G.R. No.
109138-39 April 27, 1998 In due course, the trial court rendered the assailed Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:  9
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. ALBERTO GAORANA y ERAN, 1 accused-
appellant.
 
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Minor inconsistencies in the testimony of a witness strengthen, rather than impair, credibility. Such
harmless and inconsequential errors are indicative of truth, not falsehood.
The Case
This is an appeal from the Decision 2 dated September 4, 1992, promulgated by the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Panabo, Davao, in Criminal Case Nos. 91-316 and 91-317, convicting Appellant
Alberto Gaorana 3 y Eran of two counts of rape and sentencing him to two terms of reclusion
perpetua.
On March 13, 1991, a Criminal Complaint 4 was filed by Marivel J. Fuentes with the assistance of
her mother, Priscilla J. Fuentes, before Municipal Trial Court (MTC) Judge Daydews D. Villamor of
Panabo, Davao. After conducting preliminary investigation, the MTC recommended that appellant
be charged with two are separate cases of simple seduction. However, in a Resolution dated
August 22, 1991, 5 Davao State Prosecutor I Castor B. Dorado and Provincial Prosecutor Francisco
G. Rivero modified the investigating judge's recommendation and charged appellant with two counts
of rape.
Except for the dates of the commission of the crime, the two Informations contained the same
allegations. The first Information, docketed as Crim. Case No. 91-316, charged appellant as
follows: 6
That on or about March 5, 1991, in the Municipality of Panabo, Province of Davao, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by means of force and
intimidation, and with the use of a hunting knife, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have carnal knowledge of Marivel Fuentes, against her will.
The commission of the foregoing offense is attended by the aggravating circumstance of [q]uasi-
[r]ecidivism.
The second Information, docketed as Crim. Case No. 91-317, charged appellant with rape
committed on March 6, 1991. 7 The cases were consolidated and filed before the RTC of Panabo,
Davao. Upon arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty to both charges.  8
WHEREFORE, IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, the Court finds Alberto Gaorana Y Iran guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the two cases of rape, punishable under Article 335 of the Revised
Penal Code, and this Court hereby sentences the said accused to suffer and undergo the penalty
of reclusion perpetua for each count, with all the accessory penalties and to pay the costs.
The accused is also ordered to indemnify the victim, Marivel Fuentes, [in] the amount of FIFTY
THOUSAND (P50,000.00) PESOS.
Hence, this appeal. 10
The Facts
Version of the Prosecution
In the Appellee's Brief, 11 the prosecution presented this version of the facts: 12
On March 5, 1991, before 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon, Marivel Fuentes, herein private
complainant, was cleaning her house located at DAPECOL, Panabo, Davao. At the same time, she
was also putting her younger brother and sister to sleep. Rowena Sanchez, common-law wife of
appellant, arrived and instructed her to go to her house which was about 20 meters away. 13 Private
complainant finished cleaning before she proceeded to Rowena's place.
When private complainant arrived in appellant's house, she saw appellant and Rowena lying down.
Rowena bade her to come in and told her to sit down. Rowena then stood up and told private
complainant that she [would] urinate. Appellant approached private complainant, covered her mouth
and pointed a hunting knife to her neck. He told her that he [would] kill her if she [would] tell her
mother. Private complainant fought appellant but appellant pulled her inside a room. Appellant made
her lie down on the floor. Appellant then took off his pants and opened private complainant's duster
and removed her panty. He put himself on top of private complainant and had intercourse with her.
All the while, private complainant's mouth was covered with a handkerchief.
After about five minutes, Rowena came back and saw appellant still on top of Marivel. Appellant
instructed Rowena to step out of the room. After a while, appellant stood up, put on his briefs and
called his wife inside the room. Both of them said, "Let us see."
Private complainant was allowed to leave appellant's house at 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon. Private
complainant's parents arrived at 7:00 o'clock in the evening but she did not report the incident to
them because she was afraid appellant might make good his threat (pp. 7-13, 20-24, 29-32, tsn,
March 30, 1992).
The second incident of rape occurred at around 3:00 o'clock in the morning of March 6, 1991.
Private complainant was sleeping in the sala with her brother and sister when she was awakened by
the kisses of appellant. Appellant had a knife which scared private complainant. Appellant pulled
private complainant from the mat, removed his pants, opened her duster and removed her panty,
and again had intercourse with her. Private complainant did not shout because she was afraid of
appellant who was a prisoner and had already killed somebody. After satisfying his lust, appellant
left (pp. 14, 34-36, tsn, ibid.).
Version of the Defense
Appellant interposes the defense of alibi and denial. In his Brief, 14 he presented the following
version of the facts:
EVIDENCE FOR THE DEFENSE:
MRS. ROWENA GAORANA testified that she is the wife of the accused Alberto Gaorana, and they
have one (1) child. She had known the accused since 1989 and had become his sweetheart since
May 26, 1990. Gaorana [was] a living out prisoner which means that he [was] living in a house
outside the compound of DAPECOL. She became a resident of DAPECOL since 1989 when she
was then living with her mother and stepfather who [was] likewise a colonist. She knew Marivel
Fuentes because they [had been] neighbors since she arrived in DAPECOL in December 2, 1989.
She was then 16 years old. She and Marivel Fuentes [were] friends, and as such, they would talk
sometimes and would practice how to ride on a bicycle.
It is not true that she invited Marivel Fuentes to visit their house in DAPECOL at about 2 p.m. of
March 5, 1991 because at that time and date, they were sleeping. However, on that date, she could
recall having met Marivel Fuentes in their house, when Marivel borrowed a pitcher from them. After
borrowing the pitcher, Marivel left and she continued sleeping. Then she stood up and went to her
mother's house 300 meters away to answer the call of nature. After 45 minutes she returned and
saw Marivel Fuentes sitting in their kitchen. Her husband was also sitting on the bench of their
kitchen, two (2) meters away from where Marivel was and conversing with the latter. She could not
however hear what they were talking about. She asked Marivel Fuentes why she was there and
Marivel answered that she was returning the pitcher she borrowed. She noticed that Marivel was
somewhat embarrassed because she turned her face from her. Then after around 30 minutes,
Marivel went home.
It is not true that she just laughed when she saw them doing the sexual intercourse because if it
were true that she saw them doing that thing, maybe she would kill.
It is not also true that on [the] midnight of March 6, 1991, her common-law husband Alberto
Gaorana barged in[to] the house of Marivel Fuentes and had sexual intercourse with her, because
at that time, they were sleeping in the room of their house.
Whenever she would meet Marivel Fuentes after March 5 and 6, 1991, they just looked at each
other. Marivel would not talk to her because she believe[d] she was ashamed. She asked Marivel
why she did not care to answer. That was not the usual behavior of Marivel prior to March 5 and 6,
because they used to talk and laugh together whenever they were in company. She also asked her
husband why [I]nday (referring to Marivel) changed and her husband answered "I do not know why.
You may know it because you are close to each other." TSN, June 1, 1992, pp. 3-14.
Accused ALBERTO GAORANA, 27 years old, live-in partner of Rowena and a prisoner, testified
that he came to know Marivel Fuentes in 1989. He met her in their store, being a living but prisoner,
[and] he worked as a carpenter in the house of Fuentes family in DAPECOL in 1990.
At about 2 p.m. of March 5, 1991, he was in their house sleeping with his common-law-wife. He
woke up at 4 o'clock in the afternoon. His wife was still with him when he woke up. On said date he
did not see or meet Marivel Fuentes. What Marivel Fuentes are [sic] saying against him are not true
because he was sleeping at that time with his wife. (TSN, June 1, 1992, pp. 17-19).
Ruling of the Trial Court
The trial court gave full faith and credence to the testimony of complainant who was not shown to
have any motive to falsely testify against appellant. It ruled that it was improbable that a naive and
inexperienced 15-year old girl would fabricate her own ravishment and subject herself to the
humiliation and embarrassment of a public trial if her charges were not true. Further, her testimony
was corroborated by Dr. Bendijo who, after conducting physical examination on her, found that her
hymen was no longer intact. Her positive and categorical testimony prevailed over appellant's bare
denial and alibi.
The trial court also ruled that appellant had a motive to commit the crime. Complainant's parents
supposedly failed to give him their payment for his common-law wife's laundry services.
Assignment of Errors
In his Brief, appellant imputes the following errors to the court a quo: 15
I
The trial court erred in finding the testimony of Complainant Marivel Fuentes as credible despite its
inconsistencies.
II
The trial court erred in finding Accused-Appellant Alberto Gaorana guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of rape despite the weakness of the evidence for the prosecution.
The Court's Ruling
The appeal is bereft of merit.
 First Issue: Harmless Inconsistencies
Appellant contends that the following cast "inconsistencies" cast serious doubt on the veracity and
reliability of complainant's testimony: (1) complainant declared that her father wanted her to be away
from DAPECOL (Davao Penal Colony), but she also claimed that he was happy when she returned
because he missed her terribly; 16 (2) on cross-examination, she testified that it took Rowena five
minutes to answer the call of nature 17 but, later on, she said that Rowena returned after an
hour; 18 (3) during the direct examination she said that appellant "opened" her house dress, 19 but on
cross-examination she said that he pulled her house dress up to her breast; 20 and (4) she claimed
that appellant had already pulled his penis out of her vagina when Rowena returned, which was at
the same time that complainant opened her eyes 21 - a statement contradicting her earlier one which
pointed out that appellant's penis was still inside her private part when Rowena saw the two of
them. 22
The alleged discrepancies do not discredit the complainant's testimony. The claimed inconsistency
regarding the father's reaction to the complainant's return to DAPECOL is more apparent than real.
Her father, being an inmate himself, must have realized that the penal colony was not an ideal place
for a girl to grow up in; thus, he welcomed the possibility that his daughter would live outside the
colony with her aunt. By the same token, he cannot be faulted for missing a daughter whom he had
not seen for some time.
Equally insignificant is the discrepancy regarding complainant's account of the length of time it took
Rowena to defecate and return. This is a minor lapse which is not unusual when a person is
recounting a humiliating and painful experience.
On the other hand, whether the complainant's house dress was "opened" or "pulled up" is merely a
semantic discrepancy. It could very well be attributed to an error in the translation of the testimony
from the dialect to English. In any case, both terms similarly describe how appellant exposed the
complainant's body to enable him to commit the crime.
Whether appellant's penis was still inside complainant's vagina when Rowena returned is similarly a
trivial matter. In either case, it is undisputed that appellant, with the use of force and intimidation,
had carnal knowledge of the complainant.
These alleged inconsistencies are inconsequential in the face of the essential fact that appellant
forced the complainant to have sexual intercourse with him. The Court has consistently adhered to
the rule that inconsistencies on minor derails strengthen, rather than impair, the witness' credibility.
They are considered more as badges of truth, rather than as indicia of falsehood. 23
Appellant also contends that the testimony of complainant was contrary to human experience,
because he could not have stayed at her house for thirty minutes just threatening her and doing
nothing else, after he had supposedly ravished her for two minutes around 3:00 a.m. of March 6,
1991. The Court is not persuaded.
Rape is essentially an offense committed in secrecy, generally executed in dark or deserted and
secluded places away from prying eyes. Thus, conviction for this crime rests largely upon the
credibility of the offended party who is usually the sole witness of its actual occurrence. 24 Thus,
herein complainant's testimony must thus be considered and calibrated in its entirety, and not by
truncated portions or isolated passages thereof. 25
The complainant cannot be faulted for her inability to do anything, while appellant continuously
threatened her for thirty minutes after he had defiled her body. She has more than sufficiently
explained that she was deeply distressed and overcome with fear. In People vs. Pontilar, the Court
stated: 26
It is a truism that "the workings of the human mind placed under a great deal of emotional and
psychological stress are unpredictable, and different people react differently. There is no standard
form of human behavioral response when one is confronted with a strange, startling, frightful or
traumatic experience . . . .
The assessment of a witness' credibility has always been considered to be the province of the trial
court. After all, the trial judge had the opportunity, which appellate courts do not have, to observe
the witness' demeanor and deportment on the stand. 27 In the case at bar, appellant failed to show
any cogent reason to justify a departure from this time-honored rule.
Second Issue: Evidence of Guilt Sufficient
Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances: (1) when force or intimidation is used; (2) when the woman is deprived of reason or
is otherwise unconscious; and (3) when the woman is under twelve years of age. 28 The prosecution
established that appellant raped the complainant the first time in the following manner: 29
Q After you laid [sic] down because Alberto Gaorana pointed a knife on [sic] your neck, what did
Alberto Gaorana do to you?
A He removed his pants.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Now, when Alberto Gaorana succeeded in removing your panty, what did Alberto Gaorana do to
you?
A After he removed my panty, he put himself on top of me . . . .
xxx xxx xxx
Q Was the penis of Alberto Gaorana able to penetrate . . . your vagina?
A Yes, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Now, can you tell this Honorable Court how long did Alberto Gaorana sexually abused [sic] you?
A About 5 minutes. (Emphasis supplied.)
The perpetration of rape for the second time was also established: 30
Q Now can you tell this Honorable Court what happened on March 6, 1991 at 3:00 o'clock in the
morning?
A I was surprised [at] the kisses made to me by Alberto Gaorana and he was bringing [sic] a hunting
knife and that was the reason I was awakened.
xxx xxx xxx
Q When you were brought to the floormat [sic], what did Alberto Gaorana do?
A He removed his pants.
Q Then, what did he do?
A He opened my duster.
xxx xxx xxx
Q And you said that you were sexually abused by Alberto Gaorana, was he able to penetrate on
[sic] your vagina?
A Yes, sir. (Emphasis supplied.)
The complainant positively identified appellant as her ravisher. The first rape was committed in the
afternoon at appellant's house where there was sufficient light to identify the culprit. Despite the
relatively dark situs when the second rape was committed, complainant knew that the malefactor
was appellant because there was sufficient moonlight; besides, she was familiar with him, as he had
been their neighbor for a long time. As held in People v. Castillo, 31 identification is facilitated by the
fact that the person has gained familiarity with another.
Appellant's alibi that he was at home sleeping during the second incident is negligible, because he
failed to prove the physical impossibility of his presence at the scene of the crime. His house and
that of the complainant were only 20 meters apart. Further, it was undisputed that appellant had
access to the house of the complainant because he had constructed its door. 32
The trial court ruled that appellant had a motive in raping the complainant. This is a surplusage,
considering that motive is not necessary in rape cases when the felon has been positively identified.
Appellant alleged that the complainant's mother instigated the charges against him, because she did
not pay for the laundry services of his common-law wife. Such bizarre reasoning does not explain
why a mother would subject her young daughter to the shame, scandal, embarrassment and anxiety
concomitant with a prosecution for rape. Indeed, complainant and her mother could not have been
impelled by any motive other than to bring to justice the author of the sexual assault.  33
In sum, no evidence has been presented to show that Marivel or her mother fabricated the charges
against appellant.
Quasi-Recidivism Was Not Established
The two Informations alleged that both instances of rape were attended by the aggravating
circumstance of quasi-recidivism. The trial court made no express ruling that appellant was a quasi-
recidivist, and rightly so. During the trial, the prosecution manifested that appellant had been
convicted by the Regional Trial Court of Kabangkalan, Negros Occidental in Crim. Case No. 013 on
March 29, 1988 and was serving sentence for the crime of homicide. 34 However, the prosecution
failed or neglected to present in evidence the record of appellant's previous conviction. Quasi-
recidivism, like recidivism and reiteracion, necessitates the presentation of a certified copy of the
sentence convicting an accused. 35 The fact that appellant was an inmate of DAPECOL does not
prove that final judgment had been rendered against him. 36
Civil Indemnity Improperly Imposed
The trial court erred in imposing on appellant civil indemnity of only P50,000. Appellant should pay
indemnity of P50,000 for each count of rape. 37 Because he was convicted of two counts of rape, he
should indemnify the victim in the amount of P100,000.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby DENIED. The assailed Decision is AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that appellant is ORDERED to PAY the offended party civil indemnity in the
amount of P100,000. Costs against appellant.
SO ORDERED.
 [G.R. No. 73656. October 5, 1989.]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ROGELIO VILLAPANDO y
BUNSOL, Defendant-Appellant.
The Office of the Solicitor General for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Philippine Legal Assistance Center, for Defendant-Appellant.
SYLLABUS
1. EVIDENCE; DEFENSE OF ALIBI; FAILURE TO PROVE ABSENCE FROM AND IMPOSSIBILITY
OF BEING AT THE SCENE OF THE CRIME DURING ITS COMMISSION: DEFENSE
UNAVAILABLE. — For alibi to serve as a basis for acquittal, it must be established by clear and
convincing evidence (People v. Cruz, G.R. No. 68805, July 9, 1986; 142 SCRA 576). Appellant
must not only prove that he was elsewhere at the time the crime was committed but also that it was
impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime. This appellant failed to do. The distance
between San Pablo City and Batangas City does not render it impossible for appellant to be present
at the place and time of the incident taking into account the modern means of transportation.
Further, the Seiko guarantee booklet is to Us an unconvincing piece of evidence. It does not assure
Us that the purchase was really done in San Pablo City and not in Batangas City.
2. CRIMINAL LAW; QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES; ABSENCE THEREOF IN THE KILLING
MAKES THE CRIME COMMITTED SIMPLE HOMICIDE. — Considering that the testimonies of the
eyewitnesses were confined to the actual stabbing of the victim by the accused, there being no
details as to how the stabbing incident commenced and developed; neither did the death certificate
disclose the nature of the stab wound which killed the victi so as to infer therefrom how he was
killed, negating thereby any circumstance which would qualify the killing to murder, the inevitable
conclusion is that the crime committed is simple homicide.
3. ID.; AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE; REITERACION OR HABITUALITY; PREVIOUS
PUNISHMENT OF OFFENDER ESSENTIAL; CIRCUMSTANCE NOT APPLICABLE TO THE CASE
AT BAR. — In reiteracion or habituality, it is essential that the offender be previously punished, that
is, he has served the sentence, for an offense in which the law attaches, or provides for an equal or
greater penalty than that attached by law to the second offense, or for two or more offenses, in
which the law attaches a lighter penalty (People v. Layson, Et Al., G.R. No. L-25177, October 31,
1969, 30 SCRA 92). Here, the records do not disclose that the appellant has been previously
punished by an offense to which the law attaches an equal or greater penalty or for two or more
crimes to which it attaches a lighter penalty.
4. ID.; HOMICIDE; PENALTY IMPOSABLE IN THE ABSENCE OF EITHER AGGRAVATING OR
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES. — In the absence of either aggravating or mitigating
circumstances, the penalty for homicide, which is reclusion temporal should be imposed in its
medium period (Article 249, in relation to Article 64, paragraph 1, of the Revised Penal Code).
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum penalty is twelve (12) years of prision
mayor and the maximum penalty is seventeen (17) years of reclusion temporal.
5. ID.; ABSENCE OF INTENT TO KILL ON THE PART OF THE ACCUSED ON AN INFORMATION
OF ATTEMPTED HOMICIDE; LIABILITY REDUCED TO LESS SERIOUS PHYSICAL INJURIES. —
In Criminal Case No. 771, We find the appellant guilty only of less serious physical injuries. We
gathered from the testimony of Ramon Tolentino that appellant stabbed him and Alicia Beron
because they intervened in his fight against the deceased. In fact, when Tolentino was held back
momentarily by his wounds, appellant attacked the deceased again and then, ran away (TSN, May
13, 1983, pp. 10-11; Records. pp. 64-65). There was no injury to any vital part of Tolentino and
Beron. Clearly from the foregoing, We could not see any intention on the part of appellant to kill
Tolentino and Beron (see United States v. Maghirang, 28 Phil. 655). He merely wanted to
incapacitate these two people so he could turn his ire once more to his real and intended victim, the
deceased Romulo Manalo. Absent the intent to kill, appellant should be liable only for less serious
physical injuries. He should, therefore, be sentenced to an imprisonment of our (4) months.
DECISION
MEDIALDEA, J.:
The accused-appellant, Rogelio Villapando y Bunsol was charged before the Regional Trial Court of
Batangas City 1 with the crimes of murder in CCC-VIII-823(79) and of attempted homicide in
Criminal Cases Nos. 770 and 771. The information filed in the said cases read as
follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
CCC-VIII-823(79)
"That on or about the 14th day of January, 1979, at around 6:10 o’clock in the evening at P. Genato
St., Batangas City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, while armed with a fan knife, with intent to kill and with the qualifying circumstance of
either treachery or evident premeditation, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
attack, assault and stab suddenly and without warning, one Saturno Romulo Manalo y Gabia,
thereby inflicting upon the latter wounds on the different parts of his body which directly caused the
victim’s instantaneous death.
"CONTRARY TO LAW." (Records of CCC-VIII-823(79), p. 1)
Criminal Case No. 770:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"That on or about the 14th day of January, 1979, at around 6:10 o’clock in the evening at P. Genato
St., Batangas City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, while armed with a fan knife, with intent to kill and without any justifiable cause, did then
and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously commence the commission of the crime of homicide
directly by overt acts, that is, by then and there, attacking, assaulting and stabbing with said fan
knife one Alicia Beron y Panganiban, thereby inflicting upon the latter physical injuries, to wit:
`incised wound 1 cm. long posterior aspect distal 3rd forearm right,’ which injuries had required
medical attendance and prevented her from performing her customary work for a period of not more
than nine (9) days, and if said accused did not perform all the acts of execution which should have
produced the crime of homicide as a consequence, it was not due to his spontaneous desistance
but because Saturno Romulo Manalo y Gabia was able to push the offended party.
"CONTRARY TO LAW." (Records of CC No. 770, p. 1)
Criminal Case No. 771:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"That on or about the 14th day of January, 1979, at around 6:10 o’clock in the evening at P. Genato
St., Batangas City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, while armed with a fan knife, with intent to kill and without any justifiable cause, did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously commence the commission of the crime of homicide
directly by overt acts, that is, by then and there, attacking, assaulting and stabbing with said fan
knife one Ramon Tolentino y Delgado, thereby inflicting upon the latter physical injuries, to wit: ‘1.
Sutured wound 23 cms. long extending from distal half of arm to proximal 3rd of forearm, anterior
aspect right; and 2. Sutured wound 14 cms. long anterior aspect right forearm,’ which injuries had
required medical attendance and prevented him from performing his customary work for a period of
more than one (1) month, and if said accused did not perform all the acts of execution which should
have produced the crime of homicide as a consequence, it was not due to his spontaneous
desistance.
"CONTRARY TO LAW." (Records of CC No. 771, p. 1)
Upon being arraigned, the accused entered a plea of not guilty to the offenses charged. After trial on
the merits, the lower court rendered its decisions in CCC-VIII-823(79) on October 9, 1984, and in
Criminal Cases Nos. 770 and 771 on July 12, 1985, the dispositive portions of which
read:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
CCC-VIII-823(79)
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, Accused ROGELIO VILLAPANDO Y BUNSOL is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA (life imprisonment), to indemnify the
lawful heirs of the deceased in the sum of TWELVE THOUSAND (P12,000.00) PESOS, plus FIVE
THOUSAND (P5,000.00) PESOS as actual damages and TWENTY FIVE (sic) (P25,000.00)
PESOS as moral and exemplary damages and to pay the costs.
"IT IS SO ORDERED." (Rollo, p. 92)
CC Nos. 770 and 771
"PREMISES CONSIDERED, in Criminal Case No. 770, Accused Rogelio Villapando is hereby
sentenced to a straight penalty of TWENTY (20) DAYS imprisonment and to pay the costs.
"In Criminal Case No. 771, Accused Rogelio Villapando is hereby sentenced to an imprisonment of
SIX (6) MONTHS of arresto mayor, as minimum, to TWO (2) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision
correccional, as maximum, together with the accessory penalties and to pay the costs.
"The accused in the said two cases shall be credited with the full term of his preventive
imprisonment if he has any, and to serve first the most severe penalty imposed against him in these
two cases, pursuant to Art. 70 of the Revised Penal Code.
"SO ORDERED." (Rollo, p. 70)
Not satisfied with the aforesaid decisions, the accused appealed.
The antecedent facts as summarized in the People’s brief are as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"On January 14, 1979 at about 6:00 o’clock in the evening, Ramon Tolentino, Nelia Panganiban and
Alicia Beron went to the BLTB Co. bus terminal in Batangas City to take a bus bound for Manila (pp.
10-11, tsn., July 28, 1983). Romulo Manalo, who was Alicia’s boyfriend, went with them to see Alicia
off (p. 11, Ibid.). Upon reaching the terminal, Nelia, Alicia and Romulo immediately boarded a
parked bus while Ramon went to the terminal counter to secure student fare discounts for
themselves (pp. 12-13, Ibid.). The trio proceeded to the back of the bus where Nelia and Alicia were
able to seat themselves (p. 13, Ibid.). While inside the bus, it appears that Romulo got into an
argument with the accused who was seated infront (sic) of the girl’s (sic) seats (p. 5, tsn., Dec. 9,
1983). Subsequently, Romulo turned to the direction of the bus door to alight from the bus (p. 13,
Ibid., July 28, 1983). He was followed by the accused (Id.). Near the door of the bus, Romulo and
the accused began to exchange fist blows (pp. 5-6, Ibid., Dec. 9, 1983). They continued to trade fist
blows on the ground (Id.). Suddenly, the accused pulled out a fan knife and stabbed Romulo (pp. 8-
9, tsn., May 13, 1983). Upon seeing Romulo being stabbed by the accused, both Alicia and Ramon
approached the duo to break up the fight (p. 10, Ibid.). As Alicia embraced Romulo, the accused
lunged at her three times with the knife (Id.). The first two blows landed near the base of her
handbag and at the bottom of her handbag. The third blow struck her right forearm (Id.) Ramon, on
the other hand, who was also pulling Romulo away from the accused, was likewise stabbed by the
accused with the knife, hitting the former twice on the right arm (pp. 10-11, Ibid.). The accused then
ran away towards the public market (pp. 11-12, Ibid.). Ramon chased the accused but gave up the
pursuit at the entrance of the market as it was already dark (p. 12, Ibid.). Romulo died as a result of
the stab wound inflicted by the accused on his chest which penetrated his chest wall and caused
him to suffer cardiac arrest (pp. 7-9, tsn., Aug. 31, 1983; Exh. U). Ramon sustained 2 stab wounds
on his right forearm which incapacitated him from performing his regular work for a period of more
than 1 month (Exhibit A). Alicia suffered a stab wound on her right arm which prevented her from
doing her customary duties for nine (9) days (Exhibit B)." (Appellee’s Brief, pp. 4-6; Rollo, p. 105)
The accused, on the other hand, interposed the defense of alibi. He claimed that he and his
kumpadre, Romy Acedillo, were at the cockpit in San Pablo City at the time of the incident; and that
thereafter, on their way to Acedillo’s house, Accused purchased a Seiko watch from out of his
winnings and the store issued to him a guarantee book dated January 14, 1979. In addition, he
presented an eyewitness to the crime, Paquito Sorizo, who testified that the accused was not the
victims’ assailant.
The lower court discredited the appellant’s defense of alibi as weak and the testimony of the
defense witness as biased and without probative value.
In this appeal, the accused assigned the following errors:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The Trial Court grossly became dishonest to itself when it did not take into consideration the
defense of ALIBI put up by the accused perfected collaborated (sic) by two credible witnesses;
"The Trial Court blinded itself by not taking against the prosecution the inconsistencies in the
testimonies given by the witnesses against the accused." (Appellant’s Brief, p. 3; Rollo, p. 57)
The appeal is devoid of merit.
We have already ruled that for alibi to serve as a basis for acquittal, it must be established by clear
and convincing evidence (People v. Cruz, G.R. No. 68805, July 9, 1986; 142 SCRA 576). Appellant
must not only prove that he was elsewhere at the time the crime was committed but also that it was
impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime. This appellant failed to do. The distance
between San Pablo City and Batangas City does not render it impossible for appellant to be present
at the place and time of the incident taking into account the modern means of transportation.
Further, the Seiko guarantee booklet is to Us an unconvincing piece of evidence. It does not assure
Us that the purchase was really done in San Pablo City and not in Batangas City. It is also possible
that the watch was purchased in the morning or in the afternoon of the said date. The conflicting
testimonies of appellant and his witness regarding the circumstances attendant to the purchase of
the watch, likewise, weakens the defense of alibi. Appellant contends that upon his purchase of the
Seiko watch, the jewelry store just handed him a guarantee booklet but did not give him any receipt
(TSN, February 10, 1984, p. 7; Records, p. 296). On the other hand, his witness, Romy Acedillo,
testified that the store issued to appellant a receipt and a guarantee booklet (TSN, February 10,
1984, pp. 71-72; Records, pp. 360-361). If the two were indeed together in purchasing the watch,
how come their testimonies as to the circumstances of the purchase do not jibe?
Moreover, appellant was clearly and positively identified by the prosecution witnesses as the
assailant. Witness Ramon Tolentino testified:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"FISCAL ATIENZA:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Q Now, Mr. Tolentino, after you were stabbed twice by that particular man, what else happened if
anything else happened?
A He turned again on Romulo Manalo, sir.
Q And what did he do again if he did anything else?
A Maybe he delivered another stab blow but I did not see where it landed, sir.
Q What else happened if anything else happened?
A I spoke these following words: `Tama na naman.’ And then we faced each other and then he ran
away, sir.
Q You have been referring to this particular man who stabbed Romulo, who stabbed you and
likewise stabbed Alicia, if that man is present in court, will you be able to point to him?
A I could, sir.
Q Please do so.
A (Witness pointing to a person and when that person pointed to was asked of (sic) his name,
identified himself as Rogelio Villapando).
Q Now, when you mentioned that man whom you identified now as Rogelio Villapando ran away,
what did you do if you did anything?
A I chased him up to the point he was able to gain entrance to the old public market of Batangas
City, sir.
x          x           x
"ATTY. CABILING (counsel for the accused):chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Q When you saw for the first time that Romulo was being stabbed, Mr. Romulo was facing you, is
that correct?
A Yes, sir, but Romulo was holding the neck around his left arm (kilik) while that person being "kilik"
stabbed him, sir.
Q And the person who was stabbing Romulo whom you had just described as "kilik," embraced by
the neck by Romulo, has his back in front of you, is that correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q So that at that precise moment when you saw for the first time Romulo being stabbed by that
man, you were not able to see his face at all?
A It was this way, sir. When Romulo was stabbed first by the accused, Romulo was facing me and
Romulo was holding the accused by the neck and his back was facing me, and I approached
Romulo and pulled him back and that was the time when the accused turned on me and stabbed
me twice and I was able to hold his hand and thereafter since Romulo was already wounded, he
turned again on Romulo.
. . ." (TSN, May 13, 1983, pp. 11-13, 27-28; Records, pp. 65-67, 81-82)
and witness Nelia A. Panganiban also declared:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"FISCAL ATIENZA:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Q And when yon heard the shouting outside the BLTB Co. bus, what else transpired, if anything
else transpired?
A Alicia also alighted and I remained at the bus, sir.
Q And then what did you do thereafter?
A I approached the right side of the BLTB Co. bus and I moved to a seat for two (2) persons and by
the side of the window, I looked out of that window, sir.
Q Looking out from that window, what did you witness, if you witnessed anything?
A I saw Villapando stabbing Romulo Manalo, sir.
Q If this Villapando is inside the courtroom, will you be able to point to him?
A Yes, sir.
Q Please do so.
A There he is, sir. (Witness pointing to a person and when that person pointed to was asked of (sic)
his name, identified himself as Rogelio Villapando)
Q And you mentioned that Villapando was stabbing Romulo Manalo at that time that you looked out
from the window of that BLTB Co. bus, will you please demonstrate to us their respective positions
on (sic) that time you saw Villapando striking stab blows on the person of Romulo Manalo? May I
request, if your Honor please, for any female person here? (The witness representing herself as
Romulo Manalo and the old woman representing Villapando, standing face to face while the left
hand of Romulo was embracing the neck of Villapando while Villapando’s right hand was delivering
stab blows from the left side of his head downward)
Q At that particular time when you saw Villapando stabbing Romulo Manalo, who among them were
facing you, if anybody of them were facing you?
A Romulo was facing me, sir.
Q If Romulo was the one facing you, how were you able to say with clarity here it was Villapando
who was stabbing Romulo at the time?
ATTY. BAYANI:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Objection, Your Honor. It is fiscal who is cross-examining this witness.
FISCAL ATIENZA:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Precisely that is just to clarify.
COURT:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
That is very favorable to the defense. He is helping you.
A They made a turn, sir.
FISCAL ATIENZA:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Q And during that turn, who were then facing you?
ATTY. BAYANI:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Leading, Your Honor.
COURT:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Villapando was facing after the turn.
FISCAL ATIENZA:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Q And then thereafter, what else did you do, if you did any thing?
A I took my things and alighted from the bus, sir.
Q And then after alighting from the bus, what else transpired, if anything else transpired?
A When I had already alighted from the bus, I saw Ramon Tolentino chasing Villapando towards the
south, sir.
. . ." (TSN, July 28, 1983, pp. 14-17; Records, pp. 116-119)
We find nothing in the records of the case which would show that these witnesses were actuated by
improper motives in pointing to the appellant as the person responsible for their injuries and for the
death of their companion. Their testimonies are, therefore, credible and worthy of belief.
Appellant’s avowal of innocence also cannot be sustained on the basis of the testimony of his
witness, Paquito Sorizo. A careful reading of Sorizo’s entire testimony fails to convince Us of its
veracity. Sorizo appears to be more of a coached witness. The following findings of the trial court
demonstrate clearly the unreliability of Sorizo’s testimony:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"As to the testimony of defense witness Paquito Sorizo stating that he witnessed the said stabbing
incident that resulted to the death of Romulo Manalo, this court could not believe him when he said
that Rogelio Villapando is not the assailant of Romulo Manalo. This particular witness of the defense
is a bias witness due to the special relationship and or treatment given by the accused, his wife and
the lawyer of the defense, under the following circumstances, to wit:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"1. That he was always present during the hearing of this case and the other two (2) attempted
homicide cases filed against herein accused, as evidenced by his testimony earlier stated in this
findings;
"2. That he attended at the Letty’s Restaurant to have a conference with the lawyer for the defense
upon the request of the wife of the herein accused.
"If really said witness was (sic) present when the deceased was assaulted and stabbed to death and
that he was only two (2) brazas away from the crime-scene, why is it that there is (sic) no showing
that he at least attempted to prevent the victim and the accused from the (sic) struggling with each
other, if really true (sic) as janitor of the BLTB Co, that he was then only two brazas away from
them, why did he not help when Alicia Beron embraced the victim in order to prevent the (sic) further
assault of the accused and likewise did not prevent the said accused from inflicting injury to said
Alicia Beron and Ramon Tolentino? and (sic), finally, why did he fail and/or refuse to execute any
written statement similar in substance on what he said in court immediately after the stabbing
incident or immediately after the apprehension of the accused, considering that the said incident
was properly attended to for investigation by the police authorities of Batangas City who were then
personally present immediately after the incident took place?
"To the best analysis and findings of this court, witness Paquito Sorizo was coached by someone to
testify in favor of the accused and his testimony given in court is (sic) concocted or fabricated one
and, therefore, without credence and probative value in the instant case.
"It is a well-settled rule that if a man remains silent when he ought to speak (like in the present case)
he will be barred from speaking later (Gabriel v. Bans, 56 Phil. 314)
"Further, the court has observed the demeanor or manner of said witness Paquito Sorizo while on
the witness stand and while testifying, said witness usually responded to the questions propounded
by the defense counsel on direct-examination in a manner as if the answers were already inside his
mouth or just at the tip of his tongue and, when asked if the assailant was inside the courtroom, said
witness answered that the accused was not present, although said witness did not bother himself to
look around the court premises and gave his answer while his face was little bit downward and
facing directly to the Presiding Judge." (Rollo, pp. 33-34)
Appellant, furthermore, assails the credibility of some prosecution witnesses. He claims that the
prosecution witnesses’ second, rather than their first, statements before the police were submitted
to the court; that the given description of the assailant in their first statements matched the
description given by defense witness Sorizo; that the second statements’ description of the assailant
did not match appellant’s physical appearance especially as to height since he is short while the
given height was 5’7" ; that witness Panganiban’s identification of appellant is questionable since it
was not done in a police line-up and appellant was in front of Panganiban ready to be identified;
that, also, she did not see the actual stabbing of her companions, Tolentino and Beron; that
witnesses Alicia Beron and Dr. Celso Bulanhagui, the attending physician, were not presented in
court; that the mother of the victim, Lucia Manalo, did not identify the accused; and that Miss
Rosario Panaligan, Head, Medical Records Section of the Batangas Regional Hospital, who was
presented in lieu of Dr. Bulanhagui, could not testify as to the correctness of the death and medical
certificates signed by Dr. Bulanhagui (Appellant’s Brief, pp. 6-10; Rollo, p. 57).
We are not persuaded. The fact that Panganiban did not see the actual stabbing of Ramon
Tolentino and Alicia Beron and that Lucia Manalo did not identify the appellant as the assailant is of
no moment. The important thing is that the victims themselves identified their assailant as
the Appellant.
Moreover, identification of an accused need not be done in a police line-up. It may also be made by
just pointing to the accused directly as what was done in this case. We find, too, that contrary to the
appellant’s claim, witness Panganiban was aware of appellant’s near presence,
thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"COURT:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Q Upon arrival at the police headquarters, what did you do?
A I pin-pointed at the person of Villapando and there were many persons inside when I pin-pointed
to him, Your Honor.
Q Why did you pin-point to him upon your arrival at the police station?
A Because I was asked by the police if I could possible (sic) point the assailant of Romulo Manalo,
Your Honor.
x          x           x
ATTY. BAYANI (counsel for the accused):chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Q When your statement was being taken by the police, where was Villapando? How far was
Villapando from you?
A Very near, sir.
Q How many meters, inches or feet?
A About less than two (2) meters distance at the time my statement was taken, sir.
Q And Villapando was also seated?
A No, sir.
Q He was standing?
A Yes, sir.
Q And when you were being investigated, you already knew that Villapando was the one standing
approximately one and one-half (1 1/2) meters from you?
A Yes, sir.
Q How about the other persons whom you claimed to be present at the investigating room, how far
were they from you?
A They were also equi-distant from one another. They moved one after the other, sir.
Q But Villapando was all the while standing infront (sic) of you?
A He was somewhat on my left side, sir.
Q He was all the while standing on your left side during the investigation?
A Yes, sir.
Q While the others were walking from one direction to another?
A Yes, sir.
. . ." (TSN, July 28, 1983, pp. 36-37, 42-43; Records, pp. 138-139, 144-145).
As regards the medical and death certificates signed by Dr. Bulanhagui, We hold that the testimony
of Miss Panganiban is admissible to prove the authenticity of Dr. Bulanhagui’s signatures on the
said documents. The circumstance of Dr. Bulanhagui being abroad and thus, could not verify the
contents of the documents is not fatal to the prosecution’s case. Neither is the unavailability of Alicia
Beron to testify as she is now in the United States weaken the prosecution’s cause. The fact of the
death of the victim and the injuries sustained by the other victims could be established by
testimonial evidence as was done in this case (TSNs, May 13, 1983, pp. 14-15, 20-22; Records, pp.
68-69, 74-75; August 14, 1983, pp. 6-10; Records, pp. 168-170; July 28, 1983, pp. 17-20; Records,
pp. 119-122).
Contrary to appellant’s assertion, all the statements executed by the prosecution witnesses were
submitted and now formed part of the records of the case (Records of CCC-VIII-825, pp. 3-9, 11).
The alleged inconsistency regarding the description of the height of the assailant compared to
appellant’s actual height is trivial. It must be noted that the description given by Alicia Beron was
merely the approximate height of the assailant which does not militate against her credibility.
The over-all evidence presented in these cases has fully established the culpability of the appellant
beyond reasonable doubt. However, We do not agree with the trial court that treachery is present in
CCC-VIII-823(79). For treachery to be present, it must be shown that the offender employed means,
methods or forms of execution which tend directly and specifically to insure its execution, without
risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make (Art. 14, par. 16,
Revised Penal Code). In the case at bar, the testimonies of the eyewitnesses were limited to the
actual stabbing of the victims by the accused. There were no details as to how the stabbing incident
commenced and developed. The death certificate presented by the prosecution also did not
disclose the nature of the stab wound which killed the victim so as to infer therefrom how he was
killed. It merely recited the following: "death due to cardiac arrest, stab wound, chest, left,
penetrating chest cavity" (Exhibit U, Records of CCC-VIII-823(79), p. 133). There being no
circumstance which would qualify the killing to murder, the crime committed is simple homicide.
Neither do We agree that reiteracion or habituality should be appreciated in this case. The appellant
was found by the trial court to have committed offenses prior to and after the incident of January 14,
1979, as follows:" (1) prior to January, 1979, he was arrested and accused of the crime of theft, in
Criminal Case No. 172 before the Municipal Court of Mendez, Cavite; (2) that on May 15, 1973, he
was likewise charged for physical injuries in Lipa City but said case was amicably settled; (3) that on
January 15, 1973, he was likewise charged in Criminal Case No. 1343 in Lemery, Batangas for the
crime of theft and he was convicted of the said offense; (4) that he was likewise charged and
convicted before the City Court of Batangas City in Criminal Case No. 9517; (5) that he was also
charged in Criminal Case No. 842-B for theft, before the Court of First Instance of Biñan, Laguna,
but said case was settled amicably; (6) finally, Accused was charged and convicted for the crime of
theft before the Court of First Instance of Manila in Criminal Case No. 8212791 per Judgment of
said court on October 30, 1982" (Decision, p. 19; Rollo, p. 89). In reiteracion or habituality, it is
essential that the offender be previously punished, that is, he has served the sentence, for an
offense in which the law attaches, or provides for an equal or greater penalty than that attached by
law to the second offense, or for two or more offenses, in which the law attaches a lighter penalty
(People v. Layson, Et Al., G.R. No. L-25177, October 31, 1969, 30 SCRA 92). Here, the records do
not disclose that the appellant has been previously punished by an offense to which the law
attaches an equal or greater penalty or for two or more crimes to which it attaches a lighter penalty.
Considering therefore, the absence of either aggravating or mitigating circumstances, the penalty for
homicide, which is reclusion temporal should be imposed in its medium period (Article 249, in
relation to Article 64, paragraph 1, of the Revised Penal Code). Applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, the minimum penalty is twelve (12) years of prision mayor and the maximum penalty
is seventeen (17) years of reclusion temporal. The indemnity for death imposed by the trial court is
increased to thirty thousand (P30,000.00) pesos in addition to the award of five thousand
(P5,000.00) pesos as actual damages and twenty five thousand (P25,000.00) pesos as moral and
exemplary damages.
As to Criminal Case No. 770, We uphold the trial court’s finding that the appellant is guilty of slight
physical injuries only, it not being shown by any clear and convincing evidence that appellant
intended to kill Alicia Beron.
In Criminal Case No. 771, We find the appellant guilty only of less serious physical injuries. We
gathered from the testimony of Ramon Tolentino that appellant stabbed him and Alicia Beron
because they intervened in his fight against the deceased. In fact, when Tolentino was held back
momentarily by his wounds, appellant attacked the deceased again and then, ran away (TSN, May
13, 1983, pp. 10-11; Records. pp. 64-65). There was no injury to any vital part of Tolentino and
Beron. Clearly from the foregoing, We could not see any intention on the part of appellant to kill
Tolentino and Beron (see United States v. Maghirang, 28 Phil. 655). He merely wanted to
incapacitate these two people so he could turn his ire once more to his real and intended victim, the
deceased Romulo Manalo. Absent the intent to kill, appellant should be liable only for less serious
physical injuries. He should, therefore, be sentenced to an imprisonment of our (4) months.

ACCORDINGLY, the judgments appealed from (1) in Criminal Cases Nos. CCC-VIII-823(79) and
771, are hereby modified as above indicated; and (2) in Criminal Case No. 770, is hereby affirmed.
Costs against Accused-Appellant.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, Cruz, Gancayco and Griño-Aquino, JJ., concur.

\
 G.R. No. 124319 May 13, 1998
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. GARI BIBAT Y DESCARGAR, defendant-
PURISIMA, J.:
Appeal interposed by accused Gari Bibat y Descargar from the judgment rendered by Branch IV of
the Regional Trial Court of Manila, finding him guilty of the crime of Murder in Criminal Case No. 93-
123648.
Filed on July 23, 1993 by Assistant Prosecutor Alfeo T. Siccuon, the Information indicting accused
for Murder, alleges:
That on or about October 14, 1992, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, conspiring
and confederating with others whose true names, identities and present whereabouts are still
unknown and helping one another did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent
to kill and with treachery and evident premeditation, attack, assault and use personal violence upon
the person of one LLOYD DEL ROSARIO Y CABRERA, by then and there stabbing him with bladed
weapon hitting him on the chest and abdomen, thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal stab wounds,
which are necessarily fatal and which where the direct and immediate cause of his death thereafter.
Contrary to law.
With the accused entering a negative plea upon arraignment thereunder, with assistance of the
counsel de oficio, Atty. Alejandro G. Yrreborre, Jr., trial ensued with the prosecution presenting
Nona Avila Cinco, PO3 Julian Bustamante, Florencio Castro and Rogelio Robles, as its witnesses.
Aside from accused, Marte Soriano, Lino Asuncion III, and Rogelio Robles (who was recalled to the
stand by the defense), testified for the defense.
As synthesized by the trial court of origin:
From the record and evidence presented, it appears that the accused Gari Bibat stabbed to death
one Lloyd del Rosario on October 12, 1992 at around 1:30 p.m. along G. Tuazon cor. Ma. Cristina
Sts., Sampaloc, Manila. The victim was on his way to school waiting for a ride when he was
stabbed. Thereafter the suspect fled while the victim was brought to the United Doctors Medical
Center (UDMC) where he was pronounced dead on arrival.
The incident was witnessed by Nona Avila Cinco, a laundry woman, who testified that on October
14, 1992, while she was at Funeraria Gloria waiting for her bettor, she saw a person about one
meter away talking to the accused. Said person told the accused "O pare, anduon na. Puntahan mo
na. Siguruhin mo lang na itumba mo na." to which the accused answered: "Oo ba. Ganito ba, ganito
ba?" (as the witness was speaking, she was demonstrating with her arms.)  1
After hearing the accused, she (witness) left towards Honrades Street to see another bettor. She
first went inside a house and after a while, she went outside where she saw the accused along
Honrades Street, entering an alley. She walked along with the accused. She and the accused were
even able to look at each other.
While the victim was going out of a gate, the accused hurried towards the victim and took a pointed
object from a notebook, then stabbed the victim in the left chest twice.
She was only about 4 to 5 meters away from the scene of the crime.
Thereafter, the accused fled, the victim shouted for help. Upon hearing the shouts of the victim, the
accused returned and stabbed the victim again in the middle part of the chest. She (witness) then
left the scene of the crime after the accused ran away.
She reported the matter to the authorities only on July 20, 1993 because she was afraid.  2
xxx xxx xxx
Florencio Castro testified among others that he saw the accused together with four others inside the
Gloria Memorial Homes along G. Tuason St. on October 14, 1992. One of them used the phone
inside said place to call somebody. The rest stayed beside the one calling. He saw one of them
open a notebook where a stainless knife was inserted. He heard the one using the phone, asking
"kung nasaan." Thereafter, the group went out and left towards the direction of Balic-Balic.
Rogelio Robles, testified among others that the accused Gari Bibat had been going to his place at
424 Berdad St., Sampaloc, Manila, for a long time already because their Samahang Ilocano (SI)
president, Tonton Montero, is his (witness) neighbor. Before the incident occurred, Tonton Montero
told him (witness) about a rumble in school whereby somebody died. The group of the accused was
planning to take revenge against the victim, Lloyd del Rosario (see TSN, pp. 7-8, 6/30/94), thus:
PROS. EUGENIO:
Q Now, do you know personally what this group of Gari Bibat and his companions plan to do
regarding that trouble related to you by your neighbor, Tonton Montero?
A What I know, the person against whom they will take revenge is living from a far place. I did not
know that he is from our place.
Q Did they ever mention, during that meeting the name of the person whom they will take revenge?
A In the beginning, no, sir, but later they told me.
Q What was the name, if they did mention to you the name?
A The one who was killed, Lloyd, sir. lunch, he, together with Gari, went to school (Arellano University) at around 12:00 noon. There, he
reviewed his lessons in preparation for his exams while Gari Bibat had a group study with his
Q The same Lloyd del Rosario, the victim in this case? classmates until 2:00 P.M. when Gari went inside the classroom. He knew that Gari Bibat had an
exam that day at 2:00 P.M. because he (witness) is also studying at Arellano University. The next
time he saw the accused was two (2) days after October 14, 1992.
A Yes, sir. Lloyd del Rosario.

Lino Asuncion III, testified among others: that he is a classmate of Gari Bibat at Arellano University;
He further testified that he (witness) only knows Lloyd del Rosario by the face because the latter is
that their common subject on MWF is Math 2, English 2, Computer 2; that they had a last/final oral
from his place. He only knew what had happened to Lloyd after that fateful incident because 6 or 7
examination in Computer 2 on October 14, 1992; that he saw Gari Bibat in school on that day at
of the members of the group arrived, all with a "tusok" and they even kept two (2) guns in his
about 1:00 P.M.; that he and Gari Bibat took the said last final oral exam; that they both left the
(witness) house. Gari Bibat was one of the 6 or 7 people he saw on that day, with a "tres-cantos" or
room at the same time at 4:30 P.M.
"veinte nueve" tucked in his (Bibat's) waistline. (see pp. 11-12, TSN, 6/30/94). He further narrated
that he actually saw the killing of the victim, (see pp. 22-24, ibid), that even before the day Lloyd
died, they (accused and companions) already hid some guns and "tusok" in his house. (see pp. 20, Rogelio Robles - (was recalled to the stand to testify contrary to what he had previously stated in
TSN, Ibid.) court). He testified inter alia that he did not really see what transpired on October 14, 1992 at 1:30
o'clock in 6the (sic) afternoon; that he only assisted the parents of the victim because they come
from the same place; that the father of the victim handed to him the handwritten statement which he
xxx xxx xxx
(witness) based his previous testimony; that he did not actually see the killing.
Accused Gari Bibat testified among others that on October 14, 1992, he was staying in his house at
On December 27, 1995, the court a quo handed down its decision in question; disposing, thus:
629 Reten St., Sampaloc, Manila; at that time it was his mother's birthday; that he was reviewing his
lessons from 7:00 o'clock to 10:00 o'clock in the morning in preparation for his final oral exams on
October 14, 1992; that Marte Soriano, a friend of his and a neighbor were in his house; that after Wherefore, with all the foregoing, the Court finds the accused GARI BIBAT Y Descargar, guilty
lunch, they (he and Marte Soriano) left for school at 12:35 noon; that they did not pass by Funeraria beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty
Gloria; that he and his friend were able to reach the school; that he had a review of with his of reclusion perpetua; to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amount of P49,786.14 as actual
classmates up to 1:45 o'clock in the afternoon, afterwhich they proceeded to their room for the final damages; and to pay P50,000.00 as and for moral damages, with costs.
exams; that their examination lasted from 7:30 to 4:30 o'clock in the afternoon; that he passed the
subject with a grade of 2.25; that he does not know Nona Cinco but only later in the precinct; that he SO ORDERED.
saw Rogelio Robles who was also detained at the Manila City Jail; that when he asked why Rogelio
Robles testified against him, Robles told him that it was merely concocted because the complainant Appellant places reliance on the assignment of errors, that:
is Robles' neighbor whom he cannot refuse; that he does not know Tonton Montero; that he did
frequent Verdad St., near Rogelio Robles' house, neither did he go there on October 14, 1992 I
between 1:00 and 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon; that he is not a member of Samahang Ilocano
fraternity but the United Ilocandia fraternity, a school fraternity; that he could not remember of his
fraternity being involved in any school rumble as the same is a very peaceful group which promotes THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING FULL FAITH AND CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONIES
brotherhood; that they did not have a quarrel with the victim who is already dead because the latter OF THE ALLEGED EYEWITNESSES NONA AVILA CINCO AND ROGELIO ROBLES.
is not studying at Arellano University; that with respect to the death of Lloyd del Rosario, the same is
an added charge (ipinatong) to him and that he was just implicated therein; that he knows nothing II
about it.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THE VERSION OF ACCUSED-
On cross examination, he testified that he neither saw the two prosecution witnesses before nor did APPELLANT THAT HE WAS NOT AT THE SCENE OF THE CRIME WHEN THE SAME
he know of any grudge which said witnesses have against him; and that he does not know of any HAPPENED.
reason why they would testify against him and identify him as one of the killers of Lloyd del Rosario.
III
Marte Soriano, testified among others that he was at the house of Gari Bibat at Reten St.,
Sampaloc, Manila, attending the birthday (party) of Gari's mother on October 14, 1992; that Gari
Bibat was reviewing his studies at that time in preparation for an oral examination. After taking
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN APPRECIATING THE AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF
EVIDENT PREMEDITATION
FIRST ISSUE:
CREDIBILITY OF PROSECUTION WITNESSES
The Court discerns no basis for disturbing the finding and conclusion arrived at below on the
credibility of the prosecution witnesses.
In the matter of credibility of witnesses, we reiterate the familiar and well-entrenched rule that the
factual findings of the trial court case should be respected. The judge a quo was in a better position
to pass judgment on the credibility of witnesses, having personally heard them when they testified
and observed their deportment and manner of testifying. It is doctrinally settled that the evaluation of
the testimony of the witnesses by the trial court is received on appeal with the highest respect,
because it had the opportunity to observe the witnesses on the stand and detect if they were telling
the truth. This assessment is binding upon the appellate court in the absence of a clear showing that
it was reached arbitrarily or that the trial court had plainly overlooked certain facts of substance or
value that if considered might affect the result of the case.  3
As well explained by the Solicitor General, "Persons do not necessarily react uniformly to a given
situation, for what is natural to one may be strange to another.  4 Verily, there is no standard form of
human behavioral response when one is confronted with a strange and startling experience.  5
It was thus natural for Nona Cinco to just have stayed at the sidelines. She is a woman who could
not have prevented the armed appellant from stabbing the victim, anyway. The suddenness of the
happening and Nona Cinco's fear for her own life must have prevented her from shouting for help.  6
Delay in divulging the name of the perpetrator of the crime, if sufficiently reasoned out, does not
impair the credibility of a witness and his testimony nor destroy its probative value. It has become
judicial notice that fear of reprisal is a valid cause for the momentary silence of the prosecution
witness. 7
In the case at bench, witness Nona Avila Cinco gave an eyewitness account of the killing
complained of in a categorical and straightforward manner.
Appellant belittles the fact that Nona Cinco remembers the stabbing incident to the minutest details.
According to him, "this is alright if the crime just happened, or after the happening of the crime, the
witness FORTHWITH reported the matter to the proper authorities. Unfortunately, the witness
reported the said incident after NINE (9) LONG MONTHS."
It does not appear that it was impossible for Nona Cinco to have a detailed recollection of the
stabbing sued upon. Even before the incident, she already saw the accused with some companions
inside Funeraria Gloria and overheard the plan to kill someone. At that time, she was only about one
(1) meter from the accused and his companions. And when she proceeded to Honrades Street, she
and the accused walked along with and even looked at each other.
At the time when the stabbing in question was taking place, Nona Cinco was only four to five meters
away. The possibility of her recalling even the minutest details cannot therefore be ruled out.
Appellant faults Nona Cinco for reporting the stabbing incident to the police authorities only after
nine (9) months, and for her apparent indifference during the incident, doing nothing even while
witnessing a cruel and gruesome crime.
Appellant also theorizes that Nona Cinco was lying when she testified that she was taking bets for a
PBA game on October 14, 1992, a Wednesday. Claiming that PBA games are held only on
Tuesdays, Thursdays and Saturdays; appellant concludes that "She lies on a simple or minor thing,
all the more, she can lie on a bigger scale."
On the other hand, the Solicitor General pointed out that: "There are 100 combinations which
bettors can try their luck on the so-called PBA game "ending" and, therefore, 100 corresponding
bets should be collected for maximum profit. It was not farfetched, therefore, for Nona Cinco to
collect bets a day or two before the actual PBA games which would decide the winning bet."
Besides, the lie alluded pertains to an insignificant matter which does not affect the material details
of the stabbing incident, and the unequivocal eyewitness account of the killing of the victim, Lloyd
del Rosario. "The maxim or rule 'falsus in unos, falsus in omnibus' does not lay down a categorical
test of credibility. It is not a positive rule of law of universal application. It should not be applied to
portions of the testimony corroborated by other evidence particularly where the false portions could
be innocent mistakes. Moreover, the rule is not mandatory but merely sanctions a disregard of the
testimony of the witness if the circumstances so warrant. To completely disregard all the testimony
of a witness on this ground, his testimony must have been false as to a material point, and the
witness must have a conscious and deliberate intention to falsify a material point."  8
SECOND ISSUE:
THE DEFENSE OF ALIBI
The accused relies on the defense of alibi, an inherently weak defense.  9 In a long line of cases, this
court has held that "alibi is generally considered a weak defense because of the facility with which it
can be fabricated. Thus, courts have always looked upon it with suspicion. Well-settled is the rule
that for alibi to prevail, it must be established by positive, clear and satisfactory proof that it was
physically impossible for the accused to have been at the scene of the crime at the time of its
commission, and not merely that he was somewhere else." 10
Appellant failed to convince the court that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of
the crime at G. Tuazon cor. Ma. Cristina Sts. He claimed that during the stabbing incident at around
1:30 p.m., he was reviewing for an oral examination in his subject of Computer 2 at the Arellano
University. But as the trial court noted, the situs of the crime was not far from Arellano University
such that "granting arguendo that the accused was initially at the Arellano University, he could have
easily sneaked back to the scene of the crime considering that the two places are just near each
other." 11
To buttress his theory that he was actually reviewing for his final oral examination in Computer 2 at
the very time the crime occurred, he alleged that he received a grade of 2.25 in said subject. But
aside from his testimony and that of Lino Asuncion, no other evidence was presented to
substantiate this submission. Appellant should have, at least, exhibited his class card or grading
sheet to show that he did really take an examination in that subject.
Furthermore, positive identification, where categorical and consistent and without any showing of ill
motive on the part of the eyewitness testifying on the matter, prevails over alibi and denial which, if
not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence, are negative and self-serving evidence
undeserving of weight in law. 12
In the instant case, prosecution witness Nona Cinco positively identified appellant as the culprit.
Another prosecution witness, Rogelio Robles, testified to the actual killing of the victim by appellant.
Although the latter recanted, the lower court correctly held that "the later retraction made by Rogelio
Robles does not by itself render his previous testimony false or perjured because the same
testimony appears to be credible and worthy of belief."  13 Then too, affidavits of recantation are
considered as exceedingly unreliable because they can be easily secured from poor and ignorant
witnesses usually for monetary consideration and most likely to be repudiated afterwards.  14
THIRD ISSUE:
THE PRESENCE OR ABSENCE
OF EVIDENT PREMEDITATION
Appellant argues that the trial court erroneously appreciated evident premeditation against him.
Assuming for the sake of argument that he is the felon, the crime he committed is not MURDER but
HOMICIDE, 15 he maintains.
Appellant correctly states the rule that the circumstance which would qualify the killing to murder
must be proved as convincingly as the crime
itself. 16
Here, we are of the irresistible conclusion that the attendance of evident premeditation to qualify the
killing complained of to murder is borne out by the evidence.
There is evident premeditation when the following requisites are met:
1. The time when the offender determined (conceived) to commit the crime;
2. An act manifestly indicating that the culprit has clung to his determination; and
3. A sufficient lapse of time between the determination and execution to allow him to reflect upon
the consequences of his act. 17
The essence of premeditation is that the execution of the criminal act is preceded by cool
thought and reflection upon the resolution to carry out the criminal intent during the space of time
sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment. 18
The appellant, in his brief, implies that the first requisite of evident premeditation was not sufficiently
proven, contending, that:
. . . the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation was appreciated by the trial court based
solely on the testimony of witness Rogelio Robles. The said witness testified that accused-appellant
and several others often met in his (Rogelio Robles) house. In one of their meetings, accused-
appellant and his companions hid some guns and "tusok" in the said witness' house. Other than
these testimonies, the trial court proffered no other rationale to justify the application of evident
premeditation. 19
At first glance, it may seem that the first requisite of evident premeditation, [i.e. the time when the
offender determined (conceived) to commit the crime], was appreciated by the lower court solely on
the basis of the testimony of Rogelio Robles.
Appellant theorizes that the testimony of Robles is not believable; ratiocinating, thus:
. . . such testimonies which were retracted by Rogelio Robles cannot by any yardstick be
considered credible in itself. It simply defy human experience. For evidence to be believed, it is
basic that it must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness, but it must be CREDIBLE
IN ITSELF.  (Emphasis supplied;  Layug v Sandiganbayan and People of the Phil., supra;  Tuason
v. C.A., supra;  Lee Eng Hong v. C.A., 241 SCRA 392) If it were true that accused-appellant and
several others planned the subject killing, they would not be crazy enough to have openly discussed
the same in the presence of another person (TSN, June 30, 1994, p. 9).  They would be very
discreet about it because even the most unlearned or unschooled person would know that killing is
against the law of man and of God.  If indeed they have planned it, they did it in complete
secrecy.  More, there is no explanation why of all places, accused-appellant and his group met at
Rogelio Robles' house.  The latter is only the neighbor of the alleged president of the former's
organization.  Worse, accused-appellant and his group hid some guns (Ibid., p.  11) and "tusoks"
(Ibid., p. 22), in Rogelio Robles' house. Any person who is in his right frame of mind would not allow
anybody to use his house as an "armory" so to speak or for any illegal purposes.
Appellant faults Rogelio Robles for his utter lack of concern knowing fully well that the appellant and
his companions were planning to kill someone and even allowed them to hide guns and "tusok" in
his house. But the reason for the apparent indifference of Robles could be gleaned from the
following revelation:
ATTY. CALIMAG:
Q And when they left your house and took the "tusok" and left the guns, you know very well from
Tonton Montero that they are going to kill somebody, am I right?
A In school. I did not know that the one they will kill is from my place.
such weapon, stab the victim on the chest. These overt acts clearly evinced that the appellant clung
to his resolution to kill the victim.
From the time Nona Cinco heard the plan to kill someone at 11:30 up to the killing incident at 1:30 in
the afternoon of the same day, there was a sufficient lapse of time for appellant to reflect on the
consequences of his dastardly act.

Q Now, my question - you know that they are going to kill somebody, what did you do, if any as a As held in the case of People v.  Dumdum 20 "the killing of the deceased was aggravated by evident
concerned citizen? premeditation, because the accused conceived of the assault at least one hour before its
perpetration." In the case under examination, two hours had elapsed from the time appellant clung
to his determination to kill the victim up to the actual perpetration of the crime.
A What if they turn their ire on me.

WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against accused-appellant.
COURT:

SO ORDERED.
Aside from that English translation, you put on record the Tagalog answer of the witness: "a - Eh,
kung ako naman ang pagbalingan"

ATTY. CALIMAG

Q Now, Mr. Witness, why it took you so long to come out and testify, if you really know the truth
about this matter?

A Because the parents of the victim were still mad or angry, what would happen to me if I tell them
early, what if they said that I am a part of it.

Q Why, what do you think about yourself, are you not a part of it, Mr. Witness? Because you failed
to report this matter immediately to the police officer?

A I kept it to myself for fear that my brother and sisters might be involved, what will happen to me.

Fully aware that the appellant and his companions were armed with guns and "tusok", it was but
natural for nobles to just observe the protagonists and not get involved. Fear for his own life and that
of his family may have overcome whatever humanitarian inclination he had as a concerned citizen.

Besides, even without the testimony of Rogelio Robles, the presence of the first requisite of evident
premeditation appears to have been thoroughly and sufficiently established. The determination or
conception of the plan to kill the victim could be deduced from the outward circumstances that
happened on the fateful day of October 14, 1992. Records show that at 11:30 in the morning of
October 14, 1992, prosecution witness Nona Cinco saw the accused with some companions at
Funeraria Gloria. She personally heard the plan to kill someone. Another prosecution witness,
Florencio Castro, who works at the Funeraria Gloria also saw the group of Gari Bibat in the said
place. At around 1:30 in the afternoon, Nona Cinco saw the appellant for the second time. She saw
the appellant hurry towards the victim, take a pointed thing from a notebook and with the use of
G.R. No. 70392 June 30, 1986
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
REGINO CAMILET, defendant-appellant.
FERNAN, J.:
Convicted of murder and sentenced to "life imprisonment" by the Regional Trial Court in Iloilo,
Regino Camilet interposed this appeal.
The information filed on October 25, 1982 by the Provincial Fiscal in the then Court of First Instance
of Iloilo stated thus:
That on or about the 2nd day of July, 1982 in the Municipality of Leon, Province of
Iloilo, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, armed and with the use of a deadly weapon, a knife, with
treachery and evident premeditation and taking advantage of nighttime to better
realize his purpose and in utter disregard of the rank [barangay captain] and age
[62 years old] of his victim, with deliberate intent and decided purpose to kill, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack, stab and hit
Perfecto Camancho, Sr. who at the time was in the performance of his duty as
barangay captain, thereby inflicting upon said Perfecto Camancho, Sr. a stab
wound at the left middle inguenal [sic] region [stomach] which directly caused his
death immediately thereafter.
At the arraignment on April 20, 1983, Camilet pleaded not guilty.
The prosecution's version of the crime is as follows:
At around 7:00 o'clock in the evening of July 2, 1982, a Baptist prayer meeting was held at the
residence of Barangay Captain Perfecto Camancho, Sr. in Coyogan Sur, Leon, Iloilo. After the
prayer meeting, the members of the group stayed in that house and whiled away their time
conversing with each other.
Shortly before 9:00 o'clock, Dione [Jolly] Camancho, a dumb nephew of Perfecto, Sr., arrived crying.
By making signs with his hands and fingers, Dione communicated to the group that he was
strangled and hit on his buttocks by someone at a certain place. He asked Perfecto, Sr. to go with
him to the place where he was attacked to locate the person who choked and hit him.
Although it was a moonlit night, Perfecto, Sr. brought along his flashlight. Accompanied by Dione,
Perfecto Camancho, Jr., Rosita Camayo and Cobin [Joven] Cagayao, Perfecto, Sr. went to the
place indicated by Dione.
When they had walked a distance of around 150 meters, Camilet suddenly stepped from a grove of
banana plants and, without word or warning, stabbed Perfecto, Sr. with a one- foot-long, sharp-
bladed knife. Perfecto, Sr. exclaimed "To Reno, ginbuno mo ako" [To Reno, you stabbed me].
Cagayao also heard Perfecto, Sr. say, "You flee"
Perfecto, Jr., who was seven meters behind Perfecto, Sr., stopped in his tracks after he saw his
father being stabbed by Camilet. He also saw his father grappling momentarily with Camilet and
then both fell down the ground. He then went to a barangay official to ask for help.
Cagayao, who was around eight feet from Perfecto, Sr., ran away from the scene after he heard
Perfecto, Sr. telling them to flee. Rosita, who was eight meters away from Perfecto, Sr., also
scampered away after she heard him say that Camilet had stabbed him.
Perfecto, Sr. sustained a stab wound with a 5-centimeter entrance at his left inguinal region. His
large intestine, which was injured, protruded. When autopsied, his intra-abdominal cavity revealed a
great amount of blood clot [Exhibit A]. He died because of the massive hemorrhage caused by the
stab wound [Exhibit B].
The Camancho family incurred expenses in the total amount of P4,520 for the burial and interment
of Perfecto, Sr. [Exhibits C and D].
The defense presents another story. Witness Emilio Cachila related in court that on the night of July
2, 1982, while he was on his way home, he saw Perfecto, Sr. and his children, Sherwin, Perfecto,
Jr. and Niel. Perfecto, Sr. was standing near the dike along the road. Later on, Camilet arrived,
Perfecto, Sr. told Camilet, "Reno, so you are here. I will kill you. Your soul has no value to me. "
Camilet, a 43-year old farmer, testified that he was walking along the road to his mother-in-law's
house to ask for help in planting rice the following morning when the Camanchos "waylaid" him.
Perfecto, Sr. allegedly hit his mouth with a hammer and knocked off five of his teeth. He fell down
on the muddy ricefield. As he stood up, Sherwin struck him on the shoulder with the muzzle of an air
rifle. He fell down again and received another blow from Sherwin's air rifle. Once again, he fell on
the mud. Sherwin hit his left eye which caused it to swell.
Camilet's wife, Thelma, who came to his aid after hearing the shout of Perfecto, Sr., tried to help by
lifting Camilet up from the mud. While Thelma was leading him home, he pulled out his one-foot-
long knife, swung it and hit someone whose identity he did not know. He only learned that he
wounded and killed Perfecto, Sr. the following morning. Camilet was brought to the Aleosan General
Hospital where his injuries required treatment for ten days.
The trial court discredited Camilet's claim of self-defense. If Perfecto, Sr. really hit Camilet with a
hammer, which assault would have constituted unlawful aggression, Camilet would have been
rendered unconscious. If Sherwin really attacked him, Camilet would have filed a case against him.
And, if it were true that his wife came to his rescue, then the Camanchos would have attacked her
as well. During the trial, when Camilet opened his mouth to show the alleged missing teeth, the
court observed that he had lost them due to decay.
The trial court found him guilty of murder aggravated by disregard of rank and sentenced him to "life
imprisonment". It ordered Camilet to pay the heirs of Perfecto Camancho, Sr. total damages
amounting to P35,000.
In this appeal, Camilet alleges that the lower court erred in not holding that he acted in self-defense,
and in convicting him. He avers that the injuries he suffered from the Camanchos caused his
hospitalization. He prays that he be acquitted of murder.
We agree with the Solicitor General that Camilet's claim of self-defense is devoid of merit. Camilet's
testimony that he had a knife with him because he had to prepare his ricefield and at the same time
make bamboo stakes for the dike is simply incredible. Those tasks are not performed at night. It is
more likely that he was preparing for an encounter with Perfecto, Sr. or any of his children.
It should be noted that prior to the incident described earlier, there was a misunderstanding between
the Camanchos and Camilet. According to one of Perfecto's sons, Niel, his land and the land of
Camilet's mother-in-law were adjoining each other. Camilet worked in the latter land. A dispute over
a portion of that land was referred to the barangay captain who happened to be Perfecto, Sr.
In the presence of the barangay councilmen, the dispute was settled when Camilet's mother-in-law
agreed to turn over the disputed land to Niel. That settlement apparently did not satisfy Camilet. In
fact, that morning of July 2, 1982, he passed by that land and warned Niel that he and his family
should be careful [TSN, February 27, 1984, pp. 4-6]. Camilet himself related in his sworn statement
taken by the police at the Aleosan General Hospital, that in that encounter with the Camanchos,
Perfecto, Sr. and Niel challenged him to a fight which he allegedly did not mind at all although they
harvested his corn and took the produce away [Exhibit 3].
Camilet's claim that he was attacked in unison by the Camanchos is an attempt at self-exoneration.
Considering their number, the Camanchos could have succeeded in killing him, and, his wife who
allegedly arrived to help him, would also have been harmed.
That Camilet was hospitalized after that incident is an accepted fact. However, Exhibit 2 shows that
he sustained only superficial injuries. Doctor Alejandro C. Caelian, his attending physician at the
Aleosan General Hospital, made the following findings:
1. Lacerated wound bridge of the noses superficial 2cm.
2. Contusion and swelling of the supra orbital region, left.
3. Contusion, hematoma, infra orbital region, left.
4. Lacerated wound, superficial 2 cm. lateral angle of the left eye.
5. Conjunctival hemorrhage and swelling of the eyeball, left.
6. Swelling of the mandibular region, left.
7. Depress[ed] portion of the 7th rib posterior to the axillary line.
Doctor Caelian certified that barring complications, those injuries would heal in seven to ten days.
Those injuries may prove that a scuffle or "grappling" occurred between Perfecto, Sr. and Camilet. It
is possible that during that momentary grappling between the two, Perfecto, Sr. hit Camilet with his
flashlight. Emilio Cachila's testimony that Perfecto, Sr. "stabbed an instrument" at Camilet [TSN,
November 28, 1984, p. 7] was totally ignored by the trial court.
If no unlawful aggression attributable to the victim is established, there can be no self-defense,
either complete or incomplete [People vs. Gamut L-34517, November 2, 1982, 118 SCRA 35].
However, by invoking self-defense, Camilet in effect admitted having stabbed and killed Perfecto,
Sr. The rationale for the requirement of clear and convincing proof of self-defense stems from the
admission of the accused that he has killed or wounded another which is a felony for which he
should be criminally liable [Castañares vs. Court of Appeals, L-41269-70, August 6, 1979, 92 SCRA
567].
The information alleged treachery, evident premeditation, nighttime and disregard of rank and age
as aggravating circumstances. The trial court's decision, on the other hand, does not indicate what
circumstance qualified the killing to murder but it considers disregard of rank an aggravating
circumstance.
As only one circumstance suffices to qualify the killing as murder [People vs. Dueño L-31102, May
5, 1979, 90 SCRA 23], either treachery or evident premeditation must be proven.
Treachery cannot be appreciated in this case. The testimonial evidence as to the inception of the
stabbing is quite nebulous. The prosecution only succeeded in presenting the witnesses' reaction to
the assault which indirectly proved its suddenness. However, mere suddenness of an attack is not
sufficient to constitute treachery where it does not appear that the aggressor adopted such mode of
attack to facilitate the perpetration of the killing without risk to himself [U.S. vs. Namit, 38 Phil. 926;
People vs. Torejas, L- 29935, January 31, 1972, 43 SCRA 158].
Also, the prosecution failed to discredit Emilio Cachila's testimony that Perfecto, Sr. greeted Camilet
when he saw the latter. Furthermore, it should be noted that the fatal wound inflicted on Perfecto,
Sr. was in the inguinal region or near the stomach. This shows that the attack was frontal. Treachery
does not exist where the victim is facing the assailant when the assault starts [People vs.
Casiguran, L-45387, November 7, 1979, 94 SCRA 244].

Likewise, evident premeditation was not established by the prosecution. Although the facts tend to
show that Camilet might have harbored ill-feelings towards the Camanchos after they took a portion
of the land he was farming and, as he himself stated to the police investigator, they also took the
produce from his cornfield, there is no proof that Camilet conceived of killing Perfecto, Sr. Indeed,
there is no evidence of [1] the time when he determined to commit the crime, [2] an act manifestly
indicating that he has clung to his determination, and [3] sufficient lapse of time between
determination and execution to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act and to allow
his conscience to overcome the resolution of his will had he desired to hearken to its warnings
[People vs. Gravino, L-31327, May 16, 1983,122 SCRA 123].

Nighttime can not be considered aggravating in this case as there is no proof that it was especially
sought by Camilet to perpetuate the crime [People vs. Villar, Jr., L-34092, August 21, 1974, 58
SCRA 512]. Neither could disregard of rank be aggravating here because, as correctly observed by
the Solicitor General, there is no clear evidence that Camilet committed the crime in disregard of the
respect due Perfecto, Sr. as barangay captain.

In the absence of a qualifying circumstance, the fatal stabbing of Perfecto Camancho, Sr. is a
homicide, not a murder. Homicide is punishable under Articles 249 and 64[l] of the Revised Penal
Code with reclusion temporal medium as there are neither aggravating nor mitigating
circumstances. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the proper penalty is an indeterminate
sentence of eight [8] years and one [1] day of prision mayor medium as minimum to sixteen [16]
years of reclusion temporal medium as maximum. In accordance with the ruling in People vs. De la
Fuente, L- 63251-52, December 29, 1983, 126 SCRA 518, the indemnity is pegged at P30,000.

WHEREFORE, the judgment of the trial court is modified. Appellant Regino Camilet is hereby found
guilty of homicide and sentenced to eight [8] years and one [1] day of prision mayor medium as
minimum to sixteen [16] years of reclusion temporal  medium as maximum, and to pay the heirs of
Perfecto Camancho, Sr. an indemnity of P30,000. Costs against the appellant.

SO ORDERED.
 [G.R. No. 141914. November 21, 2002.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. PEDRO MONDIJAR Y
GALLARES, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
On appeal is the decision 1 of the Regional Trial Court of Cataingan, Masbate, Branch 49, dated
March 17, 1999, in Criminal Case No. 812, finding appellant Pedro Mondijar y Gallares guilty of the
murder of Pamfilo Aplacador 2 and imposing upon him the penalty of death. Because appellant was
more than seventy-nine (79) years old at the time of the commission of the offense, the sentence
was commuted to reclusion perpetua, pursuant to Article 47 3 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Republic Act No. 7659.cralaw : red
Appellant and the victim were neighbors in Cataingan, Masbate. Although appellant was the father-
in-law of the victim, apparently, there was bad blood between them. In a previous incident, the son-
in-law (Aplacador) had stabbed appellant. 4 Whatever their quarrel, it was never patched up. A
month later, the ill feelings erupted anew with fatal results for Aplacador.
In an information dated June 16, 1994 appellant was charged with murder committed as
follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
That sometime on February 26, 1994 at about 6:30 o’clock in the evening more or less, at Barangay
Domorog, Municipality of Cataingan, Province of Masbate, Philippines, within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, above-named accused with intent to kill, evident premeditation, treachery, did
there and then wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, attack, assault, stab, hack, with the use of a sharp
and pointed bolo, one PAMFILO APLACADOR hitting him at the different parts of his body which
was the direct and the logical cause of his instantaneous death.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 5
Upon arraignment, Accused pleaded not guilty. Trial then ensued.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) summed up the prosecution’s version in its brief, as
follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Around six o’clock in the evening of February 26, 1994, while prosecution witness Josephine
Lebuga was at the back of her house located at Sitio Mangga, Domorog, Cataingan, Masbate
feeding her pigs, she heard a commotion and shouting at the house of her neighbor appellant Pedro
Mondijar. Appellant’s house is about fifteen (15) meters away from Lebuga’s house, thus, the sound
coming from appellant’s house was audible to Lebuga from where she was standing. Lebuga heard
the voice of appellant’s son-in-law, the deceased Panfilo Aplacador begging appellant "Pay, don’t
kill me because I am your son." Then she heard appellant reply, "Okay let’s go to your house." After
feeding her pigs, Lebuga went inside her house (Citation omitted).
Around six thirty in the evening of the same day, prosecution witness Rogelio Booc was walking
along Mangga Street, Cataingan, Masbate, on his way home. While working (sic), he saw his
neighbor, herein appellant, on the road about fifty (50) meters away, walking behind Aplacador and
holding a long bolo about thirty (30) inches in length. Appellant hit Aplacador on the neck with the
bolo, thereby decapitating him. When Aplacador fell down, appellant picked up the detached head
and threw it about five armslength away from its body. Afraid of what he saw, Booc ran towards his
house which is about two hundred meters away from the scene of the incident. Booc informed his
wife about the incident and they closed all the windows of their house because they feared for their
lives (Citation omitted).chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
The following morning, February 27, 1994, instead of reporting the incident to the police, Booc went
to appellant’s house and told appellant that he saw a dead body lying along Mangga Street which
looked like appellant’s son-in-law. He told appellant to proceed to Domorog to seek the help of
barangay councilor in getting Aplacador’s body. Afraid that he might be killed, appellant did not heed
Booc’s advise but instead went to Burias Island, Masbate (Citation omitted).
On that same day, prosecution witness Lilia Condrillon learned about the tragic death of her brother.
She proceeded to the Philippine National Police Station of Cataingan, Masbate and filed a
Complaint for the death of Aplacador with policeman Romy Meliton (Citation omitted). Appellant was
subsequently arrested by the police (Citation omitted). An autopsy conducted on the remains of
Aplacador revealed that he sustained the following mortal wounds:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. 12 cm. Hacking wound right auricular 6 area reaching the brain stem;
2. 12 cm. Hacking wound right zygomatic area reaching the brain stem;
3. 10 cm. hacking wound right lower mandible;
4. multiple hacking wounds neck through and through. 7
Dr. Allen Ching, who conducted the post-mortem examination of Aplacador’s remains, testified that
the victim died of cardio-respiratory arrest due to multiple stab wounds in the neck. 8
For his part, appellant admitted killing the victim, but claimed that he only acted in self-defense. He
testified that on February 26, 1994 at about 6:30 in the evening, he and his wife were in their house
when Aplacador arrived as if looking for trouble. When appellant asked what Aplacador wanted, he
did not reply but gritted his teeth. Appellant then told Aplacador to go home so there would be no
trouble. Appellant proposed that he would accompany Aplacador on his way home. Appellant then
got his bolo (minasbad), so he would use it to cut coconut leaves, which he would burn as a torch to
light his way back home. When the two were about 50 meters from appellant’s house, Aplacador,
who was walking ahead of appellant, faced the latter and said, "I will stab you now." Aplacador then
tried to stab him with his knife, but appellant parried the blow. Aplacador lunged again with his knife
at appellant but missed because the latter was able to move backward. Thereafter, appellant
hacked Aplacador twice, but was not sure whether he hit him for by then it was already dark.
Appellant then went home and slept with his wife. The following day, he went to Burias Island. He
also declared that a month before the incident, Aplacador stabbed him on the knee, thereby causing
him to limp. 9 He claimed, however, that he did not bear a grudge against Aplacador. He likewise
denied hacking the victim for being a wife-beater. Appellant insisted that he killed Aplacador
because the latter tried to kill him. 10
The trial court found the prosecution’s version credible and convicted appellant. Its judgment
reads:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
ACCORDINGLY, the court finds the accused Pedro Mondijar guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of MURDER and hereby imposes upon him the penalty of DEATH and shall indemnify the
legal heirs the amount of P50,000 for the death of Pamfilo Aplacador, P30,000 for moral damages
and P20,000 for exemplary damages.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
Considering the age of the accused (over 70 years), pursuant to Sec. 25 of R.A. 7659, he is
therefore entitled to a suspension of the execution of his death sentence (in case the herein death
sentence is affirmed by the Honorable Supreme Court), thus, the death sentence shall be
commuted to the penalty of reclusion perpetua with all the accessory penalties under the code.
With costs de officio. 11
Hence, this appeal assigning the following as errors:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
I Appellant’s claim of self-defense is, in our view, dubious. A plea of self-defense cannot be
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPRECIATING THE AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES OF
TREACHERY, ABUSE OF SUPERIOR STRENGTH AND EVIDENT PREMEDITATION AGAINST
THE ACCUSED WHICH WERE NOT PROVEN BY THE PROSECUTION.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF MURDER AS DEFINED AND PENALIZED UNDER ART. 248 OF THE
REVISED PENAL CODE AS AMENDED BY RA 7659 INSTEAD OF PLAIN HOMICIDE. 12
Considering the aforecited errors, we find that the issues before us pertain to: (1) the propriety of
appellant’s conviction for the offense charged; and (2) the presence of treachery, abuse of superior
strength, and evident premeditation as qualifying circumstances.
On the first issue, appellant merely insists that prosecution witnesses did not prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. However, he does not cite any particulars for our consideration to support his
contention.
For the appellee, the OSG counters that by claiming self-defense, appellant admitted killing the
victim. Hence, the burden of proof was shifted to appellant to show that the killing was justified.
The OSG points out that appellant failed to establish unlawful aggression on the part of the victim,
one of the elements necessary for self-defense to be sustained. Aplacador’s "gritting of his teeth"
hardly constituted unlawful aggression, says the OSG, adding that appellant’s act of continuously
hacking the victim after the latter fell down and was disarmed is unjustified because the supposed
aggression had already ceased. According to the OSG, appellant exceeded the limits of necessity to
suppress an alleged attack, and the number and location of the hacking wounds sustained by the
deceased belied appellant’s claim of self-defense.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
The OSG’s contentions are well-taken. When an accused invokes self-defense, he effectively
admits the killing, and the onus probandi shifts upon him to show clearly and convincingly that the
killing is justified and that no criminal liability is incurred. 13 For self-defense to prosper, the accused
must satisfy the following requisites: (a) unlawful aggression by the victim, (b) reasonable necessity
of the means employed to prevent or repel it, and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the
accused. 14 The accused must rely upon his own evidence and not on the weakness of the
prosecution 15 in order to establish self-defense.
Assuming arguendo that the victim, Aplacador, did try to stab appellant, we agree with the OSG that
appellant went beyond reasonable necessity in trying to prevent or repel the assault. The victim was
not only disabled by multiple hack wounds; he was in fact decapitated. The nature and number of
wounds inflicted upon the victim show that appellant’s intentions went beyond trying to protect his
person but sought to deliver serious harm, thus rendering self-defense unavailing in this case. 16
appreciated where it is not only uncorroborated by independent and competent evidence but is
extremely doubtful by itself. 17
On the second issue, appellant first argues that the trial court erred in appreciating alevosia as
attending the killing of Aplacador. According to appellant, treachery was not proven because the
prosecution failed to show how the killing commenced or how the act unfolded. For treachery to
exist, the mode of attack must be thought of by the offender, and not spring from the unexpected
turn of events. Further, appellant states that the prior stabbing incident between him and the victim
should have forewarned the latter of the possibility of an impending attack. In other words, appellant
avers there was no sudden and unexpected attack on the victim.
For the appellee, the OSG contends that treachery was established beyond reasonable doubt.
According to the OSG, when Aplacador pleaded with appellant not to kill him, and appellant told him
to go home and that appellant would accompany him in going home, the victim was lulled into
complacency. Hence, appellant’s attack was completely unanticipated by the victim. That the victim
was decapitated shows the severity and suddenness of appellant’s blow, argues the
OSG.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing
means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to ensure its
execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. 18
For treachery to qualify the act of killing to murder, two elements must concur: (1) the culprit
employed means, methods, and forms of execution which tended directly and specially to insure the
offender’s safety from any defensive or retaliatory act on the part of the offended party, which
means that no opportunity was given the latter to do so; and (2) that the offender consciously
adopted the particular means, method, or form of attack employed by him. 19 The essence of
treachery is a swift and unexpected attack on the unarmed victim without the slightest provocation
on the part of the victim. 20 Treachery is never presumed but must be proven with moral certainty
like the offense itself. 21
In that light, we find the prosecution’s evidence insufficient to sustain a finding that alevosia qualified
the killing to murder. The prosecution’s sole eyewitness, Rogelio Booc, merely testified that
appellant hacked the victim. There is no showing from his bare testimony as to how the hacking
incident commenced. When the evidence does not establish how the assault started, treachery
cannot be appreciated. 22 Moreover, no evidence was adduced to show that appellant consciously
adopted the means he employed to ensure the victim’s death without risk unto himself. That
appellant offered to accompany the victim home does not suffice to show that the offer was
deliberately adopted by appellant as means to deceive the victim, much less lull him into lowering
his defenses. Significantly, the relations between appellant and the victim were marred by ill
feelings. A month before the incident, Aplacador had stabbed and wounded appellant. Clearly,
appellant and the victim had no love lost between them. They did not trust each other. Recurrence
of violent quarrel between them was not out of the question. Otherwise put, the victim could not
discount the possibility that appellant might retaliate for the previous stabbing, or otherwise seek to
cause the victim bodily harm once an opportunity offered itself. Where an argument or quarrel
preceded a killing, treachery cannot be appreciated since the victim could be said to have been
forewarned and could anticipate aggression from the assailant. 23
Appellant next contends that it was error for the trial court to find that abuse of superior strength
characterized the killing, as it is highly improbable for a man of more than 70 years to be superior in
strength to a man much younger. In addition, both the victim and the appellant were armed with
bolos, adds appellant, so they were equally situated and there was no inequality of forces between
them.
The OSG stresses, however, that appellant took advantage of superior strength as his bolo was
bigger than that of the victim. This advantage in weapons allowed appellant to hack the victim with
impunity. The OSG further points out the fact that appellant was not wounded, even superficially,
despite his claim that the victim had tried to stab him, validating an indicium of inequality in their
weapons and strength.
As previously held, there is abuse of superior strength if the assailant purposely used excessive
force out of proportion to the means of defense available to the person attacked. 24 In the instant
case it is not disputed that both appellant and the victim were armed. That appellant’s bolo is much
longer than that of the victim would not show that appellant purposely used a greater force to his
advantage. At the time of the incident, appellant was already seventy-nine (79) years old, while the
victim was much younger. A month before the incident, appellant was stabbed on the knee, thereby
causing him to limp. This handicap would indicate in terms of health, strength, agility, and superiority
actually lies with the victim. Hence, we agree with appellant that there was no abuse of superior
strength in this case.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
Lastly, appellant argues that a close scrutiny of the prosecution’s evidence clearly shows its failure
to prove evident premeditation. The prosecution, according to appellant, failed to show that he had
conceived a plan to kill his son-in-law. Appellant insists that the incident happened so fast there was
no sufficient time for him to hatch a deliberate plan of attack. Instead, he merely relied upon and
acted on the basis of man’s natural instinct of self-preservation.
For the circumstance of evident premeditation to be appreciated, the prosecution must present clear
and positive evidence of the planning and preparation undertaken by the offender prior to the
commission of the crime. 25 Settled is the rule that evident premeditation, like any other
circumstance that qualifies a killing to murder, must be established beyond reasonable doubt as
conclusively and indubitably as the killing itself. 26 To consider evident premeditation, it is
necessary that the following requisites be met: (a) the time when the accused determined to commit
the crime; (b) an act manifestly indicating that the accused clung to his determination; and (c) a
lapse of time, between the determination to commit the crime and the execution thereof, sufficient to
allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act. 27 In the present case, no evidence was
presented by the prosecution as to when and how appellant planned and prepared for the killing of
the victim. There is no showing of any notorious act evidencing a determination to commit the crime
which could prove appellant’s criminal intent. Hence, we cannot agree that there was evident
premeditation here, on appellant’s part.
Further, the OSG submits that appellant’s act of nonchalantly picking up the victim’s head, and
throwing it about five arms’ length away, constitutes scoffing at the body of the deceased. However,
since this was not alleged in the information, this cannot be appreciated as a qualifying
circumstance. While appellant’s act is condemnable, it cannot be considered here to qualify or
aggravate the offense. For the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure requires that the
qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be specifically alleged in the information. 28
Although said Rules took effect only on December 1, 2000, well after the killing of Aplacador, it is a
rule favorable to the appellant. Thus, it should be given retrospective application in his favor.
Inasmuch as the circumstance of scoffing at the victim’s corpse was not alleged in the information, it
may not be considered to qualify or aggravate the offense.
For failure of the prosecution to properly prove the qualifying circumstances of treachery, abuse of
superior strength, and evident premeditation, we conclude that appellant could only be declared
guilty of homicide.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
Coming now to the proper penalty to be imposed, Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code 29
provides that the penalty for homicide is reclusion temporal. The special mitigating circumstance
that the offender is more than 70 years old having been established in this case, 30 the penalty of
reclusion temporal ought to be imposed in its minimum period. 31 Applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, appellant could only be penalized with an indeterminate penalty ranging from 6
years and 1 day of prision mayor, as minimum, to 12 years and 1 day of reclusion temporal, as
maximum. 32
As to damages, the trial court properly imposed the amount of P50,000 as civil indemnity and
P30,000 as moral damages for the pain, grief and shock suffered by the heirs of Pamfilo Aplacador.
However, since there is no aggravating circumstance present in this case, the award of exemplary
damages is not called for. 33

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cataingan, Masbate, Branch 49, in
Criminal Case No. 812 finding appellant PEDRO MONDIJAR Y GALLARES, guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of murder is MODIFIED. Appellant is declared guilty of HOMICIDE
only, and he is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day
of prision mayor as minimum to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as
maximum. He is also ordered to pay the heirs of the victim, Pamfilo Aplacador, the sum of
P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and P30,000.00 as moral damages. Costs de officio.chanrob1es
virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

SO ORDERED.
 [G.R. Nos. 132791 & 140465-66. September 2, 2002.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ARNEL BERNAL, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
Accused-appellant Arnel B. Bernal seeks reversal of the judgment of conviction promulgated by
Branch 2 of the Regional Trial Court of the First Judicial Region stationed in Bangued, Abra, on
November 4, 1997, sentencing him to death for the crime of Murder with the aggravating
circumstances of evident, premeditation and habitual drunkenness, and likewise separately
sentencing him to suffer the prison terms of 10 years and 1 day of prision mayor as minimum to 17
years of reclusion temporal as maximum for the crime of Illegal Possession of Firearms and
Ammunition (Presidential Decree No. 1866), and 2 years and 4 months with disqualification from
holding public office and deprivation of the right of suffrage for violation of Resolution No. 2735 of
the COMELEC otherwise known as the "Gun Ban." cralaw : red
The criminal cases were commenced with the filing of three informations for the crime of murder,
and violations of Presidential Decree No. 1866 and Resolution No. 2735 of the COMELEC,
pertinently reading as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Criminal Case No. 1645
"That on or about February 6, 1995, at Zone 5, in the Municipality of Bangued, Province of Abra,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused, with the
intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation and while armed with a caliber .38 revolver
Smith and Wesson without serial number (rcovered) (sic), did then and there, willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously (sic) shot twice from behind one PEDRITO BERALAS, hitting him on his head,
which caused his death shortly thereafter, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the offended
party."cralaw virtua1aw library
CONTRARY TO LAW. 1
Criminal Case No. 1647
"That on or about the 6th day of February, 1995, at around 9:30 o’clock in the evening, in the
Municipality of Bangued, Province of Abra, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the said accused, not authorize, by law, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, kept in his possession, custody and direct control one caliber .38 Revolver Smith and
Session (sic) without serial number with three (3) live ammunitions for caliber .38 revolver and two
(2) empty shells for caliber .38 (recovered), without first securing the necessary license to possess
the daid (sic) firearms and without lawful permit to carry the same; that the offense was also
committed during the election period in violation of firearm ban."cralaw virtua1aw library
CONTRARY TO LAW. 2
Criminal Case No. 1646
"That on or about February 6, 1995, at around 9:30 o’clock in the evening, at Zone 5, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this honorable Court, the said accused, person not authorized by law,
did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously keep in his possession, custody and control
one (1) caliber .38 Smith and Wesson without serial number with three (3) live ammunition for
caliber .38 revolver and two (2) empty shells for caliber .38 revolver (recovered), without first
securing the necessary permit from the COMELEC to carry the same outside his residence."cralaw
virtua1aw library
SO ORDERED. 3
Upon arraignment, Accused-appellant pleaded not guilty. Thereafter, the cases were tried jointly.
The inculpatory facts adduced by the prosecution during trial are succinctly summarized in the
People’s brief as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
In the evening of February 6, 1995, appellant, Pedrito Beralas, Felix Bernal, Fernando Bernal and
Rey Bernal were on board a tricycle on their way to the Benedisco pub house located along Zamora
St., Zone 5, Bangued, Abra (p. 3, Decision). Upon reaching the pub house, Pedrito invited the group
to go inside to dance. Pedrito, Rey and Arnel went inside while Felix and Fernando were left outside
(pp. 10-13, TSN, September 18, 1995).
Later, Fernando went inside to look for the three (appellant, Rey and Pedrito). He saw them in a
sleeping position inside Benedisco. Upon seeing the three (appellant, Rey and Pedrito), Fernando
returned to where Felix was and told him to start the tricycle engine as they would bring home
appellant, Rey and Pedrito. Fernando first brought Pedrito out of the pub house and had him seated
at the passenger’s seat inside the tricycle. Thereafter, he returned and got appellant who was
roused when they reached the tricycle. After that, Fernando fetched Rey. While the two (Fernando
and Rey) were already at the gate of Benedisco, Fernando heard a gunshot. When Fernando
looked at the tricycle where his companions were, he saw appellant holding a gun. Immediately, he
rushed to the tricycle where Pedrito was. Then, Fernando heard a second gunshot. According to
Fernando, "he knew that appellant shot Pedrito." Consequently, Fernando attacked appellant and
held him. The two (Fernando and appellant) grappled for possession of the gun. While they were
thus grappling, some policemen arrived (pp. 13-17, TSN, September 18, 1995).
Police Superintendent Sarte called up the police station and ordered his men to pick up appellant for
investigation (p. 10, ibid.).
Subsequently, Police Superintendent Sarte inspected the tricycle. He saw Pedrito inside who
appeared dead because of the bullet wound at his head (ibid.)
After that, Felix and Fernando brought Pedrito to Seares Clinic. Pedrito was already dead upon
arrival at said clinic (pp. 17-18, TSN, September 18, 1995).
Dr. Milagros Burgos, municipal health officer of Bangued, Abra, testified that she conducted an
autopsy on Pedrito’s cadaver on February 7, 1995 at 9:45 in the morning at the Baquiran Funeral
Homes. Dr. Burgos found out that rigor mortis had already set in when she conducted the autopsy.
She found two (2) gunshots wounds. The point of entry of the first wound was in the parietal area
which is located at lower left side of the back of the head. The other gunshot wound was beside the
other wound. Dr. Burgos opined that the assailant could have been at the back or behind the victim
when the enemy shot the victim because the entry points of the wounds were at the back (pp. 3-9,
TSN, September 18, 1995).
SPO4 Napoleon Pascual, officer-in-charge of the Firearm and Explosives Unit (FEU) of Abra, PNP
Command, testified that appellant is not a holder of any license or authorized to possess any kind of
firearm. He also testified that the gun used in killing Pedrito is not a licensed firearm (p. 11,
Decision). A certification (Exhibit K) was issued stating that appellant is not a duly licensed firearm
holder. 4
Accused-appellant denied culpability and offered his own recollection of the incident. Accused-
appellant narrated that when he was only 2 years old, his father was killed by victim Pedrito Beralas.
This he learned from his mother and other relatives. Accused-appellant admitted that, on February
6, 1995, he joined the victim and his group in their drinking spree. It was at that time that the alleged
killing of the father of accused-appellant by victim Pedrito was brought up. Accused-appellant
maintained that Pedrito confessed to killing his father. But accused-appellant insisted that they
should stop discussing about the death of his father.
Thereafter, when they were about to go home, Accused-appellant and Pedrito had an altercation.
Accused-appellant claimed that Pedrito threatened him and attempted to fire his gun at him but
failed. So, Accused-appellant struggled with Pedrito for the possession of the gun and
consequently, the gun went off. Accused-appellant felt that Pedrito was losing his grip on the gun
and so he seized it from him. Because accused-appellant feared for his life, it was at that moment
that he shot the victim.
In its decision dated November 4, 1997, the trial court rendered a judgment of conviction in the three
cases, finding and disposing that —
IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. 1645 FOR MURDER, the Court finds the accused Arnel Bernal guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder defined and penalized under Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code as amended by Sec. 6 of Republic Act No. 7659 with the aggravating
circumstances of evident premeditation and habitual drunkenness and sentences him to suffer the
penalty of DEATH and to indemnify the family of the late Pedrito Beralas the amount of P52,500.00
in actual expenses incurred in connection with the burial of the latter plus P50,000.00 for his death
and P500,000.00 in moral and exemplary damages;
IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. 1646 FOR VIOLATION OF RESOLUTION NO. 2735 OF THE COMELEC
otherwise known as the "gun ban" during an election period and the Omnibus Election Code, the
Court finds the accused Arnel Bernal guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of the said
COMELEC resolution and as provided by par. (q) Secs. 261 and 262 of Article XXII of the Omnibus
Election Code and sentences him to suffer an imprisonment for a period of TWO (2) YEARS and
FOUR (4) MONTHS and to suffer disqualification to hold public office and deprivation of the right of
suffrage; and
IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. 1647 FOR SIMPLE VIOLATION OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1866
or ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARM AND AMMUNITION, the Court likewise finds the accused
Arnel Bernal guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of simple illegal possession of firearm
defined and penalized under Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1866 and sentences him to suffer
an indeterminate penalty of TEN (10) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor as minimum to
SEVENTEEN (17) YEARS of reclusion temporal as maximum.
In all these cases, the accused is likewise ordered to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED. 5
Hence, the instant review, with accused-appellant anchoring his plea for reversal on the following
assigned errors: (1) the trial court erred in imposing upon the accused the death penalty; (2) the trial
court erred in appreciating evident premeditation and treachery; and (3) the trial court erred in
treating Criminal Case No. 1647 as a separate offense.
It appears from the record that not one of the prosecution witnesses saw the actual killing of the
victim by Accused-Appellant. However, the separate and detailed accounts of the event by
prosecution witnesses Fernando and Felix Bernal reveal only one conclusion: that it was accused-
appellant who shot the victim.
Circumstantial as it is, conviction based thereon can be upheld, provided the circumstances proven
constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion that points to
accused-appellant, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person. 6 Direct evidence of the
commission of the crime is not the only matrix from which the trial court may draw its conclusions
and findings of guilt. Circumstantial evidence is of a nature identical to direct evidence. It is equally
direct evidence of minor facts of such a nature that the mind is led, intuitively or by a conscious
process of reasoning, to a conclusion from which some other fact may be inferred. No greater
degree of certainty is required when the evidence is circumstantial than when it is direct. In either
case, what is required is that there be proof beyond reasonable doubt that a crime was committed
and that accused-appellant committed it. 7
As noted by the Solicitor General, the evidence is replete with details to prove the fact of death of
the victim and to sustain the guilt of accused-appellant, to wit:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
(1) accused-appellant, victim Pedrito, prosecution witnesses Fernando and Felix Bernal, and one
Rey Bernal together went to Benedisco pub located at Bangued, Abra;
(2) since accused-appellant, Pedrito, and Rey were already sleeping inside the pub, Fernando
decided to go home, brought out Pedrito first and seated him inside the tricycle;
(3) then Fernando took out accused-appellant who was roused from sleep and led him to the
tricycle;
(4) thereafter, Fernando went inside again to fetch Rey;
(5) on their way out, Fernando heard a gunshot and he saw accused-appellant holding a gun;
(6) Fernando rushed to the tricycle where Pedrito was and it was then that he heard another
gunshot;
(7) consequently, Fernando grappled with accused-appellant for the possession of the gun;
(8) Felix Bernal testified that while Fernando fetched Rey inside the pub, he turned on the engine of
the tricycle;
(9) while doing so, he heard two gunshots;
(10) when he looked at Pedrito, who was supposedly sleeping inside the tricycle, he saw blood
oozing from his head; and
(11) he saw accused-appellant holding a gun.
Concededly, Fernando and Felix did not see the actual shooting and killing of the victim.
Nonetheless, the above-mentioned circumstances taken together form, in our view, one unbroken
chain leading to the fair and reasonable conclusion that indeed, Accused-appellant, to the exclusion
of all others, was responsible for the death of the victim.
Worse, the death of the victim was accomplished with treachery.
The characteristic and unmistakable manifestation of alevosia is the deliberate, sudden and
unexpected attack of the victim from behind, without any warning and without giving him an
opportunity to defend himself or repel the initial assault. If the attack is sudden, unexpected, not
preceded by any provocation and the deceased is not in a situation to defend himself, treachery
must be considered as a qualifying circumstance of murder.
The circumstances obtaining in the instant case show that treachery attended the killing of the victim
by Accused-Appellant. The attack on the victim was sudden and unexpected, and this was evident
in the manner accused-appellant shot his victim — from behind and while asleep, giving his victim
no opportunity to defend himself or repel accused-appellant’s attack.
It has been held by this Court in a long line of cases that the qualifying circumstance of treachery
exists when one takes the life of a person who is asleep because in such a case, the victim was not
in a position to put up any defense. 8
Moreover, both prosecution witnesses Fernando and Felix Bernal are one in claiming that the victim
was asleep inside the tricycle when they heard the gunshots. They did not witness any altercation
immediately preceding the actual shooting nor was there any while both the victim and accused-
appellant were inside the Benedisco pub. The fact is, after accused-appellant was brought out of the
pub by Fernando, the former positioned himself at the back of the unknowing victim and discharged
his firearm twice hitting his victim on the head. Unmistakably, it indicates the conscious and
deliberate actions by accused-appellant to facilitate the killing without risk to himself. The sudden,
unexpected and unprovoked attack during which the victim was not in a position to defend himself
constitutes alevosia. 9
Accused-appellant argues that the trial court committed an error when it imposed the death penalty
on him on account of the alternative aggravating circumstance of habitual drunkenness. He claims
that the prosecution was not able to prove the same at the trial, much less that he intentionally got
drunk to commit the crime. We agree.
The general rule is that intoxication may be considered either as aggravating or mitigating,
depending upon the circumstances attending the commission of the crime. Intoxication is mitigating
and therefore has the effect of decreasing the penalty if the intoxication is not habitual or attendant
to the plan to commit the contemplated crime. On the other hand, when intoxication is habitual or
done intentionally to embolden the malefactor and facilitate the plan to commit the crime, 10 it is
considered as an aggravating circumstance. 11
In the instant case, Accused-appellant’s intoxication cannot be considered aggravating because
there was no showing that it was habitual or intentional. As testified to by prosecution witness Felix
Bernal, their group drink liquor only occasionally, that is, if they had visitors. His testimony that if
they had visitors everyday, they drank everyday does not suffice to prove that accused-appellant
was a habitual drunkard. Nor should such statement be taken against the Accused-Appellant.
Undeniably, Accused-appellant was a mere visitor at that time. He came to Bangued to attend a
hearing and from there went to Barangay Dangdangla, Bangued to visit his relatives.
Further, the prosecution failed to prove that accused-appellant got drunk on the day the murder
occurred for the purpose of committing the same. Neither did accused-appellant initiate the drinking
spree. He merely acceded to the invitation of the victim to join his group in their drinking spree.
Thus, in the absence of clear and convincing proof that the intoxication was habitual or intentional
on the part of accused-appellant, it is improper to consider the same as an aggravating
circumstance. 12
But his intoxication cannot likewise be considered mitigating because accused-appellant failed to
show that his intoxication impaired his will power or his capacity to understand the wrongful nature
of his acts. The person pleading intoxication must prove that he took such quantity of alcoholic
beverage, prior to the commission of the crime, as would blur his reason. 13 This accused-appellant
failed to do. No proof was presented by accused-appellant that the amount of liquor he had taken
was of such quantity as to affect his mental faculties. The mere claim of intoxication does not entitle
him to the mitigating circumstance of intoxication.
Accused-appellant likewise reasons that the trial court erred in holding that the killing of the victim
was premeditated. He denies that he had any prior plan or preparation to kill Pedrito Beralas. He
points out that the prosecution failed to establish the time when he supposedly decided to commit
the crime or prove the acts manifesting that he clung to his determination and that there was a
sufficient lapse of time between determination and execution.
We agree and the Office of the Solicitor General concurs.
Evident premeditation cannot be deduced from mere presumption or speculation. It must be proven
clearly. Evident premeditation cannot be appreciated without proof of how and when the plan to kill
was hatched or how much time elapsed before it was carried out. The premeditation must be
evident and not merely suspected. 14
We find no evidence directly showing any pre-conceived plan or devise employed by accused-
appellant to kill the victim. Accused-appellant did not go to Barangay Dangdangla, Bangued to kill
the victim but to attend to some important matters. As earlier stated, Accused-appellant was just
invited by his relatives, whom he had not seen for a while after he changed residence, to have a
drinking spree. The probability is that the decision to shoot the victim was made only right there and
then. This should at least cast reasonable doubt on the existence of a premeditated plan to kill the
victim. 15
The trial court thus erred in holding that evident premeditation attended the killing of the victim
merely on the basis of its finding of a deep-seated and long standing grudge felt by accused-
appellant towards the victim. The mere existence of ill-feeling or grudge between the parties is not
sufficient to establish premeditated killing. Even assuming that accused-appellant felt spite towards
Pedrito and harbored a desire to vindicate the death of his father, such a sentiment does not
necessarily translate into a resolution to commit a crime. There must be an outward act showing or
manifesting criminal intent. 16 Such is absent in the instant case. Hence, it would be erroneous to
declare that the killing of the victim was premeditated.
Anent accused-appellant’s conviction in Criminal Case No. 1647 for violation of Presidential Decree
No. 1866 (illegal possession of firearms and ammunition), the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
recommends that it should not be treated as a separate offense. According to the OSG, the
amendments introduced by Republic Act No. 8294 to Presidential Decree No. 1866 to the effect that
the use of an unlicensed firearm in killing the victim should be treated as an aggravating
circumstance finds application in the instant case. Hence, if the offense was committed before the
effectivity of the amendments, it should be given retroactive effect as it favors Accused-Appellant.
We do not, however, see how such retroactive application of the amendments favors Accused-
Appellant. The amendatory law (RA 8294), which took effect on July 6, 1997, explicitly provides that
"if homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such use of an unlicensed
firearm shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance."cralaw virtua1aw library
Accused-appellant is convicted of the crime of murder which is punishable by reclusion perpetua to
death. Without any aggravating circumstance, Accused-appellant shall be meted the penalty of
reclusion perpetua pursuant to Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code. However, the presence of
even one aggravating circumstance will send accused-appellant to lethal injection. If we were to
treat the use of an unlicensed firearm by accused-appellant in killing the victim as an aggravating
circumstance therefore, the maximum penalty of death would have to be imposed. This obviously
does not strengthen accused-appellant’s position and does not at all place him in a more favorable
situation. It in fact damns him all the more. In contrast, Accused-appellant’s separate conviction for
the offense of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition will spare him his life.
But if we do not consider the use of an unlicensed firearm as an aggravating circumstance in the
accused-appellant’s prosecution for murder, should we not instead convict him for the separate
offense of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition under PD 1866 — on the theory that this
will spare him his life and is thus favorable to him? We do not think so either.
In Criminal Case No. 1647 for illegal possession of firearms and ammunition (violation of PD 1866),
we should apply the ruling enunciated in the recent case of People v. Walpan M. Ladjaalam 17
where we declared:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
. . . if an unlicensed firearm is used in the commission of any crime, there can be no separate
offense of simple illegal possession of firearms.
x          x           x
The law is clear: the accused can be convicted of simple illegal possession of firearms, provided
that "no other crime was committed by the person arrested." If the intention of the law in the second
paragraph were to refer only to homicide and murder, it should have expressly said so, as it did in
the third paragraph. Verily, where the law does not distinguish, neither should we.
In the above-cited case of Ladjaalam, the appellant was convicted by the trial court of (1) illegal
possession of firearms, (2) direct assault with multiple attempted homicide and (3) violation of the
dangerous drugs law. We acquitted him of the first crime (illegal possession) but affirmed his
conviction of the latter two. In justifying the acquittal, we said inter alia that "when the crime was
committed on September 24, 1997, the original language of PD 1866 had already been expressly
superseded by RA 8294 . . ." and no "conviction for illegal possession of firearms separate from any
other crime" was thus possible.
In the present case, the illegal possession of firearms (as a separate offense) was committed by
accused-appellant before RA 8294 took effect. Since the amendment contained in RA 8294 is
favorable to him in the sense that it would mean his acquittal (from the charge of illegal possession
of firearms), then the law should be given retroactive effect.
We cannot therefore affirm the conviction of accused-appellant for illegal possession of firearm in
Criminal Case No. 1647.
With respect to the awards of actual, and moral damages, the same cannot likewise be upheld by
this Court. Actual damages cannot be awarded based on the allegation of a witness without any
competent document to support such claim — proof is required to be adequately supported by
receipts, 18 and not merely a list as done by the prosecution. However, as the widow of the victim
clearly incurred funeral expenses, P10,000.00 by way of nominal damages should be awarded. This
award is adjudicated so that a right which has been violated may be recognized or vindicated, but
not for the purpose of indemnification. 19

Furthermore, the award of P500,000.00 denominated as "moral and exemplary damages" by the
court below is without basis. The widow of the victim is not entitled to moral damages because she
did not testify on any mental anguish or emotional distress which she suffered as a result of her
husband’s death. But recent jurisprudence 20 justifies the imposition of exemplary damages in
cases where treachery is proven as in this case. For this reason, we award the amount of
P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.

Finally, when death occurs as a result of a crime, the heirs of the deceased are entitled to the
amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for the death of the victim without need for any evidence or
proof of damages. 21

WHEREFORE, finding the convictions of accused-appellant justified by the evidence on record, the
Court hereby AFFIRMS said judgments, with the following modifications: (a) in Criminal Case No.
1645 for murder, the penalty imposed is reduced to reclusion perpetua; (b) aside from the payment
of P10,000.00 as nominal damages, Accused-appellant is further ordered to indemnify the heir of
the victim P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages; (c) the awards of
actual and moral damages are deleted; and (d) Criminal Case No. 1647 for illegal possession of
firearm is hereby DISMISSED.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

SO ORDERED.
 G.R. No. 220761, October 03, 2016
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. EDDIE OLAZO, MIGUEL CORDIS,
CHARITO FERNANDEZ AND ROGELIO LASCONIA, Accused,
CHARITO FERNANDEZ, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
CAGUIOA, J.:
This an Appeal1 filed under Section 13, Rule 124 of the Rules of Court from the Decision dated June
2, 20152 (questioned Decision) of the Court of Appeals, Twentieth (20 th) Division (CA), which
affirmed the Decision dated June 14, 20113 of the Regional Trial Court of Abuyog, Leyte, Branch 10
(RTC), in Criminal Case No. 2402, finding herein accused-appellant Charito Fernandez (Charito)
guilty of the crime of Robbery with Homicide.
The facts, as summarized by the CA in the questioned Decision, are as follows:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
On two several (sic) occasions in the months of July and August 2004, accused Rogelio Lasconia
together with several others hatched a plan to rob the spouses Erlinda and Nicanor Vallecera inside
their home in Barangay Bito, Abuyog, Leyte. It was agreed that accused Dionesia Lasconia, who
was then employed as a stay-out house help of the spouses Vallecera would assist them by helping
them get access inside the house undetected.
At the first meeting, accused Rogelio Lasconia and Rommel Escobio were present together with
accused-appellant Miguel Corbis. On thsecond meeting, accused-appellant Miguel Corbis, as well
as, Charito Fernandez attended the planning. During both meetings however, the plan did not push
through due to the absence of some of the expected members and some superstitious omen.
Sometime on August 8, 2004, accused Dionesia Lasconia was informed by the group that they
would push through with their plan that night. Thus, despite being a Sunday and her rest day,
Dionesia returned to the house of the spouses Vallecera around five o'clock in the afternoon and
awaited for the arrival of her cohorts.
Upon her arrival at the residence, Dionesia tended to her usual chores by feeding the chickens,
sweeping the grounds and cooking for the supper of the spouses. She, however, left the back gate
open to allow her co-accused to enter the compound as agreed.
Around seven o'clock in the evening, Dionesia heard sounds near the back portion of the house.
She then immediately opened the kitchen door and allowed accused Rogelio Lasconia, Rommel
Escobio and Eddie Fernandez, all of whom were then wearing masks, to enter the house.
The three then waited near the kitchen area of the house while the spouses Vallecera were inside
the master's bedroom. After almost an hour of waiting, Erlinda Vallecera opened the master's
bedroom door and was immediately accosted by the three intruders. Accused Eddie Fernandez
then pointed a gun at Erlinda Vallecera and grabbed her.
The three then covered her face, while Rogelio whispered at Erlinda not to make any noise as they
were only there to get money. They then dragged her into the master's bedroom where they then
hogtied Nicanor Vallecera.
The three then forced Erlinda to open the vault where they then took away at least one hundred
thousand pesos in cash and several pieces of jewelry. They also raided the office of Erlinda in
search for more valuables.
After they were able to grab all the valuable items they can easily cart away, accused Eddie
Fernandez and Rommel Escobio then brought Erlinda into one of the comfort rooms inside the
house. There Rommel Escobio slashed her throat with the use of a samurai that they found inside
the office of Erlinda.
Subsequently, Rommel Escobio exited the comfort room and approached Rogelio Lasconia and
intimated that Erlinda was still alive despite the wound. Rogelio then entered the comfort room and
thereat stabbed Erlinda several times in the neck area with the use of a long knife.
Thereafter, the three accused then hogtied Dionesia Lasconia to make it appear that she had no
part in the robbery and then exited the house.4
On February 21, 2005, an Information was filed with the RTC against Eddie Olazo, Miguel Corbis
and Charito, together with Rogelio Lasconia, Joseph Oronos (Joseph), Dionesia Lasconia, Rommel
Escobio, and Eddie Fernandez, charging them with the crime of Robbery with Homicide, as follows:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
That on or about the 8th day of August 8, 2004, in the Municipality of Abuyog, Province of Leyte,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this honorable court, the above named accused conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping with one another and being armed with a gun and bladed
weapons, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with intent to gain by means of
force, violence and intimidation, to wit: by pointing at one ERLINDA T. VALLECERA with the said
gun and demanding money from her, hogtying NICANOR VALLECERA and threatening to kill the
above-named spouses, and thereafter take, steal and carry away cash amounting to more than Php
100,000.00 and undetermined amount of assorted jewelry owned by and belonging to the said
spouses NICANOR VALLECERA, against their will and without their consent to the damage and
prejudice to said owner in the said sum; that on the occasion of the said robbery, the above-named
accused, with intent to kill, with evident premeditation and taking advantage of their superior
strength, conspiring, confederating, and mutually helping with one another, and in pursuance of their
conspiracy, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously attack, assault, slash the throat,
stab, hack and wound ERLINDA T. VALLECERA with the use of bladed weapon which the accused
provided themselves for the purpose, thereby hitting and inflicting upon her fatal wounds on the
different parts of her body which were the direct and proximate cause of her death.

ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW.5chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
During arraignment, only Rommel Escobio pleaded guilty, while Eddie Fernandez remained at
large.6chanrobleslaw
Meanwhile, during trial, Joseph was discharged as state witness. On the other hand, Dionesia
Lasconia was allowed to plead guilty to the lesser offense of Homicide on the condition that she
would corroborate the testimony of Joseph, the alleged driver of the motorcycle used to transport
the accused to and from the scene of the crime.
Ruling of the RTC
After trial on the merits, in its Decision dated June 14, 2011, 7 the RTC convicted Charito, together
with Rogelio Lasconia, Eddie Olazo, and Miguel Corbis, of the cnme charged. The dispositive
portion of the said Decision reads:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, finding the Prosecution to have successfully proven the guilt of the Accused Rogelio
Lasconia alias "Tesing", Eddie Olazo, Miguel Corbis, alias "Blackie" and Charito Fernandez, guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime as charge (sic), this Court hereby sentences the aforesaid
accused to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, ordering the aforesaid to indemnify the
Heirs of the Offended Party in the amount of Php.l 00,000.00 jointly and severally and to pay the
cost.
SO ORDERED.8chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Aggrieved, Charito appealed before the CA, along with Eddie Olazo and Miguel Corbis (Accused-
appellants). Accordingly, Accused-appellants filed their Brief dated August 8, 2012, 9 while the
Appellee, through the OSG, filed its Brief on January 22, 2013. 10chanrobleslaw
Ruling of the CA
In the questioned Decision, the CA affirmed the RTC insofar as it convicted Charito of the crime
charged. Notably, however, the CA acquitted Eddie Olazo and Miguel Corbis on the ground that
there was a lack of evidence in the records to sustain their conviction. Quoted hereunder are the
pertinent portions of the questioned Decision:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Simply put, while accused-appellant Miguel Corbis had participated in conspiring to commit robbery
against the spouses Vallecera, sans any showing of his actual aid or presence during its
commission, or any overt act indicative of common design, he cannot be held criminally
culpable for such felony.
Moreover, as to the complicity of accused-appellant Eddie Olazo, We also find a total bankruptcy in
the records of the case that could even remotely exhibit his complicity and culpability to the crime
charged. The totality of the testimonies of the prosecution is bare of any participation of
Eddie Olazo. As tersely testified by state witness Joseph Oronos, Eddie Olazo was never
present during the planning of the commission of the crime nor during the actual
commission thereof.
xxxx
In the case at bench, such unity in purpose by accused-appellant Charito Fernandez to the acts
committed by his co-accused Rogelio Lasconia, Eddie Fernandez and Rommel Escobio has been
duly and clearly established by his act of planning with the other accused the conduct of
robbery, by accompanying them during its commission and hasty getaway, as well as
providing payment for their getaway vehicle and even threatening their driver with mortal
harm should be reveal what they had committed. This (sic) established acts of accused-
appellant Charito Fernandez evinces beyond cavil his complicity and agreement of the unlawful
criminal design of Rogelio Lasconia, Eddie Fernandez and Rommel Escobio. 11 (Emphasis supplied)
On June 10, 2015, Charito filed a Notice of Appeal of even date with the CA, elevating the case to
this Court.12chanrobleslaw
In a Resolution dated November 11, 2015,13 the Court instructed the parties to file their respective
Supplemental Briefs, if they so desired. In lieu of filing Supplemental Briefs, however, the parties
filed Manifestations respectively dated February 4, 2016 14 and February 19, 2016,15 informing the
Court that they were merely adopting their previous Briefs submitted with the CA.
Issue
Proceeding from the foregoing, for resolution of this Court is the issue of whether or not the RTC, as
affirmed by the CA, erred in finding Charito guilty of the crime of Robbery with Homicide.
The Court's Ruling
In the instant Appeal, Charito claims that the prosecution was unable to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. Specifically, Charito argues that the evidence showing his participation in the
planning stages of the crime was insufficient to sustain his conviction and the finding of conspiracy
between him and his co-accused.
We disagree.
To begin with, this Court has repeatedly recognized that the trial court is in the best position to
assess the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies given its unique position to observe the
elusive and incommunicable evidence of the witnesses' deportment on the stand while testifying,
which opportunity is denied to the appellate courts. 16 Hence, the trial court's assessment of the
credibility of witnesses is accorded great weight and respect and is binding on this Court, especially
when affirmed by the CA.17chanrobleslaw
We see no reason to doubt the positive testimony of Joseph, especially when weighed against the
bare allegations of Charito,  i.e., that he was elsewhere having a drinking spree during the time of
the commission of the crime.18chanrobleslaw
There is conspiracy when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission
of a felony and decide to commit it.19 Conspiracy is present when one concurs with the criminal
design of another, indicated by the performance of an overt act which produces the crime. 20 In
proving conspiracy, direct evidence is not indispensable as its existence may be inferred from the
conduct of the accused before, during, and after the commission of the crime. 21chanrobleslaw
In the instant case, the candid testimony of state witness Joseph unmistakably produces a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt. That Charito was present before, during, and after the
commission of the crime and that there was conspiracy between the malefactors are findings fully
supported by the evidence on record:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
2nd prosecution witness JOSEPH ORONOS, who turned state witness was presented on the witness
stand on January 23, 2008 to testify that on the month of July 2004, Rogelio Lasconia or "TESING"
together with his Auntie Dionesia Lasconia, Charito and Miguel hired him to ferry them to Brgy.
Barayong, to where Dionesia Lasconia was living for the plan out of the proposed
robbery and in the course of their conversation, he overheard "ONING" or DIONESIA LASCONIA
giving all the details laying on the plan of robbery on the house of Atty. Vallecera with instruction
to KILL her master so that it will not be known that it was she who planned everything. (TSN
January 23, 2008, pp. 27-28, Crim. Case No. 2402, 2 nd prosecution witness, JOSEPH ORONOS,
Guarda).
Witness also admitted that in another instance he was hired by the same group at around seven
o'clock in the evening of August 8, 2004 to the Sto. Nino Park Rotunda of Abuyog, Leyte and when
they disembarked, he saw them went straight ahead of the street and down towards the house of
her master, at around 8:00 o'clock in the evening.
On their return from Atty. Vallecera's house, "Oning" or Dionesia Lasconia was carrying a bag and
"Tesing" or Rogelio Lasconia was with a bolo in his hand, while the two persons were barehanded,
then he brought them near the house of "Tesing" in Caranhug, Javier, Leyte, it was Charito who
paid him two five-hundred peso bill (sic) few days after. (TSN January 23, 2008, pp. 31-33,
Crim. Case No. 2402, 2nd prosecution witness, JOSEPH ORONOS, Guarda)
xxxx
x x x Further admitted by him that on the month of August, the date and year he cannot recall, he
was hired by Rogelio Lasconia to ferry them to the place of Dionesia Lasconia where he overheard
their plan to rob her master with Dionesia Lasconia laying all details whereby Rogelio,
Miguel Corbis, and Charito Fernandez uttered there is no problem about that. (TSN February
12, 2008, pp. 5-9, Crim. Case No. 2402, 2nd prosecution witness, JOSEPH ORONOS,
Tonog)22(Emphasis supplied)
Without doubt, Joseph positively identified Charito and declared that he saw him during the initial
planning of the commission of the crime and noted Charito's express agreement thereto. 23 Joseph
also testified that he saw Charito in the evening of August 8, 2004, when he brought the accused
near the house of the spouses Vallecera and again upon their return to the drop-off area almost an
hour later.24 It was also established that Charito paid Joseph for the use of his motorcycle two (2)
days after the commission of the crime and that he was threatened by Charito should the former
"squeal" on them.25cralawredchanrobleslaw
These facts clearly evince unity of purpose and criminal design between Charito and his cohorts.
Finally, we take note of the fact that the RTC and the CA had concurring factual and legal findings
insofar as they found Charito guilty of the crime of Robbery with Homicide. Thus, in the absence of
any showing that material facts or circumstances were overlooked by the inferior courts, this Court
affirms the questioned Decision.
With respect to the imposition of the appropriate penalty, the dispositive portion of the questioned
Decision stated:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
As to accused-appellant CHARITO FERNANDEZ, We find him GUILTY of the crime charged and
sentence him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Accused-Appellant Charito Fernandez is
further ordered to pay the heirs of Erlinda Vallecera the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (Php
50,000.00) as moral damages, Fifty Thousand Pesos (Php 50,000.00) as civil indemnity and Forty
Thousand Pesos (Php 40,000.00) as actual damages. All monetary awards for damages shall earn
interest at the legal rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the date of finality of this Decision until
fully paid.
SO ORDERED.26
Article 294(1) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended, 27 imposes the penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death when by reason or on occasion of the crime of Robbery with violence against or
intimidation of persons, the crime of Homicide is committed. Considering that the imposable penalty
for Robbery with Homicide consists of two (2) indivisible penalties (i.e., death and reclusion
perpetua), Article 63 of the RPC finds application:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Article 63. Rules for the application of indivisible penalties. - In all cases in which the law prescribes
a single indivisible penalty, it shall be applied by the courts regardless of any mitigating or
aggravating circumstances that may have attended the commission of the deed.
In all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties, the
following rules shall be observed in the application thereof:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary1. When in the commission of the deed there is present only one
aggravating circumstance, the greater penalty shall be applied.

2. When there are neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances in the commission of the deed,
the lesser penalty shall be applied.
xxxx
In this regard, we note that both the RTC and the CA failed to consider "evident premeditation" 28 and
"taking advantage of superior strength"29 as ordinary, aggravating circumstances, despite having
been sufficiently alleged in the Information filed with the RTC, viz:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
[T]hat on the occasion of the said robbery, the above-named accused, with intent to kill, with
evident premeditation and taking advantage of their superior strength, conspiring,
confederating, and mutually helping with one another, and in pursuance of their conspiracy, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously attack, assault, slash the throat, stab, hack and wound
ERLINDA T. VALLECERA with the use of bladed weapon which the accused provided themselves
for the purpose, thereby hitting and inflicting upon her fatal wounds on the different parts of her body
which were the direct and proximate cause of her death. 30 (Emphasis supplied)
The requirements to prove the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation are the following:
(i) the time when the offender determined to commit the crime; (ii) an act manifestly indicating that
the culprit has clung to his determination; and (iii) sufficient lapse of time between the determination
and execution to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act. 31 To warrant a finding of
evident premeditation, it must appear not only that the accused decided to commit the crime prior to
the moment of its execution, but also that such decision was the result of "meditation, calculation,
reflection, or persistent attempt".32chanrobleslaw
While we have previously ruled that the circumstance of evident premeditation is inherent in
Robbery,33 it may be considered in the special complex crime of Robbery with Homicide if there is
premeditation to kill besides stealing.34 Here, the evidence clearly established how and when
Charito and his co-conspirators hatched their malevolent plan to rob the spouses Vallecera and
likewise "kill [Dionesia Lasconia's] master".35 As discussed above, the first attempt of the
malefactors to carry out their scheme was foiled and it was only on their second attempt that they
were able to consummate the conspiracy. Hence, that there were persistent attempts made by the
accused sufficiently demonstrate how determined they were to adhere to their agreement despite
the sufficient lapse of time. Moreover, that Charito and his cohorts went to great lengths to hire
Joseph to ferry them back and forth to the scene of the crime shows the sobriety and
circumspection surrounding their decision. Such circumstances therefore show that the crime
committed was a product of intent and coordination among the accused. Hence, the aggravating
circumstance of evident premeditation is present in this case.
commission of the offense, Nicanor Vallecera was hogtied by three (3) of the perpetrators, while
Erlinda Vallecera, a woman, was successively and fatally injured using a samurai sword and a long
knife. Clearly, the means employed by the culprits were patently excessive, there being no
indication of retaliation from the spouses Vallecera as their means of defense were greatly, if not
absolutely, diminished. In this regard, the aggravating circumstance of "superior strength" is
properly cognizable.
Proceeding from the foregoing, applying Article 63 of the RPC would mean that the imposable
penalty on the accused would be death given the presence of two (2) aggravating circumstances.
However, in view of Republic Act No. 9346, and as correctly ruled by the CA, the imposition of the
penalty of death has been prohibited and in lieu thereof, the penalty of reclusion perpetua is to be
imposed.
Accordingly, recognizing the presence of the two (2) aggravating circumstances affects the proper
amount of damages to be imposed. Thus, in our recent ruling in People v. Jugueta,37 we held that
the principal consideration is "the penalty provided by law or imposable for the offense because of
its heinousness, not the public penalty actually imposed on the offender". Here, since the penalty of
death would have been imposed were it not for Republic Act No. 9346, the original award of Fifty
Thousand Pesos ( 50,000.00) for moral damages and civil indemnity should be increased to One
Hundred Thousand Pesos (100,000.00) each.  Further, in light of the socially reprehensible conduct
exhibited by Charito, and to serve as a deterrent to others similarly inclined, we deem it just to
award exemplary damages in the amount of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (100,000.00). Thus, in
conformity with prevailing jurisprudence,38 we modify the award of damages made by the CA.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the appeal is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Decision
dated June 2, 2015 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 01417, finding accused-
appellant Charito Fernandez GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with
Homicide under Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, is
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION, sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua  and ordering him to pay the heirs of Erlinda Vallecera the amount of One Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P 100,000.00) as civil indemnity, One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00)
as moral damages, One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) as exemplary damages, and
Forty Thousand Pesos (P40,000.00) as actual damages. 39 All monetary awards shall earn interest at
the legal rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the date of finality of this Decision until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Meanwhile, to appreciate the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength, what is to be

considered is whether the aggressors took advantage of their combined strength in order to
consummate the offense, e.g., that excessive force out of proportion to the means of defense
available to the victim was used.36 In the case at bench, the records disclose that during the
G.R. No. 127849             August 9, 2000
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
VIVENCIO LABUGUEN @ DENCIO, accused-appellant.
PER CURIAM:
For automatic review is the Decision 1 dated October 7, 1996, of the Regional Trial Court of
Cauayan, Isabela, Branch 20, finding appellant Vivencio Labuguen @ Dencio guilty of the crime of
Robbery with Homicide in Criminal Case No. 20-738, and sentencing him thus:
"WHEREFORE, finding the accused VIVENCIO LABUGUEN @ DENCIO GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE as alleged in the information
and considering the presence of the aggravating circumstances of fraud and craft without
any mitigating circumstance, the Court, considering the provision of Article 294,
paragraph1 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act 7659, hereby
sentences said accused VIVENCIO LABUGUEN the penalty of DEATH. The accused
Vivencio Labuguen is hereby ordered to pay the heirs of Bonifacio Angeles P40,000.00 for
the money taken, P55,100.00 for the expenses incurred during the wake and- burial of the
deceased Bonifacio Angeles and P50,000.00 indemnification. Cost against the
accused.1âwphi1.nêt
SO ORDERED.2
Filed on February 3, 1995, the information indicting appellant alleges:
"That on or about the 27th day of October, 1994, in the municipality of Angadanan, province
of Isabela, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused,
by means of force violence and intimidation against person and with intent to gain, did then
and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, take, steal and carry away cash money in the
amount of P40,000.00 and belonging to Bonifacio Angeles @ Asiong, against his will and
consent, to the damage and prejudice of the said Bonifacio Angeles @ Asiong, in the
aforesaid amount of P40,000.00; that on the occasion and by reason of said robbery, and
for the purpose of enabling him to take, steal and bring away the said money, the accused,
did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to kill and without any just
motive, assault, attack and shoot for several times with a firearm and stab for several times
with a pointed/bladed instrument the said Bonifacio Angeles @ Asiong, inflicting upon him
multiple gunshot wounds and multiple stab wounds on the different parts of his body, which
directly caused his death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.3
With the appellant, assisted by Atty. Dionisio E. Bala, Jr., pleading not guilty upon arraignment 4 on
April 5, 1995, trial ensued with the prosecution presenting Marilou Dabo, Tomas Pabigayan, Romeo
(Romy) Bariza, Pantaleon Tagora, Elpidio Rivera SPO2 Joselito Apalisoc, SPO1 Elmo Bungag,
Edgar Valle, Geronimo Rivera, Dr. Inocencio R. Agpaoa and Federico Angeles, as its witnesses.
The defense called on Victoriano Dy, Romeo Estacio, Precila Labuguen, Lt. David Palaganas,
Tranquilino Cagurangan, Jessie Cabbab and Orlando Ramos and the appellant himself to testify.
The facts that matter are synthesized in the decision of the trial court as follows:
". . . Bonifacio Angeles, 56, (Bonifacio) was engaged in the business of buying cows which
he sold at the public market. Although he was married to Damasa Gante with whom he had
nine (9) children, he lived with another woman, Marilou Dabo, 28, at Coloma Village, San
Fermin, Cauayan, Isabela. They begot two (2) children during their ten (10) years of
coverture.
Early in the morning of October 27, 1994, Tomas Pagbigayan (sic) (Tomas) went to the
house of Bonifacio at San Fermin. Tomas offered two cows to sell to Bonifacio. Bonifacio
said that when he has time, he will go and see the cows. After their talk Bonifacio gave
Tomas a lift on his Honda Sports XL100 motorcycle and accompanied him to the crossing
where he could take a ride home. Tomas sat on the backseat of the motorcycle.
Marilou Dabo declared that when Bonifacio returned home, the accused Vivencio (Dencio)
Labuguen was with him. The accused sat behind Bonifacio who drove the motorcycle.
The accused stayed on the porch of the house. Marilou Dabo served him coffee. The
accused told Bonifacio that he knows of three big cows for sale and that the place where
they are is near. Bonifacio said that he will go and see the cows, after breakfast.
Marilou Dabo declared in her testimony that the accused had a handkerchief tied around his
forehead as a headband. He was wearing dark sunglasses, dark jacket and a faded maong
pants. He wore rubber slippers. Marilou Dabo recognized him as the accused Vivencio
Labuguen because before October 27, 1994, the accused had already come to their house
and offered to sell a lot to Bonifacio. After Bonifacio finished his breakfast, he went to the
porch and talked to the accused for about fifteen (15) minutes. Marilou Dabo was in the
kitchen three meters away from them.
Bonifacio entered their room and took P40,000.00 from the cabinet. Bonifacio got
P40,000.00 because the accused told him the cows are big. He counted the money and
placed it inside his pocket. Marilou Dabo was beside him. She saw Bonifacio count the
P40,000.00 in P1,000.00, P500.00 and P100.00 bills.
Then Bonifacio and the accused rode on the motorcycle. Bonifacio drove the motorcycle.
The accused was seated behind Bonifacio. This was past 8:00 o'clock in the morning of
October 27, 1994.
Bonifacio and accused Vivencio Labuguen passed by the house of Romeo Bariza, 47,
farmer, who resided in San Fermin, Cauayan. His house was 120 meters away from the
house of Bonifacio. Bariza was the planting 'kahoy' when he saw at a distance of 20 meters
Bonifacio and the accused pass by riding on a motorcycle color (sic) red and black, running
slowly because the road was full of potholes. Bariza declared that Bonifacio and the
accused glanced at him. He recognized Bonifacio because he is his compadre and the
accused because he had known him months before that date. Accused was wearing
sunglasses and a cloth on his forehead. In Court, Bariza identified the accused Vivencio
Labuguen as the same person he saw riding with Bonifacio that morning of October 27,
1994, while he was planting 'kahoy.'
Tomas declared that he was not able to get immediately a ride going home. While at the
crossing waiting for a ride, he saw Bonifacio and the accused Vivencio Labuguen. They
rode on a motorcycle driven by Bonifacio. The accused sat on the backseat of the
motorcycle. They glanced at Tomas. Tomas saw the face of the accused who was wearing
sunglasses with a handkerchief tied around his forehead. Tomas recognized the accused
Vivencio Labuguen because on October 22, 1994, he saw him talking to Romy Bariza on
the road in front of the latter's house in San Fermin. When the accused left, he (Tomas)
asked Romy Bariza who was the person he talked with and he answered, 'Dencio.' Dencio
is the nickname of the accused Vivencio Labuguen. Accused then left driving a tricycle.
At about 10:00 o'clock that morning of October 27, 1994, Pantaleon Tagora, 55, farmer and
a resident of Ramona, Angadanan, was on his way home. He had just come from his
cornfield. He was walking on top of the irrigation canal near the service drop when he met
two (2) male persons. One was younger than the other. The young one wore a jacket which
was quite yellow. His face was quite round. He was not wearing sunglasses or headband. In
Court, Tagora identified the younger person as Vivencio Labuguen. (TSN p. 10, Tagora,
July 5, 1995). The older one wore a faded maong pants. His face was quite elongated. They
were seated four (4) meters apart. Tagora first met the older male person. This place where
Tagora met them was one and a half kilometers from his house.
Tagora passed by the two persons without talking to them. After walking 200 meters away
from them, he saw a motorcycle parked on the way.
The top of the irrigation canal was used as an exit road to the National Highway between
Alicia on the South and Cauayan on the North. (TSN-Dr 2 Agpaoa, p. 13, October 31,
1995).
Elpidio Rivera, 31, farmer and a resident of Barangay Viga, Angadanan, one (1) kilometer
West of Ramona, was sundrying (sic) his corn on the concrete edge of the road near his
house at about 10:30 o'clock that morning of October 27, 1994. This road goes to
Angadanan and then to Cauayan (TSN — p. 7, Elpidio Rivera, August 16, 1995). His
attention was attracted by a loud roar of a motorcycle coming towards his place. Elpidio
stopped working. At a distance he saw a person riding on a red motorcycle (sports type). He
carne from the West from Ramona and going towards the East. When it was near the place
where Elpidio was drying corn, the motorcycle slowed down because it was a curve. Elpidio
declared in court that he saw the face of the motorcycle rider: quite round, wearing a light
yellow jacket with a handkerchief around his forehead. The handkerchief was black with red
dots. He was 6 to 7 meters from Elpidio when he passed by. In Court, Elpidio readily
identified the accused Vivencio Labuguen as the person he saw riding on the motorcycle.
(TSN — Rivera, p. 8, August 16, 1995)
Between 11:00 to 12:00 o'clock noon on October 27, 1994, Geronimo Rivera, 45, was
driving a Challenger, a passenger mini-bus (sic), at Barangay Nappaccu Grande
(Nappaccu), Reina Mercedes, Isabela. His conductor was Eduardo Valle, 20. They came
from Santiago, Isabela, bound for Tuguegarao, Cagayan. There were passengers in the
bus.
At Nappaccu, Geromino Rivera (Rivera) saw at a distance of 200 meters, a person behind
some talahibs near the National Highway. When the mini-bus (sic) came near to a distance
of 50 meters from the person, Rivera noticed that he was wiping something on his right
hand and right face. When the mini-bus (sic) was near, the person flagged it down. The bus
stopped. Rivera saw a Honda XL100 motorcycle three (3) meters from the person near the
edge of the highway.
Conductor Eduardo Valle, went down the mini-bus (sic) to allow the person to get inside the
bus. He observed that his clothes, particularly the right side of his jacket and the right side
of his pants, was soaked with blood. He was wearing a cream jacket, maong pants,
sunglasses and a handkerchief tied around his forehead. Eduardo Valle thought he met an
accident but when he looked at the Honda XL100 motorcycle parked behind the person, it
was not damaged and that he had no injuries.
The person sat on the 5th row seat, a 3-seater, on the left. He was alone there. The 4th,
3rd, 2nd and 1st row of seats were vacant. He placed the palm of his hands behind his
head. He acted as if he was looking for something which he could not find. Rivera could see
him clearly on the big rear view mirror (1 foot by 1/2) above him.
Conductor Eduardo Valle went to him and asked him where he was going but the person
did not answer, instead, without saying anything, he gave a P10.00 bill to Eduardo Valle. He
asked the person where he was going to alight so he could give him his change, but the
person did not answer. Eduardo Valle declared in Court that he saw the breast pocket of the
jacket of the person full of money, two inches thick P100.00 bills. One bill was falling, so
Eduardo Valle told the person, 'Brod, your money is falling.'
In Court, Geronimo Rivera and Eduardo Valle positively identified the person who rode on
the mini-bus (sic) with blood-soaked clothes and plenty of money on the breast pocket of his
jacket as the accused Vivencio Labuguen. They also positively identified the Honda XL100
(Exhibit 'G') as the same motorcycle behind the accused which was left when he boarded
the mini-bus (sic) at Nappaccu.
When some passengers alighted at the junction of the road in Naguillan going to San
Mariano, Isabela, the accused suddenly stoop up and alighted from the mini-bus (sic). He
did not even get his change.
Going back to Pantaleon Tagora at Ramona, Angadanan. Between 1:00 to 2:00 o'clock in
the afternoon of October 27, 1994 while he was in his house at Ramona, he heard that a
dead person was found near the irrigation canal. He and his neighbors went to see the dead
person. He was surprised to see that the dead person was the same older person who was
the companion of the younger one he met that morning. He identified the younger person as
the accused. The body of the deceased was on the middle of a ricefield (sic), 50 meters
from the service drop of the irrigation canal.
At about 5:00 o'clock that afternoon of October 27, 1994, Dr. Agpaoa in the presence of
Mayor Ong and Chief of Police Redentor Garcia of Angadanan, Isabela, conducted an
examination of the body of the deceased person at the middle of a ricefield (sic) in
Barangay Ramona, Angadanan. The dead person was identified as Bonifacio Angeles by
his brother Federico Angeles. Dr. Agpaoa wrote his findings while on the ricefield (sic).
Later, after examining again the body at the Funeraria, he put his findings into final form in
his Autopsy Report marked Exhibit 'K'. In his Autopsy Report, Dr. Agpaoa found the
following wounds on the body of the deceased Bonifacio Angeles, thus:
'Postmortem Findings
1. Gunshot wound, entrance left, inferior margin of left clavicle, slightly outside the left
midclavicular line, directed slightly downward, backward and medially.
2. Gunshot wound, entrance, right side of the thoracic cage, along slight anterior axillary
line, between 6th & 5th costal interspace, directed medially.
3. Stab wound, left temporal area, above the left ear.
4. Stab wound, supra sternal notch (deep) penetrating chest cavity.
5. Stab wound, supra clavicular area, downwards, penetrating chest cavity.
6. Multiple superficial stab wound over anterior chest wall and abdominal wall.
7. Stab wound on both thighs, anterior surface.
Cause of death — Internal Hemorrhage.'
xxx             xxx             xxx
The heirs of Bonifacio Angeles spent P55,000.00 for his burial (Exhibit 'L')." 5
Appellant placed reliance on his defense of denial and alibi. Vehemently denying the charge against
him, he asseverated that he could not have committed the crime on October 27, 1994 because he
left for Maconacon, Isabela on October 17, 1994, to manage the logging operation of a certain
Orlando Ramos and stayed there until December 20, 1994. 6
On October 7, 1996, the trial court handed down its decision under review. The defense theorized
that:
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED ON THE BASIS OF
SURMISES, SPECULATIONS, INSUFFICIENT AND INCREDIBLE CIRCUMSTANTIAL
EVIDENCE;
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN TOTALLY DISREGARDING THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED
BY THE DEFENSE; and
III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED GUILTY OF THE OFFENSE
CHARGED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.7
Circumstantial evidence is that which indirectly proves a fact in issue. The fact-finder must draw an
inference from such evidence. It is at times essential to resort to circumstantial evidence since to
insist on direct testimony would, in many cases, result in setting felons free and deny proper
protection to society. An accused can be convicted on the basis of circumstantial evidence where
the circumstances constitute an unbroken chain leading to one fair reasonable conclusion and
pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person. 8 Under Section 4, Rule
134 of the Rules on Evidence, circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if:
a) There is more than one circumstance;
b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable
doubt.
In the case under consideration, the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses spawn and generate
the following facts which constitute an unbroken chain of events leading to the inevitable conclusion
of guilt on the part of the appellant, to wit:
1. In the early morning of October 27, 1994, appellant went to the house of the victim to convince
him to purchase the cows offered for sale.
2. The victim agreed to see the cows, bringing along with him P40,000.00. Thus, at around 8:00 in
the morning of the same day, the victim and the appellant rode on the motorcycle of the victim with
the latter as the driver.
3. At past 8:00 in the morning of October 27, 1994, prosecution witness Romeo Bariza saw the
victim and appellant riding on a motorcycle.
4. At about 10:00 of the same day, the victim and the appellant were seen sitting on top of an
irrigation canal at Barangay Ramona, Angadanan, Isabela.
5. Around 10:30 in the morning of October 27, 1994, appellant was seen alone on the motorcycle of
the victim, speeding away from Barangay Ramona.
6. Between 11:00 to 12:00 noon of October 27, 1994, appellant rode a minibus leaving the
motorcycle of the victim on the shoulder of the road.
7. The bus conductor noticed that the right side of appellant's jacket and pants were soaked with
blood, and there were two inches thick of one hundred peso bills tucked in the breast pocket of
appellant's jacket.
8. Between 1:00 to 2:00 in the afternoon of the same day, the dead body of the victim with gunshot
and stab wounds was found by the residents of Barangay Ramona, 150 meters from the irrigation
canal.
9. Around 5 00 o'clock in the afternoon also of the same day, the municipal health officer, the chief
of police, the mayor, and some peace officers of Angadanan, Isabela, proceeded to the place where
the body of the unidentified victim was found (Exhibit "J", O.R., p. 156; and TSN, p. 4, October 31,
1995, direct exam. of Dr. Agpaoa).
10. Federico Angeles identified the deceased as his brother Bonifacio Angeles (Exhibit "K", O.R., p.
157.).
After a careful study, the Court is of the ineluctable finding and conclusion that the aforementioned
circumstantial evidence has established the guilt of appellant beyond reasonable doubt. The time
element of the circumstances thus proven link each chain of circumstances to another pointing to a
reasonable conclusion and no other but the guilt of appellant. From the early morning of October 27,
1994 to 10:00 o'clock in the morning of the same day, the prosecution has sufficiently shown that
the appellant was the last person seen with the victim before the latter was killed. About thirty
minutes later, appellant was seen speeding away from Barangay Ramona where he and the victim
were previously spotted by one of the prosecution witnesses. And, escaping from the consequences
of his felonious act, appellant, boarded a minibus, leaving the motorcycle of the victim on the side of
the road. All the foregoing circumstances, coupled with the fact that appellant had two inches-thick
of one hundred peso bills in his possession when he rode on the minibus with his jacket and pants
splattered with blood, suffice to prove beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of appellant of the crime
of robo con homicido perpetrated in the morning of October 27, 1994.
In People vs. Asis,9 the Court affirmed the conviction of the accused of the crime of homicide on the
basis of circumstantial evidence, holding thus:
". . . We find that all these requisites have been successfully met by the prosecution. The
evidence showed that appellant was one of two persons last seen in the company of the
victim before he was killed. On the morning that the victim's body was found, the appellant
was observed with his clothes smeared with blood. Witness dela Cruz saw his left shoulder
with bite marks and his right hand swollen. When asked about the injuries, he admitted
engaging in a fight in Bgy. Pinakpinakan. On the same morning, some CAFGU soldiers
spotted the appellant with co-accused Mendoza while walking by the road in Bgy. Caingin.
They had blood-stained clothes. The two ran away, when pursued. Their flight evinces guilt.
These circumstances taken together lead to no other conclusion but that the appellant is
guilty as charged."10
Appellant's intention to rob the victim can be gleaned unerringly from the attendant circumstances.
Obviously, robbery was the motive that impelled appellant to convince the victim to go with him.
Under the pretext of selling cows to him, appellant cajoled the victim to bring a large sum of money
and thereafter, lured him to a route where appellant could divest him of his money with the least
danger of being caught. As aptly surmised by the trial court, the two inches thick of one hundred
peso bills in appellant's pocket and the blood smeared on his clothes are two vital chains of
circumstances that undoubtedly bespeak of the robbery with homicide appellant committed.
The lower court erred not in giving full weight and credence to the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses particularly identifying appellant as the person last seen in the company of the victim
before the latter was found dead. The testimonies on record are clear and straightforward. And,
finding the witnesses for the People not ill-motivated to testify against the appellant, the Court
discerns no basis for doubting their credibility.11 Moreover, it is a jurisprudentially-embedded rule that
on the issue of credibility of witnesses, appellate courts generally do not disturb the findings of the
trial court, considering its singular opportunity to observe the deportment and manner of testifying of
the witnesses.12
Disowning liability for the commission of the crime complained of, appellant theorized that he was in
Maconacon, Isabela, from October 17, 1994 up to December 201 1994. The Court, however, finds
no credibility in the alibi theorized upon by appellant. It bears stressing that for alibi to prosper,
appellant must prove that he was somewhere else when the crime was committed and it was
physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime 13 In the present case of
appellant, he failed to establish the requisite physical impossibility of his presence at the locus
criminis at the approximate time of its commission. Granting arguendo that the appellant really went
to Maconacon, Isabela on October 17, 1994, it was easy for him to go back by plane or by boat to
Cauayan, Isabela, on or before October 27, 1994.

Furthermore, and more importantly, the defense of alibi of appellant cannot prevail over his positive
identification by the prosecution witnesses.14

Though not alleged in the Information, the generic aggravating circumstances of fraud and craft
were properly appreciated by the trial court.15 Craft involves intellectual trickery and cunning on the
part of the offender. When there is a direct inducement by insidious words or machinations, fraud is
present.16 By saying that he would accompany the victim to see the cows which the latter intended to
buy, appellant was able to lure the victim to go with him.

Under Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for Robbery with Homicide is reclusion
perpetua to death Applying Article 63 of the same Code, the imposable penalty under the premises
is death in view of the presence of the aggravating circumstances of craft and fraud and the
absence of any mitigating circumstance.

Four members of the Court are steadfast in their adherence to the separate opinion expressed
in People vs. Echegaray that Republic Act No. 7659 is unconstitutional insofar as it prescribes the
death penalty. However, they bow to the majority opinion that the aforesaid law is constitutional and
therefore, the penalty prescribe thereunder has to be imposed.

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated October 7, 1996 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 20,
Cauayan, Isabela, in Criminal Case No. 20-738, finding appellant VIVENCIO LABUGUEN @
DENCIO guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery with homicide, and imposing upon
him the penalty of DEATH, is AFFIRMED.

In accordance with Section 25 of Republic Act No 7659 amending Article 83 of the Revised Penal
Code, upon finality of this decision, let the records of the case be forwarded to the Office of the
President for the possible exercise of the pardoning power. Costs against the
appellant. 1âwphi1.nêt

SO ORDERED.
 [G.R. No. L-37400. April 15, 1988.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SABANGAN CABATO, Accused-
Appellant.
The Solicitor General for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Reubin L. Maraon for Accused-Appellant.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES; NOT AFFECTED BY MINOR
INCONSISTENCIES. — It is a truism that the most candid witness oftentimes makes mistakes but
such honest lapses do not necessarily impair his intrinsic credibility. [People v. Alcantara, L-26967,
33 SCRA 812; People v. Canada, G.R. No. 63728, Sept. 15, 1986, 144 SCRA 121]. Inconsistencies
in the testimony of witnesses due only to inaccurate expressions or honest mistake or observations
are not fatal. [People v. Demante, L-38960, March 30, 1982, 113 SCRA 353; People v. Delavin,
G.R. Nos. 73762-63, Feb. 27, 1987, 148 SCRA 257]. When they are on trivial matters only, as in
this case, they cannot be taken to mean as an attempt to perpetuate a lie.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; LACK OF IMPROPER MOTIVE BOLSTERS CREDIBILITY. — The fact that the
accused-appellant failed to ascribe to prosecution witness any improper motive or intent why he
would implicate the former as the person who killed his wife renders his testimony credible.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; — Accused’s admissions would negate any improper motive for Guinit to testify
falsely against him. In this light, Guinit’s testimony becomes more credible. [People v. Demante, 113
SCRA 353, 364].
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT RESPECTED ON APPEAL. — The appellate
court will not disturb the factual findings of the lower court for the latter is in a better position to
gauge the credibility of eyewitnesses. (People v. Mercado, G.R. No. 65152, Aug. 30, 1984, 131
SCRA 501)
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ALIBI; UNAVAILING IN THE FACE OF POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION. — Where the
identification of the accused was positively established, Accused’s defense of alibi becomes weak.
6. CRIMINAL LAW; AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES; ABUSE OF SUPERIOR STRENGTH;
NOT CONSIDERED IN THE ABSENCE OF EVIDENCE OF PHYSICAL CONDITIONS OF THE
ACCUSED AND THE VICTIMS. — Abuse of superior strength cannot be considered where the
prosecution failed to prove that there was indeed a notorious inequality between the ages, sizes and
strength of the antagonists and that these notorious advantages were purposely sought for or used
by the accused to achieve his ends.
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; CONSTRUED. — To take advantage of superior strength means to purposely use
excessive force out of proportion to the means of the defense available to the person attacked
[People v. Cabiling, L-38091, Dec. 17, 1976, 74 SCRA 285, 303].
8. ID.; ID.; DWELLING; APPRECIATED IN ROBBERY WITH VIOLENCE; CASE AT BAR. —
Dwelling is aggravating in robbery with violence or intimidation because this class of robbery can be
committed without the necessity of trespassing the sanctity of the offended party’s house.
9. ID.; ID.; DISGUISE; CONSIDERED EVEN IF THE MASK WORN BY THE ACCUSED FELL
DOWN. — The fact that the mask worn by the accused to conceal their identities fell down thus
paving for the accused’s identification will not render the aggravating circumstance of disguise
inapplicable.
DECISION
CORTES, J.:
Accused-appellant Sabangan Cabato appeals from the judgment of the Court of First Instance (now
Regional Trial Court) of Zamboanga del Norte finding him guilty of the crime of ROBBERY WITH
HOMICIDE in Criminal Case No. 307.
The facts of the case are as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
In an INFORMATION dated February 12, 1971, the Provincial Fiscal of Zamboanga del Norte
accused Sabangan Cabato of ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE committed as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"That in the evening on or about the 25th day of January, 1971, . . . the said accused SABANGAN
CABATO, conspiring, confederating and working together with two (2) other DOES who are still at
large, all armed with firearms and stones and with intent of illicit gain by means of force, violence
and intimidation against persons, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously enter the
dwelling house of one VICTOR GUINIT and once inside attack, hold tight and squeeze the mouth of
said Victor Guinit, and hug his wife Herminia Am-es Guinit, and then rob them of cash money
(coins) in the amount of P300.00; . . . that in pursuance to (sic) their evil motives, during and on the
occasion of said robbery, the above-named accused taking advantage of their superior strength and
of the darkness of the night to better accomplish their purpose and with intent to kill by means of
treachery and evident premeditation, did there and then wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
strike with stones for several times said HERMINIA AM-ES GUINIT thereby inflicting upon her
several abrasions and contusions . . . which caused her death on the spot; . .
x          x           x
CONTRARY TO LAW with the aggravating circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation,
dwelling, superior strength, and without respect due to ages of the victims (spouses) and due to the
sex of Herminia Am-es Guinit [Rollo, pp. 9-10].
Upon arraignment, the accused, assisted by counsel, pleaded NOT GUILTY.
During the hearings in the Trial Court, the prosecution, relying heavily on the eyewitness account of
Victor Guinit, established that:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
x           x          x
Offended party Victor Guinit, 69 years old, widower, testified that he knows accused Sabangan
Cabato personally; that witness pointed to accused in open court, that on January 25, 1971, his wife
was his only companion in their house; that at around 7:30 p.m., three persons came to their house
while they were taking supper; that his wife brought food to their dog; that they have two lamps in
the house, one lamp near the bed, and another lamp brought by his wife; that the two persons [who]
hugged him covered his mouth; that the robber hit his mouth with a stone causing his tooth to fell
out (sic); that one of the robbers grappled with his wife, and the mask covering the face fell out (sic)
and his wife recognized accused Sabangan Cabato; that his wife shouted "Sabangan, do not kill us,
we will give you the money" ; that the accused was at a distance of three meters from him; that
accused Sabangan Cabato said: "Get your money" ; that she (deceased) said: "Victor, we will give
the money in the piggy bank" ; that his wife went down; that later the deceased said: "Victor, I do not
know where you put the money" ; that the robbers untied him and he went downstairs; that he got
the money and gave the same to one of the bandits; that one of the bandits said, let us go upstairs,
and got (sic) the paper bills, we want P3,000.00; that the money given to the bandits were their
saving (sic) for five years consisting of coins which were proceeds from the sale of the bananas;
that the deceased and accused Cabato went to the kitchen; that they told the bandits that we do not
have paper bills and that they do not have P3,000.00; that one of the bandits struck him with a pistol
while the other boxed him; that one of the bandits struck the back of his head with a stone and his
teeth fell out that the accused and his companions left the house; that he noticed that his wife was
already dead; that he gave the stones to the police (Exh. C, C-1, C-2); that after the bandits left, he
untied himself, that he called for help but nobody came; that he went to his two married sons who
were living uphill; that the land owned by them is two hectares; that the two bandits wore masks.
[CFI Decision, pp. 5-6,] (Italics supplied.)
x           x          x
On the other hand, the accused vehemently denied his alleged participation in the gruesome crime
and testified to the effect that:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
x           x          x
. . . he [Cabato] knew offended party Victor Guinit and his wife since he was young; that the home of
the Guinit is one kilometer away from his house; that he visited them before as a neighbor; that the
Guinit has (sic) children named Felix and Isco who are living at Tambalang; that he never committed
the crime of robbery with homicide attributed to him; that on January 25, 1971, he was gathering
corn in their farm in the interior at Balatan, Salug together with his father-in-law; that he left
Tambalang bound for Balatan at 6:00 A.M., the same day; that he gathered corn and returned to
Tambalang at 5:00 P.M. and then pastured his carabao and stayed in his house the whole night;
that on January 25, 1971, in the evening, he did not know of any robbery; that on January 26, 1971,
he was informed by their neighbors of the robbery; that he was told that the victims were the Guinits;
that as a moslem he did not go to the Guinit to give alms as they are prohibited; that he met the son
of Guinit named Felix Guinit in the house of Isco; that he went to Isco Guinit to find out if the report
of the robbery of the parents of Isco is true; that Isco Guinit told him that the robbers were not
identified; that the amount taken was P80.00; that on January 29th, he was arrested at the market of
Tambalang; . . . [CFI Decision, pp. 12-13].chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
x          x           x
Faced with the issue of whether or not the accused was guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
charged, the Trial Court had to first settle the question concerning the positive identification of
Sabangan Cabato as one of the robbers who killed the deceased Herminia Am-es Guinit.
Weighing and evaluating the evidence on record, the Trial Court rendered the following
decision:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
x          x           x
There exists no doubt that accused Sabangan Cabato was clearly identified as one of the
participants in the gruesome crime that took place in the residence of Victor Guinit on January 25,
1971. By his own admission, Accused Sabangan Cabato is well-known to the Guinit family for their
houses are only one kilometer apart. Accused Cabato visited the house of the deceased at least two
times. Besides, during the incident in question, there were two kerosene lamps in the house of
Victor Guinit which illuminated their home such that the visitors were clearly seen. Another factor
that clinched the identification of the accused, Sabangan Cabato, is the fact that when the
deceased, Herminia Guinit grappled with the accused Cabato, the mask worn by the accused
Cabato fell so much so that the deceased exclaimed, "Sabangan do not kill us, we will give you the
money."cralaw virtua1aw library
According to the evidence, Accused Sabangan Cabato brought the deceased to the kitchen in order
to compel her to divulge the whereabouts of the P3,000.00 paper bills. But the deceased denied
they had any other money except the coins inside the bamboo tube in the approximate sum of
P300.00, which led the accused, Cabato, to strike the deceased with the stone in the head which
caused cerebral hemorrhage (Exh. A) leading to her death.
From the findings of the Sanitary Inspector who examined the injury suffered by deceased Herminia
Guinit, the cerebral hemorrhage was caused by hitting the head with a hard object presumably a
stone (Exh. C, C-1, C-2) which were (sic) found in the kitchen near the dead body.

The contention of the defense that Victor Guinit was unable to identify any of the perpetrators for the
police blotter (Exh. 1) is devoid of merit.
According to Patrolman Mananguil and Llenes, they were informed by Victor Guinit on January 28,
1971, that accused Cabato was one of the robbers who perpetrated the crime. The investigation
wee conducted in the Office of the Chief of Police and on the 29th day of January,
1971, Accused Cabato was brought for identification in the Municipal Building of Salug. Although
accused Cabato was together with many persons, Victor Guinit pinpointed him as one of the
robbers.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
The accused defense is alibi, claiming that he was in Barrio Balakan, in the house of his in-laws
gathering corn. But his testimony must be rejected for lack of sufficient corroboration. Outside of his
lone testimony, no other witness was presented to substantiate his alibi [CFI Decision, pp. 15-17.]
(Italics supplied.)
x           x          x
Maintaining his innocence, Accused appeals the decision asserting that his guilt has not been
proven beyond reasonable doubt. His identification by the prosecution witness Victor Guinit
allegedly lacked definiteness and concreteness not to mention that it was tainted with serious
inconsistencies [Brief for the Accused, p. 1]. These alleged inconsistencies painstakingly narrated
by accused-appellant cannot overturn the finding of guilt by the Trial Court.
Accused-appellant alleged that Victor Guinit, in his cross-examination, declared that he recognized
the accused when the piece of cloth which covered the latter’s mouth fell down as a result of the
grappling by the deceased [TSN, June 8, 1972, p. 22]. But in his examination in chief, he testified
that he recognized the accused as early as when the robbers were still at the door [TSN, June 8,
1972, p. 14]. This is allegedly incredible because when the robbers were at the door, they still had
their masks on [Brief for Accused, p. 4].
A close perusal of the direct examination of Victor Guinit would show that the identification of
Cabato was indeed made when the latter’s mask fell down.
x           x          x
Q Now, what did you do when you noticed that after your wife opened the door, Sabangan Cabato
bumped your wife with two (2) other persons?
A The two (2) other persons passed towards me and hugged me; one of them covered my mouth
with his palm and I was hit by a piece [of stone] on my nape and one of my teeth fell down.
Q Now what about this Sabangan Cabato, what did he do?
A He grappled with my wife.
Q And what happened while [he was] grappling with your wife?
A During the course of the grappling, my wife happened to scratch Sabangan Cabato’s face and the
piece of cloth used as mask fell down. Then, at this juncture, my wife said, "Sabangan, don’t kill us.
We will give you the money."cralaw virtua1aw library
Q Now, how far were you from your wife and Sabangan Cabato, while the two (2) were grappling
each other?
A About three (3) meters.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
Q Now, from that distance, were you able to recognize and identify the person grappling with your
wife?
A Yes.
Q How were you able to recognize him?
A Because his mask fell down. [TSN, June 8, 1971, pp. 14-15.]
x          x           x
Accused-appellant further pointed out that Guinit, in his cross-examination, testified that he was
unconscious for 20 minutes after he was struck with a stone by one of the robbers [TSN, June 8,
1972, P. 24). Accused alleged that if Guinit was unconscious, it was physically impossible for him to
see what happened in the kitchen between the deceased and the accused nor to see the falling
down of the mask.
However, the identification of the accused was made by Victor Guinit even before the former
proceeded to the kitchen with the deceased. The sequence of events as culled from the records
would reveal that when the deceased was opening the door to feed the dog, three masked men
bumped her on their way into the house. Once inside, two of the masked men hugged Victor Guinit
while the third grappled with Herminia. During the course of the grappling, the wife happened to
scratch the face of the masked man as a result of which the mask fell down. This was when the
identity of the accused was revealed to the couple with the wife exclaiming, "Sabangan, do not kill
us. We will give you the money." [TSN, June 8, 1972, p. 15.] At that precise time, Guinit was only
three meters away from his wife. Afterwards, Guinit proceeded to where the money was hidden then
he went back into the house to hand over the money. Not being satisfied, the robbers demanded for
paper bills which the couple denied possessing. This was when the two robbers whose identities
were not revealed, beat Guinit while Cabato went to the kitchen with Herminia.
The other inconsistencies alleged by the accused to buttress his appeal centered on minor details.
Conceding that there may have been inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution, these far
from being badges of fraud and fabrication, can justifiably be considered as a manifestation of good
faith and a confirmation of the fact that the witness was not a rehearsed witness. It is a truism that
the most candid witness oftentimes makes mistakes but such honest lapses do not necessarily
impair his intrinsic credibility. [People v. Alcantara, L-26967, 33 SCRA 812; People v. Canada, G.R.
No. 63728, Sept. 15, 1986, 144 SCRA 121]. Inconsistencies in the testimony of witnesses due only
to inaccurate expressions or honest mistake or observations are not fatal. [People v. Demante, L-
38960, March 30, 1982, 113 SCRA 353; People v. Delavin, G.R. Nos. 73762-63, Feb. 27, 1987, 148
SCRA 257]. When they are on trivial matters only, as in this case, they cannot be taken to mean as
an attempt to perpetuate a lie.
Further, there was not even an iota of evidence presented by the accused-appellant ascribing to
prosecution witness Guinit any motive or intent to implicate the former as the person who killed his
wife. The testimonies of both the prosecution and the defense, in fact would picture the Guinits and
the Cabatos as neighbors on good terms. As the accused himself narrated, the Guinits were
neighbors whom he used to visit since he was young. In this light, Guinit’s testimony becomes more
credible. As was held in one recent case:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
x           x          x
We have no doubt about the credibility of Rolando Blanco [the witness] . . . The records do not show
any improper motive on his part to falsely implicate the appellants in this diabolic crime. In fact,
Antonio Guilbao is his first cousin. They were, all positively identified by Blanco. [People v. Ladrera,
G.R. No. 55339, May 21, 1987, 150 SCRA113, 123-124.]
Accused’s admissions would negate any improper motive for Guinit to testify falsely against him. In
this light, Guinit’s testimony becomes more credible. [People v. Demante, 113 SCRA 353, 364].
Summing up, the alleged inconsistencies brought forth by the accused boil down to the question of
the eyewitness’ credibility.chanrobles.com:cralaw:red
Time and again, it has been held that the Supreme Court respects the trial court’s findings on
credibility of witnesses [People v. Palon, L-33271, Feb. 20, 1984, 120 SCRA 529; People v. Dava,
Nos. L-41642-41645, May 15, 1987, 149 SCRA 582]. The appellate court will not disturb the factual
findings of the lower court for the latter is in a better position to gauge the credibility of
eyewitnesses. [People v. Mercado, G.R. No. 65152, Aug. 30, 1984, 131 SCRA 501] "The matter of
assigning value to declarations at the witness stand is best and most completely performed by a trial
judge who, unlike appellate magistrates, can weigh such testimony in the light of the defendant’s
demeanor, conduct and attitude at the time and is thereby placed in a more competent position to
discriminate between the true and the false" [People v. Bermudez, L-30931, June 28, 1974, 57
SCRA 629, People v. Laganzon, L-47118, May 21, 1974, 129 SCRA 333, 347].
In this case, the decision of the trial court clearly outlined the evidence for both prosecution and
defense. The trial judge had observed the demeanor of both prosecution and defense witnesses on
the witness stand and found nothing amiss with the credibility of the prosecution witness.
Accused interposed alibi as his defense claiming that he was in Balakan gathering corn with his wife
and in-law [TSN, Dec. 13, 1972, PP. 10-11].
Considering however that the identification of the accused was positively established, Accused’s
defense of alibi becomes weak.
Alibi is one of the weakest defenses by an accused especially if there is direct testimony of an
eyewitness identifying the accused as the culprit. [U.S. v. Garcia, 9 Phil. 434 (1907), People v.
Coronado, G.R. No. 68932, Oct. 28, 1986, 145 SCRA 250, People v. Inot, L-36790, May 29, 1987,
150 SCRA 322]. It is rarely given credence because it is easily fabricated [People v. Millarpe, G.R.
No. 69281, Feb. 25, 1985, 134 SCRA 555, People v. Petil, G.R. No. 70223, Mar. 31, 1987, 149
SCRA 92]. Uncorroborated alibi, as in this case, is not credible against positive identification [People
v. Jones, G.R. No. 61165, June 24, 1985, 134 SCRA 166; People v. Canturia, G.R. No. 67598, Oct.
11, 1985, 139 SCRA 280]. Alibi does not deserve much credit as it was established only by the
accused himself without any corroboration from his wife or in-law.
x          x           x
Absence of such corroboration, is the light of the categorical statement of one of the victims, . . .,
that he saw [accused] stab Luisita Apostol because there was a lighted post at the place of the
incident . . . is fatal to the defense. [People v. dela Cruz, G.R. Nos. 71044-45, Mar. 16, 1987, 148
SCRA 582, 589].
x          x           x
The Court now addresses itself to the aggravating circumstances alleged by the plaintiff-appellee to
have attended the commission of the crime.
The prosecution argues that since "the attack was by a robust man of 29 years with a huge stone
against an ageing defenseless woman" [Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee, p. 15], abuse of superior
strength should aggravate the crime.cralawnad
The records of the case are bereft of any information with respect to the physical conditions of both
the accused and the victims. Thus, abuse of superior strength cannot be considered. This
aggravating circumstance depends on the age, size and strength of the parties. It is considered
whenever there is a notorious inequality of forces between the victim and the aggressor, assessing
a situation of superiority of strength notoriously advantageous for the aggressor which is selected or
taken advantage of by him in the commission of the crime. To take advantage of superior strength
means to purposely use excessive force out of proportion to the means of the defense available to
the person attacked [People v. Cabiling, L-38091, Dec. 17, 1976, 74 SCRA 285, 303].
In this case, the prosecution failed to prove that there was indeed a notorious inequality between the
ages, sizes and strength of the antagonists and that these notorious advantages were purposely
sought for or used by the accused to achieve his ends.

However, the Court considers dwelling as an aggravating circumstance since it has been proven
that, indeed robbery with homicide was committed inside the house of the offended parties. Dwelling
is aggravating in robbery with violence or intimidation because this class of robbery can be
committed without the necessity of trespassing the sanctity of the offended party’s house [People v.
Mercado, L-39511, April 28, 1980, 97 SCRA 232, People v. Dajaresco, L-32701, June 19, 1984,
129 SCRA 576; People v. Gapasin, G.R. No. 52017, Oct. 27, 1986, 140 SCRA 178].

Likewise, the Court considers disguise as another aggravating circumstance. The accused, together
with two others, wore masks to cover their faces. There could have been no other purpose for this
but to conceal their identities particularly for Cabato who was very much known to the offended
parties. The fact that the mask subsequently fell down thus paving the way for Cabato’s
identification will not render this aggravating circumstance inapplicable. In a recent case, the Court
held "that Darwin Veloso and his five (5) companions wore masks [which eventually fell down] to
conceal their identities during the commission of the crime constitutes disguise" [People v. Veloso,
L-32900, Feb. 25, 1982, 112 SCRA 173, 182].chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

Robbery with homicide under Art. 294 (1) of the Revised Penal Code is punishable with reclusion
perpetua to death. However, in view of Sec. 19 (1), Art. III of the 1987 Constitution the supreme
penalty of death can no longer be imposed.

WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is hereby AFFIRMED insofar as the judgment sentenced the
accused to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA but is MODIFIED insofar as the civil
indemnity is concerned which is hereby increased to P30,000.00.
SO ORDERED.
 G.R. No. 75508 June 10, 1994
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SGT. FELIX PADILLA, Accused-Appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.chanrobles virtual law library
Mateo M. Leanda for accused-appellant.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
M U R D E R is abhorrent; it becomes even more when the perpetrators are men in uniform, in
active service, sworn to maintain the peace, protect the body politic and uphold the rule of law. This
case may yet serve as a grim reminder, a foreboding, of the current state of affairs in the country -
policemen, military officers, agents of the law, garbed in filthy outfit, drinking inordinately in public
places, flaunting their arms as symbols of their authority, rebuking, beating, maiming, killing one
another without rhyme or reason, hitting innocent bystanders in the crossfires, a sheer antithesis of
their role in civilized society.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
SGT. FELIX PADILLA was a member of the Philippine Air Force (PAF) assigned to U-2, the
intelligence unit of General Headquarters, Armed Forces of the Philippines (GHQ-AFP), then under
the Eastern Command, now Regional Unified Command (RUC-8) stationed at Camp Lukban,
Catbalogan, Samar. He was charged together with his Senior Officer, Maj. Ildefonso de la Cruz,
before the then Court of First Instance of Catbalogan, Samar, with the crime of murder qualified by
treachery, evident premeditation and taking advantage of his public position, for the fatal shooting
on 5 May 1981 of his comrade-in-arms,
Pfc. Edino Ontuca, Officer-in-Charge of the Talalora Police Sub-Station.  1Two aggravating
circumstances were alleged to have attended the commission of the offense, namely, the aid of
armed men, 2and abuse of superior strength. 3chanrobles virtual law library
On 28 March 1983, upon motion of the prosecution, a re-investigation was granted by the trial court.
As a result, the charge against Maj. de la Cruz was provisionally dismissed but trial proceeded as to
accused Padilla.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
After trial, the court a quo convicted Sgt. Padilla of murder qualified by treachery with the generic
aggravating circumstance of taking advantage of his public position,  4but appreciating at the same
time the mitigating circumstance of sufficient provocation in favor of the accused.  5After offsetting the
two attendant circumstances, the court imposed the medium of the penalty prescribed for murder,
which is reclusion perpetua, and ordered the accused to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the
sum of P30,000.00, and to pay the costs. 6chanrobles virtual law library
Accused-appellant now comes to us claiming that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. Specifically, he imputes the following errors to the court a quo: (1) in finding that
he shot and killed the victim when no clear evidence supports it; (2) in finding that the deformed
slug, Exh. "I", was the same slug extracted from the cadaver of the victim and basing its conviction
thereon; and, (3) in giving high probative value to the testimony of Pat. Daniel Q. Omega
notwithstanding his apparent bias for the victim who was his superior in the police
force.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Clearly, the evidence for the prosecution is woven around the testimony of Pat. Daniel Q. Omega
who gave a detailed account of the incident. On 4 May 1981, Pat. Omega was on duty at Pier 1 in
Catbalogan, Samar, from eleven o'clock in the evening to seven o'clock the following morning. At
past midnight, 5 May 1981, Pfc. Edino Ontuca, Officer-in-Charge of the Talalora Police
Sub-Station, approached him for assistance claiming he was maltreated by strangers. Pat. Omega
responded and both proceeded to where complainant was reportedly assaulted, passing by
Malayan Hotel at the pier area to get Ontuca's service
revolver.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
When they reached the corner of Rizal Avenue and Del Rosario Street, the two (2) policemen saw
three (3) men in the company of a woman.
Pat. Omega approached them, identified himself as a police officer, and then began to investigate
the reported "castigo" or manhandling of complainant. A certain C1C Belino spoke for the group. He
introduced himself first and then his companions, Maj. de la Cruz and Sgt. Padilla. At that juncture,
Pfc. Ontuca gave his name, rank and position, and then remarked, "Why have you done this to me?
Brod, we are not adversaries; we are of the same feather." After saying this, Pat. Omega tapped
Pfc. Ontuca's shoulder and admonished the latter saying, "Brod, let us stop; just keep silent; just go
home and sleep." 7
Pfc. Ontuca took the advice and returned to the pier with Pat.
Omega.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
When they reached Malayan Hotel, Pfc. Ontuca stayed behind at the entrance while Pat. Omega
proceeded to the Lion's Waiting Shed some fifty (50) meters away. Suddenly, there was a
commotion in front of the hotel. Pfc. Ontuca was being ganged up by three (3) men. Pat. Omega
then rushed towards the hotel where he saw his companion already down on his right knee with
both arms stretched behind him, his left arm held by Maj. de la Cruz and his right by
Sgt. Padilla, while C1C Belino held him by the waist and took his service revolver away.  8Pat.
Omega tried to intervene but C1C Belino and Maj. de la Cruz poked their pistols at him. C1C Belino
disarmed Pat. Omega and handed over his service pistol to Maj. de la Cruz who then grabbed
Omega by the collar saying, "Let us go to the hospital because you are drunk."chanrobles virtual
law library
Pat. Omega denied that he was drunk and reasoned out that he was on duty at the pier and would
be responsible if something went wrong at his post. But Maj. de la Cruz did not listen to him;
instead, he ordered Pat. Omega and Pfc. Ontuca to go to the hospital. The accused held the victim
at the back of his waist and at the collar of his shirt as they walked along Del Rosario Street on their
way to the hospital. When they reached Lorenz Barber Shop, Maj. de la Cruz summoned a certain
Sgt. Bongosia to accompany them to the hospital purportedly in order to have the two policemen
undergo "liquor test".
Sgt. Bongosia obliged and then cocked his armalite. He even boasted that he came from Mindanao
and was not afraid of anyone. 9chanrobles virtual law library
All six (6), namely, Maj. de la Cruz, Pat. Omega, Pfc. Ontuca,
C1C Belino, Sgt. Bongosia and the accused then proceeded east along Curry Avenue with the
accused holding Pfc. Ontuca, followed by Sgt. Bongosia and C1C Belino to their right, then Pat.
Omega and Maj. de la Cruz. At the intersection of Curry Avenue and San Bartolome Street, Pfc.
Ontuca manage to free himself from the grasp of the accused and ran north along San Bartolome
Street. Upon reaching the intersection of Rizal Avenue and San Bartolome Street, Pfc. Ontuca
turned right, eastward. The accused, followed by Maj. de la Cruz and Pat. Omega, pursued Pfc.
Ontuca, while Sgt. Bongosia did not take the same route; he ran straight along Curry Avenue and
then turned left, north, along San Francisco Street. C1C Belino dashed to the opposite direction,
turning left towards Del Rosario Street. When Pfc. Ontuca reached a fruit stand beside Cinex
Theater, he grabbed a girl named Lilia, an employee at the nearby Bahay Kawayan Disco situated
along Callejon, a narrow street connecting Rizal Avenue. Lilia struggled and screamed for help as
Pfc. Ontuca held her tightly by the waist, using her as a human shield against the accused who was
pointing his pistol at him. Finally, Pfc. Ontuca and Lilia fell to the ground giving the latter a chance to
escape. Left without any protection, Pfc. Ontuca squatted on the ground and reached for a piece of
plywood which he held upward to cover his head.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library
Maj. de la Cruz and Pat. Omega were just across the street standing in front of the Bonifacio Nardo
Store some fifteen (15) meters away. From where they stood, they could clearly see the side view of
the accused and the victim facing each other. The area was fairly illuminated from the mercury lamp
at the corner of Callejon and Rizal Avenue, from the light in the gasoline station at the corner of San
Francisco Street and Rizal Avenue, and from the incandescent bulb at the Bonifacio Nardo
Store. 10chanrobles virtual law library
Pfc. Ontuca begged for his life. "I am not going to fight with you," he said. But the accused, showing
no mercy, squeezed the trigger of his .45 cal. automatic pistol pumping a single bullet into the head
of his victim who was just some three to four meters from him. The time was exactly two o'clock in
the morning. 11After shooting Pfc. Ontuca, the accused backtracked and then returned to the fallen
policeman and tauntingly kicked him saying, "Are you still alive?" The accused then went to Maj. de
la Cruz and talked to him.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Some fifteen (15) minutes later, members of the military police (MP) arrived aboard their jeep. The
MPs requested Sgt. Padilla and Maj. de la Cruz to surrender their firearms but they refused, so the
two (2) were told to go with them to the barracks and surrender their firearms to their Commanding
Officer. Maj. de la Cruz, Sgt. Padilla and Pat. Omega obliged and walked with the MPs to the
barracks. The MPs then loaded the victim, Pfc. Ontuca, in their jeep and brought him to the Samar
Provincial Hospital where he died the following day. 12chanrobles virtual law library
Appellant Sgt. Felix Padilla has a different version. He says that at about one o'clock in the morning
of 5 May 1981, he was with the later Capt. Mario Ty and his men of the 9th Infantry Brigade. They
had just arrived from a covert operation in Bgy. Rama, Catbalogan, Samar. Upon their arrival at Pier
1 they parted ways, he going to the house of his first cousin Monica Racuyal at the southwest
corner of Mabini Avenue and 7th Street, Patag District, while the rest of the group proceeded to
Calbayog City, home of his brigade. He took San Bartolome Street then turned right on Rizal
Avenue walking along the right or southern side. On the left or northern side of the street near the
Cinex Theater, he noticed a man forcing himself on a woman who was struggling and screaming for
help. Being an officer of the law, he responded. He identified himself and ordered the man to
release the woman. The man ignored him and so he fired a single warning shot into the air using his
.45 cal. pistol. Before he could even lower his arm, he heard a gun report emanating some thirty
(30) meters away near the intersection of San Bartolome Street and Rizal Avenue where the
Catbalogan Hardware was located.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
At that very moment, the man holding the woman slumped to the ground. He then saw two (2) men
from the street corner beside the hardware store dart towards Rizal Avenue. Immediately, he took
cover behind a parked jeep and called upon a bystander to summon the police. From where he was,
he heard someone near the Catbalogan Hardware saying, "Patay na yan," referring to the person
who had just been gunned down. Members of the military police soon arrived and took the victim to
the hospital. 13chanrobles virtual law library
A painstaking review of the records fails to convince us that somebody else shot the victim to death.
This Court gives credence to the contrary testimony of Pat. Daniel Omega who narrated the events
with elaborate details before, during and after the shooting. We are satisfied, as was the trial court,
with his story which rings true throughout.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The account of the defense that the victim was shot at the head by unidentified men is inconsistent
with human experience, observation and reason, and is further belied by the positive testimony of a
principal witness. The improbability of appellant's narration lies principally on the admitted medical
findings on the point of entry of the bullet, the size of the gunshot wound and its characteristics, and
well as the location of the slug taken from the head of the victim, all of which point to the culpability
of the accused. 14chanrobles virtual law library
The autopsy report shows that the bullet entered the mid-parietal region of the victim's head where
the left and the right parietal bones forming part of the upper portions of the skull unite or are joined
by a bony seam called the sagittal suture that runs along a point anterior or above the forehead and
a point posterior or about the level of the ear.  15The testimony of Dr. Caridad Quimbo, the resident
physician who conducted the post-mortem examination, as well as the diagram in the anatomical
chart (Exh. "H") marking the entrance wound, reveals that the bullet entered the roof of the skull and
embedded itself beneath the left parietal bone. From the location of the slug in relation to the entry
wound, it could be safely concluded, according to the doctor, that the trajectory of the bullet took on
a downward curve, inferring that the assailant was on a higher plane than the victim.  16She also
observed the bursting of the edges of the stellar shaped entrance wound indicating that the bullet
was fired at close
range. 17Furthermore, the size of the gunshot wound - about 3� inches in diameter - which caused
the cerebral tissues to spill out from the cranium, was too large for the bullet to have been fired from
a distance of thirty (30) meters.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
We find it difficult to believe that the alleged gunman fired the shot that hit the victim at the top of his
head from his right side, while the latter was at a distance struggling with a woman at the time he
was hit. Indeed, it is highly incredible 18for a person with ordinary shooting skills to hit an
extraordinary mark at a range of thirty (30) meters using only a handgun, especially when the target
is mobile and the sight is blocked by some persons, and the area is not comfortably lighted. Even if
the shooting was accidental, or if purposely done was consigned to chance, the probability that the
bullet would fatally hit the victim was remarkably remote.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library
Accused-appellant takes issue on whether the slug marked Exh. "I" could be considered by the
court notwithstanding the failure of the prosecution to formally offer it in evidence. 19The records
show that when Fiscal Cobriros offered his evidence in court he inadvertedly skipped Exh. "I". After
he offered Exh. "H" and its sub-markings, he proceeded to offer Exh. "J" and its
sub-markings, thereby omitting to offer Exh. "I". The accused maintains that under Sec. 35, Rule
132, of the Rules of Court, evidence not formally offered, such as Exh. "I", cannot be considered by
the court.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
This is untenable. Although Exh. "I" was not formally offered, it was nevertheless duly identified by
Ireneo Ordeano, Senior Ballistician of the NBI. It was accordingly noted and subsequently
incorporated in the records. Such oversight could not be fatal to the cause of the prosecution as its
entire evidence had been recorded and the witness who was competent to testify on the matter had
properly identified the challenged exhibit. But even without the exhibits incorporated into the
records, the prosecution can still establish its case as its principal witness properly identified Exh. "I"
and his testimony was recorded. 20The most vital pieces of physical evidence of the prosecution - the
copper jacketed slug taken from the head of the victim and the empty shell recovered from the
scene of the crime - indubitably point to the accused as the author of the
crime.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
To strengthen the theory of the prosecution that the slug taken from the head of the victim was fired
from the pistol of the accused, the prosecution detailed the procedure followed by the ballistics
expert of the PC Crime Laboratory. The evidence specimen shell was marked "OCA" and the four
(4) test specimen shells taken from four (4) live ammunition which were test-fired into a bullet
recovery box using the pistol of the accused were marked "T-82-1" to "T-82-4". The specimens were
then mounted on a special ballistics microscope. On the left stage was placed the evidence
specimen shell, while on the right, the standard (test) specimen shell. The microscope was so
designed for comparing ballistics empty shells with a single eyepiece where the examiner could
view both specimens side by side and thoroughly compare the impressions appearing thereon. A
photomicrograph was then taken of the objects appearing on the lens of the microscope.  21The
results showed that the impressions on the evidence specimen shell were identical with the
impressions on the standard specimen. On the basis of the result of the examination, the ballistics
expert of the PC Crime Laboratory concluded that the evidence specimen shell and the standard
specimen shells were fired from one and the same firearm of the accused.  22chanrobles virtual law
library
A ballistics examination on the deformed copper jacketed slug marked Exh. "I" was also conducted
by the NBI. Following the same procedure adopted by the PC Crime Laboratory by comparing the
evidence copper jacketed slug marked Exh. "I" with the three standard slugs marked Exhs. "L", "L-1"
and
"L-2", the NBI observed that the evidence copper jacketed slug possesses identical characteristic
markings with those of the standard slugs. The conclusion reached by the NBI was that the bullets
were fired from one and the same firearm. 23A photomicrograph was also taken of the specimens
and they vividly showed parallelism in the impressions. 24chanrobles virtual law library
Accused-appellant postulates that the evidence copper jacketed slug marked Exh. "I" was not the
same slug taken by the medico-legal officer from the head of the victim during the post-mortem
examination. According to appellant, it was physically impossible to conduct to appellant, it was
physically impossible to conduct a ballistics examination on the evidence slug because it was in a
"disintegrated form" and was "fragmented in smaller bits" when taken out of the head of the victim.
The accused also banks on the inconsistency between the finding of Dr. Quimbo that the evidence
slug was covered with a "bronze jacket" and the NBI ballistics expert who said that the slug was
coated with a "copper jacket". 25chanrobles virtual law library
There is nothing in the records to show that the evidence copper jacket was splintered into several
pieces when it was taken out of the head of the deceased. Neither is there evidence on record to
show that the evidence slug examined by the NBI ballistics expert is different from that extracted by
Dr. Quimbo from the victim. The ballistics report of the NBI Criminalistics Division showed that the
evidence slug submitted for examination on 24 February 1984 in People v. Sgt.  Felix
Padilla was one-piece deformed copper jacketed slug fired from a .45 cal. pistol, and not a
fragmented slug.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Accused-appellant should not rely on the recollection of Dr. Quimbo as to the form or shape of the
evidence slug. The post-mortem examination on the body of the victim was made more than a year
before Dr. Quimbo testified and she herself admitted that she was no longer certain on the shape or
form of the evidence slug 26as she was more concerned with the post-mortem examination of the
cadaver and not with forensic ballistics examination.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library
Finally, accused-appellant asserts that the testimony of Pat. Omega should not have been accepted
with precipitate credulity since the witness was too partial for the victim who was his superior in the
police force. This argument is patently flawed. The credibility of a principal witness is a perennial
object of attack by an accused in distress who endlessly fabricates convenient tales and incredible
notions to impugn a particularly damaging testimony. We quote with approval the observation of the
Solicitor General 27-
There is not a whit of truth to this claim considering that Ontuca was already dead at the time Pat.
Omega gave testimony of the criminal incident. Moreover, the defense has shown no motive for
personal or financial gain on the part of Pat. Omega when he testified and provided the trial court
with the facts on the commission of the crime.
Moreover, as the trial judge observed of the deportment of principal witness Pat. Omega: "Omega is
a peace officer. He testified in a straightforward manner. His testimony has the ring of truth. No
credible reason has been given why said witness would testify except to tell the truth."chanrobles
virtual law library
While we affirm the conviction of accused-appellant, we take exception to the findings of the court a
quo on the attendant circumstances. We do not agree that there was treachery in the killing of the
victim to qualify it to murder. There was no treachery or alevosia because the accused did not
deliberately employ means, methods or forms in the mode of his attack which tended directly and
specifically to insure his safety from any offensive or retaliatory act the victim might make. Appellant
did not consciously adopt a particular method or manner of killing the victim that would eliminate any
risk to himself, for it was not until Pfc. Ontuca and the woman he was holding hostage accidentally
fell to the ground that appellant was accorded the instant opportunity to kill his victim with
facility. 28chanrobles virtual law library
evening. To flee when danger lurks is human and can never be regarded as a source of provocation
sufficient to come within the ambit of The Revised Penal Code. In fact, when an offended party flees
from his aggressor, the latter has no reason to pursue and attack
him.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
All told, the crime committed by accused-appellant is murder qualified by abuse of superior strength.
The penalty for murder is reclusion temporal maximum to death. In the absence of any mitigating or
aggravating circumstance, the penalty should be, as correctly imposed by the court a quo, reclusion
perpetua, which is the penalty for murder.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

In the early case of People v. Cañete, 29we held that "[t]he circumstance that the deceased had WHEREFORE, the judgment of the court a quo finding accused-appellant SGT. FELIX PADILLA
fallen to the ground gave to the accused, it is true, the opportunity, of which he promptly availed guilty of murder and imposing upon him the penalty of reclusion perpetua is AFFIRMED, with the
himself, to come up with the deceased and to dispatch him at once. But that act of so doing cannot modification that the civil indemnity of P30,000.00 awarded to the heirs of the deceased Pfc. Edino
be interpreted as evincing a design to employ a method indicative of alevosia. The contrary is true in Ontuca is increased to P50,000.00. Costs against accused-
the case where the victim is bound before being slain or is driven to take refuge behind the closed appellant.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
door of a closet."chanrobles virtual law library
SO ORDERED.
Moreover, the assault on the victim was not made in a sudden and unexpected manner. Pfc. Ontuca
apparently sensed the sinister plan of his malefactors when he fled and forcibly took a woman
hostage to use as a human shield. Clearly, the victim was forewarned of a graver evil when accused
and his companions mauled him, and when Maj. de la Cruz had to summon an armed military man
purportedly to bring him and Pat. Omega to the hospital for a "liquor
test".chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

The absence of treachery of alevosia notwithstanding, the crime committed by accused-appellant is

still murder. The killing was qualified by the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength
which was alleged in the information and proved during the trial.  30Abuse of superior strength is
present not only when the offenders enjoy numerical superiority, or there is a notorious inequality of
forces between the victim and the aggressor, but also when the offender uses a powerful weapon
which is out of proportion to the defense available to the offended party. The accused was armed
with a powerful pistol which he purposely used, gaining him an advantage over his victim who only
had a piece of plywood to cover himself after he was disarmed.  31chanrobles virtual law library

The accused did not abuse his public position in committing the crime. For this circumstance to be
appreciated as aggravating, the public official must use his influence, prestige and ascendancy
which his office gives him in realizing his purpose. It could not be said that the accused purposely
used or took advantage of his position or rank in killing the victim because he could have committed
the crime just the same by using another weapon not necessarily his service firearm. Besides, Pfc.
Ontuca, himself a military man, resisted the assault on his person and did not adhere to the
accused, nor to C1C Belino, neither to Maj. de la Cruz, who was a ranking officer of the Philippine
Air Force. 32chanrobles virtual law library

Sufficient provocation could neither mitigate the criminal liability of the accused. He cannot claim
that he was provoked by Pfc. Ontuca when the latter ran away from him because, understandably
so, the hapless victim feared for his life having been beaten up twice by his assailants that same
 [G.R. No. 144308. September 24, 2002
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. ANTONIO BARCELON, JR. Y
RENDURA @ JUN, accused-appellant.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
On automatic review is the decision1 dated August 8, 2000, of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan
City, Branch 127, in Criminal Case No. C-58255 (99), finding appellant Antonio Barcelon, Jr., guilty
of murder and imposing on him the penalty of death.
Appellant was charged with the crime of murder in an amended information which reads as follows:
That on or about the 24th day of November, 1999, in Caloocan City, Metro Manila, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without any justifiable
cause, with deliberate intent to kill, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
assault and stab with a bladed weapon on the vital parts of the body of one Nicasia Amador y
Arago, thereby inflicting upon the latter serious injuries, which injuries caused the victims death.
That in the commission of the crime, the qualifying aggravating circumstances of treachery and
abuse of superior strength were present.
Contrary to Law.2cräläwvirtualibräry
Upon arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty. Trial thereafter commenced.
From the testimonies of its witnesses, the trial court summed up the prosecutions version of the
incident:
Around 9:30 in the morning of November 24, 1999, appellant Antonio Barcelon was seen sitting on
the concrete bench fronting the residence of Dr. Nicasia Amador in Barangay Binhagan, Caloocan
City. Appellant was restless and palinga-linga. Later, appellant went inside the Amadors house (pp.
4-5, TSN, May 10, 2000).
Inside Amadors house, Isabel Medino was cooking in the kitchen. Medino heard Dr. Amador
shouting Ay! Ay! Ay! Medino ran to the sala and saw appellant strangling and stabbing Dr. Amador
(pp. 7-8, TSN, May 30, 2000). At that point, Medino and appellant stared at each other
(Nagkatinginan po kami) (p.9, TSN, May 30, 2000).
Dr. Amador shouted SAKLOLO! Appellant left the house holding a knife. When appellant was asked
by Virgilio Roque why the doctor was shouting, appellant casually remarked MAY NASAKSAK (pp.
4-5, TSN, May 9, 2000). Dr. Amador then came out holding her bleeding left arm. She asked for
help (p.9 TSN, May 30, 2000). Her breast was also bleeding. (p. 10, TSN, May 30, 2000). She was
brought by her neighbors to the Chinese General Hospital (p. 37 TSN, May 10, 1999) where she
was attended to by Dr. Laren Sagurus for stab wounds at her right neck and infraclavicular area. Dr.
Amador started to have a coughing episode, became pale and gasped for breath. Her blood
pressure went down. At 3:05 in the afternoon, she was pronounced dead (p. 11, TSN, June 19,
2000).
Meanwhile, concerned neighbors pursued appellant. The police authorities, together with Salvador
Dera and Rommel Adams, caught up with appellant in Kanlaon St, Quezon City (pp. 11-16, TSN,
May 10, 2000; p. 16, TSN, May 16, 2000). At the time of the incident, appellant was wearing a dirty
white sleeveless shirt (sando) (p.12, TSN, May 16, 2000). The sando (Exhibit P with submarkings;
Exhibit BB) was referred to the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination. The serology report (Exhibit
AA) indicated presence of human blood (Exhibit AA-2 and AA-3).  3cräläwvirtualibräry
Appellant appeared as the sole witness for his defense, and his testimony has been summarized by
the trial court as follows:
ANTONIO BARCELON, JR., testified that on November 24, 1999 at around 9:00 a.m. he went to
Cash Motor of Abad Santos to apply for a job but was informed by the security guard that there was
no vacancy. So he decided to go home. While walking along Bonifacio Avenue and when he was
about to cross Mayon Street to get a ride, he saw a group of persons chasing another person
towards his direction. He thought that there was a riot so he immediately crossed the Mayon Street.
Then suddenly, he heard someone pointing at him, so he ran. After crossing the said street, he
walked casually. After walking about three blocks heading Banawe St., a policeman and an Indian
National on board a motorcycle appeared and blocked his way. The policeman pointed a gun at
him. He asked him why, but the policeman ordered him to lie down instead and told him that he was
one of those being chased by a group of persons. He again asked them the reason for his arrest but
the policeman said that he can explain in the police station later.
He was then turned over to the Caloocan Police Station. He was ordered to change his white T-shirt
with a green one. He was brought to the place of incident where he was nabbed and mauled by the
persons present in that place. Then he was detained at the Caloocan City police precinct. (TSN,
July 11, 2000, pp. 2-12.) 4cräläwvirtualibräry
In convicting appellant, the court a quo gave credence to the testimony of the lone eyewitness for
the prosecution, Isabel Medino. The court found her testimony to be positive, sincere and delivered
with candor. Having had the untrammeled opportunity to directly observe her deportment and
conduct while testifying, the court further noted that definitely she did not give the impression that
she is distorting facts to wrongly implicate an innocent man in a crime so serious as Murder. 5 There
was likewise no ill-motive found on the part of Isabel, for her to testify falsely. 6cräläwvirtualibräry
According to the trial court, Isabels positive identification of the appellant was also bolstered by the
testimony of other witnesses who saw appellant acting strangely outside the victims house before
he entered it. Shortly after the crime was committed, two witnesses also saw appellant hurriedly
coming out of the house with a concealed knife in his possession.
Weighed against the inherently weak defense of denial and alibi proffered by the appellant, the trial
court sustained the version of the prosecution. It gave no credence to the contention of appellant
that the witnesses as well as the police had mistaken him for the actual culprit. The trial court also
noted flight of the appellant as an index of his guilt.
The trial court found that the killing was attended by treachery, which qualified the killing to murder.
It also found that the attendant circumstances of dwelling and abuse of superior strength aggravated
the offense. Hence, the sentence imposed on appellant by the trial court which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE foregoing premises considered and the prosecution having established beyond an
iota of doubt the guilt of Accused ANTONIO BARCELON, Jr. y RENDURA of the crime of Murder as
defined and penalized under Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by R.A. 7659 and
considering the presence of the aggravating circumstance of dwelling without any mitigating
circumstance to off-set it, this Court consistent with the provision of Art. 63 of the Revised Penal
Code, hereby imposes upon the said Accused the maximum penalty of DEATH; to indemnify the
legal heirs of the deceased the civil indemnity of P50,000.00; to pay the Private Complainant the
actual damages in the total amount of P306,939.02 including moral damages of P200,000.00 and
exemplary damages of P150,000.00, plus costs.
xxx
SO ORDERED.7cräläwvirtualibräry
Now before us on automatic review, appellant assigns the following errors allegedly committed by
the trial court:
I
GIVING CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONIES OF PROSECUTION WITNESSES PARTICULARLY
SALVADOR DERA, VIRGILIO ROQUE AND ISABEL MEDINO DESPITE THEIR BEING
UNRELIABLE, UNBELIEVABLE AND BIASED.
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE QUALIFYING
CIRCUMSTANCES OF TREACHERY AND ABUSE OF SUPERIOR STRENGTH DESPITE
FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO ESTABLISH THE SAME WITH CERTAINTY.
III
FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE
CRIME OF MURDER AND IN IMPOSING THE SUPREME PENALTY OF DEATH.
Three issues need to be resolved: (1) whether the prosecution witnesses are credible; (2) whether
treachery, abuse of superior strength, and dwelling attended the commission of the crime; and (3)
whether the death penalty has been properly imposed.
On the issue of credibility, appellant alleges that the testimonies of prosecution witnesses were
tainted with suspicion and bias. In particular, the testimonies of witnesses Virgilio Roque, Salvador
Dera and Isabel Medino, according to appellant, lack credibility.
Appellant attacks the credibility of Isabel Medino, the lone eyewitness to the stabbing, by pointing
out that it took her two weeks after the incident to give her statement to the police, unlike other
witnesses who gave their statements on the day the crime was committed. Moreover, Medino was
inconsistent on her account of where she was during those two weeks after the killing. Initially, she
had said she was with the Amadors, but on cross-examination, she stated that she went to the
province. Appellant also avers that Medinos testimony may also be tainted with bias as she works
for the Amadors. According to appellant, her motive is to help her employer in prosecuting the
appellant.
For the appellee, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) contends that eyewitness Isabel Medino
positively identified appellant as the person who stabbed the victim. 8 The OSG cites Isabels
testimony9 where she stated that she was about four steps away when she saw the appellant
strangling and stabbing the victim. She even testified that she was able to identify the appellant as,
in the course of the stabbing and just before appellant ran out, they stared at each other. According
to the OSG, her testimony alone is sufficient to warrant appellants conviction, as the testimony of a
single witness, if positive and credible, is sufficient to sustain a judgment of conviction, even in a
charge of murder.10
With regard to the testimonies of Roque and Dera, appellant contends that they did not witness the
actual stabbing of the victim but only saw appellant within the premises of the Amadors house.
According to appellant, this does not conclusively establish that he is the killer. It is even surprising,
according to appellant, for Roque and Dera to say that he was the one who told them that
somebody was killed inside the Amadors house.11 The closeness of Roque to the victim, treating her
as a second mother, and admitting that he was willing to help the family of the victim to obtain
justice,12 clearly tainted his testimony with bias, according to appellant. Appellant further stresses
that since the victims husband is a lawyer by profession, he is quite capable of rehearsing the
witnesses and supplying the details just to pin down any suspect. 13 Hence, appellant avers that the
testimonies of Roque and Dera were unreliable.
The OSG argues, however, that, with regard to the testimonies of Roque and Dera, though they did
not actually see the stabbing incident, they corroborated the testimony of Medino and placed the
appellant at the scene of the crime. Roque also identified the knife held by the appellant as he
emerged from the house as the same knife utilized as the murder weapon. The OSG avers that
there is no sufficient showing that the prosecution witnesses were biased against appellant. The
relationship of the witnesses to the victim, by itself, does not give rise to the presumption of bias or A: Yes sir.
ulterior motive, nor does it ipso facto impair the credibility of the witnesses, nor tarnish the testimony
of said witnesses. Moreover, the close relationship of a witness could enhance the trustworthiness Q: And what happened when you reached the sala?
of his testimony, as he would naturally impute the crime only to the actual perpetrator since he
would want to bring only the real culprits to justice, and not falsely accuse innocent A: I saw a dark and slim body built man strangling with his right hand and at the same time stabbing
persons.14cräläwvirtualibräry Dra. Nicasia Amador with his left hand sir.

The contentions of the OSG are well-taken. Q: When you saw that man strangling and stabbing [D]ra. [A]mador by that man, how far were you, I
am referring to the victim and that person who according to you strangling and stabbing [D]ra.
The pertinent portions of the testimony of Isabel Medinoappears as follows: [N]icasia [A]mador?

Q: At around 10:00 oclock in the morning of November 24, 1999 do you remember where you A: Apat na hakbang po.
were?
xxx
A: I was cooking sir.
Q: At the time that according to you that man whom you saw strangling and stabbing [D]ra. [N]icasia
Q: Where? [A]mador what is his position to Dra. Amador, the victim in this case?

A: In the kitchen sir. A: The man was facing [D]ra. [A]mador sir.

Q: In what house? xxx

A: Of Dra. Amador sir. Q: When you saw that person strangling and stabbing [D]ra. [N]icasia Amador what happened next?

Q: And while cooking in the kitchen of the residence of Dra. Amador at that time and date did A: I saw the man scampered away toward the door going to the garage sir.
anything happened unusual?
Q: Will you able to recognize that person if you can see him again?
A: There was sir.
A: Yes sir.
Q: What was that?
Q: Why will you be able to identify that person?
A: On that fateful day and time while I was cooking I heard shout saying ay, ay, ay sir.
A: Dahil nagkatinginan po kami sir. (we stare each other).
Q: Were you able to determine where that voice or shout is coming?
Q: And after you and that person stare each other what happened next?
A: Inside their house particularly in the sala sir.
A: He ran outside toward the garage sir.
Q: Upon hearing those shouts or voices of [D]ra. [N]icasia [A]mador what did you do?
Q: What did you do next?
A: I ran toward the sala sir.
A: Hindi ako nakatulong dahil sa takot at sa nerbiyos ko po.
Q: Didwere you able to reach the sala?
x x x15cräläwvirtualibräry
A close scrutiny of the foregoing testimony, as well as the testimonies of other prosecution
witnesses, convinces us that no reversible error was committed by the trial court in giving credence
to the prosecutions version of the incident.
Findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses deserve great weight, given the clear
advantage of a trial judge in the appreciation of testimonial evidence. For indeed the trial court is in
a better position to decide the question of credibility, having heard the witnesses and observed their
deportment and manner of testifying during the trial. 16 Here, the trial court found the account of the
incident proffered by the lone prosecution eyewitness Isabel Medino to be positive, sincere and
candid.17
Moreover, it is a settled doctrine that the positive identification of an eyewitness, who has been
shown to have no ill motive to testify falsely against the appellant, prevails over the bare denials of
the latter.18cräläwvirtualibräry
The trial court observed in this case:
The verity that I. MEDINO is a housemaid in the house of the Private Complainant, will not by itself
discredit her testimony considering that this Court has had the untrammeled opportunity to observe
directly her deportment and conduct while testifying on the witness stand and definitely she did not
give the impression that she is capable of distorting the facts to wrongly impute an innocent man in
a crime so serious as murder.
Furthermore, there is nothing in the record to show that I. MEDINO was impelled by improper
motive in testifying the way she did against the Accused. In fact the latter admitted having had no
previous encounter with said witness prior to the incident. x x x 19cräläwvirtualibräry
Let us now resolve the issue of whether treachery attended the commission of the crime, thereby
qualifying the same to murder.
The eyewitness, Isabel Medino, did not actually see how the attack on the victim commenced.
Where no particulars are known as to how the killing began, its perpetration with treachery cannot
be merely supposed.20cräläwvirtualibräry
While the eyewitness positively identified the assailant, Isabel Medino was unable to depict exactly
how the attack was launched against Dr. Amador. It was only after Medino heard the victim shout
that she proceeded to the sala where the appellant and the victim were. At that time, Isabel saw
appellant attacking the victim, but the attack by appellant was already in full progress. The attack
was frontal, as testified to by Medino and evidenced by the medical findings. The victim suffered two
stabs in her neck and infraclavicular area. But we cannot conclude from these facts alone, that the
attack was attended by treachery. For treachery to be appreciated, it must be present and seen by
the witness right at the inception of the attack.21 Thus, we cannot accept as well-founded the
conclusion of the trial court that the killing of Dr. Amador was murder because it was attended by
treachery. That finding lacks evidentiary support.
Now, was the killing committed with abuse of superior strength?
To take advantage of superior strength means to use purposely excessive force, out of proportion to
the means of defense available to the person attacked. 22 The aggravating circumstance of abuse of
superior strength depends on the age, size and strength of the parties. It is considered whenever
there is a notorious inequality of forces between the victim and the aggressor, assessing a
superiority of strength notoriously advantageous for the aggressor which is selected or taken
advantage of by him in the commission of the crime. 23
In finding that abuse of superior strength attended the killing, the trial court observed that such
abuse is obvious, considering the blatant inequality of strength and age between the victim and the
appellant as well as the degree of force and weapon used by him. 24 The OSG points out that there
was abuse because at the time the crime was committed, the victim was a 69-year-old woman and
appellant was only 29 years old.
Appellant disputes the OSGs contention. He avers that the mere fact that the victim was a woman
does not by itself establish that there was abuse of superior strength. For appellant says he is a
short person with a small body, hence, it cannot be concluded that there was notorious disparity of
strength between him and the victim. 25cräläwvirtualibräry
We find no merit in appellants argument. As held in People vs. Ocumen,26  an attack by a man with a
deadly weapon upon an unarmed woman constitutes the circumstance of abuse of that superiority
which his sex and the weapon used in the act afforded him, and from which the woman was unable
to defend herself.
The disparity in age between the assailant and the victim, aged 29 and 69, respectively, indicates
physical superiority on appellants part over the deceased. It did not matter that appellant was dark
with a slim body build27 or medyo mataba.28 What mattered was that the malefactor was male and
armed with a lethal weapon that he used to slay the victim. Thus, abuse of superior strength was
present in the commission of the crime. But should it be considered as qualifying or aggravating?
We note that the amended information states: That in the commission of the crime, the qualifying
aggravating circumstances of treachery and abuse of superior strength were present. In its decision,
the trial court considered abuse of superior strength as a generic aggravating circumstance and
deemed it absorbed in treachery.
We agree that here abuse of superior strength should be treated as merely aggravating. And we
find it is present in this case, although there is no treachery.
Both the appellant and the OSG agree that the trial court manifestly erred in appreciating the
aggravating circumstance of dwelling. For dwelling was not alleged in the information, hence, it
could not be proved29 nor appreciated against appellant. (See Rules of Court, Rule 110, Sec. 8
which now requires that the information must allege and specify aggravating and qualifying
circumstances.)

Consequently, modifications are in order with regard to the crime committed, the penalty imposed,
and the amount of civil indemnity and damages to be paid. There being no qualifying circumstance,
appellant should be held liable for homicide, not murder. Under Art. 249 of the Revised Penal Code,
the penalty for homicide is reclusion temporal in any of its periods, the range of which is twelve (12)
years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years. There being one aggravating circumstance present,
without any mitigating circumstance to offset it, the penalty to be imposed in its maximum period.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum of the penalty that should be imposed on
the appellant must be taken from the maximum period of reclusion temporal, while the minimum
must be taken from the penalty next lower in degree, which is prision mayor, the range of which is
six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years.

The award of actual damages in the amount of P306,939.02, is evidenced by receipts and should
be maintained. However, the award of P200,000 as moral damages should be reduced to P50,000,
in line with existing jurisprudence.30 In view of the presence of an aggravating circumstance, the
award of exemplary damages has sufficient basis31 and must be granted pursuant to current case
law but only for P25,000.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, Br. 127, in Criminal Case
No. C-58255(99) is hereby MODIFIED. Accordingly, appellant ANTONIO BARCELON, JR., is
found GUILTY of HOMICIDE and sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of ten (10) years and
one (1) day of prision mayor  as minimum to seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day
of reclusion temporal as maximum. He is also ordered to pay the heirs of the victim, Dr. Nicasia
Amador, moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00, and exemplary damages in the amount of
P25,000.00, as well as actual damages in the amount of P306,939.02.

Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. Nos. 148145-46             July 5, 2004 That the crime was committed with the aggravating circumstances of dwelling, night
time and with the use of an unlicensed firearm.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs. Act contrary to law.2 (Emphasis supplied)
FELIX VENTURA y QUINDOY and ARANTE FLORES y VENTURA, appellants.
The accusatory portion of the Information for Frustrated Murder in Criminal Case No. 00-20693
reads as follows:

That on or about the 23rd day of February, 2000 in the City of Bacolod, Philippines, and
DECISION within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the herein accused, conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping each other, without any justifiable cause or motive,
accused Felix Q. Ventura armed with a .38 Caliber Homemade Revolver and Arante Flores
y Ventura armed with a bladed weapon, with intent to kill and by means of treachery and
evident premeditation, and abuse of superior strength, did, then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack and stab with said bladed weapon one Jaime
PER CURIAM: Bocateja, thereby causing upon of the latter the following wounds, to wit:

On automatic appeal1 before this Court is the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Negros -       multiple stab wounds
Occidental, Branch 50, finding appellants Felix Ventura (Ventura) and Arante Flores (Flores) guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of Murder in Criminal Case No. 00-20692 and Attempted Murder in
-       #1 Posterior axillary area right
Criminal Case No. 00-20693.
-       #2 Posterior axillary area left with minimal hemothorax
The accusatory portion of the Information for Murder in Criminal Case No. 00-20692 reads as
follows:
-       lacerated wound right parietal area
That on or about the 23rd day of February, 2000 in the City of Bacolod, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the herein accused, conspiring, confederating OPERATION PERFORMED:
and acting in concert, without any justifiable cause or motive, with intent to kill and by
means of treachery and evident premeditation, accused Felix Q. Ventura armed with a .38 -       Exploration of wound right parietal for removal of foreign body
Caliber Home-made Revolver and Arante V. Flores armed with a bladed weapon, and by
taking advantage of their superior strength, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and thus performing all the acts of execution which would have produced the crime of murder as
feloniously assault, attack and stab with bladed weapon one Aileen Bocateja y Peruelo, a consequence, but which nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of some cause or
thereby inflicting upon the person of the latter the following wounds, to wit: accident independent of the will of the perpetrator, that is, due to the timely and able
medical assistance, which saved the life of the victim and the victim was able to escape.
-       Cardio respiratory arrest
That the crime was committed with the aggravating circumstances of dwelling, night
-       Hemothorax time, and with the use of an unlicensed firearm.

-       stab wounds Act contrary to law.3 (Emphasis supplied)

which wounds were the direct and immediate cause of the death of said victim, to the When arraigned, appellants pleaded not guilty to both charges. 4 The two criminal cases were
damage and prejudice of the heirs of the latter. consolidated following which they were jointly tried.5
The spouses Jaime and Aileen Bocateja were, in the early hours of February 23, 2000, fast asleep
in their room on the ground floor of their two-storey house at Alunan-Yulo in Bacolod City, Negros
Occidental. The room had a glass wall with a glass sliding door which was closed but not locked.
The kitchen light was open, as was the light in the adjoining room where the couple's young
children, Jummylin and Janine, were sleeping. Their niece, Aireen Bocateja, and Jaime's elder
daughter, Rizza Mae, were asleep in their rooms on the second floor. 6
At around 2:00 a.m.,7 Jaime was roused from his sleep by appellant Ventura who, together with his
nephew appellant Flores, had stealthily entered the couple's room after they gained entry into the
house by cutting a hole in the kitchen door.
As established by the testimonial and object evidence for the prosecution, the following transpired
thereafter:
Appellant Ventura pointed a revolver at Jaime's face, announced a hold-up, hit Jaime on the head
with the gun and asked him for his keys. 8
When appellant Ventura struck him again, Jaime called out for help and tried to grab the revolver.
The two men then struggled for possession of the gun. As Jaime almost succeeded in wresting
possession of the gun from him, appellant Flores shouted to appellant Ventura to stab Jaime. Using
the knife he
was carrying, appellant Flores stabbed Jaime three times. Jaime thereupon released the gun, threw
a nearby plastic stool at the jalousy glass window causing it to break and cried out for help. 9
In the meantime, Aileen who had been awakened, began shouting for help as she saw her husband
in mortal danger. Appellant Flores stabbed her, however, with his knife, and although Aileen tried to
defend herself with an electric cord, appellant Flores continued stabbing her. 10
Awakened by the commotion, Aireen descended the stairs and saw the knife wielding appellant
Flores whom she recognized as a former employee of the butcher shop of the Bocataje spouses.
Pleading with appellant Flores not to harm her, Aireen ran back upstairs into Rizza Mae's room, and
the two called to their neighbors for help.11
Appellants Ventura and Flores thereupon fled the Bocateja house, 12 bringing nothing with them.13
Soon members of the Central Investigation Unit (CIU) of the Philippine National Police (PNP)
arrived in response to a flash report.14 Some of the police officers took the spouses to the Western
Visayas Regional Hospital,15 while other elements of the CIU team intercepted appellants Ventura
and Flores who were being pursued by neighbors of the spouses at the corner of Araneta-Yulo.
Recovered from appellant Ventura was a .38 caliber revolver with five (5) live bullets, and from
appellant Flores a blood stained knife16 measuring 14½ inches from tip to handle with a 10-inch
blade.17
Shortly after their arrest, appellants were interviewed by reporters from Bombo Radio to whom they
admitted responsibility for stabbing Jaime and Aileen. In response to questions from the reporters,
appellant Ventura explained that he suspected his wife was carrying on an affair with Jaime. 18
In the ocular inspection of the Bocateja residence, the CIU team found the spouses' room in
disarray, with some cabinets opened and blood splattered all over the floor, the bed and the
ceiling. 19
Aileen eventually died in the hospital on the same day of the commission of the crime. 20 Dr. Luis
Gamboa, City Health Officer of Bacolod City who conducted the autopsy of her body, found that she
suffered a hack wound on her face and four stab wounds on her body, three at the chest and one at
the back of the right shoulder, all caused by a sharp bladed instrument, such as the knife recovered
from appellant Flores. One of the stab wounds penetrated Aileen's chest near the left nipple, the
intercoastal space and the middle of her right lung causing internal hemorrhage and ultimately
resulting in her death.21
Jaime who was hospitalized for a total of six days, was treated by Dr. Jose Jocson, 22 who certified
that he sustained the following non-lethal injuries: 23
Multiple Stab Wounds
#1 Posterior Axillary Area Right
#2 Posterior Axillary Area Left with Minimal Hemothorax
Lacerated Wound Right Parietal Area24
From the evidence for the defense consisting of the testimonies of appellants Ventura and Flores
and Primitiva Empirado, the following version is culled:
Four days after February 13, 2000 when appellant Ventura arrived in Negros Occidental from
Manila where he had been working as a security guard, 25 he noticed that his wife, Johanna, who had
previously been employed as a house helper of the Bocateja spouses, was wearing a new ring.
When he confronted her, she said that it came from Jaime who was courting her, and that it was
because Jaime's wife, Aileen, had discovered their illicit relationship that she had been dismissed
from the Bocateja household. Incensed at the revelation, he slapped his wife whereupon she left the
conjugal home.26
On February 22, 2000, Johanna returned to the conjugal home in Barangay Alegria, Municipality of
Murcia, Negros Occidental to get her things. After a verbal confrontation with her husband, she left
to find work in Kabankalan, Negros Occidental. This was the last time that Johanna and appellant
Ventura saw each other.27
That same day, appellant Flores visited his uncle-appellant Ventura. The two spoke at length and
appellant Flores, who had previously worked for a day at the meat shop of the Bocateja spouses,
confirmed that Johanna and Jaime were having an affair. 28
Since appellant Flores knew where the Bocateja spouses lived, appellant Ventura asked him to go
with him to their residence so he could confront Jaime about his affair with Johanna. 29
Appellants, armed with an unlicensed revolver and a knife, thus repaired to the Bocateja residence
still on the same day, February 22, 2000, arriving there at around 11:00 p.m. They were not able to
immediately enter the premises, however. After boring a hole through the kitchen door with the
knife, appellants entered the Bocateja residence at 2:00 a.m. of the next day, February 23, 2000. 30
Once inside, appellants entered the room of the Bocateja spouses through the unlocked sliding
door. Appellant Ventura woke Jaime up, confronted him and told him to stop his relationship with
Johanna. Jaime fought back, and he and appellant Ventura grappled for possession of the latter's
gun.31
Soon after, Aileen woke up, screamed for help, and began throwing things at appellant Flores whom
she attempted to strangle with an electrical extension cord. Unable to breathe, appellant Ventura
stabbed Aileen twice with his knife. And seeing that Jaime had wrested control of the gun from
appellant Ventura, appellant Flores also stabbed Jaime. 32
Since appellants had not intended to kill Aileen or stab Jaime, they fled in the course of which Jaime
began shooting at them with a 9 mm pistol. Appellants were eventually intercepted by policemen
who placed them under arrest.33
Interviewed by the media after his arrest, appellant Ventura stressed that he just wanted to confront
Jaime about the latter's relationship with appellant's wife, Johanna. 34
By the appealed Decision of December 15, 2000, the trial court disposed as follows:
FOR ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court finds the accused FELIX VENTURA y QUINDOY
and ARANTE FLORES y VENTURA GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as Principals by
Direct Participation of the crime of ATTEMPTED MURDER as alleged in Criminal
Information No. 00-20693 with the aggravating circumstances of evident
premeditation, dwelling, nighttime and the breaking of door to gain entrance to the
house and with no mitigating circumstance. Accordingly, they are sentenced to suffer the
penalty of Reclusion Temporal in its maximum period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, they shall serve a prison term of from Eight (8) years of Prision Mayor as Minimum to
Eighteen (18) years of Reclusion Temporal as Maximum.
The Court also finds the two (2) above-named accused GUILTY as Principal[s] by Direct
participation for the crime of Murder as alleged in Criminal Information No. 00-
20692 qualified by abuse of superior strength. The aggravating circumstances of
dwelling, nighttime and by the breaking of a door are present in the commission of
the crime. There is no mitigating circumstance. The accused, therefore, are meted the
Supreme penalty of DEATH.
By way of civil liability, the accused are solidarily ordered to pay the heirs of Aileen Bocoteja
the sum of P50,000.00 as death indemnity. The accused are likewise held solidarily liable to
pay Jaime Bocateja the sum of P100,000.00 as moral damages and the sum of P20,000.00
as exemplary damages.35 (Emphasis supplied)
In their Brief,36 appellants contend that the trial court erred (1) in convicting them despite the failure
of the prosecution to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt; (2) in considering abuse of superior
strength as a qualifying circumstance in Criminal Case No. 00-20892; (3) in considering
evident premeditation as a qualifying circumstance in Criminal Case No. 00-20893; and (4) in
considering the aggravating circumstances of breaking of door and nocturnity in both cases. 37
Appellants argue that, at most, they can only be convicted of attempted homicide for the stabbing of
Jaime and homicide for the fatal stabbing of Aileen. 38
From a considered review of the records and applicable jurisprudence, the instant appeal fails.
The essence of evident premeditation is that the execution of the criminal act must be preceded by
cool thought and reflection upon the resolution to carry out the criminal intent during a space of time
sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment.39 For it to be appreciated, the following must be proven
beyond reasonable doubt: (1) the time when the accused determined to commit the crime; (2) an act
manifestly indicating that the accused clung to his determination; and (3) sufficient lapse of time
between such determination and execution to allow him to reflect upon the circumstances of his
act.40
By appellants' argument, even if appellant Ventura became jealous when he learned of the illicit
affair between his wife and Jaime, it is not, by itself, sufficient proof that he determined to kill the
latter; that with Jaime's testimony that appellant had announced a "hold-up," they, at most, intended
to rob, but not kill the spouses; that their only purpose was to confront Jaime regarding his
supposed affair with appellant Ventura's wife, Johanna; and that if they had truly intended to kill
Jaime, then appellant Ventura would not have bothered to awaken him, but would just have shot
him in his sleep.
These assertions run counter to the established facts and are debunked by appellants' own
admissions.
Appellants admittedly arrived at the Bocateja residence at 11:00 p.m. and surreptitiously entered
therein at 2:00 a.m. At that time, the surrounding premises were decidedly dark, and all the
members of the household were fast asleep. Armed with a gun and a knife, they proceeded directly
to the bedroom of the spouses, where appellant Ventura woke up Jaime. These actuations are not
of those seeking parley, but instead betray an unmistakable intention to kill, not merely confront, WITNESS:
Jaime.
A       No, I did not ask her because we had a confrontation and the next day, February
Indeed, when pressed during cross-examination to explain why he chose to "confront" Jaime under 17, she left.
the foregoing circumstances, appellant Ventura became evasive and did not give a clear answer:
Q       Of course, when you arrived at the house of the Bocateja [spouses] at 11:00 o'clock
Q       Mr. Witness, you said that your purpose in going to the house of Jaime was only to in the evening, you were armed at that time, is that right, you and your companion, Arante
confront him. My question is, why is it that you went there at 11:00 o'clock in the Flores?
evening and not in the morning so that you will have all the opportunity to confront
him? A       Yes, sir.

A       Because at that time, I was not on my proper frame of mind. Q       What was that weapon at that time?

Q       Why, is it not a fact that as early as February 17, 2000, you were already told by your A       .38 caliber revolver.
wife that there was that relationship with Jaime Bocateja and your wife?
xxx
A       Yes, sir.
ATTY. ORTIZ:
Q       Why did you not immediately confront Mr, Bocateja after that day or February
17? Q       Mr. Witness, if your intention was only to confront Mr. Jaime Bocateja, why is it
that you did not wait or you did not come to that place earlier so that at that time,
WITNESS: Jaime Bocateja was still awake or perhaps waited until the next day?

A       On that day, I don't know Jaime Bocateja. COURT:

xxx Already answered. He said that he was not at the proper frame of his
mind.41 (Emphasis supplied)
ATTY. ORTIZ:
Cross-examined on the same point, appellant Flores was equally evasive, but eventually revealed
Q       On February 22. So that you did not ask your wife where the place of Jaime that the timing and method of entry were purposely chosen to avoid detection by either the Bocateja
Bocateja was at that time you were by him on February 22, 2000? family or their neighbors:

A       Johanna did not tell me the place of Jaime Bocateja. Q       You arrived in the house of Bocateja at about 11:00 o'clock is that right?

Q       Why did you not ask her where the house is, at that time? A       Yes, sir.

A       What she told me was that, she is working in Bacolod City. Q       And your purpose in going to the house of Bocateja was only to confront Jaime
Bocateja about his relationship with Johanna is that right?
Q       Mr. Witness, you had from February 17 to 22, a number of days to confront Mr.
Jaime Bocateja. Did you not confront your wife or perhaps ask her about the place or A       Yes, sir.
where this Jaime Bocateja was at that time and have the intention to confront him, if
that was really your intention to confront him? ATTY. ORTIZ:
Q       Why did you wait Mr. Witness why did you and the other accused Felix Ventura A       Yes, sir.
wait for three (3) hours for you to confront him in his house?
Q       When you arrived at the house of Jaime Bocateja about 11:00 o'clock. . . by the way
WITNESS: when did you arrive at the house of Jaime Bocateja?

A       Because we were not able to enter the door right away because the door could A       11:00 in the evening.
not be opened.
Q       Of course you did not anymore knock at the door Mr. Witness?
Q       My question Mr. Witness, is this you ate your supper at Libertad market at
about 8:00 o'clock why did you not go to the house of Jaime Bocateja at 9:00 o'clock A       No, sir.
immediately after supper? At that time when the members of the family were yet
awake?A We stayed at Burgos market and then from Burgos to Libertad we only walk Q       Or you did not also call any member of the family to open [the door for] you, is
and from Libertad to the house of Bocateja. that right?

ATTY. ORTIZ: WITNESS:

Q       You will admit Mr. Witness at the time you left your place at Brgy. Alegria you A       No, sir.
were already armed, is that right?
ATTY. ORTIZ:
WITNESS:
Q       As a matter of fact you only broke the gate Mr. Witness in order to enter the
A       Yes, sir. compound of the Bocateja family?

Q       Your uncle Felix Ventura was armed with [a] .38 caliber revolver, is that right? A       We scaled over the gate.

A       Yes, sir. Q       And why do you have Mr. Witness to go over the fence and open a hole at the
kitchen for you to confront Mr. Jaime Bocateja if that was your purpose?
Q       And you were also armed with a bladed weapon is that correct?
A       The purpose of my uncle was just to confront Jaime.
A       Yes, sir.
Q       And when you confront, are you saying that you cannot any more knock at the
Q       Why do you have to bring this weapon Mr. Witness? door, perhaps call any member of the family inside the house?

A       We brought this weapon just to frighten Jaime Bocateja during [the] WITNESS:
confrontation.
A       No, sir.
ATTY. ORTIZ:
ATTY. ORTIZ:
Q       Are you saying Mr. Witness if your purpose was only to confront him you have
to bring this [sic] weapons? Q       Why Mr. Witness, Why?

WITNESS:
 A       We did not call or knock at the person inside the house because it will make Q       I assume that you disembarked at Burgos Market?
noise or calls and alarm to the neighbors.42 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
A       Yes, sir.
To be sure, all the elements of evident premeditation were clearly established from the lips of
appellants themselves. Thus, on clarificatory questioning by the trial court, appellant Ventura Q       And you just walked from Burgos Market to Libertad Baybay to the house of Jaime
testified: Bocateja?

COURT: A       Yes, sir.

Q       I recall that you left Murcia [at] 4:00 o'clock. Is that morning or afternoon? Q       It took you about thirty (30) [minutes] to one (1) hour, more or less?

A       I left Murcia at 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon. A       More than one (1) hour.

Q       4:00 o'clock from Alegria then to Alangilan, then to Bacolod, is that correct? Q       And during this time, you were talking again with Arante Flores [about] the
course of action that you will take once a confrontation takes place with Jaime
A       Yes, sir. Bocateja?

Q       From Alangilan to Bacolod, what mode of transportation did you make? WITNESS:

A       From Alegria to Alangilan, we only hiked and then from Alangilan to Bacolod we A       Yes, I asked him the location of 3rd Road since I do not know the house of
took the passenger jeepney. Jaime Bocateja.

Q       From Alegria to Alangilan, how long did it take you to walk? How many COURT:
kilometers?
Q       I assume that the front main door of the house was close[d] at that time, correct?
A       Four (4) kilometers.
A       Yes, sir.
Q       And, I assume that while you were walking, you were talking with Arante Flores,
your nephew, about the plans to go to the house of Jaime Bocateja? Q       You scaled that door, the front main door of the gate?

A       Yes, sir. A       Yes, sir, we scaled the gate.

COURT: Q       You were not able to open it but you simply scaled, you went over?

Q       By the way, what did you do at Alangilan? A       Yes, sir.

A       I went there because my clothes were at my sister's house. Q       And you said yet, you destroyed the main door of the house. Can you tell the
Court, how did you destroy the main door of the house?
Q       So, what time did you arrive in [Bacolod]?
A       No, the kitchen door, sir.
A       We arrived here in [Bacolod] late in the evening.
COURT:
 Q       How were you able to destroy it? Q       From Alangilan where did you proceed?

WITNESS: A       In Alangilan, we stayed at the house of my aunt and then we proceeded to
Bacolod.
A       We used the knife in unlocking the door. We made a hole.
Q       So what time did you arrived [sic] in Bacolod?
Q       You made a hole and with the use of your hand, you were able to unlock the inside
lock because of the hole? A       8:00 o'clock in the evening.

A       Yes, sir. Q       When you arrived in Bacolod, what did you do?

Q       And I assume that it took you twenty (20) – thirty (30) minutes to make that A       We ate our supper at Libertad Market.
hole?
Q       After eating your dinner at Libertad, what did you do?
A       Yes, sir.43 (Emphasis supplied)
A       After eating our supper, we proceeded to the house of Jaime Bocateja.
The immediately foregoing narration was echoed by appellant Flores who gave the following
testimony on direct examination: ATTY. JACILDO:

ATTY. JACILDO: Q       What time did you arrived [sic] at the house of Jaime?

Q       So from Brgy. Alegria where did you proceed? WITNESS:

WITNESS: A       11:00 o'clock in the evening.

A       We proceeded to Brgy. Alangilan. Q       When you arrived at the house of Jaime, what did you do?

Q       This Brgy. Alegria how far is it from Brgy. Alangilan? A       We enter[ed] the gate of their house.

A       The distance between Brgy. Alegria to Brgy. Alangilan is about three (3) kilometers. Q       Please continue?

Q       So, what means of transportation did you used in going to Alangilan? A       Then, we opened the door.

A       We walked in going to Alangilan. Q       And then?

Q       When you arrived at Brgy. Alangilan what did you do? A       We reach[ed] [the Bocateja residence] at around 11:00 o'clock and we tried to
open the door but we could not open the door immediately. We made a hole so that
WITNESS: we can get in the house. We entered the house at about 2:00 o'clock in the morning
the following day.44 (Emphasis supplied)
A       We went to our aunt's house.
Undoubtedly, the accounts of appellants evince not only their resolve to kill Jaime, but the calm and
ATTY. JACILDO: methodical manner by which they sought to carry out his murder. As pointed out by the Solicitor
General, unless shown to be customary,45 appellants' act of arming themselves with a gun and a
knife constitutes direct evidence of a careful and deliberate plan to carry out a killing. Consider the
following ruling of this Court in People v. Samolde:46
As stated earlier, accused-appellant and Armando Andres tried to borrow Cabalin's tear gas
gun. This attempt by the accused-appellant and his co-accused to arm themselves
prior to the commission of the crime constitutes direct evidence that the killing of
Feliciano Nepomuceno had been planned with care and executed with utmost
deliberation. From the time the two agreed to commit the crime to the time of the killing
itself, sufficient time had lapsed for them to desist from their criminal plan had they wanted
to. Instead, they clung to their determination and went ahead with their nefarious plan. x
x 47 (Emphasis supplied)
From the time appellants left Murcia, Negros Occidental, after they had resolved to go to confront
Jaime, to the time they entered the Bocateja residence in Bacolod City, ten hours had elapsed –
sufficient for appellants to dispassionately reflect on the consequences of their actions and allow for
their conscience and better judgment to overcome the resolution of their will and desist from
carrying out their evil scheme, if only they had desired to hearken to such warnings. In spite of this,
appellants evidently clung to their determination to kill Jaime.
That evident premeditation was established through the testimonies of appellants and not by those
of the prosecution witnesses is of no moment. While appellants could not have been compelled to
be witnesses against themselves,48 they waived this right by voluntarily taking the witness stand.
Consequently, they were subject to cross-examination on matters covered by their direct
examination.49 Their admissions before the trial court constitute relevant and competent evidence
which the trial court correctly appreciated against them. 50
Although he admitted stabbing Jaime, appellant Flores sought to justify his actions by claiming that
he was impelled by the need to prevent Jaime from shooting his uncle, appellant Ventura. This
pretense does not impress.
To successfully claim that he acted in defense of a relative, the accused must prove the
concurrence of the following requisites: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the person killed or
injured; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel the unlawful
aggression; and (3) the person defending the relative had no part in provoking the assailant, should
any provocation have been given by the relative attacked. 51 Of these, the requisite of "unlawful
aggression" is primary and indispensable without which defense of relative, whether complete or
otherwise, cannot be validly invoked.52
Not one of the foregoing requisites of defense of a relative is present. From all accounts, it was
appellants who initiated the unlawful aggression, and it was the victim Jaime who acted in self
defense. Hence, neither the justifying circumstance of defense of a relative 53 nor the special
mitigating circumstance of incomplete defense of a relative 54 may be appreciated in appellant Flores'
favor.
While appellant Ventura did not directly participate in the stabbing of Jaime, the trial court correctly
held both appellants collectively liable for the attempt on the latter's life since they were shown to
have acted in conspiracy with each other.
There is a conspiracy when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission
of a felony and decide to commit it.55 Where conspiracy has been adequately proven, as in these
cases, all the conspirators are liable as co-principals regardless of the extent and character of their
participation because, in contemplation of law, the act of one is the act of all. 56
By stabbing Jaime Bocateja pursuant to their pre-conceived plot, appellants commenced the
commission of murder directly by overt acts. Despite their efforts, however, they failed to inflict a
mortal wound on Jaime, hence, their liability only for attempted murder. 57
With respect to the death of Aileen, the trial court found both appellants guilty of murder qualified not
by evident premeditation but by taking advantage of superior strength, 58 to wit:
The killing of Aileen Bocateja is qualified by the aggravating circumstance of abuse of
superior strength. The accused Arante Flores who delivered the stabbing blow is big
and strong, standing about five feet and six (5'6") inches tall. His weapon was a 14
inch dagger. Aileen Bocateja [stood] only about five (5'0") feet tall. The disparity of
their strength is enormous.59 (Emphasis supplied)
To take advantage of superior strength means to purposely use excessive force out of proportion to
the means of defense available to the person attacked. 60 The appreciation of this aggravating
circumstance depends on the age, size and strength of the parties, and is considered whenever
there is a notorious inequality of forces between the victim and the aggressor, assuming a
superiority of strength notoriously advantageous to the aggressor, which is selected or taken
advantage of by him in the commission of the crime. 61
Appellants "agree with the trial court that accused-appellant Arante Flores is taller, and probably
stronger than the victim Aileen Bocateja because of their difference in sex as well as the fact that
the accused appellant Flores was armed at that time x x x."62 Nevertheless, they argue that Aileen's
death was not attended by abuse of superior strength since: (1) though ultimately unsuccessful, she
was able to put up a defense against appellant Flores; and (2) the prosecution failed to show that
appellant Flores deliberately took advantage of the disparity in their size and sex in order to facilitate
the commission of the crime.
Unlike in treachery, where the victim is not given the opportunity to defend himself or repel the
aggression,63 taking advantage of superior strength does not mean that the victim was completely
defenseless. Abuse of superiority is determined by the excess of the aggressor's natural strength
over that of the victim, considering the momentary position of both and the employment of means
weakening the defense, although not annulling it.64 Hence, the fact that Aileen attempted to fend off
the attack on her and her husband by throwing nearby objects, such as an electric cord, at appellant
Flores does not automatically negate the possibility that the latter was able to take advantage of his
superior strength.
On the contrary, this Court in a very long line of cases has consistently held that an attack made by
a man with a deadly weapon upon an unarmed and defenseless woman constitutes the
circumstance of abuse of that superiority which his sex and the weapon used in the act afforded
him, and from which the woman was unable to defend herself. 65 Thus, in People v. Molas,66 where
the accused was convicted of murder for stabbing to death two women and an eight year old boy,
this Court discoursed:
While treachery was not appreciated as a qualifying circumstance against Molas, the killing
of the three victims was raised to murder by the presence of the qualifying circumstance of
abuse of superior strength. There was abuse of superior strength when Molas inflicted
several mortal wounds upon Soledad. Molas, besides being younger and stronger,
was armed with a weapon which he used in seriously wounding her. That
circumstance was also present when he hacked eight-year old Abelaro and also
Dulcesima who, besides being a woman of lesser strength was unarmed.67 (Emphasis
supplied)
And in the more recent case of People v.Loreto,68 this Court opined:
The contention of accused-appellant is barren of merit. Article 14, paragraph 15 of the Revised
Penal Code provides that a crime against persons is aggravated by the accused taking advantage
of superior strength. There are no fixed and invariable rules regarding abuse of superior strength or
employing means to weaken the defense of the victim. Superiority does not always mean numerical
superiority. Abuse of superiority depends upon the relative strength of the aggressor vis-à-vis the
victim. There is abuse of superior strength even if there is only one malefactor and one victim.
Abuse of superiority is determined by the excess of the aggressor's natural strength over that of the
victim, considering the position of both and the employment of means to weaken the defense,
although not annulling it. The aggressor must have advantage of his natural strength to insure the
commission of the crime. In this case, accused-appellant was armed with a knife and used the
same in repeatedly stabbing Leah, a young wisp of a girl, no less than eighteen times after
overtaking her in the sala of Dan's house. Irrefragably, then, accused-appellant abused his
superior strength in stabbing Leah. In a case of early vintage [People v. Guzman, supra. at
1127], the Court held that:
There is nothing to the argument that the accused was erroneously convicted of murder. An
attack made by a man with a deadly weapon upon an unarmed and defenseless
woman constitutes the circumstance of abuse of that superiority which his sex and
the weapon used in the act afforded him, and from which the woman was unable to
defend herself (U.S. vs. Camiloy, 36 Phil. 757; U.S. vs. Consuelo, 13 Phil. 612; People vs.
Quesada, 62 Phil. 446). The circumstance of abuse of superior strength was, therefore,
correctly appreciated by the trial court, as qualifying the offense as murder. 69 (Emphasis
supplied; citations omitted)
By deliberately employing a deadly weapon against Aileen, appellant Flores clearly took advantage
of the superiority which his strength, sex and weapon gave him over his unarmed victim.
As for appellant Flores' claim of self-defense, it cannot be sustained. As in defense of a relative, one
claiming self defense must prove by clear and convincing evidence 70 both unlawful aggression on
the part of the person killed or injured and reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent
or repel the unlawful aggression. As a third requisite, he must also prove lack of sufficient
provocation on his part.71 None of these requisites was shown to be present. As expounded by the
trial court:
Arante declared that Aileen panicked and screamed and was hitting him with an extension
cord so he stabbed her. Arante was suggesting that had Ai[l]een remained cool, composed
and friendly, she would not have died.
This perverted reasoning need not detain the Court. There was an on-going aggression
being committed inside her house and within the confines of her room, hence, Aileen's
actuations were perfectly just and legitimate.72
As adverted to earlier, the trial court, citing People v. Dueno,73 did not consider evident
premeditation as having aggravated the killing of Aileen since she was not the intended victim of
appellants' conspiracy. Upon further scrutiny, however, this Court finds that this aggravating
circumstance should have been appreciated in connection with Aileen's murder. Jurisprudence is to
the effect that evident premeditation may be considered as present, even if a person other than the
intended victim was killed, if it is shown that the conspirators were determined to kill not only the
intended victim but also anyone who may help him put a violent resistance. 74
Here, it was established that upon seeing her husband being attacked by appellants, Aileen
immediately called for help and hurled objects at appellant Flores. And it was because of this
passionate defense of her husband that appellant Flores hacked at her face and stabbed her four
times. These factual circumstances are analogous to those in People v. Belga,75 where this Court
had occasion to state that:
While it would seem that the main target of the malefactors were Alberto and Arlene Rose,
this does not negative the presence of evident premeditation on the physical assault on the
person of Raymundo Roque. We have established jurisprudence to the effect that
evident premeditation may be considered as present, even if a person other than the
intended victim was killed (or wounded, as in this case), if it is shown that the
conspirators were determined to kill not only the intended victim but also anyone
who may help him put a violent resistance. Here, Raymundo Roque provided such
violent resistance against the conspirators, giving the latter no choice but to
eliminate him from their path.76 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied, citations omitted)
Thus, while appellants' original objective may have only been the killing of Jaime, the trial court
correctly held both of them responsible for the murder of Aileen. Co-conspirators are liable for such
other crimes which could be foreseen and are the natural and logical consequences of the
conspiracy.77 In Pring, et al. v. Court of Appeals,78 this Court held:
 While the acts done by the petitioners herein vary from those of their co-accused,
there is no question that they were all prompted and linked by a common desire to assault
and retaliate against the group of Loreto Navarro. Thus, they must share equal liability for
all the acts done by the participants in such a felonious undertaking. While petitioners
herein, Rogelio Pring and Alberto (Roberto) Roxas, on their part, had ganged up Jesus
Yumol who belonged to the group of their adversaries by hitting the latter with a bench and
a piece of wood, and that it was a certain David Ravago who stabbed the deceased Loreto
Navarro, nevertheless, it is a rule that conspirators would necessarily be liable also for
the acts of the other conspirators unless such acts differ radically or substantially
from that which they intended to commit (People vs. Enriquez, 58 Phil. 536; People vs.
Rosario, 68 Phil. 720).
The pronouncements made by this Court in the aforecited case of People vs. Enriquez, still
serve as the governing rule that should be applied to the case at bar. In the said case, this
Court stated:
"x x x x x x x x x
'We are of the opinion that this contention is not tenable. The accused had
undoubtedly conspired to do grave personal injury to the deceased, and now that
the injuries actually inflicted have resulted in death, they cannot escape from the
legal effect of their acts on the ground that one of the wounds was inflicted in a
different way from that which had been intended. x x x x x x x x x.
'As has been said by the Supreme Court of the United States, 'If a number of
persons agree to commit, and enter upon the commission of the crime which will
probably endanger human life such as robbery, all of them are responsible for the
death of a person that ensues as a consequence.' (Boyd vs. U.S., 142 U.S. 450; 35
Law. ed. 1077). In United States vs. Patten, the court said: 'Conspirators who join in
a criminal attack on a defenseless man with dangerous weapons, knock him down,
and when he tries to escape, pursue him with increased numbers, and continue the
assault, are liable for manslaughter when the victim is killed by a knife wound
inflicted by one of the them during the beating, although in the beginning they did
not contemplate the use of a knife.' (42 Appeals, D.C., 239)"
Although during the incident in question the aggression committed by the petitioners herein
was directed against the other members of the group of Loreto Navarro and not on the
deceased, this would not relieve them from the consequence of the acts jointly done by
another member of the petitioners' group who stabbed the deceased Loreto
Navarro.79 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
And in the more recent case of People v. Bisda, et al.,80 this Court held:
Each conspirator is responsible for everything done by his confederates which
follows incidentally in the execution of a common design as one of its probable and
natural consequences even though it was not intended as part of the original design.
Responsibility of a conspirator is not confined to the accomplishment of a particular
purpose of conspiracy but extends to collateral acts and offenses incident to and
growing out of the purpose intended. Conspirators are held to have intended the
consequences of their acts and by purposely engaging in conspiracy which necessarily and
directly produces a prohibited result, they are, in contemplation of law, chargeable with
intending that result. Conspirators are necessarily liable for the acts of another
conspirator unless such act differs radically and substantively from that which they
intended to commit. As Judge Learned Hand put it in United States v. Andolscheck, "when
a conspirator embarks upon a criminal venture of indefinite outline, he takes his chances as
to its content and membership, so be it that they fall within the common purposes as he
understands them." (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted)
Indeed, since they deliberately planned to attack Jaime in the sanctity of his bedroom where his wife
Aileen was also sleeping, appellants cannot now claim that the latter's violent resistance was an
unforeseen circumstance. Hence, neither of them can escape accountability for the tragic
consequences of their actions.
In determining appellants' criminal liability, the trial court appreciated the generic aggravating
circumstances of dwelling,81 nighttime82 and breaking of door83 in connection with both crimes.
Dwelling is considered aggravating because of the sanctity of privacy that the law accords to human
abode.84
Thus, it has been said that the commission of the crime in another's dwelling shows greater
perversity in the accused and produces greater alarm. 85 Here, dwelling was correctly appreciated
since the crimes were committed in the place of abode of the victims who had not given immediate
provocation.86
Upon the other hand, as pointed out by both appellants and the Solicitor General, the breaking of a
door was not alleged in either of the two informations. Thus, the same cannot be appreciated
against appellants. On this point, this Court's discussion in People v. Legaspi,87 quoted in the
Solicitor General's Brief, is instructive:
Nonetheless, it is to be noted that the appreciation by the trial court of the aggravating
circumstances of dwelling and nighttime, despite the non-allegation thereof in the
Information, resulted in the imposition of the supreme penalty of death upon accused-
appellant. In People v. Gallego (G.R. No. 130603, 338 SCRA 21, August 15, 2000), We had
occasion to rule thus:
"In People v. Albert (251 SCRA 136, 1995), we admonished courts to proceed with
more care where the possible punishment is in its severest form – death – because
the execution of such a sentence is irrevocable. Any decision authorizing the State
to take life must be as error-free as possible, hence it is the bounden duty of the
Court to exercise extreme caution in reviewing the parties' evidence. Safeguards
 designed to reduce to a minimum, if not eliminate the grain of human fault ought not
to be ignored in a case involving the imposition of capital punishment for an
erroneous conviction 'will leave a lasting stain in our escutcheon of justice.' The
accused must thence be afforded every opportunity to present his defense on
an aggravating circumstance that would spell the difference between life and
death in order for the Court to properly 'exercise extreme caution in reviewing the
parties' evidence.' This, the accused can do only if he is appraised of the
aggravating circumstance raising the penalty imposable upon him to death.
Such aggravating circumstance must be alleged in the information, otherwise
the Court cannot appreciate it. The death sentence being irrevocable, we cannot
allow the decision to take away life to hinge on the inadvertence or keenness of the
accused in predicting what aggravating circumstance will be appreciated against
him.
xxx
The principle above-enunciated is applicable to the case at bar. Consequently, we hold that
due to their non-allegation in the Information for rape filed against accused-appellant, the
aggravating circumstances of nighttime and dwelling cannot be considered in raising the
penalty imposable upon accused-appellant from reclusion perpetua to death.
xxx
It is to be noted carefully that the rule on generic aggravating circumstances has now been
formalized in the Revised Rules of Criminal procedure, which took effect on December 1,
2000. Section 8 of Rule 110 now provides that:
Sec. 8. Designation of the offense. – The complaint or information shall state the
designation of the offense given by the statute, aver the acts or omissions
constituting the offense, and specify its qualifying and aggravating
circumstances. If there is no designation of the offense, reference shall be made
to the section or subsection of the statute punishing it.
Likewise, Section 9 of the same Rule provides:
Sec. 9. Cause of the accusation. – The acts or omission complained of as
constituting the offense and the qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be
stated in ordinary and concise language and not necessarily in the language used
in the statute but in terms sufficient to enable a person of common
understanding to know what offense is being charged as well as its qualifying
and aggravating circumstances and for the court to pronounce
judgment.88 (Emphasis supplied)
Appellants and the Solicitor General also argue that nocturnity should not have been considered
since Jaime himself testified that their bedroom was well-lit and there was light coming from the
kitchen and the adjoining bedroom of their children. 89
In determining nocturnity, two tests are employed in the alternative: (1) the objective test, under
which nighttime is aggravating because the darkness facilitated the commission of the offense; and
(2) the subjective test, under which nighttime is aggravating because the darkness was purposely
sought by the offender.90 Applying these tests to the established factual circumstances, this Court
concludes that nocturnity was correctly appreciated in connection with both crimes.
While the bedroom where the crimes occurred was well-lit, the evidence shows that, in furtherance
of their murderous intent, appellants deliberately took advantage of nighttime, as well as the fact
that the household members were asleep, in order to gain entry into the Bocateja residence. Indeed,
their own testimony indicates that while they were already outside the Bocateja house at around
11:00 p.m., they purposely waited until 2:00 a.m. before breaking into the residence so as not to call
the attention of the Bocatejas and/or their neighbors. It is thus clear that appellants deliberately took
advantage of the darkness of the night, not to mention the fact that the Bocatejas were fast asleep,
to conceal their actions and to facilitate and insure that their entry into the victims' home would be
undetected.
No mitigating circumstances are present to offset the foregoing aggravating circumstances. While
the trial Court noted that appellants were apparently motivated by their belief that Johanna and
Jaime were carrying on an illicit relationship, to wit:
The accused presented evidence to prove that Jaime Bocateja and Johanna Ventura, wife
of the accused Felix Ventura, were maintaining an illicit relationship. The evidence on this
point is principally hearsay – the alleged admissions made by Johanna of the relationship.
There is no doubt, however, that the accused Ventura believes that [his] wife and Jaime
Bocateja are clandestine lovers. It is fairly reasonable, in the absence of any evidence to
the contrary, that it is Ventura's belief of this illicit relationship which prompted him to
confront Jaime Bocateja,91
it nevertheless ruled out passion or obfuscation92 or immediate vindication of a grave offense93 as
mitigating circumstances.
While jealousy may give rise to passion or obfuscation, 94 for the appreciation of this mitigating
circumstance it is necessary that the act which produced the obfuscation was not far removed from
the commission of the crime by a considerable length of time, during which the perpetrator might
recover his normal equanimity.95 In the same vein, while "immediate" vindication should be
construed as "proximate" vindication in accordance with the controlling Spanish text 96 of the Revised
Penal Code, still this mitigating circumstance cannot be considered where sufficient time elapsed for
the accused to regain his composure.97
In these cases, appellant Ventura's suspicions were aroused as early as February 17, almost a
week before the stabbing incidents on February 23, when he first confronted his wife about her ring.
Moreover, as previously noted, ten hours had elapsed from the time appellants left Murcia, Negros
Occidental, weapons in hand, to the time they entered the Bocateja residence in Bacolod City.
Within that period appellant Ventura had opportunity to change his clothes at a relatives' house in a
neighboring barangay and both appellants were able to take their dinner at the Burgos Market in
Bacolod City. They even waited three hours outside the Bocateja residence before carrying out their
plan. Without question, sufficient time had passed for appellants' emotions to cool and for them to
recover their equanimity.
In fine, for stabbing Jaime, appellants are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of attempted murder
qualified by evident premeditation with the aggravating circumstances of dwelling and nighttime.
However, as pointed out by the Solicitor General, the trial court erred in imposing the sentence of
Eight (8) Years of prision mayor as minimum to Eighteen (18) Years of reclusion temporal as
maximum.
Article 51 of the Revised Penal Code provides that a penalty two degrees lower than that prescribed
for the consummated penalty shall be imposed upon the principals in an attempted felony. Under
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, the penalty for
murder is reclusion perpetua to death. The penalty two degrees lower is prision mayor.98 Applying
Section 1 of Act No. 4103,99 as amended, otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, and
considering the presence of two aggravating circumstances, the proper imposable penalty falls
within the range of prision mayor in its maximum period (from Ten (10) Years and One (1) Day to
Twelve (12) Years) as maximum and prision correccional (from Six (6) Months and One (1) Day to
Six (6) Years) as minimum. Accordingly, this Court hereby sentences appellants to an indeterminate
penalty of Six (6) Years of prision correccional as minimum to Twelve (12) Years of prision mayor as
maximum.
For fatally stabbing Aileen, appellants are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder qualified by
abuse of superior strength with the aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation, dwelling
and nighttime. As already noted, the penalty for murder is reclusion perpetua to death. Article 63 of
the Revised Penal Code provides that when the law prescribes two indivisible penalties, the greater
penalty shall be imposed when, in the commission of the deed, one aggravating circumstance is
present. Consequently, the trial court's imposition of the supreme penalty of death must be
sustained.
Three members of the Court maintain their adherence to the separate opinions expressed in People
vs. Echegaray100 that Republic Act No. 7659, insofar as it prescribes the penalty of death, is
unconstitutional; nevertheless they submit to the ruling of the majority that the law is constitutional
and that the death penalty should accordingly be imposed.
As regards the civil liability of the appellants, the award of the trial court is hereby modified as
follows:
In Criminal Case No. 00-20692, the award of P50,000.00 to the heirs of Aileen as civil indemnity for
her death is sustained, the commission of the crime by appellants having been duly proven. 101 The
award of moral damages to her heirs is likewise proper considering that the prosecution presented
adequate proof that they suffered mental anguish and wounded feelings. 102 However, the amount of
moral damages awarded by the trial court is hereby reduced from P100,000.00 to P50,000.00 in line
with current jurisprudence.103 It should be borne in mind that the purpose for such award is to
compensate the heirs of the victim for the injuries to their feelings and not to enrich them. 104
The award of exemplary damages should be increased from P20,000.00 to P25,000.00. Such
award is proper in view of the presence of aggravating circumstances. 105 Furthermore, considering
that counsel for appellants admitted that the heirs of Aileen incurred funeral expenses of
P100,000.00106 and such admission has not been shown to have been made through palpable
mistake, the same should be awarded as actual damages. 107
In Criminal Case No. 00-20692, the trial court did not grant Jaime's claim for P20,000.00 in actual
damages for hospitalization expenses since he failed to present any receipts to substantiate the
same. Nonetheless, in light of the fact that Jaime was actually hospitalized and operated upon, this
Court deems it prudent to award P20,000.00 as temperate damages. 108 Moreover, Jaime is also
entitled to moral damages in accordance with Article 2219, paragraph 2 of the Civil Code, which this
Court hereby awards in the amount of P25,000.00. 109 Finally, exemplary damages of P25,000.00 are
also in order considering that the crime was attended by two aggravating circumstances. 110
WHEREFORE, the judgment in Criminal Case No. 00-20693 is hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION. Appellants Felix Ventura and Arante Flores are found GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of attempted murder qualified by evident premeditation with the aggravating
circumstances of dwelling and nighttime and are hereby sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of
Six (6) Years of Prision Correccional as minimum to Twelve (12) Years of Prision Mayor as
maximum.
Appellants are solidarily ORDERED to pay the victim, Jaime Bocateja, the amounts of: (a) Twenty
Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) as temperate damages; (b) Twenty Five Thousand Pesos
(P25,000.00) as moral damages; and (c) Twenty Five Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00) as exemplary
damages.
The judgment in Criminal Case No. 00-20692 is likewise AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.
Appellants Felix Ventura and Arante Flores are found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of murder
qualified by abuse of superior strength with the aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation,
dwelling and nighttime and are SENTENCED to the supreme penalty of DEATH.
Appellants are solidarily ORDERED to pay the heirs of Aileen Bocateja the amounts of: (a) Fifty
Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as civil indemnity; (b) One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00)
as actual damages; (c) Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as moral damages; and (d) Twenty Five
Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00) as exemplary damages.
Upon the finality of this Decision, and pursuant to Art. 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended
by Sec. 25 of R.A. No. 7659, let the records of the cases be immediately forwarded to the President
of the Philippines for the exercise, at her discretion, of her power to pardon appellants Felix Ventura
and Arante Flores.
 G.R. No. 134572 - April 18, 2002
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. DIONISIO UMAYAM y CASTRO, Accused-
Appellant.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision1 dated February 3, 1998 of the Regional Trial Court of Las Piñas
City, Branch 255,  in Criminal Case No. 92-1638, finding accused-appellant Dionisio Umayam y
Castro, alias "Jawo", guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder and sentencing him to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
On March 10, 1992, accused-appellant was charged with the crime of Murder in an Information
which alleged:
That on or about the 7th day of February, 1992, in the Municipality of Las Piñas, Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, with intent
to kill, with evident premeditation, and by means of treachery, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously attack, assault, and stab with a bladed weapon one Emma Mendoza, thereby
inflicting upon the latter serious and mortal stab wounds which directly caused her death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.3
At his arraignment on October 28, 1992, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty 3 to the charge;
whereupon, trial ensued.
The evidence, as culled from the testimony of prosecution witness Rodolfo Velasquez, is as follows:
Dionisio Umayam (accused-appellant) and Emma Mendoza (victim), were living as husband and
wife in a shanty they erected inside the compound owned by Rodolfo Velasquez located at San
Jose St., Ilaya, Las Piñas City (p. 9, tsn, Feb. 10, 1993). This shanty is about ten (10) meters away
from Velasquez's house located also within the compound (p. 4, tsn, supra) and where Velasquez
maintains a poultry which he tends to everyday. Oftentimes, Velasquez entertains his friends/visitors
within the compound and if too drunk, passes the night at his house therein (p.
11, supra). Velasquez's family residence however, is about a kilometer and a half away.
During Umayam and Mendoza's stay in the compound, Velasquez would notice them frequently
quarreling (pp. 5 & 8, supra).  On occasions, Mendoza would run to Velasquez for help for the
beatings inflicted on her by Umayam (p. 6, supra).  Velasquez would advise Mendoza to refer the
matter to the barangay (p. 13, supra). Velasquez described Umayam and Mendoza's relationship
as "magulo."  (p. 5, supra).
At about 7:00 p.m. of February 7, 1992, while Velasquez was inside the compound entertaining
some friends, Umayam, Mendoza and a certain Zenaida Anzo arrived amid went inside the shanty
(p. 4, supra).  Once inside, the radio was switched on a very loud volume which lasted until about
9:00 p.m. or 10:00 p.m., when Velasquez left the compound (pp. 10-11, supra). About noon of the
following day, Velasquez went to his poultry to feed his chicken. Thereat, Velasquez noticed nobody
at the shanty of the couple and its door was padlocked. Returning thereto on Sunday, Velasquez
noticed a foul odor emanating from the couple's shanty which he thought to be that of "kaning
baboy."  (p. 13, supra). On Monday, Velasquez noticed that the foul odor from the couple's shanty
became intolerable forcing him to report the incident to the barangay captain who immediately
requested for police assistance (p. 7,  supra). The responding policemen decided to break the walls
of the shanty and once inside, saw the decomposing body of Emma Mendoza. 4
Dr. Valentin Bernales, a medico-legal officer of the National Bureau of Investigation, conducted a
postmortem examination on the decomposing cadaver of the victim on February 10, 1992. His
Autopsy Report yielded the following findings, to wit:
Body, in far advanced state of decomposition; with line maggots.
Contusion, reddish; arm, left, lower third, antero-lateral aspect, 3.0 x 2.0 cm. and antero medial
aspect, 6.0 x 3.0 cm. knee, left, 4.0 x 3.5  cm.
Stab wounds, ovaloid in shape, modified by process of decomposition:
1) 1.0 cm., neck, left, antero-lateral aspect, 10.0 cm. From the anterior median line directed
medially, upward and slightly anteriorly; involving among others the common carotid artery and
jugular vein, with an approximate depth of 6.0 cm.
2) 1.0 cm., chest right, upper-outer quadrant, 17.0 cm. from the anterior median line, directed
backward, downward and medially involving among others the lung, right, upper lobe, with
approximate depth of 9.0 cm.
Hemothorax, right, 1000 c.c.
Visceral organs, in far advanced state of autolysis.
Stomach, empty.5
Dr. Bernales concluded that the victim's stab wounds on her neck and chest were fatal and caused
by a sharp pointed bladed weapon, and that the death occurred within seventy-two (72) hours prior
to the autopsy. Furthermore, he opined that a hard object, such as fist, may have caused the
contusions on the arms, thigh and knee of the deceased. 6
Accused-appellant, on the other hand, testified that from February 4 to 11, 1992, he was at the
house of his sister, Nida Vargas, in Sto. Niño, Ilaya, Parañaque. On February 4, 1992, his wife
Emma Mendoza left their rented house at Balete, Las Piñas to visit her children at La Loma, and
told him to wait for her to return and fetch him. Accused-appellant thus waited for Emma at his
sister's house, but she never arrived. On February 11, 1992, two policemen came and informed
accused-appellant that his wife had been killed. The policemen then brought him to the municipal
jail of Las Piñas.7
Nida Vargas corroborated accused-appellant's testimony. She stated that accused-appellant stayed
at her residence from February 4, 1992 until he was arrested on February 11, 1992. She testified
that her brother never left her house during his stay there because he was too busy doing carpentry
work at her residence. Neither did accused-appellant go to his rented house at Balete, Las Piñas
because according to him, Emma Mendoza would fetch him as soon as she arrived from Isabela. 8
Lastly, Beatriz Estupia, a neighbor of Nida Vargas, also testified that sometime in the month of
February 1992, she noticed the presence of accused-appellant doing carpentry works in the house
of his sister. She recalled that accused-appellant was arrested sometime on February 11, 1992. She
cannot recall any instance when accused-appellant left the house of Nida Vargas. 9 However, her
testimony on cross-examination shows inconsistencies which led the trial court to conclude that she
was lying, to wit:
Q:         And you came to know that this accused Dionisio Umayam was charged before this court
for murder in February 1992 yet, is it not?
A:         Yes, Your Honor. That was the news.
Q:         How come that it is only now, 1996, already June 1996 that you appeared before this court
and volunteered to testify?
ATTY. MACINAS
This is the first time that we are presenting our evidence.
COURT Let the witness answer.
A:         I did this because after so many years that he was incarcerated and I know he was not guilty
so I appear (sic).
xxx - xxx - xxx
Q:         You also stated earlier that you went to Bicol, when did you go to Bicol?
A:         May 5, 1994.
Q:         When did you go back to Parañaque?
A:         At the end of 1994.
Q:         Did you not state earlier that the reason why you did not come to know, why the accused
Dionisio Umayam was arrested (sic) because according to you immediately you went to Bicol in
February 1992?
A:         What I stated earlier was that I do not know the reason why he was arrested so I was
surprised when he was arrested.
Q:         You were asked whether later on you came to know the reason and according to you, you
did not know because you went to Bicol, did you state that?
A:         Yes, Your Honor.
Q:         So that it was not in 1994 that you went to Bicol but in 1992, is it not?
A:         May 1994, Your Honor.
Q:         So that when you stated earlier that the reason why you did not come to know why Dionisio
Umayam was arrested because you went to Bicol is not true?
ATTY. MACINAS
Misleading. That is not the reason why.
COURT I know this witness is telling a lie.10
The testimony of Estupia was rejected by the trial court because while she claims to be the neighbor
of accused-appellant's sister and to have allegedly witnessed accused-appellant's apprehension by
the police in his sister's house in 1992, she only came to know the reason for accused-appellant's
arrest in 1995.11
After trial, the court a quo rendered the assailed decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, and in the light of the foregoing, the Court finds the accused Dionisio Umayam y
Castro GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of Murder as charged in the information after
applying the provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of Reclusion Perpetua; to suffer the accessory penalties provided for by law; to indemnify
the heirs of the deceased Emma Mendoza the sum of P50,000.00; and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.12
Hence, this appeal anchored on the following assignment of errors:
I.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED GUILTY OF THE CRIME
CHARGED DESPITE THE INSUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE TO WARRANT CONVICTING
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
II.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN APPRECIATING THE AGGRAVATING
CIRCUMSTANCES OF TREACHERY AND EVIDENT PREMEDITATION.13
In the first assigned error, accused-appellant argues that his guilt has not been proven beyond
reasonable doubt because there was no direct evidence linking him to the commission of the crime;
rather, his conviction was based merely on the testimony of the prosecution's lone witness who did
not actually see the killing.
Accused-appellant's argument deserves no merit.
Well-settled is the rule that direct evidence of the commission of the crime is not the only matrix
wherefrom a trial court may draw its conclusion and findings of guilt. Direct evidence of the actual
killing is not indispensable for convicting an accused when circumstantial evidence can sufficiently
establish his guilt.14 If actual eyewitnesses are the only ones allowed to possibly identify a suspect
or accused to the exclusion of others, then nobody can ever be convicted unless there is an
eyewitness because of the rule that there can be no conviction until and unless an accused is
positively identified. Such a proposition is absolutely absurd, because it is settled that direct
evidence of the commission of the crime is not the only matrix. Indeed, conviction can be had on the
basis of circumstantial evidence if the established circumstances constitute an unbroken chain
leading to one fair and reasonable conclusion proving that the accused is the author of the crime to
the exclusion of all others.15
However, to support a conviction based on circumstantial evidence, the following must be present:
a) there is more than one circumstance; b) the facts from where the inferences are derived are
proven; c) the combination of all circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt.16 The circumstances proved must be consistent with each other, consistent with
the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with any other
hypothesis except that of guilt.17
In the case at bar, the trial court considered the following circumstances in arriving at its conclusion
that accused-appellant was the one who killed the victim to the exclusion of all others:
1. The tumultuous or stormy relationship between the accused-appellant and his deceased live-in
partner when the latter was still alive.18
2. The presence of just the two of them, accused- appellant and his wife, in their house on that
fateful evening of February 7, 1992 after their visitor Aida left the rented house of the live-in
partners.19 Accused-appellant was the last known companion of the deceased before her death.
3. The presence of the accused-appellant in the evening of February 7, 1992 in their house which
was established by the testimony of Rodolfo Velasquez and his sudden disappearance from the
same place the next day.
4. In addition, accused-appellant's admission that he owns a cassette radio  would logically lead to
the conclusion that he played the radio very loud to stifle or deafen any sound coming from inside
the shanty.
While, admittedly, there is no direct evidence that accused-appellant killed Emma Mendoza, the
circumstances above-stated constitute an unbroken chain which are consistent with each other and
with the hypothesis that accused-appellant is guilty, to the exclusion of other hypotheses that he is
not. As we have ruled, when circumstantial evidence constitutes an unbroken chain of natural and
rational circumstances corroborating each other, it cannot be overcome by inconcrete and doubtful
evidence submitted by the opposing party.20
Notably, although nobody may have seen accused-appellant in the act of inflicting the mortal stab
wounds on the victim, the unrebutted testimony of the witness for the prosecution points to no other
culprit but accused-appellant. Also, while the testimony of the witness does not provide direct
evidence that accused-appellant stabbed the victim, it nevertheless supplies proof of overwhelming
circumstantial evidence pointing to the guilt of the accused-appellant. This was even bolstered by
the fact that immediately after that fateful night when the victim was killed, accused-appellant
immediately left their shanty and did not return until he was arrested in the house of his sister.
Moreover, their shanty was locked in order to hide the body of the victim which was only discovered
three days later in a decomposing state. Indeed, the flight of an accused from the scene of the crime
removes any remaining shred of doubt on his guilt, 21 especially since his explanations on why he
was not in their shanty after the crime was committed has been rejected by the trial court for being
mere concoctions and fabrications.
Moreover, no ill motive can be attributed to the witness that will cast doubt on his testimony. The
witness has known the live-in partners for quite sometime since they have stayed in his compound
where they built their shanty. The rule is that, where there is no evidence to indicate that the
prosecution witness was actuated by improper motive, the presumption is that he was not so
actuated and that he would not prevaricate and cause damnation to one who brought him no harm
or injury.22
We find merit in the second assigned error. The qualifying circumstances of treachery and evident
premeditation were not established with concrete evidence.
First, the circumstantial evidence on record does not clearly show that there was any conscious and
deliberate effort on the part of the accused to adopt any particular means, method or form of attack
to ensure the commission of the crime without affording the victim any means to defend herself. The
conclusion that there was treachery can hardly be gleaned because the victim and the accused-
appellant were inside their shanty and no one witnessed how the killing took place. Notably, the
medical findings of the victim's cadaver show contusions on her arms and legs, indicating that there
may have been a quarrel prior to the stabbing. This reasonably negates treachery.
Indeed, absent any particular as to the manner in which the aggression commenced or how the act the civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00 awarded by the trial court in line with the policy of
which resulted in the death of the victim unfolded, treachery cannot be appreciated. 23 It has been the Court to award moral damages in case of violent death without need of proof. 35
held that the qualifying circumstance of treachery must be based on some positive conclusive proof
and not only upon hypothetical facts or on mere supposition or presumptions. 24 Where no particulars WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Las Piñas City,
are known regarding the manner in which the aggression was made or how the act which resulted in Branch 255, in Criminal Case No. 92-1638, finding accused-appellant Dionisio Umayam y Castro,
the death of the victim began and developed, it cannot be established from mere supposition that an guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and sentencing him to suffer the penalty
accused perpetrated the killing with treachery.25 Treachery cannot be appreciated where the lone of reclusion perpetua, is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. As modified, accused-appellant
eyewitness to the killing was not able to see how the assault started. 26 It can never be presumed, it Dionisio Umayam y Castro is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide and
must be satisfactorily proved beyond reasonable doubt. 27 Where there is no eyewitness to the killing sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as
or evidence on the manner of its execution, like in the case at bar, treachery cannot be considered minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as
an aggravating circumstance.28 maximum. Further, he is ordered to pay the heirs of the deceased, Emma Mendoza, civil indemnity
in the amount of P50,000.00 and moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00.
Likewise, the circumstance of evident premeditation cannot be appreciated. In the absence of clear
and positive evidence proving the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation, mere
presumptions and inferences thereon, no matter how logical and probable, would not be
enough.29 In the case at bar, the records do not show that, indeed, accused-appellant planned the
killing of the victim. Well-settled is the rule that evident premeditation, like other circumstances that
qualify the killing to murder, must be established by clear and positive evidence 30 as conclusively
and indubitably as the killing itself.31

It is not enough that evident premeditation is suspected or surmised. Criminal intent must be
evidenced by notorious outward acts evidencing a determination to commit the crime. In order to be
considered an aggravation of the offense, the circumstance must not merely be "premeditation" but
must be "evident premeditation."32 To consider the qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation,
it is necessary that the following requisites be present: (a) the time when the accused determined to
commit the crime, (b) an act manifestly indicating that the accused has clung to his determination,
and (c) a lapse of time, between the determination to commit the crime and the execution thereof,
sufficient to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act. 33

It should be remembered that aggravating circumstances must be established with the same
quantum of proof as fully as the crime itself and any doubt as to their existence must be resolved in
favor of the accused.34 Hence, for failure of the prosecution to prove the attendance of the qualifying
circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation, accused-appellant can only be guilty of
homicide.

The penalty for homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code in reclusion temporal.  The
same shall be imposed in its medium period, there being no mitigating or aggravating circumstance.
Accused-appellant is thus entitled to the benefits of the indeterminate Sentence Law, and is
therefore sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion
temporal,  as maximum.

The award of civil damages by the trial court needs modification. Accused-appellant must pay the
heirs of the deceased, Emma Mendoza, moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00, in addition to

[G.R. NO. 147196 : June 4, 2004]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, v. EDGAR DUMADAG y CAGADAS, Appellant.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before us on appeal is the Decision1 of the Regional Trial Court of the City of Malaybalay, Bukidnon,
Branch 8, finding appellant Edgar Dumadag y Cagadas, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder;
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and ordering him to pay the heirs of the
victim P50,000 as civil indemnity and P50,000 as moral damages.
The Indictment
The appellant was charged with murder in an Information filed before the Regional Trial Court of
Malaybalay, the accusatory portion of which is herein quoted:ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ
That on or about the 24th day of June 1999, in the afternoon, at Barangay Impalutao, Municipality of
Impasugong, Province of Bukidnon, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, withintent to kill by means of treachery, armed with a sharp bladed
weapon, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally attack, assault and stab FERNANDO
PRUDENTE, inflicting upon the latter a mortal stab wound which caused the instantaneous death of
FERNANDO PRUDENTE, to the damage and prejudice of the legal heirs of FERNANDO
PRUDENTE in such amount as may be allowed by law2 .
The Evidence of the Prosecution3 ςrνll
June 24, 1999 was the feast of St. John.Fernando Ondo Prudente, with his friends, including Marlyn
Meliston, agreed to meet at the Gantungan swimming pool in Impalutao, Impasugong, Bukidnon, to
celebrate the occasion.4 At about 5:00 p.m., Ondo and his friends headed back home.By then, there
was heavy downpour.They decided to take shelter at the store of a certain Mr. Salvaa.Jovy Baylin,
who had just come from the house of his sister, Enecita Abacajin, approximately one hundred (100)
kilometers away, was also in the store.5 Two men, one of whom was the appellant, were having
some drinks.6 When they saw Ondo, the appellant and his friend offered him a drink of
Tanduay.7 Ondo, declined, saying Bay, I am not drinking now.8 Thereafter, Ondo left.The appellant
was peeved.He rose from his seat and followed Ondo.The appellant then took hold of Ondos right
shoulder, took out a stainless knife and stabbed the latter on the breast. 9 The appellant left the
scene, walking towards the direction of the lower area of Cagayan de Oro. 10 Jovy Baylin, who was
about five meters from the scene of the crime, was stunned, and was unable to do
anything.11 Ondos companions saw the stabbing and immediately flagged down a vehicle.
Mortally wounded, Ondo ran towards the vehicle and fell inside it. 12 Ondos companions brought him
to the Bethel Baptist Hospital, Inc., in Malaybalay City, where he was pronounced dead on
arrival.13 Dr. Leslie Joan M. Arcadio signed Ondos death certificate and indicated that the cause of
death was stab wound, right chest.14
The Evidence of the Appellant15
The appellant denied the charge.He testified that in the afternoon of June 23, 1999, he was at Vista
Villa, Sumilao, Bukidnon,16 looking for some way to get money.He saw Richard Masicampo, Sr., the
owner of a 2.5 hectare riceland in the same sitio and borrowed money from him.17 The latter agreed,
but required the appellant to cut the grass in his riceland the next day.
On the aforesaid date, the appellant, along with Richard, cut grass in the ricefield.At around 11:00
a.m., they stopped and had lunch in Richards house. 18 Because it rained the whole afternoon, they
were unable to go back to the ricefield.They stayed in the house and had drinks. 19 After consuming
five (5) bottles of fighter wine, the appellant fell asleep.At 5:30 p.m., he woke up and went home.He
returned the next day to finish the job.20 ςrνll
The appellant was arrested in his house on July 4, 1999.He denied knowing Ondo and Jovy
Baylin.21 ςrνll
On November 21, 2000, the trial court rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of which
reads:ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ
WHEREFORE, judgment is entered (sic) finding accused Edgar Dumadag guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the offense of murder qualified by treachery.Accordingly, he is hereby sentenced to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and to indemnify the heirs of his victim Fernando Prudente the
sum of P50,000.00 and moral damages of P50,000.00.22
The Present Appeal
On appeal, the appellant asserts that:
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT FOR THE CRIME OF
MURDER AND IN DISREGARDING ACCUSED-APPELLANTS DEFENSE OF ALIBI BECAUSE IN
THE WORDS OF THE TRIAL COURT ALIBI IS ONE OF THE WEAKEST DEFENSE AND EASY
TO CONCOCT.
II
ASSUMING FOR THE SAKE OF ARGUMENT THAT ACCUSED IS GUILTY FOR THE DEATH OF The trial court found Baylin to be a credible witness. The denial and alibi of appellant cannot prevail
FERNANDO PRUDENTE, THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING HIM OF THE CRIME OF over the positive identification and eyewitness account of Baylin. 28 Baylin testified,
MURDER INSTEAD OF SIMPLE HOMICIDE.23 ςrνll thus:ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ

The appellant insists that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt for the crime charged beyond ASST. PROS. TORIBIO:(continuing)
reasonable doubt. He asserts that although his defense of alibi is weak, he should be acquitted
because the evidence of the prosecution is also weak. Q: After Edgar Dumadag invited Ondo Prudente to have a drink of Tanduay, what did Ondo
Prudente do, if any?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The appellant, likewise, contends that, assuming that he is guilty of the crime charged, he can only
be convicted of homicide because the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt the A: He declined the offer.
qualifying circumstance of treachery.He avers that he could not have deliberately and consciously
adopted a plan to kill the victim because they never knew each other.Citing our ruling inPeople v. Q: How did Ondo Prudente decline the offer of Dumadag?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Aguiluz,24 the appellant points out that where the sudden attack is not preconceived and intended as
the means, but is merely triggered by the sudden infuriation on the part of the accused because of
an act of the victim, or where the meeting is purely accidental, the killing would not be attended by A: He said, Bay, I am not drinking now, and then he left.
treachery.
Q: After Ondo Prudente left, what happened next, if any?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) avers that the prosecution, through Baylins direct and
straightforward testimony, proved that the appellant stabbed the victim to death.The OSG asserts A: Dumadag followed Prudente, held his right shoulder and stabbed him.
that the appellants defense of denial and alibi are weak and cannot be given probative weight in
light ofBaylins testimony, and that the admission made by the appellant during the pre-trial that he Q: Now, how many time[s] did this Dumadag stabbed (sic) Ondo Prudente?
was at the scene of the crime belied his alibi. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

The OSG, however, agrees that the appellant is guilty only of homicide because the prosecution A: Once.
failed to prove the qualifying circumstance of treachery.It posits that the altercation between the
appellant and the victim that preceded the commission thereof forestalled the attendance of Q: Was Prudente hit?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
treachery.
A: Yes.
We agree with the trial court that the appellant stabbed the victim.
COURT: (to the witness)
Time and again, we have consistently ruled that the findings of facts of the trial court, its calibration
of the testimonial evidence of the parties, as well as its conclusions on its findings, are accorded
Q: What part of his body?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
high respect if not conclusive effect.25 This is because of the unique advantage of the trial court to
observe, at close range, the conduct, demeanor and deportment of the witnesses as they testify. 26 In
this case, the trial court gave credence and probative weight to the testimony of Jovy Baylin.After a A: On his breast.
careful review of the records of this case, we find no cogent reason to overrule the trial courts
findings that the appellant stabbed the victim. Q: What did the accused use in stabbing?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

As long as it is positive, clear and credible, the testimony of a single prosecution witness on which A: A stainless knife.
judgment of conviction is anchored, is sufficient.Corroborative or cumulative evidence is not a
prerequisite to the conviction of the accused.Truth is established not by the number of witnesses but ASST. PROS. TORIBIO
by the quality of their testimonies.27 ςrνll
Q: Now, when this Dumadag followed Ondo Prudente after he declined the offer, did you see
already Dumadag carrying with him a knife (sic)  ?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A: No, he was running.
Q: When for (sic)  the first time you saw the knife of Dumadag?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A: When he held the shoulder (sic)  .
Q: Where did he get the knife?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A: From his side.29 ςrνll
On the other hand, the appellants alibi is weak. It is settled that for the defense of alibi to prosper,
the appellant must prove with clear and convincing evidence not only that he was some place else
when the crime was committed, but also that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene
of the crime or its immediate vicinity when the crime was committed. 30 To prove his alibi, the
appellant testified as follows:ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ
Q: Mr. Dumadag, you said that you borrowed money from Richard Masicampo, [Sr.] from where is
this Richard Masicampo?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A: From our sitio.
Q: Meaning to say at Kibenton?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A: No, from our place.
Q: What place?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A: Kilabong.
Q: Vista Villa, Sumilao, Bukidnon?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A: Yes.
Q: Mr. Dumadag, from Kilabong, Vista Villa going to Impalutao, how many minutes or hours it
will (sic)  take you when you ride?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A: I do not know because the distance is far.
Q: Can you not estimate thirty (30) minutes or one hour?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A: No.
Q: Even two hours?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A: I do not know.
Q: From Vista Villa to Dalirig, how many kilometers?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A: Six (6) kilometers, more or less.
Q: From Dalirig to Impalutao, how many kilometers?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A: I do not know.31 ςrνll
However, the appellant failed to prove that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of
the crime, considering his claim that he was only a few kilometers away when the stabbing
occurred.
Moreover, during the pre-trial conference held on November 4, 1999, the appellant, assisted by his
counsel, admitted that he was at the place of the incident at the time of the commission of the
crime.The same was reduced into writing, signed by the appellant, approved by the trial court and
formed part of the records of the case.32 Under Section 5 of Republic Act No. 8493, otherwise
known as The Speedy Trial Act of 1998, stipulations entered into during the pre-trial which were
approved by the Court shall bind the parties, limit the trial to matters not disposed of and control the
course of action during the trial, unless modified by the court to prevent manifest injustice. 33
The Crime Committed by the Appellant
We agree with the appellant and the OSG that the prosecution failed to prove treachery in the
commission of the crime.
Treachery is not presumed.34 Treachery must be proven as clearly and as cogently as the crime
itself.35 There is treachery (alevosia) when the offender commits any of the crimes against the
person, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and
specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended
party might make.36 Two conditions must concur for treachery to be present, viz:(1) the employment
of means of execution that gives the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate;
and, (2) the said means of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted. 37 Treachery cannot
be appreciated if it has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt that the assailant did not make
any preparation to kill the victim in such a manner as to insure the killing or to make it impossible or
difficult for the victim to defend himself.38 The prosecution must prove that the killing was
premeditated or that the assailant chose a method of attack directly and specially to facilitate and
insure the killing without risk to himself.39 The mode of attack must be planned by the offender and
must not spring from the unexpected turn of events. 40 ςrνll
In the case at bar, the trial court merely relied on the suddenness of the attack on the unarmed and
unsuspecting victim to justify treachery. As a general rule, a sudden attack by the assailant, whether
frontally or from behind, is treachery if such mode of attack was deliberately adopted by him with the
purpose of depriving the victim of a chance to either fight or retreat.The rule does not apply if the
attack was not preconceived but merely triggered by infuriation of the appellant on an act made by
the victim.41 In the present case, it is apparent that the attack was not preconceived.It was triggered
by the appellants anger because of the victims refusal to have a drink with the appellant and his
companions.

For failure of the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt the attendance of the qualifying
circumstance of treachery, the appellant can only be convicted of homicide.The penalty of homicide
under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion temporal.There being no mitigating or
aggravating circumstances attendant, the maximum of the indeterminate penalty shall be taken from
the medium period of reclusion temporal. The minimum of the indeterminate penalty shall be taken
from the full range of the penalty next lower in degree, namely, prision mayor.Thus, the appellant
may be sentenced to an indeterminate penalty ranging from eight (8) years and one (1) day
of prision mayor, in its medium period, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and
one (1) day of reclusion temporalin its medium period, as maximum.42

Civil Liabilities of the Appellants

The trial court correctly awarded P50,000 by way of civil indemnity to the heirs of the victim
Fernando Ondo Prudente.However, the award of P50,000 for moral damages should be deleted,
there being no proof that the heirs of the victim suffered wounded feelings, mental anguish, anxiety
and similar injury.The said heirs are, instead, entitled to an award of P25,000 as temperate
damages, conformably to current jurisprudence.43 ςrνll

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of the City of
Malaybalay, Bukidnon, Branch 8, is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATIONS.The appellant Edgar
Dumadag y Cagadas is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Homicide under Article 249 of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Rep. Act No. 7659 and is sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of from Eight (8) years and One (1) day of prision mayor in its medium period,
as minimum, to Fourteen (14) years, Eight (8) months and One (1) day of reclusion temporalin its
medium period, as maximum.The appellant is ORDEREDto pay Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000) as
civil indemnity and Twenty-Five Thousand (P25,000) as temperate damages to the heirs of the
victim.The award of moral damages is deleted.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 190322               November 26, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
VIRGILIO AMORA y VISCARRA, Accused-Appellant.
RESOLUTION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
The qualifying circumstance of treachery does not require that the perpetrator attack his victim from
behind. "Even a frontal attack could be treacherous when une)(pected and on an unarmed victim
who would be in no position to repel the attack or avoid it."1
On appeal is the August 28, 2009 Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No.
03294, which affirmed with modification the February 21, 2008 Decision 3 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 84, Malolos City, Bulacan. The RTC convicted Virgilio Amora y Viscarra (appellant)
of the crime of murder and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the
heirs of the victim Romeo Gibaga (Romeo) ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱35,000.00 for funerale)
(penses, and ₱16,770.69 for medical expense.
Factual Antecedents
On November 30, 2004, appellant was charged with murder defined and penalized under Article248
of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). Pertinent portions of the Information 4 filed against him read:
That on or about the 12th day of September 2004, in San Jose Del Monte City, province of Bulacan,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed
with a deadly weapon and with intent to kill one Romeo Gibaga, with treachery and evident
premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab with
the said deadly weapon the said Romeo Gibaga, hitting him on the trunk, thereby inflicting upon him
mortal wound[s] which directly caused his death.
Contrary to law.5
Upon arraignment on January 18, 2006, appellant entered a plea of not guilty to the offense
charged. Thereafter, pre-trial and trial on the merits followed.
Version of the Prosecution
The prosecution presented the testimonies of eyewitnesses Maricris Alidon (Maricris), Anselmo
Benito (Anselmo), and Aurelio Amora (Aurelio). Linda Gibaga (Linda), the wife of the victim Romeo,
and Dr. Felimon C. Porciuncula, Jr. (Dr. Porciuncula), the Medico-Legal officer who conducted the
autopsy on the body of the victim, also testified for the prosecution. Their testimonies are
summarized below.
On September 12, 2004 at around 5:45 p.m., Anselmo, Aurelio, and the victim Romeo were walking
on their way to Sampol Market in San Jose Del Monte City. Maricris and her son were tailing them
about four meters behind. As they were making their way to the market, they saw appellant in his
store located on the right side of the street. Suddenly, appellant rushed towards them and stabbed
Romeo twice - one on the chest and another on the abdomen. They were all caught by surprise due
to the suddenness of the attack. Romeo fell to the ground while appellant quickly ran away from the
scene. Aurelio chased appellant but failed to catch up with him. Maricriswent to Romeo’s house to
inform his wife Linda about what had just happened.
Upon hearing the news from Maricris, Linda rushedto the scene of the crime but did not find her
husband there as Romeo was already brought by Anselmo to the Sapang Palay District Hospital.
Later on, he was transferred to East Avenue Medical Center where he died after three days. Linda
testified that before Romeo passed away, he told her that appellant was his assailant. 6
Due to Romeo’s injuries and eventualdeath, Linda spent ₱16,770.69 for hospital expenses,
₱35,000.00 for funeral expenses, and ₱50,000.00 as expenses for the wake.
Dr. Porciuncula testified that Romeo died due to two fatal stab wounds. The first stab wound
penetrated his chest and pierced his heart while the wound on his abdomen pierced the pancreas
and his small intestines. Both stab wounds appeared to have been caused by a single-bladed
weapon.7
Version of the Defense
The appellant was the lone witness presented by the defense.He declared on the witness stand that
on September 12, 2004, at around 5:45 p.m., he was working as a construction worker in a site 8 to
9 kilometers away from his residence. On his way home, Nestor Basco, his neighbor, informed him
about a stabbing incident that had just taken place near his home. Upon arriving at his house, his
wife and his parents told him that the stabbing incident took place in front of their store and that the
alleged assailant passed through their yard to the street at the back. The alleged assailant managed
to escape, and the stabbing was wrongly imputed against appellant. On December 9, 2004,
appellant was arrested. He claimed that he does not know Romeo, whom henever met before the
stabbing incident. The only reason he could think of why he is being falsely accused was that he
turned down Anselmo’s request for ₱200.00 to buy shabu. This happened when they were having a
drinking spree with Aurelio the day before the stabbing incident. According to appellant, Anselmo
got infuriated by his refusal and threw a bottle of gin at him.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On February 21, 2008, the RTC rendered its Decision convicting appellant of the crime of murder.
Itfound that the stabbing of Romeo was attended by the qualifying circumstance of treachery as it
was "sudden and unexpected such that [Romeo] was unable to react or defend himself from the GRANTING ARGUENDOTHAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT IS CRIMINALLY LIABLE, THE
assault of [appellant]"8 TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN APPRECIATING THE QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF
TREACHERY.11
The dispositive part of the RTC Decision reads:
Our Ruling
WHEREFORE, finding the accused guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder under
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment The appeal has no merit.
of reclusion perpetuaand to indemnify the family of the deceased Romeo Gibaga the following
amounts: Appellant argues that the prosecution has failed to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Citing the testimony12 of prosecution witness Aurelio, appellant posits that the eye witnesses could
1. Php16,770.69 for medical expenses; not have possibly identified the true assailant because it was already 5:45 p.m. and the place where
the stabbing incident occurred was almost shrouded in darkness. Appellant also stresses that
2. Php35,000.00 for funeral services; and witness Aurelio, by his own statement, was drunk at the time of the incident, thereby impairing his
perception and making his judgment in identifying the assailant unreliable. Because there is
uncertainty as to the identity of the true malefactor, appellant asserts that he is entitled toan
3. Php50,000.00 for civil indemnity.
acquittal.
SO ORDERED.9
We are not persuaded.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The RTC is correct in giving weight and credence tothe testimonies of the prosecution witnesses,
viz:
On appeal, the CA affirmed with modification the Decision of the RTC. It held in its August 28,2009
Decision, thus:
x x x the Court finds the testimonies of the former ([Maricris, Anselmo, and Aurelio]) straightforward
and credible, hence, [deserving] recognition and respect as truthful account of what actually
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated February 21, 2008 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 84, transpired during the incident in question. The Court likewise noted the assertions of [Maricris,
Malolos City is hereby AFFIRMED with modification in that the heirs of the victim are additionally Anselmo, and Aurelio] that they are familiar with or know the accused and the victim well since they
awarded Php25,000.00 as temperate damages and ₱50,000.00 as moral damages. are neighbors in Sapang Palay, San Jose del Monte City, Bulacan. The Court therefore does not
doubt [Maricris, Anselmo, and Aurelio] in identifying the accused as the attacker and assailant of
SO ORDERED.10 [Romeo]. Besides, no evidence was offered to show ulterior motive on the part of [Maricris,
Anselmo, and Aurelio] to testify falsely against the accused. 13
Faulting the Decision of the CA, appellant now appeals to this Court advancing the same issues he
raised before the CA. It bears stressing that the RTC Decision finding appellant guilty of the charge was not based solely
on the testimony of Aurelio. Two other eyewitnesses positively identified the appellant as the person
Assignment of Errors who stabbed Romeo. Anselmo and Maricris were consistent in their testimonies identifying appellant
as the perpetrator of the crime. Excerpts of their testimonies are reproduced below:
Appellant asserts that:
[FISCAL ROQUE:]
I
Q: You said that you were walking together with Aurelio Amora and Romeo Gibaga. [W]hile
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF you were walking, what happened if any?
MURDER DESPITE THE PROSECUTION’S FAILURE TO PROVE HIS GUILTBEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT. [ANSELMO BENITO:]

II A: Romeo Gibaga was suddenly stabbed, sir.

Q: In relation to you, where was this Romeo Gibaga before he was stabbed? Witness pointed to a person x x x wearing a detainee’s t-shirt who identified himself as
Virgilio Amora.
A: He was at myleft side, sir.
Q: And you mentioned that Romeo Gibaga was stabbed by this accused whom you [have
Q: How about this Aurelio Amora, where was he? just] identified[. W]ere you able to see the weapon that was used in stabbing Romeo
Gibaga?
A: Aurelio was at my right side, sir.
A: No, sir.14
Q: While this Aurelio Amora was on your right and this Romeo Gibaga on your left, you
mentioned that somebody came and stabbed this Romeo Gibaga[. W]ere you able to see or xxxx
notice where this assailant came from before he stabbed Romeo Gibaga?
[FISCAL ROQUE :]
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And while you were there going toSampol Market, do you still recall x x x any unusual
Q: Where? incident that transpired?

A: He came from behind, sir. [MARICRIS ALIDON:]

xxxx A: Yes, sir.

Q: Considering your position, are you in a position to tell us whether this Romeo Gibaga Q: And what was this unusual incident, Madam witness?
actually saw the assailant before he was stabbed?
A: The stabbing incident thathappened to Romeo Gibaga, sir.
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And were you able to see who stabbed him?
Q: What did he do?
A: Yes, sir.
A: None, sir.
Q: Who was he?
Q: Why was he not able to react before he was stabbed?
A: Virgilio Amora, sir.
A: Because he was not aware, sir.
Q: If he is present today, will you be able to identify him?
Q: Mr. Witness[,] you mentioned that you were able to see this person who stabbed Romeo
Gibaga[. I]f he is now present, can you identify him? A: Yes, sir.

A: Yes, sir. Q: Kindly look around and point him out?

Q: Kindly look around and point him out? THE INTERPRETER:

THE INTERPRETER: The witness pointed to a person who identified himself as Virgilio Amora. 15
It is clear that the witnesses have properly identified the appellant as the perpetrator of the crime.
Astestified to by the witnesses and correctly ruled by the RTC and the CA, he was the person who
attacked, stabbed and killed Romeo.
Appellant tried to impeach the testimonies of Anselmo and Aurelio claiming that their motive for
falsely testifying against him was because of his refusal to give them money for shabu.
The Court finds that appellant’s assertion is a mere speculation that deserves scant consideration.
His explanation is neither supported by evidentiary proof nor buttressed by established facts. We
have consistently ruled that positive identification by credible witnesses prevails over self-serving
statements of the accused. Such statements cannot be given greater evidentiary weight over
affirmative declarations of eyewitnesses.
Finally, appellant claims that at the time of the commission of the crime, he was working at a
construction site 8 to 9 kilometers away from the scene of the crime. He argues that it was thus
impossible for him to be the person who stabbed and killed Romeo.
Appellant’s defenses of denial and alibi must likewise fail.
For the defense of alibi to prosper, "the accused must prove(a) that he was present at another place
at the time of the perpetration of the crime, and (b) that it was physically impossible for him tobe at
the scene of the crime"16 during its commission. "Physical impossibility refers to distance and the
facility of access between the situs criminisand the location of the accused when the crime was
committed. He must demonstrate that he was so far away and could not have been physically
present at the scene of the crime and its immediate vicinity when the crime was committed." 17
In this case, the appellant failed to satisfy these requirements. While a distance of 8 to 9
kilometersis quite far, appellant was not able to satisfactorily substantiate his claims regarding his
whereabouts. Aside from his own testimony, appellant did not bother to present the testimony of
other witnesses or any other proof to support his defense. Since he claimed that his parents and
wife saw the stabbing incident and that the assailant allegedly even entered their yard, it is puzzling
why he did not present them as witnesses to bolster his denial.
In any case, eyewitnesses positively identified the appellant to be present at the scene of the crime.
"Time and again, this Court has consistently ruled that positive identification prevails over alibi since
the latter can easily be fabricated and is inherently unreliable." 18
The Court finds no reason to disturb the factual findings of the RTC. The rule is well-settled that
factual findings of the trial court regarding the credibility of witnesses are accorded great weight and
utmost respect given that trial courts have firsthand observation of the witnesses’ demeanor while
testifying in court. We shall not supplant our own interpretation of the witnesses’ testimonies for that
of the trial judge since he is in the best position to determine the issue of credibility of witnesses.
Moreover, in the absence of misapprehension of facts or grave abuse of discretion, and especially
when the CA, asin this case, has affirmed the findings of the trial judge, the assessments and
conclusions of the trial court shall not be overturned.
Treachery
Paragraph 16, Article 14 of the RPC provides that"[t]here is treachery when the offender commits
any of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof
which tend directly and specially to ensure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the
defense which the offended party might make." Thus in order for the qualifying circumstance of
treachery to be appreciated, the following requisites must be shown: (1) the employment of means,
method, or manner of execution would ensure the safety of the malefactor from the defensive or
retaliatory acts of the victim, no opportunity being given to the latter to defend himself or to retaliate,
and (2) the means, method, or manner of execution was deliberately or consciously adopted by the
offender. "The essence of treachery is that the attack comes without a warning and in a
swift,deliberate, and unexpected manner, affording the hapless, unarmed, and unsuspecting victim
no chance to resist or escape."19
In this case, the appellant’s suddenattack on Romeo amply demonstrates that treachery was
employed in the commission of the crime.1âwphi1 The eyewitnesses were all consistent in declaring
that the appellant in such a swift motion stabbed Romeo such that the latter had no opportunityto
defend himself or to fight back.20 The deliberate swiftness of the attack significantly diminished the
risk to himself that may be caused by the retaliation of the victim.
It is of no consequence that appellant was in front of Romeo when he thrust the knife to his torso.
Records show that appellant initially came from behind and then attacked Romeo from the front. In
any event, "[e]ven a frontal attack could be treacherous when unexpected and on an unarmed victim
who would be in no position to repel the attack or avoid it," 21 as in this case. Undoubtedly, the RTC
and CA correctly held that the crime committed was murder under Article 248 of the RPC by reason
of the qualifying circumstance of treachery.
Penalties and Awards of Damages
The penalty for the crime of murder is reclusion perpetuato death. The RTC, as affirmed by the CA,
is correct in holding that the appellant must suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, the lower of the
two indivisible penalties, by reason of the absence of any aggravating circumstance. "It mustbe
emphasized, however, that [appellant is] not eligible for parole pursuant to Section 3 of Republic Act
No. 9346 which states that ‘persons convicted of offenses punished with reclusion perpetua, or
whose sentences will be reduced to reclusion perpetua, by reason of this Act, shall not be eligible
for parole under Act No. 4180, otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as
amended."22
With regard to the award of civil indemnity ex delicto, the same must be increased from ₱50,000.00
to ₱75,000.00 in line with prevailing jurisprudence.23 Civil indemnity is mandatory and is granted
without need of evidence other than the commission of the crime. 24 We uphold the CA in awarding
moral damages to the heirs of Romeo in the amount of ₱50,000.00. "As borne out by human nature
and experience, a violent death invariably and necessarily brings about emotional pain and anguish
on the part of the victim’s family."25 We likewise award exemplary damages in the amount of
₱30,000.00 since the qualifying circumstance of treachery was proven by the prosecution. When a
crime is committed with an aggravating circumstance, whether qualifying or generic, an award of
exemplary damages is justified under Article 2230 of the New Civil Code. 26 The CA however erred in
awarding temperate damages in lieu of actual damages in the amount of ₱25,000.00. Records show
that the RTC already awarded the heirs of the victim actualdamages consisting of ₱16,770.69 as
medical expenses and ₱35,000.00 as funeral expenses. These expenses were fully supported by
receipts.27

Lastly, all damages awarded shall be subject to 6% per annuminterest from the finality of this
Resolution until fully paid, also in line with prevailing jurisprudence.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The August 28, 2009 Decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 03294, which affirmed with modification the Decision of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 84, Malolos, Bulacan, finding appellant Virgilio Amora y Viscarra guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetuais AFFIRMED with the following modifications:

(1) the appellant is not eligible for parole;

(2) the award of civil liability ex delictois increased from ₱50,000.00 to ₱75,000.00;

(3) the appellant is ORDERED to pay the heirs of Romeo Gibaga the amount of ₱30,000.00
as exemplary damages;

(4) the award of ₱25,000.00 as temperate damages is DELETED; and

(5) the appellant is ORDERED to pay the heirs of Romeo Gibaga interest at the legal rate of
6% per annumon all the amounts ofdamages awarded, commencing from the date of finality
of this Resolution until fully paid.

Costs against appellant.

SO ORDERED.
 G.R. No. 194605, June 14, 2016 Criminal, Case No. II-92613

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MARIANO OANDASAN, JR., Accused- That on or about July 29, 2003, in the municipality of Gattaran, province of Cagayan, and within the
Appellant. jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused armed with a gun, with intent to kill,
with evident premeditation and with treacher[y], conspiring together and helping one another, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack and shot (sic) one Engr. Mario
DECISION
Paleg y Ballad, inflicting upon the latter a gunshot wound.
BERSAMIN, J.: That the accused had performed all the acts of execution which would have produce (sic) the crime
of Homicide as a consequence, but which, nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of causes
This case involves a shooting incident that resulted in the deaths of two victims and the frustrated independent of his own will.
killing of a third victim. Although the trial court properly appreciated the attendance of treachery and
pronounced the accused guilty of murder for the fatal shooting of the first victim, it erroneously
The CA summarized the facts in its assailed judgment, to wit:
pronounced the accused guilty of homicide and frustrated homicide as to the second and third
victims on the basis that treachery was not shown to be attendant. The Court of Appeals (CA)
concurred with the trial court's characterization of the felonies. Ferdinand Cutaran, 37 years old, driver at Navarro Construction, testified that on July 29, 2003
between 8:00 to 9:00 in the evening, he and his companions Jose Ifurung, Arthur Cutaran and
We disagree with both lower courts because treachery was competently shown to be attendant in victim Danny Montegrico were having a drinking spree outside the bunkhouse of Navarro
the shooting of each of the three victims. Thus, we pronounce the accused guilty of two counts of Construction at Barangay Pena Weste, Gattaran, Cagayan. Suddenly, appellant who appeared from
murder and one count of frustrated murder. back of a dump truck, aimed and fired his gun at Montegrico. Cutaran ran away after seeing the
appellant shoot Mentegrico. He did not witness the shooting of the other two victims Edgar Tamanu
and Mario Paleg. When he returned to the crime scene, he saw the bodies of Montegrico, Tamanu
Antecedents
and Paleg lying on the ground. Cutaran and his companions rushed the victims to Lyceum of Aparri
Hospital.
Three informations were filed against the accused, two of which were for murder involving the fatal
shooting of Edgardo Tamanu and Danilo Montegrico, and the third was for frustrated homicide
As a result of the shooting incident, Danilo Montegrico, 34, and Edgardo Tamanu, 33, died; while
involving the near-fatal shooting of Mario Paleg.
Mario Paleg survived. The Medical Certificate dated August 13, 2003 issued by Lyceum of Aparri
Hospital disclosed that Paleg was confined from July 29-30, 2003 for treatment of a gun shot wound
The informations, docketed as Criminal Case No. 11-9259, Criminal Case No. 11-9260, and
on his right anterior hind spine.
Criminal Case No. 11-9261 of the Regional Trial Court in Tuguegarao City (RTC), averred as
follows:
Prudencio Bueno, 68 years old, a checker at Navarro Construction and a resident of Centro 14
1 Aparri, Cagayan, stated that after having dinner with Cutaran and the others on the date and time in
Criminal Case No. II-9259
question, he went inside the bunkhouse to drink water. Suddenly, he heard successive gun reports
(sic). When he peeped through a window he saw the accused approaching from the back of a dump
That on or about July 29, 2003, in the municipality of Gattaran, province of Cagayan, and within the
truck holding something, and going to the table where they were eating. He confessed that he did
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused armed with a gun, with intent to kill,
not actually see the appellant fire his gun at the victims.
with evident premeditation and with treachery, conspiring together and helping one another, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack and shot (sic) one Edgardo Tamanu y
Dr. Nida Rosales, Municipal Health Officer of Gattaran, Cagayan testified that she conduced a post-
Palattao, inflicting upon the latter a gunshot wound which caused his death.
mortem examination on the body of Montegrico; that Montegrico sustained a single gunshot wound
below the ribs; and that the injury caused his death.
Criminal Case No. II-92602
The accused-appellant raised the defense of denial and alibi. Accused-appellant, 38 years old, a
That on or about July 29, 2003, in the municipality of Gattaran, province of Cagayan, and within the
native of Bulala Sur, Aparri, Cagayan, testified that from July up to October 2003, he was staying at
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused armed with a gun, with intent to kill,
his sister's house in Imus, Cavite. He was hired by SERG Construction, Inc. as a mason to work on
with evident premeditation and with treachery, conspiring together and helping one another, did then
a subdivision project in Rosario, Cavite. On that fateful day of July 29, 2003, he reported for work
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack and shot (sic) one Danilo Montegrico,
from 7:00 a.m. up to 5:00 p.m. To bolster his claim, he presented an Employment Certificate dated
inflicting upon the latter a gunshot wound which caused his death.
January 20, 2007 issued by Engr. Renato Bustamante of SERG Construction and a time record
sheet dated July 29, 2003. He went back to Aparri in October 2003 after the completion of his
project in Cavite. He further stated that he worked at Navarro Construction in February, 2003; that
he had a previous misunderstanding with his former co-workers witnesses Cutaran and Bueno
when he caught the two stealing sacks of cement from the company; that as a result, Cutaran and
Bueno were transferred to another project and their employer assigned him as checker in
replacement of Bueno; that the two planned to kill him as he prevented them from doing their
fraudulent act; and that he resigned between the months of March and May 2003 because the two
kept on disturbing him.
Fred Escobar, 48 years old, a resident of Pallagao, Baggao, Cagayan, testified that on July 29,
2003, he was having a drink with Montegrieo and three other men whom he did not know; that when
he was about to go home at around 8:00 p.m., a stranger appeared and fired his gun at Montegrieo;
that the assailant whom he did not know fired his gun several times. He asserted that appellant was
not the assailant since the latter was shorter in stature. 4ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Judgment of the RTC
On June 1, 2009, the RTC rendered its judgment,5 to wit:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Mariano Oandasan, Jr. guilty beyond reasonable doubt
as principal:
a) in Criminal Case No. 11-9260, for Murder for killing Danilo Montegrieo and sentences accused
with the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the heirs of Danilo Montegrieo the sum of One
Flundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (P150,000.00);
b) in Criminal Case No. 11-9259, for Homicide for killing Edgardo Tamanu and sentences accused
with the indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to
seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal as maximum and to pay the heirs of
Edgardo Tamanu the sum of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00); and
c) in Criminal Case No. 11-9261, for Frustrated Homicide for wounding Mario Paleg, and sentences
the accused with the penalty of two (2) years and one (1) day of prision correccional as minimum to
eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum.
SO ORDERED.6ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Decision of the CA
On appeal, the CA affirmed the judgment of the RTC through its decision promulgated on June 29,
2010,7 to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is DENIED. The Judgment dated June 1, 2009 of
the RTC, Branch 6 of Aparri, Cagayan is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that appellant
is ORDERED to pay the heirs of Edgardo Tamanu the amounts of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity and
P75,000.00 as moral damages, and Mario Paleg, the sum of P50,000.00 as moral damages.
SO ORDERED.8
Hence, this ultimate appeal, with the accused still insisting on the reversal of his convictions.
Ruling of the Court
This appeal opens the entire record to determine whether or not the findings against the accused
should be upheld or struck down in his favor. Nonetheless, he bears the burden to show that the
trial and the appellate courts had overlooked, misapprehended or misinterpreted facts or
circumstances that, if properly considered and appreciated, would significantly shift the outcome of
the case in his favor. His failure to discharge this burden notwithstanding, the Court still reviewed
the record conformably with the tenet that every appeal in a criminal case opens the record for
review.9 Thus, after evaluating the record, the Court affirms the finding of his being criminally
responsible for the killing of Montegrico and Tamanu, and the frustrated killing of Paleg, subject to
the rectification of the characterization of the felonies as to Tamanu and Paleg.
I
Denial and alibi do not overcome
positive identification of the accused
There is no doubt that Prosecution witness Ferdinand Cutaran positively identified the accused as
the person who had shot Montegrico. Considering that Cutaran's credibility as an eyewitness was
unassailable in the absence of any showing or hint of ill motive on his part to falsely incriminate the
accused, such identification of the accused as the assailant of Montegrico prevailed over the
accused's weak denial and alibi. As such, the CA properly rejected the denial and alibi of the
accused as unworthy, and we adopt the following stated reasons of the CA for the rejection, to wit:
As for the defense of alibi, for it to prosper, it must be established by positive, clear and satisfactory
proof that it was physically impossible for the accused to have been at the scene of the crime at the
time of its commission, and not merely that the accused was somewhere else. Physical impossibility
refers to the distance between the place where the accused was when the crime happened and the
place where it was committed, as well as the facility of the access betwee the two places. In the
case at bar, appellant failed to prove the element of physical impossibility for him to be at the scene
of the crime at the time it took place. His alibi that he was in Cavite and the employment certificate
and time record sheet which he presented cannot prevail over the positive and categorical
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. Alibi is the weakest defense not only because it is
inherently weak and unreliable, but also because it is easy to fabricate. It is generally rejected when
the accused is positively identified by a witness.10
We reiterate that denial and alibi do not prevail over the positive identification of the accused by the
State's witnesses who are categorical and consistent and bereft of ill motive towards the accused.
Denial, unless substantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is undeserving of weight in law for
being negative and self-serving. Moreover, denial and alibi cannot be given greater evidentiary
value than the testimony of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters. 11
II
Treachery also attended the shooting
of Tamanu and Paleg; hence, the accused
is guilty of two counts of murder and
one count of frustrated murder
The CA and the RTC appreciated the attendance of treachery only in the fatal shooting of
Montegrico (Criminal Case No. 11-9260). Although no witness positively identified the accused as
the person who had also shot Tamanu and Paleg, the record contained sufficient circumstantial
evidence to establish that the accused was also criminally responsible for the fatal shooting of
Tamanu and the near-fatal shooting of Paleg. Indeed, the CA declared the accused as "the lone
assailant" of the victims based on its following analytical appreciation, to wit:
The evidence in this case shows that the attack was unexpected and swift. Montegrico and his
friends were just drinking outside the bunkhouse when the appellant suddenly appeared from the
back of a dump truck, walked towards their table and, without any warning, fired at Montegrico. This
shot was followed by more shots directed at Montegrico's friends, Tamanu and Paleg. Indisputably,
Montegrico was caught off guard by the sudden and deliberate attack coming from the appellant,
leaving him with no opportunity to raise any defense against the attack. Also, appellant deliberately
and consciously adopted his mode of attack by using a gun and made sure that Montegrico, who
was unarmed, would have no chance to defend himself.
We hold that the circumstantial evidence available was enough to convict accused-appellant.
Circumstantial evidence is competent to establish guilt as long as it is sufficient to establish beyond
a reasonable doubt that the accused, and not someone else, was responsible for the killing. For
circumstantial evidence to suffice to convict an accused, the following requisites must concur: (1)
there is more than one circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven;
and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt. In this case, these requisites for circumstantial evidence to sustain a conviction
are present. First, the witnesses unanimously said that they saw appellant coming from the back of
a dump truck and shoot Montegrico pointblank.  Second, appellant fired his gun several
times. Third, immediately after the shooting incident, three victims were found lying on the ground
and rushed to the hospital. Fourth, the Certificates of Death of Montegrico and Tamanu and the
Medical Certificate of Paleg revealed that they all sustained gun shot wounds. Thus, it can be said
with certitude that appellant was the lone assailant. The foregoing circumstances are proven facts,
and the Court finds no reason to discredit the testimonies of the prosecution's witnesses. Well-
entrenched is the rule that the trial court's assessment of the credibility of witnesses is accorded
great respect and will not be disturbed on appeal, inasmuch as the court a quo was in a position to
observe the demeanor of the witnesses while testifying. The Court does not find any arbitrariness or
error on the part of the RTC as would warrant a deviation from this rule. 12
Although the CA and the RTC correctly concluded that the accused had been directly responsible
for the shooting of Tamanu and Paleg, we are perplexed why both lower courts only characterized
the killing of Tamanu and the near-killing of Paleg as homicide and frustrated homicide while
characterizing the killing of Montegrico as murder because of the attendance of treachery. The
distinctions were unwarranted. The fact that the shooting of the three victims had occurred in quick
succession  fully called for a finding of the attendance of treachery in the attacks against all the
victims. Montegrico, Tamanu and Paleg were drinking together outside their bunkhouse prior to the
shooting when the accused suddenly appeared from the rear of the dump truck, walked towards
their table and shot Montegrico without any warning. That first shot was quickly followed by more
shots. In that situation, none of the three victims was aware of the imminent deadly assault by the
accused, for they were just enjoying their drinks outside their bunkhouse. They were unarmed, and
did not expect to be shot, when the accused came and shot them.
The attack was mounted with treachery because the two conditions in order for this circumstance to
be appreciated concurred, namely: (a) that the means, methods and forms of execution employed
gave the person attacked no opportunity to defend themselves or to retaliate; and (b) that such
means, methods and forms of execution were deliberately and consciously adopted by the accused
without danger to his person.13 The essence of treachery lay in the attack that came without
warning, and was swift, deliberate and unexpected, affording the hapless, unarmed and
unsuspecting victims no chance to resist, or retaliate, or escape, thereby ensuring the
accomplishment of the deadly design without risk to the aggressor, and without the slightest
provocation on the part of the victims.
What was decisive is that the execution of the attack made it impossible for the victims to defend
themselves or to retaliate. Jurisprudence has been illustrative of this proposition. In People v.
Flora,14 for instance, treachery was appreciated as an attendant circumstance in the killing of two
victims, and in the attempted killing of a third victim, warranting the conviction of the accused for two
murders and attempted murder, notwithstanding that although the accused had first fired at his
Intended victim, he had missed and had instead hit the two other victims, with the Court observing
that the three victims were all nonetheless "helpless to defend themselves." In a nother illustrative
ruling, People v. Pinto, Jr.,15 treachery was held to attend the three killings and the wounding of a
fourth victim because the attack was sudden and the victims were defenseless; hence, the killings
were murders, and the wounding frustrated murder.
Treachery as an aggravating or attendant circumstance must be established beyond reasonable
doubt. This quantum is hardly achieved if there is no testimony showing how the accused actually
commenced the assault against the victim. But to absolutely require such testimony in all cases
would cause some murders committed without eyewitnesses to go unpunished by the law. To avoid
that most undesirable situation, the  Rules of Court permits a resort not only to direct evidence but
also to circumstantial evidence. Indeed, the proof competent to achieve the quantum is not confined
to direct evidence from an eyewitness, who may be unavailable. Circumstantial evidence can just as
efficiently and competently achieve the quantum. The Rules of Court nowhere expresses a
preference for direct evidence of a fact to evidence of circumstances from which the existence of a
fact may be properly inferred. The Rules of Court has not also required a greater degree of certainty
when the evidence is circumstantial than when it is direct, for, in either case, the trier of fact must
still be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused. 16 The quantity of
circumstances sufficient to convict an accused has not been fixed as to be reduced into some
definite standard to be followed in every instance. As the Court has observed in People v.
Modesto:17
The standard postulated by this Court in the appreciation of circumstantial evidence is well set out in
the following passage from People vs. Ludday:18 "No general rule can be laid down as to the
quantity of circumstantial evidence which in any case will suffice. All the circumstances proved must
be consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the
same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent, and with every other rational
hypothesis except that of guilt."
It is of no consequence, therefore, that Cutaran, who had meanwhile fled to safety upon hearing the
shot that had felled Montegrico, did not witness the actual shooting of Tamanu and Paleg; or that
Paleg, although surviving the assault against him and Tamanu, did not testify during the trial. What
is of consequence is that the records unquestionably and reliably showed that Tamanu and Paleg
were already prostrate on the ground when Cutaran returned to the scene; and that the gunshots
had been fired in quick succession, thereby proving with moral certainty that the accused was the
same person who also shot Tamanu and Paleg.
The averment in the second paragraph of the information filed Criminal Case No. 11-9261 (in
relation to the shooting of Paleg) that homicide was the consequence of the acts of execution by the
appellant19 does not prevent finding the accused guilty of frustrated murder. The rule is that the
allegations of the information on the nature of the offense charged, not the nomenclature given it by
the Office of the Public Prosecutor, are controlling in the determination of the offense charged.
Accordingly, considering that the information stated in its first paragraph that the accused, "armed
with a gun, with intent to kill, with evident premeditation and with treacher[y], conspiring together
and helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack and
shot (sic) one Engr. Mario Paleg y Ballad, inflicting upon the latter a gunshot wound," the accused
can be properly found guilty of frustrated murder, a crime sufficiently averred in the information.
II
Criminal Liabilities
As a consequence, the accused was criminally liable for two counts of murder for the fatal shooting
of Montegrico and Tamanu, and for frustrated murder for the near-fatal shooting of Paleg. In the
absence of any modifying circumstances, reclusion perpetua is the penalty for each count of
murder, while reclusion temporal  in its medium period is the penalty for frustrated murder. The
indeterminate sentence for the frustrated murder is eight years of prision mayor, as the minimum, to
14 years, eight months and one day of reclusion temporal, as the maximum.
IV
Civil Liability
For death caused by a crime or quasi-delict, Article 2206 of the Civil Code enumerates the damages
that may be recovered from the accused or defendant, to wit:
Article 2206. The amount of damages for death caused by a crime or quasi-delict shall be at least
three thousand pesos, even though there may have been mitigating circumstances. In addition:
(l)The defendant shall be liable for the loss of the earning capacity of the deceased, and the
indemnity shall be paid to the heirs of the latter; such indemnity shall in every case be assessed and
awarded by the court, unless the deceased on account of permanent physical disability not caused
by the defendant, had no earning capacity at the time of his death;
(2) If the deceased was obliged to give support according to the provisions of article 291, the
recipient who is not an heir called to the decedent's inheritance by the law of testate or intestate
succession, may demand support from the person causing the death, for a period not exceeding five
years, the exact duration to be fixed by the court;
(3) The spouse, legitimate and illegitimate descendants and ascendants of the deceased may
demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of the deceased.
The first item of civil liability is the civil indemnity for death, or death indemnity.
Civil indemnity comes under the general provisions of the Civil Code on damages, and refers to the
award given to the heirs of the deceased as a form of monetary restitution or compensation for the
death of the victim at the hands of the accused. Its grant is mandatory and a matter of course, and
without need of proof other than the fact of death as the result of the crime or quasi-delict, 20 and the
fact that the accused was responsible therefor. The mandatory character of civil indemnity in case of
death from crime or quasi-delict derives from the legal obligation of the accused or the defendant to
fully compensate the heirs of the deceased for his death as the natural consequence of the criminal
or quasi-delictual act or omission. This legal obligation is set in Article 2202 of the Civil Code, viz.:
Article 2202. In crimes and quasi-delicts, the defendant shall be liable for all damages which are the
natural and probable consequences of the act or omission complained of. It is not necessary that
such damages have been foreseen or could have reasonably been foreseen by the defendant.
Article 2206 of the Civil Code, supra, has fixed the death indemnity to be "at least three thousand
pesos, even though there may have been mitigating circumstances." Yet, the granting of civil
indemnity was not introduced by the Civil Code, for the courts had granted death indemnity to the
heirs of the victims even long prior to August 30, 1950, the date of the effectivity of the Civil Code.
The award of civil indemnity dated back to the early years of the Court. 21 There was also legislation
on the matter, starting with Commonwealth Act No. 284, approved on June 3, 1938, which provided
in its Section 1 the following:
Section 1. — The civil liability or the death of a person shall be fixed by the competent court at a
reasonable sum, upon consideration of the pecuniary situation of the party liable and other
circumstances, but it shall in no case be less than two thousand pesos.
In fixing the civil indemnity, the Legislature thereby set a minimum. The  Civil Code, in Article 2206,
took the same approach by specifying the amount to be at least P3,000.00, which was directly
manifesting the legislative intent of enabling the courts to increase the amount whenever the
circumstances would warrant.
Civil indemnity for death has been increased through the years from the minimum of P2,000.00 to
as high as P100,000.00. The increases have been made to consider the economic conditions,
primarily the purchasing power of the peso as the Philippine currency. In 1948, in People v.
Amansec,22 the Court awarded to the heirs of the victim of homicide the amount of P6,000.00 as
death indemnity, raising the P2,000.00 allowed by the trial court, the legal minimum at the-time, and
justified the increase by adverting to the "difference between the value of the present currency and
that at the time when the law fixing a minimum indemnity of P2,000.00 was enacted." 23 Later on, in
1968, the Court, in People v. Pantoja,24 saw a significant need to further upgrade the civil indemnity
for death to PI 2,000.00. To justify the upgrade, the Court included a review of the more recent
history of civil indemnity for death in this jurisdiction, to wit:
In 1947, when the Project of Civil Code was drafted, the Code Commission fixed the sum of P3,000
as the minimum amount of compensatory damages for death caused by a crime or quasi-delict. The
Project of Civil Code was approved by both Houses of the Congress in 1949 as the New Civil Code
of the Philippines, which took effect in 1950. In 1948 in the case of People vs. Amansec, 80 Phil.
424, the Supreme Court awarded P6,000 as compensatory damages for death caused by a crime
"considering the difference between the value of the present currency and that at the time when the
law fixing a minimum indemnity of P2,000 was enacted." The law referred to was Commonwealth
Act No. 284 which took effect in 1938. In 1948, the purchasing power of the Philippine peso was
one-third of its pre-war purchasing power. In 1950, when the New Civil Code took effect, the
minimum amount of compensatory damages for death caused by a crime or quasi-delict was fixed
in Article 2206 of the Code at P3,000. The article repealed by implication Commonwealth Act No.
284. Hence, from the time the New Civil Code took effect, the Courts could properly have awarded
P9,000 as compensatory damages for death caused by a crime or quasi-delict. It is common
knowledge that from 1948 to the present (1968), due to economic circumstances beyond
governmental control, the purchasing power of the Philippine peso has declined further such that
the rale of exchange now in the free market is U.S. $1.00 to almost £4.00 Philippine pesos. This
means that the present purchasing power of the Philippine peso is one-fourth of its pre-war
purchasing power. We are, therefore, of the considered opinion that the amount of award of
compensatory damages for death caused by a crime or quasi-delict should now be
P12,000.25 (Italics supplied)
Increases were made from time to time until the death indemnity reached the threshold of
P50,000.00, where it remained for a long time.26 In that time, however, the Court occasionally
granted P75,000.00 as civil indemnity for death.27 The Court retained the death indemnity at
P75,000.00 in subsequent cases, as in People v. Dela Cruz  (2007)28 and People v.
Buban.29 In People v. Anod,30 decided on August 5, 2009, the Court clarified that the award of
P75,000.00 was appropriate only if the imposable penalty was death but reduced to reclusion
perpetua by virtue of the enactment of Republic Act No. 9346 (An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of
Death Penalty). Hence, where the proper imposable penalty was reclusion perpetua, death
indemnity in murder remained at P50,000.00. Yet, the Court, in an apparent self-contradiction less
than a month after Anod, promulgated People v. Arbalate,31 wherein it fixed P75,000.00 as death
indemnity despite the imposable penalty being reclusion perpetua, with the Court holding that death
indemnity should be P75,000.00 regardless of aggravating or mitigating circumstances provided the
penalty prescribed by law was death or reclusion perpetua,.
Death indemnity of P75,000.00 became the standard in murder where the penalty was reclusion
perpetua. This standard has been borne out by People v. Soriano,32People v. Jadap,33 and People
v. Sanchez (2010).34 But the consistency in applying the standard was broken in 2010, when the
Court, in People v. Gutierrez (2010),35 a murder case, reverted to P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity. People v. Gutierrez (2010) was followed by People v. Apacible,36 also for murder, with
the Court, citing People v. Anod,37 reducing the civil indemnity from P75,000.00, the amount
originally awarded by the lower court, to P50,000.00. Oddly enough, on June 29, 2010, or two
months before the promulgation of Apacible, the Court promulgated People v. Orias38 and therein
awarded P75,000.00 as civil indemnity and even made a sweeping declaration that such amount
was given automatically in cases of murder and homicide. It is notable, however, that People v.
Ocampo39 and People v. Amodia,40 the two rulings cited as authority for the declaration, involved
charges and convictions for murder, not homicide.
The Court reverted to the flat amount of P50,000.00 as death indemnity in murder where the proper
imposable penalty was reclusion perpetua in People v. Dela Cruz (2010),41Talampas v.
People42 and People v. Gabrino.43 Subsequently, the Court went back to P75,000.00 in People v.
Mediado44 and People v. Anti camara45 both murder cases. In People v. Escleto46 the Court,
prescribing reclusion perpetua upon not finding any aggravating circumstance to be attendant,
imposed P75,000.00 as civil indemnity for the death of the victim. The Court did the same thing
in People v. Camat47 and People v. Laurio48 where the Court, prescribing only reclusion perpetua
due to lack of any aggravating circumstance, awarded P75,000.00 as civil indemnity for death.
In People v. Buyagan49 the Court, in awarding P75,000.00 as civil indemnity for the deaths of each
of the victims, said that the civil indemnity should be increased from P50,000.00 to P75,000.00
inasmuch as the imposable penalty against the appellant would have been death had it not been for
the enactment of Republic Act No. 9346.
In 2013, the Court once again changed its mind and awarded only P50,000.00 as civil indemnity in
murder. Thus, in People v. Pondivida50 and People v. Alawig,51 the Court sentenced the accused to
reclusion perpetua and awarded only P50,000.00 as civil indemnity.
Incidentally, the civil indemnity for homicide remained pegged at P50,000.00 for almost two decades
[e.g., Lozano v. Court of Appeals52People v. Gutierrez (2002),53People v. Dagani,54Seguritan v.
People55People v. Valdez,56People v. Lagman57 and Sombol v. People.]58 In attempted robbery with
homicide (People v. Barra, the civil indemnity was P50,000.00.59
It is again timely to raise the civil indemnity for death arising from crime or quasi-delict. We start by
reminding that human life, which is not a commodity, is priceless. The value of human life is
incalculable, for no loss of life from crime or quasi-delict can ever be justly measured. Yet, the law
absolutely requires every injury, especially loss of life, to be compensated in the form of damages.
For this purpose, damages may be defined as the pecuniary compensation, recompense, or
satisfaction for an injury sustained, or, as otherwise expressed, the pecuniary consequences that
the law imposes for the breach of some duty or the violation of some right. 60 As such, damages refer
to the amount in money awarded by the court as a remedy for the injured. 61 Although money has
been accepted as the most frequently used means of punishing, deterring, compensating and
regulating injury throughout the legal system,62 it has been explained that money in the context of
damages is not awarded as a replacement for other money, but as substitute for that which is
generally more important than money; it is the best thing that a court can do.63 Regardless, the civil
indemnity for death, being compensatory in nature, must attune to contemporaneous economic
realities; otherwise, the desire to justly indemnify would be thwarted or rendered meaningless. This
has been the legislative justification for pegging the minimum, but not the maximum, of the
indemnity.
The reasoning in Pantoja,64supra, has been premised on the pronouncement in People v.
Amansec65 to the effect that the increase to P6,000.00 in "compensatory damages for death caused
by a crime" from the legally imposed minimum indemnity of P2,000.00 under Commonwealth Act
No. 284 (which took effect in 1938) was in consideration of "the difference between the value of the
present currency and that at the time when the law fixing a minimum indemnity of P2,000 was
enacted." The Pantoja Court thus raised the amount of death indemnity to P12,000.00 by taking
judicial cognizance of the fact "that from 1948 to the present (1968), due to economic
circumstances beyond governmental control, the purchasing power of the Philippine peso has
declined further such that the rate of exchange now in the free market is U.S. $1.00 to almost £4.00
Philippine pesos. This means that the present purchasing power of the Philippine peso is one-fourth
of its pre-war purchasing power." Subsequent increases have been similarly justified.
On April 5, 2016, the Court promulgated its decision in People v. Jugueta (G.R. No. 202124),
whereby it adopted certain guidelines on fixing the civil liabilities in crimes resulting in the death of
the victims taking into proper consideration the stages of execution and gravity of the offenses, as
well as the number of victims in composite crimes. Other factors were weighed by the Court. In the
case of murder where the appropriate penalty is reclusion perpetna, the Court has thereby fixed
P75,000.00 for moral damages, P75,000.00 for exemplary damages, and P75,000.00 for civil
indemnity as the essential civil liabilities,- in addition to others as the records of each case will
substantiate. Hence, we impose herein the same amounts for such items of damages in each count
of murder.
It appears that the accused and the heirs of Montegrico stipulated that the civil indemnity of the
accused in case of conviction should not exceed P150,000.00. 66 The stipulation cannot stand
because the civil indemnity arising from each murder should only be P75,000.00. In crimes in which
death of the victim results, civil indemnity is granted even in the absence of allegation and proof.
Similarly, moral damages are allowed even without allegation and proof, it being a certainty that the
victims' heirs were entitled thereto as a matter of law.
Also in accordance with People v. Jugueta, supra, temperate damages of P50,000.00 should further
be granted to the heirs of Montegrico and Tamanu considering that they were presumed to have
spent for the interment of each of the deceased. It would be unjust to deny them recovery in the
form of temperate damages just because they did not establish with certainty the actual expenditure
for the interment of their late-lamented family members. 67
In this respect, we mention that Article 2230 of the Civil Code authorizes the grant of exemplary
damages if at least one aggravating circumstance attended the commission of the crime. For this
purpose, exemplary damages of P75,000.00 are granted to the heirs of Montegrico and Tamanu,
respectively, based on the attendant circumstance of treachery. Whether treachery was a qualifying
or attendant circumstance did not matter, for, as clarified in People v. Catubig:68
The term "aggravating circumstances'" used by the Civil Code, the law not having specified
otherwise, is to be understood in its broad or generic sense. The commission of an offense has a
two-pronged effect, one on the public as it breaches the social order and the other upon the private
victim as it causes personal sufferings, each of which is addressed by, respectively, the prescription
of heavier punishment for the accused and by an award of additional damages to the victim, (lie
increase of the penalty or a shift to a graver felony underscores the exacerbation of the offense by
the attendance of aggravating circumstances, whether ordinary or qualifying, in its commission.
Unlike the criminal liability which is basically a State concern, the award of damages, however, is
likewise, if not primarily, intended for the offended party who suffers thereby. It would make little
sense for an award of exemplary damages to be due the private offended party when the
aggravating circumstance is ordinary but to be withheld when it is qualifying. Withal, the ordinary or
qualifying nature of an aggravating circumstance is a distinction that should only be ol consequence
to the criminal, rather than to the civil, liability of the offender. In fine, relative to the civil aspect of
the case, an aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying, should entitle the offended
party to an award of exemplary damages within the unbridled meaning of Article 2230 of the Civil
Code.69
On his part, Paleg, being the victim of frustrated murder, is entitled to P50,000.00 as moral
damages, P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, and P50,000.00 as exemplary damages, P25,000.00 as
temperate damages (for his hospitalization and related expenses). This quantification accords with
the pronouncement in People v. Jugueta, supra.
In line with pertinent jurisprudence,70 interest of 6% per annum  shall be charged on all the items of
civil liability imposed herein, computed from the date of the finality of this decision until fully
paid.chanrobleslaw
WHEREFORE, the Court FINDS and DECLARES accused MARIANO OANDASAN, JR.
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of TWO COUNTS OF MURDER in Criminal Case No. 11-9259
and Criminal Case No. 11-9260 for the killing of Edgardo Tamanu and Danilo Montegrico,
respectively; and of FRUSTRATED MURDER in Criminal Case No. II-9261 for the frustrated killing
of Mario Paleg, and, ACCORDINGLY, SENTENCES him to suffer RECLUSION PERPETUA in
Criminal Case No. 11-9259 and in Criminal Case No. 11-9260, and the INDETERMINATE
SENTENCE OF EIGHT YEARS OF PRISION MAYOR, AS THE MINIMUM, TO 14 YEARS, EIGHT
MONTHS AND ONE DAY OF RECLUSION TEMPORAL, AS THE MAXIMUM, in Criminal Case
No. 11-9261; and to pay the following by way of civil liability, to wit:
1) To the heirs of Danilo Montegrico, civil indemnity of P75,000.00; moral damages of P75,000.00;
exemplary damages of P75,000.00; and temperate damages of P50,000.00;
2) To the heirs of Edgardo Tamanu, civil indemnity of P75,000.00; moral damages of P75,000.00;
exemplary damages of P75,000.00; and temperate damages of P50,000.00; and
3) To Mario Paleg, civil indemnity of P50,000.00; moral damages of P50,000.00; exemplary
damages of P50,000.00; and temperate damages of P25,000.00.

All monetary awards for damages shall earn interest at the legal rate of 6% per annum from the
finality of this decision until fully paid.

The accused shall pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary
 G.R. No. 208351, October 05, 2016
BENJAMIN RUSTIA, JR., BENJAMIN RUSTIA, SR., AND FAUSTINO "BONG"
RUSTIA, Petitioners, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
In a criminal prosecution for murder qualified by the attendant circumstance of treachery, the
means, method, or form of the attack must be shown to have been consciously and deliberately
adopted by the offender before the same can be considered to qualify the killing. Otherwise, the
killing amounts only to homicide.
The Case
This appeal is taken by all the accused from the decision promulgated on July 16, 2013 in CA-G.R.
CR-H.C. No. 04864,1 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed with modification the judgment
rendered on November 25, 2010 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Santiago City 2 finding
petitioner Benjamin Rustia, Jr. (Benjamin, Jr.) guilty as principal in the crime of murder qualified by
treachery, and his co-petitioners Benjamin Rustia, Sr. (Benjamin, Sr.) and Faustino Rustia
(Faustino) guilty as accomplices in the crime of murder.
Antecedents
The petitioners were charged with murder for the killing of the late Ambrocio Cristin (Ambrocio)
under the amended information that reads:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
That on or about the 14th day of June, 2008, at Brgy. Malvar, City of Santiago, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with malice aforethought
and with deliberate intent to take the life of AMBROCIO CRISTIN, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully, feloniously, and treacherously shot the defenseless victim [sic] AMBROCIO CRISTIN
which mode of attack BENJAMIN RUSTIA JR consciously adopted, with an unknown firearm,
inflicting gunshot wounds upon AMBROCIO CRISTIN being necessarily mortal,· that eventually
caused the death of the said AMBROCIO CRISTIN [sic]
That in the course of the killing of said AMBROCIO CRISTIN said Benjamin Rustia, Sr., and
Faustino Rustia, knowing of the criminal design of Benjamin Rustia, Jr., concur with the latter in his
purpose, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously cooperate in the execution of the
crime of murder by their simultaneous and collective acts of grappling and restraining the victim until
Benjamin Rustia, Jr., was able to wrest possession of the gun from the victim thereby supplying
both material and moral aid in the execution of the said crime of murder.
CONTRARY TO LAW.3chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The CA summarized the evidence adduced at trial as follows:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The prosecution presented Lilia Cristin ("Lilia" for brevity), Steve Pablo ("Pablo" for brevity),
Ferdinand Samin ("Samin" for brevity), Rolando Sanchez Buenaventura ("Buenaventura" for
brevity), and Dr. Jeffrey Demano ("Dr. Demano" for brevity), in order to prove the following:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibraryOn June 14, 2008, at around 1:30 in the afternoon, the victim Ambrocio
Cristin ("victim" or "Cristin" for brevity) went to the Barangay Hall of Malvar, Santiago City to meet
accused-appellants Rustia, Jr., Rustia, Sr., and Faustino, in order to talk to them about the land that
victim Cristin had bought from a certain Agcaoile.
Since the Barangay Captain was out, accused-appellants and victim Cristin left the Barangay Hall.
They were arguing.
Accused-apppellant Rustia, Jr. suddenly restrained the victim Cristin on his waist. Accused-
appellants Rustia, Sr. and Faustino helped accused-appellant Rustia, Jr. restrain both hands of the
victim. They all "grappled", and fell on the ground.
When the victim was lying on the ground, accused-appellant Rustia, Jr. took the victim's gun that
was tucked inside the victim's waist. Accused-appellant Rustia, Jr. then cocked the gun and pointed
it at the victim Cristin. The latter immediately raised his arms to surrender, saying, "Madinak
lumaban" (I will not fight). However, accused appellant Rustia, Jr. shot the victim Cristin. Accused-
appellant Rustia, Jr. started to walk away, but returned and fired another shot at the victim.
Accused appellants Rustia, Jr., Rustia, Sr., and Faustino then boarded their tricycle, and left the
place. The events were witnessed by [Buenaventura], Pablo and Samin.
Afterwards, the witnesses Buenaventura and Samin brought the victim Cristin to the Flores Hospital.
According to the victim Cristin's wife, Lilia when her husband was at the Flores Hospital, the victim
was able to tell her that accused appellant Rustia, Jr. was the one who shot him.
Victim Cristin was then transferred to the De Vera Medical Center for further treatment.
As testified to by Dr. Demano, who was the doctor who examined the victim on June 18, 2008 at the
De Vera Medical Center, the cause of death of victim Cristin was a gunshot wound on the victim's
neck. According to Dr. Demano, the gunshot wound's entry point was at the anterior neck area, and
the exit point was at the posterior area of the skull at the back.
On June 24, 2008, the victim Cristin died as a result of that gunshot wound on his neck.
The defense, on the other hand, presented the sole testimony of accused-appellant Rustia, Jr., in
order to prove the following:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibraryOn June 14, 2008 at about 2:00 in the afternoon, accused-appellant
Rustia, Jr., together with his father, accused-appellant Rustia, Sr., and his brother, accused-
appellant Faustino were at the Barangay Hall in Malvar, Santiago City to talk to the victim Cristin
about the land of accused appellant Rustia, Sr., which land was being occupied by the victim Cristin.
The barangay captain was not around at that time.

Accused-appellant Rustia, Sr. talked to the victim Cristin in order for the latter to return the land of
accused-appellant Rustia, Sr. However, victim Cristin refused to return the land, and got angry. He
uttered "fukkenenam", which meant "vulva of your mother".
Accused-appellant Rustia, Jr. saw that victim Cristin had a gun tucked in his waist, so, he, together
with his father, accused-appellant Rustia, Sr., and brother, accused-appellant Faustino "tried to
avoid" the victim.
When accused-appellant Rustia, Sr. was about to leave the Barangay Hall, accused-appellant
Rustia, Jr. saw the victim Cristin draw his gun. Accused-appellant Rustia, Jr. grabbed the victim
Cristin, causing all of them to fall down. Rustia, Jr. and the victim Cristin grappled for the possession
of the victim's gun. Accused-appellant Rustia, Jr. was able to take the victim's gun. Then, accused-
appellant Rustia, Jr. shot the victim twice.
After having shot the victim Cristin, accused-appellants Rustia, Jr., Rustia, Sr., and Faustino left.
Accused-appellant Rustia, Jr. then threw the gun.4chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
On November 25, 2010, the RTC rendered judgment finding and pronouncing Benjamin, Jr. guilty
as principal in murder, and Rustia, Sr. and Faustino guilty as accomplices in murder,
disposing:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
WHEREFORE in light of the foregoing considerations the Court finds the accused Benjamin Rustia,
Jr. GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of murder and hereby sentences him to the penalty
of reclusion perpetua. The Court also finds the two other accused Benjamin Rustia, Sr. and
Faustino Bong Rustia GUILTY as accomplices to the crime of murder and hereby sentences each of
them to an indeterminate penalty of eight (8) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of prision
mayor as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion
temporal as maximum. In addition the accused are ORDERED TO PAY jointly and solidarily, to the
widow of the deceased Ambrocio Cristin the sum of One hundred three thousand two hundred
eighty one pesos (P103,281.00) as actual damages; Twenty five thousand pesos (P25,000.00) as
temperate damages; Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) as death indemnity; Fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000.00) as moral damages; and, Twenty five thousand pesos (P25,000.00) as exemplary
damages.5chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Decision of the CA
On appeal, the petitioners assailed the adverse findings of the RTC, asserting that they had only
acted in self-defense; that the RTC had is regarded Benjamin, Jr.'s testimony showing that
Ambrocio had been reaching for the gun tucked in his waist; that Benjamin, Jr. had only reacted to
defend himself by the instinct of self-preservation; and that Benjamin, Sr. and Faustino had not been
sufficiently identified by the Prosecution's witnesses.
In its now assailed decision, the CA ruled that because Benjamin, Jr. had invoked self-defense, the
burden of evidence had shifted to him; that such defense was not established because no unlawful
aggression could be attributable to the victim; that even assuming that the victim had been
perceived to have been about to draw his gun, as the petitioners insisted, that act by itself could not
be considered an act of unlawful aggression because the danger from him had ceased once
Benjamin, Jr. had successfully wrested the gun from the victim; that the victim had already raised
his hands to indicate his surrender just before he had been shot; and that the number, location, and
severity of the wounds inflicted on the victim further negated the claim of self-defense; that
treachery had been attendant because the attack against the victim had been unexpected, precise,
and sudden, rendering the victim unable to defend himself; and that Benjamin, Sr. and Faustino had
been accomplices to the crime.
The CA modified the civil liability by deleting the temperate damages; and increasing the exemplary
damages from P25,000.00 to P30,000.00.6chanrobleslaw
Issues
In this appeal, the petitioners insist that:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
I
THE AMENDED INFORMATION FAILS TO SPECIFICALLY ALLEGE THE FACTUAL
CIRCUMSTANCES OR PARTICULAR ACTS THAT CONSTITUTE TREACHERY.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN APPRECIATING THE QUALIFYING
CIRCUMSTANCE OF TREACHERY
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING PETITIONER BENJAMIN
RUSTIA, JR. OF MURDER INSTEAD OF HOMICIDE.
IV
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN CONVICTING PETITIONERS BENJAMIN RUSTIA, SR.
AND FAUSTINO RUSTIA AS ACCOMPLICES.
V
THE TRIAL COURT AND THE COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD HAVE CONSIDERED
INCOMPLETE SELF-DEFENSE AS A SPECIAL MITIGATING
CIRCUMSTANCE.7chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In short, the decisive query is whether or not the offense committed was murder, qualified by
treachery.
In its comment, the Office of the Solicitor General points out that the petitioners took issue with the
perceived insufficiency of the amended information on the circumstance of treachery being raised
only for the first time on appeal to this Court.
 Ruling of the Court
The petition is partly meritorious.
Treachery as an attendant circumstance must be alleged and established beyond reasonable doubt.
The lower courts ruled herein that treachery was attendant based on the fact that the attack had
been unexpected and sudden because it had been mounted at a time when Ambrocio was lying on
the floor with his hands raised in surrender. Treachery exists when the following elements are
present: (a) at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself; and (b) the
accused consciously and deliberately adopted the particular means, methods, or forms of attack
employed by him.8 Thus, it is not sufficient that the victim was unable to defend himself. The
Prosecution must show that the accused consciously adopted such mode of attack to facilitate the
perpetration of the killing without risk to himself.9chanrobleslaw
The incident was precipitated by the heated argument between the petitioners and the victim.
Tempers were already high when the four of them were leaving the barangay hall. At that point,
Benjamin, Jr. grappled with Ambrocio for control of the gun that Ambrocio had brought with him.
While the shooting was sudden, Ambrocio could not be said to have been defenseless at that point.
According to the RTC, he was then struggling and fighting back. 10 During the grappling, his gun was
still tucked in his waist. Even so, it cannot be concluded that their scuffle was without risk to
Benjamin, Jr. in as much as there was then no guarantee that Benjamin, Jr. would come out on top
with control of the gun. Only the subsequent intervention of Benjamin, Sr. and Faustino that
Benjamin, Jr. succeeded in bringing Ambrocio down to the ground and secure control of the firearm.
The CA and the RTC considered Ambrocio as defenseless after he had been brought down with his
hands up.
Taking into consideration everything leading up to that moment of Ambrocio being defenseless on
the ground, we cannot justifiably state that Benjamin, Jr. had consciously and deliberately sought
and brought about that situation to be advantageous to him. In our view, such situation was rather
from pure happenstance, having resulted from their physical grappling. This persuades us to
somehow undo the conclusion reached by both lower courts to the effect that Benjamin, Jr. had
consciously and deliberately adopted the means, method, or form of the fatal shooting in order to
ensure the execution of the criminal design to kill.
Furthermore, all the circumstances in the record indicated that the killing of Ambrocio had been
done in the heat of the moment. It is quite clear that Benjamin, Jr. had not set out to kill Ambrocio
when they both agreed to meet in order to discuss their land dispute. The fact also remains that it
was the victim who had brought the gun to the meeting. In contrast, Benjamin, Jr. did not appear to
have prepared his own weapon to commit the crime. To establish the attendance of treachery in
such an environment, the State's evidence must competently and convincingly show that the
accused made some preparation to kill the victim; hence, a killing done at the spur of the moment
cannot be treacherous.11 Even where the victim was shot from behind, if the shooting was done in
the course of a heated argument between the victim and the assailant, treachery should not be
appreciated, for in that situation, the assailant was filled with anger and rage and excitement, and
had no time to reflect on his actions; in other words, he could not be shown to have consciously
adopted the mode of attacking the victim from behind to facilitate the killing without risk to
himself.12chanrobleslaw
In the same manner, the petitioner's claim of incomplete self-defense must fail for being
unsupported by the evidence. This privileged mitigating circumstance requires the indispensable
element of unlawful aggression, the nature of which we have explained in People v. Dulin:13
x x x The test for the presence of unlawful aggression under the circumstances is whether or not the
aggression from the victim put in real peril the life or personal safety of the person defending
himself; the peril must not be an imagined or imaginary threat. Accordingly, the accused must
establish the concurrence of three elements of unlawful aggression, namely: (a) there must be a
physical or material attack or assault; (b) the attack or assault must be actual, or, at least imminent;
and (c) the attack or assault must be unlawful.
Unlawful aggression is of two kinds: (a) actual or material unlawful aggression; and (b) imminent
unlawful aggression. Actual or material unlawful aggression means an attack with physical force or
with a weapon, an offensive act that positively determines the intent of the aggressor to cause the
injury. Imminent unlawful aggression means an attack that is impending or at the point of
happening; it must not consist in a mere threatening attitude, nor must it be merely imaginary, but
must be offensive and positively strong (like aiming a revolver at another with intent to shoot or
opening a knife and making a motion as if to attack). Imminent unlawful aggression must not be a
mere threatening attitude of the victim, such as pressing his right hand to his hip where a revolver
was holstered, accompanied by an angry countenance, or like aiming to throw a pot.
The burden of proving unlawful aggression belonged to the petitioners. According to them, unlawful
aggression manifested itself when Ambrocio reached for the gun tucked in his waist. Yet, they did
not thereby establish that Ambrocio had really reached for his gun and actually taken it out. What
we have on this defense was instead the sole recollection of Benjamin, Jr., which, being
uncorroborated even by the other petitioners, was accorded scant consideration by both the RTC
and the CA. It is remarkable at least that none of the three disinterested eyewitnesses saw
Ambrocio reaching for the gun first. Thus, the claim of incomplete selfdefense is rejected.
There being no treachery, the crime committed by Benjamin, Jr. was only homicide. Article 249 of
the Revised Penal Code defines homicide and penalizes it with reclusion temporal. Applying
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, and in the absence of any modifying circumstances, the maximum
of the indeterminate sentence is taken from the medium period of reclusion temporal (from 14 years,
eight months and one day to 17 years and four months), while the minimum is taken from prision
mayor, the penalty next lower (from six years and one day to 12 years). Accordingly, the
indeterminate sentence of eight years of prision mayor, as minimum, to 14 years, eight months and
one day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, is hereby imposed.
Anent the criminal liability of Benjamin, Sr. and Faustino as accomplices, we grant the petition for
review.
Article 18 of the Revised Penal Code provides that accomplices are the persons who, not being
included in Article 17, cooperate in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts.
The principals included in Article 17 are: (1) those who take a direct part in the execution of the act;
(2) those who directly force or induce others to commit it; and (3) those who cooperate in the
commission of the offense by another act without which it would not have been accomplished.

In order that a person may be considered an accomplice, three elements must be shown to concur,
namely: (1) that there be a community of design, that is, knowing the criminal design of the principal
by direct participation, he concurs with the latter in his purpose; (2) that he cooperates in the
execution by previous or simultaneous act, with the intention of supplying material or moral aid in
the execution of the crime in an efficacious way; and (3) that there be a relation between the acts
done by the principal and those attributed to the person charged as accomplice. 14chanrobleslaw
months and one day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, with full credit of his preventive
imprisonment; ORDERS petitioner BENJAMIN RUSTIA, JR. to pay to the heirs of the late Ambrocio
Cristin the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and
P103,281.00 as actual damages, with interest at the legal rate of 6% per annum from the finality of
this decision until fully paid; ACQUITS petitioners BENJAMIN RUSTIA, SR. and FAUSTINO
RUSTIA for insufficiency of evidence; and DIRECTS petitioner BENJAMIN RUSTIA, JR. to pay the
costs of suit.

The cooperation that the law punishes is the assistance knowingly or intentionally rendered that SO ORDERED.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
cannot exist without previous cognizance of the criminal act intended to be executed. 15 But it cannot
be said that Benjamin, Sr. and Faustino knew that Benjamin, Jr. would shoot the victim. As earlier
observed, the fatal shooting was done in the heat of the moment, not premeditated or preconceived.
Their group was making its way out of the barangay hall when Benjamin, Jr. suddenly grabbed
Ambrocio around the waist, and the two of them started to wrestle with each other. Up to that point,
nothing indicated that Benjamin, Jr. intended to grab Ambrocio's gun and use it against him. From
their point of view, Benjamin, Sr. and Faustino were witnessing their closest of kin suddenly
engaged in the physical struggle with Ambrocio whom they knew was armed with a gun. Going to
the aid of Benjamin, Jr. was but their most natural reaction. That their going to the latter's aid might
have enhanced the changes of Benjamin, Jr. in gaining control of the victim's firearm, but such did
not unavoidably mean that they had themselves intended such outcome. Nor did they contemplate
such outcome in the absence of any clear showing that they deliberately went to his aid to ensure
his seizure of the firearm from Ambrocio. As things stood, their acts could also mean that they were
only trying to stop the grappling from escalating into violence. Until the time when Benjamin, Jr.'s
intention became known to them that is, when he finally had full control of the gun, he cocked it and
pointed it at the victim nothing in the records established that Benjamin, Sr. and Faustino continued
to provide material and moral aid to Benjamin, Jr.

Under the established circumstances, whether or not Benjamin, Sr. and Faustino were cognizant of
Benjamin, Jr.'s felonious intention is unclear. At the very least, such lack of clarity raises doubt
about their cooperation in the commission of the crime by Benjamin, Jr. We resolve the doubt in
their favor, and decide to absolve them of criminal liability as accomplices.

Nonetheless, we adjust the civil damages awarded to conform with prevailing jurisprudence in
respect of crimes that result in the death of the victim and the penalty consists of divisible penalties,
like homicide.16 The heirs of the victim herein are entitled to civil indemnity of P50,000.00, moral
damages of P50,000.00, and P50,000.00 as exemplary damages. The actual damages of
P103,281.00 are also maintained because no issue was raised in relation thereto.

Finally, current judicial policy requires the imposition of interest at the legal rate of 6% per annum on
all the damages from the finality of this decision until fully paid. 17chanrobleslaw

WHEREFORE, the Court PARTIALLY GRANTS the petition for review on certiorari; AFFIRMS the

decision promulgated on July 16, 2013 by the Court of Appeals subject to the MODIFICATIONS that
petitioner BENJAMIN RUSTIA, JR. is FOUND AND PRONOUNCED GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT of HOMICIDE, and, ACCORDINGLY, SENTENCES him to suffer
the INDETERMINATE PENALTY of eight years of prision mayor, as minimum, to 14 years, eight
 G.R. No. 126021. March 3, 2000
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. RENE SIAO, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
GONZAGA_REYES, J.:
Accused-appellant Rene Siao together with Reylan Gimena were charged before the Regional Trial
Court of the City of Cebu with the crime of rape committed as follows:
"xxx xxx xxx:
That on or about the 27th day of May, 1994, about 3:00 P.M., in the City of Cebu, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, conniving and confederating
together and mutually helping each other, with deliberate intent and with force and intimidation upon
person, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with the
undersigned, Estrella Raymundo, a minor, 14 years old, against the latters will." 1cräläwvirtualibräry
Accused-appellant Rene Siao and Reylan Gimena pleaded "not guilty" to the charge. Hence, trial
proceeded in due course. After trial, the Regional Trial Court of the City of Cebu convicted accused-
appellant Rene Siao of the crime of rape as principal by induction and acquitted Reylan Gimena.
The dispositive portion of the decision rendered on March 29, 1996 reads:
"WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused Rene
Siao GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as principal by induction in the crime of rape committed
against the person of Ester Raymundo and imposes upon him the penalty of RECLUSION
PERPETUA. He is, likewise, directed to indemnify private complainant Ester Raymundo the sum of
P50,000.00 as and for moral damages.
Accused Reylan Gimena is hereby ACQUITTED because he acted under the impulse of
uncontrollable fear of an equal, if not greater injury.
For want of evidence, his croslaim against Rene Siao should be, as it is hereby ordered,
DISMISSED."2cräläwvirtualibräry
Hence, this appeal by Rene Siao.
The Office of the Solicitor General3 summarized the evidence for the prosecution in this wise:
Joy Raymundo and private complainant Estrella Raymundo are cousins. They worked as house
maids of appellants family. Reylan Gimena was also a helper of appellants family. Estrella was then
a 14-year old "probinsiyana" from Palompon, Leyte (p. 5, TSN, September 16, 1994).
On May 27, 1994, at about 3:00 p.m., in the Siao residence located at 417-A Basak Brotherhood,
Cebu City, appellant ordered Reylan Gimena, a houseboy of the Siaos, to pull Estrella to the room
of the women. Gimena dragged her toward the womens quarters and once inside, appellant pushed
her to the wooden bed (naomog). Appellant pointed a pistol colored white at Gimena and the face of
Estrella (pp. 7-8, TSN, September 16, 1994).
Producing a candle and a bottle of sprite, appellant asked Estrella to choose one among a pistol,
candle or a bottle of sprite. He also told Gimena "Reylan, birahi si Ester." (Reylan do something to
Ester.) Appellant lighted the candle and dropped the melting candle on her chest (p. 7, TSN,
September 20, 1994). Estrella chose a bottle of sprite because she was afraid of the pistol. She was
made to lie down on her back on the bed with her head hanging over one end. Whereupon,
appellant poured sprite into her nostrils as she was made to spread her arms. While appellant
dropped the bottle of sprite into her nostrils, he pointed the gun at her face. Estrella felt dizzy and
her eyesight became blurred (p. 6, TSN, September 20, 1994). She tried to fold her arms to cover
her breasts but appellant ordered Gimena to hold her hands (p. 10-15, TSN, September 16, 1994).
Appellant then tied her feet and hands with an electric cord or wire as she was made to lie face
down on the bed. After that, appellant untied her hands and feet but tied her back with the same
wire (p. 17, TSN, September 16, 1994).
As appellant pointed his pistol at her, he ordered Estrella to remove her pants and T-shirt, she sat
on the bed and did as she was told and when she was naked, appellant commanded her to take the
initiative (ikaw ang mauna sa lalaki.) She did not understand what appellant meant. At this point,
appellant poked the gun at her temple (pp. 19-20, TSN, September 16, 1994).
Appellant then commanded Gimena to remove his shorts. But Gimena refused. Gimena did not
remove his shorts but let his penis out (p. 21, TSN, September 1, 1994; p. 11, TSN, September 20,
1994).
Appellant spread the arms of Estrella and made her lie down spread-eagled (pp. 4-5, TSN,
September 29, 1994). She felt dizzy and shouted for help twice. Appellant ordered Gimena to rape
Estrella. At first Gimena refused to heed the command of appellant to rape Estrella (birahi) because,
according to Gimena, he has a sister. Appellant said that if they would not obey, he would kill both
of them (pp. 4-10, TSN, September 20, 1994.
Appellant told Gimena, "Reylan, do something (birahi) to Ester!" Estrella was made to suck the
penis of Gimena at gunpoint. She complied with the order of appellant and when the penis of
Gimena was inside her mouth, appellant kept looking and pointing his handgun at them (pp. 11-14,
TSN, September 20, 1994; pp. 19-20, TSN, September 21, 1994).
Thereafter, Gimena got on top of Estrella (gisakyan) and did the sexual act (kayatan). She felt
excruciating pain. Gimena made push-and-pull movements for around 10 minutes. Appellant looked
on and said, "why did it take you long to penetrate?" While Gimena was making the push-and-pull
movements, appellant held the legs of Estrella to keep them apart (pp. 21-24, TSN, September 20,
1994).
After Gimena had sexual intercourse with Estrella, she sat down. Not long after, appellant said: "You
do it again." Gimena said that he could not do it again because he was already very tired. But
appellant pointed the pistol at Gimenas temple. Gimena obeyed the order of appellant because the
pistol was pointed at him (pp. 25-26, TSN, September 20, 1994). They were made to lay side by
side while appellant kept on pointing the pistol at them. Gimena, who was behind Estrella made a
push-and-pull movements so that his organ would reach her private part (pp. 27-29, TSN,
September 20, 1994).
After the side by side position, they were made to assume the dog position (patuwad). Appellant
commanded her to do it but she refused because she was already tired. Appellant pointed the pistol
at her, so she obeyed his order. Gimena said: "I will not do that because I am already tired." At that,
appellant pointed the pistol at Gimena. Thus, Gimena copulated with Estrella in the manner dogs
perform the sexual intercourse. Gimena shouted for help. Somebody knocked on the door and they
heard the voice of Teresita Paares, the older sister of appellant. Appellant ignored Paares and kept
on pointing the pistol at Estrella and Gimena, as he looked at them with wide-open eyes (siga) (pp.
30-31, TSN, September 20, 1994). Shortly, appellant told them to go to the boys room. They
complied with his order tearfully, after he followed them laughing all the while. Appellant then
warned them: "If you will tell the police, I will kill your mothers." (pp. 33-34, TSN, September 20,
1994).
At around 6:00 oclock in the evening of the same day, Estrella and Joy Raymundo sought
permission to go home. On their way home, they met an old man who saw Estrella crying. The old
man took them to his house. After the incident was reported to the police, Senior Police Officer
Reynaldo Omaa conducted the investigation and arrested Gimena, who was identified by Esrtrella
as the one who raped her on orders of appellant. The police officers looked for appellant to shed
light on the reported rape. But they could not locate him (Exhibit "B"; pp. 5-7, TSN, December 13,
1994).4cräläwvirtualibräry
Accused-appellant Rene Siao, anchoring his defense mainly on denial, presents a different version
of the case; his story -
"Private complainant Ester or "Estrella" Raymundo, together with her cousin Joy Raymundo, was
employed as a maid by the Siao family on May 9, 1994.
In the morning of May 27, 1997, a commotion in the household of Jose Siao awakened Teresita
Paares, a sister of accused-appellant. Ms. Paares learned that accused Reylan Gimena, one of the
houseboys of the Siao family, was accusing private complainant of stealing his wristwatch. This was
not the first time accused Gimena confronted private complainant with the loss of his watch. Earlier
in the week, Teresita had also lost money in the amount of P1,300.00, while her daughter Jan
Bianca Abellana lost a necklace. It would turn out that the other househelpers of the Siaos had
likewise lost personal articles. Marilyn Resujent, a maid, lost a brand new panty and sleeveless
blouse. Simeon Siroy Jr., a houseboy, lost two T-shirts. Until the employment of the Raymundo
cousins, the household of the Siaos had not fallen victim to thievery.
At around noontime of the same day, upon his return from his morning chores, accused Gimena
inquired from Ms. Paares whether his watch had been found. When informed that his watch had not
been recovered, he confronted private complainant, who offered to pay for the value of the watch
instead. Joy Raymundo agreed to accompany accused Gimena to the house of an aunt (of Joy and
private complainant) for financial assistance. An hour later, accused Gimena and Joy Raymundo
returned to the Siao compound and reported to Ms. Paares that the aunt was unable willing (sic) to
help.
In the meantime, private complainant admitted to Ms. Paares that she stole the P1,300.00 but
denied having taken the necklace. Private complainant initially returned the sum of P600.00 to Ms.
Paares. When Ms. Paares stated that what she lost was P1,300.00, private complainant went to her
quarters and returned with an additional P200.00. Private complainant explained that she could no
longer produce the remaining money because she had already purchased a number of personal
effects (pail, basin, pants, shorts) for herself with it.
A little while after accused Gimena and Joy returned from the house of Joy and Esters aunt,
accused Gimena and private complainant went to the males quarters. Sometime thereafter,
accused Gimena emerged from the males quarters and announced the recovery of his watch.
Private complainant had revealed to accused Gimena the hiding place of his watch, which was
under the ironing board.
In the afternoon of May 24, 1994,5 many people were present in the household of Jose Siao, father
of accused-appellant. Ms. Beatriz Baricuatro was in the sala praying the rosary as was were habit.
Joy Raymundo was in the kitchen. Ms. Paares was likewise downstairs going about her daily
business. The grandchildren of Jose Siao were running in and out of the house.
At about 3:00 p.m., Ms. Paares left their residence to seek the assistance of the barangay with
respect to the lost necklace of her daughter. (Until this time, private complainant would not admit to
stealing the necklace). Within an hour, Ms. Paares returned to the compound accompanied by
Barangay Tanod Arturo Jabines. Private complainant was inside the males quarters when the two
arrived. Accused had earlier reported for work at the retail store owned by Jose Siao. When
Barangay Tanod Jabinez introduced himself, private complainant immediately begged for his
forgiveness and promised not to do it again. Barangay Tanod Jabinez instructed the private
complainant to address her pleas to her victims and not to him. Before the barangay tanod, private
complainant admitted to stealing the necklace.
Dissatisfied with the piece-meal confession of the private complainant, Ms. Paares decided to bring
her to the barangay hall where she could report the theft. On the way to the barangay hall, private
complainant confessed to selling the necklace and begged for forgiveness. At the last minute Ms.
Paares relented and decided to give the private complainant a second chance.
Upon their return to the Siao compound, private complainant and Joy Raymundo sought permission
from Ms. Baricuatro to just return to their home in Leyte. Ms. Beatriz gave her consent and even
handed them money for boat fare. At about 6:00 p.m., both housemaids left the Siao residence,
bringing with them all their personal belongings. An hour later, some people came to the house of
Jose Siao looking for private complainant and her cousin.
At this time, accused-appellant Rene Siao remained unaware of the developments that unraveled in
the residence of Jose Siao. In the morning of May 24, 1994, 6 accused-appellant made his usual
rounds ]collecting the obligations of his fathers creditors. At noontime, accused-appellant went
directly to the retail store of his father where he had lunch with his wife Gina, as was his habit. This
was the usual hour of his fathers siesta and he would tend to the store in his fathers absence, as
was his custom.
At about 9:00 p.m. of the same evening, a barangay tanod came to the retail store and invited
accused Gimena to the barangay hall. Jose Siao and Ms. Paares would follow.
At the barangay hall, upon the complaint of a certain Rosalie Sallentes (who claimed to be related to
the Raymundo cousins), Barangay Captain George Rama asked accused Gimena of the
whereabouts of Ester and Joy Raymundo. Accused Gimena answered that he did not know. During
the course of the investigation, and under threat by the Barangay Captain that his head would be
broken if he did not tell the truth, accused Gimena confessed to tying up the private complainant to
force her to reveal the place where his watch was being kept. He untied her after he recovered his
watch from under the ironing board.
The following evening, on May 28, 1994, accused Gimena was picked up by policemen at the retail
store of Jose Siao and brought to the Tabo-an Police Station.
Neither the police nor the barangay tanod looked for accused-appellant on the evenings of May 27
and 28, 1994.
Private complainant would file a complaint against accused-appellant and accused Gimena on June
21, 1994.
After the case was filed but before trial commenced, a person who presented himself as the father
of private complainant set a meeting with the Siaos. The father of private complainant demanded 1
Million Pesos from the Siaos to drop the rape case."7cräläwvirtualibräry
As stated earlier, the trial court rendered a decision finding accused-appellant Rene Siao guilty of
the crime of rape as principal by induction in accordance with Article 17(2) of the Revised Penal
Code.8cräläwvirtualibräry
Insisting on his innocence, accused-appellant assigns to the trial court the following alleged errors:
"THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT SIAO GUILTY BY
INDUCEMENT
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CHARACTERIZING THE INCONSISTENCIES AS MINOR AND
IMMATERIAL
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF THE
PROSECUTION WITNESSES"9cräläwvirtualibräry
The Court has carefully reviewed the records of this case and has found accused-appellants
contentions to be without merit. Against the victims story, accused-appellant urges us to accept his
own version. But we cannot do so, for we agree with the trial courts observation that a 14-year old
girl from the province, nave and innocent to the ways of the world, is incapable of concocting
serious charges against her employer and fabricating a story of aberrant sexual behavior as can
only be told by one who has been subjected to it.
First, accused-appellants assertion that the failure of the prosecution to present the gun used by him
to force and intimidate Ester Raymundo and Reylan Gimena to perform sexual intercourse is fatal to
the prosecutions cause is clearly untenable. This Court has held in People vs. Travero, that "[t]he
non-presentation of the weapon used in the commission of the rape is not essential to the conviction
of the accused. It suffices that the testimony of the rape victim is credible because the established
rule is that the sole testimony of the offended party is sufficient to sustain the accuseds conviction if
it rings the truth or is otherwise credible."10cräläwvirtualibräry
As to fact that accused-appellant Rene Siao forced and intimidated at gunpoint Ester Raymundo
and Reylan Gimena to have carnal knowledge of each other, we are convinced that the same has
been adequately proved by the prosecutions evidence. Even as under settled jurisprudence, the
evidence for conviction must be clear and convincing to overcome the constitutional presumption of
innocence, we find the straightforward, consistent and candid manner in which Ester Raymundo
related her harrowing experience in the hands of accused-appellant as bearing all the earmarks of
verity. Not only that, the corroborative testimony of Reylan Gimena was consistent in material
respects with that of Ester Raymundo.
Ester Raymundo testified as follows:
Q: Now, in your position which you have stated awhile ago, what did Reylan do with his penis?
COURT
"If he did anything?" To avoid any leading question. You can ask, "What happened next?" "What did
he do?" But to ask what did he do with his penis . . .
FISCAL BUENVIAJE
My questions are personal and very . . .
COURT
You can frame your question by just adding a few words "if he did anything." COURT

WITNESS Okay, ask simple questions.

A: We did the sexual act (kayatan). FISCAL BUENVIAJE

FISCAL BUENVIAJE Q: Did Reylan make a push-and-pull?

Q: Was he successful in penetrating you? ATTY. SENINING

A: Yes. That is leading also.

Q: And all the time Rene Siao was holding both of your legs? FISCAL BUENVIAJE

ATTY. SENINING That is natural, that necessarily follows:

One of the . . . COURT

COURT Let the Court ask the question:

Sustained. That is very leading. Q: What was the body movement of Reylan when he had a sexual intercourse with you?

Q: Now, what did you feel when Reylan penetrated you? A: He kept on push . . .

A: I felt excruciating pain. COURT

FISCAL BUENVIAJE "He made a push-and-pull movement."

Q: So, what did you do because of that pain? ATTY. FERNANDEZ

WITNESS Making pumping action.

A: I sat down when it was finished. FISCAL BUENVIAJE

Q: How many minutes was Reylan doing the sexual act, the push-and-pull above you? That is push-and-pull. I object that "pumping." This is not an artesian well.

ATTY. FERNANDEZ COURT

Your Honor, I would suggest, because there is no testimony to the effect that there was a push and You will just Americanize "pumping."
pull. There was no establishment, Your Honor, the penetration was established but whether there
was a push and pull after the first penetration. Just for justice in this matter it must be established by FISCAL BUENVIAJE
simple questions.
Q: For how many minutes was Reylan doing the sexual act of push-and-pull? FISCAL BUENVIAJE

WITNESS Q: Now, after that 10 minutes wherein Gimena raped you while Rene Siao was holding both of your
legs, what happened next?
A: Ten (10) minutes, more or less.
ATTY. SENINING
Q: Now, while Reylan was doing the push-and-pull for about 10 minutes, what was Rene Siao doing
all the time? I would just like to correct the word "rape."

A: Rene Siao kept on looking and said, "Why did it take long to penetrate? ATTY. FERNANDEZ

Q: Now, what was the position of both of the hands of Rene Siao? I would also . .

COURT INTERPRETER ATTY. SENINING

Witness demonstrating that Rene Siao held her both legs in order to spread it apart. I would suggest . . . (not finished)

FISCAL BUENVIAJE FISCAL BUENVIAJE

I would like to add some comments to the interpretation. According to the witness, while Reylan "Sexual act."
Gimena was doing the sexual act, all the time Rene Siao was holding both her legs. That is
precisely the meaning. ATTY. SENINING

Another question. All right.

Q: Did Reylan Gimena reach that climax wherein he was like being electrocuted? WITNESS

COURT A: Rene Siao then said that "You do it again."

Sustained; she does not even know what is a climax. COURT

FISCAL BUENVIAJE Then continue.

Q: Was Gimena able to consummate the act of rape on you? WTNESS

ATTY. SENINING A: Then Reylan Gimena answered that he cannot do it because he is already very tired.

That is a matter of law and interpretation. FISCAL BUENVIAJE

COURT Q: Did Rene Siao allow Gimena to take a rest?

Sustained. Anyway, you have the medical certificate. Next question. ATTY. SENINING
Again, Your Honor, please. Sustained. You already assumed that there was a second.

COURT FISCAL BUENVIAJE

What is your ground? Okay, I will reform.

ATTY. SENINING Q: What did Reylan Gimena do when Siao pointed his gun on his temple?

Leading. WITNESS

COURT A: He obeyed the order because he is pointed with a handgun.

Reform. Q: What position this time?

FISCAL BUENVIAJE A: He was made to lie at my side.

Q: What did Rene Siao do when at first Gimena refused because he was tired? Q: As you were now on your side, what did Reylan Gimena do?

A: He pointed the handgun to Reylan Gimena. A: Reylan Gimena also laid at his side.

Q: What portion of the body of Gimena was pointed with a gun by Rene Siao? Q: What did Rene Siao do, if any?

A: At the left temple. A: He kept on pointing the handgun.

Q: So, what did Reylan do when Siao pointed the pistol on his temple? Q: To whom?

A: He obeyed the order because he was afraid of the handgun. A: Me.

FISCAL BUENVIAJE FISCAL BUENVIAJE

Q: So, what did Reylan do to you for the second sexual act? Q: Was Gimena able to successfully penetrate you this second time around?

ATTY. FERNANDEZ ATTY. SENINING

Your Honor, please, I would object, I would rather suggest that the question, "What did Reylan do May I just request, Your Honor, that the . . . (not finished)
after?"
COURT
FISCAL BUENVIAJE:
Reform.
After the statement.
FISCAL BUENVIAJE
COURT
Q: You said Gimena also . . . (not finished) ATTY. SENINING

COURT What act?

Just ask, "What happened next?" FISCAL BUENVIAJE

WITNESS Sexual act.

A: He kept on push-and-pull toward my private part. ATTY. SENINING

Q: Where did Gimena position himself in relation to you? Already answered, penetrated.

COURT INTERPRETER FISCAL BUENVIAJE

The witness demonstrated by pointing at her left back. But there is still climax that is why I am asking.

COURT ATTY. FERNANDEZ

Q: Were you face-to-face or was he behind you? I think I have no objection to the question whether Reylan Gimena ejaculated.

A: He is behind. ATTY. SENINING

FISCAL BUENVIAJE In fact that will be part of my cross-examination.

Q: And what did he do? WITNESS

ATTY. FERNANDEZ A: Maybe.

I think that has been answered that he made push-and-pull. Q: Now, after that 10 minutes, what happened next?

Q: Was he able to penetrate you the second time? A: After the 10 minutes he let me assume a dog position (patuwad).

WITNESS FISCAL BUENVIAJE

A: Yes, Sir. Q: Who ordered you to do the dog position?

Q: For how many minutes, if you still remember, did Gimena do the push-and-pull action from your A: Rene Siao.
behind?
Q: What did he do to you?
A: Ten (10) minutes.
A: He told me to do it again but I was already tired and he pointed the handgun to me.
Q: Was he able to accomplish his act?
Q: Did you assume the dog position upon the order of Rene Siao? Q: For about how many minutes was that dog position continued until termination?

A: Yes, because I was afraid of the handgun. A: Five (5) minutes.

Q: And what did Reylan do this time, if any? Q: After that, what happened next?

A: Reylan answered that "I will not do that because I am already very tired." A: Then Rene Siao told us to do the act in the room of the boys." 11cräläwvirtualibräry

Q: What did Rene Siao do upon hearing the statement of Reylan that he would not comply? Corroborating the foregoing, Reylan Gimena testified as follows:

A: He again pointed his handgun. FISCAL BUENVIAJE

Q: Did Reylan comply wen Rene Siao pointed the gun to him? Q: After the sucking incident, what happened next?

A: Yes, because he was afraid. A: The woman was ordered to lie down.

Q: And what did Reylan do to you? COURT

A: Reylan made a push-and-pull because I was made by Rene Siao to assume the dog position The Court would like to ask one question.
(patuwad).
Q: When Ester was sucking your penis, did you ejaculate or did you feel warm liquid coming out of
Q: Was Reylan able to penetrate you this time? your penis?

A: Yes, and I even shouted. A: No, Your Honor.

Q: What did you shout? Continue, Fiscal.

A: "Tabang!" I asked for help "Tabang!" and then there was somebody who knocked. There was a FISCAL BUENVIAJE
knock made by my Ate and she asked, "What are you doing there?" And Rene Siao did not listen.
Q: Now, you said Rene Siao ordered Ester to lie down, did she comply?
FISCAL BUENVIAJE
A: Yes, because he pointed a firearm to her.
Q: According to you Rene Siao did not listen. In effect, did he order you and Reylan to continue the
act? Q: Where did she lie down?

WITNESS A: On the bed, sir.

A: Yes, Sir. Q: What was the position of Ester as she was lying down?

Q: While Reylan Gimena was doing the sexual act on you, what was Rene Siao doing all the time? A: She was lying face upward.

A: He kept on pointing the handgun and kept on looking with wide eyes (siga). Q: What was the position of her legs?
A: Straight, sir. Q: Did you make a push and pull action on the vagina of Ester?

FISCAL BUENVIAJE ATTY. SENINING

Q: Now, as Ester was already lying down straight upon order of Rene Siao, what happened then? Leading, Your Honor.

A: I was told by him to go on top of the woman. FISCAL BUENVIAJE

Q: What was the exact word of Rene Siao in ordering you so? Naturally, it follows. In the interest of justice, Your Honor.

A: He said go on top of the woman so that you can deflower her. COURT

Q: Did you understand what Rene Siao told you? Let the Court ask the question.

A: Yes, sir. Q: Were you able to penetrate or not?

Q: What was your understanding? A: I was not able to penetrate yet.

A: He wants the woman to be raped. FISCAL BUENVIAJE

COURT Q: When you were not able to penetrate Ester, what was the reaction of Rene?

Q: I think you have not answered the question of the prosecuting fiscal. If you can still recall, what A: He said, "How is that?" Is it not inserted yet?" And I answered back, "Not yet, Pard, because it is
were the words uttered or used by Rene Siao? hard." And he said, "If it is hard we will separate her legs."

A: He said that he wants me to fuck the woman and he wants it fast. Q: In effect, did Rene fulfill his words of spreading the legs of Ester?

Q: And did you lie on top of the woman of Ester? ATTY. SENINING

ATTY. SENINING Leading, Your Honor, because the word is "we." "We will spread her legs."

Leading. COURT

COURT You just reform.

Your just reform. Q: What, if anything, did Rene do?

FISCAL BUENVIAJE FISCAL BUENVIAJE

Q: What did you do? Q: After uttering those words that we will separate her legs?

A: I got on top of the woman. ATTY. FERNANDEZ

No. He answered "bilangkad," Your Honor. COURT

COURT Clarify.

No, Its on tape. FISCAL BUENVIAJE

ATTY. FERNANDEZ Because we will clarify what is not clarified.

After he said "kuan, he said "bilangkad." Q: After uttering those words, what did Rene do, if any?

COURT A: He held the woman and spread her legs.

Although you put it on record. No. Q: At this juncture wherein Rene Siao was already holding the legs of Ester in order to spread it,
were you able to penetrate Ester?
COURT INTERPRETER
ATTY. SENINING
Witness motioning as if he was spreading.
Leading again, Your Honor, please.
COURT
FISCAL BUENVIAJE
To satisfy Atty. Fernandez. You rewind.
This is cross-examination.
(The tape was rewinded and played by the stenographer.)
COURT
COURT
I will allow.
What is audible is the use of the word "kuan."
FISCAL BUENVIAJE
You clarify this point.
How can we . . .
FISCAL BUENVIAJE
COURT
We have the prerogative to ask.
Never mind. I will allow.
COURT
WITNESS
Never mind. You ask.
A: Yes, that was the time I penetrated.
FISCAL BUENVIAJE
COURT
Please do not refrain us from clarifying.
Q: So your penis was stiff?
A: Yes, Your Honor. Q: At that position wherein Ester was lying on her side, what did Rene do?

Q: Did you like what you do? A: He ordered another position.

A: No, Your Honor. Q: Did you comply to fuck Ester in that position as ordered by Rene

Next question. ATTY. SENINING

FISCAL BUENVIAJE There is no basis yet.

Q: Did you ejaculate? COURT

A: Yes, sir. There was no question yet. There was no evidence that he was commanded to have sexual
intercourse.
COURT
ATTY. SENINING
Q: What did you feel when you ejaculated?
He told . . .
A: I do not know because that was my first time, Your Honor, with a woman.
COURT
FISCAL BUENVIAJE
Not yet. He only testified that Ester was made to lie sideways.
Q: You said you were able to penetrate Ester while Rene Siao was holding both of her thighs, then
spreading it, and you said you ejaculated. After that, what happened next? FISCAL BUENVIAJE

A: He told the woman to lie on her side. Q: After Ester complied to the order of Rene to lie on her side, what more happened?

Q: Did Ester comply to lie on her side? A: That was the time that mine penetrated.

A: Yes, because a firearm was pointed at her. Q: Was that upon order of Rene?

COURT ATTY. SENINING

Q: Did you notice if Ester was bleeding? Leading again, Your Honor.

A: No, Your Honor. COURT

Q: In her vagina? Sustained.

A: Yes, Your Honor. FISCAL BUENVIAJE

FISCAL BUENVIAJE
Q: You said you were able to penetrate Ester as she was on her side, is that your own volition to A: Yes, because a firearm was pointed to her.
fuck her on that position?
COURT
ATTY. SENINING
You just put there parenthesis (gipatuwad).
Leading, Your Honor.
FISCAL BUENVIAJE
FISCAL BUENVIAJE
Q: As Ester was in a dog position, did Rene utter anything to you?
That is precisely the consequence.
ATTY. SENINING
COURT
Hearsay again, Your Honor. Leading, Your Honor.
Let the Court ask the question.
COURT
Q: Why did you fuck her on that position?
You just reform.
A: Because it was the order of Rene, Your Honor.
FISCAL BUENVIAJE
Sometimes it is the way you phrase the question. Okay, continue.
Q: After Ester assumed that dog position, what did Rene do, if any?
FISCAL BUENVIAJE
A: He ordered me.
Q: After this side position, what happened next?
Q: What was the order?
A: He ordered the woman to assume the doggy position.
ATTY. SENINING
COURT
I only request that the DSWD at my back, Your Honor, should not be allowed to coach the witness. I
Lets just understand. "Gipatuwad." Lets just assume. have no objection . . .

ATTY. FERNANDEZ COURT

Crouching position. I am warning the representative of the DSWD to leave the interpreter alone.

COURT ATTY. SENINING

Crouching. Are you interested in this case?

FISCAL BUENVIAJE COURT

Q: In effect, did Ester comply to pose in a doggy position? Never mind, Compaero. There is a warning already.
(The last question of Fiscal Buenviaje was interpreted and answered by the witness). Q: By the way, at this juncture your penis was still stiff after the third position?

COURT ATTY. SENINING

I understand because he is not used to using obscene words. Fourth.

FISCAL BUENVIAJE ATTY. FERNANDEZ

He is not accustomed. Third, Your Honor.

ATTY. FERNANDEZ COURT

We just would like to manifest that the witness is not familiar in using obscene words. Third. The sexual intercourse. Oral sex first. After the third sexual intercourse.

COURT ATTY. FERNANDEZ

We do not know. The understanding of the court is he is hesitant to use obscene words. Third penetration, Your Honor.

ATTY. SENINING WITNESS

Not because that . . . A: Yes, Your Honor.

ATTY. FERNANDEZ COURT

I would like to manifest that the witness is hesitant to use obscene words. Q: Were you afraid at that juncture or point of time?

FISCAL BUENVIAJE A: I was still afraid, Your Honor, because he kept on pointing his firearm to me.

Q: What did you do upon that order of Rene? Q: Did you like what did the third time, that is, penetrating Ester in a doggy position?

A: He ordered me to fuck the woman, sir. A: No, Your Honor.

Q: Did you comply with the order to fuck Ester? Q: But you insist that your penis was still stiff?

A: Yes, because I was afraid as he kept on pointing his firearm to me. A: Yes, Your Honor.

Q: And you were able to penetrate Ester on that position? Q: Did you easily penetrate the vagina of Ester?

A: Yes, sir. A: Not so easy, Your Honor."12cräläwvirtualibräry

COURT To sum up, Ester Raymundo and Reylan Gimena were forced and intimidated at gunpoint by
accused-appellant Rene Siao to have carnal knowledge of each other. Rene Siao called Reylan
Gimena inside the womens quarter. After Rene Siao closed the door, he told Reylan, "Reylan, birahi
si Ester". Since Reylan was at a loss as to what to do, Rene Siao commanded Ester at gunpoint to
"suck (um-um) the penis" of Reylan Gimena.13 Both Reylan and Ester performed the sexual act
because they were afraid they will be killed. Thereafter, accused-appellant commanded Reylan to
rape Ester in three (3) different positions, pointing the handgun at them the whole time.
The testimony of Ester and Reylan were assessed by the trial court to be credible. Unless certain
facts of substance and value were overlooked which, if considered, might affect the result of the
case, its assessment must be respected for it had the opportunity to observe the conduct and
demeanor of the witnesses while testifying and detect if they are lying. 14 We find no reason to
deviate from the findings of the trial court. If their story had only been contrived, Ester and Reylan
would not have been composed and consistent in the face of such intense and lengthy interrogation.
Second, accused-appellant faults the trial court for giving credence to the testimonies of Ester
Raymundo and Reylan Gimena despite being fraught with substantial inconsistencies with regard to
the following points: 1. Ester testified that Reylan pulled her to the womens quarter, while Reylan
testified that when he entered the room Ester was already tied up in the bed; 2. Ester testified that
she was lying "face down" on the bed, while Reylan testified that she was lying "face upward"; 3.
Ester testified that before being made to undress, accused-appellant Rene Siao wound electrical
wire around her neck and Gimena made no mention of this; 4. Ester testified that Gimena ejaculated
while performing the sexual acts while Gimena testified that he did not ejaculate; and lastly, 5. Ester
testified that she had sought help from her cousin Joy Raymundo on the way out from the womens
quarter while Reylan testified that she just walked slowly towards the mens quarters as ordered by
accused-appellant.
It can readily be seen that the alleged inconsistencies are inconsequential considering that they
refer to trivial matters which have nothing to do with the essential fact of the commission of rape,
that is carnal knowledge through force and intimidation. This Court has consistently adhered to the
rule that inconsistencies on minor details of the testimonies of witnesses serve to strengthen their
credibility as they are badges of truth rather than an indicia of falsehood.15 If at all, they serve as
proof that the witnesses were not coached and rehearsed.
Third, accused-appellant contends that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses do not conform
to common experience due to the following reasons: Reylan Gimena ejaculated three times in a
span of less than 30 minutes; the rape took place within earshot and near the presence of other
people; Ester and Reylan did not make a dash for freedom during the ten minutes it took Rene Siao
to follow them from the womens quarter to the males quarter where the latter wanted them to
resume their copulation; a barangay tanod was present at the place of the alleged rape at about
4:00 p.m.; the private complainant reported the incident to an old man she chanced upon on her
way home.
Again, the points raised by accused-appellant are trite and of no consequence. First of all, the
important consideration in rape is not the emission of semen but the penetration of the female
genitalia by the male organ.16 Well-settled is the rule that penetration, however slight, and not
ejaculation, is what constitutes rape.17 Thus, this factor could not affect the case for the prosecution.
Second, accused-appellants argument that it is impossible to commit a rape in house where there
are many occupants is untenable. We have held in a number of cases that lust is no respecter of
time and place.18 It is not impossible to perpetrate a rape even in a small room. Rape can be
committed in a house where there are many other occupants. 19 Third, Ester and Reylan could not be
expected to flee or even to attempt to flee under the circumstances. Undoubtedly, considering that
Ester was only fourteen-years old and a newly employed housemaid, while Reylan Gimena a
seventeen-year old houseboy, they were easily intimidated and cowed into submission by accused-
appellant, who aside from being their "amo" or employer, was menacingly threatening to kill them or
their family with a gun if they did not do as he commanded them to do. Thus, it was not improbable
for them not to attempt to escape when as accused-appellant perceived they had an opportunity to
do so. Moreover, while most victims will immediately flee from their aggressors, others become
virtually catatatonic because of the mental shock they experience. 20 It was also not improbable for
them to report the incident to an old man they met on the road as there was no on else to turn to.
In a bid to exculpate himself, accused-appellant presents a totally different version of the story.
Accused-appellant sought to establish by his story that since Ester was caught stealing money and
the personal belongings of the people in the household she had motive to implicate accused-
appellant in such a serious charge. We cannot see how a 14-year old girl from the rural area could
fabricate such charges borne out of a desire for revenge. We agree with the following explanation
by the trial court:
"The court cannot believe that a 14-year-old girl who is a stranger in the city will vent her ire on
Rene Siao. If Rene Siao were to be believed that he did not confront Ester about the latters act of
committing the crime of theft, why would Ester take revenge on Rene Siao? The court cannot
believe that this 14-year-old probinsyana will concoct a story so as to do damage against business
men like Jose Siao, Beatriz Baricuatro and Rene Siao. As a matter of fact, filing a case in court
would mean untold misery and inconvenience. It will expose her to shame. She mustered enough
courage if only to make the truth prevail. She ventured to assume the role of David against
Goliath."21cräläwvirtualibräry
On the contrary, this theory of accused-appellant backfires on him because it appears that due to
the thefts allegedly committed by Ester, Rene Siao decided to vent his ire by subjecting her to a
perverted form of punishment and using Reylan as an instrument thereof. As to the charge of
accused-appellant that the father of Ester tried to extort a huge sum of money from the accused-
appellants family so that the case against him will be dropped, we agree with the trial court that this
contention is largely self-serving as it is uncorroborated.
All told, we agree with the trial court that the testimony of Ester Raymundo as well as the testimony
of Reylan Gimena corroborating the same support the prosecutions version of the fateful incident.
The rape was committed on May 27, 1994 or after the effectivity of R.A. 7659 on December 31,
1993.22 The governing law, Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by R.A. No 7659
imposes the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, if committed with the use of a deadly weapon. It
reads:
"When and how rape is committed. Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman
under any of the following circumstances:
1. By using force or intimidation;
2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.
The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.
Whenever the crime of rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon, the penalty shall
be reclusion perpetua to death.
When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has become insane, the penalty shall be
death.
When the rape is attempted or frustrated and a homicide is committed by reason or on the occasion
thereof, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, a homicide is committed, the penalty shall be death.
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following
attendant circumstances:
1. when the victim is under eighteen (18)years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-
parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law
spouse of the parent of the victim.
2. when the victim is under the custody of the police or military authorities.
3. when the rape is committed in full view of the husband, parent, any of the children or other
relative within the third degree of consanguinity.
4. when the victim is a religious or child below seven (7) years old.
5. when the offender knows that he is afflicted with Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS)
disease.
6. when committed by any member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines or the Philippine National
Police or any law enforcement agency.
7. when by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has suffered permanent physical
mutilation.
Accused-appellant was held guilty of rape with the use of a deadly weapon, which is punishable
by reclusion perpetua to death.23 But the trial court overlooked and did not take into account the
aggravating circumstance of ignominy and sentenced accused-appellant to the single indivisible
penalty of reclusion perpetua. It has been held that where the accused in committing the rape used
not only the missionary position, i.e. male superior, female inferior but also the dog position as dogs
do, i.e. entry from behind, as was proven like the crime itself in the instant case, the aggravating
circumstance of ignominy attended the commission thereof. 24cräläwvirtualibräry
However, the use of a weapon serves to increase the penalty. 25 Since the use of a deadly weapon
increases the penalty as opposed to a generic aggravating circumstance which only affects the
period of the penalty, said fact should be alleged in the information, because of the accuseds right
to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. 26 Considering that the
complaint (which was later converted into the Information) failed to allege the use of a deadly
weapon, specifically, that herein accused-appellant was armed with a gun, the penalty to be
reckoned with in determining the penalty for rape would be reclusion perpetua, the penalty
prescribed for simple rape under Article 335, as amended by R.A. No. 7659. Simple rape is
punishable by the single indivisible penalty of reclusion perpetua,  which must be applied regardless
of any mitigating or aggravating circumstance which may have attended the commission of the
deed.27 Hence, the penalty of reclusion perpetua  imposed by the trial court is correct.
As a final matter, the trial court erred in ordering accused-appellant Rene Siao to pay the
complainant only the civil liability arising from the offense in the amount of P50,000.00. In addition, it
should have ordered accused-appellant to pay the offended party moral damages, which is
automatically granted in rape cases without need of any proof. 28 Currently, the amount of moral
damages for rape is fixed at P50,000.00.29 Moreover, the presence of one aggravating circumstance
justifies the award of exemplary damages pursuant to Article 2230 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines30 We find the amount of P20,000.00 as exemplary damages reasonable on account of
the fact that the aggravating circumstance of ignominy attended the commission of the crime of
rape.
WHEREFORE , the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 13, Cebu City, is hereby
AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that accused-appellant Rene Siao is ordered to pay
P50,000.00 to Ester Raymundo by way of moral damages, and P20,000.00 by way of exemplary
damages in addition to the amount of P50,000.00 which the trial court ordered him to pay
as indemnity.
SO ORDERED.
 [G.R. NOS. 148712-15 - January 21, 2004]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, v.  DOMINADOR CACHOLA y SALAZAR, ERNESTO
AMAY y PASCUA, NESTOR MARQUEZ y MANUEL, BENJAMIN LAEGEN y CAMADO,
RODOLFO SAGUN y JIMENEZ, RODEMIR GUERZO y LATAOAN, MELLKE IGNACIO y
SALVADOR, and NELSON C. ECHABARIA, Appellants.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
In just an instant, 12-year-old Jessie E. Barnachea lost his mother, an elder brother, an uncle, and a
cousin as a result of the carnage that took place at around 6:00 p.m. of 28 December 1999 right
inside their house in Barangay Calumbaya, Bauang, La Union. Their horrible death was attributed to
herein appellants, who, however, pleaded not guilty to the four separate informations for murder.
At the trial before the Regional Trial Court of Bauang, La Union, Branch 67, the prosecution
presented as witnesses Jessie and his brother and neighbors, as well as several police officers.
Their testimonies disclose as follows:
Jessie was about to leave their house to watch cartoons in his uncles house next door when two
armed men suddenly entered the front door of their house. The two ordered Jessie to drop to the
floor, and then hit him in the back with the butt of a long gun. Without much ado, the intruders shot
to death Jessies uncle, Victorino V. Lolarga, who was then in the living room. Jessie forthwith
crawled and hid under a bed, from where he saw the feet of a third man who had also entered the
house. The men entered the kitchen and continued shooting. When the rampage was over and after
the malefactors had already departed, Jessie came out of his hiding place and proceeded to the
kitchen. There he saw his mother, Carmelita Barnachea; his brother Felix Barnachea, Jr.; and his
cousin Rubenson Abance - all slaughtered.1
Meanwhile, Jessies eldest brother, Robert E. Barnachea, was in his uncles house watching
television with his aunt and young cousins when he sensed a commotion outside. When Robert
went out to see what was transpiring, he saw armed men running towards their house. One of them
turned and pointed a gun at him, prompting him to scamper away and hide at the back of his uncles
house. From where he was hiding, he noticed a stainless jeep, with blue rim and marking "fruits and
vegetables dealer," parked in front of the fence of their house. Standing behind the jeep were three
armed men wearing bonnets, with only their nose and eyes exposed. In the next instant, he heard
gunshots and then saw men running from his house. The men hurriedly boarded the jeep and left
the place.2
The jeep did not go unnoticed by the neighbors. Russel Tamba was with some friends in front of
Rodas Store, around 100 meters away from the Barnachea residence, when the jeep passed by
very slowly going towards the Barnachea residence. According to him, the jeep had a marking "El
Shaddai" in front, aside from the marking "fruits and vegetables dealer" on the sides. 3 Francisco
Andrada was also talking with some people in front of the Calumbaya Barangay Hall, only five
meters away from Rodas Store, when he noticed that jeep, with the "El Shaddai" marking, pass
by.4 Not long after, both heard gunshots and later saw the jeep pass by again, this time running very
fast.5
The incident was immediately reported to the police, and the description of the "El Shaddai" jeep
used by the malefactors was relayed through radio to the police stations in the province of La
Union.6 At around 7:45 p.m., the jeep was intercepted at a checkpoint set up in the highway by the
police force in Aringay, La Union. On board were the eight appellants. No firearms were found in the
vehicle. The jeep and the eight appellants were thereafter brought to the Aringay police station and
then turned over to the Bauang police.7
When the Chief of Police of Bauang Benjamin M. Lusad was informed of the apprehension of the
eight appellants, he went to the Barnachea residence, where he came to know that Jessie was an
eyewitness. He invited Jessie to ride with him to pick up the suspects. While Lusad was supervising
the boarding of the suspects into the vehicle, Jessie was in another police vehicle with PO3 Juan
Casern, Jr., to see whether he could recognize any one of the eight men. Jessie pointed to
Dominador Cachola and Ernesto Amay as the two armed men who entered his house and killed his
relatives. During the police line-up at the Bauang Police Station, Jessie again identified Cachola and
Amay as the assailants.8 The next day, when the police conducted the third confirmatory
investigation, which was to present Jessie with photographs of the suspects, Jessie identified the
two for the third time.
The eight appellants were thereafter subjected to paraffin test. But only the right hands of Cachola
and Amay yielded positive results for gunpowder nitrates. 9
The Death Certificates attest to the gruesome and merciless killings. Carmelita sustained one
gunshot wound on her head and three on her body; 10 Felix, Jr., two gunshot wounds on his head
and on his body, and stab wounds on his chest and arms; 11 Victorino, two gunshot wounds on his
head, three on his body, and with his penis excised;12 Rubenson, one gunshot wound on his head
and a stab wound that lacerated his liver.13
The testimonies of the other prosecution witnesses were dispensed with upon the stipulation by the
public prosecutor and the counsels for the appellants that the nature of their testimonies would be
that (1) PO3 Juan Casern, Jr., was inside the police car with Jessie when the latter recognized
appellants Cachola and Amay; (2) Mark Garcia would corroborate the testimony of Felix Andrada
regarding the description of the jeep; (3) Felix Barnachea, Sr., suffered actual damages amounting
to P177,000 as a result of the death of his wife Carmelita and son Felix, Jr.; (4) a police officer of
Aringay, La Union, flagged down the jeep at the checkpoint and saw the appellants on board; and
(5) a police officer of Bauang, La Union, would identify the pictures taken at the crime scene.
After the prosecution had rested its case, the defense counsels orally asked for leave of court to file
a demurrer to evidence. The trial court denied the motion outright and set the schedule for the
presentation of the evidence for the defense.14 Instead of presenting their evidence, however, the
appellants, through their respective counsels, filed a Demurrer to Evidence 15 even without leave of
court.
On 26 September 2000, the trial court rendered a decision 16 (1) convicting (a) Cachola and Amay,
as principals, of four counts of murder and sentencing them to suffer four counts of the supreme
penalty of death; and (b) Marquez, Laegen, Sagun, Guerzo, Ignacio, and Echabaria, as
accomplices, of four counts of murder and sentencing them to suffer four counts of the
indeterminate penalty of eight years of prision mayor as minimum to twelve years and one day
of reclusion temporal as maximum; and (2) ordering all of them to pay the heirs of the victims a total
of P300,000 as death indemnity; P200,000 as moral damages; and P177,000 as actual or
compensatory damages.
Before us on automatic review, appellants Cachola, Sagun, Ignacio, and Marquez contend that the
trial court erred (1) in finding conspiracy among them and their co-appellants; (2) in finding proof
beyond reasonable doubt; and (3) in not dismissing the informations outright despite a motion
before arraignment, there having been a clear illegal arrest and denial of due process.
As for appellants Amay, Guerzo, Laegen, and Echabaria, they assert that the trial court erred (1) in
finding appellant Amay guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal in the crime of murder; and (2)
in not acquitting appellants Guerzo, Laegen, and Echabaria for insufficiency of evidence and on
reasonable doubt.
In its Consolidated Reply Brief, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) recommends the
affirmance of the conviction for murder of appellants Cachola and Amay, and the acquittal of the
other appellants for failure of the prosecution to establish their identity and participation beyond
reasonable doubt.
We agree with the recommendation of the OSG to acquit appellants Sagun, Ignacio, Marquez,
Guerzo, Laegen, and Echabaria. Upon a thorough review of the records of the case, we found
nothing that would show their participation in the commission of the crimes. Not one of the
prosecution witnesses identified them as among the malefactors who were at the Barnachea
residence on that fateful day. Surprisingly, even as the trial court declared that the prosecution failed
to establish the actual participation of the other appellants in the commission of the crime, it found
that "they cooperated in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts." 17 It appears,
however, that the only reason why they were implicated was that they were with Cachola and Amay
on board the jeep that was intercepted in Aringay, La Union, almost two hours after the killings.
What constitute previous or simultaneous acts that would make them liable as accomplices are not
found in the decision or in any evidence on record.
To hold a person liable as an accomplice, two elements must concur: (1) community of design,
which means that the accomplice knows of, and concurs with, the criminal design of the principal by
direct participation; and (2) the performance by the accomplice of previous or simultaneous acts that
are not indispensable to the commission of the crime. 18 In the present case, neither element was
proved. The mere presence of the six appellants in the company of appellants Cachola and Amay
on board a jeep is not evidence of their knowledge of, or assent to, the criminal design to perpetuate
the massacre.19 That they were found to be with appellants Cachola and Amay almost two hours
after the commission of the crime does not constitute previous or simultaneous act. Absent a link
between the crime and their presence in the jeep two hours later, we cannot consider their
participation even as accessories to the crime.
It is a basic evidentiary rule in criminal law that the prosecution has the burden of proving the guilt of
the accused beyond reasonable doubt.20 If the prosecution fails to discharge that burden, the
accused need not present any evidence.21 Thus, for utter lack of evidence against the six appellants,
their acquittal is in order.
However, as regards appellants Cachola and Amay, we concur with the trial court and the OSG that
the prosecution had presented sufficient evidence to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The
credible testimony of, and positive identification by, Jessie Barnachea, which are corroborated by
forensic evidence, i.e., the positive results of the paraffin test on the right hands of Cachola and
Amay, constitute sufficient evidence to sustain their conviction.
As to the credibility of Jessie Barnachea, the trial court made the following observations:
The Court observed the demeanor of Jessie Barnachea on the witness stand and. .. did not observe
any indication of falsehood in his narration. He showed obvious readiness to answer questions
propounded to him. His reactions and answers to the questions displayed evident respect for truth.
He remained consistent on cross-examination. He positively identified accused Amay and Cachola
as the one who shot and killed his family. The Court did not observe any hesitancy or indication of
uncertainty - and his recital of the events appeared spontaneous. 22
There is nothing on record that gives this Court cause to interfere with the trial courts determination
of the credibility of Jessie. Indeed, his testimony was unwavering despite attempts of the defense
counsels to confuse or trap him. The alleged inconsistency between Jessies sworn statement and
testimony on the number of malefactors, if at all, does not detract from his credibility. That Jessie
saw two armed men enter his house is clear. While the defense claims ambiguity as to the presence
of a third man, Jessies statement easily reveals that the third man was not immediately mentioned
because he (the third man) only followed the two and Jessie did not see his face.
It is also pointed out that Jessies identification of Cachola and Amay runs counter to Roberts
testimony that the armed men were wearing bonnets. Again, from their testimonies, it is apparent
that the brothers saw different men. Besides, Robert also stated that one of the men did not have
his head covered. As to the alleged improbability of the lookouts wearing bonnets while the principal
shooters were unmasked, or of the malefactors sparing Jessie, suffice it to say that such
circumstances are not so incredible as to cast reasonable doubt on the truth of the narrated events.
In sum, none of the alleged inconsistencies, minor as they are, could leave us with doubt that Jessie
was present in his house and saw armed men shoot his relatives. Barely two hours had passed
since he witnessed the gruesome murders when Jessie identified appellants Cachola and Amay as
the malefactors. Reasonably, the memory of their faces was still fresh on his mind. Moreover,
Jessie identified the two appellants two times more at the police station and once in open court, and
he never faltered in his identification.
Significantly, the appellants have not imputed any ill motive to Jessie for testifying against Cachola
and Amay. Where there is no evidence to show a doubtful reason or improper motive why a
prosecution witness should testify against the accused or falsely implicate him in a crime, the said
testimony is trustworthy and should be accorded full faith and credit. 23
In all, there does not appear on record to be "some fact or circumstance of weight and influence
which the trial court has overlooked or the significance of which it has misapprehended or
misinterpreted. "24 We rely, therefore, on the competence of the trial court to decide the question of
credibility of the witnesses, having heard them and observed their deportment and manner of
testifying during the trial."25
The reliance by appellant Cachola on People v. Teehankee 26 is misplaced. In that case the negative
result of the paraffin test did not preclude a finding of guilt by the trial court, the reason being that
the accused was tested for the presence of nitrates only after more than 72 hours had lapsed from
the time of the shooting. In the present case, the paraffin test was conducted on the same night the
shooting incident occurred; hence, the lapse of only a few hours increases its reliability. While the
presence of nitrates on accuseds hand is not conclusive of guilt, it bolsters the testimony of an
eyewitness that the accused fired a gun.
As to whether the trial court erred in not allowing the appellants to present evidence after filing their
demurrer to evidence without leave of court, then Section 15, Rules 119 of the Rules of Court 27 is
clear on the matter, thus:
SEC. 15. - Demurrer to evidence. - After the prosecution has rested its case, the court may dismiss
the case on the ground of insufficiency of evidence: (1) on its own initiative after giving the
prosecution an opportunity to be heard; or (2) on motion of the accused filed with prior leave of
court.
If the court denies the motion for dismissal, the accused may adduce evidence in his defense. When
the accused files such motion to dismiss without express leave of court, he waives the right to
present evidence and submits the case for judgment on the basis of the evidence for the
prosecution. (Underscoring supplied).
The filing by the appellants of a demurrer to evidence in the absence of prior leave of court was a
clear waiver of their right to present their own evidence. To sustain their claim that they had been
denied due process because the evidence they belatedly sought to offer would have exculpated
them would be to allow them to "wager on the outcome of judicial proceedings by espousing
inconsistent viewpoints whenever dictated by convenience."28 Furthermore, it cannot be said that
the waiver was not clear. The trial court postponed the hearings on the motion for demurrer, even
after leave of court had been denied, and then granted extensions to Amay until he finally adopted
the position of his co-appellants. At no time other than in this automatic review was there any
attempt that is contrary to the waiver of the presentation of evidence.
Neither can the question of the legality of the warrantless arrest of the appellants be raised for the
first time before this Court. As arrests fall into the question of the exercise by the trial court of its
jurisdiction over the person of the accused, the question should have been raised prior to their
arraignment. That the appellants objected to the arrests prior to the arraignment 29 is
unsubstantiated. Their claim that they requested an extension of time to file a motion to quash the
information or to dismiss the case,30 which the trial court allegedly denied, cannot save the day for
them. The fact remains that before arraignment, no such motion was filed. Even assuming that their
arrest was illegal, their act of entering a plea during their arraignment constituted a waiver of their
right to question their arrest.31
We now discuss the circumstances that attended the commission of the crimes.
The information alleges the qualifying circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation. There
is no doubt that the killings were done with treachery, considering that the assailants suddenly
barged in and immediately went on a shooting rampage. We have time and again ruled that when
the attack is sudden and unexpected, there is treachery. 32 The presence of even this single
qualifying circumstance is sufficient to qualify the killing to murder. 33
As to the qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation, we find the same lacking, for there is no
evidence of planning or preparation to kill, much less of the time when the plot was conceived. 34
It may not be amiss to mention that the death certificate of Victorino Lolarga reveals that his penis
was excised. One may wonder whether such circumstance amounted to ignominy that can
aggravate the offense.
For ignominy to be appreciated, it is required that the offense be committed in a manner that tends
to make its effect more humiliating, thus adding to the victims moral suffering. Where the victim was
already dead when his body or a part thereof was dismembered, ignominy cannot be taken against
the accused.35 In this case, the information states that Victorinos sexual organ was severed after he
was shot and there is no allegation that it was done to add ignominy to the natural effects of the act.
We cannot, therefore, consider ignominy as an aggravating circumstance.
However, as regards Carmelita and Felix, Jr., we appreciate the aggravating circumstance of
dwelling, since it was alleged in the information and proved during the trial that they were killed
inside their house. Appellants Cachola and Amay, therefore, violated the sanctity of the said victims
home.
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code provides that the penalty for murder is reclusion perpetua to
death. In conjunction, Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code provides that when the law prescribes c. P25,000 as exemplary damages in favor of the respective heirs of Carmelita Barnachea and Felix
two indivisible penalties, the greater penalty shall be imposed when in the commission of the deed, Barnachea Jr., or a total of P50,000;chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
there is present one aggravating circumstance. In the cases of Carmelita and Felix Jr., in Criminal
Cases Nos. 2324 and 2325, there is one aggravating circumstance and no mitigating circumstance
to offset it; hence, the higher penalty of death imposed by the trial court stands. d. P177,000 as actual damages in favor of the heirs of Carmelita Barnachea and Felix Barnachea
Jr.; andcralawlibrary
Three members of the Court maintain their adherence to the separate opinions expressed in People
v. Echegaray36 that Republic Act No. 7659, insofar as it prescribes the penalty of death, is
unconstitutional; nevertheless they submit to the ruling of the majority that the law is constitutional e. P25,000 as temperate damages in favor of the respective heirs of Rubenson Abance and
and that the death penalty should accordingly be imposed.
Victorino Lolarga, or a total of P50,000.
But in the cases of Victorino and Rubenson, in Criminal Cases Nos. 2323 and 2326, there being no
aggravating or mitigating circumstance, the penalty should be reclusion perpetua, which is the lower The assailed decision is REVERSED insofar as appellants NESTOR MARQUEZ y MANUEL,
of the two indivisible penalties prescribed by law. BENJAMIN LAEGEN y CAMADO, RODOLFO SAGUN y JIMENEZ, RODEMIR GUERZO y
LATAOAN, MELLKE IGNACIO y SALVADOR, and NELSON C. ECHABARIA are concerned, and
As regards the civil liability of appellants Cachola and Amay, we hold them jointly and severally another one is hereby rendered (1) acquitting them of the crimes charged for insufficiency of
liable to pay the heirs of each of the victims death indemnity and moral damages each in the evidence; (2) ordering their immediate release from confinement unless their further detention is
amount of P50,000, or a total of P400,000. They are further ordered to pay the respective heirs of warranted by virtue of any lawful cause; and (3) directing the Director of the Bureau of Corrections
Carmelita and Felix Jr. exemplary damages in the amount of P25,000, or a total of P50,000, in view to submit a report on their release within five days from notice hereof.
of the presence of one aggravating circumstance in the commission of the crime against the said
victims. As to the claim for damages by Felix Barnachea Sr. in the amount of P177,000, we sustain Costs de oficio.
the same even if only a list of expenses,37 not official receipts, was submitted because such amount
was admitted by the defense during the trial.38 Moreover, although there is no evidence as to the SO ORDERED.
amount spent as a result of the death of Victorino and Rubenson, their respective heirs shall be
awarded temperate damages in the amount of P25,000, since they clearly incurred funeral
expenses.39

WHEREFORE, the assailed decision dated 26 September 2000 of the Regional Trial Court of
Bauang, La Union, Branch 67, is hereby AFFIRMED insofar as DOMINADOR CACHOLA y
SALAZAR and ERNESTO AMAY y PASCUA are found GUILTY of four counts of murder in Criminal
Cases Nos. 2323-26 and sentenced to suffer the supreme penalty of death in Criminal Cases Nos.
2324 and 2325. The said decision is, however, MODIFIED in that they are (1) sentenced to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua, instead of death, in Criminal Cases Nos. 2323 and 2326; and (2)
ordered to pay, jointly and severally, the following damages:

A. P50,000 as death indemnity in favor of the heirs of each victim, or a total of

P200,000;chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

b. P50,000 as moral damages in favor of the heirs of each victim, or a total of

P200,000;chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
 G.R. No. 101314 July 1, 1993 accused, with intent to kill, armed with bladed instrument, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously stab one Veronica Borja y Ramos on the vital parts of her body, thereby inflicting upon
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. JOHN AMET BAELLO Y GUINTIVANO @ her mortal wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of her death thereafter.  1chanrobles
"TOTONG," accused-appellant. virtual law library

The Solicitor General plaintiff-appellee.chanrobles virtual law library The case was docked as Criminal Case No. 84253 and raffled off to Branch 156 of the said
court.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Tomas J. Caspe for accused-appellant.
At his arraignment on 13 November 1990, the accused entered a plea of not guilty.  2 Trial in the
merits commenced on 18 December 1990.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
DAVIDE, JR., J.:

After trial, the RTC promulgated its decision 3on 19 July 1991 finding the accused guilty as charged.
In an Information filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig, Metro Manila, on 18 October
The adjudicatory portion thereof read as follows:
1990, accused John Amet Baello @ "Totong" was charged with the crime of Robbery with
Homicide. The accusatory portion of the information reads as follows:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court finds the accused JOHN AMET BAELLO y
Guintavino @ "TOTONG" guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of "robbery with homicide"
That on or about the 10th day of October, 1990 in the Municipality of Pasig, Metro-Manila,
under Article 294 (1) of the Revised Penal Code with the aggravating circumstance of unlawful entry
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring
and hereby sentences said accused to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with all its accessory
and confederating with one @ "Jerry"; whose true identity and present whereabout is still unknown,
penalties, to indemnify the heirs of Veronica Borja y Ramos in the amount of P50,000.00, to pay the
and mutually helping and aiding with one another, with intent to gain, without the knowledge and
sum of P50,000.00 by way of reparation of the stolen cassette, camera and assorted jewelries (sic),
consent of the owner thereof, entered the house of one Eustaquio Borja y Reyes thru the window at
to pay the further sum of P41,672.00 by way of reimbursement of the burial and other related
the second floor of the said house, an opening not intended for ingress or egress, and once inside
expenses and the additional sum of P20,000.00 and P10,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages,
the same, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away the
respectively, all without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the
following items, to wit:
costs.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
One (1) 20" colored
In the service of his sentence, the accused shall be credited in full with the period of his preventive
television set marked
imprisonment. 4chanrobles virtual law library
"Sharp" worth P11,269.00

From this adverse decision, the accused interposed an appeal which this Court accepted in a
One (1) stereo cassette
resolution dated 30 September 1991. 5chanrobles virtual law library
recorder colored black
worth P2,500.00
The factual antecedents of this case, as culled from the records, are as follows:chanrobles virtual
law library
One (1) camera worth P1,000.00

On 10 October 1990, at about five 5:00 o'clock in the morning. Barangay Captain Eustaquio R.
Assorted jewelries (sic)
Borja awoke to find out that the front door of his residence at No. 164 Evangelista Street, Barangay
of still undetermined amount
Santolan, Pasig, Metro-Manila, was open and that their television set in the sala was missing.
Eustaquio told his wife about what he saw and together they proceeded upstairs to the second floor
___________ to check on their 22-year old daughter, Veronica Borja. They noticed that the door to her room was
open. Upon entering the room, they were shocked to find the bloodied corpse of their daughter lying
P14,769.00 in bed. The window of her room was open. Eustaqiuo instructed his wife not to touch the body while
he summoned the authorities. He proceeded to the Barangay Hall from where he called the police.
belonging to Eustaqiuo Borja y Reyes, to the damage and prejudice of the owner thereof in the total The couple later discovered that a cassette player, a camera, and various pieces of jewelry in their
amount of P14,769.00; and that by reason and on the occasion of the robbery, the above-named daughter's cabinet, all worth about P50,000.00, were likewise missing.  6chanrobles virtual law library
On the same day, P/Capt. Florante F. Baltazar, Medico-Legal Officer of the PC/INP Crime Pasubali: Bago ko simulan ang imbestigasyong ito, nais kong ipabatid sa iyo na ikaw bilang isang
Laboratory Services, performed an autopsy on the body of the victim. He concluded that the cause mamayang Pilipino alinsunod sa ating Binagong Saligang Batas ay may mga karapatan, gaya ng
of death was "cardio-respiratory arrest due to shock and hemorrhage secondary to multiple stab mga sumusunod:chanrobles virtual law library
wounds." 7He stated in his autopsy report that the victim suffered a total of four stab wounds; that
the stab wound inflicted on the victim's neck, which severed her jugular vein, was a fatal one; and Na, karapatan mong manatiling tahimik at huwag sagutin and alin man aking mga katanungan;
that at the time of the autopsy (3:25 p.m.), the victim had been dead for more or less ten to twelve
hours. 8chanrobles virtual law library (Sgd.) (Sgd.)
Atty. Eber Generoso John Amet Baello
At 6:00 p.m., the police were able to recover the missing television set from the house of Eugenio
Tagifa (or Tadifa), the husband of the accused's sister.  9Tagifa was brought to the police station for Na, karapatan mo ring kumuha ng isang piling abogado na maaring tumulong sa iyo sa oras ng
questioning. On 11 October 1990 at 10:55 a.m., Tagifa executed a "Sinumpaang Salaysay" wherein imbestigasyong ito;
he pointed to the accused as the person who had placed the television set under the stairs of his
house. 10chanrobles virtual law library
(Sgd.) (Sgd.)
Atty. Eber Generoso John Amet Baello
On 13 October 1990 at 5:30 p.m., the accused was captured in Bangkal, Makati by elements of the
Intelligence and Special Operations Unit (ISOU) of the Pasig Police and brought to the police
station. 11He made an oral admission of his participation in the commission of the crime. 12He was Na, kung ikaw ay wala pang isang piling abogado, ikaw ay bibigyan para sa iyong kapakanan ng
then endorsed to the Criminal Investigation Division (CID) for formal investigation. 13chanrobles libre;
virtual law library
(Sgd.) (Sgd.)
The accused was asked if he could understand, read and write Tagalog, and he replied that he Atty. Eber Generoso John Amet Baello
could. 14The accused was likewise asked if he could afford the services of counsel; he answered
that he could not. 15Upon being asked if he was willing to avail of the services of Atty. Eber Na, ikaw ay muli kong pinalahanan na ang lahat ng iyong sasabihin dito ay maaring gamitin pabor
Generoso of the Public Attorney's Office (PAO), the accused replied in the affirmative. 16Atty. O' laban sa iyong panig;
Generoso then brought the accused away from the police investigators so that the two of them
could talk privately. 17Atty. Generoso inquired from the accused whether or not he had any (Sgd.) (Sgd.)
participation in the crime and told him that if he had none, he must not make any admission or Atty. Eber Generoso John Amet Baello
statement as this would be prejudicial to him. The accused, however, said, "Attorney, aaminin ko na
ho total ginawa ko naman." The accused then told Atty. Generoso that he was the one who took the 01. t: Kung gayon ay turan mong muli ang iyong tunay na pangalan, idad, katayuan sa buhay at iba
television set but denied having killed Veronia Borja. 18Afterwards, the police started the formal pang maaaring pagkakailanman sa iyo?chanrobles virtual law library
investigation of the accused in the presence of Atty. Generoso.The accused gave his statement
before the police and this was reduced into writting and marked at the trial as Exhibit "L." Atty.
s: JOHN AMET BAELLO y GUINTIVIANO, 20 anyos, binata, figthing (sic) cock caretaker, tubong
Generoso read the statement to the accused and then let the accused read it himself. 19The
Liganes, Ili-Ilo (sic) at nakatira sa may Nr. 145-B Interior, Evangelista ST., Santolan, Pasig,
accused gave then signed Exhibit "L," after which Atty. Generoso also signed the
MM.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
same.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

02. t: John Amet G. Baello, ipinakilala ko sa iyo si Atty. Eber Generoso na abogado ng CLAO, at
The body of the said document reads as follows:
siya ang siyang tutulong sa iyo, nais mo ba siyang maging abogado mo?chanrobles virtual law
library
Tanong: Ikaw ba ay marunong sumulat at umunawa ng Wikang Tagalog na atin gagamitin sa
pagsisiyasat na ito?chanrobles virtual law library
s: Opo.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Sagot: Opo.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
03. t: Bibigyan ko muna kayo ng ilang minuto para kayo mag-usap ni Atty. Generoso upang
maintindihan mo ang ibibigay mong salaysay. Sige magusap muna kayo (at this juncture this prober
allowing the affiant and Attorney to talk).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
04. t: G. Baello, nais kong ipbatid (sic) sa iyo na ikaw ay nasasngkot (sic) sa kasong Robbery with
Homicide and Rape, ano ang masasabi mo tungkol dito?chanrobles virtual law library
s: Robbery po lamang ang alam ko.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
05. t: Saan at kailan naman nangyari itong sinasabi mong Robbery kung iyong natatandaan?
chanrobles virtual law library
s: Sa bahay po ni Bgy. Captain Borja sa may Santolan, Pasig,
MM.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
06. t: Anong oras ninyo ba naman ginawa itong sinasabi mong nakawan?chanrobles virtual law
library
s: Mga humigit kumulang alas 4:00 ng mdaling (sic) araw ika-10 ng Oktubre
1990.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
07. t: Sino O' sinu-sino ba naman ang kasama mo ng nakawan ninyo ang bahay ni Bgy. Capt.
Borja?chanrobles virtual law library
s: Si Alias GERRY po lamang dalawa.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
08. t: Papaano naman ninyo pinagnakawan ang bahay nina Bgy. Capt. Borja? chanrobles virtual
law library
s: Kami po nitong si Gerry ay nagdaan sa may bintana ng second floor ng bahay sa may harap ng
basketball court.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
09. t: Anu-ano ba naman and kinuha ninyo sa loob ng bahay nina Bgy. Catp. (sic) Borja?chanrobles
virtual law library
s: Ang kinuha ko po ay isang television, pero hindi ko po alam kung ano ang mga kinuha ni
GERRY.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
10. t: Mayroon akong ipapakita sa iyong isang television, ano ang masasabi mo tungkol dito
(declarant at this juncture this prober pointing a colored Television set marked Sharp in the course
of investigation).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
s: Iyan po ang television na aking ninakaw sa bahay nina Capt. Borja (at this juncture
suspect/declarant was pointing to a colored TV Sharp placed on top of the investigating room in the
course of investigation).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
11. t: G. Baello, nais kong ipa-alam sa iyo na sa bahay na iyong pinag-nakawan ay mayroon
napatay na si Veronica Borja na anak na babae nuong may-ari ng bahay, alam mo ba kung sino
ang pumatay dito?chanrobles virtual law library
s: Opo, si GERRY po na aking kasama nang magnakaw kami.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library
12. t: Papaano mo naman nasiguro na itong si Gerry ang pumatay kay Veronia?chanrobles virtual
law library
s: Dahil po siya lamang ang naiwan sa itaas ng bahay.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual
law library
13. t: Nasaan ba naman itong Veronica Borja ng pasukin ninyo ang bahay nina Bgy. Capt. Borja?
chanrobles virtual law library
s: Siya po ay nakiya (sic) ko sa isang kuwarto sa itaas ng
bahay.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
14. t: Papaano ba naman pinatay ni Berry (sic) si Veronica Borja kung nalalaman mo?chanrobles
virtual law library
s: Hindi ko po nakita dahil sa nauna akong umalis sa kanya.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library
15. t: Bukod sa inyong dalawa ni Gerry, mayroon pa bang ibang taong pumasok sa bahay nina Bgy.
Capt. Borja?chanrobles virtual law library
s: Wala na po, kaming dalawa lamang.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
16. t: Nalaman mo ba kung saan ma-aaring matagpuan itong si Gerry?chanrobles virtual law library
s: Sa Nueva Ecija po, pero hindi ko alam kung saang lugar
duon.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
17. t: Wala na muna akong itatanong sa iyo may nais ka pa bang idadagdag O babawasin sa iyong
salaysay?chanrobles virtual law library
s: Wala na po muna.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
18. t: Ikaw ba ay tinakot, sinaktan, binayaran O' pinangakuan upang magbigay ng iyong salaysay
dito?chanrobles virtual law library
s: Hindi po, kusang loob ko po ito lahat.
(Sgd.) John Baello
19. t: Handa mo bang panumpaan at lagdaan ang iyong salaysay bilang patotoo sa lahat ng iyong
mga sinasabi dito?chanrobles virtual law library
s: Opo.
wakas ng Salaysay ni
15 Oktubre 1990
Pasig, Metro-Manila
Pinabasa, pinuu-unawa (Sgd.)
at pinirmahan John Amet Baello
ni (Sgd.) Atty. Eber Generoso
On the other hand, the defense presented only two witnesses, viz.: the accused, testifying  pro se,
and his mother, Anita Baello.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The version of the accused is as follows:chanrobles virtual law library
He was born in Leganes, Iloilo but resides with his mother at No. 145 Evangilista Street, Santolan,
Pasig, Metro Manila. He only reached the fourth grade of elementary school. He was at the house of
his cousin after having watched a movie when the police came. They handcuffed him and then
brought him to the Pasig Police Headquarters. He was immediately detained and not subjected to
any investigation. Afterwards, he was mauled inside the jail by Antonio Gabriel, the nephew of Capt.
Borja, and two of Gabriel's companions. These persons beat him up by kicking and punching his
stomach and back, and striking his back and buttocks with a "baston." He was unable to recall the
day when his statement was taken down, though he remembers it was in the afternoon. On that
particular afternoon, he was taken downstairs and told that he would be given a lawyer to assist and
defend him. However, Atty. Generosa, the lawyer assigned to him, simply sat down and stared at
him without doing anything. Atty. Generoso told him that he would be going somewhere and then
left for about an hour. When Atty. Generoso came back, the statement was already typewritten and
Atty. Generoso merely signed it after which the accused was asked to sign, which he did as he was
promised that he would be released after signing.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library
While he was downstairs, a policeman asked him carry a television set. At first, the accused refused
to do so, but then the policeman shouted at him. Since he got scared, he carried the television set.
His picture was then and presented as Exhibit "0-6" by the prosecution. All the time downstairs, the
police only asked for his name, age, civil status and nothing
more.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Anita Baello testified thus: When she visited her son, the accused, in jail a week after his arrest, she
saw contusions on his body; he complained to her of chest pains because of the beatings he had
received. She visited her son every other day and when she visited him sometime in the first week
of January 1991, he told her that he could not bear anymore the beatings he received from Antonio
Gabriel. Their lawyer then wrote a letter to the jail warden and after that, her son was not hurt
anymore. When she visited him later, she was surprised to see Gabriel in the same cell with her
son; the latter told her he was not able to sleep for three nights because he was being pricked with a
needle, so she complained to the police after which her son was separated from
Gabriel. 21chanrobles virtual law library
In his brief, 22 the accused submits the following assignment of errors:
1
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANT WAS FULLY AND
DULLY ASSISTED BY A COUNSEL ENGAGED BY HIM AND IN FURTHER [sic] HOLDING THAT
HIS EXTRA-JUDICIAL CONFESSION DURING CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION IS ADMISSIBLE IN
EVIDENCE.
2
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT CONSPIRACY EXIST IN THE COMMISSION OF
THE CRIME.
3
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING FULL CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONIES OF THE
PROSECUTION NAMELY, EUGENIO TAGIFA AND PRUDENCIO BAGASINA FOR IN TRUTH
AND IN FACT THESE WERE INCONSISTENT, HIGHLY IMPROBABLE AND EXAGGERATED.
4
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY AND CONVICTING
HIM OF THE CRIME CHARGE [sic] CONSIDERING THAT HIS GUILT WAS NOT ESTABLISHED
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT
In his first assigned error, the accused maintains that he was not "fully and duly assisted by a
counsel engaged by him." Hence, his extra-judicial confession is constitutionally infirm and
inadmissible in evidence.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The records of the case, however, clearly belie this allegation of the accused. While it is true that
Atty. Generoso was not initially his counsel of choice, the fact remains that after the accused was
asked if he could afford the services of counsel and he answered in the negative, he was informed
that he would be provided with one - Atty. Generoso of the PAO - to assist him during the
investigation. He then voluntarily accepted the services of Atty. Generoso. This was in compliance
with paragraph (1), Section 12, Article III of the Constitution which provides that:
Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed
of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own
choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These
rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
Apropos is the case of People vs. Parojinog. 23Parojinog was arrested for triple murder. Before the
start of the investigation, the police apprised Parojinog of his constitutional right to counsel of his
own choice and told him that if did not have one, a certain Atty. Fernando Fuentes III of the Citizens
Legal Assistance Office (CLAO) would be engaged to assist him. He agreed to have Atty. Fuentes
as his lawyer. Atty. Fuentes assisted Parojinog during the entire investigation after which Parojinog
signed his extra-judicial confession. Atty. Fuentes also signed the document. Later on, Parojinog
assailed the confession, contending that Atty. Fuentes was not his counsel of choice. This Court
refuted him thus:
Anent his claim that Atty. Fuentes was not his choice, Section 12(1) of Article III of the 1987
Constitution provides:
Sec. 12(1). - Any person under investigation for the commission of an offenses shall have the right
to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel
preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel he must be
provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
It is very clear from the aforequoted provision that a person under investigation for the commission
of an offense may choose his own counsel but if he cannot afford the services of counsel, he must
be provided with one. While the initial choice of the lawyer in the latter case is naturally lodged in the
police investigators, the accused really has the final choice as he may reject the counsel chosen for
him and ask for another one. In the instant case, the records show that no objection was voiced by
the accused throughout the entire proceedings of the investigation and afterwards when he
subscribed to its veracity before City Prosecutor Luzminda V. Uy. Thus, he apparently acquiesced
to the choice of the investigators. He complained for the first time that Atty. Fuentes was not his
choice only during the trial. Thus, it was too late.
Likewise, in the People vs. Masongsong, 24 we dismissed similar plaint in the wise:
To accept the appellant's contention that he was in effect denied justice since the counsel assigned
to him was not really his choice is ridiculous. As correctly stated by the Solicitor General, every
lawyer is presumed to have knowledge of the law as well as the training in procedure sufficient to
enable him to protect his client. Furthermore, the accused was given sufficient time to choose his
own counsel had he opted to so. His failure, therefore, to request for another counsel negates his
claim of denial of the right to choose his lawyer.
And in People vs. Pinzon, 25this Court made the following disquisition:
There is no merit in the above argument. We agree with the Solicitor General's view that:
. . . the entire process of custodial investigation was conducted in the manner required by the
Constitution. Atty. Saldivar informed appellant of the latter's right to remain silent, as anything he
says in said investigation could be used against him. Appellant was likewise informed of his right to
counsel and that if he could not afford to pay [for] the services of one, he could avail of the free legal
services of the CLAO, which offer appellant accepted. By said acceptance, Atty. Saldivar became
appellant's counsel of choice, and the fact that appellant had no previous acquintance with Atty.
Saldivar did not render null and void appellant's otherwise valid extra-judicial confession. Atty.
Saldivar was present from the time appellant's statements were taken up to the time appellant
affixed his signature thereon. In fact, Atty. Saldivar's signature appears on the statement. Plainly,
the admission in evidence of appellant's sworn statement does not suffer from any constitutional
infirmity.
Exhibit "L" completely belies the allegation that the accused was not fully assisted by Atty.
Generoso during the investigation. Said document discloses that the accused was informed of his
constitutional rights by Atty. Generoso  in extenso. Atty. Generoso conferred with the accused,
warned the latter of the consequences of his confession and even advised him not to make any;
however, the accused insisted on going ahead with his confession, although he only confessed to
the robbery.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
It was only after the said conference that the accused gave a statement. After it was completed,
Atty. Generoso again explained to him the contents and the adverse effects of his confession, but
the accused found himself at ease with his conscience by voluntarily affixing his signature therein. If,
indeed, he had any objections to his statement, he should not have signed Exhibit "L," or he should
have at least voiced out such objections to Atty. Generoso. Atty. Generoso, as an officer of the
PAO, would not have affixed his signature in the extra-judicial confession as counsel for the
accused had he known of any infirmity in its execution. 26If he did so, he would have been remiss in
the performance of his duty and unfaithful to his office. But there must be convincing proof of that for
he has in his favor the presumption of regularity in the performance of his
duty.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The accused likewise assails what he perceives to be "a preconditioned (sic) of the mind on the part
of the investigator as well as the counsel that an admission was about to take place and for that the
accused must be assisted only in this aspect." 27 He then labors under a misconception. In People
vs. Layuso, stated:
This Court denounces in the strongest terms possible the widespread misconception that the
presence of a lawyer under the "right to counsel" provision of the Constitution is intended to stop an
accused from saying anything which might incriminate him. The right to counsel is intended to
prelude the slightest coercion as would lead the accused to admit something false. The lawyer,
however, should never prevent an accused from freely and voluntarily telling the truth. Whether it is
an extra-judicial statement or testimony in open court, the purpose is always the ascertainment of
truth.
The accused jointly discusses the remaining assigned errors. He contends that there was no
evidence of conspiracy with respect to the crime of robbery with homicide, and faults the trial court
for giving full credence to the testimonies of prosecution witness Eugenio Tagifa (his brother-in-law)
and Prudencio Bagasina. He alleges that Eugenio Tagifa testified against him because the former
was threatened with arrest and
prosecution. 29The accused likewise impugns the testimony of Prudencio Bagasina as "inconsistent,
highly improbable and exaggerated."chanrobles virtual law library
These contentions are as hollow as those offered to support the first assignment of
error.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Anent his claim of lack of evidence of conspiracy for the crime of robbery with homicide, the
accused has absolutely nothing but vague conclusions in between which he fears to openly
express, that since he confessed only to robbery and that since it was only Jerry, his companion,
who killed Veronica Borja, he could only be held liable for robbery but not for robbery with homicide.
Indeed, the accused deliberately and carefully confined his participation to the robbery, and the
prosecution had no direct evidence that the accused took part in the killing of Veronica. But the
accused is not thereby absolved from any liability for her death. Once conspiracy is established
between the accused Jerry in the commission of the crime of robbery, the accused would be equally
culpable for the homicide committed by Jerry on the occasion of the robbery, unless the former
proved that he endeavored to prevent Jerry from committing homicide. In People vs. de la
Cruz, 30we said: "The rule is likewise settled that when homicide takes place as a consequence or
on the occasion of a robbery, all those who took part in the robbery are guilty as principals of the
crime of robbery with homicide unless proof is presented that the accused tried to prevent the
killing." Accused offered no such proof.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The conspiracy to commit the crime of robbery was sufficiently and convincingly established in this
case. As admitted by the accused in his sworn statement, he and Jerry had a prior agreement to
commit robbery in the house of Eustaquio Borja. Together they went to the latter's house at 4:00
o'clock in the morning of 10 October 1990, entered the house through the window at the second
floor, and once inside, he got the television set while Jerry got the other items, and then, together
again, they left the house with their loot. These acts taken as a whole are more than sufficient to
establish a common design between Jerry and the accused to commit robbery; such acts eloquently
showed nothing less than a joint purpose and design, and a community of interest which established
beyond doubt the existence of a conspiracy. 31It is axiomatic that direct proof is not essential to
prove conspiracy; it may be shown by acts and circumstances from which may logically be inferred
the existence of a common design 32or may be deduced from the mode and manner in which the
offense is perpetrated. 33chanrobles virtual law library
Accused's claim that his brother-in-law, Eugenio Tagifa, testified against him because "he was
intimidated with arrest and prosecution" is purely conjectural. It is to be noted that the accused does
not, in the main, dispute the prosecution's evidence that he was the one who placed the television
set under the stairs of Tagifa's house and that he was seen carrying it on his shoulders in the early
morning of 10 October 1990. All that the accused could do was to raise a feeble and
unsubstantiated denial.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
On the witness stand, Tagifa identified the sworn statement he executed on 11 October 1990
(Exhibit "A") and openly admitted that it was the accused who brought the television set, thus:
Q Who brought the TV set under your stairs if you were not the one?chanrobles virtual law library
A My brother in law, sir.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Q Could you identify him, Mr. witness?chanrobles virtual law library
A Yes, sir.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Q Will you point him now?chanrobles virtual law library
A Yes, sir. (witness pointing to a person who identified himself as John Amet Baello, the accused in
this case). 34
The due execution of Tagifa's sworn statement was not put in doubt during his cross-examination by
the counsel for the defense. The impression then that Tagifa leaves us is that he was telling the
truth. The trial court, which was obviously in a better position to decide the question of his credibility,
having heard him and observed his deportment and manner of testifying, gave full faith and credit to
Tagifa's testimony. We accord it the highest respect, especially considering that we find no fact or
circumstance of value in the said testimony that it had overlooked or misappreciated and which if
considered, may alter the result. 35chanrobles virtual law library
Prudencio Bagasina's testimony deserves a separate treatment. He had the temerity to testify in
open court that he was just brought to the police station and then made to sign a prepared
statement, which was marked as Exhibit "P." He denied having been investigated at all. In said
sworn statement, he declared that in the early morning of 10 October 1990, he saw the accused
along Daang Kalabaw at Santolan, Pasig, Metro Manila, carrying a television set - the same
television set identified by Tagifa. The trial court immediately perceived that he was lying through his
teeth and held him in contempt, thus:
COURT:
The witness is hereby cited in contempt for making untruthful statements until further orders from
this Court. Send him to the provincial jail, for twenty-four hours. Let the hearing be continued on
another date. 36chanrobles virtual law library
In short, the trial court gave full faith and credit to Bagasina's sworn statement. We find no
compelling reason to disagree with the trial court.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library

The aggravating circumstance of unlawful entry 37was properly appreciated against the accused as
he and his companion, Jerry, had entered the Borja residence through the second-floor window, a
way not intended for ingress. The evidence likewise shows that the aggravating circumstance of
nocturnity 38was present in the commission of the crime as the darkness was taken advantage of by
the malefactors and such circumstances facilitated their evil
designs.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

WHEREFORE, the judgement of conviction the Regional Trial Court of Pasig (Branch 156), Metro
Manila in Criminal Case No. 84253 is hereby AFFIRMED in toto. Cost against the accused-
appellant.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

SO ORDERED.
 G.R. No. L-32078 September 30, 1974
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. BALTAZAR LACAO and DAVID
LACAO, accused, BALTAZAR LACAO, Accused-Appellant.
Narciso C. Parayno, Jr. for accused-appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
AQUINO, J.:
This is a murder case. In the evening of March 27, 1969, around one hundred persons foregathered
in Francisco Labo's house which was located at Sitio Guimba, Barrio Manibad, Mambusao, Capiz.
The occasion was the last night of the wake (velasyon) for Labo's deceased wife. Among those
present were Baltazar Lacao (the barrio captain), his brother David, and Sergio
Gallardo.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
At about eleven o'clock, Gallardo decided to go home. As he was descending the stairs, Baltazar
Lacao followed him, called him, "Ser, Ser," and stabbed him with a knife at the right side of his
body.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Baltazar tried to pull out the knife. Gallardo ran. Baltazar followed him. When Gallardo reached the
bamboo grove, he was assaulted by David Lacao (who was armed with a carbine), Benedicto Lacao
(David's son) Salvador Lacao, Jose Mansilla and Federico Lata .(Salvador and Federico are
Baltazar's first cousins).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Gallardo sustained fourteen wounds (Exh. A). His assailants dragged him "to the field". He died due
to massive hemorrhage resulting from his numerous wounds. The wounds were caused by different
bladed instruments. Each of his nine wounds could have caused his death if there were no timely
medical attendance.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The killing was motivated by resentment. Baltazar Lacao, as barrio captain, had drafted a resolution,
recommending that the name of Barrio Manibad be changed to Hontiveros. Gallardo vigorously
opposed the change. That opposition was sufficient to provoke Baltazar to liquidate Gallardo (Exh. 1
and 2; 37 tsn August 21, 1969).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Less than twelve hours after the killing or at five to eleven o'clock in the morning of the following
day, March 28th, Baltazar surrendered to the Constabulary detachment at Loctugan Hills, Roxas
City. Evidently, he realized that he had to assume responsibility for the killing so that his relatives
would not be implicated. He also feared reprisals from the victim's family. So, he placed himself
under the protective custody of the Constabulary.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library
As proof of his surrender and to show that he waived the issuance of a warrant of arrest or
commitment, he executed in the Ilongo dialect a certification wherein he admitted that he killed
Gallardo (Exh. C). The translation of his statement reads as follows (Exh.
C-2):
To whom it may concern:chanrobles virtual law library
I, Baltazar Lacao y Arro, 33 years old, married, farmer and a resident of Barrio Manibad,
Mambusao, Capiz, on my own free will hereby depose and say:chanrobles virtual law library
That, I voluntarily surrender with the PC Headquarters, Loctugan Hills, Roxas City on this day at
about 10:55 a.m., March 28, 1969 because I stabbed Sergio Gallardo who is my barriomate and he
died in the evening of March 27, 1969 and because there is no charge or complaint in the court
against me and I am afraid of the relatives of the deceased if I am in my place, I am asking for the
protection of the PC that I will stay in the PC camp and under the protection and power of the
PC.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Loctugan Hills, Roxas City
March 28, 1969.
Baltazar Lacao
(Surrenderee)
witnesses: 1. Jose Blancaflor.
2. Benedicto Ilagan.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Note: I received a copy of this certification.
Baltazar Lacao
On the basis of that statement, Constabulary Sergeant Jose B. Blancaflor prepared a spot report
which was sent at three o'clock in the afternoon of March 29th to the Provincial Commander. it was
stated therein that "Baltazar Lacao y Arro, 33 years old, married, barrio captain of Manibad,
surrendered to the Constabulary at five to eleven o'clock in the morning of March 28th for having
stabbed to death Sergio Gallardo" in the evening of March 27th (Exh.
B).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Also on the following day, March .28th, Eulogio Lipura, Caridad Laurilla and Alfredo Vergabera
executed sworn statements implicating Baltazar Lacao in the killing of Gallardo. On that same date,
a police sergeant filed a complaint for murder against Baltazar Lacao, David Lacao, Federico Lata
and John Doe.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
On April 2, 1969 Lipura, Vergabera and Laurilla reiterated their statements at the preliminary
examination conducted by the municipal judge. Later, the complaint was amended by excluding
Lata and John Doe. Only the Lacao brothers were charged with murder. They waived the second
stage of the preliminary investigation. The case was elevated to the Court of First Instance. It was
transferred to the Circuit Criminal Court at Roxas City where on April 25, 1969 the Provincial Fiscal
filed an information for murder against the Lacao brothers. Evident premeditation was the qualifying
circumstance that was alleged.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
After trial, the lower court convicted Baltazar Lacao of murder, qualified by treachery, sentenced him
to reclusion perpetua and ordered him to pay the heirs of Sergio Gallardo the sum of thirty thousand
as indemnity and moral and exemplary damages. David Lacao was acquitted on the ground of
reasonable doubt. (Criminal Case No. CCC-Xl-83-Capiz).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library
Baltazar Lacao contends in this appeal that the trial court's decision is contrary to law and the
evidence and that his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt. He argues that his plea of self-
defense should be upheld. His complicated story is as follows:chanrobles virtual law library
He arrived at Francisco Labo's house at eight-thirty in the evening of March 27th. Sergio Gallardo
and other persons were in the yard discussing political matters. He advised them to desist from
talking about politics because the elections were still far away and their discussions might lead to
quarrels.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Later, Arturo Labo allegedly reported to him that Gallardo was chasing several persons. Lacao went
down to pacify Gallardo who was armed with a knife. Lacao announced to Gallardo: "Ser, Ser, this
is the barrio captain. Give me your knife." Instead of surrendering his knife, Gallardo tried to stab
Lacao who moved backward and retreated. Gallardo followed Lacao. When in the course of his
retreat Lacao reached the bamboo grove, Gallardo again tried to stab him. Lacao parried the
blow.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
As Gallardo persisted in his aggression, Lacao grappled with him. In the course of the scuffle, Lacao
wrested away the knife held by Gallardo. Then, Gallardo tried to get back the knife, squeezed
Lacaos neck with his right hand and held Lacaos right hand with his left
hand.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The knife fell from Lacaos hand. He was able to free himself from Gallardo's stranglehold. Lacao
fled. He was pursued by Gallardo who was armed with the knife. Lacao ran faster when he saw that
seven persons, whom he surmised were Gallardo's companions, were also chasing him. Lacao said
that Gallardo might have been wounded in the right breast and on the hand and fingers (pp. 7-8,
Appellant's Brief).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
On analyzing Lacaos testimony, the trial court found it to be riddled with improbabilities. Considering
that many persons were present when Gallardo allegedly assaulted Lacao, it was incredible that
they would not have intervened to prevent Gallardo from killing Lacao, their barrio captain.
Moreover, as noted by the trial court, Lacaos credibility was gravely impaired by his denial of the
undeniable: that fact that he voluntarily surrendered to the Constabulary on the morning following
the night of the killing (Exh. C, C-2).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Appellant Lacao contends that the trial court erred in believing the testimony of William Artuz a
prosecution eyewitness, Artuz declared that Gallardo was stabbed by Baltazar Lacao, David Lacao,
Salvador Lacao, Benedicto Lacao, Jose Mansilla and Federico Lata (6-8 tsn August 22, 1969).
Appellant points out that, according to Alfredo Vergabera, another prosecution eyewitness, Baltazar
Lacao initially wounded Gallardo with a knife on the right side of his body and that the knife got
stuck in the wound and Baltazar was not able to pull out the knife (18-19 tsn August 21,
1969).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Since, according to the prosecution, Baltazar Lacao stabbed Gallardo only once, appellant Lacao
argues that the trial court erred in concluding that he was responsible for the fourteen wounds
sustained by Gallardo. That contention is fallacious. It ignores the testimony of the prosecution
witnesses that Lacao pursued Gallardo when he ran in order to escape from Lacaos felonious
assault.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The medical certificate shows that among the fourteen wounds there were only two wounds on the
right side of Gallardo's body, namely, the stab wound, two and one-half inches long in the right
epigastric region which eviscerated the small intestines and omentum (No. 2) and a stab wound,
one and one-fourth inches long which penetrated the thoracic cavity above the right nipple (No. 4 in
Exh. A).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Whichever of those two wounds on the right side was inflicted by Baltazar Lacao would be fatal
because both injured the vital organs and caused much hemorrhage. Hence, assuming, as
contended by the appellant, that he inflicted only one wound, that wound in itself was sufficient to
hold him responsible for Gallardo's death. The fact is that, as already noted, Lacao probably inflicted
other wounds.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Appellant Lacao assails the probative value of his written acknowledgement that he surrendered so
that he would be under the protective custody of the Constabulary (Exh. C). His counsel de
oficio rightly categorizes that statement as "an admission and confession of the commission of an
offense". Lacao also impugns the veracity of the testimony of Sergeant Blancaflor who typed that
statement.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
We have weighed carefully the probative value of Lacaos statement (Exh. C) and the spot report
(Exh. B), which was based on it, as well as Blancaflor's testimony. We are satisfied that Lacao
signed Exhibit C voluntarily and understood its contents. The salutary rule is that "the admissions of
a party charged with a crime, deliberately made, are always admissible to show his guilt" (People
vs. Hernane, 75 Phil. 554, 558).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
There was no ulterior motive for Blancaflor to fabricate a statement, like Exhibit C, just to prejudice
Lacao. There was no reason why, as a Constabulary officer, he would make a false spot report
regarding Gallardo's killing. Exhibits B and C were executed in the course of Blancaflor's regular
performance of his official duties. Blancaflor had to require Lacao to state in writing that he wanted
to be detained in the Constabulary camp; otherwise, the Constabulary men would be guilty of
arbitrary or illegal detention. It was standard operating procedure to apprise the Provincial
Commander that a killing had been perpetrated and that the perpetrator thereof was under
protective custody in a Constabulary camp.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Appellant Lacao contends that he should be held liable for physical injuries only because the
prosecution failed to prove which of the fourteen wounds were inflicted by him. He cites the doctor's
testimony that the fourteen wounds were caused by different weapons or bladed instruments. That
contention is not well-taken.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Lacao was the initiator of the assault. He had the motive for getting rid of Gallardo who
spearheaded the opposition against Lacaos proposal that the name Manibad should be changed to
Hontiveros. He was armed with a deadly weapon when he stabbed Gallardo. His intent to kill was
manifest. His admission (Exh. C) removes any doubt as to his
guilt.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
As stated earlier, the information charged the Lacao brothers with murder qualified by evident
premeditation. The prosecution failed to prove  premeditacion conocida. It is true that appellant
Lacao might have nursed a grudge or resentment against Gallardo for having blocked Lacaos
proposal to change the name of Barrio Manibad to Hontiveros. That circumstance is not a
conclusive proof of evident premeditation.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
It is not sufficient to suspect that premeditation preceded the crime. The criminal intent evidenced by
outward acts must be notorious and manifest, and the purpose and determination must be plain and
have been adopted after mature consideration on the part of the persons who conceived and
resolved upon the perpetration of the crime, as a result of deliberation, meditation, and reflection
sometime before its commission (U.S. vs. Banagale, 24 Phil. 69, 73; People vs. Mendova, 100 Phil.
811).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The trial court held that the killing was murder because there was treachery (alevosia) when Lacao,
after calling Gallardo, unexpectedly and suddenly stabbed him. We agree with that conclusion.
Lacao adopted a mode of execution which insured the wounding of Gallardo without giving him a
chance to repel the initial aggression. There was no risk to Lacao arising from any defense which
Gallardo could have made. He was unarmed (See U.S. vs. Cornejo, 28 Phil. 457; People vs. Noble,
77 Phil. 93). Gallardo was not able to make any defense at all. He ran in order to avoid further injury
but Lacao pursued him and the other assailants pounced on
him.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Since treachery was not expressly alleged in the information, it could not be used to qualify the
killing as murder. It should be treated as a generic aggravating circumstance (U.S. vs. Campo, 23
Phil. 368; People vs. Borbano, 76 Phil. 702). Hence, Lacao can only be held guilty of homicide,
aggravated by treachery. Thus, in People vs. Peje, 99 Phil. 1052, the accused was charged with
murder qualified by evident premeditation and alevosia. Those two qualifying circumstances were
not proven. Abuse of superiority was proven. However, since it was not alleged in the information, it
could be considered only as generic aggravating and not qualifying. The accused was convicted
only of homicide. See People vs. Navarro, L-20860, November 28, 1964, 12 SCRA
530.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Treachery as a generic aggravating circumstance is offset by the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender to the authorities. As already noted, Lacao denied that he surrendered to
Sergeant Blancaflor. He repudiated the instrument of surrender (Exh. C), because (from his
viewpoint) he found that it was incompatible with his plea of self-defense which, however, appears
to be fabricated.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
In fairness to him and as the record is conclusive that he was not arrested and that he was turned
over to the Municipal jail by the Constabulary (See back of p. 31, record) he should be given of the
benefit of the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender to
authorities.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The trial court held that cruelty should be appreciated against Lacao because he inflicted fourteen
wounds. That ruling is not supported by the evidence. The testimonies of the prosecution
eyewitnesses tend to show that several persons inflicted the fourteen wounds. The nature of the
wounds indicates that they could not have been caused solely by one person using only a knife,
which was the weapon used by Baltazar Lacao.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library
Moreover, as observed by the Solicitor General, who disagreed with the trial court, the
numerousness of the wounds is not the criterion for appreciating cruelty (ensañamiento). (Arts.
14[21] and 248[6], Revised Penal Code, People vs. Aguinaldo, 55 Phil. 610; People vs. Dayug and
Bannaisan 49 Phil. 423, 427; People vs. Manzano L-33463, July 31,
1974).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
It results that reclusion temporal, the penalty for homicide, should be imposed on Lacao in its
medium period (Arts. 64[4] and 249, Revised Penal Code).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library
WHEREFORE, the trial court's judgment is modified. Appellant Baltazar Lacao is found guilty of
homicide and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of twelve (12) years of prison mayor as
minimum, to seventeen (17) years of reclusion temporal medium, as maximum. In other respects,
the trial court's judgment is affirmed.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
So ordered.
G.R. No. 94308 June 16, 1994
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RUBEN E. ILAOA and ROGELIO E.
ILAOA, Accused-Appellants.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff- appellee.chanrobles virtual law library
Buen Zamar for accused- appellants.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
Pfc. Reynaldo P. Angeles was dispatched in the early morning of 5 November 1987 to Tinio St., Sta.
Maria Phase I, Balibago, Angeles City, where the decapitated body of a man, later identified through
his voter�s identification card as Nestor de Loyola, was found in a grassy portion thereof. Apart
from the decapitation, the deceased bore forty-three (43) stab wounds in the chest as well as slight
burns all over the body. The head was found some two (2) feet away from the
corpse.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Five persons, Ruben E. Ilaoa, Rogelio E. Ilaoa, Rodel E. Ilaoa, Julius Eliginio and Edwin Tapang,
were charged for the gruesome murder of Nestor de Loyola. However, only the brothers Ruben and
Rogelio stood trial since the other accused escaped and were never
apprehended.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
On 15 June 1990, the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City found Ruben and Rogelio guilty of
murder with the attendant circumstances of evident premeditation, abuse of superior strength and
cruelty, and imposed upon them the penalty of "life imprisonment." 1The conviction was based on
the following circumstantial evidence:
One. The deceased Nestor de Loyola was seen at about eleven o�clock in the evening of 4
November 1987, in a drinking session with his compadre Ruben Ilaoa together with Julius Eliginio,
Edwin Tapang and a certain "Nang Kwang" outside Ruben�s apartment. 2
Two. The drunken voices of Ruben and Nestor engaged in an apparent argument were later on
heard. 3Nestor was then seen being kicked and mauled by Ruben and his brother Rodel, Julius
Eliginio and Edwin Tapang. 4Nestor was crying all the while, "Pare, aray, aray!" Afterwards, Nestor,
who appeared drunk, was seen being "dragged" 5into Ruben Ilaoa�s apartment. Nestor was heard
saying, "Pare, bakit ninyo ako ginaganito, hirap na hirap na ako!" 6
Three.  Ruben Ilaoa and Julius Eliginio borrowed Alex Villamil�s tricycle at about two o�clock the
following morning allegedly for the purpose of bringing to the hospital a neighbor who was about to
give birth. Ruben was seen driving the tricycle alone, with a sack which looked as though it
contained a human body, placed in the sidecar. The tricycle was returned an hour later to Alex who
noticed bloodstains on the floor. The latter thought that they were those of the pregnant woman.
Four. Blood was found on Ruben�s shirt when he was asked to lift it during the investigation by the
police. 7Moreover, Ruben�s hair near his right forehead was found partly burned and his shoes
were splattered with blood. 8Susan Ocampo, Ruben�s live-in partner, was likewise seen in the
early morning of 5 November 1987 sweeping what appeared to be blood at the entrance of their
apartment. 9chanrobles virtual law library
In this appeal, brothers Ruben and Rogelio Ilaoa argue for their acquittal. They contend that the
circumstantial evidence relied upon by the trial court for their conviction failed to establish their guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. Specifically, they assail the finding of evident premeditation, abuse of
superior strength and cruelty as totally unwarranted.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library
We affirm Ruben Ilaoa�s guilt having been satisfactorily established by the evidence on hand,
albeit circumstantial. However, we reverse the conviction of Rogelio as we find it patently
baseless.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
In finding Rogelio guilty of murder, the court a quo relied solely on the testimony that he helped his
brother Ruben drag Nestor de Loyola inside Ruben�s apartment where the deceased was last
seen alive. Apart from such testimony, however, there is nothing else to link Rogelio to the
killing.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
To warrant a conviction on the basis of circumstantial evidence, three requisites must concur: (a)
there must be more than one circumstance; (b) the circumstances from which the inferences are
derived are proven; and, (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to prove the guilt of
the accused beyond reasonable doubt. 10In the case at bench, it does not require much analysis to
conclude that the circumstance relied upon to establish Rogelio Ilaoa�s guilt, i.e., the alleged
dragging of the deceased to his brother�s apartment, is totally inadequate for a conviction, having
miserably failed to meet the criteria. This is especially so where the veracity of such circumstance is
even open to question. While Antonio Ramos and Abdulia Logan testified that Rogelio Ilaoa helped
his brother drag the deceased to his apartment, Eustancia Bie who claimed to have witnessed the
same incident positively testified that it was Ruben Ilaoa and Julius Eliginio who did so. 11Rogelio
Ilaoa was not mentioned. Not having been adequately established, in addition to being
uncorroborated, such circumstance alone cannot be the basis of Rogelio�s
conviction.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Ruben�s case, however, is a totally different matter. Unlike that of his brother, Ruben Ilaoa�s fate
was most definitely assured by the unbroken chain of circumstances which culminated in the
discovery of Nestor de Loyola�s decapitated body in the early morning of 5 November
1987.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
As found by the trial court, in the late evening of 4 November 1987, appellant Ruben Ilaoa was
engaged in a drinking session with the deceased Nestor de Loyola together with several others.
Ruben was heard arguing with Nestor. A few moments later, Ruben mauled and kicked the
deceased with the help of their drinking companions just outside Ruben�s apartment. As the
deceased cried "Aray! Aray!" and "Pare, bakit n�yo ako ginaganito? Hirap na hirap na ako!"
appellant dragged the deceased with the help of Julius Eliginio to the apartment from where a
man�s cries were continued to be heard later. To further seal the case against him, Ruben
borrowed Alex Villamil�s tricycle at two o�clock in the morning of 5 November 1987 on the pretext
that a neighbor was about to give birth and had to be rushed to the hospital. However, he was seen
driving the tricycle alone with a sack placed in the sidecar. The sack looked as if it contained a
human body. 12Then, an hour later, or at three o�clock in the morning, the tricycle was returned
with bloodstains on the floor.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
For his defense, appellant Ruben Ilaoa does not dispute the testimony of an eyewitness that he was
driving the tricycle at past two o�clock in the morning with the sack in the sidecar. However, he
claims that the sack contained buntot ng pusa, a local term for marijuana, not a human body, which
he delivered to a designated place in Fields Avenue as a favor to his compadre Nestor de Loyola
whom he could not refuse. Moreover, it was the vomit discharged by his drinking companions that
was being swept clean by his girlfriend at the entrance of their apartment in the early morning of 5
November 1987, not blood as the witnesses asseverated.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library
We find the version of the prosecution more persuasive than the defense. The fact that appellant
quarreled with the deceased, then mauled and pulled him to the apartment where the latter was last
seen alive, in addition to borrowing a tricycle which was found with bloodstains when returned,
sufficiently point to Ruben as the culprit responsible for the crime. The fact that the deceased was
his compadre, hence, presumably would have no motive to kill the latter, is not enough to exculpate
appellant. It is a matter of judicial knowledge that persons have been killed or assaulted for no
apparent reason at all, 13and that friendship or even relationship is no deterrent to the commission of
a crime. 14chanrobles virtual law library
If we are to believe appellant Ruben, we will not be able to account for the blood found on the floor
of the tricycle after it was brought back to the owner. Ruben himself could not explain away such
testimony for he belied the excuse that the tricycle was needed to rush a pregnant woman to the
hospital, which was the explanation he gave to Alex Villamil when he borrowed it. We cannot even
consider that the story about the blood on the tricycle was simply concocted by Alex Villamil to
incriminate Ruben because the latter was his friend, as Ruben himself has admitted. 15In fact he
could think of no reason for Alex Villamil to testify falsely against him. 16chanrobles virtual law library
Despite the foregoing, however, we hold appellant liable only for homicide, not murder, on the
ground that the qualifying circumstances alleged in the information, namely, abuse of superior
strength, cruelty and evident premeditation, were not sufficiently proved to be appreciated against
appellant.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Abuse of superior strength cannot be considered because there was no evidence whatsoever that
appellant was physically superior to the deceased and that the former took advantage of such
superior physical strength to overcome the latter�s resistance to consummate the offense. 17The
fact that Nestor de Loyola�s decapitated body bearing forty-three (43) stab wounds, twenty-four
(24) of which were fatal, 18was found dumped in the street is not sufficient for a finding of cruelty
where there is no showing that appellant Ruben Ilaoa, for his pleasure and satisfaction, caused
Nestor de Loyola to suffer slowly and painfully and inflicted on him unnecessary physical and moral
pain. 19Number of wounds alone is not the criterion for the appreciation of cruelty as an aggravating
circumstance. 20Neither can it be inferred from the mere fact that the victim�s dead body was
dismembered. 21Evident premeditation cannot likewise be considered. There is nothing in the
records to show that appellant, prior to the night in question, resolved to kill Nestor de Loyola, nor is
there proof to show that such killing was the result of meditation, calculation or resolution on his
part. On the contrary, the evidence tends to show that the series of circumstances which culminated
in the killing constitutes an unbroken chain of events with no interval of time separating them for
calculation and meditation. Absent any qualifying circumstance, Ruben Ilaoa should only be held
liable for homicide.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The penalty prescribed for homicide in Art. 249 of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion temporal.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, and in the absence of any mitigating or aggravating
circumstances, the maximum shall be taken from the medium period of reclusion temporal, which is
fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months,
while the minimum shall be taken from the penalty next lower in degree, which is prision mayor, in
any of its periods, the range of which is six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12)
years.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
In line with present jurisprudence, the civil indemnity fixed by the court a quo for the death of Nestor
de Loyola is increased from P30,000.00 to P50,000.00.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual
law library
WHEREFORE, the judgment finding accused RUBEN E. ILAOA guilty beyond reasonable doubt is
AFFIRMED but only for homicide, instead of murder. Consequently, he is sentenced to an
indeterminate prison term of eight (8) years, ten (10) months and twenty (20) days of prision
mayor medium, as minimum, to sixteen (16) years, four (4) months and ten (10) days of reclusion
temporal medium as maximum. In addition, accused-appellant RUBEN E. ILAOA is ordered to pay
the heirs of Nestor de Loyola P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and, as fixed by the court a quo,
P46,765.00 as actual damages, P10,000.00 as reasonable attorney�s fees and expenses of
litigation, and P10,000.00 for moral damages.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library
Accused-appellant ROGELIO E. ILAOA, however, is ACQUITTED of the crime charged for obvious
insufficiency of evidence.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
SO ORDERED.
 G.R. No. 139693 : January 24, 2002
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. Freddie Catian, Samuel Sumalpong and
Rogelio Calunod, Accused-Appellants.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
FREDDIE CATIAN, SAMUEL SUMALPONG AND ROGELIO CALUNODwere convicted of murder
by the trial court[1 for the violent death of one Willy Ondo for which they were each sentenced
to reclusion perpetua and to jointly indemnify the heirs of the victim P50,000.00 as death
indemnity, P50,000.00 as actual damages and to pay the costs of suit.
Acting on an earlier report that Willy Ondo was missing since 27 December 1996 and was already
believed to be dead, Barangay Captain Admir Sabado[2 sounded the alarm on his tanods on 2
January 1997 and called them to search for Willy. Their efforts would have been futile had it not
been for the chance discovery on 7 January 1997 of Willy's skeletal remains by a child who was
pasturing his cow near a peanut plantation in Barangay Poo, Lazi, Siquijor. Upon hearing the
information, Barangay Captain Sabado immediately notified the police and went to the site where
the cadaver was found. With a throng of onlookers, Sabado saw the disjoined bones of Willy
scattered around. Sabado also noticed marks of a recent bonfire near the vicinity. Those who knew
the victim, particularly his uncle Feliciano Duque, recognized the remains as those of Willy because
of a stainless steel found on his leg which was surgically inserted to support a fractured leg as a
result of an accident.
Dr. Franco Arcamo, the Medical Officer of Lazi, examined the skeletal remains of Willy Ondo and
confirmed that there was no noticeable decomposition as the body had probably been feasted on by
animals roaming the area. Dr. Arcamo also found no traces of bloodstains in the remains;
consequently, he surmised that the victim could have been dead five (5) to seven (7) days earlier as
the bones were already dried up with no foul odor. In his expert opinion, the principal cause of death
was asphyxia secondary to burning .[3cräläwvirtualibräry
Jeofrey Abe[4 narrated that on 27 December 1996 at 9:00 o'clock in the evening he went out of his
house to watch a television show at the residence of a certain Anselmo Ymbol. A couple of hours
later or at about 11:00 o'clock that evening Jeofrey returned home traversing the same route he took
earlier. On the way home, he chanced upon a group of three (3) persons whom he readily
recognized as Freddie Catian, Samuel Sumalpong and Rogelio Calunod. The three (3) were
"ganging up" on a man whom he also identified as Willy Ondo. Jeofrey easily recognized them as
they were all his barriomates and the road was not that dark despite the lateness of the hour
because it was a moonlit night.
From a distance of about twelve (12) meters, Jeofrey saw Catian repeatedly striking Willy with a
"chako"[5 on the head, causing Willy to fall on his knees. Calunod seconded by striking the victim
with a piece of wood on the face. When Willy finally collapsed, Sumalpong picked him up, carried
him over his shoulder, and walked away carrying him to an undisclosed destination. Overcome with
fear, Jeofrey went running towards home.
Jeofrey admitted that he did not inform anybody about the startling occurrence that he witnessed for
fear that the news would spread around and the assailants would hunt him down. In fact, he did not
dare divulge anything to the police or to his relatives even when he knew that the
barangay tanods were looking for the victim. Actually, according to him, he was waiting for a more
opportune time to tell the family of the deceased, which opportunity came when the victim's sister
Myrna Ondo and her husband arrived from Iligan to attend the wake of their departed kin. At the
wake, Jeofrey intimated to Myrna that he had something to tell her but would do so only at the police
station because Sumalpong, one of the accused, kept on following him. Jeofrey waited until
Sumalpong had gone home before he and Myrna went to the Lazi police station to execute an
affidavit. That affidavit which was dated 10 January 1997 contained an eyewitness account of the
dreadful event of 27 December 1996.
Teodosia Daque also testified that on 3 January 1997 she and some companions were walking
back to Barangay Poo after attending a town fiesta in Capalasanan when they saw by the wayside a
dirty blood-stained white t-shirt which they recognized to be that of Samuel Sumalpong. The
particular t-shirt was familiar to her because on many occasions she had seen Sumalpong wearing
the same t-shirt everytime the latter would gather tuba in his coconut plantation.
Marlito Patadlas, testifying also for the prosecution, recalled that before 27 December 1996, or
specifically on 18 December 1996, while he and his friends were playing billiards, Rogelio Calunod
barged into the room. He was bleeding on the face. When asked what happened to him, Rogelio
replied that he had a spat with Willy Ondo who hit him on the face with a piece of stone.
On the other hand, accused-appellant Freddie Catian vigorously denied the charges against him,
explaining that on the day that the incident allegedly took place he was working as a laborer on a
project at the Capalasanan public market. When his work ended at 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon of
that day, he immediately proceeded home. At around 8:00 oclock in the evening, after some
household chores, he retired for the evening. Freddie denied having met his co-accused Samuel
Sumalpong and Rogelio Calunod on 27 December 1996, much less had he been informed by the
accused Calunod of his quarrel with Willy Ondo. In his account, Freddie stated that he learned
about the death of Willy only on 10 January 1997 when he was arrested by the police. Freddie
further testified that although he and his two (2) co-accused were blood relatives they were not
particularly close because it was not his habit to visit them in their place. He opined that perhaps the
reason why Jeofrey implicated him in the murder was because Jeofrey being an inveterate gambler,
was bribed into accusing anybody and he being from Capalasanan was a most convenient fall guy.
[6cräläwvirtualibräry
On his part, accused Samuel Sumalpong[7 testified that at 7:00 o'clock in the morning of 27
December 1996 he was gathering tuba when Jeofrey Abe, Willy Ondo and two (2) others went to
his place to buy tuba. After giving them five (5) gallons of the beverage, he went to the farm of a
certain Angot to plant rice, afterwhich, he went back home to gather some more tuba. He went
home at about 6:30 in the evening and took his supper half an hour later. He spent the night in his
house with his wife and children and never left until dawn of the following day to gather tuba.  He
also denied having met his co-accused on 27 December 1996 but remembered having had an
encounter with them during the town fiesta of Barangay Poo on 17 November 1996. Unlike Catian,
he heard about the death of Willy Ondo on 3 January 1997. He disowned the bloodied t-shirt which
was identified to be his by Teodosia Daque who claimed to have found it on the road.
In his defense, accused Rogelio Calunod vigorously insisted that he was working in his farm from
morning until 6:00 o'clock in the evening of 27 December 1996. According to him, after finishing his
work in the farm he returned home and never left his house until the following morning. Like his
other co-accused, he also disavowed having seen them nor talked to them on 27 December 1996.
He admitted that Willy Ondo boxed him on 17 November 1996 which prompted him to report the
matter to the Barangay Captain. Despite what the victim did to him, it never crossed his mind to take
revenge, much less kill Willy.[8cräläwvirtualibräry
The defense also presented Merlyn Sumalpong,[9 wife of accused Samuel Sumalpong, and Lily
Calunod,[10 sister of accused Rogelio Calunod, whose testimonies corroborated the claim of their
accused kin that on the day of the supposed killing of Willy Ondo they were at home with their
respective families and never left their houses until the following morning.
The trial court gave full credit to the testimony of prosecution witness Jeofrey Abe, characterizing his
testimony as credible, unwavering, categorical and straightforward. As to the alleged
inconsistencies in his testimony, the trial court opined that they were inconsequential and minor
which, far from weakening its veracity, bolstered and strengthened it instead. The trial court further
emphasized that the defense of alibi interposed by the accused which, aside from being
inadequately corroborated, also failed miserably to measure up to the required quantum of evidence
considering that the accused were not able to prove that it was physically impossible for them to be
at the scene of the crime at the time the killing took place.
On the matter of the modifying circumstances, the trial court found that the killing was attended by
treachery, evident premeditation, cruelty and ignominy, and that there was conspiracy among the
accused. As the trial court explained, there is no doubt that there was treachery as the three (3)
accused ganged up on their quarry while the latter was helpless and defenseless, obviously
resorting to nighttime to facilitate the commission of the crime and where no one could come to the
rescue of the victim. There was evident premeditation as the killing was well planned and
perpetrated in such a way that there could be no obstacle or impediment to the accomplishment of
their purpose. The killing was done with cruelty and ignominy by burning the victim or boiling his
remains probably to erase any trace of their criminal act.
On the angle of conspiracy, which the trial court also found to have attended the commission of the
crime, there was clearly a unity of purpose when they ganged up on Willy Ondo; consequently, the
act of one is considered the act of all for which they must all be equally liable.[11cräläwvirtualibräry
Accused-appellants assail before us the decision of the trial court, arguing that it erred (a) in finding
accused-appellants guilty as charged despite the weakness of the prosecution evidence, particularly
the testimony of Jeofrey Abe, and (b) in appreciating the qualifying circumstances of treachery and
evident premeditation as well as cruelty and ignominy.
Accused-appellants contend that the failure of Jeofrey Abe to reveal to the authorities as soon as
possible or to the nearest relatives of the victim what he (Jeofrey) allegedly saw on the night of 27
December 1996 irreversibly sullied his credibility. They stress that if indeed Jeofrey saw and knew
the assailants, then why did he not even volunteer to pinpoint to the barangay tanods  the place
where the alleged incident took place. More importantly, according to accused-appellants, the
testimony of the witness that at around 9:00 o'clock on the night of the killing he watched Power
Rangers on television in the house of Anselmo Ymbol was subsequently belied by the latter who not
only doubted Abes presence in his house but also stated that Power Rangers was shown at 7:00
o'clock in the evening and not at 9:00 o'clock as declared by the witness.
Accused-appellants' quibbling over inconsequential matters should not be countenanced. It is of
common knowledge that the initial reluctance and vacillation of a witness to volunteer information is
more telling of his fear of being embroiled in a criminal investigation and expose himself and his
family to reprisal than an intent to suppress the truth or muddle an investigation. Delay in reporting
the identity of the perpetrators of a crime does not necessarily impair the credibility of a witness,
especially where such witness gives a sufficient explanation. For the Court to unreasonably discredit
a witness' account for the reason that it was delayed is to permanently seal the lips of reluctant and
timorous witnesses.[12 Despite the searing examination by the defense, Abe satisfactorily explained
himself when he said-[13cräläwvirtualibräry
Q: As a matter of fact you keep (sic) the information to yourself, you did not tell anybody?
A: I did not tell anybody, sir, because the person I might tell the incident might spread the rumor and
they might hear it and they might escape. They might take revenge on me.
Q: Did you know that after December 27, 1996, the relatives of Willy Ondo as well as the Barangay
Captain of the place were looking for the body of Willy Ondo?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: As a matter of fact you yourself was one of those who were looking for the body of Willy Ondo?
A: I did not go with those who were looking for the body of Willy Ondo, sir. I just keep (sic) myself at
home because I was afraid I was scattered (sic) of what I have seen.
Q: Thats why you did not volunteer to tell the information to the Barangay Captain or to the relatives
of Willy Ondo of what you have seen?
A: No, sir.
Q: In fact when the body of Willy Ondo was already recovered, you still did not inform anybody of
what you have seen?
A: I did not tell anybody because I waited for the brothers and sisters of Willy Ondo whom I would
tell the incident which I have seen.
Q: When Freddie Catian hit for the first time with the use of chaco, where did he hit?
A: On the head, sir. (Witness pointed at the back of his head)
Q: And what happened to Willy Ondo?

The inanity of accused-appellants' defensive posture becomes more pronounced with each passing A: He fell down.
argument. Now they assert that Jeofrey was less believable merely because some other television
program, and not Power Rangers, as he claims was being shown at the time he was supposed to Q: So when Willy Ondo fell down, how did Rogelio Calunod strike on Willy Ondo hitting with (sic) his
be watching television at 9:00 o'clock in the evening of 27 December 1996. Being battered by the mouth?
defense counsel on the matter, Jeofrey explained that he was so riveted to the television
program Power Rangers that he failed to keep track of the title of the other programs or of the exact
time they were actually shown. The triviality of the alleged "inconsistencies" can hardly affect either A: He struck forcefully like this. (Witness demonstrated by making striking motions with the use of
the substance or the veracity and weight of Jeofrey Abes testimony which, on the contrary, can his hand).
serve to reinforce rather than weaken his credibility.[14cräläwvirtualibräry
Q: And when Willy Ondo fell on the ground, after he was being hit for the first time by Freddie
The fact that Ymbol failed to confirm the presence of Jeofrey in his house on the night of 27 Catian?
December 1996 does not cast suspicion on Jeofrey's testimony. The uncertainty of Ymbol's denial
of Jeofery's presence in his house became apparent when Ymbol clarified that, with the exception of A: He fell down sir.
a few, he could not recall the identity of the twenty (20) or so individuals who were also watching
television at that time. He was unsure whether Jeofrey was among those viewing the television. Not Q: So Willy Ondo was being stricken (by) Rogelio Calunod when Willy Ondo was already lying on
being sure of Jeofrey presence does not discount the possibility that he was in fact present at the the ground?
place.
A: He was not yet lying on the ground and that was the time that he was struck by Rogelio Calunod.
The alibi of accused-appellants cannot persuade this Court especially so since they failed to prove
by clear and convincing evidence that it was impossible for them to be at the scene of the crime at Q: How did Freddie Catian strike for the second time with the use of chaco?
the time it was committed. Nonetheless, positive identification by the principal eyewitness, in
conjunction with other evidence for the prosecution, i.e., blood-stained shirt found and identified by
A: First, it was so sudden, sir, and the striking was too fast that Willy Ondo fell on his knees to the
other witnesses, leaves no room for doubt that the three (3) accused-appellants authored the
ground.
gruesome murder of Willy Ondo.

Q: And when Willy Ondo was about to fall on the ground, he was on a stooping position?
The court a quo appreciated treachery for the reason that the three (3) accused-appellants "ganged
up on their quarry while the latter was helpless and defenseless and committed on a nighttime x x x
x"[15 It correctly took into account the qualifying circumstance of treachery although for the wrong A: Yes, sir.
reasons. In order that treachery may be appreciated the following requisites must concur: (a) the
culprit employed means, methods and forms of execution which tended directly and specially to Q: And his head was about to fall to the ground?
insure the offender's safety from any defensive or retaliatory act on the part of the offended party,
which means, that no opportunity was given the latter to do so; and, (b) that such means, method or A: Yes.
manner of execution was deliberately or consciously chosen.[16 The fact that the culprits resorted to
overwhelming force, or that the victim was defenseless, or that the crime was perpetrated under Q: And then Rogelio Calunod, according to you, struck him on his mouth, did I get you right?
cover of darkness did not in itself connote treachery. There must be a clear and palpable showing
that the assailants resorted to a method of attack that would guarantee its execution without fear of
retaliation on the part of their prey. The following narration by Jeofrey is instructive on the character A: Yes, sir.
of the fatal assault on the victim - [17cräläwvirtualibräry
Q: How come that Willy Ondo was hit on his mouth when he was already on a stooping position and
his head was about to fall on the ground at that time that Rogelio Calunod delivered a strike on Willy
Ondo?
A: First he was standing and it was so sudden and the strike was so sudden.
The presence of alevosia in the attack cannot be disputed. The witness described the killing in clear
terms. There is nary an iota of doubt that the attack, being carried out suddenly and unexpectedly,
afforded the victim no occasion whatsoever to defend himself. Treachery qualifies the killing to
murder.
The evidence clearly shows that the three (3) accused-appellants conspired when they acted in
concert to perpetrate the ghastly incident. Catian and Calunod dealt the fatal blows while
Sumalpong watched in stolid silence, with nary a whimper of protest even when his two (2)
companions smashed their deadly weapons into the body of their defenseless victim. Not content
with his inaction, Sumalpong then carelessly slung the body of their fallen victim over his shoulder
and walked away to an undisclosed location. Inferable from the acts of accused-appellants
themselves was a common design, a community of purpose to attain their evil objective. Pertinent is
the testimony of Jeofrey Abe on direct examination - [22cräläwvirtualibräry
Q: While you were on your way home walking was there an unusual incident?

However, the trial court went far astray in its reasoning when it ruled that the aggravating A: Yes, sir.
circumstances of evident premeditation, cruelty and ignominy were also attendant in the
commission of the crime. To authorize the finding of evident premeditation, the prosecution must Q: What was that?
establish (a) the time when accused-appellants determined to commit the crime; (b) the act showing
that they clung to their determination; and (c) a sufficient interval of time between the determination A: I saw there three (3) people sir.
and the execution of the crime to allow them to reflect upon the consequences of their act.[18 Other
than a chance encounter between the witness Jeofrey and the principal antagonists in this case, Q: What were these three (3) people doing?
there is a dearth of information to show that accused-appellants had deliberately planned to commit
the crime and had persistently and consciously followed it notwithstanding that they had ample and
sufficient time to allow their conscience to overcome the determination of their will, if they had A: They were standing, sir.
desired it, after meditation and reflection.
Q: Who were these three (3) people?
Neither does it appear that the murder of the victim was attended by cruelty and ignominy. Ignominy
is a circumstance pertaining to the moral order, which adds disgrace and obloquy to the material A: Rogelio Calunod, Freddie Catian, and Samuel Sumalpong, sir.
injury caused by the crime. The mere fact that accused-appellants burned the body of the deceased
is not sufficient to show that the means were employed which added ignominy to the natural effects Q: After that what happened?
of the act. Nor may we consider the circumstance of cruelty as found by the trial court because
there is no showing that the victim was burned while he was still alive. For cruelty to exist, there A: There was one man whom they ganged up, sir.
must be proof showing that the accused delighted in making their victim suffer slowly and gradually,
causing him unnecessary physical and moral pain in the consummation of the criminal act. No proof
Q: Who was the one man that the three (3) ganged up?
was presented that would show that accused-appellants deliberately and wantonly augmented the
suffering of their victim.
A: Willy Ondo, sir.
The trial court also found conspiracy "as can be shown by the unity of purpose displayed by the
three (3) accused in ganging up their victim Willy Ondo."[19 Conspiracy in the statutory language Q: How far were you at that time?
"exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony
and decide to commit it."[20 Conspiracy need not be proved by direct evidence; it may be deduced A: Around twelve (12) meters.
from the mode and manner in which the offense was perpetrated. It is sufficient that the malefactors
acted in concert to attain the same criminal objective. As a rule, the concurrence of wills, which is Q: How did you see these three (3) people when it was 11:00 oclock in the evening?
the essence of conspiracy, may be deduced from the evidence of facts and circumstances, which
taken together, indicate that the parties cooperated and labored to the same end.[21 It must be A: Because there was a moonlight sir.
shown to exist as clearly and convincingly as the commission of the offense itself.
Q: You said that the three (3) ganged up on one person whom you identified as Willy Ondo, Q: And how thick was that piece of wood?
specifically what did Catian do?
A: It was rounded sir.
A: Willy Ondo was hit by a chako by Freddie Catian.
Q: What did Samuel Sumalpong do?
Q: Where was Willy Ondo hit by a chako?
A: When Willy Ondo fell down, he carried Willy Ondo on his shoulder.
A: On the head sir.
Q: Who carried Willy Ondo on the shoulder?
Q: What part of the head?
A: Samuel Sumalpong sir.
A: Here (Witness pointed at the back of his head).
Q: In what direction did Samuel Sumalpong go when he carried the body of Willy Ondo?
Q: Why do you say it was a chako?
A: I do not know about that sir, because in my fright I ran away home.
A: Because there are two (2) pieces of wood connected to each other, one piece was being held
and the other was the one that hit. Current jurisprudence dictates that the award of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as civil
indemnity as well as moral damages is mandatory upon the finding of the fact of murder. However,
Q: What did Rogelio Calunod do at that time? no award may be made for actual damages since there is no basis for it as no evidence was
adduced by the prosecution to justify such award.
A: He struck Willy Ondo with a piece of wood.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the court a quo finding accused-appellants Freddie Catian, Samuel
Q: Where was Willy Ondo hit? Sumalpong and Rogelio Calunod guilty of murder and sentencing each of them to reclusion
perpetua and jointly and severally to pay the heirs of the victim Willy Ondo P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity is AFFIRMED. In addition, accused-appellants are ordered jointly and severally to pay the
A: On the face sir.
same heirs P50,000.00 for moral damages. The award by the trial court of actual damages however
is deleted for lack of factual basis no proof having been presented by the prosecution to establish
Q: Which part of the face? the same. Costs against accused-appellants.

A: Here (Witness pointed to his mouth). SO ORDERED.

Q: How many times did Rogelio Calunod hit Willy Ondo with that chako?

A: Many times, sir.

Q: And how many times did Rogelio Calunod hit Willy Ondo with that piece of wood?

A: Only once, sir.

Q: You mentioned of a piece of wood being used by Rogelio Calunod, how long was that piece of
wood?

A: About this sir. (Witness indicated a length of twenty-six (26) inches).