
despite the finding of Secretary De Lima of lack of probable
cause, is judicial in nature: Junio and Lorica’s remedy under the
circumstances should have been made with the proper court
for the appropriate judicial action, not with the OCA by means
of an administrative complaint.
We also find unmeritorious Junio and Lorica’s argument that
Judge Cacatian-Beltran "arrogated unto herself the role of a
prosecutor and a judge"9 when she insisted that the accused
stand trial although she did not find any grave abuse of
discretion on the part of Justice Secretary de Lima. When a
court acts, whether its action is consistent or inconsistent with a
prosecutor’s recommendation, it rules on the prosecutor’s
action and does not thereby assume the role of a prosecutor.
The case of Hipos, Sr. v. Bay10 best explains why we so rule:
To clarify, we never stated in Ledesma that a judge is allowed to
deny a Motion to Withdraw Information from the prosecution
only when there is grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
prosecutors moving for such withdrawal. Neither did we rule
therein that where there is no grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the prosecutors, the denial of the Motion to Withdraw
Information is void. What we held therein is that a trial judge
commits grave abuse of discretion if he denies a Motion to
Withdraw Information without an independent and complete
assessment of the issues presented in such Motion.
With the independent and thorough assessment and evaluation
of the merits of the joint motion to withdraw information that
Judge Cacatian-Beltran undertook before dismissing it, she
acted as a judge should and can in no way be said to have
assumed the role of a prosecutor. The parties for their part are
not without any remedy as the Rules of Court amply provide for
the remedy against a judicial action believed to· be grossly
abusive when the remedy of direct appeal is not available. We
cannot rule on this point in the present case however as this is a
matter not before us in this administrative recourse against
Judge Cacatian-Beltran.
WHEREFORE, premises considered we APPROVE AND ADOPT as
our own the August 13, 2013 Report and Recommendation of
the Office of the Court Administrator. Judge Marivic A
Cacatian-Beltran is hereby ADMONISHED and REMINDED that
she should dispose of her cases within the period required by
law.
SO ORDERED.
36. A.M. No. SB-14-21-J September 23, 2014
[Formerly A.M. No. 13-10-06-SB]
RE: ALLEGATIONS MADE UNDER OATH AT THE SENATE BLUE
RIBBON COMMITTEE HEARING HELD ON SEPTEMBER 26, 2013
AGAINST ASSOCIATE JUSTICE GREGORY S. ONG,
SANDIGANBAYAN
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
The character of every act depends upon the circumstances in
which it is done.
- Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes
This administrative complaint was filed by the Court En Banc
after investigation into certain allegations that surfaced during
the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee Hearing indicated prima
facie violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct by an
Associate Justice of the Sandiganbayan. The investigation was
conducted motu proprio pursuant to the Court's power of
administrative supervision over members of the Judiciary.1
Factual Antecedents
In the middle of 2013, the local media ran an expose involving
billions of government funds channeled through bogus
foundations. Dubbed as the "pork barrel scam," as the money
was sourced from the Priority Development Assistance Fund
allotted to members of the House of Representatives and
Senate, the controversy spawned massive protest actions all
over the country. In the course of the investigation conducted
by the Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers
and Investigations (Blue Ribbon Committee), the names of
certain government officials and other individuals were
mentioned by "whistle-blowers" who are former employees of
the alleged mastermind, Janet Lim-Napoles (Mrs. Napoles), wife
of an ex-military officer. These personalities identified by the
whistle-blowers allegedly transacted with or attended Mrs.
Napoles' parties and events, among whom is incumbent
Sandiganbayan Associate Justice Gregory S. Ong, herein
respondent.
Benhur Luy (Luy), a cousin of Mrs. Napoles who had worked for
several years with the Napoleses, filed illegal detention charges
against Mrs. Napoles who accused him of double-dealing.
When Luy went public with his story about Mrs. Napoles'
anomalous transactions and before the warrant of arrest was
issued by the court, she reportedly tried to reach out to the
other whistle-blowers for them not to testify against her but
instead point to Luy as the one receiving and distributing the
money.
Marina Sula (Sula) executed a Sworn Statement2 before the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) on August 29, 2013, part
of which reads:
32. In the sixteen (16) years that I worked with Ms. Napoles, I
witnessed several personalities visit our offices and join us as our
special guests during our parties and other special occasions.
33. These personalities who would either visit our office or join
our events and affairs are: Senator Franklin Drilon, Senator
Jinggoy Estrada and family, Senator Bong Revilla, Lani
Mercado-Revilla, Bryan Revilla, Secretary Rene Villa,
Congressman Pichay and Wife, Congressman Plaza,
Congressman Ducut, DAR Director Theresita Panlilio, Catherine
Mae Canlas Santos, Pauline Labayen, Jen Corpuz (Staff of
Senator Sotto), Mayor Rene Maglanque, Atty. Dequina, Justice
Gregory Ong, x x x.
34. Before the warrant of arrest was issued against Ms. Napoles,
she told us that that case could take four to five years to clear.
She said, "Antayin niyo munang ma-clear pangalan ko para
makakilos ako at matulungan ko kayo". Sinabi niya na meron na
siyang kausap sa Ombudsman at sa Sandiganbayan.
35. On 28 August 2013 while me and my companions were at
the NBI, Janet Lim Napoles called me. She was crying and
ask[i]ng me not to turn my back on her, that we should stay
together. She said "kahit maubos lahat ng pera ko,
susuportahan ko kayo. Hintay[i]n nyo kasi lalabas na ang TRO
ko."
xxxx
38. Attorney Tan instructed us to implicate Benhur in case we
were asked by the NBI. He said "wala naman ipinakita sa inyong
masama si Madam (Janet Lim Napoles). Siguro wala naman
kayong sama ng loob kay madam, kaya nga idiin ninyo si
Benhur na siya ang nag-utos at saka sa kanya ninyo ibinibigay
ang pera."3 (Emphasis supplied.)
The following day, the social news network Rappler published
an article by Aries Rufo entitled "Exclusive: Napoles Parties with
Anti-Graft Court Justice" showing a photograph of Senator
Jinggoy Estrada (Senator Estrada), one of the main public
figures involved in the pork barrel scam, together with Mrs.
Napoles and respondent. The reporter had interviewed
respondent who quickly denied knowing Mrs. Napoles and
recalled that the photograph was probably taken in one of the
parties frequently hosted by Senator Estrada who is his longtime
friend. Respondent also supposedly admitted that given the
ongoing pork barrel controversy, the picture gains a different
context; nevertheless, he insisted that he has untainted service
in the judiciary, and further denied he was the one advising Mrs.
Napoles on legal strategies in connection with the Kevlar
helmet cases where she was acquitted by a Division of the
Sandiganbayan of which respondent is the Chairman and the
then Acting Presiding Justice.4
On September 12, 2013, Sula executed a "Karagdagang
Sinumpaang Salaysay "5 wherein she gave details regarding
those persons named in her sworn statement, alleged to have
visited their office or attended their events, thus:
63) T: Ayon sa paragraph Nos. 32 at 33 ng iyong sinumpaang
salaysay na may petsang 29 Agosto 2013, nabanggit mo ang
mga personalidad na nakikita mong bumibisita sa inyong
opisina o di kaya naman sa tuwing may party o special
occacions si JANET NAPOLES ay may mga special guests kayo
na kinabibilangan ng mga malalaking pulitiko at ang iba
naman ay may mga katungkulan sa gobyerno. Maari mo bang
ilahad ang mga pangyayari sa mga bawat pagkakataon na
nakita mo sila sa iyong pagkaka-alala?
S : Opo, iisa-isahin ko po ang mga pangyayari sa mga
pagkakataon na nakita ko po ang mga taong nabanggit ko:
xxxx
w) Justice GREGORY ONG - Isang beses ko po siyang nakitang
nagpunta sa office sa 2501 Discovery Centre, Ortigas at nakita
ko po silang magkausap ni Madam JANET NAPOLES sa
conference room.
x x x x6
In her testimony before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee on
September 26, 2013, Sula was asked to confirm her statement
regarding Justice Ong, thus:
THE CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Grace.
Isang tanong lang kay Ms. Sula.
Sinabi niyo kanina may tinawagan si Ms. Napoles at sinabi niya,
"Malapit na lumabas yung TRO galing sa korte." May kilala pa
ba si Janet Lim Napoles sa ltuwes sa korte sa Sandiganbayan?
MS. SULA. Hindi ko po alam.
THE CHAIRMAN. Your attention is called sa page –
MS. SULA. Sandiganbayan po, sorry. Mayroon po siyang
binanggit na ano po –
THE CHAIRMAN. Nandito sa page 20.
MS. SULA. Si Mr. Ong, po, Justice Ong po.
THE CHAIRMAN. Gregory Ong.
MS. SULA Opo.
THE CHAIRMAN. Sa Sandiganbayan?
MS. SULA. Opo.
x x x7 (Emphasis supplied.)
In a letter dated September 26, 2013 addressed to Chief Justice
Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno, respondent meticulously explained
the controversial photograph which raised questions on his
integrity as a magistrate, particularly in connection with the
decision rendered by the Sandiganbayan' s Fourth Division in
the Kevlar helmet cases, which convicted some of the accused
but acquitted Mrs. Napoles.
Respondent surmised that the photograph was taken during the
birthday of Senator Estrada in February, either in the year 2012
or 2013, but definitely not in 2010 or earlier. He explained that he
could vaguely remember the circumstances but it would have
been rude for him to prevent any guest from posing with him
and Senator Estrada during the party. On the nature of his
association with Mrs. Napoles, respondent asserted:
(4) I can categorically state, on the other hand, that I have
never attended any party or social event hosted by Mrs.
Napoles or her family, either before she had a case with our
court, or while she already had a pending case with our court,
or at any time afterwards. I have never, to use the term of Mr.
Rufo in his article, "partied" with the Napoleses. (Emphasis
supplied.)
As to the Kevlar helmet cases, respondent said it was impossible
for him to have been advising Mrs. Napoles, as claimed by Mr.
Rufo, as even the article itself noted that Mrs. Napoles' own
brother, Reynald L. Lim, ( a.k.a. Reynaldo L. Francisco), a co-
accused in the case, was convicted by the Sandiganbayan. He
stressed that these cases were decided on the merits by the
Sandiganbayan, acting as a collegial body and he was not
even the ponente of the decision. Respondent thus submitted
himself to the discretion of the Chief Justice such that even
without being required to submit an explanation, he voluntarily
did so "to defend [his] reputation as a judge and protect the
Sandiganbayan as an institution from unfair and malicious
innuendos."
On October 7, 2013, Chief Justice Sereno wrote the Members of
this Court, citing the testimonies of Luy and Sula before the
Senate Blue Ribbon Committee "[t]hat the malversation case
involving Mrs. Janet Lim-Napoles, Major Jaime G. Napoles,
Jenny Lim Napoles, Reynaldo L. Francisco and other
perpetrators was 'fixed' (inayos) through the intervention of
Justice Gregory S. Ong of the Sandiganbayan", to wit:
SEN. ANGARA. Sa inyo, hindi niyo a/am kung inayos iyong kaso
na iyon? Kasi napakaraming koneksiyon, 'di ba?
xxxx Sige, huwag kang matakot, Benhur.
MR. LUY. Alam ko, inayos ni Ms. Napoles iyon dahil may connect
nga siya sa Sandiganbayan
SEN. ANGARA. Okay.
xxxx
THE CHAIRMAN. xxx Sinabi niyo kanina na may tinawagan si Ms.
Napoles at sinabi niya "Malapit na lumabas yung TRO galing sa
korte." May kilala pa ba si Janet Lim Napoles sa huwes sa korte
sa Sandiganbayan?
xxxx
MS. SULA. Si Mr. Ong po, Justice Ong po.
THE CHAIRMAN. Gregory Ong.
MS. SULA. Opo.
THE CHAIRMAN. Sa Sandiganbayan?
MS. SULA. Opo.
Xxxx8
Chief Justice Sereno then requested the Court En Banc to
conduct an investigation motu proprio under this Court's power
of administrative supervision over members of the judiciary and
members of the legal profession (referring to notaries public
who were alleged to have purposely left their specimen
signatures, dry seals and notarial books with Mrs. Napoles to
facilitate the incorporation of non-governmental organizations
[NGOs] involved in the scam).9
Under our Resolution dated October 17, 2013, the Court En
Banc required respondent to submit his comment and directed
the NBI to furnish the Court with certified copies of the affidavit
of Luy. On November 21, 2013, the Court received respondent's
Comment.10 Respondent categorically denied any irregularity
in the Kevlar helmet cases and explained the visit he had made
to Mrs. Napoles as testified by Sula.
On Sula's statement, respondent points out that Sula never really
had personal knowledge whether respondent is indeed the
alleged "contact" of Mrs. Napoles at the Sandiganbayan; what
she supposedly "knows" was what Mrs. Napoles merely told her.
Hence, Sula's testimony on the matter is based purely on
hearsay. Assuming that Mrs. Napoles actually made the
statement, respondent believes it was given in the context of
massive media coverage of the pork barrel scam exploding at
the time. With the consciousness of a looming criminal
prosecution before the Office of the Ombudsman and later
before the Sandiganbayan, it was only natural for Mrs. Napoles
to assure Sula and others involved in their business operation
that she would not leave or abandon them and that she would
do all that she can to help them just so they would not turn their
backs on her and become whistle-blowers. Thus, even if Mrs.
Napoles made misrepresentations to Sula regarding respondent
as her "connection", she only had to do so in order to convince
Sula and her co-employees that the cases to be filed against
them would be "fixed."
As to Sula's statement that she personally witnessed respondent
at one time visiting Mrs. Napoles at her office and having a
meeting with her at the conference room, respondent said that
at the birthday party of Senator Estrada where the controversial
photograph was taken, Mrs. Napoles engaged him in a casual
conversation during which the miraculous healing power of the
robe or clothing of the Black Nazarene of Quiapo was
mentioned. When Mrs. Napoles told respondent that she is a
close friend of the Quiapo Church's parish priest, he requested
her help to gain access to the Black Nazarene icon. Eventually,
respondent, who is himself a Black Nazarene devotee and was
undergoing treatment for his prostate cancer, was given special
permission and was able to drape the Black Nazarene's robe or
clothing for a brief moment over his body and also receive a
fragrant ball of cotton taken or exposed to the holy image,
which article he keeps to this day and uses to wipe any ailing
part of his body in order to receive healing. Because of such
favor, respondent out of courtesy went to see Mrs. Napoles and
personally thank her. Respondent stressed that that was the
single occasion Sula was talking about in her supplemental
affidavit when she said she saw respondent talking with Mrs.
Napoles at the conference room of their office in Discovery
Suites.
Respondent maintains that there was nothing improper or
irregular for him to have personally seen Mrs. Napoles at the
time in order to thank her, considering that she no longer had
any pending case with his court, and to his knowledge, with any
other division of the Sandiganbayan at the time and even until
the date of the preparation of his Comment. He thus prays that
this Court duly note his Comment and accept the same as
sufficient compliance with the Court's Resolution dated October
17, 2013.
This Court upon evaluation of the factual circumstances found
possible transgressions of the New Code of Judicial Conduct
committed by respondent. Accordingly, a Resolution was issued
on January 21, 2014 stating that:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby resolves to have the instant
administrative matter RE-DOCKETED as A.M. No. SB-14-21-J (Re:
Allegations Made Under Oath at tlze Senate Blue Ribbon
Committee Hearing held on September 26, 2013 against
Associate Justice Gregory S. Ong, Sandiganbayan), and
ASSIGNS the same to retired Supreme Court Justice Angelina
Sandoval-Gutierrez for investigation, report and
recommendation within a period of sixty (60) days from notice
hereof.
The Court further resolves to NOTE the letter dated January 7,
2014 of Atty. Joffre Gil C. Zapata, Executive Clerk of Court III,
Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division, in compliance with the
resolution of the Court En Banc dated December 3, 2013,
transmitting the original records of Criminal Case Nos. 26768 and
26769. Atty. Zapata is INFORMED that there is no more need to
transmit to this Court the post-sentence investigation reports
and other reports on the supervisory history of the accused-
probationers in Criminal Case Nos. 26768 and 26769.
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Justice
Justice Angelina Sandoval-Gutierrez, a retired Member of this
Court, submitted her report with the following findings and
conclusions:
FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS
1. THE KEVLAR CASE
Two criminal cases were filed with the Sandiganbayan
sometime in 2001 - Criminal Case No. 26768 for Falsification of
Public Documents and Criminal Case No. 26769 for Violation of
Section 3(e) of the AntiGraft Law. Charged were several
members of Philippine Marine Corps and civilian employees
including Ms. Janet L. Napoles (Napoles), her mother
Magdalena Francisco (now deceased), her brother Reynaldo
Francisco and wife Anna Marie Dulguime, and her (Napoles')
three employees.
These cases are referred to as the Kevlar case because the
issue involved is the same - the questionable purchase of 500
Kevlar helmets by the Philippine Marine Corps in the amount of
₱3,865,310.00 from five suppliers or companies owned by
Napoles.
The prosecution alleged inter alia that the accused, acting in
conspiracy, released the payment although there was yet no
delivery of the Kevlar helmets; that the suppliers are mere
dummies of Napoles; and that the helmets were made in
Taiwan, not in the U.S.A.
Napoles' husband, Major Jaime Napoles, was dropped from the
two Informations in an Order issued by the Ombudsman on
March 18, 2002.
Napoles' mother, brother, and sister-in-law were among those
convicted for the lesser crime of Falsification of Public
Documents and sentenced to suffer the penalty of 4 years and
2 months of prision correccional to 8 years and 1 day of prision
mayor and each to pay PS,000.00. They all underwent
probation.
Napoles and six members of the Philippine Marine Corps were
acquitted in both cases.
The court ruled that Napoles "was not one of the dealer-payees
in the transaction in question. Even if she owns the bank
account where the 14 checks were later deposited, this does
not in itself translate to her conspiracy in the crimes charged x x
x."
xxxx
THE INVESTIGATION
xxxx
I. During the investigation, Benhur testified that he and Napoles
are second cousins. After passing the Medical Technology
Licensure Examination in 2002, he was employed in the JLN
(Janet Lim Napoles) Corporation as Napoles' personal assistant.
As such, he was in charge of disbursements of her personal
funds and those of her office. He was also in charge of
government transactions of the corporation and kept records of
its daily business activities.
In the course of Benhur's employment at the JLN Corporation,
Napoles mentioned to him the Kevlar case, then pending in the
Sandiganbayan, saying she has a "connect" in that court who
would help her.
When asked about his testimony before the Senate Blue Ribbon
Committee concerning the Kevlar case, Benhur declared that
Napoles' "connect" with the Sandiganbayan is respondent, thus:
Q The question was, Mr. Witness, this is coming from Senator
Angara, and I quote, "Kailan ho lumabas yung decision ng
Court sa Kevlar?" And just to refresh your memory, Mr. Witness,
then Ms. Sula answered, "I think 2010. Yun po yung lumabas po."
And then going forward, Senator Angara referred to both of
you this question: "Sa inyo, hindi ninyo alam kung inayos yung
kaso na iyon kasi napakaraming koneksyon, di ba? Baka alam
ng ibang whistleblowers kung nagka-ayusan sa kaso na iyon.
Sige, huwag kang matakot, Benhur." Do you remember that
question being asked from you?
xxxx
A Yes po.
Q And now Mr. Witness, about this statement of yours at the
Blue Ribbon Committee that Ms. Napoles has a certain connect
sa Sandiganbayan, who was this connect you were talking
about, if you remember?
Witness Luy
A Si Justice Gregory Ong po.
Q How do you know that Justice Gregory Ong was the connect
of Ms. Napoles at the Sandiganbayan?
A Ang sinabi po ... Si Ms. Napoles, pinsan ko po kasi we are
second cousins. So kinuwento talaga sa akin ni Madam kung
ano ang mga developments sa mga cases, kung ano ang mga
nangyayari. Tapos po, sinabi niya sa akin mismo na nakakausap
niya si Justice Gregory Ong at ang nagpakilala raw sa kanya
po ay si Senator Jinggoy Estrada.
Benhur further testified that even before the decision in the
Kevlar case was promulgated, Napoles and respondent were
already communicating with each other (nag-uusap na po
si!a). Therefore, she was sure the decision would be in her favor:
Q Do you remember the date when the decision (in Kevlar
case) was promulgated?
A Ano po, the year 2010 po ma' am.
Q And you met him (Justice Ong) in 2012?
A 2012 po, pero prior to that decision, madam, naririnig ko na
po kay madam (Ms. Napoles) kasi kinukwento na po ni madam
sa akin na nag-uusap na po sila ni Justice Gregory Ong.
Q That was after the decision was promulgated?
A Bago po nailabas yung decision, ikinwento po m Ms. Napoles
sa akin na nag-uusap na po sila ni Justice Gregory Ong. Kaya
kampante po si Ms. Napoles. Noong lumabas po yung decision,
alam niya na po. Yung ang sabi sa akin ni Ms. Napoles.
Going back to the hearing before the Blue Ribbon Committee,
Benhur told Senator Angara that Napoles fixed the Kevlar case
because she has a "connect" in the Sandiganbayan:
"Baka alam ng ibang whistle blowers kung nagkaka-ayusan sa
kaso na iyon (Kevlar case). Sige huwag kang matakot Benhur."
Benhur Luy: "Alam ko inayos ni Ms. Napoles iyon dahil may
connect nga siya sa Sandiganbayan."
On how Napoles "inayos" or fixed the Kevlar case, Benhur said
that he kept a ledger of the Sandiganbayan case wherein he
listed all her expenses in the sum of P 100 million pesos. He was
surprised why she would spend such amount considering that
what was involved in the Kevlar case was only ₱3.8 million. She
explained that she gave various amounts to different people
during the pendency of the case which lasted up to ten years.
And before the decision in the Kevlar case was released, she
also gave money to respondent but she did not mention the
amount. Thus, she knew she would be acquitted.
Q You answered Senator Angara this way which we already
quoted a while ago, "Alam ko inayos ni Ms. Napoles iyon dahil
may connect nga siya sa Sandiganbayan." You stated that the
connect is Justice Ong. Can you explain before us what you
mean, "Alam ko inayos ni Ms. Napoles iyon." What do you mean
by that "inayos"?
A Kasi po ma' am meron kaming ledger ng Sandiganbayan
case sa lahat ng nagastos ni Ms. Janet Napoles, nilista ko po
yon lahat. Kasi naririnig ko po kay Janet Napoles, parang pinsan
ko po si Janet Napoles, "Paano nagkaroon ng kaso ang ate ko?
So nadiscover ko na Jang po na yun pala yung Kevlar. So,
mahigit one hundred million na nagastos po ni Ms. Napoles kasi
di Jang naman po si sir Justice Gregory Ong ...
xxx
Q Did you come to know to whom she gave all the money?
A Wala po siyang ... basta ang sabi niya inayos na niya si ...
binaggit niya po si ... kasi si madam hindi kasi nagki-keep kasi
ako pinsan niya po kasi ako, nabanggit niya po si Justice
Gregory Ong. Sinabi niya nagbigay daw po siya ng pera kay
Justice Ong pero she never mentioned kung magkano yung
amount.
xxx
Q Nagbigay ng pera kay Justice Gregory Ong?
A Opo, yung ang sabi niya (referring to Ms. Napoles).
Q To you?
A Yes, madam.
Q Do you remember when she made that kind of statement?
A Bago po ano madam, bago po lumabas yung decision kaya
kampante na po si Ms. Napoles bago lumabas yung decision
na acquitted siya. Alam na niya. Sa Kevlar case.
xxx
Justice Gutierrez
Continue counsel.
Witness Luy
Kasi naikwento po madam ni Ms. Napoles na almost PlOO
million na ang nagastos niya. Tapos ang sabi ko nga po sa
kanya: "Madam, P 100 million na sa halagang ₱3.8 lang na PO
(purchase order) sa Kevlar helmet, tapos P 100 million na ang
nagastos mo?"
Q Did she tell you or explain to you to whom this P 100 million
was paid? How was it spent?
A Basta ang natatandaan ko ... di ko na po matandaan ang
mga dates kasi parang staggered. May ₱5 million sa ibang tao
ang kausap niya. Tapos ito naman tutulong ng ganito. lba-iba
kasi madam, eh.
Q But there was no showing the money was given to Justice
Ong?
A Wala po pero nabanggit lang po niya (Ms. Napoles) sa akin
na nagbigay po siya kay Justice Ong, but she never mentioned
the amount.
Continuing with his testimony, Benhur declared that in 2012,
respondent went twice to Napoles' office at the Discovery Suites
Center, 25 ADB Avenue, Ortigas, Pasig City. On the first visit,
Napoles introduced Justice Ong to Benhur and her other
employees.
Benhur narrated what transpired during that visit. According to
him, Napoles has so much money being placed at the Armed
Forces of the Philippines and Police Savings and Loan
Association, Inc. (AFPSLAI) which offered 13% interest annually.
Napoles called Benhur telling him that respondent would like to
avail of such interest for his BDO check of ₱25.5 million. To
arrange this, Napoles informed Benhur that she would just
deposit respondent's ₱25.5 million in her personal account with
Metro bank. Then she would issue to respondent in advance
eleven (11) checks, each amounting to ₱282,000.00 as monthly
interest, or a total of ₱3,102,000.00 equivalent to 13% interest.
Upon Justice Ong's suggestion, the checks should be paid to
cash. So, Benhur prepared the corresponding eleven (11)
checks, thus:
Q With respect to the Kevlar case, what participation did you
have, if there was any?
Witness Luy
A Noon 2012 po kasi si Justice Gregory Ong po nasa unit 2501,
yung office (of Ms. Napoles), so kami ni Janet Napoles, nandito
sa 2502 kasi yun po talaga ang office namin. Si Ms. Napoles po
sinabi niya sa akin, Ben, kasi si Ms. Napoles, may pera siyang
madarni na pine-place niya po sa AFPSLAI at yung AFPSLAI po
ay nagbibigay po sa kanya o nagooffer ng 13% interest
annually po. So, ang nangyari po <loon, sabi ni Janet Napoles,
si Justice Ong ho raw, gustong magkaroon din ng interest
parang ganoon. So tutulungan niya. So ang ginawa po namin x
x x. Q Meaning to say, Justice Ong would like to deposit
money?
A Opo.
Q So he could get 13% interest?
A Opo, kasi tapos madam ang nangyari po pumunta na po si
Ms. Napoles sa kanyang opisina. Tinawag po niya ako kasi
pinasulat na niya sa akin ang checke. So, ang ginawa po ni Ms.
Napoles, yung checke ni .. BDO check po kasi yun. Ang sabi sa
akin ni Ms. Napoles, checke daw po yun ni Justice Gregory
Ong. Sa, BDO. So, di ko naman din po nakita Madam yung
nakalagay sa ...
Q So it is the check of Justice Ong, not the check of Ms.
Napoles?
A Opo, ang amount po ng check madam ay ₱25.5 million ang
amount noong BDO check na inissue ...
Q That belongs to Justice Ong?
A Opo. Tapos madam, so ang ginawa po namin ni Ms. Napoles,
dahil po 13% interest ang ino-offer ng AFPSLAI, sabi ni Madam
ganito na lang, Ben, ipasok na lang muna natin yung check
niya sa personal account ko. Ako na lang muna for the
meantime, mag-iissue ng check sa kanya para maavail ni
Justice Ong yung interest. So, ang ginawa nan1in madam,
₱25.5 million times 13% interest, tapos divided by 12, lumalabas
₱282,000.00 or ₱283,000.00 or ₱281,000.00 po madam kasi
naground off kami sa ₱282,000.00. So, ang ginawa ni Madam,
baga monthly. So eleven (11) checks ang prinepare namin.
Kung hindi po ako nagkakamali po, JLN Corporation check ang
... Ako pa nga po ang nagsulat at saka bago po namin isinulat
yung payee, inalam pa po namin. x x x So, pumunta na naman
si madam sa 2501 kasi nandoon si Justice Gregory Ong. Noong
bumalik siya, pay to cash na lang daw. So, makikita po sa
records namin ni Ms. Napoles na pumasok ang ₱25.5 million na
amount sa kanyang account at the same time nag-issue siya
ng checke na ₱282,000.00 na eleven checks. Nagstart kami
madam 2012, siguro sometime July or August or mga ganoong
buwan po. Basta 11 checks, hindi nalalayo doon. So, siguro
tapos na.
Q But what actually turned out was that the money of Justice
Ong was deposited at the bank but the interest was paid in
advance by Ms. Napoles, and actually the bank will pay Ms.
Napoles the advanced interest she paid to Justice Ong, is that
clear? Is that the arrangement? Do you understand me?
Sula was asked to explain her testimony before the Blue Ribbon
Committee during the hearing on September 26, 2013, quoted
as follows:
The Chairman (Senator Teofisto Guingona III)
Sinabi ninyo na may tinawagan si Mrs. Napoles at sinabi niya,
Malapit nang lumabas yung TRO galing sa korte. May kilala pa
ba si Janet Lim Napoles sa huwes sa korte sa Sandiganbayan?
xxx
Ms. Sula
Si Mr. Ong po. Justice Ong po.
The Chairman

A Kasi ang nangyari po ma'am ganito e: yung ₱25.5 million Gregory Ong?
ipinasok sa personal account ni Ms. Napoles dito sa Metrobank. Ms. Sula
Metrobank kasi po yun e.
Opo.
On the second visit of respondent to Napoles' office, they just
engaged in conversation. She ordered Chinese food for him The Chairman
which, according to Benhur, is his (respondent's) favorite.
Sa Sandiganbayan?
On cross-examination, Benhur claimed that in his affidavits
Ms. Sula
executed in the NBI, he did not mention respondent's name.
However, in his reply-affidavit filed with the Sandiganbayan, he Opo.
alleged that Napoles issued ₱282,000.00 (the amount stated in
The Chairman
each of the 11 checks) but he did not mention the name of the
payee upon instruction of his lawyer, Atty. Baligod. Nonetheless, Okay. With that, I will just have a closing statement before we
he knew that the checks were issued to respondent. leave the hearing.
II. Sula, also a whistle blower, testified that she was an employee Sula explained that the TRO mentioned by Napoles refers to the
of JLN Corporation. Her duties included the formation of TRO to be issued by the Sandiganbayan in the event the case
corporations by making use of the forms, applying for business involving the PIO billion PDAF scam against her is filed with that
licenses, transfer of properties, purchase of cars, and others. court; and that Napoles told Sula and the other employees not
to worry because she has contact with the Sandiganbayan -
Sula corroborated Benhur's testimony that respondent visited
respondent Justice Ong, thus:
the office of Napoles twice sometime in 2012.
Q Not the illegal detention case?
Witness Sula
A Hindi po, pag nakasuhan na po kami sa Sandiganbayan.
Q Okay, again?
A Sa pagkakaintindi po namin, ang sabi po ni Madam na it
takes 4 to 5 years, so hihintayin niya na maacquit, sabi niyang
ganoon, ang pangalan niya para maluwag na tulungan kami.
Ito po ang pagkakaintindi namin na sa Sandiganbayan.
Q Yung PDAF?
A Opo, yung PDAF sa Sandiganbayan.
Q Pagdating ng kaso sa Sandiganbayan?
A Opo, kasi po ina-ano po niya, siya po tinitira na ni Benhur - si
Madam tungkol sa PlO billion scam. So, pinag-uusapan namin
sa bahay niya sa South Garden Unit na, Madam, paano po
yan, pag lahat ng kaso na iyan dadaan sa lawmakers, dadaan
yon sa Ombudsman at saka sa Sandiganbayan? Sabi niya,
"Huwag kayong mag-alala. Meron naman akong mga contact
doon." Sabi niyang ganoon sa Ombudsman at sa
Sandiganbayan.
Q Is that in your affidavit?
A Wala po. Pero sinabi ko po doon sa part na yon (her
testimony before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee) na meron
na siyang kilala sa Ombudsman, pero hindi niya nabanggit ang
pangalan. Pero sa Sandiganbayan, ang alam namin kilala niya
si Justice Ong.
Q Yun ang sagot niya kay Chairman Guingona. Di ba I read it a
while ago?
A Opo, doon sa Sandiganbayan.
Sula also testified that every time Napoles talked to her and the
other employees, she would say that Justice Ong will help her in
the Kevlar case. Sula's testimony is as follows:
Q x x x you told me that somebody will help in the Kevlar case?
A Opo. Sinabi po niya sa amin every time po pag nagkukwento
siya, sinasabi niya na si Justice Ong ang tumulong sa kanya
para ma-clear po yung Kevlar case niya.
Sula likewise testified that Napoles told her and the other
employees that she will fix (aayusin) the "PDAF case" in the
Sandiganbayan. Then they replied in jest that her acquaintance
in that court is respondent. Napoles retorted, "Ay huag na iyon
kasi masyadong mataas ang talent fee."
xxxx
III. Aries Rufo, a Reporter of Rappler, testified that he cannot
reveal who gave him the photograph [of respondent beside
Napoles and Senator Jinggoy Estrada] because he is shielded
by law and he has to protect his source.
When asked about his comment upon seeing the picture, Rufo
said:
Initially, when I saw the picture, since I knew that Justice Ong
was one of the members of the division that handled the Kevlar
case, it aroused my curiosity why he was in that picture.
Second, because in journalism, we also get to practice ethical
standards, I immediately sensed though that a Justice or a
lawyer, that he should not be seen or be going to a party or be
in an event where respondent (Ms. Napoles) was in a case
under his Division. He should not be in a situation that would
compromise the integrity of his office.
Rufo further testified that on August 27, 2013, he faxed a letter to
respondent to "get his side about the photo." The next day, he
went to respondent's office and showed it to him. Respondent
was shocked. He explained that it must have been taken during
one of the parties hosted by his friend Senator Jinggoy Estrada;
that he did not know that the woman in the picture is Napoles
because she did not appear during the hearing of the Kevlar
case; and that such picture must have been taken in one of
those instances when a guest would like to pose with celebrities
or public figures.
xxxx
Respondent, in his defense, vehemently denied the imputations
hurled against him.
1. He asserted that he could not be the contact or "connect" of
Napoles at the Sandiganbayan for he never met or came to
know her during the pendency of the Kevlar case;
2. Challenging Benhur's testimony that he fixed or "inayos" the
Kevlar case, respondent claimed that it was decided based on
the merits by the Sandiganbayan Fourth Division as a collegial
body. The two other members of the court, Justice Jose R.
Hernandez (ponente) and Justice Maria Cristina J. Cornejo, are
independent-minded jurists who could not be pressured or
influenced by anybody, not even by their peers;
3. On Benhur's allegation that respondent received an amount
of money from Napoles prior to the promulgation of the
decision in the Kevlar case, respondent deplored the fact that
Benhur was attempting to tarnish his reputation without any
proof. And that it is unthinkable for him to have received money
from Napoles considering that her mother, brother, and sister-in-
law were convicted;
4. Respondent admitted he went to Napoles' office twice,
sometime in March 2012, after the decision in the Kevlar case
was promulgated in 2010 and narrated what prompted him to
do so, thus:
At the birthday party of Senator Jinggoy Estrada on February 17,
2012, Napoles approached him and introduced herself. She
engaged him in a casual conversation and thanked him for her
acquittal in the Kevlar case. Respondent replied she should
thank her "evidence" instead, adding that had the court found
enough evidence against her, she would have been convicted.
She talked about her charity works like supporting Chinese
priests, building churches and chapels in China, and sponsoring
Chinese Catholic priests. He was not interested though in what
she was saying until she mentioned the name of Msgr. Ramirez,
former Parish Priest of Quiapo Church.
Respondent became interested because he has been a
devotee of the Holy Black Nazarene since he was a little boy.
Napoles told him that Msgr. Ramirez has with him the robe of
the Holy Black Nazarene which has a healing power if one
wears it. Then respondent asked if he can have access to the
robe so he can be cured of his ailment (prostate cancer) which
he keeps only to himself and to the immediate members of his
family. Napoles made arrangement with Msgr. Ramirez until
respondent was able to drape the robe over his body for about
one or two minutes in Quiapo Church. He also received a
fragrant ball of cotton which he keeps until now to heal any
ailing part of his body. That was a great deal for him. So out of
courtesy, he visited Napoles in her office and thanked her. That
was his first visit.
Thereafter, Napoles kept on calling respondent, inviting him to
her office, but he kept on declining. Then finally after two
weeks, he acceded for she might think he is "walang kwentang
tao." They just engaged in a small talk for about 30 minutes and
had coffee.
5. Concerning Benhur's testimony that Napoles paid respondent
an advanced interest consisting of eleven (11) checks in the
amount of ₱282,000.00 each and that he issued to her his BDO
check of ₱25.5 million which she deposited in her account, he
claimed that "he never issued that check as he did not intend
to invest in AFPSLAI. In fact, he does not have any money
deposited there. Inasmuch as he did not issue any BDO check,
it follows that Napoles could not have given him those eleven
(11) checks representing advanced interest. He further
explained that he found from the internet that in AFPSLAI, an
investor can only make an initial deposit of ₱30,000.00 every
quarter or Pl20,000.00 per year. The limit or ceiling is ₱3 million
with an interest of 15% or 16% per annum.
6. The whistle blower's testimony are conflicting and therefore
lack credibility. While Sula testified that Napoles told her that
she did not want to approach respondent (should a case
involving the pork barrel scam be filed with the
Sandiganbayan) because his talent fee is too high, however,
both whistle blowers claimed that he is Napoles' contact in the
Sandiganbayan.
With respect to the Rappler Report, according to respondent,
Rufo was insinuating four things: 1. That there was irregularity in
the manner the Kevlar case was decided;
2. That respondent was close to Napoles even during the
pendency of the Kevlar case;
3. That respondent was attending parties of the Napoleses; and
4. That respondent was advising Napoles about legal strategies
relative to the Kevlar case. Respondent "dismissed all the above
insinuations as false and without factual basis." As to the last
insinuation that he advised Napoles about legal strategies to be
pursued in the Kevlar case, respondent stressed that the case
was decided by a collegial body and that he never interceded
on her behalf.
EVALUATION
xxxx
It bears stressing that before the Senate Blue Ribbon
Committee, Benhur initially testified that Napoles fixed or
"inayos" the Kevlar case because she has a contact at the
Sandiganbayan, referring to respondent. Sula corroborated
Benhur's testimony.
Testifying before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee is certainly
an ordeal. The witnesses and everything they say are open to
the public. They are subjected to difficult questions propounded
by the Senators, supposedly intelligent and knowledgeable of
the subject and issues under inquiry. And they can easily detect
whether a person under investigation is telling the truth or not.
Considering this challenging and difficult setting, it is indubitably
improbable that the two whistle blowers would testify false! y
against respondent.
Moreover, during the investigation of this case, Benhur and Sula
testified in a candid, straightforward, and categorical manner.
Their testimonies were instantaneous, clear, unequivocal, and
carried with it the ring of truth.
In fact, their answers to the undersigned's probing questions
were consistent with their testimonies before the Senate Blue
Ribbon Committee. During cross-examination, they did not
waver or falter. The undersigned found the two whistle blowers
as credible witnesses and their story untainted with bias and
contradiction, reflective of honest and trustworthy witnesses.
The undersigned therefore finds unmeritorious respondent's
claim that Benhur and Sula were lying.
. . . respondent insisted he could not have intervened in the
disposition of the Kevlar case considering that Napoles' mother,
brother and sister-in-law were convicted.
Respondent must have forgotten that Napoles' natural instinct
was self-preservation. Hence, she would avail of every possible
means to be exonerated. Besides, respondent's belief that the
two members of his Division are independent-minded Jurists
remains to be a mere allegation.
xxxx
With the undersigned's finding that there is credence in the
testimonies of Benhur and Sula, there is no need to stretch one's
imagination to arrive at the inevitable conclusion that in "fixing"
Kevlar case, money could be the consideration ... Benhur
testified he kept a ledger (already shredded) of expenses
amounting to P 100 million incurred by Napoles for the
Sandiganbayan during the pendency of the Kevlar case which
extended up to ten years; and that Napoles told him she gave
respondent an undetermined sum of money.
Respondent maintains that the testimonies of Benhur and Sula
are pure hearsay, inadmissible in evidence:
Justice Ong
Your honor, since these are all accusations against me by Luy
and Sula, and according to Luy and Sula, these were only told
to them by Napoles, always their statements were ... they do
not have personal knowledge, it was only told to them by
Napoles, is it possible that we subpoena Napoles so that the
truth will come out? If. ..
xxxx
Justice Gutierrez
That is your prerogative.
Justice Ong
I am willing to take the risk although I know I am not an
acquaintance of Napoles. Just to clear my name whether I
should be hung or I should not be hung.
xxxx
Atty. Geronilla
I don't think it would be necessary, your honor.
Justice Gutierrez (to Atty. Geronilla)
Discuss this matter with your client, file a motion, then we will
see.
However, respondent and his counsel did not take any action
on the undersigned's suggestion. They did not present Napoles
to rebut the testimonies of Benhur and Sula. Significantly,
respondent failed to consider that his testimony is likewise
hearsay. He should have presented Msgr. Ramirez and Napoles
as witnesses to support his claim regarding their role which
enabled him to wear the robe of the Holy Black Nazarene.
x x xx
Respondent's acts of allowing himself to be Napoles' contact in
the Sandiganbayan, resulting in the fixing of the Kevlar case,
and of accepting money from her, constitute gross misconduct,
a violation of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the
Philippine Judiciary.
xxxx
That Benhur personally prepared the eleven (11) checks which
Napoles handed to respondent led the undersigned to
conclude without hesitation that this charge is true. It is highly
inconceivable that Benhur could devise or concoct his story. He
gave a detailed and lucid narration of the events, concluding
that actually Napoles gave respondent ₱3, 102,000.00 as
advanced interest.
According to respondent, the purpose of his first visit was to
thank Napoles for making it possible for him to wear the Holy
Black Nazarene's robe. Even assuming it is true, nonetheless it is
equally true that during that visit, respondent could have
transacted business with Napoles. Why should Napoles pay
respondent an advanced interest of ₱3,102,000.0 with her own
money if it were not a consideration for a favor?
Respondent's transgression pertains to his personal life and no
direct relation to his judicial function. It is not misconduct but
plain dishonesty. His act is unquestionably disgraceful and
renders him morally unfit as a member of the Judiciary and only while in the performance of official duties but also outside
unworthy of the privileges the law confers on him. Furthermore, the court, must be beyond reproach. A judicial office
respondent's conduct supports Benhur's assertion that he circumscribes a personal conduct and imposes a number of
received money from Napoles. inhibitions, whose faithful observance is the price one has to
pay for holding an exalted position.
Dishonesty likewise violates Canon 2 (1 and 2) on Integrity of the
same Code providing in part that judges must ensure that their xxxx
conduct is above reproach and must reaffirm the people's faith
On the photograph showing respondent
in the integrity of the Judiciary.
with Senator Jinggoy Estrada and Napoles.
Indeed, respondent should not stay in his position even for a
moment. xxxx
xxxx This incident manifests respondent's disregard of the dictum that
propriety and the appearance of propriety are essential to the
...From respondent's end, there was nothing wrong when he
performance of all the activities of a judge. This exacting
visited Napoles twice in her office considering that the visits took
standard of decorum is demanded from judges to promote
place long after the promulgation of the decision in the Kevlar
public confidence in the integrity of the Judiciary.
case.
In joining Senator Estrada and Napoles in a picture taking,
Contrary to respondent's submission, such acts also constitute
respondent gave a ground for reproach by reason of
gross misconduct in violation of Canon 4 on Propriety of the
impropriety. It bears reiterating Canon 4 (1) on Propriety of the
same Code. Section 1 provides that judges shall avoid
same Code which provides that judges shall avoid impropriety
impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their
and the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities.
activities .
Respondent maintained that he did not know Napoles at that
. . . respondent's reason for his first visit was to thank Napoles for
time because she was not present before the Sandiganbayan
her help in making it possible for him to wear the robe of the
during the hearing of the Kevlar case for she must have waived
Holy Black Nazarene. Instead of visiting her, respondent could
her appearance. Respondent's explanation lacks merit. That
have extended his gratitude by simply calling her by phone.
court could not have acquired jurisdiction over her if she did not
Worse, he visited her again because she may think he is an
appear personally for arraignment.
unworthy person. This is an extremely frail reason. He was seen
by the whistle blowers and their co-workers who, without doubt, Of utmost significance is the fact that this is not the first time that
readily confirmed that he was Napoles' contact at the respondent has been charged administratively. In "Assistant
Sandiganbayan and that he "fixed" the decision in the Kevlar Special Prosecutor Ill Rohermina J Jamsani-Rodriguez v. Justices
case. Gregory S. Ong, Jose R. Hernandez and Rodolfo A. Ponferrada,
Sandiganbayan,'' the Supreme Court found respondent Justice
Respondent cannot be excused for his unconcern for the
Ong guilty of violation of PD 1606 and The Revised Internal Rules
position he holds. Being aptly perceived as the visible
of the Sandiganbayan for nonobservance of collegiality in
personification of law and justice, his personal behavior, not
hearing criminal cases in the Hall of Justice, Davao City. Instead
of siting as a collegial body, the members of the
Sandiganbayan Fourth Division adopted a different procedure.
The Division was divided into two. As then Chairperson of the
Division, respondent was ordered to pay a fine of ₱15,000.00
with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar
offense shall be dealt with more severely.
xxxx
...the undersigned cannot hold back her skepticism regarding
the acquittal of Napoles. The Sandiganbayan Fourth Division, of
which respondent was the Chairman, held that Napoles did not
conspire with the suppliers in the questionable purchase of the
Kevlar helmets as she was not one of the "dealer-payees" in the
transaction in question and that there was no proof of an overt
act on her part. How could the Fourth Division arrive at such
conclusion? The Decision itself indicates clearly that ( 1) Napoles
was following up the processing of the documents; (2) that she
was in charge of the delivery of the helmets; and (3) the checks
amounting to ₱3,864,310.00 as payment for the helmets were
deposited and cleared in only one bank account, Security Bank
Account No. 512-000-2200, in the name of Napoles.
Considering this glaring irregularity, it is safe to conclude that
indeed respondent has a hand in the acquittal of Napoles. All
along, the whistle blowers were telling the truth.
xxxx
RECOMMENDATION
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, It is respectfully recommended, for
consideration of the Honorable Court, that respondent Justice
Gregory S. Ong be found GUILTY of gross misconduct,
dishonesty, and impropriety, all in violations of the New Code of
Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary and be meted the
penalty of DISMISSAL from the service WITH FORFEITURE of all
retirement benefits, excluding accrued leave credits, and WITH
PREJUDICE to reemployment to any government, including
government-owned or controlled corporations.
xxxx
The Court's Ruling
This Court adopts the findings, conclusions and
recommendations of the Investigating Justice which are well-
supported by the evidence on record.
Based on the testimonies of Luy, Sula and Rufo, the Investigating
Justice formulated the charges against the respondent, as
follows:
1. Respondent acted as contact of Napoles in connection with
the Kevlar case while it was pending in the Sandiganbayan
Fourth Division wherein he is the Chairman;
2. Respondent, being Napoles' contact in the Sandiganbayan,
fixed the Kevlar case resulting in her acquittal;
3. Respondent received an undetermined amount of money
from Napoles prior to the promulgation of the decision in the
Kevlar case thus, she was sure ("kampante")of her acquittal; 4.
Respondent visited Napoles in her office where she handed to
him eleven (ll) checks, each amounting to ₱282,000.00 or a total
of ₱3,102,000.00, as advanced interest for his ₱25.5 million BDO
check she deposited in her personal account; and
5. Respondent attended Napoles' parties and was
photographed with Senator Estrada and Napoles.11
Respondent thus stands accused of gross misconduct, partiality
and corruption or bribery during the pendency of the Kevlar
case, and impropriety on account of his dealing and socializing
with Napoles after her acquittal in the said case. Additionally,
respondent failed to disclose in his September 26, 2013 letter to
Chief Justice Sereno that he had actually visited Napoles at her
office in 2012, as he vehemently denied having partied with or
attended any social event hosted by her.
Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite
rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, unlawful
behavior, willful in character, improper or wrong behavior; while
·"gross" has been defined as "out of all measure beyond
allowance; flagrant; shameful; such conduct as is not to be
excused."12 We agree with Justice Sandoval-Gutierrez that
respondent's association with Napoles during the pendency
and after the promulgation of the decision in the Kevlar case
resulting in her acquittal, constitutes gross misconduct
notwithstanding the absence of direct evidence of corruption
or bribery in the rendition of the said judgment.
We cannot overemphasize that in administrative proceedings,
only substantial evidence, i.e., that amount of relevant
evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate
to support a conclusion, is required. The standard of substantial
evidence is satisfied when there is reasonable ground to believe
that respondent is responsible for the misconduct complained
of, even if such evidence might not be overwhelming or even
preponderant.13
The testimonies of Luy and Sula established that Napoles had
been in contact with respondent ("nag-uusap sila") during the
pendency of the Kevlar case. As Napoles' trusted staff, they
(especially Luy who is a cousin) were privy to her daily business
and personal activities. Napoles constantly updated them of
developments regarding the case. She revealed to them that
she has a "connect" or "contact" in the Sandiganbayan who will
help "fix" the case involving her, her mother, brother and some
employees. Having closely observed and heard Napoles being
confident that she will be acquitted even prior to the
promulgation of the decision in the Kevlar case, they were
convinced she was indeed in contact with respondent, whose
identity was earlier divulged by Napoles to Luy. Luy
categorically testified that Napoles told him she gave money to
respondent but did not disclose the amount. There was no
reason for them to doubt Napoles' statement as they even keep
a ledger detailing her expenses for the "Sandiganbayan," which
reached Pl 00 million. Napoles' information about her
association with respondent was confirmed when she was
eventually acquitted in 2010 and when they saw respondent
visit her office and given the eleven checks issued by Napoles in
2012.
Respondent maintains that the testimonies of Luy and Sula were
hearsay as they have no personal knowledge of the matters
they were testifying, which were merely told to them by
Napoles. Specifically, he points to portions of Sula's testimony
indicating that Napoles had not just one but "contact persons"
in Ombudsman and Sandiganbayan; hence, it could have
been other individuals, not him, who could help Napoles "fix" the
Kevlar case, especially since Napoles never really disclosed to
Sula who was her (Napoles) contact at the Sandiganbayan
and at one of their conversations Napoles even supposedly said
that respondent's "talent fee" was too high. Bribery is committed
when a public officer agrees to perform an act in connection
with the performance of official duties in consideration of any
offer, promise, gift or present received.14 Ajudge who extorts
money from a party-litigant who has a case before the court
commits a serious misconduct and this Court has condemned
such act in the strongest possible terms. Particularly because it
has been committed by one charged with the responsibility of
administering the law and rendering justice, it quickly and surely
corrodes respect for law and the courts.15
An accusation of bribery is easy to concoct and difficult to
disprove. The complainant must present a panoply of evidence
in support of such an accusation. Inasmuch as what is imputed
against the respondent judge connotes a grave misconduct,
the quantum of proof required should be more than
substantial.16 Concededly, the evidence in this case is
insufficient to sustain the bribery and corruption charges against
the respondent. Both Luy and Sula have not witnessed
respondent actually receiving money from Napoles in
exchange for her acquittal in the Kevlar case. Napoles had
confided to Luy her alleged bribe to respondent.
Notwithstanding the absence of direct evidence of any corrupt
act by the respondent, we find credible evidence of his
association with Napoles after the promulgation of the decision
in the Kevlar case. The totality of the circumstances of such
association strongly indicates respondent's corrupt inclinations
that only heightened the public's perception of anomaly in the
decision-making process. By his act of going to respondent at
her office on two occasions, respondent exposed himself to the
suspicion that he was partial to Napoles. That respondent was
not the ponente of the decision which was rendered by a
collegial body did not forestall such suspicion of partiality, as
evident from the public disgust generated by the publication of
a photograph of respondent together with Napoles and
Senator Jinggoy Estrada. Indeed, the context of the
declarations under oath by Luy and Sula before the Senate Blue
Ribbon Committee, taking place at the height of the "Pork
Barrel" controversy, made all the difference as respondent
himself acknowledged. Thus, even in the present administrative
proceeding, their declarations are taken in the light of the
public revelations of what they know of that government
corruption controversy, and how it has tainted the image of the
Judiciary.
The hearsay testimonies of Luy and Sula generated intense
public interest because of their close relationship to Napoles
and their crucial participation in her transactions with
government officials, dubbed by media as the "Pork Barrel
Queen." But as aptly observed by Justice SandovalGutierrez, the
"challenging and difficult setting" of the Senate hearings where
they first testified, made it highly improbable that these whistle
blowers would testify against the respondent. During the
investigation of this case, Justice Sandoval-Gutierrez described
their manner of testifying as "candid, straightforward and
categorical." She likewise found their testimonies as
"instantaneous, clear, unequivocal, and carried with it the ring
of truth," and more important, these are consistent with their
previous testimonies before the Senate; they never wavered or
faltered even during cross-examination.
It is a settled rule that the findings of investigating magistrates
are generally given great weight by the Court by reason of their
unmatched opportunity to see the deportment of the witnesses
as they testified.17 The rule which concedes due respect, and
even finality, to the assessment of credibility of witnesses by trial
judges in civil and criminal cases applies a fortiori to
administrative cases.18 In particular, we concur with Justice
Sandoval-Gutierrez's assessment on the credibility of Luy and
Sula, and disagree with respondent's claim that these witnesses
are simply telling lies about his association with Napoles.
Contrary to respondent's submission, Sula in her testimony said
that whenever Napoles talked about her contacts in the
Ombudsman and Sandiganbayan, they knew that insofar as
the Sandiganbayan was concerned, it was understood that she
was referring to respondent even as she may have initially
contacted some persons to get to respondent, and also
because they have seen him meeting with Napoles at her
office. It appears that Napoles made statements regarding the
Kevlar case not just to Luy but also to the other employees of
JLN Corporation. The following are excerpts from Sula's
testimony on direct examination, where she even hinted at their
expected outcome of the Kevlar case:
Atty. Benipayo
Q So, Ms. Sula, what were the statements being made by Ms.
Janet Lim Napoles regarding her involvement in the Kevlar
case, or how she was trying to address the problem with the
Kevlar case pending before the Sandiganbayan?
Witness Sula
A Ang alam ko po kasi marami po siyang kinaka-usap na mga
lawyers na binabayaran niya para tulungan siya kay Gregory
Ong sa Kevlar case. Tapos, sa kalaunan po, nasabi na niya sa
amin na mcron na po siyang nakilala sa Sandiganbayan na
nagngangalang Justice Gregory Ong. Tapos, sabi niya, siya po
ang tutulong sa amin para ma-clear kami. Pero hindi niya sinabi
na meron din pong ma ... sasagot sa kaso. Hindi po lahat, kasi
po dalawa sa mga empleyado niya, bale apat, dalawang
empleyado niya, isang kapatid niya at sister-in-law ang mag-
aano sa kaso pati yung mother niya na namatay na ay sasagot
din sa kaso. Siya Jang at saka yung asawa niya ang bale makli-
clear sa kaso.
Q So, she told you that two (2) employees, one (1) sister-in-law
and one brother will answer for the case and Janet Lim Napoles
and her husband will be acquitted, is that right?
A Yun po ang aking pagkaka-alam kasi po, nag-petition po kasi
sila eh, yung mga officemates ko. Nagkaroon ng probation.
Noong lumabas ang hatol, meron silang probation period.
xxxx
Q Which you told me that somebody will help in the Kevlar
case?
A Opo. Sinabi po niya sa amin everytime po pag nagkukwento
siya, sinasabi niya na si Justice Ong ang tutulong sa kanya para
ma-clear po yung Kevlar case niya.
x x x x19 (Emphasis supplied.)
As it turned out, Napoles' husband was dropped from the two
informations while her mother, brother and sister-in-law were
convicted in the lesser charge of falsification of public
documents. Apparently, after her acquittal, Napoles helped
those convicted secure a probation. But as stated in our earlier
resolution, the Court will no longer delve into the merits of the
Kevlar case as the investigation will focus on respondent's
administrative liability.
Respondent's act of voluntarily meeting with Napoles at her
office on two occasions was grossly improper and violated
Section 1, Canon 4 (Propriety) of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct, which took effect on June 1, 2004.
SECTION 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance
of impropriety in all of their activities.
A judge must not only be impartial but must also appear to be
impartial and that fraternizing with litigants tarnishes this
appearance.20 Public confidence in the Judiciary is eroded by
irresponsible or improper conduct of judges. A judge must avoid
all impropriety and the appearance thereof. Being the subject
of constant public scrutiny, a judge should freely and willingly
accept restrictions on conduct that might be viewed as
burdensome by the ordinary citizen.21
In Caneda v. Alaan,22 we held that:
Judges are required not only to be impartial but also to appear
to be so, for appearance is an essential manifestation of reality.
Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct enjoins judges to
avoid not just impropriety in their conduct but even the mere
appearance of impropriety.
They must conduct themselves in such a manner that they give
no ground for reproach. [Respondent's] acts have been less
than circumspect. He should have kept himself free from any
appearance of impropriety and endeavored to distance
himself from any act liable to create an impression of
indecorum.
xxxx
Indeed, respondent must always bear in mind that:
"A judicial office traces a line around his official as well as
personal conduct, a price one has to pay for o ccupying an
exalted position in the judiciary, beyond which he may not
freely venture. Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct enjoins
a judge to avoid not just impropriety in the performance of
judicial duties but in all his activities whether in his public or
private life. He must conduct himself in a manner that gives no
ground for reproach." (Emphasis supplied.)
On this score, our previous pronouncements have enjoined
judges to avoid association or socializing with persons who have
pending cases before their court. Respondent cites the case of
Abundo v. Mania, Jr.23 where this Court did not find fault with a
judge who was charged with fraternizing with his lawyer-friend.
In that case, we said:
Respondent admits that he and Atty. Pajarillo became close
friends in 1989 when they were both RTC judges stationed in
Naga City. Since they both resided in Camarines Norte, Atty.
Pajarillo hitched rides with respondent to Daet, Camarines Norte
in the latter's car.
In his Comment, respondent claims that he leaves the door to
his chambers open to lawyers or parties with official court
business, whose requests and complaints regarding their cases
he listens to in full view of his staff, who are witnesses to his
transparency and honesty in conducting such dialogues. He
also admits that Atty. Pajarillo has been to his house on several
occasions, but only to make emergency long-distance calls to
his children in Metro Manila. He, however, denies that he and
Atty. Pajarillo were frequently seen eating and drinking together
in public places.
We agree with Justice Buzon's finding that the evidence against
respondent on this point was insufficient, viz.:
"On the other hand, the admission of respondent that he
attended two public functions where Atty. Pajarillo was also
present; that Atty. Pajarillo had been in his house twice or thrice
and used his telephone; and that he receives lawyers, including
Atty. Pajarillo, and litigants inside his chambers, the door to
which is always open so that [the] staff could see that no under
the table transactions are taking place, is not proof that he is
fraternizing with Atty. Pajarillo. A judge need not ignore a former
colleague and friend whenever they meet each other or when
the latter makes requests which are not in any manner
connected with cases pending in his court. Thus, Canon 30 of
the Canons of Judicial Ethics provides:
'30. Social relations
It is not necessary to the proper performance of judicial duty
that judges should live in retirement or seclusion; it is desirable
that, so far as the reasonable attention to the completion of
their work will permit, they continue to mingle in social
intercourse, and that they should not discontinue their interests
in or appearance at meetings of members at the bar. A judge
should, however, in pending or prospective litigation before him
be scrupulously careful to avoid such action as may reasonably
tend to waken the suspicion that his social or business relations
or friendships constitute an element in determining his judicial
course.'"
The factual setting in Abundo v. Mania, Jr. is not similar to the
present case because Napoles was not a colleague or lawyer-
friend but an accused in a former case before the
Sandiganbayan's Fourth Division chaired by respondent and
which acquitted her from malversation charge. What
respondent perhaps want to underscore is the caveat for
judges, in pending or prospective litigation before them, to
avoid such action as may raise suspicion on their partiality in
resolving or deciding the case. Thus, he emphasized in his
Memorandum that he "never knew Napoles on a personal level
while she was still on trial as an accused in Kevlar helmet case."
Respondent even quoted Sula's testimony expressing her
opinion that she finds nothing wrong with respondent going to
Napoles' office because at that time, the Kevlar case had
already been terminated.
We do not share the view that the rule on propriety was
intended to cover only pending and prospective litigations.
Judges must, at all times, be beyond reproach and should
avoid even the mere suggestion of partiality and impropriety.24
Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct states that "[p
]ropriety and the appearance of propriety are essential to the
performance of all the activities of a judge." Section 2 further
provides:
SEC. 2. As a subject of constant public scrutiny, judges must
accept personal restrictions that might be viewed as
burdensome by the ordinary citizen and should do so freely and
willingly. In particular, judges shall conduct themselves in a way
that is consistent with the dignity of the judicial office.
As we held in Sibayan-Joaquin v. Javellana25
... Judges, indeed, should be extra prudent in associating with
litigants and counsel appearing before them so as to avoid
even a mere perception of possible bias or partiality. It is not
expected, of course, that judges should live in retirement or
seclusion from any social intercourse. Indeed, it may be
desirable, for instance, that they continue, time and work
commitments permitting, to relate to members of the bar in
worthwhile endeavors and in such fields of interest, in general,
as are in keeping with the noble aims and objectives of the
legal profession. In pending or prospective litigations before
them, however, judges should be scrupulously careful to avoid
anything that may tend to awaken the suspicion that their
personal, social or sundry relations could influence their
objectivity, for not only must judges possess proficiency in law
but that also they must act and behave in such manner that
would assure, with great comfort, litigants and their counsel of
the judges' competence, integrity and independence.
In this light, it does not matter that the case is no longer pending
when improper acts were committed by the judge. Because
magistrates are under constant public scrutiny, the termination
of a case will not deter public criticisms for acts which may cast
suspicion on its disposition or resolution. As what transpired in this
case, respondent's association with Napoles has unfortunately
dragged the Judiciary into the "Pork Barrel" controversy which
initially involved only legislative and executive officials. Worse,
Napoles' much-flaunted "contact" in the judiciary is no less than
a Justice of the Sandiganbayan, our special court tasked with
hearing graft cases. We cannot, by any stretch of indulgence
and compassion, consider respondent's transgression as a
simple misconduct.
During his testimony, respondent acknowledged his violation of
judicial ethics and its serious repercussions, as shown by his
answers to the questions from the Investigation Justice, viz:
Justice Gutierrez
What I am thinking Justice, as a Justice holding a very high
position, could it not be possible for you to just go to the Church
of Quiapo and ask the priest there to help you or assist you, no
longer through Ms. Napoles?
Justice Ong
You cannot do that, your honor. Ever since when I was a small
boy, I never got near the image of the Mahal na Poon. Nobody
can do that, your honor.
Justice Gutierrez
No, no. What I mean is that you can just go to the priest in
Quiapo and make the proper request. Why did you not do
that?
Justice Ong
I don't know, your honor.
Justice Gutierrez
Because you have been suffering from that ailment, mass or
whatever, and that you are a devotee of the Black Nazarene.
You could have gone to the Office of the priest there and had
that request for you to wear that robe of the Black Nazarene?
Justice Ong
Hindi ko po alam na may ganyan, your honor. I was only told by
Napoles during that conversation. Had I known that, siguro po
pwede ko pong gawin. Had I known that there is such a robe,
maybe I will do that.
Justice Gutierrez
Okay. It happened already. But just to thank Ms. Napoles, I think
Justice you should have been very, very careful about your
actuations. You should not have been seen in public, you know,
with a woman like her who was an accused before. You could
have thanked her simply by calling her. You could have relayed
to her your true feelings that you are so grateful because of her
assistance. Were it not for her, you could not have worn that
Holy Robe of the Black Nazarene. You could have simply called
her instead of going to her office; instead of, you know, going to
the Church of Santuario de San Antonio in Forbes Park. And you
should have been more careful not to be seen by the public
with her considering that she was a former accused in that
case.
Justice Ong
I will heed to that advice, your honor.
Justice Gutierrez
Q And you admitted a while ago, during the interview
conducted by Mr. Aries Rufo that. "That is a lesson for me; that I
should not have associated, you know, with a former
respondent or accused in a case before me." You admitted
that? You said you learned you lesson. Was that the first time
you learned that kind of lesson, Mr. Justice? Or even before you
took your oath as a member of the Judiciary, you already knew
that lesson, isn't it or was that the first time? That is why you
associated yourself with Senator Jinggoy Estrada who was
accused before of plunder?
Justice Ong
Your honor, talking about ....
Justice Gutierrez
Q Do you admit you committed a lapse along that line?
Justice Ong
A Yes, your honor. You have to forgive me for that.26 (Emphasis
supplied.)
In her report, Justice Sandoval-Gutierrez noted that
respondent's purported reason for visiting Napoles in her office
remains uncorroborated, as Napoles and the Quiapo parish
priest were not presented as witnesses despite her suggestion to
respondent and his counsel. On the other hand, Luy's testimony
on what transpired in one of respondent's meeting with Napoles
at her office appears to be the more plausible and truthful
version. Expectedly, respondent denied having issued a BDO
check for ₱25 .5 million as claimed by Luy, and asserted he
(respondent) did not deposit any money to AFPSLAI.
Unfortunately, Luy is unable to present documentary evidence
saying that, as previously testified by him before the Senate,
most of the documents in their office were shredded upon
orders of Napoles when the "Pork Barrel Scam" controversy
came out.
Justice Sandoval-Gutierrez stated that the eleven checks of
₱282,000.00 supposed advance interest for respondent's check
deposit to AFPSLAI were given to respondent as consideration
for the favorable ruling in the Kevlar case.1âwphi1 Such finding
is consistent with Luy's testimony that Napoles spent a
staggering PlOO million just to "fix" the said case. Under the
circumstances, it is difficult to believe that respondent went to
Napoles office the second time just to have coffee.
Respondent's act of again visiting Napoles at her office, after he
had supposedly merely thanked her during the first visit, tends to
support Luy's claim that respondent had a financial deal with
Napoles regarding advance interest for AFPSLAI deposit. The
question inevitably arises as to why would Napoles extend such
an accommodation to respondent if not as consideration for
her acquittal in the Kevlar case? Respondent's controversial
photograph alone had raised adverse public opinion, with the
media speculating on pay-offs taking place in the courts.
Regrettably, the conduct of respondent gave cause for the
public in general to doubt the honesty and fairness of his
participation in the Kevlar case and the integrity of our courts of
justice. Before this Court, even prior to the commencement of
administrative investigation, respondent was less than candid. In
his letter to the Chief Justice where he vehemently denied
having attended parties or social events hosted by Napoles, he
failed to mention that he had in fact visited Napoles at her
office. Far from being a plain omission, we find that respondent
deliberately did not disclose his social calls to Napoles. It was
only when Luy and Sula testified before the Senate and named
him as the "contact" of Napoles in the Sandiganbayan, that
respondent mentioned of only one instance he visited Napoles
("This is the single occasion that Sula was talking about in her
supplemental affidavit x x x."27).
The Court finds that respondent, in not being truthful on crucial
matters even before the administrative complaint was filed
against him motu proprio, is guilty of Dishonesty, a violation of
Canon 3 (Integrity) of the New Code of Judicial Conduct.
Dishonesty is a "disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud;
untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of honesty, probity or
integrity in principle; lack of fairness and straightforwardness;
disposition to defraud, deceive or betray."28 Dishonesty, being
a grave offense, carries the extreme penalty of dismissal from
the service with forfeiture of retirement benefits except accrued
leave credits, and with perpetual disqualification from
reemployment in government service. Indeed, dishonesty is a
malevolent act that has no place in the Judiciary.29
Under Section 11(A), Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, a
respondent found guilty of a serious charge may be penalized
as follows:
SEC. 11. Sanctions. - A. If the respondent is guilty of a serious
charge, any of the following sanctions may be imposed:
1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the
benefits as the Court may determine, and disqualification from
reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including
governmentowned or -controlled corporations. Provided,
however, that the forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include
accrued leave credits;
2. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for
more than three (3) but not exceeding six (6) months; or
3. A fine of more than ₱20,000.00 but not exceeding ₱40,000.00.
Considering that respondent is not a first time offender and the
charges of gross misconduct and dishonesty are both grave
offenses showing his unfitness to remain as a magistrate of the
special graft court, we deem it proper to impose the supreme
penalty of dismissal.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Sandiganbayan
Associate Justice Gregory S. Ong GUILTY of GROSS
MISCONDUCT, DISHONESTY and IMPROPRIETY, all in violations of
the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary,
for which he is hereby DISMISSED from the service, with forfeiture
of all retirement benefits, except accrued leave credits, if any,
and with prejudice to reemployment in any branch, agency or
instrumentality of the government including government-owned
or -controlled corporations.
This Decision is IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY.
SO ORDERED.
37. A.M. No. RTJ-15-2423, January 11, 2017
SANTIAGO D. ORTEGA, JR., Complainant, v. JUDGE ROGELIO LL.
DACARA, PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH
37, IRIGA CITY, CAMARINES SUR, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is an administrative case for gross ignorance of the law and
gross inexcusable negligence filed by Santiago D. Ortega, Jr.
(complainant) against Judge Rogelio Ll. Dacara (respondent
judge), Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
37, Iriga City, Camarines Sur.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The Facts
In a verified complaint dated 18 December 2013, complainant
charged respondent judge with gross ignorance of the law and
gross inexcusable negligence.
The complaint alleged that complainant is the president of the
Siramag Fishing Corporation (SFC). On 18 January 2013, SFC and
complainant filed a case for Damages with Application for the
Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction against
the Regional Director of the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic
Resources, Regional Office V (BFAR RO-V) and the Chief of
Fisheries Resource Management Division, BFAR RO-V. The case
was raffled to RTC-Branch 37, Iriga City, Camarines Sur, presided
by respondent judge.
After the hearing on the injunction issue, respondent judge
issued an Order dated 22 April 2013, denying the application for
the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction. The
denial of the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction was
based on the following reasons: (1) plaintiffs have not shown a
clear and inestimable right to be protected; (2) the trial court is
prohibited from issuing the preliminary injunction under
Presidential Decree No. 6051 (PD 605) and Section 10, Rule 2 of
A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC;2 and (3) the trial court has no jurisdiction
over the defendants, who are within the territorial jurisdiction of
RTC, Pili, Camarines Sur.
Complainant alleged that the Order shows respondent judge's
incompetence and ignorance of the law by his failure to
distinguish between a writ of preliminary injunction and a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction. Complainant asserted that
the prohibition under Section 10, Rule 2 of A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC
and PD 605 applies only to the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction but not to a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction.
Furthermore, RTC-Branch 37 has jurisdiction to issue a writ of
injunction which may be enforced within the Fifth Judicial
Region, which includes Pili, Camarines Sur, where the office of
the defendants is located. Complainant maintained that
respondent judge, whose sala is not designated as an
environmental court, should not have taken cognizance of the
case which involved environmental issues. It was only upon
complainant's motion that the case was eventually transferred
to RTC-Branch 35, a designated environmental court.
In his Comment dated 26 March 2014, respondent judge
maintained that a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction is
included in the term preliminary injunction under Section 3(a) of
Rule 58.3 Citing Section 10, Rule 2 of A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC and
Section 14 of PD 605, respondent judge stated that he is
expressly prohibited from issuing a writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction.
As regards lack of jurisdiction over the defendants, respondent
judge explained that under Section 18 of Batas Pambansa Blg.
129 (BP 129), the territorial jurisdiction of RTC-Branch 37 does not
include the Municipality of Pili where the office of the
defendants is located. Respondent judge claimed good faith in
believing that the territorial jurisdiction of RTC Branch 37 includes
only the City of Iriga and the municipalities of Nabua, Bato,
Buhi, and Balatan in Camarines Sur. Respondent judge
submitted that if he misinterpreted the law, it was merely an
error of judgment. Besides, respondent judge insisted that he
denied the prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction because the plaintiffs failed to show that
there is a clear and inescapable right to be protected.
On the allegation that he should not have taken cognizance of
the case since his sala is not an environmental court,
respondent judge clarified that the case was assigned to him
and that it was not apparent from the title of the case that it
involved an environmental issue. The case was eventually
transferred to RTC-Branch 35 after respondent judge told the
presiding judge of RTC-Branch 35 that the case involved
environmental law and thus, cognizable by RTC-Branch 35,
which is designated as an environmental court.
Respondent judge compulsorily retired from service on 16
September 2014.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The OCA's Report and Recommendation
In its Report dated 27 February 2015, the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) found respondent judge liable for gross
ignorance of the law.
The OCA stated that although respondent judge may have
loosely used the term "writ of preliminary injunction"
interchangeably with "writ of preliminary mandatory injunction,"
he was not remiss in appreciating the requisites of Rule 58 on
Preliminary Injunction. In his Order, respondent judge discussed
the requirements for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction and found that complainant failed to
show a clear and inestimable right to be protected.
On the issue that respondent judge should not have taken
cognizance of the case because it is not designated as an
environmental court, the OCA noted that the case was raffled
to respondent judge's sala. Respondent judge cannot be
faulted for taking cognizance of the case since the complaint
failed to indicate that it is an environmental case. Besides, the
case was eventually transferred to Branch 35, a designated
environmental court.
However, the OCA found that respondent judge erred in stating
that RTC-Branch 37 of Iriga City has no jurisdiction over the
defendants whose office address is in Pili, Camarines Sur.
Section 21 of BP 129 states that the RTCs have original
jurisdiction to issue writs of injunction which may be enforced in
any part of their respective regions. Under Section 13 of BP 129,
the RTC of Iriga City, Camarines Sur is within the Fifth Judicial
Region and the Municipality of Pili, which is the capital of the
Province of Camarines Sur, is also part of the Fifth Judicial
Region.
The OCA recommended (a) that the administrative complaint
against respondent judge be re-docketed as a regular
administrative matter; and (b) that respondent judge be fined
in the amount of P20,000 for gross ignorance of the law, to be
deducted from his retirement benefits and/or from the
monetary value of leave credits due him.
The Ruling of the Court
In the case for damages filed by SFC and complainant in the
trial court, they prayed for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction to compel the defendants to renew the
Commercial Fishing Vessel/Gear License of the plaintiffs fishing
vessel F/V "Mercy Cecilia-I." Respondent judge denied the
prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction, which led to the filing of the administrative complaint
against respondent judge.
Complainant asserts that the prohibition under A.M. No. 09-6-8-
SC and PO 605 applies only to the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction but not to a writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction.
Contrary to complainant's allegation, respondent judge is
correct in stating that he is prohibited from issuing a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction in the case filed by SFC and
complainant. Although the prohibition against the issuance of a
writ of preliminary mandatory injunction was not expressly
stated under A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC, such prohibition is very clear
under Section I of PD 6055 which reads:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
SECTION 1. No court of the Philippines shall have jurisdiction to
issue any restraining order, preliminary injunction or preliminary
mandatory injunction in any case involving or growing out of
the issuance, approval or disapproval, revocation or suspension
of, or any action whatsoever by proper administrative official or
body on concessions, licenses, pem1its, patents, or public
grants of any kind in connection with the disposition,
exploitation, utilization, exploration, and/ or development of the
natural resources of the Philippines. (Emphasis
supplied)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The case filed by SFC and complainant to compel the renewal
of the license of their fishing vessel is clearly covered under
Section 1 of PD 605, prohibiting the issuance of a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction in any case involving the
disapproval, revocation or suspension of a license in connection
with the exploitation of natural resources. It was therefore
proper for respondent judge to deny their prayer for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction. Besides,
respondent judge found that complainant failed to show that
there is a clear and inescapable right to be protected which
would justify the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction.
Complainant cannot blame respondent judge for taking
cognizance of the case which was assigned to him.
Respondent judge explained that it was not apparent from the
title of the case that it involved an environmental issue. Besides,
as noted by the OCA, the complaint failed to state that it is an
environmental case as required under Section 3, Rule 2 of A.M.
No. 09-6-8- SC.6 Such omission caused the raffling of the case to
a regular court and not to an environmental court. The case
was eventually transferred to RTC Branch 35, which is
designated as an environmental court. In the same manner
that, under Section 3, Rule 2 of A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC, if the
complaint is not an environmental complaint despite its
designation as such, the case will be re-raffled to a regular
court.
Furthermore, the Court notes that complainant actively
participated as plaintiff in the lower court (RTC-Branch 37) by:
(a) filing a Motion to set Injunction Incident for Hearing; (b)
arguing through his counsel the necessity of the writ of
preliminary injunction; (c) submitting his judicial affidavit in
support of his claims; and (d) filing a Manifestation with Motion
praying that the injunction incident be submitted for resolution.7
It was only after respondent judge issued an adverse Order
denying the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction that complainant attacked the jurisdiction of RTC-
Branch 37 since it is not a designated environmental court.
However, respondent judge erred in stating that RTC-Branch 37
of Iriga City has no jurisdiction over the defendants whose office
address is in Pili, Camarines Sur. Respondent judge asserts that
the territorial jurisdiction of RTC-Branch 37 includes only the City
of Iriga and the municipalities of Nabua, Bato, Buhi, and
Balatan, in Camarines Sur. That is incorrect. Section 218 of BP 129
provides that RTCs exercise original jurisdiction in the issuance of
writs of injunction which may be enforced in any part of their
respective regions. Under Section 13 of BP 129, the Fifth Judicial
Region consists of the provinces of Albay, Camarines Sur,
Camarines Norte, Catanduanes, Masbate, and Sorsogon, and
the cities of Legazpi, Naga, and Iriga. The RTC of Iriga City is
within the Fifth Judicial Region. The Municipality of Pili, which is
the capital of the Province of Camarines Sur, is also part of the
Fifth Judicial Region. Clearly, respondent judge of RTCBranch
37, Iriga City can issue a writ of injunction which can be
enforced in any part of the Fifth Judicial Region, including Pili,
Camarines Sur.
Nevertheless, it should be stressed that respondent judge issued
the Order denying the issuance of a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction primarily because the plaintiffs failed to
show a clear and inestimable right to be protected and
because it is prohibited under A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC and PD 605.
Thus, even if respondent judge erred in stating that the trial
court has no jurisdiction over the defendants, the Order denying
the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction was
proper. Furthermore, there was no allegation or proof that
respondent judge acted with malice or bad faith in issuing the
Order denying the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction.
Not every error or mistake committed by a judge in the exercise
of his adjudicative functions renders him liable, unless his act
was tainted with bad faith or a deliberate intent to do an
injustice.9 To hold a judge administratively liable for gross
ignorance of the law, the assailed decision, order or act of the
judge in the performance of his official duties must not only be
contrary to existing law or jurisprudence, but must also be
motivated by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty, or corruption on his
part.10 In this case, there was no evidence that respondent
judge was motivated with bad faith, fraud, or corruption when
he denied the prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction. More importantly, notwithstanding
respondent judge's error in stating that there was no jurisdiction
over the defendants, the Order denying the writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction was proper.
Considering the circumstances of this case and the lack of
malice and bad faith on the part of respondent judge in issuing
the assailed Order, the Court finds respondent judge not liable
for gross ignorance of the law and gross inexcusable
negligence.
The Court is cognizant of respondent judge's extensive service in
the judiciary. Respondent judge was appointed as Presiding
Judge of RTC Branch 37 in Iriga City on 22 September 2005 and
compulsorily retired on 16 September 2014. Prior to his
appointment as RTC judge, he was the Presiding Judge of the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Iriga City since 9 September
1995. He also served as Clerk of Court VI and Clerk V of RTC
Office of the Clerk of Court, Iriga City from 1990 to 1995. As
noted by the OCA, this is the only administrative case filed
against respondent judge.
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the administrative complaint against
Judge Rogelio Ll. Dacara for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary
38. June 6, 2017
A.M. No. 16-12-03-CA
RE: LETTER OF LUCENA OFENDOREYES ALLEGING ILLICIT ACTIVITIES
OF A CERTAIN ATTY. CAJAYON INVOLVING CASES IN THE COURT
OF APPEALS, CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY,
RESOLUTION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
These consolidated administrative matters arose from the
lettercomplaints respectively filed by Sylvia Adante (Adante)
and Lucena Ofendoreyes (Ofendoreyes) 1 both charging a
certain Atty. Dorothy Cajayon (Atty. Cajayon) from Zamboanga
City and Associate Justice Jane Aurora C. Lantion (Justice
Lantion) of the Court of Appeals in Cagayan De Oro City (CA-
CDO) of illicitly selling favorable decisions involving cases filed in
the CA-CDO to the highest bidding clients.
The Facts
On October 17, 2016, Adante filed before the Office of the
Ombudsman (Ombudsman) a letter, 2 alleging that it was
"intimated to [her]" that Atty. Cajayon, whom she met only
once, was in cahoots with Justice Lantion in engaging in the
shameful business of "selling" decisions involving cases from the
CA-CDO to the highest bidder.
Subsequently, or on October 25, 2017, Ofendoreyes filed before
the same agency a letter, 3 requesting the latter to investigate
and stop the purported partnership of Atty. Cajayon and
Justice Lantion from the business of selling decisions in
exchange for money.
Both letter-complaints were respectively referred by the
Ombudsman to this Court on November 22, 20164 and
November 23, 2016, 5 which were, consequently, docketed as
IPI No. 17-248-CA-J and A.M. No. 16-12-03-CA. In a Resolution 6
dated January 10, 2017, the Court referred the administrative
matters to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) to study
the possible consolidation of the same.
The OCA's Report and Recommendation
In a Memorandum 7 dated February 14, 2017, the OCA
recommended that the matters be consolidated, 8 considering
that both letter-complaints involve the same respondents, i.e.,
Atty. Cajayon and Justice Lantion, and issue, i.e., the sale of
favorable decisions involving cases in the CA-CDO to the
highest bidder.
The OCA, however, observed that the letter-complaints were
insufficient in form and substance in that they: (1) were not
verified; and (2) lacked affidavits of persons who may have
personal knowledge of the facts to prove or substantiate the
letter-complaints' allegations against respondents, as well as
supporting documents. Moreover, it echoed the rule that in
administrative proceedings, the burden of proof that the
respondent committed the acts complained of rests on the
complainant, and that in the absence of evidence against a
court employee or magistrate to discipline for a grave offense,
the presumption that the respondent has regularly performed
his duties will prevail. 9
The Issue Before the Court
The sole issue is whether or not Atty. Cajayon and Justice
Lantion should be held administratively liable.
The Court's Ruling
Under the Rules of Court, administrative complaints both against
lawyers and judges of regular and special courts as well as
Justices of the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan must
be verified and supported by affidavits of persons who have
personal knowledge of the facts alleged therein or by
documents which may substantiate said allegations. For
lawyers, these requirements are stated in Section 1, Rule 139-B
of the Rules of Court:
SECTION 1. How Instituted. - Proceedings for the disbarment,
suspension, or discipline of attorneys may be taken by the
Supreme Court motu propio, or by the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) upon the verified complaint of any person. The
complaint shall state clearly and concisely the facts
complained of and shall be supported by affidavits of persons
having personal knowledge of the facts therein alleged and/or
by such documents as may substantiate said facts. (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)
Meanwhile, for judges and Justices of the Court of Appeals and
the Sandiganbayan, the requirements are found in Section 1,
Rule 140 of the Rules of Court: 10
SECTION 1. How instituted. - Proceedings for the discipline of
Judges of regular and special courts and Justices of the Court
of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan may be instituted motu
proprio by the Supreme Court or upon a verified complaint,
supported by affidavits of persons who have personal
knowledge of the facts alleged therein or by documents which
may substantiate said allegations, or upon an anonymous
complaint, supported by public records of indubitable integrity.
The complaint shall be in writing and shall state clearly and
concisely the acts and omissions constituting violations of
standards of conduct prescribed for Judges by law, the Rules of
Courts or the Code of Judicial Conduct. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
In this relation, Section 2 of Rule 140 states that:
SECTION 2. Action on the complaint. - If the complaint is
sufficient in form and substance, a copy thereof shall be served
upon the respondent, and he shall be required to comment
within ten (10) days from the date of service. Otherwise, the
same shall be dismissed. (Emphasis supplied)
In these cases, it is evident that the herein complaints lacked
the foregoing requirements. Complainants' respective single
page letter complaints are indisputably unverified, and bereft of
any supporting affidavits or documents that would support the
charges made against herein respondents. Overall, they
contain bare allegations that, unfortunately, have no factual or
legal anchorage.
Moreover, it appears that complainants did not have personal
knowledge of the acts imputed against respondents as they
merely relied on hearsay to support their claims. 1âwphi1For
one, Atlante clearly stated in her letter complaint that the
alleged offense was only "intimated to [her]," 11 while
Ofendoreyes simply asks the Court to "investigate and stop"12
the said illicit activities without providing any further details on
the information. The Court has emphasized that "to satisfy the
substantial evidence requirement for administrative cases,
hearsay evidence should necessarily be supplemented and
corroborated by other evidence that are not hearsay,"13 which,
however, was not presented here.
Jurisprudence dictates that in administrative proceedings,
complainants bear the burden of proving the allegations in their
complaints by substantial evidence. If they fail to show in a
satisfactory manner the facts upon which their claims are
based, the respondents are not obliged to prove their
exception or defense. 14 The same goes with administrative
cases disciplining for grave offense court employees or
magistrates. The evidence against the respondent should be
competent and should be derived from direct knowledge. 15
Thus, considering that the complainants not only failed to
comply with the formal requirements provided in the Rules of
Court, but also did not present evidence to lend any ostensible
merit to their letter-complaints that accuse herein respondents
of serious ethical violations (i.e., bidding out court decisions in
favor of moneyed clients), the Court finds no proper conclusion
other than to dismiss outright the present cases.
WHEREFORE, the complaints are DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
39. October 18, 2017
A.M. No. rtj-16-2467
ATTY. EDDIE U. TAMONDONG, Petitioner
vs.
JUDGE EMMANUEL P. PASAL, Presiding Judge, Branch 38,
Regional Trial Court, Cagayan De Oro City, Respondent
DECISION
LEONARDO DE-CASTRO, J.:
This is an administrative complaint1 for gross ignorance of the
law, gross incompetence, gross inefficiency and/or neglect of
duty filed by Atty. Eddie U. Tamondong (Atty. Tamondong)
against Judge Emmanuel P. Pasal (Judge Pasal), Presiding
Judge of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Cagayan de Oro City,
Branch 38, relative to Special Civil Action No. 2013-184, entitled
Henmar Development Property, Inc. v. Judge Michelia O.
Capadocia, Judge, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Opal, Misamis
Oriental and Heirs of Enrique Abada represented by his wife
and children, et al.
The antecedent facts of the instant administrative complaint
are recounted below.
On June 21, 2012, the heirs of Enrique Abada (Abada's heirs),
represented by his wife and children, filed a case for Quieting of
Title, Recovery of Possession, Annulment of Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) No. T-33060, and Annulment of Extrajudicial
Settlement of Estate with Sale,before the Municipal Trial Court in
Cities (MTCC) of Opol, Misamis Oriental, against Atty.
Tamondong's client, Henmar Development Property Inc.
(Henmar), docketed as Civil Case No. 2012-06-04. Subsequently,
Henmar, through Atty. Tamondong, filed an Omnibus Motion
(Ad Cautelam) which prayed for, among other reliefs, the
dismissal of the complaint based on the following grounds: (a)
lack of jurisdiction over the person of Henmar; (b) lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter and/or improper venue; and
(c) prescription and/or laches. In an Order dated March 26,
2013, the MTCC denied the motion to dismiss ofHenmar.
Henmar filed a Motion for Reconsideration but it was also
denied by the MTCC in an Order dated July 4, 2013.
Aggrieved, Henmar filed a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, and
Preliminary Injunction with Prayer for Issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order (TR0)2 before the RTC, docketed as Special
Civil Action No. 2013- 184. The case was raffled to Branch 38,
presided by Judge Pasal.
On December 23, 2013, Judge Pasal issued a Resolution3
dismissing the Petition for lack of merit, for the following reasons:
This court holds that the denial of the dismissal by the public
respondent falls short of the foregoing to justify the issuance of
the extraordinary writ of certiorari and prohibition.
On the first ground, the public respondent acted well within her
jurisdiction when she ruled that summons was validly served and
jurisdiction over the person of Henmar was validly obtained.
True, the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure enumerates specific
persons who may validly receive summons for or on behalf of
corporations. In the case of E.B. Villarosa and Partner Co.,
Limited vs. Herminia I Benito, et al. (G.R. No. 136426, August 6,
1999) the Supreme Court emphasized that the list of persons
who validly receive summons for a corporation is exclusive and
should be strictly followed. However, this is but one side of the
jurisprudential spectrum in the interpretation and application on
the rule of service of summons on corporations. On the other
side of the spectrum is the opinion of Justice Regalado (p. 225,
Remedial Law Compendium Volume 1, 6th ed.) that service of
summons to a secretary who is not the official corporate
secretary is binding on the corporation when the same is
seasonably received by the corporation. Said opinion became
a binding precedent when the same was integrated by the
Supreme Court in its ruling in the case of BPI vs. Sps. Santiago
(G.R. No. 169116, March 28, 2007). It thus appears that the strict
interpretation of the rule on service of summons to corporations
espoused by the earlier E.B. Villarosa case has been modified
by the subsequent BPI case where the Supreme Court went as
far as to pronounce that "there is no hard and fast rule
pertaining to the manner of service of summons". The law
therefore gives sufficient latitude for judges to exercise
discretion in determining whether there was valid service of
summons.
Whether or not there were sufficient grounds to declare
substantial compliance is irrelevant in a certiorari proceeding as
this is not an error of jurisdiction but an error of law which is a
proper subject for appeal. Even assuming that the requirements
for substantial compliance of service of summons were not
present, there is no showing that the public respondent acted
arbitrarily or despotically.
On the second ground, petitioner points out that jurisdiction
over the case lies outside of the territorial jurisdiction of
respondent court which is limited to the Municipality of Opol.
The property involved in this case is described in the title and
the decree as located in Iponan which is part 6f the city of
Cagayan de Oro. This argument however conveniently ignores
the fact, which the public respondent took judicial notice of,
that the title and the decree refer to a cadastral survey
conducted in 1933 when the Municipality of Opol was not yet in
existence. It was only in 1950 that Opol came into existence. A
trial is therefore necessary to determine the political boundaries
of said new municipality and determine whether the subject
property lies within the court's jurisdictional borders.
Finally, on the issue of prescription, jurisprudence has established
that an action for reconveyance based on fraud is
imprescriptible when the plaintiff is in actual possession of the
property (Leyson et. al. vs. Bontuyan, et. al., G.R. No. 156357). In
this case, private respondents alleged that they were in actual
possession of the property until they were ousted from the same
in 2008. Prescription therefore commenced to run only in 2008.
Since the present action was filed in 2012, the action has not yet
prescribed.
Henmar filed a Motion for Reconsideration 4 of the foregoing
Resolution, and Abada's heirs filed their Opposition/Comment to
the Motion for Reconsideration.5
In an Order6 dated February 24, 2014, Judge Pasal deemed the
Motion for Reconsideration of Henmar as already submitted for
resolution. However, even after more than six months, Judge
Pasal had yet to resolve the said Motion.
Hence, Atty. Tamondong initiated the instant administrative
complaint charging Judge Pasal with gross ignorance of the
law and/or gross incompetence.
Atty. Tamondong contends that Judge Pasal's Resolution dated
December 23, 2013 in Special Civil Action No. 2013-184 is legally
erroneous, insisting that: (a) the MTCC has not acquired
jurisdiction over the person of Henmar as the summons was
improperly served on the clerical/secretarial staff of another
corporation, the Radio Mindanao Network, Inc.; (b) the MTCC
does not have jurisdiction over the subject property because
said property is located in Cagayan de Oro City and not in the
Municipality of Opol; and (c) Henmar has been in possession of
the subject property, plus, the document/agreement which
Abada's heirs seek to enforce against Henmar had been
executed on April 22, 1968, so the complaint filed by Abada's
heirs before the MTCC only in 2013 is already beyond the 10-
year prescriptive period under the Civil Code for filing an action
based on a written contract. Atty. Tamondong asserts that
Judge Pasal, in ruling against Henmar and dismissing its Petition,
showed gross and manifest ignorance and incompetence; and
also Judge Pasal, "with all his too glaring, unfounded and
unjustified rejection of the factual and legal grounds"7 raised by
Henmar in its Petition, was unduly favoring Abada's heirs.
In addition, Atty. Tamondong questions Judge Pasal's failure to
seasonably act on and resolve the Motion for Reconsideration
of Henmar and avers that Judge Pasal's inaction on said Motion
for more than six months constituted gross inefficiency and/or
gross neglect of duty.
In his Comment,8 Judge Pasal invites attention to his Resolution
dated December 23,.2013 in Special Civil Action No. 2013-184,
which he claims to be self-explanatory as it amply cites the
applicable rule, jurisprudence, and opinion of an eminent
author. Judge Pasal also points out that the act Atty.
Tamondong complains of, i.e., the dismissal of the Petition in
Special Civil Action No. 2013-184, is judicial in nature and, in
fact, Atty. Tamondong has already elevated the same before
the Court ·of Appeals. Judge Pasal lastly reasons that the
exercise of one's judicial discretion in accordance with law, no
matter how unfavorable it might be to a party, does not
constitute gross ignorance of the law.
Atty. Tamondong filed a Reply to Comment9 reiterating the
supposed flaws in Judge Pasal's Resolution dated December 23,
2013 in Special Civil Action No. 2013-184. According to Atty.
Tamondong, there is no dispute as to the authorities cited by
Judge Pasal in said Resolution and the only problem is the
absence of facts and/or evidence for their application. Atty.
Tamondong further argues that the appeal of Judge Pasal's
Resolution before the Court of Appeals is not a barrier to the
present administrative complaint against Judge Pasal since
these two remedies can proceed independently and be
resolved separately from one another. The administrative
complaint concerns Judge Pasal's fitness to remain in the
Judiciary and not the merits of Special Civil Action No. 2013-184.
Atty. Tamondong additionally alleges that by being completely
mum on the matter, Judge Pasal has impliedly admitted his
failure to timely resolve the Motion for Reconsideration of
Henmar.
The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), through Deputy
Court Administrator Raul Bautista Villanueva, submitted a
Memorandum10 dated June 7, 2016, recommending as follows:
RECOMMENDATION: It is respectfully recommended for the
consideration of the Honorable Court that:
a. The instant administrative complaint against Presiding Judge
Emmanuel P. Pasal, Branch 38, Regional Trial Court, Cagayan
de Oro City, be RE-DOCKETED as a regular administrative
matter;
b. Respondent Judge Pasal be found GUILTY of gross
inefficiency and/or neglect of duty arising from undue delay in
resolving a motion and be FINED in the amount of Two
Thousand Pesos (PhP2,000.00) with a WARNING to be more
punctilious in the observance of the reglementary periods for
resolving pending motions in his court as a repetition of the
same infraction shall be dealt with more severely; and
c. The charge of gross ignorance of the law against respondent
Judge Pasal is DISMISSED for being judicial in nature and for lack
of merit.
The Court, in a Resolution11 dated August 17, 2016, resolves,
among other matters, to re-docket the instant administrative
complaint as a regular administrative matter.
In their respective Manifestations,12 the parties agree to already
submit the administrative complaint for resolution based on the
pleadings filed.
The Court fully adopts the findings and recommendations of the
OCA.
On the charge of gross ignorance and/or gross incompetence
There is no merit in Atty. Tamondong's charge of gross
ignorance of the law and/or gross incompetence against
Judge Pasal.1âwphi1
Atty. Tamondong's sole basis for his charge is Judge Pasal's
Resolution dated December 23, 2013 in Special Civil Action No.
2013-184 dismissing the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition
which Atty. Tamondong filed on behalf of his client, Henmar. In
said Resolution, Judge Pasal determined that there was no
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of the MTCC in denying the motion to
dismiss of Henmar in Civil Case No. 2012-06-04. Atty. Tamondong
though is adamant that the MTCC should have dismissed the
complaint of Abada's heirs against Henmar in Civil Case No.
2012-06-04 on the grounds of (a) lack of jurisdiction over the
person of Henmar; (b) lack of territorial jurisdiction over the
subject property; and (c) lack of jurisdiction over a prescribed
action.
Judge Pasal issued the Resolution dated December 23, 2013 in
Special Civil Action No. 2013-184 in the exercise of his
adjudicative functions, and any errors he might have
committed therein cannot be corrected through administrative
proceedings, but should instead be assailed through judicial
remedies.13 The issues of jurisdiction being argued by Atty.
Tamondong are judicial matters, which again can only be
decided upon through judicial remedies. A party's recourse, if
prejudiced by a judge's orders in the course of a trial, is with the
proper reviewing court and not with the OCA, through an
administrative complaint.14
The Court declared that an administrative complaint is not the
appropriate remedy for every act of a judge deemed aberrant
or irregular where a judicial remedy exists and is available. The
acts of a judge in his judicial capacity are not subject to
disciplinary action. A judge cannot be civilly, criminally, or
administratively liable for his official acts, no matter how
erroneous, provided he acts in good faith.15
The Court also expounded in Flores v. Abesamis16that:
As everyone knows, the law provides ample judicial remedies
against errors or irregularities being committed by a Trial Court in
the exercise of its jurisdiction. The ordinary remedies against
errors or irregularities which may be regarded as normal in
nature (i.e., error in appreciation or admission of evidence, or in
construction or application of procedural or substantive law or
legal principle) include a motion for reconsideration (or after
rendition of a judgment or final order, a motion for new trial),
and appeal. The extraordinary remedies against error or
irregularities which may be deemed extraordinary in character
(i.e., whimsical, capricious, despotic exercise of power or
neglect of duty, etc.) are inter alia the special civil action of
certiorari, prohibition or mandamus, or a motion for inhibition, a
petition for change of venue, as the case may be.
Now, the established doctrine and policy is that disciplinary
proceedings and criminal actions against Judges are not
complementary or suppletory of, nor a substitute for, these
judicial remedies, whether ordinary or extraordinary. Resort to
and exhaustion of these judicial remedies, as well as the entry of
judgment in the corresponding action or proceeding, are pre-
requisites for the taking of other measures against the persons 6f
the judges concerned, whether of civil, administrative, or
criminal nature. It is only after the available judicial remedies
have been exhausted and the appellate tribunals have spoken
with finality, that the door to an inquiry into his criminal, civil, or
administrative liability may be said to have opened, or closed.
In the present administrative complaint, Atty. Tamondong
admitted that he already filed an appeal of Judge Pasal's
Resolution dated December 23, 2013 in Special Civil Action No.
2013-184 before the Court of Appeals. Absent any showing that
Atty. Tamondong has exhausted all available judicial remedies
and that there is already an entry of judgment in the
appropriate judicial action or proceeding, the Court cannot
proceed to inquire herein into Judge Pasal's administrative
liability in relation to said Resolution.
Moreover, Atty. Tamondong failed to offer proof that in issuing
the Resolution dated December 23, 2013 in Special Civil Action
No. 2013-184, Judge Pasal was acting in bad faith and unduly
favoring Abada's heirs. Mere imputation of bias and partiality
against a judge is insufficient because bias and partiality can
never be presumed. Also, bad faith or malice cannot be
inferred simply because the judgment is adverse to a party.17
On the charge of gross inefficiency and/or gross neglect of duty
As for the other charge of gross inefficiency and/ or gross
neglect of duty, the Court finds Judge Pasal administratively
liable for undue delay in resolving the Motion for
Reconsideration of the Resolution dated December 23, 2013
filed by Atty. Tamondong, on behalf of Henmar, in Special Civil
Action No. 2013-184.
Canon 6, Section 5 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for
the Philippine Judiciary18 mandates that "[j]udges shall perform
all judicial duties, including the delivery of reserved decisions,
efficiently, fairly and with reasonable promptness."
Decision-making is primordial among the many duties of judges.
The speedy disposition of cases is the primary aim of the
Judiciary, for only thereby may the ends of justice not be
compromised and the Judiciary may be true to its commitment
of ensuring to all persons the right to a speedy, impartial, and
public trial. To pursue this aim, the Court, through the Rules of
Court and other issuances, has fixed reglementary periods for
acting on cases and matters.19
Under Rule 37, Section 4 of the Rules of Court, "[a] motion for
new trial or reconsideration shall be resolved within thirty (30)
days from the time it is submitted for resolution."
After the filing by Henmar of its Motion for Reconsideration and
Abada's Heirs of their Opposition/Comment to the same, Judge
Pasal issued an Order dated February 24, 2014 submitting the
said Motion for resolution. The 30-day period for resolution
expired on March 26, 2014. However, Judge Pasal issued the
Resolution denying the Motion for Reconsideration only on June
17, 2014, 113 days or almost four months after the submission of
said Motion for resolution. Notably, Judge Pasal did not offer
any explanation at all for the delay. It is, therefore, undeniable
that there was undue delay on Judge Pasal's part in resolving
the Motion for Reconsideration.
As a frontline official of the Judiciary, Judge Pasal should act
with efficiency and probity at all times.20 Judge Pasal's
unexplained delay in resolving the Motion for Reconsideration is
inexcusable, unwarranted, and unreasonable.21 Judge Pasal
failed to heed the consistent reminder of the Court for judges to
decide cases promptly and expeditiously under the time-
honored precept that justice delayed is justice denied. Every
judge should decide cases with dispatch and should be careful,
punctual, and observant in the performance of his functions for
delay in the disposition of cases erodes the faith and
confidence of the people in the Judiciary, lowers its standards,
and brings it into disrepute. Judge Pasal's failure to resolve the
Motion for Reconsideration within the 30-day reglementary
period is not excusable and warrants the imposition of
administrative sanctions upon him.22
If Judge Pasal found himself unable to comply with the
mandatory 30- day reglementary period for resolving the
Motion for Reconsideration in Special Civil Action No. 2013-184,
he could have asked the Court for a reasonable extension of
time to do so. The Court is also aware of the heavy case load of
trial courts, and has allowed reasonable extensions of time
needed to decide cases or resolve pending incidents therein,
but such extensions must first be requested from the Court. A
judge cannot by himself choose to prolong the period for
deciding cases beyond that authorized by law.23 Yet, Judge
Pasal made no such request for extension of time to resolve the
Motion for Reconsideration of Henmar in Special Civil Action No.
2013-184.
Pursuant to the latest amendments to Rule 14024 of the Rules of
Court, undue delay in rendering a decision or order is a less
serious charge, for which the respondent judge shall be
penalized with either (a) suspension from office without salary
and other benefits for not less than one (1) nor more than three
(3) months; or (b) a fine of more than Ten Thousand Pesos
(₱l0,000.00), but not more than Twenty Thousand Pesos
(₱20,000.00).
Taking into account Judge Pasal's seven years of continuous
service to the Judiciary and his subsequent, albeit delayed,
resolution of the Motion for Reconsideration, the Court agrees
with the OCA that the imposition of a fine of Two Thousand
Pesos (₱2,000.00) upon Judge Pasal would already suffice.
WHEREFORE, the administrative complaint for gross ignorance of
the law and/or gross incompetence against Judge Emmanuel
P. Pasal, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Cagayan
de Oro City, Branch 38, is DISMISSED for being judicial in nature.
However, Judge Emmanuel P. Pasal is found GUILTY for his
undue delay in the resolution of the Motion for Reconsideration
of the Resolution dated December 23, 2013 filed by Henmar
Development Property, Inc. in Special Civil Action No. 2013- 184,
for which he is FINED in the amount of Two Thousand Pesos
(₱2,000.00).
SO ORDERED.
40. A.M. No. MTJ-16-1876 (Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 14-2668-MTJ),
April 26, 2017 - JOCELYN MCLAREN, JUNARIO VILLAMAYOR,
RESTITUTO BARLES, JANG JONG DAE, AMANDA TALIBONG,
NOMER A. TALIBONG AND EMELYN FREJOLES, Complainant, v.
HONORABLE JACINTO C. GONZALES, PRESIDING JUDGE
MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT IN CITIES, BRANCH 2, OLONGAPO CITY,
Respondents.
SECOND DIVISION
A.M. No. MTJ-16-1876 (Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 14-2668-MTJ),
April 26, 2017
JOCELYN MCLAREN, JUNARIO VILLAMAYOR, RESTITUTO BARLES,
JANG JONG DAE, AMANDA TALIBONG, NOMER A. TALIBONG
AND EMELYN FREJOLES, Complainant, v. HONORABLE JACINTO
C. GONZALES, PRESIDING JUDGE MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT IN
CITIES, BRANCH 2, OLONGAPO CITY, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
On March 17, 2014, complainants Jocelyn Mclaren, et al. filed
an administrative complaint against respondent Judge Jacinto
C. Gonzales, Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 2,
Olongapo City for gross misconduct in connection with Civil
Case No. 7439, entitled "Subic International Hotel Corp. v.
Jocelyn Mclaren, et al." and for gross dishonesty in failing to
disclose that he had a pending criminal case filed against him
when he applied for judgeship in the Judiciary.
Complainants, who were the defendants in Civil Case No. 7439
for Unlawful Detainer, alleged that their counsel was badly
treated in three hearings in the following manner: (1) he was not
allowed to argue or discuss their objections to the plaintiffs'
motion for preliminary injunction and their two motions to dismiss
ad cautelam; (2) most of the manifestations of their counsel
were cut short by respondent even while he was just beginning
to say something; and (3) he was ordered to sit down three
times. Respondent allegedly had a visible ferocious negative
facial countenance when he addressed their counsel.
Moreover, complainants said that respondent arbitrarily issued
in open court, without legal basis, an Order denying all motions
of the parties. They alleged that respondent was arrogant
during the hearings, not wearing the judicial robe, incessantly
puffing a lighted cigarette, and unnecessarily banging the
gavel.
Complainants had the impression that respondent lost the
neutrality of an impartial judge; hence, they filed an Urgent Ex-
Parte Motion for Inhibition, which motion was denied by
respondent in an Order1 dated January 21, 2014.
In addition, complainants alleged that respondent should be
held liable for gross dishonesty, since he failed to disclose that
he had a pending criminal case for sexual harassment filed in
2002 in connection with his application for judgeship and his
appointment to the Judiciary in December 2005.
In his Comment,2 respondent stated that the charge against
him stemmed from the denial of complainants' motion for
inhibition from Civil Case No. 7439 on the ground that it was
already submitted for decision. Respondent asserted that the
charge of impropriety alleged to have been committed by him
during the hearings was not true and was not a valid reason
and legal basis for his inhibition and administrative sanction.
Assuming that there were instances wherein counsels were cut
short by him in the course of the hearing, respondent said that
those were judgment calls designed to maintain orderly court
proceedings and were made in the performance of duty in
good faith.
Moreover, respondent averred that complainants' contention
that he arbitrarily and without legal basis issued in open court
an order denying all pending motions, including their motion to
dismiss, is belied by the Order3 issued on August 29, 2013. He
maintained that the order denying complainants' motion to
dismiss was not tainted by bias, negligence or any improper
motives, but it was issued upon due consideration of the
arguments of the parties in open court and contained in their
respective pleadings. He also said that there was no factual
basis in complainants' imputation of ferocity, negative facial
countenance and arrogance on his part in the conduct of the
trial.
Further, respondent stated that complainants' motion to inhibit
him from taking cognizance of Civil Case No. 7439, which
motion was filed after the case was submitted for decision, was
an abuse of judicial process and dilatory tactic to prejudice the
plaintiff and would prove antithetical to the speedy
administration of justice. According to respondent, under the
circumstances, he could not simply relinquish his sworn duty to
finally dispose of the case at the risk of violating his
constitutional mandate to decide the subject case within the
90-day period. While Rule 137, Section 1 of the Rules of Court
allows a presiding judge to voluntarily inhibit himself from
hearing a case, which is primarily a matter of conscience and
addressed to his sound discretion, the decision must be based
on his rational and logical assessment of the circumstances
obtaining in the case pending before him.
In addition, respondent stated that, except for the alleged non-
wearing of the judicial robe which at some instances could not
be avoided due to the extreme heat, the failing air-conditioning
unit and the regular daily brownouts, equally without factual
basis were complainants' allegation that he unnecessarily
banged the gavel and smoked during trial.
Finally, respondent contended that the issue raised by
complainants relative to the other cases filed against him in
another forum is a matter within the cognizance of the
appropriate body where they are pending. As such, said issue
cannot be considered or taken together with this administrative
complaint without violating established rules of procedure and
non-forum shopping.
Respondent prays that this complaint be dismissed for lack of
merit.
This administrative complaint raises the following issues:
1. Whether or not respondent Judge Gonzales should be
held administratively liable for gross misconduct for his
alleged hostile behavior toward complainants' counsel
 which resulted in the filing of a motion for inhibition, and
for his alleged arrogance during the hearing with his non-
wearing of the judicial robe, smoking and unnecessarily
banging the gavel; and
2. Whether or not respondent Judge Gonzales should be
held liable for dishonesty for his failure to disclose in his
application for judgeship before the Judicial and Bar
Council that he has a pending criminal case.
On February 23, 2016, the Office of the Court Administrator
(OCA) submitted a report4 and recommended that the
administrative complaint against respondent Judge Gonzales
be re-docketed as a regular administrative matter, and that
respondent be found guilty of violating Supreme Court
Administrative Circular No. 25 dated June 9, 1989 for non-
wearing of the judicial robe during court sessions and be fined
therefor.
The OCA stated that the allegation that respondent Judge
Gonzales smoked cigarettes during trial, displayed arrogance in
the conduct of the proceedings, and unnecessarily banged the
gavel should be dismissed in the absence of substantial
evidence by the complainants to support the charge.
In regard to the propriety of inhibiting from the case, the OCA
stated that, under Supreme Court Circular No. 7 dated
November 10, 1980, it has been settled that orders of inhibition
are not administrative in character, but are judicial in nature.
Questions on the competency of the inhibiting judge should be
determined with finality in an appropriate judicial proceeding.
Moreover, complainants failed to provide substantial evidence
that respondent was partial to the other party. The presumption
that official duty has been performed will govern.
In regard to the issue of dishonesty, the OCA stated that it is
essentially the same allegation raised in OCA I.P.I. No. 09-2119-
MTJ, and the Court had already resolved the issue in a
Resolution dated March 9, 2009, hence, the charge of
dishonesty by herein complainants should be dismissed and the
matter considered closed and terminated.
The Court sustains the findings of the OCA that the charge of
dishonesty against respondent should be dismissed as it has
been resolved in OCA IPI No. 09-2119-MTJ. There is insufficient
evidence against respondent in regard to all other charges of
complainants, except the non-wearing of his judicial robe.
Respondent Judge Gonzales admitted not wearing the judicial
robe due to the extreme heat, non-functioning air-conditioning
units and regular brownouts. His justification for not wearing his
judicial robe is unacceptable. In Atty. Tiongco v. Judge Savillo,5
the Court said:
Respondent judge admitted that he does not wear the black
robe, but seeks to excuse his non-compliance because of his
illness. The Court cannot accept his plea. In Chan v.
Majaducon, where respondent judge tried to excuse his non-
compliance because of his hypertension, we held that:
The wearing of robes by judges during official proceedings,
which harks back to the 14th century, is not an idle ceremony.
Such practice serves the dual purpose of "heightening] public
consciousness on the solemnity of judicial proceedings," as
Circular No. 25 states, and of impressing upon the judge, the
exacting obligations of his office. As well put by an eminent jurist
of another jurisdiction:
[J]udges [are] x x x clothed in robes, not only, that they who
witness the administration of justice should be properly advised
that the function performed is one different from, and higher,
than that which a man discharges as a citizen in the ordinary
walks of life; but also, in order to impress the judge himself with
the constant consciousness that he is a high priest in the temple
of justice and is surrounded with obligations of a sacred
character that he cannot escape and that require his utmost
care, attention and self-suppression.
Consequently, a judge must take care not only to remain true OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, Complainant
to the high ideals of competence and integrity his robe
vs
represents, but also that he wears one in the first place.6
JUDGE ELIZA B. YU, METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 47,
Respondent's act of not wearing the judicial robe during court
PASAY CITY, Respondent
sessions is violative of Administrative Circular No. 25 dated June
9, 1989, thus: x-----------------------x
Pursuant to Sections 5 and 6, Article 8 of the Constitution and in A.M. N0.12-1-09-MeTC
order to heighten public consciousness on the solemnity of
judicial proceedings, it is hereby directed that beginning RE: LETTER DATED 21 JULY 2011 OF EXECUTIVE JUDGE BIBIANO G.
Tuesday, August 1, 1989, all Presiding Judges of all Trial Courts COLASITO AND THREE (3) OTHER JUDGES OF THE METROPOLITAN
shall wear black robes during sessions of their respective courts.7 TRIAL COURT, PASAY CITY, FOR THE SUSPENSION OR DETAIL TO
ANOTHER STATION OF JUDGE ELIZA B. YU, BRANCH 47, SAME
Under the principles of statutory construction, the term "shall" is COURT.
mandatory.8 The Circular orders all Presiding Judges of all trial
courts to wear their black robes during sessions in their x-----------------------x
respective courts. A.M. NO. MTJ-13-1836
Under Section 9(4), Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Court, (Formerly A.M. No. 11-11-115- MeTC)
violation of Supreme Court rules, directives and circulars is
considered a less serious charge and punishable under Section RE: LETTER DATED MAY 2, 2011 OF HON. ELIZA B. YU, PRESIDING
11 (B) of the Revised Rules of Court with suspension from office JUDGE, METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 47, PASAY CITY.
without salary and other benefits for not less than one month x-----------------------x
nor more than three months, or a fine of more than P10,00.0.00
but not exceeding P20,000.00. A.M. NO. MTJ-12-1815

WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Judge Jacinto C. (Formerly OCA IPI No. 11-2401- MTJ)
Gonzales, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 2, Olongapo
LEILANI A. TEJERO-LOPEZ, Complainant,
City, guilty of violating Administrative Circular No. 25 dated June
9, 1989. Respondent Judge Jacinto C. Gonzales is ORDERED to vs.
PAY a fine of Twelve Thousand Pesos (P12,000.00), with a
JUDGE ELIZA B. YU, BRANCH 47, METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT,
warning that the commission of a similar act in the future shall
PASA Y CITY, Respondent.
be dealt with more severely.
x-----------------------x
SO ORDERED.
OCA IPI NO. 11-2398-MTJ
41. March 14, 2017
JOSEFINA G. LABID, Complainant,
A.M. No. MTJ-12-1813
vs.
JUDGE ELIZA B. YU, METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 47,
PASAY CITY, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
OCA IPI NO. 11-2399-MTJ
AMOR V. ABAD, FROILAN ROBERT L. TOMAS, ROMER H. A VILES,
EMELINA J. SAN MIGUEL, NORMAN D.S. GARCIA, MAXIMA SA YO
and DENNIS ECHEGOYEN, Complainants,
vs.
HON. ELIZA B. YU, PRESIDING JUDGE, METROPOLITAN TRIAL
COURT, BRANCH 47, PASAY CITY, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
OCA IPI NO. 11-2378-MTJ
EXECUTIVE JUDGE BIBIANO G. COLAS ITO, VICE EXECUTIVE
JUDGE BONIFACIO S. PASCUA, JUDGE RESTITUTO V.
MANGALINDAN, JR., JUDGE CATHERINE P. MANODON, MIGUEL
C. INFANTE (CLERK OF COURT IV, OCC-METC), RACQUEL C.
DIANO (CLERK OF COURT Ill, METC, BRANCH 45), EMMA ANNIE D.
ARAFILES (ASSISTANT CLERK OF COURT, OCC-METC), PEDRO C.
DOCTOLERO, JR. (CLERK OF COURT Ill, METC, BRANCH 44), LYDIA
T. CASAS (CLERK OF COURT III, METC, BRANCH 46), ELEANOR N.
BA YOG (LEGAL RESEARCHER,METC,BRANCH 45), LEILANIE A.
TEJERO (LEGAL RESEARCHER, METC, BRANCH 46), ANA MARIA V.
FRANCISCO (CASHIER I, OCCMETC), SOLEDAD J. BASSIG (CLERK
III, OCC-METC), MARISSA MASHHOOR RASTGOOY (RECORDS
OFFICER, OCC-METC), MARIE LUZ M. OBIDA (ADMINISTRATIVE
OFFICER, OCC-METC), VIRGINIA D. GALANG (RECORDS OFFICER
I, OCC-METC), AUXENCIO JOSEPH CLEMENTE (CLERK OF COURT
III, METC, BRANCH 48), EVELYN P. DEPALOBOS (LEGAL
RESEARCHER, METC, BRANCH 44), MA. CECILIA GERTRUDES R.
SALVADOR (LEGAL RESEARCHER, METC, BRANCH 48), JOSEPH B.
PAMATMAT (CLERK Ill, OCCMETC), ZENAIDA N. GERONIMO
(COURT STENOGRAPHER, OCC-METC), BENJIE V. ORE (PROCESS
SERVER, OCC-METC), FORTUNATO E. DIEZMO (PROCESS SERVER,
OCCMETC), NO MER B. VILLANUEVA (UTILITY WORKER, OCC-
METC), ELSA D. GARNET (CLERK Ill, OCCMETC), FATIMA V. ROJAS
(CLERK III, OCC-METC), EDUARDO E. EBREO (SHERIFF III, METC,
BRANCH 45), RONALYN T. ALMARVEZ (COURT STENOGRAPHER II,
METC, BRANCH 45), MA. VICTORIA C. OCAMPO (COURT
STENOGRAPHER II, METC, BRANCH 45), ELIZABETH LIPURA (CLERK
III METC, BRANCH 45), MARY ANN J. CAYANAN (CLERK III, METC,
BRANCH 45), MANOLO MANUEL E. GARCIA (PROCESS SERVER,
METC, BRANCH 45), EDWINA A. JUROK (UTILITY WORKER, OCC-
METC), ARMINA B. ALMONTE (CLERK III, OCC-METC), ELIZABETH
G. VILLANUEVA (RECORDS OFFICER, METC, BRANCH 44), ERWIN
RUSS B. RAGASA (SHERIFF III, METC, BRANCH 44), BIEN T. CAMBA
(COURT STENOGRAPHER II, METC, BRANCH 44), MARLON M.
SULIGAN (COURT STENOGRAPHER II, METC, BRANCH 44),
CHANDA B. TOLENTINO (COURT STENOGRAPHER II, METC,
BRANCH 44), FERDINAND R. MOLINA (COURT INTERPRETER, METC,
BRANCH 44), PETRONILO C. PRIMACIO, JR. (PROCESS SERVER,
METC, BRANCH 45), EDWARD ERIC SANTOS (UTILITY WORKER,
METC, BRANCH 45), EMILIO P. DOMINE (UTILITY WORKER, METC,
BRANCH 45), ARNOLD P. OBIAL (UTILITY WORKER, METC, BRANCH
44), RICARDO E. LAMPITOC (SHERIFF III, METC, BRANCH 46),
JEROME H. A VILES (COURT STENOGRAPHER II, METC, BRANCH
46), ANA LEA M. ESTACIO (COURT STENOGRAPHER II, METC,
BRANCH 46), LANIE F. AGUINALDO (CLERK III, METC, BRANCH
44), JASMINE L. LINDAIN (CLERK III, METC, BRANCH 44),
RONALDO S. QUIJANO (PROCESS SERVER, METC, BRANCH 44),
DOMINGO H. HOCOSOL (UTILITY WORKER, METC, BRANCH 48),
EDWIN P. UBANA (SHERIFF III, METC, BRANCH 48), MARVIN 0.
BALICUATRO (COURT STENOGRAPHER II, METC, BRANCH 48), MA.
LUZ D. DIONISIO (COURT STENOGRAPHER II, METC, BRANCH 48),
MARIBEL A. MOLINA (COURT STENOGRAPHER II, METC, BRANCH
48), CRISTINA E. LAMPITOC (COURT STENOGRAPHER II, METC,
BRANCH 46), MELANIE DC. BEGASA (CLERK III, METC, BRANCH
46), EV ANGELINE M. CHING (CLERK III, METC, BRANCH 46), LA
WREN CE D. PEREZ (PROCESS SERVER, METC, BRANCH 46),
EDMUNDO VERGARA (UTILITY WORKER, METC, BRANCH 46),
AMOR V. ABAD (COURT INTERPRETER, METC, BRANCH 47),
ROMER H. A VILES (COURT STENOGRAPHER II, METC, BRANCH
47), FROILAN ROBERT L. TOMAS (COURT STENOGRAPHER II, METC,
BRANCH 47), MAXIMA C. SAYO (PROCESS SERVER, BRANCH 47),
SEVILLA B. DEL CASTILLO (COURT INTERPRETER, METC, BRANCH
48), AIDA JOSEFINA IGNACIO (CLERK III, METC, BRANCH 48),
BENIGNO A. MARZAN (CLERK III, METC, BRANCH 48), KARLA MAE
R. PACUNAYEN (CLERK III, METC, BRANCH 48), IGNACIO M.
GONZALES (PROCESS SERVER, METC, BRANCH 48), EMELINA J.
SAN MIGUEL (RECORDS OFFICER, OCC, DETAILED AT BRANCH
47), DENNIS M. ECHEGOYEN (SHERIFF III, OCC-METC), NORMAN
GARCIA (SHERIFF III, METC, BRANCH 47), NOEL G. LABID (UTILITY
WORKER I, BRANCH 47), Complainant,
vs.
HON. ELIZA B. YU, PRESIDING JUDGE, METROPOLITAN TRIAL
COURT, BRANCH 47, PASAY CITY, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
OCA IPI NO. 12-2456-MTJ
JUDGE BIBIANO G. COLASITO, JUDGE BONIFACIO S. PASCUA,
JUDGE RESTITUTO V. MANGALINDAN, JR. and CLERK OF COURT
MIGUEL C. INFANTE, Complainants,
vs.
HON. ELIZA B. YU, PRESIDING JUDGE, METROPOLITAN TRIAL
COURT, BRANCH 47, PASAY CITY, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
A.M. NO. MTJ-13-1821
JUDGE EMILY L. SAN GASPAR- GITO, METROPOLITAN TRIAL
COURT, BRANCH 20, MANILA, Complainant,
vs.
JUDGE ELIZA B. YU, METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 47,
PASAY CITY, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
We hereby consider and resolve respondent Eliza B. Yu's Motion
for Reconsideration with Explanation for the Show Cause Order
filed vis-a-vis the decision promulgated on November 22, 2016
disposing against her as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court FINDS and PRONOUNCES respondent
JUDGE ELIZA B. YU GUILTY of GROSS INSUBORDINATION; GROSS
IGNORANCE OF THE LAW; GROSS MISCONDUCT; GRAVE ABUSE
OF AUTHORITY; OPPRESSION; and CONDUCT UNBECOMING OF
A JUDICIAL OFFICIAL; and, ACCORDINGLY, DISMISSES her from
the service EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY, with FORFEITURE OF ALL HER
BENEFITS, except accrued leave credits, and further
DISQUALIFIES her from reinstatement or appointment to any
public office or employment, including to one in any
government-owned or government-controlled corporations.
Respondent JUDGE ELIZA B. YU is directed to show cause in
writing within ten (10) days from notice why she should not be
disbarred for violation of the Lawyer's Oath, the Code of
Professional Responsibility, and the Canons of Professional Ethics
as outlined herein.
Let a copy of this decision be furnished to the Office of the
Court Administrator for its information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.1
In her motion, the respondent repeatedly denies committing all
the administrative offenses for which she was held guilty, and
insists on the absence of proof to support the findings against
her. She pleads that the Court reconsiders based on the
following:
1. Noncompliance with A.O. No. 19-2011
The complaint against her was premature because of the
pendency of her protest against night court duty. A.O. No. 19-
2011 did not carry a penal provision, and was only directory
because of the use of the permissive word may. In addition to
A.O. No. 19-2011 being noncompliant with the requirements of
a valid administrative order, the requirement of night court duty
violated Section 5, Rule XVII of the Omnibus Rules Implementing
Book V of the Administrative Code,2 which limited the working
hours for government officials and employees. It was also not
illegal to write to the Secretary of the Department of Tourism
(DOT) considering that he was the requesting authority
regarding the rendering of the night court duty. She did not
publicly broadcast her disobedience to A.O. No. 19-2011 when
she wrote the letter to the Secretary. There was no law
prohibiting her from writing the protest letters. At any rate, she
had the right to do so under the Freedom of Speech Clause.
She did not refuse to obey A.O. No. 19-2011 because she
actually allowed her staff to report for night duty. She did not
willfully and intentionally disobey because her protest had legal
basis. She would also violate Section 3(a)3 of Republic Act No.
3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) if she would comply
with the patently illegal A.O. No. 19-2011.4
2. Refusal to honor the appointments of Ms. Mariejoy P. Lagman
and Ms. Leilani Tejero-Lopez
The respondent claims that she did not refuse to honor the
appointment because rejection was different from protesting
the appointment. She merely exercised her statutory right as a
judge to question the appointment of the branch clerk of court
assigned to her sala. Under Canon 2, Section 3 of the New
Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary,5 she was
mandated to bring to the proper authorities the irregularities
surrounding the appointments. Moreover, the contents of the
complaint letter and the protest could not be used against her
pursuant to the constitutional right against self-incrimination. She
did not also commit any act of cruelty against Ms. Tejera-Lopez;
on the contrary, it was Ms. Tejero-Lopez who "went beyond the
norms of decency by her persistent and annoying application in
my court that it actually became a harassment." Her opposition
against the appointment of Ms. Lagman was meritorious. She
only employed the wrong choice of words with her choice of
the term privileged communication that was viewed negatively.
There was no proof of the alleged verbal threats, abuse,
misconduct or oppression committed against Ms. Tejero-Lopez.
It was not proper to penalize a judge based on a "letter with
few words that other people find objectionable."6
3. Show-cause order respondent issued against fellow judges
The respondent posits that the show-cause order she issued to
her fellow judges had legal basis because "anything that is legal
cannot be an assumption of the role of a tyrant wielding power
with unbridled breath."7 It was premature to rule that she
thereby abused and committed misconduct because she did
not issue any ruling on the explanation by the other judges.8
She did not violate Section 5, Canon 3 and Section 8, Canon 4
of the Code of Judicial Conduct. What the other judges should
have done was to avail themselves of the appropriate
remedy.9
4. Refusal to sign the leave of absence of Mr. Noel Labid
The refusal to sign the application for leave of absence had
factual and legal bases.10 Moreover, she should be presumed
to have acted in good faith if she misconstrued the rules on
approval of application of leave.11
5. Allowing on-the-job trainees
The respondent claims that she did not order the trainees to
perform judicial tasks. She asserts that she could not remember
their affidavit. She had no personal knowledge that the trainees
were made to serve as assistant court stenographers. Based on
what she heard, the trainees were only in the premises of her
court for a few hours. She reminds that she allowed the trainees
to merely observe proceedings. OCA Circular No. 111-2005 was
impliedly amended when paralegals and law students were
allowed to be trained under the Hustisyeah Project.12
6. Designation of an officer-in-charge and ordering reception of
evidence by a non-lawyer
The respondent denies having violated CSC Memorandum
Circular No. 06-05 when she designated an officer-in-charge.
There was no proof showing that she willfully and deliberately
intended to cause public damage. In fact, the OCA recognized
Mr. Ferdinand Santos as the OIC of her branch in several letters.
There was no proof that she violated Section 9, Rule 30 of the
Rules of Court. The ex parte reception of evidence by a non-
lawyer clerk of court was allowed under the Rules of Court, as
well as by Section 2l(e), Administrative Circular No. 35-2004, and
Administrative Circular No. 37-93.13
7. Allowing criminal proceedings to continue despite the
absence of counsel
The respondent merely followed the Rules of Criminal Procedure
in allowing criminal proceedings despite absence of counsel. In
so doing, she relied in good faith on the rulings in People v.
Arcilla,14 Bravo v. Court of Appeals,15 and People v. Malinao.16
Under Section l(c), Rule 115 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure,
the accused may be allowed to defend himself in person
without the assistance of counsel.17
8. Sending of inappropriate email messages
The respondent maintains that the e-mail messages were
hearsay because the certification by the SC-MISO was not
presented to her, depriving her of the opportunity to object. Her
granting access by the MISO to her private e-mails was
conditional to prove tampering. Her
Lycos e-mail account was hacked. She did not completely
waive her right to privacy. Considering that she did not
authenticate said e-mail messages, the same were inadmissible
for being hearsay. The e-mail messages with her full name
written in capital letters as the sender did not emanate from her
because her Yahoo! and MSN accounts carried her name with
only the first letters being capitalized. The e-mails reproduced in
the decision were not the same messages that she had
requested Judge San Gaspar-Gito to delete. There were words
that she did not write on the e-mail messages pertaining to her
demand for reimbursement of $10.00. Her writing style was
different from what appeared in the e-mail messages. She
denies having opened the "Rudela San Gaspar" account. It was
wrong to penalize her based on assumptions and speculations.
She did not commit electronic libel. Her funny and innocent
comments were not actionable documents. The certification by
the SC MISO was not an authentication as to the truthfulness of
the contents of the e-mail messages and as to the identification
of the sender or author of the messages. It was wrong and
unjust to impute wrongdoing to her when there was no proof
that she had sent the inappropriate messages. The disclaimer in
the e-mails were not printed in the decision; hence, the
messages were inadmissible. The presentation of the messages
without her consent as the sender was covered by the
exclusionary rule. Letters and communications in writing were
guaranteed and protected by Sections 2,18 3(1),19 Article III of
the 1987 Constitution, and Article 723 of the Civil Code,20
Articles 22621 and 22822 of the Revised Penal Code, Section
2756 of the Revised Administrative Code,23 Sections 3224 and
3325 of the R.A. No. 8792. There was no proof that she had
apologized through e-mail, and had sent messages with sexual
undertones and lewd graphics. Judge Gita had a dirty mind
because nothing was wrong with the 69 image by Felicien Raps.
She (respondent) did not commit internet stalking. She had
difficulty in remembering the private communications, which
were taken out of context. It was Judge Gita who must have a
problem because she had kept the trash messages. She
(respondent) did not transgress any law. The allegations against
her were hearsay. She submitted a letter proposal for a "winwin"
solution so that she would not pursue any criminal action
against Judge Gito. She did not violate Section 8, Canon 4 of
the New Code of Judicial Conduct because it was one of her
staff who had typed the letter addressed to Atty. San Gaspar.
To find her to have abused her power and committed
impropriety was unwarranted. Her absence from the
investigation conducted by Justice Abdulwahid could not be
taken against her and could not be construed as her admission
of wrong doing or as an evasion of truth. There was no proof
that she had used the phrase our court to advance her
personal interest.26
Ruling of the Court
We deny the respondent's Motion for Reconsideration with
Explanation for the Show Cause Order for the following reasons.
1.
The respondent's Motion for Reconsideration is denied for lack
of merit
The submissions tendered in the respondent's Motion for
Reconsideration with Explanation for the Show Cause Order
were matters that the Court had already exhaustively
considered and fully resolved in the decision of November 22,
2016. We deem it unnecessary to dwell at length on such
submissions. We still hold and declare that the respondent
flagrantly and blatantly violated the Lawyer's Oath, and several
canons and rules of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the
Canon of Judicial Ethics and the New Judicial Code of
Conduct.
Nonetheless, we propose to expound on some points for
greater enlightenment on the issues and grounds taken into
consideration in removing the respondent from the Judiciary,
and for purposes of providing the requisite predicate to the
ruling on the directive for her to show sufficient cause in writing
why she should not also be disbarred from the Roll of Attorneys.
The respondent insists that there was no proof to support the
adverse findings of the Court. She is absolutely mistaken. The
records involved in these cases were voluminous, because they
consisted of the affidavits and other evidence submitted by the
several complainants as well as her own pleadings and motions,
most of which constituted proof of her administrative
wrongdoings. As the per curiam decision of November 22, 2016
indicated, her explanations vis-a-vis the complaints often
backfired against her, and all the more incriminated her by
systematically exposing her personal and professional
ineptitude and stilted logic. In short, the evidence against her
was too compelling to ignore, and sufficed to warrant the
supreme action of her removal from the Judiciary. She was
more than aware that the quantum of evidence required in
administrative proceedings like these was substantial evidence,
or that amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.27
The respondent's argument that she was deprived of the
guarantee against self-incrimination has no basis. As a judge,
she was quite aware that the constitutional guarantee only set
the privilege of an individual to refuse to answer incriminating
questions that may directly or indirectly render her criminally
liable. The constitutional guarantee simply secures to a witness -
whether a party or not - the right to refuse to answer any
particular incriminatory question.28 The privilege did not prohibit
legitimate inquiry in non-criminal matters. At any rate, the rule
only finds application in case of oral testimony and does not
apply to object evidence. As the Court has pointed out in
People v. Malimit:29
[The right against self-incrimination], as put by Mr. Justice
Holmes in Holt vs. United States, "x x x is a prohibition of the use
of physical or moral compulsion, to extort communications from
him x x x" It is simply a prohibition against legal process to
extract from the [accused] 's own lips, against his will, admission
of his guilt. It docs not apply to the instant case where the
evidence sought to be excluded is not an incriminating
statement but an object evidence. Wigmore, discussing the
question now before us in his treatise on evidence, thus, said:
If, in other words (the rule) created inviolability not only for his
[physical control of his] own vocal utterances, but also for his
physical control in whatever form exercise, then, it would be
possible for a guilty person to shut himself up in his house, with all
the tools and indicia of his crime, and defy the authority of the
law to employ in evidence anything that might be obtained by
forcibly overthrowing his possession and compelling the
surrender of the evidential articles - a clear reduction ad
absurdum. In other words, it is not merely compulsion that is the
kernel of the privilege, x x x but testimonial compulsion.30
The respondent's correspondences were outside the scope of
the constitutional proscription against self-incrimination. She had
not been subjected to testimonial compulsion in which she
could validly raise her right against self-incrimination. Worthy to
recall is that she had herself voluntarily waived her right to be
present and to confront the complainant and her witnesses and
evidence during the administrative investigation conducted by
CA Associate Justice Hakim Abdulwahid. She was emphatically
granted the opportunity to confront the complainant and her
witnesses but the voluntary and knowing waiver of her presence
divested her of the right to insist on the right to confrontation, if
any.
The respondent contends that she was not given the
opportunity to raise her objection to the certification issued by
the SC-MISO. This contention is dismissed also because of the
same voluntary waiver of her presence from the proceedings
held before Justice Abdulwahid.
At any rate, the respondent alternatively pleads for compassion
and mercy, and vows not to repeat the same transgressions. In
this connection, she would have the Court consider in her favor
the following mitigating circumstances pursuant to Section 48,
Rule 10 of the Revised Rules of Administrative Cases in Civil
Service,31 which provides thus:
1. Medications on allergies as analogous circumstance to an
unsubstantiated charge;
2. Good faith on each the unsubstantiated charge xxx;
3. First time offense of the unsubstantiated charge;
4. Lack of education or lack of experience on administrative
matters as analogous circumstance to the unsubstantiated
charge;
5. Newness or short number in the judicial service as analogous
circumstance to the unsubstantiated charge;
6. Very different work culture from previous employment as
unsubstantiated charge;
7. Lack of prejudice to the public as analogous circumstance to
the unsubstantiated charge;
8. Remorse for not listening to the unsolicited advices of Court
Administrator Jose Midas Marquez and Assistant Court
Administrator Thelma Bahia as analogous circumstance to the
unsubstantiated charge;
9. Lack of intent to commit any wrong as analogous
circumstance to the unsubstantiated charge;
10. Previously received awards in the performance of his duties
to the unsubstantiated charge; and
11. Outstanding court performance as to cases disposal for year
to the unsubstantiated charge.32
The respondent's pleading is unworthy of sympathy.
Firstly, the respondent does not thereby present any compelling
argument on how her having medications for allergies was
analogous to physical illness under Section 48(a) of the Revised
Rules of Administrative Cases in Civil Service. Although the list of
circumstances in Section 48 is not exclusive because the
provision expressly recognizes other analogous circumstances,
she cannot simply state any situation without pointing out why it
would be analogous to the listed circumstances. The Court is
unable to appreciate how her consumption of medications for
allergies could generate arrogance, insubordination, gross
ignorance of laws, and offensive conduct that manifested
themselves in the periods material to the administrative
complaints.
Secondly, the respondent's overall conduct negated her
allegation of good faith. Good faith implies the lack of any
intention to commit a wrongdoing. Based on the totality of her
acts and actuations, her claims of good faith and lack of intent
to commit a wrong cannot be probable. According to Civil
Service Commission v. Maala,33 good faith as a defense in
administrative investigations has been discussed in this wise:
In common usage, the term "good faith" is ordinarily used to
describe that state of mind denoting "honesty of intention, and
freedom from knowledge of circumstances which ought to put
the holder upon inquiry; an honest intention to abstain from
taking any unconscientious advantage of another, even
through technicalities of law, together with absence of all
information, notice, or benefit or belief of facts which render
transaction unconscientious."
In short, good faith is actually a question of intention. Although
this is something internal, we can ascertain a person's intention
by relying not on his own protestations of good faith, which is
self-serving, but on evidence of his conduct and outward acts.
(bold emphasis supplied)
The respondent is reminded that her removal from the Judiciary
by reason of her gross insubordination and gross misconduct did
not proceed only from her non-compliance with A.O. No. 19-
2011. Other acts and actuations were also efficient causes,
namely: (1) her refusal to abide by the directive of MeTC
Executive Judge Bibiano Colasito that resulted in the disruption
of orderliness in the other Pasay City MeTCs to the prejudice of
the public service and public interest; (2) her direct
communications to the DOT Secretary and other agencies that
seriously breached established protocols, thereby opening an
irregular avenue to publicly broadcast her defiance to the
directive of the Court itself; and (3) her willful disregard of the
direct advice by the Court Administrator despite the latter
being the official expressly authorized by law to assist the Court
in exercising administrative supervision over all lower courts and
personnel.34
Furthermore, we emphatically observed and pointed out in the
decision of November 22, 2016 the following:
In all, Judge Yu exhibited an unbecoming arrogance in
committing insubordination and gross misconduct. By her refusal
to adhere to and abide by A.O. No. 19-2011, she deliberately
disregarded her duty to serve as the embodiment of the law at
all times. She thus held herself above the law by refusing to be
bound by the issuance of the Court as the duly constituted
authority on court procedures and the supervision of the lower
courts. To tolerate her insubordination and gross misconduct is
to abet lawlessness on her part. She deserved to be removed
from the service because she thereby revealed her
unworthiness of being part of the Judiciary. (Bold emphasis
supplied)
We have stated in the decision of November 22, 2016 that the
respondent's recalcitrant streak did not end with her
unbecoming repudiation of and defiance to A.O. No. 19-2011.
To recall, she also exhibited extreme arrogance in rejecting the
valid appointments of Ms. Lagman and Ms. Tejero-Lopez
despite being fully aware that the appointing powers pertained
to and were being thereby exercised by the Court, and that she
was bereft of any discretion to control or reject the
appointments. Under no circumstance could she be justified in
draping herself with the mantle of good faith in regard to her
insubordination and arrogance.
We also reject the respondent's appeal for relief based on her
supposed lack of experience as a neophyte judge, and her
previously received awards and outstanding court
performance. Lack of experience had no relevance in
determining her administrative liabilities for acts and actuations
fundamentally irregular or contrary to judicial ethical standards.
We even believe that her being a novice in the Judiciary,
instead of mitigating her liability, could have aggravated her
offense, for her being a neophyte judge should have impelled
her instead to practice greater prudence and caution in her
daily actuations and performance. But instead of pausing and
hesitating, she acted rashly and imprudently by
condescendingly asserting herself over her peers, by flagrantly
disobeying her superiors, including this Court, and by ignoring
obvious boundaries that should have kept her in check or
reined her in. On the other hand, the awards for outstanding
performances as a professional and as a judge, far from
accenting her good qualities as a person, rather highlighted her
unworthiness to remain on the Bench by showing that her
misconduct and general bad attitude as a member thereof has
put the awards and recognitions in serious question.
2.
Disbarment is also to be imposed on the respondent
The respondent's accountability did not end with her removal
from the Judiciary. In the decision of November 22, 2016, we
declared that her misdemeanor as a member of the Bench
could also cause her expulsion from the Legal Profession
through disbarment. Consequently, we directed her to show
good and sufficient cause why her actions and actuations
should not also be considered grounds for her disbarment,
justifying our directive in the following manner, viz.:
The foregoing findings may already warrant Judge Yu's
disbarment.
A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC, dated September 17, 2002 and entitled Re:
Automatic Conversion of Some Administrative Cases Against
Justices of the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan;
Judges of Regular and Special Courts; and Court Officials Who
are Lawyers as Disciplinary
Proceedings Against Them Both as Such Officials and as
Members of the Philippine Bar, relevantly states:
Some administrative cases against Justices of the Court of
Appeals and the Sandiganbayan; judges of regular and special
courts; and court officials who are lawyers are based on
grounds which are likewise grounds for the disciplinary action of
members of the Bar for violation of the Lawyer's Oath, the Code
of Professional Responsibility, and the Canons of Professional
Ethics, or for such other forms of breaches of conduct that have
been traditionally recognized as grounds for the discipline of
lawyers.
In any of the foregoing instances, the administrative case shall
also be considered a disciplinary action against the respondent
Justice, judge or court official concerned as a member of the
Bar. The respondent may forthwith be required to comment on
the complaint and show cause why he should not also be
suspended, disbarred or otherwise disciplinarily sanctioned as a
member of the Bar. Judgment in both respects may be
incorporated in one decision or resolution.
Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, an attorney
may be disbarred on the ground of gross misconduct and willful
disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court. Given her
wanton defiance of the Court's own directives, her open
disrespect towards her fellow judges, her blatant abuse of the
powers appurtenant to her judicial office, and her penchant for
threatening the defenseless with legal actions to make them
submit to her will, we should also be imposing the penalty of
disbarment.1âwphi1 The object of disbarment is not so much to
punish the attorney herself as it is to safeguard the
administration of justice, the courts and the public from the
misconduct of officers of the court. Also, disbarment seeks to
remove from the Law Profession attorneys who have
disregarded their Lawyer's Oath and thereby proved
themselves unfit to continue discharging the trust and respect
given to them as members of the Bar.
The administrative charges against respondent Judge Yu based
on grounds that were also grounds for disciplinary actions
against members of the Bar could easily be treated as justifiable
disciplinary initiatives against her as a member of the Bar. This
treatment is explained by the fact that her membership in the
Bar was an integral aspect of her qualification for judgeship.
Also, her moral and actual unfitness to remain as a Judge, as
found in these cases, reflected her indelible unfitness to remain
as a member of the Bar. At the very least, a Judge like her who
disobeyed the basic rules of judicial conduct should not remain
as a member of the Bar because she had thereby also violated
her Lawyer's Oath.
Indeed, respondent Judge Yu's violation of the fundamental
tenets of judicial conduct embodied in the New Code of
Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary would constitute a
breach of the following canons of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, to wit:
CANON 1 - A LA WYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY
THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND
FOR LEGAL PROCESSES.
Rule 1.02 - A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at
defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal
system.
CANON 6 - THESE CANONS SHALL APPLY TO LAWYERS IN
GOVERNMENT SERVICE IN THE DISCHARGE OF THEIR OFFICIAL
TASKS.
Rule 6.02 - A lawyer in the government service shall not use his
public position to promote or advance his private interests, nor
allow the latter to interfere with his public duties.
CANON 11 - A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE AND MAINTAIN THE
RESPECT DUE TO THE COURTS AND TO JUDICIAL OFFICERS AND
SHOULD INSIST ON SIMILAR CONDUCT BY OTHERS.
Rule 11.03 - A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or
menacing language or behavior before the Courts.
The Court does not take lightly the ramifications of Judge Yu's
misbehavior and misconduct as a judicial officer. By penalizing
her with the supreme penalty of dismissal from the service, she
should not anymore be allowed to remain a member of the
Law Profession.
However, this rule of fusing the dismissal of a Judge with
disbarment does not in any way dispense with or set aside the
respondent's right to due process. As such, her disbarment as an
offshoot of A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC without requiring her to
comment on the disbarment would be violative of her right to
due process. To accord due process to her, therefore, she
should first be afforded the opportunity to defend her
professional standing as a lawyer before the Court would
determine whether or not to disbar her.
In her comment, the respondent reiterates her submissions in the
Motion for Reconsideration with Explanation for the Show Cause
Order. Considering that we have dismissed her pleadings
altogether for the reasons given earlier, her disbarment is now
inevitable.
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court reads:
Sec. 27. Attorneys removed or suspended by Supreme Court on
what grounds. - A member of the bar may be removed or
suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for
any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such
office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of
a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the
oath which he is required to take before the admission to
practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a
superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an
attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The
practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either
personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes
malpractice.
Accordingly, gross misconduct, violation of the Lawyer's Oath,
and willful disobedience of any lawful order by the Court
constitute grounds to disbar an attorney. In the respondent's
case, she was herein found to have committed all of these
grounds for disbarment, warranting her immediate disbarment
as a consequence.
We deem it worthwhile to remind that the penalty of
disbarment being hereby imposed does not equate to stripping
the respondent of the source of her livelihood. Disbarment is
intended to protect the administration of justice by ensuring
that those taking part in it as attorneys should be competent,
honorable and reliable to enable the courts and the clients they
serve to rightly repose their confidence in them.35
Once again, we express our disdain for judges and attorneys
who undeservedly think too highly of themselves, their personal
and professional qualifications and qualities at the expense of
the nobility of the Law Profession. It is well to remind the
respondent that membership in the Law Profession is not like
that in any ordinary trade. The Law is a noble calling, and only
the individuals who are competent and fit according to the
canons and standards set by this Court, the law and the Rules of
Court may be bestowed the privilege to practice it.36
Lastly, every lawyer must pursue only the highest standards in
the practice of his calling. The practice of law is a privilege, and
only those adjudged qualified are permitted to do so.37 The
respondent has fallen short of this standard thus meriting her
expulsion from the profession.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the Motion for Reconsideration
with Explanation for the Show Cause Order with FINALITY;
DISBARS EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY respondent ELIZA B. YU
pursuant to A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC for violation of the Lawyer's
Oath, the Code of Professional Responsibility, and the Canons
of Professional Ethics; and
ORDERS the striking off of respondent ELIZA B. YU's name from
the Roll of Attorneys.
Let copies of this resolution be furnished to: (a) the Office of the
Court Administrator for dissemination to all courts throughout
the country for their information and guidance; (b) the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and (c) the Office of the Bar
Confidant to be appended to the respondent's personal record
as a member of the Bar.
SO ORDERED.
42. March 13, 2018
A.M. No. 17-11-06-CA
RE: ANONYMOUS LETTERCOMPLAINT (with Attached Pictures)
AGAINST ASSOCIATE JUSTICE NORMANDIE B. PIZARRO, COURT OF
APPEALS,
DECISION
MARTIRES, J.:
This administrative matter arose from an anonymous letter-
complaint1 charging Associate Justice Normandie B. Pizarro
(Justice Pizarro) of the Court of Appeals (CA) of habitually
gambling in casinos, "selling" decisions, and immorally engaging
in an illicit relationship. The subject letter-complaint was initially
filed with the Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman) on 20
September 2017. The matter was referred by the Ombudsman He further confessed that sometime in 2009 he also played at
to this Court on 24 October 2017.2 the casino in what he termed, again, a parlor game concept.
He maintained, however, that such was an indiscretion
The anonymous letter-complaint accused Justice Pizarro of
committed by a dying man because, prior to this, he had
being a gambling addict who would allegedly lose millions of
learned that he had terminal cancer.
pesos in the casinos daily, and insinuated that Justice Pizarro
resorted to "selling" his cases in order to support his gambling He also found as cruel, baseless, and highly unfair the
addiction. accusation that he is the "most corrupt justice in the Philippines"
noting that no administrative case had been filed against him
The anonymous complainant further accused Justice Pizarro of
for the past seven (7) years; that his first administrative case,
having an illicit relationship, claiming that Justice Pizarro bought
which this Court resolved in his favor, actually involved his
his mistress a house and lot in Antipolo City, a condominium unit
former driver in Ilocos Sur who forged his signature to make it
in Manila, and brand new vehicles such as Toyota Vios and Ford
appear that the driver was employed in the judiciary; and that
Everest worth millions of pesos. Lastly, the anonymous
all of the few administrative cases filed against him did not
complainant alleged that Justice Pizarro, together with his
involve corruption; and that he was absolved in all.
mistress and her whole family, made several travels abroad to
shop and to gamble in casinos. Justice Pizarro likewise categorically denied having a mistress.
He characterized such accusations as cowardly acts of his
Attached to the anonymous letter-complaint are four (4) sheets
detractors, who even furnished· copies of the anonymous
of photographs3 showing Justice Pizarro sitting at the casino
complaint to the presiding justice of the appellate court and
tables allegedly at the Midori Hotel and Casino in Clark,
the leader of a major religious group, with the intent of
Pampanga.
destroying his character.
On 21November2017, the Court issued a Resolution4 noting the
ISSUE
27 September 2017 Letter of the Ombudsman referring the
anonymous letter-complaint; and requiring Justice Pizarro to file The sole issue before the Court is whether Justice Pizarro is guilty
his comment on the anonymous letter-complaint. of the accusations against him for which he may be held
administratively liable.
On 8 December 2017, Justice Pizarro filed his comment5 wherein
he admitted to his indiscretion. He stated that he was indeed THE COURT’S RULING
the person appearing on the subject photographs sitting at a
Under the Rules of Court, administrative complaints against
casino table. He explained that the photographs were taken
judges of regular courts and special courts as we11 as justices of
when he was accompanying a balikbayan friend; and that
the CA and the Sandigan,bayan may be instituted: (1) by the
they only played a little in a parlor game fashion without big
Supreme Court motu proprio; (2) upon a verified complaint,
stakes and without their identities introduced or made known.
supported by affidavits of persons who have personal
Justice Pizarro averred that the photographs may have been
knowledge of the facts alleged therein or by documents which
taken by people with ulterior motives considering his plan for
may substantiate said allegations; or (3) upon an anonymous
early retirement.
complaint, supported by public records of indubitable integrity.6
The rationale for the requirement that complaints against judges
and justices of the judiciary must be accompanied by
supporting evidence is to protect magistrates from the filing of
t1imsy and virtually unsubstantiated charges against them.7 This
is consistent with the rule that in administrative proceedings, the
complainants bear the burden of proving the allegations in their
complaints by substantial evidence. If they fail to show in a
satisfactory manner the facts upon which their claims are
based, the respondents are not obliged to prove their
exception or defense.8
In this case, the anonymous complaint accused Justice Pizarro
of selling favorable decisions, having a mistress, and habitually
playing in casinos; and essentially charging him of dishonesty
and violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Law,
immorality, and unbecoming conduct. These accusations,
however, with the only exception of gambling in casinos, are
not supported by any evidence or by any public record of
indubitable integrity. Thus, the bare allegations of corruption
and immorality do not deserve any consideration. For this
reason, the charges of corruption and immorality against
Justice Pizarro must be dismissed for lack of merit.
Inasmuch as the Court would want to cleanse the Judiciary of
its erring and undesirable members and personnel, such policy
could only be implemented with the strict observance of due
process, such that substantial evidence is required to prove the
charges against a member of the Judiciary.9 The Court is duty
bound to protect its ranks or any member or personnel of the
Judiciary from baseless or unreasonable charges.10
Indeed, while the law and justice abhor all forms of abuse
committed by public officers and employees whose sworn duty
is to discharge their duties with utmost responsibility, integrity,
competence, accountability, and loyalty, the Court must
protect them against unsubstantiated charges that tend to
adversely affect, rather than encourage, the effective
performance of their duties and functions.11
As regards the accusation of habitually playing in casinos, it is
clear that the anonymous complaint was not supported by
public records of indubitable integrity as required by the rules.
Nevertheless, it is equally undisputed, as in fact it was admitted,
that Justice Pizarro was the same person playing in a casino in
Clark, Pampanga, as shown by the photographs attached to
the anonymous complaint. He also admitted that he played in
a casino sometime in 2009. The Court cannot simply ignore this
evident and admitted fact. The issue now is whether Justice
Pizarro may be held administratively liable for gambling in
casinos.
Recently, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) reminded
judges and court personnel to strictly comply with the
prohibition against gambling or being seen in gambling places
such as the casino.12 The OCA cited Circular No. 413 issued by
the Court on 27 August 1980 which reads:
The attention of the Court has been invited to the presence of
some judges in gambling casinos operating under Presidential
Decree No. 1067- B. This is clearly violative of Section 5(3-b) of
said Decree. It reads as follows:
(3-b) Persons not allowed to play -
(a) Government officials connected directly with the operation
of the government or any of its agencies."
In accordance with law and pursuant to the Resolution of the
Court en bane in Administrative Matter No. 1544-0, dated
August 21, 1980, judges of inferior courts and the court
personnel are enjoined from playing in or being present in
gambling casinos.
Moreover, judges are likewise enjoined to keep in mind the
Canons of Judicial Ethics, paragraph 3 of which provides:
3. Avoidance of appearance of impropriety. - A judge’s official
conduct should be free from the appearance of impropriety,
and his personal behavior, not only upon the bench and in the
performance of judicial duties, but also in his everyday life,
should be beyond reproach." (emphases supplied and italics in
the original)
With respect to Circular No. 4 and Administrative Matter No.
1544-0, it is with regret that the Court finds them inapplicable to
the present case. It is clear from the words of these issuances
that the prohibition from entering and gambling in casinos is
applicable only to judges of inferior courts and court personnel.
Stated differently, the aforesaid issuances do not cover justices
of collegial courts for the simple reason that they are neither
judges of the inferior courts nor can they be described as
personnel of the court. Although the term "judge" has been held
to comprehend all kinds of judges, the same is true only if the
said term is not modified by any word or phrase.14 In the case of
Circular No. 4 and Administrative Matter No. 1544- 0, the term
"judge" has been qualified by the phrase "inferior courts." Thus,
absurd as it may seem, Justice Pizarro cannot be held
administratively liable under Circular No. 4 and Administrative
Matter No. ] 544-0.
Nevertheless, the inapplicability of the aforestated Court
issuances to justices of collegial courts does not necessarily
mean that Justice Pizarro is absolutely cleared of his evident
and admitted act of playing in casinos.
Section 5 (3-b)(a) of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1067-B and
Section 14(4)(a) of P.D. No. 1869, which consolidated P.D. No.
1067-B with other presidential decrees issued relative to the
franchise and powers of the Philippine Amusement and Gaming
Corporation, did not define the meaning of the term
"government officials connected directly with the operation of
the government or any of its agencies" as well as the words
used therein. The same is true with respect to the presidential
issuances relative to such prohibition.15 Considering, however,
that the obvious purpose of the subject prohibition is the
regulation of conduct of government officials, reference may
be made to pertinent administrative laws and jurisprudence
pertaining thereto to comprehend the meaning of the term
under scrutiny.
In this regard, Section 2(1) of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 292 or
the Administrative Code of 1987 defines "Government of the
Republic of the Philippines" as "the corporate governmental
entity through which the functions of government are exercised
throughout the Philippines, including, save as the contrary
appears from the context, the various arms through which
political authority is made effective in the Philippines, whether
pertaining to the autonomous regions, the provincial, city,
municipal or barangay subdivisions or other forms of local
government."16 The term "Government of the Republic of the
Philippines" or "Philippine Government" is broad enough to
include the local governments and the central or national
government which, in turn, consist of the legislative, executive,
and judicial branches, as well as constitutional bodies and other
bodies created in accordance with the constitution.17
Section 2(4) of E.O. No. 292 further states that "Agency of the
Government" refers to any of the various units of the
Government, including a department, bureau, office,
instrumentality, or government-owned or -controlled
corporations, or a local government or a distinct unit therein.
Section 2(14) of E.0. No. 292 also defines an "officer" as
distinguished from a "clerk" or "employee" as "a person whose
duties, not being of a clerical or manual nature, involves the
exercise of discretion in the performance of the functions of the
government." On the other hand, when used with reference to
a person having authority to do a particular act or perform a
particular function in the exercise of governmental power,
"officer" includes any government employee, agent or body
having authority to do the act or exercise that function.
As regards the qualifying phrase "connected directly with the
operation," its definition could not be found in the Administrative
Code and other similarly applicable statutes and rules. It is
settled, however, that in the absence of legislative intent to the
contrary, words and phrases used in a statute should be given
their plain, ordinary, and common usage meaning.18
The words should be read and considered in their natural,
ordinary, commonly accepted and most obvious signification,
according to good and approved usage and without resorting
to forced or subtle construction.19 Indeed, the lawmaker is
presumed to have employed the words in the statute in their
ordinary and common use and acceptation.20
Thus, the words "connected," "directly," and "operation" must be
given their ordinary meaning in relation to their ordinary use in
organizations or institutions such as the government. Hence, the
term "connected" may mean "involved" "associated" or
"related;" "directly" may mean "immediately" "without any
intervening agency or instrumentality or determining influence"
or "without any intermediate step;" and "operation" may mean
"doing or performing action" or "administration." Additionally, "to
operate" is synonymous to the terms "to exercise" and "to act."
From the foregoing, it is opined that the term "government
official connected directly to the operation of the government
or any of its agencies" refers to any person employed by the
government whose tasks is the performance and exercise of
any of the functions and powers of such government or any
agency thereof, as conferred on them by law, without any
intervening agency. Simply put, a "government official
connected directly to the operation of the government or any
of its agencies" is a government officer who performs the
functions of the government on his own judgment or discretion -
essentially, a government officer under Section 2(14) of E.O. No.
292.
Applying the above definition to the present case, it is clear that
Justice Pizarro is covered by the term "government official
connected directly with the operation of the government."
Indeed, one of the functions of the government, through the
Judiciary, is the administration of justice within its territorial
jurisdiction. Justice Pizarro, as a magistrate of the CA, is clearly a
government official directly involved in the administration of
justice; and in the performance of such function, he exercises
discretion. Thus, by gambling in a casino, Justice Pizarro violated
the prohibition from gambling in casinos as provided under
Section 14(4)(a) of P.D. No. 1869.
Although P.D. No. 1869 did not provide for a penalty for any act
done in contravention of its provisions particularly the
prohibition on gambling, in City Government of Tagbilaran v.
Hontanosas, Jr., 21 it was held that such transgression constitutes
violations of Paragraphs 3 and 22 of the Canons of Judicial
Ethics, which respectively provide:
3. Avoidance of appearance of impropriety -
A judge’s official conduct should be free from the appearance
of impropriety, and his personal behavior, not only upon the
bench and in the performance of judicial duties, but also in his
everyday life, should be beyond reproach.
xxxx
22. Infractions of law -
The judge should be studiously careful himself to avoid even the
slightest infraction of the law, lest it be a demoralizing example
to others.22
Further, Justice Pizarro also violated Canons 2 and 4 of the New
Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary which
pe1tinently provides:
CANON 2
INTEGRITY
Integrity is essential not only to the proper discharge of the
judicial office but also to the personal demeanor of judges.
SEC. 1. Judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct above
reproach, but that it is perceived to be so in the view of a
reasonable observer.
SEC. 2. The behavior and conduct of judges must reaffirm the
people’s faith in the integrity of the judiciary.1âwphi1 Justice
must not merely be done but must also be seen to be done.
xxxx
CANON 4
PROPRIETY
Propriety and the appearance of propriety are essential to the
performance of all the activities of a judge.
SEC. 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of
impropriety in all of their activities.
SEC. 2. As a subject of constant public scrutiny, judges must
accept personal restrictions that might be viewed as
burdensome by the ordinary citizen and should do so freely and
willingly. In particular, judges shall conduct themselves in a way
that is consistent with the dignity of the judicial office.
The Court has repeatedly reminded judges to conduct
themselves irreproachably, not only while in the discharge of
official duties but also in their personal behavior every day.23 No
position demands greater moral righteousness and uprightness
from its occupant than does the judicial office. Judges in
particular must be individuals of competence, honesty and
probity, charged as they are with safeguarding the integrity of
the court and its proceedings. Judges should behave at all
times so as to promote public confidence in the integrity and
impartiality of the judiciary, and avoid impropriety and the
appearance of impropriety in all their activities. A judge's
personal behaviour outside the court, and not only while in the
performance of his official duties, must be beyond reproach, for
he is perceived to be the personification of law and justice.
Thus, any demeaning act of a judge degrades the institution he
represents.24
Accordingly, the Court finds respondent Justice Pizarro guilty of
conduct unbecoming of a member of the judiciary.
Considering, however, that this is the respondent justice's first
transgression, and further bearing in mind his immediate
admission of his indiscretion as well as the number of years he
has been in government service, the Court finds the imposition
of a fine in the amount of ₱100,000.00 sufficient in this case.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Associate Justice
Normandie B. Pizarro GUILTY of conduct unbecoming of a
member of the judiciary, and is hereby ORDERED to pay a fine in
the amount of ₱100,000,00.
SO ORDERED.
43. August 30, 2016
A.C. No. 9920
[Formerly A.M. No. MTJ-07-1691
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, Complainant
vs.
FORMER JUDGE ROSABELLA M. TORMIS, Respondent
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
A judge should know, or ought to know, his or her role as a
solemnizing officer.
This disbarment complaint is an offshoot of our Decision in Office
of the Court Administrator v. Judge Necessario, et al.1
Respondent Former Judge Rosabella M. Tormis (Tormis),
together with other judges and employees of the Municipal Trial
Court in Cities, Cebu City, was dismissed for turning the
solemnization of marriages into a business.2 Tormis was
dismissed from the service for the second time, and this Court
directed the Office of the Bar Confidant to initiate disbarment
proceedings against her.
On July 3, 2007, Atty. Rullyn Garcia, Region 7 Judicial Supervisor,
led the judicial audit.team created by the Office of the Court
Administrator to investigate Branches 2, 3, 4, and 8 of the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Cebu City for alleged misdeeds
in the solemnization of marriages.3
Two (2) undercover agents from the judicial audit team, posing
as a couple, went to the Palace of Justice to ask about the
marriage application process.4 They were told by the guard on
duty to go to Branch 4 and look for a certain "Meloy."5
Fearing that the male undercover would be recognized by the
court employees in Branch 4, the two agreed that only the
female undercover would go inside the court. 6 She was then
assisted by a woman named Helen.1âwphi1 Helen assured the
female undercover that their marriage process could be
hurried. 7 She also claimed that it was possible for the marriage
to be solemnized the next day, but the marriage certificate
would only be dated when the marriage license became
available. 8
The Office of the Court Administrator found that the respondent
judges in that case connived with the court personnel, who
acted as "fixers" in solemnizing marriages.9 The judges heedlessly
kept solemnizing marriages despite irregularities in the
requirements provided under the law.10
In the Resolution dated July 10, 2007, this Court treated the
judicial audit team's memorandum as an administrative
complaint against the respondent judges, including Tormis.11
The judges were directed to file their comments on the charges
against them. 12 They were also suspended pending resolution
of the case.13
On August 24, 2007, Senior Deputy Court Administrator Zenaida
N. Elepafio of the Office of the Court Administrator submitted a
Memorandum dated August 29, 2007 and Supplemental
Report. 14 The Report stated that:
Six hundred forty-three (643) marriage certificates were
examined by the judicial audit team. The team reported that
out of the 643 marriage certificates examined, 280 marriages
were solemnized under Article 34 of the Family Code. The
logbooks of the MTCC Branches indicate a higher number of
solemnized marriages than the number of marriage certificates
in the courts' custody. There is also an unusual number of
marriage licenses obtained from the local civil registrars of the
towns of Barili and Liloan, Cebu. There were even marriages
solemnized at 9 a.m. with marriage licenses obtained on the
same day. The town of Barili, Cebu is more than sixty (60)
kilometers away from Cebu City and entails a travel time of
almost two (2) hours. Liloan, Cebu, on the other hand, is more
than ten (10) kilometers away from Cebu City. 15 (Citations
omitted)
The Report included the court employees' admissions of their
participation in the alleged misdeeds. The following personnel
substantiated the charges against Tormis:
(1) Celeste P. Retuya, Clerk III of Branch 6 of the Municipal Trial
Court in.Cities, Cebu City, confirmed that she would personally
assist couples who wished to be married by checking that their
documents were complete before referring them to the judges,
including Tormis;16
(2) Corazon P. Retuya, Court Stenographer of Branch 6 of the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Cebu City, "narrated several
anomalies involving foreign nationals and their acquisition of
marriage licenses from the local civil registrar of Barili, Cebu
despite the fact that parties were not residents of Barili." 17
These marriages were solemnized by Tormis; 18
(3) Rhona F. Rodriguez, Administrative Officer I of the Office of
the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court, Cebu City, would
aid couples in the solemnization of their marriages by referring
them to the judges;19
(4) Emma D. Valencia, Court Stenographer III of Branch 18 of
the Regional Trial Court, Cebu City, "admitted that she assisted
couples seeking to get married and that most of the marriage
licenses were obtained from the local civil registrar of Barili and
Liloan, Cebu because the registrars in those towns were not
strict about couples' attendance in the family planning
seminar";20
(5) Marilou Cabafiez, Court Stenographer of Branch 4 of the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Cebu City, admitted that she
would assist couples and refer them to the judges, including
Tormis.21 She added that "during the 8th, 18th, and 28th of the
month, seven (7) to eight (8) couples would go directly to
Judge Rosabella M. Tormis for a fifteen-minute marriage
Solemnization";22
(6) Rebecca L. Alesna, Court Interpreter of Branch 1 of the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Cebu City, admitted that "she
usually referred couples to Judges Necessario or Tormis. Couples
who wanted to get married under Article 34 of the Family Code
were advised to buy a pro-forma affidavit of joint cohabitation
for ten pesos (₱10)";23 and
(7) Filomena C. Lopez, Local Civil Registrar of Barili, Cebu,
admitted that she did not examine marriage applications.24
Couples who were not Barili residents could obtain a marriage
license from her, provided that they had relatives residing in
Barili;25
Affidavits of private individuals were also attached to the
records.26 Among these individuals was Jacqui Lou Baguio-
Manera (Baguio-Manera), a resident of Panagdait, Mabolo,
Cebu. Baguio-Manera claimed that her marriage was
solemnized by Tormis with the aid of "Meloy," who asked for a
fee of ₱l,500.00.27 She and her then fiance were not required to
present a marriage license; they were only directed to bring
their birth certificates.28 She averred that while Article 3429 did
not apply to them, their marriage certificate was marked with
the annotation, "No marriage license was necessary, the
marriage being solemnized under Article 34 of Executive Order
No. 209."30
On November 27, 2007, this Court En Banc issued the Resolution
requiring all the judges involved, including Tormis, to comment
on the Supplemental Report. 31 The Resolution also directed the
Process Servicing Unit to furnish all the judges with a copy of the
Report.32 Further, all the court personnel involved were asked to
show cause why they should not be disciplined for their
misconduct. 33
In her comm~nt, Tormis denied the charges against her.34 She
claimed that the action of the Office of the Court Administrator
was an "entrapment."35 According to her, there was nothing
wrong with solemnizing marriages on the same date the
marriage license was issued.36 In view of the pro forma
affidavits of cohabitation, she relied on the presumption of
regularity.37 Tormis asserted that she should not be blamed for
assuming that the affidavits were true since judges are not
handwriting experts.38
Tormis also claimed that Baguio-Manera's affidavit was
hearsay.39 She averred that when Baguio-Manera and her
husband was asked about the affidavit, they confirmed the
truthfulness of their statements, particularly that they had been
living together for five (5) years.40 Lastly, Tormis blamed the filing
clerks for the irregularities in the number of marriages
solemnized in her sala.41
On November 12, 2007, Tormis, together with Judge Edgemelo
C. Rosales, filed a Memorandum of Law with Plea for Early
Resolution, Lifting of Suspension and Dismissal of the Case.42 This
Court lifted the suspension of the judges but forbade them from
solemnizing marriages.43 On December 7, 2007, both judges
moved for early resolution with a waiver of formal and/or further
investigation and to dismiss.44 This Court noted their Motion and
affirmed the relief they sought, thus allowing the payment of the
judges' unpaid salaries and benefits from July 9, 2007.45
The Office of the Court Administrator, through a memorandum
dated June 15, 2010, found Tormis guilty of
gross inefficiency or neglect of duty for solemnizing marriages
with questionable documents, for failure to make sure that the
solemnization fee has been paid, for solemnizing marriages
wherein one of the contracting parties is a foreigner who
submitted a mere affidavit of his capacity to marry in lieu of the
required certificate from the embassy and for solemnizing a
marriage with an expired license.46
This Court upheld the findings of the Office of the Court
Administrator and noted the individual liability of the judges:
Liability of Judge Rosabella M. Tormis
Judge Tormis solemnized a total of one hundred eighty-one
(181) marriages from 2003 to 2007 based on the marriage
certificates actually examined. However, the monthly report of
cases showed that she solemnized three hundred five (305)
marriages instead for the years 2004 to 2007. The OCA report
also noted that it was only in July 2007 that her court started to
use a logbook to keep track of marriages.
Respondent judge solemnized thirty-seven (37) marriages with
incomplete or missing documents such as the marriage license,
certificate of legal capacity to marry, and the joint affidavit of
cohabitation. In several instances, only affidavits were
submitted by the foreign parties in lieu of the certificate of legal
capacity to marry.
Judge Tormis solemnized thirteen (13) marriages despite the
questionable character of the validity of the required
documents particularly the marriage license. The judicial audit
team found numerous erasures and superimpositions on entries
with regard to the parties' place of residence. In one instance,
the judge solemnized the marriage of Rex Randy E. Cujardo
and Anselma B. Laranio on 28 December 2006 despite the
marriage license containing a rubberstamp mark saying, "THIS
LICENSE EXPIRES ON" and a handwritten note saying "12/28/06"
under it.
The judge solemnized a total of forty-seven (47) marriages under
Article 34 of the Family Code wherein the marriage
requirements' authenticity was doubtful due to the
circumstances of the cohabitation of the parties and the given
address of the parties.1âwphi1 These irregularities were evident
in the case of 22-year-old John Rey R. Tibalan and Ana Liza
Secuya who were married on 25 May 2007. The residential
address of the couple in the marriage certificate is "Sitio
Bamboo, Buhisan, Cebu City." However, there was an
application for marriage license attached to the marriage
certificate showing that Secuya's address is "F. Lopez Comp.
Morga St., Cebu City."47
This Court ruled that:
3. Judge Rosabella M. Tormis, Presiding Judge, Municipal Trial
Court in Cities, Branch 4, Cebu City, GUILTY of gross inefficiency
or neglect of duty and of gross ignorance of the law and that
she would have been DISMISSED FROM THE SERVICE with
forfeiture of her retirement benefits, except leave credits, if any,
and disqualified from reinstatement or appointment to any
public office, including government-owned or -controlled
corporation, had she not been previously dismissed from service
in A.M. No. MTJ-12-1817 (Formerly A.M. No. 09-2-30- MTCC);
....
The case against Judge Rosabella M. Tormis, including the
sworn statements of Celerina Plaza and Crisanto dela Cerna,
should be REFERRED to the Office of the Bar Confidant for the
purpose of initiating disbarment proceedings against the
judge.48 (Emphasis in the original)
The affidavits of Celerina Plaza (Plaza) and Crisanto Dela Cerna
(Dela Cerna) resulted from Marilou Cabanes' (Cabanes) and
Helen Mongaya's (Mongaya) separate supplemental
comments on the charges against them. 49 Cabanes, then
Court Stenographer of Branch 4, named Plaza as Tormis'
assistant, in charge of meeting couples at their lobby.so On the
other hand, Mongaya, then Court Interpreter of Branch 4,
attached Dela Cerna's affidavit to her comment.51
Plaza claimed to be Tormis' personal aide since 2002.52 She
alleged that after Tormis' suspension in 2006, she was directed to
find couples who wanted to get married.53 She was also told to
direct the parties to Branch 4 and find Cabanes or "Meloy."54
In his affidavit, Dela Cerna stated that he was employed as
Tormis' personal aide.55 He claimed that during the
investigation, Tormis directed him and Tormis' children to bring
all the marriage certificates from her office to her house. 56
In view of Judge Necessario, et al., the Office of the Bar
Confidant recommended that the case be docketed as A.C.
No. 9920 (Formerly A.M. No. MTJ-07-1691) and entitled Office of
the Court Administrator v. Former Judge Rosabella M Tormis.57
On June 18, 2013, this Court approved the docketing of the
case and directed respondent Former Judge Rosabella M.
Tormis to comment on the disbarment charge against her.58
Respondent filed an Urgent Motion for Clarification59 dated
August 12, 2013 asking the Office of the Court Administrator to
state the particular Canons of the Code of Professional
Responsibility that she had violated as basis for her disbarment.
In the Resolution60 dated September 10, 2013, this Court noted
the Urgent Motion for Clarification and directed the Office of
the Bar Confidant to inform respondent of the particular Canons
that she had violated.
On November 29, 2013, the Office of the Bar Confidant sent
respondent a letter informing her that the charges in her
administrative cases as a judge were the grounds for her
disbarment.61 It cited A.M. No. 02-9-02- SC, 62 which provides
that administrative cases against judges shall also be
considered as disciplinary charges against them as members of
the bar.63 Some administrative cases against judges stand on
grounds that similarly violate the Lawyer's Oath, the Code of
Professional Responsibility, and the Canons of Professional
Ethics, or on other breaches long recognized as grounds for
discipline of lawyers. The Office of the Bar Confident reiterated
that, in those cases the respondent judge may be directed to
comment on the complaint and explain why he or she should
not be punished as a member of the bar.64
The letter cited the previous administrative charges against
respondent, thus:
(a) A.M. No. MTJ-07-1691, 65 where respondent was dismissed
from service, had she not been previously dismissed from service
in A.M. No. MTJ-12-181766 for gross inefficiency or neglect of
duty and gross ignorance of the law by turning solemnization of
marriage into a business;67
(b) A.M. No. MTJ-07-1692,68 where respondent was suspended
for six (6) months without salary for gross misconduct for
repeatedly disregarding the directives of this Court to furnish the
complainant with her comment;69
(c) A.M. No. 04-7-373-RTC70 and A.M. No. 04-7-374-RTC,71
where respondent was fined ₱5,000.00 for gross violation of Rule
114, Section 1772 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure by
inappropriately approving the bail posted by an accuse m a
criminal case;73
(d) A.M. No. MTJ-05-1609,74 where respondent was severely
reprimanded for her "unauthorized receipt of cash bond and
keeping the same in her house";75
(e) A.M. No. MTJ-12-1817,76 where respondent was dismissed
from service for gross inefficiency, violation of Supreme Court
rules, directives and circulars, and gross ignorance of the law;77
and
(f) A.M. No. MTJ-001337,78 where respondent was reprimanded
after being found "guilty of improper conduct for trying to
influence the course of litigation in Criminal Case No. 99796-
12."79 She, together with another judge, was admonished for
her "unbecoming conduct as dispensers of justice."80
Respondent filed her one-page Comment81 on January 10,
2014, asking this Court to grant her peace of mind.82 She states
that she is adopting her Motion for Reconsideration83 in A.M.
No. MTJ-12-1817 as her Comment on the disbarment case
against her.84 In this Motion, respondent enumerates her
previous administrative cases with her justifications.
For A.M. No. MTJ-07-1692, respondent claims that she had
furnished the complainant with a copy of her comment three
(3) times.85 She avers that the complainant even
acknowledged the receipt of her comment through her
manifestation, as noted in this Court's July 30, 2003 Resolution.86
Despite this, she was still fined ₱2,000.00 for her repeated
defiance to this Court's directive to furnish the complainant with
a copy of her comment.87 She believed that the case ended
upon resolution and upon this Court's noting her payment of the
fine. However, she claims that:
[The Supreme Court] made an underground evaluation of the
case and made it appear that when she complied with their
Resolution in 2 March 2005 to impose a fine of ₱2,000.00, it was
already an admission that "[s]he (respondent) refused to
present proof of service to complainant of her Comment or she
did not furnish complainant with said document[.]"88
For A.M. No. 04-7-373-RTC and A.M. No. 04-7-374-RTC,
respondent claims that this Court "obviously ignored" her
explanation.89 She asserts that she was the only available judge
at that time since she was working from Mondays through
Saturdays and even Sundays due to her load of cases. 90
For A.M. No. MTJ-05-1609, respondent questions why this Court
ruled that she deliberately made untruthful statements in her
Comment with the intent to deceive this Court.91
For A.M. No. MTJ-12-1817, respondent claims that the audit was
conducted one (1) day after she had served a prior
suspension.92 She argues that since she was not in her court for
a long time, she cannot be faulted for knowing nothing about
what has been happening in her sala during her absence.93
She alleges that the Clerk of Court, her co-respondent in the
case, "could have manipulated it so that even if the cases had
already been disposed of some years back he made it appear
that this had remained unacted upon."94
For A.M. No. MTJ-001337, respondent claims that the dismissal of
the judges was based on an alleged "entrapment." She argues
that it was impossible for her to act on the marriage of the
undercover agents because she was in Tacloban City for her
high school reunion.95 She was merely indicted based on the
statements of Plaza and Dela Cerna, who had been
intimidated by Atty. Rullyn Garcia, Office of the Court
Administrator judicial audit team head.96 On March 18, 2014,
this Court noted respondent's Comment and resolved to refer
the case to the Office of the Bar Confidant for investigation,
report, and recommendation. 97
In its Report and Recommendation98 dated August 24, 2015,
the Office of the Bar Confidant noted that the Office of the
Court Administrator, represented by Atty. Miguel Mergal,
presented Plaza and Dela Cerna as their witnesses.99
Respondent also requested Atty. Rullyn Garcia's presence in the
proceedings.100
However, none of the witnesses participated in the
proceedings. Hence, the parties were required to just submit
their respective memoranda for evaluation.101
The Office of the Court Administrator filed a memorandum102
dated February 27, 2015 quoting the facts and ruling in Judge
Necessario, et al. It avers that Plaza's and Dela Cema's
testimonies "are beside the point and these have been
rendered moot because of their failure to appear at the
hearings scheduled by the Office of the Bar Confidant." 103
The Office of the Court Administrator argues that respondent
should be disbarred due to gross misconduct for her
participation in the solemnization of marriages. 104 It points out
that the various administrative charges against respondent
"clearly shows that she does not possess high standards of
competence and reliability required of a practicing lawyer." 105
On the other hand, respondent's memorandum106 dated
February 26, 2015 mainly anchored on the claim that Atty. Rullyn
Garcia's report submitted was falsified. 107 Respondent claims
that Atty. Rullyn Garcia intimidated the court employees and
caused them to "admit whatever allegations he brought up
during the investigation."108 She prays that the case be
dismissed for lack of substantial evidence since Plaza's and Dela
Cema's affidavits were not personally attested to by the
affiants.109
The Office of the Bar Confidant, after conducting the
proceedings and considering the memoranda of the parties,
recommended that the disbarment case against respondent
be dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.110 It emphasized
that formal investigation is indispensable in disbarment
proceedings:
For the charge of gross misconduct for the irregularities in the
solemnization of marriages as the basis for this disbarment
proceedings.
This case was set for hearing. During the scheduled hearing, the
representative from OCA manifested that they are presenting
two (2) witnesses in the persons of Celerina Plaza and Crisanto
Dela Cerna. The purposes of their testimonies are for them to
substantiate the allegations against former Judge Tormis,
identify and authenticate the existence and veracity of their
respective affidavits submitted to the Court. However, the two
witnesses failed to appear during the proceedings of this case.
Thus, their affidavits are considered hearsay and inadmissible in
evidence ... in this proceeding. The affidavit are [sic] not entirely
reliable evidence in court due to their incompleteness and
inaccuracies that may have attended in their formulation. The
affidavit does not purport to contain a complete narration of
facts and that court testimonies are generally viewed as more
reliable as they are subjected to cross examination from the
opposing party .... Likewise, Atty. Rullyn Garcia, the OCA audit
team head, failed to appear. The purpose of his testimony
would be to shed light more on whether the alleged affidavits
executed by Celerina Plaza and Crisanto Dela Cerna were
actually and voluntarily submitted to the Court and, if so, who
required them to execute and submit the same to the Court.
....
The determination of the merit of th[ ese] disbarment
proceedings may not be relied upon solely on the premise of
the dismissal from the service of former Judge Tormis. As earlier
discussed, the grounds for dismissal from the service of former
Judge Tormis, in her capacity as presiding judge, in
administrative matter is different from this disbarment
proceedings against her. Otherwise, the Court would have ruled
on the disbarment aspect, which shall be incorporated in the
decision of dismissal from the service of former Judge Tormis in
one decision only. As provided for under the constitutional right
to due process, former Judge Tormis should be given full
opportunity to be heard and confront witnesses against her in
th[ ese] disbarment proceedings. This constitutional right should
not be denied to former Judge Tormis, who cried for due
process since her dismissal from the service.
....
For the dismissal from the service, in her capacity as judge, for
gross inefficiency or neglect of duty and of gross ignorance of
the law in performance of her duties as presiding judge.
Former Judge Tormis cried for justice in dismissing her from
service, as presiding judge, without according her due process.
She was not given the opportunity to be heard but the only
basis of her dismissal from the service was the
testimonies/allegations against her of some courts [sic]
personnel, who were allegedly intimidated by the judicial audit
team, during the judicial audit. She was not given the chance
to confront nor furnished copies of the said court personnel's
testimonies. She was denied her constitutional right against
searches and seizures of documents from her sala when the
audit team obtained documents and records, as evidence
against her, when they conducted the investigation in her sala,
since she was not informed of the said audit.
In A.M. No. P-08-2520, the Court held that he rights against
unreasonable searches and seizures as provided under Section
2, Article III in the Constitution may be invoked even in
administrative proceedings. The exclusionary rule under Section
3 (2), Art. III of the Constitution also bars the admission of
evidence obtained in violation of such "right. The fact that the
present case is administrative in nature, does not render the
above principle inoperative. As expounded in Zulueta vs C.A.,
any violation of the aforestated constitutional right renders the
evidence inadmissible for any purpose in any proceedings.
Records show that all the administrative sanctions against
former Judge Tormis were all for simple gross inefficiency or
neglect of duties and gross ignorance of the law in the
discharge of her duties and responsibilities as the presiding
judge of the MTCC, Br. 4, Cebu City. Neither of these findings
held her for gross misconduct, which constitute immoral
conduct, that would tend to affect her standing and moral
character as an officer of the court and as a member of the
Bar. Further, she has never been found guilty for graft and
corruption during her entire service in the judiciary as a member
of the bench in the lower court that would cause her
automatically disbarred from the practice of law.
Finally, the counter-charges of former Judge Tormis against Atty.
Rullyn Garcia may not be given due course in th[ese]
proceedings for lack of jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing premises, it is
respectfully recommended that the disbarment case against
former JUDGE ROSABELLA M. TORMIS be DISMISSED for
insufficiency of evidence.111 (Emphasis in the original, citations
omitted)
The issues for resolution are as follows:
First, whether the alleged irregularities committed by
respondent in the solemnization of marriages, where she was
found guilty of gross inefficiency or neglect of duty and of gross
ignorance of the law, constitute gross misconduct warranting
her disbarment;
Second, whether Plaza's and Dela Cema's affidavits are
indispensable in finding that respondent's acts constitute gross
misconduct and merit the penalty of disbarment; and
Lastly, whether respondent's long line of administrative sanctions
should affect her standing as a member of the bar.
Although this Court recognizes the indispensability of the
appearance of Plaza and Dela Cerna in the proceedings
before the Office of the Bar Confidant, the disbarment case
cannot be dismissed solely based on this.
An affidavit is commonly recognized as hearsay evidence.112
Since it is often prepared not by the affiant but by another
person who makes use of his or her own language in writing the
statements, it is generally rejected unless the affiant is placed on
the witness stand to testify.113 "Courts take judicial notice of the
fact that an affidavit does not purport to contain a complete
narration of facts."114 Court testimonies, therefore, are favored
because these can be subjected to cross exammation.115
Plaza and Dela Cerna failed to appear in the proceedings
before the Office of the Bar Confidant. The Office of the Bar
Confidant noted that their testimonies would have supposedly
confirmed the charge against respondent regarding the
alleged irregularities in the solemnization of marriages.116
Plaza's and Dela Cema's testimonies would have likewise
verified the existence and veracity of their affidavits.117
Similarly, Atty. Rullyn Garcia failed to appear in the
proceedings. His purported testimony would have disproved the
accusation that Plaza's and Dela Cema's testimonies were
executed with his intimidation.118 Due to their absence, Plaza's
and Dela Cema's allegations in their affidavits were rendered
inadmissible.119 Nevertheless, despite the inadmissibility of the
affidavits, this Court in Judge Necessario, et al. upheld the
finding of the judicial audit team that respondent committed
irregularities in the solemnization of marriages. This Court ruled
that these findings had sufficient basis and were supported by
evidence, pertinent laws, and jurisprudence.120 Respondent
was held guilty of gross inefficiency or neglect of duty and gross
ignorance of the law warranting her dismissal, had she not been
previously dismissed from service in another case.121
The administrative case against respondent in Judge
Necessario, et al. Should likewise be considered as a disciplinary
proceeding against her under A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC, which
provides:
Some administrative cases against Justices od the Court of
Appeals and the Sandiganbayan; judges of regular and special
courts; and court officials who are lawyers are based on
grounds which are likewise grounds for the disciplinary action of
members of the Bar for violation of the Lawyers Oath, the Code
of Professional Responsibility, and the Canons of Professional
Ethics, or for such other forms of breaches of conduct that have
been traditionally recognized as grounds for the discipline of
lawyers.
In any of the foregoing instances, the administrative case shall
also be considered a disciplinary action against the respondent
Justice, judge or court official concerned as a member of the
Bar. The respondent may forthwith be required to comment on
the complaint and show cause why he should not also be
suspended, disbarred or otherwise disciplinary sanctioned as a
member of the Bar. Judgment in both respects may be
incorporated in one decision or resolution. (Emphasis supplied)
While respondent blatantly violated particular Canons of
Judicial Ethics with her participation in the alleged marriage
scam, she similarly breached the following Canons on the Code
of Professional Responsibility:
CANON 1 - A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws
of the land and promote respect for law and for legal
processes.
Rule 1.01. - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct.
....
CANON 7 - A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and
dignity of the legal profession ....
....
Rule 7.03. - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely
reflects on his fitness to practice law[.]
Membership in the bar is an essential requirement for
membership in the bench.122 "[T]he moral fitness of a judge also
reflects his [or her] moral fitness as a lawyer.".123 Consequently,
a judge who violates the code of judicial conduct similarly
violates his or her lawyer's oath. 124
Respondent's act of heedlessly solemnizing marriages in utter
disregard of the law and jurisprudence clearly constitutes gross
misconduct. The repetitiveness of her act shows her clear intent
to violate the law. She disregarded the lawyer's oath, which
mandates lawyers to support the Constitution and obey the
laws. In view of this, either the penalty of suspension or
disbarment is warranted. Rule 138, Section 27 provides:
Section 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme
Court; grounds therefor. - A member of the bar may be
disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the
Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross
misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by
reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or
for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before
admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience of any lawful
order of a superior court, or for corruptly or wilfully appearing as
an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The
practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either
personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes
malpractice. (Emphasis supplied)
Gross misconduct is an "improper or wrong conduct, the
transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a
forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in character, and
implies a wrongful intent and not mere error in judgment."125 To
consider gross misconduct "the elements of corruption, clear
intent to violate the law, or flagrant disregard of established rule
must be manifest[.]" 126
The Supplemental Report of the Office of the Court
Administrator made the following findings:
III On Judge Rosabella M Tormis
1. Based on the documents, i.e., marriage certificates and other
supporting documents, actually examined, she solemnized a
total of one hundred eighty-one (181) marriages from 2003 to
2007, while the monthly reports of cases reflected a total of
three hundred and five (305) marriages she solemnized from
2004 to 2007.
2. It was only last July that her court started using a logbook to
record the marriages she solemnized, which, as of the date of
the judicial audit and investigation, reflected a total of sixty-
three (63) marriages for that month.
3. Of the 181 marriages she solemnized, one hundred thirty-one
(131), or 72.38% were solemnized under Article 34 of the Family
Code, while fifty (50), or 27.62% were with marriage licenses.
4. Of the 50 marriages with marriage license, forty (40), or 80%
marriage licenses were obtained from the local civil registrar of
Barili, Cebu, while the remaining ten (10), or 20%, were obtained
from other local civil registrars.
5. The following marriages were solemnized by her with no or
incomplete supporting documents:
....
6. The following marriages were solemnized by her even if the
validity of the supporting documents, especially the marriage
licenses
presented, appear to be questionable[.]
7. The authenticity of the requirements for the following
marriages under Article 34 of the Family Code, by reason of the
(a) circumstances of the cohabitation, (b) minority during the
period of cohabitation, and (c) given address of the
contracting parties, appears to be questionable:
8. In almost all of the marriages solemnized by her, there was no
proof that the solemnization fee of ₱300.000, as required under
Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, was paid by the contacting
parties. 127
The act of solemnizing marriages without the required marriage
license constitutes misconduct. 128 The positive testimonies
substantiate that respondent solemnized marriages without
previously issued licenses; hence, respondent's act deviates
from the established rule.129 In Aranes v. Occiano:130
[A] marriage which preceded the issuance of the marriage
license is void, and that the subsequent issuance of such license
cannot render valid or even add an iota of validity to the
marriage. Except in cases provided by law, it is the marriage
license that gives the solemnizing officer the authority to
solemnize a marriage. 131
Tupal v. Rojo132 explained the role of a judge as a solemnizing
officer:
Before performing the marriage ceremony, the judge must
personally interview the contracting parties and examine the
requirements they submitted. The parties must have complied
with all the essential and formal requisites of marriage. Among
these formal requisites is a marriage license.
A marriage license is issued by the local civil registrar to parties
who have all the qualifications and none of the legal
disqualifications to contract marriage. Before performing the
marriage ceremony, the judge must personally examine the
marriage license presented.
If the contracting parties have cohabited as husband and wife
for at least five years and have no legal impediment to marry,
they are exempt from the marriage license requirement.
Instead, the parties must present an affidavit of cohabitation
sworn to before any person authorized by law to administer
oaths. The judge, as solemnizing officer, must personally
examine the affidavit of cohabitation as to the parties having
lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and
the absence of any legal impediment to marry each other. The
judge must also execute a sworn statement that he personally
ascertained the parties' qualifications to marry and found no
legal impediment to the marriage. Article 34 of the Family Code
of the Philippines provides:
Art. 34. No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man
and a woman who have lived together as husband and wife for
at least five years and without any legal impediment to marry
each other. The contracting parties shall state the foregoing
facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to
administer oaths. The solemnizing officer shall also state under
oath that he ascertained the qualifications of the contracting
parties and found no legal impediment to the marriage. 133
(Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
Although it is true that marriages under Article 34 of the Family
Code merit exemption from a marriage license, respondent
should have complied with the mandate of personally
ascertaining the circumstances of cohabitation of the parties.
Records reveal that the declarations embodied in the required
joint affidavit of cohabitation of the parties do not actually
represent the accurate circumstances of their alleged
cohabitation.134
In addition, there were marriages solemnized by respondent
involving foreigners who only submitted affidavits in lieu of a
certificate of legal capacity to marry.135 In cases where one or
both of the contracting parties are foreigners, Article 21136 of
the Family Code provides that a certificate of legal capacity to
marry is necessary before the acquisition of a marriage license.
As the solemnizing officer, respondent should have ensured that
pertinent requirements were secured before the issuance of the
marriage license. Thus, the absence of a certificate of legal
capacity to marry should have prompted her to question the
propriety of the issuance.
The connivance between respondent and the court employees
is settled. The court employees acted as "'fixers' and 'facilitators"
137 that mediated between the judges and the contacting
parties. Apparent are the superimpositions and erasures in the
addresses of the contracting parties so they would appear to
be residents of either Barili or Liloan, Cebu.138 For the
contracting parties to easily obtain their marriage license,
discrepancies between their true addresses as declared in their
marriage certificates and their addresses in their marriage
licenses were made. The contracting parties were able to get
married despite incomplete requirements. Thus, the handwritten
marginal notes of monetary figures attached to the marriage
certificates show the presence of consideration.139
Marriage is recognized under the law as an inviolable social
institution, which is the foundation of the family.140 In Beso v.
Daguman.141
[M]arriage in this country is an institution in which the community
is deeply interested. The state has surrounded it with safeguards
to maintain its purity, continuity and permanence. The security
and stability of the state are largely dependent upon it. It is the
interest and duty of each and every member of the community
to prevent the bringing about of a condition that would shake
its foundation and ultimately lead to its destruction. 142
Respondent used her authority as a judge to make a mockery
of marriage. As a judicial officer, she is expected to know the
law on solemnization of marriages.143 "A judge is not only
bound by oath to apply the law; he [or she] must also be
conscientious and thorough in doing so. Certainly, judges, by
the very delicate nature of their office[,] should be more
circumspect in the performance of their duties."144
Similarly, as a lawyer who is an officer of the court, respondent
should have not permitted herself to be an instrument of any
violation of law. Her careless attention in dispensing with the
necessary requirements of marriage and in conniving with court
employees to further monetary interests underscores her utter
disregard of the sanctity of marriage.
Any gross misconduct of a lawyer, whether in his or her
professional dealings or in a private capacity, is basis for
suspension or disbarment.145 Possession of good character is a
fundamental requirement not only for admission to the bar but
also for the continuance of exercising the privilege to practice
law.146 However, as a rule, disbarment is only warranted in
cases of misconduct that "seriously affect the standing and
character of the lawyer as an officer of the court."147
Respondent's undue haste in repeatedly solemnizing marriages
despite incomplete and irregular requirements shows
indifference to her role as an officer of the court. The
repetitiveness of her acts shows her proclivity in transgressing the
law and protecting these violations with her authority. A lawyer,
as an officer and an essential partner of the court in the solemn
task of giving justice, is given the grave obligation of
maintaining the integrity of the courts. 148 This is especially so
with judges. A judge is "the visible representation of law and
justice from whom the people draw their will and awareness to
obey the law. For the judge to return that regard, the latter must
be the first to abide by the law and weave an example for the
others to follow."149 In Samson v. Caballero:150
The first step towards the successful implementation of the
Court's relentless drive to purge the judiciary of morally unfit
members, officials and personnel necessitates the imposition of
a rigid set of rules of conduct on judges. The Court is
extraordinarily strict with judges because, being the visible
representation of the law, they should set a good example to
the bench, bar and students of the law. The standard of
integrity imposed on them is - and should be - higher than that
of the average person for it is their integrity that gives them the
right to judge.151
Respondent was involved in infractions that warranted her prior
administrative sanctions. Her long line of cases shows her
depravity of character, in that she remained undeterred by the
past penalties she had incurred. Considering that she was
repeatedly involved in administrative charges, the severe
penalty of disbarment should be meted against her. Disbarment
does not equate to a sanction stripping a lawyer of his or her
source of living.152 It is intended to "protect the administration
of justice that those who exercise this function should be
competent, honorable and reliable in order that the courts and
clients may rightly repose confidence in them."153 As held in
Foronda v. Guerrero: 154

[T]he practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions.

Adherence to the rigid standards of mental fitness,
maintenance of the highest degree of morality and faithful
compliance with the rules of legal profession are the conditions
required for remaining a member of good standing of the bar
and for enjoying the privilege to practice law.155

Respondent's conduct has fallen short of the strict standards

required by the legal profession. Hence, her repeated failure to
live up to the values expected of her as an officer of the court
renders her unfit to be a member of the bar.

WHEREFORE, respondent former Judge Rosabella M. Tormis is

DISBARRED from the practice of law and her name stricken from
the Roll of Attorneys.

Let copies of this Resolution be furnished to the Office of the Bar

Confidant to be attached to respondent's personal records, to
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for dissemination to its
chapters and members and all administrative and quasi-judicial
agencies, and to the Office of the Court Administrator for
circulation to all courts in the Philippines.

SO ORDERED.