Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 100113 September 3, 1991

RENATO CAYETANO, petitioner,

vs.
CHRISTIAN MONSOD, HON. JOVITO R. SALONGA, COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENT, and HON.
GUILLERMO CARAGUE, in his capacity as Secretary of Budget and Management, respondents.

Renato L. Cayetano for and in his own behalf.

Sabina E. Acut, Jr. and Mylene Garcia-Albano co-counsel for petitioner.

PARAS, J.:

We are faced here with a controversy of far-reaching proportions. While ostensibly only legal issues are
involved, the Court's decision in this case would indubitably have a profound effect on the political aspect of
our national existence.

The 1987 Constitution provides in Section 1 (1), Article IX-C:

There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners who
shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-
five years of age, holders of a college degree, and must not have been candidates for any elective
position in the immediately preceding -elections. However, a majority thereof, including the
Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for
at least ten years. (Emphasis supplied)

The aforequoted provision is patterned after Section l(l), Article XII-C of the 1973 Constitution which
similarly provides:

There shall be an independent Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and eight

Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment,
at least thirty-five years of age and holders of a college degree. However, a majority thereof, including the
Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at
least ten years.' (Emphasis supplied)

Regrettably, however, there seems to be no jurisprudence as to what constitutes practice of law as a legal
qualification to an appointive office.

Black defines "practice of law" as:

The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal principles and
technique to serve the interest of another with his consent. It is not limited to appearing in court, or
advising and assisting in the conduct of litigation, but embraces the preparation of pleadings, and
other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of legal
instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all legal advice to clients. It embraces all advice to clients
and all actions taken for them in matters connected with the law. An attorney engages in the
practice of law by maintaining an office where he is held out to be-an attorney, using a letterhead
describing himself as an attorney, counseling clients in legal matters, negotiating with opposing
counsel about pending litigation, and fixing and collecting fees for services rendered by his
associate. (Black's Law Dictionary, 3rd ed.)
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. (Land Title Abstract and Trust Co. v.
Dworken, 129 Ohio St. 23, 193 N.E. 650) A person is also considered to be in the practice of law when he:

... for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person, firms, associations or
corporations as to their rights under the law, or appears in a representative capacity as an advocate
in proceedings pending or prospective, before any court, commissioner, referee, board, body,
committee, or commission constituted by law or authorized to settle controversies and there, in such
representative capacity performs any act or acts for the purpose of obtaining or defending the rights
of their clients under the law. Otherwise stated, one who, in a representative capacity, engages in
the business of advising clients as to their rights under the law, or while so engaged performs any
act or acts either in court or outside of court for that purpose, is engaged in the practice of law.
(State ex. rel. Mckittrick v..C.S. Dudley and Co., 102 S.W. 2d 895, 340 Mo. 852)

This Court in the case of Philippine Lawyers Association v.Agrava, (105 Phil. 173,176-177) stated:

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the
preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the
management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in
addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in
matters connected with the law incorporation services, assessment and condemnation services
contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of
a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in
attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice, as
do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work done involves the
determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jr. p. 262,
263). (Emphasis supplied)

Practice of law under modem conditions consists in no small part of work performed outside of any
court and having no immediate relation to proceedings in court. It embraces conveyancing, the
giving of legal advice on a large variety of subjects, and the preparation and execution of legal
instruments covering an extensive field of business and trust relations and other affairs. Although
these transactions may have no direct connection with court proceedings, they are always subject
to become involved in litigation. They require in many aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide
experience with men and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to difficult and complex
situations. These customary functions of an attorney or counselor at law bear an intimate relation to
the administration of justice by the courts. No valid distinction, so far as concerns the question set
forth in the order, can be drawn between that part of the work of the lawyer which involves
appearance in court and that part which involves advice and drafting of instruments in his office. It is
of importance to the welfare of the public that these manifold customary functions be performed by
persons possessed of adequate learning and skill, of sound moral character, and acting at all times
under the heavy trust obligations to clients which rests upon all attorneys. (Moran, Comments on
the Rules of Court, Vol. 3 [1953 ed.] , p. 665-666, citing In re Opinion of the Justices [Mass.], 194
N.E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. v. Automobile Service Assoc. [R.I.] 179 A. 139,144).
(Emphasis ours)

The University of the Philippines Law Center in conducting orientation briefing for new lawyers (1974-1975)
listed the dimensions of the practice of law in even broader terms as advocacy, counselling and public
service.

One may be a practicing attorney in following any line of employment in the profession. If what he
does exacts knowledge of the law and is of a kind usual for attorneys engaging in the active practice
of their profession, and he follows some one or more lines of employment such as this he is a
practicing attorney at law within the meaning of the statute. (Barr v. Cardell, 155 NW 312)

Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure,
knowledge, training and experience. "To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are
characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice or render any kind of service,
which device or service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill." (111 ALR 23)
The following records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission show that it has adopted a liberal
interpretation of the term "practice of law."

MR. FOZ. Before we suspend the session, may I make a manifestation which I forgot to do during
our review of the provisions on the Commission on Audit. May I be allowed to make a very brief
statement?

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir).

The Commissioner will please proceed.

MR. FOZ. This has to do with the qualifications of the members of the Commission on Audit. Among
others, the qualifications provided for by Section I is that "They must be Members of the Philippine
Bar" — I am quoting from the provision — "who have been engaged in the practice of law for at
least ten years".

To avoid any misunderstanding which would result in excluding members of the Bar who are now employed
in the COA or Commission on Audit, we would like to make the clarification that this provision on
qualifications regarding members of the Bar does not necessarily refer or involve actual practice of law
outside the COA We have to interpret this to mean that as long as the lawyers who are employed in the
COA are using their legal knowledge or legal talent in their respective work within COA, then they are
qualified to be considered for appointment as members or commissioners, even chairman, of the
Commission on Audit.

This has been discussed by the Committee on Constitutional Commissions and Agencies and we deem it
important to take it up on the floor so that this interpretation may be made available whenever this provision
on the qualifications as regards members of the Philippine Bar engaging in the practice of law for at least
ten years is taken up.

MR. OPLE. Will Commissioner Foz yield to just one question.

MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.

MR. OPLE. Is he, in effect, saying that service in the COA by a lawyer is equivalent to the
requirement of a law practice that is set forth in the Article on the Commission on Audit?

MR. FOZ. We must consider the fact that the work of COA, although it is auditing, will necessarily
involve legal work; it will involve legal work. And, therefore, lawyers who are employed in COA now
would have the necessary qualifications in accordance with the Provision on qualifications under our
provisions on the Commission on Audit. And, therefore, the answer is yes.

MR. OPLE. Yes. So that the construction given to this is that this is equivalent to the practice of law.

MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.

MR. OPLE. Thank you.

... ( Emphasis supplied)

Section 1(1), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution, provides, among others, that the Chairman and two
Commissioners of the Commission on Audit (COA) should either be certified public accountants with not
less than ten years of auditing practice, or members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in
the practice of law for at least ten years. (emphasis supplied)

Corollary to this is the term "private practitioner" and which is in many ways synonymous with the word
"lawyer." Today, although many lawyers do not engage in private practice, it is still a fact that the majority of
lawyers are private practitioners. (Gary Munneke, Opportunities in Law Careers [VGM Career Horizons:
Illinois], [1986], p. 15).
At this point, it might be helpful to define private practice. The term, as commonly understood, means "an
individual or organization engaged in the business of delivering legal services." (Ibid.). Lawyers who
practice alone are often called "sole practitioners." Groups of lawyers are called "firms." The firm is usually
a partnership and members of the firm are the partners. Some firms may be organized as professional
corporations and the members called shareholders. In either case, the members of the firm are the
experienced attorneys. In most firms, there are younger or more inexperienced salaried attorneyscalled
"associates." (Ibid.).

The test that defines law practice by looking to traditional areas of law practice is essentially tautologous,
unhelpful defining the practice of law as that which lawyers do. (Charles W. Wolfram, Modern Legal
Ethics [West Publishing Co.: Minnesota, 1986], p. 593). The practice of law is defined as the performance
of any acts . . . in or out of court, commonly understood to be the practice of law. (State Bar Ass'n v.
Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 145 Conn. 222, 140 A.2d 863, 870 [1958] [quoting Grievance Comm. v.
Payne, 128 Conn. 325, 22 A.2d 623, 626 [1941]). Because lawyers perform almost every function known in
the commercial and governmental realm, such a definition would obviously be too global to be
workable.(Wolfram, op. cit.).

The appearance of a lawyer in litigation in behalf of a client is at once the most publicly familiar role for
lawyers as well as an uncommon role for the average lawyer. Most lawyers spend little time in courtrooms,
and a large percentage spend their entire practice without litigating a case. (Ibid., p. 593). Nonetheless,
many lawyers do continue to litigate and the litigating lawyer's role colors much of both the public image
and the self perception of the legal profession. (Ibid.).

In this regard thus, the dominance of litigation in the public mind reflects history, not reality. (Ibid.). Why is
this so? Recall that the late Alexander SyCip, a corporate lawyer, once articulated on the importance of a
lawyer as a business counselor in this wise: "Even today, there are still uninformed laymen whose concept
of an attorney is one who principally tries cases before the courts. The members of the bench and bar and
the informed laymen such as businessmen, know that in most developed societies today, substantially
more legal work is transacted in law offices than in the courtrooms. General practitioners of law who do
both litigation and non-litigation work also know that in most cases they find themselves spending more
time doing what [is] loosely desccribe[d] as business counseling than in trying cases. The business lawyer
has been described as the planner, the diagnostician and the trial lawyer, the surgeon. I[t] need not [be]
stress[ed] that in law, as in medicine, surgery should be avoided where internal medicine can be effective."
(Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).

In the course of a working day the average general practitioner wig engage in a number of legal tasks, each
involving different legal doctrines, legal skills, legal processes, legal institutions, clients, and other
interested parties. Even the increasing numbers of lawyers in specialized practice wig usually perform at
least some legal services outside their specialty. And even within a narrow specialty such as tax practice, a
lawyer will shift from one legal task or role such as advice-giving to an importantly different one such as
representing a client before an administrative agency. (Wolfram, supra, p. 687).

By no means will most of this work involve litigation, unless the lawyer is one of the relatively rare types —
a litigator who specializes in this work to the exclusion of much else. Instead, the work will require the
lawyer to have mastered the full range of traditional lawyer skills of client counselling, advice-giving,
document drafting, and negotiation. And increasingly lawyers find that the new skills of evaluation and
mediation are both effective for many clients and a source of employment. (Ibid.).

Most lawyers will engage in non-litigation legal work or in litigation work that is constrained in very important
ways, at least theoretically, so as to remove from it some of the salient features of adversarial litigation. Of
these special roles, the most prominent is that of prosecutor. In some lawyers' work the constraints are
imposed both by the nature of the client and by the way in which the lawyer is organized into a social unit to
perform that work. The most common of these roles are those of corporate practice and government legal
service. (Ibid.).

In several issues of the Business Star, a business daily, herein below quoted are emerging trends in
corporate law practice, a departure from the traditional concept of practice of law.

We are experiencing today what truly may be called a revolutionary transformation in corporate law
practice. Lawyers and other professional groups, in particular those members participating in
various legal-policy decisional contexts, are finding that understanding the major emerging trends in
corporation law is indispensable to intelligent decision-making.

Constructive adjustment to major corporate problems of today requires an accurate understanding

of the nature and implications of the corporate law research function accompanied by an
accelerating rate of information accumulation. The recognition of the need for such improved
corporate legal policy formulation, particularly "model-making" and "contingency planning," has
impressed upon us the inadequacy of traditional procedures in many decisional contexts.

In a complex legal problem the mass of information to be processed, the sorting and weighing of
significant conditional factors, the appraisal of major trends, the necessity of estimating the
consequences of given courses of action, and the need for fast decision and response in situations
of acute danger have prompted the use of sophisticated concepts of information flow theory,
operational analysis, automatic data processing, and electronic computing equipment.
Understandably, an improved decisional structure must stress the predictive component of the
policy-making process, wherein a "model", of the decisional context or a segment thereof is
developed to test projected alternative courses of action in terms of futuristic effects flowing
therefrom.

Although members of the legal profession are regularly engaged in predicting and projecting the
trends of the law, the subject of corporate finance law has received relatively little organized and
formalized attention in the philosophy of advancing corporate legal education. Nonetheless, a cross-
disciplinary approach to legal research has become a vital necessity.

Certainly, the general orientation for productive contributions by those trained primarily in the law
can be improved through an early introduction to multi-variable decisional context and the various
approaches for handling such problems. Lawyers, particularly with either a master's or doctorate
degree in business administration or management, functioning at the legal policy level of decision-
making now have some appreciation for the concepts and analytical techniques of other professions
which are currently engaged in similar types of complex decision-making.

Truth to tell, many situations involving corporate finance problems would require the services of an
astute attorney because of the complex legal implications that arise from each and every necessary
step in securing and maintaining the business issue raised. (Business Star, "Corporate Finance
Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).

In our litigation-prone country, a corporate lawyer is assiduously referred to as the "abogado de

campanilla." He is the "big-time" lawyer, earning big money and with a clientele composed of the
tycoons and magnates of business and industry.

Despite the growing number of corporate lawyers, many people could not explain what it is that a
corporate lawyer does. For one, the number of attorneys employed by a single corporation will vary
with the size and type of the corporation. Many smaller and some large corporations farm out all
their legal problems to private law firms. Many others have in-house counsel only for certain
matters. Other corporation have a staff large enough to handle most legal problems in-house.

A corporate lawyer, for all intents and purposes, is a lawyer who handles the legal affairs of a
corporation. His areas of concern or jurisdiction may include, inter alia: corporate legal research, tax
laws research, acting out as corporate secretary (in board meetings), appearances in both courts
and other adjudicatory agencies (including the Securities and Exchange Commission), and in other
capacities which require an ability to deal with the law.

At any rate, a corporate lawyer may assume responsibilities other than the legal affairs of the
business of the corporation he is representing. These include such matters as determining policy
and becoming involved in management. ( Emphasis supplied.)

In a big company, for example, one may have a feeling of being isolated from the action, or not
understanding how one's work actually fits into the work of the orgarnization. This can be frustrating
to someone who needs to see the results of his work first hand. In short, a corporate lawyer is
sometimes offered this fortune to be more closely involved in the running of the business.

Moreover, a corporate lawyer's services may sometimes be engaged by a multinational corporation

(MNC). Some large MNCs provide one of the few opportunities available to corporate lawyers to
enter the international law field. After all, international law is practiced in a relatively small number of
companies and law firms. Because working in a foreign country is perceived by many as glamorous,
tills is an area coveted by corporate lawyers. In most cases, however, the overseas jobs go to
experienced attorneys while the younger attorneys do their "international practice" in law libraries.
(Business Star, "Corporate Law Practice," May 25,1990, p. 4).

This brings us to the inevitable, i.e., the role of the lawyer in the realm of finance. To borrow the
lines of Harvard-educated lawyer Bruce Wassertein, to wit: "A bad lawyer is one who fails to spot
problems, a good lawyer is one who perceives the difficulties, and the excellent lawyer is one who
surmounts them." (Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).

Today, the study of corporate law practice direly needs a "shot in the arm," so to speak. No longer
are we talking of the traditional law teaching method of confining the subject study to the
Corporation Code and the Securities Code but an incursion as well into the intertwining modern
management issues.

Such corporate legal management issues deal primarily with three (3) types of learning: (1)
acquisition of insights into current advances which are of particular significance to the corporate
counsel; (2) an introduction to usable disciplinary skins applicable to a corporate counsel's
management responsibilities; and (3) a devotion to the organization and management of the legal
function itself.

These three subject areas may be thought of as intersecting circles, with a shared area linking
them. Otherwise known as "intersecting managerial jurisprudence," it forms a unifying theme for the
corporate counsel's total learning.

Some current advances in behavior and policy sciences affect the counsel's role. For that matter,
the corporate lawyer reviews the globalization process, including the resulting strategic repositioning
that the firms he provides counsel for are required to make, and the need to think about a
corporation's; strategy at multiple levels. The salience of the nation-state is being reduced as firms
deal both with global multinational entities and simultaneously with sub-national governmental units.
Firms increasingly collaborate not only with public entities but with each other — often with those
who are competitors in other arenas.

Also, the nature of the lawyer's participation in decision-making within the corporation is rapidly
changing. The modem corporate lawyer has gained a new role as a stakeholder — in some cases
participating in the organization and operations of governance through participation on boards and
other decision-making roles. Often these new patterns develop alongside existing legal institutions
and laws are perceived as barriers. These trends are complicated as corporations organize for
global operations. ( Emphasis supplied)

The practising lawyer of today is familiar as well with governmental policies toward the promotion
and management of technology. New collaborative arrangements for promoting specific
technologies or competitiveness more generally require approaches from industry that differ from
older, more adversarial relationships and traditional forms of seeking to influence governmental
policies. And there are lessons to be learned from other countries. In
Europe, Esprit, Eureka and Race are examples of collaborative efforts between governmental and
business Japan's MITI is world famous. (Emphasis supplied)

Following the concept of boundary spanning, the office of the Corporate Counsel comprises a
distinct group within the managerial structure of all kinds of organizations. Effectiveness of both
long-term and temporary groups within organizations has been found to be related to indentifiable
factors in the group-context interaction such as the groups actively revising their knowledge of the
environment coordinating work with outsiders, promoting team achievements within the
organization. In general, such external activities are better predictors of team performance than
internal group processes.

In a crisis situation, the legal managerial capabilities of the corporate lawyer vis-a-vis the managerial
mettle of corporations are challenged. Current research is seeking ways both to anticipate effective
managerial procedures and to understand relationships of financial liability and insurance
considerations. (Emphasis supplied)

Regarding the skills to apply by the corporate counsel, three factors are apropos:

First System Dynamics. The field of systems dynamics has been found an effective tool for new
managerial thinking regarding both planning and pressing immediate problems. An understanding of
the role of feedback loops, inventory levels, and rates of flow, enable users to simulate all sorts of
systematic problems — physical, economic, managerial, social, and psychological. New
programming techniques now make the system dynamics principles more accessible to managers
— including corporate counsels. (Emphasis supplied)

Second Decision Analysis. This enables users to make better decisions involving complexity and
uncertainty. In the context of a law department, it can be used to appraise the settlement value of
litigation, aid in negotiation settlement, and minimize the cost and risk involved in managing a
portfolio of cases. (Emphasis supplied)

Third Modeling for Negotiation Management. Computer-based models can be used directly by
parties and mediators in all lands of negotiations. All integrated set of such tools provide coherent
and effective negotiation support, including hands-on on instruction in these techniques. A
simulation case of an international joint venture may be used to illustrate the point.

[Be this as it may,] the organization and management of the legal function, concern three pointed
areas of consideration, thus:

Preventive Lawyering. Planning by lawyers requires special skills that comprise a major part of the
general counsel's responsibilities. They differ from those of remedial law. Preventive lawyering is
concerned with minimizing the risks of legal trouble and maximizing legal rights for such legal
entities at that time when transactional or similar facts are being considered and made.

Managerial Jurisprudence. This is the framework within which are undertaken those activities of the
firm to which legal consequences attach. It needs to be directly supportive of this nation's evolving
economic and organizational fabric as firms change to stay competitive in a global, interdependent
environment. The practice and theory of "law" is not adequate today to facilitate the relationships
needed in trying to make a global economy work.

Organization and Functioning of the Corporate Counsel's Office. The general counsel has emerged
in the last decade as one of the most vibrant subsets of the legal profession. The corporate counsel
hear responsibility for key aspects of the firm's strategic issues, including structuring its global
operations, managing improved relationships with an increasingly diversified body of employees,
managing expanded liability exposure, creating new and varied interactions with public decision-
makers, coping internally with more complex make or by decisions.

This whole exercise drives home the thesis that knowing corporate law is not enough to make one a
good general corporate counsel nor to give him a full sense of how the legal system shapes
corporate activities. And even if the corporate lawyer's aim is not the understand all of the law's
effects on corporate activities, he must, at the very least, also gain a working knowledge of the
management issues if only to be able to grasp not only the basic legal "constitution' or makeup of
the modem corporation. "Business Star", "The Corporate Counsel," April 10, 1991, p. 4).

The challenge for lawyers (both of the bar and the bench) is to have more than a passing
knowledge of financial law affecting each aspect of their work. Yet, many would admit to ignorance
of vast tracts of the financial law territory. What transpires next is a dilemma of professional security:
 Will the lawyer admit ignorance and risk opprobrium?; or will he feign understanding and risk
exposure? (Business Star, "Corporate Finance law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).

Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the position of Chairman
of the COMELEC in a letter received by the Secretariat of the Commission on Appointments on April 25,
1991. Petitioner opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does not possess the required
qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.

On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the nomination of Monsod as Chairman of
the COMELEC. On June 18, 1991, he took his oath of office. On the same day, he assumed office as
Chairman of the COMELEC.

Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of Monsod's nomination,
petitioner as a citizen and taxpayer, filed the instant petition for certiorari and Prohibition praying that said
confirmation and the consequent appointment of Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections be
declared null and void.

Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed the bar examinations of 1960 with
a grade of 86-55%. He has been a dues paying member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines since its
inception in 1972-73. He has also been paying his professional license fees as lawyer for more than ten
years. (p. 124, Rollo)

After graduating from the College of Law (U.P.) and having hurdled the bar, Atty. Monsod worked in the law
office of his father. During his stint in the World Bank Group (1963-1970), Monsod worked as an operations
officer for about two years in Costa Rica and Panama, which involved getting acquainted with the laws of
member-countries negotiating loans and coordinating legal, economic, and project work of the Bank. Upon
returning to the Philippines in 1970, he worked with the Meralco Group, served as chief executive officer of
an investment bank and subsequently of a business conglomerate, and since 1986, has rendered services
to various companies as a legal and economic consultant or chief executive officer. As former Secretary-
General (1986) and National Chairman (1987) of NAMFREL. Monsod's work involved being knowledgeable
in election law. He appeared for NAMFREL in its accreditation hearings before the Comelec. In the field of
advocacy, Monsod, in his personal capacity and as former Co-Chairman of the Bishops Businessmen's
Conference for Human Development, has worked with the under privileged sectors, such as the farmer and
urban poor groups, in initiating, lobbying for and engaging in affirmative action for the agrarian reform law
and lately the urban land reform bill. Monsod also made use of his legal knowledge as a member of the
Davide Commission, a quast judicial body, which conducted numerous hearings (1990) and as a member
of the Constitutional Commission (1986-1987), and Chairman of its Committee on Accountability of Public
Officers, for which he was cited by the President of the Commission, Justice Cecilia Muñoz-Palma for
"innumerable amendments to reconcile government functions with individual freedoms and public
accountability and the party-list system for the House of Representative. (pp. 128-129 Rollo) ( Emphasis
supplied)

Just a word about the work of a negotiating team of which Atty. Monsod used to be a member.

In a loan agreement, for instance, a negotiating panel acts as a team, and which is adequately
constituted to meet the various contingencies that arise during a negotiation. Besides top officials of
the Borrower concerned, there are the legal officer (such as the legal counsel), the finance
manager, and an operations officer (such as an official involved in negotiating the contracts) who
comprise the members of the team. (Guillermo V. Soliven, "Loan Negotiating Strategies for
Developing Country Borrowers," Staff Paper No. 2, Central Bank of the Philippines, Manila, 1982, p.
11). (Emphasis supplied)

After a fashion, the loan agreement is like a country's Constitution; it lays down the law as far as the
loan transaction is concerned. Thus, the meat of any Loan Agreement can be compartmentalized
into five (5) fundamental parts: (1) business terms; (2) borrower's representation; (3) conditions of
closing; (4) covenants; and (5) events of default. (Ibid., p. 13).

In the same vein, lawyers play an important role in any debt restructuring program. For aside from
performing the tasks of legislative drafting and legal advising, they score national development
 policies as key factors in maintaining their countries' sovereignty. (Condensed from the work paper,
entitled "Wanted: Development Lawyers for Developing Nations," submitted by L. Michael Hager,
regional legal adviser of the United States Agency for International Development, during the
Session on Law for the Development of Nations at the Abidjan World Conference in Ivory Coast,
sponsored by the World Peace Through Law Center on August 26-31, 1973). ( Emphasis supplied)

Loan concessions and compromises, perhaps even more so than purely renegotiation policies,
demand expertise in the law of contracts, in legislation and agreement drafting and in renegotiation.
Necessarily, a sovereign lawyer may work with an international business specialist or an economist
in the formulation of a model loan agreement. Debt restructuring contract agreements contain such
a mixture of technical language that they should be carefully drafted and signed only with the advise
of competent counsel in conjunction with the guidance of adequate technical support personnel.
(See International Law Aspects of the Philippine External Debts, an unpublished dissertation, U.S.T.
Graduate School of Law, 1987, p. 321). ( Emphasis supplied)

A critical aspect of sovereign debt restructuring/contract construction is the set of terms and
conditions which determines the contractual remedies for a failure to perform one or more elements
of the contract. A good agreement must not only define the responsibilities of both parties, but must
also state the recourse open to either party when the other fails to discharge an obligation. For a
compleat debt restructuring represents a devotion to that principle which in the ultimate analysis
is sine qua non for foreign loan agreements-an adherence to the rule of law in domestic and
international affairs of whose kind U.S. Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. once
said: "They carry no banners, they beat no drums; but where they are, men learn that bustle and
bush are not the equal of quiet genius and serene mastery." (See Ricardo J. Romulo, "The Role of
Lawyers in Foreign Investments," Integrated Bar of the Philippine Journal, Vol. 15, Nos. 3 and 4,
Third and Fourth Quarters, 1977, p. 265).

Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term Practice of law". particularly the modern concept
of law practice, and taking into consideration the liberal construction intended by the framers of the
Constitution, Atty. Monsod's past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-
entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the
poor — verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement — that he has been engaged in the practice
of law for at least ten years.

Besides in the leading case of Luego v. Civil Service Commission, 143 SCRA 327, the Court said:

Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be performed by the officer in which it is
vested according to his best lights, the only condition being that the appointee should possess the
qualifications required by law. If he does, then the appointment cannot be faulted on the ground that
there are others better qualified who should have been preferred. This is a political question
involving considerations of wisdom which only the appointing authority can decide. (emphasis
supplied)

No less emphatic was the Court in the case of (Central Bank v. Civil Service Commission, 171 SCRA 744)
where it stated:

It is well-settled that when the appointee is qualified, as in this case, and all the other legal
requirements are satisfied, the Commission has no alternative but to attest to the appointment in
accordance with the Civil Service Law. The Commission has no authority to revoke an appointment
on the ground that another person is more qualified for a particular position. It also has no authority
to direct the appointment of a substitute of its choice. To do so would be an encroachment on the
discretion vested upon the appointing authority. An appointment is essentially within the
discretionary power of whomsoever it is vested, subject to the only condition that the appointee
should possess the qualifications required by law. ( Emphasis supplied)

The appointing process in a regular appointment as in the case at bar, consists of four (4) stages: (1)
nomination; (2) confirmation by the Commission on Appointments; (3) issuance of a commission (in the
Philippines, upon submission by the Commission on Appointments of its certificate of confirmation, the
President issues the permanent appointment; and (4) acceptance e.g., oath-taking, posting of bond, etc. . .
. (Lacson v. Romero, No. L-3081, October 14, 1949; Gonzales, Law on Public Officers, p. 200)
The power of the Commission on Appointments to give its consent to the nomination of Monsod as
Chairman of the Commission on Elections is mandated by Section 1(2) Sub-Article C, Article IX of the
Constitution which provides:

The Chairman and the Commisioners shall be appointed by the President with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years without reappointment. Of those first
appointed, three Members shall hold office for seven years, two Members for five years, and the last
Members for three years, without reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the
unexpired term of the predecessor. In no case shall any Member be appointed or designated in a
temporary or acting capacity.

Anent Justice Teodoro Padilla's separate opinion, suffice it to say that his definition of the practice of
law is the traditional or stereotyped notion of law practice, as distinguished from the modern concept
of the practice of law, which modern connotation is exactly what was intended by the eminent
framers of the 1987 Constitution. Moreover, Justice Padilla's definition would require generally a
habitual law practice, perhaps practised two or three times a week and would outlaw say, law
practice once or twice a year for ten consecutive years. Clearly, this is far from the constitutional
intent.

Upon the other hand, the separate opinion of Justice Isagani Cruz states that in my written opinion, I made
use of a definition of law practice which really means nothing because the definition says that law practice "
. . . is what people ordinarily mean by the practice of law." True I cited the definition but only by way of
sarcasm as evident from my statement that the definition of law practice by "traditional areas of law practice
is essentially tautologous" or defining a phrase by means of the phrase itself that is being defined.

Justice Cruz goes on to say in substance that since the law covers almost all situations, most individuals, in
making use of the law, or in advising others on what the law means, are actually practicing law. In that
sense, perhaps, but we should not lose sight of the fact that Mr. Monsod is a lawyer, a member of the
Philippine Bar, who has been practising law for over ten years. This is different from the acts of persons
practising law, without first becoming lawyers.

Justice Cruz also says that the Supreme Court can even disqualify an elected President of the Philippines,
say, on the ground that he lacks one or more qualifications. This matter, I greatly doubt. For one thing, how
can an action or petition be brought against the President? And even assuming that he is indeed
disqualified, how can the action be entertained since he is the incumbent President?

We now proceed:

The Commission on the basis of evidence submitted doling the public hearings on Monsod's confirmation,
implicitly determined that he possessed the necessary qualifications as required by law. The judgment
rendered by the Commission in the exercise of such an acknowledged power is beyond judicial interference
except only upon a clear showing of a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
(Art. VIII, Sec. 1 Constitution). Thus, only where such grave abuse of discretion is clearly shown shall the
Court interfere with the Commission's judgment. In the instant case, there is no occasion for the exercise of
the Court's corrective power, since no abuse, much less a grave abuse of discretion, that would amount to
lack or excess of jurisdiction and would warrant the issuance of the writs prayed, for has been clearly
shown.

Additionally, consider the following:

(1) If the Commission on Appointments rejects a nominee by the President, may the Supreme Court
reverse the Commission, and thus in effect confirm the appointment? Clearly, the answer is in the
negative.

(2) In the same vein, may the Court reject the nominee, whom the Commission has confirmed? The
answer is likewise clear.
 (3) If the United States Senate (which is the confirming body in the U.S. Congress) decides
to confirm a Presidential nominee, it would be incredible that the U.S. Supreme Court would
still reverse the U.S. Senate.

Finally, one significant legal maxim is:

We must interpret not by the letter that killeth, but by the spirit that giveth life.

Take this hypothetical case of Samson and Delilah. Once, the procurator of Judea asked Delilah (who was
Samson's beloved) for help in capturing Samson. Delilah agreed on condition that —

No blade shall touch his skin;

No blood shall flow from his veins.

When Samson (his long hair cut by Delilah) was captured, the procurator placed an iron rod burning white-
hot two or three inches away from in front of Samson's eyes. This blinded the man. Upon hearing of what
had happened to her beloved, Delilah was beside herself with anger, and fuming with righteous fury,
accused the procurator of reneging on his word. The procurator calmly replied: "Did any blade touch his
skin? Did any blood flow from his veins?" The procurator was clearly relying on the letter, not the spirit of
the agreement.

In view of the foregoing, this petition is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-12426 February 16, 1959

PHILIPPINE LAWYER'S ASSOCIATION, petitioner,

vs.
CELEDONIO AGRAVA, in his capacity as Director of the Philippines Patent Office, respondent.

Arturo A. Alafriz for petitioner.

Office of the Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla and Solicitor Pacifico P. de Castro for respondent.

MONTEMAYOR, J.:

This is the petition filed by the Philippine Lawyer's Association for prohibition and injunction against
Celedonio Agrava, in his capacity as Director of the Philippines Patent Office.

On may 27, 1957, respondent Director issued a circular announcing that he had scheduled for June 27,
1957 an examination for the purpose of determining who are qualified to practice as patent attorneys before
the Philippines Patent Office, the said examination to cover patent law and jurisprudence and the rules of
practice before said office. According to the circular, members of the Philippine Bar, engineers and other
persons with sufficient scientific and technical training are qualified to take the said examination. It would
appear that heretofore, respondent Director has been holding similar examinations.

It is the contention of the petitioner Philippine Lawyer's Association that one who has passed the bar
examinations and is licensed by the Supreme Court to practice law in the Philippines and who is in good
standing, is duly qualified to practice before the Philippines Patent Office, and that consequently, the cat of
the respondent Director requiring members of the Philippine Bar in good standing to take and pass an
examination given by the Patent Office as a condition precedent to their being allowed to practice before
said office, such as representing applicants in the preparation and prosecution of applications for patent, is
in excess of his jurisdiction and is in violation of the law.

In his answer, respondent Director, through the Solicitor General, maintains that the prosecution of patent
cases "does not involve entirely or purely the practice of law but includes the application of scientific and
technical knowledge and training, so much so that, as a matter of actual practice, the prosecution of patent
cases may be handled not only by lawyers, but also engineers and other persons with sufficient scientific
and technical training who pass the prescribed examinations as given by the Patent Office; . . . that the
Rules of Court do not prohibit the Patent Office, or any other quasi-judicial body from requiring further
condition or qualification from those who would wish to handle cases before the Patent Office which, as
stated in the preceding paragraph, requires more of an application of scientific and technical knowledge
than the mere application of provisions of law; . . . that the action taken by the respondent is in accordance
with Republic Act No. 165, otherwise known as the Patent Law of the Philippines, which similar to the
United States Patent Law, in accordance with which the United States Patent Office has also prescribed a
similar examination as that prescribed by respondent. . . .

Respondent further contends that just as the Patent law of the United States of America authorizes the
Commissioner of Patents to prescribe examinations to determine as to who practice before the United
States Patent Office, the respondent, is similarly authorized to do so by our Patent Law, Republic Act No.
165.

Although as already stated, the Director of Patents, in the past, would appear to have been holding tests or
examinations the passing of which was imposed as a required qualification to practice before the Patent
Office, to our knowledge, this is the first time that the right of the Director of Patents to do so, specially as
regards members of the bar, has been questioned formally, or otherwise put in issue. And we have given it
careful thought and consideration.
The Supreme Court has the exclusive and constitutional power with respect to admission to the practice of
law in the Philippines1 and to any member of the Philippine Bar in good standing may practice law
anywhere and before any entity, whether judicial or quasi-judicial or administrative, in the Philippines.
Naturally, the question arises as to whether or not appearance before the patent Office and the preparation
and the prosecution of patent applications, etc., constitutes or is included in the practice of law.

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the
preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and social proceedings, the
management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in
addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in
matters connected with the law corporation services, assessment and condemnation services
contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of
a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in
attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice as
do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work done involves the
determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jur. p. 262,
263). (Emphasis supplied).

Practice of law under modern conditions consists in no small part of work performed outside of any
court and having no immediate relation to proceedings in court. It embraces conveyancing, the
giving of legal advice on a large variety of subjects, and the preparation and execution of legal
instruments covering an extensive field of business and trust relations and other affairs. Although
these transactions may have no direct connection with court proceedings, they are always subject
to become involved in litigation. They require in many aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide
experience with men and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to difficult and complex
situations. These customary functions of an attorney or counselor at law bear an intimate relation to
the administration of justice by the courts. No valid distinction, so far as concerns the question set
forth in the order, can be drawn between that part which involves advice and drafting of instruments
in his office. It is of importance to the welfare of the public that these manifold customary functions
be performed by persons possessed of adequate learning and skill, of sound moral character, and
acting at all times under the heavy trust obligations to clients which rests upon all attorneys. (Moran,
Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 3 (1953 ed.), p. 665-666, citing In re Opinion of the Justices
(Mass.), 194 N.E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. vs. Automobile Service Assoc. (R. I. ) 179 A.
139, 144). (Emphasis ours).

In our opinion, the practice of law includes such appearance before the Patent Office, the representation of
applicants, oppositors, and other persons, and the prosecution of their applications for patent, their
oppositions thereto, or the enforcement of their rights in patent cases. In the first place, although the
transaction of business in the Patent Office involves the use and application of technical and scientific
knowledge and training, still, all such business has to be rendered in accordance with the Patent Law, as
well as other laws, including the Rules and Regulations promulgated by the Patent Office in accordance
with law. Not only this, but practice before the Patent Office involves the interpretation and application of
other laws and legal principles, as well as the existence of facts to be established in accordance with the
law of evidence and procedure. For instance: Section 8 of our Patent Law provides that an invention shall
not be patentable if it is contrary to public order or morals, or to public health or welfare. Section 9 says that
an invention shall not be considered new or patentable if it was known or used by others in the Philippines
before the invention thereof by the inventor named in any printed publication in the Philippines or any
foreign country more than one year before the application for a patent therefor, or if it had been in public
use or on sale in the Philippines for more than one year before the application for the patent therefor.
Section 10 provides that the right to patent belongs to the true and actual inventor, his heirs, legal
representatives or assigns. Section 25 and 26 refer to connection of any mistake in a patent. Section 28
enumerates the grounds for cancellation of a patent; that although any person may apply for such
cancellation, under Section 29, the Solicitor General is authorized to petition for the cancellation of a patent.
Section 30 mentions the requirements of a petition for cancellation. Section 31 and 32 provide for a notice
of hearing of the petition for cancellation of the patent by the Director of Patents in case the said
cancellation is warranted. Under Section 34, at any time after the expiration of three years from the day the
patent was granted, any person patent on several grounds, such as, if the patented invention is not being
worked in the Philippines on a commercial scale, or if the demand for the patented article in the Philippines
on a commercial scale, or if the demand for the patented article in the Philippines is not being met to an
adequate extent and reasonable terms, or if by reason of the patentee's refusal to grant a license on
reasonable terms or by reason of the condition attached by him to the license, purchase or use of the
patented article or working of the patented process or machine of production, the establishment of a new
trade or industry in the Philippines is prevented; or if the patent or invention relates to food or medicine or is
necessary to public health or public safety. All these things involve the applications of laws, legal principles,
practice and procedure. They call for legal knowledge, training and experience for which a member of the
bar has been prepared.

In support of the proposition that much of the business and many of the act, orders and decisions of the
Patent Director involve questions of law or a reasonable and correct evaluation of facts, the very Patent
Law, Republic Act No. 165, Section 61, provides that:

. . . . The applicant for a patent or for the registration of a design, any party to a proceeding to
cancel a patent or to obtain a compulsory license, and any party to any other proceeding in the
Office may appeal to the Supreme Court from any final order or decision of the director.

In other words, the appeal is taken to this Tribunal. If the transaction of business in the Patent Office and
the acts, orders and decisions of the Patent Director involved exclusively or mostly technical and scientific
knowledge and training, then logically, the appeal should be taken not to a court or judicial body, but rather
to a board of scientists, engineers or technical men, which is not the case.

Another aspect of the question involves the consideration of the nature of the functions and acts of the
Head of the Patent Office.

. . . . The Commissioner, in issuing or withholding patents, in reissues, interferences, and

extensions, exercises quasi-judicial functions. Patents are public records, and it is the duty of the
Commissioner to give authenticated copies to any person, on payment of the legal fees. (40 Am.
Jur. 537). (Emphasis supplied).

. . . . The Commissioner has the only original initiatory jurisdiction that exists up to the granting and
delivering of a patent, and it is his duty to decide whether the patent is new and whether it is the
proper subject of a patent; and his action in awarding or refusing a patent is a judicial function. In
passing on an application the commissioner should decide not only questions of law, but
also questions of fact, as whether there has been a prior public use or sale of the article invented. . .
. (60 C.J.S. 460). (Emphasis supplied).

The Director of Patents, exercising as he does judicial or quasi-judicial functions, it is reasonable to hold
that a member of the bar, because of his legal knowledge and training, should be allowed to practice before
the Patent Office, without further examination or other qualification. Of course, the Director of Patents, if he
deems it advisable or necessary, may require that members of the bar practising before him enlist the
assistance of technical men and scientist in the preparation of papers and documents, such as, the drawing
or technical description of an invention or machine sought to be patented, in the same way that a lawyer
filing an application for the registration of a parcel of land on behalf of his clients, is required to submit a
plan and technical description of said land, prepared by a licensed surveyor.

But respondent Director claims that he is expressly authorized by the law to require persons desiring to
practice or to do business before him to submit an examination, even if they are already members of the
bar. He contends that our Patent Law, Republic Act No. 165, is patterned after the United States Patent
Law; and of the United States Patent Office in Patent Cases prescribes an examination similar to that which
he (respondent) has prescribed and scheduled. He invites our attention to the following provisions of said
Rules of Practice:

Registration of attorneys and agents. — A register of an attorneys and a register agents are kept in
the Patent Office on which are entered the names of all persons recognized as entitled to represent
applicants before the Patent Office in the preparation and prosecution of applicants for patent.
Registration in the Patent Office under the provisions of these rules shall only entitle the person
registered to practice before the Patent Office.
 (a) Attorney at law. — Any attorney at law in good standing admitted to practice before any United
States Court or the highest court of any State or Territory of the United States who fulfills the
requirements and complied with the provisions of these rules may be admitted to practice before the
Patent Office and have his name entered on the register of attorneys.

xxx xxx xxx

(c) Requirement for registration. — No person will be admitted to practice and register unless he
shall apply to the Commissioner of Patents in writing on a prescribed form supplied by the
Commissioner and furnish all requested information and material; and shall establish to the
satisfaction of the Commissioner that he is of good moral character and of good repute and
possessed of the legal and scientific and technical qualifications necessary to enable him to render
applicants for patent valuable service, and is otherwise competent to advise and assist him in the
presentation and prosecution of their application before the Patent Office. In order that the
Commissioner may determine whether a person seeking to have his name placed upon either of the
registers has the qualifications specified, satisfactory proof of good moral character and repute, and
of sufficient basic training in scientific and technical matters must be submitted and an examination
which is held from time to time must be taken and passed. The taking of an examination may be
waived in the case of any person who has served for three years in the examining corps of the
Patent Office.

Respondent states that the promulgation of the Rules of Practice of the United States Patent Office in
Patent Cases is authorized by the United States Patent Law itself, which reads as follows:

The Commissioner of Patents, subject to the approval of the Secretary of Commerce may prescribe
rules and regulations governing the recognition of agents, attorneys, or other persons representing
applicants or other parties before his office, and may require of such persons, agents, or attorneys,
before being recognized as representatives of applicants or other persons, that they shall show they
are of good moral character and in good repute, are possessed of the necessary qualifications to
enable them to render to applicants or other persons valuable service, and are likewise to
competent to advise and assist applicants or other persons in the presentation or prosecution of
their applications or other business before the Office. The Commissioner of Patents may, after
notice and opportunity for a hearing, suspend or exclude, either generally or in any particular case
from further practice before his office any person, agent or attorney shown to be incompetent or
disreputable, or guilty of gross misconduct, or who refuses to comply with the said rules and
regulations, or who shall, with intent to defraud in any matter, deceive, mislead, or threaten any
applicant or prospective applicant, or other person having immediate or prospective applicant, or
other person having immediate or prospective business before the office, by word, circular, letter, or
by advertising. The reasons for any such suspension or exclusion shall be duly recorded. The action
of the Commissioner may be reviewed upon the petition of the person so refused recognition or so
suspended by the district court of the United States for the District of Columbia under such
conditions and upon such proceedings as the said court may by its rules determine. (Emphasis
supplied)

Respondent Director concludes that Section 78 of Republic Act No. 165 being similar to the provisions of
law just reproduced, then he is authorized to prescribe the rules and regulations requiring that persons
desiring to practice before him should submit to and pass an examination. We reproduce said Section 78,
Republic Act No. 165, for purposes of comparison:

SEC. 78. Rules and regulations. — The Director subject to the approval of the Secretary of Justice,
shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations, not inconsistent with law, for the conduct of
all business in the Patent Office.

The above provisions of Section 78 certainly and by far, are different from the provisions of the United
States Patent Law as regards authority to hold examinations to determine the qualifications of those
allowed to practice before the Patent Office. While the U.S. Patent Law authorizes the Commissioner of
Patents to require attorneys to show that they possess the necessary qualifications and competence to
render valuable service to and advise and assist their clients in patent cases, which showing may take the
form of a test or examination to be held by the Commissioner, our Patent Law, Section 78, is silent on this
important point. Our attention has not been called to any express provision of our Patent Law, giving such
authority to determine the qualifications of persons allowed to practice before the Patent Office.

Section 551 of the Revised Administrative Code authorizes every chief of bureau to prescribe forms and
make regulations or general orders not inconsistent with law, to secure the harmonious and efficient
administration of his branch of the service and to carry into full effect the laws relating to matters within the
jurisdiction of his bureau. Section 608 of Republic Act 1937, known as the Tariff and Customs Code of the
Philippines, provides that the Commissioner of Customs shall, subject to the approval of the Department
Head, makes all rules and regulations necessary to enforce the provisions of said code. Section 338 of the
National Internal Revenue Code, Commonwealth Act No. 466 as amended, states that the Secretary of
Finance, upon recommendation of the Collector of Internal Revenue, shall promulgate all needful rules and
regulations for the effective enforcement of the provisions of the code. We understand that rules and
regulations have been promulgated not only for the Bureau of Customs and Internal Revenue, but also for
other bureaus of the Government, to govern the transaction of business in and to enforce the law for said
bureaus.

Were we to allow the Patent Office, in the absence of an express and clear provision of law giving the
necessary sanction, to require lawyers to submit to and pass on examination prescribed by it before they
are allowed to practice before said Patent Office, then there would be no reason why other bureaus
specially the Bureau of Internal Revenue and Customs, where the business in the same area are more or
less complicated, such as the presentation of books of accounts, balance sheets, etc., assessments
exemptions, depreciation, these as regards the Bureau of Internal Revenue, and the classification of goods,
imposition of customs duties, seizures, confiscation, etc., as regards the Bureau of Customs, may not also
require that any lawyer practising before them or otherwise transacting business with them on behalf of
clients, shall first pass an examination to qualify.

In conclusion, we hold that under the present law, members of the Philippine Bar authorized by this
Tribunal to practice law, and in good standing, may practice their profession before the Patent Office, for
the reason that much of the business in said office involves the interpretation and determination of the
scope and application of the Patent Law and other laws applicable, as well as the presentation of evidence
to establish facts involved; that part of the functions of the Patent director are judicial or quasi-judicial, so
much so that appeals from his orders and decisions are, under the law, taken to the Supreme Court.

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for prohibition is granted and the respondent Director is hereby
prohibited from requiring members of the Philippine Bar to submit to an examination or tests and pass the
same before being permitted to appear and practice before the Patent Office. No costs.
 FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 150718 March 26, 2003

BASILIO BORJA, SR., petitioner,

vs.
SULYAP, INC. and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This is a petition for review assailing the April 20, 2001 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 62237, and its October 31, 2001 Resolution2 denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.

The antecedent facts reveal that petitioner Basilio Borja, Sr., as lessor, and private respondent Sulyap Inc.,
as lessee, entered into a contract of lease involving a one-storey office building owned by the petitioner and
located at 12th Street, New Manila, Quezon City. Pursuant to the lease, private respondent paid, among
others, advance rentals, association dues and deposit for electrical and telephone expenses. Upon the
expiration of their lease contract, private respondent demanded the return of the said advance rentals, dues
and deposit but the petitioner refused to do so. Thus, on October 5, 1995, the former filed with the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 80, a complaint for sum of money against the petitioner. 3 Subsequently,
the parties entered into and submitted to the trial court a "Compromise Agreement" dated October 16,
1995.4 On the basis thereof, the trial court, on October 24, 1995 rendered a decision5 approving the
compromise agreement. The full text of the said decision reads:

Parties thru counsel submitted the following compromise agreement:

"1. That the parties agree that defendant is the LESSOR and owner of the premises subject of the
herein complaint and that herein plaintiff is the LESSEE thereof who is to vacate the leased
premises peacefully on November 7, 1995;

2. That in the possession of defendant are the following amounts:

a) P20,000.00 – deposited by plaintiff to defendant on June 7, 1994 for utilities;

b) 5,400.00 – as returnable association dues to plaintiff;

c) 30,000.00 – deposited by the plaintiff to defendant on August 30, 1994, for telephone
[expenses];

d) 55,000.00 – … [rental] deposit [to be applied as rental payment] for the period of October
7 to November 7, 1995.

3. That likewise plaintiff paid for the 5% withholding taxes to the Bureau of Internal Revenue for the
rentals which is due from the defendant amounting to P25,175.00 covering the period from July
1994, to July of 1995, whereon plaintiff is hereto attaching proof of payment or receipts as annexes
"A" and "B" of said withholding taxes and had been credited to the defendant entitling plaintiff to full
reimbursement;

4. That it is expressly agreed that prior to or on November 7, 1995, defendant will reimburse to
plaintiff the withholding taxes paid to the Bureau of Internal Revenue in the name of defendant upon
signing of the herein compromise agreement plus the association dues of P5,400.00 or a total of
P30,575.00;

5. That with the P55,000.00 consumed by way of rentals up to November 7, 1995, there will be left
in the possession of defendant of plaintiff’s money in the amount of P50,000.00; said amount shall
be turned over by defendant to plaintiff within 5 days from arrival of billings for telephone, electrical
and water charges only;
 6. That the amount shall be subject to actual billings ending November 7, 1995 only and shall
immediately as stated, be hand[ed] over to plaintiff;

7. That it is expressly agreed that the parties shall comply in good faith to the terms of the herein
compromise agreement and that any amount due not paid within the period stated in this agreement
shall earn 2% interest per month until fully paid plus twenty five 25% attorney’s fees of the amount
collectible and that writ of execution shall be issued as a matter of right. (Emphasis supplied)

WHEREFORE, in light of the above, it is respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court that judgment
be rendered on the basis of the above compromise agreement.

Manila for Quezon City

October 16, 1995."

Finding the foregoing compromise agreement to be not contrary to law, morals and public policy,
the same is hereby APPROVED.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in accordance with the terms and conditions set forth
in the compromise agreement and the parties are hereby enjoined to comply with and abide by the
said terms and conditions thereof.

SO ORDERED.6

Petitioner, however, failed to pay the amounts of P30,575.00 and P50,000.00 stated in the judicial
compromise. Hence, private respondent filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution for the total
amounts of P30,575.00 and P50,000.00 or a total of P102,733.12, inclusive of 2% interest and 25%
attorney’s fees.7 The trial court, in its February 7, 1996 order,8 granted the motion over the opposition9 of
the petitioner. On May 24, 1996, the latter filed a motion to quash the writ of execution, contending that the
penalty of 2% monthly interest and 25% attorney’s fees should not be imposed on him because his failure
to pay the amounts of P30,575.00 and P50,000.00 within the agreed period was due to private
respondent’s fault.10

On February 20, 1997, petitioner filed another motion praying for the quashal of the writ of execution and
modification of the decision.11 This time, he contended that there was fraud in the execution of the
compromise agreement. He claimed that 3 sets of compromise agreement were submitted for his approval.
Among them, he allegedly chose and signed the compromise agreement which contained no stipulation as
to the payment of 2% monthly interest and 25% attorney’s fees in case of default in payment. He alleged
that his former counsel, Atty. Leonardo Cruz, who assisted him in entering into the said agreement,
removed the page of the genuine compromise agreement where he affixed his signature and fraudulently
attached the same to the compromise agreement submitted to the court in order to make it appear that he
agreed to the penalty clause embodied therein.

Private respondent, on the other hand, vehemently denied the contention of the petitioner. To refute the
latter’s claim, he presented Atty. Leonardo Cruz, who declared that the petitioner gave his consent to the
inclusion of the penalty clause of 2% monthly interest and 25% attorney’s fees in the compromise
agreement. He added that the compromise agreement approved by the court was in fact signed by the
petitioner inside the courtroom before the same was submitted for approval. Atty. Cruz stressed that the
penalty clause of 2% interest per month until full payment of the amount due, plus 25% thereof as
attorney’s fees, in case of default in payment, was actually chosen by the petitioner over another proposed
more burdensome penalty clause which states – "That it is expressly agreed that the parties shall comply in
good faith to the terms of the herein compromise agreement and that any violation thereof shall
automatically entitle the aggrieved party to damages in the amount of P250,000.00 plus P50,000.00
attorney’s fees."12

On October 26, 1998, the trial court issued the assailed order denying petitioner’s motion seeking to quash
the writ of execution and to modify the judgment on compromise. It gave credence to the testimony of Atty.
Leonardo Cruz that petitioner consented to the penalty clause in the compromise agreement. The court
further noted that it was only on February 20, 1997, or more than one year from receipt of the judgment on
compromise on October 25, 1995, when he questioned the inclusion of the penalty clause in the approved
compromise agreement despite several opportunities to raise said objection. The dispositive portion of the
said order states:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, and as earlier stated, the defendant’s motion to quash the writ
of execution and modification of judgment is denied.

SO ORDERED.13

On appeal by the petitioner to the Court of Appeals, the latter affirmed the challenged order of the trial
court.

Hence, the instant petition.

Is the petitioner bound by the penalty clause in the compromise agreement?

The settled rule in criminal as well as in civil cases is that, in the matter of credibility of witnesses, the
findings of the trial courts are given great weight and highest degree of respect by the appellate court
considering that the latter is in a better position to decide the question, having heard the witnesses
themselves and observed their deportment and manner of testifying during the trial, unless it plainly
overlooked certain facts of substance and value that, if considered, might affect the result of the case.

In the case at bar, we are faced with the conflicting claim of the petitioner that the questioned penalty
clause was fraudulently added to the compromise agreement approved by the court, and the assertion of
private respondent that the petitioner consented to the inclusion thereof in the compromise agreement. A
scrutiny of the records reveal that the trial court correctly sustained the claim of private respondent. While a
judicial compromise may be annulled or modified on the ground of vitiated consent or forgery, 14 we find that
the testimony of the petitioner failed to establish the attendance of fraud in the instant case. Indeed, the
testimony of Atty. Leonardo Cruz is worthy of belief and credence. We are inclined to believe that the
petitioner had knowledge of and consented to the penalty clause embodied in the agreement considering
that the same is less burdensome than the automatic imposition of the penalty of P250,000.00 and
attorney’s fees of P50,000.00 in case of violation of the terms of the agreement or default in payment.
Moreover, we see nothing irregular in the compromise agreement approved by the trial court. No evidence
was presented by petitioner other than his bare allegation that his former counsel fraudulently attached the
page of the genuine compromise agreement where he affixed his signature to the compromise agreement
submitted to the court.

What further militates against the claim of the petitioner is his conduct after receiving the judgment based
on the compromise agreement. From October 25, 1995, when he received the judgment reproducing the
full text of the compromise agreement, to February 19, 1997, he never raised the issue of the fraudulent
inclusion of the penalty clause in their agreement. We note that petitioner is a doctor of medicine. He must
have read and understood the contents of the judgment on compromise. In fact, on November 13, 1995, he
filed, without the assistance of counsel, a motion praying that the amounts of P50,000.00 and 37,575.00 be
withheld from his total obligation and instead be applied to the expenses for the repair of the leased
premises which was allegedly vandalized by the private respondent.15 He did not question the penalty
clause in the compromise agreement. Even when the petitioner was already represented by his new
counsel, Atty. Felixberto F. Abad, to whom he allegedly confided his former counsel’s fraudulent inclusion
of the penalty clause, the issue of fraud was never brought to the trial court’s attention. On January 31,
1996, when petitioner filed an opposition to the private respondent’s motion for the issuance of a writ of
execution, he likewise failed to mention the fraud complained of. On May 24, 1996, petitioner filed a motion
to quash the writ of execution but based on a different ground. He argued that the penalty of 2% monthly
interest and 25% attorney’s fees cannot be imposed on him considering that his failure to pay on time was
due to the fault of the private respondent. He allegedly refused to pay because the person sent by private
respondent to collect payment did not present a special power of attorney authorizing him to receive said
payment.16 In effect, therefore, petitioner acknowledged the validity of the penalty clause.
Evidently, petitioner cannot feign ignorance of the existence of the penalty clause in the compromise
agreement approved by the court. Even assuming that Atty. Leonardo Cruz exceeded his authority in
inserting the penalty clause, the status of the said clause is not void but merely voidable, i.e., capable of
being ratified.17 Indeed, petitioner’s failure to question the inclusion of the 2% monthly interest and 25%
attorney’s fees in the judicial compromise despite several opportunities to do so was tantamount to
ratification. Hence, he is estopped from assailing the validity thereof.18

Finally, we find no merit in petitioner’s contention that the compromise agreement should be annulled
because Atty. Leonardo Cruz, who assisted him in entering into such agreement, was then an employee of
the Quezon City government, and is thus prohibited from engaging in the private practice of his profession.
Suffice it to state that the isolated assistance provided by Atty. Cruz to the petitioner in entering into a
compromise agreement does not constitute a prohibited "private practice" of law by a public official. "Private
practice" of a profession, specifically the law profession does not pertain to an isolated court appearance;
rather, it contemplates a succession of acts of the same nature habitually or customarily holding one’s self
to the public as a lawyer.19 Such was never established in the instant case.

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 62237, which sustained the trial court’s denial of petitioner’s motion to quash
the writ of execution and to modify the compromise judgment, is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
 FIRST DIVISION

A.C. No. 4219 December 8, 2003

LOTHAR SCHULZ, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. MARCELO G. FLORES, respondent.

RESOLUTION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Only recently, we stressed that membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. A high sense
of morality, honesty and fair dealing is expected and required of a member of the bar. Rule 1.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility provides that "a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct." The nature of the office of a lawyer requires that he shall be of good moral
character. This qualification is not only a condition precedent to the admission to the legal profession, but
its continued possession is essential to maintain one’s good standing in the profession.1 Furthermore,
implicit in a vocation characterized by professionalism is a certain level of competence and dedication. 2 Far
from measuring up to the norms of conduct set in the Code, the respondent charged in this case, in fact,
breached his avowed duty as a lawyer and the ethical standards he was strictly bound to observe.

On March 22, 1994, Lothar Schulz, a German national filed a verified complaint for disbarment against Atty.
Marcelo G. Flores of Dumaguete City, Negros Oriental.3 He alleged that sometime in December 1992, he
engaged the services of respondent for the purposes of filing a complaint against Wilson Ong for revocation
of contract and damages for the latter’s failure to deliver the jeep he sold to complainant within the
stipulated period. Respondent advised him that there was no need to refer the complaint for barangay
conciliation. Three months later, respondent instructed him to file his complaint with the Lupon Tagapayapa
of Tabuc-tubig, Dumaguete City. Wilson Ong refused to appear at the conciliation hearings, arguing that
the Lupon of Tabuc-tubig had no jurisdiction over his person because he was a resident of Barangay
Banilad. Complainant thus brought the complaint before the Barangay Captain of Banilad. By that time,
however, complainant learned that Wilson Ong had already filed a case for Specific Performance against
him before the Regional Trial Court of Negros Oriental, Brang 31, entitled "Rachel Lisa B. Ong, et al. v.
Lothar Schulz," docketed as Civil Case No. 10527. Complainant argued that respondent’s inordinate delay
in acting on his case resulted in his being defendant rather than a complainant against Wilson Ong.

Complainant also charged respondent with collecting excessive and unreasonable fees and of unjustifiably
refusing to return his files. He undertook to pay respondent attorney’s fees of P5,000.00 if the case does
not reach the court, and P10,000.00 attorney’s fees and P500.00 appearance fees if it reaches the court.
This notwithstanding, respondent alleged in the Answer with Counterclaim which he prepared on behalf of
complainant in Civil Case No. 10527 that his attorney’s fees was P50,000.00 and appearance fee was
P1,000.00 per hearing. When complainant questioned him about this, respondent explained that it was
Wilson Ong who will be made to pay for the said fees. This, complainant claimed, showed respondent’s
deceit and lack of candor in his dealings with the parties in court.

Further, complainant alleged that since he suspected respondent of not protecting his interest in Civil Case
No. 10527, he instructed respondent to withdraw his appearance as his counsel after the filing of the
answer. Thereafter, he asked respondent to return the amount of P12,000.00 out of the total of P17,000.00
that he has paid to the latter, inasmuch as the amount of P5,000.00 should be sufficient compensation for
the minimal services rendered by him. Respondent, however, refused to return the amount to complainant
and, instead, demanded additional fees. Complainant’s new counsel wrote a formal demand letter to
respondent which, however, was ignored. This prompted complainant to file a complaint with the Lupon
Tagapayapa of Barangay Bantayan where respondent resided. After the parties failed to reach a
settlement, complainant instituted an action for sum of money against respondent, docketed as Civil Case
No. 10645.

Complainant alleged that respondent offered to return his files provided that he signs a statement
acknowledging that respondent does not owe him anything. Complainant refused, for fear that it would
prejudice the collection suit he filed against respondent. Thus, respondent continued to unreasonably retain
his files.

In support of his charges against respondent, complainant pointed out that respondent was formerly a
Municipal Judge of Siaton, Negros Oriental who was dismissed from the service after the end of the Marcos
regime. He submitted a copy of an Order4 of the Regional Trial Court of Negros Oriental, , Branch 34, in
Civil Case No. 9142 entitled "Bishop of Dumaguete v. Fausta Pajunar, et al." In that case, respondent
sought the inhibition of the Presiding Judge, Rosendo Bandal, Jr. The latter inhibited himself but cited in the
said Order nine instances of anomalous, illegal and unethical practices committed by respondent.

In his Comment,5 respondent alleged that upon accepting the case of complainant, he immediately sent a
letter to Wilson Ong demanding that he deliver the jeep to complainant for road test.6 Ong complied with the
demand and allowed complainant to road-test the vehicle, during which he discovered that the jeep was
defective.7 Respondent thereafter requested Ong to cause the repairs on the jeep. It was only after the
negotiations with Ong failed that he advised complainant to proceed with the filing of his complaint before
the Barangay Captain of Tabuc-tubig. At the time, he believed Tabuc-tubig was the proper venue
considering that the South Pacific Metal Works owned by Wilson Ong was located there.

Respondent claims that complainant was to blame for the fact that Wilson Ong filed his complaint in court
first. He alleged that complainant failed to follow up his case because he was involved in a traffic accident.
Complainant’s inability to attend to his complaint with the Barangay Lupon in Tabuc-tubig caused the delay
thereof.

Anent the attorney’s fees, respondent alleges that complainant agreed to pay him P50,000 as attorney’s
fees, one-half of which is payable upon the filing of the Answer with Counterclaim8 in Civil Case No. 10527
less the amount of P17,000.00 given as payment for past services. Complainant also agreed to pay him
P1,000.00 per appearance. Hence, respondent avers that complainant still owed him P8,000.00 to
complete the required one-half of the P50,000.00 attorney’s fees, and P1,000.00 appearance fee for the
hearing on April 15, 1993. Respondent further explained that he was willing to return complainant’s files
provided that he sign a receipt acknowledging the turn-over, but complainant refused to sign.

Respondent admitted that he was once a Municipal Judge of Siaton, Negros Oriental but he decided to go
on optional retirement. During his 17-year stint in the judiciary, he was held in high esteem by his
colleagues and was elected President of the Municipal Judges League of Negros Oriental for 14
consecutive terms. Out of the 15 RTC Judges in Negros Oriental, it is only Judge Bandal who had shown
animosity, hostility and hatred towards him. However, he added that he and Judge Bandal have reconciled
and are now on good terms.

On August 29, 1994, the Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation.9

On August 9, 2002, respondent filed a Manifestation and Motion alleging that complainant had long left the
country, for which reason the case may be resolved on the basis of the pleadings.10

The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline submitted a Report dated June 28, 2003 recommending that: (1)
respondent be suspended from the practice of law for six months with a warning that a repetition of the
same or similar acts will merit a more severe penalty; (2) he be ordered to return to complainant the
amount of Twelve Thousand Pesos (P12,000.00) with legal interest; and (3) he return the papers of
complainant which came under his custody during the period of his engagement as counsel.

In justifying the recommended penalty, the IBP-CBD made the following observations:

[Respondent] was presumed to be knowledgeable on the laws, but in this case, it turned out that Atty.
Flores knew too little of the provisions and application of PD No. 1508 which mandates that all disputes,
except those specifically cited (the dispute between Lothar Schulz and Wilson Ong not included), between
and among residents of the same city or municipality should be brought first under the system of barangay
conciliation before recourse to the court can be allowed.
He was not all certain if the complaint of Lothar Schulz falls under PD No. 1508 or not. As Lothar Schulz
narrated, Atty. Flores told him at first that there was no need for his complaint to be coursed through the
barangay authorities.

Not realizing the need and urgency to avail of PD No. 1508, Atty. Flores found it more important to spend
more than two months to dialogue and confer with Wilson and hope that he could get the parties to come to
an amicable settlement of their differences, an undertaking that only involves a waste of time and effort as
he later realized it because it turned out that Wilson Ong did not appear to have any genuine intent to make
good his obligation to put the jeep in good running condition and fee from defects because Lothar Schulz
and his mechanics found out from the result of the last road test on the jeep that aside from several defects
discovered during previous road tests and which had remained uncorrected/unrepaired, there are twenty-
six more new defects.

It was already March 8, 1992, more than two months after becoming Lothar Schulz’s lawyer that Atty.
Flores reversed position and suddenly prepared a written complaint for the client which he asked the latter
to file with the Barangay Captain of Tabuc-tubig. However, that belated move did not benefit the cause of
his client at all. On the contrary, Atty. Flores even made the problem of delay worse. Upon the
misconception that the proper venue was Tabuc-tubig which was the place where the assembly/motor shop
of Wilson Ong is located, he directed Lothar Schulz to file his complaint there. That was a wrong advice.
Section 3 of PD No. 1508 states that the dispute should be lodged for conciliation with the barangay where
the respondent actually resides. Because PD No. 1508 applies only to parties who are natural persons, the
location of the assembly should of Wilson Ong is of no consequence to the law. The respondent who could
be made a party under PD No. 1508 in this case is Wilson Ong and the complaint against him must be filed
where he resides which is Barangay Banilad in Dumaguete City. Thus, the complaint of Lothar Schulz was
not able to move at all for the entire duration that it was in Barangay Tabuc-tubig which had no authority
over it. Such was the situation until that barangay was impelled to dismiss the complaint for lack of
jurisdiction. It is true that the complaint was eventually brought to the proper barangay (Banilad), but the
Lupon in that place was no longer in a position to assert its jurisdiction because at that time there was
already a case that Wilson Ong had succeeded to file against Lothar Schulz on the subject of their failed
contract.

xxx xxx x x x.

Between the conflicting versions given by the parties as to the reason why the papers of Lothar Schulz had
continued to be possessed by Atty. Flores, the version of the complainant appears more deserving of
credence. If the paper which was presented for the signature of Lothar Schulz is really an acknowledgment
to evidence the return of the papers of the case to Lothar Schulz, as the respondent would have it appear,
there is no reason why Lothar Schulz [should] hesitate or refuse to sign the paper[s] as there is nothing
prejudicial to his interest. But certainly if the contents of the paper presented by Atty. Flores to Lothar
Schulz for the purpose of signature involve[s] an admission on the part of Lothar Schulz that the lawyer is
clear on the matter of money accountability, it is understandable that Lothar Schulz will not sign that paper
because his signature will have the effect of a desistance in his pending civil case for the recovery of the
P12,000.00 which he alleged to be an overcharge on attorney’s fee[s] by Atty. Flores. The continuing
possession by Atty. Flores of the papers of Lothar Schulz can only be compatible with the version that
Lothar Schulz presented. Atty. Flores would not release the papers for they serve as means to harass
and/or pressure Lothar Schulz until the latter is impelled to agree to give up his efforts to pursue Civil Case
No. 10645 which will provide Atty. Flores the assurance that a day may come when he will be made to
reimburse the amount of P12,000.00 previously collected from the former client.11

The findings and recommendation of the IBP-CBD were thereafter approved and adopted by the IBP Board
of Governors in Resolution No. XVI-2003-109 dated August 30, 2003.

We agree with the findings and conclusions of the Committee on Bar Discipline, as approved by the IBP
Board of Governors. The breach of respondent’s sworn duty as a lawyer and of the ethical standards he
was strictly to honor and observe has been sufficiently established.

Respondent has fallen short of the competence and diligence required of every member of the
Bar.1âwphi1 The pertinent Canons of the Code of Professional Responsibility state:
CANON 17. – A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND HE SHALL BE
MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM.

CANON 18. – A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE

xxx xxx xxx

Rule 18.03 – A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in connection
therewith shall render him liable.

It is dismaying to note that respondent patently violated his duty as a lawyer in this case. He committed a
serious transgression when he failed to exert his utmost learning and ability to give entire devotion to his
client’s cause. His client had relied upon him to file the complaint with dispatch so that he would not be
preempted by the adverse party. But he failed him. As a consequence of respondent’s indolence, his client
was haled to court as a party-defendant. It therefore behooves this Court to wield its corrective hand on this
inexcusable infraction which caused undeserved and needless prejudice to his client’s interest, adversely
affected the confidence of the community in the legal profession and eroded the public’s trust in the judicial
system. As an attorney, respondent is sworn to do his level best and to observe full fidelity to the court and
his clients.12

The Court has time and again emphatically stated that the trust and confidence necessarily reposed by
clients requires in the lawyer a high standard and an appreciation of his duty to his clients, his profession,
the courts and the public.13 Every case an attorney accepts deserves his full attention, diligence, skill and
competence, regardless of its importance and whether he accepts it for a fee or for free.14 To be sure, any
member of the legal fraternity worth his title cannot afford to practice the profession in a lackadaisical
manner.

Likewise, respondent erred in not returning complainant’s money despite demands after his failure to file
the case and his devious act of compelling complainant to sign a document stating that he has no financial
obligation to complainant in exchange of the return of complainant’s papers. This conduct violated the
following Canon:

CANON 15. – A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE CANDOR, FAIRNESS, AND LOYALTY IN ALL HIS
DEALINGS AND TRANSACTIONS WITH HIS CLIENT.

Rule 16.03. – A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of client when due or upon demand. x x x.

Where a client gives money to his lawyer for a specific purpose, such as to file an action, appeal an
adverse judgment, consummate a settlement, or pay the purchase price of a parcel of land, the lawyer
should, upon failure to take such step and spend the money for it, immediately return the money to his
client.15 The fact that a lawyer has a lien for his attorney’s fees on the money in his hands collected for his
client does not relieve him from the obligation to make a prompt accounting.16 Neither is a lawyer entitled to
unilaterally appropriate his client’s money for himself by the mere fact alone that the client owes him
attorney’s fees.17

The failure of an attorney to return the client’s money upon demand gives rise to the presumption that he
has misappropriated it for his own use to the prejudice and violation of the trust reposed in him by the
client.18 It is not only a gross violation of the general morality as well as of professional ethics; it also impairs
public confidence in the legal profession and deserves punishment.19 In short, it is settled that the
unjustified withholding of money belonging to his client, as in this case, warrants the imposition of
disciplinary action.20

A lawyer must conduct himself, especially in his dealings with his clients, with integrity in a manner that is
beyond reproach. His relationship with his clients should be characterized by the highest degree of good
faith and fairness.21
Therefore, we agree with the evaluation of the IBP-CBD and find that respondent’s acts warrant the
imposition of disciplinary sanctions against him. The recommended penalty of six months suspension from
the practice of law is well-taken.1âwphi1

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, respondent Atty. MARCELO G. FLORES is found guilty of
negligence and incompetence, and is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months
effective immediately. He is ordered to RETURN to complainant Lothar Schulz the amount of Twelve
Thousand Pesos (P12,000.00) with legal interest from the date of promulgation of this Resolution, and all
papers which came into his custody as a result of having served as counsel for said complainant.
Respondent is further STERNLY WARNED that a commission of the same or similar act in the future will
be dealt with more severely.

Let copies of this Resolution be entered in the record of respondent and served on the IBP, as well as on
the Court Administrator who shall circulate it to all courts for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.
 EN BANC

A.C. No. 6705 March 31, 2006

RUTHIE LIM-SANTIAGO, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. CARLOS B. SAGUCIO, Respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This is a disbarment complaint against Atty. Carlos B. Sagucio for violating Rule 15.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and for defying the prohibition against private practice of law while working as
government prosecutor.

The Facts

Ruthie Lim-Santiago ("complainant") is the daughter of Alfonso Lim and Special Administratrix of his
estate. 1 Alfonso Lim is a stockholder and the former President of Taggat Industries, Inc. 2

Atty. Carlos B. Sagucio ("respondent") was the former Personnel Manager and Retained Counsel of Taggat
Industries, Inc. 3 until his appointment as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Tuguegarao, Cagayan in
1992. 4

Taggat Industries, Inc. ("Taggat") is a domestic corporation engaged in the operation of timber concessions
from the government. The Presidential Commission on Good Government sequestered it sometime in
1986, 5 and its operations ceased in 1997. 6

Sometime in July 1997, 21 employees of Taggat ("Taggat employees") filed a criminal complaint entitled
"Jesus Tagorda, Jr. et al. v. Ruthie Lim-Santiago," docketed as I.S. No. 97-240 ("criminal
complaint"). 7 Taggat employees alleged that complainant, who took over the management and control of
Taggat after the death of her father, withheld payment of their salaries and wages without valid cause from
1 April 1996 to 15 July 1997. 8

Respondent, as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, was assigned to conduct the preliminary

investigation. 9 He resolved the criminal complaint by recommending the filing of 651 Informations 10
for
violation of Article 288 11 in relation to Article 116 12 of the Labor Code of the Philippines. 13

Complainant now charges respondent with the following violations:

1. Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility

Complainant contends that respondent is guilty of representing conflicting interests. Respondent, being the
former Personnel Manager and Retained Counsel of Taggat, knew the operations of Taggat very well.
Respondent should have inhibited himself from hearing, investigating and deciding the case filed by Taggat
employees. 14 Furthermore, complainant claims that respondent instigated the filing of the cases and even
harassed and threatened Taggat employees to accede and sign an affidavit to support the complaint. 15

2. Engaging in the private practice of law while working as a government prosecutor

Complainant also contends that respondent is guilty of engaging in the private practice of law while working
as a government prosecutor. Complainant presented evidence to prove that respondent received P10,000
as retainer’s fee for the months of January and February 1995, 16 another P10,000 for the months of April
and May 1995, 17 and P5,000 for the month of April 1996. 18
Complainant seeks the disbarment of respondent for violating Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and for defying the prohibition against private practice of law while working as government
prosecutor.

Respondent refutes complainant’s allegations and counters that complainant was merely aggrieved by the
resolution of the criminal complaint which was adverse and contrary to her expectation. 19

Respondent claims that when the criminal complaint was filed, respondent had resigned from Taggat for
more than five years. 20 Respondent asserts that he no longer owed his undivided loyalty to
Taggat. 21 Respondent argues that it was his sworn duty to conduct the necessary preliminary
investigation. 22 Respondent contends that complainant failed to establish lack of impartiality when he
performed his duty. 23 Respondent points out that complainant did not file a motion to inhibit respondent
from hearing the criminal complaint 24 but instead complainant voluntarily executed and filed her counter-
affidavit without mental reservation. 25

Respondent states that complainant’s reason in not filing a motion to inhibit was her impression that
respondent would exonerate her from the charges filed as gleaned from complainant’s statement during the
hearing conducted on 12 February 1999:

xxx

Q. (Atty. Dabu). What do you mean you didn’t think he would do it, Madam Witness?

A. Because he is supposed to be my father’s friend and he was working with my Dad and he was supposed
to be trusted by my father. And he came to me and told me he gonna help me. x x x. 26

Respondent also asserts that no conflicting interests exist because he was not representing Taggat
employees or complainant. Respondent claims he was merely performing his official duty as Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor. 27 Respondent argues that complainant failed to establish that respondent’s act was
tainted with personal interest, malice and bad faith. 28

Respondent denies complainant’s allegations that he instigated the filing of the cases, threatened and
harassed Taggat employees. Respondent claims that this accusation is bereft of proof because
complainant failed to mention the names of the employees or present them for cross-examination. 29

Respondent does not dispute his receipt, after his appointment as government prosecutor, of retainer fees
from complainant but claims that it

was only on a case-to-case basis and it ceased in 1996. 30 Respondent contends that the fees were paid
for his consultancy services and not for representation. Respondent submits that consultation is not the
same as representation and that rendering consultancy services is not prohibited. 31 Respondent, in his
Reply-Memorandum, states:

x x x [I]f ever Taggat paid him certain amounts, these were paid voluntarily by Taggat without the
respondent’s asking, intended as token consultancy fees on a case-to-case basis and not as or for retainer
fees. These payments do not at all show or translate as a specie of ‘conflict of interest’. Moreover, these
consultations had no relation to, or connection with, the above-mentioned labor complaints filed by former
Taggat employees. 32

Respondent insists that complainant’s evidence failed to prove that when the criminal complaint was filed
with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Cagayan, respondent was still the retained counsel or legal
consultant. 33

While this disbarment case was pending, the Resolution and Order issued by respondent to file 651
Informations against complainant was reversed and set aside by Regional State Prosecutor of Cagayan
Rodolfo B. Cadelina last 4 January 1999. 34 Hence, the criminal complaint was dismissed. 35

The IBP’s Report and Recommendation

The Integrated Bar of the Philippines’ Investigating Commissioner Ma. Carmina M. Alejandro-Abbas ("IBP
Commissioner Abbas") heard the case 36 and allowed the parties to submit their respective
memoranda. 37 Due to IBP Commissioner Abbas’ resignation, the case was reassigned to Commissioner
Dennis A.B. Funa ("IBP Commissioner Funa"). 38

After the parties filed their memoranda and motion to resolve the case, the IBP Board of Governors issued
Resolution No. XVI-2004-479 ("IBP Resolution") dated 4 November 2004 adopting with modification 39 IBP
Commissioner Funa’s Report and Recommendation ("Report") finding respondent guilty of conflict of
interests, failure to safeguard a former client’s interest, and violating the prohibition against the private
practice of law while being a government prosecutor. The IBP Board of Governors recommended the
imposition of a penalty of three years suspension from the practice of law. The Report reads:

Now the issue here is whether being a former lawyer of Taggat conflicts with his role as Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor in deciding I.S. No. 97-240. A determination of this issue will require the test of
whether the matter in I.S. No. 97-240 will conflict with his former position of Personnel Manager and Legal
Counsel of Taggat.

I.S. No. 97-240 was filed for "Violation of Labor Code" (see Resolution of the Provincial Prosecutors Office,
Annex "B" of Complaint). Herein Complainant, Ruthie Lim-Santiago, was being accused as having
the "management and control" of Taggat (p. 2, Resolution of the Prov. Pros. Office, supra).

Clearly, as a former Personnel Manager and Legal Counsel of Taggat, herein Respondent
undoubtedly handled the personnel and labor concerns of Taggat. Respondent, undoubtedly dealt with and
related with the employees of Taggat. Therefore, Respondent undoubtedly dealt with and related with
complainants in I.S. No. 97-240. The issues, therefore, in I.S. No. 97-240, are very much familiar with
Respondent. While the issues of unpaid salaries pertain to the periods 1996-1997, the mechanics and
personalities in that case are very much familiar with Respondent.

A lawyer owes something to a former client. Herein Respondent owes to Taggat, a former client, the
duty to "maintain inviolate the client’s confidence or to refrain from doing anything which will injuriously
affect him in any matter in which he previously represented him" (Natam v. Capule, 91 Phil. 640; p. 231,
Agpalo, Legal Ethics, 4th ed.)

Respondent argues that as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, he does not represent any client or any interest
except justice. It should not be forgotten, however, that a lawyer has an immutable duty to a former
client with respect to matters that he previously handled for that former client. In this case, matters relating
to personnel, labor policies, and labor relations that he previously handled as Personnel Manager and
Legal Counsel of Taggat. I.S. No. 97-240 was for "Violation of the Labor Code." Here lies the conflict.
Perhaps it would have been different had I.S. No. 97-240 not been labor-related, or if Respondent had not
been a Personnel Manager concurrently as Legal Counsel. But as it is, I.S. No. 97-240 is labor-related and
Respondent was a former Personnel Manager of Taggat.

xxxx

While Respondent ceased his relations with Taggat in 1992 and the unpaid salaries being sought in I.S.
No. 97-240 were of the years 1996 and 1997, the employees and management involved are the very
personalities he dealt with as Personnel Manager and Legal Counsel of Taggat. Respondent dealt
with these persons in his fiduciary relations with Taggat. Moreover, he was an employee of the corporation
and part of its management.

xxxx

As to the propriety of receiving "Retainer Fees" or "consultancy fees" from herein Complainant while being
an Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, and for rendering legal consultancy work while being an Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor, this matter had long been settled. Government prosecutors are prohibited to
engage in the private practice of law (see Legal and Judicial Ethics, Ernesto Pineda, 1994 ed., p.
20; People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109; Aquino v. Blanco 70 Phil. 647). The act of being a legal consultant
is a practice of law. To engage in the practice of law is to do any of those acts that are characteristic of the
legal profession (In re: David, 93 Phil. 461). It covers any activity, in or out of court, which required the
application of law, legal principles, practice or procedures and calls for legal knowledge, training and
experience (PLA v. Agrava, 105 Phil. 173; People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 111; Cayetano v. Monsod, 201
SCRA 210).

Respondent clearly violated this prohibition.

As for the secondary accusations of harassing certain employees of Taggat and instigating the filing of
criminal complaints, we find the evidence insufficient.

Accordingly, Respondent should be found guilty of conflict of interest, failure to safeguard a former client’s
interest, and violating the prohibition against the private practice of law while being a government
prosecutor. 40

The IBP Board of Governors forwarded the Report to the Court as provided under Section 12(b), Rule 139-
B 41 of the Rules of Court.

The Ruling of the Court

The Court exonerates respondent from the charge of violation of Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility ("Code"). However, the Court finds respondent liable for violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility against unlawful conduct. 42 Respondent committed unlawful
conduct when he violated Section 7(b)(2) of the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials
and Employees or Republic Act No. 6713 ("RA 6713").

Canon 6 provides that the Code "shall apply to lawyers in government service in the discharge of their
official duties." 43 A government lawyer is thus bound by the prohibition "not [to] represent conflicting
interests." 44 However, this rule is subject to certain limitations. The prohibition to represent conflicting
interests does not apply when no conflict of interest exists, when a written consent of all concerned is given
after a full disclosure of the facts or when no true attorney-client relationship exists. 45 Moreover,
considering the serious consequence of the disbarment or suspension of a member of the Bar, clear
preponderant evidence is necessary to justify the imposition of the administrative penalty. 46

Respondent is also mandated under Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 not to engage in "unlawful x x x conduct."
Unlawful conduct includes violation of the statutory prohibition on a government employee to "engage in the
private practice of [his] profession unless authorized by the Constitution or law, provided, that such practice
will not conflict or tend to conflict with [his] official functions." 47

Complainant’s evidence failed to substantiate the claim that respondent represented conflicting interests

In Quiambao v. Bamba, 48 the Court enumerated various tests to determine conflict of interests. One test of
inconsistency of interests is whether the lawyer will be asked to use against his former client any
confidential information acquired through their connection or previous employment. 49 In essence, what a
lawyer owes his former client is to maintain inviolate the client’s confidence or to refrain from doing anything
which will injuriously affect him in any matter in which he previously represented him. 50

In the present case, we find no conflict of interests when respondent handled the preliminary investigation
of the criminal complaint filed by Taggat employees in 1997. The issue in the criminal complaint pertains to
non-payment of wages that occurred from 1 April 1996 to 15 July 1997. Clearly, respondent was no longer
connected with Taggat during that period since he resigned sometime in 1992.

In order to charge respondent for representing conflicting interests, evidence must be presented to prove
that respondent used against Taggat, his former client, any confidential information acquired through his
previous employment. The only established participation respondent had with respect to the criminal
complaint is that he was the one who conducted the preliminary investigation. On that basis alone, it does
not necessarily follow that respondent used any confidential information from his previous employment with
complainant or Taggat in resolving the criminal complaint.
The fact alone that respondent was the former Personnel Manager and Retained Counsel of Taggat and
the case he resolved as government prosecutor was labor-related is not a sufficient basis to charge
respondent for representing conflicting interests. A lawyer’s immutable duty to a former client does not
cover transactions that occurred beyond the lawyer’s employment with the client. The intent of the law is to
impose upon the lawyer the duty to protect the client’s interests only on matters that he previously handled
for the former client and not for matters that arose after the lawyer-client relationship has terminated.

Further, complainant failed to present a single iota of evidence to prove her allegations. Thus, respondent
is not guilty of violating Rule 15.03 of the Code.

Respondent engaged in the private practice of law while working as a government prosecutor

The Court has defined the practice of law broadly as –

x x x any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge,
training and experience. "To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are characteristics
of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice or render any kind of service, which device or
service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill." 51

"Private practice of law" contemplates a succession of acts of the same nature habitually or customarily
holding one’s self to the public as a lawyer. 52

Respondent argues that he only rendered consultancy services to Taggat intermittently and he was not a
retained counsel of Taggat from 1995 to 1996 as alleged. This argument is without merit because the law
does not distinguish between consultancy services and retainer agreement. For as long as respondent
performed acts that are usually rendered by lawyers with the use of their legal knowledge, the same falls
within the ambit of the term "practice of law."

Nonetheless, respondent admitted that he rendered his legal services to complainant while working as a
government prosecutor. Even the receipts he signed stated that the payments by Taggat were for
"Retainer’s fee." 53 Thus, as correctly pointed out by complainant, respondent clearly violated the prohibition
in RA 6713.

However, violations of RA 6713 are not subject to disciplinary action under the Code of Professional
Responsibility unless the violations also constitute infractions of specific provisions of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Certainly, the IBP has no jurisdiction to investigate violations of RA 6713 – the
Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees – unless the acts involved also
transgress provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Here, respondent’s violation of RA 6713 also constitutes a violation of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, which
mandates that "[a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct."
Respondent’s admission that he received from Taggat fees for legal services while serving as a
government prosecutor is an unlawful conduct, which constitutes a violation of Rule 1.01.

Respondent admitted that complainant also charged him with unlawful conduct when respondent stated in
his Demurrer to Evidence:

In this instant case, the complainant prays that the respondent be permanently and indefinitely suspended
or disbarred from the practice of the law profession and his name removed from the Roll of Attorneys on
the following grounds:

xxxx

d) that respondent manifested gross misconduct and gross violation of his oath of office and in his dealings
with the public. 54

On the Appropriate Penalty on Respondent

The appropriate penalty on an errant lawyer depends on the exercise of sound judicial discretion based on
the surrounding facts. 55

Under Civil Service Law and rules, the penalty for government employees engaging in unauthorized private
practice of profession is suspension for six months and one day to one year. 56 We find this penalty
appropriate for respondent’s violation in this case of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.

WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. Carlos B. Sagucio GUILTY of violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, we SUSPEND respondent Atty. Carlos B. Sagucio
from the practice of law for SIX MONTHS effective upon finality of this Decision.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to respondent’s
personal record as an attorney, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Department of Justice, and all
courts in the country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

A.C. No. 5095 November 28, 2007

FATHER RANHILIO C. AQUINO, LINA M. GARAN, ESTRELLA C. LOZADA, POLICARPIO L.

MABBORANG, DEXTER R. MUNAR, MONICO U. TENEDRO, ANDY R. QUEBRAL, NESTOR T.
RIVERA, EDUARDO C. RICAMORA, ARTHUR G. IBAÑEZ, AURELIO C. CALDEZ and DENU A.
AGATEP, complainants,
vs.
ATTY. EDWIN PASCUA, respondent.

DECISION

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

For our resolution is the letter-complaint dated August 3, 1999 of Father Ranhilio C. Aquino, then Academic
Head of the Philippine Judicial Academy, joined by Lina M. Garan and the other above-named
complainants, against Atty. Edwin Pascua, a Notary Public in Cagayan.

In his letter-complaint, Father Aquino alleged that Atty. Pascua falsified two documents committed as
follows:

(1) He made it appear that he had notarized the "Affidavit-Complaint" of one Joseph B. Acorda
entering the same as "Doc. No. 1213, Page No. 243, Book III, Series of 1998, dated December 10,
1998".

(2) He also made it appear that he had notarized the "Affidavit-Complaint" of one Remigio B.
Domingo entering the same as "Doc. No. 1214, Page 243, Book III, Series of 1998, dated
December 10, 1998.

Father Aquino further alleged that on June 23 and July 26, 1999, Atty. Angel Beltran, Clerk of Court,
Regional Trial Court, Tuguegarao, certified that none of the above entries appear in the Notarial Register of
Atty. Pascua; that the last entry therein was Document No. 1200 executed on December 28, 1998; and
that, therefore, he could not have notarized Documents Nos. 1213 and 1214 on December 10, 1998.

In his comment on the letter-complaint dated September 4, 1999, Atty. Pascua admitted having notarized
the two documents on December 10, 1998, but they were not entered in his Notarial Register due to the
oversight of his legal secretary, Lyn Elsie C. Patli, whose affidavit was attached to his comment.

The affidavit-complaints referred to in the notarized documents were filed by Atty. Pascua with the Civil
Service Commission. Impleaded as respondents therein were Lina M. Garan and the other above-named
complainants. They filed with this Court a "Motion to Join the Complaint and Reply to Respondent's
Comment." They maintain that Atty. Pascua's omission was not due to inadvertence but a clear case of
falsification.1 On November 16, 1999, we granted their motion.2

Thereafter, we referred the case to the Office of the Bar Confidant for investigation, report and
recommendation.

On April 21, 2003, the Office of the Bar Confidant issued its Report and Recommendation partly
reproduced as follows:

A notarial document is by law entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. For this reason, notaries
public must observe the utmost care to comply with the formalities and the basic requirement in the
performance of their duties (Realino v. Villamor, 87 SCRA 318).
Under the notarial law, "the notary public shall enter in such register, in chronological order, the
nature of each instrument executed, sworn to, or acknowledged before him, the person executing,
swearing to, or acknowledging the instrument, xxx xxx. The notary shall give to each instrument
executed, sworn to, or acknowledged before him a number corresponding to the one in his register,
and shall also state on the instrument the page or pages of his register on which the same is
recorded. No blank line shall be left between entries" (Sec. 246, Article V, Title IV, Chapter II of the
Revised Administrative Code).

Failure of the notary to make the proper entry or entries in his notarial register touching his notarial
acts in the manner required by law is a ground for revocation of his commission (Sec. 249, Article
VI).

In the instant case, there is no question that the subject documents allegedly notarized by Atty.
Pascua were not recorded in his notarial register.

Atty. Pascua claims that the omission was not intentional but due to oversight of his staff. Whichever
is the case, Atty. Pascua cannot escape liability. His failure to enter into his notarial register the
documents that he admittedly notarized is a dereliction of duty on his part as a notary public and he
is bound by the acts of his staff.

The claim of Atty. Pascua that it was simple inadvertence is far from true.

The photocopy of his notarial register shows that the last entry which he notarized on December 28,
1998 is Document No. 1200 on Page 240. On the other hand, the two affidavit-complaints allegedly
notarized on December 10, 1998 are Document Nos. 1213 and 1214, respectively, under Page No.
243, Book III. Thus, Fr. Ranhilio and the other complainants are, therefore, correct in maintaining
that Atty. Pascua falsely assigned fictitious numbers to the questioned affidavit-complaints, a clear
dishonesty on his part not only as a Notary Public, but also as a member of the Bar.

This is not to mention that the only supporting evidence of the claim of inadvertence by Atty. Pascua
is the affidavit of his own secretary which is hardly credible since the latter cannot be considered a
disinterested witness or party.

Noteworthy also is the fact that the questioned affidavit of Acorda (Doc. No. 1213) was submitted
only when Domingo's affidavit (Doc. No. 1214) was withdrawn in the administrative case filed by
Atty. Pascua against Lina Garan, et al. with the CSC. This circumstance lends credence to the
submission of herein complainants that Atty. Pascua ante-dated another affidavit-complaint making
it appear as notarized on December 10, 1998 and entered as Document No. 1213. It may not be
sheer coincidence then that both documents are dated December 10, 1998 and numbered as 1213
and 1214.

A member of the legal fraternity should refrain from doing any act which might lessen in any degree
the confidence and trust reposed by the public in the fidelity, honesty and integrity of the legal
profession (Maligsa v. Cabanting, 272 SCRA 409).

As a lawyer commissioned to be a notary public, Atty. Pascua is mandated to subscribe to the

sacred duties appertaining to his office, such duties being dictated by public policy and impressed
with public interest.

A member of the Bar may be disciplined or disbarred for any misconduct in his professional
or private capacity. The Court has invariably imposed a penalty for notaries public who were found
guilty of dishonesty or misconduct in the performance of their duties.

In Villarin v. Sabate, Jr. (325 SCRA 123), respondent lawyer was suspended from his Commission
as Notary Public for a period of one year for notarizing a document without affiants appearing before
him, and for notarizing the same instrument of which he was one of the signatories. The Court held
that respondent lawyer failed to exercise due diligence in upholding his duties as a notary public.
 In Arrieta v. Llosa (282 SCRA 248), respondent lawyer who certified under oath a Deed of Absolute
Sale knowing that some of the vendors were dead was suspended from the practice of law for a
period of six (6) months, with a warning that another infraction would be dealt with more severely. In
said case, the Court did not impose the supreme penalty of disbarment, it being the respondent's
first offense.

In Maligsa v. Cabanting (272 SCRA 409), respondent lawyer was disbarred from the practice of law,
after being found guilty of notarizing a fictitious or spurious document. The Court considered the
seriousness of the offense and his previous misconduct for which he was suspended for six months
from the practice of law.

It appearing that this is the first offense of Atty. Pascua, a suspension from the practice of law for a
period of six (6) months may be considered enough penalty for him as a lawyer. Considering that
his offense is also a ground for revocation of notarial commission, the same should also be imposed
upon him.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, it is most respectfully recommended that the notarial commission of

Atty. EDWIN V. PASCUA, if still existing, be REVOKED and that he be SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for a period of six (6) months."3

After a close review of the records of this case, we resolve to adopt the findings of facts and conclusion of
law by the Office of the Bar Confidant. We find Atty. Pascua guilty of misconduct in the performance of his
duties for failing to register in his Notarial Register the affidavit-complaints of Joseph B. Acorda and
Remigio B. Domingo.

"Misconduct" generally means wrongful, improper or unlawful conduct motivated by a premeditated,

obstinate or intentional purpose.4 The term, however, does not necessarily imply corruption or criminal
intent.5

The penalty to be imposed for such act of misconduct committed by a lawyer is addressed to the sound
discretion of the Court. In Arrieta v. Llosa,6 wherein Atty. Joel A. Llosa notarized a Deed of Absolute Sale
knowing that some of the vendors were already dead, this Court held that such wrongful act "constitutes
misconduct" and thus imposed upon him the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for six months,
this being his first administrative offense. Also, in Vda. de Rosales v. Ramos,7 we revoked the notarial
commission of Atty. Mario G. Ramos and suspended him from the practice of law for six months for
violating the Notarial Law in not registering in his notarial book the Deed of Absolute Sale he notarized.
In Mondejar v. Rubia,8 however, a lesser penalty of one month suspension from the practice of law was
imposed on Atty. Vivian G. Rubia for making a false declaration in the document she notarized.

In the present case, considering that this is Atty. Pascua's first offense, we believe that the imposition of a
three-month suspension from the practice of law upon him is in order. Likewise, since his offense is a
ground for revocation of notarial commission, the same should also be imposed upon him.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Edwin Pascua is declared GUILTY of misconduct and is SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for three (3) months with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar act
will be dealt with more severely. His notarial commission, if still existing, is ordered REVOKED.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

JBC No. 013 August 22, 2007

Re: Non-disclosure Before the Judicial and Bar Council of the Administrative Case Filed Against
Judge Jaime V. Quitain, in His Capacity as the then Asst. Regional Director of the National Police
Commission, Regional Office XI, Davao City.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

Judge Jaime Vega Quitain was appointed Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 10,
Davao City on May 17, 2003.1 Subsequent thereto, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) received
confidential information that administrative and criminal charges were filed against Judge Quitain in his
capacity as then Assistant Regional Director, National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM), Regional Office
11, Davao City, as a result of which he was dismissed from the service per Administrative Order (A.O.) No.
183 dated April 10, 1995.

In the Personal Data Sheet (PDS)2 submitted to the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) on November 26, 2001,
Judge Quitain declared that there were five criminal cases (Criminal Cases Nos. 18438, 18439, 22812,
22813, and 22814) filed against him before the Sandiganbayan, which were all dismissed. No
administrative case was disclosed by Judge Qutain in his PDS.

To confirm the veracity of the information, then Deputy Court Administrator (DCA) Christopher O. Lock
(now Court Administrator) requested from the Sandiganbayan certified copies of the Order(s) dismissing
the criminal cases.3 On even date, letters4 were sent to the NAPOLCOM requesting for certified true copies
of documents relative to the administrative complaints filed against Judge Quitain, particularly A.O. No. 183
dated April 10, 1995 dismissing him from the service. Likewise, DCA Lock required Judge Quitain to
explain the alleged misrepresentation and deception he committed before the JBC.5

In a letter6 dated November 28, 2003, the NAPOLCOM furnished the Office of the Court Administrator
(OCA) a copy of A.O. No. 183 showing that respondent Judge was indeed dismissed from the service for
Grave Misconduct for falsifying or altering the amounts reflected in disbursement vouchers in support of his
claim for reimbursement of expenses. A.O. 183 partly reads:

THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES

ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 183

DISMISSING FROM THE SERVICE ASSISTANT REGIONAL DIRECTOR JAIME VEGA QUITAIN,
NATIONAL POLICE COMMISSION, REGIONAL OFFICE NO. 11

This refers to the administrative complaint against Jaime Vega Quitain, Assistant Regional Director,
National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM), Regional Office No. 11, Davao City, for Grave Misconduct
(Violation of Art. 48, in relation to Arts. 171 and 217 of the Revised Penal Code and Art. IX of the Civil
Service Law) filed by the NAPOLCOM.

xxxx

After circumspect study, I am in complete accord with the above findings and recommendation of the
NAPOLCOM.
It was established that the falsification could not have been consummated without respondent’s direct
participation, as it was upon his direction and approval that disbursement vouchers were prepared showing
the falsified amount. The subsequent endorsement and encashment of the check by respondent only
shows his complete disregard for the truth which per se constitutes misconduct and dishonesty of the
highest order. By any standard, respondent had manifestly shown that he is unfit to discharge the functions
of his office. Needless to stress, a public office is a position of trust and public service demands of every
government official or employee, no matter how lowly his position may be, the highest degree of
responsibility and integrity and he must remain accountable to the people. Moreover, his failure to adduce
evidence in support of his defense is a tacit admission of his guilt. Let this be a final reminder to him that
the government is serious enough to [weed out] misfits in the government service, and it will not be
irresolute to impose the severest sanction regardless of personalities involved. Accordingly, respondent’s
continuance in office becomes untenable.

WHEREFORE, and as recommended by the NAPOLCOM, Assistant Regional Director Jaime Vega Quitain
is hereby DISMISSED from the service, with forfeiture of pay and benefits, effective upon receipt of a copy
hereof.

Done in the City of Manila, this 10th day of April in the year of our Lord, nineteen hundred and ninety-five.

(Sgd. by President Fidel V. Ramos)

By the President:

(Sgd.)
TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR.

Executive Secretary7

In a letter8 dated October 22, 2003 addressed to DCA Lock, Judge Quitain denied having committed any
misrepresentation before the JBC. He alleged that during his interview, the members thereof only inquired
about the status of the criminal cases filed by the NAPOLCOM before the Sandiganbayan, and not about
the administrative case simultaneously filed against him. He also alleged that he never received from the
Office of the President an official copy of A.O. No. 183 dismissing him from the service.

Thereafter, DCA Lock directed Judge Quitain to explain within ten (10) days from notice why he did not
include in his PDS, which was sworn to before a notary public on November 22, 2001, the administrative
case filed against him, and the fact of his dismissal from the service.9

In his letters10 dated March 13, 2004 and June 17, 2004, respondent explained that during the investigation
of his administrative case by the NAPOLCOM Ad Hoc Committee, one of its members suggested to him
that if he resigns from the government service, he will no longer be prosecuted; that following such
suggestion, he tendered his irrevocable resignation from NAPOLCOM on June 1, 199311 which was
immediately accepted by the Secretary of the Department of Interior and Local Governments; that he did
not disclose the case in his PDS because he was of the "honest belief" that he had no more pending
administrative case by reason of his resignation; that his resignation "amounted to an automatic dismissal"
of his administrative case considering that "the issues raised therein became moot and academic"; and that
had he known that he would be dismissed from the service, he should not have applied for the position of a
judge since he knew he would never be appointed.

Finding reasonable ground to hold him administratively liable, then Court Administrator Presbitero J.
Velasco, Jr. (now a member of this Court) and then DCA Lock submitted a Memorandum12 dated
September 3, 2004 to then Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., which states:

In order that this Office may thoroughly and properly evaluate the matter, we deemed it necessary to go
over the records of the subject administrative case against Judge Jaime V. Quitain, particularly the matter
that pertains to Administrative Order No. 183 dated 10 April 1995. On 15 May 2004, we examined the
records of said administrative case on file with the NAPOLCOM, Legal Affairs Service, and secured
certified [true] copies of pertinent documents.
After careful perusal of the documents and records available, including the letters-explanations of Judge
Jaime V. Quitain, this Office finds that there are reasonable grounds to hold him administratively liable.

An examination of the Personal Data Sheet submitted by Judge Quitain with the Judicial and Bar Council,
which was subscribed and sworn to before Notary Public Bibiano M. Bustamante of Davao City on 22
November 2001, reveals that he concealed material facts and even committed perjury in having answered
"yes" to Question No. 24, but without disclosing the fact that he was dismissed from the government
service. Question No. 24 and his answer thereto are hereunder quoted as follows:

24. Have you ever been charged with or convicted of or otherwise imposed a sanction for the violation of
any law, decree, ordinance or regulation by any court, tribunal or any other government office, agency or
instrumentality in the Philippines or in any foreign country or found guilty of an administrative offense or
imposed any administrative sanction? [ / ] Yes [ ] No. If your answer is "Yes" to any of the questions, give
particulars.

But all dismissed (acquitted)

Sandiganbayan Criminal Cases Nos. 18438, 18439

Date of [Dismissal] – August 2, 1995

Sandiganbayan Criminal Cases Nos. 22812, 22813, 22814

Date of [Dismissal] – July 17, 2000

As borne out by the records, Judge Quitain deliberately did not disclose the fact that he was dismissed from
the government service. At the time he filled up and submitted his Personal Data Sheet with the Judicial
and Bar Council, he had full knowledge of the subject administrative case, as well as Administrative Order
No. 183 dismissing him from the government service. Based on the certified documents secured from the
Office of the NAPOLCOM, the following data were gathered:

1. In compliance with the "Summons" dated 19 March 1993, signed by Commissioner Alexis C.
Canonizado, Chairman, Ad Hoc Committee of the NAPOLCOM, Judge Jaime V. Quitain, through
Atty. Pedro S. Castillo, filed his Answer (dated 29 March 1993) to the administrative complaint
lodged against him by the Napolcom;

2. On 30 March 1993, Judge Quitain received a copy of the "Notice of Hearing" of even date, signed
by Mr. Canonizado, in connection with the formal hearing of the subject administrative case
scheduled on 30 April 1993;

3. Administrative Order No. 183, dismissing Judge Quitain from the service, was dated 10 April
1995. On 18 April 1995, newspaper items relative to the dismissal of Judge Quitain were separately
published in the Mindanao Daily Mirror and in the Mindanao Times, the contents of which read as
follows:

Mindanao Times:

Dismissed NAPOLCOM chief airs appeal

Former National Police Commission (Napolcom) acting regional director Jaime Quitain yesterday appealed
for understanding to those allegedly behind his ouster from his post two years ago. Quitain, who was one of
the guests in yesterday’s Kapehan sa Dabaw, wept unabashedly as he read his prepared statement on his
dismissal from government service.

Quitain claimed that after Secretary Luis Santos resigned from the Department of Interior and Local
Governments in 1991, a series of administrative charges were hurled against him by some regional
employees.
"I was dismissed from the Napolcom Office without due process," Quitain said.

He also said he had no idea as to who the people (sic) are behind the alleged smear campaign leveled
against him.

"Whoever is behind all this, I have long forgiven you. My only appeal to you, give me my day in court, give
me the chance to clear my name, the only legacy that I can leave to my children," Quitain said in his
statement.

"It is my constitutional right to be present in all proceedings of the administrative case," he also said.

Quitain was appointed Assistant Regional Director of Napolcom in 1991 by then President Corazon Aquino
upon the recommendation of Secretary Santos. He was later designated Napolcom acting regional director
for Region XI.

Mindanao Daily Mirror:

Quitain vows to clear name

Former assistant regional director Jaime Quitain of the National Police Commission (Napolcom) vowed
yesterday to clear his name in court from charges of tampering with an official receipt.

Quitain[,] who is running for a council seat, expressed confidence that he would soon be vindicated in court
against the group that plotted his ouster from office: He said his only appeal was for Interior and Local
Government Secretary Rafael Alunan to grant him his day in court to answer the charges.

"Whoever was behind all of these things, I have long forgiven them," Quitain said.

"Just give me the chance to clear my name because this is the only legacy that I can give my children,"
Quitain said.

While the records of the subject administrative case on file with the NAPOLCOM Office does not bear proof
of receipt of Administrative Order No. 183 by Judge Quitain, the same does not necessarily mean that he is
totally unaware of said Administrative Order. As shown by the above-quoted newspaper clippings, Judge
Quitain even aired his appeal and protest to said Administrative Order.

xxxx

Judge Quitain asseverated that he should not have applied with the JBC had he known that he was
administratively charged and was consequently dismissed from the service since he will not be considered.
But this may be the reason why he deliberately concealed said fact. His claim that he did not declare the
administrative case in his Personal Data Sheet because of his honest belief that there is no administrative
or criminal case that would be filed against him by reason of his resignation and the assurance made by the
NAPOLCOM that no administrative case will be filed, does not hold water. It is rather absurd for him to
state that his resignation from the NAPOLCOM amounts to an automatic dismissal of whatever
administrative case filed against him because when he resigned and relinquished his position, the issues
raised therein became moot and academic. He claims that he did not bother to follow up the formal
dismissal of the administrative case because of said belief. All these are but futile attempts to exonerate
himself from administrative culpability in concealing facts relevant and material to his application in the
Judiciary. As a member of the Bar, he should know that his resignation from the NAPOLCOM would not
obliterate any administrative liability he may have incurred[,] much less, would it result to the automatic
dismissal of the administrative case filed against him. The acceptance of his resignation is definitely without
prejudice to the continuation of the administrative case filed against him. If such would be the case, anyone
charged administratively could easily escape from administrative sanctions by the simple expedient of
resigning from the service. Had it been true that Judge Quitain honestly believes that his resignation
amounts to the automatic dismissal of his administrative case, the least he could have done was to
personally verify the status thereof. He should not have relied on the alleged assurance made by the
NAPOLCOM.
On the strength of his misrepresentation, Judge Quitain misled the Judicial and Bar Council by making it
appear that he had a clean record and was qualified to join the Judiciary. His prior dismissal from the
government service is a blot on his record, which has gone [worse] and has spread even more because of
his concealment of it. Had he not concealed said vital fact, it could have been taken into consideration
when the Council acted on his application. His act of dishonesty renders him unfit to join the Judiciary,
much less remain sitting as a judge. It even appears that he was dismissed by the NAPOLCOM for
misconduct and dishonesty.

Thus, the OCA recommended that: (1) the instant administrative case against respondent be docketed as
an administrative matter; and (2) that he be dismissed from the service with prejudice to his reappointment
to any position in the government, including government-owned or controlled corporations, and with
forfeiture of all retirement benefits except accrued leave credits.

Respondent was required to Comment.13

In compliance with the Court’s Resolution respondent filed his Comment14 contending that before he filed
his application for RTC Judge with the JBC, he had no knowledge that he was administratively dismissed
from the NAPOLCOM service as the case was "secretly heard and decided." He averred that:

1. Being a religious lay head and eventually the Pastoral Head of the Redemptorist Eucharistic Lay
Ministry in Davao City and the surrounding provinces, he was recruited as one of the political
followers of then Mayor Luis T. Santos of Davao City, who later became the Secretary of the
Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) and was instrumental in his appointment as
Assistant Regional Director of the National Police Commission, Region XI;

2. After Secretary Luis T. Santos was replaced as DILG Secretary, the political followers of his
successor, who were the same followers involved in the chain of corruption prevalent in their
department, began quietly pressing for his (Quitain) resignation as Assistant Regional Director;

3. Finding difficulty in attacking his honesty and personal integrity, his detractors went to the extent
of filing criminal charges against him;

4. Before these criminal charges were scheduled for trial, he was being convinced to resign in
exchange for the dismissal of said criminal charges, but when he refused to do so, he was
unjustifiably detailed or "exiled" at the DILG central office in Manila;

5. Upon his "exile" in Manila for several months, he realized that even his immediate superiors
cooperated with his detractors in instigating for his removal. Hence, upon advice of his relatives,
friends and the heads of their pastoral congregation, he resigned from his position in NAPOLCOM
on condition that all pending cases filed against him, consisting of criminal cases only, shall be
dismissed, as in fact they were dismissed;

6. From then on he was never formally aware of any administrative case filed against him. Hence,
when he submitted his Personal Data Sheet before the Judicial and Bar Council in support of his
application as RTC judge, he made the following answer in Question No. 23:

23. Is there any pending civil, criminal, or administrative (including disbarment) case or
complaint filed against you pending before any court, prosecution office, any other office,
agency or instrumentality of the government, or the Integrated Bar of the Philippines?

He could only give a negative answer since there was no pending administrative case filed against
him that he knows;

7. Had he known that there was an administrative case filed against him he would have desisted
from applying as a judge and would have given his full attention to the said administrative case, if
only to avoid ensuing embarrassment; and
 8. The filing of the administrative case against him as well as the proceedings had thereon and the
decision rendered therein, without his knowledge, could have probably occurred during his "exile
period" when he was detailed indefinitely in Manila. The proceedings had in the said administrative
case are null and void since he was denied due process.

Respondent’s Comment was submitted to the OCA for evaluation, report and recommendation.15

OCA submitted its Memorandum16 dated August 11, 2005 stating therein that it was adopting its earlier
findings contained in its Memorandum dated September 3, 2004. Based on the documents presented, it
can not be denied that at the time Judge Quitain applied as an RTC judge, he had full knowledge of A.O.
No. 183 dismissing him from government service. Considering that Judge Quitain’s explanations in his
Comment are but mere reiterations of his allegations in the previous letters to the OCA, the OCA
maintained its recommendation that Judge Quitain be dismissed from the service with prejudice to his
reappointment to any position in the government, including government-owned or controlled corporations,
and with forfeiture of all retirement benefits except accrued leave credits.

The Court fully agrees with the disquisition and the recommendation of the OCA.

It behooves every prospective appointee to the Judiciary to apprise the appointing authority of every matter
bearing on his fitness for judicial office, including such circumstances as may reflect on his integrity and
probity. These are qualifications specifically required of appointees to the Judiciary by Sec. 7(3), Article VIII
of the Constitution.17

In this case, Judge Quitain failed to disclose that he was administratively charged and dismissed from the
service for grave misconduct per A.O. No. 183 dated April 10, 1995 by no less than the former President of
the Philippines. He insists that on November 26, 2001 or before he filed with the JBC his verified PDS in
support of his application for RTC Judge, he had no knowledge of A.O. No. 183; and that he was denied
due process. He further argues that since all the criminal cases filed against him were dismissed on August
2, 1995 and July 17, 2000, and considering the fact that he resigned from office, his administrative case
had become moot and academic.

Respondent’s contentions utterly lack merit.

No amount of explanation or justification can erase the fact that Judge Quitain was dismissed from the
service and that he deliberately withheld this information. His insistence that he had no knowledge of A.O.
No. 183 is belied by the newspaper items published relative to his dismissal. It bears emphasis that in the
Mindanao Times dated April 18, 1995,18 Judge Quitain stated in one of his interviews that "I was dismissed
from the (Napolcom) office without due process." It also reads: "Quitain, who was one of the guests in
yesterday’s Kapehan sa Dabaw, wept unabashedly as he read his prepared statement on his dismissal
from the government service." Neither can we give credence to the contention that he was denied due
process. The documents submitted by the NAPOLCOM to the OCA reveal that Commissioner Alexis C.
Canonizado, Chairman Ad Hoc Committee, sent him summons on March 19, 1993 informing him that an
administrative complaint had been filed against him and required him to file an answer. 19 Then on March
29, 1993, respondent, through his counsel, Atty. Pedro Castillo, filed an Answer.20 In administrative
proceedings, the essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or an opportunity to explain
one’s side or opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. Where opportunity
to be heard either through oral arguments or through pleadings is accorded, there is no denial of due
process.21 Furthermore, as we have earlier mentioned and which Judge Quitain ought to know, cessation
from office by his resignation does not warrant the dismissal of the administrative complaint filed against
him while he was still in the service nor does it render said administrative case moot and academic.22 Judge
Quitain was removed from office after investigation and was found guilty of grave misconduct. His dismissal
from the service is a clear proof of his lack of the required qualifications to be a member of the Bench.

More importantly, it is clear that Judge Quitain deliberately misled the JBC in his bid to gain an exalted
position in the Judiciary. In Office of the Court Administrator v. Estacion, Jr., 23 this Court stressed:

x x x The important consideration is that he had a duty to inform the appointing authority and this Court of
the pending criminal charges against him to enable them to determine on the basis of his record, eligibility
for the position he was seeking. He did not discharge that duty. His record did not contain the important
information in question because he deliberately withheld and thus effectively hid it. His lack of candor is as
obvious as his reason for the suppression of such a vital fact, which he knew would have been taken into
account against him if it had been disclosed."

Thus, we find respondent guilty of dishonesty. "Dishonesty" means "disposition to lie, cheat or defraud;
unworthiness; lack of integrity."24

Section 8(2), Rule 14025 of the Rules of Court classifies dishonesty as a serious charge. Section 11, same
Rules, provides the following sanctions:

SEC. 11. Sanctions. – A. If the respondent is guilty of a serious charge, any of the following sanctions may
be imposed:

1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may determine, and
disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government-owned
or controlled corporations. Provided, however, That the forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include
accrued leave credits;

2. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3) but not
exceeding six (6) months; or

3. A fine of not less than ₱20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00.

In Re: Inquiry on the Appointment of Judge Enrique A. Cube,26 we held:

By his concealment of his previous dismissal from the public service, which the Judicial and Bar Council
would have taken into consideration in acting on his application, Judge Cube committed an act of
dishonesty that rendered him unfit to be appointed to, and to remain now in, the Judiciary he has tarnished
with his falsehood.

WHEREFORE, Judge Enrique A. Cube of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila is DISMISSED with
prejudice to his reappointment to any position in the government, including government-owned or controlled
corporations, and with forfeiture of all retirement benefits. This decision is immediately executory.

We cannot overemphasize the need for honesty and integrity on the part of all those who are in the service
of the Judiciary.27 We have often stressed that the conduct required of court personnel, from the presiding
judge to the lowliest clerk of court, must always be beyond reproach and circumscribed with the heavy
burden of responsibility as to let them be free from any suspicion that may taint the Judiciary. We condemn,
and will never countenance any conduct, act or omission on the part of all those involved in the
administration of justice, which would violate the norm of public accountability and diminish or even just
tend to diminish the faith of the people in the Judiciary.28lavvphil

Considering the foregoing, Judge Quitain is hereby found guilty of grave misconduct. He deserves the
supreme penalty of dismissal.

However, on August 9, 2007, the Court received a letter from Judge Quitain addressed to the Chief Justice
stating that he is tendering his irrevocable resignation effective immediately as Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 10, Davao City. Acting on said letter, "the Court Resolved to accept the
irrevocable resignation of Judge Jaime V. Quitain effective August 15, 2007, without prejudice to the
decision of the administrative case."29

Verily, the resignation of Judge Quitain which was accepted by the Court without prejudice does not render
moot and academic the instant administrative case. The jurisdiction that the Court had at the time of the
filing of the administrative complaint is not lost by the mere fact that the respondent judge by his resignation
and its consequent acceptance – without prejudice – by this Court, has ceased to be in office during the
pendency of this case. The Court retains its authority to pronounce the respondent official innocent or guilty
of the charges against him. A contrary rule would be fraught with injustice and pregnant with dreadful and
dangerous implications.30 Indeed, if innocent, the respondent official merits vindication of his name and
integrity as he leaves the government which he has served well and faithfully; if guilty, he deserves to
receive the corresponding censure and a penalty proper and imposable under the situation.31

WHEREFORE, in view of our finding that JUDGE JAIME V. QUITAIN is guilty of grave misconduct which
would have warranted his dismissal from the service had he not resigned during the pendency of this case,
he is hereby meted the penalty of a fine of ₱40,000.00. It appearing that he has yet to apply for his
retirement benefits and other privileges, if any, the Court likewise ORDERS the FORFEITURE of all
benefits, except earned leave credits which Judge Quitain may be entitled to, and he is PERPETUALLY
DISQUALIFIED from reinstatement and appointment to any branch, instrumentality or agency of the
government, including government-owned and/or controlled corporations.

This Decision is immediately executory.

Let a copy of this Decision be attached to Judge Jaime V. Quitain’s 201 File.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Baguio City

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 154207 April 27, 2007

FERDINAND A. CRUZ, Petitioner,

vs.
ALBERTO MINA, HON. ELEUTERIO F. GUERRERO and HON. ZENAIDA LAGUILLES, Respondents.

DECISION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Before the Court is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, grounded on pure
questions of law, with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction assailing the Resolution dated May 3, 2002
promulgated by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 116, Pasay City, in Civil Case No. 02-0137, which
denied the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction against the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch
45, Pasay City, in Criminal Case No. 00-1705;1 and the RTC’s Order dated June 5, 2002 denying the
Motion for Reconsideration. No writ of preliminary injunction was issued by this Court.

The antecedents:

On September 25, 2000, Ferdinand A. Cruz (petitioner) filed before the MeTC a formal Entry of
Appearance, as private prosecutor, in Criminal Case No. 00-1705 for Grave Threats, where his father,
Mariano Cruz, is the complaining witness.

The petitioner, describing himself as a third year law student, justifies his appearance as private prosecutor
on the bases of Section 34 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court and the ruling of the Court En Banc
in Cantimbuhan v. Judge Cruz, Jr.2 that a non-lawyer may appear before the inferior courts as an agent or
friend of a party litigant. The petitioner furthermore avers that his appearance was with the prior conformity
of the public prosecutor and a written authority of Mariano Cruz appointing him to be his agent in the
prosecution of the said criminal case.

However, in an Order dated February 1, 2002, the MeTC denied permission for petitioner to appear as
private prosecutor on the ground that Circular No. 19 governing limited law student practice in conjunction
with Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court (Law Student Practice Rule) should take precedence over the ruling
of the Court laid down in Cantimbuhan; and set the case for continuation of trial.3

On February 13, 2002, petitioner filed before the MeTC a Motion for Reconsideration seeking to reverse the
February 1, 2002 Order alleging that Rule 138-A, or the Law Student Practice Rule, does not have the
effect of superseding Section 34 of Rule 138, for the authority to interpret the rule is the source itself of the
rule, which is the Supreme Court alone.

In an Order dated March 4, 2002, the MeTC denied the Motion for Reconsideration.

On April 2, 2002, the petitioner filed before the RTC a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus with Prayer for
Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order against the private respondent and the public
respondent MeTC.

After hearing the prayer for preliminary injunction to restrain public respondent MeTC Judge from
proceeding with Criminal Case No. 00-1705 pending the Certiorari proceedings, the RTC, in a Resolution
dated May 3, 2002, resolved to deny the issuance of an injunctive writ on the ground that the crime of
Grave Threats, the subject of Criminal Case No. 00-1705, is one that can be prosecuted de oficio, there
being no claim for civil indemnity, and that therefore, the intervention of a private prosecutor is not legally
tenable.
On May 9, 2002, the petitioner filed before the RTC a Motion for Reconsideration. The petitioner argues
that nowhere does the law provide that the crime of Grave Threats has no civil aspect. And last, petitioner
cites Bar Matter No. 730 dated June 10, 1997 which expressly provides for the appearance of a non-lawyer
before the inferior courts, as an agent or friend of a party litigant, even without the supervision of a member
of the bar.

Pending the resolution of the foregoing Motion for Reconsideration before the RTC, the petitioner filed a
Second Motion for Reconsideration dated June 7, 2002 with the MeTC seeking the reversal of the March 4,
2002 Denial Order of the said court, on the strength of Bar Matter No. 730, and a Motion to Hold In
Abeyance the Trial dated June 10, 2002 of Criminal Case No. 00-1705 pending the outcome of the
certiorari proceedings before the RTC.

On June 5, 2002, the RTC issued its Order denying the petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.

Likewise, in an Order dated June 13, 2002, the MeTC denied the petitioner’s Second Motion for
Reconsideration and his Motion to Hold in Abeyance the Trial on the ground that the RTC had already
denied the Entry of Appearance of petitioner before the MeTC.

On July 30, 2002, the petitioner directly filed with this Court, the instant Petition and assigns the following
errors:

I.

the respondent regional trial court abused its discretion when it resolved to deny the prayer for the writ of
injunction of the herein petitioner despite petitioner having established the necessity of granting the writ;

II.

THE RESPONDENT TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION, TANTAMOUNT TO IGNORANCE OF

THE LAW, WHEN IT RESOLVED TO DENY THE PRAYER FOR THE WRIT OF PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTION AND THE SUBSEQUENT MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF THE HEREIN
PETITIONER ON THE BASIS THAT [GRAVE] THREATS HAS NO CIVIL ASPECT, FOR THE SAID BASIS
OF DENIAL IS NOT IN ACCORD WITH THE LAW;

III.

THE RESPONDENT METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT DENIED
THE MOTION TO HOLD IN ABEYANCE TRIAL, WHEN WHAT WAS DENIED BY THE RESPONDENT
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT IS THE ISSUANCE OF THE WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION and
WHEN THE RESPONDENT REGIONAL TRIAL COURT IS YET TO DECIDE ON THE MERITS OF THE
PETITION FOR CERTIORARI;

IV.

THE RESPONDENT COURT[s] ARE CLEARLY IGNORING THE LAW WHEN THEY PATENTLY
REFUSED TO HEED TO [sic] THE CLEAR MANDATE OF THE LAPUT, CANTIMBUHAN AND BULACAN
CASES, AS WELL AS BAR MATTER NO. 730, PROVIDING FOR THE APPEARANCE OF NON-
LAWYERS BEFORE THE LOWER COURTS (MTC’S).4

This Court, in exceptional cases, and for compelling reasons, or if warranted by the nature of the issues
reviewed, may take cognizance of petitions filed directly before it. 5

Considering that this case involves the interpretation, clarification, and implementation of Section 34, Rule
138 of the Rules of Court, Bar Matter No. 730, Circular No. 19 governing law student practice and Rule
138-A of the Rules of Court, and the ruling of the Court in Cantimbuhan, the Court takes cognizance of
herein petition.
The basic question is whether the petitioner, a law student, may appear before an inferior court as an agent
or friend of a party litigant.

The courts a quo held that the Law Student Practice Rule as encapsulated in Rule 138-A of the Rules of
Court, prohibits the petitioner, as a law student, from entering his appearance in behalf of his father, the
private complainant in the criminal case without the supervision of an attorney duly accredited by the law
school.

Rule 138-A or the Law Student Practice Rule, provides:

RULE 138-A
LAW STUDENT PRACTICE RULE

Section 1. Conditions for Student Practice. – A law student who has successfully completed his 3rd year of
the regular four-year prescribed law curriculum and is enrolled in a recognized law school's clinical legal
education program approved by the Supreme Court, may appear without compensation in any civil, criminal
or administrative case before any trial court, tribunal, board or officer, to represent indigent clients accepted
by the legal clinic of the law school.

Sec. 2. Appearance. – The appearance of the law student authorized by this rule, shall be under the direct
supervision and control of a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines duly accredited by the law
school. Any and all pleadings, motions, briefs, memoranda or other papers to be filed, must be signed by
the supervising attorney for and in behalf of the legal clinic.

However, in Resolution6 dated June 10, 1997 in Bar Matter No. 730, the Court En Banc clarified:

The rule, however, is different if the law student appears before an inferior court, where the issues and
procedure are relatively simple. In inferior courts, a law student may appear in his personal capacity without
the supervision of a lawyer. Section 34, Rule 138 provides:

Sec. 34. By whom litigation is conducted. - In the court of a justice of the peace, a party may conduct his
litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid of an
attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney, and his
appearance must be either personal or by a duly authorized member of the bar.

Thus, a law student may appear before an inferior court as an agent or friend of a party without the
supervision of a member of the bar.7 (Emphasis supplied)

The phrase "In the court of a justice of the peace" in Bar Matter No. 730 is subsequently changed to "In the
court of a municipality" as it now appears in Section 34 of Rule 138, thus:8

SEC. 34. By whom litigation is conducted. — In the Court of a municipality a party may conduct his litigation
in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid of an
attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney and his
appearance must be either personal or by a duly authorized member of the bar. (Emphasis supplied)

which is the prevailing rule at the time the petitioner filed his Entry of Appearance with the MeTC on
September 25, 2000. No real distinction exists for under Section 6, Rule 5 of the Rules of Court, the term
"Municipal Trial Courts" as used in these Rules shall include Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts in Cities, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts.

There is really no problem as to the application of Section 34 of Rule 138 and Rule 138-A. In the former,
the appearance of a non-lawyer, as an agent or friend of a party litigant, is expressly allowed, while the
latter rule provides for conditions when a law student, not as an agent or a friend of a party litigant, may
appear before the courts.

Petitioner expressly anchored his appearance on Section 34 of Rule 138. The court a quo must have been
confused by the fact that petitioner referred to himself as a law student in his entry of appearance. Rule
138-A should not have been used by the courts a quo in denying permission to act as private prosecutor
against petitioner for the simple reason that Rule 138-A is not the basis for the petitioner’s appearance.

Section 34, Rule 138 is clear that appearance before the inferior courts by a non-lawyer is allowed,
irrespective of whether or not he is a law student. As succinctly clarified in Bar Matter No. 730, by virtue of
Section 34, Rule 138, a law student may appear, as an agent or a friend of a party litigant, without the
supervision of a lawyer before inferior courts.

Petitioner further argues that the RTC erroneously held that, by its very nature, no civil liability may flow
from the crime of Grave Threats, and, for this reason, the intervention of a private prosecutor is not
possible.

It is clear from the RTC Decision that no such conclusion had been intended by the RTC. In denying the
issuance of the injunctive court, the RTC stated in its Decision that there was no claim for civil liability by
the private complainant for damages, and that the records of the case do not provide for a claim for
indemnity; and that therefore, petitioner’s appearance as private prosecutor appears to be legally
untenable.

Under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable
except in instances when no actual damage results from an offense, such as espionage, violation of
neutrality, flight to an enemy country, and crime against popular representation.9 The basic rule applies in
the instant case, such that when a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability
arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with criminal action, unless the offended party
waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the
criminal action.10

The petitioner is correct in stating that there being no reservation, waiver, nor prior institution of the civil
aspect in Criminal Case No. 00-1705, it follows that the civil aspect arising from Grave Threats is deemed
instituted with the criminal action, and, hence, the private prosecutor may rightfully intervene to prosecute
the civil aspect.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolution and Order of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 116, Pasay City are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 45, Pasay
City is DIRECTED to ADMIT the Entry of Appearance of petitioner in Criminal Case No. 00-1705 as a
private prosecutor under the direct control and supervision of the public prosecutor.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

A.M. No. 1928 August 3, 1978

In the Matter of the IBP Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. MARCIAL A. EDILION (IBP
Administrative Case No. MDD-1)

RESOLUTION

CASTRO, C.J.:

The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing attorney in the Philippines.

On November 29, 1975, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP for short) Board of Governors
unanimously adopted Resolution No. 75-65 in Administrative Case No. MDD-1 (In the Matter of the
Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. Marcial A. Edillon) recommending to the Court the removal of the
name of the respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for "stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues" to the
IBP since the latter's constitution notwithstanding due notice.

On January 21, 1976, the IBP, through its then President Liliano B. Neri, submitted the said resolution to
the Court for consideration and approval, pursuant to paragraph 2, Section 24, Article III of the By-Laws of
the IBP, which reads:

.... Should the delinquency further continue until the following June 29, the Board shall
promptly inquire into the cause or causes of the continued delinquency and take whatever
action it shall deem appropriate, including a recommendation to the Supreme Court for the
removal of the delinquent member's name from the Roll of Attorneys. Notice of the action
taken shall be sent by registered mail to the member and to the Secretary of the Chapter
concerned.

On January 27, 1976, the Court required the respondent to comment on the resolution and letter adverted
to above; he submitted his comment on February 23, 1976, reiterating his refusal to pay the membership
fees due from him.

On March 2, 1976, the Court required the IBP President and the IBP Board of Governors to reply to
Edillon's comment: on March 24, 1976, they submitted a joint reply.

Thereafter, the case was set for hearing on June 3, 1976. After the hearing, the parties were required to
submit memoranda in amplification of their oral arguments. The matter was thenceforth submitted for
resolution.

At the threshold, a painstaking scrutiny of the respondent's pleadings would show that the propriety and
necessity of the integration of the Bar of the Philippines are in essence conceded. The respondent,
however, objects to particular features of Rule of Court 139-A (hereinafter referred to as the Court
Rule) 1 — in accordance with which the Bar of the Philippines was integrated — and to the provisions of
par. 2, Section 24, Article III, of the IBP By-Laws (hereinabove cited).

The authority of the IBP Board of Governors to recommend to the Supreme Court the removal of a
delinquent member's name from the Roll of Attorneys is found in par. 2 Section 24, Article Ill of the IBP By-
Laws (supra), whereas the authority of the Court to issue the order applied for is found in Section 10 of the
Court Rule, which reads:

SEC. 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. — Subject to the provisions of Section 12 of this
Rule, default in the payment of annual dues for six months shall warrant suspension of
 membership in the Integrated Bar, and default in such payment for one year shall be a
ground for the removal of the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys.

The all-encompassing, all-inclusive scope of membership in the IBP is stated in these words of the Court
Rule:

SECTION 1. Organization. — There is hereby organized an official national body to be

known as the 'Integrated Bar of the Philippines,' composed of all persons whose names now
appear or may hereafter be included in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court.

The obligation to pay membership dues is couched in the following words of the Court Rule:

SEC. 9. Membership dues. Every member of the Integrated Bar shall pay such annual dues
as the Board of Governors shall determine with the approval of the Supreme Court. ...

The core of the respondent's arguments is that the above provisions constitute an invasion of his
constitutional rights in the sense that he is being compelled, as a pre-condition to maintaining his status as
a lawyer in good standing, to be a member of the IBP and to pay the corresponding dues, and that as a
consequence of this compelled financial support of the said organization to which he is admittedly
personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights to liberty and property guaranteed to him by the
Constitution. Hence, the respondent concludes, the above provisions of the Court Rule and of the IBP By-
Laws are void and of no legal force and effect.

The respondent similarly questions the jurisdiction of the Court to strike his name from the Roll of
Attorneys, contending that the said matter is not among the justiciable cases triable by the Court but is
rather of an "administrative nature pertaining to an administrative body."

The case at bar is not the first one that has reached the Court relating to constitutional issues that inevitably
and inextricably come up to the surface whenever attempts are made to regulate the practice of law, define
the conditions of such practice, or revoke the license granted for the exercise of the legal profession.

The matters here complained of are the very same issues raised in a previous case before the Court,
entitled "Administrative Case No. 526, In the Matter of the Petition for the Integration of the Bar of the
Philippines, Roman Ozaeta, et al., Petitioners." The Court exhaustively considered all these matters in that
case in its Resolution ordaining the integration of the Bar of the Philippines, promulgated on January 9,
1973. The Court there made the unanimous pronouncement that it was

... fully convinced, after a thoroughgoing conscientious study of all the arguments adduced in
Adm. Case No. 526 and the authoritative materials and the mass of factual data contained in
the exhaustive Report of the Commission on Bar Integration, that the integration of the
Philippine Bar is 'perfectly constitutional and legally unobjectionable'. ...

Be that as it may, we now restate briefly the posture of the Court.

An "Integrated Bar" is a State-organized Bar, to which every lawyer must belong, as distinguished from bar
associations organized by individual lawyers themselves, membership in which is voluntary. Integration of
the Bar is essentially a process by which every member of the Bar is afforded an opportunity to do his
share in carrying out the objectives of the Bar as well as obliged to bear his portion of its responsibilities.
Organized by or under the direction of the State, an integrated Bar is an official national body of which all
lawyers are required to be members. They are, therefore, subject to all the rules prescribed for the
governance of the Bar, including the requirement of payment of a reasonable annual fee for the effective
discharge of the purposes of the Bar, and adherence to a code of professional ethics or professional
responsibility breach of which constitutes sufficient reason for investigation by the Bar and, upon proper
cause appearing, a recommendation for discipline or disbarment of the offending member. 2

The integration of the Philippine Bar was obviously dictated by overriding considerations of public interest
and public welfare to such an extent as more than constitutionally and legally justifies the restrictions that
integration imposes upon the personal interests and personal convenience of individual lawyers. 3
Apropos to the above, it must be stressed that all legislation directing the integration of the Bar have been
uniformly and universally sustained as a valid exercise of the police power over an important profession.
The practice of law is not a vested right but a privilege, a privilege moreover clothed with public interest
because a lawyer owes substantial duties not only to his client, but also to his brethren in the profession, to
the courts, and to the nation, and takes part in one of the most important functions of the State — the
administration of justice — as an officer of the court. 4 The practice of law being clothed with public interest,
the holder of this privilege must submit to a degree of control for the common good, to the extent of the
interest he has created. As the U. S. Supreme Court through Mr. Justice Roberts explained, the expression
"affected with a public interest" is the equivalent of "subject to the exercise of the police power" (Nebbia vs.
New York, 291 U.S. 502).

When, therefore, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 6397 5 authorizing the Supreme Court to "adopt rules
of court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar under such conditions as it shall see fit," it did so in the
exercise of the paramount police power of the State. The Act's avowal is to "raise the standards of the legal
profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility
more effectively." Hence, the Congress in enacting such Act, the Court in ordaining the integration of the
Bar through its Resolution promulgated on January 9, 1973, and the President of the Philippines in
decreeing the constitution of the IBP into a body corporate through Presidential Decree No. 181 dated May
4, 1973, were prompted by fundamental considerations of public welfare and motivated by a desire to meet
the demands of pressing public necessity.

The State, in order to promote the general welfare, may interfere with and regulate personal liberty,
property and occupations. Persons and property may be subjected to restraints and burdens in order to
secure the general prosperity and welfare of the State (U.S. vs. Gomez Jesus, 31 Phil 218), for, as the
Latin maxim goes, "Salus populi est supreme lex." The public welfare is the supreme law. To this
fundamental principle of government the rights of individuals are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing without
which life is a misery, but liberty should not be made to prevail over authority because then society win fall
into anarchy (Calalang vs. Williams, 70 Phil. 726). It is an undoubted power of the State to restrain some
individuals from all freedom, and all individuals from some freedom.

But the most compelling argument sustaining the constitutionality and validity of Bar integration in the
Philippines is the explicit unequivocal grant of precise power to the Supreme Court by Section 5 (5) of
Article X of the 1973 Constitution of the Philippines, which reads:

Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

xxx xxx xxx

(5) Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and pro. procedure in all courts, and the
admission to the practice of law and the integration of the Bar ...,

and Section 1 of Republic Act No. 6397, which reads:

SECTION 1. Within two years from the approval of this Act, the Supreme Court may adopt
rules of Court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar under such conditions as it shall
see fit in order to raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the administration of
justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more effectively.

Quite apart from the above, let it be stated that even without the enabling Act (Republic Act No. 6397), and
looking solely to the language of the provision of the Constitution granting the Supreme Court the power "to
promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the
practice of law," it at once becomes indubitable that this constitutional declaration vests the Supreme Court
with plenary power in all cases regarding the admission to and supervision of the practice of law.

Thus, when the respondent Edillon entered upon the legal profession, his practice of law and his exercise
of the said profession, which affect the society at large, were (and are) subject to the power of the body
politic to require him to conform to such regulations as might be established by the proper authorities for
the common good, even to the extent of interfering with some of his liberties. If he did not wish to submit
himself to such reasonable interference and regulation, he should not have clothed the public with an
interest in his concerns.

On this score alone, the case for the respondent must already fall.

The issues being of constitutional dimension, however, we now concisely deal with them seriatim.

1. The first objection posed by the respondent is that the Court is without power to compel him to become a
member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, hence, Section 1 of the Court Rule is unconstitutional for it
impinges on his constitutional right of freedom to associate (and not to associate). Our answer is: To
compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar is not violative of his constitutional freedom to
associate. 6

Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of which he is not already a member. He
became a member of the Bar when he passed the Bar examinations. 7 All that integration actually does is
to provide an official national organization for the well-defined but unorganized and incohesive group of
which every lawyer is a ready a member. 8

Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not attend the
meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he chooses. The only
compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues. The Supreme Court, in order to further
the State's legitimate interest in elevating the quality of professional legal services, may require that the
cost of improving the profession in this fashion be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory
program — the lawyers.9

Assuming that the questioned provision does in a sense compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated
Bar, such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of the State. 10

2. The second issue posed by the respondent is that the provision of the Court Rule requiring payment of a
membership fee is void. We see nothing in the Constitution that prohibits the Court, under its constitutional
power and duty to promulgate rules concerning the admission to the practice of law and the integration of
the Philippine Bar (Article X, Section 5 of the 1973 Constitution) — which power the respondent
acknowledges — from requiring members of a privileged class, such as lawyers are, to pay a reasonable
fee toward defraying the expenses of regulation of the profession to which they belong. It is quite apparent
that the fee is indeed imposed as a regulatory measure, designed to raise funds for carrying out the
objectives and purposes of integration. 11

3. The respondent further argues that the enforcement of the penalty provisions would amount to a
deprivation of property without due process and hence infringes on one of his constitutional rights. Whether
the practice of law is a property right, in the sense of its being one that entitles the holder of a license to
practice a profession, we do not here pause to consider at length, as it clear that under the police power of
the State, and under the necessary powers granted to the Court to perpetuate its existence, the
respondent's right to practise law before the courts of this country should be and is a matter subject to
regulation and inquiry. And, if the power to impose the fee as a regulatory measure is recognize, then a
penalty designed to enforce its payment, which penalty may be avoided altogether by payment, is not void
as unreasonable or arbitrary. 12

But we must here emphasize that the practice of law is not a property right but a mere privilege, 13 and as
such must bow to the inherent regulatory power of the Court to exact compliance with the lawyer's public
responsibilities.

4. Relative to the issue of the power and/or jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to strike the name of a lawyer
from its Roll of Attorneys, it is sufficient to state that the matters of admission, suspension, disbarment and
reinstatement of lawyers and their regulation and supervision have been and are indisputably recognized
as inherent judicial functions and responsibilities, and the authorities holding such are legion. 14

In In Re Sparks (267 Ky. 93, 101 S.W. (2d) 194), in which the report of the Board of Bar Commissioners in
a disbarment proceeding was confirmed and disbarment ordered, the court, sustaining the Bar Integration
Act of Kentucky, said: "The power to regulate the conduct and qualifications of its officers does not depend
upon constitutional or statutory grounds. It is a power which is inherent in this court as a court —
appropriate, indeed necessary, to the proper administration of justice ... the argument that this is an
arbitrary power which the court is arrogating to itself or accepting from the legislative likewise misconceives
the nature of the duty. It has limitations no less real because they are inherent. It is an unpleasant task to
sit in judgment upon a brother member of the Bar, particularly where, as here, the facts are disputed. It is a
grave responsibility, to be assumed only with a determination to uphold the Ideals and traditions of an
honorable profession and to protect the public from overreaching and fraud. The very burden of the duty is
itself a guaranty that the power will not be misused or prostituted. ..."

The Court's jurisdiction was greatly reinforced by our 1973 Constitution when it explicitly granted to the
Court the power to "Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice ... and the admission to the practice of
law and the integration of the Bar ... (Article X, Sec. 5(5) the power to pass upon the fitness of the
respondent to remain a member of the legal profession is indeed undoubtedly vested in the Court.

We thus reach the conclusion that the provisions of Rule of Court 139-A and of the By-Laws of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines complained of are neither unconstitutional nor illegal.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is the unanimous sense of the Court that the respondent Marcial A.
Edillon should be as he is hereby disbarred, and his name is hereby ordered stricken from the Roll of
Attorneys of the Court.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 79690-707 February 1, 1989

ENRIQUE A. ZALDIVAR, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN and HONORABLE RAUL M. GONZALEZ, claiming to be and
acting as Tanodbayan-Ombudsman under the 1987 Constitution, respondents.

G.R. No. 80578 February 1, 1989

ENRIQUE A. ZALDIVAR, petitioner,

vs.
HON. RAUL M. GONZALES, claiming to be and acting as Tanodbayan-Ombudsman under the 1987
Constitution, respondent.

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:

We have examined carefully the lengthy and vigorously written Motion for Reconsideration dated October
18, 1988 filed by counsel for respondent Raul M. Gonzalez, relating to the per curiam Resolution of the
Court dated October 7, 1988. We have reviewed once more the Court's extended per curiam Resolution, in
the light of the argument adduced in the Motion for Reconsideration, but must conclude that we find no
sufficient basis for modifying the conclusions and rulings embodied in that Resolution. The Motion for
Reconsideration sets forth copious quotations and references to foreign texts which, however, whatever
else they may depict, do not reflect the law in this jurisdiction.

Nonetheless, it might be useful to develop further, in some measure, some of the conclusions reached in
the per curiam Resolution, addressing in the process some of the "Ten (10) Legal Points for
Reconsideration," made in the Motion for Reconsideration.

1. In respondent's point A, it is claimed that it was error for this Court "to charge respondent
[with] indirect contempt and convict him of direct contempt."

In the per curiam Resolution (page 50), the Court concluded that "respondent Gonzalez is guilty both of
contempt of court in facie curiae and of gross misconduct as an officer of the court and member of the bar."
The Court did not use the phrase "in facie curiae" as a technical equivalent of "direct contempt," though we
are aware that courts in the United States have sometimes used that phrase in speaking of "direct
contempts' as "contempts in the face of the courts." Rather, the court sought to convey that it regarded the
contumacious acts or statements (which were made both in a pleading filed before the Court and in
statements given to the media) and the misconduct of respondent Gonzalez as serious acts flaunted in the
face of the Court and constituting a frontal assault upon the integrity of the Court and, through the Court,
the entire judicial system. What the Court would stress is that it required respondent, in its Resolution dated
2 May 1988, to explain "why he should not be punished for contempt of court and/or subjected to
administrative sanctions" and in respect of which, respondent was heard and given the most ample
opportunity to present all defenses, arguments and evidence that he wanted to present for the
consideration of this Court. The Court did not summarily impose punishment upon the respondent which it
could have done under Section 1 of Rule 71 of the Revised Rules of Court had it chosen to consider
respondent's acts as constituting "direct contempt."

2. In his point C, respondent's counsel argues that it was "error for this Court to charge
respondent under Rule 139 (b) and not 139 of the Revised Rules of Court."
In its per curiam Resolution, the Court referred to Rule 139 (b) of the Revised Rules of Court pointing out
that:

[R]eference of complaints against attorneys either to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines or
to the Solicitor General is not mandatory upon the Supreme Court such reference to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines or to the Solicitor General is certainly not an exclusive
procedure under the terms of Rule 139 (b) of the Revised Rules of Court, especially where
the charge consists of acts done before the Supreme Court.

The above statement was made by the Court in response to respondent's motion for referral of this case
either to the Solicitor General or to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines under Rule 139 (b). Otherwise,
there would have been no need to refer to Rule 139 (b). It is thus only necessary to point out that under the
old rule, Rule 139, referral to the Solicitor General was similarly not an exclusive procedure and was not the
only course of action open to the Supreme Court. It is well to recall that under Section 1 (entitled "Motion or
complaint") of Rule 139, "Proceedings for the removal or suspension of attorneys may be taken by the
Supreme Court, (1) on its own motion, or (2) upon the complaint under oath of another in writing"
(Parentheses supplied). The procedure described in Sections 2 et seq. of Rule 139 is the procedure
provided for suspension or disbarment proceedings initiated upon sworn complaint of another person,
rather than a procedure required for proceedings initiated by the Supreme Court on its own motion. It is
inconceivable that the Supreme Court would initiate motu proprio proceedings for which it did not find
probable cause to proceed against an attorney. Thus, there is no need to refer a case to the Solicitor
General, which referral is made "for investigation to determine if there is sufficient ground to proceed with
the prosecution of the respondent" (Section 3, Rule 139), where the Court itself has initiated against the
respondent. The Court may, of course, refer a case to the Solicitor General if it feels that, in a particular
case, further factual investigation is needed. In the present case, as pointed out in the per
curiam Resolution of the Court (page 18), there was "no need for further investigation of facts in the present
case for it [was] not substantially disputed by respondent Gonzalez that he uttered or wrote certain
statements attributed to him" and that "in any case, respondent has had the amplest opportunity to present
his defense: his defense is not that he did not make the statements ascribed to him but that those
statements give rise to no liability on his part, having been made in the exercise of his freedom of speech.
The issues which thus need to be resolved here are issues of law and of basic policy and the Court, not
any other agency, is compelled to resolve such issues."

In this connection, we note that the quotation in page 7 of the Motion for Reconsideration is from
a dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Black in Green v. United State. 1 It may be pointed out that the majority
in Green v. United States, through Mr. Justice Harlan, held, among other things, that: Federal courts do not
lack power to impose sentences in excess of one year for criminal contempt; that criminal contempts are
not subject to jury trial as a matter of constitutional right; nor does the (US) Constitution require that
contempt subject to prison terms of more than one year be based on grand jury indictments.

In his concurring opinion in the same case, Mr. Justice Frankfurter said:

Whatever the conflicting views of scholars in construing more or less dubious manuscripts of
the Fourteenth Century, what is indisputable is that from the foundation of the United States
the constitutionality of the power to punish for contempt without the intervention of a jury has
not been doubted. The First Judiciary Act conferred such a power on the federal courts in
the very act of their establishment, 1 State 73, 83, and of the Judiciary Committee of eight
that reported the bill to the Senate, five member including the chairman, Senator, later to be
Chief Justice, Ellsworth, had been delegates to the Constitutional Convention (Oliver
Ellsworth, Chairman, William Paterson, Caleb Strong, Ricard Basett, William Few. 1 Annals
of Cong 17). In the First Congress itself no less than nineteen member including Madison
who contemporaneously introduced the Bill of Rights, had been delegates to the Convention.
And when an abuse under this power manifested itself, and led Congress to define more
explicitly the summary power vested in the courts, it did not remotely deny the existence of
the power but merely defined the conditions for its exercise more clearly, in an Act
"declaratory of the law concerning contempts of court." Act of Mar. 2, 1831, 4 Stat 487.

xxxxxxxxx
 Nor has the constitutionality of the power been doubted by this Court throughout its
existence . In at least two score cases in this Court, not to mention the vast mass of
decisions in the lower federal courts, the power to punish summarily has been accepted
without question. ... 2

To say that a judge who punishes a contemnor judges his own cause, is simplistic at best. The judge who
finds himself compelled to exercise the power to punish for contempt does so not really to avenge a wrong
inflicted upon his own person; rather he upholds and vindicates the authority, dignity and integrity of the
judicial institution and its claim to respectful behaviour on the part of all persons who appears before it, and
most especially from those who are officers of the court.

3. In his point D, respondent counsel urges that it is error "for this Court to apply the "visible
tendency" rule rather than the "clear and present danger" rule in disciplinary and contempt
charges."

The Court did not purport to announce a new doctrine of "visible tendency," it was, more modestly, simply
paraphrasing Section 3 (d) of Rule 71 of the Revised Rules of Court which penalizes a variety of
contumacious conduct including: "any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct
or degrade the administration of justice."

The "clear and present danger" doctrine invoked by respondent's counsel is not a magic incantation which
dissolves all problems and dispenses with analysis and judgment in the testing of the legitimacy of claims
to free speech, and which compels a court to exonerate a defendant the moment the doctrine is invoked,
absent proof of impending apocalypse. The clear and present danger" doctrine has been an accepted
method for marking out the appropriate limits of freedom of speech and of assembly in certain contexts. It is
not, however, the only test which has been recognized and applied by courts. In Logunzad v. Vda. de
Gonzales, 3 this Court, speaking through Mme. Justice Melencio-Herrera said:

...The right of freedom of expression indeed, occupies a preferred position in the "hierarchy
of civil liberties" (Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization v. Philippine Blooming
Mills Co., Inc., 51 SCRA 191 [1963]. It is not, however, without limitations. As held in
Gonzales v. Commission on Elections, 27 SCRA 835, 858 [1960]:

"From the language of the specific constitutional provision, it would appear that the right is
not susceptible of any limitation. No law may be passed abridging the freedom of speech
and of the press. The realities of life in a complex society preclude however, a literal
interpretation. Freedom of expression is not an absolute. It would be too much to insist that
all times and under all circumstances it should remain unfettered and unrestrained. There
are other societal values that press for recognition."

The prevailing doctrine is that the clear and present danger rule is such a limitation. Another
criterion for permissible limitation on freedom of speech and of the press, which includes
such vehicles of the mass media as radio, television and the movies, is the "balancing-of-
interests test" (Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando on the Bill of Rights, 1970 ed., p. 79). The
principle "requires a court to take conscious and detailed consideration of the interplay of
interests observable in a given situation or type of situation (Separate Opinion of the late
Chief Justice Castro in Gonzales v. Commission on Elections, supra, p. 899). (Emphasis
Supplied) 4

Under either the "clear and present danger" test or the "balancing-of-interest test," we believe that the
statements here made by respondent Gonzalez are of such a nature and were made in such a manner and
under such circumstances, as to transcend the permissible limits of free speech. This conclusion was
implicit in the per curiam Resolution of October 7, 1988. It is important to point out that the "substantive evil"
which the Supreme Court has a right and a duty to prevent does not, in the instant case, relate to threats of
physical disorder or overt violence or similar disruptions of public order. 5 What is here at stake is the
authority of the Supreme Court to confront and prevent a "substantive evil" consisting not only of the
obstruction of a free and fair hearing of a particular case but also the avoidance of the broader evil of the
degradation of the judicial system of a country and the destruction of the standards of professional conduct
required from members of the bar and officers of the courts. The "substantive evil" here involved, in other
words, is not as palpable as a threat of public disorder or rioting but is certainly no less deleterious and
more far reaching in its implications for society.

4. In his point H, respondent's counsel argues that it is error "for this Court to hold that intent
is irrelevant in charges of misconduct." What the Court actually said on this point was:

Respondent Gonzalez disclaims an intent to attack and denigrate the Court. The
subjectivities of the respondent are irrelevant so far as characterization of his conduct or
misconduct is concerned. He will not, however, be allowed to disclaim the natural and plain
import of his words and acts. It is, upon the other hand, not irrelevant to point out that the
respondent offered no apology in his two (2) explanations and exhibited no repentance
(Resolution, p. 7; footnotes omitted).

The actual subjectivities of the respondent are irrelevant because such subjectivities (understood as
pyschological phenomena) cannot be ascertained and reached by the processes of this Court. Human
intent can only be shown derivatively and implied from an examination of acts and statements. Thus, what
the Court was saying was that respondent's disclaimer of an intent to attack and denigrate the Court,
cannot prevail over the plain import of what he did say and do. Respondent cannot negate the clear import
of his acts and statements by simply pleading a secret intent or state of mind incompatible with those acts
or statements. It is scarcely open to dispute that, e.g., one accused of homicide cannot successfully deny
his criminal intent by simply asserting that while he may have inserted a knife between the victim's ribs, he
actually acted from high motives and kind feelings for the latter.

5 In his point 1, respondent's counsel argues that it is error "for this Court to punish
respondent for contempt of court for out of court publications."

Respondent's counsel asks this Court to follow what he presents as alleged modern trends in the United
Kingdom and in the United States concerning the law of contempt. We are, however, unable to regard the
texts that he cites as binding or persuasive in our jurisdiction. The Court went to some length to document
the state of our case law on this matter in its per curiam Resolution. There is nothing in the circumstances
of this case that would suggest to this Court that that case law, which has been followed for at least half a
century or so, ought to be reversed.

6. In his point J, respondent's counsel pleads that the imposition of indefinite suspension
from the practice of law constitutes "cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment". The Court
finds it difficult to consider this a substantial constitutional argument. The indefiniteness of
the respondent's suspension, far from being "cruel" or "degrading" or "inhuman," has the
effect of placing, as it were, the key to the restoration of his rights and privileges as a lawyer
in his own hands. That sanction has the effect of giving respondent the chance to purge
himself in his own good time of his contempt and misconduct by acknowledging such
misconduct, exhibiting appropriate repentance and demonstrating his willingness and
capacity to live up to the exacting standards of conduct rightly demanded from every
member of the bar and officer of the courts.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to DENY the Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit. The denial
is FINAL.

The Court also NOTED the Ex-Parte Manifestation and Motion, dated October 25, 1988 and the
Supplemental Manifestation, dated October 27, 1988, filed by respondent
 THIRD DIVISION

A.C. No. 5838 January 17, 2005

SPOUSES BENJAMIN SANTUYO AND EDITHA SANTUYO, complainants,

vs.
ATTY. EDWIN A. HIDALGO, respondent.

RESOLUTION

CORONA, J.:

In a verified complaint-affidavit dated September 18, 2001,1 spouses Benjamin Santuyo and Editha
Santuyo accused respondent Atty. Edwin A. Hidalgo of serious misconduct and dishonesty for breach of his
lawyer’s oath and the notarial law.

Complainants stated that sometime in December 1991, they purchased a parcel of land covered by a deed
of sale. The deed of sale was allegedly notarized by respondent lawyer and was entered in his notarial
register as Doc. No. 94 on Page No. 19 in Book No. III, Series of 1991. Complainant spouses averred that
about six years after the date of notarization, they had a dispute with one Danilo German over the
ownership of the land. The case was estafa through falsification of a public document.

During the trial of the case, German presented in court an affidavit executed by respondent denying the
authenticity of his signature on the deed of sale. The spouses allegedly forged his notarial signature on said
deed.2

According to complainants, respondent overlooked the fact that the disputed deed of sale contained all the
legal formalities of a duly notarized document, including an impression of respondent’s notarial dry seal.
Not being persons who were learned in the technicalities surrounding a notarial act, spouses contended
that they could not have forged the signature of herein respondent. They added that they had no access to
his notarial seal and notarial register, and could not have made any imprint of respondent’s seal or
signature on the subject deed of sale or elsewhere.3

In his answer4 to the complaint, respondent denied the allegations against him. He denied having notarized
any deed of sale covering the disputed property. According to respondent, he once worked as a junior
lawyer at Carpio General and Jacob Law Office where he was asked to apply for a notarial commission.
While he admitted that he notarized several documents in that office, these, however, did not include the
subject deed of sale. He explained that, as a matter of office procedure, documents underwent scrutiny by
the senior lawyers and it was only when they gave their approval that notarization was done. He claimed
that, in some occasions, the secretaries in the law firm, by themselves, would affix the dry seal of the junior
associates on documents relating to cases handled by the law firm. Respondent added that he normally
required the parties to exhibit their community tax certificates and made them personally acknowledge the
documents before him as notary public. He would have remembered complainants had they actually
appeared before him. While he admitted knowing complainant Editha Santuyo, he said he met the latter’s
husband and co-complainant only on November 5, 1997, or about six years from the time that he
purportedly notarized the deed of sale. Moreover, respondent stressed that an examination of his alleged
signature on the deed of sale revealed that it was forged; the strokes were smooth and mild.l^vvphi1.net He
suspected that a lady was responsible for forging his signature.

To further refute the accusations against him, respondent stated that, at the time the subject deed of sale
was supposedly notarized, on December 27, 1991, he was on vacation. He surmised that complainants
must have gone to the law office and enticed one of the secretaries, with the concurrence of the senior
lawyers, to notarize the document. He claimed he was a victim of a criminal scheme motivated by greed.

The complaint was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation. In a report5 it submitted to the Court, the IBP noted that the alleged forged signature of
respondent on the deed of sale was different from his signatures in other documents he submitted during
the investigation of the present case.6 However, it ruled that respondent was also negligent because he
allowed the office secretaries to perform his notarial functions, including the safekeeping of his notarial dry
seal and notarial register.7 It thus recommended:

WHEREFORE[,] in view of the foregoing, it is respectfully recommended that respondent’s commission as

notary public be revoked for two (2) years if he is commissioned as such; or he should not be granted a
commission as notary public for two (2) years upon receipt hereof.8

After going over the evidence submitted by the parties, complainants did not categorically state that they
appeared before respondent to have the deed of sale notarized. Their appearance before him could have
bolstered this allegation that respondent signed the document and that it was not a forgery as he claimed.
The records show that complainants themselves were not sure if respondent, indeed, signed the document;
what they were sure of was the fact that his signature appeared thereon. They had no personal knowledge
as well as to who actually affixed the signature of respondent on the deed.1awphi1.nét

Furthermore, complainants did not refute respondent’s contention that he only met complainant Benjamin
Santuyo six years after the alleged notarization of the deed of sale. Respondent’s assertion was
corroborated by one Mrs. Lyn Santy in an affidavit executed on November 17, 20019 wherein she stated
that complainant Editha Santuyo had to invite respondent to her house on November 5, 1997 to meet her
husband since the two had to be introduced to each other. The meeting between complainant Benjamin
Santuyo and respondent was arranged after the latter insisted that Mr. Santuyo personally acknowledge a
deed of sale concerning another property that the spouses bought.

In finding respondent negligent in performing his notarial functions, the IBP reasoned out:

xxx xxx xxx.

Considering that the responsibility attached to a notary public is sensitive respondent should have been
more discreet and cautious in the execution of his duties as such and should not have wholly entrusted
everything to the secretaries; otherwise he should not have been commissioned as notary public.

For having wholly entrusted the preparation and other mechanics of the document for notarization to the
secretary there can be a possibility that even the respondent’s signature which is the only one left for him to
do can be done by the secretary or anybody for that matter as had been the case herein.

As it is respondent had been negligent not only in the supposed notarization but foremost in having allowed
the office secretaries to make the necessary entries in his notarial registry which was supposed to be done
and kept by him alone; and should not have relied on somebody else.10

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Edwin A. Hidalgo is hereby found GUILTY of negligence in the
performance of his duties as notary public and is hereby SUSPENDED from his commission as a notary
public for a period of two years, if he is commissioned, or if he is not, he is disqualified from an appointment
as a notary public for a period of two years from finality of this resolution, with a warning that a repetition of
similar negligent acts would be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.
 EN BANC

A.C. No. 5864 April 15, 2005

ARTURO L. SICAT, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. GREGORIO E. ARIOLA, JR., respondent.

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:

In an affidavit-complaint,1 complainant Arturo L. Sicat, a Board Member of the Sangguniang

Panglalawigan of Rizal, charged respondent Atty. Gregorio E. Ariola, the Municipal Administrator of Cainta,
Rizal, with violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility by committing fraud, deceit and falsehood in
his dealings, particularly the notarization of a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) purportedly executed by a
one Juanito C. Benitez. According to complainant, respondent made it appear that Benitez executed the
said document on January 4, 2001 when in fact the latter had already died on October 25, 2000.

He alleged that prior to the notarization, the Municipality of Cainta had entered into a contract with J.C.
Benitez Architect and Technical Management, represented by Benitez, for the construction of low-cost
houses. The cost of the architectural and engineering designs amounted to P11,000,000 and two
consultants were engaged to supervise the project. For the services of the consultants, the Municipality of
Cainta issued a check dated January 10, 2001 in the amount of P3,700,000, payable to J.C. Benitez
Architects and Technical Management and/or Cesar Goco. The check was received and encashed by the
latter by virtue of the authority of the SPA notarized by respondent Ariola.

Complainant further charged respondent with the crime of falsification penalized under Article 171 of the
Revised Penal Code by making it appear that certain persons participated in an act or proceeding when in
fact they did not.

In his Comment,2 respondent explained that, as early as May 12, 2000, Benitez had already signed the
SPA. He claimed that due to inadvertence, it was only on January 4, 2001 that he was able to notarize it.
Nevertheless, the SPA notarized by him on January 4, 2001 was not at all necessary because Benitez had
signed a similar SPA in favor of Goco sometime before his death, on May 12, 2000. Because it was no
longer necessary, the SPA was cancelled the same day he notarized it, hence, legally, there was no public
document that existed. Respondent prayed that the complaint be dismissed on the ground of forum-
shopping since similar charges had been filed with the Civil Service Commission and the Office of the
Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon. According to him, the complaints were later dismissed based on findings
that the assailed act referred to violations of the implementing rules and regulations of PD 1594, 3 PD
1445,4 RA 71605 and other pertinent rules of the Commission on Audit (COA). He stressed that no criminal
and administrative charges were recommended for filing against him.

In a Resolution dated March 12, 2003,6 the Court referred the complaint to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. On August 26, 2003, the IBP submitted its
investigation report:

x x x it is evident that respondent notarized the Special Power of Attorney dated 4 January 2001
purportedly executed by Juanito C. Benitez long after Mr. Benitez was dead. It is also evident that
respondent cannot feign innocence and claim that he did not know Mr. Benitez was already dead at the
time because respondent, as member of the Prequalification and Awards Committee of the Municipality of
Cainta, personally knew Mr. Benitez because the latter appeared before the Committee a number of times.
It is evident that the Special Power of Attorney dated 4 January 2001 was part of a scheme of individuals to
defraud the Municipality of Cainta of money which was allegedly due them, and that respondent by
notarizing said Special Power of Attorney helped said parties succeed in their plans.7

The IBP recommended to the Court that respondent's notarial commission be revoked and that he be
suspended from the practice of law for a period of one year.8
After a careful review of the records, we find that respondent never disputed complainant's accusation that
he notarized the SPA purportedly executed by Benitez on January 4, 2001. He likewise never took issue
with the fact that on said date, Benitez was already dead. His act was a serious breach of the sacred
obligation imposed upon him by the Code of Professional Responsibility, specifically Rule 1.01 of Canon 1,
which prohibited him from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. As a lawyer and
as an officer of the court, it was his duty to serve the ends of justice,9 not to corrupt it. Oath-bound, he was
expected to act at all times in accordance with law and ethics, and if he did not, he would not only injure
himself and the public but also bring reproach upon an honorable profession.10

In the recent case of Zaballero v. Atty. Mario J. Montalvan,11 where the respondent notarized certain
documents and made it appear that the deceased father of complainant executed them, the Court declared
the respondent there guilty of violating Canon 10, Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.12 The Court was emphatic that lawyers commissioned as notaries public should not
authenticate documents unless the persons who signed them are the very same persons who executed
them and personally appeared before them to attest to the contents and truth of what are stated therein.
The Court added that notaries public must observe utmost fidelity, the basic requirement in the
performance of their duties, otherwise the confidence of the public in the integrity of notarized deeds and
documents will be undermined.

In the case at bar, the records show that Benitez died on October 25, 2000. However, respondent notarized
the SPA, purportedly bearing the signature of Benitez, on January 4, 2001 or more than two months after
the latter's death. The notarial acknowledgement of respondent declared that Benitez "appeared before him
and acknowledged that the instrument was his free and voluntary act." Clearly, respondent lied and
intentionally perpetuated an untruthful statement. Notarization is not an empty, meaningless and routinary
act.13 It converts a private document into a public instrument, making it admissible in evidence without the
necessity of preliminary proof of its authenticity and due execution.14

Neither will respondent's defense that the SPA in question was superfluous and unnecessary, and
prejudiced no one, exonerate him of accountability. His assertion of falsehood in a public document
contravened one of the most cherished tenets of the legal profession and potentially cast suspicion on the
truthfulness of every notarial act. As the Municipal Administrator of Cainta, he should have been aware of
his great responsibility not only as a notary public but as a public officer as well. A public office is a public
trust. Respondent should not have caused disservice to his constituents by consciously performing an act
that would deceive them and the Municipality of Cainta. Without the fraudulent SPA, the erring parties in
the construction project could not have encashed the check amounting to P3,700,000 and could not have
foisted on the public a spurious contract ― all to the extreme prejudice of the very Municipality of which he
was the Administrator. According to the COA Special Task Force:

Almost all acts of falsification of public documents as enumerated in Article 171 in relation to Article 172 of
the Revised Penal Code were evident in the transactions of the Municipality of Cainta with J.C. Benitez &
Architects Technical Management for the consultancy services in the conduct of Detailed Feasibility Study
and Detailed Engineering Design of the Proposed Construction of Cainta Municipal Medium Rise Low Cost
Housing, in the contract amount of P11,000,000. The agent resorted to misrepresentation, manufacture or
fabrication of fictitious document, untruthful narration of facts, misrepresentation, and counterfeiting or
imitating signature for the purpose of creating a fraudulent contract. All these were tainted with deceit
perpetrated against the government resulting to undue injury. The first and partial payment, in the amount
of P3,700,000.00 was made in the absence of the required outputs. x x x15

We need not say more except that we are constrained to change the penalty recommended by the IBP
which we find too light.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Gregorio E. Ariola, Jr., is found guilty of gross misconduct and is hereby
DISBARRED from the practice of law. Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar
Confidant and entered in the records of respondent, and brought to the immediate attention of the
Ombudsman.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

A.C. No. 8254 February 15, 2012

(Formerly CBD Case No. 04-1310)

NESA ISENHARDT, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. LEONARDO M. REAL, Respondent.

DECISION

PEREZ, J.:

This case stemmed from the verified complaint1 filed with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) on 9
September 2004 by Nesa G. Isenhardt (complainant), through her counsel Atty. Edgardo Golpeo, seeking
the disbarment of respondent Atty. Leonardo M. Real (respondent) for allegedly notarizing a document
even without the appearance of one of the parties.

The Antecedent Facts

Complainant alleged that on 14 September 2000 respondent notarized a Special Power Attorney
(SPA)2 supposedly executed by her. The SPA authorizes complainant’s brother to mortgage her real
property located in Antipolo City. Complainant averred that she never appeared before respondent. She
maintained that it was impossible for her to subscribe to the questioned document in the presence of
respondent on 14 September 2000 since she was in Germany at that time.

To support her contention, complainant presented a certified true copy of her German passport3 and a
Certification from the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID)4 indicating that she arrived in the
Philippines on 22 June 2000 and left the country on 4 August 2000. The passport further indicated that she
arrived again in the Philippines only on 1 July 2001.

Complainant submitted that because of respondent’s act, the property subject of the SPA was mortgaged
and later foreclosed by the Rural Bank of Antipolo City.

In his answer,5 respondent denied the allegations in the complaint. He narrated that sometime in the middle
of year 2000, spouses Wilfredo and Lorena Gusi approached him to seek advice regarding the computer
business they were planning to put up. During one of their meetings, the spouses allegedly introduced to
him a woman by the name of Nesa G. Isenhardt, sister of Wilfredo, as the financier of their proposed
business.

Respondent further narrated that on 14 September 2000, spouses Gusi, together with the woman
purporting to be the complainant, went to his office to have the subject SPA notarized. He maintained that
the parties all signed in his presence, exhibiting to him their respective Community Tax Certificates (CTCs).
He added that the complainant even presented to him the original copy of the Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT)6 of the property subject of the SPA evidencing her ownership of the property.

Respondent noted that spouses Gusi even engaged his services as counsel in a civil case filed before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Antipolo City. The expenses incurred for the case, which was predicated on
the closure of their computer business for non-payment of rentals, was allegedly financed by complainant.
The professional engagement with the spouses was, however, discontinued in view of differences of
opinion between lawyer and clients, as well as, non-payment of respondent’s professional fees.
Respondent concluded that complainant’s cause of action had already prescribed. He argued that under
the Rules of Procedure of the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
a complaint for disbarment prescribes in two years from the date of professional misconduct. Since the
document questioned was notarized in year 2000, the accusation of misconduct which was filed only in
September 2004 had already prescribed. Moreover, respondent noted that the SPA in question authorizing
the grantee Wilfredo Gusi to mortgage the property of complainant was not used for any transaction with a
third person prejudicial to the latter. The annotation at the back of the TCT 7 would show that the property
subject of the SPA was instead sold by complainant to her brother Wilfredo for ₱500,000.00 on 12 January
2001. Thus, he submits that the SPA did not cause grave injury to the complainant.

The IBP Report and Recommendation

On 8 September 2006, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XVII-2006-405,8 which adopted
and approved the Report and Recommendation9 of the Investigating Commissioner. IBP Commissioner
Dennis A. B. Funa, after due proceeding, found respondent guilty of gross negligence as a notary public
and recommended that he be suspended from the practice of law for one year and disqualified from
reappointment as notary public for two (2) years.

Aggrieved, respondent on 13 November 2006 filed a Motion for Reconsideration10 of the aforesaid
Resolution. This was, however, denied by the IBP Board of Governors in a Resolution dated 11 December
2009.

Our Ruling

We sustain the findings and recommendation of the IBP. As stated by the IBP Board of Governors, the
findings of the Investigating Commissioner are supported by evidence on record, as well as applicable laws
and rules.

Respondent violated his oath as a lawyer and the Code of Professional Responsibility11 when he made it
appear that complainant personally appeared before him and subscribed an SPA authorizing her brother to
mortgage her property.

It cannot be overemphasized that a notary public should not notarize a document unless the person who
signs it is the same person who executed it, personally appearing before him to attest to the contents and
the truth of what are stated therein. This is to enable the notary public to verify the genuineness of the
signature of the acknowledging party and to ascertain that the document is the party’s free act.12

Section 1, Public Act No. 2103, otherwise known as the Notarial Law states:

The acknowledgement shall be before a notary public or an officer duly authorized by law of the country to
take acknowledgements of instruments or documents in the place where the act is done. The notary public
or the officer taking the acknowledgement shall certify that the person acknowledging the instrument or
document is known to him and that he is the same person who executed it, acknowledged that the same is
his free act and deed. The certificate shall be made under the official seal, if he is required by law to keep a
seal, and if not, his certificate shall so state.

Such requirement of affiant’s personal appearance was further emphasized in Section 2 (b) of Rule IV of
the Rules on Notarial Practice of 2004 which provides that:

A person shall not perform a notarial act if the person involved as signatory to the instrument or document –

(1) is not in the notary’s presence personally at the time of the notarization; and

(2) is not personally known to the notary public or otherwise identified by the notary public through
competent evidence of identity as defined by these Rules.

Respondent insists that complainant appeared before him and subscribed to the SPA subject of the instant
case. His contention, however, cannot prevail over the documentary evidence presented by complainant
that she was not in the Philippines on 14 September 2000, the day the SPA was allegedly notarized.
Respondent may have indeed met complainant in person during the period the latter was allegedly
introduced to him by Spouses Gusi but that did not change the fact established by evidence that
complainant was not in the personal presence of respondent at the time of notarization. It is well settled that
entries in official records made in the performance of a duty by a public officer of the Philippines, or by a
person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the facts therein
stated.13 This principle aptly covers the Certification from the BID that complainant left the Philippines on 4
August 2000 and arrived back only on 1 July 2001.

Respondent’s contention was further negated when he claimed that complainant presented to him the
original TCT of the property subject of the SPA. A perusal of the TCT would reveal that ownership of the
property was transferred to complainant only on 10 January 2001. Thus, it could not have been presented
to respondent by complainant on 14 September 2000.

The allegation of respondent that there were other documents subscribed by complainant during the interim
of 4 August 2000 and 1 July 2001 or the time that she was supposed to be in Germany deserves scant
consideration. Such allegation was refuted during the hearing before the Investigating Commissioner when
counsel for complainant informed Commissioner Funa that those documents are subjects of criminal and
civil cases pending before the Regional Trial Courts of Pasig, Antipolo and Quezon City,14 where the
documents are being contested for being spurious in character.

Anent respondent’s claim of prescription of the offense pursuant to Section 1, Rule VIII of the Rules of
Procedure15 of the Commission on Bar Discipline, we agree with the Investigating Commissioner that the
rule should be construed to mean two years from the date of discovery of the professional misconduct. To
rule otherwise would cause injustice to parties who may have discovered the wrong committed to them only
at a much later date. In this case, the complaint was filed more than three years after the commission of the
act because it was only after the property was foreclosed that complainant discovered the SPA.

The duties of a notary public is dictated by public policy and impressed with public interest.16 It is not a
meaningless ministerial act of acknowledging documents executed by parties who are willing to pay the
fees for notarization. It is of no moment that the subject SPA was not utilized by the grantee for the purpose
it was intended because the property was allegedly transferred from complainant to her brother by virtue of
a deed of sale consummated between them. What is being penalized is respondent’s act of notarizing a
document despite the absence of one of the parties. By notarizing the questioned document, he engaged in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.17 A notarized document is by law entitled to full credit
upon its face and it is for this reason that notaries public must observe the basic requirements in notarizing
documents. Otherwise, the confidence of the public in notarized documents will be undermined.18 1âwphi1

In a catena of cases,19 we ruled that a lawyer commissioned as notary public having thus failed to
discharge his duties as a notary public, the revocation of his notarial commission, disqualification from
being commissioned as a notary public for a period of two years and suspension from the practice of law
for one year, are in order.

WHEREFORE, the notarial commission of respondent Atty. Leonardo M. Real is hereby REVOKED. He is
disqualified from reappointment as notary public for a period of two (2) years and SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for a period of one (1) year, effective immediately. He is WARNED that a repetition of the
same or similar offense in the future shall be dealt with more severely. He is directed to report the date of
receipt of this Decision in order to determine the date of effectivity of his suspension.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and all courts in the country for their information and guidance. Let a copy of this Decision be
attached to respondent’s personal record as attorney.

SO ORDERED.
 SECOND DIVISION

ADM. CASE No. 3319 June 8, 2000

LESLIE UI, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. IRIS BONIFACIO, respondent.

DE LEON, JR., J.:

Before us is an administrative complaint for disbarment against Atty. Iris Bonifacio for allegedly carrying on
an immoral relationship with Carlos L. Ui, husband of complainant, Leslie Ui.

The relevant facts are:

On January 24, 1971 complainant Leslie Ui married Carlos L. Ui at the Our Lady of Lourdes Church in
Quezon City1 and as a result of their marital union, they had four (4) children, namely, Leilani, Lianni,
Lindsay and Carl Cavin, all surnamed Ui. Sometime in December 1987, however, complainant found out
that her husband. Carlos Ui, was carrying on an illicit relationship with respondent Atty. Iris Bonifacio with
whom he begot a daughter sometime in 1986, and that they had been living together at No. 527 San Carlos
Street, Ayala Alabang Village in Muntinlupa City. Respondent who is a graduate of the College of Law of
the University of the Philippines was admitted to the Philippine Bar in 1982.

Carlos Ui admitted to complainant his relationship with the respondent. Complainant then visited
respondent at her office in the later part of June 1988 and introduced herself as the legal wife of Carlos Ui.
Whereupon, respondent admitted to her that she has a child with Carlos Ui and alleged, however; that
everything was over between her and Carlos Ui. Complainant believed the representations of respondent
and thought things would turn out well from then on and that the illicit relationship between her husband
and respondent would come to an end.

However, complainant again discovered that the illicit relationship between her husband and respondent
continued, and that sometime in December 1988, respondent and her husband, Carlos Ui, had a second
child. Complainant then met again with respondent sometime in March 1989 and pleaded with respondent
to discontinue her illicit relationship with Carlos Ui but to no avail. The illicit relationship persisted and
complainant even came to know later on that respondent had been employed by her husband in his
company.

A complaint for disbarment, docketed as Adm. Case No. 3319, was then filed on August 11, 1989 by the
complainant against respondent Atty. Iris Bonifacio before the Commission on Bar Discipline of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (hereinafter, Commission) on the ground of immorality, more particularly,
for carrying on an illicit relationship with the complainant's husband, Carlos Ui. In her Answer,2 respondent
averred that she met Carlos Ui sometime in 1983 and had known him all along to be a bachelor, with the
knowledge, however, that Carlos Ui had children by a Chinese woman in Amoy, China, from whom he had
long been estranged. She stated that during one of their trips abroad, Carlos Ui formalized his intention to
marry her and they in fact got married in Hawaii, USA in 19853 . Upon their return to Manila, respondent did
not live with Carlos Ui. The latter continued to live with his children in their Greenhills residence because
respondent and Carlos Ui wanted to let the children gradually to know and accept the fact of his second
marriage before they would live together.4

In 1986, respondent left the country and stayed in Honolulu, Hawaii and she would only return occasionally
to the Philippines to update her law practice and renew legal ties. During one of her trips to Manila
sometime in June 1988, she was confronted by a woman who insisted that she was the lawful wife of
Carlos Ui. Hurt and desolate upon her discovery of the true civil status of Carlos Ui, respondent then left for
Honolulu, Hawaii sometime in July 1988 and returned only in March 1989 with her two (2) children. On
March 20, 1989, a few days after she reported to work with the law firm5 she was connected with, the
woman who represented herself to be the wife of Carlos Ui again came to her office, demanding to know if
Carlos Ui has been communicating with her.
It is respondent's contention that her relationship with Carlos Ui is not illicit because they were married
abroad and that after June 1988, when respondent discovered Carlos Ui's true civil status, she cut off all
her ties with him. Respondent averred that Carlos Ui never lived with her in Alabang, and that he resided at
26 Potsdam Street, Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila. It was respondent who lived in Alabang in a house
which belonged to her mother, Rosalinda L. Bonifacio; and that the said house was built exclusively from
her parents' funds.6 By way of counterclaim, respondent sought moral damages in the amount of Ten
Million Pesos (Php10,000,000.00) against complainant for having filed the present allegedly malicious and
groundless disbarment case against respondent.

In her Reply7 dated April 6, 1990, complainant states, among others, that respondent knew perfectly well
that Carlos Ui was married to complainant and had children with her even at the start of her relationship
with Carlos Ui, and that the reason respondent went abroad was to give birth to her two (2) children with
Carlos Ui.

During the pendency of the proceedings before the Integrated Bar, complainant also charged her husband,
Carlos Ui, and respondent with the crime of Concubinage before the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal,
docketed as I.S. No. 89-5247, but the same was dismissed for insufficiency of evidence to establish
probable cause for the offense charged. The resolution dismissing the criminal complaint against
respondent reads:

Complainant's evidence had prima facie established the existence of the "illicit relationship"
between the respondents allegedly discovered by the complainant in December 1987. The same
evidence however show that respondent Carlos Ui was still living with complainant up to the latter
part of 1988 and/or the early part of 1989.

It would therefore be logical and safe to state that the "relationship" of respondents started and was
discovered by complainant sometime in 1987 when she and respondent Carlos were still living at
No. 26 Potsdam Street, Northeast Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila and they, admittedly,
continued to live together at their conjugal home up to early (sic) part of 1989 or later 1988, when
respondent Carlos left the same.

From the above, it would not be amiss to conclude that altho (sic) the relationship, illicit as
complainant puts it, had been prima facie established by complainant's evidence, this same
evidence had failed to even prima facie establish the "fact of respondent's cohabitation in the
concept of husband and wife at the 527 San Carlos St., Ayala Alabang house, proof of which is
necessary and indispensable to at least create probable cause for the offense charged. The
statement alone of complainant, worse, a statement only of a conclusion respecting the fact of
cohabitation does not make the complainant's evidence thereto any better/stronger (U.S. vs.
Casipong and Mongoy, 20 Phil. 178).

It is worth stating that the evidence submitted by respondents in support of their respective positions
on the matter support and bolster the foregoing conclusion/recommendation.

WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully recommended that the instant complaint be dismissed for
want of evidence to establish probable cause for the offense charged.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.8

Complainant appealed the said Resolution of the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal to the Secretary of Justice, but
the same was dismissed9 on the ground of insufficiency of evidence to prove her allegation that respondent
and Carlos Ui lived together as husband and wife at 527 San Carlos Street, Ayala Alabang, Muntinlupa,
Metro Manila.

In the proceedings before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, complainant filed a Motion to Cite
Respondent in Contempt of the Commission 10 wherein she charged respondent with making false
allegations in her Answer and for submitting a supporting document which was altered and intercalated.
She alleged that in the Answer of respondent filed before the Integrated Bar, respondent averred, among
others, that she was married to Carlos Ui on October 22, 1985 and attached a Certificate of Marriage to
substantiate her averment. However, the Certificate of Marriage 11 duly certified by the State Registrar as a
true copy of the record on file in the Hawaii State Department of Health, and duly authenticated by the
Philippine Consulate General in Honolulu, Hawaii, USA revealed that the date of marriage between Carlos
Ui and respondent Atty. Iris Bonifacio was October 22, 1987, and not October 22, 1985 as claimed by
respondent in her Answer. According to complainant, the reason for that false allegation was because
respondent wanted to impress upon the said IBP that the birth of her first child by Carlos Ui was within the
wedlock. 12 It is the contention of complainant that such act constitutes a violation of Articles 183 13 and
184 14 of the Revised Penal Code, and also contempt of the Commission; and that the act of respondent in
making false allegations in her Answer and submitting an altered/intercalated document are indicative of
her moral perversity and lack of integrity which make her unworthy to be a member of the Philippine Bar.

In her Opposition (To Motion To Cite Respondent in Contempt), 15 respondent averred that she did not have
the original copy of the marriage certificate because the same was in the possession of Carlos Ui, and that
she annexed such copy because she relied in good faith on what appeared on the copy of the marriage
certificate in her possession.

Respondent filed her Memorandum 16 on February 22, 1995 and raised the lone issue of whether or not she
has conducted herself in an immoral manner for which she deserves to be barred from the practice of law.
Respondent averred that the complaint should be dismissed on two (2) grounds, namely:

(i) Respondent conducted herself in a manner consistent with the requirement of good moral
character for the practice of the legal profession; and

(ii) Complainant failed to prove her allegation that respondent conducted herself in an immoral
manner.

In her defense, respondent contends, among others, that it was she who was the victim in this case and not
Leslie Ui because she did not know that Carlos Ui was already married, and that upon learning of this fact,
respondent immediately cut-off all her ties with Carlos Ui. She stated that there was no reason for her to
doubt at that time that the civil status of Carlos Ui was that of a bachelor because he spent so much time
with her, and he was so open in his courtship. 18

On the issue of the falsified marriage certificate, respondent alleged that it was highly incredible for her to
have knowingly attached such marriage certificate to her Answer had she known that the same was
altered. Respondent reiterated that there was no compelling reason for her to make it appear that her
marriage to Carlos Ui took place either in 1985 or 1987, because the fact remains that respondent and
Carlos Ui got married before complainant confronted respondent and informed the latter of her earlier
marriage to Carlos Ui in June 1988. Further, respondent stated that it was Carlos Ui who testified and
admitted that he was the person responsible for changing the date of the marriage certificate from 1987 to
1985, and complainant did not present evidence to rebut the testimony of Carlos Ui on this matter.

Respondent posits that complainant's evidence, consisting of the pictures of respondent with a child,
pictures of respondent with Carlos Ui, a picture of a garage with cars, a picture of a light colored car with
Plate No. PNS 313, a picture of the same car, and portion of the house and ground, and another picture of
the same car bearing Plate No. PNS 313 and a picture of the house and the garage, 19 does not prove that
she acted in an immoral manner. They have no evidentiary value according to her. The pictures were taken
by a photographer from a private security agency and who was not presented during the hearings. Further,
the respondent presented the Resolution of the Provincial Fiscal of Pasig in I.S. Case No. 89-5427
dismissing the complaint filed by Leslie Ui against respondent for lack of evidence to establish probable
cause for the offense charged 20 and the dismissal of the appeal by the Department of Justice21 to bolster
her argument that she was not guilty of any immoral or illegal act because of her relationship with Carlos
Ui. In fine, respondent claims that she entered the relationship with Carlos Ui in good faith and that her
conduct cannot be considered as willful, flagrant, or shameless, nor can it suggest moral indifference. She
fell in love with Carlos Ui whom she believed to be single, and, that upon her discovery of his true civil
status, she parted ways with him.

In the Memorandum 22 filed on March 20, 1995 by complainant Leslie Ui, she prayed for the disbarment of
Atty. Iris Bonifacio and reiterated that respondent committed immorality by having intimate relations with a
married man which resulted in the birth of two (2) children. Complainant testified that respondent's mother,
Mrs. Linda Bonifacio, personally knew complainant and her husband since the late 1970s because they
were clients of the bank where Mrs. Bonifacio was the Branch Manager. 23 It was thus highly improbable
that respondent, who was living with her parents as of 1986, would not have been informed by her own
mother that Carlos Ui was a married man. Complainant likewise averred that respondent committed
disrespect towards the Commission for submitting a photocopy of a document containing an intercalated
date.

In her Reply to Complainant's Memorandum 24 , respondent stated that complainant miserably failed to
show sufficient proof to warrant her disbarment. Respondent insists that contrary to the allegations of
complainant, there is no showing that respondent had knowledge of the fact of marriage of Carlos Ui to
complainant. The allegation that her mother knew Carlos Ui to be a married man does not prove that such
information was made known to respondent.

Hearing on the case ensued, after which the Commission on Bar Discipline submitted its Report and
Recommendation, finding that:

In the case at bar, it is alleged that at the time respondent was courted by Carlos Ui, the latter
represented himself to be single. The Commission does not find said claim too difficult to believe in
the light of contemporary human experience.

Almost always, when a married man courts a single woman, he represents himself to be single,
separated, or without any firm commitment to another woman. The reason therefor is not hard to
fathom. By their very nature, single women prefer single men.

The records will show that when respondent became aware the (sic) true civil status of Carlos Ui,
she left for the United States (in July of 1988). She broke off all contacts with him. When she
returned to the Philippines in March of 1989, she lived with her brother, Atty. Teodoro Bonifacio, Jr.
Carlos Ui and respondent only talked to each other because of the children whom he was allowed
to visit. At no time did they live together.

Under the foregoing circumstances, the Commission fails to find any act on the part of respondent
that can be considered as unprincipled or disgraceful as to be reprehensible to a high degree. To be
sure, she was more of a victim that (sic) anything else and should deserve compassion rather than
condemnation. Without cavil, this sad episode destroyed her chance of having a normal and happy
family life, a dream cherished by every single girl.

xxx xxx xxx

Thereafter, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines issued a Notice of Resolution
dated December 13, 1997, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of
this Resolution/Decision as Annex "A", and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the
evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, the complaint for Gross Immorality against
Respondent is DISMISSED for lack of merit. Atty. Iris Bonifacio is REPRIMANDED for knowingly
and willfully attaching to her Answer a falsified Certificate of Marriage with a stern warning that a
repetition of the same will merit a more severe penalty.

We agree with the findings aforequoted.

The practice of law is a privilege. A bar candidate does not have the right to enjoy the practice of the legal
profession simply by passing the bar examinations. It is a privilege that can be revoked, subject to the
mandate of due process, once a lawyer violates his oath and the dictates of legal ethics. The requisites for
admission to the practice of law are:

a. he must be a citizen of the Philippines;

 b. a resident thereof;

c. at least twenty-one (21) years of age;

d. a person of good moral character;

e. he must show that no charges against him involving moral turpitude, are filed or pending in court;

f. possess the required educational qualifications; and

g. pass the bar examinations. 25 (Emphasis supplied)

Clear from the foregoing is that one of the conditions prior to admission to the bar is that an applicant must
possess good moral character. More importantly, possession of good moral character must be continuous
as a requirement to the enjoyment of the privilege of law practice, otherwise, the loss thereof is a ground for
the revocation of such privilege. It has been held —

If good moral character is a sine qua non for admission to the bar, then the continued possession of
good moral character is also a requisite for retaining membership in the legal profession.
Membership in the bar may be terminated when a lawyer ceases to have good moral character.
(Royong vs. Oblena, 117 Phil. 865).

A lawyer may be disbarred for "grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude". A member of the bar should have moral integrity in addition to
professional probity.

It is difficult to state with precision and to fix an inflexible standard as to what is "grossly immoral
conduct" or to specify the moral delinquency and obliquity which render a lawyer unworthy of
continuing as a member of the bar. The rule implies that what appears to be unconventional
behavior to the straight-laced may not be the immoral conduct that warrants disbarment.

Immoral conduct has been defined as "that conduct which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and
which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members of the
community." (7 C.J.S. 959). 26

In the case at bar, it is the claim of respondent Atty. Bonifacio that when she met Carlos Ui, she knew and
believed him to be single. Respondent fell in love with him and they got married and as a result of such
marriage, she gave birth to two (2) children. Upon her knowledge of the true civil status of Carlos Ui, she
left him.

Simple as the facts of the case may sound, the effects of the actuations of respondent are not only far from
simple, they will have a rippling effect on how the standard norms of our legal practitioners should be
defined. Perhaps morality in our liberal society today is a far cry from what it used to be before. This
permissiveness notwithstanding, lawyers, as keepers of public faith, are burdened with a higher degree of
social responsibility and thus must handle their personal affairs with greater caution. The facts of this case
lead us to believe that perhaps respondent would not have found herself in such a compromising situation
had she exercised prudence and been more vigilant in finding out more about Carlos Ui's personal
background prior to her intimate involvement with him.

Surely, circumstances existed which should have at least aroused respondent's suspicion that something
was amiss in her relationship with Carlos Ui, and moved her to ask probing questions. For instance,
respondent admitted that she knew that Carlos Ui had children with a woman from Amoy, China, yet it
appeared that she never exerted the slightest effort to find out if Carlos Ui and this woman were indeed
unmarried. Also, despite their marriage in 1987, Carlos Ui never lived with respondent and their first child, a
circumstance that is simply incomprehensible considering respondent's allegation that Carlos Ui was very
open in courting her.
All these taken together leads to the inescapable conclusion that respondent was imprudent in managing
her personal affairs. However, the fact remains that her relationship with Carlos Ui, clothed as it was with
what respondent believed was a valid marriage, cannot be considered immoral. For immorality connotes
conduct that shows indifference to the moral norms of society and the opinion of good and respectable
members of the community. 27 Moreover, for such conduct to warrant disciplinary action, the same must be
"grossly immoral," that is, it must be so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as
to be reprehensible to a high degree. 28

We have held that "a member of the Bar and officer of the court is not only required to refrain from
adulterous relationships . . . but must also so behave himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating
the belief that he is flouting those moral standards." 29 Respondent's act of immediately distancing herself
from Carlos Ui upon discovering his true civil status belies just that alleged moral indifference and proves
that she had no intention of flaunting the law and the high moral standard of the legal profession.
Complainant's bare assertions to the contrary deserve no credit. After all, the burden of proof rests upon
the complainant, and the Court will exercise its disciplinary powers only if she establishes her case by
clear, convincing and satisfactory evidence. 30 This, herein complainant miserably failed to do.

On the matter of the falsified Certificate of Marriage attached by respondent to her Answer, we find
improbable to believe the averment of respondent that she merely relied on the photocopy of the Marriage
Certificate which was provided her by Carlos Ui. For an event as significant as a marriage ceremony, any
normal bride would verily recall the date and year of her marriage. It is difficult to fathom how a bride,
especially a lawyer as in the case at bar, can forget the year when she got married. Simply stated, it is
contrary to human experience and highly improbable.

Furthermore, any prudent lawyer would verify the information contained in an attachment to her pleading,
especially so when she has personal knowledge of the facts and circumstances contained therein. In
attaching such Marriage Certificate with an intercalated date, the defense of good faith of respondent on
that point cannot stand.

It is the bounden duty of lawyers to adhere unwaveringly to the highest standards of morality.1avvphi1 The
legal profession exacts from its members nothing less. Lawyers are called upon to safeguard the integrity
of the Bar, free from misdeeds and acts constitutive of malpractice. Their exalted positions as officers of the
court demand no less than the highest degree of morality.

WHEREFORE, the complaint for disbarment against respondent Atty. Iris L. Bonifacio, for alleged
immorality, is hereby DISMISSED.

However, respondent is hereby REPRIMANDED for attaching to her Answer a photocopy of her Marriage
Certificate, with an altered or intercalated date thereof, with a STERN WARNING that a more severe
sanction will be imposed on her for any repetition of the same or similar offense in the future.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

SBC Case No. 519 July 31, 1997

PATRICIA FIGUEROA, complainant,

vs.
SIMEON BARRANCO, JR., respondent.

RESOLUTION

ROMERO, J.:

In a complaint made way back in 1971, Patricia Figueroa petitioned that respondent Simeon Barranco, Jr.
be denied admission to the legal profession. Respondent had passed the 1970 bar examinations on the
fourth attempt, after unsuccessful attempts in 1966, 1967 and 1968. Before be could take his oath,
however, complainant filed the instant petition averring that respondent and she had been sweethearts, that
a child out of wedlock was born to them and that respondent did not fulfill his repeated promises to many
her.

The facts were manifested in hearings held before Investigator Victor F. Sevilla in June and July 1971.
Respondent and complainant were townmates in Janiuay, Iloilo. Since 1953, when they were both in their
teens, they were steadies. Respondent even acted as escort to complainant when she reigned as Queen at
the 1953 town fiesta. Complainant first acceded to sexual congress with respondent sometime in 1960.
Their intimacy yielded a son, Rafael Barranco, born on December 11, 1964.1 It was after the child was
born, complainant alleged, that respondent first promised he would marry her after he passes the bar
examinations. Their relationship continued and respondent allegedly made more than twenty or thirty
promises of marriage. He gave only P10.00 for the child on the latter's birthdays. Her trust in him and their
relationship ended in 1971, when she learned that respondent married another woman. Hence, this
petition.

Upon complainant's motion, the Court authorized the taking of testimonies of witnesses by deposition in
1972. On February 18, 1974, respondent filed a Manifestation and Motion to Dismiss the case
citing complainant's failure to comment on the motion of Judge Cuello seeking to be relieved from the duty
to take aforesaid testimonies by deposition. Complainant filed her comment required and that she remains
interested in the resolution of the present case. On June 18, 1974, the Court denied respondent's motion to
dismiss.

On October 2, 1980, the Court once again denied a motion to dismiss on the ground of abandonment filed
by respondent on September 17, 1979.2 Respondent's third motion to dismiss was noted in the Court's
Resolution dated September 15, 1982.3 In 1988, respondent repeated his request, citing his election as a
member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Janiuay, Iloilo from 1980-1986, his active participation in civic
organizations and good standing in the community as well as the length of time this case has been pending
as reasons to allow him to take his oath as a lawyer.4

On September 29, 1988, the Court resolved to dismiss the complaint for failure of complainant to prosecute
the case for an unreasonable period of time and to allow Simeon Barranco, Jr. to take the lawyer's oath
upon payment of the required fees.5
Respondent's hopes were again dashed on November 17, 1988 when the Court, in response to
complainant's opposition, resolved to cancel his scheduled oath-taking. On June 1, 1993, the Court referred
the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.

The IBP's report dated May 17, 1997 recommended the dismissal of the case and that respondent be
allowed to take the lawyer's oath.

We agree.

Respondent was prevented from taking the lawyer's oath in 1971 because of the charge of gross immorality
made by complainant. To recapitulate, respondent bore an illegitimate child with his sweetheart, Patricia
Figueroa, who also claims that he did not fulfill his promise to marry her after he passes the bar
examinations.

We find that these facts do not constitute gross immorality warranting the permanent exclusion of
respondent from the legal profession. His engaging in premarital sexual relations with complainant and
promises to marry suggests a doubtful moral character on his part but the same does not constitute grossly
immoral conduct. The Court has held that to justify suspension or disbarment the act complained of must
not only be immoral, but grossly immoral. "A grossly immoral act is one that is so corrupt and false as to
constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled or disgraceful as to be reprehensible to a high degree."6 It is a
willful, flagrant, or shameless act which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of respectable members
of the community.7

We find the ruling in Arciga v. Maniwang8 quite relevant because mere intimacy between a man and a
woman, both of whom possess no impediment to marry, voluntarily carried on and devoid of any deceit on
the part of respondent, is neither so corrupt nor so unprincipled as to warrant the imposition of disciplinary
sanction against him, even if as a result of such relationship a child was born out of wedlock.9

Respondent and complainant were sweethearts whose sexual relations were evidently consensual. We do
not find complainant's assertions that she had been forced into sexual intercourse, credible. She continued
to see and be respondent's girlfriend even after she had given birth to a son in 1964 and until 1971. All
those years of amicable and intimate relations refute her allegations that she was forced to have sexual
congress with him. Complainant was then an adult who voluntarily and actively pursued their relationship
and was not an innocent young girl who could be easily led astray. Unfortunately, respondent chose to
marry and settle permanently with another woman. We cannot castigate a man for seeking out the partner
of his dreams, for marriage is a sacred and perpetual bond which should be entered into because of love,
not for any other reason.

We cannot help viewing the instant complaint as an act of revenge of a woman scorned, bitter and
unforgiving to the end. It is also intended to make respondent suffer severely and it seems, perpetually,
sacrificing the profession he worked very hard to be admitted into. Even assuming that his past
indiscretions are ignoble, the twenty-six years that respondent has been prevented from being a lawyer
constitute sufficient punishment therefor. During this time there appears to be no other indiscretion
attributed to him.10 Respondent, who is now sixty-two years of age, should thus be allowed, albeit belatedly,
to take the lawyer's oath.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED. Respondent Simeon Barranco, Jr. is ALLOWED
to take his oath as a lawyer upon payment of the proper fees.

SO ORDERED.