In Re: Diosdado Gutierrez

5 SCR 661 – Legal Ethics – Conditional Pardon will not bar disbarment

Attorney Diosdado Gutierrez is a member of the Philippine Bar. While he was the municipal mayor of
Calapan, he and other co-conspirators murdered the former municipal mayor of Calapan, Filemon
Samaco in 1956. They were held guilty and sentenced to the penalty of death.  Upon review by the
Supreme court the penalty was changed to reclusion perpetua.
In 1958, after serving a portion of the penalty, Gutierrez was granted conditional pardon by the President. 
He was released on the condition that he shall not commit any crime.

Subsequently, the widow of Samaco filed a disbarment case against Gutierrez by reason of the latter’s
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. Murder, is without a doubt, such a crime.

ISSUE:
W/N the conditional pardon to Gutierrez places him beyond the rule of disbarment

Held: NO.
§   Under section 5 of Rule 127, a member of the bar may be removed or suspended from his office as
attorney by the Supreme Court by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude.  Murder is,
without doubt, such a crime. “Moral turpitude” includes everything contrary to justice, honesty, modesty,
or good morals.
§   In the Lontok case, on which Gutierrez relies, the respondent, Lontok, was granted absolute or
unconditional pardon after  conviction for the crime of crime of bigamy.  It was held that such pardon
releases the punishment and blots out existence of guilt, so that in the eye of the law the offender is as
innocent as if he had never committed the offense.
§   In the case at bar, the pardon granted was conditional, and merely remitted the unexecuted portion of
his term.  It was not a full pardon which could have blotted out the offense committed.
§   The crime was qualified by treachery and aggravated by its having been committed in band, by taking
advantage of his official position, and with the use of a motor vehicle.  The degree of moral turpitude
warrants disbarment.  Admission of a candidate to the bar requires academic preparation and satisfactory
testimonials of good moral character.  These standards are neither dispensed with nor lowered after
admission: the lawyer must adhere to them or incur the risk of suspension or removal.

Whether or not Gutierrez may be disbarred considering the fact that he was granted pardon.

HELD:
Yes. The pardon granted to Gutierrez is not absolute but conditional. It merely remitted his sentence. It
does not reach the offense itself. Gutierrez must be judged upon the fact of his conviction for murder
without regard to the pardon (which he invoked in defense). The crime was actually qualified by treachery
and aggravated by its having been committed in hand, by taking advantage of his official position
(Gutierrez being municipal mayor at the time) and with the use of motor vehicle. The degree of moral
turpitude involved is such as to justify his being purged from the profession.
Zaldivar vs. Sandiganbayan [G.R. Nos. 79690-707 October 7,1988]

FACTS:
Petitioner filed Resolution including Motion to Cite in Contempt Special Prosecutor (formerly Tanodbayan)
Raul M. Gonzalez. Gonzalez in: (1) having caused the filing of the information against petitioner in
criminal case before the Sandiganbayan, and (2) issuing certain allegedly contemptuous statements to
the media in relation to the proceedings in where respondent is claiming that he is acting as Tanodbayan-
Ombudsman. A Resolution from the Supreme Court required respondent to show cause why he should
not be punished for contempt and/or subjected to administrative sanctions for making certain public
statements. Portion of the published article from Philippine Daily Globe in his interview:
What I am afraid of (with the issuance of the order) is that it appears that while rich and influential persons
get favorable actions from the Supreme Court, it is difficult for an ordinary litigant to get his petition to be
given due course.
Respondent has not denied making the above statements; indeed, he acknowledges that the newspaper
reports of the statements attributed to him are substantially correct.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent Atty. Gonzales is entitled to invoke freedom of speech as a defense.

HELD:
NO. Respondent indefinitely suspended from the practice of law.

RATIO:
The Court concludes that respondent Gonzalez is guilty both of contempt of court in facie curiae and of
gross misconduct as an officer of the court and member of the Bar.(Section 27, Rule 138, Rules of Court)
[F]reedom of speech and of expression, like all constitutional freedoms, is not absolute and that freedom
of expression needs on occasion to be adjusted to and accommodated with the requirements of equally
important public interests.
ZALDIVAR v GONZALES

FACTS:

This case stemmed when Tanodbayan Justice Raul M. Gonzales expressed his disappointment
publicly the Supreme Court order stopping him from investigating graft cases involving Antique
Gov. Enrique Zaldivar. He uttered contemptuous words against the tribunal alleging them of
restraining him to prosecute graft cases involving affluent people. He opined that SC’s action
will heighten the people’s apprehension over the justice system in this country, especially
because the people have been thinking that only the small fry can get it while big fishes go scot-
free. Petitioner filed a motion to cite in contempt of respondent. The Court acting on the said
petition required him to comment on aforesaid motion. However, after having argued the legal merits of
his position, respondent made the following statements totally unrelated to any legal issue raised either in
the Court’s Decision or in his own Motion. According to him, members of the Court has been prodding him
to go slow on Zaldivar and refrain from investigating the COA report on illegal disbursements in the SC
because it will embarrass the Court. He further claimed that in several instances, the undersigned
respondent was called over the phone by a leading member of the Court and was asked to dismiss the
cases against (two Members of the Court). Respondent Gonzalez also attached three (3) handwritten
notes which he claimed were sent by “some members of this Honorable Court, interceding for cases
pending before this office (i.e., the Tanodbayan).” He either released his Motion for Reconsideration with
facsimiles of said notes to the press or repeated to the press the above extraneous statements: the
metropolitan papers for the next several days carried long reports on those statements and variations and
embellishments thereof. Also, he prayed for the inhibition of four (4) justices in his case thinking that he
will no longer be afforded with impartiality and cold neutrality. As a defense, respondent argued that his
actions were valid exercise of his freedom of speech.

ISSUE/S:

1.WON respondent is guilty of contempt.

2.WON respondents utterances are valid exercise of his freedom of speech. Or Whether or Not there
was a violation of the freedom of speech/expression. 

HELD:
1.YES, respondent must be cited for contempt. Second only to the duty of maintaining allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines and to support the Constitution and obey the laws of the Philippines, is the
duty of all attorneys to observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers
(Sec. 20 (b) Rule 138, Rules of Court). It is well to recall that respondent Gonzalez, apart from being a
lawyer and an officer of the court, is also a Special Prosecutor who owes duties of fidelity and respect to
the Republic and to this Court as the embodiment and the repository of the judicial power in the
government of the Republic. The responsibility of the respondent “to uphold the dignity and authority

2. No. There was no violation. The Court did not purport to announce a new doctrine of "visible tendency,"
it was simply paraphrasing Section 3 (d) of Rule 71 of the Revised Rules of Court which penalizes a
variety of contumacious conduct including: "any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to
impede, obstruct or degrade the administration of justice." 

Under either the "clear and present danger" test or the "balancing-of-interest test," the Court held that the
statements made by respondent Gonzalez are of such a nature and were made in such a manner and
under such circumstances, as to transcend the permissible limits of free speech. What is here at stake is
the authority of the Supreme Court to confront and prevent a "substantive evil" consisting not only of the
obstruction of a free and fair hearing of a particular case but also the avoidance of the broader evil of the
degradation of the judicial system of a country and the destruction of the standards of professional
conduct required from members of the bar and officers of the courts, which has some implications to the
society.
 Piatt           September 1, 1933

C.E. PIATT, Chief of Police of Manila, complainant,

vs.
PERFECTO ABORDO, respondent.

The Respondent in his own behalf.

Office of the Solicitor-General Hilado for the Government.

MALCOLM, J.:

On February 19, 1932, Perfecto Abordo, a member of the Philippine Bar, accepted the offer of two individuals to sell
him a quantity of opium, a prohibited drug, and agreed to pay P1.50 per tin for the opium. On the afternoon of the
same day, Abordo was picked up at the corner of Taft Avenue extension and Vito Cruz in the City of Manila, by one
of the individuals who had made him the opium proposition, and was taken to Rizal Avenue Extension outside of the
city limits where they found a number of persons awaiting them in an automobile. A can was disclosed to Abordo as
containing opium, and believing that it was opium, he delivered to one Cabrales the amount of P600 in payment of
the stuff. The can was loaded in the automobile which brought Abordo to the scene of the delivery, but in returning to
Manila another automobile overtook them and the parties riding therein, pretending to be constabulary soldiers, told
Abordo to stop. Instead Abordo drew his revolver and commanding the driver of the car to turn into Calle Vito Cruz
was able to evade his pursuers and to arrive safely at his home in Pasay. Once in his home Abordo examined the
contents of the can and found it to contain fake opium and sand. Thereupon Abordo reported to the Luneta Police
Station of Manila that he had been robbed of P600. Two individuals were later arrested, charged with the crime
of estafa, and convicted.

Abordo admits that he entered into the transaction detailed above, adding that "he is sincerely sorry for it and vows
not to repeat". His defense is that "there being no evidence in the record establishing the relationship of attorney and
client between the respondent and the malefactors", and "the act complained of not having been committed in the
exercise of his profession of attorney-at-law", the acts he committed could not affect his status as attorney-at-law and
could not, therefore, constitute a ground for disciplinary action.

Section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure enumerates the grounds for the suspension or disbarment of a lawyer.
Nevertheless, it is well settled that a member of the bar may be suspended or removed from his office as lawyer for
other than statutory grounds. However, as a general rule, a court will not assume jurisdiction to discipline one of its
officers for misconduct alleged to be committed in his private capacity. The exception to the rule is that an attorney
will be removed not only for malpractice and dishonesty in his profession, but also for gross misconduct not
connected with his professional duties, which shows him to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges which
his license and the law confer upon him. (In re Pelaez [1923], 44 Phil., 567.)

The courts are not curators of the morals of the bar. At the same time the profession is not compelled to harbor all
persons whatever their character, who are fortunate enough to keep out of prison. As good character is an essential
qualification for admission of an attorney to practice, when the attorney's character is bad in such respect as to show
that he is unsafe and unfit to be entrusted with the powers of an attorney, the courts retain the power to discipline
him.

It will be recalled that Perfecto Abordo, a member of the Philippine Bar, attempted to engage in an opium deal in
direct contravention of the criminal law of the Philippine Islands. All that kept the nefarious plan from succeeding was
the treacherous conduct of his co-conspirators. The intention to flaunt the law was present even if consummation of
the overt act was not accomplished. In the eyes of the canons of professional ethics which govern the conduct of
attorneys, the act was as reprehensible as if it had been brought to a successful culmination. "Of all classes and
professions, the lawyer is most sacredly bound to uphold the laws" said the United States Supreme Court in the well
known case of Ex Parte Wall ( [1882], 107 U.S., 265), and to that doctrine we give our unqualified support.

The Solicitor-General submits that the respondent should be reprimanded and warned that a repetition of similar
conduct in the future will be dealt with more severely. To our minds such leniency on the part of the Supreme Court
would serve merely to condone a pernicious example set by a member of the bar, and would result in action entirely
inadequate considering the aggravated nature of the case. In this respect we are not without judicial precedents to
guide us. Thus, in the case of In re Terrel ( [1903], 2 Phil., 266), although the respondent had been acquitted on the
charge of estafa, yet it was held that, since the promotion of an organization for the purpose of violating or evading
the penal laws amounted to such malpractice on the part of an attorney as will justify removal or suspension, the
respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a term of one year. Again, In re Pelaez, supra, where an
attorney-at-law who, as a guardian, pledged the shares of stock belonging to his ward to guarantee the payment of
his personal debt, although this was misconduct committed in his private capacity, the court nevertheless suspended
the respondent from the legal profession for one year. We think the instant case grave, and meriting as severe a
sentence.

It is the order of the court that the respondent Perfecto Abordo be suspended from the practice of law for a period of
one year to begin on September 1, 1933.

Street, Villa-Real, Abad Santos, Hull, Vickers, and Imperial, JJ., concur.

Issue: WON the actions of Abordo could serve as grounds for disbarment?

Ruling: Yes.

Although Section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure enumerates the grounds for the suspension or disbarment of a
lawyer. A lawyer may be suspended or removed from his office as lawyer for other than statutory grounds.

As a general rule, a court will not assume jurisdiction to discipline one of its officers for misconduct alleged to be
committed in his private capacity. The exception to the rule is that an attorney will be removed not only for
malpractice and dishonesty in his profession, but also for gross misconduct not connected with his professional
duties, which shows him to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges which his license and the law confer
upon him. (In re Pelaez [1923], 44 Phil., 567.)

 
Ui vs BonifacioA.C. No. 3319. June 8, 2000Facts:

Facts:
Leslie Ui filed a complaint for disbarment againstAtty Iris Bonifacio for allegedly carrying on an immoral
relationship with her husband Carlos L. Ui. Respondent also had two children with complainant’s
husband. Respondent contended that her relationship with Carlos Ui is not illicit because they were
married abroad and that after June 1988when respondent discovered Carlos Ui’s true civil status, she cut
off all her ties with him. Respondent averred that Carlos Ui never lived with her.

Complainant also filed a Motion to Cite Respondent in Contempt of the Commission and alleged that in

the Answerof respondent filed before the Integrated Bar, respondent averred that she was married to
Carlos Ui on October 22,1985 and attached a Certificate of Marriage to substantiate
her averment. However, the Certificate of Marriage duly certified by the State Registrar as a true copy of
the record on file in the Hawaii State Department of Health, and duly
authenticated by the Philippine Consulate General in Honolulu, Hawaii, USA revealed that the date of
marriage was October 22, 1987, and not October 22, 1985 as claimed by respondent in her Answer.

Issues:
1. Whether respondent engaged in an immoral conduct and may be disbarred for such.
2. Whether the photocopy of respondent’s Marriage Certificate, with an altered or intercalated date is
indicative of her moral perversity and lack of integrity which makes her unworthy to be a member of the
Philippine Bar

Held:
1. No. The complaint for disbarment was dismissed by the SC.
Respondent was imprudent in managing her personal affairs. However, the fact remains that her
relationship with Carlos Ui, clothed as it was with what respondent believed was a valid marriage,
cannot be considered immoral. For immorality connotes conduct that shows indifference to the
moral norms of society and the opinion of good and respectable members of the community.
Moreover, for suchconduct to warrant disciplinary action, the same must be "grossly immoral,"
that is, it must be so corrupt and false asto constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be
reprehensible to a high degree. 

The court have held that "a member of the Bar and officer of the court is not only required
to refrain from adulterous relationships x x x but must also so behave himself as toavoid
scandalizing the public by creating the belief that he is flouting those moral standards."

 Respondent’s act of immediately distancing herself from Carlos Ui upondiscovering his true

civil status belies just that alleged moral
indifference and proves that she had no intention of flaunting the law and the high moral standard
of the legal profession. Complainant’s bare assertions to the contrary deserve no credit.

All the facts taken together leads to the inescapable conclusion that respondent
was imprudent in managing her personal affairs. However, the fact remains that
her relationship with Carlos Ui, clothed as it was with what respondent believed
was a valid marriage, cannot be considered immoral. For immorality connotes
conduct that shows indifference to the moral norms of society and the opinion of
good and respectable members of the community. Moreover, for such conduct
to warrant disciplinary action, the same must be “grossly immoral,” that is, it
must be so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as
to be reprehensible to a high degree.
 2. No. Respondent is only reprimanded for attaching to her Answer a photocopy of her
Marriage Certificate, with an altered or intercalated
date. The court found it improbable to believe the averment of respondent that she merely relied
on the photocopy of the Marriage Certificate which was provided her by Carlos Ui. For an event
as significant as a marriage ceremony, any normal bride would verily recall the date and year of
her marriage. It is difficult to fathom how a bride, especially a lawyer as in the case at bar, can
forget the year when she got married. Simply stated, it is contrary to human experience and
highly improbable.

Furthermore, any prudent lawyer would verify theinformation contained in an attachment to her
pleading, especially so when she has personal knowledge of the facts
and circumstances contained therein. In attaching such Marriage Certificate with an intercalated
date, the defense of good faith of respondent on that point cannot stand.

13. FIGUEROA v.
BARRANCO, SBC Case No.
519, 276 SCRA 445 (1997)
FACTS
- In 1971, Patricia Figueroa
petitioned that Simeon
Barranco, Jr. be denied
admission to the legal
profession. Barranco
passed the 1970 bar exams
on the fourth attempt.
- Figueroa avers that she
and Barranco had been
sweethearts, that a child
was born to them out of
wedlock and that
respondent did not fulfill his
repeated promises to marry
her.
- Figueroa and Barranco
were townmates in Janiuay,
Iloilo and were steadies
since 1953. Figueroa
first acceded to sexual
congress in 1960. A son,
Rafael Barranco, was born
on Dec 11, 1964.
Barranco promised to marry
Figueroa after he passes
the bar exams. Their
relationship continued,
with more than 20 or 30
promises of marriage.
Barranco gave only P10 for
the child on Rafael‘s
birthdays. In 1971, Figueroa
learned Barranco married
another woman.
- From 1972 to 1988,
several motions to dismiss
and comments were filed.
- On Sept 29, 1988, the
Court resolved to dismiss
the complaint for failure of
complainant to prosecute
the case for an
unreasonable period of time
and to allow Simeon
Barranco, Jr. to take the
lawyer‘s
oath.
- Nov 17, 1988, the Court,
in response to Figueroa‘s
opposition, resolved to
cancel Barranco‘s
scheduled oath-taking. -
June 1, 1993, the Court
referred the case to the IBP.
On May 17, 1997, IBP
recommended the dismissal
of the case and that
respondent be allowed to
take the lawyer‘s oath
ISSUE
WON the facts constitute
gross immorality warranting
the permanent exclusion of
Barranco from the
legal profession
13. FIGUEROA v.
BARRANCO, SBC Case No.
519, 276 SCRA 445 (1997)
FACTS
- In 1971, Patricia Figueroa
petitioned that Simeon
Barranco, Jr. be denied
admission to the legal
profession. Barranco
passed the 1970 bar exams
on the fourth attempt.
- Figueroa avers that she
and Barranco had been
sweethearts, that a child
was born to them out of
wedlock and that
respondent did not fulfill his
repeated promises to marry
her.
- Figueroa and Barranco
were townmates in Janiuay,
Iloilo and were steadies
since 1953. Figueroa
first acceded to sexual
congress in 1960. A son,
Rafael Barranco, was born
on Dec 11, 1964.
Barranco promised to marry
Figueroa after he passes
the bar exams. Their
relationship continued,
with more than 20 or 30
promises of marriage.
Barranco gave only P10 for
the child on Rafael‘s
birthdays. In 1971, Figueroa
learned Barranco married
another woman.
- From 1972 to 1988,
several motions to dismiss
and comments were filed.
- On Sept 29, 1988, the
Court resolved to dismiss
the complaint for failure of
complainant to prosecute
the case for an
unreasonable period of time
and to allow Simeon
Barranco, Jr. to take the
lawyer‘s
oath.
- Nov 17, 1988, the Court,
in response to Figueroa‘s
opposition, resolved to
cancel Barranco‘s
scheduled oath-taking. -
June 1, 1993, the Court
referred the case to the IBP.
On May 17, 1997, IBP
recommended the dismissal
of the case and that
respondent be allowed to
take the lawyer‘s oath
ISSUE
WON the facts constitute
gross immorality warranting
the permanent exclusion of
Barranco from the
legal profession

13. FIGUEROA v.
BARRANCO, SBC Case No.
519, 276 SCRA 445 (1997)
FACTS
- In 1971, Patricia Figueroa
petitioned that Simeon
Barranco, Jr. be denied
admission to the legal
profession. Barranco
passed the 1970 bar exams
on the fourth attempt.
- Figueroa avers that she
and Barranco had been
sweethearts, that a child
was born to them out of
wedlock and that
respondent did not fulfill his
repeated promises to marry
her.
- Figueroa and Barranco
were townmates in Janiuay,
Iloilo and were steadies
since 1953. Figueroa
first acceded to sexual
congress in 1960. A son,
Rafael Barranco, was born
on Dec 11, 1964.
Barranco promised to marry
Figueroa after he passes
the bar exams. Their
relationship continued,
with more than 20 or 30
promises of marriage.
Barranco gave only P10 for
the child on Rafael‘s
birthdays. In 1971, Figueroa
learned Barranco married
another woman.
- From 1972 to 1988,
several motions to dismiss
and comments were filed.
- On Sept 29, 1988, the
Court resolved to dismiss
the complaint for failure of
complainant to prosecute
the case for an
unreasonable period of time
and to allow Simeon
Barranco, Jr. to take the
lawyer‘s
oath.
- Nov 17, 1988, the Court,
in response to Figueroa‘s
opposition, resolved to
cancel Barranco‘s
scheduled oath-taking. -
June 1, 1993, the Court
referred the case to the IBP.
On May 17, 1997, IBP
recommended the dismissal
of the case and that
respondent be allowed to
take the lawyer‘s oath
ISSUE
WON the facts constitute
gross immorality warranting
the permanent exclusion of
Barranco from the
legal professio
FACTS
- In 1971, Patricia Figueroa
petitioned that Simeon
Barranco, Jr. be denied
admission to the legal
profession. Barranco
passed the 1970 bar exams
on the fourth attempt.
- Figueroa avers that she
and Barranco had been
sweethearts, that a child
was born to them out of
wedlock and that
respondent did not fulfill his
repeated promises to marry
her.
- Figueroa and Barranco
were townmates in Janiuay,
Iloilo and were steadies
since 1953. Figueroa
first acceded to sexual
congress in 1960. A son,
Rafael Barranco, was born
on Dec 11, 1964.
Barranco promised to marry
Figueroa after he passes
the bar exams. Their
relationship continued,
with more than 20 or 30
promises of marriage.
Barranco gave only P10 for
the child on Rafael‘s
birthdays. In 1971, Figueroa
learned Barranco married
another woman.
- From 1972 to 1988,
several motions to dismiss
and comments were filed.
- On Sept 29, 1988, the
Court resolved to dismiss
the complaint for failure of
complainant to prosecute
the case for an
unreasonable period of time
and to allow Simeon
Barranco, Jr. to take the
lawyer‘s
oath.
- Nov 17, 1988, the Court,
in response to Figueroa‘s
opposition, resolved to
cancel Barranco‘s
scheduled oath-taking. -
June 1, 1993, the Court
referred the case to the IBP.
On May 17, 1997, IBP
recommended the dismissal
of the case and that
respondent be allowed to
take the lawyer‘s oath
ISSUE
WON the facts constitute
gross immorality warranting
the permanent exclusion of
Barranco from the
legal profession
HELD
No. To justify suspension or
disbarment, the act
complained of must not
only be immoral, but
grossly
immoral. A grossly immoral
act is one that is so corrupt
and false as to constitute a
criminal act or so
unprincipled or disgraceful
as to be reprehensible to a
high degree. It is a willful,
flagrant, or shameless
acts which shows a moral
indifference to the opinion
of respectable members of
the community.
RIVERA V. CORRAL

Facts:
Rivera instituted a complaint for disbarment charging Atty. Corral with malpractice and conduct
unbecoming a member of the Philippine Bar. A decision for an ejectment case was received by
Atty. Corral’s secretary on February 23, 1990. Notice of Appeal was filed by Atty. Corral on
March 13, 1990. Next day, he went to the clerk of court and changed the date February 23 to
February 29 without the court’s prior knowledge and permission. Atty. Corral later on filed a
reply to plaintiff’s manifestation claiming that he received the decision on February 28, not 29
(because there is no Feb 29).

Issue:
W/N Atty. Corral should be disbarred for changing the date when he received the decision of the
court without the court’s prior knowledge of decision

Held:
No, Atty. Corral is suspended for 1 year. The correction of date by Atty. Corral was made not to
reflect the truth but to mislead the trial court in believing that the notice of appeal was filed
within the reglementary period. Because if the decision was received on Feb 22, the notice of
appeal filed on March 13 is filed out of time. To extricate himself from such predicament, Atty.
Corral altered the date he received the court’s decision. By altering the material dates to make it
appear that the Notice of Appeal was timely filed, Atty. Corral committed an act of dishonesty.
Dishonesty constitutes grave misconduct.
 FLORENCE TEVES MACARRUBO, the Minors JURIS ALEXIS T. MACARRUBO and GABRIEL ENRICO T.
MACARRUBO as represented by their Mother/Guardian, FLORENCE TEVES MACARRUBO, complainant, v.
ATTY. EDMUNDO L. MACARRUBO, respondent.
A.C. No. 6148. February 27, 2004.

Facts:

Florence Teves Macarrubo, complainant, filed on June 6, 2000 a verified complaint for disbarment against Atty.
Edmundo L. Macarubbo,respondent, with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines alleging that respondent deceived her
into marrying him despite his prior subsisting marriage with a certain Helen Esparza. The complainant averred that he
started courting her in April 1991, he representing himself as a bachelor; that they eventually contracted marriage
which was celebrated on two occasions administered by Rev. Rogelio J. Bolivar, the first on December 18, 1991 in
the latter’s Manila office, and the second on December 28, 1991 at the Asian Institute of Tourism Hotel in Quezon
City; and that although respondent admitted that he was married to Helen Esparza on June 16, 1982, he succeeded
in convincing complainant, her family and friends that his previous marriage was void.

Complainant further averred that respondent entered into a third marriage with one Josephine T. Constantino; and
that he abandoned complainant and their children without providing them any regular support up to the present time,
leaving them in precarious living conditions.

Respondent denied employing deception in his marriage to complainant, insisting instead that complainant was fully
aware of his prior subsisting marriage to Helen Esparza, but that she dragged him against his will to a “sham
wedding” to protect her and her family’s reputation since she was then three-months pregnant. He submitted in
evidence that in the civil case “Edmundo L. Macarubbo v. Florence J. Teves,” it declared his marriage to complainant
void ab initio. He drew attention to the trial court’s findings on the basis of his evidence which was not controverted,
that the marriage was indeed “a sham and make believe” one, “vitiated by fraud, deceit, force and intimidation, and
further exacerbated by the existence of a legal impediment” and want of a valid marriage license. Respondent raised
the additional defenses that the judicial decree of annulment of his marriage to complainant is res judicata upon the
present administrative case; that complainant is in estoppel for admitting her status as mere live-in partner to
respondent in her letter to Josephine T. Constantino. Stressing that he had always been the victim in his marital
relations, respondent invoked the final and executory August 21, 1998 in the case “Edmundo L. Macarubbo v. Helen
C. Esparza,” declaring his first marriage void on the ground of his wife’s psychological incapacity.

It is recommended that respondent Atty. Edmundo L. Macarrubo be suspended for three months for gross
misconduct reflecting unfavorably on the moral norms of the profession. The IBP Board of Governors adopted and
approved the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.

Issue:

Whether or not the respondent should be suspended for gross misconduct

Ruling:

While the marriage between complainant and respondent has been annulled by final judgment, this does not cleanse
his conduct of every tinge of impropriety. He and complainant started living as husband and wife in December 1991
when his first marriage was still subsisting, as it was only on August 21, 1998 that such first marriage was annulled,
rendering him liable for concubinage. Such conduct is inconsistent with the good moral character that is required for
the continued right to practice law as a member of the Philippine bar. Even assuming that respondent was coerced by
complainant to marry her, the duress, by his own admission as the following transcript of his testimony reflects,
ceased after their wedding day, respondent having freely cohabited with her and even begot a second child by her.
Thus, respondent Edmundo L. Macarubbo is found guilty of gross immorality and is hereby disbarred from the
practice of law.
Facts: A disbarment complaint was filed against Atty. Edmundo Macarrubo who had a subsisting marriage with Helen
Esparza (with whom he had two children) before he entered into a second marriage with Florence Macarrubo (with
whom he also had two children), herein Complainant. It was further averred that Atty. Macarrubo also entered into a
third marriage with one Josephine Constantino. On the other hand, Atty. Macarrubo claims that he was able to secure
the annulment of his first two marriages and is in the process of procuring one for his third.

Issue: Whether or not Atty. Macarrubo should be held administratively liable.

Decision: Yes. Atty. Macarrubo has exhibited the vice of entering into multiple marriages and then leaving them
behind by the mere expedient of resorting to legal remedies to sever them. Atty. Macarrubo is found guilty of gross
immorality and is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law. He is likewise ordered to show satisfactory evidence
that he is supporting his two children by the complainant.

PEOPLE VS. TUANDA (A.M. NO. 3360 01/30/1990)

FACTS: Respondent Fe T. Tuanda, a member of the Philippine Bar, asks this Court to lift the suspension from the
practice of law imposed upon her by a decision of the Court of Appeals. In 1983, Atty. Fe Tuanda received from one
Herminia A. Marquez several pieces of jewelry with a total value of P36,000 for sale on commission basis. In 1984,
instead of returning the unsold pieces of jewelry worth P26,250, she issued 3 checks. These checks were dishonored
by the drawee bank, Traders Royal Bank, for insufficiency of funds. Notwithstanding receipt of the notice of dishonor,
Tuanda made no effort to settle her obligation. Criminal cases were filed, wherein she was acquitted of estafa but
was found guilty of violation of BP 22 (The Anti-Bouncing Check Law). The appellate court affirmed the decision of
the trial court and imposed further suspension against Tuanda in the practice of law, on the ground that the offense
involves moral turpitude. Tuanda is now appealing to the Supreme Court for her suspension to be lifted arguing that
her suspension was a penalty so harsh on top of the fines imposed to her in violation of the aforementioned law.
Arguing further that she intends no damage to the plaintiff-appellee (Herminia A. Marquez)and she is not guilty of the
offense charged.

ISSUE: Whether or not the suspension of Atty. Tuanda be lifted.

HELD: NO. The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that "the offense [of] which she is found guilty involved moral
turpitude. Sections 27 and 28 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court provide as follows:
 Sec. 27. Attorneys renewed or suspended by Supreme Court on what grounds. A member of the bar may
be removed or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court of any deceit, malpractice, or other
gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a
wilful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or wilfully appearing as an attorney for
a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either
personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice. (Italics supplied)
 Sec. 28. Suspension of attorney by the Court of Appeals or a Court of First Instance. — The Court of
Appeals or a Court of First Instance may suspend an attorney from practice for any of the causes named in the
last preceding section, and after such suspension such attorney shall not practice his profession until further
action of the Supreme Court in the premises.
Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude relates to and affects the good moral character of a person convicted
of such offense. Herein, BP 22 violation is a serious criminal offense which deleteriously affects public interest and
public order. The effects of the issuance of a worthless check transcends the private interest of parties directly
involved in the transaction and touches the interest of the community at large. Putting valueless commercial papers in
circulation, multiplied a thousand fold, can very well pollute the channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking
system and eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public interest. The crimes of which respondent was
convicted also import deceit and violation of her attorney's oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility under
both of which she was bound to "obey the laws of the land."

ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to DENY the Motion to Lift Order of Suspension. Respondent shall remain
suspended from the practice of law until further orders from this Court.

De Mijares v.Villaluz, 274 SCRA 1

FACTS:

Priscilla de Mijares and Justice Onofre Villaluz were married despite the pendency of Justice Villaluz’ former marriage
in court. Few days after the marriage, De Mijares and Villaluz had a heated fight which led to exchange of offending
remarks. Villaluz called the complainant a nagger and told her to get the marriage contract and have it burned. Such
unbearable utterances of respondent left complainant no choice but to leave in haste the place of their would-be
honeymoon. Since then, the complainant and respondent have been living separately because as complainant
rationalized, contrary to her expectation respondent never got in touch with her and did not even bother to apologize
for what happened. Several months after, she learned that respondent married a certain Lydia Geraldez. Thus, the
basis of this complaint.

ISSUE: WON Ret. Justice Onofre A. Villaluz be suspended from his practice of law.

HELD: Citing Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the Supreme Court found the respondent
engaging in an unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceiful conduct and recommends SUSPENSION with the specific
WARNING that a more severe penalty shall be imposed should he commit the same or a similar offense hereafter.

SUMMARY:

The night of their wedding day, Judge Mijares and retired CA Justice Villaluz got into a huge fight and since then has
started living separately. Several months after, Judge Mijares filed a complaint for DISBARMENT against Justice
Villaluz when she learned that he married a certain Lydia Geraldez 4 months after their wedding. In his defense,
Justice Villaluz argues that his wedding with complainant is just a sham. It is just an effort to help Judge Mijares in the
administrative case for immorality filed against her by her Legal Researcher, Atty. Joseph Gregorio Naval, Jr. The SC
did not give credence to the defense of Justice Villaluz. He was, however, merely suspended for 2 years and not
disbarred.

DOCTRINES:

The theory of respondent that what was solemnized with complainant was nothing but a “sham” marriage is too
incredible to deserve serious consideration. To repeat: regardless of the intention of respondent in saying “I do” with
complainant before a competent authority, all ingredients of a valid marriage were present.

FACTS:

January 7, 1994, complainant got married to respondent in a civil wedding before Judge Myrna Lim Verano, then
Presiding Judge of the MCTC – Carmona, Cavite.
Their marriage was the culmination of a long engagement. They met sometime in 1977, when respondent, as
Presiding Judge of the Criminal Circuit Court in Pasig, Metro Manila, was trying a murder case involving the death of
a son of Judge Mijares. Since then, respondent became a close family friend of complainant.

After the wedding, they reached the condominium unit of respondent. The phone rang which she answered. At the
other end of the line was a woman offending her with insulting remarks. Consternated, complainant confronted
respondent on the identity of such caller but respondent simply remarked it would have been just a call at the wrong
number. What followed was a heated exchange of harsh words, one word led to another, to a point when respondent
called complainant a nagger. He allegedly said: Ayaw ko nang ganyan! Ang gusto ko sa babae, ‘yong sumusunod sa
bawa’t gusto ko.’ Get that marriage contract and have it burned.

Since then, the complainant and respondent have been living separately.

Several months after that fateful encounter, in a Bible Study session, the complainant learned from Manila RTC
Judge Ramon Makasiar, a member of the Bible Group, that he (Judge Makasiar) solemnized the marriage between
former Justice Onofre A. Villaluz and a certain Lydia Geraldez.

Infuriated and impelled by the disheartening news, complainant filed the instant Complaint for Disbarment against
him.

Respondent gave a different version. According to him, what he inked with the complainant on January 7, 1994 was
merely but a sham marriage. He explained that he agreed as, in fact, he voluntarily signed the Marriage Contract in
an effort to help Judge Mijares in the administrative case for immorality filed against her by her Legal Researcher,
Atty. Joseph Gregorio Naval, Jr.

The SC resolved to refer the administrative case to Associate Justice Fidel P. Purisima of the Court of Appeals for
investigation, report and recommendation. Justice Purisima found respondent guilty of deceit and immoral conduct.

ISSUE:WON respondent is guilt of deceit and immoral conduct? (YES)

RATIO:

The Court Adopted the findings of Justice Purisima:

That what complainant and respondent contracted was a valid marriage is borne out by law and the evidence. To be
sure,  all the essential and formal requisites of a valid marriage under Articles 2 and 3 of the Family Code were
satisfied and complied with.

– legal capacity of the contracting parties, who must be a male and a female;
– consent freely given in the presence of the solemnizing officer;
– authority of the solemnizing officer;
– a valid marriage license except in the cases provided for in Chapter 2 of Title I on marriage, Family Code; and
– a marriage ceremony with the appearance of the contracting parties before the solemnizing officer, and
– their personal declaration that they take each other as husband and wife, in the presence of not less than two
witnesses of legal age

The theory of respondent that what was solemnized with complainant was nothing but a “sham” marriage is too
incredible to deserve serious consideration. To repeat: regardless of the intention of respondent in saying “I do” with
complainant before a competent authority, all ingredients of a valid marriage were present.

His consent thereto was freely given. Judge Myrna Lim Verano was authorized by law to solemnize the civil marriage,
and both contracting parties had the legal capacity to contract such marriage.

From the foregoing, it is evident that respondent dismally fails to meet the standard of moral fitness for continued
membership in the legal profession.

Under Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral
or deceitful conduct. The commission of grossly immoral conduct and deceit are grounds for suspension or
disbarment of lawyers. However, the Court feels that disbarment would be too harsh a penalty in this peculiar case
considering that respondent is in the declining years of his life, his impulsive conduct during some episodes of the
investigation reveal a degree of aberrant reactive behavior probably ascribable to advanced age; and the undeniable
fact that he has rendered some years of commendable service in the Judiciary,
Hence, a suspension of two years, as recommended, would suffice as a punitive but compassionate disciplinary
measure.

DISPOSITIVE:

WHEREFORE, finding herein respondent, GUILTY of immoral conduct, he is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice
of law for a period of 2 years effective upon notice hereof, with the specific WARNING that a more severe penalty
shall be imposed should he commit the same or a similar offense hereafter.

STEMMERIK V. MAS

FACTS:
Stemmerik, a Danish citizen, wanted to buy Philippine property due to its beauty. He consulted
Atty Mas about his intention, to which the latter advised him that he could legally buy such
properties. Atty Mas even suggested a big piece of property that he can buy, assuring that it is
alienable. Because of this, Stemmerik entrusted all of the necessary requirements and made Atty
Mas his attorney in fact as he went back to Denmark. After some time, Atty Mas informed
Stemmerik that he found the owner of the big piece of property and stated the price of the
property is P3.8M. Stemmerik agreed, giving Atty Mas the money, and the latter supposedly
drawing up the necessary paperwork. When Stemmerik asked when he could have the property
registered in his name, Atty Mas can’t be found. He returned to the Philippines, employed
another lawyer, and to his horror, was informed that aliens couldn’t own Philippine Lands and
that the property was also inalienable. Stemmerik the filed a DISBARMENT case against Atty
MAS in the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the IBP. The CBD ruled that Atty Mas
abused the trust and confidence of Stemmerik and recommended that he be disbarred. The IBP
Board of Governors adopted such recommendations.

ISSUE/S: W/N Atty Mas can be disbarred.

HELD: YES! Disbarred. RATIO: Disobeyed the Laws and the Constitutional Prohibition Section
7, Article XII of the Constitution prohibits foreigners from buying Philippine Lands.
Respondent, in giving advice that directly contradicted a fundamental constitutional policy,
showed disrespect for the Constitution and gross ignorance of basic law. Worse, he prepared
spurious documents that he knew were void and illegal. Deceitful Conduct By advising
complainant that a foreigner could legally and validly acquire real estate in the Philippines and
by assuring complainant that the property was alienable, respondent deliberately deceived his
client. He did not give due regard to the trust and confidence reposed in him by complainant.
Illegal Conduct By pocketing and misappropriating the P3.8 million given by complainant for
the purchase of the property, respondent committed a fraudulent act that was criminal in nature.
MAELOTISEA S. GARRIDO, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTYS. ANGEL
E. GARRIDO AND ROMANA P. VALENCIA, RESPONDENTS.

FACTS:  Maelotisea Sipin Garrido filed a complaint for disbarment against Atty. Angel E. Garrido (Atty. Garrido) and
Atty. Romana P.Valencia (Atty. Valencia) before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Committee on Discipline
charging them with gross immorality.

Maelotisea  alleged that she is the legal wife of Atty. Garrido. They have 6 children. Sometime in 1987, one of their
children confided that an unknown caller talked with her claiming that the former is a child of Atty Garrido. Also, one
of her daughter, May Elizabeth, told her that she saw Atty. Garrido strolling at a mall together with a woman and a
child who was later identified as Atty. Valencia and Angeli Ramona Valencia Garrido, respectively.

Maelotisea was able to secure the Certificate of Live Birth of the child, stating among others that the said child is the
daughter of Atty. Garrido and Atty. Valencia.

In 1993, Atty. Garrido left the conjugal home and joined Atty. Valencia at their residence. Since he left the conjugal
home Atty. Garrido failed and still failing to give Maelotisea the needed financial support to the prejudice of their
children who stopped schooling because of financial constraints.

By way of defense, Atty. Garrido alleged that Maelotisea was not his legal wife, as he was already married to
Constancia David (Constancia) when he married Maelotisea. He claimed he married Maelotisea after he and
Constancia parted ways. As he and Maelotisea grew apart over the years due to financial problems, Atty. Garrido met
Atty. Valencia. He became close to Atty. Valencia to whom he confided his difficulties. Together, they resolved his
personal problems and his financial difficulties with his second family. Atty. Garrido denied that he failed to give
financial support to his children with Maelotisea, emphasizing that all his six (6) children were educated in private
schools; all graduated from college except for Arnel Victorino, who finished a special secondary course.
Atty. Garrido emphasized that all his marriages were contracted before he became a member of the bar on May 11,
1979, with the third marriage contracted after the death of Constancia on December 26, 1977. Likewise, his children
with Maelotisea were born before he became a lawyer.

On her part, Atty. Valencia denied that she was the mistress of Atty. Garrido. She explained that Maelotisea was not
the legal wife of Atty. Garrido since the marriage between them was void from the beginning due to the then existing
marriage of Atty. Garrido with Constancia.

In the course of the hearings before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, Maelotisea filed a motion for the
dismissal of her complaint, arguing that she wanted to maintain friendly relations with Atty. Garrido, who is the father
of her six (6) children.

ISSUES:
Should the disbarment case against Atty. Garrido be dismissed because the alleged immoral acts were committed
before he was admitted to the Philippine Bar?
Whether the desistance of Maelotisea merits the dismissal of the case.
Whether Atty. Garrido should be disbarred for gross immoral conduct.
Whether Atty. Valencia’s defense that the marriage between Atty. Garrido and Maelotisea is void tenable.

RULING:
A.       Prescription of offenses by the complainant do not apply in the determination of a lawyer’s
qualifications and fitness for membership in the Bar. Admission to the practice of law is a component of the
administration of justice and is a matter of public interest because it involves service to the public.
The time that elapsed between the immoral acts charged and the filing of the complaint is not material in considering
the qualification of Atty. Garrido when he applied for admission to the practice of law, and his continuing qualification
to be a member of the legal profession. From this perspective, it is not important that the acts complained of were
committed before Atty. Garrido was admitted to the practice of law. The possession of good moral character is
both a condition precedent and a continuing requirement to warrant admission to the bar and to retain
membership in the legal profession. Admission to the bar does not preclude a subsequent judicial inquiry,
upon proper complaint, into any question concerning the mental or moral fitness of the respondent before he
became a lawyer (Zaguirre v. Castillo). Admission to the practice only creates the rebuttable presumption that the
applicant has all the qualifications to become a lawyer; this may be refuted by clear and convincing evidence to the
contrary even after admission to the Bar.

B.       In light of the public service character of the practice of law and the nature of disbarment proceedings
as a public interest concern, Maelotisea’s affidavit of desistance cannot have the effect of discontinuing or
abating the disbarment proceedings. Maelotisea is more of a witness than a complainant in these proceedings.
We note further that she filed her affidavits of withdrawal only after she had presented her evidence; her evidence are
now available for the Court’s examination and consideration, and their merits are not affected by her desistance. We
cannot fail to note, too, that Mealotisea filed her affidavit of desistance, not to disown or refute the evidence she had
submitted, but solely because of compassion (and, impliedly, out of concern for her personal financial interest in
continuing friendly relations with Atty. Garrido).

C.       The undisputed facts gathered from the evidence and the admissions of Atty. Garrido established a pattern of
gross immoral conduct that warrants his disbarment. His conduct was not only corrupt or unprincipled; it was
reprehensible to the highest degree.

First, Atty. Garrido admitted that he left Constancia to pursue his law studies; thereafter and during the marriage, he
had romantic relationships with other women. He had the gall to represent to this Court that the study of law was his
reason for leaving his wife; marriage and the study of law are not mutually exclusive.

Second, he misrepresented himself to Maelotisea as a bachelor, when in truth he was already married to Constancia.
This was a misrepresentation given as an excuse to lure a woman into a prohibited relationship.

Third, Atty. Garrido contracted his second marriage with Maelotisea notwithstanding the subsistence of his first
marriage. This was an open admission, not only of an illegal liaison, but of the commission of a crime.

Fourth, Atty. Garrido engaged in an extra-marital affair with Atty. Valencia while his two marriages were in place and
without taking into consideration the moral and emotional implications of his actions on the two women he took as
wives and on his six (6) children by his second marriage.

Fifth, instead of making legal amends to validate his marriage with Maelotisea upon the death of Constancia, Atty.
Garrido married Atty. Valencia who bore him a daughter.

Sixth, Atty. Garrido misused his legal knowledge and convinced Atty. Valencia (who was not then a lawyer) that he
was free to marry, considering that his marriage with Maelotisea was not “valid.”

Seventh, as the evidence on record implies, Atty. Garrido married Atty. Valencia in Hongkong in an apparent attempt
to accord legitimacy to a union entered into while another marriage was in place.

Eighth, after admission to the practice of law, Atty. Garrido simultaneously cohabited and had sexual relations with
two (2) women who at one point were both his wedded wives. He also led a double life with two (2) families for a
period of more than ten (10) years.

By his actions, Garrido committed multiple violations relating to the legal profession, specifically, violations of the bar
admission rules, of his lawyer’s oath, and of the ethical rules of the profession.

Immoral conduct involves acts that are willful, flagrant, or shameless, and that show a moral indifference to the
opinion of the upright and respectable members of the community. Immoral conduct is gross when it is so corrupt as
to constitute a criminal act, or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree, or when committed under such
scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the community’s sense of decency. We make these distinctions as
the supreme penalty of disbarment arising from conduct requires grossly immoral, not simply immoral, conduct.
He did not possess the good moral character required of a lawyer at the time of his admission to the Bar. As a lawyer,
he violated his lawyer’s oath, Section 20(a) of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, and Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, all of which commonly require him to obey the laws of the land.

He violated ethical rules of the profession, specifically, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which
commands that he “shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct”; Canon 7 of the same
Code, which demands that “a lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession”; Rule
7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides that, “a lawyer shall not engage in conduct that
adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a
scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.”
D.      While Atty. Valencia contends that Atty. Garrido’s marriage with Maelotisea was null and void, the fact remains
that he took a man away from a woman who bore him six (6) children. Ordinary decency would have required her to
ward off Atty. Garrido’s advances, as he was a married man, in fact a twice-married man with both marriages
subsisting at that time; she should have said no to Atty. Garrido from the very start. Instead, she continued her liaison
with Atty. Garrido, driving him, upon the death of Constancia, away from legitimizing his relationship with Maelotisea
and their children. Worse than this, because of Atty. Valencia’s presence and willingness, Atty. Garrido even left his
second family and six children for a third marriage with her. This scenario smacks of immorality even if viewed
outside of the prism of law.

Atty. Valencia violated Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, as her behavior demeaned
the dignity of and discredited the legal profession. She simply failed in her duty as a lawyer to adhere unwaveringly to
the highest standards of morality. Lawyers, as officers of the court, must not only be of good moral character
but must also be seen to be of good moral character and must lead lives in accordance with the highest
moral standards of the community. Atty. Valencia failed to live up to these standards before she was admitted to
the bar and after she became a member of the legal profession.

Moral character is not a subjective term but one that corresponds to objective reality. To have good moral character,
a person must have the personal characteristics of being good. It is not enough that he or she has a good reputation,
i.e., the opinion generally entertained about a person or the estimate in which he or she is held by the public in the
place where she is known. The requirement of good moral character has four general purposes, namely: (1) to
protect the public; (2) to protect the public image of lawyers; (3) to protect prospective clients; and (4) to
protect errant lawyers from themselves. Each purpose is as important as the other.

The Fallo:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves to:
(1) DISBAR Atty. Angel E. Garrido from the practice of law for gross immorality, violation of the Lawyer’s Oath; and
violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility; and
(2) DISBAR Atty. Romana P. Valencia from the practice of law for gross immorality, violation of Canon 7 and Rule
7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
MAPALAD, SR. v. ATTY. ECHANEZ
VIRGILIO J. MAPALAD, SR., Complainant vs. ATTY. ANSELMO S. ECHANEZ, Respondent.
A.C. No. 10911
JUNE 6, 2017

FACTS:

Before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) is a disbarment case filed by Virgilio J. Mapalad, Sr.
against respondent-lawyer Atty. Anselmo S. Echanez, for failure to comply with the MCLE requirements.
The respondent’s act of deliberately and unlawfully misleading the courts, parties and counsels
concerned into believing that he had complied with the Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE)
requirements, when in truth he had not, is a serious malpractice and grave misconduct in violation of the
Lawyer’s Oath, Canon 1, /Rule 1.01 and Canon 10, Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
when he falsified his MCLE Compliance Number. The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD), after
thorough investigation, and careful evaluation of pieces of evidence submitted by the complainant
(respondent opted not to heed the directive of the Commission to file comment and position papers),
recommended that Atty. Anselmo S. Echanez be disbarred and his name be stricken from the Roll of
Attorneys, which was adopted and approved by the IBP Board of Governors.

Facts:
    Complainant filed a disbarment case against the respondent for presenting falsified Mandatory Continuing Legal
Education (MCLE) Number without indicating the date of issue. The respondent used the said falsified MCLE Number
in several legal pleadings against the complainant.

    Upon inquiry with the MCLE Office, a certification was issued stating the respondent has yet complied his MCLE
requirements. The complainant filed his complaint against the respondent at the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) for act of deliberately and unlawfully misleading the courts, parties and counsels concerned into believing that
he had complied with the MCLE requirements when in truth he had not, is a serious malpractice and grave
misconduct. The complainant, thus, prayed for the IBP to recommend respondent’s disbarment.

    The respondent was given the chance to comment on the complaint twice but the respondent didn’t provide any
response.

    Both the complainant and the respondent were called for a hearing by the IBP-CBD – both parties attend. The IBP-
CBD then directed both parties to submit position papers. Only the complainant complied. The IBP-CBD recommend
the respondent be disbarred and his name stricken from the Roll of Attorneys. The IBP-BOG adopted and approved
the IBP-CBD’s report.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondent be administratively disciplined based on the allegations in the complaint
and evidence on record?

HELD:

YES. Respondent violated Bar Matter No. 850. The Lawyer’s Oath in Rule 138, Section 3 of the Rules of
Court requires commitment to obeying laws and legal orders, doing no falsehood, and acting with fidelity
to both court and client, among others. A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land
and promote respect for law and legal processes (Canon 1), he shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct (Rule 1.01), he owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court (Canon
10), he shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court, nor shall he mislead, or allow
the court to be mislead by any artifice (Rule 10.01), he owes fidelity to the cause of his client and shall be
mindful of the trust and confidence reposed upon him (Canon 17), and he shall serve his client with
competence and diligence (Canon 18).
A.C. No. 10676, September 08, 2015
ATTY. ROY B. ECRAELA, Complainant, v. ATTY. IAN RAYMOND A. PANGALANGAN, Respondent.

Facts:
The complainant was Atty. Roy B. Ecraela and the respondent was Atty. Ian Raymond A. Pangalangan.
The complainant and the respondent were best friends and both graduated from UP College of Law in
1990. The respondent was formerly married to Shiela P. Jardiolin. The complainant stated that while the
respondent had series of adulterous and illicit relations with married and unmarried women from 1990 to
2007, including the complainant’s wife. The complainant also said that the Respondent attempted to bribe
the MIAA and received the car as a gift. The Respondent also abused his authority as an educator in
some schools where he induced his male students to engage in nocturnal preoccupation and entertained
romance with female students for passing grades. Furthermore, the respondent did not attend his
hearings.

Issue:
Whether or not the respondent committed gross immoral conduct which would warrant his disbarment.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court found the respondent to be guilty of gross immorality and violating the Section 2 of
Article XV of 1987 Constitution of the Philippines, Canon 1 and Rule 1.01, Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 and
Rule 10.1 of Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and also the Lawyer’s Oath. He is
hereby disbarred from the practice of Law and his name is ordered stricken from the Rolls of Attorney
effective immediately.
 
The 1987 Constitution, specifically Article XV. Section 2 thereof clearly provides that marriage, an
inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the state.
CANON 1 – A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND
PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.
Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
CANON 7 – A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE
LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.
Rule 7.03 – A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor
shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession.
CANON 10 – A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT.
Rule 10.01 – A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he
mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.
Rule 10.03 – A lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure and shall not misuse them to defeat the ends
of justice.

The Lawyer’s Oath

I,__________ , do solemnly swear that I will maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines; [will
support its Constitution and obey laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities
therein; 1 will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any court; I will not wittingly nor willingly
promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, or give aid nor consent to the same; I will delay no
man for money or malice, and will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and
discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to my clients; and I impose upon myself this
voluntary obligations without any menial reservation or purpose of evasion. So help me God.

ESTRADA vs. SANDIGANBAYAN G.R. No. 159486-88. November 25, 2003 Partisan Political Activities
OCTOBER 30, 2017
 
FACTS:
Atty. Alan F. Paguia, speaking for petitioner, Joseph Ejercito Estrada claims of political partisanship against the
members of the Court, asserting that the justices have violated Rule 5.10 of the Code of Judicial Conduct which
prohibits justices or judges from participating in any partisan political activity by attending the ‘EDSA 2 Rally’ and by
authorizing the assumption of Vice-President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo to the Presidency in violation of the 1987
Constitution. Petitioner contends that the justices have thereby prejudged a case that would assail the legality of the
act taken by President Arroyo.
Sandiganbayan issued an order denying the foregoing motion, as well as the motion to dismiss, filed by petitioner.
Forthwith, petitioner filed a ‘Mosyong Pangrekonsiderasyon’ of the foregoing order.
 
ISSUE:
Was the act of the Chief Justice in swearing into office PGMA in EDSA a partisan political activity?
 
RULING:
No. The claim of the petitioner is of no merit. It should be clear that the phrase “partisan political activities,” in its
statutory context, relates to acts designed to cause the success or the defeat of a particular candidate or candidates
who have filed certificates of candidacy to a public office in an election. The taking of an oath of office by any
incoming President of the Republic before the Chief Justice of the Philippines is a traditional official function of the
Highest Magistrate. The assailed presence of other justices of the Court at such an event could be no different from
their appearance in such other official functions as attending the Annual State of the Nation Address by the President
of the Philippines before the Legislative Department.
Kupers v. Hontanosas A.C. No. 5704, May 8, 2009
Facts:  Complainant claimed that as counsel for Hans and Vivian Busse, respondent had prepared a
memorandum of agreement and a contract of lease between the spouses Busse and Hochstrasser, a
Swiss national. Under said agreement, Hochstrasser would lease Vivian Busse’s property in Alcoy, Cebu
for fifty (50) years, renewable for another fifty (50) years. Complainant added that respondent had acted
despite conflict of interest on his part since the Spouses Busse and Hochstrasser were both his clients.
Respondent prepared a similar agreement and lease contract between the spouses Busse and Karl
Emberger, a Swiss national, over another parcel of land in Alcoy, Cebu. This time the lease contract was
for a period of forty nine (49) years renewable for another forty nine (49) years. All four (4) documents
were notarized by respondent. It was also averred that respondent drafted two deeds of sale over the
leased properties of Spouses Busse to Naomie Melchior, a Filipina, and Karl Novak, a German National.
The Commissioner found that respondent had prepared and notarized contracts that violated Presidential
Decree No. 471 (P.D. No. 471) since leases of private lands by aliens cannot exceed twenty five (25)
years, renewable for another twenty five (25) years. Nonetheless, complainant failed to prove the other
charges he had hurled against respondent as the former was not privy to the agreements between
respondent and the latter’s clients. Moreover, complainant failed to present any concrete proof of the
other charges. The commissioner recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law
for two (2) months. Upon review, the IBP Board of Governors disregarded the recommendation of the
commissioner and dismissed the complaint. The Board of Governors ratiocinated that suspension was not
warranted since respondent did not really perform an illegal act. The act was not illegal per se since the
lease agreement was likely made to reflect the agreement among the parties without considering the
legality of the situation. While admittedly respondent may be guilty of ignorance of the law or plain
negligence, the Board dismissed the complaint out of compassion.

Issue: Whether the Lawyer’s committed a violation of this oath and the Code of Professional
Responsibility?

Held: Yes, the court stressed that much is demanded from those who engage in the practice of law
because they have a duty not only to their clients, but also to the court, to the bar, and to the public. The
lawyer’s diligence and dedication to his work and profession ideally should not only promote the interests
of his clients. A lawyer has the duty to attain the ends of justice by maintaining respect for the legal
profession. The administrative cases against lawyers are sui generes and as such the complainant in the
case need not be the aggrieved party. Thus even if complainant is not a party to the contracts, the charge
of drafting and notarizing contracts in contravention of law holds weight. A plain reading of these contracts
clearly shows that they violate the law limiting lease of private lands to aliens for a period of twenty five
(25) years renewable for another twenty five (25) years. In preparing and notarizing the illegal lease
contracts, respondent violated the Attorney’s Oath and several canons of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. One of the foremost sworn duties of an attorney-at-law is to “obey the laws of the
Philippines.” This duty is enshrined in the Attorney’s Oath16 and in Canon 1, which provides that “(a)
lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal
processes.” Rule 1.02 under Canon 1 states: “A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at
defiance of the law or at decreasing confidence in the legal systems.”
The other canons of professional responsibility which respondent transgressed are the following:
Canon 15 – a lawyer shall observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and transactions with
his clients.
Rule 15.07- a lawyer shall impress upon his client compliance with the laws and the principles of
hairness.
Canon 17 – a lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and
confidence reposed in him.
CASTANEDA V. AGO

Facts:
Castaneda filed a replevin suit against Ago to recover certain machineries. Judgment was rendered in favor of Castaneda.
Levy was made to Ago’s house. Writ of possession of Ago’s house was also issued in favor of Castaneda. Ago filed a writ of
preliminary injunction against the writ of possession and sale of his house based on the fact that his wife wasn’t impleaded and the
house was part of their conjugal partnership. (Apparently they only set up this defense after a lot of motions and delays. Hence this
cause of action is already barred by laches. The case has been going on for 14 years already)

Issue:

Held:
The Court condemns the attitude of the respondents and their counsel who, far from viewing courts as sanctuaries for those
who seek justice, have tried to use them to subvert the very ends of justice.
Forgetting his sacred mission as a sworn public servant and his exalted position as an officer of the court, Atty. Luison has allowed
himself to become an instigator of controversy and a predator of conflict instead of a mediator for concord and a conciliator for
compromise, a virtuoso of technicality in the conduct of litigation instead of a true exponent of the primacy of truth and moral
justice.
A counsel's assertiveness in espousing with candour and honesty his client's cause must be encouraged and is to be
commended; what we do not and cannot countenance is a lawyer's insistence despite the patent futility of his client's position, as in
the case at bar.
It is the duty of a counsel to advise his client, ordinarily a layman to the intricacies and vagaries of the law, on the merit or
lack of merit of his case. If he finds that his client's cause is defenseless, then it is his bounden duty to advise the latter to acquiesce
and submit, rather than traverse the incontrovertible. A lawyer must resist the whims and caprices of his client, and temper his
clients propensity to litigate. A lawyer's oath to uphold the cause of justice is superior to his duty to his client; its primacy is
indisputable.