SARNO, JOBEL S.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2
UNIVERSITY OF BAGUIO
CASES:

1. ESTRADA VS. SANDIGANGBAYAN

2. CHURCHILL VS. RAFFERTY
3. PEOPLE VS JOHNSON,348 SCRA 526
4. QUINTERO VS NBI, 162 SCRA 467
5. ROLDAN VS ARCA, 65 SCRA 336
6. CALLANTA VS VILLANUEVA, 77 SCRA 777
7. SANIDAD VS, COMELEC 181 SCRA 529
8. TANADA VS. TUVERA ,136 SCRA 27 / 146 SCRA 1986
IN RE: PROD'N OF COURT RECORDS AND DOCS AND THE ATTENDANCE OF
9. PEOPLE VS. JOSE 37 SCRA 450, 1971
10. LEVISTE VS. COURT OF APPEALS 615 SCRA 650, 2010
11. PEOPLE VS. VELASCO 340 SCRA 207, 2000
12. SO VS. REPUBLIC 513 SCRA 267 2007
 EN BANC

G.R. No. 148560 November 19, 2001

JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA, petitioner,

vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (Third Division) and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.

FACTS:

Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada was President of the Philippines until January
20, 2001 when he was forced to vacate the presidency by people power and then Vice
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo succeeded him in office.

Among the 8 cases filed before the Sandiganbayan, Estrada was charged for
plunder for allegedly having amassed ill-gotten wealth in the amount of P4.1 billion, more
or less.

He moved to quash the information for plunder on the ground that R.A. No. 7080,
otherwise called the Anti-Plunder Law, is unconstitutional and that the information
charges more than one offense. The Sandiganbayan denied Estrada’s motion.

Estrada then filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the Supreme Court
contending that the Sandiganbayan erred in denying his motion to quash. He alleged that
the Anti-Plunder Law is void for being vague and overbroad.

Estrada contended that the Anti-Plunder Law failed to provide for the statutory
definition of the terms "combination" and "series" in the phrase "a combination or series
of overt or criminal acts" found in Sec. 1, par. (d), and Sec. 2, and the word "pattern" in
Sec. 4.

He posited that without their definitions, the Anti-Plunder Law is unconstitutional

for being vague and overbroad and denied him the right to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him, hence, it is violative of his fundamental right to due
process.

ISSUES:

The issues delineated by the Supreme Court are the following:

(a) Whether the Plunder Law is unconstitutional for being vague;

(b) Whether the Plunder Law requires less evidence for proving the predicate
crimes of plunder, thus, it violates the rights of the accused to due process; and,
 (c) Whether the crime of Plunder as defined in RA 7080 is a malum prohibitum,
and if so, whether it is within the power of Congress to so classify it.

RULING:

Is R.A. 7080 or “ANTI-PLUNDER LAW” unconstitutional?

NO. The Court held that RA 7080 otherwise known as the Plunder Law, as
amended by RA 7659, is CONSTITUTIONAL.

Is the Anti-Plunder Law vague?

NO. The Supreme Court held that it cannot be contended that the Anti-Plunder
Law does not give a fair warning and sufficient notice of what it seeks to penalize.

Hence, Estrada’s reliance on the "void-for-vagueness" doctrine is manifestly

misplaced.

The Court also said that the doctrine has been formulated in various ways, but is
most commonly stated to the effect that a statute establishing a criminal offense must
define the offense with sufficient definiteness that persons of ordinary intelligence can
understand what conduct is prohibited by the statute. It can only be invoked against that
specie of legislation that is utterly vague on its face, i.e., that which cannot be clarified
either by a saving clause or by construction.

Churchill vs. Rafferty

G.R. No. L-10572, December 21, 1915
(32 Phil 580)

FACTS:
The law involved in this case is Act No. 2339, otherwise known as the “Internal
Revenue Law of 1914” that took effect in July 1, 1914.
James Rafferty, then the Collector of Internal Revenue, seeks to collect from
Francis Churchill and Stewart Tait the annual tax mandated under subsection (b) of
section 100 of Act No. 2339.
Under the same provision of Act 2339, the Collector of Internal Revenue has also
the power to remove any sign, signboard, or billboard on the ground if the same is
offensive to the sight or a nuisance.
 Churchill and Tait were the owners of a billboard located on private lands in the
Province of Rizal and that the Collector of Internal Revenue ordered to remove them after
determining that the billboard complained of by the British and German Consuls was
offensive to the sight and also a nuisance.
Churchill and Tait then filed a case of injunction against the Collector of Internal
Revenue and to restrain him from implementing the Subsection (b) of Section 100 of Act
No. 2339.
The trial court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs and it perpetually restrained and
prohibited the Collector of Internal Revenue and his deputies from collecting the annual
tax and enforcing Subsection (b) of Section 100 of Act No. 2339.
The Collector of Internal Revenue questioned the order of the court by invoking
Sections 139 and 140 of the same law. The first expressly forbids the use of an injunction
to stay the collection of any internal revenue tax and the second provides a remedy for
any wrong in connection with such taxes, and this remedy was intended to be exclusive,
thereby precluding the remedy by injunction.
Plaintiffs, on the other hand, contended that portion of Section 100 of Act No. 2339
that empowers the Collector of Internal Revenue to remove billboards as nuisances is
unconstitutional as it deprives one’s property without due process of law.

(The case gives rise to two (2) main questions –

1. that relating to the power of the court to restrain by injunction the collection of
the tax complained of, and
2. that relating to the validity of those provisions of subsection (b) of section 100
of Act No. 2339 conferring power upon the Collector of Internal Revenue to
remove any sign, signboard, or billboard upon the ground that the same is
offensive to the sight or is otherwise a nuisance.)

ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 100 of Act No. 2339 was a legitimate exercise of police power.
RULING:
On the first question, the SC held that Section 139 of Act No. 2339 did not
necessarily take away the power of the court to issue injunction reasoning that an
injunction will not issue if there is an adequate remedy provided under the law.
There being adequate remedy made available under the law to dissatisfied
taxpayers, the authority of the court to issue injunctions was rendered inoperative only.
ON THE ISSUE OF WHETHER SECTION 100 OF ACT NO. 2339 IS LEGITIMATE
EXERCISE OF POLICE POWER
The SC held that it is a VALID EXERCISE OF POLICE POWER. It pronounced
that the exercise of the police power of the Philippine Government belongs to the
Legislature and that this power is limited only by the Acts of Congress and those
fundamentals principles which lie at the foundation of all republican forms of government.
An Act of the Legislature which is obviously and undoubtedly foreign to any of the
purposes of the police power and interferes with the ordinary enjoyment of property
would, without doubt, be held to be invalid. But where the Act is reasonably within a proper
consideration of and care for the public health, safety, or comfort, it should not be
disturbed by the courts.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

vs.
LEILA JOHNSON

G.R. No. 138881, December 18, 2000

348 SCRA 526

FACTS:

At the time of the incident, Leila Johnson was a registered nurse, and a former
Filipino citizen who was naturalized as an American.

On June 16, 1998, she arrived in the Philippines to visit her son’s family in
Calamba, Laguna and was due to fly back to the United States on July 26.

Upon checking in at the airport at around 7:30 p.m. of June 26, 1998, she was
frisked by Olivia Ramirez, a lady frisker, who felt something hard on her abdomen. Upon
inquiry, Mrs. Johnson explained she needed to wear two panty girdles as she had just
undergone an operation as a result of an ectopic pregnancy.

Not satisfied with the explanation, Ramirez took Mrs. Johnson to the nearest
women’s room for inspection as directed by her superior Reynaldo Embile. Inside the
women’s room, Mrs. Johnson was asked again by Ramirez what was the hard object on
her stomach and she gave the same answer she had previously given. When Mrs.
Johnson was asked to bring out the thing under her girdle, she brought out three plastic
packs which Ramirez turned over to Embile who was outside the women’s room.

According to the NBI Chemist George de Lara, the confiscated packs contained a
total of 580.2 grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu." Thus, Mrs.
Johnson was then arrested and charged for the possession of illegal drugs.
 In her defense, Mrs. Johnson claimed that she was standing in line at the last
boarding gate when she was approached by Embile and two female officers who
handcuffed and took her to the women’s room. There, she was asked to undress and was
then subjected to a body search. After two hours, she was transferred to the office of a
certain Col. Castillo and after another two hours, Col. Castillo and about eight security
guards came in and threw two white packages on the table. They told her to admit that
the packages were hers. She claimed that she was detained until noon of June 28, 1999
before she was taken before a fiscal for inquest. She claimed that throughout the period
of her detention, from the night of June 26 until June 28, she was never allowed to talk to
counsel nor was she allowed to call the U.S. Embassy or any of her relatives in the
Philippines.

After trial, the trial court rendered a decision convicting Mrs. Johnson for violation
of Section 16 of Republic Act 6425 as amended and was sentenced to suffer a penalty of
RECLUSION PERPETUA.

On appeal, Mrs. Johnson claimed that she was arrested and detained in gross
violation of her constitutional rights. She argued that the "shabu" confiscated from her is
inadmissible against her because she was forced to affix her signature on the plastic bags
while she was detained, without the assistance of counsel and without having been
informed of her constitutional rights. Hence, she argued, the methamphetamine
hydrochloride, or "shabu," should have been excluded from the evidence.

ISSUE:

Is the contention of Mrs. Johnson correct?

RULING:

NO. The contention has no merit. No statement, if any, was taken from Mrs.
Johnson during her detention and used in evidence against her. There is, therefore, no
basis for invoking Art. III, §12(1) and (3). On the other hand, what is involved in this case
is an arrest in flagrante delicto pursuant to a valid search made on her person.

The constitutional right of the accused was not violated as she was never placed
under custodial investigation but was validly arrested without warrant pursuant to the
provisions of Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure which provides:

Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a

private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

(a) when in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed,

is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
 (b) when an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has
committed it;

G.R. No. L-35149 June 23, 1988

EDUARDO QUINTERO, petitioner,

vs.
THE NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, HON. ELIAS
ASUNCION, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, and HON.
JOSE FLAMINIANO, City Fiscal of Pasay City, respondents.

FACTS:

On 19 May 1972, petitioner Eduardo Quintero, delegate of the first district of Leyte
to the 1971 Constitutional Convention (Con-Con, for short) delivered a privilege
speech 1 at a plenary session of the Con-Con. In his speech, Delegate Quintero disclosed
that, on different occasions, certain persons had distributed money to some delegates of
the Con-Con, apparently in an effort to influence the delegates in the discharge of their
functions. As an offshoot of this disclosure, Delegate Quintero delivered to the Con-Con
the aggregate amount of the "payola" he himself had received, the amount of eleven
thousand one hundred fifty pesos (P11,150.00) in cash, preserved intact for delivery to
the proper officials of the Con-Con, for whatever action it may wish to take on the matter.
Delegate Quintero, however, did not reveal the names of the persons who gave him the
money; and he begged at that time not to be made to name names. However, pressure
mounted on Delegate Quintero to reveal the Identities of the people behind the "payola"
scheme. Hence, on 30 May 1972 (the day after he returned from Tacloban City, where
he had attended the funeral of his brother), Delegate Quintero released from his hospital
bed in San Juan de Dios Hospital, where he was hospitalized due to an indisposed
condition, a sworn statement addressed to the Committee on Privileges of the Con-Con,
mentioning the names of the persons who gave him the "payola."

ISSUE:

Whether or not the issue of search of warrant is Valid?

RULING:

The circumstances prevailing before the issuance of the questioned search warrant, and
the actual manner in which the search was conducted in the house of the petitioner, all
but imperfectly, and yet, strongly suggest that the entire procedure, from beginning to
end, was an orchestrated movement designed for just one purpose — to destroy
petitioner Quintero's public image with "incriminating evidence," and, as a corollary to this,
that the evidence allegedly seized from his residence was "planted" by the very raiding
party that was commanded to "seize" such incriminating evidence.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court finds, and so holds, that the questioned search
warrant issued by respondent judge, is null and void, for being violative of
the Constitution and the Rules of Court.

WHEREFORE, Search Warrant No. 7 issued on 31 May 1972 by

respondent Judge is declared NULL and VOID and of no force and effect.
The Temporary Restraining Order issued by this Court on 6 June 1972 is
hereby made PERMANENT The amount of P379,200.00 allegedly seized
from the house of petitioner Quintero, now in the possession of the Central
Bank, and already demonetized, is left with said Central Bank, to be
disposed of, as such, in accordance with law and the regulations.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-25434 July 25, 1975

HONORABLE ARSENIO N. ROLDAN, JR., in his capacity as Acting

Commissioner, Philippine Fisheries Commission, and THE PHILIPPINE
NAVY, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE FRANCISCO ARCA, as Presiding Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Manila (Branch 1) and MORABE, DE GUZMAN &
COMPANY, respondents.

FACTS:

Respondent company filed a case against Fisheries Commissioner Arsenio N.

Roldan, Jr.for the recovery of fishing vessel Tony Lex VI which had been seized
and impounded by petitioner Fisheries Commissioner through the Philippine Nay.
The CFI Manila granted it, thus respondent company took to possession of the
vessel Tony Lex VI. Petitioner requested the Philippine Navy to apprehended
vessels Tony Lex VI and Tony Lex III, also respectively called Srta. Winnie and
Srta. Agnes, for alleged violations of some provisions of the Fisheries Act. On
August 5, or 6, 1965, the two fishing boats were actually seized for illegal fishing
with dynamite

ISSUE: WON the seizure of the vessel, its equipment and dynamites therein were
valid.

DECISION:
The seizure of the vessel, its equipment and dynamites was valid. Search and
seizure of vessels and aircraft without search warrant for violations of the customs
laws have been traditional exception to the constitutional requirement of a search
warrant because, the vessel can be quickly moved out of the locality and
jurisdiction in which the search warrant must be sough before such search or
seizure can be constitutionality effected. The same exception should apply to the
seizures of fishing vessels breaching our fishery laws. They are usually equipped
with powerful motors that enable them to elude pursuing ships of the Philippine
Navy or Coast Guard. Another exception to the constitutional requirement of a
search warrant for a valid search and seizure, is a search or seizure as an incident
to a lawful arrest. Under our Rules of Court, a police officer or a private individual
may, without warrant, arrest a person a) who has committed, is actually committing
or is about the commit an offense which has been actually committed; b)who is
reasonably believed to have committed the offense which has been actually
committed; or c) who is detention prisoner who has escaped from confinement
while serving final judgement or from temporary detention during pendency of his
case or while being transferred from one confinement to another. In the case at
bar, the members of the two vessels were caught in flagrante illegally fishing with
dynamite and without the requisite license. Thus, their apprehension without a
warrant of arrest while committing a crime is lawful. Consequently, the Seizure of
the vessel, its equipment and dynamites therein was equally valid as an incident
to a lawful arrest.

G.R. Nos. L-24646 & L-24674 June 20, 1977

FAUSTINA CALLANTA, petitioner,

vs.
HON. FELIPE VILLANUEVA, City Judge, City Court of Dagupan City, CORNELIA
JIMENEZ and PASTORA DAVID JIMENEZ, respondents.

Facts:

Two complaints for grave oral defamation were filed against Faustina Callanta. The City
Judge of Dagupan City, Felipe Villanueva, denied the motions to quash the complaints.
Thus, petitioner Callanta brought the suits for certiorari in the Supreme Court. Petitioner
questions the validity of the issuance of warrant of arrest by respondent, arguing that the
City Fiscal should have conducted the preliminary investigation. According to petitioner’s
counsel, there was jurisdictional infirmity. After the issuance of the warrants of arrest and
the bail fixed at P600, petitioner posted the bail bond, thus obtaining her
provisional liberty. The City Fiscal in this case did not disagree with the judge’s
investigation, and agreed with the complaints filed.

Issue: Whether or Not petitioner’s contentions are to be given merit.

RULING:

Based on many precedent cases of the Supreme Court, “where the accused has
filed bail and waived the preliminary investigation proper, he has waived whatever defect,
if any, in the preliminary examination conducted prior to the issuance of the warrant of
arrest”. In the case at bar, it is futile for the petitioner to question the validity of the
issuance of the warrant of arrest, because she posted the bail bond. Petitioner also erred
in arguing that only the City Fiscal can conduct a preliminary Investigation. According to
the Charter of the City of Dagupan, “the City Court of Dagupan City may also
conduct preliminary investigation for any offense, without regard to the limits
of punishment, and may release, or commit and bind over any person charged with such
offense to secure his appearance before the proper court”. Petition for certiorari is denied.
Restraining order issued by the Court is lifted and set aside.

PABLITO V. SANIDAD, petitioner,

vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

FACTS:

On September 27, 1976, PABLO SANIDAD and PABLITO SANIDAD, father and
son, filed a special civil action of PROHIBITION WITH PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
against the COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (COMELEC).

Petitioners Sanidad seek –

a. to ENJOIN the COMELEC from holding and conducting the Referendum

Plebiscite set on October 16, 1976;

b. to DECLARE WITHOUT FORCE AND EFFECT Presidential Decree Nos. 991

and 1033, insofar as they propose amendments to the Constitution;

*PD 991 - calling for a national referendum on October 16, 1976;

*PD 1033 – stating the QUESTIONS to be submitted to the people in the
Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16, 1976

c. to DECLARE WITHOUT FORCE AND EFFECT Presidential Decree No. 1031

insofar as it directs the Commission on Elections to supervise, control, hold,
and conduct the Referendum-Plebiscite scheduled on October 16, 1976.
 Petitioners also claim that under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, there is nothing
in the said constitutions that gives the incumbent President the power to exercise
CONSTITUENT POWER TO PROPOSE AMENDMENTS to the new Constitution.

ISSUE/S:

The MAIN ISSUE raised in these prohibition cases is –

WHETHER OR NOT the incumbent President has the power to propose amendments
to the 1973 Constitution in the absence of the interim National Assembly which has not
been convened.

The Supreme Court, however, resolved three (3) questions and they are the following:

1. Is the question of the constitutionality of Presidential Decrees Nos. 991, 1031 and
1033 political or justiciable?

2. During the present stage of the transition period, and under, the environmental
circumstances now obtaining, does the President possess power to propose
amendments to the Constitution as well as set up the required machinery and prescribe
the procedure for the ratification of his proposals by the people?

3. Is the submission to the people of the proposed amendments within the time frame
allowed therefor a sufficient and proper submission?

RULING:

The Supreme Court held that the petitions for prohibition were devoid of merit and
DISMISSED the same. (8 justices voted to DISMISS the petitions while only 2 justices
voted to GRANT the petitions)

In resolving the FIRST ISSUE on whether question on the constitutionality of the

Presidential Decrees No. 991, 1031 and 1033 is a political or justiciable question, the
Supreme Court held that it is a JUSTICIABLE QUESTION. (meaning, the Court has
jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case and determine the rights of the parties.)

(Seven (7) justices were of the view that the question posed is JUSTICIABLE while only
three (3) justices considered the question as POLITICAL.)

A justiciable controversy involves a definite and concrete dispute touching on the legal
relations of parties who are pitted against each other due to their demanding and
conflicting legal interests.6 And a dispute is ripe for adjudication when the act being
challenged has had direct adverse effect on the person challenging it and admits of
specific relief through a decree that is conclusive in character.
On the SECOND ISSUE on whether the President possesses the power to propose
amendments to the Constitution, the Court ruled that President Marcos had the power to
propose amendments to the Constitution. (This is also the answer to MAIN ISSUE of the
prohibition cases)

Seven (7) justices voted in the AFFIRMATIVE, while two (2) justices voted in the
NEGATIVE.

Associate Justice Fernando, conformably to his concurring and dissenting opinion in

Aquino vs. Enrile (59 SCRA 183), specifically dissents from the proposition that there is
concentration of powers in the Executive during periods of crisis, thus raising serious
doubts as to the power of the President to propose amendments.

And lastly, the THIRD ISSUE on whether the submission to the people of the proposed
amendments within the time frame allowed is sufficient and proper, the Court ruled that
there is sufficient and proper submission of the proposed amendments for ratification.

6 justices were of the view that there is a sufficient and proper submission of the proposed
amendments for ratification by the people.

2 justices expressed the hope, however that the period of time may be extended.

3 justices were of the view that the question is political and therefore beyond the
competence and cognizance of this Court.

1 justice adheres to his concurrence in the opinion of Chief Justice Concepcion in

Gonzales vs. COMELEC (21 SCRA 774).

2 justices held that prescinding from the President's lack of authority to exercise the
constituent power to propose the amendments, etc., as above stated, there is no fair and
proper submission with sufficient information and time to assure intelligent consent or
rejection under the standards set by this Court in the controlling cases of Gonzales, supra,
and Tolentino vs. COMELEC (41 SCRA 702).

G.R. No. L-63915 December 29, 1986

LORENZO M. TAÑ;ADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and MOVEMENT OF

ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD, INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC.
(MABINI), petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the President,
 HON. JOAQUIN VENUS, in his capacity as Deputy Executive Assistant to the
President, MELQUIADES P. DE LA CRUZ, ETC., ET AL., respondents.

G.R. No. L-28232 February 6, 1971

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
JAIME JOSE Y GOMEZ, ET AL., defendants. JAIME JOSE Y GOMEZ, BASILIO
PINEDA, JR., alias "BOY," EDGARDO AQUINO Y PAYUMO and ROGELIO CAÑAL
Y SEVILLA, defendants-appellants.

Office of the Solicitor General Antonio P. Barredo and Solicitor Augusto M.

Amores for plaintiff-appellee.

Baizas, Alberto and Associates, Andreciano F. Caballero and Lota, Paraiso,

Garcia and Dueñas for defendant-appellant Jaime G. Jose.

Mabanag, Eliger and Associates for defendant-appellant Basilio Pineda, Jr.

Sycip, Salazar, Luna, Manalo and Feliciano for defendant-appellant Edgardo P.

Aquino.

Antonio Coronel Law Office and Roberto J. Ignacio for defendant-appellant

Rogelio S. Canial.

FACTS:

The undersigned complainant accuses JAIME JOSE Y GOMEZ, BASILIO PINEDA, JR.
Alias "BOY," EDUARDO AQUINO Y PAYUMO alias "EDDIE" and ROGELIO CAÑAL Y
SEVILLA alias "ROGER," as principals, WONG LAY PUENG, SILVERIO GUANZON Y
ROMERO and JESSIE GUION Y ENVOLTARIO as accomplices, of the crime of Forcible
Abduction with rape, committed as follows:

That on or about the 26th day of June, 1967, in Quezon City, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named principal accused, conspiring together,
confederating with and mutually helping one another, did, then and there, wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, with lewd design, forcibly abduct the undersigned complainant
against her will, and did, then and there take her, pursuant to their common criminal
design, to the Swanky Hotel in Pasay City, where each of the four (4) accused, by means
of force and intimidation, and with the use of a deadly weapon, have carnal knowledge of
the undersigned complainant against her will, to her damage and prejudice in such
amount as may be awarded to her under the provisions of the civil code.

That WONG LAY PUENG, SILVERIO GUANZON y ROMERO, and JESSIE GUION y
ENVOLTARIO without taking a direct part in the execution of the offense either by forcing,
inducing the principal accused to execute, or cooperating in its execution by an
indispensable act, did, then and there cooperate in the execution of the offense by
previous or simultaneous acts, that is, by cooperating, aiding, abetting and permitting the
principal accused in sequestering the undersigned complainant in one of the rooms of the
Swanky Hotel then under the control of the accused Wong Lay Pueng, Silverio Guanzon
y Romero and Jessie Guion y Envoltario, thus supplying material and moral aid in the
consummation of the offense.

That the aforestated offense has been attended by the following aggravating
circumstances:

1. Use of a motor vehicle.

2. Night time sought purposely to facilitate the commission of the crime and to make its
discovery difficult;

3. Abuse of superior strength;

4. That means were employed or circumstances brought about which added ignominy to
the natural effects of the act; and

5. That the wrong done in the commission of the crime be deliberately augmented by
causing other wrong not necessary for the commission.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

G.R. No. 189122 March 17, 2010

JOSE ANTONIO LEVISTE, Petitioner,

vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

FACTS:

Charged with the murder of Rafael de las Alas, petitioner Jose Antonio Leviste was
convicted by the Regional Trial Court of Makati City for the lesser crime of homicide and
sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of six years and one day of prision mayor
as minimum to 12 years and one day of reclusion temporal as maximum. He appealed
his conviction to the Court of Appeals. Pending appeal, he filed an urgent application for
admission to bail pending appeal, citing his advanced age and health condition, and
claiming the absence of any risk or possibility of flight on his part. The Court of Appeals
denied petitioner’s application for bail. It invoked the bedrock principle in the matter of bail
pending appeal, that the discretion to extend bail during the course of appeal should be
exercised “with grave caution and only for strong reasons.” Petitioner now questions as
grave abuse of discretion the denial of his application for bail, considering that none of
the conditions justifying denial of bail under the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of
the Rules of Court was present. Petitioner’s theory is that, where the penalty imposed by
the trial court is more than six years but not more than 20 years and the circumstances
mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5 are absent, bail must be granted to an
appellant pending appeal.

ISSUE:

In an application for bail pending appeal by an appellant sentenced by the trial court to a
penalty of imprisonment for more than six years, does the discretionary nature of the grant
of bail pending appeal mean that bail should automatically be granted absent any of the
circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of
Court?

HELD: NO, discretionary nature of bail mentioned in Section 5 of Rule 114 does not mean
automatic grant of bail in case of appeal.

After conviction by the trial court, the presumption of innocence terminates and,
accordingly, the constitutional right to bail ends. From then on, the grant of bail is subject
to judicial discretion. At the risk of being repetitious, such discretion must be exercised
with grave caution and only for strong reasons. Considering that the accused was in fact
convicted by the trial court, allowance of bail pending appeal should be guided by a
stringent-standards approach. This judicial disposition finds strong support in the history
and evolution of the rules on bail and the language of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of
Court. It is likewise consistent with the trial court’s initial determination that the accused
should be in prison. Furthermore, letting the accused out on bail despite his conviction
may destroy the deterrent effect of our criminal laws. This is especially germane to bail
pending appeal because long delays often separate sentencing in the trial court and
appellate review. In addition, at the post-conviction stage, the accused faces a certain
prison sentence and thus may be more likely to flee regardless of bail bonds or other
release conditions. Finally, permitting bail too freely in spite of conviction invites frivolous
and time-wasting appeals which will make a mockery of our criminal justice system and
court processes
 G.R. No. 140633 February 4, 2002

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
THE SANDIGANBAYAN (Fourth Division) and GERONIMO Z.
VELASCO, respondents.

FACTS:

Sentenced to life imprisonment and a fine of P20,000.00 by the Regional Trial

Court of Manila was appellant Yolanda Velasco y Pamintuan, after having been
found guilty of unlawfully selling “shabu,” in violation of Section 15 of Article III in
relation to Section 2(e-2), (f), (m), and (o) of Article 1 of “The Dangerous Drugs Act
of 1972” (R.A. 6425).

Velasco was apprehended in a buy-bust operation in the afternoon of June 28,

1991. Velasco was caught in flagrante delicto as she was handing shabu to a
designated poseur-buyer. Five more decks were found in her pockets.

Appellant argues that the court erred in admitting the said decks of shabu as
evidence against her since those were acquired through a warrantless arrest.
Hence, its inadmissibility. Secondly, appellant questions the RTC’s jurisdiction
over the case given the quantity allegedly obtained in her possession.

ISSUES:

1.) Whether or not the decks of shabu are inadmissible as evidence for having
been acquired through a warrantless arrest.

2.) Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over the case.

RULING:

1.) Yes. Section 5(a) of Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides that
an arrest when done lawfully either by a peace officer or any private person may
be done if the person to be arrested is actually committing, has committed or
attempting to commit an offense.

Appellant was caught in flagrante delicto thus her denial and defense of frame-up
cannot be justified under the said provision. Moreover, appellant failed to establish
that the members of the buy-bust team are policemen engaged in mulcting or other
unscrupulous caprice when they entrapped her.
2.) Yes. The enforcement of R.A. 7659, which amended the penalty provided for
in R.A. 6425, agrees with the appellants argument that under the foregoing
directive, since the amount of shabu involved in the instant case is only 0.8020
gram, the proper imposable component penalty is prision correccional to be
applied in its medium period, in the absence of any mitigating or aggravating
circumstances. Applying the indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum shall be
taken from the medium of prision correccional, which is two (2) years, four (4)
months and one (1) day, to four (4) years and two (2) months, while the minimum
shall be taken from the penalty next lower in degree, which is arresto mayor, the
range of which is one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6) months.”

R.A. 7691 expanded the jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal
Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts. The said act vested these courts
with exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment
not exceeding six years. However, R.A. 7691 shows that retroactive provisions
apply only to civil cases that have not yet reached the pre-trial stage. Neither from
an express proviso nor by implication can it be understood as having retroactive
application to criminal cases pending or decided by the Regional Trial Courts prior
to its effectivity. RTC’s jurisdiction to proceed to the final determination of the cause
is not affected by the new legislation.

At the time that the case against appellant was filed, the Regional Trial Court had
jurisdiction over the offense charged in as much as Section 39 of R.A 6425. In fine,
the jurisdiction of the trial court (RTC) over the case of the appellant was conferred
by the aforecited law then in force (R.A. 6425 before amendment) when the
information was filed. Jurisdiction attached upon the commencement of the action
and could not be ousted by the passage of R.A. 7691 reapportioning the
jurisdiction of inferior courts, the application of which to criminal cases is, to stress,
prospective in nature.

G.R. No. 170603 January 29, 2007

EDISON SO, Petitioner,

vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

Facts:

Petitioner Edison So filed before the RTC a Petition for Naturalization under
Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 473, otherwise known as the Revised Naturalization
Law,... He was born on February 17, 1982, in Manila; he is a Chinese citizen who
has lived in No. 528 Lavezares St., Binondo, Manila, since birth were the Joint
Affidavit[4] of Atty. Artemio Adasa, Jr. and Mark B. Salcedo; and petitioner�s
Certificate of Live Birth,[5] Alien Certificate of Registration,[6] and Immigrant
Certificate of Residence

On March 22, 2002, the RTC issued an Order setting the petition for hearing at
8:30 a.m. of December 12 and 17, 2002 during which all persons concerned were
enjoined to show cause, if any, why the petition should not be granted. The entire
petition and... its annexes, including the order, were ordered published once a
week for three consecutive weeks in the Official Gazette and also in a newspaper
of general circulation in the City of Manila. The RTC likewise ordered that copies
of the petition and notice be posted in public and... conspicuous places in the
Manila City Hall Building.

No one opposed the petition. During the hearing, petitioner presented Atty. Adasa,
Jr. who testified that he came to know petitioner in 1991 as the legal consultant
and adviser of the So family�s business.

Atty. Adasa, Jr. further testified that petitioner was gainfully employed and
presently resides at No. 528 Lavezares

Street, Binondo, Ma

Another witness for petitioner, Mark Salcedo, testified that he has known petitioner
for ten (10) years; they first met at a birthday party in 1991. He and petitioner were
classmates at the University of Santo Tomas (UST) where they took up Pharmacy.
Petitioner was a member of... some school organizations and mingled well with
friends... petitioner also testified and attempted to prove that he has all the
qualifications and none of the disqualifications to become a citizen of the
Philippines.

The RTC granted the petition on June 4, 2003.

The trial court ruled that the witnesses for petitioner had known him for the period
required by law, and they had affirmed that petitioner had all the qualifications and
none of the disqualifications to become a Filipino citizen. Thus, the court concluded
that petitioner had... satisfactorily supported his petition with evidence.

Respondent Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), appealed the decision to the CA

Issues:

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION FOR

NATURALIZATION DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE TWO (2) CHARACTER
WITNESSES, NAMELY: ARTEMIO ADASA, JR. AND MARK SALCEDO WERE
NOT QUALIFIED CHARACTER WITNESSES.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION FOR
NATURALIZATION DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE TWO (2) CHARACTER
WITNESSES, NAMELY: ARTEMIO ADASA, JR. AND MARK SALCEDO WERE
NOT QUALIFIED CHARACTER WITNESSES.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION FOR

NATURALIZATION DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE TWO (2) CHARACTER
WITNESSES, NAMELY: ARTEMIO ADASA, JR. AND MARK SALCEDO WERE
NOT QUALIFIED CHARACTER WITNESSES.

Respondent contended that based on the evidence on record, appellee failed to

prove that he possesses all the qualifications under Section 2 and none of the
disqualifications under Section 4 of C.A. No. 47

Ruling:

the CA set aside the ruling of the RTC and dismissed the petition for naturalization
without prejudice.[34] According to the CA, petitioner�s two (2) witnesses were
not credible because they... failed to mention specific details of petitioner�s life
or character to show how well they knew him; they merely �parroted� the
provisions of the Naturalization Act without clearly explaining their applicability to
petitioner�s case.[35] The... appellate court likewise ruled that petitioner failed
to comply with the requirement of the law that the applicant must not be less than
21 years of age on the day of the hearing of the petition; during the first hearing on
December 12, 2002, petitioner was only twenty (20)... years, nine (9) months, and
twenty five (25) days old, falling short of the requirement.[36] The CA stated,
however, that it was not its intention to forever close the door to any future
application for naturalization which petitioner would file, and that... it believes that
he would make a good Filipino citizen in due time, a decided asset to this
country.[37]

Petitioner�s motion for reconsideration was denied in a Resolution... petitioner

failed to show full and complete compliance with the requirements of naturalization
law. For this reason, we affirm the decision of the CA denying the petition for
naturalization without prejudice.

It must be stressed that admission to citizenship is one of the highest privileges

that the Republic of the Philippines can confer upon an alien. It is a privilege that
should not be conferred except upon persons fully qualified for it, and upon strict
compliance with the... law.[60]

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.