Thomas Frampton

Climenko Fellow and Lecturer on Law

Harvard Law School
Griswold Hall 106 North Suite
Telephone (617) 496-4660
Fax (617) 495-5125
Email tframpton@law.harvard.edu
Affiliation for identification only

March 9, 2020

Office of Disciplinary Counsel

4000 S. Sherwood Forest Blvd., Suite 607
Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70816

To Whom It May Concern:

Undersigned counsel has become aware of the following potential misconduct by

Assistant District Attorney Scott Vincent occurring within the past twelve months. Counsel
has identified at least eleven cases, apart from State v. Lerone Lewis, where serious
misrepresentations of fact or law (or violations of other court rules) may have occurred. In
each matter, the misrepresentations had the effect (with mixed success) of obscuring
misconduct by law enforcement or errors made by trial attorneys at the Orleans Parish
District Attorney’s office, and/or granting the District Attorney a strategic advantage in
criminal litigation. In this letter, I have identified provisions of the Louisiana Rules of
Professional Conduct, the Rules of the Louisiana Supreme Court, and the Uniform Rules of
the Courts of Appeal that I believe Mr. Vincent’s conduct may implicate. See La. R. Prof.
Cond. 3.4(c) (prohibiting knowing violations of obligations under the rules of a tribunal).

State v. Ernest Cloud, 531-909 “J”

• La. R. Prof. Conduct 3.1 (prohibiting lawyers from “assert[ing] or controvert[ing]

an issue therein, unless there is a basis in law and fact for doing so that is not
frivolous”)
• La. R. Prof. Conduct 3.3(a)(1) (“false statement of fact or law”)
• La. R. Prof. Conduct 3.3.(a)(3) (“offer[ing] evidence that the lawyer knows to be
false”)
• La. R. Prof. Conduct 3.4(c)(“knowingly disobey an obligation under the rules of a
tribunal”)
• La. R. Prof. Conduct 3.5(c) (ex parte communication)
• La. R. Prof. Conduct 8.4 (prohibiting “knowingly assisting” another to violate
Rules of Professional Conduct (e.g., violation of Rule 3.5(c)), engaging in “conduct
involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation,” or “engag[ing] in
conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice”).
• Rule 4-5(A), Uniform Rules of the Courts of Appeal (requiring verification)

Mr. Cloud was charged with a variety of offenses and filed pretrial motions seeking a
preliminary examination. On the morning of the hearing, December 19, 2018, the State called
Mr. Cloud’s case. The State had no witnesses present. The State did not request a

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continuance. The State submitted no police reports or warrants into the record, and the trial
court found no probable cause to hold Mr. Cloud. The State objected and noticed its intent to
seek supervisory writs. Later in the day, without Mr. Cloud or his attorney present, the State
asked ex parte to insert materials into the court file. The State “submitted [a November 2016
arrest warrant for Mr. Cloud] into the record ex parte at the end of the court session that day.
The State did not request for this Court to reopen the motion hearing for the purpose of
introducing this evidence, nor did they move for reconsideration of this Court’s ruling on
probable cause at any point prior to the filing of their supervisory writ application in this
matter.” Per Curiam Opinion, Hon. Darryl A. Derbigny (Mar. 21, 2019).
Mr. Vincent filed a supervisory writ application. See State’s Fourth Circuit Writ
Application, No. 2019-K-0070. In it, he recited the procedural posture of the case as follows:
At the hearing conducted on December 19, 2018, the State requested a
continuance. When the trial court denied the request for a continuance, the
State introduced a copy of the Arrest Warrant onto [sic] evidence. The trial
court then found insufficient probable cause to substantiate the charges
against defendant and ordered defendant’s release from custody. The State
objected to the court’s ruling and immediately noticed its intent in open court.
Id. at p. 3 (emphasis added). In a “Statement of Facts,” Mr. Vincent then copy-and-pasted the
narrative contained in the arrest warrant that was never submitted into evidence at the
hearing. The writ application included a sworn verification from Mr. Vincent stating “[t]hat
he has reviewed the foregoing application and attachments thereto and that the allegations
contained therein are truthful.” Id. at 7.
The Fourth Circuit ordered Mr. Cloud, the State, and the trial court to clarify the
procedural posture of the case. The trial court and Mr. Cloud provided the true procedural
history. Mr. Vincent responded that he had reviewed the transcript before submitting his
writ application and “noticed that the transcript made no reference to the Arrest Warrant
but assumed the absence of such a reference was due to the fact that either the introduction
onto [sic] evidence was not formally made on the record or the reporter failed to pick up this
post-ruling presentation.” See State’s Response to Court Order (Mar. 25, 2019) (emphasis
added). Crediting this account, Mr. Vincent not only supplied a false procedural history in a
sworn filing to the Fourth Circuit, but additionally supplied a procedural history to the
Fourth Circuit that was contrary to what he “assumed” (incorrectly) had occurred during the
hearing. Mr. Vincent did not offer any explanation for his representation that prosecutors
requested a continuance and that the trial court denied this request.
The Fourth Circuit denied the writ application on April 4, 2019, emphasizing “the
State’s failure to present any evidence in support of a finding of probable cause at the motion
hearing.” State v. Cloud, No. 2019-K-0070 (La. App. 4 Cir. 4/4/19).

State v. Radon Ray, Case No. 544-524 “J”

• La. R. Prof. Conduct 3.3(a)(1) (“false statement of fact or law”)

• La. R. Prof. Conduct 3.4(c)(“knowingly disobey an obligation under the rules of a
tribunal”)
• La. R. Prof. Conduct 8.4 (engaging in “conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit
or misrepresentation,” or “engag[ing] in conduct that is prejudicial to the
administration of justice”)
• La. R. Prof. Conduct 8.4 (d) (conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice)
• Rule X, §§ 2(d), 4(4), Rules of Sup. Ct. of La. (requiring verification)

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 • Rule X, § 4(6)(d), Rules of Sup. Ct. of La. (requiring copy of the judgment, order
or ruling of the trial court, and the reasons for same, if written or transcribed)
• Rule 4-5(A), Uniform Rules of the Courts of Appeal (requiring verification)

Mr. Ray was seized and searched by a team of NOPD detectives. See Per Curiam
Opinion, Hon. Darryl A. Derbigny (Oct. 24, 2019) (finding seizure and search illegal), aff’d
State v. Ray, Case No. 2019-K-0822 (La. App. 4 Cir. 12/6/19). The trial court initially denied
Mr. Ray’s motion to suppress based on the testimony of the States’ sole witness, Det. Sherr.
The detective testified that he detained Mr. Ray during a drug investigation into Mr. Ray’s
friends, that he frisked him, “[a]nd at that point, I felt what [appeared] to be a hard metallic
object, believed to be a firearm” around his waistband. Hr’g Tr. (Aug. 6, 2019) at 5. But the
trial court later reversed its own ruling based on further review of video footage indicating
that Det. Sherr fabricated the account of his recovery of the weapon from Mr. Ray; moreover,
the video footage depicts two colleagues of Det. Sherr, Det. Knowles and Det. Senter,
apparently concocting a false account (in Det. Sherr’s presence) of how Det. Senter might
have legally recovered the weapon from Mr. Ray:
Det. Knowles: Where was the gun?
Det. Senter: Front waistband.
Det. Knowles: Easy. We stopped two of his friends, he tries to sneak
back, as soon as you saw him, you put your hand on his
waist and you felt the gun . . . . It’s all good. Hey, it’s all
good. That’s what happened.
See Mr. Ray’s Opposition to Fourth Circuit Writ Application, p. 4 (quoting Fourth Circuit
Writ Application, Ex. L (BWC footage) at 9:55). The video evidence “directly contraven[ed]
the testimony” of Det. Sherr, revealed an effort to “fabricate” evidence, and gave the trial
court “serious pause and undermined its confidence in the investigation and the testimony of
Detective Sherr.” Per Curiam Opinion, Hon. Darryl A. Derbigny (Oct. 24, 2019).
Mr. Vincent filed a writ application to the Fourth Circuit (Case No. 2019-K-0822). The
“Statement of Facts” in his writ application omitted the misconduct revealed in the video
evidence. Instead, Mr. Vincent provided a “Statement of Facts” replicating Det. Sherr’s
discredited testimony, and asserting that “Detective Sherr reached out to stop Ray’s
movement[,] touched Ray’s waist near the front of his body, [and] felt a hard metallic object
which he immediately recognized to be a handgun concealed beneath his sweatshirt.” Fourth
Circuit Writ Application, p. 4. Mr. Vincent also filed a sworn affidavit verifying “that the
allegations contained [in the foregoing application] are truthful.” Id. at 20. The Fourth Circuit
denied the writ application.
Mr. Vincent then filed a writ application to the Louisiana Supreme Court (No. 2020-
KK-0041). Notwithstanding Mr. Ray’s correction of the record in his Fourth Circuit
opposition, Mr. Vincent’s Louisiana Supreme Court application again repeated the false
factual narrative regarding Det. Sherr finding the weapon, see LASC Writ Application, p. 4;
Mr. Vincent signed a sworn affidavit affirming that “he ha[d] reviewed the foregoing
application and . . . that the allegations contained therein are truthful,” id. at 18.
Additionally, Mr. Vincent omitted from the writ application the trial court’s Per Curiam
Opinion—rejecting the credibility of Det. Sherr’s testimony—and the video evidence itself.
Before Mr. Ray’s counsel could file a brief with the Louisiana Supreme Court, the Court
granted Mr. Vincent’s writ application on January 24, 2020.
Mr. Ray filed a motion to reconsider urging Mr. Vincent “deliberately misled” the
Court, and a subsequent filing providing the video footage; the Court ordered a response and

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the matter is currently pending. See Mr. Ray’s LASC Application for Rehearing, p. 3; Order
(Jan. 31, 2020), No. 2020-KK-00041, State v. Ray (La. 1/31/2020).
To counsel’s knowledge, the District Attorney has taken no action again Det. Sherr,
Det. Knowles and Det. Senter. But see infra State v. Joshua Jordan, No. 2019-KK-1564 (La.
10/6/19) (involving unconstitutional conduct by same officers and writ applications authored
by Scott Vincent).

State v. Joshua Jordan, 543-394 “K”

• La. R. Prof. Conduct 3.4(c)(prohibiting “knowingly disobey[ing] an obligation

under the rules of a tribunal”)
• La. R. Prof. Conduct 8.4 (prohibiting “knowingly assisting” another to violate
Rules of Professional Conduct, “conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or
misrepresentation,” or “engag[ing] in conduct that is prejudicial to the
administration of justice”).
• La. R. Prof. Conduct 8.4 (d) (conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice)
• Rule 4-5(C), Uniform Rules of the Courts of Appeal (requiring “a copy of the
judge's reasons for judgment, order, or ruling (if written)”)

Mr. Jordan was illegally arrested and searched by NOPD Officers William Knowles,
Samuel Senter, and Jason Collins.1 The trial court held an evidentiary hearing on August 6,
2019, and then set the matter for ruling on August 9, 2019, at which time the trial court filed
a detailed “Opinion and Order” into the record. See Fourth Circuit Writ Application, Ex. D
(minute entry of Aug. 9, 2019). “In its review of the facts,” the trial court explained, “this
Court can come to no other conclusion in this case other than that the officers’ apprehension
of Mr. Jordan was a result of profiling him to be a suspected criminal.” See Opinion and
Order, Judge Arthur L. Hunter, Jr. (Aug. 9, 2019); see also State v. Jordan, No. 2019-K-0704
(La. App. 4 Cir. 9/24/19) (“Considering the trial court’s well-reasoned written judgment and
per curiam submitted to this Court, we find no error . . .”).
Mr. Vincent filed a writ application to the Fourth Circuit (Case No. 2019-K-0704) on
August 19, 2019. The writ application, however, omitted the trial court’s “Opinion and
Order,” which Mr. Jordan subsequently supplied in a response. As the Fourth Circuit
highlighted in its denial of Mr. Vincent’s writ:
The docket master and court minutes indicate that a copy of the trial court’s
written judgment and order was filed into the record on August 9, 2019. The
State failed to include a copy with its writ application, a violation of
Uniform Rules 4-5[C](6) and (7).
State v. Jordan, No. 2019-K-0704, p. 1 (La. App. 4 Cir. 9/24/19) (emphasis added).
Although trial was set for Monday, October 7, 2019, Mr. Vincent waited more than a
week (until 3:03PM on Friday, October 4, 2019) before filing an emergency writ application
to the Louisiana Supreme Court. See No. 2019-KK-1564 (La. 10/6/19). (Both the emergency
filing sheet and the affidavit for the Louisiana Supreme Court writ application were
completed on October 3, 2019, however.) Nowhere in Volume I of his Louisiana Supreme
Court writ application did Mr. Vincent mention the trial court’s written legal and factual
findings. (The trial court’s “Order and Opinion” does appear deep in an unpaginated Volume

1 Two of these officers were involved in the arrest of Radon Ray. The record there uses
the rank “Detective,” whereas the record in State v. Jordan references the rank “Officer.”

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II of the emergency writ application, but only as an unlisted exhibit to Item No. 3, the
“Opposition to Writ Application” that Mr. Jordan filed below.) The Louisiana Supreme Court
denied the writ application on Sunday, October 6, 2019.

State v. Jeremy Lee, Case No. 545-714 “J”

• La. R. Prof. Conduct 3.3(a)(1) (“false statement of fact or law”)

• La. R. Prof. Conduct 3.3.(a)(3) (“offer[ing] evidence that the lawyer knows to be
false”)
• La. R. Prof. Conduct 3.4(c)(“knowingly disobey an obligation under the rules of a
tribunal”)
• La. R. Prof. Conduct 8.4 (prohibiting “conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit
or misrepresentation,” or “engag[ing] in conduct that is prejudicial to the
administration of justice”)
• Rule 4-5(A), Uniform Rules of the Courts of Appeal (requiring verification)
• Rule X, §§ 2(d), 4(4), Rules of Sup. Ct. of La. (requiring verification)
• Rule X, § 4(6)(d), Rules of Sup. Ct. of La. (requiring copy of the judgment, order
or ruling of the trial court, and the reasons for same, if written or transcribed)

Mr. Lee was illegally arrested, searched, and interrogated without valid Miranda
warnings. See Per Curiam Opinion, Hon. Darryl Derbigny (Aug. 27, 2019). In reaching this
conclusion, the trial court “relied chiefly upon body-worn video camera evidence, which belied
much of the testimony of the subpoenaed officer [Det. Timothy Krennerich].” Id. Specifically,
the trial court found that body-worn camera footage, admitted into evidence at the hearing,
showed that Det. Krennerich falsified important details of the encounter, including the
manner in which he supposedly discovered a firearm on Mr. Lee’s person:
The officer testified that the firearm was discovered when the firearm slipped
from the defendant’s waistband, falling into his pants. The body-worn camera
footage clearly shows that while Mr. Lee was fully detained in handcuffs, the
officer begins a search of Mr. Lee, wherein he frisks the pockets and waistband
of the defendant before announcing that he has discovered a firearm. The
weapon does not slip from the defendant’s waistband as described in the
officer’s in-Court testimony, in direct contradiction to the submitted camera
evidence, calling into serious question the credibility of that testimony.
Id.
Mr. Vincent filed a writ application with the Fourth Circuit (No. 2019-K-0601). His
“Statement of Facts” contained a number of assertions without any support in the record,
and also included assertions that (just like Det. Krennerich’s testimony) are directly
contradicted by the video evidence. Compare Fourth Circuit Writ Application, p. 3 (claiming
“[t]he officers proceeded to handcuff Lee out of concern for officer safety”), with Hr’g Tr. at 16
(“Q: [Y]ou, actually, don’t know the basis for the reason that Mr. Lee was handcuffed at that
time, because you were not the one who decided to handcuff Mr. Lee? [A:] That would be
correct. . . .”). See generally Fourth Circuit Writ Application, p. 2-3; but see Mr. Lee’s
Opposition, p. 4-7 (“Correction to the State’s Statement of the Facts”). Mr. Vincent’s filing
was accompanied by a sworn verification “that the allegations contained therein are
truthful.” Fourth Circuit Writ Application, p. 23. The Fourth Circuit unanimously denied the
writ application on September 6, 2019.

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 Mr. Vincent then filed a writ application with the Louisiana Supreme Court (No. 2019-
KK-1462). This writ application repeated the exact same factual assertions, supported by the
same sworn verification by Mr. Vincent. Mr. Vincent omitted the trial court’s Per Curiam
opinion.2 As Mr. Lee noted in his Opposition:
Given Mr. Lee’s belief that the State’s recitation of facts set forth in its Writ
Application is both incomplete and inaccurate to the evidence and introduced
at the motions hearing, Mr. Lee has included this section in his Response to
hopefully clarify for this Honorable Court the events that ultimately led to both
Mr. Lee’s arrest and the trial court’s decision to suppress the evidence in this
matter. It should be brought to this Honorable Court’s attention that
this correction to the facts was previously made part of Mr. Lee’s
Response to the State’s Writ Application by the State that no effort has
been made to improve the veracity of this presentation.
LASC Opposition, p. 4 (emphasis added). See also id. at 7 (noting conspicuous absence of trial
court’s per curiam from State’s LASC writ application). The Louisiana Supreme Court
rejected the writ application on November 12, 2019.

State v. Jarrell Holmes, 543-272 “B”

• La. R. Prof. Conduct 3.1 (prohibiting lawyers from “assert[ing] or controvert[ing]

an issue therein, unless there is a basis in law and fact for doing so that is not
frivolous”)
• La. R. Prof. Conduct 3.3(a)(1) (“false statement of fact or law”)
• La. R. Prof. Conduct 3.3.(a)(3) (“offer[ing] evidence that the lawyer knows to be
false”)
• La. R. Prof. Conduct 3.4(c)(“knowingly disobey an obligation under the rules of a
tribunal”)
• La. R. Prof. Conduct 8.4 (prohibiting engag[ing] in “conduct involving dishonesty,
fraud, deceit or misrepresentation,” or “engag[ing] in conduct that is prejudicial
to the administration of justice”).
• La. R. Prof. Conduct 8.4 (d) (conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice)
• Rule X, §§ 2(d), 4(4), Rules of Sup. Ct. of La. (requiring verification)
• Rule 4-5(A), Uniform Rules of the Courts of Appeal (requiring verification)

Ms. Holmes’s vehicle was illegally searched by NOPD Det. Chadwick Taylor during a
traffic stop. During the search, Det. Taylor found prescription pills in a “blister pack” in the
car, though Ms. Holmes denied that the pills were hers (or that she knew they were in the
car). The trial court found that the search was illegal and granted Ms. Holmes’s motion to
suppress evidence.

2 Although it was not included in all of the pleadings undersigned counsel has reviewed,
the Louisiana Supreme Court typically requires counsel to file a “Writ Application Filing
Sheet.” This sheet requires a certification that “all of the information and all of the
information contained in this application is true and correct to the best of my knowledge and
that all relevant pleadings and rulings, as required by Supreme Court Rule X, are attached
to this filing.” Rule X requires that any relevant written opinion of the trial court be included
in writ applications. See Rule X, § 4(6)(d). Mr. Vincent signed his “certification” of this
statement on September 11, 2019 for his LASC Writ Application in Mr. Lee’s case.

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 Mr. Vincent filed a writ application to the Fourth Circuit (2019-K-0724). Mr. Vincent’s
“Statement of Facts” contained multiple misrepresentations unsupported by the record, and
which went directly to the question of whether there was a lawful basis for the search. See
Ms. Holmes’ Opposition to Fourth Circuit Writ Application, p. 4-5. Mr. Vincent’s “Statement
of Facts” also included a confession—“Holmes . . . admitted the pills were hers”—for which
there was no support in the motions hearing record. See Writ Application, p. 4 (citing
“Transcript p. 5-12” as source of supposed confession). Mr. Vincent filed a sworn affidavit
verifying “that the allegations contained [in the foregoing application] are truthful.” Ms.
Holmes emphasized Mr. Vincent’s misrepresentations in her Opposition to the Fourth
Circuit, see Ms. Holmes’ Opposition to Fourth Circuit Writ Application, p. 4-5, and the court
unanimously denied Mr. Vincent’s writ application.
Mr. Vincent then filed a writ application to the Louisiana Supreme Court (2019-KK-
1490). In the writ application, he again made numerous misrepresentations, and repeated
the unsupported claim that Ms. Holmes had confessed to possessing the pills. See LASC Writ
Application, p. 3-4. Again, Mr. Vincent filed a sworn affidavit representing that the
allegations contained therein were truthful. In her opposition, Ms. Holmes noted that Mr.
Vincent “completely fabricates a confession and attributes it to Ms. Holmes . . . . The defense
brought these material misrepresentations to the State’s and the Fourth Circuit’s attention
in the defense’s response to the State’s writ to the Fourth Circuit . . . . [Mr. Vincent] has been
made aware of its misrepresentations of the trial court record and has made an affirmative
choice to again include these misrepresentations in [his] writ to this Court.” Ms. Holmes’s
Opposition to LASC Writ Application, p. 4-5. On November 12, 2019, the Louisiana Supreme
Court denied the writ application.

State v. Timothy Smothers, 543-762 “E”

• La. R. Prof. Conduct 3.3(a)(1) (“false statement of fact or law”)

• La. R. Prof. Conduct 8.4 (prohibiting engag[ing] in “conduct involving dishonesty,
fraud, deceit or misrepresentation” or “engag[ing] in conduct that is prejudicial to
the administration of justice”).

Mr. Smothers was the victim of two unconstitutional actions by NOPD Off. Troy
Williams, who (1) illegally arrested Mr. Smothers and (2) then illegally searched Mr.
Smothers’s car. See State v. Smothers, No. 19-KK-0848 (La. 6/26/19) (per curiam).
Before the trial court, the State’s sole witness was Off. Williams. The basic narrative
to which Off. Williams testified was the same on both direct examination and cross
examination: (1) he saw what he perceived to be a possible hand-to-hand transaction
involving a bicyclist and the driver of a car; (2) he saw the car’s driver (Mr. Smothers) “bend
down, like as if he was trying to put something on the floorboard or under the seat” (3) he
ordered Mr. Smothers to exit the vehicle and placed him in handcuffs; (4) he placed Mr.
Smothers in the rear of the police car; (5) he returned to vehicle; (6) he opened the door to the
vehicle; and (7) after opening the car door, he observed a firearm “sitting out in plain view,”
which he seized. See Hr’g Tr. (Mar. 21, 2019) at 5 (direct examination); id. at 11-12 (cross
examination). Off. Williams gave a very different account of the incident in his police report,
which was not introduced at the hearing: he claimed to have first noticed the weapon when
he first approached Mr. Smothers’s car (i.e., before the arrest and before returning to enter
Mr. Smothers’s car through the shut door). See Opposition to LASC Writ Application, p.4 n.1
(reciting version contained in Off. Williams’s police report). The trial court denied Mr.

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Smothers’ motion to suppress, and the Fourth Circuit denied his writ application on April 23,
2019 (No. 2019-K-328).
Mr. Smothers then filed a writ application with the Louisiana Supreme Court (No. 19-
KK-0848). In opposing Mr. Smothers’s writ application, Mr. Vincent argued that Off.
Williams actually first noticed the handgun inside the vehicle when he initially encountered
Mr. Smothers, not when he subsequently searched the car (as he testified at the motions
hearing). In support of this contention, which found no support in the evidentiary record from
the hearing, Mr. Vincent urged the Louisiana Supreme Court to credit Off. Williams’s initial
police report (which Mr. Vincent admitted he knew was not submitted into evidence and was
not a part of the motions hearing record). See Opposition to LASC Writ Application, p.4 n.1
(“The parties dispute when Officer Williams first noticed the handgun inside the vehicle.
According to the police report prepared by Officer Williams, a copy of which was not
introduced into evidence at the suppression hearing . . .”).
The Louisiana Supreme Court granted the writ application. See State v. Smothers,
No. 19-KK-0848 (La. 6/26/19). The Court explained “a review of [Off. Williams’s] testimony
reveals no supporting facts from which the trial court could have concluded that the legal
standard for a plain view seizure was met.” Id. The Court additionally held that “there was
no probable cause for defendant’s arrest upon his initial detention.

State v. Nathaniel Paul, 545-473 “J”

• La. R. Prof. Conduct 3.3(a)(1) (“false statement of fact or law”)

• La. R. Prof. Conduct 3.4(c)(“knowingly disobey an obligation under the rules of a
tribunal”)
• La. R. Prof. Conduct 8.4 (d) (conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice)
• Rule X, §§ 2(d), 4(4), Rules of Sup. Ct. of La. (requiring verification)
• Rule X, § 4(6)(d), Rules of Sup. Ct. of La. (requiring copy of the judgment, order
or ruling of the trial court, and the reasons for same, if written or transcribed)
• Rule 4-5(A), Uniform Rules of the Courts of Appeal (requiring verification)

Mr. Paul’s person and a nearby car were illegally searched by a team of NOPD officers.
See Per Curiam Opinion, Hon. Darryl A. Derbigny (Jan. 15, 2020). Prosecutors argued that
the search of Mr. Paul was justified because Mr. Paul (1) looked at police officers, while (2)
“reaching into what appeared to be picking up something or hiding something inside of the
parked vehicle.” See Fourth Circuit Writ Application, Ex. D (Hr’g Tr.) at 6. The state’s sole
witness further explained that he did not “know whether [Mr. Paul] was taking something
out of car or whether he was putting something in”; that he “couldn’t see Mr. Paul’s hands”;
that Mr. Paul was reaching “in through an open door in the back seat” of the car; and that
was not “aware of what exactly Mr. Paul [was] doing when reaching into the car.” Id. at 8, 9).
Based on this evidence, the officers placed Mr. Paul in handcuffs and “conducted a search of
Mr. Paul,” including his pockets, during which evidence was unlawfully seized. Id. at 11.
The trial court granted Mr. Paul’s motion to suppress. It found that the state’s sole
witness, Off. Douglas Boudreaux, “did not give any testimony to support the State’s
contention that Mr. Paul was engaged in any nervous or furtive behavior.” Id. Apart from
Mr. Paul “look[ing] at the marked police cruiser as it passed in front of him, in the direction
he was already facing,” the officers “had no other reason to believe that Mr. Paul was
engaging in any suspicious or illegal behavior.” Id.

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 Mr. Vincent filed a writ application to the Fourth Circuit (Case No. 2019-K-1046). In
his “Statement of Facts,” Mr. Vincent reported that Mr. Paul’s “furtive suspicious behavior”
had “caused the officers to suspect that Paul might be concealing a weapon on other
contraband on the back seat.” Fourth Circuit Writ Application, p. 3 (emphasis added). But at
no time did the officer testify that he, or anyone else, feared or suspected Mr. Paul was
concealing a weapon (a critical factual claim insofar as it might justify a Terry frisk). See id.,
Ex. C. Nor did Off. Boudreaux testify that he had observed “furtive” behavior (i.e., behavior
“done in a quiet or secretive way to avoid being noted”) from Mr. Paul. Id.; Per Curiam
Opinion, Hon. Darryl Derbigny (Jan. 15, 2020). Mr. Vincent filed a sworn affidavit verifying
“that the allegations contained [in the foregoing application] are truthful.” Fourth Circuit
Writ Application, p. 15. The Fourth Circuit unanimously denied Mr. Vincent’s writ
application on January 23, 2020; a brief opinion highlighted that the Fourth Circuit had
undertaken a “review of . . . the district court’s per curiam in light of the applicable law” and
did “not find that the district court abused its discretion.”
Mr. Vincent then filed an emergency writ application to the Louisiana Supreme Court
(No. 2020-KK-00168) on January 27, 2020. The writ application repeated the same factual
claims, and again Mr. Vincent filed a sworn affidavit attesting to the truthfulness of his
factual allegations. Mr. Vincent omitted the trial court’s Per Curiam Opinion from his writ
application (which would have immediately flagged for the Court that, contrary to Mr.
Vincent’s “Statement of Facts,” the record was bereft of evidence “to support the State’s
contention that Mr. Paul was engaged in any nervous or furtive behavior”). Mr. Paul
eventually submitted the trial court’s Per Curiam Opinion that Mr. Vincent omitted, and
later that day the Court unanimously denied the writ application.

State v. Dwight Jones, 544-693 “I” / State v. Tre King, 528-600 “J”

• La. R. Prof. Conduct 8.4 (d) (conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice)

A vehicle that was being driven by Dwight Jones was illegally searched by Louisiana
State Troopers during a traffic stop. Inside of a backpack on the passenger’s seat floor, officers
found a firearm; prosecutors argued that this was a valid “wingspan” search. But as the
Fourth Circuit later explained (and video evidence confirmed), the search was illegal because
at the time that Mr. Jones’s “vehicle was searched, he was handcuffed outside the vehicle
being questioned by another officer, thus posing no threat.” State v. Jones, No. 2019-K-0914
(La. App. 4 Cir. 11/14/19). Mr. Jones moved to suppress the physical evidence.
At the trial court level, in lieu of an evidentiary hearing with live testimony, the
parties agreed to submit Trooper Mitchell Saunders’ body-worn camera footage into evidence.
See Mr. Jones’s Fourth Circuit Writ Application, p. 6. In the video, while Trooper Saunders
is questioning the handcuffed Mr. Jones, another officer (Trooper Brandon Ostarly) searches
the car. Id., Ex. C. The video shows that Mr. Jones is not within the “wingspan” of the
passenger seat floorboard at the time of the search. When Trooper Ostarly tells Trooper
Saunders that he discovered a gun inside of a backpack during the search, Trooper Saunders
quickly turns off the audio on his body-worn camera, id., Ex. C at 02:19; Trooper Saunders
does not turn the audio back on until after they have finished discussing the illegal search,
id., Ex. C at 2:40. After reviewing the video evidence, the trial court denied the motion to
suppress evidence, but stated “I do consider this to be a close call . . . I would like to hear
what the higher courts say.” See Mr. Jones’s Fourth Circuit Writ Application, Ex. I at 8-9.

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 Mr. Jones submitted a writ application, complete with the body-worn camera footage
that made up the core of the evidentiary hearing, to the Fourth Circuit (No. 2019-K-0914).
The Fourth Circuit granted the writ application on November 14, 2019, reversing the ruling
of the trial court.
At 4:54PM on November 18, 2019, Mr. Vincent filed an emergency writ application
with the Louisiana Supreme Court (No. 2019-KK-1844), seeking expedited consideration
before Mr. Jones’s trial at 9:00AM the next morning. Mr. Vincent’s “Statement of Facts” not
only omitted any mention of Trooper Saunders’s suspicious muting of the video, but also
(based on a review by counsel of the Louisiana Supreme Court record) omitted the video itself,
which was an exhibit to Mr. Jones’s Fourth Circuit Writ Application. This omission forced
the Louisiana Supreme Court to resolve the writ application (1) without the critical evidence,
and (2) based solely on Mr. Vincent’s characterization of the video evidence. Mr. Vincent
signed a verification, however, stating that he had attached to his filing “all relevant
pleadings and rulings, as required by Supreme Court Rule X.” The Court denied the writ
application (though two Justices voted to grant the application.)
Mr. Vincent’s decision to file his emergency writ six minutes before the Court’s closure
for the weekend (and his omission of the dispositive evidence) is notable in light of the fact
that, three months earlier, Mr. Vincent was publicly reprimanded for “abuse” of the Fourth
Circuit’s expedited writ procedure in an unrelated matter. See State v. Tre King, No. 2019-K-
0680 (La. App. 4 Cir. 08/16/19) (“The trial in this case is currently set for August 21, 2019.
Although the pertinent ruling was made on June 11, 2019, the State waited more than two
months to file its writ application and seek expedited consideration due to the looming trial
date. This abuse of the court’s expedited consideration procedure is particularly egregious
. . . .”).

State v. Terrill McField, 545-063 “G”

• La. R. Prof. Conduct 3.3(a)(1) (“false statement of fact or law”)

• Rule X, §§ 2(d), 4(4), Rules of Sup. Ct. of La. (requiring verification)
• Rule 4-5(A), Uniform Rules of the Courts of Appeal (requiring verification)

Mr. McField’s Fourth Amendment rights were violated when two Louisiana State
Police troopers unlawfully searched his vehicle following Mr. Mcfield’s arrest for driving in
an HOV lane without any passengers and for an outstanding misdemeanor attachment.
Although the arresting officers intermittently turned off the audio on their body-worn
cameras during the encounter, they recorded themselves joking after the illegal search: “You
wanted to come out here and hunt, now look what you got.” See Fourth Circuit Writ
Application, Ex. L at 26:00-26:10 (body-worn camera of Trooper Joseph).
The trial court (Hon. Dennis Waldron) granted the motion to suppress. It did so after
a lengthy examination of the record, and after making detailed legal and factual findings,
including credibility determinations. See, e.g., Hr’g Tr. (Aug. 2, 2019) at 1-31.
Mr. Vincent filed a writ application to the Fourth Circuit. No. 2019-K-0735. The writ
application made no mention of the trial court’s factual findings. But in support of Mr.
Vincent’s legal argument that the warrantless search of the vehicle was justified either as an
“inventory search” or under the “community caretaker” doctrine, he made the following
factual claims in his “Statement of Facts”:
Trooper Joseph proceeded to prepare the vehicle for removal from the scene.
The trooper allowed McField to contact his wife to come get the vehicle. The

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 trooper proceeded with the towing procedure in case McField’s wife arrived
after the tow form was completed and the tow company was contacted. July 21,
2019 Transcript, pp. 10, 11, 31, 32, 34, 38, 39; Police Report; Body/Dash Cam
DVD. Trooper Thomas performed an inventory search of the vehicle in
accordance with NOPD policy.
Fourth Circuit Writ Application, p. 3. If this account were complete and accurate, the search
may have been lawful as an “inventory search”; but Mr. Vincent’s account contains material
omissions and inaccuracies. See Opposition to Fourth Circuit Writ Application, p. 4-7
(discussing numerous ways in which Mr. Vincent’s recitation of facts is “both incomplete and
inaccurate”). Among other important points, Mr. Vincent neglected to mention that video
evidence revealed (1) that officers conducted the illegal search long before they decided
whether to tow the vehicle, see Fourth Circuit Writ Application, Ex. 7 at 19:40-19:50 (“If
someone comes, they can have it”); and (2) that officers apparently began filling out the
aforementioned “tow form” only after the car had been searched and Mr. McField’s wife had
arrived to claim the vehicle (i.e., as a post hoc rationalization for the search). See Fourth
Circuit Writ Application, Ex. 7 at 31:25-31:35 (“Give me a tow form”). Mr. Vincent’s factual
claim that “Trooper Thomas performed an inventory search of the vehicle in accordance with
NOPD policy” (emphasis added) was also unsupported by the record; no NOPD employees
were even involved with the arrest.3 The Fourth Circuit unanimously denied the Writ
Application. See State v. McField, 2019-K-0735 (La. App. 4 Cir. 11/13/19).
Mr. Vincent filed a writ application to the Louisiana Supreme Court. See No. 2019-
KK-1847. Once again, he included an identical “Statement of Facts” in his application,
including the incorrect claim regarding “NOPD policy.” See LASC Writ Application, p. 3-4. In
response, Mr. McField noted: “It also should be brought to this Honorable Court’s attention
that this correction of the facts was previously made part of Mr. McField’s Response to the
State’s Writ Application with the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal, and it is clear from the
present Writ Application by the State that no effort has been made to improve the veracity
of the presentation.” See Opposition to LASC Writ Application, p. 4 n.1. The Louisiana
Supreme Court unanimously denied the Writ Application. See State v. McField, 2019-KK-
1847 (1/14/20).

State v. Regan Preatto, 534-657 ”D”

• La. R. Prof. Conduct 3.3(a)(1) (“false statement of fact or law”)

• La. R. Prof. Conduct 3.4(c)(“knowingly disobey an obligation under the rules of a
tribunal”)
• Rule X, §§ 2(d), 4(4), Rules of Sup. Ct. of La. (requiring verification)
• Rule X, § 4(6)(d), Rules of Sup. Ct. of La. (requiring copy of the judgment, order
or ruling of the trial court, and the reasons for same, if written or transcribed)

3 Trooper Joseph testified that that “State Police policy states that, if we going to tow a
vehicle, or we release it to someone else, we have to care for valuables. Inventory the vehicle.”
Hr’g Tr. (June 21, 2019) at 10. On information and belief, no such LSP policy—requiring an
“inventory [search of] the vehicle” as a precondition for “releas[ing] it to someone else”—
exists; if it does, it likely violates the Fourth Amendment. See South Dakota v. Opperman,
428 U.S. 364 (1976) (establishing framework for permissible “inventory searches”).

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 The trial court ordered Mr. Preatto released at 12:01AM on Aug. 1, 2019 under La. C.
Cr. P. art. 701, because more than 120 days had run since the filing of his speedy trial motion.
As the trial court explained in a written Per Curiam opinion dated Aug. 1, 2019, prosecutors
continued every trial date they set during the 120 period and were never once prepared for
trial. Per Curiam Opinion, Hon. Paul Bonin (Aug. 1, 2019) (noting service to Mr. Vincent’s
email address). The opinion further explained that although Mr. Collins informed the court
on July 15, 2019 that he was leaving the Public Defender’s office on August 2, 2019, he
“advised that he was leaving the OPD after the date of the expiration of the 120 period [Aug.
1, 2019]. If the prosecution had set the case for trial (see La. C. Cr. P. art 61) within the delay
for the speedy trial, we would have proceeded to trial as late as today. But it did not.” Id.
(emphasis in original). On July 31, 2019, when prosecutors made clear that they would not
try Mr. Preatto within 120 days (and just hours before Mr. Preatto’s 12:01AM release), the
parties met in chambers to select a mutually agreeable date at which Mr. Preatto would have
to return to court; a September trial date worked for all parties. See id. (“We selected the
earliest date for trial (September 17, 2019) available under our calendar and served Mr.
Preatto for that date.”).
Mr. Vincent filed an emergency writ application with the Fourth Circuit, which denied
relief. See State v. Preatto, No. 2019-K-0654 (La. App. 4 Cir. 8/7/19).
Mr. Vincent then filed an emergency writ application with the Louisiana Supreme
Court on August 8, 2019. See No. 2019-KK-1266. The writ application contained the following
representations:
On [April 22, 2019], trial was reset to May 28, 2019. The May 28, 2019 trial
date was ultimately reset, as were several subsequent dates. On July 8, 2019,
the court noted that it would continue the then set trial date of July 15, 2019
and took notice that the expiration of the Defendant’s Motion for Speedy Trial
was July 31, 2019.
On July 15, 2019, Sean Collins, attorney for the Defendant, appeared
before the court and informed the State that that he was leaving the Public
Defender’s office and that the Defendant would therefore need new counsel. As
of that date, the matter was not currently set for trial. The Court set the matter
for a hearing to determine counsel and a pre-trial conference on July 31, 2019.
. . . It should be noted that subsequent to the ruling, new Defense counsel, Beth
Sgro, indicated that she was in need of additional time to prepare the case for
trial.
LASC Writ Application, p. 3-4. The application also claimed “as of July 15, 2019, defendant
and his counsel have not been prepared to proceed to trial.” Id. at 5; see also id. at 6 (“The
State further submits that the defense counsel’s withdrawal from representation and
defendant’s not having an attorney able to go to trial vitiated and voided defendant’s Motion
for Speedy Trial.”).
Mr. Vincent’s emergency writ application contained numerous factual
misrepresentations; omitted the trial court’s written opinion; and omitted transcripts that
would have undermined his factual claims. First, and most importantly, it was simply false
that “as of July 15, 2019, defendant and his counsel have not been prepared to proceed to
trial”; the precise opposite was true. Second, the omission of the Per Curiam Opinion was
significant because (1) it would have made it much easier for the Louisiana Supreme Court
to recognize the falsity of Mr. Vincent’s claim that Mr. Preatto and his attorneys were
unprepared for trial after July 15, 2019, (2) it would have clarified that Mr. Preatto did not
“acquiesce” to a post-701 trial date when the parties collectively decided, hours before Mr.
Preatto’s release, a date on which Mr. Preatto would return to court. Third, Mr. Vincent’s

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omission of the July 8, 2019 hearing transcript—during which Mr. Preatto objected to the
continuation of the final trial setting offered by the State within the 120-day window—no
doubt made it easier for the Court to erroneously conclude (as urged by Mr. Vincent) that Mr.
Preatto “acquiesced” to the continuation of his trial outside the 120-day window. In fact, the
transcript shows Mr. Preatto did everything in his power to have the State bring him to trial
within that time period.
In Opposition, Mr. Preatto urged the Louisiana Supreme Court to consult the actual
transcripts from the relevant period before accepting at face value Mr. Vincent’s “numerous
material misrepresentations and omissions of fact.” See Opposition to LASC Writ
Application, p. 4. (“As a threshold matter, Mr. Preatto wishes to inform this Court that the
state’s writ application before this Court contains makes [sic] numerous material
misrepresentations and omissions of fact that would be corrected by the transcripts of the
court proceedings during the 701 period at issue in this case, should this Court order the
state to produce them.”). Without ordering transcripts, and over the dissent of two Justices,
the Louisiana Supreme Court granted Mr. Vincent’s emergency writ application on August
13, 2019. State v. Preatto, No. 2019-KK-1266 (La. 8/13/19) (concluding no violation of La. C.
Cr. P. art. 701 “because defense counsel acquiesced to the September 17, 2019 trial date which
was beyond the statutory time delays for a speedy trial”).

***

Mr. Vincent’s pattern of omissions and misstatements, despite repeated efforts to call
attention to these errors by defense counsel (and even reprimands by various tribunals), has
prompted counsel to write. In each case, the conduct outlined above served to give a strategic
advantage to the prosecution.
One final point bears emphasis with respect to the question of intent. In a Fourth
Circuit appeal in 2018, Mr. Vincent noticed an unintentional and irrelevant typographical
error in a defense pleading (filed by my co-counsel, public defender Aaron Zagory). See State’s
Motion for Sanctions and Incorporated Memorandum, April 5, 2018, in State v. Andrews, No.
2018-K-0149 (La. App. 4 Cir.). Specifically, the filing stated that “undersigned counsel” had
left multiple unreturned voicemails with the District Attorney’s office, when it should have
read “co-counsel” had left multiple unreturned voicemails with the District Attorney’s office.
Mr. Vincent, on behalf of the State of Louisiana, implored the Court to impose
sanctions against opposing counsel for his alleged “lack of candor to the Court.” Id. at 2.
Specifically, Mr. Vincent explained to the Court:
According to the Verification and Certification located at the foot of the Motion,
Aaron Zagory ‘being duly sworn and depose[d] and state[d] that he has
reviewed the foregoing [Petition] [and] that all the facts therein are true and
accurate to the best of his information and belief[.]’ Contrary to Mr. Zagory’s
sworn statement, Ms. Andrieu has never received a voice message from Mr.
Zagory . . . . The State invokes this Court’s supervisory jurisdiction and
implores the Court to impose sanctions against Mr. Zagory for his lack of
candor to the Court.”
Id. at 2 (emphasis in original).
The Fourth Circuit summarily denied this motion for sanctions, see State v. Andrews,
255 So.3d 1106, 1112 n.4 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2018), but in light of Mr. Vincent’s past efforts to
obtains sanctions against defense counsel, it cannot be argued that Mr. Vincent fails to
appreciate the legal significance of the Affidavit accompanying his appellate filings. Mr.
Vincent has also improperly sought monetary sanctions against opposing counsel—public

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defenders representing indigent defendants—in other contexts. See also State’s Original Br.
in State v. Sceau, No. 16-0841 (La. App. 4 Cir. 8/19/16) (unpub’d writ action) (seeking financial
sanctions against municipal court public defender for alleged “failure to comply with the
law”); see also State v. Sceau, 206 So.3d 866 (La. 2016) (holding it was improper for appellate
court to consider sanctions on public defender, as requested by Mr. Vincent, since the issue
“had never been raised in the municipal court”).
Please do not hesitate to contact me if there is additional information that I can
provide.

Sincerely,

Thomas Frampton

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