SECOND DIVISION [G.R. No. 188133. July 7, 2014.

]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. OLIVER RENATO EDAÑO y EBDANE, appellant
Theme: Inadmissibility of evidence in arrest inflagrante delicto; Chain of custody requirement: Section 21,
Article II of R.A. No. 9165
FACTS:
The prosecution charged the appellant Edaño and Godofredo Siochi with violation of Section 11, Article
II of R.A. No. 9165 under two separate Informations.

The appellant and Siochi pleaded not guilty to the charge on arraignment. Joint trial on the merits
followed.

Prosecution
Witnesses: Police Inspector (P/Insp.) Aylin
Casignia and Police Officer (PO) 3 Elmer
Corbe
On the evening of August 6, 2002, members
of the Metro Manila Drugs Enforcement
Group, together with a female informant,
went to the parking area of McDonalds, West
Avenue to conduct an entrapment operation
against a certain alias "Nato."
At around 7:00 p.m., the appellant arrived on
board a space wagon driven by Siochi. 5 The
informant approached the appellant and
talked to him inside the vehicle. Afterwards,
the informant waved at PO3 Corbe. 6 When
PO3 Corbe was approaching the appellant,
the latter went out of the vehicle and ran
away.
PO3 Corbe recovered a "knot-tied"
transparent plastic bag from the appellant's
right hand, while PO3 Alcancia seized a gun
tucked in the appellant's waist. The other
members of the police arrested Siochi.
Thereafter, the police brought the appellant,
Siochi and the seized items to the police
station for investigation.
P/Insp. Casignia, the Forensic Chemical
Officer examined the seized items and found
them positive for the presence of shabu.
Defense
Witnesses: Siochi and Ruben Forteza
At around 4:00 p.m. on August 6, 2002, he
called Siochi on the phone, and informed him
that the motorbike starter the latter needed
was already available. On the same day,
Vanessa Paduada called the appellant, and
asked for the directions to McDonalds, West
Avenue. At around 6:00 p.m., Siochi and
Ruben arrived at the gate of Philam Homes
on board a space wagon. The appellant met
them at the subdivision gate, and showed the
starter to Siochi. Thereafter, Vanessa called
on the appellant's cellular phone. The
appellant then boarded the vehicle, and told
Siochi that he would just talk to a person at
McDonalds. Afterwards, Vanessa called him
from inside a parked car. The appellant
approached Vanessa who, for her part,
alighted from the car. Vanessa told the
appellant to get inside the car's rear. The
appellant did as instructed. Immediately after,
the male driver alighted from the vehicle and
entered the car's rear. The appellant went out
of the car, but the male driver followed him
and grabbed his hand. The appellant
resisted, and wrestled with the driver along
West Avenue. During this commotion, the
appellant heard a gunfire; four (4) persons
approached him, and then tied his hands with
a masking tape. The police placed him on
board a pick-up truck, and then brought him
to Bicutan. In Bicutan, the police brought him
to the interrogation room, where they
punched him and placed a plastic on his
head.

RTC: found the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal possession of shabu under Section
11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment. It also
ordered him to pay a P500,000.00 fine. The RTC, however, acquitted Siochi on the ground of
reasonable doubt.

On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC decision. The CA added that strict compliance with Section 21,
Article II of R.A. No. 9165 was not required as long as the integrity of the seized item had been
ensured. It further held that the police officers were presumed to have regularly performed their official
duties. Finally, the CA held that the prosecution was able to establish all the elements of illegal
possession of shabu.

1
 The appellant moved to reconsider this decision, but the CA denied his motion in its resolution dated
December 23, 2008. Hence, the instant appeal.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the warrantless arrest was valid, and if so, whether or not the seized items were
admissible?
2. Whether or not the corpus delicti of the crime charged was adequately proven?
RULING:
1. No, the shabu purportedly seized from the appellant is inadmissible in evidence for being the
proverbial fruit of the poisonous tree.
Section 5 (a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that a peace officer or a private person
may, without a warrant, arrest a person when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. This is known as arrest in flagrante delicto.
"For a warrantless arrest of an accused caught in flagrante delicto to be valid, two requisites must concur:
(1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the
view of the arresting officer."
In the present case, there was no overt act indicative of a felonious enterprise that could be properly
attributed to the appellant to rouse suspicion in the mind of PO3 Corbe that he (appellant) had just committed,
was actually committing, or was attempting to commit a crime. In fact, PO3 Corbe testified that the appellant
and the informant were just talking with each other when he approached them.
As testified to by PO3 Corbe himself, the appellant and the informant were just talking to each other; there
was no exchange of money and drugs when he approached the car. Notably, while it is true that the informant
waved at PO3 Corbe, the latter admitted that this was not the pre-arranged signal to signify that the sale of
drugs had been consummated. PO3 Corbe also admitted on cross-examination that he had no personal
knowledge on whether there was a prohibited drug and gun inside the space wagon when he approached it.
That the appellant attempted to run away when PO3 Corbe approached him is irrelevant and cannot by
itself be construed as adequate to charge the police officer with personal knowledge that the appellant had just
engaged in, was actually engaging in or was attempting to engage in criminal activity.
As the Court explained in People v. Villareal:
Flight per se is not synonymous with guilt and must not always be attributed to one's
consciousness of guilt. It is not a reliable indicator of guilt without other circumstances, for
even in high crime areas there are many innocent reasons for flight, including fear of
retribution for speaking to officers, unwillingness to appear as witnesses, and fear of being
wrongfully apprehended as a guilty party.
In other words, trying to run away when no crime has been overtly committed, cannot be evidence of guilt.
Considering that the appellant's warrantless arrest was unlawful, the search and seizure that resulted
from it was likewise illegal. Thus, the alleged plastic bag containing white crystalline substances
seized from him is inadmissible in evidence, having come from an invalid search and seizure.
2. No, the prosecution failed to adequately prove the corpus delicti of the crime charged.
We stress that "[t]he existence of dangerous drugs is a condition sine qua non for conviction for the
illegal sale and possession of dangerous drugs, it being the very corpus delicti of the crimes." Thus, the
evidence of the corpus delicti must be established beyond reasonable doubt.
In the present case, the various lapses — enumerated and discussed below — committed by the police
in the handling, safekeeping and custody over the seized drug tainted the integrity and evidentiary value of
the confiscated shabu.
1) We find it highly unusual and irregular that the police officers would let the appellant mark the drugs
seized from him, instead of doing the marking themselves.

Marking, as used in drug cases, means the placing by the apprehending officer or the poseur-buyer of
his/her initials and signature on the item/s seized. "Consistency with the "chain of custody" rule requires
that the "marking" of the seized items — to truly ensure that they are the same items that enter the
chain and are eventually the ones offered in evidence — should be done (1) in the presence of the
apprehended violator (2) immediately upon confiscation."

2
 Thus, while marking of the seized drugs at the police station is permitted, the marking should be done
by the police, and not by the accused. The appellant's participation in the marking procedure should
only be as a witness. Why the police failed to do a basic police procedure truly baffles us.

2) The police did not inventory or photograph the seized drugs, whether at the place of confiscation or at
the police station. These omissions were admitted by the prosecution during pre-trial.

The required procedure on the seizure and custody of drugs is embodied in Section 21, paragraph 1,
Article II of R.A. No. 9165, which states:

The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the
same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were
confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from
the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who
shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof[.]

This is implemented by Section 21 (a), Article II of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of
R.A. No. 9165.
To be sure, Section 21 (a), Article II of the IRR offers some flexibility in complying with the express
requirements under paragraph 1, Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, i.e., "non-compliance with these
requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items
are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and
custody over said items[.]" This saving clause, however, applies only where the prosecution recognized
the procedural lapses and thereafter explained the cited justifiable grounds, and when the prosecution
established that the integrity and evidentiary value of the evidence seized had been preserved. These
conditions were not met in the present case, as the prosecution did not even attempt to offer any justification
for its failure to follow the prescribed procedures in the handling and safekeeping of the seized items.
Although the Court has recognized that minor deviations from the procedures under R.A. No. 9165
would not automatically exonerate an accused, we have also declared that when there is gross disregard of
the procedural safeguards prescribed in the substantive law (R.A. No. 9165), serious uncertainty is generated
about the identity of the seized items that the prosecution presented in evidence. This doubt cannot be
remedied by simply invoking the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties, for a gross,
systematic, or deliberate disregard of the procedural safeguards effectively produces an irregularity in the
performance of official duties.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we REVERSE and SET ASIDE the October 16, 2008 decision and the
December 23, 2008 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 01142. Appellant Oliver Renato
Edaño y Ebdane is hereby ACQUITTED for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.

PEOPLE v. ROMY LIM y MIRANDA

G.R. NO. 231989 September 4, 2018
FACTS: Accused-appellant Romy Lim y Miranda (Lim) was guilty of violating Sections 11 and 5, respectively,
of Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165, or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
Around 8:00 p.m. on October 19, 2010, Intelligence Officer (IO) 1 Orellan and his teammates were at
Regional Office X of the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) and received from a confidential
informant (CI) that a certain "Romy" has been engaged in the sale of prohibited drugs in Zone 7, Cabina,
Bonbon, Cagayan de Oro City. They were directed by their Regional Director, Lt. Col. Edwin Layese, to gather
for a buy-bust operation. During the briefing, IO2 Orcales, IO1 Orellan, and IOl Carin were assigned as the
team leader, the arresting officer, and the poseur-buyer, respectively.
When the team arrived in the target area at around 10:00 p.m., IO1 Carin and the CI alighted from the
vehicle near the house of "Romy," while IO1 Orellan and the other team members positioned themselves in the
area to observe. Upon reaching the house, IO1 Carin and the CI encountered Gorres who invited them inside.
Lim was sitting on the sofa, watching TV. When the CI introduced IO1 Carin as a buyer, Lim nodded and told
Gorres to get one inside the bedroom. Gorres handed a small medicine box to Lim, who then took one sachet
of shabu and gave it to IO1 Carin. In turn, IO1 Carin paid him with the buy-bust money of P500. After
examining the plastic sachet, IO1 Carin made a signal and the team immediately rushed to Lim's house. IO1
Orellan declared that they were PDEA agents and informed Lim and Gorres, of their arrest for selling
dangerous drug. Thereafter, IO1 Orellan conducted a body search on both. The buy-bust team brought Lim
and Gorres to the PDEA Regional Office, with IO1 Orellan in possession of the seized items. Likewise, he
3
made the Inventory Receipt of the confiscated items. It was not signed by Lim and Gorres. Also, there was no
signature of an elected public official and the representatives of the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the
media as witnesses. Pictures of both accused and the evidence seized were taken.
The accused’s version is that Gorres was watching TV when the PDEA forcibly entered the house,
pointed their firearms at him, inflicted injuries and cuffed him while inquiring where the shabu was and the
whereabouts of “Romy”. They found Romy upstairs, sleeping. Thereafter, the two were brought to the PDEA
Regional Office and the crime laboratory. During the inquest proceedings, Lim, without the aid of counsel,
admitted ownership of the two sachets of shabu because he was afraid that the police would imprison him.
Like Gorres, he was not involved in drugs at the time of his arrest. Unlike him, however, he was previously
arrested by the PDEA agents but was acquitted in the case.
On September 2, 2013, RTC handed a guilty verdict on Lim for illegal possession and sale of shabu
and acquitted Gorres for lack of sufficient evidence linking him as a conspirator. CA affirmed the RTC’s
decision on February 23, 2017.
ISSUE: W/N Romy Lim is guilty of violating RA No. 9165
HELD: No. In a criminal case, the prosecution must offer sufficient evidence from which the trier of fact could
reasonably believe that an item still is what the government claims it to be.
It must be alleged and proved that the presence of the three witnesses to the physical inventory and
photograph of the illegal drug seized was not obtained due to reason/s such as:
(1) their attendance was impossible because the place of arrest was a remote area; (2) their safety during the
inventory and photograph of the seized drugs was threatened by an immediate retaliatory action of the
accused or any person/s acting for and in his/her behalf; (3) the elected official themselves were involved in the
punishable acts sought to be apprehended; (4) earnest efforts to secure the presence of a DOJ or media
representative and an elected public official within the period required under Article 125 of the Revised Penal
Code prove futile through no fault of the arresting officers, who face the threat of being charged with arbitrary
detention; or (5) time constraints and urgency of the anti-drug operations, which often rely on tips of
confidential assets, prevented the law enforcers from obtaining the presence of the required witnesses even
before the offenders could escape.
In this case, IO1 Orellan testified that no members of the media and barangay officials arrived at the
crime scene because it was late at night and it was raining, making it unsafe for them to wait at Lim's house.
IO2 Orcales similarly declared that the inventory was made in the PDEA office considering that it was late in
the evening and there were no available media representative and barangay officials despite their effort to
contact them. He admitted that there are times when they do not inform the barangay officials prior to their
operation as they might leak the confidential information.

G.R. No. 198389               December 11, 2013

VIVENCIO ROALLOS y TRILLANES, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

The Facts
Roallos was charged in an Information5 for the crime of sexual abuse under Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No.
7610, docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-02-108825 before the RTC, viz:
The undersigned accuses VIVENCIO ROALLOS Y TRILLANES of the crime of Acts of Lasciviousness in
relation to Sec. 5(b)[,] Art. III of R.A. 7610, committed as follows:
That on or about the 15th day of April, 2002, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused, with lewd design,
by means of force and intimidation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously commit acts of
lasciviousness upon the person of one [AAA]6, a minor, 15 years of age, by then and there mashing her breast
and kissing her cheek, against her will which act debases, degrades or demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity
of said [AAA] as a human being.
CONTRARY TO LAW.7
Upon arraignment, Roallos pleaded "not guilty" to the offense charged.8 On June 24, 2002, the pre-trial
conference was deemed terminated. Trial on the merits ensued thereafter.9
Roallos, a retired officer of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, was the Executive Director of the Aguinaldo
Vets and Associates Credit Cooperative (AVACC). BBB, AAA’s mother, worked as the secretary and treasurer
of Roallos.
On April 15, 2002, at around 1:00 p.m., AAA went to BBB’s office at Camp Aguinaldo, Quezon City; BBB,
however, was then out running office errands. AAA decided to stay in her mother’s office and wait for the latter
to return. At that time, two women were talking to Roallos inside the AVACC office.
4
AAA alleged that, after the two women left, Roallos went by the door of the office, looked outside to see if
anybody was around, and then locked it. He then approached AAA and asked her if there was any pain
bothering her; the latter replied that her tooth ached. Thereupon, Roallos held AAA’s hand and intermittently
pressed it. He then asked AAA if there is anything else aching in her body. AAA said none. Roallos then placed
his left hand on the table while his right hand was on AAA’s right shoulder. At this point, AAA was seated on a
chair without a backrest while Roallos was standing behind her. Roallos then slid his hand towards AAA’s right
breast and mashed it. AAA asked Roallos why he is touching her. Roallos ignored her. He then mashed AAA’s
left breast. AAA shouted "Ano ba!," but Roallos still ignored her and, instead slid his hand towards AAA’s
abdomen. AAA then stomped her feet and pushed her chair towards Roallos. Roallos then left the office.
Thinking that her mother would soon return, AAA stayed inside the office. However, after about ten minutes,
Roallos returned to the office and approached AAA. He then asked AAA if she was hungry, the latter told him
that she would just wait for BBB to return. Roallos then offered to give money to AAA for her to buy food, but
the latter refused the offer. AAA then felt Roallos’ body pressing against her back. Thereafter, Roallos
attempted to kiss AAA. AAA was unable to escape as there was no space in front of her; she just turned her
face to avoid his kiss. He then held AAA’s right cheek, pulled her face towards him, and kissed her left cheek.
AAA then stomped her feet, still trying to free herself from the grasp of Roallos. Roallos then left the office. This
time, AAA decided to stay outside the AVACC office and wait for her mother to return.
Upon her return to the office, BBB saw AAA crying. She asked AAA why she was crying. AAA then relayed
what Roallos did to her. BBB then confronted Roallos about the incident. Roallos, however, denied having
done anything to AAA. BBB and AAA thereafter left the office. However, BBB saw that Roallos was following
them. Fearing that Roallos would do something to harm them, BBB and AAA immediately entered the office of
the Department of National Defense (DND) in Camp Aguinaldo. They were then advised by the employees
therein to go to DND’s legal department office, where they were advised to report the incident to the police
authorities.
AAA and BBB went to the police station where a report regarding the incident was prepared. They then
referred the report to the provost marshal for proper coordination and to effect the arrest of the accused.
Thereafter, the police and the provost marshal brought Roallos to the police station for investigation.
In his defense, Roallos denied that he molested AAA. He claimed that, on the date of the incident, he merely
stayed with AAA in the AVACC office while the latter waited for her mother; that he went out of the office twice
to meet clients of AVACC. Roallos further claimed that his arrest was illegal since the same was effected sans
any warrant of arrest. He likewise averred that he was not informed of his rights when he was arrested nor was
he made to undergo any preliminary investigation.
On July 26, 2007, the RTC rendered a Decision10 finding Roallos guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation
of Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610, viz:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused VIVENCIO ROALLOS Y TRILLANES is hereby found GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 5 (b) of Republic Act 7610 and he is hereby sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty of EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor medium as minimum to
SEVENTEEN (17) YEARS FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of reclusion temporal maximum as
maximum; to indemnify [AAA] in the amount of [P]20,000.00 by way of moral damages; and pay the fine of
[P]15,000.00.
SO ORDERED.11
Roallos’ Amended Motion for Reconsideration12 was denied by the RTC in its Order13 dated June 30, 2008.
On appeal, the CA rendered the Decision dated April 29, 2011 which affirmed the RTC Decision dated July 26,
2007, albeit with the modification that the awards of moral damages and civil indemnity were both increased to
₱50,000.00.
Roallos sought a reconsideration of the CA Decision dated April 29, 2011,14 but it was likewise denied by the
CA in its Resolution15 dated August 19, 2011.
In support of the instant petition, Roallos claims that the CA erred in affirming his conviction considering that
the Information filed against him was defective since it charged two crimes, i.e., acts of lasciviousness under
Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) and sexual abuse under Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610.
He further argues that he was denied due process as he was not made to undergo a preliminary investigation.
Roallos also asserts that his arrest was illegal considering that the same was effected sans any warrant of
arrest. Moreover, he alleges that the charge against him should have been dismissed considering the
unreasonable delay in the prosecution of the case.
Further, Roallos avers that the charge against him was defective since neither AAA nor BBB signed the
Information that was filed against him and, thus, Roallos claims that the prosecutor had no authority to file the
said Information and, accordingly, the charge against him was defective.

5
Furthermore, Roallos alleges that the offense of sexual abuse under Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610
only applies when the victim is a child engaged in prostitution or when they indulge in lascivious conduct due to
the coercion of an adult or a syndicate. Thus, he claims that he is not liable for sexual abuse under Section
5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610 since AAA is not a child engaged in prostitution. In any case, he avers that the
evidence adduced by the prosecution is not sufficient to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the
offense charged.
Issue
Essentially, the issue presented for the Court’s resolution is whether the CA erred in affirming Roallos’
conviction for the offense of sexual abuse under Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610.
The Court’s Ruling
The petition is bereft of any merit.
First, Roallos’ claim that the Information filed against him is duplicitous as it charged him with the commission
of two crimes is plainly untenable. The designation of the crime in the Information is clear – Roallos was
charged with the crime of acts of lasciviousness in relation to Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610.
The mention of the phrase "acts of lasciviousness" in the Information does not mean that Roallos was charged
with the felony of acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC. The charge of acts of lasciviousness
against Roallos is specifically delimited to that committed in relation to Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610.
In any case, "the real nature of the criminal charge is determined not from the caption or preamble of the
information, or from the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, which are mere
conclusions of law, but by the actual recital of the facts in the complaint or information."16
The recital of the ultimate facts and circumstances in the Information that was filed against Roallos clearly
makes out a case for the offense of sexual abuse under Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610. The elements
of sexual abuse under Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610 are as follows:
1. The accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct[;]
2. The [said] act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse[; and]
3. The child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age.17
The Information that was filed against Roallos alleged that he committed lascivious acts towards AAA, i.e., that
he mashed the breasts and kissed the cheeks of the latter. It likewise alleged that AAA, at the time she was
subjected to sexual abuse by Roallos, was only 15 years of age. Clearly, all the elements of sexual abuse
under Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610 are set out in the Information that was filed against Roallos.
In this regard, the Court likewise finds that the CA and the RTC did not err in finding Roallos criminally liable for
violation of Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610. It is undisputed that AAA was only 15 years old at the time
of the incident. Further, the prosecution was able to establish beyond reasonable doubt the committed
lascivious conduct towards AAA, who is a child subjected to sexual abuse within the purview of Section 5(b),
Article III of R.A. No. 7610.
That Roallos did in fact commit lascivious conduct towards AAA is a finding of fact by the lower courts, which
this Court cannot simply disregard. In a criminal case, factual findings of the trial court are generally accorded
great weight and respect on appeal, especially when such findings are supported by substantial evidence on
record. It is only in exceptional circumstances, such as when the trial court overlooked material and relevant
matters, that this Court will re-calibrate and evaluate the factual findings of the court below.18 The Court finds
no reason to overturn the factual findings as the lower courts in this case.
Roallos’ assertion that he is not liable for sexual abuse under Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610 since
AAA is not a child engaged in prostitution is plainly without merit. "[T]he law covers not only a situation in which
a child is abused for profit but also one in which a child, through coercion or intimidation, engages in any
lascivious conduct. The very title of Section 5, Article III (Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse) of R.A.
No. 7610 shows that it applies not only to a child subjected to prostitution but also to a child subjected to other
sexual abuse. A child is deemed subjected to "other sexual abuse" when he or she indulges in lascivious
conduct under the coercion or influence of any adult."19
Second, Roallos’ claim that he was denied due process since he was arrested without any warrant of arrest
and that he was not afforded a preliminary investigation is likewise untenable. In Miclat, Jr. v. People,20 the
Court emphasized that the accused is estopped from assailing any irregularity attending his arrest should he
fail to move for the quashal of the information against him on this ground prior to arraignment, viz:
At the outset, it is apparent that petitioner raised no objection to the irregularity of his arrest before his
arraignment. Considering this and his active participation in the trial of the case, jurisprudence dictates that
petitioner is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial court, thereby curing any defect in his
6
arrest. An accused is estopped from assailing any irregularity of his arrest if he fails to raise this issue or to
move for the quashal of the information against him on this ground before arraignment. Any objection involving
a warrant of arrest or the procedure by which the court acquired jurisdiction over the person of the accused
must be made before he enters his plea; otherwise, the objection is deemed waived.21 (Citations omitted and
emphasis ours)
Similarly, in Villarin v. People,22 the Court stressed that the absence of a proper preliminary investigation must
be timely raised. The accused is deemed to have waived his right to a preliminary investigation by entering his
plea and actively participating in the trial without raising the lack of a preliminary investigation. Thus:
Moreover, the absence of a proper preliminary investigation must be timely raised and must not have been
waived. This is to allow the trial court to hold the case in abeyance and conduct its own investigation or require
the prosecutor to hold a reinvestigation, which, necessarily "involves a re-examination and re-evaluation of the
evidence already submitted by the complainant and the accused, as well as the initial finding of probable cause
which led to the filing of the Informations after the requisite preliminary investigation."
Here, it is conceded that Villarin raised the issue of lack of a preliminary investigation in his Motion for
Reinvestigation. However, when the Ombudsman denied the motion, he never raised this issue again. He
accepted the Ombudsman’s verdict, entered a plea of not guilty during his arraignment and actively
participated in the trial on the merits by attending the scheduled hearings, conducting cross-examinations and
testifying on his own behalf. It was only after the trial court rendered judgment against him that he once again
assailed the conduct of the preliminary investigation in the Motion for Reconsideration. Whatever argument
Villarin may have regarding the alleged absence of a preliminary investigation has therefore been mooted. By
entering his plea, and actively participating in the trial, he is deemed to have waived his right to preliminary
investigation.23 (Citations omitted and emphases ours)
It is undisputed that, at the time of his arraignment, Roallos did not raise any objection to the supposed
illegality of his arrest and the lack of a proper preliminary investigation. Indeed, he actively participated in the
proceedings before the RTC. Thus, he is deemed to have waived any perceived irregularity in his arrest and
has effectively submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the RTC. He is likewise deemed to have waived his right
to preliminary investigation.
Third, Roallos failed to substantiate his claim that his right to speedy trial was violated.1âwphi1 The right to
speedy trial is violated only when the proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious and oppressive
delays. In the determination of whether said right has been violated, particular regard must be taken of the
facts and circumstances peculiar to each case. The conduct of both the prosecution and defendant, the length
of the delay, the reasons for such delay, the assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused, and the
prejudice caused by the delay are the factors to consider and balance.24 In order for the government to
sustain its right to try the accused despite a delay, it must show two things: first, that the accused suffered no
serious prejudice beyond that which ensued from the ordinary and inevitable delay; and second, that there was
no more delay that is reasonably attributable to the ordinary processes of justice.25
As aptly ruled by the CA, Roallos failed to show that the proceedings below were attended by vexatious,
capricious, and oppressive delays. The postponements sought for by the prosecution did not, in any way,
seriously prejudice Roallos. If at all, the delay in the proceedings below is only attributable to the ordinary
processes of justice.
Lastly, that neither AAA nor BBB signed the Information filed against Roallos would not render the charge
against the latter defective; it does not signify that they did not conform to the filing of the Information against
Roallos. AAA and BBB vigorously pursued the indictment against Roallos. Likewise, contrary to Roallos’ claim,
AAA executed a complaint-affidavit for the indictment of Roallos.26 The foregoing circumstances clearly
indicate the conformity of both AAA and BBB to the charge against Roallos.
For acts of lasciviousness performed on a child under Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610, the penalty
prescribed is reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua. Notwithstanding that R.A. No.
7610 is a special law, Roallos may enjoy the benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence Law. Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, Roallos shall be entitled to a minimum term to be taken within the range of the
penalty next lower to that prescribed by R.A. No. 7610. The penalty next lower in degree is prision mayor
medium to reclusion temporal minimum, the range of which is from eight (8) years and one (1) day to fourteen
(14) years and eight (8) months. On the other hand, the maximum term of the penalty should be taken from the
penalty prescribed under Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610, which is reclusion temporal in its medium
period to reclusion perpetua, the range of which is from fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day
to reclusion perpetua. The minimum, medium and maximum term of the same is as follows: minimum –
fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months; medium –
seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to twenty (20) years; and maximum – reclusion
perpetua.27
Considering that there are neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstances extant in this case, both the RTC
and the CA correctly imposed on Roallos the indeterminate penalty of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision
7
mayor medium as the minimum term to seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of reclusion
temporal as the maximum term. The Court likewise upholds the fine imposed by the lower courts in the amount
of ₱15,000.00.
Nevertheless, the Court hereby modifies the amount of moral damages and civil indemnity awarded by the
CA.1âwphi1 The RTC directed Roallos to pay AAA moral damages in the amount of ₱20,000.00. The CA
increased the amount of moral damages awarded by the RTC to ₱50,000.00 and imposed an additional award
for civil indemnity in the amount of ₱50,000.00. In line with recent jurisprudence,28 the Court deems it proper
to reduce the award of moral damages from ₱50,000.00 to ₱15,000.00, as well as the award of civil indemnity
from ₱50,000.00 to ₱20,000.00.
In addition, and in conformity with current policy, the Court imposes interest on all monetary awards for
damages at the rate of six percent ( 6%) per annum from the date of finality of this Resolution until fully paid.29
WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing disquisitions, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated April
29, 2011 and the Resolution dated August 19, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 32192 are
hereby AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION in that Vivencio Roallos y Trillanes is ordered to pay ₱15,000.00 as
moral damages and ₱20,000.00 as civil indemnity. He is likewise ordered to pay interest on all monetary
awards for damages at the rate of six percent ( 6%) per annum from the date of finality of this Resolution until
fully satisfied.
SO ORDERED.

Roallos vs People

The Facts

Roallos was charged in an Information5 for the crime of sexual abuse under Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No.
7610, docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-02-108825 before the RTC, viz:

The undersigned accuses VIVENCIO ROALLOS Y TRILLANES of the crime of Acts of Lasciviousness in
relation to Sec. 5(b)[,] Art. III of R.A. 7610, committed as follows:

That on or about the 15th day of April, 2002, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused, with lewd design,
by means of force and intimidation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously commit acts of
lasciviousness upon the person of one [AAA] 6, a minor, 15 years of age, by then and there mashing her breast
and kissing her cheek, against her will which act debases, degrades or demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity
of said [AAA] as a human being.

CONTRARY TO LAW.7

Upon arraignment, Roallos pleaded "not guilty" to the offense charged.8 On June 24, 2002, the pre-trial
conference was deemed terminated. Trial on the merits ensued thereafter.9

Roallos, a retired officer of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, was the Executive Director of the Aguinaldo
Vets and Associates Credit Cooperative (AVACC). BBB, AAA’s mother, worked as the secretary and treasurer
of Roallos.

On April 15, 2002, at around 1:00 p.m., AAA went to BBB’s office at Camp Aguinaldo, Quezon City; BBB,
however, was then out running office errands. AAA decided to stay in her mother’s office and wait for the latter
to return. At that time, two women were talking to Roallos inside the AVACC office.

AAA alleged that, after the two women left, Roallos went by the door of the office, looked outside to see if
anybody was around, and then locked it. He then approached AAA and asked her if there was any pain
bothering her; the latter replied that her tooth ached. Thereupon, Roallos held AAA’s hand and intermittently
pressed it. He then asked AAA if there is anything else aching in her body. AAA said none. Roallos then placed
his left hand on the table while his right hand was on AAA’s right shoulder. At this point, AAA was seated on a
chair without a backrest while Roallos was standing behind her. Roallos then slid his hand towards AAA’s right
breast and mashed it. AAA asked Roallos why he is touching her. Roallos ignored her. He then mashed AAA’s
left breast. AAA shouted "Ano ba!," but Roallos still ignored her and, instead slid his hand towards AAA’s
abdomen. AAA then stomped her feet and pushed her chair towards Roallos. Roallos then left the office.

Thinking that her mother would soon return, AAA stayed inside the office. However, after about ten minutes,
Roallos returned to the office and approached AAA. He then asked AAA if she was hungry, the latter told him

8
that she would just wait for BBB to return. Roallos then offered to give money to AAA for her to buy food, but
the latter refused the offer. AAA then felt Roallos’ body pressing against her back. Thereafter, Roallos
attempted to kiss AAA. AAA was unable to escape as there was no space in front of her; she just turned her
face to avoid his kiss. He then held AAA’s right cheek, pulled her face towards him, and kissed her left cheek.
AAA then stomped her feet, still trying to free herself from the grasp of Roallos. Roallos then left the office. This
time, AAA decided to stay outside the AVACC office and wait for her mother to return.

Upon her return to the office, BBB saw AAA crying. She asked AAA why she was crying. AAA then relayed
what Roallos did to her. BBB then confronted Roallos about the incident. Roallos, however, denied having
done anything to AAA. BBB and AAA thereafter left the office. However, BBB saw that Roallos was following
them. Fearing that Roallos would do something to harm them, BBB and AAA immediately entered the office of
the Department of National Defense (DND) in Camp Aguinaldo. They were then advised by the employees
therein to go to DND’s legal department office, where they were advised to report the incident to the police
authorities.

AAA and BBB went to the police station where a report regarding the incident was prepared. They then
referred the report to the provost marshal for proper coordination and to effect the arrest of the accused.
Thereafter, the police and the provost marshal brought Roallos to the police station for investigation.

In his defense, Roallos denied that he molested AAA. He claimed that, on the date of the incident, he merely
stayed with AAA in the AVACC office while the latter waited for her mother; that he went out of the office twice
to meet clients of AVACC. Roallos further claimed that his arrest was illegal since the same was
effected sans any warrant of arrest. He likewise averred that he was not informed of his rights when he was
arrested nor was he made to undergo any preliminary investigation.

On July 26, 2007, the RTC rendered a Decision 10 finding Roallos guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of
Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610, viz:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused VIVENCIO ROALLOS Y TRILLANES is hereby found GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 5 (b) of Republic Act 7610 and he is hereby sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty of EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor medium as minimum to
SEVENTEEN (17) YEARS FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of reclusion temporal maximum as
maximum; to indemnify [AAA] in the amount of [P]20,000.00 by way of moral damages; and pay the fine of
[P]15,000.00.

SO ORDERED.11

Roallos’ Amended Motion for Reconsideration12 was denied by the RTC in its Order13 dated June 30, 2008.

On appeal, the CA rendered the Decision dated April 29, 2011 which affirmed the RTC Decision dated July 26,
2007, albeit with the modification that the awards of moral damages and civil indemnity were both increased to
₱50,000.00.

Roallos sought a reconsideration of the CA Decision dated April 29, 2011, 14 but it was likewise denied by the
CA in its Resolution15 dated August 19, 2011.

In support of the instant petition, Roallos claims that the CA erred in affirming his conviction considering that
the Information filed against him was defective since it charged two crimes, i.e., acts of lasciviousness under
Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) and sexual abuse under Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610.
He further argues that he was denied due process as he was not made to undergo a preliminary investigation.
Roallos also asserts that his arrest was illegal considering that the same was effected sans any warrant of
arrest. Moreover, he alleges that the charge against him should have been dismissed considering the
unreasonable delay in the prosecution of the case.

Further, Roallos avers that the charge against him was defective since neither AAA nor BBB signed the
Information that was filed against him and, thus, Roallos claims that the prosecutor had no authority to file the
said Information and, accordingly, the charge against him was defective.

Furthermore, Roallos alleges that the offense of sexual abuse under Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610
only applies when the victim is a child engaged in prostitution or when they indulge in lascivious conduct due to
the coercion of an adult or a syndicate. Thus, he claims that he is not liable for sexual abuse under Section
5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610 since AAA is not a child engaged in prostitution. In any case, he avers that the
evidence adduced by the prosecution is not sufficient to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the
offense charged.

9
Issue

Essentially, the issue presented for the Court’s resolution is whether the CA erred in affirming Roallos’
conviction for the offense of sexual abuse under Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610.

The Court’s Ruling

The petition is bereft of any merit.

First, Roallos’ claim that the Information filed against him is duplicitous as it charged him with the commission
of two crimes is plainly untenable. The designation of the crime in the Information is clear – Roallos was
charged with the crime of acts of lasciviousness in relation to Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610.

The mention of the phrase "acts of lasciviousness" in the Information does not mean that Roallos was charged
with the felony of acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC. The charge of acts of lasciviousness
against Roallos is specifically delimited to that committed in relation to Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610.

In any case, "the real nature of the criminal charge is determined not from the caption or preamble of the
information, or from the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, which are mere
conclusions of law, but by the actual recital of the facts in the complaint or information."16

The recital of the ultimate facts and circumstances in the Information that was filed against Roallos clearly
makes out a case for the offense of sexual abuse under Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610. The elements
of sexual abuse under Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610 are as follows:

1. The accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct[;]

2. The [said] act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual
abuse[; and]

3. The child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age.17

(Emphasis supplied)

The Information that was filed against Roallos alleged that he committed lascivious acts towards AAA, i.e., that
he mashed the breasts and kissed the cheeks of the latter. It likewise alleged that AAA, at the time she was
subjected to sexual abuse by Roallos, was only 15 years of age. Clearly, all the elements of sexual abuse
under Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610 are set out in the Information that was filed against Roallos.

In this regard, the Court likewise finds that the CA and the RTC did not err in finding Roallos criminally liable for
violation of Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610. It is undisputed that AAA was only 15 years old at the time
of the incident. Further, the prosecution was able to establish beyond reasonable doubt the committed
lascivious conduct towards AAA, who is a child subjected to sexual abuse within the purview of Section 5(b),
Article III of R.A. No. 7610.

That Roallos did in fact commit lascivious conduct towards AAA is a finding of fact by the lower courts, which
this Court cannot simply disregard. In a criminal case, factual findings of the trial court are generally accorded
great weight and respect on appeal, especially when such findings are supported by substantial evidence on
record. It is only in exceptional circumstances, such as when the trial court overlooked material and relevant
matters, that this Court will re-calibrate and evaluate the factual findings of the court below. 18 The Court finds
no reason to overturn the factual findings as the lower courts in this case.

Roallos’ assertion that he is not liable for sexual abuse under Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610 since
AAA is not a child engaged in prostitution is plainly without merit. "[T]he law covers not only a situation in which
a child is abused for profit but also one in which a child, through coercion or intimidation, engages in any
lascivious conduct. The very title of Section 5, Article III (Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse) of R.A.
No. 7610 shows that it applies not only to a child subjected to prostitution but also to a child subjected to other
sexual abuse. A child is deemed subjected to "other sexual abuse" when he or she indulges in lascivious
conduct under the coercion or influence of any adult."19

Second, Roallos’ claim that he was denied due process since he was arrested without any warrant of arrest
and that he was not afforded a preliminary investigation is likewise untenable. In Miclat, Jr. v. People,20 the
Court emphasized that the accused is estopped from assailing any irregularity attending his arrest should he
fail to move for the quashal of the information against him on this ground prior to arraignment, viz:
10
At the outset, it is apparent that petitioner raised no objection to the irregularity of his arrest before his
arraignment. Considering this and his active participation in the trial of the case, jurisprudence
dictates that petitioner is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial court, thereby curing
any defect in his arrest. An accused is estopped from assailing any irregularity of his arrest if he fails to raise
this issue or to move for the quashal of the information against him on this ground before arraignment. Any
objection involving a warrant of arrest or the procedure by which the court acquired jurisdiction over the person
of the accused must be made before he enters his plea; otherwise, the objection is deemed
waived.21 (Citations omitted and emphasis ours)

Similarly, in Villarin v. People,22 the Court stressed that the absence of a proper preliminary investigation must
be timely raised. The accused is deemed to have waived his right to a preliminary investigation by entering his
plea and actively participating in the trial without raising the lack of a preliminary investigation. Thus:

Moreover, the absence of a proper preliminary investigation must be timely raised and must not have
been waived. This is to allow the trial court to hold the case in abeyance and conduct its own investigation or
require the prosecutor to hold a reinvestigation, which, necessarily "involves a re-examination and re-
evaluation of the evidence already submitted by the complainant and the accused, as well as the initial finding
of probable cause which led to the filing of the Informations after the requisite preliminary investigation."

Here, it is conceded that Villarin raised the issue of lack of a preliminary investigation in his Motion for
Reinvestigation. However, when the Ombudsman denied the motion, he never raised this issue again. He
accepted the Ombudsman’s verdict, entered a plea of not guilty during his arraignment and actively
participated in the trial on the merits by attending the scheduled hearings, conducting cross-examinations and
testifying on his own behalf. It was only after the trial court rendered judgment against him that he once again
assailed the conduct of the preliminary investigation in the Motion for Reconsideration. Whatever argument
Villarin may have regarding the alleged absence of a preliminary investigation has therefore been mooted. By
entering his plea, and actively participating in the trial, he is deemed to have waived his right to
preliminary investigation.23 (Citations omitted and emphases ours)

It is undisputed that, at the time of his arraignment, Roallos did not raise any objection to the supposed
illegality of his arrest and the lack of a proper preliminary investigation. Indeed, he actively participated in the
proceedings before the RTC. Thus, he is deemed to have waived any perceived irregularity in his arrest and
has effectively submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the RTC. He is likewise deemed to have waived his right
to preliminary investigation.

Third, Roallos failed to substantiate his claim that his right to speedy trial was violated.1âwphi1 The right to
speedy trial is violated only when the proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious and oppressive
delays. In the determination of whether said right has been violated, particular regard must be taken of the
facts and circumstances peculiar to each case. The conduct of both the prosecution and defendant, the length
of the delay, the reasons for such delay, the assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused, and the
prejudice caused by the delay are the factors to consider and balance. 24 In order for the government to sustain
its right to try the accused despite a delay, it must show two things: first, that the accused suffered no serious
prejudice beyond that which ensued from the ordinary and inevitable delay; and second, that there was no
more delay that is reasonably attributable to the ordinary processes of justice.25

As aptly ruled by the CA, Roallos failed to show that the proceedings below were attended by vexatious,
capricious, and oppressive delays. The postponements sought for by the prosecution did not, in any way,
seriously prejudice Roallos. If at all, the delay in the proceedings below is only attributable to the ordinary
processes of justice.

Lastly, that neither AAA nor BBB signed the Information filed against Roallos would not render the charge
against the latter defective; it does not signify that they did not conform to the filing of the Information against
Roallos. AAA and BBB vigorously pursued the indictment against Roallos. Likewise, contrary to Roallos’ claim,
AAA executed a complaint-affidavit for the indictment of Roallos. 26 The foregoing circumstances clearly
indicate the conformity of both AAA and BBB to the charge against Roallos.

For acts of lasciviousness performed on a child under Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610, the penalty
prescribed is reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua. Notwithstanding that R.A. No.
7610 is a special law, Roallos may enjoy the benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence Law. Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, Roallos shall be entitled to a minimum term to be taken within the range of the
penalty next lower to that prescribed by R.A. No. 7610. The penalty next lower in degree is prision
mayor medium to reclusion temporal minimum, the range of which is from eight (8) years and one (1) day to
fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months. On the other hand, the maximum term of the penalty should be taken
from the penalty prescribed under Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610, which is reclusion temporal in its
medium period to reclusion perpetua, the range of which is from fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one
11
(1) day to reclusion perpetua. The minimum, medium and maximum term of the same is as follows: minimum –
fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months; medium –
seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to twenty (20) years; and maximum – reclusion
perpetua.27

Considering that there are neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstances extant in this case, both the RTC
and the CA correctly imposed on Roallos the indeterminate penalty of eight (8) years and one (1) day
of prision mayor medium as the minimum term to seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day
of reclusion temporal as the maximum term. The Court likewise upholds the fine imposed by the lower courts
in the amount of ₱15,000.00.

Nevertheless, the Court hereby modifies the amount of moral damages and civil indemnity awarded by the
CA.1âwphi1 The RTC directed Roallos to pay AAA moral damages in the amount of ₱20,000.00. The CA
increased the amount of moral damages awarded by the RTC to ₱50,000.00 and imposed an additional award
for civil indemnity in the amount of ₱50,000.00. In line with recent jurisprudence, 28 the Court deems it proper to
reduce the award of moral damages from ₱50,000.00 to ₱15,000.00, as well as the award of civil indemnity
from ₱50,000.00 to ₱20,000.00.

In addition, and in conformity with current policy, the Court imposes interest on all monetary awards for
damages at the rate of six percent ( 6%) per annum from the date of finality of this Resolution until fully paid.29

WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing disquisitions, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated April
29, 2011 and the Resolution dated August 19, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 32192 are
hereby AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION in that Vivencio Roallos y Trillanes is ordered to pay ₱15,000.00 as
moral damages and ₱20,000.00 as civil indemnity. He is likewise ordered to pay interest on all monetary
awards for damages at the rate of six percent ( 6%) per annum from the date of finality of this Resolution until
fully satisfied.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 200304               January 15, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,  vs. DONALD VASQUEZ y SANDIGAN @

"DON," Accused-Appellant,

FACTS: This is an appeal from the Decision of CA which affirmed the joint decision of RTC in a consolidated
case, convicting the appellant Donald Vasquez y Sandigan (Don) of the crimes of illegal sale and illegal
possession of regulated drugs. Initially the case of illegal possession of drugs was raffled but upon motion it
was consolidated with the case of illegal sale of drugs. On arraignment, the appellant pleaded not guilty to both
charges. The pre-trial conference of the cases was held, but the same was terminated without the parties
entering into any stipulation of facts. During the trial of the case the prosecution stated the events. There was a
confidential informant reported to PO2 Trambulo about the illegal drug activities. Fajardo form a buy-bust team.
It was in the buy-bust operation that Don was arrested. RTC convicted the appellant of the crimes charged.
The RTC gave more credence to the prosecution’s evidence given that the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duty on the part of the police officers was not overcome. On appeal the Court of
Appeals affirmed the conviction of the appellant. Hence this appeal. He argues that the police officers did not
have a search warrant or a warrant of arrest at the time he was arrested. This occurred despite the fact that the
police officers allegedly had ample time to secure a warrant of arrest against him. Inasmuch as his arrest was
illegal, the appellant avers that the evidence obtained as a result thereof was inadmissible in court.
ISSUE: Whether the appellant Don may assail the validity of arrest.
RULING: NO. At the outset, the Court rules that the appellant can no longer assail the validity of his arrest. We
reiterated in People v. Tampis52 that "[a]ny objection, defect or irregularity attending an arrest must be made
before the accused enters his plea on arraignment. Having failed to move for the quashing of the information
against them before their arraignment, appellants are now estopped from questioning the legality of their
arrest. Any irregularity was cured upon their voluntary submission to the trial court’s jurisdiction."53 Be that as
it may, the fact of the matter is that the appellant was caught in flagrante delicto of selling illegal drugs to an
undercover police officer in a buy-bust operation. His arrest, thus, falls within the ambit of Section 5(a), Rule
11354 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure when an arrest made without warrant is deemed lawful.
Having established the validity of the warrantless arrest in this case, the Court holds that the warrantless
seizure of the illegal drugs from the appellant is likewise valid. We held in People v. Cabugatan55 that:
This interdiction against warrantless searches and seizures, however, is not absolute and such warrantless
searches and seizures have long been deemed permissible by jurisprudence in instances of (1) search of
moving vehicles, (2) seizure in plain view, (3) customs searches, (4) waiver or consented searches, (5) stop
12
 and frisk situations (Terry search), and search incidental to a lawful arrest. The last includes a valid warrantless
arrest, for, while as a rule, an arrest is considered legitimate [if] effected with a valid warrant of arrest, the
Rules of Court recognize permissible warrantless arrest, to wit: (1) arrest in flagrante delicto, (2) arrest effected
in hot pursuit, and (3) arrest of escaped prisoners. (Citation omitted.)
Thus, the appellant cannot seek exculpation by invoking belatedly the invalidity of his arrest and the
subsequent search upon his person.
Miranda v. Arizona

Facts

The Supreme Court’s decision in Miranda v. Arizona addressed four different cases involving custodial
interrogations. In each of these cases, the defendant was questioned by police officers, detectives, or a
prosecuting attorney in a room in which he was cut off from the outside world. In none of these cases was the
defendant given a full and effective warning of his rights at the outset of the interrogation process. In all the
cases, the questioning elicited oral admissions and, in three of them, signed statements that were admitted at
trial.

 Miranda v. Arizona: Miranda was arrested at his home and taken in custody to a police station where
he was identified by the complaining witness. He was then interrogated by two police officers for two hours,
which resulted in a signed, written confession. At trial, the oral and written confessions were presented to the
jury. Miranda was found guilty of kidnapping and rape and was sentenced to 20-30 years imprisonment on
each count. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Arizona held that Miranda’s constitutional rights were not
violated in obtaining the confession.
 Vignera v. New York: Vignera was picked up by New York police in connection with the robbery of a
dress shop that had occurred three days prior. He was first taken to the 17th Detective Squad headquarters.
He was then taken to the 66th Detective Squad, where he orally admitted the robbery and was placed under
formal arrest. He was then taken to the 70th Precinct for detention, where he was questioned by an assistant
district attorney in the presence of a hearing reporter who transcribed the questions and answers. At trial, the
oral confession and the transcript were presented to the jury. Vignera was found guilty of first degree robbery
and sentenced to 30-60 years imprisonment. The conviction was affirmed without opinion by the Appellate
Division and the Court of Appeals.
 Westover v. United States: Westover was arrested by local police in Kansas City as a suspect in two
Kansas City robberies and taken to a local police station. A report was also received from the FBI that
Westover was wanted on a felony charge in California. Westover was interrogated the night of the arrest and
the next morning by local police. Then, FBI agents continued the interrogation at the station. After two-and-a-
half hours of interrogation by the FBI, Westover signed separate confessions, which had been prepared by one
of the agents during the interrogation, to each of the two robberies in California. These statements were
introduced at trial. Westover was convicted of the California robberies and sentenced to 15 years’
imprisonment on each count. The conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
 California v. Stewart: In the course of investigating a series of purse-snatch robberies in which one of
the victims died of injuries inflicted by her assailant, Stewart was identified as the endorser of checks stolen in
one of the robberies. Steward was arrested at his home. Police also arrested Stewart’s wife and three other
people who were visiting him. Stewart was placed in a cell, and, over the next five days, was interrogated on
nine different occasions. During the ninth interrogation session, Stewart stated that he had robbed the
deceased, but had not meant to hurt her. At that time, police released the four other people arrested with
Stewart because there was no evidence to connect any of them with the crime. At trial, Stewart’s statements
were introduced. Stewart was convicted of robbery and first-degree murder and sentenced to death. The
Supreme Court of California reversed, holding that Stewart should have been advised of his right to remain
silent and his right to counsel.

Issues

Whether “statements obtained from an individual who is subjected to custodial police interrogation” are
admissible against him in a criminal trial and whether “procedures which assure that the individual is accorded
his privilege under the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution not to be compelled to incriminate himself” are
necessary.

Supreme Court holding

The Court held that “there can be no doubt that the Fifth Amendment privilege is available outside of criminal
court proceedings and serves to protect persons in all settings in which their freedom of action is curtailed in
any significant way from being compelled to incriminate themselves.” As such, “the prosecution may not use
statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless
13
it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination. By
custodial interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been
taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.”

The Court further held that “without proper safeguards the process of in-custody interrogation of persons
suspected or accused of crime contains inherently compelling pressures which work to undermine the
individual’s will to resist and to compel him to speak where he would otherwise do so freely.” Therefore, a
defendant “must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says
can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he
cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires.”

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Supreme Court of Arizona in Miranda, reversed the judgment
of the New York Court of Appeals in Vignera, reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit in Westover, and affirmed the judgment of the Supreme Court of California in Stewart.

Argued: Feb. 28, March 1 and 2, 1966

Decided: June 13, 1966

Vote: 5-4

Majority opinion written by Chief Justice Warren and joined by Justices Black, Douglas, Brennan, and Fortas.

Dissenting opinion written by Justice Harlan and joined by Justices Stewart and White.

Dissenting in part opinion written by Justice Clark.

Follow-Up

Miranda v. Arizona: After Miranda’s conviction was overturned by the Supreme Court, the State of Arizona
retried him. At the second trial, Miranda’s confession was not introduced into evidence. Miranda was once
again convicted and sentenced to 20-30 years in prison.

PEOPLE V. CAPITLE
G.R. No. 175330, January 12, 2011

FACTS:
Brgy. Chairman Avelino Pagalunan was gunned down by four men at Orambo Drive, Orambo Pasig in Aug. 6,
1993 at 7:40am. This was witnessed by Ruiz Constantino and Solomon Molino which were identified by Arturo
Nagares as one of the four gun men. Other witnessed also identified Arturo Nagares as the gun men. Under
detention at the NBI, Arturo Nagares executed an extrajudicial confession to the killing of Brgy. Chairman
before Atty. Orlando Dizon which was assisted by Atty. Galang, in his confession he is pointing to Vice Mayor
Anching De Guzman as mastermind and Rodolfi Capile a.k.a Putol, Elymar Santos and John Doe as his
cohorts in the killing of Brgy. Chairman. Solomon Molino in his third affidavit identified Ramil Marquina and
Rodolfo Capitle part of the gunmen. Criminall charges were filed against Rodolfo Capitle , Arturo Nagares and
Ramil Marquina. During trial the accused offered an alibi as a defense. Nagares said he was sleeping at the
house of his sister and was suffering for fever due to boil and was treated at Rizal Medical Center and claimed
that he was violated, forced coerced and tortured into admitting the crime. At the trial court found the guilty
beyond reasonable doubt except for Ramil Marquina. The Trial court did not give credit to the alibis of the
accused and did not find any violation on Nagares constitutional right since he was assisted by an independent
and effective counsel during the custodial investigation. They elevated the case to the CA but CA affirmed the
decision of the RTC and found no reversible error in the appealed judgement.
ISSUE: Whether or not the constitutional rights of appellants were violated with regards to the confession
making it inadmissible
Whether or not the prosecution was able to establish the guilt of appellants beyond reasonable doubt.
HELD:
1. No. Nagares extrajudicial confession is admissible in evidence. Nagares claims that his right under Art. 3
sec. 12 of the constitution has been violated but based on the records, the extrajudicial confession was
voluntarily given. There are no evidence of compulsion or duress or violence. Nagares also did not complain to
the officers administering the oath during the taking of his sworn statement. He also did not have himself
14
examined by a physician to support his claim. Furthermore in the confession are photographs taken during the
thumbmarking and swearing. All the pictures depicted a "cordial and pleasant atmosphere" devoid of any sign
of torture, threat, duress or tension on Nagares' person. In fact, the photographs showed Nagares smiling.
Lastly he was assisted throughout by an effective and independent counsel during the custodial investigation.
2. Yes. Nagares and Captile was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Nagares was positively identified as
one of the victim’s assailant. The CA cannot rule on the credibility of the witness based on the evaluation of the
RTC since RTC personally heard such testimony. With regards to the alibi, it was weak and cannot prevail
over the positive identification made by the eyewitnesses at the crime scene. Here, Constantino positively
identified Nagares as one of the perpetrators of the crime overthrowing the latter's alibi and denial. More
importantly, Nagares miserably failed to establish the physical impossibility for him to be at the crime scene at
the time of the commission of the felony. Furthermore no record or documents were presented in his claim.
Capitle was guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder based on circumstantial evidence.
Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. — Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if:
(a)There is more than one circumstance;
(b)The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
(c)The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt.
Hence, to justify a conviction based on circumstantial evidence, the combination of circumstances must be
interwoven in such a way as to leave no reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused.There is sufficient
circumstantial evidence justifying Capitle's conviction. There is more than one circumstance: (1) the victim was
gunned down at the corner of Orambo Drive and St. Jude St., Mandaluyong City; (2) Paat heard several
gunshots coming from that area; (3) Paat saw four men, including Nagares and Capitle, coming from the
corner of Orambo Drive and St. Jude St. and running away towards Shaw Blvd.; (4) the four men, including
Nagares and Capitle, were all carrying guns; and (5) prosecution witness Constantino saw Nagares, together
with several other men, shot the victim. To the unprejudiced mind, the foregoing circumstances, when
analyzed and taken together, leads to no other conclusion except that of appellants' culpability for the victim's
death.
The award of P30,000 attorney's fees lacks factual and legal basis and thus must be deleted.
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the appeal and AFFIRM with MODIFICATION the 27 January 2006 Decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 01479. We award temperate damages in the amount of P25,000.
The amounts of moral damages and exemplary damages are reduced to P50,000 and P30,000, respectively.
The award of actual damages and attorney's fees is deleted. ESTDIA
SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ARTURO LARA y ORBISTA

REYES, J p: [G.R. No. 199877. August 13, 2012.]

FACTS:
o Information charging Lara with robbery with homicide was filed with the RTC.
o Following Lara's plea of not guilty, trial ensued.
PROSECUTION: 3 witnesses: Enrique Sumulong, SPO1 Bernard Cruz and PO3 Efren Calix
SUMULONG:
 May 31, 2001, 9:00 AM, he withdrew the amount of P230,000.00 from the Metrobank-Mabini Branch, Pasig
City to defray the salaries of the employees of San Sebastian and while at around 10:30 AM, while the
pickup he was riding was at the intersection of Mercedes and Market Avenues, Pasig City, Lara suddenly
appeared at the front passenger side of the pick-up and pointed a gun at him stating, "Akin na ang pera,
iyong bag, nasaan?";
 Bautista, one of those who accompanied him told him not to give the bag. He threw the bag in Bautista's
direction and Bautista alighted from the pick-up and ran. Seeing Bautista, Lara ran after him while firing his
gun
 He then ran towards Mercedes Plaza and called up the office of San Sebastian to relay the incident and
when he went back to where the pick-up was parked, he went to the rear portion of the vehicle and saw
blood on the ground;
 He was informed by one bystander that Bautista was shot and the bag was taken away from him;
 June 7, 2001: While on his way to Pasig City, he saw Lara walking along Dr. Pilapil Street, San Miguel,
Pasig City and he alerted the police and Lara was thereafter arrested. At the police station, he, Atie and
Manacob (other companions at pickup) identified Lara as the one who shot and robbed them of San
Sebastian's money.

15
SPO1 CRUZ
 Around 7:55 PM on June 7, 2001, Sumulong went to the police station and informed him that he saw Lara
walking along Dr. Pilapil Street
 4 police officers and Sumulong went to Dr. Pilapil Street where they saw Lara, who Sumulong identified
and they then approached Lara and invited him for questioning.
 At the police station, Lara was placed in a line-up where he was positively identified by Sumulong,
Manacob and Atie; and after being identified, Lara was informed of his rights and subsequently detained.
PO3 CALIX
 May 31, 2001: he was informed of a robbery that took place and he, together with 3 other police officers,
proceeded to the crime scene wherein upon arriving one of the police officers who were able to respond
ahead of them, handed to him 11 pieces of empty shells and 6 deformed slugs of a 9mm pistol;
 As part of his investigation, he interviewed Sumulong, Atie, Manacob at the police station; and before
Bautista died, he was able to interview Bautista at the hospital where the latter was brought after the
incident.

DEFENSE:
LARA
o May 31, 2001: he was at his house, digging a sewer trench while his brother, Wilfredo, was constructing a
comfort room which was corroborated by his sister, Edjosa Manalo and neighbor, Simplicia Delos Reyes.
o June 7, 2001 and at around 7:00 in the evening, while he was at the house of one of his cousins, police
officers arrived and asked him if he was Arturo Lara and after confirming that he was Arturo Lara, the police
officers asked him to go with them to the Barangay Hall. He voluntarily went with them and while inside the
patrol car, one of the policemen said, "You are lucky, we were able to caught you in your house, if in
another place we will kill you".
o He was brought to the police station and not the barangay hall as he was earlier told where he was
investigated for robbery with homicide and when he told the police that he was at home when the subject
incident took place, the police challenged him to produce witnesses but when his witnesses arrived at the
station, one of the police officers told them to come back the following day.
o While he was at the police line-up holding a name plate, a police officer told Sumulong and Atie, "Ituru nyo
na yan at uuwi na tayo"; and when his witnesses arrived the following day, they were told that he will be
subjected to an inquest.

RTC: GUILTY of robbery with homicide sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of reclusion perpetua,
with all the accessory penalties prescribed by law.
 Rejected Lara's defense of alibi as follows because Enrique Sumulong positively identified accused
Arturo Lara as the person who carted away the payroll money of San Sebastian Allied Services, and
the one who shot Joselito Bautista which caused his instantaneous death on the same day. Also, it is
not impossible for him to be at the place
ARGUMENTS:
 On appeal, Lara pointed out several errors that supposedly attended his conviction. First, that he was
arrested without a warrant under circumstances that do not justify a warrantless arrest rendered void all
proceedings including those that led to his conviction.
 Second, he was not assisted by counsel when the police placed him in a line-up to be identified by the
witnesses for the prosecution in violation of Section 12, Article III of the Constitution. The police line-up is
part of custodial investigation and his right to counsel had already attached.
 Third, the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Specifically, the prosecution failed
to present a witness who actually saw him commit the alleged acts. Sumulong merely presumed that he
was the one who shot Bautista and who took the bag of money from him. The physical description of Lara
that Sumulong gave to the police was different from the one he gave during the trial, indicating that he did
not have a fair glimpse of the perpetrator. Moreover, this gives rise to the possibility that it was his
unidentified companion who shot Bautista and took possession of the money. Hence, it cannot be
reasonably claimed that his conviction was attended with moral certainty.
 Fourth, the trial court erred in discounting the testimony of his witnesses. Without any showing that they
were impelled by improper motives in testifying in his favor, their testimonies should have been given the
credence they deserve. While his two (2) witnesses were his sister and neighbor, this does not by itself
suggest the existence of bias or impair their credibility.
CA: AFFIRMED conviction.
 AUTOMATIC APPEAL TO SC as the penalty imposed was reclusion perpetua

ISSUES:
1. Whether Lara's supposedly illegal arrest may be raised for the first time on appeal for the purpose of
nullifying his conviction? (YES)
2. Whether the identification made by Sumulong, Atie and Manacob in the police line-up is inadmissible
because Lara stood therein without the assistance of counsel? (NO, identification not custodial investigation)
3. Whether there is sufficient evidence to convict Lara? (YES)
16
4. Whether Lara's alibi can be given credence so as to exonerate him from the crime charged? (NO)

HELD: DENY appeal.

1. YES. That Lara was supposedly arrested without a warrant may not serve as a ground to invalidate the
proceedings leading to his conviction considering its belated invocation. Any objections to the legality of the
warrantless arrest should have been raised in a motion to quash duly filed before the accused enters his plea;
otherwise, it is deemed waived. Further, that the accused was illegally arrested is not a ground to set aside
conviction duly arrived at and based on evidence that sufficiently establishes culpability:
 Jurisdiction over the person of the accused may be acquired through compulsory process such as a
warrant of arrest or through his voluntary appearance, such as when he surrenders to the police or to the
court.
 Any objection to the arrest or acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of the accused must be made
before he enters his plea, otherwise the objection is deemed waived. An accused submits to the jurisdiction
of the trial court upon entering a plea and participating actively in the trial and this precludes him invoking
any irregularities that may have attended his arrest. In voluntarily submitting himself to the court by entering
a plea, instead of filing a motion to quash the information for lack of jurisdiction over his person, accused-
appellant is deemed to have waived his right to assail the legality of his arrest.
 Furthermore, the illegal arrest of an accused is not a sufficient ground to reverse and set aside a conviction
that was arrived upon a complaint duly filed and a trial conducted without error. The warrantless arrest,
even if illegal, cannot render void all other proceedings including those leading to the conviction of the
appellants and his co-accused, nor can the state be deprived of its right to convict the guilty when all the
facts on record point to their culpability.
 As Section 9, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides: Sec. 9. Failure to move to
quash or to allege any ground therefor. — The failure of the accused to assert any ground of a motion to
quash before he pleads to the complaint or information, either because he did not file a motion to quash or
failed to allege the same in said motion, shall be deemed a waiver of any objections except those based on
the grounds provided for in paragraphs (a), (b), (g) and (i) of Section 3 of this Rule.

2. NO. There was no legal compulsion to afford him a counsel during a police line-up since the latter is not part
of custodial investigation and this does not constitute a violation of his right to counsel
 That he stood at the police line-up without the assistance of counsel did not render Sumulong's
identification of Lara inadmissible. The right to counsel is deemed to have arisen at the precise
moment custodial investigation begins and being made to stand in a police line-up is not the
starting point or a part of custodial investigation.
 People v. Amestuzo: The guarantees of Sec. 12 (1), Art. III of the 1987 Constitution, or the so-called
Miranda rights, may be invoked only by a person while he is under custodial investigation. Custodial
investigation starts when the police investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime
but has begun to focus on a particular suspect taken into custody by the police who starts the
interrogation and propounds questions to the person to elicit incriminating statements.
 Police line-up is not part of the custodial investigation; hence, the right to counsel guaranteed
by the Constitution cannot yet be invoked at this stage.
 The right to be assisted by counsel attaches only during custodial investigation and cannot be claimed
by the accused during identification in a police line-up because it is not part of the custodial
investigation process. This is because during a police line-up, the process has not yet shifted
from the investigatory to the accusatory and it is usually the witness or the complainant who is
interrogated and who gives a statement in the course of the line-up.
 An exception to this rule is when the accused had been the focus of police attention at the start
of the investigation. In the case at bench, appellant was identified in a police line-up by prosecution
witnesses from a group of persons gathered for the purpose. However, there was no proof that
appellant was interrogated at all or that a statement or confession was extracted from him. During the
police line-up, the accusatory process had not yet commenced.
 Assuming there was interrogation, any allegation of violation of rights during custodial investigation is
relevant and material only to cases in which an extrajudicial admission or confession extracted
from the accused becomes the basis of their conviction. Here, appellant was convicted based on
the testimony of a prosecution witness and not on his alleged uncounseled confession or admission.

3. YES. Contrary to appellant's assertion, prosecution witness Sumulong actually saw him shoot Bautista, the
victim. Also, it is apparent from the assailed decision of the CA that the finding of guilt against Lara is based on
circumstantial evidence.
 Not only direct evidence but also circumstantial evidence can overcome the presumption of innocence.
Direct evidence of the commission of the crime is not the only matrix wherefrom a trial court may draw
its conclusion and finding of guilt. Even in the absence of direct evidence, conviction can be had if
the established circumstances constitute an unbroken chain, consistent with each other and to
the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, to the exclusion of all other hypothesis that he is not.
 REQUISITES OF CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE: Under Section 4, Rule 133 of the Revised Rules on
17
 Criminal Procedure, circumstantial evidence sufficed to convict upon the concurrence of the following
requisites: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived
are proven; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt.
 It is not only by direct evidence that an accused may be convicted of the crime for which he is charged.
Resort to circumstantial evidence is essential since to insist on direct testimony would, in many cases,
result in setting felons free and denying proper protection to the community.
 Here, the following circumstantial evidence are tellingly sufficient to prove the guilt of appellant:
o While the vehicle was at the intersection of Mercedes and Market Avenues, Pasig City, appellant
suddenly emerged and pointed a gun at prosecution witness Sumulong, demanding from him to
produce the bag containing the money.
o Prosecution witness Sumulong threw the bag to the victim who was then seated at the backseat
of the vehicle.
o The victim alighted from vehicle carrying the bag
o Appellant chased and fired several shots at the victim.
o The victim sustained several gunshot wounds.
o The police officers recovered from the scene of the crime six deformed empty shells.
 Indeed, in cases of robbery with homicide, the taking of personal property with intent to gain must itself
be established beyond reasonable doubt. The mere presence of the accused at the crime scene is not
enough to implicate him. It is essential to prove the intent to rob and the use of violence was necessary
to realize such intent.
o In this case, Lara's intent to gain is proven by Sumulong's positive narration that it was Lara who
pointed the gun at him and demanded that the bag containing the money be turned over to him.
That Lara resorted to violence in order to actualize his intent to gain is proven by Sumulong's
testimony that he saw Lara fire the gun at the direction of Bautista, who was running away from
the pick-up in order to prevent Lara from taking possession of the money.
o Notably, the incident took place in broad daylight and in the middle of a street. Thus, where
considerations of visibility are favorable and the witness does not appear to be biased
against the accused, his or her assertions as to the identity of the malefactor should be
normally accepted.
o Lara did not allege, much less, convincingly demonstrate that Sumulong was impelled by
improper or malicious motives to impute upon him, however perjurious, such a serious charge.
Thus, his testimony, which the trial court found to be forthright and credible, is worthy of full faith
and credit and should not be disturbed. If an accused had nothing to do with the crime, it is
against the natural order of events and of human nature and against the presumption of good
faith that a prosecution witness would falsely testify against the former.
4. NO. In view of Sumulong's positive identification of Lara, the CA was correct in denying Lara's alibi outright.
It is well-settled that positive identification prevails over alibi, which is inherently a weak defense. Such
is the rule, for as a defense, alibi is easy to concoct, and difficult to disapprove.
 In order for the defense of alibi to prosper, it must be demonstrated that:
o that he was present at another place at the time of the perpetration of the crime
o he was so far away that it was not possible for him to have been physically present at the place
of the crime or its immediate vicinity at the time of its commission.
 Physical impossibility "refers to the distance between the place where the accused was
when the crime transpired and the place where it was committed, as well as the facility
of access between the two places.
 Proximity of Lara's house at the scene of the crime wholly negates his alibi. He himself admitted that
his house was just a stone's throw (about three minutes away) from the crime scene. Lara and his
witnesses failed to prove that it is well-nigh impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime.
DISPOSITIVE: CA AFFIRMED

People vs. Lugod

[GR 136253, 21 February 2001]

Facts: A case of rape with homicide was filed against the accused, Clemente John Lugod, for allegedly raping
the eight-year old girl victim, Nairube J. Ramos and dumping her dead body in the grassy coconut plantation
area.
On September 15, 1997 at around 7:00 p.m., Helen Ramos, the victim’s mother, was asleep in her
house together with her husband and their children, Nimrod, Neres and Nairube. At around 12:30 a.m., they
noticed that Nairube was gone. The backdoor of their house was left open where a pair of slippers that did not
belong to the family was found. In the morning, the police began their search for Nairube wherein a panty
belonging to the victim was found, as well as a black collared shirt belonging to the accused, Lugod. Witnesses
testified that both slippers and the shirt were worn by Lugod. Lugod was then brought to the police station
where he was temporarily incarcerated. Although he admitted to SPO2 Gallardo that he raped and killed
Nairube, Lugud refused to make a statement regarding the same.
18
 On September 19, 1997, the Vice-Mayor visited the accused in his cell. In the course of his
conversation with Lugod, Lugod allegedly confessed to the commission of the offense. Lugod was charged for
rape with homicide. After trial, Lugod was found guilty and was sentenced to death. Hence, the automatic
review.

Issue: Whether or not Lugod’s alleged confession can be used against him?

Held: At the time of his arrest, records reveal that accused-appellant was not informed of his constitutional
rights to remain silent and his rights to counsel. There is also no evidence to indicate that he intended to waive
these rights. Consequently, the accused-appellant’s act of confessing to SPO2 Gallardo that he raped and
killed Nairube without the assistance of counsel cannot be used against him for having transgressed accused-
appellant’s rights under the Bill of Rights. This is a basic tenet of our Constitution which cannot be disregarded
or ignored no matter how brutal the crime committed may be.

Even if we were to assume that accused-appellant was not yet under interrogation and thus, not
entitled to his constitutional rights at the time he was brought to the police station, the acts of accused-
appellant subsequent to his apprehension cannot be characterized as having been voluntarily made
considering the peculiar circumstances surrounding his detention. Amidst such a highly coercive atmosphere,
accused-appellant’s claim that he was beaten up and maltreated by the police officers raises a very serious
doubt as to the voluntariness of his alleged confession.

In addition, the records do not support the confession allegedly made by the accused-appellant to the
Mayor and Vice-Mayor of Cavinti. Records show that the Mayor of Cavinti did not testify in the criminal trial.
Moreover, the testimony of the Vice-Mayor with respect to the alleged confession made by the accused-
appellant is not conclusive.

As can be seen from the testimony of the Vice-Mayor, accused-appellant merely responded to the
ambiguous questions that the Vice-Mayor propounded to him. He did not state in certain and categorical terms
that he raped and killed Nairube. In fact, the Vice-Mayor admitted that the accused-appellant did not tell him
that he raped and killed Nairube.

People vs. Joselito del Rosario – GR 127755, April 14, 1999

FACTS
The accused-appellant was convicted of the robbery with homicide and sentenced to death. The conviction of
the accused was based on the testimony of a tricycle driver who claimed that the accused was the one who
drove the tricycle, which the suspects used as their get-away vehicle. The accused was then invited by the
police for questioning and he pointed to the location where he dropped off the suspects. When the police
arrived at the supposed hide-out, a shooting incident ensued, resulting to the death of some of the suspects.
After the incident, the accused was taken back to the precint where his statement was taken on May 14, 1996.
However, this was only subscribed on May 22, 1996 and the accused was made to execute a waiver of
detention in the presence of Ex-Judge Talavera. It was noted that the accused was handcuffed through all this
time upon orders of the fiscal and based on the authorities' belief that the accused might attempt to escape
otherwise.
ISSUES
(1) Whether the Miranda rights of the accused-appellant were violated.
(2) Whether the warrantless arrest of the accused-appellant was lawful.

HELD
(1) YES. It was established that the accused was not apprised of his rights to remain silent and to have
competent and independent counsel in the course of the investigation. The Court held that the accused
should always be apprised of his Miranda rights from the moment he is arrested by the authorities as
this is deemed the start of custodial investigation. In fact, the Court included “invitations” by police
officers in the scope of custodial investigations.
It is evident in this case that when the police invited the accused-appellant to the station, he was already
considered as the suspect in the case. Therefore, the questions asked of him were no longer general inquiries
into an unsolved crime, but were intended to elicit information about his participation in the crime.

19
However, the Miranda rights may be waived, provided that the waiver is voluntary, express, in writing and
made in the presence of counsel. Unfortunately, the prosecution failed to establish that the accused made
such a waiver.
(2) NO. There are certain situations when authorities may conduct a lawful warrantless arrest: (a) when the
accused is caught in flagrante delicto; (b) when the arrest is made immediately after the crime was
committed; and © when the one to be arrested is an escaped convict. The arrest of the accused in this
case did not fall in any of these exceptions. The arrest was not conducted immediately after the
consummation of the crime; rather, it was done a day after. The authorities also did not have personal
knowledge of the facts indicating that the person to be arrested had committed the offense because
they were not there when the crime was committed. They merely relied on the account of one
eyewitness.
Unfortunately, athough the warrantless arrest was not lawful, this did not affect the jurisdiction of the Court in
this case because the accused still submitted to arraignment despite the illegality of his arrest. In effect, he
waived his right to contest the legality of the warrantless arrest.
VIVO vs PAGCOR
FACTS:
• Petitioner Vivo was employed as Managing Head of PAGCOR’s Gaming Department.
• Vivo received a letter from PAGCOR’s HR Head advising that he was being administratively charged
with gross misconduct, rumor-mongering, conduct prejudicial to the interest of the company, and loss of
trust and confidence; that he should submit a written explanation of the charges; and that he was at the
same time being placed under preventive suspension.
• Thereafter, he received the summons for him to attend an administrative inquiry, instructing him to
appear before PAGCOR’s Corporate Investigation Unit (CIU).
• At the petitioner’s request, however, the inquiry was conducted at his residence on said date.
• He was also furnished the memorandum of charges that recited the accusations against him and
indicated the acts and omissions constituting his alleged offenses.
• Petitioner Vivo received a letter from HRD Head informing him of the resolution of the PAGCOR Board
of Directors in its May 14, 2002 meeting to the effect that he was being dismissed from the service.
• CSC : PAGCOR had violated the petitioner’s right to due process, and accordingly set aside his
dismissal from the service.
• CA : set aside and reversed CSC’s decision upon its finding that the petitioner had been accorded
procedural due process.
ISSUES:
1. Whether PAGCOR’s failure to furnish the petitioner a copy of the Board Resolutions authorizing his
dismissal and denying his motion for reconsideration was a fatal and irreparable defect in the
administrative proceedings that ultimately resulted in the illegality of his dismissal from the service.
2. Whether PAGCOR’s refusal to re-schedule the Adjudication Committee meeting in order to enable his
counsel to attend the meeting with him, because the refusal constituted a violation of his right to be
represented by counsel.
RULING:
1. On PAGCOR’s failure to furnish petitioner copies of the Board Resolutions.
• This did not negate the existence of the resolutions, and did not invalidate the contents of the board
resolutions. It is beyond question that he was duly informed of the subject-matter of the board
resolutions.
• Consequently, the CSC’s conclusion that his dismissal had been unauthorized was unfounded. In any
case, even assuming for the sake of argument that there was no board resolution approving his
dismissal, the lapse did not render his dismissal illegal but unauthorized. However, as the CA succinctly
put it, an unauthorized act could be the subject of ratification.
People v. Ayson
GR No. 85215 July 7, 1989
Narvasa, J.:

20
Private respondent Ramos was a Philippine Airlines ticket freight clerk assigned in Baguio. He was allegedly
involved in irregularities in the sales of plane tickets. PAL management notified him that an investigation will be
conducted on the matter. The investigation will be in accordance with PAL’s Code of Conduce and Discipline
and the CBA with PALEA (Ramos was a member).
The day before the investigation, Ramos gave his superiors handwritten notes stating his willingness to settle
the irregularities. At the investigation, Ramos was informed of the finding of the Audit Team. His answers in
response to questions asked by PAL branch manager Cruz were taken in writing. It seemed that no
compromise agreement was reached or consummated.
Two months later, an Information was filed against Ramos charging him with the crime of estafa. Ramos
entered a plea of not guilty and trial ensued. At the close of the People’s case, the private prosecutors made a
written offer of evidence which included that statement of accused (the handwritten notes) as well as his
handwritten admission (the written responses to the questions).
Ramos’ lawyers filed “Objections/Comments to Plaintiff’s Evidence.” The objection was that the document
(handwritten notes), which appears to be a confession, was taken without the accused being represented by a
lawyer. The objection to the written responses was for the same reason.
Judge Ayson admitted all evidence as part of the testimony of the witnesses who testified in connection
therewith and for whatever they are worth but he rejected the handwritten notes (Exhibit A) and the written
responses (Exhibit K).
Judge Ayson declared Exhibit A, which according to the defense appears considered as a confession,
inadmissible since it does not appear that the accused was reminded of his constitutional rights to remain silent
and to have counsel, and that when he waived the same and gave his statement, it was with the assistance
actually of a counsel. He also declared Exhibit K inadmissible since it did not appear that the accused was
assisted by counsel when the admission was made.
The private prosecutors filed a motion for reconsideration. Judge Ayson denied the motion on the ground that
the fact that Ramos was not detained at that time, or the investigation was administrative in character could not
operate to except the case from the ambit of the constitutional provision in custodial investigation.
ISSUE:
a) Whether the right against self-incrimination is available in an administrative case.
b) Whether all statement made to the police by a person involved in some crime is within the scope of the
constitutional right in custodial investigation
c) Whether the Exhibits should be excluded in evidence on the ground that Miranda rights was not
accorded to the accused.

HELD:
a) YES
The first right, against self-incrimination, mentioned in Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, is
accorded to every person who gives evidence, whether voluntarily or under compulsion of subpoena, in any
civil, criminal, or administrative proceeding. The right is NOT to "be compelled to be a witness against himself"
The precept set out in that first sentence has a settled meaning. It prescribes an "option of refusal to answer
incriminating questions and not a prohibition of inquiry." It simply secures to a witness, whether he be a party
or not, the right to refue to answer any particular incriminatory question, i.e., one the answer to which has a
tendency to incriminate him for some crime. However, the right can be claimed only when the specific
question, incriminatory in character, is actually put to the witness. It cannot be claimed at any other time. It
does not give a witness the right to disregard a subpoena, to decline to appear before the court at the time
appointed, or to refuse to testify altogether. The witness receiving a subpoena must obey it, appear as
required, take the stand, be sworn and answer questions. It is only when a particular question is addressed to
him, the answer to which may incriminate him for some offense, that he may refuse to answer on the strength
of the constitutional guaranty.
The right against self-incrimination is not self- executing or automatically operational. It must be claimed. If not
claimed by or in behalf of the witness, the protection does not come into play. It follows that the right may be
waived, expressly, or impliedly, as by a failure to claim it at the appropriate time.
b) NO
In Miranda, Chief Justice Warren summarized the procedural safeguards laid down for a person in police
custody, "in-custody interrogation" being regarded as the commencement of an adversary proceeding against
the suspect.
He must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be
used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot

21
afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires. Opportunity to
exercise those rights must be afforded to him throughout the interrogation. After such warnings have been
given, such opportunity afforded him, the individual may knowingly and intelligently waive these rights and
agree to answer or make a statement. But unless and until such warnings and waivers are demonstrated by
the prosecution at the trial, no evidence obtained as a result of interrogation can be used against him.
The objective is to prohibit "incommunicado interrogation of individuals in a police-dominated atmosphere,
resulting in self-incriminating statement without full warnings of constitutional rights."
Not every statement made to the police by a person involved in some crime is within the scope of the
constitutional protection. If not made "under custodial interrogation," or "under investigation for the commission
of an offense," the statement is not protected.
c) NO
In fine, a person suspected of having committed a crime and subsequently charged with its commission in
court, has the following rights in the matter of his testifying or producing evidence, to wit:
1) BEFORE THE CASE IS FILED IN COURT (or with the public prosecutor, for preliminary
investigation), but after having been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his liberty in some
significant way, and on being interrogated by the police: the continuing right to remain silent and to
counsel, and to be informed thereof, not to be subjected to force, violence, threat, intimidation or any
other means which vitiates the free will; and to have evidence obtained in violation of these rights
rejected; and
2) AFTER THE CASE IS FILED IN COURT —
a) to refuse to be a witness;
b) not to have any prejudice whatsoever result to him by such refusal;
c) to testify in his own behalf, subject to cross-examination by the prosecution;
d) WHILE TESTIFYING, to refuse to answer a specific question which tends to incriminate him
for some crime other than that for which he is then prosecuted.
It should by now be abundantly apparent that respondent Judge has misapprehended the nature and import of
the disparate rights set forth in Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution. He has taken them as applying
to the same juridical situation, equating one with the other. In so doing, he has grossly erred. To be sure, His
Honor sought to substantiate his thesis by arguments he took to be cogent and logical. The thesis was
however so far divorced from the actual and correct state of the constitutional and legal principles involved as
to make application of said thesis to the case before him tantamount to totally unfounded, whimsical or
capricious exercise of power. His Orders were thus rendered with grave abuse of discretion. They should be as
they are hereby, annulled and set aside.
It is clear from the undisputed facts of this case that Felipe Ramos was not in any sense under custodial
interrogation, as the term should be properly understood, prior to and during the administrative inquiry into the
discovered irregularities in ticket sales in which he appeared to have had a hand. The constitutional rights of a
person under custodial interrogation under Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution did not therefore
come into play, were of no relevance to the inquiry. It is also clear, too, that Ramos had voluntarily answered
questions posed to him on the first day of the administrative investigation, February 9, 1986 and agreed that
the proceedings should be recorded, the record having thereafter been marked during the trial of the criminal
action subsequently filed against him as Exhibit A, just as it is obvious that the note (later marked as Exhibit K)
that he sent to his superiors on February 8,1986, the day before the investigation, offering to compromise his
liability in the alleged irregularities, was a free and even spontaneous act on his part. They may not be
excluded on the ground that the so-called "Miranda rights" had not been accorded to Ramos.

Office of the Court Administrator vs Sumilang

A.M. No. MTJ-94-989.  April 18, 1997
Facts: An on the spot audit examination was conducted by the Fiscal Audit Division of the Office of the Court
Administrator, several anomalous transaction were discovered during the time of court interpreter Malla, who
was then resigned when the audit was done. It involved a manager’s check in connection with a civil case
amounting to P240, 000 which was entrusted to Malla instead of being handed over to the Clerk of Court. Upon
further questioning, Malla admitted that she lent the amount of P87, 000, P40, 000 and P81, 000 to steno-
reporter Lagmay, steno-reporter Mercado and Mrs. Sumilang respectively, and the remaining balance she
used for her husband’s hospitalization and for personal purposes. Later on, she executed an affidavit stating
that only Lagmay and Mercado borrowed P55, 000 and P 40, 000 respectively. On the other hand, she used
P100, 000 for her personal needs. Judge Sumilang, Malla, Lagmay and Mercado, court employees of the
22
Metropolitan Trial Court were charged in a report by the Office of the Court Administrator for misappropriating
funds. The Supreme Court issued a resolution treating the memorandum as an administrative complaint.
Issue: Whether Malla’s constitutional rights were violated when she signed an affidavit before the Office of the
Court Administrator, where she admitted her misdeed.
Held: No.
The constitutional provision under Section 12, Article III of the Constitution may be invoked only during
“custodial investigation”. Such investigation is defined as an “investigation conducted by police authorities who
will include investigation conducted by the Municipal Police (now PNP) and the NBI and such other police
agencies. Thus, the Office of the Court Administrator can hardly be deemed to be the law enforcement
authority contemplated in the constitutional provision. During the investigation, Malla repeated what she
basically stated in her affidavit i,e. that she used a substantial amount for her personal needs. This effectively
refutes whatever pressure and coercion she claims was employed against her.
Carbonnel vs Civil Service Commission
G.R. No. 187689, September 07, 2010

Facts: On May 21, 1999, petitioner went to the CSCRO IV to secure a copy of the result of the Computer
Assisted Test (CATS) Career Service Professional Examination given on March 14, 1999, because she lost
the original copy of her Career Service Professional Certificate of Rating (hereafter referred to as certificate of
rating). Petitioner was directed to accomplish a verification slip. The Examination Placement and Service
Division noticed that petitioner’s personal and physical appearance was entirely different from the picture of the
examinee attached to the application form and the picture seat plan. It was also discovered that the signature
affixed on the application form was different from that appearing on the verification slip. Because of these
discrepancies, the Legal Affairs Division of the CSCRO IV conducted an investigation.
In the course of the investigation, petitioner voluntarily made a statement before Atty. Rosalinda S.M. Gepigon,
admitting that, sometime in March 1999, she accepted the proposal of a certain Bettina J. Navarro (Navarro)
for the latter to obtain for petitioner a Career Service Professional Eligibility by merely accomplishing an
application form and paying the amount of P10,000.00. Petitioner thus accomplished an application form to
take the CATS Career Service Professional Examination and gave Navarro P5,000.00 as down payment.
Upon receipt of the original copy of the certificate of rating from Navarro, petitioner gave the latter the
remaining P5,000.00. Petitioner, however, misplaced the certificate of rating. This prompted her to secure
another copy from the CSCRO IV.
Hence, the formal charge against petitioner.

Denying her admissions in her voluntary statement before the CSCRO IV, petitioner, in her Answer, traversed
the charges against her. She explained that after filling up the application form for the civil service examination,
she asked Navarro to submit the same to the CSC. She, however, admitted that she failed to take the
examination as she had to attend to her ailing mother. Thus, when she received a certificate of eligibility
despite her failure to take the test, she was anxious to know the mystery behind it. She claimed that she went
to the CSCRO IV not to get a copy of the certificate of rating but to check the veracity of the certificate. More
importantly, she questioned the use of her voluntary statement as the basis of the formal charge against her
inasmuch as the same was made without the assistance of counsel.

After the formal investigation, the CSCRO IV rendered its March 25, 2002 Decision No. 020079 finding
petitioner guilty of dishonesty, grave misconduct, and falsification of official documents. The penalty of
dismissal from the service, with all its accessory penalties, was imposed on her. Petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration was denied by CSCRO IV on November 14, 2003.

Petitioner appealed, but the CSC dismissed the same for having been filed almost three years from receipt of
the CSCRO IV decision. The CSC did not give credence to petitioner’s explanation that she failed to timely
appeal the case because of the death of her counsel. The CSC opined that notwithstanding the death of one
lawyer, the other members of the law firm, petitioner’s counsel of record, could have timely appealed the
decision. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied in Resolution No. 072049 dated November 5,
2007.

Unsatisfied, petitioner elevated the matter to the CA. On November 24, 2008, the CA rendered the assailed
decision affirming the decisions and resolutions of the CSCRO IV and the CSC. Petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration was denied by the CA on April 29, 2009.
Hence, the instant petition based on the following grounds:

23
Issue: Serious error of fact and law amounting to grave abuse of discretion was committed by the Court of
Appeals in its assailed decision dated November 24, 2008 because petitioner’s finding of guilt was grounded
entirely on her unsworn statement that she admitted the offenses charged and without the assistance of a
counsel.
Ruling: The petition is without merit.
Petitioner faults the CSC’s finding because it was based solely on her uncounselled admission taken during
the investigation by the CSCRO IV. She claims that her right to due process was violated because she was not
afforded the right to counsel when her statement was taken.

It is true that the CSCRO IV, the CSC, and the CA gave credence to petitioner’s uncounselled statements and,
partly on the basis thereof, uniformly found petitioner liable for the charge of dishonesty, grave misconduct,
and falsification of official document.
However, it must be remembered that the right to counsel under Section 12 of the Bill of Rights is meant to
protect a suspect during custodial investigation. Thus, the exclusionary rule under paragraph (2), Section 12 of
the Bill of Rights applies only to admissions made in a criminal investigation but not to those made in an
administrative investigation.

While investigations conducted by an administrative body may at times be akin to a criminal proceeding, the
fact remains that, under existing laws, a party in an administrative inquiry may or may not be assisted by
counsel, irrespective of the nature of the charges and of petitioner’s capacity to represent herself, and no duty
rests on such body to furnish the person being investigated with counsel. The right to counsel is not always
imperative in administrative investigations because such inquiries are conducted merely to determine whether
there are facts that merit the imposition of disciplinary measures against erring public officers and employees,
with the purpose of maintaining the dignity of government service.

As such, the admissions made by petitioner during the investigation may be used as evidence to justify her
dismissal. We have carefully scrutinized the records of the case below and we find no compelling reason to
deviate from the findings of the CSC and the CA. The written admission of petitioner is replete with details that
could have been known only to her. Besides, petitioner’s written statement was not the only basis of her
dismissal from the service. Records show that the CSCRO IV’s conclusion was reached after consideration of
all the documentary and testimonial evidence submitted by the parties during the formal investigation.

PEOPLE v. RAUL SANTOS Y NARCISO, GR Nos. 100225-26, 1993-05-11

Facts:
On 26 October 1989, appellant Santos was charged with the crimes of murder with the use of unlicensed
firearms and frustrated murder
Three (3) other persons were charged in the same informations. Upon request of the City Prosecutor who had
conducted a re-investigation of the cases, the trial court ordered the amendment of the informations on 4 April
1990 so as to insert the name of one Mario Morales, in... lieu of John Doe, as a co-accused. Morales for whom
a warrant of arrest was issued, is, however, still at large. The identities of the two (2) other accused remain
unknown.
At arraignment, Raul Santos entered a plea of not guilty. A joint trial of the two (2) criminal cases ensued,
culminating in a judgment of conviction.
The trial court found that the accused Raul Santos had been identified positively by the surviving victim of the
shooting incident -- Alberto Bautista, and by the Traffic Aide who had witnessed the execution of the crime --
Victorino Bohol. The defense of alibi offered by the... accused and supported by the testimonies of a friend and
a sister, was rejected as weak and unavailing.
In his second assignment of error, appellant Santos in effect questions the trial court for admitting a sworn
statement by one Ronaldo Guerrero (Exhibit "EE"), a witness in another criminal case (Criminal Case No.
8117) where appellant Santos was also charged with the murder... of one Daniel Nuguera which had taken
place in the very same site where Bautista and Cupcupin were ambushed, i.e., at the corner of Yangco Street
and Estrella Street, Malabon, Metro Manila. When the prosecution first presented the sworn statement of
Guerrero in order to show... criminal propensity on the part of appellant Santos, the defense objected to
admission of such sworn statement; the trial court sustained the objection and rejected the evidence for the
purpose it was initially offered. However, the trial court admitted the same as falling... within one or more of the
exceptions set out in Section 34, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, which reads:
"Sec. 34. Similar Acts as Evidence. -- Evidence that one did or did not do a certain thing at one time is not
admissible to prove that he did or did not do the same or a similar thing at another time; but it may be received
to prove a specific intent... or knowledge, identity, plan, system, scheme, habit, custom or usage and the like."
24
Issues:
Appellant Santos now complains that the affidavit of Ronaldo Guerrero was hearsay evidence, considering that
the prosecution did not present Ronaldo Guerrero as a witness during the trial.
Ruling:
the trial court did not commit reversible error in admitting the
Guerrero affidavit for the limited purpose for proving knowledge or plan or scheme, and more specifically, that
appellant knew that the particular corner of two (2) particular streets in Malabon was a good place to ambush a
vehicle and its passengers. Appellant also had waived... the hearsay character of this evidence by failure
seasonably to object to the admission of the affidavit; it is too late in that day to raise the hearsay rule in the
appellant's memorandum after prosecution and defense had presented their respective cases and had made
their... respective offers of evidence.[21] Finally, and in any case, as pointed out by the Solicitor General, the
exclusion of the Guerrero affidavit would not result in any change in the result reached by the trial court. For
that result... is essentially and adequately based upon the positive identification of appellant Santos as one of
the gunmen by Bautista and Bohol.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,  vs. JERRY PEPINO y RUERAS and PRECIOSA
GOMEZ y CAMPOS, Accused-Appellants.
G.R. No. 174471
FACTS:
Two men and a woman entered the office of Edward Tan at Kilton Motors Corporation in Sucat, Parafiaque
City, and pretended to be customers. When Edward was about to receive them, one of the men, eventually
identified as Pepino pulled out a gun. Thinking that it was a holdup, Edward told Pepino that the money was
inside the cashier's box. Pepino and the other man looted the "'cashier's box, handcuffed Edward, and forced
him to go with them. The abductors then confined Edward in an apartment in Quezon City where they insisted
on asking ransom from Edward’s father.
The exchange was performed eventually with the abductors and Edward’s wife Jocelyn wherein after the
exchange of money and Edward being released, the victim reported the kidnapping to Teresita Ang See, a
known anti-crime crusader.
After five months, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI!) informed Edward that they had apprehended
some suspects, and invited him to identify them from a lineup consisting of seven persons: five males and two
females. Edward positively identified Pepino, Gomez, and one Mario Galgo.9 Jocelyn likewise identified
Pepino.
Pepino and Gomez did not testify for their defense. The defense instead presented Zeny Pepino, Reynaldo
Pepino who alleged that they were arrested without a valid warrant of arrest leading to a violation of their
rights.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the illegal arrest of an accused is sufficient cause for setting aside a valid judgment rendered
upon a sufficient complaint after a trial free from error.
RULING:
No.The Court pointed out at the outset that Gomez did not question before arraignment the legality of her
warrantless arrest or the acquisition of RTC's jurisdiction over her person. Thus, Gomez is deemed to have
waived any objection to her warrantless arrest.
It is settled that any objection to the procedure followed in the matter of the acquisition by a court of jurisdiction
over the person of the accused must be opportunely raised before he enters his plea; otherwise, the objection
is deemed waived.
A]ppellant is now estopped from questioning any defect in the manner of his arrest as he failed to move for the
quashing of the information before the trial court. Consequently, any irregularity attendant to his arrest was
cured when he voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the trial court by entering a plea of "not guilty"
and by participating in the trial.
At any rate, the illegal arrest of an accused is not sufficient cause for setting aside a valid judgment rendered
upon a sufficient complaint after a trial free from error. Simply put, the illegality of the warrantless arrest cannot
deprive the State of its right to prosecute the guilty when all other facts on record point to their culpability. It is
much too late in the day to complain about the warrantless arrest after a valid information had been filed, the
accused had been arraigned, the trial had commenced and had been completed, and a judgment of conviction
had been rendered against her.24

25
PEOPLE v ESCORDIAL
FACTS:
Name of Accused: Anthony Escordial
Name of Offended party: Michelle Darunday, Erma Blanca, Ma. Teresa Gallaver
Facts
Petitioners were all living in the ground floor of a boarding house. On the night of the crime (December
27, 1997), a jeep was parked in front of the boarding house where children (later witnesses) were playing.
They were told to go home by a man who would be later identified as the accused. While the three were
sleeping, Erma was awakened by the presence of a man. This man had his head covered with a t-shirt to
prevent identification and carried a knife about four inches long. He asked for her money and was able to get
P500 from her. She then turned to the other petitioners who were already awake by that time and was able to
take P3100 from Michelle and none from Teresa because her bag was in the other room.
After taking the money, they were told to blindfold one another. He then proceeded to have carnal
knowledge with Michelle. Michelle said that although she was blindfolded and could not see, she could feel that
the man had no cover on his face when he was raping her.  She felt that his chest was rough and had some
scars.  When he placed her hands on his nape, she felt that it was also rough (keloid). On the other hand,
Erma claimed she was able to see through her blindfold and that she saw the man’s face.
After he finished raping Michelle, he sat down on the bed and talked to the women. He then raped
Michelle for the second time, threatening her so she’d concede that it would be much worse if he’d call others
(companions) from outside to rape her. After which (about 12:30am) he left.
PO3 Tancinco was one of those who responded to the crime. A report was made in the police station.
Subsequent searches, through the descriptions of the petitioners, the children playing in the jeep in front of the
boarding house, and others led to the pinpointing of accused-appellant.
Accused was playing in basketball when the police “invited” him to the Pontevedra police station for
questioning. At the station Michelle saw him and she identified him as his alleged robber and rapist. He was
also brought to the Bacolod police station so that the other witnesses could identify him. They picked him out of
four in the line-up.
Accused claims that he went home to Pontevedra, Negros Occidental at the time of the incident as
testified by three other witnesses for the defense.
Procedural:
RTC: Guilty of Robbery with rape
DECISION: Acquitted on the ground of reasonable doubt.
HELD
WON the warrantless arrest was valid?
It was invalid but was cured due to accused-appellants failure to question warrantless arrest before
arraignment (waiver).
Valid warrantless searches are enumerated under Rule 113, §5 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure:
(a)            When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or
is attempting to commit an offense;
(b)            When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c)            When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment
or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or
has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
In these cases, the crime took place on December 27, 1996. But, accused-appellant was arrested only on
January 3, 1997, a week after the occurrence of the crime.  As the arresting officers were not present when the
crime was committed, they could not have “personal knowledge of the facts and circumstances of the
commission of the crime”.
Personal knowledge of facts in arrests without a warrant must be based upon “probable cause” which means
“an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion.” (Reasonable: in the absence of actual belief of the
arresting officers, the suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense is
based on actual facts)
26
WON evidence should have been excluded by the RTC for failure to apprise him with his right to
remain silent and his right to counsel?
No. He has not shown that, as a result of his custodial interrogation, the police obtained any statement
from him – whether inculpatory or exculpatory - which was used in evidence against him.  
WON evidence regarding the identification of accused was inadmissible because of absence of
counsel?
OUT-OF-COURT IDENTIFICATION: This should have been inadmissible because identification of
an uncounseled accused made in a police line-up, or in a show-up for that matter, after the start of the
custodial investigation is inadmissible as evidence against him. However, again, failure to object when these
pieces of evidence were presented constituted a waiver.
TESTIMONIES OF THE WITNESSES (regarding the identity of the accused): should be regarded as
inadmissible under the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine. In court.
IN-COURT IDENTIFICATION: inadmissibility of these out-of-court identifications does not render the in-court
identification of accused-appellant inadmissible for being the “fruits of the poisonous tree.” As it was not
derived or drawn from the illegal arrest of accused-appellant or as a consequence thereof, it is admissible as
evidence against him.

(People v. Piedad y Consolacion, G.R. No. 131923, [December 5, 2002], 441 PHIL 818-840)

DOCTRINE: For conviction of an accused in criminal cases, it is enough that the prosecution proves beyond
reasonable doubt that a crime was committed and that the accused committed it. Production of the weapon
used in committing the crime is not a condition sine qua non for the discharge of that burden. It is not vital to
the cause of the prosecution, especially where other evidence is available to support sufficiently the charges.

FACTS: Accused Niel Piedad, Lito Garcia and Richard Palma were arrested and charged with the crime of
murder for feloniously stabbing to death Mateo Lactawan on April 10, 1996. Accused denied the charges
against them, but the trial court gave credence to the prosecution's version of the incident and eventually
convicted accused Niel Piedad and Lito Garcia of the crime charged and sentenced them to reclusion
perpetua. However, accused Richard Palma was acquitted by the trial court on the ground of reasonable
doubt. Hence, this appeal. Accused-appellants questioned their conviction arguing that that prosecution failed
to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Niel Piedad assails the admissibility of the alleged murder
weapon for lack of proper authentication. Lito Garcia for his part impugns the non-presentation of the knife
used in stabbing the deceased.

ISSUE: Whether or not the accused has been proven guilty beyond reasonable doubt.

HELD: Yes. The weapon used in the killing, after all, is not an element of the either the crimes of homicide or
murder. Verily, the non-presentation by the prosecution of the items which the accused-appellants used in
stoning and stabbing the victim is not fatal considering that the accused has been positively identified. The
case of People v. Bagcal 35 is in point: . . . For conviction of an accused in criminal cases, it is enough that the
prosecution proves beyond reasonable doubt that a crime was committed and that the accused committed it.
Production of the weapon used in committing the crime is not a condition sine qua non for the discharge of that
burden. It is not vital to the cause of the prosecution, especially where other evidence is available to support
sufficiently the charges. . . .

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. BENJAMIN SAYABOC y SEGUBA, PATRICIO ESCORPISO y

VALDEZ, MARLON BUENVIAJE y PINEDA, and MIGUEL BUENVIAJE y FLORES
G.R. No. 147201 (419 SCRA 659); January 15, 2004

FACTS
In its decision, the trial court found Benjamin Sayaboc guilty of the crime of murder, with treachery as the
qualifying circumstance and craft and price or reward as aggravating circumstances. It then sentenced him to
the maximum penalty of death. As for the other accused, the court held that the treachery employed by
Sayaboc could not be taken against them and, therefore, declared them guilty of the crime of homicide only,
with the first as principal and the two others as accomplices. From this decision, accused appealed.

Anent the third assignment of error, appellants contend that the extrajudicial confession of Sayaboc may not be
admitted in evidence against him because Atty. Cornejo, the PAO lawyer who was his counsel during the
custodial investigation, was not a competent, independent, vigilant, and effective counsel. He was ineffective
because he remained silent during the entire proceedings. He was not independent, as he was formerly a

27
judge in the National Police Commission, which was holding court inside the PNP Command of Bayombong,
Nueva Vizcaya.

ISSUE: Whether the extrajudicial confession of Sayaboc is not admissible in evidence.

HELD: YES.
Jurisprudence provides that extrajudicial confessions are presumed to be voluntary. The condition for this
presumption, however, is that the prosecution is able to show that the constitutional requirements safeguarding
an accused’s rights during custodial investigation have been strictly complied with, especially when the
extrajudicial confession has been denounced. The rationale for this requirement is to allay any fear that the
person being investigated would succumb to coercion while in the unfamiliar or intimidating environment that is
inherent in custodial investigations. Therefore, even if the confession may appear to have been given
voluntarily since the confessant did not file charges against his alleged intimidators for maltreatment, the failure
to properly inform a suspect of his rights during a custodial investigation renders the confession valueless and
inadmissible.

Apart from the absence of an express waiver of his rights, the confession contains the passing of information of
the kind held to be in violation of the right to be informed under Section 12, Article III of the Constitution. The
right to be informed requires “the transmission of meaningful information rather than just the ceremonial and
perfunctory recitation of an abstract constitutional principle.”27 It should allow the suspect to consider the
effects and consequences of any waiver he might make of these rights. More so when the suspect is one like
Sayaboc, who has an educational attainment of Grade IV, was a stranger in Nueva Vizcaya, and had already
been under the control of the police officers for two days previous to the investigation, albeit for another
offense.

CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION
PEOPLE VS GALIT MARCH 20, 1985
FACTS:
The prisoner was arrested for killing the victim oil the occasion of a robbery. He had been detained and
interrogated almost continuously for five days, to no avail. He consistently maintained his innocence. There
was no evidence to link him to the crime. Obviously, something drastic had to be done. A confession was
absolutely necessary. So the investigating officers began to maul him and to torture him physically. Still the
prisoner insisted on his innocence. His will had to be broken. A confession must be obtained. So they
continued to maltreat and beat him. 'They covered his face with a rag and pushed his face into a toilet bowl full
of human waste. The prisoner could not take any more. His body could no longer endure the pain inflicted on
him and the indignities he had to suffer. His will had been broken. He admitted what the investigating officers
wanted him to admit and he signed the confession they prepared. Later, against his will, he posed for pictures
as directed by his investigators, purporting it to be a reenactment.

ISSUE: Whether or not the accused was informed of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel,
and that any statement he might make could be used against him.

RULING:
Such a long question followed by a monosyllabic answer does not satisfy the requirements of the law that the
accused be informed of his rights under the Constitution and our laws. Instead there should be several short
and clear questions and every right explained in simple words in a dialect or language known to the person
under investigation. Accused is from Samar and there is no showing that he understands Tagalog. Moreover,
at the time of his arrest, accused was not permitted to communicate with his lawyer, a relative, or a friend. In
fact, his sisters and other relatives did not know that he had been brought to the NBI for investigation and it
was only about two weeks after he had executed the salaysay that his relatives were allowed to visit him. His
statement does not even contain any waiver of right to counsel and yet during the investigation he was not
assisted by one. At the supposed reenactment, again accused was not assisted by counsel of his choice.
These constitute gross violations of his rights.

GR. No. 89223 | May 27, 1994

People of the Philippines, plaintiff-appellee vs.
AURELIO BANDULA y LOPEZ, accussed-appellant

Facts
 Six armed men barged into the compound of Polo Coconut Plantation in Tanjay, Negros Oriental. The
armed men were identified by Security Guard Antonio Salva of the plantation as Aurelio Bandula, Teofilo
Dionanao, Victoriano Ejan and Pantaleon Sedigo while the two others who wore masks were simply
referred to as "Boy Tall" and "Boy Short." At gunpoint, the 2 masked men held Salva who was manning
his post, disarmed him of his shotgun and tied his hands behind his back. They then went up the house

28
 of Leoncio Pastrano, Chief of Security and General Foreman of the plantation, hog-tied him, and
divested him of his driver's license, goggles, wristwatch and .38 cal. snubnose revolverand accused
proceeded to the Atty. Garay, counsel of plantation. They ransacked the place and took with them
money and other valuables. Atty. Garay was killed. Accused-appellant is charged with robbery with
homicide along with 3 others who were acquitted for insufficiency of evidence. Appellant was convicted.

 Now, appellant argues that the extrajudicial confessions he and accused Dionanao executed suffer from
constitutional infirmities, hence, inadmissible in evidence considering that they were extracted under
duress and intimidation, and were merely countersigned later by the municipal attorney who, by the
nature of his position, was not entirely an independent counsel nor counsel of their choice.
Consequently, without the extrajudicial confessions, the prosecution is left without sufficient evidence to
convict him of the crime charged.

ISSUE/S of the CASE:

(a) Whether admissions obtained during custodial interrogations requires mere counsel or independent
counsel present.

HELD:
Bandula and Dionanao were investigated immediately after their arrest, they had no counsel present. If
at all, counsel came in only a day after the custodial investigation with respect to Dionanao, and two weeks
later with respect to Bandula. And, counsel who supposedly assisted both accused was Atty. Ruben Zerna, the
Municipal Attorney of Tanjay.
On top of this, there are telltale signs that violence was used against Bandua. Certainly, these are
blatant violations of the Constitution which mandates in Section 12, Art. III, that
(1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed
of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the
person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived
except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation or any other means which vitiate the free will shall be
used against him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are
prohibited.
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible
in evidence against him.
(4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violations of this section as well as
compensation to and rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar practices, and their families. The present case
is analogous to the more recent case of People v. De Jesus, where it was held that admissions obtained during
custodial interrogations without the benefit of counsel although later reduced to writing and signed in the
presence of counsel are still flawed under the Constitution.
The Constitution also requires that counsel be independent. Obviously, he cannot be a special counsel,
public or private prosecutor, counsel of the police, or a municipal attorney whose interest is admittedly adverse
to the accused. Granting that Atty. Zerna assisted Dionanao and Bandula when they executed their respective
extrajudicial confessions, still their confessions are inadmissible in evidence considering that Atty. Zerna does
not qualify as an independent counsel. As a legal officer of the municipality, he provides legal assistance and
support to the mayor and the municipality in carrying out the delivery of basic services to the people, including
the maintenance of peace and order. It is thus seriously doubted whether he can effectively undertake the
defense of the accused without running into conflict of interests. He is no better than a fiscal or prosecutor who
cannot represent the accused during custodial investigations.

LENIDO LUMANOG and AUGUSTO SANTOS,

Petitioners,
-vs-
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent
Facts:
The consolidated cases arose in connection with the killing of former Chief of the Metropolitan Command
Intelligence and Security Group of the Philippine Constabulary, now the Philippine National Police (PNP),
Colonel Rolando N. Abadilla (Abadilla), who was ambushed in broad daylight while driving his car along
Katipunan Avenue, Quezon City.
- at 8 am Abadilla left the house
- at 8:40 am a shooting incident report was received by SPO2 Ortiz at CPDC
From the testimony and medico-legal report of Dr. Jesusa N. Vergara, it was disclosed that the victim died of
hemorrhage as a result of multiple gunshot wounds, mostly in the head and chest, and also sustained
29
abrasions, contusions, lacerated skin, hematoma and incised wounds or cuts in the skin caused by glass
splinters. Records indicate that immediately after the incident, elements of the CPDC, PNP-NCR at Camp
Karingal were already coordinating with investigators of Station 8-CPDC who had turned over to said office
the evidence gathered and referred the witnesses present at the crime scene. [14] As a result of follow-up
operations, Joel de Jesus, alias Tabong, was apprehended on June 19, 1996 at his house at Dahlia St.,
Fairview, Quezon City. He executed his Sinumpaang Salaysay dated June 20, 1996 and Karagdagang
Sinumpaang Salaysay dated June 21, 1996.
Statements of the Accused
Joel de Jesus narrated that on June 13, 1996 at 6:30 in the morning after parking his tricycle at the corner
of Regalado and Camaro Streets, Fairview, he was fetched by Lorenzo Larry delos Santos who was his
neighbor at Ruby St. Larry was accompanied by his nephew Ogie, and a certain Tisoy who drove the owner-
type jeep. Larry told him they were going to kill a big-time personality (may titirahin na malaking tao), whose
name was Abadilla, and that they were going to ambush the latter at Katipunan Avenue. The ambush would
be carried out by Joel, Larry, Tisoy, Ram (de Jesus), Cesar who was a policeman, and four (4)
others. According to Joel, he only acted as lookout; Lorenzo, Ram and Cesar were the ones who fired shots,
while Tisoy focused on a security guard at a store.
Joel further stated that the ambush-slay of Abadilla was planned by the group three (3) days before, when
they met at the house of Ram de Jesus also in Fairview near his house. Although he did not know the identity
of the person who masterminded the ambush-slay of Abadilla, he described the mastermind as the one (1)
who opened Abadillas car and pulled Abadilla from the inside of the car, and he was also the one (1) who
drove the L-300 van. Lorenzo told him he should not worry because Lorenzo would take care that he would be
compensated for his participation. 
In his second statement, Joel pointed to his cohorts in a police line-up inside the CID-CPDC, PNP-NCR,
Camp Karingal, Quezon City where he positively identified Rameses de Jesus (Ram), Cesar Fortuna, Lenido
Lumanog and PO2 Romeo Costibolo as among those who participated in the ambush-slaying of Abadilla on
June 13, 1996.

With respect to Lorenzo delos Santos, he also executed a statement dated June 21, 1996 admitting his
participation in the ambush-slay of Abadilla on June 13, 1996, and pointing to Rameses de Jesus as the
mastermind and also named the following suspects: POGS whose real name was Lenido Lumanog, Joel de
Jesus alias Tabong, Cesar Fortuna and four (4) others whom he did not know. He said that he was just
brought along by Rameses de Jesus and was further threatened that if he would not go with them, they would
kill his family. He claimed that he merely acted as a lookout. A gold-plated Omega wristwatch and a wallet
containing an undetermined amount of cash plus calling cards and other important papers, all of which were
supposedly stolen by them after killing Abadilla.

When arraigned, all the accused pleaded not guilty to the murder charge.
P/Insp. Castillo
The witness declared that the constitutional mandate and requirements under Republic Act (R.A.) No.
7438 had been complied with because he secured the services of a counsel during the interrogation of then
suspect Joel de Jesus when his sworn statement was taken on June 20, 1996. He had informed the said
suspect of his right to counsel in the presence of CID personnel and when he brought him to the office of Atty.
Confesor R. Sansano of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) located at the second floor of the Hall of
Justice, Quezon City Hall. Asked why it occurred to him to bring the suspect to the IBP, the witness replied
that he believed IBP was a private, not a government, institution. He also asked Joel -- who was allowed to
make a telephone call, although he was not aware if Joel made any such call -- whether he had his own
lawyer. He recalled asking Joel if he was willing to go with them to the City Hall, because he had asked to
secure the services of counsel. There had been instances when the IBP lawyers assisted some suspects
brought by the CPDC. Joel executed his statement, with SPO2 Jose L. Garcia, Jr. propounding the
questions. They started taking his statement at 1:10 p.m. of June 20, 1996 at Room 235, IBP Office, Quezon
City Hall of Justice in the presence of Atty. Sansano and a number of people inside said office. He was
apprised for the first time about a suspect (Joel) who was just apprehended when he called their office upon
arriving home on the night of June 19, 1996. The information was given to him by the desk sergeant and
thereupon he gave instruction to contact the witness and include that suspect in a line-up.
SPO2 Garcia, Jr. 
While still inside the office of P/Insp. Castillo, he asked Joel if his statement was voluntary and what kind of
statement he was going to give. Joel answered that his statement was voluntary and he wanted to be included
as state witness in the Abadilla case. After completing the taking down of the statement, he gave it to Joel and
asked the latter to read it. Joel read the typewritten statement and when he finished reading, he gave the
same to Atty. Sansano. Atty. Sansano read all the contents of the document and asked Joel if he understood
30
it, to which he answered Yes, sir. Atty. Sansano then asked Joel if he was willing to sign the statement, to
which the latter again replied in the affirmative. Joel signed the statement in his presence and also that of Atty.
Sansano, who likewise signed it in his presence. 
On cross-examination, SPO2 Garcia, Jr. affirmed that before the taking down of the statement, he had
explained to Joel the consequences of his being a state witness, in accordance with the instruction of P/Insp.
Castillo. He specifically explained to Joel: Itong statement na ito ay puwedeng gamitin laban o panig sa yo sa
alinmang hukuman dito sa Pilipinas. Ikaw ba ay nakahandang tumestigo sa mga sasabihin ng tao dito sa
statement mo na ito na magiging laban sa kanila. Joel told him, Yes, sir. P/Insp. Castillo had told him that Joel
was to turn state witness before the latter was brought to the IBP Office.
SPO2 Tarala 
Before taking down the statement of Lorenzo, he advised the latter of his rights under the law, warning that
any statement he would make could be used against him in any court of law, so that he had the right not to
answer any question which to his mind would incriminate him. Lorenzo responded by saying that he wanted to
give a statement and to be a state witness. When Lorenzo asked if he could use a telephone at the
information table, he said yes. Lorenzo then called his office because he was a customs broker, and also
called up a relative who was a certain Col. Sala (Col. Milagros Sala), a Quezon City police official. He told
Lorenzo that he should have a lawyer of his choice during the taking down of his statement. He prodded
Lorenzo to call the lawyer, whom Lorenzo knew to be always at the City Hall. They then proceeded to the
Quezon City Hall to look for that lawyer at the Office of the City Attorney. However, Lorenzo was not able to
find said lawyer; he asked somebody (a woman) who referred them to the Hall of Justice. After failing to find
the person Lorenzo was looking for to be his counsel, an old man, a vendor suggested to them to go upstairs
at the IBP Office. The lady secretary of the IBP chapter office introduced them to Atty. Florimond Rous, who
then asked him and his companions to step out of the room so Atty. Rous could talk to Lorenzo.  Atty. Rous
and Lorenzo talked for ten (10) to fifteen (15) minutes, after which they were called again to enter the
office. His two (2) companions were left outside and he was told by Atty. Rous that he had already apprised
Lorenzo of his rights, but Lorenzo still wanted to give a statement.
Atty. Rous
The police investigator who accompanied Lorenzo to their office was the one (1) who had propounded
questions in Tagalog and typed the answers given by Lorenzo also in Tagalog. He was just within hearing
distance and was present during the entire time of the taking of Lorenzos statement.Afterwards, he let
Lorenzo read the typewritten statement, and he asked Lorenzo if those were the questions given to him and
the answers he had given, to which he replied in the affirmative. He further asked Lorenzo if he was willing to
sign the statement without pressure, and Lorenzo said he was willing to sign the same. He asked Lorenzo to
sign his statement before the office of Prosecutor Ben dela Cruz. Prosecutor dela Cruz first read the
statement and then asked Lorenzo if he was willing to sign the same, and he answered in the
affirmative.Lorenzo signed the statement in their presence; he and Prosecutor dela Cruz also signed it.
The principal witness for the prosecution was Freddie Alejo, who testified that as a security guard employed
by Provider Security Agency, he was then assigned at 211 Katipunan Avenue, Blue Ridge, Quezon City.  
The Trial Courts Verdict
Accused Arturo Napolitano y Caburnay is hereby ACQUITTED;
Accused Lorenzo delos Santos y dela Cruz is hereby ACQUITTED.
Accused SPO2 Cesar Fortuna y Abudo, Rameses de Jesus y Calma, Leonardo Lumanog y Luistro (a.k.a.
Leonido or Lenido), Joel de Jesus y Valdez, and Augusto Santos y Galang are hereby found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt as co-principals of the crime of MURDER as defined and penalized in the Revised Penal
Code for the death of ex-Col. Rolando Abadilla y Nolasco with the aggravating circumstances of treachery
(absorbing abuse of superior strength) and evident premeditation and they are hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of DEATH;
The trial court also found that the statements of Joel, in which he admitted his participation in the crime
assisted by Atty. Sansano and in the presence of the IBP personnel and police investigators, were not flawed
by intimidation or violence when obtained and sworn to before the fiscal. The common defense of alibi put up
by all the accused was rejected by the trial court, holding that (1) the alleged treasure-hunting trip made by
Lumanog and Rameses was incredible and unpersuasive, as it was contrary to ordinary human
experience; (2) Fortunas claim was weak, the logbook entry on his supposed transaction in the Office of the
Directorate for Personnel and Recruitment at Camp Crame was a mere photocopy, and also, as in the case of
Rameses, he never mentioned such digging activity in Pampanga in the sworn complaint he had filed before
the CHR; (3) Augustos alibi was supported only by his brother-in-law, and it was simply not usual for menfolk,
instead of women, in our family culture, to fetch a woman who had just given birth at the hospital, aside from
the observation that Augusto could have gone straight to Fabella Hospital in Sta. Cruz, Manila instead of
going first to Buendia, Makati before 7:00 a.m. to fetch his brother-in-law. With respect to Lumanog, the trial
31
court pointed out that his silence and failure to testify in court, despite the evidence implicating him in the
murder of Abadilla, justified an inference that he was not innocent.
Lumanog filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied as well as the petition for new trial.
Ruling of the CA
The CA upheld the conviction of the accused-appellants based on the credible eyewitness testimony of Alejo,
who vividly recounted before the trial court their respective positions and participation in the fatal shooting of
Abadilla, having been able to witness closely how they committed the crime. 
SC’s Ruling

Rights of Accused During

Custodial Investigation

Extrajudicial Confession of Joel de Jesus Not Valid

Police officers claimed that upon arresting Joel, they informed him of his constitutional rights to remain
silent, that any information he would give could be used against him, and that he had the right to a competent
and independent counsel, preferably, of his own choice, and if he cannot afford the services of counsel he will
be provided with one (1). However, since these rights can only be waived in writing and with the assistance of
counsel, there could not have been such a valid waiver by Joel, who was presented to Atty. Sansano at the
IBP Office, Quezon City Hall only the following day and stayed overnight at the police station before he was
brought to said counsel. P/Insp. Castillo admitted that the initial questioning of Joel began in the morning of
June 20, 1996, the first time said suspect was presented to him at the CPDC station, even before he was
brought to the IBP Office for the taking of his formal statement. Thus, the possibility of appellant Joel having
been subjected to intimidation or violence in the hands of police investigators as he claims, cannot be
discounted. The constitutional requirement obviously had not been observed. Settled is the rule that the
moment a police officer tries to elicit admissions or confessions or even plain information from a suspect, the
latter should, at that juncture, be assisted by counsel, unless he waives this right in writing and in the
presence of counsel.The purpose of providing counsel to a person under custodial investigation is to curb the
police-state practice of extracting a confession that leads appellant to make self-incriminating statements.

Even assuming that custodial investigation started only during Joels execution of his statement before
Atty. Sansano on June 20, 1996, still the said confession must be invalidated. To be acceptable, extrajudicial
confessions must conform to constitutional requirements. A confession is not valid and not admissible in
evidence when it is obtained in violation of any of the rights of persons under custodial investigation.

Since Joel was provided with a lawyer secured by CPDC investigators from the IBP-Quezon City
chapter, it cannot be said that his right to a counsel preferably of his own choice was not complied with,
particularly as he never objected to Atty. Sansano when the latter was presented to him to be his counsel for
the taking down of his statement. A lawyer provided by the investigators is deemed engaged by the accused
when he does not raise any objection against the counsels appointment during the course of the investigation,
and the accused thereafter subscribes to the veracity of the statement before the swearing officer.

Atty. Sansano, who supposedly interviewed Joel and assisted the latter while responding to questions
propounded by SPO2 Garcia, Jr., did not testify on whether he had properly discharged his duties to said
client. While SPO2 Garcia, Jr. testified that Atty. Sansano had asked Joel if he understood his answers to the
questions of the investigating officer and sometimes stopped Joel from answering certain questions, SPO2
Garcia, Jr. did not say if Atty. Sansano, in the first place, verified from them the date and time of Joels arrest
and the circumstances thereof, or any previous information elicited from him by the investigators at the station,
and if said counsel inspected Joels body for any sign or mark of physical torture.

With respect to the other appellants, they were likewise entitled to the rights guaranteed by the Constitution
when they were brought to the police station as suspects and were, therefore under custodial
investigation. However, they cannot simply rely on those violations of constitutional rights during custodial
investigation, which are relevant only when the conviction of the accused by the trial court is based on the
evidence obtained during such investigation.As for the matters stated in the extrajudicial confession of
appellant Joel, these were not the basis for appellants conviction. It has to be stressed further that no
confession or statement by appellants Fortuna, Lumanog, Augusto and Rameses was used as evidence by
the prosecution at the trial.

32
 After a thorough and careful review, we hold that there exists sufficient evidence on record to sustain
appellants conviction even without the extrajudicial confession of appellant Joel de Jesus.

WHEREFORE, the consolidated petitions and appeal are hereby DISMISSED. The Decision dated April
1, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00667 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS in
that the civil indemnity for the death of Col. Rolando N. Abadilla is hereby increased to P75,000.00, and the
amounts of moral and exemplary damages awarded to his heirs are reduced to P75,000.00 and P30,000.00,
respectively.

With costs against the accused-appellants.

SO ORDERED.

People vs Peñaflor
G.R. No. 206296 | Aug 12, 2015
Facts:
Estur, a COA Auditor, discovered in July 1993 rice stocks unaccounted for in the bodega of the NFA. The
stocks were under the account of Matas. Upon the recommendation of Estur, COA State Auditor IV, Betonio,
who was the Provincial Manager of NFA, Lanao del Norte, suspended accused Matas.
On 21 August 1993, at about 8:00 p.m., Betonio, upon disembarking from the Ford Fiera driven by Fajardo,
was stabbed and shot in front of his rented apartment at Bertumen Compound, Palao, Iligan City. Upon
hearing her husband shout, “If you want to kill me, don’t include my wife,” quickly followed by two gunshots,
Vicenta hid inside their apartment. After a few minutes, she went out of the house and saw Betonio, barely
alive, slumped on the ground with a knife, with a handle like that of an eagle and a carving like that of a
dragon, still pierced through his chest. Before Betonio was brought to the Dr. Uy Hospital, where he was later
pronounced dead on arrival, he whispered to his wife the names, Delfin and Matas.
Based on the necropsy conducted by Dr. Villarin, Betonio died of cardiorespiratory arrest hypovolemic shock
due to a gunshot and deep stab wounds.
During the investigation, SPO4 Lubang initially identified the following as suspects: Edgar Matas, Anacleto
Matas, Jr., and Oscar Ondo. However, in the course of the investigation, after publishing a sketch of the knife
which was found embedded in Betonio’s chest, they were informed that a certain Ramil Peñaflor was the
actual killer.
On 12 November 1993, SPO4 Lubang and SPO3 Badelles went to the house of one Dioscora Praquilles.
There they found accused-appellant Peñaflor, whom they invited to the Iligan City Police Station for
interrogation. During the investigation, accused-appellant Peñaflor admitted killing Betonio and that he was
hired by accused Ondo, the brother-in-law of Matas, for the amount of P15,000.00, to kill Betonio. At 3:00 p.m.
of that same day, the police brought accused-appellant Peñaflor to the Office of the City Prosecutor to obtain
his admission,11 which was conducted by Assistant City Prosecutor Albulario, with the assistance of Atty.
Cristobal, as counsel de officio.
The following day, 13 November 1993, Praquilles went to the Padilla Law Office to engage the latter’s services
as counsel for accused-appellant Peñaflor. Pursuant to the agreement, the Padilla Law Office, through Atty.
Gerardo Padilla, entered its appearance as counsel for accused-appellant Peñaflor in a letter, which was
received by the Office of the City Prosecutor on 15 November 1993.12
However, on the same day that the Padilla Law Office entered its appearance as counsel for accused-
appellant Peñaflor, or three days after accused-appellant Peñaflor’s first extrajudicial confession/admission,
accused-appellant Peñaflor discharged the Padilla Law Office as counsel and entered a second extrajudicial
confession.13 This time, however, the second extrajudicial confession was conducted by City Prosecutor
Lagcao, with the assistance of Atty. Cavales, as counsel de officio.
Issue:
Are extra-judicial confession executed during preliminary investigation covered by rules on custodial
investigation ?
Ruling:
Yes, the import of the distinction between custodial interrogation and preliminary investigation relates to the
inherently coercive nature of a custodial intereogation which is conducted by the police authorities. Due to the
interrogatory procedures employed by police authorities, which are conductive to physical and psychological

33
coercion, the law affords arrested persons constitutional rights to guarantee the voluntariness of their
confession and admissions, and to act as deterrnt from coercion by police authorities. These safeguards are
found in Article III, Section 12(1) of the Constitution and Section 2 of RA No. 7438. Sans proper safeguards,
custodial investigation is a fertile means to obtain confessions and admissions in dures.
In this case, even if accused-appellant Peñaflor’s extrajudicial confessions were obtained under custodial
investigation, these are admissible. To be admissible, a confession must comply with the following
requirements. It must be:
1 voluntary
2 made with the assistance of a competent and independent counsel
3 express
4 in writing
In the case at bar, the prosecution dis not present proof of the absence of any of these requirements.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ARMANDO GALLARDO y GANDER et. al. G.R. No. 113684 January
25, 2000 Independent and Competent Counsel

FACTS: On July 28, 1991, the lifeless body of Edmundo Orizal was found in the rest house of Ronnie Balao.
The victim was found to have sustained seven (7) gunshot wounds in the chest, abdomen, back, left and right
thighs, and two (2) grazing wounds on the left arm and back.

Investigation by the Tuguegarao police station identified the suspects in the murder of Edmundo Orizal as
Armando Gallardo y Gander, Alfredo Columna y Correa, and Jessie Micate y Orteza. The police received
information that the suspects were detained at the Camalaniugan Police Station because of other criminal
charges. The Tuguegarao police went to the Camalaniugan Police Station to fetch the suspects. Only
Armando Gallardo and Alfredo Columna alias Fermin were in the custody of the Camalaniugan Police Station.
They were investigated by Police Investigator SPO4 Isidro Marcos, and they gave statements admitting that
they, together with Jessie Micate, killed Edmundo Orizal.

During the investigation, the dialect used was Ilocano, the native tongue of the accused, and during the taking
of the statements, Atty. Rolando Velasco assisted them. Judge Vilma Pauig was present. She administered
the oath on the jurat of the statements. Accused-appellants signed their statements admitting the killing of
Edmundo Orizal.

ISSUE: Must the lawyer be known to the accused prior to investigation?

RULING: The Court held that “while the initial choice of the lawyer in cases where a person under custodial
investigation cannot afford the services of a lawyer is naturally lodged in the police investigators, the accused
really has the final choice as he may reject the counsel chosen for him and ask for another one. A lawyer
provided by the investigators is deemed engaged by the accused where he never raised any objection against
the former’s appointment during the course of the investigation and the accused thereafter subscribes to the
veracity of his statement before the swearing officer.

In the case at bar, although Atty. Velasco was provided by the State and not by the accused themselves, the
accused were given an opportunity whether to accept or not to accept him as their lawyer. They were asked
and they immediately agreed to have Atty. Velasco as their counsel during the investigation. There is no
requirement in the Constitution that the lawyer of an accused during custodial investigation be previously
known to them. The Constitution provides that the counsel be a competent and independent counsel, who will
represent the accused and protect their Constitutionally guaranteed rights.

People vs. Elias Barasina

Facts: Fiscal Lino Mayo of Olongapo was shot by a single bullet on his side of his face while he was walking at
the VIP parking lot of Victory Liner Compound. Elias Barasina was the suspect in the crime. 2 criminal charges
werecharged against him: 1. Illegal possession of firearms and 2. Murder. Barasina was indifferent in entering
any plea hence, the plea of not guilty to the 2 criminal charges was entered by the court.During the
investigation, when Cpl. Del rosario informed Barasina of his constitutional rights, he stated his desireto have a
lawyer. Hence, as instructed by Lt. Surara, a private practitioner named Atty. Abelardo Torres wasfetched from
his office. When Atty. Torres arrived at the police station, he conferred with Barasina for 30 mins.Barasina
indicated his desire to give a statement in the presence of Atty. Torres. Cpl. Del Rosario prepared awritten
34
appraisal of Constitutional rights signed by Atty. Torres and Barasina.RTC: Barasina is guilty of murder and
illegal possessionCA: modifiedBarasina contention: RTC erred in admitting in evidence the extrajudicial
confession of Barasina because themanner the extrajudicial confession and waiver were extracted from him
was without the presence of the lawyerof his own choice. He alleges that he procured the services of Atty.
Mendoza but it turned out that it was Atty.Torres who assisted during the interrogation. He says that
extrajudicial confession cannot be utilized against himfor want of competent, independent counsel, of his own
choice.

Issue: W/N the extrajudicial confession of Barasina can be used as evidence despite being done without the
lawyerof his choice.

Held: YES. Art. 3 sec. 12 of the 1987 Constitution provides that an accused has the right to be informed on his
right to remain silent and to have a competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. The
word preferably does not convey the message that the choice of a lawyer by a person under investigation is
exclusive as to preclude other equally competent and independent attys. From handling his defense. If the rule
is otherwise, the tempo of a custodial investigation will be solely in the hands of the accused who can impede
or obstruct the progress of the interrogation by simply selecting lawyer who for one reason or another is not
available to protect his interest.
In this case, during the custodial investigation Barasina failed to indicate in any manner and at any stage of the
process that he wishes to consult with an atty. of his own preference before speaking or giving any statement.
There was no showing that he manifested any resistance when he was assisted by Atty. Torres. The hiring of
Atty. Mendoza was an afterthought. Note: The phrase “competent and independent” and preferably of his own
choice were explicit details which were added upon the persistence of human rights lawyers during the 1986
ConCom who pointed out cases where, during the ML, lawyers made available to the detainee would be one
appointed by military and is beholden to them. Double jeopardy: No double jeopardy because first jeopardy
has not yet attached. Mere filing of two info charging the same offenses is not double jeopardy for the simple
reason that the primary basis of defense of double jeopardy is that the accused has already been convicted or
acquitted in the first case. It is the conviction or jeopardy of being convicted or acquittal of the accused that
bars further prosecution

PEOPLE VS. DOMINGO REYES G.R. No. 178300 March 17, 2009 581 SCRA 691 Rights of an Accused,
Evidence, Extra-judicial Confessions
OCTOBER 16, 2017
FACTS:
On July 16, 1999, at Sitio Lambakin, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan, accused-appellant, conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one another and grouping themselves together with Juanito Pataray
Cayaban, Federico Pataray Cabayan and Rommel Libarnes Acejo, who are still at large, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, by means of force and intimidation and with use of firearms, carry away and
deprive Robert Yao, Yao San, Chua Ong Ping Sim, Raymond Yao, Ronald Matthew Yao, Lennie Yao,
Charlene Yao, Jona Abagatnan ang Josephine Ortea against their will and consent on board their Mazda MVP
van for the purpose of extorting money in the amount of Five Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00), that during the
detention of Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymong Yao, said accused with intent to kill, willfully and unlawfully
strangled Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymond Yao to death to the damage and prejudice of their heirs.
Appellant Arnaldo surrendered to the Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Task Force (PAOCTF) at Camp
Crame. Thereupon, appellant Arnaldo, with the assistance of Atty. Uminga, executed a written extra-judicial
confession narrating his participation in the incident. Appellant Arnaldo identified appellants Reyes and Flores.
Afterwards, appellant Flores, with the assistance of Atty. Rous, executed a written extra-judicial confession
detailing his participation in the incident.
After trial, the RTC rendered a Decision convicting appellants of the special complex crime of kidnapping for
ransom with homicide and sentencing each of them to suffer the supreme penalty of death. Appellants were
also ordered to pay jointly and severally the Yao family ₱150,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱500,000.00 as moral
damages and the costs of the proceedings.
ISSUES:
1. Were the extra-judicial confessions (Pasubali) of the accused admissible in evidence?
2. Was he afforded the right to counsel of his own choice?
RULING:
1. Yes. The Pasubali of appellants Arnaldo and Flores’s written extra-judicial confessions clearly shows that
before they made their respective confessions, the PAOCTF investigators had informed them that the
interrogation about to be conducted on them referred to the kidnapping of the Yao family.
35
Since the prosecution has sufficiently established that the respective extra-judicial confessions of appellant
Arnaldo and appellant Flores were obtained in accordance with the constitutional guarantees, these
confessions are admissible. They are evidence of a high order because of the strong presumption that no
person of normal mind would deliberately and knowingly confess to a crime, unless prompted by truth and
conscience. Consequently, the burden of proving that undue pressure or duress was used to procure the
confessions rests on appellants Arnaldo and Flores.
We have held that an extra-judicial confession is admissible in evidence if the following requisites have been
satisfied: (1) it must be voluntary; (2) it must be made with the assistance of competent and independent
counsel; (3) it must be express; and (4) it must be in writing.
Yes. The phrase “preferably of his own choice” does not convey the message that the choice of a lawyer by a
person under investigation is exclusive as to preclude other equally competent and independent attorneys from
handling the defense. A lawyer provided by the investigators is deemed engaged by the accused when he
does not raise any objection to the counsel’s appointment during the course of the investigation, and the
accused thereafter subscribes to the veracity of the statement before the swearing officer. Appellants Arnaldo
and Flores did not object to the appointment of Atty. Uminga and Atty. Rous as their lawyers, respectively,
during their custodial investigation. Appellants Arnaldo and Flores are deemed to have engaged the services of
Atty. Uminga and Atty. Rous, respectively.

PEOPLE V. SIONGCO G.R. NO. 186472 JULY 5, 2010

Rule 115 Rights of the accused
FACTS: Appellants Siongco, Boton and Enriquez, induced 11-year old Nikko Satimbre, a resident of Balanga,
Bataan, to board a bus bound for Pilar, Bataan and promised the latter a “Gameboy”. He was then bought to
Dinalupihan, Bataan where he was kept for the night. Two days after, Siongco called Elvira Satimbre, Nikko’s
mother, and demanded P400,000.00, in exchange for the release of her son. Siongco further threatened that
Nikko would be killed if Elvira failed to give the ransom money. Nikko was moved to Taguig City and was
cautioned not to tell anybody that he was kidnapped. Appellants were finally arrested in an entrapment
operation conducted by the PAOCTF four days after Nikko was kidnapped. The RTC convicted appellants of
kidnapping with serious illegal detention, then punishable by death, with the exception of Boton, on the ground
of reasonable doubt. The CA affirmed the conviction byt modified the penalty to reclusion perpetua.
On review, the appellants claimed that they were deprived of their right to an independent and competent
counsel when the RTC appointed Atty. Michael Moralde (Atty. Moralde) as their counsel de oficio during the
pre-trial conference, direct examination and cross-examination of the prosecution’s principal witness, Nikko.
This was so, despite Atty. Moralde’s manifestation during Nikko’s cross-examination that the defense of his
actual client, accused Boton, conflicts with that of the other accused.
ISSUE: Whether Appellants were deprived of their right to an independent and competent counsel by the
appointment of Atty.Moralde.
HELD: NO, A scrutiny of the records shows that Atty. Moralde was appointed as appellants’ counsel de oficio
in six (6) hearings, because their regular counsel de oficio, Atty. Antoniano from the Public Attorney’s Office
(PAO), was inexplicably absent. There is no denial of the right to counsel where a counsel de oficio is
appointed during the absence of the accused's counsel de parte, or in this case the regular counsel de oficio,
pursuant to the court's desire to finish the case as early as practicable under the continuous trial system. The
choice of counsel by the accused in a criminal prosecution is not a plenary one. If the chosen counsel
deliberately makes himself scarce, the court is not precluded from appointing a de oficio counsel, which it
considers competent and independent, to enable the trial to proceed until the counsel of choice enters his
appearance. Otherwise, the pace of a criminal prosecution will be entirely dictated by the accused, to the
detriment of the eventual resolution of the case.

PEOPLE vs. MORIAL G.R. No. 129295 August 15, 2001

Facts:
Edwin Morial, Leonardo Morial and Nonelito Abinon were convicted of Robbery with Homicide. During
the custodial investigation, Leonardo Morial made an extrajudicial confession admitting to the crime. However,
later on, he recanted his confession saying that the police tortured him into admitting the crime. On appeal,
Morial moved to quash the extrajudicial confession claiming that such confession was made without the
assistance of counsel given him by the police was not present during the whole interrogation. He left to attend
some personal matters while the interrogation of Morial was still going on. However, said attorney claimed that
he was present when Morial signed the admission.
Issue: Is the extrajudicial confession admissible as evidence against the accused?
36
Ruling: No, the extrajudicial confession is not admissible as evidence. Under section 2A of RA 7438, any
person arrested, detained under custodial investigations shall at all times be assisted by counsel. In the
absence of a lawyer, no custodial investigation shall be conducted. In the present case, the counsel left for a
different appointment while the accused was under investigation by the police officer. This is a clear violation of
RA 7438. Moreover, there was an invalid waiver of the right to counsel since this right cannot be waived except
through writing and in the presence of counsel. In this case, no written waiver and counselled waiver was
presented as evidence.

People vs Dasig G.R. No. 100231 April 28, 1993

Facts:
Appellants Rodrigo Dasig, Edwin Nuñez and 6 others were charged together of shooting Redempto Manatad,
a police officer, as he died while performing duties. Upon arraignment, appellant and Edwin Nuñes entered a
plea of "not guilty." However, after the prosecution had presented its first witness, accused Nuñes changed his
plea of "not guilty" to "guilty." Hence, the lower court held in abeyance the promulgation of a judgment against
said accused until the prosecution had finished presenting its evidence. While trial was still ongoing, Nuñez
died on March 10, 1989, thereby extinguishing his criminal liability.
At about 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon, Pfc. Catamora noticed eight (8) persons, one of whom he identified as
Edwin Nuñez, acting suspiciously. He noticed one of them giving instructions to two of the men to approach
Pfc. Manatad. On August 16, 1987, two teams of police officers were tasked to conduct surveillance on a
suspected safehouse of members of the sparrow unit located in Peace Valley, Cebu City. Upon reaching the
place, the group saw Rodrigo Dasig and Edwin Nuñes trying to escape. The team of Capt. Antonio Gorre
captured Nuñes and confiscated a .45 caliber revolver with 3 magazines and ammunitions, while the group of
Sgt. Ronald Arnejo pursued Dasig, who threw a grenade at his pursuers, but was shot on his left upper arm
and subsequently apprehended while a .38 caliber revolver with 17 live ammunitions were confiscated from
him. Thereafter, Dasig was brought to the hospital for treatment, while Nuñes was turned over to the
Metrodiscom for investigation. Dasig confessed that he and the group of Edwin Nuñes killed Pfc. Manatad. He
likewise admitted that he and Nuñes were members of the sparrow unit and the their aliases were "Armand"
and "Mabi," respectively.
The extra-judicial confession of appellant was signed by him on every page thereof with the first page
containing a certification likewise signed by him. However, Dasig contends that the procedure by which his
extra-judicial confession was taken was legally defective, and contrary to his Constitutional rights. He further
contends that assuming he conspired in the killing of Pfc. Manatad, he should be convicted at most of simple
rebellion and not murder with direct assault. Appellant also claims that the custodial interrogation was done
while he was still very sick and consequently, he could not have fully appreciated the wisdom of admitting such
a serious offense.
Issue:
Whether or not the accused-appellant is liable for extra-judicial killing of the deceased and participated in the
act of rebellion?
Held:
Yes. Accused Rogelio Dasig is found guilty of participating in an act of rebellion beyond reasonable doubt and
is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of eight (8) years of prision mayor, and to pay the
heirs of Pfc. Redempto Manatad, P50,000.00 as civil indemnity.

As to the proper imposable penalty, the Indeterminate Sentence Law is not applicable to persons convicted of
rebellion (Sec. 2, R.A. 4203), contrary to the insinuation of the Solicitor General. Article 135 of the Revised
Penal Code imposes the penalty of prision mayor and a fine not exceeding P20,000.00 to any person who
promotes, maintains, or heads a rebellion. However, in the case at bar, there is no evidence to prove that
appellant Dasig headed the crime committed. As a matter of fact he was not specifically pinpointed by Pfc.
Catamora as the person giving instructions to the group which attacked Pfc. Manatad.
Appellant merely participated in committing the act, or just executed the command of an unknown leader.
Hence, he should be made to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of eight (8) years of prision mayor. For the
resulting death, appellant is likewise ordered to pay the heirs of Pfc. Manatad FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS
(P50,000.00) as civil indemnity.

People vs. Castro [GR 106583, 19 June 1997]

Second Division, Romero (J): 4 concur

37
Facts: At about 5:30 p.m. of 19 March 1991, Capt. Allyn Evasco together with Sgt. Rogelio Raguine, Sgt.
Emilio de Guzman and CIC Julian Discargar formed a team for the purpose of conducting a buy-bust
operation. The team went to their target area in San Roque, San Miguel, Pangasinan and proceeded to deploy
themselves as planned. Sgt. de Guzman who acted as poseur-buyer and civilian informer Discargar proceeded
to Victoriano Castro y Calagno's house. Sgt. Raguine, meanwhile, hid in a grassy spot near the house.
Discargar introduced Castro to Sgt. de Guzman who said that he wanted to purchase a kilo of dried marijuana
leaves. After going inside the house, Castro emerged with a plastic bag which he handed to Sgt. de Guzman
who, in turn, paid him P600.00. After the exchange, Sgt. de Guzman made the pre-arranged signal, indicating
that the transaction was complete, by raising his right hand. Upon espying the signal, Sgt. Raguine and the
other team members approached Castro, introduced themselves as NARCOM (Narcotics Command) agents,
and arrested him. He was thereafter brought to the San Manuel Police Station. While the arresting team went
to San Fernando, La Union for further investigation, the marijuana leaves were sent to Camp Crame for
examination where it was discovered that the actual weight of the confiscated marijuana leaves was 930
grams. Castro was charged before the Regional Trial Court of Pangasinan, Branch 38 in an information dated
21 March 1991, for violation of Section 4, Article II of Republic Act 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972). After
Castro entered a plea of not guilty, trial on the merits commenced. On 29 April 1992, the trial court rendered its
decision finding Castro guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense charged, and sentencing him to suffer
the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P25,000.00, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency and to pay the costs of the proceedings. Castro appealed.
Issue: Whether Castro’s signature on the “Receipt of Property Seized” is admissible in evidence.
Held: Castro's signature on the "Receipt of Property Seized" is inadmissible in evidence as there is no showing
that he was assisted by counsel when he signed the same. Since this is a document tacitly admitting the
offense charged, the constitutional safeguard must be observed. Be that as it may, even disregarding this
document, there is still ample evidence to prove Castro's guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the same having
been shown by the detailed testimonies of the law officers who took part in the buy-bust operation.
People v. Wong Chuen Ming G.R. Nos. 112801-11
summary Accused were charged with unlawfully transporting “Shabu” into the country. All of them were
found guilty and sentenced to life imprisonment by the RTC. Wong and Au appealed and were acquitted by the
SC because there signatures on the boxes and plastic bags containing the prosecution’s evidence were
inadmissible.
facts of the case
• Said 11 accused arrived as a group at the NAIA on Sept. 1991 at 1:00PM. Their respective passports
showed that Wong and Au are the only British (Hongkong) nationals in the group while the rest are all
Malaysian nationals. All accused arrived in Manila as a tour group arranged by Select Tours International Co.,
Ltd. Au Wing Cheung, an employee of said travel agency, acted as the tour guide.
• After passing through and obtaining clearance from immigration officers, the group went to the baggage
claim area to retrieve their respective checked-in baggages. Thereafter, they proceeded to the customs area
which at the time was manned by customs examiner Danilo Gomez.
• According to Gomez’ testimony, he instructed the group to place their baggages on the examiner’s
table for inspection. Chin Kong Song’s bag was first to be examined. In the course of the inspection, Gomez
found 3 brown colored boxes, marked Alpen Cereals and similar in size to powdered milk boxes, underneath
the clothes. Gomez found nothing wrong with them. Gomez allowed Chin Kong to go. Following the same
procedure, Gomez next examined the baggage of Wong Chuen and the former again found and pulled out 2
boxes of Alpen Cereals without cutting them open. He found nothing wrong with them and allowed Wong
Chuen to go. But by the time the third baggage belonging to Lim Nyuk was examined, Gomez again pulled out
another 3 boxes of Alpen Cereals and this time he became suspicious and decided to open one of the boxes
with his cutter. The box contained white crystalline substance. Gomez immediately called the attention of
Appraiser Oreganan Palala and Duty Collector Zenaida Bonifacio.
• The group were thereafter escorted to the district collector’s office, including Chin Kong and Wong
Chuen who were previously cleared by Gomez. Gomez continued to examined the remaining baggages and
he allegedly found that each baggage contained 1, 2, or 3 boxes similar to those previously found. A total of 30
boxes (34.45 kg) of Alpen Cereals were recovered. Gomez bundled these boxes together with a masking tape
and handed them to Bonifacio, who in turn called out the names of the accused, one by one, and ordered them
to sign on the masking tape placed on the boxes allegedly recovered from their respective baggages.
• Capt. Rustico Francisco, who was present in the district collector’s office, testified that he conducted a
field test on a sample of the substance and confirmed that they were indeed “Shabu.” Francisco immediately
informed the 11 accused that they were under arrest.

38
• The accused were brought to Camp Crame, where they were asked to identify their signatures on the
boxes. They were again made to sign on the plastic bags containing white crystalline substance. Elizabeth
Ayonon, a forensic chemist at the PNP Crime Lab confirmed that they were indeed “Shabu.”
• The defense endeavored to show that only Lim Chan Fatt, Chin Kong Song, and Lim nyuk Sun were
responsible for bringing boxes of Alpen Cereals into the country (Lim Chan testified that he met the two at his
boarding house in Hongkong a few days before the trip; that a certain Hongkong businessman Ah Hong asked
Lim Chan to deliver these boxes and in turn the former will see to it that the latter will have a good time in the
Philippines; that Lim Chan requested Chin Kong and Lim Nyuk to accommodate some of the boxes in their
baggages) and that they cannot be held liable for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act because they had no
knowledge that these boxes contained “shabu.”
• As for the accused-appellants Wong Chuen and Au Wing, they denied that the boxes were recovered
from their baggages. They claimed that they were forced into signing the boxes by the police authorities who
were present inside the collector’s office.
• Only Wong Chuen and Au Wing appealed (the others neither filed a notice of appeal nor filed their
appellant’s brief).
issues
(1) WON the accused-appellants were deprived of their constitutional right to effective counsel and due
process. NO.
(2) WON the signatures of the accused on the boxes and plastic bags were inadmissible evidence as they
were obtained in violation of their Miranda Rights. YES.
ratio
(1) WON the accused-appellants were deprived of their constitutional right to effective counsel and due
process. NO.
• Their contention that they were deprived of such rights when their previous counsels also represented
the other accused despite “conflicting interests” is NOT WELL-TAKEN.
• Counsels trued to present all the defenses available to each of the accused and that they did not, in
any way, put in jeopardy accused-appellants’ constitutional right to counsel as it does not appear from the
records that the effectiveness of accused-appellants’ previous counsels was diminished by the fact that they
also represented the other accused.
(2) WON the signatures of the accused on the boxes and plastic bags were inadmissible evidence as they
were obtained in violation of their Miranda Rights. YES.
• Accused were never informed of their fundamental rights during the entire time that they were under
investigation. When they were made to affix their signature on the boxes and on the plastic bags, they were not
informed of their right to remain silent and to counsel and that any statement they might make could be used
against them. Even custom examiner himself and witness Danilo Gomez admitted to this fatal lapse during
cross-examination.
• Capt. Francisco, in his testimony, also admitted that he did not inform the accused of their rights when
he placed them under arrest.
• It is also not shown from the testimony of Elizabeth Ayonon, the chemist, that the accused were
informed of their rights when they were again made to affix their signatures on the plastic bags.
• By affixing their signatures, accused in effect made a tacit admission of the crime charged for mere
possession of “shabu.” These signatures are tantamount to an uncounseled extra-judicial confession which is
not sanctioned by Sec. 12(1)(3), Art. III, of the 1987 Constitution. The fact that all the accused are foreign
nationals does not preclude application of the exclusionary rule because they extend to all persons, both aliens
and citizens.
• Without said signatures, the prosecution is left with the testimonies of its witnesses to establish that all
11 accused transported “shabu” into the country. Among the witnesses, only Gomez testified that all the seized
baggages, include those of accused-appellants, contained boxes of “shabu.” But Gomez’ testimony was not
corroborated by the other witnesses.
o Bonifacio stated during cross-examination that she could not recall if each and everyone of the accused
were found in possession of any box or boxes.
o Francisco’s testimony, to the effect that he was not sure if he saw with his own two eyes that a box or
boxes were recovered from the bag of both Au Wing and Wong Chuen, casts doubt on the claim of Gomez.
Hence, no presumption of regularity in the performance of duties could be accorded.

39
• Other circumstances the Court considered in acquitting Wong Chuen and Au Wing:
o Accused-appellants are British national while all the other are Malaysians. They are total strangers and
do not even speak the same language. Difficult to imagine how they could have conspired with each other.
o Testimonies of Au Wing’s superiors to the effect that the latter is indeed a bona fide employee of Select
Tours.
o Wong Chuen was not originally part of the tour group arranged by Select Tours but he was only
accommodated at the last minute when his package tour to Cebu was cancelled.
o Both accused-appellants adamantly refused to sign on the transparent plastic bags.

Marcelo v. Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 109242, January 26, 1999

Facts: On February 10, 1989, Jacinto Merete, a letter carrier in  the Makati Central Post Office, disclosed to his
chief,  Projecto Tumagan, the existence of a group responsible for the pilferage of mail matter in the post
office.  Among those mentioned by Merete were Arnold Pasicolan,  an emergency laborer assigned as a bag
opener in the Printed Matters Section, and Redentor Aguinaldo, a mail sorter of the Makati Post Office. For this
reason, Tumagan sought the aid of the National Bureau of Investigation in apprehending the  group
responsible for mail pilferage in the Makati Post Office.
On February 17, 1989, NBI Director Salvador Ranin dispatched  NBI agents to Legaspi Village following a
report that the group would stage a theft of mail matter on that day. Tumagan accompanied a team of NBI
agents composed of Senior Agent Arles Vela and two other agents in a private car.
At 2:00 p.m., a postal delivery jeep, driven by one Henry Orindai, was parked in front of the Esguerra Building
on Adelantado Street. Pasicolan alighted from the jeep bringing with him a mail bag. Upon reaching Amorsolo
St., Pasicolan gave the mail bag to two persons, who were later identified as Ronnie Romero and petitioner
Lito Marcelo. The latter transferred the contents of the mail bag to a travelling bag. Meanwhile, the NBI team
led by agent Vela, upon seeing Pasicolan going towards Amorsolo St., moved their car and started towards
Amorsolo St. They were just in time to see Pasicolan handing over the mail bag to Marcelo and Romero. At
that point, Atty. Sacaguing and Arles Vela arrested the two accused. The NBI agents followed the postal
delivery jeep, overtook it, and arrested Pasicolan.
The NBI agents brought Pasicolan, Marcelo, and Romero to their headquarters. Romero,  Marcelo, and
Pasicolan were asked to affix their signatures on the envelopes of the letters.  They did so in the
presence of the members  of the NBI Administrative and Investigative Staff and the people transacting
business with the NBI at that time. According to Director Ranin, they required the accused to do this in order to
identify the letters as the very same letters confiscated from them.
A case for qualified theft was filed before the Sandiganbayan wherein the accused were declared guilty.

Issue(s): Whether or not the letters signed by the petitioner were inadmissible as evidence.

Held: The Supreme Court held that the letters were valid evidence. It is known that during custodial
investigation, a person has the right to remain silent and the right to an attorney. Any admission or confession
made in the absence of counsel is inadmissible as evidence. Furthermore, no person shall be compelled to be
a witness against himself. In the instant case, even though the petitioner was asked to sign the letters, the
letters are still admissible as evidence because the accused was convicted not only by means of these
letters but also by testimonies made by the NBI agents. Moreover, the Supreme Court held that the letters
were validly seized as an incident of a valid arrest and therefore can stand on their own. The decision
of the Sandiganbayan is affirmed.

CATERPILLAR INC. V. SAMSON

Facts

Petitioner Caterpillar, Inc. is a foreign corporation engaged in the business of manufacturing shoes, clothing
items, among others. Search warrant applications were filed against Manolo Samson (herein after referred to
as Samson) for violations of unfair competition provided under Section 168.3(a) in relation to Sections 131.3,
123(e) and 170 of Republic Act No. 8293, otherwise known as the Intellectual Property Code. Search warrants
were then issued against respondent Samson and his other business establishments (Itti Shoes Corporation,
Kolm’s Manufacturing, and Caterpillar Boutique and General Merchandise). Pursuant to the search warrants
various merchandise garments, footwear, bags, wallets, deodorant sprays, shoe cleaners and accessories, all
bearing the trademarks "CAT," "CAT AND DESIGN," "CATERPILLAR," "CATERPILLAR AND DESIGN,"
"WALKING MACHINES" and/or "Track-type Tractor and Design" were seized. Respondent Samson filed a

40
motion to quash the search warrants but was denied. However, the Court ordered the release of the articles
that were seized since there was no criminal action filed against the respondent. Petitioner then filed Motion for
Partial Reconsideration but was denied by the TC. CA also denied the petition after noting that all the criminal
complaints that were filed against the respondent were dismissed by the investigating prosecutor and that the
respondent never denied the existence of the said items.

Issue/s

1) W/N CA erred in upholding the immediate release of the seized items on the ground that there was no
criminal action for unfair competition filed against the respondent?

2) W/N the CA erred in ruling that the subsequent dismissal of the investigating State Prosecutor of the
criminal complaints against respondent justifies the return of the seized items?

Held/Ratio

1) NO. The Joint Resolution of the DOJ has become final; therefore no criminal case was filed against the
respondent in relation with the five search warrants that were issued by the Trial Court. There was also no
criminal case filed against the articles that were seized. With these, the seized articles should be immediately
released. Also, the numerous articles of clothing, footwear and accessories, among others, that were seized
had little, if any, evidentiary value for the criminal action of unfair competition.

An action for unfair competition is based on the proposition that no dealer in merchandise should be allowed to
dress his goods in simulation of the goods of another dealer, so that purchasers desiring to buy the goods of
the latter would be induced to buy the goods of the former. The most usual devices employed in committing
this crime are the simulation of labels and the reproduction of form, color and general appearance of the
package used by the pioneer manufacturer or dealer. In the case at hand the respondent already admitted the
existence of the seized articles. The Court therefore ruled that the admissions of the respondent in the case at
hand are already suffiecient to establish that he used such trademarks in order to sell merchandise at a
commercial scale and that the actual products manufactured by the respondent need not be presented to
prove such fact. Also, there were already available samples from the purchases as well as photographs of the
particular parts of the merchandise where the trademark in dispute were attached or used, therefore there is no
more need for the court to take custody of the countless articles that were seized.

2) NO. In the case at hand there is no criminal action that has been filed. The Court therefore was left with no
custody of the highly depreciable merchandise that were seized. More importantly, these highly depreciable
articles would have been superfluous if presented as evidence for the following reasons: (1) the respondent
had already admitted that he is the owner of the merchandise seized, which made use of the trademarks in
dispute; (2) the court required the respondent to execute an undertaking to produce the articles seized when
the court requires and had already in its possession a complete inventory of the items seized as secondary
evidence; (3) actual samples of the respondent’s merchandise are in the possession of the police officers who
had applied for the search warrant, and photographs thereof had been made part of the records, and
respondent did not dispute that these were obtained from his stores. Where the purpose of presenting as
evidence the articles seized is no longer served, there is no justification for severely curtailing the rights of a
person to his property. Hence, petition denied.

People of the Philippines vs. Pablito Andan y Hernandez GR No. 116437, March 3, 1997

FACTS: Marianne Guevarra, a second-year nursing student at Fatima was on her way to her school dormitory
in Valenzuelal, Metro Manila when Pablito Andan alias “Bobby” asked her to check the blood pressure of the
grandmother of Andan’s wife but there was nobody inside the house. She was punched in the abdomen by
Andan and was brought to the kitchen where he raped her. She was left in the toilet until it was dark and was
dragged to the backyard. It was when Andan lifted her over the fence to the adjacent vacant lot where she
started to move. Andan hit her head with a concrete block to silence her and dragged her body to a shallow
portion of the lot and abandoned it. The death of Marianne drew public attention which prompted Baliuag
Mayor Cornelio Trinidad to form a team of police officers to solve the case. Apart from the vacant lot, they also
searched Andan’s nearby house and found evidences linked to the crime. The occupants of the house were
interviewed and learned that accused-appellant was in Barangay Tangos, Baliuag, Bulacan. A police team lead
by Mayor Trinidad located Andan and took him to the police headquarters where he was interrogated where he
said that Dizon killed the girl. The three were then brought to Andan’s house where he showed the police
where the bags of Marianne were hidden. They were then brought back to the police station while waiting for
the result of the investigation. The gruesome crime attracted the media and as they were gathered at the police
headquarters for the result of the investigation, Mayor Trinidad arrived and proceeded to the investigation
room. Upon seeing the mayor, appellant approved him and whispered a request that they talk privately to

41
which the mayor agreed. They went to another room and there, the Andan agreed to tell the truth and admitted
that he was the one who killed Marianne. The mayor opened the door of the room to let the public and the
media representatives witness the confession. Mayor Trinidad first asked for a lawyer to assist the appellant
but since no lawyer was available he ordered the proceedings photographed and recorded in video. In the
presence of the media and his relatives, Andan admitted to the crime and disclosed how he killed Marianne
and that he falsely implicated Larin and Dizon because of ill-feelings against them. However, appellant entered
a plea of “not guilty” during his arraignment. He provided an alibi why he was at his father’s house at another
barangay and testified that policemen tortured and coerced him to admit the crime but the trial court found him
guilty and sentenced him to death.

ISSUE: Whether or not the admission of Andan to the mayor without the assistance of counsel is in violation of
the constitution and cannot be admitted as evidence in court.

RULING: Under these circumstances, it cannot be claimed that the appellant’s confession before the mayor is
inadmissible. A municipal mayor has “operational supervision and control” over the local police and may be
deemed a law enforcement officer for purposes of applying Section 12 (1) and (3) of Article III of the
Constitution. However, Andan’s confession to the mayor was not made in response to any interrogation by the
latter. In fact, the mayor did not question appellant at all and no police authority ordered the appellant to talk to
the mayor. It was the appellant who spontaneously, freely and voluntarily sought the mayor for a private
meeting. The mayor acted as a confidant and not as a law enforcer and therefore did not violate his
constitutional rights. Constitutional procedures on custodial investigation do not apply to a spontaneous
statement, not elicited through questioning by the authorities, but given in an ordinary manner whereby
appellant orally admitted having committed the crime. What the constitution bars is the compulsory disclosure
of incriminating facts or confession. Hence, we hold that appellant’s confession to the mayor was correctly
admitted by the trial court. Andan was found guilty of the special complex crime of rape with homicide.

RIGHTS OF PERSONS UNDER CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION

In the evening of October 16, 1991 of Puerto Princesa City in the presence of Clara Agagas a Gerry
Galgarin, uncle of accused Edward Endino, suddenly and without warning stabbed Dennis Aquino repeatedly
on the chest. Dennis was able to momentarily free himself from the attacker however from out of nowhere
Edward Endino appeared and fired at him. Wounded and bleeding he was able to sought refuge inside the
Elohim Store. Clara with the help of some onlookers took him to the hospital but he died before getting any
medical treatment. According to the autopsy report of Dr. Josephine Goh-Cruz, cause of death was cardio-
respiratory arrest
Title: People of the Philippines vs. Edward Endino (at large) and Gerry Galgarin, accused-appellant
G.R. No. 133026, February 20, 2001
Facts: secondary to hypovolemic shock secondary to a stab wound which penetrated the heart. On October
18, 1991 an information was filed against them however both accused remained at large. On November 19,
1992 Galgarin was apprehended by the Antipolo Police. He remained in their custody until he was fetched by
the Palawan Police. On their way to the airport, they stopped at the ABS-CBN television station where accused
Galgarin was interviewed by reporters. Video footages of the interview were taken showing Galgarin admitting
his guilt while pointing to his nephew Edward Endino as the gunman.

The case against Galgarin was established through the testimony of Clara who said that she was with
the victim standing outside the Soundlab Recording Studio, a barhouse owned by him when Galgaran attaked
him and as he was escaping Endino a spurned lover who harbored ill-feelings towards her and Dennis, shot
Dennis. Her testimony was corroborated by the victims neighbor Anita Leong who testified that a little past six
o'clock in the evening of 16 October 1991 Galgarin together with a companion went to her house looking for
Dennis. She instructed them to proceed to the Soundlab Recording Studio as Dennis might still be there. A few
minutes later she heard a gun shot and instructed her daughters to duck, she waited for her 7 year old
daughter Josephine whom she ask to run some errand to come back, soon enough she heard her daughter
crying and knocking at their door and told her that Kuya Dennis was shot and stabbed. Josephine confirmed
her mother's testimony and even said that she had seen Gerry Galgarin stab her Kuya Dennis and she could
remember Gerry very well because of the mole below his nose.

However, in the trial, Galgarin claimed that he did not take part in the slewing of Dennis and that on
October 14, 1991 he was with his Common-law wife who gave birth to their first born and that he had stayed
with her till October 16, 1991. He also disowned the confession which he made over TV Patrol and claimed
that it was induced by the threats of the arresting police officers. He asserted that the videotaped confession
was constitutionally infirmed and inadmissible under the exclusionary rule provided in Sec.12, Art. III, of the
Constitution. The trial court however admitted the video footages and his alibi rejected.

ISSUE: Whether or not the trial courts admission of videotape confession is invalid as it violates his Rights
under Sec. 12, Art. III, of the Constitution.
42
Ruling:
No, the court finds the admission of the videotaped confession proper. The interview was recorded on
video and it showed accused-appellant unburdening his guilt willingly, openly and publicly in the presence of
newsmen. Such confession does not form part of custodial investigation as it was not given to police officers
but to media men in an attempt to elicit sympathy and forgiveness from the public. Furthermore in his TV
interview he freely admitted that he had stabbed Dennis, and that Endino had shot him (Aquino). There is no
showing that the interview of accused was coerced or against his will. Hence, there is basis to accept the truth
of his statements therein.
However this court shall remind the lower courts to be extremely cautious in admitting similar
confessions for there is the probability that the police in connivance with unscrupulous media practitioners,
may attempt to legitimize coerced extrajudicial confessions and place them beyond the exclusionary rule by
having an accused admit an offense on television. Such a situation would be detrimental to the guaranteed
rights of the accused and thus imperil our criminal justice system. A word of counsel then to lower courts: we
should never presume that all media confessions described as voluntary have been freely given. This type of
confession always remains suspect and therefore should be thoroughly examined and scrutinized.

Wherefore the court finds the accused galgaran guilty of murder with treachery sentencing him to
reclusion perpetua, and ordering him to indemnify the heirs of Dennis Aquino in the amount of P50,000.00 as
compensatory damages and P72,725.35 as actual damages and that accused-appellant is further ordered to
compensate the decedent's heirs P50,000.00 as moral damages for their emotional and mental anguish. Costs
against accused-appellant.

PEOPLE V. PACITA ORDONO G.R. NO. 132154

November 27, 2010
Facts : On 5 August 1994 the decomposing body of a young girl was found among the bushes near a bridge in
Barangay Poblacion, Santol, La Union. The girl was later identified as Shirley Victore, fifteen (15) years old,
who three (3) days before was reported missing. Post-mortem examination conducted by the NBI, revealed
that the victim was raped and strangled to death.
Unidentified sources pointed to Pacito Ordoño and Apolonio Medina as the authors of the crime. The police
thereupon invited the two (2) suspects and brought them to the police station for questioning. However, for lack
of evidence , they were allowed to go home.
On 10 August 1994 the accused Pacito Ordoño and Apolonio Medina returned to the police station and
acknowledged that they had indeed committed the crime.The police immediately conducted an investigation
and put their confessions in writing. They however could not at once get the services of a lawyer to assist the
two (2) accused in the course of the investigation because there were no practicing lawyers in the Municipality.
Be that as it may, the statements of the two (2) accused where nevertheless taken.Both accused were
apprised in their own dialect of their constitutional right to remain silent and to be assisted by a competent
counsel of their choice. They assure that they understood their rights and did not require the services of
counsel, hence, the investigation was conducted with the Parish Priest, the Municipal Mayor, the Chief of
Police, other police officers and the suspect’s wife and mother, in attendance to listen to and witness the giving
of the voluntary statements of the two (2) suspects who admitted their participation in the crime.
Roland Almoite, leading radio announcer, visited and interviewed them. In the interview which was duly tape-
recorded both accused admitted again their complicity in the crime and narrated individually the events
surrounding their commission thereof
A couple of days later, the police brought the two (2) accused to the office of the PAO lawyer in Balaoan, La
Union, for assistance and counseling. PAO lawyer apprised each of the accused of his constitutional rights
and explained to them each of the questions and answers taken during the investigation. He likewise advised
them to ponder the consequences of their confessions, leading them to defer the affixing of their second
signature/ thumbmark thereon. After a week or so, the two (2) separately went back to Atty. Corpuz and
informed him of their willingness to affix their signatures and thumbmarks for the second time in their
respective confessions. They assured that their statements had been given freely and voluntarily. Upon such
assurance that they had not been coerced into giving and signing their confessions, Judge Bautista finally
asked the accused to affix their signatures/ thumbmarks on their respective confessions, and to subscribe the
same before him. Atty. Corpuz then signed their statements as their assisting counsel, followed by a few
members of the MTC staff who witnessed the signing.
On arraignment, in a complete turnabout, the two (2) accused pleaded not guilty.
The accused are now assailing their conviction on the ground that constitutional infirmities attended the
execution of their extrajudicial confessions, i.e., mainly the lack of counsel to assist them during custodial
investigation thereby making their confessions inadmissible in evidence.

43
Issue: WON the confessions is inadmissible in evidence due to the lack of counsel assistance during custodial
investigation.
Facts: Yes, The absence of counsel renders the extra judicial confession inadmissible. The presence of the
mayor, municipal judge and the family of the accused during the confession did not cure the defect.

confession to be admissible in evidence must satisfy four (4) fundamental requirements:

(a) the confession must be voluntary;
(b) the confession must be made with the assistance of competent and independent counsel;
(c) the confession must be express; and,
(d) the confession must be in writing.[6]

Among all these requirements none is accorded the greatest respect than an accused's right to counsel to
adequately protect him in his ignorance and shield him from the otherwise condemning nature of a custodial
investigation. The person being interrogated must be assisted by counsel to avoid the pernicious practice of
extorting false or coerced admissions or confessions from the lips of the person undergoing interrogation for
the commission of the offense.[7] Hence, if there is no counsel at the start of the custodial investigation any
statement elicited from the accused is inadmissible in evidence against him. This exclusionary rule is premised
on the presumption that the defendant is thrust into an unfamiliar atmosphere and runs through menacing
police interrogation procedures where the potentiality for compulsion, physical and psychological, is forcefully
apparent.[8]
Before persons can appear as substitute for counsel, two (2) conditions must be met:
(a) counsel of the accused must be absent, and,
(b) a valid waiver must be executed.

Hence, in the absence of such valid waiver, the Parish Priest of Santol, the Municipal Mayor, the relatives of
the accused, the Chief of Police and other police officers of the municipality could not stand in lieu of counsel's
presence. The apparent consent of the two (2) accused in continuing with the investigation was of no moment
as a waiver to be effective must be made in writing and with the assistance of counsel.[9] Consequently, any
admission obtained from the two (2) accused emanating from such uncounselled interrogation would be
inadmissible in evidence in any proceeding.
Securing the assistance of the PAO lawyer five (5) to eight (8) days later does not remedy this omission either.
It could not cure the absence of counsel during the custodial investigation when the extrajudicial statements
were being taken.[10]
With the extrajudicial confession of the accused rendered inadmissible in evidence, we are left with the
interview taken by DZNL radio announcer Roland Almoite as evidence. The taped interview likewise revealed
that the accused voluntarily admitted to the rape-slay and even expressed remorse for having perpetrated the
crime. We have held that statements spontaneously made by a suspect to news reporters on a televised
interview are deemed voluntary and are admissible in evidence.[15] By analogy, statements made by herein
accused to a radio announcer should likewise be held admissible. The interview was not in the nature of an
investigation as the response of the accused was made in answer to questions asked by the radio reporter, not
by the police or any other investigating officer. When the accused talked to the radio announcer, they did not
talk to him as a law enforcement officer, as in fact he was not, hence their uncounselled confession to him did
not violate their constitutional rights.
Accordingly, herein accused should be held liable for the special complex crime of rape with homicide on two
(2) counts as defined and penalized in Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by RA 7659.

People vs. Guillermo, GR 147786 Jan 20, 2004

Facts: On March 22, 1998, Guillermo was arrested by police officers after he positively admitted to the witness,
Campos, he had just killed his employer, Victor Francisco Keyser, and asked for his help to dispose of his
body. During custodial investigation, the appellant was not apprised of his constitutional rights, nor was he
afforded a counsel. Appellant made a confession to the police that he committed the crime. He also confessed
to the media on two separate occasions that he killed his employer. But during trial he recanted his confession.

44
However, the Trial Court found him guilty and sentenced him to death. Hence, this was committed for
automatic review before the Supreme Court.
Issue: If its Sunday and no lawyer is available, can this right be waived?
Ruling: No. The record does not show that appellant had waived his constitutional rights in writing and in the
presence of counsel. Article III Section 12(1) of the Constitution provides that an admissible confession must
satisfy the following requisites: that the confession must be (a) voluntary; (b) made with the assistance of
competent and independent counsel; (c) express; and (d) in writing. The records clearly show that the
requisites were not complied with. Even if the admission or confession of an accused is gospel truth, even if it
was voluntarily given, is still inadmissible if it was made without the assistance of counsel (People v. Dano,
G.R. No. 117690, 1 September 2000, 339 SCRA 515, 527). However, failing to prove treachery, the appellant
was still found guilty of homicide, because he made a spontaneous confession on several occasions admitting
his guilt.

People vs. Gomez, 270 SCRA 432

Facts: Accused Eduardo Gomez, a bartender, and Felipe Immaculata, a stay-in Driver of David, were
implicated in the crime of transporting twenty (20) kilograms of heroin on a flight from Bangkok to Manila
sometime March 14, 1990. They were alleged to be in conspiracy with Aya Yupangco, Art David, Lito Tuazon
and Benito Cunanan, all business partners. Gomez, claiming to be innocent of such travel he is into,
surrendered himself to Drug Enforcement Agency(DEA) of the United States in Manila. Meanwhile, Immaculata
was imprisoned in Hongkong because of an expired visa while he travels with David. He was visited by NBI
agents for his implication in the "heroin" case, of which he denied the accusation. Later, he agreed, without the
assistance of counsel, to execute a sworn statement at the Stanley Prison. After his prison term, Immaculata
was deported to Manila. Eventually, Gomez and Immaculata were then convicted by the RTC which made
them file for notices of appeal. In his appeal, Immaculata insists that the trial court has erred in including him in
the drug conspiracy and in admitting in evidence his sworn statement taken, without the assistance of counsel,
by an NBI agent at the Stanley Prison in Hongkong. He contended that this is in violation of his constitutional
rights as contemplated in Section 12(1), Article III, of the Constitution.
Issue: Is an uncounselled confession executed in Hongkong admissible?
Ruling: No. The court ruled that Section 12(1), Article III, of the Constitution requires that any person under
investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent
and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the
services of counsel, he must be provided with one.
These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel. In the case at bar, even if the
appellant allowed himself to be investigated without a counsel, this does not signify that he has waived his right
of having one. Such right is for any Filipino citizen to exercise even when abroad. Therefore, his sworn
statement remains an inadmissible evidence in court. Moreover, conspiracy to be the basis for a conviction,
should be proved in the same manner as the criminal act itself. It is also essential that a conscious design to
commit an offense must be established . Conspiracy is not the product of negligence but of intentionality on the
part of the cohorts. Under our laws, the onus probandi in establishing the guilt of an accused for a criminal
offense lies with the prosecution. There is no clear proof that appellant Immaculata was together with the other
accused in designing the commission of the crime charged.
Illinois v. Perkins
Brief Fact Summary. An undercover police agent was placed in jail with the suspect and got them to elicit
incriminating statements.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. Miranda warnings are not required when an undercover agent asks questions that
could result in incriminating statements.
Facts. After obtaining information that a murder suspect was being held in jail on an unrelated charge, police
placed an undercover agent in jail with the suspect. The agent engaged the suspect in conversations, and the
suspect then made incriminating statements about the murder. The trial court granted the respondent Lloyd
Perkins’s motion to suppress the statements made at the jail at his murder trial, and the appellate court
affirmed. The state of Illinois was granted certiorari.
Issue. Are Miranda warnings required when an undercover agent is asking questions that could elicit an
incriminating result?
Held. No. Reverse the appellate court’s decision affirming the suppression of the statements.

45
The Fifth Amendment privilege versus self-incrimination is not implicated when a suspect is not aware they are
speaking to law enforcement, and then gives incriminating statements, thus admit the statements into
evidence.
There is no convergence here between custody and official interrogation, thus admit the statements made to
the undercover agent.
This is different from the situations where Miranda warnings are necessary since the suspect was motivated
only by his desire to impress his fellow inmates, had no reason to think that the agent had legal authority to
force the suspect to give testimony, and showed no signs of being intimidated.
Sixth Amendment right to counsel concerns do not apply since no charges had been filed at the time of
interrogation.
People vs Maqueda
FACTS:
- Britisher Horace William Barker and Filipino wife, Teresita Mendoza, reside in Tuba, Benguet. On 27 April
1991, Horace was brutally slain and Teresita badly battered with lead pipes on the occasion of a robbery in
their house.
- Rene Salvamante, the victims’ former houseboy, was pinpointed. Richard Malig was initially included in the
information robbery with homicide and serious physical injuries filed in the RTC of Benguet.
- Only Malig was arrested. Before his arraignment, the prosecution filed a motion to amend the information to
implead as co-accused Hector Maqueda alias Putol. On the hearing of the motion the next day, the
Prosecutor asked that Malig be dropped from the information because the evidence against him wasn’t
sufficient. The motion was granted.
- Warrants for the arrest of Salvamante and Maqueda were issued. Maqueda was arrested and he filed an
application for bail about a month later. He categorically stated that he is willing and volunteering to be a
State witness, as he is the least guilty among the accused. Salvamante continued to elude arrest.
- Maqueda was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery with homicide and serious
physical injuries.
- Prosecution’s version:
- At 6 AM on 27 August 1991, Norie Dacara, a househelp who shared a room with Julieta Villanueva
(her cousin and fellow househelp), got up and went to the toilet. There, she was surprised to see
Rene Salvamante (whom she knew because she and Julieta replaced Salvamante and his sister).
- Salvamante suddenly strangled her and she saw a fair-complexioned, tall man she identified as
Maqueda at his side. She fled towards the garage but Salvamante pulled her back into the house.
- Julieta got up and saw a man brandishing a lead pipe outside her door. She pointed to Maqueda as
the man she saw. She immediately closed the door and she held on to it as the man was trying to
force his way in.
- The shouts awakened Teresita. In the dining room, she saw Salvamante and a man she identified as
Maqueda. They rushed to her and beat her with lead pipes until she lost consciousness. Salvamenta
made Julieta and Norie open the door of the garage and then they hid in their room.
- Mike Tabayan and Mark Pacio were in a waiting shed beside the Asin road a kilometer away from the
Barkers’ home and two men asked them if the road they were following would lead to Naguilian, La
Union. Mike replied that it did not. They identified the shorter man as Salvamante and Maqueda as
the taller man with an amputated left hand and a right hand with a missing thumb and index finger.
- September 1, 1991: A police team from the Tuba Police Station came to the hospital bed of Mrs.
Barker and asked her to identify the persons who assaulted her. She pointed out one who turned out
to be Richard Malig. When informed of the investigation, Dr. Hernandez told them it was improper for
them to conduct an investigation since Mrs. Barker had not yet fully recovered consciousness and her
eyesight had not yet improved.
- After efforts to locate Maqueda had failed, on March 1992, they received information that Maqueda
had been arrested in Guinyangan. The Guinyangan police turned him over to Maj. Anagaran who
brought him to the Benguet Provincial Jail.
- Before Maj. Anagaran arrived, Maqueda was taken to the headquarters of the 235th PNP Mobile
Force Company and SP03 Amando Molleno got his statement. He informed Maqueda of his rights
and Maqueda signed a Sinumpaang Salaysay narrating his participation in the crime.
- While under detention, Maqueda filed a Motion to Grant Bail in which he stated that he is willing and
volunteering to be a State witness in the case. Prosecutor Zarate had a talk with Maqueda and asked
him if he was in the company of Salvamante on the day in question in entering the Barkers’ home.
When he got an affirmative answer, Zarate told him he would oppose the motion to bail since
Maqueda is the only one on trial.
- Ray Dean Salvosa arrived at the Office of the Prosecutor Zarate and obtained permission to talk to
Maqueda. Maqueda narrated to Salvosa that Salvamante brought him to Baguio to find a job as a
peanut vendor but instead brought him to the Barkers’ house and told him of his plan. He initially
objected but later on agreed to it.
- Maqueda put up the defense of denial and alibi. He says:
46
 - He claims to have been at the polvoron factory of Minda Castrense. That day, he claims to have been
teaching new employees how to make polvoron seasoning. On December 20, 1991, he went home to
Gapas, Guinyangan for vacation and ran into Salvamenta, his childhood playmate. They just waved to
each other. He again saw Salvamante after Christmas day and Salvamante invited him to go to
Calauag. Since he wanted to visit his brother, he agreed. There, Salvamante asked him to
accompany him in selling a cassette recorder from Baguio. After that, he never saw Salvamante
again.
- He was arrested by CAFGU members on March 2. He was told that if he points to Salvamante, he
would be freed and would become a state witness, He told them he could attest to Salvamante’s sale
of the recorder.
- Prosecution responded by presenting Fredesminda Castrence, the owner of the factory Maqueda worked in,
who testified that she started her business in 30 August 1991, making it impossible for her to have hired
Maqueda on 5 July 1991.
- The trial court disregarded the testimonies of Mrs. Barker and the maids on Maqueda’s identification, they
decreed a conviction “based on the confession and the proof of corpus delicti” plus circumstantial evidence.

HELD:
- The appeal is dismissed. The decision of RTC Benguet to convict Maqueda is affirmed.

RATIONALE:
- It was wrong for the trial court to hold that the the rights to counsel and against self-incrimination are limited to
custodial investigation and do not apply to a person against whom a criminal complaint or information has
already been filed.
- The trial court made a distinction between an extrajudicial confession --the Sinumpaang Salaysay--
and an extrajudicial admision--the verbal admissions to Prosecutor Zarate and Ray Dean Salvosa. A
perusal of the Sinumpaang Salaysay shows that it is an extrajudicial admission.
- The distinction is made clear in Sections 26 and 33, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court:
- Sec. 26: Admission of a party -- The act, declaration or omission of a party as to a
relevant fact may be given in evidence against him.
- Sec 33. Confession -- The declaration of an accused acknowledging his guilty of the
offense charged , or of any offense necessarily included therein, may be given in
evidence against him.
- In a confession, there is acknowledgement of guilt. The term admission is usually applied in
criminal cases to statements of fact by the accused which do not directly involve an
acknowledgement of his guilty or of the criminal intent to commit the offense with which he is
charged.
- A confession is an acknowledgement in express terms, by a party in a criminal case, of his
guilty of the crime charged while an admission is a statement by the accused, direct or implied,
of facts pertinent to the issue and tending, in connection with proof of other facts, to prove his
guilty. An admission is something less than a confession, and is but an acknowledgement of
some fact or circumstance which, in itself is sufficient to authorize a conviction.
- TC: At the time the Sinumpaang Salaysay was made, Maqueda was already facing charges in court
and no longer had the right to remain silent and to counsel but he had a right to refuse to be a
witness. And still, he confessed. Thus, the admissibility of the Sinumpaang Salaysay should be tested
not under the Constitution (Section 12, Article III) but on the voluntariness of its execution.
Voluntariness is presumed so Maqueda has the burden of proving otherwise.
- SC: DISAGREE. The exercise of the rights to remain silent and to counsel and to be informed are not
confined to that period prior to filing of a criminal complaint or information but available at that stage
when a person is under investigation for the commission of an offense. Thus, procedural safeguards
still need to be used.
- The fact that the framers of our Constitution did not choose to use the term “custodial” by
inserting it between the words “under” and “investigation” proves that our Constitution did not
adopt in toto the entire fabric of the Miranda doctrine. The second paragraph of Section 20
broadened the application of Miranda by making it applicable to the investigation for the
commission of an offense of a person and in custody.
- If we follow the TC’s theory, police enforcement authorities would have a heyday extracting
confessions or admissions from accused persons after they had been arrested but before they
are arraigned because at such stage, the accused are supposedly not entitled to the rights to
remain silent and to counsel.
- Once a criminal complaint or information is filed in court and the accused is thereby arrested
by virtue of a warrant of arrest, he must be delivered to the nearest police station or jail and the
arresting officer must make a return of the warrant to the issuing judge, and since the court
has already accepted jurisdiction over his person, it would be improper for any public officer or
law enforcement agency to investigate him in connection with the commission of the offense
for which he is charged. If, nevertheless, he is subjected to such investigation, then Section

47
 12(1), Article III of the Constitution and the jurisprudence thereon must be faithfully complied
with.
- The Sinumpaang Salaysay of Maqueda taken after his arrest was in violation of his Article III rights. He was
not even told of any of his constitutional rights under the said section and the statement was taken in the
absence of counsel.
- The extrajudicial admissions of Maqueda to Prosecutor Zarate and Ray Dean Salvosa, however, stand on a
different footing and are not governed by the exclusionary rules under the Bill of Rights. He made them
voluntarily and freely made them to Prosecutor Zarate not in the course of an investigation but in connection
with his plea to be used as a state witness. As to Salvosa, he is a private person. The Bill of Rights concerns
limitations on the government.
- Even if we disregard his extrajudicial admissions, his guilty was established by circumstantial evidence.

G.R. No. 144886 April 29, 2002

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ANTONIO SILVANO, accused-appellant.

This is an appeal from the decision,1 dated June 26, 2000, of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, Midsayap,
Cotabato, finding accused-appellant Antonio Silvano guilty of the crime of rape with homicide and sentencing
him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the heirs of the victim Maramanay Tomas
P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages.
The crime was committed on October 7, 1991 in Inudaran, Mapurok, Alamada, Cotabato. On March 9, 1993,
more than a year after the commission of the crime, a criminal complaint for attempted rape with homicide was
filed in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Pigcawayan-Alamada, Cotabato2 against accused-appellant. On
March 16, 1993, accused-appellant was arrested.
After appropriate preliminary investigation, Acting Judge Charito Untal-de Guzman of the Municipal Circuit Trial
Court found probable cause and accordingly remanded the case to the Provincial Prosecutor. In a resolution
dated January 25, 1994, Rolando Y. Deiparine, of the Provincial Prosecution Office in Kidapawan, Cotabato,
modified Judge de Guzman’s findings and recommended the filing of consummated rape with homicide against
accused-appellant.3 His recommendation was approved and the following information was filed, alleging ¾
That on or about October 7, 1991 in the Municipality of Alamada, Province of Cotabato, Philippines the said
accused, armed with a bladed weapon, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and by means of
force and intimidation, succeeded in having carnal knowledge with one MARAMANAY TOMAS against her will,
that after the occasion the said accused, with intent to kill, stabbed the victim hitting her on the different parts of
her body, which is the direct and proximate cause of her death thereafter.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
Upon being on August 23, 1994, accused-appellant entered a plea of not guilty, whereupon he was tried.5
Four witnesses were presented by the prosecution: namely Constancio Jimenez, accused-appellant’s nephew;
Samotor Polayagan, the person who found the body of the victim at the crime scene; Onotan Tomas, the
victim’s father; and Dr. Ebenezer Demetillo, who conducted the necropsy.
The prosecution evidence shows: The body of Maramanay Tomas, a Muslim girl, was found by a certain
Margarito near the river at Sitio Inudaran, Barangay Mapurok, Alamada, Cotabato at around 1 o’clock in the
afternoon of October 7, 1991.6 Upon receipt of the information, prosecution witness Samotor Polayagan said
he proceeded to the crime scene and found the dead body of a girl. He saw a turban (tubao) ten meters, more
or less, from the cadaver. Polayagan said that he did not move the cadaver and waited for the police to arrive
at the scene.7
One policeman arrived, who then made a sketch and a report of the crime. The body of Maramanay Tomas
was subsequently brought to her home.8 At the request of Alamada Mayor Wenceslao dela Cerna, a necropsy
examination was conducted by Dr. Ebenezer Demetillo on the same day. In describing the injuries sustained
by and the examination conducted on the victim, Dr. Demetillo testified:
PROS. LUMANG:
. . . There are how many serious wounds in these 21 stab wounds which will cause the instantaneous death of
the victim?
A The serious stab wound is the first stab wound which is 2 cms. in width x 6 cms. depth supracelanicular
area penetrating the upper right lung. This wound is more than enough to cause the hypovolemia of the victim.
Also the number 2 stab wound is fatal. It is 2 cms. in width x 4 cms. in depth by medial active of the right neck
cutting the jugular vein. So, this is more than enough to cause the hypovolemia of the patient and the rest are
minor, sir.
48
Q When you say hypovolemia, you mean to say the loss of blood of the victim?
A Yes, sir.
Q So, in other words, even if only these two wounds that were inflicted it will cause the immediate death
of the victim?
A Yes, sir.
Q So, in totality Doctor, what was then therefore the cause of death of the victim?
A The cause of death of the victim is cardio-respiratory arrest and the second is hypovolemia then the
multiple stab wounds.
Q Aside from the injuries inflicted on the cadaver of Maramanay Tomas, did you ever try to conduct any
examination?
A Yes, I examined the different parts of her body from head to foot sir.
Q Did you conduct an examination on the genitalia of the victim?
A Yes, sir.
Q Do you still remember what was your findings on the genitalia of the cadaver of the victim when you
conducted a necropsy examination?
A Based on that report, I did not put any findings on the genitalia because I did not find any.9
More than a year after Maramanay Tomas’ death, accused-appellant allegedly confessed to his nephew,
Constancio Jimenez, at a birthday party that he had raped and killed the victim. On the basis of this alleged
confession, Jimenez gave a statement on March 3, 1993 incriminating his uncle, accused-appellant Antonio
Silvano. The statement was given to the Philippine National Police of Alamada, Cotabato. Testifying on the
alleged confession of accused-appellant, Jimenez said that on December 3, 1992, accused-appellant came to
his house in Kapayawi, Libungan, Cotabato for his son’s birthday party. While they were having drinks with
three other persons (Garcio Payot, Donita Payot and Orlando Mojado), accused-appellant allegedly told
Jimenez he was not going back to Alamada because the police were looking for him as he had raped and
killed a Muslim girl. Accused-appellant allegedly killed the child after raping her for fear that she would testify
against him.10 Jimenez testified that accused-appellant had in fact transferred residence many times to
escape from the police. From Alamada, Cotabato, accused-appellant transferred to Malamote, Midsayap,
Cotabato, and then to Kapayawi, Libungan, Cotabato.11
On cross-examination, however, Jimenez admitted that there was bad blood between him and accused-
appellant. He said:
ATTY. ERAMIS:
. . . . Is it not [true] that on May 4 in Kapayawi you have stated that your house and the house of the accused is
near [to] each other, and is it not [true] that there was a conflict between you and the accused in connection
with your dogs and your chickens?
A Yes, sir. When he is drunk he stabbed our dogs.
Q And you do not like the behavior of the accused?
A Yes, sir.
Q And as neighbor you do not like the behavior of the accused?
A Yes, sir.
Q Even if he is your uncle?
A Yes, sir.
Q And in fact you are harboring hatred against the accused?
A Yes, sir.
Q You did not see the commission of the crime in this case?
A Yes, sir. I am not an eyewitness of the incident and I am only telling to this court the words which was
told by the accused to me during the birthday party of my son.
Q And what is the reason why you said you do not like the behavior of the accused and in fact you
harbored hatred [against] him. Why is it that you invited him to the birthday party of your son[?] What is the
reason?
49
A Because we are [close to] each other sir and our closeness [ended] when he chased my son, sir.
Q And because of that hatred you decided to testify against him in this case?
A Yes, sir.
Q As an act of vengeance?
A Yes, sir.12
Testifying in his turn, Onotan Tomas, the victim’s father, said he came to know the identity of the person who
allegedly killed his daughter only after more than a year since her death. He claimed to have spent more than
P25,000.00 for his daughter’s wake and another P25,000.00 for his daughter’s 40 days and first year death
anniversary.13 These amounts, however, were not supported by receipts.
At the conclusion of its case, the prosecution failed to make a formal offer of its evidence. This was construed
by the trial court as a waiver of the formal offer of evidence.14
The defense then presented its only witness: accused-appellant Antonio Silvano. He denied going to the
birthday party of Constancio Jimenez’s son on December 3, 1992. He denied having told Jimenez that he had
raped and killed a Muslim child in Alamada, Cotabato. Nor did he leave a tubao and knife at the crime scene.
He said that on October 7, 1991, when the crime was committed, he was in his house in Brgy. Kapayawi,
Libungan, Cotabato. Accused-appellant said he and Jimenez had altercations because accused-appellant hit
Jimenez’s cows for feeding in his corn land and Jimenez’s dogs devoured his chickens. Said accused-
appellant:
Q You were charged [with] rape with Homicide before this Honorable Court which happened on October
7, 1991 at Sitio Mapurok, Alamada, Cotabato based on the testimony of Constancio Jimenez who testified in
court that on December 3, 1992 you were invited to his house and you attended this party and on that occasion
you admitted that you allegedly killed a girl and allegedly you left a knife and tubao in the crime scene, what
can you say about this?
A That is not true, sir.
Q Why do you say that this is not true?
A Because I and Constancio Jimenez used to have a quarrel, sir.
Q Could you tell this Honorable Court when did this first quarrel start?
A 1990, sir.
Q Could you tell this Honorable Court what was your quarrel with Constancio Jimenez?
A It pertains to his cow, sir.
Q Do you know . . . where . . . this Constancio Jimenez live[s]?
A Yes, sir.
Q Where?
A In Kapayawi, sir.
Q You mean to tell us that he is your neighbor?
A Yes, sir.
Q You said you have a quarrel arising from a cow, could you tell us what happened to the cow?
A This Constancio Jimenez had 10 heads of cows and sometimes some of these cows [go] to my corn
land.
Q And what did you do to those cows [which go] to your farm?
A I drove [away] the other cows and there was one cow left. I [hit] that cow, sir.
Q After hitting that cow what was the reaction of Constancio Jimenez if any?
A That was the root of our quarrel, he sided with these cows who destroyed my plants.
Q And you said you have your first quarrel arising from a cow, did you have any [more] quarrel with this
Constancio Jimenez?
A Yes, sir, there was.
Q Could you tell this Honorable Court when was that?
50
A 1993, sir.
Q Could you tell us what was the root of that quarrel in 1993?
A About the dog, sir?
Q Could you tell us what was the relation of this dog to your quarrel?
A His dog [ate] my chicken, sir.
Q Why do you say that the testimony of Constancio Jimenez that you left a tubao and a knife, that you
admitted you killed and rape[d] a Muslim girl, you said that that is not true?
A He harbored ill feelings against me, sir.15
On June 26, 2000, the trial court rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, finding accused ANTONIO SILVANO guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape with
Homicide, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and ordered to indemnify the
heirs of victim Maramanay Tomas in the amount of P50,000.00 and to pay them moral damages of
P50,000.00.
The accused is credited in the service of his sentence, with the full time during which he underwent preventive
imprisonment. He is ordered committed to the Davao Penal Colony in Carmen, Davao del Norte from the
Cotabato Rehabilitation Center, Amas, Kidapawan City.
SO ORDERED.16
Hence this appeal. Accused-appellant contends that –
I
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING FULL FAITH AND CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF
PROSECUTION WITNESS CONSTANCIO JIMENEZ.
II
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF RAPE WITH HOMICIDE.
First. There is a need to scrutinize Constancio Jimenez’s testimony because it is the basis of accused-
appellant’s conviction. On direct examination, Jimenez testified:
Q Now, while you were there celebrating the birthday party of your child was there any unusual thing that
took place?
A In that birthday celebration the accused Antonio Silvano told us that he raped and killed a Muslim child,
sir.
Q What else did he [tell] you if any?
A He told us that he is no longer interested in going back to Alamada because the policemen are looking
for him, sir.
Q Was there an instance if you know that he told you why he killed the Muslim?
A He told us that he killed the child of the Muslim because he raped this child and if he will not kill the
[M]uslim child, the child can testify against him, sir.
ATTY. ERAMIS
Before the Prosecution proceed[s] Your Honor we would like to put on record the objection by reason of
hearsay evidence.
FISCAL DEIPARINE
We would like to put on record our opposition to that objection because there is an exception of the hearsay
rule as an independent relevant statement.
COURT
The witness is not testifying as to the truth of his statement. He is only testifying in connection with the
statement given by the accused to him on December 3, 1995. Proceed.
FISCAL DEIPARINE
What else did the accused tell you if any?
51
A He told us that a tubao or head band made of cloth and a knife [was] left [on] the scene of the crime, sir.
Q What else did he tell you if any?
A He told us that he raped that Muslim child and after that he killed and stabbed the child sir.
In convicting accused-appellant, the trial court relied on Jimenez’s testimony and on what it considered as
circumstantial evidence to justify accused-appellant’s conviction. The trial court said in its decision:
There is no eyewitness in this case. The prosecution is banking on the admissions of the accused and on
circumstantial evidence.
The query now before us is: are Antonio Silvano’s admissions to Constancio Jimenez, a private party,
admissible in evidence?
The court believes that the declaration of an accused expressly acknowledging his guilt of the offense may be
given in evidence against him and any person, otherwise competent to testify as a witness, who heard the
confession, is competent to testify as to the substance of what he heard and understood it.
In People vs. Maqueda, 242 SCRA 565, the Supreme Court ruled:
"Accordingly, Maqueda’s admissions to Ray Dean Salvosa, a private party, are admissible in evidence against
the former under Section 26, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. In Aballe vs. People, this Court held that the
declaration of an accused expressly acknowledging his guilt of the offense may be given in evidence against
him and any person, otherwise competent to testify as a witness, who heard the confession, is competent to
testify as to the substance of what he heard and understood it. The said witness need not repeat verbatim the
oral confession; it suffices if he gives its substance."
In People vs. Domantay, G.R. No. 130612, May 11, 1999, a very recent case, the Supreme Court ruled:
"We agree with the Solicitor General, however, that accused-appellant’s confession to the radio reporter, Celso
Manuel is admissible. In People vs. Andan, the accused in a rape with homicide case confessed to the crime
during interviews with the media. In holding the confession admissible, despite the fact that the accused gave
his answers without the assistance of counsel, this court said:
"[A]ppellant’s [oral] confessions to the newsmen are not covered by Section 12(1) and (3) of Article III of the
Constitution. The Bill of Rights does not concern itself with the relation between a private individual and
another individual. It governs the relationship between the individual and the State. The prohibitions therein are
primarily addressed to the State and its agents."17
Jimenez was competent to testify only as to the substance of what he had heard, but not as to the truth
thereof. However, despite its ruling during trial that it is admitting Jimenez’s account as an independently
relevant statement, the trial court considered the substance of accused-appellant’s alleged statements to
Jimenez as true and then proceeded to justify conviction of accused-appellant on circumstantial evidence. In
its consideration of the contents of accused-appellant’s alleged statements to Jimenez, the trial court treated
them as an extrajudicial confession made to a private party, and not just as an independent relevant statement.
This is error. As previously noted, Jimenez admitted on cross-examination that there was bad blood between
him and accused-appellant. It was, therefore, improbable that accused-appellant went to Jimenez’s house for
the birthday of the latter’s son, on the occasion of which accused-appellant confessed to the crime. It is even
more improbable that accused-appellant confessed to the crime. It is even moe improbable that accused-
appellant made his confession in the presence of other people. Jimenez named three persons as being
allegedly present when accused-appellant made his confession. These were Garcia Payot, Donita Payot, and
Orlando Mojado.18 However, not one of this persons was presented to corroborate Jimenez’s claim.
We are more inclined to believe accused-appellant’s claim that on the date in question he was in his house in
Kapayawi, Libungan, Cotabato and that he had never gone to Sitio Mapurok, Alamada, Cotabato.19 Accused-
appellant denied Constancio Jimenez’s allegation that he had transferred residence several times, as well as
Onotan Tomas’ allegation that accused-appellant was his neighbor in Sitio Mapurok, Alamada, Cotabato.
Accused-appellant maintained that he had been a resident of Kapayawi, Libungan, Cotabato since his
childhood.20
Second. There is no evidence that the victim was raped. However, in finding that the victim had been raped,
the trial court stated:
Dr. Demetillo testified that he also examined the [genitalia] of the victim but he did not enter any finding in the
report as he did not find any (TSN, October 29, 1998, pp. 12-13).
The Supreme Court consistently ruled that a medical certificate is not [indispensable] to prove the commission
of rape (People vs. Quaimco, 268 SCRA 516; People vs. Ederalino, 271 SCRA 189; People vs. Bugarin, 273
SCRA 384; People vs. Zaballero, 274 SCRA 627). The Highest Court also consistently ruled that lack of
lacerated wounds does not negate sexual intercourse (People vs. San Juan, 270 SCRA 693; People vs.

52
Erardo, 277 SCRA 643; People vs. Gabayron, 278 SCRA 78; People vs. Betonio, 279 SCRA 532; People vs.
Oliva, 282 SCRA 470).
The trial court is correct in ruling tht the absence of lacerated wounds in the genitalia does not necessarily
mean that rape had not been committed. Rape, however, is never presumed. We agree with the Solicitor
General, who recommends that accused-appellant be absolved of the charge of rape, 21 that there must at
least be some evidence of finger grips and contusion on the body of the victims, torn garment, and lacerations,
redness, and swelling, especially of the genital area, to prove rape.22
Indeed, not only is there no proof of rape in this case but the witness for the prosecution who conducted the
necropsy categorically stated that he did not have any findings concerning victim’s genitalia.
Third. Nor can accused-appellant be held responsible for the death of the victim. Evidence showing a mere
possibility of guilt is insufficient to warrant a conviction. In this case, the trial court stated –
Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court provides that circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if: (a)
There is more than one circumstance; (b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (c)
The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
From the very start of the investigation, accused Silvano was the principal suspect (Opposition to Motion to
Quash, p. 27, Record). After the incident, the accused left Macabasa, Alamada and transferred his residence
to Midsayap, Cotabato and finally at Libungan, Cotabato where he was arrested. The accused’s flight is a
strong indication of guilt (People vs. Vitor, 245 SCRA 620) for flight evidences culpability and a guilty
conscience, and it strongly indicates a guilty mind or betrays the existence of a guilty conscience (People vs.
Salvame, 270 SCRA 766). The accused never explained why he fled after the incident took place. The
accused’s admission is corroborated by evidence of corpus delicti e.g. the corpse of victim Maramanay Tomas.
The accused’s admission that he stabbed and killed the victim is further corroborated by the findings of Dr.
Ebenezer Demetillo that the victim sustained twenty-one (21) stab wounds. (TSN, October 29, 1998, p. 8;
Exhibits "B-4" and "B-5").23
There is no circumstantial evidence to show accused-appellant's guilt:
1. Disregarding accused-appellant’s alleged admission, the only factual circumstance left is that of flight. Even
this is in question in the face of accused-appellant’s assertion that he is actually a resident of Brgy. Kapayawi,
Libungan, Cotabato since childhood.
2. The assertion that accused-appellant was a principal suspect from the start of the investigation is not
corroborated by evidence.
3. There is no proof that accused-appellant was, or could have been, in the place and at the time of the
commission of the crime in question.
4. The injuries sustained by the victim Maramanay Tomas, do not indicate the probability that accused-
appellant raped and killed her, if at all.
5. The tubao allegedly found near the cadaver of the victim and turned over to the police was not identified,
marked, and offered as evidence nor in any case shown to belong to accused-appellant.
As we have held:
Accused-appellant’s conviction by the trial court hinged on circumstantial evidence. To validly invoke
circumstantial evidence, it must be shown that there is more than one circumstance and the facts from which
the inferences derived are proven. The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction
beyond reasonable doubt. The circumstances must constitute an unbroken chain of events that can reasonably
lead to the conclusion pointing to the accused to the exclusion of all others as the author of the crime. . . . Like
a tapestry made of strands which create a pattern when interwoven, a judgment of conviction based on
circumstantial evidence can be upheld only if the circumstances proved constitute an unbroken chain which
leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty
person.24
Fourth. The prosecution thus failed to prove accused-appellant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt. To secure a
conviction, it is not enough that the evidence establishes a strong suspicion or even a probability of guilt. Moral
certainty that the accused committed the crime is required.25 That alibi (which accused-appellant invokes) is
the weakest defense is irrelevant. For when the prosecution fails to discharge its burden, an accused need not
even offer evidence in his behalf.26
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, Midsayap, Cotabato, finding accused-
appellant Antonio Silvano guilty of the crime of rape with homicide and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua and to pay the heirs of the victim Maramanay Tomas P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and
P50,000.00 as moral damages, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-appellant ANTONIO

53
SILVANO is ACQUITTED on ground of reasonable doubt and is ordered immediately released unless he is
lawfully held in custody for another cause.
The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is directed to implement this Decision and to report to this Court the
action taken hereon within 5 days upon receipt hereof.
SO ORDERED.

People v. Luvendino G.R. No. L-69971 July 3, 1992 211 SCRA 36 (1992)

Facts: On the morning of 17 January 1983, 18-year old Rowena Capcap left her home at Deva Village,
Tambak, Taguig, Metro Manila to attend classes at the University of Manila where she was a sophomore
commerce student. She would usually be home by 7:30 to 8:00 on school evenings, 1 but on that tragic day,
she would not reach home alive. On that particular evening, her father Panfilo Capcap arriving home from work
at around 7:30 p.m., noted her absence and was told by his wife and other children that Rowena was not yet
home from school. Later, a younger brother of Rowena, sent on an errand, arrived home carrying Rowena’s
bag which he had found dropped in the middle of a street in the village. Panfilo Capcap lost no time in seeking
the help. The search ended in a grassy vacant lot within the Deva Village Subdivision, only about 70 to 80
meters from the Capcap residence, where lay the apparently lifeless body of Rowena, that the presence of
spermatozoa showed that the victim had sexual intercourse prior to death; and that death was due to asphyxia
by mutual strangulation. By 5 March 1984, an information had been filed in the trial court charging Ernesto C.
Luvendino, Cesar Borca alias “Cesar Putol” and Ricardo de Guzman alias “Ric” with the crime of rape with
murder. The trial court rendered a decision finding Luvendino guilty, sentencing him to death, requiring him to
indemnify the heirs of the victim Rowena in the amount of P50,000.00 for the damages suffered as a result of
her death. Appellant Luvendino contends that the trial court committed grievous error.

Issue: Whether the re-enactment of the accused of a  crime he was charged of without the presence of an
independent and competent counsel can be admitted as evidience in the court.

Held: No, Clearly, the trial court took into account the testimony given by Panfilo Capcap on what had occurred
during the re-enactment of the crime by Luvendino. We note that the re-enactment was apparently staged
promptly upon apprehension of Luvendino and even prior to his formal investigation at the police station. The
decision of the trial court found that the accused was informed of his constitutional rights “before he was
investigated by Sgt. Galang in the police headquarters” and cited the “Salaysay” of appellant Luvendino.  The
decision itself, however, states that the re-enactment took place before Luvendino was brought to the police
station. Thus, it is not clear from the record that before the re-enactment was staged by Luvendino, he had
been informed of his constitutional rights including, specifically, his right to counsel and that he had waived
such right before proceeding with the demonstration. Under these circumstances, we must decline to uphold
the admissibility of evidence relating to that re-enactment. That the “demonstration” or re-enactment and the
accused extrajudicial confession were effected and secured in the absence of a valid waiver by him of his
constitutional rights and that the re-enactment and the confession should be held inadmissible in evidence
because they had been involuntarily made.

G.R. No. 78531 June 22, 1990

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
HENRY JUNGCO y SANTIAGO, EDUARDO PALENCIA y GALLO, ORLANDO ORTEGA y MALINIA,
RAFAEL ZARAGOZA y DE IA CRUZ, and ROLANDO AGUILAR y SOMBRA, defendants, RAFAEL
ZARAGOSA y DE LA CRUZ and EDUARDO PALENCIA y GALLO, defendants-appellants.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Public Assistance Office for defendants-appellants.

PADILLA, J.:

This is an appeal interposed by the accused Rafael Zaragosa y De la Cruz and Eduardo Palencia y
Gallo from the judgment * rendered in Criminal Case No. 17280 of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan
City, finding them and their co-accused Henry Jungco y Santiago, Orlando Ortega y Malinia, and
Rolando Aguilar y Sombra, 1 guilty of the crime of Robbery with Homicide and sentencing each of them
to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, with the accessory penalties provided for by law, to
indemnify the heirs of the deceased Dr. Lutgarda Rivera, jointly and severally, in the amounts of
54
P30,000.00, as death indemnity, P30,000.00 as actual damages, and P50,000.00, by way of lost
earnings, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.

The incriminatory facts of the case, according to the Solicitor General, are as follows:

On December 20, 1981, at about 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon, Patrolman Eddie Regalado
of the Northern Police District was in Women's Club Street, Malabon, Metro Manila
conducting a surveillance on the group of accused Rafael Zaragoza, Henry Jungco,
Orlando Ortega, Rolando Aguilar and Eduardo Palencia, as part of his assignment to
monitor the drug pushing activities of the bystanders in the said area (pp. 6-9, 7-9, tsn,
Aug. 23, 1983). At that time all the accused were at the store drinking beer near the
drugstore owned by Dr. Lutgarda Rivera (pp. 8-9, tsn, Ibid). One of them was holding a
wrapped newspaper more or less twelve (12) inches long and one (1) inch in diameter (p.
9, Ibid). All the while that Regalado was watching the accused, he was standing in front
of the drugstore of Dr. Rivera (p. 7, Ibid). Later, at around 4:35 o'clock in the afternoon,
the accused finished their beer and then proceeded to the drugstore of Dr. Rivera which
is located at the Women's Club Street, Malabon. When they reached the drugstore,
Rolando Aguilar was left in front of the drugstore standing, while the four accused were
inside the drugstore (p. 12, Ibid). Regalado then left the place and went to the nearby
police outpost to take a rest (p. 11, Ibid). In a short while a person came to him
(Regalado) and told him that there was a killing committed in the drugstore of Dr. Rivera
(p. 11, Ibid). He hurriedly went to the scene and found the dead body of Dr. Rivera
prostrate on the floor (ibid). Immediately, he asked the sidewalk vendors that gathered
around the drugstore if they have seen persons that came out from the store of Dr.
Rivera (p. 11, Ibid). One of the sidewalk vendors said that he saw five male persons
hurriedly left the drugstore of the deceased (p. 35, Ibid).

Patrolman Eddie Regalado then relayed the information he gathered from the sidewalk
vendor to Sgt. Dante Buenaventura who arrived at the scene together with Patrolman
Leopoldo Simangan (p. 13, Ibid; p. 6, tsn, Sept. 6, 1983). Thereupon, they (Pat. Regalado,
Sgt. Dante Buenaventura and members of the Anti-Organized Task Force) proceeded to
arrest Henry Jungco and Orlando Ortega in their residence at Tambak, Navotas, Malabon
(pp. 6-7, 11, tsn, Sept. 6, 1983; p. 14, tsn, Aug. 23, 1983). On the other hand, accused
Rafael Zaragosa and Eduardo Palencia were apprehended inside Hulo Market, while
Rolando Aguilar was arrested the following day by members of the other elements of the
Malabon Police Force (pp- 11-12, tsn, Sept. 6, 1983). At the Malabon Police Station,
Patrolman Leopoldo Simangan conducted the investigation of the five accused. In said
investigation, after the accused were duly apprised of their constitutional rights by Pat.
Simangan, they executed and signed their respective sworn statements (Exhibits I, J, K
and L, pp. 8-17, records; pp. 12-19, tsn, Sept. 6, 1983), except Henry Jungco who invoked
his right to remain silent (p. 13, tsn, Ibid). Ortega and Palencia admitted having stabbed
the victim several times on the body with the use of an icepick and having ransacked the
cash register of the drugstore and that they thereafter fled away (Exhibits I, L, pp. 8-10,
15, 17, record). After their statements were taken down they (Rafael Zaragosa, Henry
Jungco, Eduardo Palencia, Rolando Aguilar and Orlando Ortega) were brought to
Assistant Fiscal Eduardo Manalaysay where they swore to the truthfulness of their
confessions (Exhibits 1, J, K and L, Ibid; pp. 12-19, tsn, Ibid).

On December 23, 1981, the police investigators conducted a reenactment of the crime at
the place of the incident (pp-20-21, tsn, Ibid). Present at time were the Mayor of Malabon
Maynardo Espiritu, Station Commander Alfredo Cruz, Deputy Station Commander Julio
Duenas, Lt. Daniel B. Cruz and a People's Journal Reporter Bernie Razon and hundreds
of other people surrounding the vicinity (p. 21, tsn, Ibid). Before Regalado started the re-
enactment, he informed again the accused of their constitutional rights, but nonetheless
all the accused willingly participated in the re-enactment (p. 24, tsn, Ibid). Pictures of the
re-enactment then were taken (Exhibits N to N24, pp. 22-30, tsn, Ibid). As depicted in the
pictures of the re-enactment, accused Henry Jungco, Eduardo Palencia and Orlando
Ortega Went to the drugstore of the victim Dr. Lutgarda Rivera to buy cough syrup
(Exhibit N, p. 26, tsn, Ibid). The victim, however, refused to sell them Ornacol cough
syrup (p. 26, tsn, Ibid). A heated argument then ensued between Ortega and the victim
(pp. 26-27, Ibid). In the course of the argument, Ortega pulled out an improvised dagger
and stabbed the victim hitting her on the body (Exh. N-1 2, p. 27, tsn, Ibid). Palencia then
entered the store and likewise stabbed the victim with an icepick (Exh. N-13, Ibid). Seeing
what happened, Jungco grabbed the icepick and dagger from the hands of Palencia and
Ortega and without any hesitation stabbed the victim three times with the use of an

55
 icepick (Exhs. N-14 to N-17, p. 28, Ibid). Then Jungco and Ortega pulled down the body of
the victim (Exh. N-19, p. 29, Ibid), while Palencia proceeded to ransack the cash register
of the victim and take the money found therein (Exh. N-23, p. 30, Ibid).

On December 21, 1981, Dr. Alberto M. Reyes, NBI Supervising Medico-Legal Officer,
performed the post mortem examination on the cadaver of Dr. Lutgarda Rivera (Exhibit E,
pp. 6-7, 13- 20, tsn, July 12, 1983). According to his findings, the victim sustained eleven
(11) stabbed wounds caused by a sharp pointed instrument such as an icepick; that the
wounds on the aorta and upper and lower lobes of the left lung were fatal; that the
wounds sustained at the anterior chest wall of the victim indicate that the assailant was
in front of the victim when the said wounds were inflicted on her body (pp. 13-16,
tsn, Ibid).

Atty. Roberto Rivera, the son of the victim, testified that before 6:00 o'clock in the
afternoon of December 20, 1981, the son of the owner of the adjoining establishment
adjacent to the drugstore of her mother came to their house and informed him that
something bad happened to his mother; that immediately he went hurriedly to their
drugstore together with his father; that upon reaching the place, he saw hundreds of
people around the door of the drugstore; that he saw the dead body of his mother
covered with a white blanket being carried by persons working with the International
Funeral Homes; that inside the drugstore, he noticed that the shelves were forced
opened, many bottles of medicines and boxes were scattered on the floor; that the store
lost cash money in the sum of P2,000.00; that they spent P5,000-00 for the wake and
P10,000.00 for the funeral expenses; that his mother was earning Pl,000.00 per month as
a professor in the College of Medicine of the University of Santo Tomas; that their
drugstore had an average net income of P300.00 a day (pp. 5-13, tsn, Sept. 13, 1983). 2

The appellants denied having committed the crime charged. According to the appellant Rafael Zaragoza, he
was in the Hulo Market in Malabon on 20 December 1981. He arrived at the said market at about 6:00 o'clock
in the morning of the said day after selling fish, and stayed thereat with his co-accused, drinking until about
10:00 o'clock of the same morning, when he went home to Tangos, Navotas. Then, on the following day, 21
December 1981, while he was inside the said market eating "mami", policemen came and arrested him in
connection with the death of Dr. Rivera.

According to appellant Zaragosa, he was brought to a salt bed ("asinan") at Tonsuya where he was maltreated
by the policemen and made to affix his thumbprint on a document the contents of which he did not know. He
was also laid on a wooden bed with his head hanging and his feet tied to the bed an distilled water (for dry
batteries) was poured over his mouth. He latter complained to the National Police Commission, 3 but he does
not know what happened to his complaint. He admitted that he had also executed a statement 4 wherein he
stated that he was not maltreated by the policemen. He explained that he made such statement because he
was given money by Atty. Rivera, the son of the deceased, through Pat. Gungon. 5

The appellant, Eduardo Palencia, for his part, declared that he arrived at the Hulo Market at about 1:00 o'clock
in the afternoon of 20 December 1981, and spent his time playing the jukebox, until 2:30 o'clock of the same
afternoon when he went to the Chinese restaurant at the back of the factory of Rufina Patis and drank beer
with his co-accused. After about thirty (30) minutes, they went back to the market place where they read
"komiks" at a store in the corner of said market until 3:30 o'clock when they parted. We went home to Tanza,
Malabon, while the others went to Cubao, Quezon City.6 Then, in the morning of the following day, he and
Zaragoza were picked up by the police. He was brought inside a bodega in Niugan, Malabon, where he was
maltreated and made to sign a document the contents of which he did not know. He also complained but he
does not know what happened to his complaint.7

In finding the appellants guilty of the crime with which they were charged, the trial court relied principally upon
the extrajudicial confessions executed by them on 21 December 1981, 8 and the pictures taken during the re-
enactment of the crime.9

Counsel for the appellants, in this appeal, contends that the said extra-judicial confessions are inadmissible in
evidence because they were extracted from the appellants during custodial investigation without the assistance
of counsel and after the appellants had been subjected to different forms of maltreatment, threats, and
intimidation. Counsel further asserts that the pictures of the re-enactment were taken in a manner contrary to
law and are, therefore, inadmissible.

After going over the record of the case, we are convinced that the extra-judicial confessions in question are
inadmissible in evidence, the same having been executed by the appellants during custodial investigation

56
without the assistance of counsel, particularly, when the confessants manifested the waiver of their right to
counsel. The prevailing rule is still that laid down in People vs. Galit10 as follows:

10. This Court, in the case of Morales vs. Ponce Enrile, laid down the correct procedure for
peace officers to follow when making an arrest and in conducting a custodial investigation, and
which We reiterate:

7. At the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to
inform him of the reason for the arrest and he must be shown the warrant of
arrest, if any. He shall be informed of his constitutional rights to remain silent and
to counsel, and that any statement he might make could be used against him.
The person arrested shall have the right to communicate with his lawyer, a
relative, or anyone he chooses by the most expedient means--by telephone if
possibleor by letter or messenger. It shall be the responsibility of the arresting
officer to see to it that this is accomplished. No custodial investigation shall be
conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel engaged by the person
arrested, or by any person on his behalf, or appointed by the court upon petition
either of the detainee himself or by anyone on his behalf. The right to counsel
may be waived but the waiver shall not be valid unless made with the assistance
of counsel. Any statement obtained in violation of the procedure herein laid
down, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be
inadmissible in evidence.

We also find that the pictures taken during the re-enactment of the crime, are inadmissible in evidence since
the re-enactment was based upon the defendants' inadmissible extra-judicial confessions. Pictures re-enacting
a crime which are based on an inadmissible confession are themselves inadmissible.11

However, in a sworn statement executed on 14 July 1982, 12 the appellant Rafael Zaragoza admitted that he
and his co-accused were responsible for the robbery and the death of Dr. Lutgarda Rivera. His sworn
statement reads, in part, as follows:

23. T: Ano ang inamin mo?

S: Inamin ko na kasama ako sa pagnanakaw at pagpatay kay Dra. Rivera.

24. T: Sabihin mo sa akin ngayon kung tutoo ngang kasama ka sa pagnanakaw

at pagpatay.

S: Iyon nga po ang pagkakamali ko dahil nasa labas lang po ako ng botika. Hindi
pumasok sa loob.

25. T: Isalaysay mo nga sa akin ang tunay na pangyayari?

S: Ganito po iyon, magka kasama po kami nina Butch (referring to HENRY

JUNGCO), si Lando (Referring to Orlando Ortega), si Labo (referring to Rolando
Aguilar), at Eding Hula (referring to Eduardo Palencia), sa may harapan ng
botika ni Dra. Rivera. Bumibili po kami ng Corex D pero ayaw kaming pagbilhan.
Ang ginawa namin ay nagpunta kami sa palengke, tapos nagbigay ako ng
katorse pesos kay LANDO pambili ng Corex D, si Lando na po ang bahala doon
sa kulang. Naghanap siya ng mabilhan. Tapos, dumating na si Lando at may
dala siyang dalawang boteng siento bente bawat isa nang Corex. Naghati-hati na
kami. tapos, nagkuwentuhan kami sa palengke, tapos naisipan naming balikan si
doktora. May dalang kutsilyo si Lando, si Butch naman po ay ice pick ang dala.
Ang dating may dala ng ice pick noong nasa may botika na kami ay Eding Hula,
pero nakita kong kinuha iyon ni Butch bago sila pumasok sa loob ng botika. Ako
ppo ay nagbantay nalang sa labas, dalawa kami, akot at si Labo. Nang lumabas
na iyong tatlo na tumatakbo, umalis na rin ako. Hindi na ako sumunod sa kanila
sa palengke. Tapos nga noon, nahuli na kaming lahat.

Rafael Zaragosa, during the trial, confirmed his execution of the said sworn statement. He claims, however,
that he was paid for it by Atty. Rivera, the son of the victim, who gave him the money through Pat.
Gungon,13 but this was denied by Atty. Rivera and Pat. Gungon.14

57
The trial court, therefore, did not commit an error in finding the appellants guilty of the crime with which they
were charged. Zaragosa's admission is supported by the physical facts of the case and the testimonies of Pat.
Eddie Regalado that he saw the appellants and their co-accused enter the drug store of Dr. Lutgarda Rivera
and later leave the place hurriedly, at about the time the crime was committed, and of Atty. Roberto Rivera that
upon his arrival at the drug store, he saw the dead body of his mother and that the shelves of the drug store
were forcibly opened and bottles and boxes containing medicine scattered on the floor. Zaragosa's admission
is further supported by the testimonies of the appellant Eduardo Palencia and co-accused Orlando Ortega, and
Rolando Aguilar that they were together in the afternoon of 20 December 1981. 15 While admittedly no
prosecution witness testified to have actually seen the appellants and their co-accused in the act or robbing the
drug store and killing the owner thereof, the circumstantial evidence is consistent with each other, such that the
appellants and their co-accused, and no other, were the culprits and are guilty therefor.

Besides, the acceptance by co-accused Henry Jungco, Orlando Ortega and Rolando Aguilar of their sentence
proves, not only their guilt but also that of their companions, the herein appellants Rafael Zaragosa and
Eduardo Palencia.16

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED, with proportionate costs.

SO ORDERED.

People v. Decierdo May 7, 1987 Sarmiento, J.

Facts:  Sept. 28 -- Emilio Montillano, a former barangay captain of Barrio Ebarle, Tambulig, Zamboanga del
Sur was shot dead. No one saw the crime happen.  A day after the killing (Sept. 29), an autopsy was made.
Also, Ernesto Cortes, desk sergeant of the Tambulig police, commenced Criminal Case No. 629 in the
Municipal Court of Tambulig against one Felipe Cedilla for preliminary investigation. On the same date, Judge
Gualberto Bacarro, Sr. of the Tambulig Municipal Court issued a warrant of arrest against Cedilla.  Finding a
prima facie case against Cedilla, Judge Bacarro, on March 18, 1972, issued an order forwarding the case to
the then Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del Sur for trial. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No.
905 of the Zamboanga del Sur Court of First Instance. The charge: murder of Emilio Montillano.  Cedilla was
duly arraigned, after which the government presented its evidence.  Meanwhile, on January 11, 1973, Rufino
Fernandez, Chief of Police of Tambulig, on the strength of a statement given by Adelita Decierdo pointing to
Pedro Decierdo, Adelita's husband, and Regino Duhay lungsod as Montillano's killers, filed a complaint against
Decierdo and Duhay lungsod. Judge Bacarro, who conducted the preliminary examination, issued a warrant for
the arrest of both Decierdo and Duhay lungsod on January 15, 1973.  Decierdo was apprehended in his
residence at Matingon, about 30 kilometers from Tambulig, on May 23 or 24, 1973, by Patrolman Alfredo
Bopadora of the Tambulig police.  He was brought to the Tambulig municipal building on May 25, 1973,
where he supposedly executed a written confession admitting responsibility for the shooting of Montillano on
September 27, 1971.  He likewise allegedly fingered Duhay lungood as the mastermind. It was a confession
Decierdo was supposed to have reiterated before Baldomero Fernandez, Assistant Provincial Fiscal of
Zamboanga del Sur, who investigated Criminal Case No. 905. Issue: W/N Decierdo’s extra-judicial confession
is admissible in court.

Held/Ratio: NO.

 There is no doubt that the accused's alleged extrajudicial confession is in the nature of an uncounselled
confession and hence, inadmissible in evidence. Section 20 of Article IV of the 1973 Constitution applies2.

2 Section 20. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. Any person under investigation for
the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such
right. No force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will shall be used
against him. Any confession obtained in violation of this section shall be inadmissible in evidence.

 In the case at bar, Pedro Decierdo was not assisted by a lawyer when he signed his supposed confession.
Judge Bacarro himself so admitted.  Furthermore, there is no showing that the accused in fact waived his
constitutional rights when he executed, or more precisely, was made to execute said statements  It is
claimed, however, that Decierdo reiterated his confession before Fiscal Baldomero Fernandez upon the
reinvestigation of Criminal Case No. 905, before whom he allegedly. declined anew the assistance of a lawyer.
-- But assuming that this amounts to a waiver, still, it is an invalid waiver, Decierdo not having been assisted by
a lawyer. o “Whenever a protection given by the Constitution is waived by the person entitled to that protection,
the presumption is always against the waiver. Consequently, the prosecution must prove with strongly
convincing evidence to the satisfaction of this Court that indeed the accused willingly and voluntarily submitted
his confession and knowingly and deliberately manifested that he was not interested in having a lawyer assist
him during the taking of that confession. That proof is missing in this case (PP v. Jar)”

58
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. FLAVIANO PUDA YGARAPEA alias "FLAVIO
PUDA", accused-appellant.

G.R. No. L-33841, October 31, 1984

Facts

In the early morning of December 19, 1959 defendant Flaviano Puda climbedover the fence of the house of
Luis Ching Kiat Biak located at 557 Tomas Claudia Street,Parañaque, Rizal, then once over the fence he
clambered to the awning (media agua) ofthe back part of the ground floor of the house and from there, he went
up to the secondstory, removed the wooden moldings which held in place the glass plates therebycausing an
opening to be made; that thereafter he removed his rubber shoes and wentthru the opening and gained
entrance into the bedroom of Ching Tian Un, son of theowner of the house who was then sleeping alone in
said bedroom at the time; that afterhaving gained entry into the bedroom, defendant stabbed twice the sleeping
Ching TianUn with a dagger causing the death of the latter.The confession of the accused, which showed that
the accused had been earlierconvicted by the Court of First Instance of Rizal for having stolen P100.00 from
thefather of the victim and for which reason he was dismissed as houseboy and that because of this and of the
fact that he had not been treated well by the deceased he wentto the victim's house in the night of December
19, 1959 with the intention to kill thedeceased. Thus, on November 21, 1960, the trial court found the accused
guilty ofmurder with two aggravating circumstances and sentenced him to the supreme penaltyof
death.Unfortunately because of negligence of some court personnel the records of thecase were not forwarded
by the court a quo to this Court for automatic review.Eleven years after his conviction, the accused wrote a
letter to this Courtinquiring about the status of his case. We inquired through a letter addressed to theClerk of
Court of the Court of First Instance of Pasig, Rizal, about the veracity of theallegations of the letter of the
accused and received a reply informing us that due to theinadvertence of the then clerk in charge of criminal
cases of Branch II, the records ofthis case were placed in the archives sometime in 1960 instead of being
forwarded to us.Hence, it was only then that the entire records were elevated to this Court.The accused raised
an alleged error that in any event, accused should not bemeted with the supreme penalty of death by this
Honorable Supreme Court as he hasfully paid his dues to society for having suffered enough in staying in
death row for morethan twenty (20) years.

Issue

Whether or not the accused is guilty of murder with two aggravatingcircumstances and should be sentenced to
the supreme penalty of death.

Ruling

The Court is convinced that the crime committed was murder. Treachery andevident premeditation were both
present in the commission of the crime. The records ofthe case clearly establish the fact that the accused after
having served for eleven monthsas a houseboy of the victim's family was dismissed because he stole money
from hisemployers and for which he was convicted by the Court of First Instance of Rizal.Because of this and
the fact that he was not treated well by the deceased, he decided toseek revenge and did so in the early
morning of December 19, 1959.The trial court, therefore, correctly ruled that the crime committed was
murderqualified by treachery and that evident premeditation dwelling and unlawful entry werealso present.The
Court, however, agrees with the accused's contention that the penaltyshould not be imposed on him since he
has been for detained and continues to be in thedeath row about 24 years now since as stated earlier, it took
eleven years after his trialand conviction before the records of this case were discovered and transmitted to
thisCourt for automatic review. For lack of the needed votes, the penalty of death is reducedto reclusion
perpetua. WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED with theMODIFICATION that the
penalty of death is reduced to reclusion perpetua and theindemnity for the heirs of the victim increased to
THIRTY THOUSAND (P30,000.00)PESOS.In view of the long period of time during which the accused-
appellant has been inDeath Row this case is referred to the Board of Pardons and Parole for a thorough
studyof all aspects of the case, including the accused conduct while in prison, with the end in view of
recommending executive clemency if warranted by the facts.

People v Alicando GR No. 117487 (December 2, 1995)

Facts: Accused was convicted with a crime of rape with homicide of a 4 year old girl. He was arrested and
during the interrogation he made a confession of the crime without the assistance of a counsel. By virtue of his
uncounseled confession the police came to know where to find the evidences consisting of the victim’s
personal things like clothes stained with blood which was admitted to court as evidences. The victim pleaded
guilty during the arraignment and was convicted with the death penalty. The case was forwarded to the SC for
automatic review.
Issue: Whether or not due process during the custodial investigation was accorded to the accused.
59
Held: Due process was not observed in the conduct of custodial investigation for the accused. He was not
informed of his right to a counsel upon making his extrajudicial confession and the information against him was
written in a language he could not understand and was not explained to him. This is in violation of section 1(a)
of Rule 116, the rule implementing the constitutional right of the appellant to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him. The lower court also violated section 3 of Rule 116 when it accepted the
plea of guilt of the appellant without conducting a search inquiry on the voluntariness and full understanding of
the accused of the consequences of his plea. Moreover the evidences admitted by the court that warranted his
convicted were inadmissible because they were due to an invalid custodial investigation that did not provide
the accused with due process of the law. Thus the SC annulled the decision of the imposition of the death
penalty and remanded the case back to the lower for further proceeding.

Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971)

Argued December 17, 1970
Decided February 24, 1971
Synopsis of Rule of Law.
Evidence inadmissible for lack of Miranda warnings does not prevent the admission of the evidence for all
purposes if the admission satisfies another legal admission, such as impeachment.
Facts.
Petitioner Harris was charged with selling in heroin to an undercover officer on two occasions. Petitioner took
the stand in his own defense but denied the offense, and he claimed he sold the officer two bags of baking
powder. On cross-examination the prosecution used contradicting statements made by Petitioner to police
shortly after his arrest. The contradicting statements were made before Petitioner received his Miranda
warnings.
Issue.
Was the prosecution improperly allowed to use the statements to impeach Petitioner’s testimony since the
statements were made without Miranda warnings?
Held.
Chief Justice Burger issued the opinion for the United States Supreme Court in holding that Petitioner was
allowed to be impeached using his conflicting statements.
Every criminal defendant is privileged to testify in his own defense, or to refuse to do so. But that privilege
cannot be construed to include the right to commit perjury. Having voluntarily taken the stand, petitioner was
under an obligation to speak truthfully and accurately, and the prosecution here did no more than utilize the
traditional truth-testing devices of the adversary process. The shield provided by Miranda cannot be perverted
into a license to use perjury by way of a defense, free from the risk of confrontation with prior inconsistent
utterances. We hold, therefore, that petitioner's credibility was appropriately impeached by use of his earlier
conflicting statements.
Dissent.
Justice Black dissented without comment.
Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Douglas and Marshall issued an opinion arguing that the Court’s ruling
supports police officers who don’t follow the law by not properly giving Miranda warnings. He notes that police
may be encouraged to interrogate without proper warnings because while the prosecution may not be able to
use the statements in its direct case, it may be allowed to do so if the defendant chooses to testify.
Discussion.
The Court found that a defendant should not be allowed to commit perjury, and if impeachment evidence is
available and admissible for that purpose, then the lack of Miranda warning should not prevent it. If Petitioner’s
statement had been to a third party instead of police, there would have been little question as to the
admissibility.
1987 Constitution
Section 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be
informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own
choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot
be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel. (Miranda Rights)

60
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the free will shall be used
against him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are
prohibited.
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in
evidence against him.
(4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violations of this section as well as compensation to
and rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar practices, and their families.
In the case at bar, since the uncounseled statements (direct testimonies of Harris) were made before Harris
received his Miranda rights, such statements should be inadmissible as evidence and cannot be used against
him in trial. The decision of the this case contradicts such principle because Chief Justice allowed the use of
the contradicting testimonies against Harris that is why there are dissenting opinions given by other justices
since they are contesting that the statements were illegally obtained by the prosecution in violation of the
Miranda doctrine.
New York v. Quarles
Brief Fact Summary. After being stopped and frisked, revealing an empty shoulder holster, respondent
Benjamin Quarles said “the gun is over there” in response to an officer’s question about its whereabouts. Only
then did the officer give the respondent his Miranda warnings.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. There is a public safety exception to the requirement that Miranda warnings be given
before a suspect’s answers can be admitted into evidence.
Facts. A woman identified a man as her rapist to a police officer in a supermarket. The officer frisked the
respondent and found an empty shoulder holster, and thus asked the respondent where the gun was. The
respondent said “the gun is over there,” and the officer retrieved it and then gave the respondent their Miranda
warnings. The trial court suppressed the respondent’s statement in quotes above and the gun, and the state
appellate courts affirmed. The state of New York was then granted certiorari.
Issue. Is there an exception to the requirement that a suspect be read their Miranda rights before their answers
can be admitted into evidence when the officer’s aims in questioning are to insure that no danger to the public
results from concealment of a weapon?
Held. Yes. Reverse the decision of the lower court to suppress the gun and statement.
Under these circumstances, there are strong public safety concerns justifying the court creating an exception
to the requirement that officers provide Miranda warnings before asking questions. The officer’s trying to
retrieve a weapon he knew was somewhere nearby so that no accomplice or customer would pick it up and
start shooting protected the public, and this type of action should not be discouraged.
Although admittedly this caveat may cloud the Miranda rule, police officers have the ability to distinguish when
this exception should apply.
His motivation in asking where the gun was is not at issue in this case.
Dissent. Justice Thurgood Marshall dissented by saying that this statement violated the Fifth Amendment
protection versus coerced self-incrimination because it was possible for the officers in this situation to advise
the respondent of his right to remain silent and his right to counsel.
Concurrence. Justice Sandra Day O’Connor dissented in part and concurred in part by saying that the gun
should have been admitted but not the statement. Nontestimonial evidence from informal custodial
interrogations in violation of Miranda is not required to be excluded.
Discussion. This decision is important in that it shows a conviction that Miranda warnings were separate from
the Fifth Amendment. However, its greatest significance may be however in that it reduced the bright line rules
of Miranda in creating a somewhat vague “public safety” exception.

BLAS F. OPLE, Petitioners, – versus - RUBEN D. TORRES, ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, HECTOR

VILLANUEVA, CIELITO HABITO, ROBERT BARBERS, CARMENCITA REODICA, CESAR SARINO,
RENATO VALENCIA, TOMAS P. AFRICA, HEAD OF THE NATIONAL COMPUTER CENTER and
CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT, Respondents. G.R. No. 127685, EN BANC, July 23, 1998,
PUNO, J.

The Court prescind from the premise that the right to privacy is a fundamental right guaranteed by the
Constitution, hence, it is the burden of government to show that A.O. No. 308 is justified by some compelling
state interest and that it is narrowly drawn. The indefiniteness of A.O. No. 308 can give the government the
61
roving authority to store and retrieve information for a purpose other than the identification of the individual
through his PRN. It does not provide who shall control and access the data, under what circumstances and for
what purpose. These factors are essential to safeguard the privacy and guaranty the integrity of the
information. FACTS: Petitioner Senator Blas F. Ople assailed the constitutionality of the Administrative Order
No. 308 entitled “Adoption of Computerized Identification Reference System” - providing for a national
computerized identification system with the goal of providing convenient way to transact business with the
government. Among the grounds raised is that the A.O. impermissibly intrudes the citizen’s constitutional right
of privacy.
ISSUE: Whether the Administrative Order No. 308 violates the constitutional right to privacy. (YES)
RULING: If we extend our judicial gaze, we will find that the right of privacy is recognized and enshrined in
several provisions of our Constitution. The Court prescind from the premise that the right to privacy is a
fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution, hence, it is the burden of government to show that A.O. No.
308 is justified by some compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn. A.O. No. 308 is predicated on
two considerations: (1) the need to provides our citizens and foreigners with the facility to conveniently transact
business with basic service and social security providers and other government instrumentalities and (2) the
need to reduce, if not totally eradicate, fraudulent transactions and misrepresentations by persons seeking
basic services. It is debatable whether these interests are compelling enough to warrant the issuance of A.O.
No. 308. But what is not arguable is the broadness, the vagueness, the overbreadth of A.O. No. 308 which if
implemented will put our people's right to privacy in clear and present danger. The heart of A.O. No. 308 lies in
its Section 4 which provides for a Population Reference Number (PRN) as a "common reference number to
establish a linkage among concerned agencies" through the use of "Biometrics Technology" and "computer
application designs." A.O. No. 308 should also raise our antennas for a further look will show that it does not
state whether encoding of data is limited to biological information alone for identification purposes In fact, the
Solicitor General claims that the adoption of the Identification Reference System will contribute to the
"generation of population data for development planning." This is an admission that the PRN will not be used
solely for identification but the generation of other data with remote relation to the avowed purposes of A.O.
No. 308. Clearly, the indefiniteness of A.O. No. 308 can give the government the roving authority to store and
retrieve information for a purpose other than the identification of the individual through his PRN. The potential
for misuse of the data to be gathered under A.O. No. 308 cannot be underplayed. Pursuant to said
administrative order, an individual must present his PRN everytime he deals with a government agency to avail
of basic services and security. His transactions with the government agency will necessarily be recorded —
whether it be in the computer or in the documentary file of the agency. The more frequent the use of the PRN,
the better the chance of building a huge formidable informatin base through the electronic linkage of the files.
The data may be gathered for gainful and useful government purposes; but the existence of this vast reservoir
of personal information constitutes a covert invitation to misuse, a temptation that may be too great for some of
our authorities to resist. We can even grant, arguendo, that the computer data file will be limited to the name,
address and other basic personal infomation about the individual. Even that hospitable assumption will not
save A.O. No. 308 from constitutional infirmity for again said order does not tell us in clear and categorical
terms how theseinformation gathered shall he handled. It does not provide who shall control and access the
data, under what circumstances and for what purpose. These factors are essential to safeguard the privacy
and guaranty the integrity of the information. It is plain and we hold that A.O. No. 308 falls short of assuring
that personal information which will be gathered about our people will only be processed for unequivocally
specified purposes. The lack of proper safeguards in this regard of A.O. No. 308 may interfere with the
individual's liberty of abode and travel by enabling authorities to track down his movement; it may also enable
unscrupulous persons to access confidential information and circumvent the right against self-incrimination; it
may pave the way for "fishing expeditions" by government authorities and evade the right against
unreasonable searches and seizures. The possibilities of abuse and misuse of the PRN, biometrics and
computer technology are accentuated when we consider that the individual lacks control over what can be read
or placed on his ID, much less verify the correctness of the data encoded.
SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS) v. DANGEROUS DRUGS BOARD and PHILIPPINE DRUG
ENFORCEMENT AGENCY (GRs. 157870, 158633 and 161658)
Date: November 3, 2008 Ponente: J. Velasco Jr. Facts: Before the Court are 3 consolidated petitions assailing
the constitutionality of Section 361 of RA 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 insofar as
it requires mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office, students of secondary and tertiary schools,
officers and employees of public and private offices, and persons charged before the prosecutor’s office with
certain offenses. According to Aquilino Pimentel Jr., a senator of the RP and a candidate for re-election in May
2004 elections, said mandatory drug testing imposes an additional qualification for Senators beyond that which
are provided by the Constitution. No provision in the Constitution authorizes the Congress or the COMELEC to
expand the qualification requirements of candidates for senator. Meanwhile, SJS contends that Section 36(c)
(d)(f) and (g) are constitutionally infirm as it constitutes undue delegation of legislative power when they give
unbridled discretion to schools and employers to determine the manner of drug testing. It also violates the
equal protection clause as it can be used to harass a student or employee deemed undesirable. The
constitutional right against unreasonable searches is also breached. In addition to the abovementioned
62
contentions, Atty. Manuel J. Laserna, Jr., as a citizen and taxpayers maintains that said provision should be
struck down as unconstitutional for infringing on the constitutional right to privacy, the right against
unreasonable search and seizure, and the right against self-incrimination, and for being contrary to the due
process and equal protection guarantees.
Issue: WON Section 36 (c), (d), (f) and (g) are unconstitutional
Held: Section 36 (c) and (d) are constitutional while (f) and (g) are not. Ratio: Section 36 (c) and (d) – as to
students and employees of private and public offices
Using US authorities, the Court ruled in favor of the constitutionality of Section 36(c) applying the following
reasonable deductions: (1) schools and their administrators stand in loco parentis with respect to their
students; (2) minor students have contextually fewer rights than an adult, and are subject to the custody and
supervision of their parents, guardians, and schools; (3) schools, acting in loco parentis, have a duty to
safeguard the health and well - being of their students and may adopt such measures as may reasonably be
necessary to discharge such duty; and (4) schools have the right to impose conditions on applicants for
admission that are fair, just, and non-discriminatory.
Therefore, the provisions of RA 9165 requiring mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing of students
are constitutional. Indeed, it is within the prerogative of educational institutions to require, as a condition for
admission, compliance with reasonable school rules and regulations and policies. To be sure, the right to enroll
is not absolute; it is subject to fair, reasonable, and equitable requirements. Just as in the case of secondary
and tertiary level students, the mandatory but random drug test prescribed by Sec. 36 of RA 9165 for officers
and employees of public and private offices is justifiable, albeit not exactly for the same reason.
For another, the random drug testing shall be undertaken under conditions calculated to protect as much as
possible the employee's privacy and dignity. As to the mechanics of the test, the law specifies that the
procedure shall JJMO employ two testing methods, i.e., the screening test and the confirmatory test, doubtless
to ensure as much as possible the trustworthiness of the results. But the more important consideration lies in
the fact that the test shall be conducted by trained professionals in access - controlled laboratories monitored
by the Department of Health (DOH) to safeguard against results tampering and to ensure an accurate chain of
custody. All told, therefore, the intrusion into the employees' privacy, under RA 9165, is accompanied by
proper safeguards, particularly against embarrassing leakages of test results, and is relatively minimal.
The essence of privacy is the right to be left alone. In context, the right to privacy means the right to be free
from unwarranted exploitation of one's person or from intrusion into one's private activities in such a way as to
cause humiliation to a person's ordinary sensibilities. And while there has been general agreement as to the
basic function of the guarantee against unwarranted search, "translation of the abstract prohibition against
‘unreasonable searches and seizures' into workable broad guidelines for the decision of particular cases is a
difficult task," to borrow from C. Camara v. Municipal Court. Authorities are agreed though that the right to
privacy yields to certain paramount rights of the public and defers to the state's exercise of police power.
The first factor to consider in the matter of reasonableness is the nature of the privacy interest upon which the
drug testing, which effects a search within the meaning of Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution, intrudes. Just as
defining as the first factor is the character of the intrusion authorized by the challenged law. Reduced to a
question form, is the scope of the search or intrusion clearly set forth, or, as formulated in Ople v. Torres, is the
enabling law authorizing a search "narrowly drawn" or "narrowly focused"?
To reiterate, RA 9165 was enacted as a measure to stamp out illegal drug in the country and thus protect the
well - being of the citizens, especially the youth, from the deleterious effects of dangerous drugs. Taking into
account the foregoing factors, i.e., the reduced expectation of privacy on the part of the employees, the
compelling state concern likely to be met by the search, and the well - defined limits set forth in the law to
properly guide authorities in the conduct of the random testing, we hold that the challenged drug test
requirement is, under the limited context of the case, reasonable and, ergo, constitutional.
Like their counterparts in the private sector, government officials and employees also labor under reasonable
supervision and restrictions imposed by the Civil Service law and other laws on public officers, all enacted to
promote a high standard of ethics in the public service. And if RA 9165 passes the norm of reasonableness for
private employees, the more reason that it should pass the test for civil servants, who, by constitutional
command, are required to be accountable at all times to the people and to serve them with utmost
responsibility and efficiency.
On the charge of being an undue delegation, the provision in question is not so extensively drawn as to give
unbridled options to schools and employers to determine the manner of drug testing. It expressly provides how
drug testing for students of secondary and tertiary schools and officers/employees of public/private offices
should be conducted. It enumerates the persons who shall undergo drug testing. In the case of students, the
testing shall be in accordance with the school rules as contained in the student handbook and with notice to
parents. On the part of officers/employees, the testing shall take into account the company's work rules. In
either case, the random procedure shall be observed, meaning that the persons to be subjected to drug test

63
shall be picked by chance or in an unplanned way. And in all cases, safeguards against misusing and
compromising the confidentiality of the test results are established.
Section 36 (f) – as to persons charged before the prosecutor’s office with criminal offenses
The Court found the situation entirely different in the case of persons charged before the public prosecutor's
office with criminal offenses punishable with six (6) years and one (1) day imprisonment. The operative
concepts in the mandatory drug testing are "randomness" and "suspicionless." In the case of persons charged
with a crime before the prosecutor's office, a mandatory drug testing can never be random or suspicionless.
The ideas of randomness and being suspicionless are antithetical to their being made defendants in a criminal
complaint. They are not randomly picked; neither are they beyond suspicion. When persons suspected of
committing a crime are charged, they are singled out and are impleaded against their will. The persons thus
charged, by the bare fact of being haled before the prosecutor's office and peaceably submitting themselves to
drug testing, if that be the case, do not necessarily consent to the procedure, let alone waive their right to
privacy. To impose mandatory drug testing on the accused is a blatant attempt to harness a medical test as a
tool for criminal prosecution, contrary to the stated objectives of RA 9165. Drug testing in this case would
violate a persons' right to privacy guaranteed under Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution. Worse still, the accused
persons are veritably forced to incriminate themselves.
It is basic that if a law or an administrative rule violates any norm of the Constitution, that issuance is null and
void and has no effect. The Constitution is the basic law to which all laws must conform; no act shall be valid if
it conflicts with the Constitution. In the discharge of their defined functions, the three departments of
government have no choice but to yield obedience to the commands of the Constitution. Whatever limits it
imposes must be observed.
Congress' inherent legislative powers, broad as they may be, are subject to certain limitations. Thus, legislative
power remains limited in the sense that it is subject to substantive and constitutional limitations which
circumscribe both the exercise of the power itself and the allowable subjects of legislation. The substantive
constitutional limitations are chiefly found in the Bill of Rights and other provisions, such as Sec. 3, Art. VI of
the Constitution prescribing the qualifications of candidates for senators.
In the same vein, the COMELEC cannot, in the guise of enforcing and administering election laws or
promulgating rules and regulations to implement Sec. 36(g), validly impose qualifications on candidates for
senator in addition to what the Constitution prescribes. If Congress cannot require a candidate for senator to
meet such additional qualification, the COMELEC, to be sure, is also without such power. The right of a citizen
in the democratic process of election should not be defeated by unwarranted impositions of requirement not
otherwise specified in the Constitution.
(EMMA K. LEE vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 177861, July13, 2010, ABAD, J.).
The Facts and the Case
Spouses (Lee) and Keh entered the Philippines in the 1930sas immigrants from China. They had 11 children.
In 1948, Leebrought from China a young woman (Tiu), as housemaid. Respondent Lee-Keh’s children believed
that Tiu left the household and had a relation with him. Shortly after Keh died in 1989, the Lee-Keh children
learned that Tiu’s children with Lee (collectively, the Lee’s other children) claimed that they, too, were children
of Lee and Keh. This prompted the Lee-Keh children to request the (NBI) to investigate the matter. After
conducting such an investigation, the NBI concluded in its report it is not KEH SHIOK CHENG, but a much
younger woman, most probably TIU CHUAN. The NBI found, for example, that in the hospital records Keh’s
declared age did not coincide with her actual age when she supposedly gave birth to such other children,
numbering eight. On the basis of this report, the respondent Lee-Keh children filed two separate petitions, one
of them before the (RTC) for the deletion from the certificate of live birth of the petitioner Emma Lee, one of
Lee’s other children, the name Keh and replace the same with the name Tiu to indicate her true mother’s
name. In April 2005 the Lee-Keh children filed with the RTC an ex parte request for the issuance of a
subpoena ad testificandum to compel Tiu, Emma Lee’s presumed mother, to testify in the case. However, later
on, the subpoena was quashed by the RTC as it was oppressive and violated Section 25, Rule130 of the Rules
of Court, the rule on parental privilege, she being Emma Lee’s stepmother.
CA rendered a decision setting aside the RTC’s Order on the ground that only a subpoena duces tecum, not a
subpoena adtestificandum, may be quashed for being oppressive or unreasonable under Section 4, Rule 21 of
the Rules of CivilProcedure. The CA also held that Tiu’s advanced age alonedoes not render her incapable of
testifying. The party seekingto quash the subpoena for that reason must prove that shewould be unable to
withstand the rigors of trial, something thatpetitioner Emma Lee failed to do.
ISSUE: Whether or not court may compel Tiu to testify in the correction of entry case that respondent Lee-
Kehchildren filed for the correction of the certificate of birth of petitioner Emma Lee to show that she is not
Keh’s daughter.

64
HELD: Under Section 25, Rule 130 of the Rules of Evidence “No personmay be compelled to testify against his
parents, other directascendants, children or other direct descendants.”The afore-quoted rule is an adaptation
from a similar provision in Article 315 of the Civil Code that applies only in criminal cases.
But those who revised the Rules of Civil Procedure chose to extend the prohibition to all kinds of actions,
whether civil, criminal, or administrative, filed against parents and other direct ascendantsor descendants.
In Emma Lee vs. Court of Appeals, the person (TIU) who invokes the filial privilege, claims that she is the
stepmother of petitioner EmmaLee.
The SC declared that the privilege cannot apply to them because the rule applies only to "direct" ascendants
and descendants, a family tie connected by a common ancestry. A stepdaughter has no common ancestry by
her stepmother . Relative thereto, Article 965 of the New Civil Code provides: “Thedirect line is either
descending or ascending. The former unites the head of the family with those who descend from him. The
latter bindsa person with those from whom he descends.”
Consequently, Tiu can be compelled to testify against petitioner Emma Lee.

MERALCO, et al. v. Lim, G.R. No. 184769, 05 October 2010.

FACTS:
Rosario G. Lim (respondent), also known as Cherry Lim, an administrative clerk at the Manila Electric
Company (MERALCO), learned of an anonymous letter that was posted at the door of the Metering Office of
the Administration building of MERALCO Plaridel, Bulacan Sector, at which respondent is assigned,
denouncing respondent. The letter reads:
“Cherry Lim:
MATAPOS MONG LAMUNIN LAHAT NG BIYAYA NG MERALCO, NGAYON NAMAN AY GUSTO MONG
PALAMON ANG BUONG KUMPANYA SA MGA BUWAYA NG GOBYERNO. KAPAL NG MUKHA MO,
LUMAYAS KA RITO, WALANG UTANG NA LOOB…”
By Memorandum, petitioner Alexander Deyto, Head of MERALCO’s Human Resource Staffing, directed the
transfer of respondent to MERALCO’s Alabang Sector in Muntinlupa as “A/F OTMS Clerk,” in light of the
receipt of “… reports that there were accusations and threats directed against [her] from unknown individuals
and which could possibly compromise [her] safety and security.”
Respondent questions the propriety of MERALCO’s action in a letter as “highly suspicious…” and being
“punitive”, but the latter never responded. Respondent filed a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas data
against petitioners before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bulacan. Additionally, respondent prayed for the
issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) enjoining petitioners from effecting her transfer to the
MERALCO Alabang Sector.
The trial court granted the prayers of respondent including the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
directing petitioners to desist from implementing respondent’s transfer until such time that petitioners comply
with the disclosures required.
ISSUES:
[1] Whether the RTC lacked jurisdiction to over the case and cannot restrain MERALCO’s prerogative as
employer to transfer the place of work of its employees.
[2] Is the issuance of the writ outside the parameters expressly set forth in the Rule on the Writ of Habeas
Data?
HELD:
[1] YES.
The habeas data rule, in general, is designed to protect by means of judicial complaint the image, privacy,
honor, information, and freedom of information of an individual. It is meant to provide a forum to enforce one’s
right to the truth and to informational privacy, thus safeguarding the constitutional guarantees of a person’s
right to life, liberty and security against abuse in this age of information technology. It bears reiteration that like
the writ of amparo, habeas data was conceived as a response, given the lack of effective and available
remedies, to address the extraordinary rise in the number of killings and enforced disappearances. Its intent is
to address violations of or threats to the rights to life, liberty or security as a remedy independently from those
provided under prevailing Rules.
[W]rits of …habeas data will NOT issue to protect purely property or commercial concerns nor when the
grounds invoked in support of the petitions therefor are vague or doubtful. Employment constitutes a property
65
right under the context of the due process clause of the Constitution. It is evident that respondent’s
reservations on the real reasons for her transfer – a legitimate concern respecting the terms and conditions of
one’s employment – are what prompted her to adopt the extraordinary remedy of habeas data. Jurisdiction
over such concerns is inarguably lodged by law with the NLRC and the Labor Arbiters.
[2] YES.
There is no showing from the facts presented that petitioners committed any unjustifiable or unlawful violation
of respondent’s right to privacy vis-a-vis the right to life, liberty or security. To argue that petitioners’ refusal to
disclose the contents of reports allegedly received on the threats to respondent’s safety amounts to a violation
of her right to privacy is at best speculative. Respondent in fact trivializes these threats and accusations from
unknown individuals in her earlier-quoted portion of her letter as “highly suspicious, doubtful or are just mere
jokes if they existed at all.” And she even suspects that her transfer to another place of work “betray[s] the real
intent of management]” and could be a “punitive move.” Her posture unwittingly concedes that the issue is
labor-related.
Fernando vs St. Scholastica’s College
GR 1611107, 12 March 2013
Facts: Respondent SSC’s property is enclosed by a tall concrete perimeter fence. Marikina City enacted an
ordinance which provides that walls and fences shall not be built within a five-meter allowance between the
front monument line and the building line of an establishment.
The City Government of Marikina sent a letter to the respondents ordering them to demolish, replace, and
move back the fence. As a response, the respondents filed a petition for prohibition with an application for a
writ of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order before the Regional Trial Court of Marikina. The
RTC granted the petition and the CA affirmed. Hence, this certiorari.
Issue: Is Marikina Ordinance No. 192, imposing a five-meter setback, a valid exercise of police power?
Ruling: No. “Police power is the plenary power vested in the legislature to make statutes and ordinances to
promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety and general welfare of the people.” Two
tests have been used by the Court – the rational relationship test and the strict scrutiny test:
Under the rational relationship test, an ordinance must pass the following requisites:
(1) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require its exercise;
and (2) the means employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly
oppressive upon individuals.
The real intent of the setback requirement was to make the parking space free for use by the public and
not for the exclusive use of respondents. This would be tantamount to a taking of private property for public
use without just compensation. Anent the objectives of prevention of concealment of unlawful acts and “un-
neighborliness” due to the walls and fences, the parking area is not reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of these goals. The Court, thus, finds Section 5 of the Ordinance to be unreasonable and
oppressive. Hence, the exercise of police power is not valid.

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE WRIT OF AMPARO AND HABEAS DATA IN FAVOR OF
NORIEL H. RODRIGUEZ, NORIEL H. RODRIGUEZ, Petitioner, -versus- GLORIA MACAPAGALARROYO,
GEN. VICTOR S. IBRADO, PDG JESUS AME VERSOZA, LT. GEN. DELFIN BANGIT, MAJ. GEN. NESTOR
Z. OCHOA, P/CSUPT. AMETO G. TOLENTINO, P/SSUPT. JUDE W. SANTOS, COL. REMIGIO M. DE VERA,
an officer named MATUTINA, LT. COL. MINA, CALOG, GEORGE PALACPAC under the name “HARRY,”
ANTONIO CRUZ, ALDWIN “BONG” PASICOLAN and VINCENT CALLAGAN, Respondents. IN THE MATTER
OF THE PETITION FOR THE WRIT OF AMPARO AND HABEAS DATA IN FAVOR OF NORIEL H.
RODRIGUEZ, POLICE DIR. GEN. JESUS A. VERSOZA, P/SSUPT. JUDE W. SANTOS, BGEN. REMEGIO M.
DE VERA, 1ST LT. RYAN S. MATUTINA, LT. COL. LAURENCE E. MINA, ANTONIO C. CRUZ, ALDWIN C.
PASICOLAN and VICENTE A. CALLAGAN, Petitioners, -versusNORIEL H. RODRIGUEZ, Respondent. G.R.
No. 191805 & G.R. No. 193160, EN BANC, November 15, 2011, Sereno, J.
To hold someone liable under the doctrine of command responsibility, the following elements must obtain: a)
the existence of a superior-subordinate relationship between the accused as superior and the perpetrator of
the crime as his subordinate; b) the superior knew or had reason to know that the crime was about to be or had
been committed; and, c) the superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent the
criminal acts or punish the perpetrators thereof. The president, being the commander-in-chief of all armed
forces, necessarily possesses control over the military that qualifies him as a superior within the purview of the
command responsibility doctrine.

66
FACTS: Noriel Rodriguez (petitioner) is a member of Alyansa Dagiti Mannalon Iti Cagayan, a peasant
organization affiliated with Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (KMP). Under the Oplan Bantay Laya, the military
tagged KMP members as an enemy of the state, making its members an easy target of extra-judicial killings
and enforced disappearances. On September 6, 2009, Rodriguez just alighted from a tricycle driven by Hermie
Antonio Carlos in Brgy. Tapel, Cagayan, when 4 men forcibly took him and forced him to get inside a car
where more men in civilian clothing were waiting (1 was holding a .45 caliber pistol). The men started punching
Rodriguez inside the car, and forced him to confess that he is a member of the New People’s Army (NPA).
Rodriguez remained silent until they reached a military camp belonging to the 17th Infantry Battalion of the
Philippine Army.
Rodriguez was then subjected to beatings and torture by members of the Philippine Army. Members of the
army wanted him to admit that he is an NPA member and then pinpoint other NPA members and camp
locations. Since Rodriguez cannot answer, he is repeatedly beaten and tortured. Rodriguez was also coerced
to sign several documents to declare that he is a surenderree. On September 17, 2009, Rodriguez’s mother
and brother came to see him (accompanied by members of the CHR – Pasicolan, Cruz and Callagan). They
insisted to take Rodriguez home with them to Manila. Rodriguez arrived in Manila on September 18. Callagan
and 2 military members went inside their house and took pictures for around 30 minutes despite Rodriguez’s
effort to stop them.
On November 3, Rodriguez and his girlfriend notices that several suspicious-looking men are following them
on the streets, jeepney and MRT. On December 7, Rodriguez filed a Petition for the Writ of Amparo and
Petition for the Writ of Habeas Data with Prayers for Protection Orders, Inspection of Place, and Production of
Documents and Personal Properties dated 2 December 2009.
The petition was filed against former President Arroyo, Gen. Ibrado, PDG. Versoza, Lt. Gen. Bangit, Major
General (Maj. Gen.) Nestor Z. Ochoa, P/CSupt. Tolentino, P/SSupt. Santos, Col. De Vera, 1st Lt. Matutina,
Calog, George Palacpac, Cruz, Pasicolan and Callagan. Respondents contend that Rodriguez is a double
agent, and had been working as their informant/infiltrator in the fight against NPA rebels.
Then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, through the solicitor-general, insisted on her immunity from suits (by
virtue of her position as president). Supreme Court granted the writs after finding that the petition sufficiently
alleged the abduction and torture of Rodriguez by members of the Philippine Army. SC directed the Court of
Appeals to hear the petition.
CA ruled in favor of Rodriguez and found Ibrado, Versoza, Bangit, Ochoa, Tolentino, Santos, De Vera and
Matutina liable for his abduction and torture. As to Calog and Palacpac, the case was dismissed for lack of
merit. On President Arroyo, the case was dismissed on account of her immunity from suits.
ISSUES: 1) Whether former President Arroyo should be dropped as a respondent on the basis of the
presidential immunity from suit. (NO)
2) Whether the doctrine of command responsibility can be used in amparo and habeas data cases. (YES)
RULING: Presidential Immunity from Suit Since there is no determination of administrative, civil or criminal
liability in amparo and habeas data proceedings, courts can only go as far as ascertaining responsibility or
accountability for the enforced disappearance or extrajudicial killing
In Razon v. Tagitis, the court held that responsibility refers to the extent the actors have been established by
substantial evidence to have participated in whatever way, by action or omission, in an enforced
disappearance, as a measure of the remedies this Court shall craft, among them, the directive to file the
appropriate criminal and civil cases against the responsible parties in the proper courts. On the other hand,
Accountability, refers to the measure of remedies that should be addressed to those:
a) who exhibited involvement in the enforced disappearance without bringing the level of their complicity to the
level of responsibility defined above; or
b) who are imputed with knowledge relating to the enforced disappearance and who carry the burden of
disclosure; or
c) those who carry, but have failed to discharge, the burden of extraordinary diligence in the investigation of the
enforced disappearance.
In all these cases, the issuance of the Writ of Amparo is justified by our primary goal of addressing the
disappearance, so that the life of the victim is preserved and his liberty and security are restored.
In the case at bar, the CA found respondents the exception of Calog, Palacpac or Harry to be accountable for
the violations of Rodriguezs right to life, liberty and security committed by the 17th Infantry Battalion. The Court
of Appeals dismissed the petition with respect to former President Arroyo on account of her presidential
immunity from suit.Rodriguez contends, though, that she should remain a respondent in this case to enable the
courts to determine whether she is responsible or accountable therefor. In this regard, it must be clarified that

67
the CA rationale for dropping her from the list of respondents no longer stands since her presidential immunity
is limited only to her incumbency.
In Estrada v. Desierto, we clarified the doctrine that a non-sitting President does not enjoy immunity from suit,
even for acts committed during the latter’s tenure. We emphasize our ruling therein that courts should look with
disfavor upon the presidential privilege of immunity, especially when it impedes the search for truth or impairs
the vindication of a right. In US v. Nixon, US President Nixon, a sitting President, was subpoenaed to produce
certain recordings and documents relating to his conversations with aids and advisers. SC concluded that
when the ground for asserting privilege as to subpoenaed materials sought for use in a criminal trial is based
only on the generalized interest in confidentiality, it cannot prevail over the fundamental demands of due
process of law in the fair administration of criminal justice.
In Nixon v. Fitzgerald, the US SC further held that the immunity of the President from civil damages covers
only official acts. Recently, the US Supreme Court had the occasion to reiterate this doctrine in the case of
Clinton v. Jones where it held that the US President's immunity from suits for money damages arising out of
their official acts is inapplicable to unofficial conduct.
Applying the foregoing rationale to the case at bar, it is clear that former President Arroyo cannot use the
presidential immunity from suit to shield herself from judicial scrutiny that would assess whether, within the
context of amparo proceedings, she was responsible or accountable for the abduction of Rodriguez.
Command Responsibility in Amparo and Habeas Data Cases
The doctrine of command responsibility may be used to determine whether respondents are accountable for
and have the duty to address the abduction of Rodriguez in order to enable the courts to devise remedial
measures to protect his rights.
Proceedings under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo do not determine criminal, civil or administrative liability, but
this should not abate the applicability of the doctrine of command responsibility.
“In the context of amparo proceedings, responsibility may refer to the participation of the respondents, by
action or omission, in enforced disappearance. Accountability, on the other hand, may attach to respondents
who are imputed with knowledge relating to the enforced disappearance and who carry the burden of
disclosure; or those who carry, but have failed to discharge, the burden of extraordinary diligence in the
investigation of the enforced disappearance.”
“Despite maintaining former President Arroyo in the list of respondents in G.R. No. 191805, and allowing the
application of the command responsibility doctrine to amparo and habeas data proceedings, Rodriguez failed
to prove through substantial evidence that former President Arroyo was responsible or accountable for the
violation of his rights to life, liberty and property. He likewise failed to prove through substantial evidence the
accountability or responsibility of respondents Maj. Gen. Ochoa, Cruz, Pasicolan and Callagan.”
SC affirmed the decision of the CA, but with modifications. The case is dismissed with respect to respondents
former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, P/CSupt. Ameto G. Tolentino, and P/SSupt. Jude W. Santos,
Calog, George Palacpac, Antonio Cruz, Aldwin Pasicolan and Vicent Callagan for lack of merit.
SPOUSES HING V CHOACHUY
GR #S 179736 | June 26, 2013
Petition: Review on Certiorari
Petitioner: SPOUSES BILL AND VICTORIA HING
Respondent: ALEXANDER CHOACHUY, SR. and ALLAN CHOACHUY
Article 26 (1) of the Civil Code,on the other hand, protects an individual's right to privacy and provides a legal
remedy against abuses that may be committed against him by other individuals. It states:
Art. 26. Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and
other persons. The following and similar acts, though they may not constitute a criminal offense, shall produce
a cause of action for damages, prevention and other relief:
(1) Prying into the privacy of another's residence;

Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 2. Parties-in-interest. — A real party-in-interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the
judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless otherwise authorized by law or these
Rules, every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party-in-interest.
DOCTRINE
68
Privacy of Communication and Correspondence
FACTS
On August 23, 2005, petitioner-spouses Bill and Victoria Hing filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Mandaue City a Complaint for Injunction and Damages with prayer for issuance of a Writ of Preliminary
Mandatory Injunction/Temporary Restraining Order (TROagainst respondents Alexander Choachuy, Sr. and
Allan Choachuy.
Petitioners alleged that they are the registered owners of a parcel of land (Lot 1900-B) covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 42817 situated in Barangay Basak, City of Mandaue, Cebu;
- that respondents are the owners of Aldo Development & Resources, Inc. (Aldo) located at Lots 1901
and 1900-C, adjacent to the property of petitioners; that respondents constructed an auto-repair shop
building (Aldo Goodyear Servitec) on Lot 1900-C;
- that in April 2005, Aldo filed a case against petitioners for Injunction and Damages with Writ of
Preliminary Injunction/TRO, docketed as Civil Case No. MAN-5125;
- that in that case, Aldo claimed that petitioners were constructing a fence without a valid permit and that
the said construction would destroy the wall of its building, which is adjacent to petitioners' property;
- that the court, in that case, denied Aldo's application for preliminary injunction for failure to substantiate
its allegations;
- that, in order to get evidence to support the said case, respondents on June 13, 2005 illegally
set-up and installed on the building of Aldo Goodyear Servitec two video surveillance cameras
facing petitioners' property;
- that respondents, through their employees and without the consent of petitioners, also took
pictures of petitioners' on-going construction;
- and that the acts of respondents violate petitioners' right to privacy. Thus, petitioners prayed that
respondents be ordered to remove the video surveillance cameras and enjoined from conducting illegal
surveillance.

In their Answer with Counterclaim, respondents claimed that they did not install the video surveillance
cameras, nor did they order their employees to take pictures of petitioners' construction. They also clarified that
they are not the owners of Aldo but are mere stockholders.
RTC RULING : The RTC issued an Order granting the application for a TRO and Writ of Preliminary
Injunction. Respondents were ordered to remove the cameras, they moved for a reconsideration but the RTC
denied the same in its Order
CA RULING : The CA ruled that the Writ of Preliminary Injunction was issued with grave abuse of discretion
because petitioners failed to show a clear and unmistakable right to an injunctive writ:
- Right to privacy of residence under Article 26 (1) of the Civil Code was not violated since the property
subject of the controversy is not used as a residence.
- respondents are not the owners of the building, they could not have installed video surveillance
cameras.
- They are mere stockholders of Aldo, which has a separate juridical personality.

ISSUE/S
Whether or not the right to privacy of the spouses Hing were violated.

RULING & RATIO

- YES. The right to privacy is the right to be let alone. The Bill of Rights guarantees the people's right to
privacy and protects them against the State's abuse of power. In this regard, the State recognizes the
right of the people to be secure in their houses. No one, not even the State, except "in case of
overriding social need and then only under the stringent procedural safeguards," can disturb
them in the privacy of their homes.

- An individual's right to privacy under Article 26 (1) of the Civil Code should not be confined to his
house or residence as it may extend to places where he has the right to exclude the public or
deny them access.

- In ascertaining whether there is a violation of the right to privacy, courts use the "reasonable
expectation of privacy" test. This test determines whether a person has a reasonable expectation of
privacy and whether the expectation has been violated.

69
 (1) whether, by his conduct, the individual has exhibited an expectation of privacy; and
(2) this expectation is one that society recognizes as reasonable." Customs, community norms, and
practices may, therefore, limit or extend an individual's "reasonable expectation of privacy."

- The operation by [respondents] of a revolving camera, even if it were mounted on their building,
violated the right of privacy of [petitioners], who are the owners of the adjacent lot. The camera does
not only focus on [respondents'] property or the roof of the factory at the back (Aldo Development and
Resources, Inc.) but it actually spans through a good portion of [the] land of [petitioners]. YES. There
was reasonable expectation of privacy.
- A real party defendant is one who has a correlative legal obligation to redress a wrong done to the
plaintiff by reason of the defendant's act or omission which
had violated the legal right of the former.

DISPOSITION
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated July 10, 2007 and the Resolution dated
September 11, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB-SP No. 01473 are hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The Orders dated October 18, 2005 and February 6, 200[6] of Branch 28 of the Regional Trial Court of
Mandaue City in Civil Case No. MAN-5223 are hereby REINSTATED and AFFIRMED.
Disini, et al. v. The Secretary of Justice, et al., G.R. No. 203335, 11 February 2014
FACTS
Petitioners lament that libel provisions of the penal code and, in effect, the libel provisions of the cybercrime
law carry with them the requirement of “presumed malice” even when the latest jurisprudence already replaces
it with the higher standard of “actual malice” as a basis for conviction. Petitioners argue that inferring
“presumed malice” from the accused’s defamatory statement by virtue of Article 354 of the penal code infringes
on his constitutionally guaranteed freedom of expression.

ISSUE

Whether or not Section 4(c)(4) of the Cybercrime Prevention Act on cyberlibel affected the requirement of
“actual malice” as opposed to “presumed malice” as basis for conviction of libel.

RULING

The prosecution bears the burden of proving the presence of actual malice in instances where such element is
required to establish guilt. The defense of absence of actual malice, even when the statement turns out to be
false, is available where the offended party is a public official or a public figure, as in the cases of Vasquez (a
barangay official) and Borjal (the Executive Director, First National Conference on Land Transportation). Since
the penal code and implicitly, the cybercrime law, mainly target libel against private persons, the Court
recognizes that these laws imply a stricter standard of “malice” to convict the author of a defamatory statement
where the offended party is a public figure. Society’s interest and the maintenance of good government
demand a full discussion of public affairs.

But, where the offended party is a private individual, the prosecution need not prove the presence of malice.
The law explicitly presumes its existence (malice in law) from the defamatory character of the assailed
statement. For his defense, the accused must show that he has a justifiable reason for the defamatory
statement even if it was in fact true.

SOCORRO D. RAMIREZ, petitioner vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, and ESTER S. GARCIA,
respondents G.R. No. 93833 September 28, 1995

FACTS: Petitioner Socorro D. Ramirez filed a civil case in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City alleging that
the private respondent, Ester S. Garcia, in a confrontation in the latter's office, allegedly vexed, insulted and
humiliated her in a "hostile and furious mood" and in a manner offensive to his dignity and personality, contrary
to morals, good customs and public policy.

In support of her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the event and sought moral damages,
attorney's fees and other expenses of litigation in the amount of P610,000.00, in addition to costs, interests
and other reliefs awardable at the trial court's discretion. The transcript on which the civil case was based was
culled from a tape recording of the confrontation made by petitioner.

70
As a result of petitioner's recording of the event and alleging that the said act of secretly taping the
confrontation was illegal, private respondent filed a criminal case before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City
for violation of Republic Act 4200, entitled "An Act to prohibit and penalize wire tapping and other related
violations of private communication, and other purposes.

ISSUE: Whether or not the applicable provision of Republic Act 4200 does not apply to the taping of a private
conversation by one of the parties to the conversation.

RULING: No. Section 1 of the Republic Act 4200 states that it shall be unlawful for any person, not being
authorized by all the parties to any private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using
any other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken
word by using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or
tape recorder, or however otherwise described.

The law is clear and unambiguous. Where the law makes no distinctions, one does not distinguish. The
Supreme Court affirmed the appealed decision. The instant petition is hereby DENIED. Cost against petitioner.

GANAAN V IAC
G.R. No. L-69809 | October 16, 1986 | J. Gutierrez Jr.

Facts: Complainant Atty. Tito Pintor and his client Manuel Montebon were in the living room of complainant’s
residence discussing the terms for the withdrawal of the complaint for direct assault which they filed with the
Office of the City Fiscal of Cebu against Leonardo Laconico. After they had decided on the proposed
conditions, complainant made a telephone call to Laconico. That same morning, Laconico telephoned
appellant, who is a lawyer, to come to his office and advise him on the settlement of the direct assault case
because his regular lawyer, Atty. Leon Gonzaga, went on a business trip.
When complainant called, Laconico requested appellant to secretly listen to the telephone conversation
through a telephone extension so as to hear personally the proposed conditions for the settlement. Twenty
minutes later, complainant called again to ask Laconico if he was agreeable to the conditions. Laconico
answered ‘Yes’. Complainant then told Laconico to wait for instructions on where to deliver the money.
Complainant called again and instructed Laconico to give the money to his wife at the office of the then
Department of Public Highways. Laconico who earlier alerted his friend Colonel Zulueta of the Criminal
Investigation Service of the Philippine Constabulary, insisted that complainant himself should receive the
money. When he received the money at the Igloo Restaurant, complainant was arrested by agents of the
Philippine Constabulary.
Appellant executed on the following day an affidavit stating that he heard complainant demand P8,000.00 for
the withdrawal of the case for direct assault. Laconico attached the affidavit of appellant to the complainant for
robbery/extortion which he filed against complainant. Since appellant listened to the telephone conversation
without complainant’s consent, complainant charged appellant and Laconico with violation of the Anti-
Wiretapping Act.
The lower court found both Gaanan and Laconico guilty of violating Section 1 of Republic Act No. 4200, which
prompted petitioner to appeal. The IAC affirmed with modification hence the present petition for certiorari.
Issue: W/N an extension telephone is covered by the term “device or arrangement” under Rep. Act No. 4200
Held: No. The law refers to a “tap” of a wire or cable or the use of a “device or arrangement” for the purpose of
secretly overhearing, intercepting, or recording the communication. There must be either a physical interruption
through a wiretap or the deliberate installation of a device or arrangement in order to overhear, intercept, or
record the spoken words.
An extension telephone cannot be placed in the same category as a dictaphone, dictagraph or the other
devices enumerated in Section 1 of RA No. 4200 as the use thereof cannot be considered as “tapping” the wire
or cable of a telephone line. The telephone extension in this case was not installed for that purpose. It just
happened to be there for ordinary office use.
Katz v. United States
Brief Fact Summary. The petitioner, Katz (the “petitioner”), was convicted of transmitting wagering information
over telephone lines in violation of federal law. The government had entered into evidence the petitioner’s end
of telephone conversations that the government had obtained by placing a listening device to the phone booth
that the petitioner used. The Court of Appeals rejected the petitioner’s contention that the evidence should be
suppressed.

71
Synopsis of Rule of Law. The protection of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution
(“Constitution”), against unreasonable searches and seizures, follows the person and not the place.
Facts. The petitioner used a public telephone booth to transmit wagering information from Los Angeles to
Boston and Miami in violation of federal law. After extensive surveillance, the FBI placed a listening device to
the top of the telephone booth and recorded the petitioner’s end of the telephone conversations which was
then used as evidence against him at his trial. The petitioner moved to have the evidence suppressed under
the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution, and that motion was denied. The Court of Appeals rejected the
contention that the evidence is inadmissible. Certiorari was granted.
Issue. Whether the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution protects telephone conversations conducted in a
phone booth and secretly recorded from introduction as evidence against a person?
Held. Justice Potter Stewart filed the majority opinion. The petitioner strenuously asserted that the phone booth
was a constitutionally protected area. However, the Fourth Amendment protects persons and not places from
unreasonable intrusion. Even in a public place, a person may have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his
person. Although the petitioner did not seek to hide his self from public view when he entered the telephone
booth, he did seek to keep out the uninvited ear. He did not relinquish his right to do so simply because he
went to a place where he could be seen. A person who enters into a telephone booth may expect the
protection of the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution as he assumes that the words he utters into the
telephone will not be broadcast to the world. Once this is acknowledged, it is clear that the Fourth Amendment
of the Constitution protects persons and not areas from unreasonable searches and seizures. The
Government’s activities in electronically listening to and recording the petitioner’s telephone conversations
constituted a search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment and absent a search warrant predicated upon
sufficient probable cause, all evidence obtained is inadmissible.
Dissent. Justice Hugo Black (“J. Black”) filed a dissenting opinion. J. Black observed that eavesdropping was
an ancient practice that the Framers were certainly aware of when they drafted the United States Constitution
(“Constitution”). Had they wished to prohibit this activity under the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution they
would have added such language that would have effectively done so. By clever wording, the Supreme Court
finds it plausible to argue that language aimed specifically at searches and seizures of things that can be
searched and seized may, to protect privacy, be applied to eavesdropped evidence of conversations.
Concurrence. Justice John Harlan (“J. Harlan”) filed a dissenting opinion. The Fourth Amendment of the
Constitution protects persons, not places. There is a twofold requirement for what protection is afforded to
those people. First, that a person has exhibited an actual expectation of privacy and, second, that the
expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. The critical fact in this case is that a
person who enters a telephone booth shuts the door behind him, pays the toll, and is surely entitled to assume
that his conversation is not being intercepted. On the other hand, conversations out in the open public would
not be protected against being overheard as the expectation of privacy would not be reasonable.
Discussion. The Fourth Amendment of the Constitution provides constitutional protection to individuals and not
to particular places. The two-part test for this protection is introduced by J. Harlan. First, the person must have
exhibited an actual expectation of privacy and, second, that expectation must be reasonable.
People vs. Albofera G.R. No. L-69377, July 20, 1987 152 SCRA 123 (1987)
Facts: Sometime in 1980, Rodrigo Esma was tending his onion farm when the accused called him and
informed him they would ran after somebody. There Lawi-an told Albofera that the forester was around making
a list of people engaged in “caingin” Whereupon, Albofera asked Esma to join him in going after the forester.
The two were able to overtake the forester. Albofera at once put his arm on the shoulder of Carancio and
asked him to go with them to the upper portion because they will do something there. Thereafter, the persons
gathered decided to kill Carancio. Esma did not join the group but remained in the house of Lawi-an.
The following day, at about 9:00 o’clock in the morning, Sisneros was at his farm when accused Lawi-an and
Jun Menez passed by and called him. When Sisneros got near the two, accused Lawi-an told him that the
forester was already killed and warned him not to reveal this matter to anybody otherwise he would be killed. In
June 1981, Sisneros reported the killing of that forester to his brother. The police authorities arrested accused
Albofera on July 2, 1981. Accused Romeo Lawi-an was subsequently arrested on July 4, 1981. In the course
of the trial, the prosecution presented a letter written in the Visayan dialect by accused Alexander Albofera,
while under detention, to witness Rodrigo Esma several days before the latter testified on October 20, 1982.
Rodrigo Esma’s Affidavit referred to in the letter taken on July 21, 1981, mentioned accused “Albofera and
“alias Jun” “as having killid the victim. After trial, the lower Court found the circumstantial evidence sufficient to
warrant conviction beyond reasonable doubt of both accused for the crime charged, and sentenced them to
death in its Decision of October 5, 1984.
Issue: Whether the letter of the Accused to prosecution witness is inadmissible in evidence against him which
violates his rights of privacy of communication and correspondence.

72
Held: No, the submission is untenable. The foregoing provision implements another Constitutional provision on
the security of a citizen against unreasonable search and seizure. The production of that letter by the
prosecution was not the result of an unlawful search and seizure nor was it through unwarranted intrusion or
invasion into Albofera’s privacy. Albofera admitted having sent the letter and it was its recipient, Rodrigo Esma
himself, who produced and Identified the same in the course of his testimony in Court. Besides, there is
nothing really self-incriminatory in the letter. Albofera mainly pleaded that Esma change his declaration in his
Affidavit and testify in his (Albofera’s) favor. Furthermore, nothing Albofera stated in his letter is being taken
against him in arriving at a determination of his culpability.
Zulueta vs Court of Appeals

Facts:  Cecilia Zulueta is the Petitioner who offset the private papers of his husband Dr. Alfredo Martin. Dr.
Martin is a doctor of medicine while he is not in his house His wife took the 157 documents consisting of
diaries, cancelled check, greeting cards, passport and photograph, private respondents between her Wife and
his alleged paramours, by means of forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet. Cecilia Zulueta filed the papers
for the evidence of her case of legal separation and for disqualification from the practice of medicine against
her husband.
Dr. Martin brought the action for recovery of the documents and papers and for damages against Zulueta, with
the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch X. the trial court rendered judgment for Martin, declaring him the
capital/exclusive owner of the properties described in paragraph 3 of Martin’s Complaint or those further
described in the Motion to Return and Suppress and ordering Zulueta and any person acting in her behalf to a
immediately return the properties to Dr. Martin and to pay him P5,000.00, as nominal damages; P5,000.00, as
moral damages and attorney’s fees; and to pay the costs of the suit. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed
the decision of the Regional Trial Court. Zulueta filed the petition for review with the Supreme Court.
Issue: The papers and other materials obtained from forcible entrusion and from unlawful means are
admissible as evidence in court regarding marital separation and disqualification from medical practice. 
Ruling/Held: The documents and papers are inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional injunction declaring
“the privacy of communication and correspondence to be inviolable is no less applicable simply because it is
the wife who thinks herself aggrieved by her husband’s infidelity, who is the party against whom the
constitutional provision is to be enforced. 
The only exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a lawful order from a court or when public
safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law. Any violation of this provision renders the evidence
obtained inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. The intimacies between husband and wife do not
justify any one of them in breaking the drawers and cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any telltale
evidence of marital infidelity. A person, by contracting marriage, does not shed his/her integrity or his right to
privacy as an individual and the constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her. The law insures
absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it privileged. Neither husband nor wife
may testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected spouse while the marriage subsists.
Neither may be examined without the consent of the other as to any communication received in confidence by
one from the other during the marriage, save for specified exceptions. But one thing is freedom of
communication; quite another is a compulsion for each one to share what one knows with the other. And this
has nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that each owes to the other.
Deano vs. Godinez [GR L-19518, 28 November 1964]
En Banc, Bautista Angelo (J): 10 concur
Facts: On or about 20 March 1956, Diogenez Godinez, as a responsible public school official, wrote a letter to
the Division Superintendent of Schools, his immediate superior officer, in essence that "Dr. Trinidad A. Deaño,
as the school dentist of Lanao, required the teachers in the field to sign blank forms indicating therein a
contribution of P20.00 which she intended to be only for the dental-medical drive, when she knew well that the
drive included the Boy Scout Rally of the district; that in view of the above, Dr. Deaño is a carping critic, a fault
finder and suspects every teacher or school official to be potential grafters and swindlers of the medical-dental
funds; and thus the lady dentist will not be welcomed in Lumbatan district next school year as she did more
harm than good to the teeth of the patients she treated. Deaño, assisted by her husband Manuel Deaño, filed
an action for damages against Godinez before the Court of First Instance of Lanao del Norte based on a
communication sent by the latter as district supervisor to his immediate superior, the Division Superintendent
of Schools. Trinidad claims that, with malice aforethought and in disregard of proper decorum and accepted
administrative practices, Godinez wrote the aforesaid communication making therein statements which are
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy, and to existing rules and regulations, thereby causing
irreparable damage to her personal dignity and professional standing, for which reason she asks that she be
paid P30,000.00 as moral damages, P10,000.00 as exemplary damages, and P1,000.00 as attorney's fees for
bringing the present action. Godibnez moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the letter complained
of is a privileged communication and the action has already prescribed. The motion was upheld, and the trial
court dismissed the complaint. Deano appealed.
73
Issue: Whether the letter in which the alleged defamatory statements appear partake of the nature of a
privileged communication.
Held: The doctrine of privileged communication rests upon public policy, which looks to the free and unfettered
administration of justice, though, as an incidental result, it may in some instances afford an immunity to the
evil-disposed and malignant slanderer. Public policy is the foundation of the doctrine of privilege
communications. It is based upon the recognition of the fact that the right of the individual to enjoy immunity
from the publication or untruthful charges derogatory to his character is not absolute and must at times yield to
the superior necessity of subjecting to investigation the conduct of persons charged with wrongdoing. In order
to accomplish this purpose and to permit private persons having, or in good faith believing themselves to have,
knowledge to such wrong doing, to perform the legal, moral, social duty resulting from such knowledge or
belief, without restraining them by the fear that an error, no matter how innocently or honestly made, may
subject them to punishment for defamation, the doctrine of qualified privilege has been evolved. Herein, the
communication denounced as defamatory is one sent by Godinez to his immediate superior in the performance
of a legal duty, or in the nature of a report submitted in the exercise of an official function. He sent it as an
explanation of a matter contained in an indorsement sent to him by his superior officer. It is a report submitted
in obedience to a lawful duty, though in doing so Godinez employed a language somewhat harsh and uncalled
for. But such is excusable in the interest of public policy. The letter sent by Godinez being a privileged
communication, it is presumed that it was sent without malice. It being a communication sent in the discharge
of a legal duty, the writer is not liable for damages.
Silverthorne Lumber Co. vs. United States [251 US 385, 25 January 1920]
Facts: An indictment upon a single specific charge having been brought against Frederick Silverthorne and his
father (of Silverthorne Lumber Co.), they both were arrested at their homes early in the morning of February
25, and were detained in custody a number of hours. While they were thus detained representatives of the
Department of Justice and the United States marshal without a shadow of authority went to the office of their
company and made a clean sweep of all the books, papers and documents found there. All the employes were
taken or directed to go to the office of the District Attorney of the United States to which also the books, &c.,
were taken at once. An application was made as soon as might be to the District Court for a return of what thus
had been taken unlawfully. It was opposed by the District Attorney so far as he had found evidence against
Silverthorne, and it was stated that the evidence so obtained was before the grand jury. Color had been given
by the District Attorney to the approach of those concerned in the act by an invalid subpoena for certain
documents relating to the charge in the indictment then on file. Thus the case is not that of knowledge acquired
through the wrongful act of a stranger, but it must be assumed that the Government planned or at all events
ratified the whole performance. Photographs and copies of material papers were made and a new indictment
was framed based upon the knowledge thus obtained. The District Court ordered a return of the originals but
impounded the photographs and copies. Subpoenas to produce the originals then were served and on the
refusal of the Silverthornes to produce them the Court made an order that the subpoenas should be complied
with, although it had found that all the papers had been seized in violation of the parties' constitutional rights.
The refusal to obey this order is the contempt alleged. The Government now, while in form repudiating and
condemning the illegal seizure, seeks to maintain its right to avail itself of the knowledge obtained by that
means which otherwise it would not have had.
Issue: Whether the exclusion of papers acquired in illegal search and seizure applies also their copies.
Held: It is that although of course its seizure was an outrage which the Government now regrets, it may study
the papers before it returns them, copy them, and then may use the knowledge that it has gained to call upon
the owners in a more regular form to produce them; that the protection of the Constitution covers the physical
possession but not any advantages that the Government can gain over the object of its pursuit by doing the
forbidden act, to be sure, had established that laying the papers directly before the grand jury was
unwarranted, but it is taken to mean only that two steps are required instead of one. In our opinion such is not
the law. It reduces the Fourth Amendment to a form of words. The essence of a provision forbidding the
acquisition of evidence in a certain way is that not merely evidence so acquired shall not be used before the
Court but that it shall not be used at all. Of course this does not mean that the facts thus obtained become
sacred and inaccessible. If knowledge of them is gained from an independent source they may be proved like
any others, but the knowledge gained by the Government's own wrong cannot be used by it in the way
proposed. The numberous decisions, like Adams v. New York (192 U.S. 585) holding that a collateral inquiry
into the mode in which evidence has been got will not be allowed when the question is raised for the first time
at the trial, are no authority in the present proceeding, as is explained in Weeks v. United States (232 U.S.
383). Whether some of those decisions have gone too far or have given wrong reasons it is unnecessary to
inquire; the principle applicable to the present case seems to us plain. It is stated satisfactorily in Flagg v.
United States (233 Fed. 481, 483, 147 C. C. A. 367). In Linn v. United States (251 Fed. 476, 480, 163 C. C. A.
470), it was thought that a different rule applied to a corporation, on the ground that it was not privileged from
producing its books and papers. But the rights of a corporation against unlawful search and seizure are to be
protected even if the same result might have been achieved in a lawful way.
People vs. Aruta [GR 120915, 13 April 1998]
74
Facts: On 13 December 1988, P/Lt. Abello was tipped off by his informant, known only as Benjie, that a certain
"Aling Rosa" would be arriving from Baguio City the following day, with a large volume of marijuana. Acting on
said tip, P/Lt. Abello assembled a team composed of P/Lt. Jose Domingo, Sgt. Angel Sudiacal, Sgt. Oscar
Imperial, Sgt. Danilo Santiago and Sgt. Efren Quirubin. Said team proceeded to West Bajac-Bajac, Olongapo
City at around 4:00 p.m. of 14 December 1988 and deployed themselves near the Philippine National Bank
(PNB) building along Rizal Avenue and the Caltex gasoline station. Dividing themselves into two groups, one
group, made up of P/Lt. Abello, P/Lt. Domingo and the informant posted themselves near the PNB building
while the other group waited near the Caltex gasoline station. While thus positioned, a Victory Liner Bus with
body number 474 and the letters BGO printed on its front and back bumpers stopped in front of the PNB
building at around 6:30 p.m. of the same day from where two females and a male got off. It was at this stage
that the informant pointed out to the team "Aling Rosa" who was then carrying a travelling bag. Having
ascertained that Rosa Aruta y Menguin was "Aling Rosa," the team approached her and introduced
themselves as NARCOM agents. When P/Lt. Abello asked "Aling Rosa" about the contents of her bag, the
latter handed it to the former. Upon inspection, the bag was found to contain dried marijuana leaves packed in
a plastic bag marked "Cash Katutak." The team confiscated the bag together with the Victory Liner bus ticket to
which Lt. Domingo affixed his signature. Aruta was then brought to the NARCOM office for investigation where
a Receipt of Property Seized was prepared for the confiscated marijuana leaves. Upon examination of the
seized marijuana specimen at the PC/INP Crime Laboratory, Camp Olivas, Pampanga, P/Maj. Marlene
Salangad, a Forensic Chemist, prepared a Technical Report stating that said specimen yielded positive results
for marijuana, a prohibited drug. Aruta was charged with violating Section 4, Article II of Republic Act 6425 or
the Dangerous Drugs Act. Upon arraignment, she pleaded "not guilty." Aruta claimed that immediately prior to
her arrest, she had just come from Choice Theater where she watched the movie "Balweg." While about to
cross the road, an old woman asked her help in carrying a shoulder bag. In the middle of the road, Lt. Abello
and Lt. Domingo arrested her and asked her to go with them to the NARCOM Office. After trial on the merits,
the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City convicted and sentenced her to suffer the penalty of life
imprisonment and to pay a fine of P20,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. Aruta
appealed.
Issue: Whether the plea of “not guilty” during Aruta’s arraigment effectly waived the non-admissibility of the
evidence acquired in the invalid warrantless search and seizure.
Held: Articles which are the product of unreasonable searches and seizures are inadmissible as evidence
pursuant to the doctrine pronounced in Stonehill v. Diokno. This exclusionary rule was later enshrined in Article
III, Section 3(2) of the Constitution. From the foregoing, it can be said that the State cannot simply intrude
indiscriminately into the houses, papers, effects, and most importantly, on the person of an individual. The
constitutional provision guaranteed an impenetrable shield against unreasonable searches and seizures. As
such, it protects the privacy and sanctity of the person himself against unlawful arrests and other forms of
restraint. Therewithal, the right of a person to be secured against any unreasonable seizure of his body and
any deprivation of his liberty is a most basic and fundamental one. A statute, rule or situation which allows
exceptions to the requirement of a warrant of arrest or search warrant must perforce be strictly construed and
their application limited only to cases specifically provided or allowed by law. To do otherwise is an
infringement upon personal liberty and would set back a right so basic and deserving of full protection and
vindication yet often violated. While it may be argued that by entering a plea during arraignment and by actively
participating in the trial, Aruta may be deemed to have waived objections to the illegality of the warrantless
search and to the inadmissibility of the evidence obtained thereby, the same may not apply herein for the
following reasons: (1) The waiver would only apply to objections pertaining to the illegality of the arrest as her
plea of "not guilty" and participation in the trial are indications of her voluntary submission to the court's
jurisdiction. 32 The plea and active participation in the trial would not cure the illegality of the search and
transform the inadmissible evidence into objects of proof. The waiver simply does not extend this far. (2)
Granting that evidence obtained through a warrantless search becomes admissible upon failure to object
thereto during the trial of the case, records show that accused-appellant filed a Demurrer to Evidence and
objected and opposed the prosecution's Formal Offer of Evidence. As held in People vs. Barros, waiver of the
non-admissibility of the " fruits" of an invalid warrantless arrest and of a warrantless search and seizure is not
casually to be presumed, if the constitutional right against unlawful searches and seizures is to retain its vitality
for the protection of our people. In fine, there was really no excuse for the NARCOM agents not to procure a
search warrant considering that they had more than 24 hours to do so. Obviously, this is again an instance of
seizure of the "fruit of the poisonous tree," hence illegal and inadmissible subsequently in evidence. The
exclusion of such evidence is the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against
unreasonable searches and seizure. The non-exclusionary rule is contrary to the letter and spirit of the
prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures.
People vs. Rondero [GR 125687, 9 December 1999]
Facts: On the evening of 25 March 1994, Mardy Doria came home late from a barrio fiesta. When he noticed
that his 9-year old sister, Mylene, was not around, he woke up his parents to inquire about his sister's
whereabouts. Realizing that Mylene was missing, their father, Maximo Doria, sought the help of a neighbor,
Barangay Kagawad Andong Rondero to search for Mylene. Maximo and Andong went to the house of a
75
Barangay Captain to ask for assistance and also requested their other neighbors in Pugaro, Dagupan to look
for Mylene. The group began searching for Mylene at around 1:00 a.m. of 26 March 1994. They scoured the
campus of Pugaro Elementary School and the seashore in vain. They even returned to the school and
inspected every classroom but to no avail. Tired and distraught, Maximo started on his way home. When he
was about 5 meters away from his house, Maximo, who was then carrying a flashlight, saw Delfin Rondero
pumping the artesian well about 1 meter away. Rondero had an ice pick clenched in his mouth and was
washing his bloodied hands. Maximo hastily returned to the school and told Kagawad Andong what he saw
without, however, revealing that the person he saw was the latter's own son. Maximo and Andong continued
their search for Mylene but after failing to find her, the two men decided to go home. After some time, a
restless Maximo began to search anew for her daughter. He again sought the help of Andong and the
barangay secretary. The group returned to Pugaro Elementary School where they found Mylene's lifeless body
lying on a cemented pavement near the canteen. Her right hand was raised above her head, which was
severely bashed, and her fractured left hand was behind her back. She was naked from the waist down and
had several contusions and abrasions on different parts of her body. Tightly gripped in her right hand were
some hair strands. A blue rubber slipper with a tiny leaf painted in red was found beside her body while the
other slipper was found behind her back. Half an hour later, 5 policemen arrived at the scene and conducted a
spot investigation. They found a pair of shorts under Mylene's buttocks, which Maximo identified as hers.
Thereafter, Maximo led the policemen to the artesian well where he had seen Rondero earlier washing his
hands. The policemen found that the artesian well was spattered with blood. After the investigation, the
policemen, together with Maximo, went back to their headquarters in Dagupan City. There, Maximo disclosed
that before they found Mylene's body, he saw Rondero washing his bloodstained hands at the artesian well.
Acting on this lead, the policemen returned to Pugaro and arrested Rondero. Some policemen took the newly
washed undershirt and short pants of Rondero from the clothesline. The policemen brought Rondero's wife,
Christine, with them to the police headquarters for questioning. When asked about the blood on her husband's
clothes, Christine told them about their quarrel the night before. On 28 March 1994, the hair strands which
were found on the victim's right hand and at the scene of the crime, together with hair specimens taken from
the victim and Rondero, were sent to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) for laboratory examination.
Meanwhile, on 30 March 1994, Rondero was formally charged with the special complex crime of rape with
homicide. Rondero pleaded not guilty at his arraignment. As to the hair specimen sent to the NBI, comparative
micro-physical examination on the specimens showed that the hair strands found on the right hand of the
victim had similar characteristics to those of accused-appellant's, while the hair specimen taken from the crime
scene showed similar characteristics to those of the victim's. On 13 October 1995, the trial court rendered
judgment convicting Rondero of the crime of murder and sentencing him to death. Rondero moved for
reconsideration. On 10 November 1995, the trial court issued an order modifying its earlier decision, convicting
Rondero of the crime of homicide and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua instead, on
the ground that under Section 10 of Republic Act 7610, otherwise known as the "Special Protection of Children
Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act," the penalty for homicide is reclusion perpetua when
the victim is under 12 years of age. Rondero appealed.
Issue: Whether the hair strands, undershirt and shorts taken from Rondero are admissible as evidence.
Held: Under Section 12 and 17 of Article III of the Constitution, what is actually proscribed is the use of
physical or moral compulsion to extort communication from the accused-appellant and not the inclusion of his
body in evidence when it may be material. For instance, substance emitted from the body of the accused may
be received as evidence in prosecution for acts of lasciviousness and morphine forced out of the mouth of the
accused may also be used as evidence against him. Consequently, although Rondero insists that hair samples
were forcibly taken from him and submitted to the NBI for forensic examination, the hair samples may be
admitted in evidence against him, for what is proscribed is the use of testimonial compulsion or any evidence
communicative in nature acquired from the accused under duress. On the other hand, the bloodstained
undershirt and short pants taken from Rondero are inadmissible in evidence. They were taken without the
proper search warrant from the police officers. Rondero's wife testified that the police officers, after arresting
her husband in their house, took the garments from the clothesline without proper authority. This was never
rebutted by the prosecution. Under the libertarian exclusionary rule known as the "fruit of the poisonous tree,"
evidence illegally obtained by the state should not be used to gain other evidence because the illegally
obtained evidence taints all evidence subsequently obtained. Simply put, Rondero's garments, having been
seized in violation of his constitutional right against illegal searches and seizure, are inadmissible in court as
evidence. Nevertheless, even without the admission of the bloodied garments of Rondero as corroborative
evidence, the circumstances obtaining against Rondero are sufficient to establish his guilt.
Aberca vs. Ver [GR L-69866, 15 April 1988]
Facts: The case stems from alleged illegal searches and seizures and other violations of the rights and liberties
of Rogelio Aberca, Rodolfo Benosa, Nestor Bodino, Noel Etabag, Danilo De La Fuente, Belen DiazFlores,
Manuel Mario Guzman, Alan Jazminez, Edwin Lopez, Alfredo Mansos, Alex Marcelino, Elizabeth Protacio-
Marcelino, Joseph Olayer, Carlos Palma, Marco Palo, Rolando Salutin, Benjamin Sesgundo, Arturo Tabara,
Edwin Tulalian and Rebecca Tulalian by various intelligence suits of the Armed Forces of the Philippines,
known as Task Force Makabansa (TFM), ordered by General Fabian Ver "to conduct pre-emptive strikes
76
against known communist-terrorist (CT) underground houses in view of increasing reports about CT plans to
sow disturbances in Metro Manila." Aberca, et. al. alleged that complying with said order, elements of the TFM
raided several places, employing in most cases defectively issued judicial search warrants; that during these
raids, certain members of the raiding party confiscated a number of purely personal items belonging to Aberca,
et. al.; that Aberca, et. al. were arrested without proper warrants issued by the courts; that for some period
after their arrest, they were denied visits of relatives and lawyers; that Aberca, et. al. were interrogated in
violation of their rights to silence and counsel; that military men who interrogated them employed threats,
tortures and other forms of violence on them in order to obtain incriminatory information or confessions and in
order to punish them; that all violations of Aberca, et. al.'s constitutional rights were part of a concerted and
deliberate plan to forcibly extract information and incriminatory statements from Aberca, et. al. and to terrorize,
harass and punish them, said plans being previously known to and sanctioned by Maj. Gen. Fabian Ver, Col.
Fidel Singson, Col. Rolando Abadilla, Col. Gerardo B. Lantoria, Col. Galileo Kintanar, Lt. Col. Panfilo M.
Lacson, Maj. Rodolfo Aguinaldo, Capt. Danilo Pizarro, 1lt. Pedro Tango, 1lt. Romeo Ricardo, 1lt. Raul Bacalso,
Msgt. Bienvenido Balaba. Aberca, et. al. sought actual/compensatory damages amounting to P39,030.00;
moral damages in the amount of at least P150,000.00 each or a total of P3,000,000.00; exemplary damages in
the amount of at least P150,000.00 each or a total of P3,000,000.00; and attorney's fees amounting to not less
than P200,000.00. Ver, et. al. moved to dismiss. On 8 November 1983, the Regional Trial Court, National
Capital Region, Branch 95, through Judge Willelmo C. Fortun presiding, issued a resolution granting the
motion to dismiss. A motion to set aside the order dismissing the complaint and a supplemental motion for
reconsideration was filed by Aberca, et. al. on 18 November 1983, and 24 November 1983, respectively. On 15
December 1983, Judge Fortun issued an order voluntarily inhibiting himself from further proceeding in the case
and leaving the resolution of the motion to set aside the order of dismissal to Judge Lising, "to preclude any
suspicion that he (Judge Fortun) cannot resolve [the] aforesaid pending motion with the cold neutrality of an
impartial judge and to put an end to plaintiffs assertion that the undersigned has no authority or jurisdiction to
resolve said pending motion." This order prompted Aberca, et. al. to file an amplificatory motion for
reconsideration signed in the name of the Free Legal Assistance Group [FLAG] of Mabini Legal Aid
Committee, by Attys. Joker P. Arroyo, Felicitas Aquino and Arno Sanidad on 12 April 1984. In an order dated
11 May 1984, the trial court, Judge Esteban Lising presiding, without acting on the motion to set aside order of
8 November 1983, issued an order declaring the order of 8 November 1983 final against Aberca, et al. for
failure to move for reconsideration nor to interpose an appeal therefrom. Assailing the said order of 11 May
1984, Anerca, et. al. filed a motion for reconsideration on 28 May 1984. In its resolution of 21 September 1984,
the court dealt with both motions (1) to reconsider its order of 11 May 1984 declaring that with respect to
certain plaintiffs, the resolution of 8 November 1983 had already become final, and (2) to set aside its
resolution of 8 November 1983 granting Ver, et. al.'s motion to dismiss. On 15 March 1985, Aberca, et. al. filed
the petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether Ver, et. al., may be held civilly liable for undertaking invalid search and seizures, or violation of
Constitutional rights or liberties of another in general.
Held: It may be that Ver, et. al., as members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, were merely responding
to their duty, as they claim, "to prevent or suppress lawless violence, insurrection, rebellion and subversion" in
accordance with Proclamation 2054 of President Marcos, despite the lifting of martial law on 27 January 1981,
and in pursuance of such objective, to launch pre-emptive strikes against alleged communist terrorist
underground houses. But this cannot be construed as a blanket license or a roving commission untramelled by
any constitutional restraint, to disregard or transgress upon the rights and liberties of the individual citizen
enshrined in and protected by the Constitution. The Constitution remains the supreme law of the land to which
all officials, high or low, civilian or military, owe obedience and allegiance at all times. Article 32 of the Civil
Code which renders any public officer or employee or any private individual liable in damages for violating the
Constitutional rights and liberties of another, as enumerated therein, does not exempt Ver, et. al. from
responsibility. Only judges are excluded from liability under the said article, provided their acts or omissions do
not constitute a violation of the Penal Code or other penal statute. This is not to say that military authorities are
restrained from pursuing their assigned task or carrying out their mission with vigor. However, in carrying out
this task and mission, constitutional and legal safeguards must be observed, otherwise, the very fabric of our
faith will start to unravel. Article 32 clearly speaks of an officer or employee or person "directly" or "indirectly"
responsible for the violation of the constitutional rights and liberties of another. Thus, it is not the actor alone
(i.e. the one directly responsible) who must answer for damages under Article 32; the person indirectly
responsible has also to answer for the damages or injury caused to the aggrieved party. By this provision, the
principle of accountability of public officials under the Constitution acquires added meaning and assumes a
larger dimension. No longer may a superior official relax his vigilance or abdicate his duty to supervise his
subordinates, secure in the thought that he does not have to answer for the transgressions committed by the
latter against the constitutionally protected rights and liberties of the citizen. Part of the factors that propelled
people power in February 1986 was the widely held perception that the government was callous or indifferent
to, if not actually responsible for, the rampant violations of human rights. While it would certainly be too naive
to expect that violators of human rights would easily be deterred by the prospect of facing damage suits, it
should nonetheless be made clear in no uncertain terms that Article 32 of the Civil Code makes the persons
who are directly, as well as indirectly, responsible for the transgression joint tortfeasors. Further, the

77
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus does not destroy Aberca, et. al.'s right and cause of
action for damages for illegal arrest and detention and other violations of their constitutional rights. The
suspension does not render valid an otherwise illegal arrest or detention. What is suspended is merely the right
of the individual to seek release from detention through the writ of habeas corpus as a speedy means of
obtaining his liberty. Furthermore, their right and cause of action for damages are explicitly recognized in P.D.
No. 1755 which amended Article 1146 of the Civil Code by adding the following to its text: "However, when the
action (for injury to the rights of the plaintiff or for a quasi-delict) arises from or out of any act, activity or
conduct of any public officer involving the exercise of powers or authority arising from Martial Law including the
arrest, detention and/or trial of the plaintiff, the same must be brought within one (1) year." Thus, even
assuming that the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus suspends Aberca, et. al.'s right of
action for damages for illegal arrest and detention, it does not and cannot suspend their rights and causes of
action for injuries suffered because of Ver, et. al.'s confiscation of their private belongings, the violation of their
right to remain silent and to counsel and their right to protection against unreasonable searches and seizures
and against torture and other cruel and inhuman treatment.

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF CAPT. GARY ALEJANO, PN (MARINES)
CAPT. NICANOR FAELDON, ET AL., Petitioners, -versus- GEN. PEDRO CABUAY, GEN. NARCISO
ABAYA, SEC. ANGELO REYES, and SEC. ROILO GOLEZ, Respondents. G.R. No. 160792, EN BANC
In our jurisdiction, the last paragraph of Section 4(b) of RA 7438 provides the standard to make regulations in
detention centers allowable: "such reasonable measures as may be necessary to secure the detainee’s safety
and prevent his escape." In the present case, the visiting hours accorded to the lawyers of the detainees are
reasonably connected to the legitimate purpose of securing the safety and preventing the escape of all
detainees.
FACTS: Early morning of 27 July 2003, some 321 armed soldiers, led by the now detained junior officers,
entered and took control of the Oakwood Premier Luxury Apartments located in the business district of Makati
City. The junior officers publicly renounced their support for the administration and called for the resignation of
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and several cabinet members. Around 7:00 p.m. of the same date, the
soldiers voluntarily surrendered to the authorities after several negotiations with government emissaries. On 31
July 2003, Gen. Abaya, as the Chief of Staff of the AFP, issued a directive to all the Major Service
Commanders to turn over custody of ten junior officers to the ISAFP Detention Center. The transfer took place
while military and civilian authorities were investigating the soldiers’ involvement in the Oakwood incident. On 1
August 2003, government prosecutors filed an Information for coup d’etat with the RTC of Makati City, Branch
61, against the soldiers involved in the 27 July 2003 Oakwood incident. The trial court later issued the
Commitment Orders giving custody of junior officers Lt. SG Antonio Trillanes IV and Capt. Gerardo Gambala to
the Commanding Officers of ISAFP. On 2 August 2003, Gen. Abaya issued a directive to all Major Service
Commanders to take into custody the military personnel under their command who took part in the Oakwood
incident except the detained junior officers who were to remain under the custody of ISAFP. On 11 August
2003, petitioners filed a petition for habeas corpus with the Supreme Court. On 12 August 2003, the Court
issued a Writ of Habeas Corpus directing respondents to make a return of the writ and to appear and produce
the persons of the detainees before the Court of Appeals on the scheduled date for hearing and further
proceedings. On the same date, the detainees and their other co-accused filed with the RTC a Motion for
Preliminary Investigation, which the trial court granted.
On August 18, 2003, respondents submitted their Return of the Writ and Answer to the petition and produced
the detainees before the CA during the scheduled hearing. On 17 September 2003, the CA rendered its
decision dismissing the petition. The appellate court ordered Gen. Cabuay to adhere to his commitment made
in court regarding visiting hours and the detainees’ right to exercise for two hours a day.
ISSUE: Whether there was an actual prohibition of the detainees’ right to effective representation when
petitioners’ visits were limited by the schedule of visiting hours. (NO)
RULING: The schedule of visiting hours does not render void the detainees’ indictment for criminal and military
offenses to warrant the detainees’ release from detention. The ISAFP officials did not deny, but merely
regulated, the detainees’ right to counsel. The purpose of the regulation is not to render ineffective the right to
counsel, but to secure the safety and security of all detainees. In our jurisdiction, the last paragraph of Section
4(b) of RA 7438 provides the standard to make regulations in detention centers allowable: "such reasonable
measures as may be necessary to secure the detainee’s safety and prevent his escape." In the present case,
the visiting hours accorded to the lawyers of the detainees are reasonably connected to the legitimate purpose
of securing the safety and preventing the escape of all detainees. While petitioners may not visit the detainees
any time they want, the fact that the detainees still have face-to-face meetings with their lawyers on a daily
basis clearly shows that there is no impairment of detainees’ right to counsel. Petitioners as counsels could
visit their clients between 8:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m. with a lunch break at 12:00 p.m. The visiting hours are
regular business hours, the same hours when lawyers normally entertain clients in their law offices. Clearly, the
visiting hours pass the standard of reasonableness. Moreover, in urgent cases, petitioners could always seek

78
permission from the ISAFP officials to confer with their clients beyond the visiting hours. The scheduled visiting
hours provide reasonable access to the detainees, giving petitioners sufficient time to confer with the
detainees. The detainees’ right to counsel is not undermined by the scheduled visits. Even in the hearings
before the Senate and the Feliciano Commission, petitioners were given time to confer with the detainees, a
fact that petitioners themselves admit. Thus, at no point were the detainees denied their right to counsel.
Kilusang Mayo Uno v. Director-General, National Economic Development
Facts: President Arroyo issued Executive Order 450 which requires all government agencies and controlled
corporations to have a uniform identification card; the director-general of the national economic development
authority was tasked to implement this order. The information required to be in the said identification card
would be: name, home address, sex, picture, signature, date of birth, place of birth, marital status, names of
parents, height, weight, two index fingers and two thumb marks, any prominent distinguishing features like
moles and others, tax identification number (TIN). The petitioners argued that the said executive order usurped
legislative functions and violates the right of privacy. Petitioners alleged that EO 450 is contrary to law because
it violated the principle handed down by the Court in Ople v Torres and RA 8282 or the Social Security Act
of1997. The order according to the petitioners was also going to use funds that are not appropriated by the
Congress, it was also issued without a public hearing. The order was also violating the constitutional provision
of equal protection of the laws because it discriminates and penalizes those who do not have an id. The
petitioners also argue that the order violates the right to privacy by allowing for the access of the personal data
of the owner without his or her consent.
Issue: Whether or not EO 450 usurped legislative functions and violated the citizen’s right to privacy.
Held: The Supreme Court ruled that the petition had no merit. The said order only applies to government
agencies who are already issuing identification cards even before the said order was implemented. The
purposes of the order were to: reduce costs, achieve efficiency and reliability, convenience to the people
served by the government entities and insure compatibility. Section 17 Article VII of the Constitution also
provides for the President to have control to all executive departments, bureaus and offices. This constitutional
power of the President is self-executing and does not need implementing legislation. This power of course is
limited to executive branch of the government and does not extend to other branches or independent
constitutional commissions. EO 450 does not violate the right to privacy since no citizen particularly
government employee have complained upon the showing of information on their identification cards, even the
petitioners have not made any complaint about their own identification cards. EO 450 also issues identification
cards that only have 14 data about the owner much less than what is issued upon Supreme Court employees.
In re Camilo Sabio GR No. 174340
FACTS:
Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago introduced Philippine Senate Resolution No. 455 (Senate Res. No. 455),
"directing an inquiry in aid of legislation on the anomalous losses incurred by the Philippines Overseas
Telecommunications Corporation (POTC), Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation (PHILCOMSAT),
and PHILCOMSAT Holdings Corporation (PHC) due to the alleged improprieties in their operations by their
respective Board of Directors. "
Chief of Staff Rio C. Inocencio, under the authority of Senator Richard J. Gordon, wrote Chairman Camilo L.
Sabio of the PCGG, one of the herein petitioners, inviting him to be one of the resource persons in the public
meeting jointly conducted by the Committee on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises and
Committee on Public Services. The purpose of the public meeting was to deliberate on Senate Res. No. 455.
However, Chairman Sabio refused to appear, invoking Section 4(b) of EO No., provided as follows:
No member or staff of the Commission shall be required to testify or produce evidence in any judiciallegislative
or administrative proceeding concerning matters within its official cognizance.
ISSUES: (2 TOPICS)
A. The power of legislative inquiry: Who exercises power – the Houses themselves or their respective
committees.
Issue:
Whether or not the Houses themselves or their respective committees exercises the power of inquiry.
Ruling:
The power of inquiry is "an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. Although there is no
provision in the Constitution expressly investing either House of Congress with power to make investigations
and exact testimony to the end that it may exercise its legislative functions advisedly and effectively, such
power is so far incidental to the legislative function as to be implied.

79
In other words, the power of inquiry – with process to enforce it – is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to
the legislative function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information
respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change; and where the legislation body
does not itself possess the requisite information – which is not infrequently true – recourse must be had to
others who possess it. "
Notably, the 1987 Constitution recognizes the power of investigation, not just of Congress, but also of "any of
its committee." This is significant because it constitutes a direct conferral of investigatory power upon the
committees and it means that the mechanisms which the Houses can take in order to effectively perform its
investigative function are also available to the committees.
B. Power of legislative inquiry under Section 21 repeals inconsistent provisions of law.
Issue:
Whether of not Section 4(b) of EO No. 1 is repealed by the 1987 Constitution.
Ruling:
Yes. Section 4(b) of EO No. 1 is repealed by the 1987 Constitution.
Section 4(b) limits or obstructs the power of Congress to secure from PCGG members and staff information
and other data in aid of its power to legislate. A statute may be declared unconstitutional because it is not
within the legislative power to enact; or it creates or establishes methods or forms that infringe constitutional
principles; or its purpose or effect violates the Constitution or its basic principles.
Significantly, Article XVIII, Section 3 of the Constitution provides:
All existing laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations, letters of instructions, and other executive
issuances not inconsistent with this Constitution shall remain operative until amended, repealed, or revoked.
The clear import of this provision is that all existing laws, executive orders, proclamations, letters of instructions
and other executive issuances inconsistent or repugnant to the Constitution are repealed.
The Constitution is the highest law of the land. It is the basic and paramount law to which all other laws must
conform and to which all persons, including the highest officials of the land, must defer. No act shall be valid,
however noble its intentions, if it conflicts with the Constitution. Consequently, this Court has no recourse but to
declare Section 4(b)of E.O. No. 1 repealed by the 1987 Constitution.

80