[ GR No.

208146, Jun 08, 2016 ]

VIRGINIA DIO v. PEOPLE & TIMOTHY DESMOND +

LEONEN, J.:

When a motion to quash an information is based on a defect that may be cured by amendment, courts must provide the prosecution with
the opportunity to amend the information.

This resolves a Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] assailing the Court of Appeals Decision[2] dated January 8, 2013 and
Resolution[3]dated July 10, 2013. The Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the Regional Trial Court Order that quashed the
Informations charging petitioner Virginia Dio (Dio) with libel because these Informations failed to allege publication.[4]

Private respondent Timothy Desmond (Desmond) is the Chair and Chief Executive Officer of Subic Bay Marine Exploratorium, of which Dio
is Treasurer and Member of the Board of Directors.[5]

On December 9, 2002, Desmond filed a complaint against Dio for libel.[6] Two (2) separate Informations, both dated February 26, 2003,
were filed and docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 9108 and 9109.[7] The Information in Criminal Case No. 9108 reads:

That on or about July 6, 2002 in Morong, Bataan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused with
malicious intent to besmirch the honor, integrity and reputation of Timothy Desmond, Chairman and Chief Executive Office of Subic Bay
Marine Exploratorium, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously send electronic messages to the offended party and to other
persons namely: Atty. Winston Ginez, John Corcoran, and Terry Nichoson which read as follows:

'NOW THAT WE ARE SET TO BUILD THE HOTEL SO THAT YOU COULD SURVIVED, (sic) YOU SHOULD STOP YOUR NONSENSE
THREAT BECAUSE YOU COULD NOT EVEN FEED YOUR OWN SELF UNLESS WE PAY YOUR EXHORBITANT (sic) SALARY, HOUSE
YOU ADN (sic) SUPPORT ALL YOUR PERSONAL NEEDS. YOU SHOULD BE ASHAMED IN DOING THIS. AS FAR AS WE ARE
CONCERNED, YOU ARE NOTHING EXCEPT A PERSON WHO IS TRYING TO SURVIVED (sic) AT THE PRETEXT OF
ENVIRONMENTAL AND ANIMAL PROTECTOR [sic]. YOU ARE PADI (sic) TO THE LAST CENTS ON ALL YOUR WORK IN THE WORK
(sic). AT THE SAME TIME, YOU BLOATED THE PRICE OF EACH ANIMAL YOU BROUGHT TO THE PHILIPPINES from US$500,000.00
to US$750,000.00 each so that you could owned (sic) more shares that you should. Please look into this deeply.

IF YOU INSISTS (sic) TO BE CALLED AN ENVIRONMENTAL AND ANIMAL PROTECTOR IN OUR COUNTRY, THEN YOU AND YOUR
WIFE SHOULD STOP BLEEDING THE COMPANY WITH YOUR MONTHLY PAYROLL OF ALMOST P1 MILLION A MONTH.'

The above-quoted electronic message being defamatory or constituting an act causing or tending to cause dishonor, discredit or contempt
against the person of the said Timothy Desmond, to the damage and prejudice of the said offended party.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[8]

The Information in Criminal Case No. 9109 reads:

That on or about July 13, 2002 in Morong, Bataan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, with
malicious intent to besmirch the honor, integrity and reputation of Timothy Desmond, Chairman and Chief Executive Office of Subic Bay
Marine Exploratorium, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously send electronic messages to the [sic] Atty. Winston Ginez and
Fatima Paglicawan, to the offended party, Timothy Desmond and to other persons namely: Hon. Felicito Payumo, SBMA Chariman [sic],
Terry Nichoson, John Corcoran, and Gail Laule which read as follows:

'Dear Winston and Fatima:

UNDER THE LEADERSHIP OF TIM DESMOND AS CHAIRMAN AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER OF SBME, AS OF THIS DATE THE
COMPANY HAD INCURRED A LOSS OF MORE THAN ONE HUNDRED MILLION. A BALANCE SHEET SUBMITTED TODAY BY THEIR
ACCOUNTANT JULIET REFLECT AND (sic) ASSETS OF MORE THAN THREE HUNDRED MILLION PESOS, 50% OF WHICH IS
OVERVALUED AND NON-EXISTENT. TIM DESMOND AND FAMILY HAD ACCUMULATED A (sic) SHARES OF MORE THAN 70% OF
THE RECORDED PAID UP CAPITAL BY OVERVALUING OF THE ASSETS CONTRIBUTION, PAYMENT TO THEIR OWN COMPANY IN
THE USA, ETC. AT THE SAME TIME, TIM DESMOND AND FAMILY BLEED THE COMPANY FROM DATE OF INCORPORATION TO
PRESENT FOR AN AVERAGE OF ONE MILLION PER MONTH FOR THEIR PERSONAL GAIN, LIKE SALARY, CAR, ET, [sic] ETC.'

The above-quoted electronic message being defamatory or constituting an act causing or tending to cause dishonor, discredit or contempt
against the person of the said Timothy Desmond, to the damage and prejudice of the said offended party.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[9]

On April 22, 2003, Dio filed a Petition to suspend the criminal proceedings,[10] but it was denied in the Order dated February 6, 2004.[11]

Dio moved for reconsideration of the February 6, 2004 Order.[12] She also moved to quash the Informations, arguing that the "facts
charged do not constitute an offense."[13] In its Order[14] dated July 13, 2004, the trial court denied both Motions. The dispositive portion
of the Order reads:

Premises considered, the Motion For Reconsideration of the Order dated February 6, 2004 and the Motion To Quash, both filed for
accused, as well as the Motion For Issuance of a Hold Departure Order filed by the Prosecution, are hereby DENIED.

Arraignment will proceed as previously set on July 20, 2005 at 9:00 a.m.

SO ORDERED.[15]

Dio moved for partial reconsideration of the July 13, 2004 Order, but the Motion was denied in the trial court's Order dated September 13,
2005.[16]

On October 11, 2005, Dio filed a Motion for leave of court to file a second motion for reconsideration.[17] She also filed an Omnibus Motion
to quash the Informations for failure to allege publication and lack of jurisdiction, and for second reconsideration with leave of court.[18]

The trial court's Order dated February 7, 2006 denied both Motions and scheduled Dio's arraignment on March 9, 2006.[19] Dio moved for
partial reconsideration.[20]

The trial court granted Dio's Motion for Partial Reconsideration in its February 12, 2009 Order,[21] the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the Motion For Partial Reconsideration filed by the accused in Criminal Cases (sic) Nos. 9108 and 9109, on the ground that
the Informations in the said cases fail (sic) to allege publication, is GRANTED and, accordingly, the Informations filed against the accused
are thereby QUASHED and DISMISSED.

No finding as to costs.

SO ORDERED.[22]

After filing a Notice of Appeal on March 5, 2009,[23] Desmond raised before the Court of Appeals the following issues:

I
WHETHER OR NOT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE ACCUSED'S ARGUMENT THAT THE PRESENT CHARGES
SHOULD BE QUASHED FOR FAILURE OF THE INFORMATIONS TO ALLEGE PUBLICATION.
 II
WHETHER OR NOT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE CASE AND QUASHING THE INFORMATIONS WITHOUT
GIVING THE PROSECUTOR THE OPPORTUNITY TO AMEND THE INFORMATIONS.[24]

In its January 8, 2013 Decision, the Court of Appeals sustained that the Informations did not substantially constitute the offense
charged.[25] It found that the Informations did not contain any allegation that the emails allegedly sent by Dio to Desmond had been
accessed.[26]However, it found that the trial court erred in quashing the Informations without giving the prosecution a chance to amend
them pursuant to Rule 117, Section 4 of the Rules of Court:

Although we agree with the trial court that the facts alleged in the Informations do not substantially constitute the offense charged, the most
prudent thing to do for the trial court is to give the prosecution the opportunity to amend it and make the necessary corrections. Indeed, an
Information may be defective because the facts charged do not constitute an offense, however, the dismissal of the case will not
necessarily follow. The Rules specifically require that the prosecution should be given a chance to correct the defect; the court can order
the dismissal only upon the prosecution's failure to do so. The trial court's failure to provide the prosecution with this opportunity constitutes
an arbitrary exercise of power.[27]

The dispositive portion reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is GRANTED. The order of the Regional Trial Court of Balanga City, Branch 3 dated
February 12, 2009 in Criminal Case Nos. 9108 and 9109 is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The case is remanded to the trial court and the
Public Prosecutor of Balanga City is hereby DIRECTED to amend the Informations.

SO ORDERED.[28]

Dio moved for reconsideration,[29] but the Court of Appeals denied the Motion in its July 10, 2013 Resolution.[30]

Hence, this Petition was filed.

Desmond and the Office of the Solicitor General filed their Comments,[31] to which Dio filed her Reply.[32] On April 2, 2014, this Court
gave due course to the Petition and required the parties to submit their respective memoranda.[33]

The Office of the Solicitor General filed on June 11, 2014 a Manifestation and Motion[34] adopting its Comment. Desmond and Dio filed
their memoranda on June 19, 2014[35] and July 10, 2014,[36] respectively.

Dio stresses that "venue is jurisdictional in criminal cases."[37] Considering that libel is limited as to the venue of the case, failure to allege
"where the libelous article was printed and first published"[38] or "where the offended party actually resided at the time of the commission
of the offense"[39] is a jurisdictional defect. She argues that jurisdictional defects in an Information are not curable by amendment, even
before arraignment. To support this position, she cites Agustin v. Pamintuan:[40]

We do not agree with the ruling of the CA that the defects in the Informations are merely formal. Indeed, the absence of any allegations in
the Informations that the offended party was actually residing in Baguio City, where the crimes charged were allegedly committed, is a
substantial defect. Indeed, the amendments of the Informations to vest jurisdiction upon the court cannot be allowed.[41] (Citations
omitted)

Dio also cites Leviste v. Hon. Alameda,[42] where this Court has stated that not all defects in an Information are curable by amendment
prior to arraignment:

It must be clarified though that not all defects in an information are curable by amendment prior to entry of plea. An information which is
void ab initio cannot be amended to obviate a ground for quashal. An amendment which operates to vest jurisdiction upon the trial court is
likewise impermissible.[43] (Citations omitted)
Dio argues that the Informations were void as the prosecutor of Morong, Bataan had no authority to conduct the preliminary investigation of
the offenses charged.[44] The complaint filed before the prosecutor did not allege that the emails were printed and first published in
Morong Bataan, or that Desmond resided in Morong, Bataan at the time of the offense.[45] In the absence of these allegations, the
prosecutor did not have the authority to conduct the preliminary investigation or to file the information.[46]

Dio further argues that publication, one of the elements of libel, was not present in the case. She asserts that emailing does not constitute
publication under Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code. As there was no allegation in the Informations that the emails were received,
accessed, and read by third persons other than Desmond, there could be no publication.[47] Further, emails are not covered under Article
355 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, at the time the allegedly libelous emails were sent, there was no law punishing this act.[48]

Finally, Dio argues that she sent the emails as private communication to the officers of the corporation, who were in the position to act on
her grievances.[49] The emails were sent in good faith, with justifiable ends, and in the performance of a legal duty.[50]

The primordial issue for resolution is whether an information's failure to establish venue is a defect that can be cured by amendment before
arraignment.

The Petition is denied.

I
If a motion to quash is based on a defect in the information that can be cured by amendment, the court shall order that an amendment be
made. Rule 117, Section 4 of the Rules of Court states:

SEC. 4. Amendment of complaint or information. - If the motion to quash is based on an alleged defect of the complaint or information
which can be cured by amendment, the court shall order that an amendment be made.

If it is based on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, the prosecution shall be given by the court an opportunity to
correct the defect by amendment. The motion shall be granted if the prosecution fails to make the amendment, or the complaint or
information still suffers from the same defect despite the amendment.

This Court has held that failure to provide the prosecution with the opportunity to amend is an arbitrary exercise of power.[51] In People v.
Sandiganbayan:[52]

When a motion to quash is filed challenging the validity and sufficiency of an Information, and the defect may be cured by amendment,
courts must deny the motion to quash and order the prosecution to file an amended Information. Generally, a defect pertaining to the failure
of an Information to charge facts constituting an offense is one that may be corrected by an amendment. In such instances, courts are
mandated not to automatically quash the Information; rather, it should grant the prosecution the opportunity to cure the defect through an
amendment. This rule allows a case to proceed without undue delay. By allowing the defect to be cured by simple amendment,
unnecessary appeals based on technical grounds, which only result to prolonging the proceedings, are avoided.

More than this practical consideration, however, is the due process underpinnings of this rule. As explained by this Court in People v.
Andrade, the State, just like any other litigant, is entitled to its day in court. Thus, a court's refusal to grant the prosecution the opportunity
to amend an Information, where such right is expressly granted under the Rules of Court and affirmed time and again in a string of
Supreme Court decisions, effectively curtails the State's right to due process.[53]

In this case, petitioner Virginia Dio has not yet been arraigned; thus, Rule 117, Section 4 of the Rules of Court applies. If the information is
defective, the prosecution must be given the opportunity to amend it before it may be quashed.

Petitioner claims that Rule 117, Section 4 of the Rules of Court applies only to informations that can be cured by amendment. She argues
that before a court orders that an amendment be made, or otherwise gives the prosecution an opportunity to amend an information, it must
first establish that the defective information can be cured by amendment.
 Petitioner relies on Agustin to argue the proscription of an amendment of an information in order to vest jurisdiction in the court. This is
misplaced.

In Agustin, the accused in the criminal case was already arraigned under a defective information that failed to establish venue.[54] The
Court of Appeals held that the defect in the information was merely formal and, consequently, could be amended even after plea, with
leave of court. Thus, this Court held:

We do not agree with the ruling of the CA that the defects in the Informations are merely formal. Indeed, the absence of any allegations in
the Informations that the offended party was actually residing in Baguio City, where the crimes charged were allegedly committed, is a
substantial defect. Indeed, the amendments of the Informations to vest jurisdiction upon the court cannot be allowed.[55]

In turn, Agustin cited Agbayani v. Sayo.[56] However, Agbayani does not involve the amendment of a defective information before or after
arraignment. Subsequent cases have cited Agustin as basis that amendment of an information to vest jurisdiction in the trial court is
impermissible. Thus, in Leviste, this Court cited Agustin and stated that certain amendments are impermissible even before arraignment:

It must be clarified though that not all defects in an information are curable by amendment prior to entry of plea. An information which is
void ab initio cannot be amended to obviate a ground for quashal. An amendment which operates to vest jurisdiction upon the trial court is
likewise impermissible.[57]

It may appear that Leviste supports petitioner's contention that an amendment operating to vest jurisdiction in the trial court is
impermissible. However, the statement in Leviste was obiter dictum. It cites only Agustin, which did not involve the amendment of an
information before arraignment.

Aside from obiter dictum in jurisprudence, petitioner provides no legal basis to reverse the Court of Appeals' determination that the
defective informations may be amended before arraignment. Although the cases petitioner cited involved defective informations that failed
to establish the jurisdiction of the court over the libel charges, none involved the amendment of an information before arraignment. Thus,
these cannot be controlling over the facts of this case.

II
A defect in the complaint filed before the fiscal is not a ground to quash an information. In Sasot v. People:[58]

Section 3, Rule 117 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, which was then in force at the time the alleged criminal acts were committed,
enumerates the grounds for quashing an information, to wit:

a) That the facts charged do not constitute an offense;

b) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged or the person of the accused;
c) That the officer who filed the information had no authority to do so;
d) That it does not conform substantially to the prescribed form;
That more than one offense is charged except in those cases in which existing laws prescribe a single punishment for
e)
various offenses;
f) That the criminal action or liability has been extinguished;
g) That it contains averments which, if true, would constitute a legal excuse or justification; and
h) That the accused has been previously convicted or in jeopardy of being convicted, or acquitted of the offense charged.

Nowhere in the foregoing provision is there any mention of the defect in the complaint filed before the fiscal and the complainant's capacity
to sue as grounds for a motion to quash.[59]
On the other hand, lack of authority to file an information is a proper ground. In Cudia v. Court of Appeals:[60]
With respect to the second requisite, however, it is plainly apparent that the City Prosecutor of Angeles City had no authority to file the first
information, the offense having been committed in the Municipality of Mabalacat, which is beyond his jurisdiction. Presidential Decree No.
1275, in relation to Section 9 of the Administrative Code of 1987, pertinently provides that:

"Section 11. The provincial or the city fiscal shall:. . . .

(b) Investigate and/or cause to be investigated all charges of crimes, misdemeanors and violations of all penal laws and ordinances within
their respective jurisdictions and have the necessary information or complaint prepared or made against the persons accused. In the
conduct of such investigations he or his assistants shall receive the sworn statements or take oral evidence of witnesses summoned by
subpoena for the purpose.. . . .

It is thus the Provincial Prosecutor of Pampanga, not the City Prosecutor, who should prepare informations for offenses committed within
Pampanga but outside of Angeles City. An information, when required to be filed by a public prosecuting officer, cannot be filed by another.
It must be exhibited or presented by the prosecuting attorney or someone authorized by law. If not, the court does not acquire jurisdiction.

Petitioner, however, insists that his failure to assert the lack of authority of the City Prosecutor in filing the information in question is
deemed a waiver thereof. As correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, petitioner's plea to an information before he filed a motion to
quash may be a waiver of all objections to it insofar as formal objections to the pleadings are concerned. But by clear implication, if not by
express provision of the Rules of Court, and by a long line of uniform decisions, questions relating to want of jurisdiction may be raised at
any stage of the proceeding. It is a valid information signed by a competent officer which, among other requisites, confers jurisdiction on
the court over the person of the accused (herein petitioner) and the subject matter of the accusation. In consonance with this view, an
infirmity in the information, such as lack of authority of the officer signing it, cannot be cured by silence, acquiescence, or even by express
consent.

In fine, there must have been a valid and sufficient complaint or information in the former prosecution. If, therefore, the complaint or
information was insufficient because it was so defective in form or substance that the conviction upon it could not have been sustained, its
dismissal without the consent of the accused cannot be pleaded. As the fiscal had no authority to file the information, the dismissal of the
first information would not be a bar to petitioner's subsequent prosecution. Jeopardy does not attach where a defendant pleads guilty to a
defective indictment that is voluntarily dismissed by the prosecution.

Petitioner next claims that the lack of authority of the City Prosecutor was the error of the investigating panel and the same should not be
used to prejudice and penalize him. It is an all too familiar maxim that the State is not bound or estopped by the mistakes or inadvertence
of its officials and employees. To rule otherwise could very well result in setting felons free, deny proper protection to the community, and
give rise to the possibility of connivance between the prosecutor and the accused.

Finally, petitioner avers that an amendment of the first information, and not its dismissal, should have been the remedy sought by the
prosecution. Suffice it to say that this Court, in Galvez vs. Court of Appeals has ruled that even if amendment is proper, pursuant to Section
14 of Rule 110, it is also quite plausible under the same provision that, instead of an amendment, an information may be dismissed to give
way to the filing of a new information.[61] (Emphasis in the original, citations omitted)

However, for quashal of an information to be sustained, the defect of the information must be evident on its face. In Santos v. People:[62]
First, a motion to quash should be based on a defect in the information which is evident on its face. The same cannot be said herein. The
Information against petitioner appears valid on its face; and that it was filed in violation of her constitutional rights to due process and equal
protection of the laws is not evident on the face thereof. As pointed out by the CTA First Division in its 11 May 2006 Resolution, the more
appropriate recourse petitioner should have taken, given the dismissal of similar charges against Velasquez, was to appeal the Resolution
dated 21 October 2005 of the Office of the State Prosecutor recommending the filing of an information against her with the DOJ
Secretary.[63]

For an information to be quashed based on the prosecutor's lack of authority to file it, the lack of the authority must be evident on the face
of the information.
The Informations here do not allege that the venue of the offense was other than Morong, Bataan. Thus, it is not apparent on the face of
the Informations that the prosecutor did not have the authority to file them.

The proper remedy is to give the prosecution the opportunity to amend the Informations. If the proper venue appears not to be Morong,
Bataan after the Informations have been amended, then the trial court may dismiss the case due to lack of jurisdiction, as well as lack of
authority of the prosecutor to file the information.

III
Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code provides: Article 355. Libel by means of writings or similar means. - A libel committed by means of
writing, printing, lithography, engraving, radio, phonograph, painting, theatrical exhibition, cinematographic exhibition, or any similar means,
shall be punished by prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods or a fine ranging from 200 to 6,000 pesos, or both, in addition
to civil action which may be brought by the offended party.

Petitioner argues that at the time of the offense, emails were not covered under Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code. Petitioner claims
this is bolstered by the enactment of Republic Act No. 10175, otherwise known as the Anti-Cybercrime Law, which widened the scope of
libel to include libel committed through email, among others.[64]

Whether emailing or, as in this case, sending emails to the persons named in the Informations—who appear to be officials of Subic Bay
Metropolitan Authority where Subic Bay Marine Exploratorium is found—is sufficiently "public," as required by Articles 353 and 355 of the
Revised Penal Code and by the Anti-Cybercrime Law, is a matter of defense that should be properly raised during trial.

Passionate and emphatic grievance, channelled through proper public authorities, partakes of a degree of protected freedom of
expression.[65]

Certainly, if we remain faithful to the dictum that public office is a public trust,[66] some leeway should be given to the public to express
disgust. The scope and extent of that protection cannot be grounded in abstractions. The facts of this case need to be proven by evidence;
otherwise, this Court exercises barren abstractions that may wander into situations only imagined, not real.

IV
Good faith is not among the grounds for quashing an information as enumerated in Rule 117, Section 3 of the Rules of Court. It is not
apparent on the face of the Informations, and what is not apparent cannot be the basis for quashing them. In Danguilan-Vitug v. Court of
Appeals:[67]

We find no reason to depart from said conclusion. Section 3, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Court enumerates the grounds for quashing
an information. Specifically, paragraph (g) of said provision states that the accused may move to quash the complaint or information where
it contains averments which, if true, would constitute a legal excuse or justification. Hence, for the alleged privilege to be a ground for
quashing the information, the same should have been averred in the information itself and secondly, the privilege should be absolute, not
only qualified. Where, however, these circumstances are not alleged in the information, quashal is not proper as they should be raised and
proved as defenses. With more reason is it true in the case of merely qualifiedly privileged communications because such cases remain
actionable since the defamatory communication is simply presumed to be not malicious, thereby relieving the defendant of the burden of
proving good intention and justifiable motive. The burden is on the prosecution to prove malice. Thus, even if the qualifiedly privileged
nature of the communication is alleged in the information, it cannot be quashed especially where prosecution opposes the same so as not
to deprive the latter of its day in court, but prosecution can only prove its case after trial on the merits. In People v. Gomez we held, inter
alia:

"The claim of the accused . . . that the letter is privileged communication is not a ground for a motion to quash. It is a matter of defense
which must be proved after trial of the case on the merits."[68] (Citations omitted)

Thus, the Court of Appeals did not err in disregarding petitioner's purported good faith. This should be a matter of defense properly raised
during trial.
 WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari dated July 29, 2013 is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated January 8, 2013
and Resolution dated July 10, 2013 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

[ GR No. 198270, Dec 09, 2015 ]

ARMILYN MORILLO v. PEOPLE +

PERALTA, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to reverse and set aside the
Decision[1]dated January 18, 2011 and Resolution[2] dated August 9, 2011 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 32723 which
reversed and set aside the Decision[3] dated February 23, 2009 and Order[4] dated July 13, 2009, of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in
Criminal Case Nos. 08-1876-77, which, in turn, affirmed the Joint Decision[5] dated September 3, 2008 of the Metropolitan Trial Court
(MeTC) in Criminal Case Nos. 337902-03.

The antecedent facts are as follows:

Sometime in July 2003, respondent Richard Natividad, Milo Malong and Bing Nanquil, introducing themselves as contractors doing
business in Pampanga City under the name and style of RB Custodio Construction, purchased construction materials for their project
inside the Subic Freeport Zone from petitioner Armilyn Morillo, owner of Amasea General Merchandize and Construction Supplies. The
parties agreed that twenty percent (20%) of the purchases shall be paid within seven (7) days after the first delivery and the remaining
eighty percent (80%) to be paid within thirty-five (35) days after the last delivery, all of which shall be via post-dated checks.[6]

Pursuant to the agreement, petitioner delivered construction materials amounting to a total of P500,054.00 at the construction site where
respondent and his partners were undertaking their project. After the last delivery, respondent paid P20,000.00 in cash and issued two (2)
post-dated checks, drawn from Metrobank, Pampanga branch, in the amounts of P393,000.00 and P87,054.00. Upon maturity, petitioner
attempted to deposit the checks in her savings account at Equitable PCI Bank, San Lorenzo, Makati City. They were, however, dishonored
by the drawee bank. Immediately thereafter, petitioner communicated the dishonor to respondent and his partners and demanded for
payment. Again, respondent issued two (2) post-dated Metrobank checks and assured petitioner that they will be honored upon maturity.
Upon deposit in her savings account at Equitable PCI Bank, Makati Branch, the checks were once again dishonored for the reason that the
account from which they were drawn was already a closed account. Consequently, petitioner made several demands from respondent and
his partners, but to no avail, prompting her to file a complaint with the City Prosecution Office, Makati City.[7] Thus, on August 12, 2004,
two (2) Informations were filed against respondent and Milo Malong, the accusatory portions of which read:

Criminal Case No. 337902

That on or about the 20th day of October 2003, or prior thereto, in the City of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines, a place within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously make out, draw and
issue to AMASEA GENERAL MERCHANDIZE AND CONSTRUCTION SUPPLIES herein represented by ARMILYN MORILLO to apply on
account or for value the check described below:

Check No. : 2960203217

Drawn Against : Metrobank
In the amount : Php434,430.00
Postdated / Dated : October 20, 2003
Payable to : AMASEA GENERAL MERCHANDIZE AND CONSTRUCTION SUPPLIES
said accused well knowing that at the time of issue thereof, said accused did not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for
 the payment in full of the face amount of such check upon its presentment which check when presented for payment within ninety (90)
days from the date thereof, was subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for the reason "Account Closed" and despite receipt of
notice of such dishonor, the said accused failed lo pay said payee the face amount of said check or to make arrangement for full payment
thereof within five (5) banking days after receiving notice.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Criminal Case No. 337903

That on or about the 20th day of October 2003, or prior thereto, in the City of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines, a place within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously make out, draw and
issue to AMASEA GENERAL MERCHANDIZE AND CONSTRUCTION SUPPLIES herein represented by ARMILYN MORILLO to apply on
account or for value the check described below:
Check No. : 2960203218
Drawn Against : Metrobank
In the amount : Php13,032.00
Postdated / Dated : October 20, 2003
Payable to : AMASEA GENERAL MERCHANDIZE AND CONSTRUCTION SUPPLIES
said accused well knowing that at the time of issue thereof, said accused did not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for
the payment in full of the face amount of such check upon its presentment which check when presented for payment within ninety (90)
days from the date thereof, was subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for the reason "Account Closed" and despite receipt of
notice of such dishonor, the said accused failed to pay said payee the face amount of said check or to make arrangement for full payment
thereof within five (5) banking days alter receiving notice.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[8]
On September 15, 2004, the Assistant City Prosecutor issued a Resolution recommending that respondent and his partners be charged in
court with the crime of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code as well as for Violation of Batas Pambansa No.
22 (BP 22), which was later docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 337902-03.

On September 3, 2008, the MeTC rendered its Joint Decision, finding that the prosecution had proven all the elements of violation of BP 22
as against respondent, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered in Criminal Cases Nos. 337902-03 finding the accused, RICHARD NATIVIDAD, GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the offense of Violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and is sentenced to pay a fine equivalent to Two Hundred
Thousand Pesos (Php200,000.00), for Check No. 2960203217 and Thirteen Thousand Thirty-Two Pesos for Check No. 2960203218 or a
total penalty of Two Hundred Thousand Thirteen Thousand Thirty Two Pesos (Php213,032.00), with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency. However, accused MILO MALONG, is ACQUITTED on the ground of reasonable doubt. Both accused Malong and Natividad
are ordered to jointly pay the private complainant the total sum of Four Hundred Forty-Seven Thousand Four Hundred Sixty-Two Pesos
(Php447,462.00) which are the face value of the two (2) checks issued, subject of these cases, with interest at twelve percent (12%) per
annum and three percent (3%) penalty per month as stipulated in the invoices, reckoned from the date of receipt of the demand on
February 28, 2004, until the amount is fully paid, plus the costs of suit.

All other claims are DISMISSED for lack of evidence.

SO ORDERED.[9]

Respondent appealed the decision of the MeTC to the RTC arguing that the MeTC of Makati City had no jurisdiction over the case. He
asserted that since the subject checks were issued, drawn, and delivered to petitioner in Subic, the venue of the action was improperly laid
for none of the elements of the offense actually transpired in Makati City. Respondent also pointed out that during the retaking of
petitioner's testimony on March 14, 2008, the records of the case did not show that the public prosecutor manifested his presence in court
and that he delegated the prosecution of the case to the private prosecutor. Thus, since there was no appearance for the public prosecutor,
nor was there a proper delegation of authority, the proceedings should be declared null and void.[10]

On February 23, 2009, the RTC affirmed the MeTC ruling in the following wise:
Since accused Natividad failed to raise before the court [a quo] the issue of authority of the private prosecutor to present witness Morillo in
the absence of the public prosecutor during the March 14, 2008 proceeding, and only did so after obtaining an adverse judgment, it would
be an injustice if all the proceedings had in the case would be set aside.

The second issue raised on appeal also holds no ground. A violation of BP 22 is a continuing or transitory offense, which is oft-repeated in
our jurisprudence. Under this doctrine, jurisdiction may be had in several places where one of the acts material to the crime occurred.

Accused Natividad postulates that since the checks were presented and dishonored in Makati City, which is not the place where
it was issued and delivered, the court [a quo] lacks jurisdiction. This argument is, at best, specious. The fact remains that the
bank where it was presented for payment is in Makati City. These checks passed through this bank for clearance, confirmation,
and or validation processes. Moreover, the eventual dishonour indeed took place or was completed at the end of the collecting
bank in Makati City, where the private complainant maintains her account over which the court [a quo] has jurisdiction.

WHEREFORE, finding no merit on accused-appellant Natividad's appeal, the same is hereby dismissed. Accordingly, the appealed
decision of the court [a quo] is hereby AFFIRMED in full.

SO ORDERED.[11]

On appeal, however, the Court of Appeals, in its January 18, 2011 Decision, reversed the lower courts' rulings and dismissed the case
without prejudice to its refiling in the proper venue, the pertinent portions of said Decision state:
In this case, records will reveal that the first element of the offense happened in Pampanga. It was indisputably established that the subject
checks were issued to private complainant at petitioner's office in Pampanga. Said checks were drawn from petitioner's account in
Metrobank, Pampanga branch.

The second element of the offense or the knowledge of dishonor of the checks by the maker also transpired in Pampanga. After private
complainant was informed of the dishonor of the checks, she immediately proceeded to petitioner's office in Pampanga, personally
informed him and his companions of the dishonor of the checks and tendered a demand letter for the payment of the construction materials.

Finally, the third element or dishonor of the checks by the drawee bank also happened in Pampanga. Upon maturity of the
subject checks, private complainant deposited the same in her savings account at Equitable PCI Bank, Makati Branch.
Subsequently, she was informed by the latter bank that the subject checks were dishonored by the drawee bank, Metrobank,
Pampanga branch.

Clearly, all the essential elements of the offense happened in Pampanga. Consequently, the case can only be filed in said place.
Unfortunately, private complainant filed the case in Makati City, under the erroneous assumption that since she deposited the
subject checks in Equitable PCI Bank, Makati City, and was informed of lite dishonor of the checks by the same bank, the case
may be filed in Makati City. However, as correctly argued by the OSG, the act of depositing the check is not an essential clement
of BP 22. Likewise, the fact that private complainant was informed of the dishonor of the checks at her bank in Makati City did
not vest the MeTC, Makati City with jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case. To reiterate, a transitory crime can only be tiled in
any of the places where its constitutive elements actually transpired. And, knowledge of the payee of the dishonor of the checks
is not an element of BP 22. The law speaks only of the subsequent dishonor of the checks by the drawee bank and the
knowledge of the fact of dishonor by the maker. Consequently, none of the elements of the offense can be considered to have
transpired in Makati City. Thus, the venue of the instant case was improperly laid.[12]

Aggrieved, petitioner filed the instant action invoking the following argument:
 I.

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT OF MAKATI CITY DID
NOT HAVE JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE DESPITE A CLEAR SHOWING THAT THE OFFENSE WAS COMMITTED WITHIN THE
JURISDICTION OF SAID COURT.[13]

Petitioner maintains that the MeTC of Makati City, the place where the dishonored checks were deposited, had jurisdiction over the instant
case. In support of her contention, petitioner cites the ruling in Nieva, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,[14] wherein it was held that since the check
drawn in violation of BP 22 was deposited and presented for encashment with the Angeles City Branch of the Bank of the Philippine
Islands, the RTC of Pampanga clearly had jurisdiction over the crime of which accused therein was charged.[15] Thus, petitioner asserts
that the appellate court erred in ruling that the Makati MeTC did not have jurisdiction to try the instant case. That none of the essential
elements of the crime of violation of BP 22 occurred in the City of Makati is belied by the Nieva doctrine recognizing the jurisdiction of the
court of the place where the check was deposited and/or presented for encashment.

Petitioner went on lo state that all the elements of violation of BP 22 were duly proven beyond reasonable doubt. First, the prosecution
sufficiently established that the respondent issued the subject checks as shown by the documentary evidence submitted. They were issued
for value, as payment for the construction supplies and materials which petitioner delivered to the accused.

As to the second and third elements, petitioner posits that it was clearly shown that respondent had knowledge of the insufficiency of funds
in or credit with the drawee bank, which subsequently dishonored the subject checks. Section 2 of BP 22 provides that "the dishonor of a
check when presented within ninety (90) days from the date of the check shall be prima facie evidence of knowledge of insufficiency of
funds or credit unless such maker or drawer pays the holder thereof the amount due thereon, or makes arrangements for payment in full by
the drawee of such check within five (5) banking days after receiving notice that such check has not been paid by the drawee." In this case,
petitioner states that the prosecution was able to sufficiently show that the subject checks were presented within the time period required
by law. In fact, written demand relaying the fact that the drawee bank dishonored the subject checks was even personally delivered by
petitioner to respondent as evidenced by the demand letter signed by respondent. Thus, respondent cannot deny that he had knowledge of
the insufficiency of funds in his account with the drawee bank and that the subject checks were subsequently dishonored for the reason
that the account from which they were drawn was already a closed account.

For its part, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), representing the State, is in line with the appellate court's and respondent's stance
that the MeTC had no jurisdiction over the instant case. According to the OSG, the act of depositing the check is not an essential element
of the offense under the Bouncing Checks Law. Citing the ruling in Rigor v. People,[16] the OSG posited that the place of deposit and the
place of dishonor are distinct from each other and that the place where the check was issued, delivered, and dishonored is the proper
venue, not the place where the check was deposited, viz.:
The evidence clearly shows that the undated check was issued and delivered at the Rural Bank of San Juan, Metro Manila. x x x The
check was deposited with PS Bank, San Juan Branch, Metro Manila. x x x The information at bar effectively charges San Juan as the place
of drawing and issuing. The jurisdiction of courts in criminal cases is determined by the allegations of the complaint or information.
Although the check was dishonored by the drawee, Associated Bank, in its Tarlac Branch, appellant has drawn, issued and delivered it at
RBSJ, San Juan. The place of issue and delivery was San Juan and knowledge, as an essential part of the offense, was also overtly
manifested in San Juan. There is no question that crimes committed in San Juan are triable by the RTC stationed in Pasig.[17]

On the basis of the pronouncement in Rigor, the OSG thus claimed that the MeTC of Makati City did not have jurisdiction over the instant
case for none of the essential elements of violation of BP 22 occurred therein.

The contention is untenable.

It is well settled that violations of BP 22 cases are categorized as transitory or continuing crimes, meaning that some acts material and
essential thereto and requisite in their consummation occur in one municipality or territory, while some occur in another. In such cases, the
court wherein any of the crime's essential and material acts have been committed maintains jurisdiction to try the case; it being understood
that the first court taking cognizance of the same excludes the other. Thus, a person charged with a continuing or transitory crime may be
validly tried in any municipality or territory where the offense was in part committed.[18]

The OSG, relying on our ruling in Rigor v. People, concluded that "the Supreme Court regarded the place of deposit and the place of
dishonor as distinct from one another and considered the place where the check was issued, delivered and dishonored, and not where the
check was deposited, as the proper venue for the filing of a B.P. Blg. 22 case." The Court, however, cannot sustain such conclusion.

In said case, She accused therein obtained a loan from the Rural Bank of San Juan, Metro Manila, and in payment thereof, he issued a
check drawn against Associated Bank of Tarlac. Thereafter, Rural Bank deposited the check at PS Bank, San Juan, but the same was
returned for the reason that it had been dishonored by Associated Bank of Tarlac. When all other efforts to demand the repayment of the
loan proved futile, Rural Bank filed an action against the accused for violation of BP 22 at the RTC of Pasig City, wherein crimes committed
in. San Juan are triable. The accused, however, contends that the RTC of Pasig had no jurisdiction thereon since no proof had been
offered to show that his check was issued, delivered, dishonored or that knowledge of beneficiency of funds occurred in the Municipality of
San Juan. The Court, however, disagreed and held that while the check was dishonored by the drawee. Associated Bank, in its Tarlac
Branch, evidence clearly showed that the accused had drawn, issued and delivered it at Rural Bank, San Juan, viz.:
Lastly, positioner contends that the Regional Trial Court of Pasig had no jurisdiction over this case since no proof has been offered that his
check was issued, delivered, dishonored or that knowledge of insufficiency of funds occurred in the Municipality of San Juan, Metro Manila.

The contention is untenable.

x x x x.

The evidence clearly shows that the undated check was issued and delivered at the Rural Bank of San Juan, Metro Manila on November
16, 1989, and subsequently the check was dated February 16, 1990 thereat. On May 25, 1990, the check was deposited with PS Bank,
San Juan Branch, Metro Manila. Thus, the Court of Appeals correctly ruled:

Violations of B.P. 22 are categorized as transitory or continuing crimes. A suit on the check can be filed in any of the places where any of
the elements of the offense occurred, that is, where the check is drawn, issued, delivered or dishonored. x x x

The information at bar effectively charges San Juan as the place of drawing and issuing. The jurisdiction of courts in criminal
cases is determined by the allegations of the complaint or information. Although, the check was dishonored by the drawee,
Associated Bank, sit its Tarlac Branch, appellant has drawn, issued and delivered it at RBSJ, San Juan. The place of issue and
delivery was San Juan and knowledge, as an essential part of she offense, was also overtly manifested in San Juan. There is no
question that crimes committed in November, 1989 in San Juan arc triable by the RTC stationed in Pasig. In short both allegation
and proof in this case sufficiently vest jurisdiction upon the RTC in Pasig City.[19]

The bone of contention in Rigor, therefore, was whether the prosecution had offered sufficient proof that the check drawn in violation of BP
22 was issued, delivered, dishonored or that knowledge of insufficiency of funds occurred in the Municipality of San Juan, thereby vesting
jurisdiction upon the RTC of Pasig City. Nowhere in the cited case, however, was it held, either expressly or impliedly, that the place where
the check was deposited is not the proper venue for actions involving violations of BP 22, it is true that the Court, in Rigor, acknowledged
the feet that the check was issued and delivered at the Rural Bank of San Juan, while the same was deposited wilts the PS Bank of San
Juan. But such differentiation cannot be taken as basis sufficient enough to conclude that the court of the place of deposit cannot exercise
jurisdiction over violations of BP 22. In the absence, therefore, of any ground, jurisprudential or otherwise, to sustain the OSG's arguments,
the Court cannot take cognizance of a doctrine that is simply inapplicable to the issue at hand.

In contrast, the ruling in Nieva, Jr. v. Court of Appeals[20] cited by petitioner is more squarely on point with the instant case. In Nieva, the
accused delivered to Ramon Joven a post-dated check drawn against the Commercial Bank of Manila as payment for Joven's dump truck.
Said check was deposited in the Angeles City Branch of the Bank of Philippine Islands, joven was advised, however, that the Commercial
Bank of Manila returned the check for the reason that the account against which the check was drawn is a "closed account." Consequently,
the accused was charged with violation of BP 22 before the RTC of Pampanga. On the contention of the accused that said court had no
jurisdiction to try the case, the Court categorically ruled:
As to petitioner's contention that the Regional Trial Court of Pampanga has no jurisdiction to try the cases charged herein as
none of the essential elements thereof took place in Pampanga, suffice it to say that such contention has no basis. The evidence
discloses that the check was deposited and/or presented for encashment with the Angeles City Branch of the Bank of the
Philippine Islands. This fact clearly confers jurisdiction upon the Regional Trial Court of Pampanga over the crimes of which
petitioner is charged. It must be noted that violations of B.P. Blg. 22 are categorized as transitory or continuing crimes and so is the crime
of estafa. The rule is that a person charged with a transitory crime may be validly tried in any municipality or territory where the offense was
in part committed.[21]

In fact, in the more recent Yalong v. People,[22] wherein the modes of appeal and rules of procedure were the issues at hand, the Court
similarly inferred:
Besides, even discounting the above-discussed considerations, Yalong's appeal still remains dismissible on the ground that, inter alia, the
MTCC had properly acquired jurisdiction over Criminal Case No. 45414. It is well-settled that violation of BP 22 cases is categorized as
transitory or continuing crimes, which means that the acts material and essential thereto occur in one municipality or territory, while some
occur in another. Accordingly, the court wherein any of the crime's essential and material acts have been committed maintains jurisdiction
to try the case; it being understood that the first court taking cognizance of the same excludes the other. Stated differently, a person
charged with a continuing or transitory crime may be validly tried in any municipality or territory where the offense was in part committed.
Applying these principles, a criminal case for violation of BP 22 may be tiled in any of the places where any of its elements occurred - in
particular, the place where the check is drawn, issued, delivered, or dishonored.

In this case, while it is undisputed that the subject check was drawn, issued, and delivered in Manila, records reveal that Ylagan
presented the same for deposit and encashment at the LBC Bank in Batangas City where she learned of its dishonor. As such,
the MTCC [of Batangas City] correctly took cognizance of Criminal Case No. 45414 as It had the territorial jurisdiction to try and
resolve the same. In this light, the denial of the present petition remains warranted.[23]

Guided by the foregoing pronouncements, there is no denying, therefore, that the court of the place where the check was deposited or
presented for encashment; can be vested with jurisdiction to try cases involving violations of BP 22. Thus, the fact that the check subject of
the instant case was drawn, issued, and delivered in Pampanga does not strip off the Makati MeTC of its jurisdiction over the instant case
for it is undisputed that the subject check was deposited and presented for encashment at the Makati Branch of Equitable PC IBank. The
MeTC of Makati, therefore, correctly took cognizance of the instant case and rendered its decision in the proper exercise of its jurisdiction.

It may be argued, however, that the instant petition ought to be dismissed outright due to certain procedural infirmities. Section 35 (1),
Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code provides that the OSG shall represent the Government of the Philippines, its
agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the services of
lawyers. Specifically, it shall represent the Government in all criminal proceedings before the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals.[24]
Thus, as a general rule, if a criminal case is dismissed by the trial court or if there is an acquittal, the appeal on the criminal aspect of the
case must be instituted by the Solicitor General on behalf of the State.[25]

There have been instances, however, where the Court permitted an offended party to file an appeal without the intervention of the OSG,
such as when the offended party questions the civil aspect of a decision of a lower court,[26] when there is denial of due process of law to
the prosecution and the State or its agents refuse to act on the case to the prejudice of the State and the private offended party,[27] when
there is grave error committed by the judge, or when the interest of substantial justice so requires.[28]

Corollary, a judgment of acquittal may be assailed through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court showing that the
lower court, in acquitting the accused, committed not merely reversible errors of judgment, but also exercised grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, or a denial of due process, thereby rendering the assailed judgment null and void. If there is
grave abuse of discretion, granting the aggrieved party's prayer is not tantamount to putting the accused in double jeopardy,[29] in violation
of the general rule that the prosecution cannot appeal or bring error proceedings from a judgment rendered in favor of the defendant in a
criminal case. This is because a judgment of acquittal is immediately final and executory, and the prosecution is barred from appealing lest
the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy be violated.[30]

Thus, it may be argued that since the instant petition is one for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, not under Rule 65,
and was not filed by the OSG representing the interest of the Republic, the same should be summarily dismissed. The unique and special
circumstances attendant in the instant petition, however, justify an adjudication by the Court on the merits and not solely on technical
grounds.

First of all, the Court stresses that the appellate court's dismissal of the case is not an acquittal of respondent. Basic is the rule that a
dismissal of a case is different from an acquittal of the accused therein. Except in a dismissal based on a Demurrer to Evidence filed by the
accused, or for violation of the right of the accused to a speedy trial, the dismissal of a criminal case against the accused will not result in
his acquittal.[31] In the oft-cited People v. Salico,[32] the Court explained:
This argument or reasoning is predicated on a confusion of the legal concepts of dismissal and acquittal. Acquittal is always based on
the merits, that is, the defendant is acquitted because the evidence does not show that defendant's guilt is beyond a reasonable
doubt; but dismissal does tint decide the case on the merits or that the defendant is not guilty. Dismissal terminates the
proceeding, either because the court is not a court of competent jurisdiction, or the evidence does not show that the offense was
committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the court, or the complaint or information is not valid or sufficient in form and
substance, etc. The only case in which the word dismissal is commonly but not correctly used, instead of the proper term acquittal, is
when, after the prosecution has presented all its: evidence, the defendant moves for me dismissal and the court dismisses the ease on the
ground that the evidence tails to show beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty; for in such case the dismissal is in reality an
acquittal because the case is decided on the merits. If the prosecution fails to prove that the offense was committed within the
territorial jurisdiction of the court and the case is dismissed, the dismissal is not an acquittal, inasmuch as if it were so the
defendant could not be again prosecuted before the court of competent jurisdiction; and it is elemental that in such case, the
defendant may again be prosecuted for the same offense before a court of competent jurisdiction.[33]

Thus, when the appellate court herein dismissed the instant case on the ground that the MeTC lacked jurisdiction over the offense charged,
it did not decide the same on the merits, let alone resolve the issue of respondent's guilt or innocence based on the evidence proffered by
the prosecution.[34] The appellate court merely dismissed the case on the erroneous reasoning that none of the elements of BP 22 was
committed within the lower court's jurisdiction, and not because of any finding that the evidence failed to show respondent's guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. Clearly, therefore, such dismissal did not operate as an acquittal, which, as previously discussed, may be repudiated
only by a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, showing a grave abuse of discretion.

Thus, petitioner's resort to Rule 45 of the Rules of Court cannot be struck down as improper. In a petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45, the parties raise only questions of law because the Court, in its exercise of its power of review, is not a trier of facts. There is a
question of law when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on certain state of facts and which does not call for an existence
of the probative value of the evidence presented by the parties-litigants.[35] In De Vera v. Spouses Santiago,[36] the Court categorically
ruled that the issue of whether the appellate court erred in annulling the RTC Decision for lack of jurisdiction is a question of law, to wit:
Undeniably, the issue whether the CA erred in annulling the RTC Decision for lack of jurisdiction is a question of law. The
resolution of such issue rests solely on what the law [B.P. Blg. 129, as amended] provides on the given set of circumstances as
alleged in petitioners' complaint for reconveyance of ownership and possession with damages.[37]

In the instant case; the lone issue invoked by petitioner is precisely "whether the Court of Appeals erred when it ruled that the Metropolitan
Trial Court of Makati City did not have jurisdiction over the case despite clear showing that the offense was committed within the jurisdiction
of said court." Evidently, therefore, the instant petition was filed within the bounds of our procedural rules for the issue herein rests solely
on what the law provides on the given set of circumstances insofar as the commission of the crime of BP 22 is concerned. In criminal
cases, the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the averments of the complaint or Information, in relation to the law prevailing at the
time of the filing of the complaint or Information, and the penalty provided by law for the crime charged at the time of its commission.[38]
Thus, when a case involves a proper interpretation of the rules and jurisprudence with respect to the jurisdiction of courts to entertain
complaints filed therewith, it deals with a question of law that can be properly brought to this Court under Rule 45.[39]

More importantly, moreover, since the dismissal of the instant case cannot be considered as an acquittal of respondent herein, he cannot
likewise claim that his constitutional right to protection against double jeopardy will be violated. In Paulin v. Hon. Gimenez,[40] the Court
held:
Jurisprudence on double jeopardy as well as the exceptions thereto which finds application to the case at bar has been laid down by this
Court as follows:

. . . However, an appeal by the prosecution from the order of dismissal (of the criminal case) by the trial court shall not constitute
double jeopardy if (1) the dismissal is made upon motion, or with the express consent of the defendant; (2) the dismissal is not
an acquittal or based upon consideration of the evidence or of the merits of the case; and (3) the question to be passed upon by
the appellate court is purely legal so that should the dismissal he found incorrect, the case would have to be remanded to the
court of origin for further proceedings, to determine the guilt or innocence of the defendant.[41]

A cursory review of the records would readily reveal the presence of the foregoing requisites. First, as early as the stage of respondent's
appeal of the MeTC's decision to the RTC, respondent had already been moving for the dismissal of the case alleging the ground of lack of
jurisdiction. Accordingly, the CA's dismissal on said ground can rightly be considered to have been with respondent's express consent.
Second, as earlier mentioned, the dismissal herein is not an acquittal or based upon a consideration of the merits. Third, the question
raised in this case is based purely on a question of law. In view therefore of the presence of all three requisites, the Court finds that
petitioner's appeal of the appellate court's dismissal cannot be barred by double jeopardy.

As to the issue of petitioner's legal standing to file the instant petition in the absence of the OSG's participation, the circumstances herein
warrant the Court's consideration. In Narciso v. Sta. Romana-Cruz,[42] the Court gave due regard to the ends of substantial justice by
giving due course to a petition filed before it by the private offended party, viz.:
Citing the "ends of substantial justice," People v. Calo, however, provided an exception to the above doctrines in this manner:

While the rule is, as held by the Court of Appeals, only the Solicitor General may bring or defend actions on behalf of the Republic of the
Philippines, or represent the People or the State in criminal proceedings pending in this Court and the Court of Appeals (Republic vs.
Partisala, 118 SCRA 320 [1982]), the ends of substantial justice would be better served, and the issues in this action could be
determined in a more just, speedy and inexpensive manner, by entertaining the petition at bar. As an offended party in a criminal
case, private petitioner has sufficient personality and a valid grievance against Judge Adao's order granting bail to the alleged
murderers of his (private petitioner's) father.

xxxx

The ends of substantial justice indeed require the affirmation of the appellate court's ruling on this point. Clearly, the assailed
Order of Judge Santiago was issued in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. A void order is no order at all. It
cannot confer any right or be the source of any relief. This Court is not merely a court of law; it is likewise a court of justice.

To rule otherwise would leave the private respondent without any recourse to rectify the public injustice brought about by the
trial court's Order, leaving her with only the standing to file administrative charges for ignorance of the law against the judge and
the prosecutor. A party cannot be left without recourse to address a substantive issue in law.[43]

In a similar manner, the Court finds that in the interest of substantial justice, it must give due course to the instant petition and consequently
rule on the merits of the same. The circumstances surrounding this case left petitioner with no other suitable recourse but to appeal the
case herself. Not only was there an absence of support from the OSG, said government office also took a position in contrast to the rights
and interests of petitioner. Moreover, as discussed above, the arguments which ran counter to petitioner's interest as well as the grounds
used to support them were simply inapplicable to the issue at hand. In fact, these erroneous contentions were adopted by the appellate
court in their entirety, dismissing the instant case in a manner not in accord with law and applicable jurisprudence. For the Court, now, to
apply procedural rules in their strict and literal sense by similarly dismissing, as the CA had, petitioner's action poses serious
consequences tantamount to a miscarriage of justice. To rule that the accused can postpone criminal prosecution and delay the
administration of justice at petitioner's expense on the erroneous ground of lack of jurisdiction would create a hazardous precedent and
open loopholes in our criminal justice system.[44]

Indeed, the unique and exceptional circumstances in the instant case demand that the Court forego a rigid application of the technicalities
under

the law so as to prevent petitioner from suffering a grave injustice. As disclosed by the records, petitioner had already fulfilled her end of
the agreement in giving respondent, as early as in the year 2003, construction materials amounting to half a million pesos and yet up until
now, she has not been paid therefor. In feet, after having sufficiently proven to the satisfaction of both the MeTC and the RTC her right
allegedly violated by respondent, the CA simply dismissed, albeit without prejudice to the re-filing of the case with the appropriate court, her
action for the incorrect ground of wrong venue. On the mistaken reasoning that the MeTC of Makati City did not have jurisdiction over the
instant case, the CA, without providing any legal or jurisprudential basis, would have petitioner start from the very beginning and refile her
complaint before the same court which already had jurisdiction in the first place.

Thus, when there exists meritorious grounds to overlook strict procedural matters, the Court cannot turn a blind eye thereto lest the
administration of justice be derailed by an overly stringent application of the rules.[45] Rules of procedure are meant to be tools to facilitate
a fair and orderly conduct of proceedings. Strict adherence thereto must not get in the way of achieving substantial justice. As long as their
purpose is sufficiently met and no violation of due process and fair play takes place, the rules should be liberally construed.[46] Dismissal
of appeals purely on technical grounds is frowned upon where the policy of the court is to encourage hearings of appeals on their merits
and the rules of procedure ought not to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense; rules of procedure are used only to help secure, not
override substantial justice. It is a far better and more prudent course of action for the court to excuse a technical lapse and afford the
parties a review of the case on appeal to attain the ends of justice rather than dispose of the case on technicality and cause a grave
injustice to the parties, giving a false impression of speedy disposal of cases while actually resulting in more delay, if not a miscarriage of
justice.[47]

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated January 18, 2011 and Resolution dated August
9, 2011 of the Court Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 32723 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision dated February 23, 2009 and
Order dated July 13, 2009, of the Regional Trial Court in Criminal Case Nos. 08-1876-77, which affirmed the Joint Decision dated
September 3, 2008 of the Metropolitan Trial Court in Criminal Case Nos. 337902-03 are hereby REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.
 [ GR No. 179814, Dec 07, 2015 ]

WILFRED N.CHIOK v. PEOPLE +

JARDELEZA, J.:

These are consolidated petitions[1] seeking to nullify the Court of Appeals (CA) July 19, 2007 Decision[2] and October 3, 2007
Resolution[3] in CA-G.R. CR No. 23309. The CA reversed and set aside the December 3, 1998 Decision[4] of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Pasig-Branch 165, and acquitted petitioner Wilfred Chiok (Chiok) of the crime of estafa in Criminal Case No. 109927, but ordered
him to pay civil liability to Rufina Chua in the total amount of P9,500,000.00, plus interests:

WHEREFORE, the DECISION DATED DECEMBER 3, 1998 is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE and accused WILFRED N. CHIOK is
ACQUITTED for failure of the Prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt, but he is ORDERED to pay complainant RUFINA
CHUA the principal amount of [P]9,500,000.00, plus legal interest of 6% per annum reckoned from the tiling of this case, which rate shall
increase to 12% per annum from the finality of judgment.

No pronouncement on costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.[5] (Emphasis in original)

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Chiok was charged with estafa, defined and penalized under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code, in an Information that
reads:

That sometime in June, 1995 in the Municipality of San Juan, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, received in trust from Rufina Chua the amount of P9,563,900.00 for him to buy complainant shares of stocks,
under the express obligation on the part of the accused to deliver the documents thereon or to return the whole amount if the purchase did
not materialize, but the accused once in possession of the said amount, far from complying will his obligation as aforesaid, with intent to
defraud the complainant, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously misapply, misappropriate and convert lo his own personal
use and benefit the said amount of P9,563,900.00, and despite repeated demands failed and relused and still fails and refuses to return
the said amount or to account for the same, to the damage and prejudice of the complainant Rufina Chua in the aforementioned amount of
P9,563,900.00.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[6]
Chiok pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. Thereafter, trial ensued, with both parties presenting their evidence in support of their
respective claims and defenses.

According to the Prosecution, petitioner Rufina Chua (Chua) met Chiok in mid-1989, during which he offered to be her investment adviser.
Convinced by Chiok's representations and the fact that he is Chinese, Chua made an initial investment of P200,000.00, allegedly to buy
Meralco and PLDT shares. She rolled over the original investment and profits, and this went on until 1994. For each of their transactions,
Chua claimed she was not given any document evidencing every stock transaction and that she only relied on the assurances of Chiok. In
mid-1995, she accepted his proposal to buy shares in bulk in the amount of P9,563,900.00. Chua alleged that she deposited
P7,100,000.00 to Chiok's Far East Bank, Annapolis account on June 9, 1995 and delivered to him P2,463,900.00 in cash later that same
date at the Han Court Restaurant in Annapolis, Greenhills. As proof, she presented a deposit slip dated June 9, 1995 of Chiok's Far Bast
Bank Annapolis account. There was no receipt or memorandum for the cash delivery.[7]

Chua narrated that she became suspicious when Chiok later on avoided her calls and when he failed to show any document of the sale.
He reassured her by giving her two interbank checks, Check No. 02030693 dated July 11, 1995 for P7,963,900.00 and Check No.
02030694 dated August 15, 1995 in the amount of P1,600,000.00 (interbank checks). The interbank checks were given with the request to
deposit the first check only after 60-75 days to enable him to generate funds from the sale of a property in Hong Kong. Both interbank
checks were ultimately dishonored upon presentment for payment due to garnishment and insufficiency of funds. Despite Chua's pleas,
Chiok did not return her money. Hence, she referred the matter to her counsel who wrote a demand letter dated October 25, 1995. Chiok
sent her a letter-reply dated November 16, 1995 stating that the money was Chua's investment in their unregistered partnership, and was
duly invested with Yu Que Ngo. In the end, Chua decided to file her complaint-affidavit against him in the Pasig Prosecutor's Office.[8]

In his defense, Chiok denied that he enticed Chua to invest in the stock market, or offered her the prospect of buying shares of stocks in
bulk. Chiok maintained that from the time he met her in 1991 and until 1995, he previously only had dollar transactions with Chua. It was in
1995 when both of them decided to form an unregistered partnership. He admitted that the P7,963,900.00 she gave him before she left for
the United States was her investment in this unregistered partnership. Chua allegedly instructed him to invest according to his best
judgment and asked him to issue a check in her name for her peace of mind. Chiok denied having received the P2,463,900.00 in cash from
her.[9]

On cross-examination, however, Chiok admitted receiving "P7.9" million in June 1995 and "P1.6" million earlier.[10] He testified that
exercising his best judgment, he invested P8,000,000.00 with Yu Que Ngo, a businesswoman engaged in the manufacture of machine
bolts and screws under the name and style of Capri Manufacturing Company.[11] Chiok narrated that Chua only panicked when she
learned that he was swindled by one Gonzalo Nuguid, who supplied him with dollars.[12] It was then that she immediately demanded the
return of her investment. To reassure Chua, Chiok informed her that lie had invested the money with Yu Que Ngo and offered to give Yu
Que Ngo's checks to replace his previously issued interbank checks.[13] Chua agreed, but instead of returning his checks, she retained
them along with the checks of Yu Que Ngo. Chua rejected Yu Que Ngo's offer to settle her obligation with land and machineries, insisting
on recovering the "whole amount plus interest, litigation expenses plus attorney's fees."[14] After the case was filed, Chiok and Yu Que
Ngo met with Chua, accompanied by their lawyers, in an effort to amicably settle Chua's demand for the return of her funds. Chua
demanded more than P30,000,000.00, but Chiok and Yu Que Ngo requested for a lower amount because the original claim was only
P9,500,000.00. Chua did not grant their request.[15]

In a Decision[16] dated December 3, 1998, the RTC convicted Chiok of the crime of estafa (RTC conviction). Its dispositive portion reads:

In View Of All The Foregoing, the Court hereby finds the accused Wilfred N. Chiok guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of estafa
under Art. 315, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code.

Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the Court hereby sentences the accused to suffer imprisonment of twelve (12) years of prision
mayor as minimum to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal as maximum and to pay the costs.

The accused is ordered to pay the private complainant the amount of P9,563,900.00 with interest at the legal rate to be computed from the
date of demand - October 25, 1995 until fully paid.

For want of evidence, the Court cannot award the alleged actual damages.

SO ORDERED.[17]

The prosecution filed a Motion for Cancellation of Bail[18] pursuant to Section 5, Rule 114 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure on
February 1, 1999, the same day the judgment was promulgated.[19] On February 15, 1999, Chiok filed a Motion for Reconsideration[20] of
the RTC conviction.

The RTC, in an omnibus order[21] dated May 28, 1999 (omnibus order), denied Chiok's motion for reconsideration, and also cancelled his
bail pursuant to Section 5, Rule 114 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure. The RTC held that the circumstances of the accused
indicated the probability of flight if released on bail and/or that there is undue risk that during the pendency of the appeal, he may commit
another crime. Thus:

WHEREFORE, the bail of the accused is cancelled. The accused is given five (5) days from receipt of this order within which to surrender
before this Court otherwise, his arrest will be ordered.

SO ORDERED.[22]

On June 18, 1999, Chiok filed a Notice of Appeal[23] on the RTC conviction and omnibus order, docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 23309 (the
appeal case) and rallied to the CA Fifteenth Division. On June 19, 1999, Chiok also filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with a
prayer for Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Injunction against the omnibus order,[24] which was docketed as CA-G.R. CR No.
53340 (bail case) and raffled to the CA Thirteenth Division.

Meanwhile, the RTC issued an order of arrest[25] on June 25, 1999 (order of arrest) pursuant to the omnibus order. The order of arrest was
returned to the trial court by the Makati Police Station on July 25, 1999 on the ground that Chiok could not be located at his last given
address.[26]

The Bail Case

On July 27, 1999, the CA issued a TRO on the implementation of the omnibus order until further orders.[27] On September 20, 1999, the
CA issued a writ of preliminary injunction[28] enjoining the arrest of Chiok. The CA ruled that Chiok should not be deprived of liberty
pending the resolution of his appeal because the offense for which he was convicted is a non-capital offense, and that the probability of
flight during the pendency of his appeal is merely conjectural.[29] The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) and Chua filed a motion for
reconsideration but it was denied by the CA in a Resolution dated November 16, 1999.

On November 3, 1999, the OSG representing the People of the Philippines, and Chua, filed separate petitions for certiorari before us
seeking review of the CA Resolutions dated September 20, 1999 and November 16, 1999.[30] We granted the OSG's and Chua's petitions
and reversed the CA's injunction on the arrest of Chiok.[31] Our decisions (SC bail decisions) became final on December 6, 2006 and June
20, 2007, respectively.

The Appeal Case

On September 21, 1999, the CA Thirteenth Division dismissed the appeal of Chiok finding him to have jumped bail when the order of arrest
was returned unserved.[32] The CA considered his appeal abandoned, dismissing it pursuant to Section 8, Rule 124 of the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure. However, on February 29, 2000, the CA reinstated Chiok's appeal when it learned of the issuance of the TRO and
injunction in the bail case on September 20, 1999 or a day prior to the appeal's dismissal.[33]
Proceedings before the CA ensued. Chiok filed his Appellant's Brief[34] dated August 28, 2003 while the OSG filed its Appellee's
Brief[35]dated December 23, 2003. Chiok submitted his Reply Brief[36] dated April 14, 2004 while the OSG and Chua replied through their
Rejoinder Briefs[37] dated October 6, 2004.

On July 19, 2007, the CA in a Special Division of Five (Former-Fourth Division) rendered a Decision reversing and setting aside the
Decision dated December 3, 1998 of the trial court, and acquitted Chiok for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt (CA acquittal).

The CA found that the RTC conviction did not contain findings of fact on the prosecution's evidence but merely recited the evidence of the
prosecution as if such evidence was already proof of the ultimate facts constituting estafa. Instead of relying on the strength of the
prosecution's evidence, the trial court relied on the weakness of the defense. It found that Chua's testimony, which was the sole evidence
of the prosecution, was inconsistent and improbable. Specifically, it was irregular that Chua was not able to produce any single receipt or
documentary evidence of all the alleged stock dealings which spanned for a long period of six years with Chiok—the purpose of which was
to prove that he misappropriated the amount contrary to her instructions of investing it to blue chip stocks. More importantly, the
acceptance by Chua of the checks issued by Yu Que Ngo ratified his application of the funds based on the instructions to invest it. Simply
put, the prosecution was not able to prove the element of misappropriation (i.e., deviation from Chua's instructions). As to the civil aspect,
the CA found Chiok liable to Chua for the amount of P9,500,000.00,[38] the amount he admitted on record.

The OSG did not file a motion for reconsideration on the ground of double jeopardy. Chua, on the other hand, filed a motion for
reconsideration[39] on August 8, 2007. Chiok also filed his own motion for reconsideration,[40] on the civil liability imposed on him.

In a Resolution[41] dated October 3, 2007, the CA denied Chua's motion for reconsideration and its supplement on the ground that
acquittal is immediately final and the re-examination of the record of the case would violate the guarantee against double jeopardy. It also
denied the motions tor reconsideration of both parties on the civil aspect of the case.

Hence, these consolidated petitions questioning the CA acquittal by way of a petition for certiorari and mandamus, and the civil aspect of
the case by way of appeal by certiorari.

Issues

The consolidated petitions raise the following issues:

1 Whether or not Chua has a legal personality to file and prosecute this petition.

2 Whether or not the case is an exception to the rule on finality of acquittal and the doctrine of double jeopardy.

3 Whether or not Chiok is civilly liable to Chua.

Discussion
I. Chua lacks the legal personality to file this petition.

Chua argues that her petition should be allowed because the circumstances of this case warrant leniency on her lack of personality to
assail the criminal aspect of the CA acquittal. She argues that "the OSG did not take any action to comment on the position of Chua [and]
that this case belongs to the realm of exceptions to the doctrine of double jeopardy."[42]

We disagree with Chua.

Chua lacks the personality or legal standing to question the CA Decision because it is only the OSG, on behalf of the State, which can
bring actions in criminal proceedings before this Court and the CA.

In Villareal v. Aliga,[43] we upheld the doctrine that it is only the OSG, as representative of the State, which may question the acquittal of
the accused via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, viz:

x x x The authority to represent the State in appeals of criminal cases before the Supreme Court and the CA is solely vested in
the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG). Section 35 (I), Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code explicitly provides
that the OSG shall represent the Government of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any
litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the services of lawyers. It shall have specific powers and functions to represent the
Government and its officers in the Supreme Court and the CA, and all other courts or tribunals in all civil actions and special proceedings in
which the Government or any officer thereof in his official capacity is a party. The OSG is the law office of the Government.

To be sure, in criminal cases, the acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case against him can only be appealed by the
Solicitor General, acting on behalf of the State. The private complainant or the offended party may question such acquittal or dismissal
only insofar as the civil liability of the accused is concerned. In a catena of cases, this view has been time and again espoused and
maintained by the Court. In Rodriguez v. Gadiane, it was categorically slated that if the criminal case is dismissed by the trial court or if
there is an acquittal, the appeal on the criminal aspect of the case must be instituted by the Solicitor General in behalf of the State. The
capability of the private complainant to question such dismissal or acquittal is limited only to the civil aspect of the case. The same
determination was also arrived at by the Court in Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company v. Veridiano II. In the recent case of Bangayan, Jr.
v. Bangayan, the Court again upheld this guiding principle.

xxx

Thus, the Court has definitively ruled that in a criminal case in which the offended party is the State, the interest of the private complainant
or the private offended party is limited to the civil liability arising therefrom. If a criminal case is dismissed by the trial court or if there is an
acquittal, an appeal of the criminal aspect may be undertaken, whenever legally feasible, only by the State through the Solicitor General.
As a rule, only the Solicitor General may represent the People of the Philippines on appeal. The private offended party or complainant may
not undertake such appeal. (Emphasis supplied)

The rationale behind this rule is that in a criminal case, the party affected by the dismissal of the criminal action is the State and not the
private complainant.[44] The interest of the private complainant or the private offended party is limited only to the civil liability.[45] In the
prosecution of the offense, the complainant's role is limited to that of a witness for the prosecution such that when a criminal case is
dismissed by the trial court or if there is an acquittal, an appeal therefrom on the criminal aspect may be undertaken only by the State
through the Solicitor General.[46] The private offended party or complainant may not take such appeal, but may only do so as to the civil
aspect of the case.[47]

Although there are instances when we adopt a liberal view and give due course to a petition filed by an offended party, we direct the OSG
to file its comment.[48] When through its comment, the OSG takes a position similar to the private complainant's, we hold that the OSG
ratifies and adopts the private complainant's petition as its own.[49] However, when the OSG in its comment neither prays that the petition
be granted nor expressly ratifies and adopts the petition as its own, we hesitate in disregarding, and uphold instead, the rule on personality
or legal standing.[50]

In this case, the OSG neither appealed the judgment of acquittal of the CA nor gave its conformity to Chua's special civil action for
certiorari and mandamus. In its Comment[51] dated March 27, 2008, the OSG is of the view that Chua's petition will place Chiok in double
jeopardy:

x x x Notably, while petitioner [Chua] imputes grave abuse of discretion on the Court of Appeals in acquitting private respondent, a perusal
of the allegations will reveal errors of judgment in the appreciation of evidence, not error of jurisdiction. Verily, petitioner contends that the
Court of Appeals abused its discretion when it pronounced that "we have also reviewed the evidence of the accused in order to satisfy
ourselves about the essential question of misappropriation or conversion" and hold thereafter that "review now justifies us to pronounce
that his version on the matter was probably credible." Petitioner argues that a simple review of the evidence of respondent accused readily
leads to the conclusion that it is very far from being probably credible.
Clearly, the errors ascribed to the Court of Appeals are errors that go deeply into the appreciation and assessment of the evidence
presented by the prosecution and the defense during the trial. Thus, the present petition smacks in the heart of the Court of [Appeals]
appreciation of evidence x x x.[52]

In view of the contrary position of the OSG, we do not subscribe to Chua's view that the circumstances of this case warrant the relaxation
on the rule. Even if we do relax this procedural rule, we find that the merits of the case still calls for the dismissal of Chua's petition.

II. The appeal from the judgment of acquittal will place Chiok in double jeopardy.

The 1987 Constitution, as well as its predecessors, guarantees the right of the accused against double jeopardy.[53] Section 7, Rule 117 of
the 1985 and 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure strictly adhere to the constitutional proscription against double jeopardy and provide for
the requisites in order for double jeopardy to attach. For double jeopardy to attach, the following elements must concur: (1) a valid
information sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction of the crime charged; (2) a court of competent jurisdiction; (3) the
accused has been arraigned and had pleaded; and (4) the accused was convicted or acquitted or the case was dismissed without his
express consent.[54]

In order to give life to the rule on double jeopardy, our rules on criminal proceedings require that a judgment of acquittal, whether ordered
by the trial or the appellate court, is final, unappealable, and immediately executory upon its promulgation.[55] This is referred to as the
"finality-of-acquittal" rule. The rationale for the rule was explained in People v. Velasco:[56]

The fundamental philosophy highlighting the finality of an acquittal by the trial court cuts deep into "the humanity of the laws and in a
jealous watchfulness over the rights of the citizen, when brought in unequal contest with the State, x x x." Thus, Green expressed the
concern that "(t)he underlying idea, one that is deeply ingrained in at least the Anglo-American system of jurisprudence, is that the State
with sill its resources and power should not be allowed to make repealed attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense,
thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and
insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even though innocent, he may be found guilty."

It is axiomatic that on the basis of humanity, fairness and justice, an acquitted defendant is entitled to the right of repose as a direct
consequence of the finality of his acquittal. The philosophy underlying this rule establishing the absolute nature of acquittals is "part of the
paramount importance criminal justice system attaches to the protection of the innocent against wrongful conviction." The interest in the
finality-of-acquittal rule, confined exclusively to verdicts of not guilty, is easy to understand: it is a need for "repose," a desire to
know the exact extent of one's liability. With this right of repose, the criminal justice system has built in a protection lo insure that the
innocent, even those whose innocence rests upon a jury's leniency, will not be found guilty in a subsequent proceeding.

Related to his right of repose is the defendant's interest in his right to have his trial completed by a particular tribunal. This interest
encompasses his right to have his guilt or innocence determined in a single proceeding by the initial jury empanelled to try him, for
society's awareness of the heavy personal strain which the criminal trial represents for the individual defendant is manifested in the
willingness to limit Government to a single criminal proceeding to vindicate its very vital interest in enforcement of criminal laws. The
ultimate goal is prevention of government oppression; the goal finds its voice in the finality of the initial proceeding. As observed in Lockhart
v. Nelson, "(t)he fundamental tenet animating the Double Jeopardy Clause is that the State should not be able to oppress
individuals through the abuse of the criminal process." Because the innocence of the accused has been confirmed by a final
judgment, the Constitution conclusively presumes that a second trial would be unfair. (Citations omitted, emphasis supplied)

There were cases, however, where we recognized certain exceptions to the rule against double jeopardy and its resultant doctrine of
finality-of-acquittal.

In Galman v. Sandiganbayan,[57] we remanded a judgment of acquittal to a trial court due to a finding of mistrial. In declaring the trial
before the Sandiganbayan of the murder of former Senator Benigno Simeon "Ninoy" Aquino, Jr., which resulted in the acquittal of all the
accused, as a sham, we found that "the prosecution and the sovereign people were denied due process of law with a partial court and
biased [Tanodbayan] under the constant and pervasive monitoring and pressure exerted by the authoritarian [p]resident to assure the
carrying out of his instructions."[58] We considered the acquittal as void, and held that no double jeopardy attached.

In People v. Uy,[59] we held that by way of exception, a judgment of acquittal in a criminal case may be assailed in a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court upon clear showing by the petitioner that the lower court, in acquitting the accused, committed not
merely reversible errors of judgment but grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction or a denial of due process,
thus rendering the assailed judgment void.

Chua assails the acquittal of Chiok on two grounds. First, the first jeopardy did not attach because the CA did not have jurisdiction over the
appeal; Chiok having lost his right to appeal when the CA found him to have jumped bail. Second assuming that the first jeopardy attached,
the circumstances of this case is an exception to the rule on double jeopardy.

A. The CA had jurisdiction to entertain Chiok's appeal.

Chua claims that the SC bail decisions set aside as bereft of any factual or legal basis the CA resolutions in the bail case which enjoined
the cancellation of bail of Chiok and his warrant of arrest by the trial court. The logical and legal consequence of the nullification of the CA
resolutions is to automatically revive the CA's Resolution dated September 21, 1999 dismissing the appeal of Chiok. Accordingly, the CA
had no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal of Chiok and the proceedings therein are null and void.

We find no merit in Chua's claims.

At the outset, the CA validly acquired jurisdiction over Chiok's appeal. Chiok filed his Notice of Appeal on June 18, 1999 at the time when
the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure was still in effect. Section 6, Rule 120 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure explicitly provides
that the right to appeal is not automatically forfeited when an accused fails to appear during the promulgation of judgment.[60] Upon
perfection of Chiok's Notice of Appeal and the subsequent denial of the prosecution's Motion to Deny Due Course to the Notice of Appeal
by the RTC in its Order[61] dated July 15, 1999, the CA completely acquired jurisdiction over Chiok's appeal.

After acquiring jurisdiction over the appeal, the CA took cognizance of the unserved order of arrest. Exercising jurisdiction over Chiok's
appeal, the CA in its Resolution dated September 21, 1999 dismissed his appeal in accordance with Section 8, Rule 124 of the 1985 Rules
on Criminal Procedure:

Sec. 8. Dismissal of appeal for abandonment, or failure to prosecute. - The appellate court may, upon motion of the appellee or on its own
motion and notice to the appellant, dismiss the appeal if the appellant fails to file his brief within the time prescribed by this Rule, except in
case the appellant is represented by a counsel de oficio.

The court may also, upon motion of the appellee or on its own motion, dismiss the appeal if the appellant escapes from prison or
confinement or jumps bail or flees to a foreign country during the pendency of the appeal. (Emphasis and italics supplied)

The aforecited section gives the CA the authority to dismiss an appeal for abandonment if the accused escapes from prison or confinement
or jumps bail or flees to a foreign country during the pendency of the appeal. This authority to dismiss an appeal is, nevertheless,
discretionary.[62] When an accused jumps bail during the pendency of his appeal, the appellate court may exercise its discretion whether
to proceed with the appeal or dismiss it outright.[63] In several cases, we still proceeded to acquit an accused who remained at large
during the pendency of the appeal.[64]

In this case, the CA exercised this discretion when it found that Chiok jumped bail because the order of arrest was not served.
Subsequently, when Chiok moved for its reconsideration, the CA again exercised its discretion, this time to entertain the appeal. Notably,
neither the prosecution nor Chua attributed any grave abuse of discretion on the part of the appellate court when it reinstated the appeal
via a Resolution dated February 29, 2000. This resolution, which effectively replaces the original resolution dismissing the appeal, has
already attained finality.
Thus, contrary to the claim of Chua, the SC bail decisions which set aside the CA resolutions enjoining Chiok's arrest did not automatically
revive the CA resolution dismissing the appeal; the dismissal being a discretionary act on the part of the appellate court. Consequently, we
reject the claim of Chua that the first jeopardy did not attach because the whole proceedings before the CA, and the CA acquittal, are null
and void.

B. Exceptions to the rate on finality-of-acquittal and double jeopardy doctrine do not apply.

Chua next asserts that certain exceptions to the rule on double jeopardy are present in this case. Particularly, she submits that: (1) the
appellate court's proceeding is a sham or mock proceeding; (2) the People through the OSG, was deprived of the opportunity to be heard
and its "day in court"; and (3) the result is a null and void judgment of acquittal. Chua cites the case of Galman v. Sandiganbayan[65] to
bolster her assertions.

Chua claims that the "trial in both the bouncing checks cases and this estafa case, is a sham insofar as they have resulted in
acquittals."[66] Chua anchors her claim on the report submitted by Judge Elvira D.C. Panganiban that there were unauthorized tamperings
in the evidence in the bouncing checks cases[67] (BP 22 case) she filed against Chiok, and that a TSN in the same BP 22 case, where
Chiok allegedly made an implied admission of guilt, has been secretly removed from the record.

We do not see any exception to the rule on double jeopardy in this case.

The factual milieu in Galman v. Sandiganbayan[68] is starkly different from this case. In Galman, we concluded that there was a mock or
sham trial because of the overwhelming evidence of collusion and undue pressures made by former President Marcos on the prosecution
and the Justices who tried and decided the case, which prevented the prosecution from fully ventilating its position and offering all
evidence. We recognized the intensity and gravity of the pressure exerted by the highest official in the land that resulted to a miscarriage of
justice.

In this case, Chua presents a report submitted by Judge Elvira D.C. Panganiban showing irregularities in the BP 22 case against Chiok,
including the loss of a TSN containing an alleged offer of settlement by Chiok equivalent to his implied admission of guilt. We, however, do
not see the same evils presented in Galman when the alleged anomalies pointed out by Chua were in a different case and when the main
basis of the acquittal is not on the credibility of the physical evidence but of the testimony of Chua herself. Moreover, it is apparent from the
CA acquittal that the appellate court considered Chiok's offer of settlement in arriving at the decision, having included it in its statement of
facts. In essence, Chua is asking us to nullify the CA acquittal because in her opinion, if the appellate court considered these pieces of
evidence, it would have convicted Chiok. These are purported errors of judgment or those involving misappreciation of evidence which
cannot be raised and be reviewed in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.

We are also not convinced that the State was deprived of due process in presenting its case. The OSG, in fact, actively participated in
prosecuting the case before the CA. It was able to file an Appellee's Brief[69] dated December 23, 2003, as well as its Rejoinder
Brief[70]dated October 6, 2004. As Chua even admits in her petition, the OSG was able to present its case before the appellate court as
when "[t]he OSG's position in this case on the merits is clear in the submissions it has filed, as most eloquently expressed in the Rejoinder
Brief..."[71]Certainly, no grave abuse of discretion can be ascribed where both parties had the opportunity to present their case and even
required them to submit memoranda from which its decision is based, as in this case.[72]

Although we do not absolutely preclude the availment of the remedy of certiorari to correct an erroneous acquittal, the petitioner must
clearly and convincingly demonstrate that the appellate court blatantly abused its authority to a point so grave and so severe as to deprive
it of its very power to dispense justice.[73] Chua failed to do so.

III. Chiok is civilly liable to Chua in the amount of P9,563,900.00.

Chiok claims thai the Joint Decision[74] dated November 27, 2000 in the BP 22 case docketed as Criminal Case No. 44739 of the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) San Juan, Manila - Branch 58, which absolved Chiok from civil liability, is res judicata on this case. On the
other hand, Chua. claims that the CA erred when it ordered Chiok to pay only the amount of P9,500,000.00 when it was shown by
evidence that the amount should be P9,563,900.00.

We rule that Chiok is liable For the amount of P9,563,900.00.

In Castillo v. Salvador[75] and several cases before it, we ruled that if the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt, the accused is not
automatically exempt from civil liability which may be proved by preponderance of evidence only. In this regard, preponderance of evidence
is the weight, credit, and value of the aggregate evidence on either side and is usually considered to be synonymous with the term "greater
weight of the evidence" or "greater weight of the credible evidence." Preponderance of evidence is evidence which is more convincing to
the court as worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto.[76]

While the CA acquitted Chiok on the ground that the prosecution's evidence on his alleged misappropriation of Chua's money did not meet
the quantum of proof beyond reasonable doubt, we hold that the monetary transaction between Chua and Chiok was proven by
preponderance of evidence.

Chua presented in evidence a bank deposit slip dated June 9, 1995 to Chiok's Far East Bank, Annapolis account in the amount of
P7,100,000.00. She also testified that she delivered to him in cash the amount of P2,463,900.00. Chiok's admission that he issued the
interbank checks in the total amount of P9,563,900.00 to Chua, albeit claiming that it was "for safekeeping purposes only" and to assure
her that she will be paid back her investment, corroborates Chua's evidence. In any event, as found by the appellate court, Chiok admitted
that he received from Chua the amount of "P7.9" million in June 1995 and for "P1.6" million at an earlier time. It is on this basis that the CA
found Chiok civilly liable in the amount of P9,500,000.00 only.

However, we find that during the direct and cross-examination of Chiok on September 15, 1997 and October 13, 1997, the reference to
"P9.5" million is the amount in issue, which is the whole of P9,563,900.00:

TSN September 15, 1907 (direct examination of Wilfred Chiok)

ATTY ESPIRITU[:] Mr. Witness. The amount here you are being charged in the information is P9,563,900.00 covered by the two (2) checks
Exhibits "C" and "D" of the prosecution. x x x[77]

TSN Octobcr 13, 1997 (cross examination of Wilfred Chiok)

PROSECUTOR RASA[:] Do you know how much Mrs. Chua is claiming from you [which is the] subject matter of this case of estafa?

WITNKSK[:] Yes, ma'am.

PROSECUTOR RASA[:] How much?

WITNESS[:] More or less 9.5.

PROSECUTOR RASA[:] In peso or in dollar?

WITNESS[:] In Peso.

PROSECUTOR RASA[:] 9.5 Million what?

WITNESS[:] Million Peso, ma'am.

PROSECUTOR RASA[:] You admit that you received 9.5 Million from Mrs. Chua?

WITNESS[:] I admitted that, ma'am.[78] (Italics supplied)

Accordingly, the amount admitted should be P9,563,900.00.

There is also no merit in Chiok's claim that his absolution from civil liability in the BP 22 case involving the same transaction bars civil
liability in this estafa case under the doctrine of res judicata in the concept of "conclusiveness of judgment."
The doctrine of res judicata under the concept of "conclusiveness of judgment" is found in paragraph (c) of Section 47, Rule 39 of the
Revised Rules of Court. Under this doctrine, a final judgment or decree on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive of
the rights of the parties or their privies in all later suits on points and matters determined in the former suit.[79] Stated differently, facts and
issues actually and directly resolved in a former suit cannot again be raised in any future case between the same parties, even if the latter
suit may involve a different cause of action.[80] This principle of res judicata bars the re-litigation of particular facts or issues in another
litigation between the same parties on a different claim or cause of action.[81]

In Rodriguez v. Ponferrada,[82] we explained that a civil action in a BP 22 case is not a bar to a civil action in estafa case. In rejecting the
theory of petitioner therein that the civil action arising from the criminal case for violation of BP 22 precludes the institution of the
corresponding civil action in the criminal case for estafa pending before the RTC, we ruled that Rule 111 of the Rules of Court expressly
allows the institution of a civil action in the crimes of both estafa and violation of BP 22, without need of election by the offended party.
There is no forum shopping because both remedies are simultaneously available to the offended party. We explained that while every such
act of issuing a bouncing check involves only one civil liability for the offended party who has sustained only a single injury, this single civil
liability can be the subject of both civil actions in the estafa case and the BP 22 case. However, there may only be one recovery of the
single civil liability.

We affirmed this in Rimando v. Aldaba,[83] where we were confronted with the similar issue of whether an accused's civil liability in the
estafa case must be upheld despite acquittal and exoneration from civil liability in BP 22 cases. We held that both estafa and BP 22 cases
can proceed to their final adjudication-both as to their criminal and civil aspects—subject only to the prohibition on double recovery.

Since the Rules itself allows for both remedies to be simultaneously availed of by the offended party, the doctrine of res judicata finds no
application here.

Moreover, the principle of res judicata in the concept of conclusiveness of judgment presupposes that facts and issues were actually and
directly resolved in a previous case.[84] However, the records show that in the BP 22 case, the facts and issues proving the transaction
were not actually and directly resolved in the decision, viz:

The court is not persuaded.

First, what the law requires is a notice of dishonor of the check to be given to the accused after its dishonor. There is no showing dial this
requirement was complied by the prosecution. Second, the drawer must be given at least 5 banking days from such notice of dishonor
within which to pay the holder thereof the amount due thereon or to make arrangement for payment in full by the drawee of such check.
Indeed, there was no notice of dishonor established to have been furnished the accused and therefore there is more reason that the
accused was not given the requisite 5-banking day to make good aforesaid cheeks. The 5-day notice serves to mitigate the harshness of
the law in its application by giving the drawer an opportunity to make good the bum check. And, it cannot be said that accused was ever
given that opportunity simply because the prosecution failed to prove that accused was notified of the dishonor of the checks in suit.
xxx
Even assuming without admitting but only for the sake of argument that accused was notified of the dishonor of the checks in suit by the
demand letter adverted to above, still the prosecution cause must fail because there are more reasons not to believe than to believe the
theory of the prosecution as compared with that of the defense as will be explained hereunder.
xxx
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing considerations, the court hereby absolves the accused from criminal as well as civil liability and
orders these cases DISMISSED for lack of evidence to support the charges levelled against him.

Costs de officio.

No other pronouncements.

SO ORDERED.[85]
The basis or Chiok's acquittal therein is the prosecution's failure to show that a notice of dishonor was first given to Chiok. The discussion
that the prosecution's version is incredible was merely secondary, and was not necessary, for accused's acquittal. There were no findings
of fact on the transaction which gives rise to the civil liability.

In light of these, we reject Chiok's claim that res judicata in the concept of conclusiveness of judgment bars Chua from recovering any civil
claims.

Following this Court's ruling in Nacar v. Gallery Frames,[86] the foregoing amount of P9,563,900.00 shall earn interest at the rate of six
percent (6%) per annum computed from October 25, 1995, the date of Chua's extrajudicial demand, until the date of finality of this
judgment. The total amount shall thereafter earn interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from such finality of judgment until its
satisfaction.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari in G.R. No. 179814 and the special civil action for certiorari and mandamus in G.R. No.
180021 are DENIED. The petition for review on certiorari in G.R. No. 180021 is GRANTED. The Assailed Decision dated July 19, 2007 and
the Resolution dated October 3, 2007 of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that Wilfred Chiok is ordered to pay
Rufina Chua the principal amount of P9,563,900.00, with interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum computed from October 25,
1995 until the date of finality of this judgment. The total amount shall thereafter earn interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from
the finality of judgment until its satisfaction.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

[ GR No. 183681, Jul 27, 2015 ]

SPO2 ROLANDO JAMACA v. PEOPLE +

PERALTA, J.:

This resolves the petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) promulgated on May
26, 2004 and the Resolution[2] dated June 19, 2008 in CA G.R. CR No. 23887. The CA affirmed the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of
Cagayan de Oro City (RTC), finding petitioner SPO2 Rolando Jamaca guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Grave Threats in Criminal Case
No. 97-1598.

The antecedent facts are as follows:

Private complainant Atty. Emilie Bangot filed a complaint for Grave Threats against petitioner with the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for
the Military, docketed as OMB-MIL-CRIM-97-0754. He likewise filed a similar complaint before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Cagayan
de Oro City.

In a Resolution[3] dated January 26, 1998, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military dismissed the complaint on the ground
that the accusation against petitioner was unfounded, based solely on the statement of one Rustom Roxas that there were no threatening
words uttered by petitioner. A petition for certiorari was filed with this Court to assail said ruling of the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for
the Military, but the same was dismissed in a Resolution dated July 29, 1998, which read, thus:

The petition [or] for certiorari is dismissed for utter lack of merit, having failed to comply with well nigh all the relevant requisites laid down
by law, prescinding from the obvious proposition that the Supreme Court does not review findings and conclusions of investigators
conducting a preliminary inquiry or investigation into charges of a crime.[4]
On the other hand, private complainant's complaint before the Office of the City Prosecutor prospered and led to the filing of an Information
against petitioner. He was charged with grave threats defined and penalized under paragraph 1 of Article 282 of the Revised Penal Code
allegedly committed as follows:

That on [or] about July 22 1997 in the evening, at Kalambaguhan/Burgos Streets, Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to kill and moved by personal resentment which he entertained
against Atty. Emelie P. Bangot, Jr., did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously threaten the latter with the infliction upon him of a
wrong amounting to a crime subject to a condition, by threatening to kill the offended party thus uttering or shouting words in the presence
of, and within the hearing distance of Jay Jay R. Bangot (son of offended party) as follows, to wit:

KUNG MATANGTANG AKO SA TRABAHO, BUAKON KO ANG ULO NI ATTY. BANGOT ...

which means in English: "If I will loss my work I will break the head of Atty. Bangot ...",or words of similar import, directed to the said
offended party, Atty. Emelie P. Bangot, Jr., without however attaining accused's purpose, thereby casting fear upon offended party's person
and endangering his life.

Contrary to and in violation of Art. 282, paragraph I, of the Revised Penal Code.[5]

Upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty and trial then ensued. The prosecution presented three witnesses, including the son of
private complainant, who all testified that while petitioner was at the house of Rustom Roxas, they all heard petitioner utter words
threatening to cause private complainant Atty. Bangot grave bodily harm. On the other hand, petitioner insisted that he went to the house of
Rustom Roxas, a relative by affinity of Atty. Bangot, to ask Rustom Roxas to mediate and reconcile him (petitioner) with Atty. Bangot.
Petitioner denied that he ever mentioned any threatening words against Atty. B mgot. Elisea Jamaca, petitioner's wife, corroborated
petitioner's testimony. The prosecution then presented Phoebe Roxas, the wife of Rustom Roxas, as rebuttal witness. She testified that she
was in the very same room and clearly heard petitioner utter words to the effect that if he (petitioner) loses his job, he will break the head of
Atty. Bangot. She also said that Jay Bangot, the son of private complainant, was also there in their house, sitting only about two and a half
meters away from petitioner, when petitioner made the threats against Atty. Bangot.

The trial court, ascribing greater credibility to the testimony of each of the prosecution witnesses, ruled that the evidence clearly
established the guilt of petitioner. The dispositive portion of the RTC Decision reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused SPO2 Rolando Jamaca guilty beyond reasonable
doubt as principal of the offense of GRAVE THREATS defined and punishable under paragraph 2 of Art. 282 of the Revised Penal Code
without attendance of any aggravating or mitigating circumstances. Consequently, pursuant to said law, he is hereby sentenced with the
accessories of the law as provided by Art. 44 of the Revised Penal Code, to an imprisonment of two (2) months and one (1) day to be
served at the City Jail, Cagayan de Oro City and to pay a fine in the sum of Five Hundred Pesos (500.00) with subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency computed at the rate of one (1) day for each eight pesos but in no case will it exceed one-third of the term of the
sentence.

No pronouncement as to the credit of preventive imprisonment since accused immediately put up a bond for his temporary liberty without
waiting for his arrest.

SO ORDERED.[6]

The trial court's Decision was appealed to the CA and, on May 26, 2004, the CA promulgated a Decision affirming in toto petitioner's
conviction for the crime of Grave Threats. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied by the CA per Resolution dated June 19, 2008.

Petitioner then filed his Petition for Review on Certiorari and a Supplemental Petition for Review on Certiorari with this Court. The only
issue presented in the original petition is whether the CA should have dismissed the petition outright and ruled that the RTC had no
jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case because private complainant was guilty of forum shopping, having filed similar complaints before
both the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman and the Office of the City Prosecutor. Subsequently, in his Supplemental Petition, petitioner
raised additional issues, to wit:

I
RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT APPLYING THE DOCTRINE OF RES JUDICATA
AS THE CONVICTION OF THE ACCUSED PETITIONER FOR THE CRIME OF GRAVE THREATS BY THE TRIAL COURT HAD LONG
BEEN DISMISSED BY THE OMBUDSMAN FOR THE MILITARY IN ITS RESOLUTION OF JANUARY 26, 1998 FOR EXACTLY THE
SAME CRIME, WHICH WAS UPHELD BY THIS HONORABLE COURT IN G.R. NO. 134664 WHEN IT DISMISSED A PETITION FOR
CERTIORARI OF SUCH DISMISSAL AND THAT ENTRY OF JUDGMENT HAD BEEN MADE ON DECEMBER 1, 1998, HENCE, IF THIS
ERRONEOUS CONVICTION IS NOT REVERSED IN THIS PETITION FOR REVIEW THE SAME WOULD [BE] TANTAMOUNT TO
VIOLATING THE CONSTITUTIONAL RlGHTS OF THE ACCUSED AGAINST DOUBLE JEOPARDY.

II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE INFORMATION FILED BY THE OFFICE OF THE CITY PROSECUTOR
OF CAGAYAN DE ORO IS NULL AND VOID FROM THE VERY BEGINNING FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION AS THE OFFICE OF THE
DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN FOR THE MILITARY HAD ALREADY DISMISSED THE CASE AFTER IT TOOK COGNIZANCE OF THE SAME,
THE PETITIONER BEING A POLICE OFFICER.

III
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THERE WAS NO GRAVE THREATS BECAUSE THE ALLEGATIONS IN
THE COMPLAINT ARE MERELY HEARSAY.[7]

The petition is bereft of merit.

It should be borne in mind that for a claim of double jeopardy to prosper, petitioner has to prove that a first jeopardy has attached prior to
the second. As stated in Braza v. Sandiganbayan,[8] "[t]he first jeopardy attaches only (a) after a valid indictment; (b) before a competent
court; (c ) after arraignment; (d) when a valid plea has been entered; and (e) when the accused was acquitted or convicted, or the case
was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent."[9] In this case, the complaint before the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman for the Military was dismissed as early as the preliminary investigation stage, thus, there was as yet, no indictment to speak
of. No complaint or Information has been brought before a competent court. Hence, none of the aforementioned events has transpired for
the first jeopardy to have attached.

In Vincoy v. Court of Appeals,[10] which is closely analogous to the present case, the private complainant therein initially filed a complaint
with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Pasay City, but said office dismissed the complaint. Private complainant then re-filed the complaint
with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Pasig City. The Office of the Prosecutor of Pasig City found probable cause and filed the
Information against the accused therein. In said case, the Court categorically held that:

The dismissal of a similar complaint x x x filed by [private complainant] before the City Prosecutor's Office of Pasay City will not exculpate
the petitioner. The case cannot bar petitioner's prosecution. It is settled that the dismissal of a case during its preliminary investigation does
not constitute double jeopardy since a preliminary investigation is not part of the trial and is not the occasion for the full and exhaustive
display of the parties' evidence but only such as may engender a well-grounded belief that an offense has been committed and accused is
probably guilty thereof. For this reason, it cannot be considered equivalent to a judicial pronouncement of acquittal.[11]

The foregoing ruling was reiterated in Trinidad v. Office of the Ombudsman,[12] where the Court has categorically ruled that since the
preliminary investigation stage is not part of the trial, the dismissal of a case during preliminary investigation would not put the accused in
danger of double jeopardy in the event of a re-investigation or the filing of a similar case. An investigating body is not bound by the findings
or resolution of another such office, tribunal or agency which may have had before it a different or incomplete set of evidence than what
had been presented during the previous investigation.[13] Therefore, petitioner's indictment pursuant to the findings of the Office of the City
Prosecutor, and his eventual conviction for the crime of grave threats, has not placed him in double jeopardy.

As to petitioner's argument that the information filed by the Office of the City Prosecutor is null and void for lack of jurisdiction as the Office
of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military had already dismissed the case, the same is likewise tenuous. In Flores v. Montemayor,[14] the
Court clarified that the Ombudsman's jurisdiction to investigate public officers and employees as defined under Section 15 of R.A. No. 6770
is not exclusive, and explained, thus:

This power of investigation granted to the Ombudsman by the 1987 Constitution and The Ombudsman Act is not exclusive but is
shared with other similarly authorized government agencies, such as the PCGG and judges of municipal trial courts and municipal
circuit trial courts. The power to conduct preliminary investigation on charges against public employees and officials is likewise concurrently
shared with the Department of Justice. Despite the passage of the Local Government Code in 1991, the Ombudsman retains concurrent
jurisdiction with the Office of the President and the local Sanggunians to investigate complaints against local elective officials.[15]

Petitioner's argument that the CA should have dismissed the petition outright because private complainant committed forum shopping by
filing similar complaints with the Office of the Ombudsman for the Military and the Office of the City Prosecutor, should not be given
consideration. The Court stated in De Guzman v. Ochoa,[16] that failure to comply with the requirements on the rule against forum
shopping is not a ground for the motu proprio dismissal of the complaint because the rules are clear that said issue shall cause the
dismissal of the case only upon motion and after hearing.[17] More importantly, as the Court held in S.C. Megaworld Construction and
Development Corporation v. Parada,[18] to wit:

It is well-settled that no question will be entertained on appeal unless it has been raised in the proceedings below. Points of law, theories,
issues and arguments not brought to the attention of the lower court, administrative agency or quasi-judicial body, need not be
considered by a reviewing court, as they cannot be raised for the first time at that late stage. Basic considerations of fairness and due
process impel this rule. Any issue raised for the first time on appeal is barred by estoppel.
xxxx
In Young v. John Keng Seng, it was also held that the question of forum shopping cannot be raised in the CA and in the Supreme
Court, since such an issue must be raised at the earliest opportunity in a motion to dismiss or a similar pleading. The high court
even warned that [i]nvoking it in the later stages of the proceedings or on appeal may result in the dismissal of the action x x x.[19]

With regard to the sufficiency of the evidence presented by the prosecution, the Court has time and again abided by the principle that
factual findings of the trial court, its assessment of the credibility of witnesses and the probative weight of their testimonies, and the
conclusions based on these factual findings are to be given the highest respect. Thus, generally, the Court will not recalibrate and
reexamine evidence that had been analyzed and ruled upon by the trial court and affirmed by the CA. Moreover, the supposed
inconsistencies of witnesses in recounting the wordings of the threats uttered by petitioner, are much too trivial and inconsequential to put a
dent on said witnesses' credibility. As ruled in People v. Cabtalan,[20] "[m]inor inconsistencies and discrepancies pertaining to trivial
matters do not affect the credibility of witnesses, as well as their positive identification of the accused as the perpetrators of the
crime."[21]Both the trial court and the CA found the prosecution witnesses' candid and straight forward testimony to be worthy of belief and
this Court sees no reason why it should not conform to the principle reiterated in Medina, Jr. v. People[22] that:

Time and again, this Court has deferred to the trial court's factual findings and evaluation of the credibility of witnesses, especially when
affirmed by the CA, in the absence of any clear showing that the trial court overlooked or misconstrued cogent facts and circumstances
that would justify altering or revising such findings and evaluation. This is because the trial court's determination proceeds from its
first-hand opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses, their conduct and attitude under grilling examination, thereby placing the
trial court in the unique position to assess the witnesses' credibility and to appreciate their truthfulness, honesty and candor.[23]

The records of this case, particularly the testimonies of the witnesses, reveal no outstanding or exceptional circumstance to justify a
deviation from such long-standing principle. There is no cogent reason to overturn the courts' ruling that the prosecution evidence, is
worthy of belief. Thus, prosecution evidence established beyond any reasonable doubt that petitioner is indeed guilty of grave threats.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, and the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated May 26, 2004 and the Resolution dated June 19,
2008 in CA-G.R. CR No. 23887 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
 [ GR No. 209195, Sep 17, 2014 ]

MANUEL J. JIMENEZ v. PEOPLE +

BRION, J.:

Before the Court are two consolidated petitions for review on certiorari filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the amended
decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 121167 entitled Manuel J. Jimenez, Jr. v. Hon. Zaldy B. Docena et al.

The CA did not find any grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Regional Trial Court (RTC Branch 170, Malabon) Judge Zaldy B.
Docena (Judge Docena) in issuing the order which granted the People of the Philippines' motion to discharge Manuel A. Montero(Montero)
as a state witness in Criminal Case No. 39225-MN.

The G.R. No. 209195 petition was filed by Manuel J. Jimenez, Jr. (Jimenez). He prays in this petition for the reversal of the CA's amended
decision insofar as it ruled that Judge Docena did not gravely abuse his discretion in issuing the assailed order.

The People likewise filed its petition, docketed as G.R. No. 209215. This petition seeks to reverse the amended decision of the CA insofar
as it ordered the re-raffle of the criminal case to another RTC judge for trial on the merits.

The Factual Antecedents

On May 18, 2009 and June 11, 2009, Montero (a former employee of the BSJ Company owned by the Jimenezes) executed sworn
statements confessing his participation in the killing of Ruby Rose Barrameda (Ruby Rose), and naming petitioner Jimenez, Lope Jimenez
(Lope, the petitioner Jimenez's younger brother), Lennard A. Descalso (Lennard) alias "Spyke," Robert Ponce (Robert) alias "Obet," and
Eric Fernandez (Eric), as his co-conspirators.[2]

The statements of Montero which provided the details on where the alleged steel casing containing the body of Ruby Rose was dumped,
led to the recovery of a cadaver, encased in a drum and steel casing, near or practically at the place that Montero pointed to.[3]

On August 20, 2009, the People, through the state prosecutors, filed an Information before the RTC, charging Jimenez, Lope, Lennard,
Robert, Eric and Montero of murder for the killing of Ruby Rose.[4]

Montero thereafter filed a motion for his discharge entitled "Motion for the Discharge of the Witness as Accused Pursuant to the Witness
Protection Program" pursuant to Republic Act No. 6981. The People also filed a motion to discharge Montero as a state witness for the
prosecution. Jimenez opposed both motions.[5]

The RTC's ruling

On March 19, 2010, the RTC's Acting Presiding Judge Hector B. Almeyda (Judge Almeyda) denied the motion to discharge Montero as a
state witness.[6]

Judge Almeyda ruled that the prosecution failed to comply with the requirements of Section 17, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure for the discharge of an accused as a state witness; it failed to clearly show that Montero was not the most guilty or, at best, the
least guilty among the accused. The judge further ruled that Montero's statements were not corroborated by the other evidence on record.
The prosecution, too, failed to present evidence to sustain the possibility of conviction against Jimenez.[7]

Montero and the People filed separate motions for reconsideration.

The July 30, 2010 order

On July 30, 2010, Judge Docena, the newly-appointed regular judge, reconsidered and reversed Judge Almeyda's order and ruled that the
prosecution had presented clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence showing compliance with the requisites of Section 17, Rule 119 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.

According to Judge Docena, the crime would have remained undiscovered and unsolved had it not been for Montero's extrajudicial
confession that narrated in detail the manner of the abduction and subsequent murder of Ruby Rose. As the crime was committed in
secret, only one of the co-conspirators, such as Montero, could give direct evidence identifying the other coconspirators.

Judge Docena further ruled that Montero is qualified to be discharged as a state witness as he does not appear to be the most guilty
although he is a principal by direct participation. The principals by inducement are more guilty because, without their orders, the crime
would not have been committed. Finally, Montero has not been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude.

Jimenez moved for the reconsideration of Judge Docena's ruling.[8]

The December 29, 2010 order

During the pendency of the motion for reconsideration, Jimenez filed a motion for inhibition, praying that Judge Docena inhibit himself from
hearing the case on the ground of bias and prejudice. Judge Docena denied the motion in his order of December 29, 2010.[9]

The June 29, 2011 order

On June 29, 2011, Judge Docena issued an omnibus order: 1) denying the petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the July 30, 2010
order; 2) denying the petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the December 29, 2010 order; and 3) granting Manuel Jimenez III's
alternative motion to suspend the proceedings, as his inclusion in the Information was still pending final determination by the Office of the
President.
 Jimenez responded to these adverse rulings by filing with the CA a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The petition
sought the annulment of Judge Docena's orders dated July 30, 2010, December 29, 2010, and June 29, 2011. The petition also prayed for
the issuance of a temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction that the CA both granted in its resolutions of December 8,
2011 and February 6, 2012, respectively.[10]

The CA's Decision

On May 22, 2012, the CA's then Tenth Division, through the ponencia of Associate Justice Agnes Reyes-Carpio (concurred in by Associate
Justice Jose C. Reyes, Jr. and Associate Justice Priscilla J. Baltazar-Padilla) rendered a decision granting Jimenez' petition.[11]

However, on motion for reconsideration filed by the People, the CA reversed its earlier ruling and issued an Amended Decision penned by
Associate Justice Jose Reyes.

The CA's Amended Decision

The CA held that Judge Docena did not gravely abuse his discretion in ordering Montero's discharge to become a state witness because
the prosecution had complied with the requirements of Section 17, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.[12]

First, Judge Docena acted in accordance with settled jurisprudence when he ruled that there was absolute necessity for the testimony of
Montero as no other direct evidence other than his testimony was available. Additionally, since the determination of the requirements under
Section 17, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure is highly factual in nature, Judge Docena did not commit grave abuse of
discretion in largely relying on the recommendation of the prosecution to discharge Montero as a state witness.[13]

Furthermore, the CA agreed with Judge Docena that Montero is not the most guilty among the accused because the principals by
inducement are more guilty than the principals by direct participation. To the CA, this finding is highly factual in nature and it would not
interfere with the trial court's exercise of discretion on factual issues in the absence of showing that the court had acted with grave abuse of
discretion.[14]

On Judge Docena's 'no inhibition' order, the CA held that while the case does not call for mandatory inhibition, it should still be raffled to
another sala for trial on the merits to avoid any claim of bias and prejudice.[15]

The CA likewise dismissed the motion for the issuance of a show cause order which Jimenez filed against Judge Docena.[16]

Both Jimenez and the People moved for partial reconsideration of the CA's order but these motions were all denied.[17] The denials
prompted both parties to file with this Court the present consolidated petitions for review on certiorari.

The Present Petitions

I. G.R. No. 209195 (The Jimenez Petition)

Jimenez raises the following errors:

First, there is no necessity to discharge Montero as a state witness because: 1) the voluntary sworn extrajudicial confessions of Montero
are all in the possession of the prosecution which they could readily present in court without discharging Montero; and 2) there was unjust
favoritism in the discharge of Montero because all the other conspirators are equally knowledgeable of the crime.[18]

Second, contrary to the CA's ruling, the judge, and not the prosecution, has the ultimate discretion in ensuring that the requirements under
Section 17, Rule 119 are complied with.[19]

Third, the cases the CA cited are factually different from the present case. Chua v. CA[20] should not apply as it deals with two accused,
one of whom was ordered discharged.[21]
Fourth, Montero's testimony cannot be substantially corroborated in its material points as the prosecution's own evidence contradicts his
declarations.

These inconsistencies include: Montero's statement that a "busal" was placed inside the mouth of Ruby Rose; this statement is belied by
the other prosecution witness; Montero also never mentioned the presence of a packaging tape wrapped around the head and neck of the
recovered cadaver; in Montero's sinumpaang salaysay, he stated that Ruby Rose was killed by strangulation using a "lubid" but the death
certificate stated asphyxia by suffocation and not by strangulation; the identification of the cadaver as Ruby Rose is likewise questionable
as there are differences in the height, and the dental and odontological reports of Ruby Rose and the recovered cadaver.

Jimenez argued that these inconsistencies would require a thorough scrutiny; hence, the immediate discharge of Montero as a state
witness is suspicious. [22]

Fifth, Montero appears to be the most guilty. He was the architect who designed and actively participated in all phases of the alleged
crime.[23]

Jimenez further argued that there is no authority supporting the ruling that the principals by inducement are more guilty than the principal
by direct participation. On the contrary, the Revised Penal Code imputes on the principal by direct participation the heavier guilt; without the
latter's execution of the crime, the principal by inducement cannot be made liable. Even if the principal by inducement is acquitted, the
principal by direct participation can still be held liable and not vice-versa.[24]

Sixth, the discharge of Montero was irregular because Judge Docena failed to conduct a prior hearing.[25]

Finally, Montero already executed a notice of withdrawal of consent and testimony which was submitted to the CA.[26]

Comment of the People

The People argued that Jimenez is now estopped from raising the lack of hearing as an issue since he raised this issue only after Judge
Docena granted the motion to discharge and not after Judge Almeyda denied the motion an action that was favorable to him.[27]

It also argued that Jimenez actively participated in the proceedings for Montero's discharge as the trial court received evidence for and
against the discharge. In this light, Judge Docena's order granting or denying the motion for discharge is in order, notwithstanding the lack
of actual hearing.[28]

The People also agreed with the CA's amended ruling that the requirements for the discharge of an accused as a state witness were
complied with.[29] It added that the availability of the extrajudicial statements in the prosecution's possession is not a ground to disqualify
an accused from being a state witness.[30]

It further maintained that the alleged contradictions between Montero's statements and other prosecution's evidence are better resolved
during trial and are irrelevant to the issues in the present case.[31]

For purposes of the present case, the material allegations of Montero on the identity of the victim and the manner of her killing were
substantially corroborated by the presence of the recovered original steel casing, the drum containing a cadaver, the place where it was
found, and the cadaver's apparel.[32]

The People observed that Montero had already testified on direct examination on June 28, 2011 and October 25, 2011. He attested and
affirmed his statements in his affidavits dated May 18 and June 11, 2009; he narrated in his statements the murder of Ruby Rose and
Jimenez' participation.[33]
Reply of Jimenez

Jimenez reiterated his allegations in the comment. He added that Montero did not identify or authenticate his sworn statements in support
of the motion for his discharge.[34]

According to Jimenez, the notice of withdrawal of consent and testimony of Montero rendered his discharge as a state witness moot and
academic.[35]

II. G.R. No. 209215 (The People's Petition)

The People, through the Office of the Solicitor General, argue that the CA's order to re-raffle the case to another sala is not supported by
Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court, either under mandatory or voluntary inhibition.[36]

To disqualify a judge from hearing a case, bias and prejudice must be proven, in the manner being done in cases of voluntary inhibition.[37]

Jurisprudence establishes, too, that affiliation does not necessarily translate to bias.[38] A judge's non-favorable action against the defense
is not also necessarily indicative of bias and prejudice.[39]

Finally, the administrative case filed against Judge Docena is not a ground to disqualify him from hearing the case.[40]

Comment of Jimenez

The option for voluntary inhibition does not give judges unlimited discretion to decide whether or not they will desist from hearing a case.
Jimenez enumerated Judge Docena's acts that allegedly constituted bias and prejudice:

First, Judge Docena granted the motion to discharge even though the legal requirements under Section 17, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure were not factually and legally proven. He also relied on the suggestions and information of the prosecutors thereby
surrendering his duty to ensure that the requirements for a discharge are duly complied with.

Second, in a previous case where his fraternity brother appeared as counsel, Judge Docena inhibited himself from hearing the case. Thus,
no reason exists for him not to similarly act in the present case where Jimenez is his fraternity brother and State Prosecutor Villanueva was
his classmate.

Third, Judge Docena granted the prosecution's motion for cancellation of the September 29, 2011 hearing because the state prosecutor
would be attending a legal forum. This was improper since other prosecutors were available and other prosecution witnesses could be
presented.

Fourth, Judge Docena has an uncontrolled temper and unexplainable attitude. In Jimenez' bail hearing, Judge Docena immediately
shouted at Jimenez' counsel when he made a mistake.[41]

The Issues

Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that Judge Docena did not commit grave abuse of discretion in granting the motion
1)
to discharge Montero as a state witness; and
Whether or not the CA erred in ordering the re-raffle of Criminal Case No. 39225-MN to another RTC branch for trial on
2)
the merits.

THE COURT'S RULING:

 G.R. No. 209195
We agree with the CA's ruling that Judge Docena did not gravely abuse his discretion when he granted the motion to discharge Montero as
a state witness.

The well-settled rule is that a petition for certiorari against a court which has jurisdiction over a case will prosper only if grave abuse of
discretion is clear and patent. The burden is on the part of the petitioner to prove not merely reversible error, but grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the public respondent issuing the impugned order.

Notably, mere abuse of discretion is not enough; the abuse must be grave. Jurisprudence has defined "grave abuse of discretion" as the
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to
perform a duty enjoined by law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner because of passion or hostility.[42]

We agree with the CA that the prosecution has complied with the requisites under Section 17, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure which provides that:

(1) Two or more accused are jointly charged with the commission of an offense;
(2) The motion for discharge is filed by the prosecution before it rests its case;
The prosecution is required to present evidence and the sworn statement of each proposed state witness at a hearing in
(3)
support of the discharge;
(4) The accused gives his consent to be a state witness; and
(5) The trial court is satisfied that:
a) There is absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused whose discharge is requested;
There is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the offense committed, except the testimony of
b)
said accused;
c) The testimony of said accused can be substantially corroborated in its material points;
d) Said accused does not appear to be the most guilty; and,
e) Said accused has not at any time been convicted of any offense involving moral turpitude.

No issues have been raised with respect to conditions (1), (2), (4), and 5(e). The parties dispute the compliance with conditions (3) and 5(a)
to (d) as the issues before us. We shall discuss these issues separately below.

Absolute necessity of the testimony of Montero

We see no merit in Jimenez's allegation that no absolute necessity exists for Montero's testimony.

Absolute necessity exists for the testimony of an accused sought to be discharged when he or she alone has knowledge of the crime. In
more concrete terms, necessity is not there when the testimony would simply corroborate or otherwise strengthen the prosecution's
evidence.[43]

We do not agree with Jimenez that the Court's pronouncement in Chua v. CA et al. is inapplicable in the present case simply because more
than two accused are involved in the present case. The requirement of absolute necessity for the testimony of a state witness depends on
the circumstances of each case regardless of the number of the participating conspirators.

In People v. Court of Appeals and Perez et al.,[44] the Court ordered the discharge of the accused Roncesvalles, ruling that his testimony
is absolutely necessary to prove conspiracy with his other co-accused. The Court agreed with the Solicitor General that considering the
circumstances of the case and that the other accused could not be compelled to testify, certain facts necessary for the conviction of the
accused would not come to light unless the accused Roncesvalles was allowed to testify for the State. Specifically, unless accused
Roncesvalles was allowed to testify for the government, there would be no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the
offense charged, particularly on the role of his co-accused in the preparation and completion of the falsified loan application and its
supporting papers.

Similarly in People v. Court of Appeals and Tan,[45] the Court reinstated the ruling of the trial court which ordered the discharge of accused
Ngo Sin from among the five accused. The record justified his discharge as a state witness considering the absolute necessity of his
testimony to prove that the accused Luciano Tan had planned and financed the theft.

In the present case, not one of the accused-conspirators, except Montero, was willing to testify on the alleged murder of Ruby Rose and
their participation in her killing. Hence, the CA was correct in ruling that Judge Docena acted properly and in accordance with jurisprudence
in ruling that there was absolute necessity for the testimony of Montero. He alone is available to provide direct evidence of the crime.

That the prosecution could use the voluntary statements of Montero without his discharge as a state witness is not an important and
relevant consideration. To the prosecution belongs the control of its case and this Court cannot dictate on its choice in the discharge of a
state witness, save only when the legal requirements have not been complied with.

The prosecution's right to prosecute gives it "a wide range of discretion the discretion of whether, what and whom to charge, the exercise of
which depends on a smorgasbord of factors which are best appreciated by prosecutors." Under Section 17, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure, the court is given the power to discharge a state witness only after it has already acquired jurisdiction over the crime
and the accused.[46]

Montero's testimony can be substantially corroborated

We also do not find merit in Jimenez' argument that Montero's testimony cannot be substantially corroborated in its material points and is
even contradicted by the physical evidence of the crime.

As the trial court properly found, the evidence consisting of the steel casing where the cadaver was found; the drum containing the cadaver
which the prosecution successfully identified (and which even the acting Judge Almeyda believed) to be Ruby Rose; the spot in the sea
that Montero pointed to (where the cadaver was retrieved); the apparel worn by the victim when she was killed as well as her burned
personal effects, all partly corroborate some of the material points in the sworn statements of Montero.[47]

With these as bases, Judge Docena's ruling that Montero's testimony found substantial corroboration cannot be characterized as grave
abuse of discretion.

Jimenez points to the discrepancies in Montero's statements and the physical evidence, such as the absence of "busal" in the mouth of the
retrieved cadaver; his failure to mention that they used packaging tape wrapped around the head down to the neck of the victim; and his
declaration that the victim was killed through strangulation using a rope (lubid).

However, the corroborated statements of Montero discussed above are far more material than the inconsistencies pointed out by Jimenez,
at least for purposes of the motion to discharge.

The alleged discrepancies in the physical evidence, particularly on the height and dental records of Ruby Rose, are matters that should
properly be dealt with during the trial proper.

We emphasize at this point that to resolve a motion to discharge under Section 17, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,
the Rules only require that that the testimony of the accused sought to be discharged be substantially corroborated in its material points,
not on all points.

This rule is based on jurisprudential line that in resolving a motion to discharge under Section 17, Rule 119, a trial judge cannot be
expected or required, at the start of the trial, to inform himself with absolute certainty of everything that may develop in the course of the
trial with respect to the guilty participation of the accused. If that were practicable or possible, there would be little need for the formality of
a trial.[48]

Montero is not the most guilty

We also do not agree with Jimenez that the CA erred in finding that Montero is not the most guilty.

By jurisprudence, "most guilty" refers to the highest degree of culpability in terms of participation in the commission of the offense and does
not necessarily mean the severity of the penalty imposed. While all the accused may be given the same penalty by reason of conspiracy,
yet one may be considered to have lesser or the least guilt taking into account his degree of participation in the commission of the
offense.[49]

What the rule avoids is the possibility that the most guilty would be set free while his co-accused who are less guilty in terms of
participation would be penalized.[50]

Before dwelling on the parties' substantive arguments, we find it necessary to first correct the rulings of the CA that are not exactly correct.

Contrary to the CA's findings, a principal by inducement is not automatically the most guilty in a conspiracy. The decision of the Court in
People v. Baharan[51] did not involve the resolution of a motion to discharge an accused to become a state witness. Instead, the
pronouncement of the Court related to the culpability of a principal by inducement whose co-inducement act was the determining cause for
the commission of the crime.

Thus viewed, Baharan cannot be the basis of a peremptory pronouncement that a principal by inducement is more guilty than the principal
by direct participation.

In Chua v. People,[52] which involved a motion to discharge an accused, the Court declared that if one induces another to commit a crime,
the influence is the determining cause of the crime. Without the inducement, the crime would not have been committed; it is the inducer
who sets into motion the execution of the criminal act.

To place the Chua ruling in proper perspective, the Court considered the principal by inducement as the most guilty based on the specific
acts done by the two accused and bearing in mind the elements constitutive of the crime of falsification of private documents where
the element of "damage" arose through the principal by inducement's encashment of the falsified check. This led the Court to
declare that the principal by inducement is the "most guilty" (or properly, the more guilty) between the two accused.

Thus, as a rule, for purposes of resolving a motion to discharge an accused as a state witness, what are controlling are the specific acts of
the accused in relation to the crime committed.

We cannot also agree with Jimenez' argument that a principal by direct participation is more guilty than the principal by inducement as the
Revised Penal Code penalizes the principal by inducement only when the principal by direct participation has executed the crime.

We note that the severity of the penalty imposed is part of the substantive criminal law which should not be equated with the procedural
rule on the discharge of the particeps criminis. The procedural remedy of the discharge of an accused is based on other considerations,
such as the need for giving immunity to one of several accused in order that not all shall escape, and the judicial experience that the
candid admission of an accused regarding his participation is a guaranty that he will testify truthfully.[53]

On the substantive issues of the present case, we affirm the CA ruling that no grave abuse of discretion transpired when Judge Docena
ruled that Montero is not the most guilty.

We draw attention to the requirement that a state witness does not need to be found to be the least guilty; he or she should not only
"appear to be the most guilty."[54]

From the evidence submitted by the prosecution in support of its motion to discharge Montero, it appears that while Montero was part of
the planning, preparation, and execution stage as most of his co-accused had been, he had no direct participation in the actual killing of
Ruby Rose.

While Lope allegedly assigned to him the execution of the killing, the records do not indicate that he had active participation in hatching the
plan to kill Ruby Rose, which allegedly came from accused Lope and Jimenez, and in the actual killing of Ruby Rose which was executed
by accused Lennard.[55] Montero's participation was limited to providing the steel box where the drum containing the victim's body was
placed, welding the steel box to seal the cadaver inside, operating the skip or tug boat, and, together with his co-accused, dropping the
steel box containing the cadaver into the sea.

At any rate, the discharge of an accused to be utilized as a state witness because he does not appear to be the most guilty is highly factual
in nature as it largely depends on the appreciation of who had the most participation in the commission of the crime. The appellate courts
do not interfere in the discretionary judgment of the trial court on this factual issue except when grave abuse of discretion intervenes.[56]

In light of these considerations, we affirm the ruling of the CA that Judge Docena did not commit grave abuse of discretion in ruling that
Montero is not the most guilty.

The discharge of Montero as a state

witness was procedurally sound

We agree with the People that Jimenez is estopped from raising the issue of lack of hearing prior to the discharge of Montero as a state
witness. Jimenez did not raise this issue when Acting Judge Almeyda denied the motion to discharge. This denial, of course, was favorable
to Jimenez. If he found no reason to complain then, why should we entertain his hearing-related complaint now?

The People even supported its argument that Jimenez actively participated in the proceedings of the motion to discharge such as his filing
of a 20-page opposition to the motion; filing a reply to the People's comment; submitting his memorandum of authorities on the qualification
of Montero as state witness; and filing a consolidated opposition on the People's and Montero's motion for reconsideration of Judge
Almeyda's order.[57]

In these lights, Jimenez cannot impute grave abuse of discretion on Judge Docena for not conducting a hearing prior to his grant of the
motion to discharge. In People v. CA and Pring,[58] the Court ruled that with both litigants able to present their sides, the lack of actual
hearing is not sufficiently fatal to undermine the court's ability to determine whether the conditions prescribed for the discharge of an
accused as a state witness have been satisfied.

Contrary to Jimenez' argument, the Pring ruling is applicable in the present case. In Pring, the sworn statements of the accused sought to
be discharged (Nonilo Arile), together with the prosecution's other evidence, were already in the possession of the court and had been
challenged by the respondent in his Opposition to Discharge Nonilo Arile and in his Petition for Bail. The issue in that case was the
propriety of the trial court's resolution of the motion to discharge Nonilo Arile without conducting a hearing pursuant Section 9, Rule 119 of
the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure (now Section 17, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure).

With Jimenez' active participation in the proceeding for the motion to discharge as outlined above, the ruling of the Court in Pring should
squarely apply.

Montero's Notice of Withdrawal of

Consent is not material in the resolution
of the present case
We find no merit in Jimenez' argument that Montero's submission of his notice of withdrawal of consent and testimony of Manuel dated
February 26, 2013 rendered the present case moot, since the Court cannot consider this document in this petition.

It must be recalled that the present case involves an appellate review of the CA's decision which found no grave abuse of discretion on the
part of Judge Docena in granting the motion to discharge.

Under the present recourse now before this Court, we cannot rule on the notice of withdrawal and consider it in ruling on the absence or
presence of grave abuse of discretion in the issuance of the assailed orders. The present case is not the proper venue for the
determination of the value of the notice.

This conclusion is all the more strengthened by the fact that Montero already testified on direct examination on June 28, 2011 and October
25, 2011. He attested and affirmed his statements in his affidavits dated May 18 and June 11, 2009; he not only narrated the grisly murder
of Ruby Rose, but also revealed Jimenez' participation in the murder.

With this development, the notice may partake of the nature of a recantation, which is usually taken ex parte and is considered inferior to
the testimony given in open court. It would be a dangerous rule to reject the testimony taken before a court of justice simply because the
witness who gave it later changed his/her mind.[59]

In sum on this point, the appreciation of the notice of withdrawal properly belongs to the trial court.

Interplay between the judge and

prosecutor in the motion to discharge
an accused to become a state witness

As a last point, we find it necessary to clarify the roles of the prosecution and the trial court judge in the resolution of a motion to discharge
an accused as a state witness. This need arises from what appears to us to be a haphazard use of the statement that the trial court judge
must rely in large part on the prosecution's suggestion in the resolution of a motion to discharge.

In the present case, the CA cited Quarto v. Marcelo[60] in ruling that the trial court must rely in large part upon the suggestions and the
information furnished by the prosecuting officer, thus:
A trial judge cannot be expected or required to inform himself with absolute certainty at the very outset of the trial as to everything which
may be developed in the course of the trial in regard to the guilty participation of the accused in the commission of the crime charged in the
complaint. If that were practicable or possible there would be little need for the formality of a trial. He must rely in large part upon the
suggestions and the information furnished by the prosecuting officer in coming to his conclusions as to the "necessity for the testimony of
the accused whose discharge is requested"; as to the availability or non-availability of other direct or corroborative evidence; as to which of
the accused is "most guilty," and the like.

We deem it important to place this ruling in its proper context lest we create the wrong impression that the trial court is a mere "rubber
stamp" of the prosecution, in the manner that Jimenez now argues.

In Quarto, we emphasized that it is still the trial court that determines whether the prosecution's preliminary assessment of the
accused-witness' qualifications to be a state witness satisfies the procedural norms. This relationship is in reality a symbiotic one as the
trial court, by the very nature of its role in the administration of justice, largely exercises its prerogative based on the prosecutor's findings
and evaluation.[61]

Thus, we ruled in People v. Pring[62] that in requiring a hearing in support of the discharge, the essential objective of the law is for the
court to receive evidence for or against the discharge, which evidence shall serve as the court's tangible and concrete basis independently
of the fiscal's or prosecution's persuasions in granting or denying the motion for discharge. We emphasize, in saying this, that actual
hearing is not required provided that the parties have both presented their sides on the merits of the motion.

We likewise do not agree with Jimenez that Quarto should not apply to the present case, since the principles laid down in that case
similarly operate in the present case, specifically, on issue of the procedural processes required in the discharge of the accused as a state
witness.

G.R. No. 209215

We find the People's petition meritorious.

We note at the outset that the CA did not provide factual or legal support when it ordered the inhibition of Judge Docena. Additionally, we
do not find Jimenez' arguments sufficiently persuasive.

The second paragraph of Section 1 of Rule 137 does not give judges the unlimited discretion to decide whether or not to desist from
hearing a case. The inhibition must be for just and valid causes. The mere imputation of bias or partiality is likewise not enough ground for
their inhibition, especially when the charge is without basis.[63]

It is well-established that inhibition is not allowed at every instance that a schoolmate or classmate appears before the judge as counsel for
one of the parties. A judge, too, is not expected to automatically inhibit himself from acting in a case involving a member of his fraternity,
such as Jimenez in the present case. [64]

In the absence of clear and convincing evidence to prove the charge of bias and prejudice, a judge's ruling not to inhibit oneself should
be allowed to stand.[65]

In attributing bias and prejudice to Judge Docena, Jimenez must prove that the judge acted or conducted himself in a manner
clearlyindicative of arbitrariness or prejudice so as to defeat the attributes of the cold neutrality that an impartial judge must possess.
Unjustified assumptions and mere misgivings that the judge acted with prejudice, passion, pride and pettiness in the performance of his
functions cannot overcome the presumption that a judge shall decide on the merits of a case with an unclouded vision of its facts.[66]

In the present case, Jimenez' allegation of bias and prejudice is negated by the CA finding in its amended decision, as affirmed by this
Court, that Judge Docena did not gravely abuse his discretion in granting the motion to discharge. We support this conclusion as the
cancellation of the September 29, 2011 hearing is not clearly indicative of bias and prejudice.

On the allegation that Judge Docena's uncontrollable temper and unexplainable attitude should be considered as a factor, we note that the
allegations and perceptions of bias from the mere tenor and language of a judge is insufficient to show prejudgment. Allowing inhibition for
these reasons would open the floodgates to abuse. Unless there is concrete proof that a judge has a personal interest in the proceedings,
and that his bias stems from an extra-judicial source, the Court would uphold the presumption that a magistrate shall impartially decide the
merits of a case.[67]

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition in G.R. No. 209195 and affirm the CA's amended decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 121167 insofar as it
found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of Judge Docena in granting the People's motion to discharge Montero as a state witness.

We GRANT the petition in G.R. No. 209215 and modify the CA's amended decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 121167 in accordance with our
ruling that Judge Docena's denial of the motion for inhibition was proper.

SO ORDERED.
 [ GR No. 197953, Aug 05, 2015 ]

PEOPLE v. SANDIGANBAYAN +

BRION, J.:

The People of the Philippines (the People) filed this petition for certiorari[1] to annul and set aside the Sandiganbayan's resolution[2]dated
June 21, 2011, granting Quintin B. Saludaga, Arthus E. Adriatico and Romeo De Luna's joint demurrer to evidence[3] (demurrer) in Criminal
Case No. 28261.
 The Antecedents

On March 30, 2005, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman (Ombudsman) for Visayas charged Mayor Quintin B. Saludaga (Mayor
Saludaga) and Revenue Collection Clerk Arthus E. Adriatico (Adtriatico) of Lavezares, Northern Samar, together with Romeo De Luna (De
Luna), a private individual, for falsification of public documents penalized under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).[4]

The accused (respondents) pleaded not guilty.[5]

During the pre-trial, the parties submitted their joint stipulations, to wit:

JOINT STIPULATION OF FACTS

That at the time material to this case, as alleged in the information, accused Quintin Saludaga was a public officer being
then a [sic] Municipal Mayor of the Municipality of Lavezares, Northern Samar, and Arthus Adriatico was then the
1.1
Revenue Collection
Clerk of the Office of the Municipal Treasurer of the abovementioned municipality.
That accused Romeo de Luna entered into a Pakyaw Contract with the Municipality of Lavezares, Northern Samar for
1.2 the construction of 3 Units Shallow Well Hand pump on December 9, 1997 and the construction of 3 units Jetmatic
Shallow Well Hand pump on December 17, 1997.
That from the time the Pakyaw Contract was entered into by the Municipality of Lavezares and accused Romeo de
1.3 Luna and up to the completion of said project in 1997, private complainant Armando F. Chan was the Vice Mayor of
the said Municipality.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE

Whether or not Accused Quintin B. Saludaga, Arthus E. Adriatico, and Romeo de Luna falsified the Official
2.1
Receipt and the Mayor's Permit issued in favor of Romeo de Luna, the subject of the instant case.[6]

The prosecution alleged[7] that sometime in January 1999, Adriatico issued Official Receipt No. 7921300-D (subject OR) dated August
27, 1997, to De Luna representing the latter's payment (P200.00) for his mayor's permit[8] to operate as a pakyaw contractor.[9]

Conniving with Adriatico and De Luna, Mayor Saludaga allegedly issued and signed the mayor's permit also sometime in January
1999.[10] The mayor's permit allowed De Luna to engage in business as a pakyaw contractor for the period August 27, 1997 to
December 30, 1997.

The prosecution averred that Mayor Saludaga antedated the mayor's permit to confer on De Luna the status of a bona fide
pakyawcontractor when the contracts were executed on December 9 and 17, 1997. Both Mayor Saludaga and Adriatico purportedly knew
that De Luna was not a licensed pakyaw contractor when they issued the mayor's permit and the subject OR.

The prosecution further claimed that the provincial treasurer only issued the Official Receipt Booklet containing the subject OR to the
municipality in October 1998, and thus, it could not have been used as an official receipt for a transaction completed in 1997.

Ultimately, the prosecution submitted that the respondents connived, confederated with, and mutually helped one another in falsifying the
subject OR and the mayor's permit to make it appear that De Luna was a bona fide pakyaw contractor.[11]

The prosecution presented the following witnesses during trial:

Armando F. Chan[12] (Vice Mayor) - Chan took the stand to prove that the respondents conspired with each other in falsifying the mayor's
permit and the subject OR. He testified that as the presiding officer of the Sangguniang Bayan, he received from the Commission on Audit
(COA) a copy of the COA Audit Report for the calendar year 1998. The report found that the municipality failed to conduct public bidding for
several projects, which included the pakyaw contracts entered into by De Luna and the municipality. As a consequence, a committee was
formed to investigate the alleged irregularities. The committee later found that irregularities had indeed been committed. Thus, a complaint
for violation of the anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (Republic Act No. 3019) was filed against Mayor Saludaga, De Luna, and a certain
SPO2 Negro.

In this regard, Chan testified that while the subject OR was issued only in 1999, it was dated August 27, 1997, to make it appear that De
Luna was a licensed contractor and to give a semblance of legality to the award of the contracts. Finally, he claimed that Mayor Saludaga
used as evidence the falsified subject OR and the mayor's permit in the graft case filed against him.

Bonifacio M. So[13] (Provincial Treasurer) - So testified that he was the custodian of the booklet which contained the subject OR and that
he issued the said booklet to the municipality only in October 1998.

Jose Y. Lim[14] (Municipal Treasurer) - Lim testified that the booklet containing the subject OR was issued to the municipality only in
October 1998. He also claimed that De Luna was not a contractor but an employee of the municipality hired by Mayor Saludaga.

Carlos G. Fornelos (COA Auditor) - Fornelos testified that he received a letter from the municipal treasurer requesting a duplicate copy of
the subject OR and that despite best efforts, he could not locate the same.

The prosecution then rested its case and submitted its formal offer of evidence[15] which the Sandiganbayan admitted.[16]

The respondents filed a joint motion for leave to file a demurrer to evidence on December 2, 2008. The Sandiganbayan granted the said
motion; thus, on May 15, 2006, the respondents filed the demurrer.

In praying for the dismissal of the criminal case for insufficiency of evidence, the respondents argued that the prosecution failed to prove
conspiracy. "Conspiracy, the respondents asserted, cannot be presumed; it must be proved by positive and conclusive evidence and
shown to exist as clearly and convincingly as the commission of the offense itself.

The respondents further argued that even implied conspiracy was not proved because, while conspiracy need not be established by direct
evidence (for it may be inferred from the conduct of the accused before, during, and after the commission of the crime), it still cannot be
based on mere conjectures but must be established as fact.

Since conspiracy was not shown to exist, the respondents urged the Sandiganbayan to evaluate the prosecution's evidence vis-a-vis their
individual participation in the crime alleged to have been committed. They denied their personal liability as follows:

Mayor Saludaga's Defense[17]

Mayor Saludaga maintained that the prosecution failed to prove he had a hand in the preparation and issuance of the subject OR; nor did
he personally make the entries in the mayor's permit. He insisted that all that could be inferred from the face of the mayor's permit was that
he signed it. In the absence of evidence that he knew the mayor's permit to be spurious, Mayor Saludaga claimed that he could not be held
guilty of knowingly making untruthful statements in a narration of facts.

To support this theory, Mayor Saludaga invoked the case of Magsuci v. Sandiganbayan[18] which supposedly held that when the infraction
consists in the reliance in good faith, albeit misplaced, by a head of office on a subordinate upon whom the primary responsibility rests,
absent a clear case of conspiracy, the Arias doctrine[19] must be upheld.

The Arias doctrine held that all heads of offices have to rely to a reasonable extent on their subordinates and on the good faith of those
who prepare bids, purchase supplies, or enter into negotiations. There has to be some added reason why the head of office should
examine each of the documents he is supposed to sign.

Adriatico 's Defense[20]

Adriatico argued that the prosecution failed to show that he signed or executed the subject OR. He noted that even the prosecution's
witness admitted that it was the name of a certain A.L. Moncada, described in the subject OR as the Collecting Officer, that appeared on
the subject OR; and that neither Adriatico's nor any of his co-respondents' names or signatures appeared thereon.

Adriatico also argued that assuming he executed the subject OR, the prosecution failed to show that he willingly and knowingly made an
untruthful statement in the narration of facts; that the OR was dated August 27, 1997, and that it was received by the municipality only in
1998, do not exclude each other. Adriatico insisted that he did not necessarily make an untruthful statement of facts when he antedated the
subject OR there being the truth that the payment received was for a past transaction.

De Luna's Defense[21]

De Luna argued that the prosecution failed to prove he was not a bona fide pakyaw contractor. He alleged that the falsified documents
neither affirmed nor contradicted his legal status as a bona fide pakyaw contractor. He reasoned that with or without the subject OR and
the mayor's permit, he was either a bona fide pakyaw contractor or not.

Moreover, De Luna emphasized that he did not sign nor execute the subject OR and the mayor's permit and that any alleged falsification
could not be attributed to him for failure of the prosecution to prove conspiracy.

The Sandiganbayan Ruling[22]

The Sandiganbayan granted the demurrer. It held that in criminal prosecutions for offenses under the RPC, the prosecution must prove
beyond reasonable doubt that the accused had criminal intent to commit the offense charged.[23]

In this regard, the prosecution failed to prove some of the elements of falsification of documents under Article 171 (4) of the RPC, namely:
(1) the offender is a public officer, employee, or notary public; (2) the offender takes advantage of his official position; and (3) the offender
falsifies a document by making untruthful statements in a narration of facts. In particular, the Sandiganbayan found that the prosecution
failed to prove the second and third elements. The graft court resolved to grant the demurrer as follows:

First, the Sandiganbayan was not persuaded by the prosecutions' evidence that Mayor Saludaga had a hand in the preparation and
issuance of the subject OR. Thus, he could not have taken advantage of his position as Mayor and knowingly made untruthful narration of
facts.

Second, the Sandiganbayan is unconvinced that the subject OR was falsified despite Adriatico's admission that he antedated it upon De
Luna's request. It held that although Adriatico prepared and issued the subject OR, he did not make untruthful statements in a narration of
facts; because the statements were not altogether false since there was some recognizable truth in these.

Thus, the Sandiganbayan took the view that Adriatico did not necessarily make an untruthful statement as to the date since it was a fact
that the payment received was for a previous transaction.

The Sandiganbayan also found that Adriatico acted in good faith when he issued the subject OR for the payment of a past transaction in
his belief that the municipality would derive additional revenue therefrom.

Finally, the Sandiganbayan ruled that the prosecution failed to prove that De Luna was not a bona fide pakyaw contractor from August 27
to December 30, 1997, or during the time the questioned pakyaw contracts were awarded. The graft court gave no weight to the
prosecution's evidence, i.e., the Time Book and Payroll covering the period September 15 to September 30, 1997, which purportedly
proved that De Luna was a hired municipal laborer and not a pakyaw contractor.

The dispositive portion of the Sandiganbayan resolution reads:

WHEREFORE, the Joint Demurrer to Evidence filed by the accused, Saludaga, Adriatico and De Luna, is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly,
Criminal Case No. 28261 is hereby ordered DISMISSED.

The Petition

The People impute grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the Sandiganbayan when it granted
the demurrer. The People disagree that the prosecution failed to establish the respondents' guilt with moral certainty. Specifically, the
People refute the Sandiganbayan's conclusion that the prosecution failed to prove certain elements of the falsification charged.

With respect to the element that the offenders must have taken advantage of their official position, the People emphasized Adriatico's
own admission[24] that he antedated the subject OR upon De Luna's request, a fact that the latter confirmed.[25]

Such act, according to the People, already constitutes falsification of a public document and thereby untruthful.

The People cite the case of Relucio v. Civil Service Commission,[26] which laid down the elements of falsification of public documents, to
wit: (i) the offender makes in a document untruthful statements in a narration of facts; (ii) the offender has a legal obligation to disclose the
truth of the facts narrated; (iii) the facts narrated by the offender are absolutely false; and (iv) the perversions of truth in the narration of
facts was made with the wrongful intent to injure a third person.

As regards the element that the offender must have falsified a document by making untruthful statements in a narration of facts,
the People dispute the Sandiganbayan's reasoning that the narration of facts be absolutely false to constitute falsification.

The People argue that the Sandiganbayan erred when it held that there can be no conviction of falsification of public document if the acts
of the accused are consistent with good faith.[27] Good faith does not apply in this case because Adriatico was not confronted with a
difficult question of law and he should have known better that it was illegal to issue an antedated receipt.

Further, the People posit that Mayor Saludaga cannot invoke the Arias doctrine, maintaining that Mayor Saludaga may be deemed a
knowing participant in the conspiracy when he affixed his signature despite the patent irregularities thereon.[28]

In fine, the People insist that Mayor Saludaga and Adriatico took advantage of their positions in falsifying the subject OR and mayor's
permit; that the falsifications were intended to evade their prosecution under the Anti-Corrupt and Practices Act; and that the respondents'
acts were so concerted it may be inferred that Mayor Saludaga, together with his subordinate Adriatico and dummy De Luna, conspired to
commit the crime.

The Respondents' Case[29]

The respondents reiterate their arguments to support the demurrer. In summary, they argue that the People failed to: (1) prove conspiracy,
(2) show that Mayor Saludaga took advantage of his official position to cause the falsification of the subject OR and the mayor's permit, (3)
show that Adriatico executed the subject OR, (4) adduce evidence that antedating the subject OR is prohibited by law, (5) submit evidence
that De Luna was not a bona fide pakyaw contractor, and (6) prove that De Luna had any hand in the execution of the subject OR and
mayor's permit.

The respondents further argue that in a petition for certiorari, the Court does not reexamine the trial or appellate court's appreciation of
facts unless the evidence on record does not support their findings or the judgment is based on misappreciation of facts; and that the
jurisdiction of the Court in a petition for certiorari does not include a correction of the Sandiganbayan's evaluation of the prosecution's
evidence but is confined to the issue of grave abuse of discretion.

Issue

The sole issue before the Court is whether the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion when it granted the respondents' demurrer.

Our Ruling

We dismiss the petition.

We stress at the outset that the People assail the Sandiganbayan's grant of demurrer through certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure. To put our discussions in proper perspective, a review of the nature and purpose of a petition for certiorari is in order.

Section 1 of Rule 65 reads:

Section 1. Petition for certiorari - When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in
excess of [its or his] jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of its or his jurisdiction, and there is
no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition
in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such
tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require, x x x. [Emphasis supplied.]

A petition for certiorari is intended to correct errors of jurisdiction only or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. Its principal office is to keep the inferior court within the parameters of its jurisdiction or to prevent it from committing grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.[30]

Further, mere abuse of discretion is not enough; the abuse must be grave. Jurisprudence defines "grave abuse of discretion" as the
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to
perform a duty enjoined by law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner because of passion or hostility.[31]

The office of demurrer and

the effect of its grant

Section 23, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:

Sec. 23. Demurrer to evidence. - After the prosecution rests its case, the court may dismiss the case on the ground of insufficiency of
evidence: (1) on its own initiative after giving the prosecution an opportunity to be heard; or (2) on motion of the accused with prior leave of
court.
A demurrer to evidence is an objection by one of the parties in an action to the effect that the evidence which his adversary produced is
insufficient in point of law to make out a case or sustain the issue.[32] The party filing the demurrer challenges the sufficiency of the
prosecution's evidence. The Court's task is to ascertain if there is competent or sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case to
sustain the indictment or support a verdict of guilt.[33]

In criminal cases, the grant of a demurrer amounts to an acquittal, and the dismissal order may not be appealed as this would place the
accused in double jeopardy.[34] Although the dismissal order is not subject to appeal, it may be reviewed through certiorari under Rule
65.[35]

For the writ to issue, the trial court must be shown to have acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
such as where the prosecution was denied the opportunity to present its case or where the trial was a sham thus rendering the assailed
judgment void.[36]

The burden is on the petitioner to clearly demonstrate that the trial court blatantly abused its authority to a point so grave as to deprive it
of its very power to dispense justice.[37]

The People failed to overcome this burden.

Falsification and Conspiracy

In brief, the respondents allegedly committed falsification under paragraph 4, Article 171 of the RPC, and that they connived, confederated
with, and mutually helped one another in committing the said crime.

Article 171, paragraph 4 of the RPC provides:

Art. 171. Falsification by public officer, employee or notary or ecclesiastical minister. — The penalty of prision mayor and a fine not to
exceed 5,000 pesos shall be imposed upon any public officer, employee, or notary who, taking advantage of his official position, shall
falsify a document by committing any of the following acts:

xxxx
4. Making untruthful statements in a narration of facts;

x x x x.
Reduced to its elements, a violation under this provision requires that:

(1) The offender makes in a public document untruthful statements in a narration of facts;
(2) He has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of
the facts narrated by him; and
(3) The facts narrated by him are absolutely false.[38]

The prosecution must likewise prove that the public officer or employee had taken advantage of his official position in making the
falsification. The offender is considered to have taken advantage of his official position when (1) he has the duty to make or prepare or
otherwise to intervene in the preparation of a document; or (2) he has the official custody of the document which he falsifies.[39]

Moreover, in falsification of public or official documents, it is not necessary that there be present the idea of gain or the intent to injure a
third person because in the falsification of a public document, what is punished is the violation of the public faith and the destruction of the
truth as therein solemnly proclaimed.[40]

Conspiracy
A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it; it
may be alleged as a mode of committing a crime or as constitutive of the crime itself.[41] It need not be shown by direct proof of an
agreement of the parties to commit the crime[42] as it can be inferred from the acts of the accused which clearly manifest a concurrence
of wills, a common intent or design to commit a crime.[43]

More significant, conspiracy as a basis for conviction must rest on nothing less than a moral certainty. While conspiracy need not be
established by direct evidence, it is, nonetheless, required to be proved by clear and convincing evidence by showing a series of acts done
by each of the accused in concert and in pursuance of a common unlawful purpose.[44]

Guided by the foregoing principles, we hold that the Sandiganbayan did not gravely abuse its discretion when it granted the
respondents' demurrer.
The People's evidence vis-a-vis
the Sandiganbayan's findings
The People submit that the Sandiganbayan exercised its judicial functions in arbitrary and despotic manner because it completely
disregarded the prosecution's evidence and ignored settled jurisprudence.[45]

We disagree with this contention.

A scrutiny of the assailed resolution shows that the Sandiganbayan thoroughly passed upon the prosecution's testimonial and documentary
pieces of evidence. Finding them insufficient to support the charge vis-a-vis the elements of the crime, the graft court granted the demurrer
and dismissed the criminal case.

In a nutshell, the Sandiganbayan dismissed the case because the prosecution failed to prove some elements of the crime, namely: (i) that
the offenders take advantage of their official positions and (ii) that they falsify a document by making untruthful statements in a narration of
facts.

The Sandiganbayan justified its grant of the demurrer as follows:

First, the Sandiganbayan was not convinced that Mayor Saludaga took advantage of his official position to falsify the subject OR. It held
that the prosecution's evidence failed to establish that he was in any way involved in the execution and issuance of the subject OR.

Although Mayor Saludaga signed the mayor's permit, the Sandiganbayan ruled that it is the issuance of the subject OR to support the
mayor's permit which is crucial in determining his culpability for the crime charged against him. As it was not shown that Mayor Saludaga
had any involvement in its issuance, he could not have taken advantage of his position as Mayor and knowingly made untruthful narration
of facts in the said document.

Second, the Sandiganbayan was not persuaded that the subject OR was in fact falsified.
While Adriatico admitted that he issued the subject OR and that he antedated it to August 27, 1997, the Sandiganbayan held that such act
does not constitute falsification. It held that if the statements are not altogether false, there being some colorable truth in them, the crime of
falsification is deemed not to have been committed. Adriatico did not necessarily make an untruthful statement of fact as to the date, there
being truth that the payment received was for a past transaction.

Finally, the Sandiganbayan held that the prosecution failed to prove that De Luna was not a bona fide pakyaw contractor when the
contracts were executed in December 1997. The graft court did not give credence to the prosecution's evidence (i.e., Time Book and
Payroll for the period September 15 to September 30, 1997) that De Luna was a mere laborer employed by the municipality. It also
dismissed the insinuations made by the prosecution's witnesses Chan and Lim that De Luna was not a qualified contractor, holding that
they were mere insinuations and nothing more.

To our mind, the foregoing disquisitions sufficiently counter the People's claim that the Sandiganbayan completely ignored the
prosecution's evidence and that it disregarded settled jurisprudence.

On the contrary, we find that the Sandiganbayan, by examining the prosecution's evidence vis-a-vis the elements of the crime, adequately
laid the basis in resolving to grant the demurrer. We do not see how this method of arriving at a decision or resolution can be deemed a
grave abuse of discretion. Simply put, we are not convinced that the Sandiganbayan acted in a capricious, arbitrary, and whimsical
manner when it granted the respondents' demurrer.

This is not to say that the Sandiganbayan correctly applied the law to the facts of the case. Our finding is limited to the issue of grave
abuse of discretion; we do not rule on the legal soundness of the Sandiganbayan resolution.
To reiterate, certiorari shall lie only when the respondent court gravely abuses its discretion such as when it blatantly ignores
facts or denies a party due process. Certiorari does not correct errors of judgment.
Thus, even if the Sandiganbayan erred in weighing the sufficiency of the prosecution's evidence, such error does not necessarily amount to
grave abuse of discretion.[46] It is merely an error of judgment which may no longer be appealed because it would place the
respondents in double jeopardy.
In the case of People v. Sandiganbayan,[47] we found the Sandiganbayan to have erred in applying certain provisions of the Government
Auditing Code of the Philippines when it granted the accused's demurrer to evidence. Nonetheless, we held that even if the
Sandiganbayan proceeded from an erroneous interpretation of the law, the error committed was an error of judgment and not of jurisdiction.

We found therein that the People failed to establish that the dismissal order was tainted with grave abuse of discretion. In fine, we held that
the error committed by the Sandiganbayan is of such a nature that could no longer be rectified on appeal by the prosecution because it
would place the accused in double jeopardy.

In another case, after the prosecution had presented its evidence and rested its case, the accused filed a motion to dismiss for
insufficiency of evidence. The trial court granted the motion and dismissed the case. On appeal by the prosecution to this Court, we were
of the view that the dismissal order was erroneous and resulted in a miscarriage of justice. However, we ruled that such error could not be
corrected because double jeopardy had already set in.[48]

In sum, although the Sandiganbayan, in the absence of grave abuse of discretion, may have erred in dismissing the criminal case, such
error may no longer be annulled or set aside because it would place the respondents in double jeopardy.

At any rate, even if we go beyond the function of certiorari and dissect the prosecution's theory that the respondents conspired to commit
the crime, we still sustain the Sandiganbayan.

Three acts are undisputed: (1) Adriatico issued the antedated subject OR in 1999, (2) De Luna requested Adriatico to antedate the OR, and
(3) Mayor Saludaga signed in 1999 the mayor's permit which allowed De Luna to engage as pakyaw contractor for the period August 27
-December 30, 1997.

As a rule, conspiracy may be inferred from the acts of the accused. However, it is required that said acts must clearly manifest a
concurrence of wills, a common intent or design to commit a crime.
The concurrence of will and common intent or design to commit a crime is not clearly manifest in the present case. The charge of
conspiracy simply does not hold water.

No convincing evidence was presented to show how the respondents conspired to commit the crime. We find no credible proof that links or
gives unifying purpose to the respondents' individual acts. Without such proof, we cannot conclude with moral certainty that they conspired,
connived, and mutually helped one another to commit the crime. These acts, on their own and nothing more, do not support the allegation
of conspiracy.

As a final point, we note the People's suggestion that the Sandiganbayan, in granting the demurrer, tried to exculpate Mayor Saludaga and
thereby abetted the freeing of a corrupt public official.49 While we recognize the prosecutors' efforts in bringing unscrupulous public
officials to justice, we find these comments unwarranted and unfair to the Sandiganbayan. Besides, unfounded accusations such as these
have no place in a pleading.

WHEREFORE, in the light of these findings and legal premises, we find no grave abuse of discretion in the June 21, 2011 Sandiganbayan
resolution granting the respondents' joint demurrer to evidence in Criminal Case No. 28261 and therefore, accordingly, DISMISS the
petition.

SO ORDERED.
 [ GR No. 203370, Apr 11, 2016 ]

MALAYAN INSURANCE COMPANY v. PHILIP PICCIO +

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Before this Court are two (2) consolidated petitions for review on certiorari.[1] The first petition, docketed as G.R. No. 203370, filed by
petitioners Malayan Insurance Company, Inc. (Malayan Insurance) and Helen Y. Dee (petitioners) assails the Decision[2] dated February
24, 2012 and the Resolution[3] dated September 5, 2012 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 31467, which denied their
appeal from the Order[4] dated February 20, 2007 and the Resolution[5] dated September 3, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati
City (Makati-RTC), Branch 137 (Makati-RTC, Br. 137) in Criminal Case Nos. 06-877 and 06-882 on the ground that the same was not
authorized by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG). On the other hand, the second petition, docketed as G.R. No. 215106, filed by
petitioner Malayan Insurance assails the Decision[6] dated March 31, 2014 and the Resolution[7] dated October 17, 2014 of the CA in
CA-G.R. CR. No. 32148, which denied its appeal from the Orders[8] dated December 28, 2007 and August 29, 2008 of the Makati-RTC,
Branch 62 (Makati-RTC, Br. 62) in Criminal Case No. 06-884 on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.

The Facts

On October 18, 2005, Jessie John P. Gimenez (Gimenez), President of the Philippine Integrated Advertising Agency - the advertising arm
of the Yuchengco Group of Companies (Yuchengco Group), to which Malayan Insurance is a corporate member - filed a
Complaint-Affidavit[9] for thirteen (13) counts of Libel, defined and penalized under Article 355 in relation to Article 353 of the Revised
Penal Code (RPC), before the City Prosecutor of Makati City, docketed as I.S. No. 05-1-11895, against herein respondents Philip Piccio,
Mia Gatmaytan, Ma. Annabella Relova Santos, John Joseph Gutierrez, Jocelyn Upano, Jose Dizon, Rolando Pareja, Wonina M. Bonifacio,
Elvira Cruz, Cornelio Zafra, Vicente Ortuoste, Victoria Gomez Jacinto, Juvencio Pereche, Jr., Ricardo Lorayes, Peter C. Suchianco, and
Trennie Monsod (respondents) for purportedly posting defamatory articles/statements on the website www.pepcoalition.com that
besmirched the reputation of the Yuchengco family and the Yuchengco Group, including herein petitioners.[10]

Upon the prosecutor's finding of probable cause,[11] thirteen (13) Informations were filed before the Makati-RTC. Among those filed were
Criminal Case Nos. 06-877[12] and 06-882[13] (raffled to Makati-RTC, Br. 137) and Criminal Case No. 06-884[14] (raffled to Makati-RTC,
Br. 62), from which arose the present petitions.

In Criminal Case Nos. 06-877 and 06-882, respondents filed a Motion to Quash[15] dated June 7, 2006, asserting, among others, lack of
jurisdiction, since the residences of petitioners were not alleged in the Informations. Besides, even if so stated, the residence or principal
office address of petitioners was admittedly at Quintin Paredes Street, Binondo, Manila, and not in Makati City. Hence, the venue was
mislaid, and the Makati-RTC, Br. 137 did not have jurisdiction over the said cases.[16]

In an Order[17] dated February 20, 2007, the Makati-RTC, Br. 137 granted the said motion and dismissed Criminal Case Nos. 06-877 and
06-882 on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.[18] It found that the Informations filed in these cases failed to state that any one of the
offended parties resides in Makati City, or that the subject articles were printed or first published in Makati City.[19] Hence, the failure to
state the aforementioned details was a fatal defect which negated its jurisdiction over the criminal cases.[20] Petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration,[21] which was, however, denied in a Resolution[22] dated September 3, 2007. Hence, petitioners filed an
appeal[23]before the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 31467.

Similarly, in Criminal Case No. 06-884, respondents filed a Motion to Quash[24] dated June 5, 2006, based on the following grounds: (a)
that the Information failed to vest jurisdiction on the Makati-RTC; (b) that the acts complained of in the Information are not punishable by
law; and (c) that the Information is fatally defective for failing to designate the offense charged and to allege the acts or omissions
complained of as constituting the offense of Libel.[25]

In an Order[26] dated December 28, 2007, the Makati-RTC, Br, 62 dismissed Criminal Case No. 06-884 for lack of probable cause. Among
others, it ruled that the element of malice was lacking since respondents did not appear to have been motivated by personal ill will to speak
or spite Malayan Insurance.[27] The prosecution filed a motion for reconsideration,[28] which was,, however, denied in an Order[29] dated
August 29, 2008. Thus, Malayan Insurance filed an appeaL[30] before the CA. docketed as CA-GR. CR. No. 32148.

The Proceedings Before the CA

In CA-GR. CR No. 31467, the CA noted that while petitioners filed a Notice of Appeal, the Appellants' Brief was filed only by the private
prosecutor, and not by the OSG as required by law.[31] It likewise observed from the records that the OSG filed a Manifestation and
Motion[32] dated September 16, 2008 asking that "it be excused from filing any documents or pleadings relative to the aforementioned
case[,] considering that it had not received any endorsement coming from the Department of Justice to appeal the same."[33] Moreover,
the CA held that "the Chief City Prosecutor-of Makati City was required to comment, and he categorically stated in his Explanation and
Compliance that he did not authorize the filing, nor conform to the filing of an appeal from the quashal of the two (2) Informations in
[Criminal Case Nos. 06-877 and 06-882]."[34]

Thus, in the assailed Decision[35] dated February 24, 2012, the CA denied the appeal outright on the ground that the same was not filed
by the authorized official, i.e., the OSG. It remarked that although the private prosecutor may, at certain times, be permitted to participate in
criminal proceedings on appeal in the CA, his participation is always subject to prior approval of the OSG; and the former cannot be
permitted to adopt a position that is not consistent with that of the OSG.[36] Petitioners' motion for reconsideration[37] was denied in the
assailed Resolution[38] dated September 5, 2012, prompting them to file the petition in G.R. No. 203370.

The same was reached when the CA, in the assailed Decision[39] dated March 31, 2014 in CA-GR. CR. No. 32148, denied Malayan
Insurance's appeal, but this time, on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. The ruling was premised on its finding that the case of Bonifacio v.
RTC of Makati, Branch 149 (Bonifacio),[40] which involved one of the thirteen (13) Libel cases, particularly Criminal Case No. 06-876,
participated in by the same parties albeit concerning a different defamatory article, is already controlling.[41] Hence, since this Court
directed the quashal of Information in Criminal Case No. 06-876 and dismissed the same, the CA did not delve on the propriety of the
Makati-RTC, Br. 62's finding of probable cause, and instead, adopted, the same course of action in Bonifacio. In its view, all other issues
are rendered moot and academic in light of this Court's declaration that the Makati-RTC is without jurisdiction to try and hear cases for
Libel filed by Malayan Insurance against respondents. [42] Malayan Insurance's motion for reconsideration[43] was denied in the assailed
Resolution[44] dated October 17, 2014, prompting it to file the petition in G.R. No. 215106.

The Issues Before the Court

In G.R. No. 203370, petitioners contend that the CA erred in denying the appeal in CA-GR. CR No. 31467 due to lack of the OSG's
authorization. While in G.R. No. 215106, Malayan Insurance argued that the CA likewise erred in denying its appeal, in CA-GR. CR. No.
32148, but this time, on jurisdictional grounds.

The Court's Ruling

I. Resolution of G.R. No. 203370

The authority to represent the State in appeals of criminal cases before the Court and the CA is vested solely in the OSG[45] which is "the
law office of the Government whose specific powers and functions include that of representing the Republic and/or the People [of the
Philippines] before any court in any action which affects the welfare of the people as the ends of justice may require."[46] Section 35 (1),
Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code[47] provides that:

Section 35. Powers and Functions. — The Office of the Solicitor General shall represent the Government of the Philippines, its
agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the services of a
lawyer, x x x. It shall have the following specific powers and functions:
(1) Represent the Government in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals in all criminal proceedings; represent the
Government and its officers in the Supreme Court, and Court of Appeals, and all other courts or tribunals in all civil actions and special
proceedings in which the Government or any officer thereof in his official capacity is a party. (Emphases supplied)

In People v. Piccio (Piccio),[48] which involved one of the thirteen (13) criminal cases between the same parties, this Court held that "if
there is a dismissal of a criminal case by the trial court or if there is an acquittal of the accused, it is only the OSG that may bring an
appeal on the criminal aspect representing the People. The rationale therefor is rooted in the principle that the party affected by the
dismissal of the criminal action is the People and not the petitioners who are mere complaining witnesses. For this reason, the People are
therefore deemed as the real parties in interest in the criminal case and, therefore, only the OSG can represent them in criminal
proceedings pending in the CA or in this Court. In view of the corollary principle that every action must be prosecuted or defended in
the name of the real party in interest who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or by the party entitled to the avails
of the suit, an appeal of the criminal case not filed by the People as represented by the OSG is perforce dismissible. The private
complainant or the offended party may, however, file an appeal without the intervention of the OSG but only insofar as the civil liability of
the accused is concerned. He may also file a special civil action for certiorari even without the intervention of the OSG, but only to the end
of preserving his interest in the civil aspect of the case."[49]

In this case, as in Piccio, records show that petitioners' appeal in CA-G.R. CR No. 31467 principally sought the remand of Criminal Case
Nos. 06-877 and 06-882 to the Makati-RTC, Br. 137 for arraignment and trial, or, in the alternative, amend the Informations, and therefore,
was not intended to merely preserve their interest in the civil aspect of the case. Thus, as its appeal was filed in relation to the criminal
aspect of the case, it is necessary that the same be filed with the authorization of the OSG, which, by law, is the proper representative of
the real party in interest in the criminal proceedings, the People. There being no authorization given, the appeal was rightfully dismissed by
the CA. In fact, in its Comment[50] dated July 5, 2013, the People, through the OSG, even sought the dismissal of petitioners' appeal
before this Court[51] on the ground that "petitioners have no legal personality to elevate on appeal the quashal of the [Informations] in the
subject criminal cases."[52] As it is, petitioners have no legal standing to interpose an appeal in the criminal proceeding; hence, as they
went beyond the bounds of their interest, petitioners cannot successfully contest the propriety of the Makati-RTC, Br. 137's dismissal of the
criminal cases. It must, however, be clarified that the CA's denial of petitioners' appeal is without prejudice to their filing of the appropriate
action to preserve their interest in the civil aspect of the Libel cases, following the parameters of Rule 111 of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure.[53]

II. Resolution of G.R. No. 215106

"Venue is jurisdictional in criminal actions such that the place where the crime was committed determines not only the venue of the action
but constitutes an essential element of jurisdiction. This principle acquires even greater import in libel cases, given that Article 360 [of the
RPC], as amended [by Republic Act No. 4363[54]], specifically provides for the possible venues for the institution of the criminal and civil
aspects of such cases,"[55] to wit:

Article 360. Persons responsible. - x x x.

xxxx

The criminal and civil action for damages in cases of written defamations as provided for in this chapter, shall be filed simultaneously or
separately with the court of first instance of the province or city where the libelous article is printed and first published or where
any of the offended parties actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense: x x x.

x x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Thus, generally speaking, "the venue of libel cases where the complainant is a private individual is limited to only either of two places,
namely: 1) where the complainant actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense; or 2) where the alleged defamatory article
was printed and first published.[56]
In this case, the CA proceeded to deny Malayan Insurance's appeal in view of the Makati-RTC, Br. 62's lack of jurisdiction over Criminal
Case No. 06-884. It held that this Court's ruling in Bonifacio is already "controlling here because they involve the same parties and the
same issues," [57] observing that this case is "one (1) of the thirteen (13) cases/[I]nformations filed before the [Makati-RTC] which
originated from the complaint initiated by [Gimenez]."[58]

To contextualize, the Libel case involved in Bonifacio was Criminal Case No. 06-876 which, as the CA observed, involved the same parties
herein. Highlighting the Amended Information's allegation that the offending article "was first published and accessed by the private
complainant in Makati City,"[59] respondents submitted that "[t]he prosecution erroneously laid the venue of the case in the place where
the offended party accessed the internet-published article."[60] This Court sustained the argument, and directed the Makati-RTC to quash
the Amended Information in Criminal Case No. 06-876 and dismiss the case, ratiocinating in the following wise:

If the circumstances as to where the libel was printed and first published are used by the offended party as basis for the venue in the
criminal action, the Information must allege with particularity where the defamatory article was printed and first published, as evidenced or
supported by, for instance, the address of their editorial or business offices in the case of newspapers, magazines or serial publications.
This pre-condition becomes necessary in order to forestall any inclination to harass.

The same measure cannot be reasonably expected when it pertains to defamatory material appearing on a website on the internet as there
would be no way of determining the situs of its printing and first publication. To credit Gimenez's premise of equating his first access to the
defamatory article on petitioners' website in Makati with printing and first publication would spawn the very ills that the amendment to
Article 360 of the RPC sought to discourage and prevent. It hardly requires much imagination to see the chaos that would ensue in
situations where the website's author or writer, a blogger or anyone who posts messages therein could be sued for libel anywhere in the
Philippines that the private complainant may have allegedly accessed the offending website.

For the Court to hold that the Amended Information sufficiently vested jurisdiction in the courts of Makati simply because the defamatory
article was accessed therein would open the floodgates to the libel suit being filed in all other locations where the pepcoalition website is
likewise accessed or capable of being accessed.[61] (Underscoring in the original)

Here, Malayan Insurance opposes the CA's application of Bonifacio, asserting that the venue was properly laid as the Informations subject
of this case state in one continuous sentence that: "x x x in Makati City, [Metro Manila,] Philippines and a place within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court xxx, the above-named accused x x x did then and there x x x caused to be composed, posted and published in the
said website www.pepcoalition.com and [sic] injurious and defamatory article."[62] They also aver that Bonifacio laid down an entirely new
requirement on internet Libel cases which did not exist prior to its promulgation and, hence, should not be applied retroactively to Malayan
Insurance's prejudice.[63]

While Bonifacio's applicability was indeed squarely raised in the instant petition, this Court finds that it would be improper not to pass upon
this issue considering that - similar to the appeal in CA-G.R. CR No. 31467 - the appeal in CA-G.R. CRNo. 32148, as well as this petition
for review, suffers from a fatal defect in that they were filed without the conformity of the OSG. As earlier stated, the right to prosecute
criminal cases pertains exclusively to the People, which is, therefore, the proper party to bring the appeal, through the representation of the
OSG. The People are deemed as the real parties in interest in the criminal case and, therefore, only the OSG can represent them
in criminal proceedings pending in the CA or in this Court. As the records bear out, this Court, in a Resolution[64] dated September 9,
2015, required the OSG to file its Comment so as to be given the ample opportunity to manifest its desire to prosecute the present appeal,
in representation of the People. However, in a Manifestation (In lieu of Comment),[65] the People, through the OSG, manifested that it is
adopting its Comment[66] dated July 5, 2013 in G.R. No. 203370, which sought the dismissal of the petition on the ground that "petitioners
have no legal personality to elevate on appeal the quashal of the [Informations] in the subject criminal cases."[67] Hence, in view of
Malayan Insurance's lack of legal personality to file the present petition, this Court has to dismiss the same, without prejudice, however, to
Malayan Insurance's filing of the appropriate action to preserve its interest in the civil aspect of the Libel case following the parameters of
Rule 111 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure.[68]
WHEREFORE, the petitions are DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

[ GR No. 193681, Aug 06, 2014 ]

PEOPLE v. PHILIP PICCIO +

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari[1] is the Resolution[2] dated September 15, 2009 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CR No. 31549 which granted respondents' motion for reconsideration of the Resolution[3] dated January 21, 2009, thereby dismissing
petitioners' notice of appeal[4] from the dismissal of Criminal Case No. 06-875[5] for libel on the ground that petitioners had no personality
to appear for the State and appeal the criminal aspect of a case because the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) did not give its
conformity to the same. Assailed further is the Resolution[6] dated September 2, 2010 denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration of
the September 15, 2009 Resolution of the CA for lack of merit.

The Facts

On October 18, 2005, Jessie John P. Gimenez, President of the Philippine Integrated Advertising Agency the advertising arm of the
Yuchengco Group of Companies, to which Malayan Insurance Company, Inc. is a corporate member filed a Complaint-Affidavit for libel
before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati City against a group called the Parents Enabling Parents Coalition, Inc. (PEPCI) for
posting on the website www.pepcoalition.com on August 25, 2005 an article entitled "Back to the Trenches: A Call to Arms, AY/HELEN
Chose the War Dance with Coalition." As alleged in the complaint, such publication was highly defamatory and libelous against the
Yuchengco family and the Yuchengco Group of Companies, particularly petitioners Malayan Insurance Co., Inc. and Helen Y. Dee
(petitioners).[7]

The Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati City[8] found probable cause to indict 16 trustees, officers and/or members of PEPCI, namely,
respondents Philip Piccio, Mia Gatmaytan, Ma. Annabella Relova Santos, John Joseph Gutierrez, Jocelyn Upano (Upano), Jose Dizon,
Rolando Pareja, Wonina Bonifacio (Bonifacio), Elvira Cruz, Cornelio Zafra, Vicente Ortuoste (Ortuoste), Victoria Gomez Jacinto, Juvencio
Pereche, Jr. (Pereche, Jr.), Ricardo Lorayes, Peter Suchianco, and Trennie Monsod (respondents) for 13 counts of libel.[9]

The criminal information in I.S. No. 1-11-11995 was soon after raffled to the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 139 (RTC) and was
docketed as Criminal Case No. 06-875. Upon motion of respondents Bonifacio, Upano, Ortuoste, and Pereche, Jr., the RTC, in an Order
dated May 23, 2007, quashed the criminal information for libel and dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction,[10] holding that the criminal
information failed to allege where the article was printed and first published or where the offended parties reside.[11] It subsequently
denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration in an Order dated February 11, 2008.[12]

On February 29, 2008, the People of the Philippines (People), through the private prosecutors, and with the conformity of public prosecutor
Benjamin S. Vermug, Jr., filed a Notice of Appeal.[13] Soon after, petitioners filed the Brief for the Private Complainants-Appellants[14] as
directed by the CA. The OSG, for its part, however, sought suspension of the period to file the required brief pending information and
endorsement from the Department of Justice (DOJ) on whether it is the People or the private complainant that should file the same.[15]

Subsequently, the OSG filed a Manifestation and Motion[16] dated October 20, 2008 stating that it had received an advisory from the DOJ
that the latter had no information about the case and, thus, prayed that it be excused from filing the appellant's brief.

Meanwhile, respondents Bonifacio, Upano, Ortuoste, and Pereche, Jr. filed a Motion to Dismiss Appeal,[17] citing as grounds for dismissal
the fact that the Brief for the Private Complainants-Appellants filed by petitioners did not carry the conforme of the OSG and that ordinary
appeal was not the appropriate remedy. In a Resolution[18] dated January 21, 2009 the CA denied the said motion and directed
respondents to file their appellee's brief.[19]

Instead of filing the required appellee's brief, respondents moved for the reconsideration of the aforesaid Resolution, prompting petitioners
and the OSG to file their respective comments.[20]

In their Comment/ Opposition[21] to the said motion for reconsideration, petitioners insisted that the trial court's order of dismissal was a
final order from which an appeal was available; that the notice of appeal was signed by the public prosecutor and therefore valid; and that
jurisprudence shows that the conformity of the OSG is not required when grave errors are committed by the trial court or where there is
lack of due process.

In its Comment,[22] the OSG concurred in the propriety of the remedy of an appeal against the assailed order, but nonetheless, asserted
that the appeal, without its conformity, must fail because under the law it is only the OSG that should represent the People in criminal
cases.

The CA Ruling

In a Resolution dated September 15, 2009, the CA dismissed the appeal on the ground that the OSG had not given its conformity to the
said appeal.[23]

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration[24] but the same was denied by the CA in a Resolution[25] dated September 2, 2010,
hence, this petition.

The Issue Before the Court

The sole issue in this case is whether or not petitioners, being mere private complainants, may appeal an order of the trial court dismissing
a criminal case even without the OSG's conformity.

The Court's Ruling

The petition lacks merit.

The CA correctly dismissed the notice of appeal interposed by petitioners against the May 23, 2007 Order of the RTC because they, being
mere private complainants, lacked the legal personality to appeal the dismissal of Criminal Case No. 06-875 (resulting from the quashal of
the information therein on the ground of lack of jurisdiction).

To expound, it is well-settled that the authority to represent the State in appeals of criminal cases before the Court and the CA is vested
solely in the OSG[26] which is the law office of the Government whose specific powers and functions include that of representing the
Republic and/or the people before any court in any action which affects the welfare of the people as the ends of justice may require.[27]
Explicitly, Section 35(1), Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code[28] provides that:

SECTION 35. Powers and Functions. The Office of the Solicitor General shall represent the Government of the Philippines, its
agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the services of
lawyers. x x x. It shall have the following specific powers and functions:

(1) Represent the Government in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals in all criminal proceedings; represent the Government
and its officers in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, and all other courts or tribunals in all civil actions and special proceedings in
which the Government or any officer thereof in his official capacity is a party. (Emphases supplied)
Accordingly, jurisprudence holds that if there is a dismissal of a criminal case by the trial court or if there is an acquittal of the accused, it is
only the OSG that may bring an appeal on the criminal aspect representing the People. [29] The rationale therefor is rooted in the
principle that the party affected by the dismissal of the criminal action is the People and not the petitioners who are mere complaining
witnesses. For this reason, the People are therefore deemed as the real parties in interest in the criminal case and, therefore, only the
OSG can represent them in criminal proceedings pending in the CA or in this Court.[30] In view of the corollary principle that every action
must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party-in-interest who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit,
or by the party entitled to the avails of the suit,[31] an appeal of the criminal case not filed by the People as represented by the OSG is
perforce dismissible. The private complainant or the offended party may, however, file an appeal without the intervention of the OSG but
only insofar as the civil liability of the accused is concerned.[32] He may also file a special civil action for certiorari even without the
intervention of the OSG, but only to the end of preserving his interest in the civil aspect of the case. [33]

Here, it is clear that petitioners did not file their appeal merely to preserve their interest in the civil aspect of the case. Rather, by seeking
the reversal of the RTC's quashal of the information in Criminal Case No. 06-875 and thereby seeking that the said court be directed to set
the case for arraignment and to proceed with trial,[34] it is sufficiently clear that they sought the reinstatement of the criminal prosecution of
respondents for libel. Being an obvious attempt to meddle into the criminal aspect of the case without the conformity of the OSG, their
recourse, in view of the above-discussed principles, must necessarily fail. To repeat, the right to prosecute criminal cases pertains
exclusively to the People, which is therefore the proper party to bring the appeal through the representation of the OSG. Petitioners have
no personality or legal standing to interpose an appeal in a criminal proceeding. Since the OSG had expressly withheld its conformity and
endorsement in the instant case, the CA, therefore, correctly dismissed the appeal. It must, however, be clarified that the aforesaid
dismissal is without prejudice to their filing of the appropriate action to preserve their interests but only with respect to the civil aspect of the
libel case following the parameters of Rule 111 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Resolutions dated September 15, 2009 and September 2, 2010 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR No. 31549 dismissing petitioners' appeal from the dismissal of the criminal case for libel are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
 [ GR No. 219468, Jun 08, 2016 ]

JOSE BURGOS v. SPOUSES ELADIO SJ. NAVAL & ARLINA B. NAVAL +

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari[1] are the Resolutions dated March 5, 2015[2] and July 2, 2015[3] of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 138203, which denied petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr.'s (Burgos) petition for certiorari[4] before it for his lack of
authority to initiate and bring the same in the name of the People of the Philippines (People).

The Facts

This case stemmed from a letter-complaint[5] dated April 26, 2012 filed by Burgos, before the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, Taytay,
Rizal, charging respondents spouses Eladio and Arlina Naval (Sps. Naval) and their daughter, Amalia Naval (Amalia; collectively
respondents), of the crime of Estafa through Falsification of Public Documents. Burgos alleged that he and his wife, Rubie S.
Garcia-Burgos, were the registered owners of a lot with an area of 1,389 square meters, situated in the Municipality of Taytay, Rizal,
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 550579 (subject lot).[6] On November 19, 1996, the subject lot was purportedly
mortgaged to a certain Antonio Assad,[7] and subsequently, Burgos decided to obtain a loan from Sps. Naval in order to avoid foreclosure.
Respondents agreed and asked spouses Burgos to sign some blank documents in return -to which they faithfully complied.[8]

Sometime in February 2011, Burgos allegedly discovered that TCT No. 550579 was cancelled, and a new one was issued, i.e., TCT No.
644582,[9] in favor of Sps. Naval on April 1, 1998. He claimed that the blank documents which he and his wife previously signed turned out
to be a receipt[10] and a Deed of Absolute Sale[11] over the subject lot through the ploy and conspiracy of respondents. Thereafter, or on
February 11, 2013, an Information[12] was filed before the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City, Branch 97 (RTC), docketed as Criminal
Case No. 13-45768, accusing respondents of having committed the aforesaid crime.[13]

Before arraignment, respondents filed a motion to quash[14] based on the following grounds: (a) that their criminal liability has been
extinguished due to prescription;[15] (b) that the information failed to charge Amalia with an offense;[16] and (c) that they were not afforded
the opportunity of a preliminary investigation.[17] Respondents averred that since the information was filed on February 11, 2013, beyond
the reglementary period often (10) years from the registration of the title on April 1, 1998, the crime had already prescribed. They also
claimed that the information did not contain any specific charge against Amalia. Finally, they maintained that they were deprived of their
right to dispute the allegations of the complaint during the preliminary investigation.[18]

The RTC Ruling

In an Order[19] dated August 14, 2013, the RTC granted respondents' motion and, consequently, dismissed the case on the ground of
prescription.

The RTC essentially observed that the prescriptive period for the alleged crime commenced from the time Burgos had constructive notice
of the alleged falsification, i.e., when the document was registered with the Register of Deeds on April 1, 1998. Therefore, since more than
ten (10) years had elapsed when the information was filed on February 11, 2013, the subject crime had prescribed.[20]

Aggrieved, Burgos moved for reconsideration,[21] which was denied in an Order[22] dated July 14, 2014. Notably, the RTC declared that it
could not order the public prosecutor to amend the information to include the specific amount of damage sustained by Burgos amounting to
P8,500,000.00, as it would improperly infringe his executive functions.[23] Thus, Burgos elevated the matter to the CA via a petition for
certiorari, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 138203.

The CA Ruling

In a Resolution[24] dated March 5, 2015, the CA dismissed the petition for failure of Burgos to join the People in his certiorari petition as
required by the Administrative Code of 1987.[25]

Unstirred, Burgos moved for reconsideration,[26] which was likewise denied in a Resolution dated July 2, 2015. Significantly, the CA
observed that the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) has not consented to the filing of the certiorari petition;[27] hence, this petition
before the Court.

The Issue Before the Court

The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA correctly dismissed the certiorari petition on the ground that the People, as
represented by the OSG, was not impleaded as a party.

The Court's Ruling

In his petition, Burgos averred that the CA Resolutions dated March 5, 2015 and July 2, 2015 should be declared null and void for having
been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. He claimed that he already complied with the
directive to furnish the OSG with a copy of the certiorari petition before the CA,[28] and that he even made a letter dated April 7, 2015,[29]
requesting the OSG for authority to appear and prosecute the case on behalf of the People. Relatedly, he prayed for the reinstatement of
the Information and/or a declaration that prescription has not yet set in as the crime of Estafa through Falsification of Public Documents
was only discovered sometime in February 2011.[30]

In their comment,[31] respondents maintained that Burgos nevertheless failed to furnish the OSG with a copy of the certiorari petition filed
before the CA as mandated by Section 3,[32] Rule 46 of the Rules of Court, which is a sufficient ground for its dismissal.[33] In fact, they
averred that Burgos did not even attempt to change or amend the title of the petition from "Jose Burgos, Jr." to "People of the
Philippines."[34] Moreover, they pointed out that Burgos's letter-request for authority addressed to the OSG was filed only on April 10, 2015
or nine (9) days after Burgos's receipt of the adverse March 5, 2015 CA Resolution, further alleging that mere request from the OSG is not
tantamount to authority.[35]

The Court finds for respondents.

Jurisprudence dictates that it is the OSG which possesses the requisite authority to represent the People in an appeal on the criminal
aspect of a case.[36] The OSG is "the law office of the Government whose specific powers and functions include that of representing the
Republic and/or the [P]eople before any court in any action which affects the welfare of the people as the ends of justice may
require."[37]Section 35(1), Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code[38] provides that:

Section 35. Powers and Functions. - The Office of the Solicitor General shall represent the Government of the Philippines, its
agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the services of
lawyer, x x x. It shall have the following specific powers and functions:

(1) Represent the Government in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals in all criminal proceedings;represent the
Government and its officers in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, and all other courts or tribunals in all civil actions and special
proceedings in which the Government or any officer thereof in his official capacity is a party. (Emphases supplied)

In People v. Piccio (Piccio),[39] this Court held that "if there is a dismissal of a criminal case by the trial court or if there is an acquittal of the
accused, it is only the OSG that may bring an appeal on the criminal aspect representing the People. The rationale therefor is rooted in the
principle that the party affected by the dismissal of the criminal action is the People and not the petitioners who are mere complaining
witnesses. For this reason, the People are therefore deemed as the real parties in interest in the criminal case and, therefore, only
the OSG can represent them in criminal proceedings pending in the CA or in this Court. In view of the corollary principle that every
action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the
suit, or by the party entitled to the avails of the suit, an appeal of the criminal case not filed by the People as represented by the OSG is
perforce dismissible. The private complainant or the offended party may, however, file an appeal without the intervention of the OSG but
only insofar as the civil liability of the accused is concerned. He may also file a special civil action for certiorari even without the
intervention of the OSG, but only to the end of preserving his interest in the civil aspect of the case."[40]

In this case, records show that Burgos's petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 138203 sought for the reinstatement of the Information
and/or a ruling that the crime has not vet prescribed.[41] Accordingly, the same was not intended to merely preserve his interest in the
civil aspect of the case. Thus, as his certiorari petition was filed seeking for relief/s in relation to the criminal aspect of the case, it is
necessary that the same be filed with the authorization of the OSG, which, by law, is the proper representative of the People, the real party
in interest in the criminal proceedings. As the CA aptly noted, "[t]o this date, the [OSG] as appellant's counsel of the [People] has not
consented to the filing of the present suit."[42] There being no authorization given - as his request to the OSG filed on April 10, 2015 was
not shown to have been granted - the certiorari petition was rightfully dismissed.

It must, however, be clarified that the CA's dismissal of Burgos's certiorari petition is without prejudice to his filing of the appropriate action
to preserve his interest in the civil aspect of the Estafa through Falsification of Public Documents case, provided that the parameters of
Rule 111 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure are complied with.[43]

It is noteworthy to point out that "[t]he extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil action where[:] (a) the
acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required; (b) the court declares that the liability of the
accused is only civil; and (c) the civil liability of the accused does not arise from or is not based upon the crime of which the accused was
acquitted. The civil action based on delict may, however, be deemed extinguished if there is a finding on the final judgment in the criminal
action that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist."[44] In this case, the RTC did not render any ruling that
the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist; instead, the RTC granted the motion to quash and thereby,
dismissed the criminal case on the sole ground of prescription. Any misgivings regarding the propriety of that disposition is for the People,
thru the OSG, and not for Burgos to argue. As earlier intimated, Burgos's remedy is to institute a civil case under the parameters of Rule
111 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Resolutions dated March 5, 2015 and July 2, 2015 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
138203 are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
 [ GR NO. 141524, Sep 14, 2005 ]

DOMINGO NEYPES v. DEL MUNDO +

506 Phil. 613

CORONA, J.

Petitioners Domingo Neypes, Luz Faustino, Rogelio Faustino, Lolito Victoriano, Jacob Obania and Domingo Cabacungan filed an action for
annulment of judgment and titles of land and/or reconveyance and/or reversion with preliminary injunction before the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 43, of Roxas, Oriental Mindoro, against the Bureau of Forest Development, Bureau of Lands, Land Bank of the Philippines and the
heirs of Bernardo del Mundo, namely, Fe, Corazon, Josefa, Salvador and Carmen.

In the course of the proceedings, the parties (both petitioners and respondents) filed various motions with the trial court. Among these were:
(1) the motion filed by petitioners to declare the respondent heirs, the Bureau of Lands and the Bureau of Forest Development in default
and (2) the motions to dismiss filed by the respondent heirs and the Land Bank of the Philippines, respectively.

In an order dated May 16, 1997, the trial court, presided by public respondent Judge Antonio N. Rosales, resolved the foregoing motions
as follows: (1) the petitioners' motion to declare respondents Bureau of Lands and Bureau of Forest Development in default was granted
for their failure to file an answer, but denied as against the respondent heirs of del Mundo because the substituted service of summons on
them was improper; (2) the Land Bank's motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action was denied because there were hypothetical
admissions and matters that could be determined only after trial, and (3) the motion to dismiss filed by respondent heirs of del Mundo,
based on prescription, was also denied because there were factual matters that could be determined only after trial.[1]

The respondent heirs filed a motion for reconsideration of the order denying their motion to dismiss on the ground that the trial court could
very well resolve the issue of prescription from the bare allegations of the complaint itself without waiting for the trial proper.

In an order[2] dated February 12, 1998, the trial court dismissed petitioners' complaint on the ground that the action had already prescribed.
Petitioners allegedly received a copy of the order of dismissal on March 3, 1998 and, on the 15th day thereafter or on March 18, 1998, filed
a motion for reconsideration. On July 1, 1998, the trial court issued another order dismissing the motion for reconsideration[3]which
petitioners received on July 22, 1998. Five days later, on July 27, 1998, petitioners filed a notice of appeal[4] and paid the appeal fees on
August 3, 1998.

On August 4, 1998, the court a quo denied the notice of appeal, holding that it was filed eight days late.[5] This was received by petitioners
on July 31, 1998. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but this too was denied in an order dated September 3, 1998.[6]

Via a petition for certiorari and mandamus under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, petitioners assailed the dismissal of the
notice of appeal before the Court of Appeals.
In the appellate court, petitioners claimed that they had seasonably filed their notice of appeal. They argued that the 15-day reglementary
period to appeal started to run only on July 22, 1998 since this was the day they received the final order of the trial court
denying their motion for reconsideration. When they filed their notice of appeal on July 27, 1998, only five days had
elapsed and they were well within the reglementary period for appeal.[7]

On September 16, 1999, the Court of Appeals (CA) dismissed the petition. It ruled that the 15-day period to appeal should have been
reckoned from March 3, 1998 or the day they received the February 12, 1998 order dismissing their complaint. According to the
appellate court, the order was the "final order" appealable under the Rules. It held further:

Perforce the petitioners' tardy appeal was correctly dismissed for the (P)erfection of an appeal within the reglementary period and in the
manner prescribed by law is jurisdictional and non-compliance with such legal requirement is fatal and effectively renders the judgment
final and executory.[8]

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforementioned decision. This was denied by the Court of Appeals on January 6,
2000.

In this present petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules, petitioners ascribe the following errors allegedly committed by the appellate
court:

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISMISSING THE PETITIONERS' PETITION FOR CERTIORARI AND
MANDAMUS AND IN AFFIRMING THE ORDER OF THE HON. JUDGE ANTONIO N. ROSALES WHICH DISMISSED THE
PETITIONERS' APPEAL IN CIVIL CASE NO. C-36 OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 43, ROXAS, ORIENTAL MINDORO,
EVEN AFTER THE PETITIONERS HAD PAID THE APPEAL DOCKET FEES.

II

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS LIKEWISE ERRED IN RULING AND AFFIRMING THE DECISION OR ORDER OF THE
RESPONDENT HON. ANTONIO M. ROSALES THAT PETITIONERS' APPEAL WAS FILED OUT OF TIME WHEN PETITIONERS
RECEIVED THE LAST OR FINAL ORDER OF THE COURT ON JULY 22, 1998 AND FILED THEIR NOTICE OF APPEAL ON JULY 27,
1998 AND PAID THE APPEAL DOCKET FEE ON AUGUST 3, 1998.

III

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS FURTHER ERRED IN RULING THAT THE WORDS "FINAL ORDER" IN SECTION 3, RULE 41,
OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE WILL REFER TO THE [FIRST] ORDER OF RESPONDENT JUDGE HON. ANTONIO M.
MORALES DATED FEBRUARY 12, 1998 INSTEAD OF THE LAST AND FINAL ORDER DATED JULY 1, 1998 COPY OF WHICH WAS
RECEIVED BY PETITIONERS THROUGH COUNSEL ON JULY 22, 1998.

IV.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS FINALLY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE DECISION IN THE CASE OF DENSO, INC. V. IAC,
148 SCRA 280, IS APPLICABLE IN THE INSTANT CASE THEREBY IGNORING THE PECULIAR FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF
THIS CASE AND THE FACT THAT THE SAID DECISION WAS RENDERED PRIOR TO THE ENACTMENT OF THE 1997 RULES OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE.[9]

The foregoing issues essentially revolve around the period within which petitioners should have filed their notice of appeal.

First and foremost, the right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a part of due process. It is merely a statutory privilege and may be
exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of law. Thus, one who seeks to avail of the right to appeal must comply
with the requirements of the Rules. Failure to do so often leads to the loss of the right to appeal.[10] The period to appeal is fixed by both
statute and procedural rules. BP 129,[11] as amended, provides:

Sec. 39. Appeals. The period for appeal from final orders, resolutions, awards, judgments, or decisions of any court in all these cases shall
be fifteen (15) days counted from the notice of the final order, resolution, award, judgment, or decision appealed from. Provided, however,
that in habeas corpus cases, the period for appeal shall be (48) forty-eight hours from the notice of judgment appealed from. x x x

Rule 41, Section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states:

SEC. 3. Period of ordinary appeal. The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from the notice of the judgment or final order
appealed from. Where a record on appeal is required, the appellant shall file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal within thirty (30)
days from the notice of judgment or final order.

The period to appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or reconsideration. No motion for extension of time to file a motion
for new trial or reconsideration shall be allowed. (emphasis supplied)

Based on the foregoing, an appeal should be taken within 15 days from the notice of judgment or final order appealed
from. A final judgment or order is one that finally disposes of a case, leaving nothing more for the court to do with respect to it. It is an
adjudication on the merits which, considering the evidence presented at the trial, declares categorically what the rights and obligations of
the parties are; or it may be an order or judgment that dismisses an action.[12]

As already mentioned, petitioners argue that the order of July 1, 1998 denying their motion for reconsideration should be construed as the
"final order," not the February 12, 1998 order which dismissed their complaint. Since they received their copy of the denial of their motion
for reconsideration only on July 22, 1998, the 15-day reglementary period to appeal had not yet lapsed when they filed their notice of
appeal on July 27, 1998.

What therefore should be deemed as the "final order," receipt of which triggers the start of the 15-day reglementary period to appeal the
February 12, 1998 order dismissing the complaint or the July 1, 1998 order dismissing the MR?

In the recent case of Quelnan v. VHF Philippines, Inc.,[13] the trial court declared petitioner Quelnan non-suited and accordingly dismissed
his complaint. Upon receipt of the order of dismissal, he filed an omnibus motion to set it aside. When the omnibus motion was filed, 12
days of the 15-day period to appeal the order had lapsed. He later on received another order, this time dismissing his omnibus motion. He
then filed his notice of appeal. But this was likewise dismissed for having been filed out of time.

The court a quo ruled that petitioner should have appealed within 15 days after the dismissal of his complaint since this was the final order
that was appealable under the Rules. We reversed the trial court and declared that it was the denial of the motion for reconsideration of an
order of dismissal of a complaint which constituted the final order as it was what ended the issues raised there.

This pronouncement was reiterated in the more recent case of Apuyan v. Haldeman et al.[14] where we again considered the order
denying petitioner Apuyan's motion for reconsideration as the final order which finally disposed of the issues involved in the case.

Based on the aforementioned cases, we sustain petitioners' view that the order dated July 1, 1998 denying their motion for reconsideration
was the final order contemplated in the Rules.

We now come to the next question: if July 1, 1998 was the start of the 15-day reglementary period to appeal, did petitioners in fact file their
notice of appeal on time?

Under Rule 41, Section 3, petitioners had 15 days from notice of judgment or final order to appeal the decision of the trial court. On the
15th day of the original appeal period (March 18, 1998), petitioners did not file a notice of appeal but instead opted to file a motion for
reconsideration. According to the trial court, the MR only interrupted the running of the 15-day appeal period.[15] It ruled that petitioners,
having filed their MR on the last day of the 15-day reglementary period to appeal, had only one (1) day left to file the notice of appeal upon
receipt of the notice of denial of their MR. Petitioners, however, argue that they were entitled under the Rules to a fresh period of 15 days
from receipt of the "final order" or the order dismissing their motion for reconsideration.

In Quelnan and Apuyan, both petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the trial court. We ruled there that they only
had the remaining time of the 15-day appeal period to file the notice of appeal. We consistently applied this rule in similar
cases,[16]premised on the long-settled doctrine that the perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period permitted by law is not
only mandatory but also jurisdictional.[17] The rule is also founded on deep-seated considerations of public policy and sound practice that,
at risk of occasional error, the judgments and awards of courts must become final at some definite time fixed by law.[18]

Prior to the passage of BP 129, Rule 41, Section 3 of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court read:

Sec. 3. How appeal is taken. Appeal maybe taken by serving upon the adverse party and filing with the trial court within thirty (30)
days from notice of order or judgment, a notice of appeal, an appeal bond, and a record on appeal. The time during which a motion
to set aside the judgment or order or for new trial has been pending shall be deducted, unless such motion fails to satisfy the requirements
of Rule 37.

But where such motion has been filed during office hours of the last day of the period herein provided, the appeal must be perfected within
the day following that in which the party appealing received notice of the denial of said motion.[19] (emphasis supplied)

According to the foregoing provision, the appeal period previously consisted of 30 days. BP 129, however, reduced this appeal period to 15
days. In the deliberations of the Committee on Judicial Reorganization[20] that drafted BP 129, the raison d' etre behind the amendment
was to shorten the period of appeal[21] and enhance the efficiency and dispensation of justice. We have since required strict observance
of this reglementary period of appeal. Seldom have we condoned late filing of notices of appeal,[22] and only in very exceptional
instances to better serve the ends of justice.

In National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority and Authority v. Municipality of Libmanan,[23] however, we declared that appeal is an
essential part of our judicial system and the rules of procedure should not be applied rigidly. This Court has on occasion advised the lower
courts to be cautious about not depriving a party of the right to appeal and that every party litigant should be afforded the amplest
opportunity for the proper and just disposition of his cause, free from the constraint of technicalities.

In de la Rosa v. Court of Appeals,[24] we stated that, as a rule, periods which require litigants to do certain acts must be followed unless,
under exceptional circumstances, a delay in the filing of an appeal may be excused on grounds of substantial justice. There, we condoned
the delay incurred by the appealing party due to strong considerations of fairness and justice.

In setting aside technical infirmities and thereby giving due course to tardy appeals, we have not been oblivious to or unmindful of the
extraordinary situations that merit liberal application of the Rules. In those situations where technicalities were dispensed with, our
decisions were not meant to undermine the force and effectivity of the periods set by law. But we hasten to add that in those rare cases
where procedural rules were not stringently applied, there always existed a clear need to prevent the commission of a grave injustice.
Our judicial system and the courts have always tried to maintain a healthy balance between the strict enforcement of procedural laws and
the guarantee that every litigant be given the full opportunity for the just and proper disposition of his cause.[25]

The Supreme Court may promulgate procedural rules in all courts.[26] It has the sole prerogative to amend, repeal or even establish new
rules for a more simplified and inexpensive process, and the speedy disposition of cases. In the rules governing appeals to it and to the
Court of Appeals, particularly Rules 42,[27] 43[28] and 45,[29] the Court allows extensions of time, based on justifiable and compelling
reasons, for parties to file their appeals. These extensions may consist of 15 days or more.

To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it
practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt of the
order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration. [30]

Henceforth, this "fresh period rule" shall also apply to Rule 40 governing appeals from the Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional Trial
Courts; Rule 42 on petitions for review from the Regional Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals; Rule 43 on appeals from quasi-judicial
agencies[31] to the Court of Appeals and Rule 45 governing appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court.[32] The new rule aims to regiment
or make the appeal period uniform, to be counted from receipt of the order denying the motion for new trial, motion for reconsideration
(whether full or partial) or any final order or resolution.

We thus hold that petitioners seasonably filed their notice of appeal within the fresh period of 15 days, counted from July 22, 1998 (the
date of receipt of notice denying their motion for reconsideration). This pronouncement is not inconsistent with Rule 41, Section 3 of the
Rules which states that the appeal shall be taken within 15 days from notice of judgment or final order appealed from. The use of the
disjunctive word "or" signifies disassociation and independence of one thing from another. It should, as a rule, be construed in the sense
in which it ordinarily implies.[33] Hence, the use of "or" in the above provision supposes that the notice of appeal may be filed within 15
days from the notice of judgment or within 15 days from notice of the "final order," which we already determined to refer to the July 1, 1998
order denying the motion for a new trial or reconsideration.

Neither does this new rule run counter to the spirit of Section 39 of BP 129 which shortened the appeal period from 30 days to 15 days to
hasten the disposition of cases. The original period of appeal (in this case March 3-18, 1998) remains and the requirement for strict
compliance still applies. The fresh period of 15 days becomes significant only when a party opts to file a motion for new trial or motion for
reconsideration. In this manner, the trial court which rendered the assailed decision is given another opportunity to review the case and, in
the process, minimize and/or rectify any error of judgment. While we aim to resolve cases with dispatch and to have judgments of courts
become final at some definite time, we likewise aspire to deliver justice fairly.

In this case, the new period of 15 days eradicates the confusion as to when the 15-day appeal period should be counted from receipt of
notice of judgment (March 3, 1998) or from receipt of notice of "final order" appealed from (July 22, 1998).

To recapitulate, a party litigant may either file his notice of appeal within 15 days from receipt of the Regional Trial Court's decision or file it
within 15 days from receipt of the order (the "final order") denying his motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration. Obviously, the new
15-day period may be availed of only if either motion is filed; otherwise, the decision becomes final and executory after the lapse of the
original appeal period provided in Rule 41, Section 3.

Petitioners here filed their notice of appeal on July 27, 1998 or five days from receipt of the order denying their motion for reconsideration
on July 22, 1998. Hence, the notice of appeal was well within the fresh appeal period of 15 days, as already discussed.[34]

We deem it unnecessary to discuss the applicability of Denso (Philippines), Inc. v. IAC[35] since the Court of Appeals never even referred
to it in its assailed decision.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED and the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Accordingly, let the records of this case be remanded to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.
 [ GR No. 170979, Feb 09, 2011 ]

JUDITH YU v. ROSA SAMSON-TATAD +

657 Phil. 431

BRION, J.:

We resolve the petition for prohibition filed by petitioner Judith Yu to enjoin respondent Judge Rosa Samson-Tatad of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 105, Quezon City, from taking further proceedings in Criminal Case No. Q-01-105698, entitled "People of the
Philippines v. Judith Yu, et al."[1]

The Factual Antecedents

The facts of the case, gathered from the parties' pleadings, are briefly summarized below.

Based on the complaint of Spouses Sergio and Cristina Casaclang, an information for estafa against the petitioner was filed with the RTC.

In a May 26, 2005 decision, the RTC convicted the petitioner as charged. It imposed on her a penalty of three (3) months of imprisonment
(arresto mayor), a fine of P3,800,000.00 with subsidiary imprisonment, and the payment of an indemnity to the Spouses Casaclang in the
same amount as the fine.[2]

Fourteen (14) days later, or on June 9, 2005, the petitioner filed a motion for new trial with the RTC, alleging that she discovered new and
material evidence that would exculpate her of the crime for which she was convicted.[3]

In an October 17, 2005 order, respondent Judge denied the petitioner's motion for new trial for lack of merit.[4]

On November 16, 2005, the petitioner filed a notice of appeal with the RTC, alleging that pursuant to our ruling in Neypes v. Court of
Appeals,[5] she had a "fresh period" of 15 days from November 3, 2005, the receipt of the denial of her motion for new trial, or up to
November 18, 2005, within which to file a notice of appeal.[6]

On November 24, 2005, the respondent Judge ordered the petitioner to submit a copy of Neypes for his guidance.[7]
On December 8, 2005, the prosecution filed a motion to dismiss the appeal for being filed 10 days late, arguing that Neypes is inapplicable
to appeals in criminal cases.[8]

On January 4, 2006, the prosecution filed a motion for execution of the decision.[9]

On January 20, 2006, the RTC considered the twin motions submitted for resolution.

On January 26, 2006, the petitioner filed the present petition for prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order
and a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the RTC from acting on the prosecution's motions to dismiss the appeal and for the execution
of the decision.[10]

The Petition

The petitioner argues that the RTC lost jurisdiction to act on the prosecution's motions when she filed her notice of appeal within the 15-day
reglementary period provided by the Rules of Court, applying the "fresh period rule" enunciated in Neypes.

The Case for the Respondents

The respondent People of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a manifestation in lieu of comment,
stating that Neypes applies to criminal actions since the evident intention of the "fresh period rule" was to set a uniform appeal period
provided in the Rules.[11]

In view of the OSG's manifestation, we required the Spouses Casaclang to comment on the petition.[12]

In their comment, the Spouses Casaclang aver that the petitioner cannot seek refuge in Neypes to extend the "fresh period rule" to criminal
cases because Neypes involved a civil case, and the pronouncement of "standardization of the appeal periods in the Rules" referred to the
interpretation of the appeal periods in civil cases, i.e., Rules 40, 41, 42 and 45, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure among others;
nowhere in Neypes was the period to appeal in criminal cases, Section 6 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,
mentioned.[13]

Issue

The core issue boils down to whether the "fresh period rule" enunciated in Neypes applies to appeals in criminal cases.

The Court's Ruling

We find merit in the petition.

The right to appeal is not a constitutional, natural or inherent right -- it is a statutory privilege and of statutory origin and, therefore, available
only if granted or as provided by statutes. It may be exercised only in the manner prescribed by the provisions of the law.[14] The period to
appeal is specifically governed by Section 39 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (BP 129),[15] as amended, Section 3 of Rule 41 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, and Section 6 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.

Section 39 of BP 129, as amended, provides:

SEC. 39. Appeals. - The period for appeal from final orders, resolutions, awards, judgments, or decisions of any court in all casesshall be
fifteen (15) days counted from the notice of the final order, resolution, award, judgment, or decision appealed from: Provided, however,
That in habeas corpus cases, the period for appeal shall be forty-eight (48) hours from the notice of the judgment appealed from.

Section 3, Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states:

SEC. 3. Period of ordinary appeal. ― The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment or final order
appealed from. Where a record on appeal is required, the appellant shall file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal within thirty (30)
days from notice of the judgment or final order.

The period of appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or reconsideration. No motion for extension of time to file a
motion for new trial or reconsideration shall be allowed.

Section 6, Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure reads:

SEC. 6. When appeal to be taken. -- An appeal must be taken within fifteen (15) days from promulgation of the judgment or from notice of
the final order appealed from. This period for perfecting an appeal shall be suspended from the time a motion for new trial or
reconsideration is filed until notice of the order overruling the motion has been served upon the accused or his counsel at which
time the balance of the period begins to run.

In Neypes, the Court modified the rule in civil cases on the counting of the 15-day period within which to appeal. The Court categorically
set a fresh period of 15 days from a denial of a motion for reconsideration within which to appeal, thus:

The Supreme Court may promulgate procedural rules in all courts. It has the sole prerogative to amend, repeal or even establish new rules
for a more simplified and inexpensive process, and the speedy disposition of cases. In the rules governing appeals to it and to the Court of
Appeals, particularly Rules 42, 43 and 45, the Court allows extensions of time, based on justifiable and compelling reasons, for parties to
file their appeals. These extensions may consist of 15 days or more.

To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it
practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt of the
order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration.

Henceforth, this "fresh period rule" shall also apply to Rule 40 governing appeals from the Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional
Trial Courts; Rule 42 on petitions for review from the Regional Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals; Rule 43 on appeals from
quasi-judicial agencies to the Court of Appeals and Rule 45 governing appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court. The new rule
aims to regiment or make the appeal period uniform, to be counted from receipt of the order denying the motion for new trial, motion for
reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any final order or resolution.[16]

The Court also reiterated its ruling that it is the denial of the motion for reconsideration that constituted the final order which finally disposed
of the issues involved in the case.

The raison d'être for the "fresh period rule" is to standardize the appeal period provided in the Rules and do away with the confusion as to
when the 15-day appeal period should be counted. Thus, the 15-day period to appeal is no longer interrupted by the filing of a motion for
new trial or motion for reconsideration; litigants today need not concern themselves with counting the balance of the 15-day period to
appeal since the 15-day period is now counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration or
any final order or resolution.
While Neypes involved the period to appeal in civil cases, the Court's pronouncement of a "fresh period" to appeal should equally apply to
the period for appeal in criminal cases under Section 6 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, for the following reasons:

First, BP 129, as amended, the substantive law on which the Rules of Court is based, makes no distinction between the periods to appeal
in a civil case and in a criminal case. Section 39 of BP 129 categorically states that "[t]he period for appeal from final orders, resolutions,
awards, judgments, or decisions of any court in all cases shall be fifteen (15) days counted from the notice of the final order, resolution,
award, judgment, or decision appealed from." Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos. When the law makes no distinction, we
(this Court) also ought not to recognize any distinction.[17]

Second, the provisions of Section 3 of Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and Section 6 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, though differently worded, mean exactly the same. There is no substantial difference between the two provisions
insofar as legal results are concerned - the appeal period stops running upon the filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration and
starts to run again upon receipt of the order denying said motion for new trial or reconsideration. It was this situation that Neypesaddressed
in civil cases. No reason exists why this situation in criminal cases cannot be similarly addressed.

Third, while the Court did not consider in Neypes the ordinary appeal period in criminal cases under Section 6, Rule 122 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure since it involved a purely civil case, it did include Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure on petitions for
review from the RTCs to the Court of Appeals (CA), and Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure governing appeals by certiorari to
this Court, both of which also apply to appeals in criminal cases, as provided by Section 3 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, thus:

SEC. 3. How appeal taken. -- xxxx

(b) The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction shall be by
petition for review under Rule 42.

xxxx
Except as provided in the last paragraph of section 13, Rule 124, all other appeals to the Supreme Court shall be by petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45.

Clearly, if the modes of appeal to the CA (in cases where the RTC exercised its appellate jurisdiction) and to this Court in civil and criminal
cases are the same, no cogent reason exists why the periods to appeal from the RTC (in the exercise of its original jurisdiction) to the CA
in civil and criminal cases under Section 3 of Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and Section 6 of Rule 122 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure should be treated differently.

Were we to strictly interpret the "fresh period rule" in Neypes and make it applicable only to the period to appeal in civil cases, we shall
effectively foster and encourage an absurd situation where a litigant in a civil case will have a better right to appeal than an accused in a
criminal case - a situation that gives undue favor to civil litigants and unjustly discriminates against the accused-appellants. It suggests a
double standard of treatment when we favor a situation where property interests are at stake, as against a situation where liberty stands to
be prejudiced. We must emphatically reject this double and unequal standard for being contrary to reason. Over time, courts have
recognized with almost pedantic adherence that what is contrary to reason is not allowed in law - Quod est inconveniens, aut contra
rationem non permissum est in lege.[18]

Thus, we agree with the OSG's view that if a delay in the filing of an appeal may be excused on grounds of substantial justice in civil
actions, with more reason should the same treatment be accorded to the accused in seeking the review on appeal of a criminal case where
no less than the liberty of the accused is at stake. The concern and the protection we must extend to matters of liberty cannot be
overstated.
In light of these legal realities, we hold that the petitioner seasonably filed her notice of appeal on November 16, 2005, within the fresh
period of 15 days, counted fromNovember 3, 2005,the date of receipt of notice denying her motion for new trial.

WHEREFORE, the petition for prohibition is hereby GRANTED. Respondent Judge Rosa Samson-Tatad is DIRECTED to CEASEand
DESIST from further exercising jurisdiction over the prosecution's motions to dismiss appeal and for execution of the decision. The
respondent Judge is also DIRECTED to give due course to the petitioner's appeal in Criminal Case No. Q-01-105698, and to elevate the
records of the case to the Court of Appeals for review of the appealed decision on the merits.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

[ GR NOS. 96027-28, Mar 08, 2005 ]

BRIG. GEN. LUTHER A. CUSTODIO* v. SANDIGANBAYAN +

493 Phil. 194

PUNO, J.:

Before us is a Motion To Re-Open Case With Leave Of Court filed by petitioners who were convicted and sentenced to reclusion
perpetuaby the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Cases Nos. 10010 and 10011 for the double murder of Senator Benigno Aquino, Jr. and
Rolando Galman on August 21, 1983.[1]

Petitioners were members of the military who acted as Senator Aquino's security detail upon his arrival in Manila from his three-year
sojourn in the United States. They were charged, together with several other members of the military, before the Sandiganbayan for
the killing of Senator Aquino who was fatally shot as he was coming down from the aircraft of China Airlines at the Manila International
Airport. Petitioners were also indicted for the killing of Rolando Galman who was also gunned down at the airport tarmac.

On December 2, 1985, the Sandiganbayan rendered a Decision in Criminal Cases Nos. 10010-10011 acquitting all the accused, which
include the petitioners. However, the proceedings before the Sandiganbayan were later found by this Court to be a sham trial. The Court
thus nullified said proceedings, as well as the judgment of acquittal, and ordered a re-trial of the cases.[2]

A re-trial ensued before the Sandiganbayan.

In its decision dated September 28, 1990, the Sandiganbayan, while acquitting the other accused, found the petitioners guilty as principals
of the crime of murder in both Criminal Cases Nos. 10010 and 10011. It sentenced them to reclusion perpetua in each case.[3] The
judgment became final after this Court denied petitioners' petition for review of the Sandiganbayan decision for failure to show reversible
error in the questioned decision,[4] as well as their subsequent motion for reconsideration.[5]
In August 2004, petitioners sought legal assistance from the Chief Public Attorney who, in turn, requested the Independent Forensic Group
of the University of the Philippines to make a thorough review of the forensic evidence in the double murder case. The petitioners,
assisted by the Public Attorney's Office, now want to present the findings of the forensic group to this Court and ask the Court to allow
the re-opening of the cases and the holding of a third trial to determine the circumstances surrounding the death of Senator Benigno
Aquino, Jr. and Rolando Galman.

Petitioners invoke the following grounds for the re-opening of the case:

Existence of newly discovered pieces of evidence that were not available during the second trial of the above-entitled cases which could
have altered the judgment of the Sandiganbayan, specifically:

A) Independent forensic evidence uncovering the false forensic claims that led to the unjust conviction of the petitioners-movants.

B) A key defense eyewitness to the actual killing of Senator Benigno Aquino, Jr.

II

There was a grave violation of due process by reason of:

A) Insufficient legal assistance of counsel;

B) Deprivation of right to counsel of choice;

C) Testimonies of defense witnesses were under duress;

D) Willful suppression of evidence;

E) Use of false forensic evidence that led to the unjust conviction of the petitioners-movants.

III

There was serious misapprehension of facts on the part of the Sandiganbayan based on false forensic evidence, which entitles
petitioners-movants to a re-trial.[6]

Petitioners seek to present as new evidence the findings of the forensic group composed of Prof. Jerome B. Bailen, a forensic
anthropologist from the University of the Philippines, Atty. Erwin P. Erfe, M.D., a medico-legal practitioner, Benito E. Molino, M.D., a forensic
consultant and Human Rights and Peace Advocate, and Anastacio N. Rosete, Jr., D.M.D., a forensic dentistry consultant. Their report
essentially concludes that it was not possible, based on the forensic study of the evidence in the double murder case, that C1C Rogelio
Moreno fired at Senator Aquino as they descended the service stairway from the aircraft. They posit that Senator Aquino was shot while he
was walking on the airport tarmac toward the waiting AVSECOM van which was supposed to transport him from the airport to Fort
Bonifacio. This is contrary to the finding of the Sandiganbayan in the second trial that it was C1C Moreno, the security escort positioned
behind Senator Aquino, who shot the latter. The report also suggests that the physical evidence in these cases may have been
misinterpreted and manipulated to mislead the court. Thus, petitioners assert that the September 28, 1990 decision of the
Sandiganbayan should be voided as it was based on false forensic evidence. Petitioners submit that the review by the forensic group of
the physical evidence in the double murder case constitutes newly discovered evidence which would entitle them to a new trial under Rule
121 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure. In addition to the report of the forensic group, petitioners seek to present the testimony of
an alleged eyewitness, the driver of the waiting AVSECOM van, SPO4 Ruben M. Cantimbuhan. In his affidavit submitted to this Court,
SPO4 Cantimbuhan states that he saw a man in blue uniform similar to that of the Philippine Airlines maintenance crew, suddenly fire at
Senator Aquino as the latter was about to board the van. The man in blue was later identified as Rolando Galman.

Petitioners pray that the Court issue a resolution:

1. [a]nnulling and setting aside this Honorable Court's Resolutions dated July 23, 1991 and September 10, 1991;

2. [a]nnulling and setting aside the Decision of the Sandiganbayan (3rd Division) dated September 28, 1990 in People vs. Custodio,
et al., Case No. 10010-10011[;]

3. [o]rdering the re-opening of this case; [and]

4. [o]rdering the Sandiganbayan to allow the reception of additional defense evidence/re-trial in the above entitled cases.[7]

The issue now is whether petitioners are entitled to a third trial under Rule 121 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure.

The pertinent sections of Rule 121 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure provide:

Section 1. New Trial or reconsideration. At any time before a judgment of conviction becomes final, the court may, on motion of the
accused or at its own instance but with the consent of the accused, grant a new trial or reconsideration.

Sec. 2. Grounds for a new trial. The court shall grant a new trial on any of the following grounds:

(a) That errors of law or irregularities prejudicial to the substantial rights of the accused have been committed during the trial;

(b) That new and material evidence has been discovered which the accused could not with reasonable diligence have discovered and
produced at the trial and which if introduced and admitted would probably change the judgment.

xxx

Sec. 6. Effects of granting a new trial or reconsideration. The effects of granting a new trial or reconsideration are the following:

(a) When a new trial is granted on the ground of errors of law or irregularities committed during the trial, all the proceedings and evidence
affected thereby shall be set aside and taken anew. The court may, in the interest of justice, allow the introduction of additional evidence.

(b) When a new trial is granted on the ground of newly discovered evidence, the evidence already adduced shall stand and the
newly-discovered and such other evidence as the court may, in the interest of justice, allow to be introduced shall be taken and considered
together with the evidence already in the record.

(c) In all cases, when the court grants new trial or reconsideration, the original judgment shall be set aside or vacated and a new judgment
rendered accordingly. (emphasis supplied)

In line with the objective of the Rules of Court to set guidelines in the dispensation of justice, but without shackling the hands that dispense
it, the remedy of new trial has been described as "a new invention to temper the severity of a judgment or prevent the failure of justice."[8]
Thus, the Rules allow the courts to grant a new trial when there are errors of law or irregularities prejudicial to the substantial rights of the
accused committed during the trial, or when there exists newly discovered evidence. In the proceedings for new trial, the errors of law or
irregularities are expunged from the record or new evidence is introduced. Thereafter, the original judgment is vacated and a new one is
rendered.[9]

Under the Rules, a person convicted of a crime may avail of the remedy of new trial before the judgment of conviction becomes final.
Petitioners admit that the decision of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Cases Nos. 10010 and 10011 became final and executory upon denial
of their petition for review filed before this Court and their motion for reconsideration. Entry of judgment has in fact been made on
September 30, 1991.[10] Nonetheless, they maintain that equitable considerations exist in this case to justify the relaxation of the Rules
and re-open the case to accord petitioners the opportunity to present evidence that will exonerate them from the charges against them.
We do not find merit in their submission.

Petitioners anchor their motion on the ground of newly discovered evidence. Courts are generally reluctant in granting motions for new trial
on the ground of newly discovered evidence for it is presumed that the moving party has had ample opportunity to prepare his case
carefully and to secure all the necessary evidence before the trial. Such motions are treated with great caution due to the danger of
perjury and the manifest injustice of allowing a party to allege that which may be the consequence of his own neglect to defeat an adverse
judgment. Hence, the moving party is often required to rebut a presumption that the judgment is correct and that there has been a lack of
due diligence, and to establish other facts essential to warrant the granting of a new trial on the ground of newly discovered
evidence.[11]This Court has repeatedly held that before a new trial may be granted on the ground of newly discovered evidence, it must be
shown (1) that the evidence was discovered after trial; (2) that such evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the trial
even with the exercise of reasonable diligence; (3) that it is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative, or impeaching; and (4) the
evidence is of such weight that it would probably change the judgment if admitted. If the alleged newly discovered evidence could have
been very well presented during the trial with the exercise of reasonable diligence, the same cannot be considered newly discovered.[12]

These standards, also known as the "Berry" rule, trace their origin to the 1851 case of Berry vs. State of Georgia[13] where the Supreme
Court of Georgia held:

Applications for new trial on account of newly discovered evidence, are not favored by the Courts. x x x Upon the following points there
seems to be a pretty general concurrence of authority, viz; that it is incumbent on a party who asks for a new trial, on the ground of newly
discovered evidence, to satisfy the Court, 1st. That the evidence has come to his knowledge since the trial. 2d. That it was not owing to the
want of due diligence that it did not come sooner. 3d. That it is so material that it would produce a different verdict, if the new trial were
granted. 4th. That it is not cumulative only viz; speaking to facts, in relation to which there was evidence on the trial. 5th. That the affidavit
of the witness himself should be produced, or its absence accounted for. And 6th, a new trial will not be granted, if the only object of the
testimony is to impeach the character or credit of a witness. (citations omitted)

These guidelines have since been followed by our courts in determining the propriety of motions for new trial based on newly discovered
evidence.

It should be emphasized that the applicant for new trial has the burden of showing that the new evidence he seeks to present has complied
with the requisites to justify the holding of a new trial.

The threshold question in resolving a motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence is whether the proferred evidence is in fact
a "newly discovered evidence which could not have been discovered by due diligence." The question of whether evidence is newly
discovered has two aspects: a temporal one, i.e., when was the evidence discovered, and a predictive one, i.e., when should or could it
have been discovered. It is to the latter that the requirement of due diligence has relevance.[14] We have held that in order that a
particular piece of evidence may be properly regarded as newly discovered to justify new trial, what is essential is not so much the time
when the evidence offered first sprang into existence nor the time when it first came to the knowledge of the party now submitting it; what is
essential is that the offering party had exercised reasonable diligence in seeking to locate such evidence before or during trial but had
nonetheless failed to secure it.[15]

The Rules do not give an exact definition of due diligence, and whether the movant has exercised due diligence depends upon the
particular circumstances of each case.[16] Nonetheless, it has been observed that the phrase is often equated with "reasonable
promptness to avoid prejudice to the defendant." In other words, the concept of due diligence has both a time component and a good faith
component. The movant for a new trial must not only act in a timely fashion in gathering evidence in support of the motion; he must act
reasonably and in good faith as well. Due diligence contemplates that the defendant acts reasonably and in good faith to obtain the
evidence, in light of the totality of the circumstances and the facts known to him.[17]
Applying the foregoing tests, we find that petitioners' purported evidence does not qualify as newly discovered evidence that would justify
the re-opening of the case and the holding of a third trial.

The report of the forensic group may not be considered as newly discovered evidence as petitioners failed to show that it was impossible
for them to secure an independent forensic study of the physical evidence during the trial of the double murder case. It appears from
their report that the forensic group used the same physical and testimonial evidence proferred during the trial, but made their own analysis
and interpretation of said evidence. They cited the materials and methods that they used for their study, viz:

MATERIALS AND METHODS

MATERIALS:

5. Court records of the case, especially photographs of: a) the stairway where the late Sen. Aquino and his escorts descended; b) the
part of the tarmac where the lifeless bodies of the late Sen. Aquino and Galman fell; and c) the autopsy conducted by the NBI
Medico-legal team headed by Dr. Mu[ñ]oz; and the autopsy report of the late Sen. Benigno Aquino[,] Jr. signed by Dr. Mu[ñ]oz and Dr.
Solis;

6. The gun and live ammunitions collected at the crime scene;

7. A reference human skull photos and X-rays of the same to demonstrate wound location and bullet trajectory;

8. The reports of interviews and statements by the convicted military escorts, and other witnesses;

9. Re-enactment of the killing of Aquino based on the military escorts['] version, by the military escorts themselves in the Bilibid Prison
and by volunteers at the NAIA Tarmac;

10. Various books and articles on forensic and the medico-legal field[;]

11. Results of Forensic experiments conducted in relation to the case.

METHODS:

1. Review of the forensic exhibits presented in the court;

2. Review of TSNs relevant to the forensic review;

3. Study of and research on the guns, slugs and ammunitions allegedly involved in the crime;

4. Interviews/re-enactment of the crime based on the military's accounts, both in the Bilibid Prison where the convicts are confined and
the MIA (now NAIA) stairway and tarmac;

5. Conduct of ocular inspection and measurements on the actual crime scene (stairway and tarmac) at the old Manila International
Airport (now NAIA);

6. Retracing the slug's trajectory based on the autopsy reports and experts' testimonies using an actual human skull;

7. X-rays of the skull with the retraced trajectory based on the autopsy report and experts' testimonies;
8. Evaluation of the presented facts and opinions of local experts in relation to accepted forensic findings in international publications on
forensic science, particularly on guns and [gunshot] wound injuries;

9. Forensic experiments and simulations of events in relation to this case.[18]

These materials were available to the parties during the trial and there was nothing that prevented the petitioners from using them at the
time to support their theory that it was not the military, but Rolando Galman, who killed Senator Aquino. Petitioners, in their present motion,
failed to present any new forensic evidence that could not have been obtained by the defense at the time of the trial even with the exercise
of due diligence. If they really wanted to seek and offer the opinion of other forensic experts at the time regarding the physical evidence
gathered at the scene of the crime, there was ample opportunity for them to do so before the case was finally submitted and decided.[19]

A reading of the Sandiganbayan decision dated September 28, 1990 shows a thorough study by the court of the forensic evidence
presented during the trial, viz:

COURT FINDINGS

As to the physical evidence

Great significance has to be accorded the trajectory of the single bullet that penetrated the head and caused the death of Sen. Benigno
Aquino, Jr. Basic to the question as to trajectory ought to be the findings during the autopsy. The prosector in the autopsy, Dr. Bienvenido
Muñoz, NBI Medico-Legal Officer, reported in his Autopsy Report No. N-83-22-36, that the trajectory of the gunshot, the wound of entrance
having been located at the mastoid region, left, below the external auditory meatus, and the exit wound having been at the anterior portion
of the mandible, was "forward, downward and medially." (Autopsy Report No. N-83-22-36, Exhibit "NNNN-2-t-2")

A controversy as to this trajectory came about when, upon being cross-examined by counsel for the defense, Dr. Bienvenido Muñoz made
a significant turn-about by stating that the correct trajectory of the fatal bullet was "upward, downward, and medially." The present
position of Dr. Muñoz is premised upon the alleged fact that he found the petrous bone fractured, obviously hit by the fatal bullet. He
concluded, in view of this finding, that the fatal bullet must have gone upward from the wound of entrance. Since the fatal bullet exited at
the mandible, it is his belief that the petrous bone deflected the trajectory of the bullet and, thus, the bullet proceeded downwards from the
petrous bone to the mandible.

This opinion of Dr. Bienvenido Muñoz in this regard notwithstanding, We hold that the trajectory of the fatal bullet which killed Sen. Benigno
Aquino, Jr. was, indeed, "forward, downward and medially." For the reason that the wound of entrance was at a higher elevation than the
wound of exit, there can be no other conclusion but that the trajectory was downward. The bullet when traveling at a fast rate of speed
takes a straight path from the wound of entrance to the wound of exit. It is unthinkable that the bullet, while projected upwards, would,
instead of exiting to the roof of the head, go down to the mandible because it was allegedly deflected by a petrous bone which though hard
is in fact a mere spongy protuberance, akin to a cartilage.

Clear is proof of the downward trajectory of the fatal bullet; First, as Dr. Pedro Solis and Dr. Ceferino Cunanan, the immediate superiors of
Dr. Bienvenido Muñoz, manifested before the Court, that, since the wound of entrance appeared ovaloid and there is what is known as a
contusion collar which was widest at the superior portion, indicating an acute angle of approach, a downward trajectory of the bullet is
indicated. This phenomenon indicates that the muzzle of the fatal gun was at a level higher than that of the point of entry of the fatal bullet.

There was no showing as to whether a probe could have been made from the wound of entrance to the petrous bone. Out of curiosity, Dr.
Juanito Billote tried to insert a probe from the wound of exit into the petrous bone. He was unsuccessful notwithstanding four or five
attempts. If at all, this disproves the theory of Dr. Muñoz that the trajectory was upward, downward and medially. On the other hand, Dr.
Juanito Billote and photographer Alexander Loinaz witnessed the fact that Dr. Muñoz'[s] understudy, Alejandrino Javier, had successfully
made a probe from the wound of entrance directly towards the wound of exit. Alejandrino Javier shouted with excitement upon his
success and Alexander Loinaz promptly photographed this event with Alejandrino Javier holding the protruding end of the probe at the
mandible. (Exhibit "XXXXX-39-A")

To be sure, had the main bullet hit the petrous bone, this spongy mash of cartilage would have been decimated or obliterated. The fact that
the main bullet was of such force, power and speed that it was able to bore a hole into the mandible and crack it, is an indication that it
could not have been stopped or deflected by a mere petrous bone. By its power and force, it must have been propelled by a powerful gun.
It would have been impossible for the main bullet to have been deflected form an upward course by a mere spongy protuberance. Granting
that it was so deflected, however, it could not have maintained the same power and force as when it entered the skull at the mastoid region
so as to crack the mandible and make its exit there.

But what caused the fracture of the petrous bone? Was there a cause of the fracture, other than that the bullet had hit it? Dr. Pedro
Solis, maintaining the conclusion that the trajectory of the bullet was downward, gave the following alternative explanations for the fracture
of the petrous bone:

First, the petrous bone could have been hit by a splinter of the main bullet, particularly, that which was found at the temporal region; and,

Second, the fracture must have been caused by the kinetic force applied to the point of entrance at the mastoid region which had the
tendency of being radiated towards the petrous bone.

Thus, the fracture in the occipital bone, of the temporal bone, and of the parietal bone, Dr. Pedro Solis pointed out, had been caused by the
aforesaid kinetic force. When a force is applied to the mastoid region of the head, Dr. Pedro Solis emphasized, a radiation of forces is
distributed all over the cranial back, including, although not limited to, the parietal bone. The skull, Dr. Solis explains, is a box-like structure.
The moment you apply pressure on the portion, a distortion, tension or some other mechanical defect is caused. This radiation of forces
produces what is known as the "spider web linear fracture" which goes to different parts of the body. The so-called fracturing of the petrous
portion of the left temporal bone is one of the consequences of the kinetic force forcefully applied to the mastoid region.

The fact that there was found a fracture of the petrous bone is not necessarily indicative of the theory that the main bullet passed through
the petrous bone.

Doubt was expressed by Dr. Pedro Solis as to whether the metal fragments alleged by Dr. Bienvenido Muñoz to have been found by him
inside the skull or at the wound of exit were really parts of the main bullet which killed the Senator. When Dr. Pedro Solis examined these
fragments, he found that two (2) of the fragments were larger in size, and were of such shapes, that they could not have gone out of the
wound of exit considering the size and shape of the exit wound.

Finding of a downward trajectory of the fatal bullet fatal to the credibility of defense witnesses.

The finding that the fatal bullet which killed Sen. Benigno Aquino, Jr. was directed downwards sustains the allegation of prosecution
eyewitnesses to the effect that Sen. Benigno Aquino, Jr. was shot by a military soldier at the bridge stairs while he was being brought down
from the plane. Rebecca Quijano saw that the senator was shot by the military man who was directly behind the Senator while the
Senator and he were descending the stairs. Rebecca Quijano's testimony in this regard is echoed by Jessie Barcelona, Ramon Balang,
Olivia Antimano, and Mario Laher, whose testimonies this Court finds likewise as credible.

The downward trajectory of the bullet having been established, it stands to reason that the gun used in shooting the Senator was fired from
an elevation higher than that of the wound of entrance at the back of the head of the Senator. This is consistent with the testimony of
prosecution witnesses to the effect that the actual killer of the Senator shot as he stood at the upper step of the stairs, the second or third
behind Senator Aquino, while Senator Aquino and the military soldiers bringing him were at the bridge stairs. This is likewise consistent
with the statement of Sandra Jean Burton that the shooting of Senator Aquino occurred while the Senator was still on the bridge stairs, a
conclusion derived from the fact that the fatal shot was fired ten (10) seconds after Senator Aquino crossed the service door and was led
down the bridge stairs.
It was the expert finding of Dr. Matsumi Suzuki that, as was gauged from the sounds of the footsteps of Senator Aquino, as the Senator
went down the bridge stairs, the shooting of the Senator occurred while the Senator had stepped on the 11th step from the top.

At the ocular inspection conducted by this Court, with the prosecution and the defense in attendance, it should be noted that the following
facts were established as regards the bridge stairs:

"Observations:

The length of one block covering the tarmac 19'6";

The width of one block covering the tarmac 10';

The distance from the base of the staircase leading to the emergency tube to the Ninoy marker at the tarmac 12'6";

There are 20 steps in the staircase including the landing;

The distance from the first rung of the stairway up to the 20th rung which is the landing of stairs 20'8";

Distance from the first rung of the stairway up to the 20th rung until the edge of the exit door 23'11";

Distance from the 4th rung up to the exit door 21';

Distance from the 5th rung up to the exit door 19'11";

Length of one rung including railpost 3'4";

Space between two rungs of stairway 9";

Width of each rung 11-1/2";

Length of each rung (end to end) 2'9":

Height of railpost from edge of rung to railing 2'5".

(underlining supplied)[20]

The Sandiganbayan again exhaustively analyzed and discussed the forensic evidence in its resolution dated November 15, 1990 denying
the motion for reconsideration filed by the convicted accused. The court held:

The Autopsy Report No. N-83-2236, Exhibit "NNNN-2-t-2" indicated a downward trajectory of the fatal bullet when it stated that the fatal
bullet was "forward, downward, and medially . . ."

xxx

II
The wound of entrance having been at a higher elevation than the wound of exit, there can be no other conclusion but that the trajectory
was downward. The fatal bullet, whether it be a Smith and Wesson Caliber .357 magnum revolver or a .45 caliber, must have traveled at
a fast rate of speed and it stands to reason that it took a straight path from the wound of entrance to the wound of exit. A hole indicating
this straight path was proven to have existed. If, as contended on cross-examination by Dr. Bienvenido Muñoz, that the bullet was
projected upwards, it ought to have exited at the roof of the head. The theory that the fatal bullet was deflected by a mere petrous bone
is inconceivable.

III
Since the wound of entrance appeared ovaloid and there is what is known as a contusion collar which was widest at the superior portion,
indicating an acute angle of approach, a downward trajectory of the fatal bullet is conclusively indicated. This phenomenon indicates that
the muzzle of the fatal gun was at a level higher than that of the point of entry of the fatal bullet.

IV
There was no hole from the petrous bone to the mandible where the fatal bullet had exited and, thus, there is no support to the theory of Dr.
Bienvenido Muñoz that the fatal bullet had hit the petrous bone on an upward trajectory and had been deflected by the petrous bone
towards the mandible. Dr. Juanito Billote's testimony in this regard had amplified the matter with clarity.

xxx
These physical facts, notwithstanding the arguments and protestations of counsel for the defense as now and heretofore avowed, compel
the Court to maintain the holding: (1) that the trajectory of the fatal bullet which hit and killed Senator Benigno Aquino, Jr. was "forward,
downward and medially"; (2) that the Senator was shot by a person who stood at a higher elevation than he; and (3) that the Senator
was shot and killed by CIC Rogelio Moreno on the bridge stairs and not on the tarmac, in conspiracy with the rest of the accused convicted
herein.[21]

This Court affirmed said findings of the Sandiganbayan when it denied the petition for review in its resolution of July 25, 1991. The Court
ruled:

The Court has carefully considered and deliberated upon all the contentions of the petitioners but finds no basis for the allegation that the
respondent Sandiganbayan has gravely erred in resolving the factual issues.

The attempt to place a constitutional dimension in the petition is a labor in vain. Basically, only questions of fact are raised. Not only is
it axiomatic that the factual findings of the Sandiganbayan are final unless they fall within specifically recognized exceptions to the rule but
from the petition and its annexes alone, it is readily apparent that the respondent Court correctly resolved the factual issues.

xxx
The trajectory of the fatal bullet, whether or not the victim was descending the stairway or was on the tarmac when shot, the circumstances
showing conspiracy, the participants in the conspiracy, the individual roles of the accused and their respective parts in the conspiracy, the
absence of evidence against thirteen accused and their co-accused Col. Vicente B. Tigas, Jr., the lack of credibility of the witnesses
against former Minister Jose D. Aspiras, Director Jesus Z. Singson, Col. Arturo A. Custodio, Hermilo Gosuico, Major General Prospero
Olivas, and the shooting of Rolando Galman are all factual matters w[h]ich the respondent court discussed with fairness and at length.
The petitioners' insistence that a few witnesses in their favor should be believed while that of some witnesses against them should be
discredited goes into the question of credibility of witnesses, a matter which under the records of this petition is best left to the judgment of
the Sandiganbayan.[22]

The report of the forensic group essentially reiterates the theory presented by the defense during the trial of the double murder case.
Clearly, the report is not newly discovered, but rather recently sought, which is not allowed by the Rules.[23] If at all, it only serves to
discredit the version of the prosecution which had already been weighed and assessed, and thereafter upheld by the Sandiganbayan.

The same is true with the statement of the alleged eyewitness, SPO4 Cantimbuhan. His narration merely corroborates the testimonies of
other defense witnesses during the trial that they saw Senator Aquino already walking on the airport tarmac toward the AVSECOM van
when a man in blue-gray uniform darted from behind and fired at the back of the Senator's head.[24] The Sandiganbayan, however, did not
give weight to their account as it found the testimonies of prosecution eyewitnesses Rebecca Quijano and Jessie Barcelona more credible.
Quijano and Barcelona testified that they saw the soldier behind Senator Aquino on the stairway aim and fire a gun on the latter's nape.
As earlier quoted, the Sandiganbayan found their testimonies to be more consistent with the physical evidence. SPO4 Cantimbuhan's
testimony will not in any way alter the court's decision in view of the eyewitness account of Quijano and Barcelona, taken together with the
physical evidence presented during the trial. Certainly, a new trial will only be allowed if the new evidence is of such weight that it would
probably change the judgment if admitted.[25] Also, new trial will not be granted if the new evidence is merely cumulative, corroborative or
impeaching.

As additional support to their motion for new trial, petitioners also claim that they were denied due process because they were deprived of
adequate legal assistance by counsel. We are not persuaded. The records will bear out that petitioners were ably represented by Atty.
Rodolfo U. Jimenez during the trial and when the case was elevated to this Court. An experienced lawyer in criminal cases, Atty.
Jimenez vigorously defended the petitioners' cause throughout the entire proceedings. The records show that the defense presented a
substantial number of witnesses and exhibits during the trial. After the Sandiganbayan rendered its decision, Atty. Jimenez filed a petition
for review with this Court, invoking all conceivable grounds to acquit the petitioners. When the Court denied the petition for review, he
again filed a motion for reconsideration exhausting his deep reservoir of legal talent. We therefore find petitioners' claim to be
unblushingly unsubstantiated. We note that they did not allege any specific facts in their present motion to show that Atty. Jimenez had
been remiss in his duties as counsel. Petitioners are therefore bound by the acts and decisions of their counsel as regards the conduct of
the case. The general rule is that the client is bound by the action of his counsel in the conduct of his case and cannot be heard to
complain that the result of the litigation might have been different had his counsel proceeded differently.[26] We held in People vs.
Umali:[27]

In criminal as well as civil cases, it has frequently been held that the fact that blunders and mistakes may have been made in the conduct
of the proceedings in the trial court, as a result of the ignorance, inexperience, or incompetence of counsel, does not furnish a ground for a
new trial.

If such grounds were to be admitted as reasons for reopening cases, there would never be an end to a suit so long as new counsel could
be employed who could allege and show that prior counsel had not been sufficiently diligent, or experienced, or learned.

So it has been held that mistakes of attorneys as to the competency of a witness, the sufficiency, relevancy, materiality, or immateriality of a
certain evidence, the proper defense, or the burden of proof are not proper grounds for a new trial; and in general the client is bound by the
action of his counsel in the conduct of his case, and can not be heard to complain that the result of the litigation might have been different
had counsel proceeded differently. (citations omitted)

Finally, we are not moved by petitioners' assertion that the forensic evidence may have been manipulated and misinterpreted during the
trial of the case. Again, petitioners did not allege concrete facts to support their crass claim. Hence, we find the same to be unfounded
and purely speculative.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the motion is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.