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1-1-1929
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Corbin, Arthur, "The Restatement of the Common Law by the American Law Institute" (1929). Faculty Scholarship Series. Paper 2922.
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THE RESTATEMENT
RESTATEMENT OF THE COMION
CO:aThION LAW
LAW BY THE
THE
MIERICAN
AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE
INSTITUTE
T HE organization of the American Law Law Institute grew
grew out ofof
T discussions at the annual meetings of the Association
American Law Schools. These discussions
Association of
discussions began more than
of
than ten
ten
ago. The teachers of law composing that .Association
years ago. Association had
become increasingly impressed with the growing complexity and and
uncertainty of the common law. The thousands of new decisions decisions
annually added to our already bursting storehouses
annually storehouses of learning
were making it continually
were continually more difficult
difficult to understand,
understand, to state,
teach the common law. To the same extent and for the
and to teach
same reasons the work of the practicing
same practicing lawyer in'advising
in advising clients
and the work of the judges in deciding cases were becoming becoming in-
creasingly
creasingly difficult. Necessarily, this situation was reflected in the
published opinions of the judges. Uncertainty of mind produced produced
confused reasoning and actual conflict in decision. Legal termin-
confused
ology, always shifty and inexact as in the case of all the other
ology, other
branches of socialsocial science, became more and more inefficient
inefficient in
unsatisfactory to every-
obtaining clarity of expression and more unsatisfactory
body concerned, as the strain upon it
body it was increased
increased by the rapidity
and complexity of modern life.11
and
Largely for
Largely for the foregoing reasons, doubts beganbegan to be expressed,
expressed,
both byby the public at large
large and by thoughtful
thoughtful members of the legal legal
profession, that our judicial organization
organization and our system of law
were rendering
were rendering adequate
adequate service
service to the community. In In law school
law school
faculties there
faculties there was much agitation for the study of jurisprudence
jurisprudence
in all
in all its phases, particularly as regards legal analysis and termin-
ology. It
ology. It was believed that there is a science of jurisprudence
jurisprudence and
that law
that law schools
schools should be places for its development, and not mere-
ly professional
ly professional training
training schools.
schools. The
The organization of a national
school of jurisprudence
school jurisprudence was proposed a number of times; and one
ill-starred attempt,
ill-starred attempt, wholly
wholly outside
outside ofof the
the Law
Law School Association,
Association,
was made to organize an academy for
was made to organize an academy for the creation the creation of a modern
modern
Corpus Juris.
Juris.
1 That uncertainty may also edst under a codified system of law,
11 That uneertainty may also a-nst under a eodified system of law, see
see Wurzel,
'Wurzel,
99 Modern
Modern Legal
Legal Phil.
Phil. Series,
Series, 304,
304, who
who says:
says: "If
"If the
the faet
fact of uncertainty
uneertainty is
to
to bebe seen
seen in
in all
all its
its nakedness, one has but to observe the guessing process
nakedness, one that
proeess that
goes on
goes on regarding
regarding thethe deeisions
decisions of
of our
our courts of last
eourts of instance."
last instanee."
19
19
tute is such
such a great public undertaking that every person having
special knowledge in any :field
field of law is in duty bound to make a
careful study of the documents that are being prepared in his his :field
field
and to send to the Institute all the criticisms
criticisms and suggestions
suggestions that
that
he thinks to be of importance. There are certaincertain parts of the Re-Re-
statements, however, that may now properly
properly be made the subject
subject
of published criticism and controversy
controversy;j these parts have
have been
been pub-
lished in the form of Official Drafts without any restriction
restriction as toto
citation as authority or quotation for purposes of criticism
criticism and fmn-
im-
provement 51i
provement.
It
It is
is proper, however, to consider
consider several questions in in the light
light
of sL>:
six years of experience
experience in the work of restatement. The :first of
first of
these questions is: Do the United States of AmericaAmerica have a com-
mon law that can be restated
restated?7 The answer
answer to this requires a brief
brief
statement as to what is meant by "law.""law." If by "law"
If "law" is meant
meant
an unchangeable rule expressed
expressed in words and and handed down by by
divinity or by some great human law-giver of the past, itit is clear clear
that we have no such law or system
that system of law. Not only do the United
United
States have no such law or system neither
system;j neither does the state of Iowa
Iowa
nor the state of New York have such a law or system. In In a com-
paratively recent dissenting opinion, ~fr.Mr. Justice
Justice Holmes
Holmes has sug-
gested that there is no "august
gested "august corpus,"
corpus," no "transcendental
"transcendental bodybody
law,"" no system of "common
of law, "common law" outside of a particular
particular state;
and
and he thinks it "an
"an unconstitutional assumption
assumption of powers"
powers" for
a federal court to attempt to declare and applyapply within
within any state a
rule of supposed common law that is repudiated
repudiated by the courts
courts ofof
that state.666
6Ii A
Ii A criticism, already published
published by Professor Whittier,
Mhittier, will be considered
considered
further on in
further in this article.
6G"Books
6 "Books written
written about any branch of of the co=on
common law treat it as a unit,
treat it
cite cases from this Court, from the Circuit Courts of Appeal, from the State
cite
Courts, from
Courts, from England and the Colonies of England indiscriminately,
indiscriminately, andand
criticize them as right or wrong according to the writer's writer's notions of a single
single
theory. It
theory. It is
is very
very hard
hard to
to resist
resist the impression that there
the impression is one august
there is august corpus,
to understand
to understand which clearly is the only task of any Court concerned. If If there
transcendental body of law outside
were such a transcendental outside of any particular
particular State butbut
obligatory within
obligatory within it unless and until changed
changed by statute, the Courts of the
United States might be be right
right in using their
their independent
independent judgment
judgment as to whatwhat
it was.
it was. But But there
there is
is no
no such body of law. The fallacy and illusion that I
think exist
think exst consist
consist in supposing that there is this outside
outside thing
thing to be found.
Law is
Law is aa word
word used
used with
with different
different meanings, but law in the sense in
meanings, but in which
courts speak
courts speak ofof it
it today
today does
does not
not exist
exist without
with~ut some
some definite
definite authority behind
It
It has
has been constructed by hundreds of thousands
thousands of decisions in in
actual
actual cases. These decisions show a greater or less degree of uni-
formityand
formity and consistency. Precedents are in fact followed. History History
repeats
repeats itself in judicial and administrative
administrative conduct, as well as in
political events. The extent of this uniformity
uniformity and consistency
consistency is
such as to make prediction possible, and thus to enable the
such as the mem-
bers of the legal profession to earn their living
living by giving
giving advice in in
advance and preventing litigation, as well as by acting as advo-
cates after
cates after disputes have arisen and litigation is begun. The com-
mon law consists of this uniformity and consistency in judicial and and
administrative
administrative conduct. Its rules and principles
principles are statements
statements in
words of of this uniformity and consistency. In In this fundamental
fundamental
aspect
aspect the common
common law is no different from the laws that we think
think
we have discovered
discovered in physics or in chemistry. A law is a state-
ment of uniformity in the past sequence of events, based based upon the
recorded observation of those events, by the help of which we we be-
be-
lieve that we are able to predict the future course of events. This
is true, whether the uniformities that have been been observed are uni-
formities in judicial
formities judicial action or uniformities in the conduct of atoms atoms
or planets or suns.
Human observation of events, however, is often inaccurate inaccurate and
is always incomplete. The stated laws of physics and chemistry
is chemistry
have continually had to be restated in the light of wider wider observa-
observa-
tion and more nearly correct analysis. In In the same way and for
exactly the same reasons, we have
exactly have had a continuous series series of re-
statements of the common law, law, from the very earliest times of of
which we have a record down to the present. The work of the
American Law Institute is merely the latest of these restatements;
restatements;
but instead of its being the restatement
restatement of a single jurist or legal
scholar working alone in his closet, it prepared by a large
it is being prepared
and diversified group of men working through through special committees
committees
of jurists and scholars. The efforts of these committees are
of are not re-
stricted to the finding and stating of uniformities
uniformities of judicial action
judicial action
within a single
single state. They are attempting to state the uniformi-
ties that may be found in the judicial action of many courts courts in all
of these United States.
In this attempt they must assuredly find thousands
thousands of instances
instances
in which there is no perfect uniformity judicial action. They
uniformity of judicial They
find variation from the past and conflict in the present. In In some
instances the conflict may be so great as to make it it impossible for for
the Institute to assert the existence of any uniformity-to state a
supplementing
supplementing and amending the work of the Institute. With re-
speet
spect to some one or more sections, they can collect the court court de-
cisions and make a comparative
comparative study of them much more more exhaust-
exhaust-
ively than is possible to the force now available. On the basis basis of
of
this study,
study, new and more accurate
accurate generalizations
generalizations can be drafted.
Thus gradually the hope of 1\11'. Air. Root may be realized that the the
Restatement
Restatement will deserve to be accepted accepted as a sound prima facie, facie
basis for judicial action.
So far as new social mores and business practicespractices are concerned,
concerned,
there is no research machinery for their discovery. The present present
writer believes, however, that if if there were such machinery, it
influential in affecting the Restatement
would be iniluential Restatement only in very lim-
ited fields. Before this great community for which the RestatementRestatement
is being made would be willing to adopt it, it, its doctrines
doctrines must have
received approval and application in some litigated case. Ardent
reformers and confident
reformers confident legislators often believe that they are wise
enough to generalize for the future; but experienceexperience indicates
indicates that
that
the best way to turn mores into law is to do itit piecemeal piecemeal by the the
"molecular
,"molecular motion" of
'molecular motion" of the courts.
This
This is no argument
argument against research into the economic
economic and social
social
life around us. Every university law school school is, no doubt, already
already
engaged in it
engaged it on a greater
greater or smaller scale; and no law school school
should be allowed to prepare men for the Bar without being fitted
to engage in it and actually doing so. One of the great
to great functions
of
of the Institute in
in the future will be to provide machinery
macbjnery for this
research
research and to make its wheels go round. Those who believe
believe that
that
certain
certain sections of the Restatement are ancient and out-of-date
should at once get busy and prove it publicly.8
rules, should publicly." Such work work
forms the basis of the new and constant revisions that are to come.
But we should remember that new social mores and business prac-
tices are in general forced upon the attentionattention of our courts
courts about
"prevailing."
as soon as they can be described as "prevailing." It is no new or
It or
surprising dogma
surprising dogma that custom makes law. As As fast as custom can
88s Concerning the proposed Code of Criminal Procedure, Judge .Judge Harry Olson,
of Chicago, speaking at a meeting of the Association
of Association of American
American Law Schools
Schools
in December, 1928, said: "I
in "I occasionally
occasionally sit in
in with a committee in in New
York of
York of the
the American
American Law
Law Institute who are revising the Criminal Code for
the
the United States; and we areare working on the authorities-what judges have
the authorities-what
said, what
said, what courts
courts have
have said-and
said-and we are collecting it it all. I do it
it with great
with great
impatience, because
impatience, because II realize that the
realize that the law
law upon
upon which
which the
the decisions
decisions of
of those
those
courts were based is is often :fifty
fifty years behind time."
safely be turned into law, the courts generally do it; and the Insti-
tute will be willing to recognize
recognize it.
it. In
In general, it it is best to trust
to the recent
recent judicial decisions and to the collective wisdom of a
number
number of of selected men. While there is danger that they they may
may notnot
have the time or industry to collect all the decisions and that they
have the
may
may not carry the latest mores in their collective
collective bosoms, the danger
danger
involved in
involved in stating
stating unadjudicated
unadjudicated mores and practices
practices as existing
existing
law
law would be much greater.
Among the benefits that can already be seen slowly slowly emerging
from
from the work of the Institute is the development
development of a greater
greater cer-
terminology. If
tainty and uniformity in legal terminology. thing more
If one thing
than any
any other has been demonstrated
demonstrated by this co-operative
co-operative commun-
ity undertaking in making a restatement of the common
ity common law, it is
the fact that each jurist and scholar, however eminent
the eminent and how-
ever accustomed
accustomed to the writing of law books, is continually continually sur-
prised and frequently chagrined
chagrined by finding that his most cherished
cherished
and careful generalizations,
and generalizations, his dearest formulas, and the legal
verbiage to which he has been most religiously
religiously wedded
wedded convey no
and definite idea to the benighted minds of the judges, law-
clear and
yers, and scholars who constitute the other members members of the various
various
committees and the Council of the Institute. But the "scenes "scenes of of
carnage and and mutilation"
mutilation" in the field of language
language are nearly alwaysalways
followed by the confession of error and the forgiveness of sin., sin. ' Out
there usually emerges a form of expression that is reason-
of them there
ably intelligible to all the members
members of the restating committee.
committee.
This
This is one important
important step in our eternal
eternal struggle for a common
common
tongue. A A black letter
letter statement that is finally adopted
adopted may still
be found to be made up of variables and modes of expressions that that
may have had their origin on the tower of Babel;
may Babel; but they have
survivors in a struggle with other forms of
the merit of being the survivors of
expression that almost invariably are worse. The straining for
expression
definiteness and certainty may at times lead the Institute
definiteness Institute to de-
clare the existence of a uniformity
uniformity and of a rule of law .that ,that in
in
fact does not exist; but at least we are being spared the repetition repetition
of those noble labor-saving devices of the encyclopaedist
encyclopaedist and the
hack text-writer, such as "some "some courts hold"hold" and "probably
"probably the
better rule is.is.""
The productions of of the Institute should
should receive constant
constant criticism,
both destructive and constructive, from within the membership membership of of
the Institute and from without. There will be found bad analysis,
classification, and terminology. There
classification, There will be turgidity and com- com-
plexity of
plexity style. In
of style. In places
places there will be
there will be unfilled gaps where
unfilled gaps where thethe
law should
law should have have been
been stated;
stated; andand inin other
other places
places there
there will
will be
be
efforts to
labored efforts
labored to cover
cover unimportant
unimportant details and to
details and to express
express every
every
possible limitation
possible limitation andand exception.
exception.99 There
There will be failure
will be failure toto recog-
recog-
nize the
the obsolescence
obsolescence of of old rules through
old rules through disuse
disuse by the courts
by the courts and
and
realize the
to realize the existence
existence of new
new rules
rules already
already immanent
immanent in in the
the more
more
decisions and
recent decisions
recent and in the life
life around us. The The men
men available
available maymay
not be expert or sufficiently
sufficiently expert
be sufficiently numerous; and
sufficiently numerous; and some
some that
that
are expert
are expert and available may not
available may not be
be enlisted. There are problems
enlisted. There problems
here to be
here be solved
solved and weaknesses to overcome. The
and weaknesses German Civil
The German Civil
Code is is said toto have
have required
required twenty-two
twenty-two years its completion.
years for its completion.
has received high
It has
It high encomiums
encomiums and and severe
severe criticism. As As applied
applied
by officials
by with narrow
officials with experience and
narrow experience and dull
dull minds, it may at times
it may
result in
result harmful as
in decisions as harmful as would
would have beenbeen rendered without
without
it. We
it. We may may be sure that the the Restatement
Restatement of of American
American Law will will
have imperfections
have imperfections and that develop in the
that new ones will develop the future;
and we should see to itit that that the American
American Law Law Institute
Institute is given
given
machinery
immortal life in order to have the machinery constantly constantly at hand
hand
for their correction.
A critical article, admirable in in form andand spirit, dealing with the
statement of of the mutual assent as itit appears in the Con-
the law as to mutual
tracts Restatement,
tracts Restatement, has already published by Professor
already been published Professor Whit-
tier. 100 He
tier.' He expresses
expresses adverse criticism
criticism of some of of the sections
sections onon
the topic in question. No doubt there there are other sections with which which
he is not altogether satisfied;
he satisfied; and no doubt many sections
doubt there are many sections
with which other jurists will :find find serious fault. Other critical
o0 :r.rontesquieu,
Montesquicu, in his "L'Esprit
"L 'Esprit des Lois,"
Lois," gave us a number of observa-
tions on the manner of making statutes, which are equally applicable applicable to any
restatement of the law made by anybody. Among Among these observations, are the
following:
I The style of statutes should be
I"The 1)e concise.
"It ought to be simple; a direct e~"pression
"It ex-pression is always more easily understood
understood
than an indirect one.
"It
"It is essential that the words used in in a statute should suggest the same
ideas in all men.
I Statutes must not be subtle; they are intended for people of average power
I"Statutes power
of understanding.
"When
"When aa statute doesdoes not need exceptions, limitations, qualifications,
limitations, or qualifications,
these ought not to be inserted; such details
inserted; such the need for new
details will create the
details."
details."
1010 Clarke B. Whittier, I"The Restatement of
I The Restatement of Contracts and Mutual
Contracts and Assent,"
Mutual Assent,"
17 Calif. L. Rev.
Rev. 441
441 (1929).
(1929).
to say
say that certain types of manifestation
manifestation are operative and that
operative and that
others are not.
It
It mayor
may or it may not be wise to use this common
common form of expres-
sion
sion in Sections 55, 71, and 72. They could have been been stated in in
terms of manifestation alone, in more apparent harmony
apparent harmony with anwith an
"objective" theory.
"objective" theory. ButBut one
one who attempts to state
who attempts skate any part of of
our law must at many points yield to the necessity of speaking speaking in in
the tongue that is in common use, even even though it it is not as exact
exact
and scientific as he thinks himself capable
capable of making it. it. A limited
limited
distance in abandoning certain usages he may safely go; the safe
distance for inventing new terms and usages is considerably
considerably less.
It
It is not here being asserted, however, that these three sections sections do
not betray the influence of a subjective theory of contract.
contract. Even Even
if so regarded, they merely indicate
indicate that the objective theory has has
its limits; and surely no greater fault can be found than with the
form of statement that agreement in "intention"
"intention" is necessary, but but
that there are exceptions
exceptions where
where one party was negligent
negligent
12
or where
words have a meaning of which he
of which not aware.
was not
he was aware.12
Objective
Objective manifestations take many forms; they may be oral oral or
or
written words, hand motion in the language
language of the deaf and dumb,
deaf and
a nod of the head, or otherother visible bodily
bodily movements. Also, they
conceivably be heart beats or nervous reactions perceivable
might conceivably
only with the aid of some scientist's delicate machine.
machine. But if if the
truth is that itit is by objective manifestation alone that we can af-
fect others, we should
should not begin a restatement
restatement of contract
contract law by by
saying
saying that there must generally be a subjective meeting
subjective meeting of minds,
agreement in intention, as differentiated from expression.
an agreement
The sufficiency
sufficiency of a manifestation produce a certain
manifestation to produce certain legal
legal ef-
ef-
It seems
12 It
12
12 seems clear to the
clear to the writer
writer that the "objective"
that the "9objective" method
method is
is always
always used
used
by the courts in in interpreting written contracts.
contracts. The parties
parties are bound by by
what they said,saw, objectively interpreted.
interpreted. The courts
courts do not undertake to dis-
cover what the parties meant, in any subjective
cover subjective sense; and they hold a partyparty
bound by what what he said, even though he was not "negligent"
"negligent" in his choice of
cllOice of
words. Negligence
Negligence followed by change of position may work an estoppel; estoppel;
but negligence in in the choice
choice of words is seldom
seldom made an issue in the inter-
pretation
pretation of aa contract. It It is far too limited a view of contract
contract to hold that
that
agreement in subjective intention is necessary
necessary except
except where a 'party
party is "neg-
"neg-
ligent. "I"
ligent.
Professor
Professor Walter
Walter W. Cook wrote:
wrote: "It"it is fundamental
fundamental in the law of of con-
tracts that aa person is bound, not by his real, but by his manifested inten-
i.e., by his intention
tion, i.e., intention as manifested to the other party." ,"Agency 'Agency by by
Estoppel," 5 Col. L. Rev. 36 (1905).
Estoppel," (1905).
.feet
feet is always
always a question for judicial determination;
determination; this is true
true
even though the manifestation consists
manifestation consists of oral or written words.
Further, what conduct constitutes
constitutes a sufficient manifestation under
sufficient manifestation under
one set of circumstances
circumstances does not constitute one under another
another set.
It
It is believed that, whenever the courts or the Institute say that that
intention is the operative fact,
fact, the only meaning that is capable ofof
practical application is that the manifestations
manifestations that will be oper-
ative are not the same as in other cases.
The con:fl.ict
The conflict between subjective
subjective and objective theories is not a
objective theories
one.' 3 It
new oneP It existed in the views of Sir William Anson and Pro-
fessor T. E.B. Holland. In In his work on Contracts, the former wrote:
wrote:
"Dr.
"Dr. Holland's view (Jurisprudence,
(Jurisprudence, ed. 11, p. 258)
258) is that the
contracting parties
law does not require contracting parties to have a common
common inten-
tion,
tion, but only to seem to have one, that the law 'must (must needs regard
regard
not the will itself but the will as expressed.'
expressed.' Our difference
difference may
may
be shortly stated. He holds that the law does not ask for 'a (a union
of
of wills,'
wills,' but only for the phenomena
phenomena of suchsuch a union. I hold that
that
the law
law does
does require the wills of the parties to be at one, but that
when men present all the phenomena
phenomena of agreement,
agreement, they are not
not
allowed to to say that they were not agreed. For all practical pur-
conflict of view is immaterial.
poses, our con:fl.ict immaterial.""
In this con:fl.ict
In conflict of theory the present writer agrees with Holland,
and not with Anson. He £nds finds that the actual decisions
decisions of the
courts can best be explained on the theory of agreement
agreement in expres-
expres-
sion, rather
sion, rather than agreement
agreement in intention. The legal operation of
operation of
the words of of an agreement depends upon their effect upon otherother
people, and not upon the state of mind of the party using them.
people,
It was
It was said by Lord Watson:
"The appellant contracted, as every person does who becomes
"The becomes a
party to a written contract, to be bound in case of dispute by the
party
interpretation which a court of law may put upon the language
interpretation of
language of
the instrument. The result of admitting any other principle
principle would
would
contract in writing could be obligatory
be that no contract obligatory if the parties
parties
13 See the
13 See
13 the discussion
discussion of
of "Proof
"Proof of of so-called
so-called Mental Facts, especially
Mental Facts, especially the
the
Intention of
Intention of Parties"
Parties" by Wurzel
'Wurzel in 9 Modern Legal Phil. Series, 394. He
says: «"From
« From the beginning two theories have been contending with each
been conte,nding each other
other
and neither
and neither has
has been
been able
able to gain aa foot of ground. One is the theory of ex-
pressed intention,
pressed intention, placing
placing most
most stress
stress on
on the
the declarations
declarations the party
party has actual-
ly made and which,
which, therefore, has an objective existence. The other other theory
is that of thethe real intention. ItIt seeks to discover behind the declaration
declaration the
actual psychological
psychological processes
processes of which
which the declaration was the result."
It
It is to be observed that Sir William
William .Anson
Anson thought that for all all
practical purposes
practical purposes the conflict of view is immaterial. Evidently
Evidently
he thought that the rules of court action constituting
constituting the law of of
contracts
contracts would be the same and would lead to the same results,
whichever theory as to mutual assent is adopted. There There is a ma-
terial difference between a rule of court action and a theory of con-
tract
tract;j and it is true that the theory is of importance
importance only as it in-
fluences
fluences the substance and application of the rules and as it it clarifies
clarifies
them to the reader. In the present instance Anson .Anson was probably
probably
wrong in thinking that the theory held does not affect judicial
affect the judicial
decisions made. The present writer is confident that the actual actual
decisions being
decisions being rendered cannot be explained and their rules re-
stated without making
making use of the objective theory. There are are too
many thousands of cases in which a contractor has been held bound
many bound
in accordance
in accordance with his objective expression, even even though he could could
convince both a court and a jury that he never never had a consenting
consenting
mind to the agreement enforced
mind enforced by the court and also that he was
not negligent in his choice of the expressions used.
With respect to the case of the ship "Peerless"
"Peerless" which is used as
an illustration under
an under Section 71/71,166 it
it is believed that there
there was no
contract, not because of the absence of a meeting of two hypothet-
contract, hypothet-
ical "minds,"
"minds," but because the objective expressionsexpressions of of the two
parties
parties were not in agreement
agreement and did not so identify the subject
identify subject
matter of the contract as to make itit enforceable.
enforceable. In In the light of of
the surrounding facts, the words used by the two parties parties might
might
equally well be taken to express anyone any one of the following:
following: (1) (1)
October "Peerless"
agreement to sell the cotton on the October (2) agree-
"Peerless"; j (2)
ment to sell the cotton on the December
December "Peerless";
"Peerless"; (3) (3) a promise
promise
to sell cotton on the October "Peerless"
to "Peerless" and a return return promise to
Stewart
14 Stewart
14
14 v. Kennedy,
v. Kennedy, 15
15 App.
App. Cas.
Cas. 108,
108, 123
123 (1890).
(1890).
Becker v.
15 Becker
IG
IG v. London
London Assur.
Assur. Corp.,
Corp., 117
117 L.
L. T.
T. 609
609 (H.
(H. L.
L. 1918).
1918). See further
further
Pollock, Contracts (9 ed.) 5.
ORaffles
16 v. Wichelhaus,
Raffies v. Wichelhaus, 22 H.
H. &
& C.
0. 906 (Exch. 1864).
906 (Exch. 1864).
Is the attempt
attempt likely to be successful7
successful? Will judgesjudges be able
able to
understand
understand the Restatement and be willing to be guided guided by it it?7
This is yet to be seen. Judge Cardozo predicted that "those "those who
begin by scoffing will end by paying the tribute of adherence adherence and
Ehrlich, who
22 Ehrlich,
22 who certainly
certainly cannot
cannot be be justly
justly accused
accused of of underestimating
underestimating the
the
sociological aspects of law, says: "The "The codification
codification of the law actually in
force becomes
force becomes aa necessity
necessity after
after the
the body
body of
of lawyers'
lawyers' law
law has increased
increased beyond
beyond
Notwithstanding some undeniable
a certain point. Notwithstanding drawbacks, such codifica-
undeniable drawbacks,
tion seems
tion seems to
to be
be advantageous
advantageous on the whole. By By summing up the entire course
course
of legal
of legal development
development to
to date,
date, it
it creates
creates some sort of
some sort of order
order out of the
out of chaos of
the chaos of
the law,-which,
the law,--which, in
in the
the course
course ofof time,
time, tends to become
tends to become an an impenetrable
impenetrable wilder-
wilder-
oven to the most skillful.'
ness even skillful." , 9 Modern
modern Legal Phil. Series, 61.
There are very many places in the law where economic economic needs
social desires are not sufficiently
and social sufficiently clear to point definitely to to one
rather than another. In
rule rather In such a case the selection
selection made by the the
well be accepted. In
Institute may well In other cases the courts may have
made a false start and then been been induced
induced by the
the doctrine of starestare
decisis
decisis to camouflage their subsequent contrary decisions by obvious
fiction, confusing terminology, and distinctions without a differ-
ence. A large part of the existing confusion and tIDcertainty uncertainty is
directly due to these two causes.
In many instances there has been obfuscation of intellect by such
"privity of contract;
terms as "privity contract;"I I and yet the court will render a
just decision in favor of a third party beneficiary
beneficiary by saying that that
"the privity.' ' 25 The House of Lords has been
"the law creates the privity."2fi been
heard to say that "our"our law lmows
kmows nothing of a jus quaesitum tertio
q1wesit'nm tertio
arising by way of contract,
contract,'"26
'26 while four years later it it gave judg-
ment in favor of a third party on the theory, totally unimaginedunimagined by by
the contracting parties, that the promisee had acted as a "trustee" "trustee"
27
for him. 27 The New York courts held that a third party could get get
no enforceable
enforceable right unless the promise was to perform perform an existing
obligation
obligation owed to him by the promisee ;28 ;28 and then they held that that
requirement was fully satisfied in one case where
this requirement promisee
where the promisee.
was the husband
husband of the beneficiary and was causing her enrichment enrichment
$50,000,29 and also in another case where
by buying her a gift of $50,000,29 where the
promisee was the rich aunt of the beneficiarybeneficiary and was merely try-
ing to make a donation for her beloved niece's future support.3300
In many cases they say that the third party has no legal right un-
less the contract intentionally for his benefit
contract was made intentionally ;31 but at
benefit ;" at
the same time they hold that, when when a debtor arranges
arranges for the pay-
ment of his debt by another person, he is making making the contract
contract not not
for his own benefit,
own benefit, but for that of his creditors, thus enabling them
maintain action.32
to maintain 32
25 Brewer
2:; Brewer v. Dyer, 77 Cush.
v. Dyer, 337 (Mass.
Cush. 337 1851).
(Mass. 1851).
"o Dunlop Tyre Co. v. Selfridge, [1915]
26 Dunlop Tyre Co. v. Selfridge, [1915] A. A. C.
C. 847.
847.
Les Affreteurs
27 Les Affreteurs
27 v. Walford, [1919] A. C. 80l.
[1919] 801.
28 Vrooman
28 Vrooman v. v. Turner, 69 N.
Turner, 69 N. Y.
Y. 280 (1877).
280 (1877).
Buchanan v. Tilden, 158 N. Y.
29 Buchanan v. Tilden, 158 N. Y. 109,52
21) 109, 52 N.
N. E. 724 (1899).
E. 724 (1899).
30 Scaver
so v. Ransom,
Seaver v. Ransom, 224 224 N.
N. Y.
Y. 233
233 (1918).
(1918).
a'
31 Simson
Simson v. Brown, 68 N. Y. Y. 355
355 (1877);
(1877); Blymire v. Boistle,
Boistle, 66 Watts
Watts 182
182
(Pa. 1837).
1837).
32 Lawrence
32 Lawrence v. v. Fox,
Fox, 20 N.N. Y.
Y. 268
268 (1859),
(1859), followed in numberless
numberless cases.
cases. In
In
It
It is possible that laymen and members of the Bar may be led to
expect too much of the Restatement. They may expect simplicity,
expect simplicity,
where life isis itself too complex to permit
permit of simplicity. They may
finality, when the truth is that no legislator
expect finality, legislator or jurist has
the capacity to anticipate 01;
the oi to control the future. They may ex-
pect near
near perfection, as a result of what seems to them a mighty
effort of scholars and jurists. These they will not get;
effort get; and the
ensuing judicial development
development of the law ought soon soon to disabuse
their minds of the error. It
their It may still be hoped, however, that they
will get a better systematic statement than they have had before,
one that will itself mark some progress in the evolution of law and
one and
society.
society.
ARTiUR L. CORBIN
ARTHUR CORBmN
YALE UNIVERSITY
YALE
II